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Eliot A. Cohen is the Arleigh Burke chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His latest book is The Strategist: How to Think About War and Politics.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Eliot Cohen discuss what genuine strategic thinking requires, why America’s war with Iran represents a failure of strategy rather than of military capability, and what Winston Churchill’s wartime memoranda reveal about what good strategy actually looks like.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Why is this term “strategy,” which people throw around in all kinds of contexts, often very loosely, actually very important if you’re trying to understand the world, and if you’re using it rigorously?
Eliot Cohen: Well, I think you have to go back to the origins of the word, which come from the Greek, strategos, general. We live in an age of war. I suppose that’s really my central point. I begin the book by saying you undoubtedly live in a state that may be at war, or whose borders have certainly been shaped by war. That’s true of pretty much all of us. And strategy is at the heart of what war is all about. I think what’s happened is that the word “strategy” has gotten so diluted, and the considerations of it really so bloated, that people have in some ways lost the ability to think about it. So what I wanted to do was to write a book, a relatively brief book, that would not be a massive tome, to try to focus people on the original meaning of the word. Because if there’s one thing particularly Americans have learned, but plenty of others have as well, you can have the most advanced weapons, you can have very professional and skilled soldiers, you can have perfectly sound tactics, and you can still fail. The reasons for the failure are at the level of strategy, usually not at the other levels of tactics and so forth.
Mounk: Perhaps I’ll start with that, and we might be able to come back to it, because I want to get into some of the interesting, meaty theoretical concepts in your book. But what’s striking about the Iran war at the moment is that America continues to be militarily supreme compared to any of its competitors—certainly compared to any of the competitors that have been fighting in the Iranian theater. China may be catching up to the United States on various military metrics, but China’s not directly involved in this war. And yet, despite the fact that very few American soldiers have died, America has superior planes, superior operations, is able to carry out these very impressive, technologically sophisticated operations—this looks like one of the biggest humiliations for the United States in a long time, and it comes after other humiliations, from the Iraq War to the Vietnam War and so on. So, should we lay the fault for all of that at the feet of strategy? Is it Trump’s total lack of strategy going into this war which explains this?
Cohen: The fact that American installations suffered as much damage as they did, that American aircraft suffered as much damage on the ground as they did—that is really more of a kind of military-technical result of people failing to take precautions which, in some ways, you just can’t understand. And there are operational failures here too. But it does seem to me that the big failures have really been at the strategic level, in a whole bunch of ways. Failing, I think, to operate within a real strategic context. The Trump administration goes into this war having alienated almost all of our allies, when actually you really do need their support if you’re going to be in this conflict. It goes in, I think, failing to understand the Iranian regime—I’m not sure even now that it does. I think it’s failing to have thought through what are the means it can really bring to bear to achieve what it wants, and really without having a clear—what I call—a theory of victory, an explanation for how all this is supposed to work. Now, you could have had a much better strategic approach to the war, and that doesn’t necessarily mean that you succeed, but you have a much better chance.
I guess I would also just say, on the Iran war specifically, we still don’t know what the final outcome is. I do think a lot of people have been surprised by the way in which Trump has not simply walked away from it, which many friends of mine who share a similar view of the president that I do really expected—that he would, in the now-stock phrase, “chicken out.” He hasn’t quite, which is an interesting thing. So the end of the story has not been written. But yeah, I would say fundamentally, the major missteps that we’ve seen are very much strategic missteps.
Mounk: I wrote an ill-timed article back in January arguing that Trump doesn’t have a doctrine, but he has a playbook. And the playbook is that he goes for these rapid strikes, spectacular actions, that don’t risk many American lives, don’t cost a lot of money, and by the time people wake up, it’s kind of over. Very true for the first round of strikes against Iran, and very true, of course, for the spectacular capture of Nicolás Maduro. It’s very much not true for this. So the question is, why is that? Now, I think I’m going to slightly defend my ill-timed article and say I think they believed it would be similar. They believed they had a plan that’s very similar to Venezuela, where they’re going to go in, use massive force, and decapitate the Iranian regime. They seem to have believed they had some kind of deal with Ahmadinejad, who was going to be able to go in and take over in the same way that Delcy Rodríguez had taken over in Venezuela. Presumably they thought, if it somehow doesn’t work, we just retreat—we’ve destroyed a bunch of Iranian facilities and planes, and that’s the end of it. But they don’t seem to have reckoned with the Iranian ability to close the Strait of Hormuz. Now, ironically, Trump is in the same situation that he has repeatedly criticized George W. Bush for, which is to get into a war for which you don’t have an exit plan.
Cohen: I would say I mostly agree with that, but not entirely. Let me spell out—well, first, I would say I agree that he does not have a deep understanding of military affairs, and I do think the Venezuela episode influenced how he thinks about this. There have been other cases like that too—the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in the first administration; he actually has a record there. What are some of the things that are different, though? I think one is his antipathy to the regime is qualitatively different than his attitude to just about any other country on earth. Part of that is for the rather simple reason that they have tried to kill him. Even now they’re threatening not just to kill him but members of his family. People do take that kind of thing personally.
Mounk: Of all the different strange things that Donald Trump takes personally, this seems like a very reasonable one.
Cohen: Yeah, I was going to say—I think even you or I would really take it personally. I think he does take the nuclear dimension quite seriously as well. What’s the reason for that? I suspect that, with Trump, a lot of his basic views of politics were formed in the eighties, roughly the early eighties. He thinks of that regime in particular in that framework, and they were a particularly threatening kind of regime when they were first created. That’s one thing—his view of them is different. I think the second thing, though, that is surprising—if he simply followed that playbook, it would be the “TACO” bet. “Trump Always Chickens Out,” which I tend to modify as “Trump Always Chickens Out Sometimes,” which makes it a little bit less useful.
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What they’ve decided to do instead is to maintain a distant blockade of Iran, which has been successful—a return to a very intense sanctions regime, and doing things quietly which enable a fair amount of oil to get out through the Strait of Hormuz. I was just looking at the news today, and people are saying somewhere between ten and twelve million barrels—it fluctuates down from seventeen million, but that’s not zero. He’s adopted a military course of action which is different from the one that one might have expected. What I think they certainly didn’t expect, though, is that this war would begin to expand in the way that it has, particularly with the Houthi successes in Yemen, and the Iranian connection there. He’s not a strategic thinker, he’s not a geopolitical thinker really, and I think they’re finding themselves surprised on that score. On this one, I think he has departed somewhat from the playbook.
Mounk: I agree with you. I think there’s a way you can make that argument less awfully wrong than it seems on a superficial reading. I think fundamentally it’s true that this goes against a lot of the other things he said. He said in his second inaugural, “I want to be measured by the wars I don’t start.” It’s striking—it’s really a strange irony—that he rose to prominence in good part by beating up on his Republican predecessor, George W. Bush, as well as, of course, by his nativist attacks on Barack Obama. Now he is facing a terrible shellacking in his second-term midterms, about to be a huge lame duck, and a big part of the reason for that is an unpopular war of choice. I think those wars have different contexts, and I don’t want to equate them, but it is really a very strange echo of history—and particularly ironic, given how gleefully cruel he was to and about George W. Bush—that he has not emulated any of the better things about George W. Bush, but very much emulated some of the shortcomings of George W. Bush.
Cohen: Yeah, well, he’s not the only one who’s been cruel to George W. Bush. It is striking, and I think it does show—if I can use the word “seriousness” with reference to Donald Trump, which seems like a bit of a stretch—look, if he were really primarily concerned about the midterms above all else, he would have declared victory and gone home. Said, “We destroyed the nuclear program, obliterated it”—or “reobliterated” it, depending on your point of view—and disengaged. That really would have brought diesel prices down, I suspect. The markets would certainly have reacted to that if we’d said, “Okay, no more violence in the Persian Gulf.” He hasn’t done that. On the other hand, I think you’re right that part of his self-conception is that he’s the only guy who can settle wars, and that accounts for two fits of vituperation: one against Volodymyr Zelensky, which is really pernicious and unwarranted, and the other against the hapless Norwegians on the Nobel Prize Committee, who he went after for not giving him the Nobel Prize. I think that is because he’s dealing with that sort of internal, psychic conflict between his ideal self, I suppose, in which he sees himself as the dealmaker, peacemaker, and the real world, in which he’s conducting a war which has expanded and could expand further.
Mounk: That’s fascinating. His obsession with winning the Nobel Peace Prize is itself a fascinating psychological case study. I think it’s partially that he has this very strange competition with Barack Obama, and he can’t brook the idea that Obama won the Peace Prize, of course, hugely prematurely and strangely—but Obama did, and he himself is not going to. I want to go into some of the deeper concepts in the book, and then perhaps we can come back to some of those more contemporary questions about strategy and other things. What does it look like to have a good strategy when you go to war? What does that tell us about some of the failures that we’ve seen in recent American military history?
Cohen: In the book, as people always ask, “So what does good look like?”—it’s one thing to be critical—I try to give an example. What I do is I take the memoranda that Winston Churchill wrote as he’s sailing across the Atlantic, immediately after Pearl Harbor, to meet with Franklin Roosevelt. I say, this is as good as it gets. He’s been prime minister for a couple of years, since May of 1940. He has all of his subordinates around him. He has eight days with no distractions. He has been at the top of the British government for a very long time, and he’s a very, very distinguished military historian. What I do is I go through these memoranda and I talk about what they tell us about how good it is possible to be—because he gets some things very right and some things very wrong.
I would say that some of the qualities that made him as effective as he was—and I believe he was effective—was, first, a certain quality of empathy. Empathy not with his allies, because the memoranda are very artfully crafted to try to avoid irritating the Americans while still trying to get them to do what he wanted. Empathy with the enemy, actually—I think he understood Hitler far better than Hitler understood him. There is a kind of intellectual humility in that he fully acknowledges the limits of how far ahead you can see, but in his very characteristic way he says, “Look, we have to have some sort of unifying theme for how the war is going to be brought to an end.” That’s something that crops up actually in a lot of his writings, including a wonderful little book that he wrote about painting, of all things, which he actually compares to waging military campaigns—I suppose that’s typical. The other thing is a profound realism. He’s very clear about what you can and cannot foresee in war, and he understands that you’re going to have to adjust. On the one hand, you have to have a big idea that you’re trying to pursue. On the other hand, you have to be able to adjust.
The very last thing I would say, which doesn’t really figure in the memos per se, although it emerges very quickly thereafter—I think people sometimes have the idea that strategy is about big ideas, that it’s almost an academic discipline. Of course it’s not. It’s overwhelmingly about implementation. Some of the most important things that happen—and I think Churchill wanted to see this happen when he sailed over there—are things which sound very mundane, like setting up the right array of committees, setting up a Combined Chiefs of Staff, which is quite extraordinary, where you have very, very senior British military leaders, beginning with the guy who had been the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, sitting in Washington with the American Chiefs of Staff and doing a vast array of other things. He thought about implementation, and not just about the big ideas. I think that’s really particularly important for those of us who are not in government, or not in positions of responsibility, to remember—it’s an absolutely essential part of strategy.
Mounk: In your answer, you started to hint at the importance of a series of questions that you think we should ask. Perhaps I can go through them with you very quickly. I’ll ask you to be brief in your responses. The first one is: what else is going on? What is the broader context of what’s happening here? Why is that the starting point?
Cohen: Because no war occurs in a vacuum. I mentioned earlier that one of the mistakes I think the Trump administration made was going into the Iran war with allies who were deeply mistrustful, who had resources that we absolutely needed. Frequently, an action that might make sense if you were simply confronting an opponent alone does not make sense if you’re thinking about what some of the larger repercussions might be. I give a number of historical examples of how that happens. First, you have to look big. The problem is, when you’re thinking about war, you tend to look narrow—you tend to look very much at your immediate opponent.
Mounk: Another example might be that the Trump administration underestimated the progress of the Houthis in Yemen, and therefore that there’s going to be a kind of simultaneous blockage on two sides. Lots of examples of that. The other thing you hinted at is that Churchill, going forward, had a much better understanding of Hitler than Hitler had of Churchill. The question of “who are those guys?”—that seems like an obvious thing, but you want to understand the person you’re fighting against.
Cohen: I should explain where that comes from. It’s a movie from the late sixties called Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid—a wonderful movie with Paul Newman and Robert Redford. It’s a movie about a pair of train robbers at the end of the Wild West. What happens is, they rob a train and they’re relieving everybody of their wallets, and all of a sudden a boxcar opens and half a dozen men on horseback leap out and begin pursuing them. There’s a great chase scene that then ensues—they’re doing all the usual things, jumping over canyons and doubling back and forth through gulches and creeks and so forth, and they can’t throw them off the track. At one point Paul Newman turns to Robert Redford and says, “Who are those guys?” That becomes a motif in the movie.
It’s actually a profound question, because if you think about it, they know exactly how many there are, they know what kind of weapons they carry, they probably can even tell the breed of the horses. What they don’t understand is why are these guys so skilled, why are they so persistent, why are they motivated differently than the other people who’ve tried to pursue them. The point I’m making here is that the way intelligence organizations in particular function—but the way all of us do—is we tend to count things. We take out the IISS Military Balance, we count up the number of tanks and planes and so forth. Where we make our biggest misjudgments is in that “who are those guys?” area, where you’re trying to figure out what motivates them, how big are their ambitions, a whole array of problems. People consistently fail at that. Vladimir Putin clearly failed at that in assessing the Ukrainians. Just as people who were interested from the outside—Americans, the American government—profoundly misunderstood who the Ukrainians were, and indeed are the Russians. The Israelis failed, I think, to understand who Yahya Sinwar was, and that’s even though he was in one of their prisons for ten years, interrogated by experts. It’s a very, very difficult question to get at. I think it’s actually one of the most important.
Mounk: Is one of the dangers that people structurally misunderstand democracies? When you look at a dictatorship, you can underestimate how coherent it is, or at least how much willpower the ruling clique has. I think that’s clearly part of what happened in the Iran war—that the United States fought believing that if they could decapitate a couple of the leaders, the country would sort of give in, and clearly the Revolutionary Guards are a much more cohesive ruling force of the country than Trump seems to have believed. Authoritarians tend to radiate strength, right? There’s a strongman at the top, and there’s a lot of propaganda to make that person look very determined and in control, and any splits in the regime are very hard to see from the outside. On the other hand, in democracies, you always have the opposition criticizing the government and citizens voicing their displeasure and their anger. Outsiders might often be tempted to think, “The United States, Ukraine, whatever—they’re not really going to fight, look at all their divisions, look at how weak they are.” In a way, that might be to the benefit of democracies, because they turn out to be stronger than the opponents believe, and that’s a good thing. Of course it also invites aggression, because outside countries might think that they can conquer them and subdue them more easily than is in fact true. Something about this open public sphere that is a feature of democracy might make it harder to deter enemies.
Cohen: I think that’s right. I think the problem is even more extensive. I don’t disagree with what you’ve said. I think, in general, it is very difficult to understand people who are in a profoundly different place culturally, civilizationally, politically. For example, I think modern secularists—we’re the people who populate most Western governments—find it very hard to understand religious motivation for war. It’s one of the reasons why we wrestled throughout everything after 9/11 with “who really is the enemy, and why are they doing the things that they’re doing?” By the way, I think this applies to the Iran war. I think democrats don’t fully understand dictators, and dictators don’t fully understand democrats either. Then there’s another phenomenon, which is: things change, people change, societies change. One of the things I talk about in the book are some of the things you can take away from cognitive psychology. One of them is the phenomenon of anchoring, where if you’ve seen something that’s very dramatic, that really sticks out, even if you kind of acknowledge things have changed a little, you can’t really acknowledge that they’ve changed a lot.
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This is a classic mistake. I think of the Germans in World War II, at the beginning of the invasion of the Soviet Union—Hitler and his generals, not just Hitler but his generals very much, who were still a somewhat different group of people—they looked at the Soviet performance in the Winter War and they said, “Okay, maybe they’ll be a little bit better up against us, but not enough to make a real difference.” Similarly, I think with Ukraine, people anchored on 2014. They didn’t understand that, actually, in the eight years between 2014—first, 2014 was a bit different than people thought at the time, but in the interval between the Russian seizure of Crimea and then a large part of Donbas, and eight years later, a lot of things had changed. Then there are the circumstances—the Russian seizure of Crimea was one thing; the Russian attempt to occupy the whole country and massacre lots of people, that was a different thing. I think most of us kind of stumble around in a bit of a fog, almost no matter where we’re from. Just one last thing on that: everybody, of course, has heard of the famous Chinese general who’s also a philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, who put a great deal of emphasis on understanding one’s enemy. The point that always has to be made is that he’s operating from a world in which it’s rival kingdoms within the same civilizational structure who are fighting each other. The barriers to understanding are a lot lower than they are in our world. We’re actually, I would argue, despite the information revolution, a lot higher than they were for Sun Tzu a couple of millennia ago.
Mounk: That’s a great gloss on that famous line by Sun Tzu, that the most important thing is to understand your enemy. The third question you ask is: what is your objective? That seems obvious—you want to win a war. Why is that an important question, and what are examples of people getting that question wrong?
Cohen: Sure. I’m a good Clausewitzian, and I believe that the strategic approach to war is thinking about war as the use of military means to serve the ends of policy.
Mounk: That’s a very famous phrase, and I feel like people throw it around, but probably few people who listen to this actually read Clausewitz. Even though I know I have a particularly erudite listenership, I feel like Clausewitz is a constant reference, but unless you’re a military historian or a military strategist, I don’t know how many people have actually read Clausewitz. What’s the alternative to that point of view? When you say that war is politics through other means—how does that distinguish itself from other ways people have thought of warfare, or other ways we might pose that question?
Cohen: I think it is a very famous phrase. The first thing that everybody should think, before they quote that phrase, whether they’ve read On War or not, is that this is not how we normally think about war. We think about it as tragedy, we think about it as divine punishment, we think about it as a hideous accident. Some people think of it as just kind of a bloody sport. There’s a wide range of ways in which we think about war, and most of the time we do not think about war as an instrument of policy. The second thing I would say about that—first you have to just step back and say, “Wow, that’s a different way of thinking about war than I’m used to.” The central point, which it seems to me is often lost on people, is: if war is indeed the use of military means to serve the ends of policy, well, the ends of policy are, by definition, political, and politics always changes.
I taught for a number of years at the Naval War College, and I know the officers would always be frustrated that the civilians just didn’t give you a bunch of clear-cut objectives and then get out of the way and let you go off and win the war. That’s not the way it works. If you take the example which people frequently cite as the classic case of somebody who did it right, it would be George H. W. Bush in the first Gulf War, who very famously set four objectives for the U.S. military. When people have brought that up, I’ve always asked, “Can you name those four objectives?” Of course they can’t. They just know that he had four objectives, which were one sentence each. Here’s the problem. The first objective was to ensure the safety and security of American citizens in the Gulf—an objective articulated when Saddam Hussein was still holding American hostages. They were released before we began hostilities. By going to war, all you were doing was endangering those American citizens—in the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—who were about to go into combat. The second objective was to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait. That was a very concrete objective, which ended up being achieved. The third objective was to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait, which is an interesting concept, given that it’s a hereditary monarchy and represents maybe a quarter of the people who live there. The fourth objective was to ensure the safety and security of the Persian Gulf—that speaks for itself as a fuzzy objective. In fact, there were unstated objectives: the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the elimination of the nuclear program. Then there were follow-on objectives which nobody anticipated, which is: at the end of the war, protecting Shia Muslim Arabs in the south from annihilation by a rather vengeful Saddam Hussein. You begin to have air patrols over southern Iraq and over northern Iraq, to protect the Kurds and so on. Objectives change.
Or to take another World War II example: Britain goes to war in September 1939, at least nominally, to defend Poland. By 1945, despite the fact that Polish soldiers had fought valiantly in Italy and in France, as well as in the Royal Air Force and alongside the Royal Navy, Polish contingents were prohibited from marching in the victory parade in London. That’s because, basically, Poland had been consigned to the Soviet sphere of influence. The point is, objectives will change. The challenge for strategists, with all these questions—what I try to say is the questions are very simple, the answers are much more complicated and more difficult than anybody can imagine. The problem is that even in the course of a war, you have to be periodically reconsidering what your objectives really are, including those objectives that you may not be able to publicly disclose, but are nonetheless quite real.
Mounk: Once you’ve figured out what the situation is, you have an understanding of your enemy, and you’ve actually defined what it is that you’re trying to do—even if you might have to update your understanding of that as the war goes on—you obviously have to think about how on earth you achieve those goals. What are the means of doing that?
Cohen: That question, what are the means—again, it may seem quite straightforward, but it usually isn’t, for a bunch of reasons. One, when you look at the technical kinds of considerations, almost everybody goes to war with things that they’ve never really used before, or on a scale or in a way that they’ve never used before. It’s not nearly as clear as you might think.
There’s another dimension of understanding the means that you bring to bear, and that’s the organizations themselves. I talk in the book a bit about my own experiences, and this is actually one area where I think I fell short. I didn’t understand how reluctant and, in some ways, unable we would be to successfully wage counterinsurgent campaigns in Iraq from 2003 onwards. The United States military is a very adaptive military, so I think by the end it actually got to be quite effective. That is one aspect of thinking about the means that you bring to bear.
Mounk: The idea being here that at the beginning the thinking was, well, the means is just: we go in, we push back the Iraqi forces, we enter Baghdad, and that’s the end of it. It turned out that in order to achieve your objectives you needed means that go well beyond that.
Cohen: One was actually a sort of nonviolent means, which was military government—something the United States has done in a number of wars, which we were not prepared for. When it became clear that we were up against an insurgency, it also became clear that this is something the U.S. military had not been thinking about. I actually conducted a study for the Defense Policy Board on our counterinsurgency doctrine and was pretty appalled to realize that the manuals all dated back to Vietnam. Whatever was going on in Iraq, it wasn’t like fighting the Viet Cong.
Mounk: In a way, each of the steps you’ve described so far involves setting priorities, but you have, as a separate kind of question, what is the priority? How do you sharpen that point?
Cohen: It’s an issue that Americans have tended not to think about as much, particularly in the Cold War period, because we’ve been so wealthy and have had such a surplus of power. One of the most difficult things I think politicians find as they lead a country into war is saying, we’re going to say that some things are much more important than others. They’ll usually try to find somewhat evasive ways of putting it.
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Going into World War II, actually, I think the British in particular—but we also—did a much better job of that. In terms of what kind of forces we were going to develop, one of the biggest strategic decisions ended up being the United States’ deciding to build an army of ninety divisions, which is still a pretty huge army. The original plan was well over two hundred, which would have been unsustainable, and would have prevented us from developing the air forces that we did, which were in many ways decisive. Another priority decision, which was in retrospect the right one, came about a year into the war in Korea—1951, early ‘52—when the Joint Chiefs of Staff said we’re going to cap the troop levels in Korea because the Cold War is now really on, and we have to build up in Europe. They made those kinds of choices.
To go back to Donald Trump, I’m not sure he fully understands that. I think he doesn’t fully accept that you really do have to assign different priorities, and that that will be extremely difficult. The administration comes in thinking, “We’ll just focus on China,” and then they realize they can’t quite do that. They’re not able to do that as well as they should.
The related question, which is the next question, is about sequencing. What do you do first and what do you do second? A number of different issues there. The one I would just highlight is what social scientists like to call path dependence—that once you’ve made one choice, you’ve actually foreclosed others. Politicians in particular, I think, really don’t like that idea. The example, again a World War II example: President Roosevelt understood it was very important to have American forces in action in Europe within the year of Pearl Harbor, to keep the American people committed to a Germany-first strategy, given that for us the war began in the Pacific. He didn’t fully understand that by doing that, he was foreclosing the possibility of invading France in 1943. So we did it in 1944 instead.
The very last question that I talk about is the theory of victory, which I mentioned a little bit earlier—why do we think what we’re doing is going to get us what we want? Again, these all seem like very simple-minded questions. Just drawing on some personal experience: when I was the counselor of the State Department, I would spend a lot of time representing the State at meetings in the Situation Room about Afghanistan and Iraq. There were a lot of very important, consequential decisions—do we send an additional brigade combat team, or another $400 million worth of aid, or build out some provincial reconstruction teams. Almost never did anybody ask—this ended up being partly my job—why do we think doing those things will get us to the place that we want to be. It’s certainly a disturbing question to ask, because the future is murky. It’s a question that you do periodically have to ask. I think you have to ask it right now about Iran. What is the theory of victory? I think it’s either regime collapse, or that there is just so much societal pain that the Iranian government pulls back. I think that second possibility is actually rather limited, because I think the people in charge don’t particularly care about how much suffering the society goes through. We may be stuck with a theory of victory that is not particularly promising.
Mounk: Let me stick with that for a moment and then go to the broader questions. If you’re saying the only really realistic theory of victory is still effective regime change in Iran, and it doesn’t look like we’re about to get regime change in Iran—I certainly would be very happy to see the theocratic regime of Iran collapse, or now I guess it’s some weird mixture between a theocratic regime and just a kind of military junta of the Revolutionary Guard—but if we’re saying that is unlikely to happen, don’t we need to have some other theory of victory, or at least some other theory of ceasefire, some way of securing the Strait of Hormuz with a lasting agreement, or some other way of bringing this war to a close? It sounds to me like you’re advocating for a kind of indefinite war in which we don’t actually have a very clear strategy about how to achieve victory, or really answer the other questions that you’ve just outlined so clearly.
Cohen: Unfortunately, I think that is where we are. One thing I should have said at the very outset—it makes a big difference in terms of how you think about strategy—if you ask the question, when did the war begin? Because that helps you understand the nature of the war. You can think of this as a war that began with the beginning of Operation Rising Lion, in the spring, or you can think of it as having begun before that, with Operation Midnight Hammer.
Or—and unfortunately I think this is closer to the truth—say that fundamentally we’re in the middle of a war that began around 1979, with a regime that is deep in its DNA hostile to the United States, determined to drive us out of the region and to destroy the state of Israel. That sounds very bleak, but unfortunately I think that’s the correct way to see it.
The way to think about this war is: what we’re doing is waging one campaign. There will be truces from time to time, but the opposition of interests, the intensity of the animosity on both sides, and the nature of the opposing objectives is such that it’s probably going to be a protracted war.
I would add one further thing to that—and the book, I have to say, does end on a somewhat bleak note. We’re entering a period, it seems to me, of rather long wars, which we haven’t known for a while. We like our wars—I think the German phrase is frisch und fröhlich—short and sharp. Who wants a long war? But I think unfortunately the world that we’re in is increasingly one of longer wars, in which societal endurance becomes the key, and partly as a result of that, societies again become targets of attack.
This was a phenomenon that I think we began to really see in the American Civil War. If you look at the evolution of the objectives of the North and the strategy of the North, it eventually becomes to break the will of the people of the South to continue to fight. I think you can argue it’s sort of the story of the World Wars, but if you look at the evolution of the Russia-Ukraine war—Russia’s clearly trying to break Ukrainian society in the most brutal possible way. The Ukrainians are trying to do something similar in a much less brutal way—blow up all the data centers and oil refineries, plus Wildberries, the equivalent of Amazon. It’s still going after societal resolve. I think that’s actually, in some ways, the true battleground that we’re going to be looking at.
Mounk: That’s an interesting, scary observation, especially given that there’s been this strange transformation of the war in Ukraine, in which the ground troops seem mired in a kind of World War One impasse. The Ukraine war has now lasted longer than World War One. The defensive capabilities on the ground seem to have a huge advantage over the offensive capabilities, and as a result very little territory changes hands. At the same time, the ability to inflict damage deep behind enemy lines has expanded. There’s a huge advantage to offensive capabilities in the air now because of drones and other technological innovations. It’s the case at the moment that neither Ukraine nor Russia is succeeding in making much progress on the ground. Yet Russia can obviously strike Kyiv and many other Ukrainian cities and inflict terrible suffering. But quite remarkably, Ukraine can also strike the outskirts of Moscow and attack those data centers and so on.
If you play that out, it does suggest huge vulnerability for civilian populations in these protracted conflicts. I want to go for one more beat and stay with your point about Iran, because I obviously agree that there has been deep hostility between Iran and the United States since 1979, and that that is largely the result of Iranian actions—the taking of American hostages, the deep hostility to the United States as well as Israel, the arming of all kinds of proxies and terrorist groups. But of course, for most of that time the war has not been a hot war. It has in some way been managed below the level of a hot war, and I worry that losing that distinction altogether potentially makes it harder for us to understand the choices we face, and the stakes of those decisions.
Certainly I think it’s very hard to imagine that, no matter who’s the next American president or what kind of change of mind Donald Trump might have, Americans and Iranians are going to come together around a table and figure out the terms on which they can be allies, let alone just mutually indifferent, coexisting nations, and the problem is solved. I think that would be very naive to believe. But surely there is still a difference between whether we’re going to continue being in a state of war for the next ten or five or two years, or whether we are able to find an exit from the war we are currently in—even if we will have to continue to deal with a deeply hostile Iran and a serious threat to the security of the region in those years.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Eliot discuss how the war in Iran is going and the causes of American military successes and failures. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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The war in Ukraine is spreading and, like quicksand, dragging in more and more countries. When the first missile fell on Poland in 2022, the world held its breath, waiting to see if NATO’s Article 5 would be triggered. Now, ships attacking off Romania and Bulgaria for two weeks straight, armed men crossing into Latvia from Belarus, and drones galore along the eastern border, generally do not even elicit a murmur. The more we try to contain this war, the further it spreads.
We got here in large part because Russia has worked out that Europe will keep playing by the rules, whatever Russia does. Its modus operandi is fairly simple: It uses the protections offered by the civilized Europe it detests so much, such as courts. Several Russian oligarchs have successfully argued their cases against sanctions in European courts. Russian money frozen in Europe is not being used to help Ukraine win for fear of (wait for it) Russia taking European countries to court! We have a rogue state attempting to massacre an entire nation on European soil, having broken the UN Charter and every rule of war, and we are worried about being sued. Russia discards its obligations but hangs on to those protections.
Comparisons with the eve of the Second World War are common. As the historian Timothy Snyder put it, we are now in 1938, but Czechoslovakia has decided to fight. So how do we make sure September 1, 1939 does not happen again?
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The answer lies in the prisoner’s dilemma, the best-known model in game theory. And no, this is not just another rallying cry against appeasement. It is about strategy, and about the fact that Europe is ignoring its most basic principles.
What Is The Prisoner’s Dilemma?In 1950, as the Cold War set in and both superpowers acquired nuclear weapons, mathematicians at the RAND Corporation devised a simple game to explore how two rivals with opposing goals and values could avoid destroying each other: the prisoner’s dilemma. Two accomplices, held in separate cells, can either cover for each other or rat each other out to the police. If both stay silent, both get a light sentence. If both betray each other, both get a severe one. But if one betrays the other while the other covers for him, the traitor walks free and the one who did not break faith bears the full punishment. Each is tempted to betray the other, yet if both do that, they both lose.
In 1980, the political scientist Robert Axelrod set out to discover what happens when this game is played not once, but over and over. He had computer programs play it against each other, 200 rounds at a time. In each round, a player could “cooperate” or “defect.”
The results were very simple. A player who always cooperates, facing an opponent who always defects, loses every round. The most successful strategy turned out to be never defecting first but instead answering every defection in kind. That shows defecting does not pay, and gives the opponent every reason to return to cooperation.
Let’s apply this to our world. In order for the 200-odd countries in the world to coexist without a common sovereign who could punish them, they have to follow rules that come down to two main principles: do not kill and do not steal. Each keeps to them on the understanding that everybody else will do the same. When one country does not abide by the rules that constrain the others, it gains an unfair advantage. That is exactly what Russia has been doing: disregarding the rules while counting on Europe to keep its promises, follow its procedures, and protect Russian rights, whatever Russia does.
For Europe, defecting would mean refusing to be a “sucker” who keeps granting Russia the protections of rules it has abandoned.
We Really Should Know BetterConsider the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the annexation of Austria in 1938, and the takeover of the Sudetenland and then the rest of Czechoslovakia. On every single occasion, Germany’s actions amounted to defection from agreements and customary international law. And in every single one of those cases, Britain, France, and the League of Nations played nice—or, in game terms, cooperated. This did not stop Germany; it only made it stronger.
Another great example of the prisoner’s dilemma in play is the Cold War. For almost half a century, global stability rested on the understanding that any attack would be answered in kind.
When the Cuban missile crisis struck in 1962, both sides escalated, Moscow first and Washington in response, until they realized that they would both lose. When one side returned to cooperation, the other did the same.
The starkest contrast is Finland and the Baltic states. In World War II, Russia did not annex Finland as it annexed the Baltic states. What made the difference was that when Russia sent its troops into Finland, the Finns fought back. As a result, Finland kept its independence (albeit limited) because it answered defection with defection, refusing to accept occupation, whereas the Baltics ended up in the prison of nations for 50-odd years, because they cooperated against defection.
If we look back at Russia’s actions and Europe’s responses, a certain pattern emerges.
Europe: SuckerThe first real post-Cold War example of defection by Russia was the 2008 invasion of Georgia. By and large, the international community cooperated: Russia did not lose anything as a result of this breach of rules. Indeed, in March 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with a large red button as a symbol of the Obama administration’s “reset” in relations with Russia.
Then came 2014: the annexation of Crimea, soldiers in eastern Ukraine, and the downing of MH17. Russia defected, and the West… imposed limited sanctions, agreed to build Nord Stream 2, forced Ukraine into two Minsk agreements, and wined and dined Putin while telling the President of Ukraine to just go away and comply with the rules. You could say the West cooperated with extreme prejudice.
After that, in 2022, came the full-scale invasion, and with it the destruction of Mariupol and Bucha, including the killing of tens of thousands of civilians, countless apartment buildings folding under a barrage of bombs, and civilians buried under the rubble or burning alive. Prisoners of war were tortured to death and bodies returned with vital organs missing. All illegal and outside any set of rules. Yet the West (back then this still included the United States) insisted that its response stay within the rules—and even well short of what the rules allowed—so as not to anger Russia. Russia kept defecting, and Europe and the United States kept cooperating.
Every single time, Russia defects. It has not cooperated even once. Whereas Europe has cooperated almost without fail, just as Moscow expects it to do.
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Holding oneself to a high standard in a cooperative environment is one thing. Doing it in a situation where it only feeds the crocodile that will eat you anyway is really stupid. Chickening out only makes you the victim, especially if the other side is rattling the nuclear saber.
It Wasn’t UsJust recently, Mikhail Zvinchuk, founder of the Russian propaganda outlet Rybar—identified by British and American authorities as a key player in Russian hybrid operations—was detained in Montenegro, a NATO country. Instead of swapping him for one of the multitudes of hostages Russia is holding, Montenegro just expelled him.
Poland has initiated a process of creating a “pre-war state,” which, in the absence of a full state of war, will allow it to act faster to defend against threats. Russia has been waging war on Europe for years, while Europe has remained bound by the rules of peace, which restrict its ability to exercise self-defence. Measures that would be illegal in peacetime become legitimate once a country admits it is under attack. A “pre-war state” could show the rest of Europe a way to bridge that gap.
And while we are at it, Europe should stop telling Russia the truth. Russia cheats anyhow, yet Europe continues to keep its word, every single time. Europe should start saying one thing and doing another, exactly as Russia does. This way Russia will not be able to plan ahead, because it will not know what Europe will do. Only then can Europe get a different response.
According to the entire body of international law, what Russia has done to Ukraine and its people is illegal. You cannot hide behind the same international law to let Russia get away scot-free just because it has nuclear weapons. If Russia wants to avail itself of legal protections, it first has to obey the rules. This is not rocket science. Either Russia is violating international law and has to pay for it, or we should just admit there is no international law. And in that case, Russia cannot use it to demand the protection of its state assets. Russia’s frozen assets should be used to fund Ukraine’s—and therefore Europe’s—defence.
Ultimately, none of this is new. The prisoner’s dilemma has been researched ad nauseam by political scientists and think tanks alike, applied to most major conflicts, and taught to all international relations students. The conclusions are clear: the side always cooperating against the side always defecting loses. Always. Yet Europe is behaving as if it has got a dispensation from a higher power, and this time it will be different. It won’t. If Europe wants Russia to start cooperating, it will need to learn the art of defection.
Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK. Born in the Baltics, with a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter, she writes and gives live commentary on European security and Russia.
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Supporters look toward Donald Trump at an election rally on October 14, 2026. (Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images.)The midterm elections are now less than three weeks away—and I think we’ve seen more than enough to conclude that, short of a systemic polling error on a scale surpassing anything we have seen before, Republicans are going to get their asses kicked.
Here’s what that means in practical terms: Democrats are almost certainly going to take control of the House of Representatives. They would have accomplished that this year in almost any scenario, but with Donald Trump’s approval in a slow-motion downward spiral, the generic ballot leaning more and more heavily in the direction of the Dems, and external indicators all looking bad for the incumbent party, such an outcome now looks like a lock.
The only question is how big of a blowout it will be. With the current GOP margin of control in the House already so narrow and so many districts uncompetitive, it likely won’t be as large as the swings we saw to the right in 1994 (54 seats) or 2010 (63 seats), or the swing we saw to the left in 2018 (41 seats). But the Dems only need three wins to take the majority, and they will easily get there and quite a bit more. Nate Silver’s “deluxe” prediction model gives a 93.4 percent chance of Democratic control of the House, with the most likely seat split being 239 to 196.
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In the Senate, things are more challenging—but not nearly as challenging as they seemed just a couple of months ago. It turns out that public opinion changes when the president initiates a war he can’t win and never made a compelling case for starting; gas and diesel prices surge; inflation rises; and interest rates shoot skyward. According to Silver’s aggregate tracking poll, Trump now sits at 37.5 percent, with his net approval languishing at an astonishing -22.3. (At this point in 2018, he was at -11.6, while Biden at the same point came in with -9.6.) The deluxe model now has the Democrats with just over a 74 percent chance of taking control of the Senate, with the most likely outcome a Dem majority of 52 to 48. Those are good odds, though nowhere near as good as the House. But as recently as last month, Silver’s Senate model had the odds exactly even, so there’s been a big swing in the direction of the Dems.
In other words, the election is the Democrats’ to lose.
Assuming that’s how things play out and the Democrats take control of both houses of Congress, what will that mean for the short- and medium-term future of the country?
The short answer, I’m afraid, is not much.
The political fact of our time is that ours is a populist era. In this era, electoral cycles work like this:
A right-populist figure or party runs against the liberal-centrist “establishment” or “the system”;
This right-populist figure or party wins power;
This right-populist figure or party becomes the new establishment, overreaches, and makes mistakes;
Representatives of the old liberal-centrist establishment run against this new establishment and defeat it;
The old establishment returns to power and misreads its mandate as an endorsement of a return to the old liberal-centrist ways rather than a narrower repudiation of the governing mistakes of the right-wing populists;
This sets up the right-populists to run and win another campaign against the liberal-centrist establishment;
Rinse and repeat.
In sum: Voters are unhappy. They reflexively recoil from whoever is currently running the show—whether the old establishment or the newish counter-establishment. This makes for unstable politics, and anyone who wins has a very narrow time horizon in which to do things before they get booted out of office.
Where that leaves us, I’m afraid, is pretty much where we’ve been for the past decade: Republicans elated and Dems demoralized in November 2016; Republicans shell-shocked and Dems ecstatic in November 2018 and 2020; Republicans thrilled and Dems reeling in 2024. If I were a betting man (I am not), I would put a decent amount of money on Democrats winning back the White House in 2028—and on Republicans winning it back again in 2032.
Some will call it crazy that I’m willing to say anything at all about a presidential election that won’t take place for six years. We don’t even know who will be president after November 2028!
Good point. But here’s the thing: I think there might be something about our world (whispered: it’s the digital networking effects of social media) that is giving our politics its populist shape. That might change. But we don’t know if it will, let alone when, so the responsible thing to do when thinking about the near-term future is to extrapolate from the present that began roughly a decade ago.
I don’t like this. I don’t think it’s good. In fact, I think it’s bad, even dangerous. But I don’t know how to stop it. Neither do I think it can be traced to institutional quirks of the American electoral system that can be fixed by reforms. The patterns I’ve noted here are happening around the democratic world, in both presidential and parliamentary systems. That’s why, however illuminating it can be to examine the continuities and discontinuities between Trump and America’s political past, such work will not give us a roadmap for getting us out of our populist cul-de-sac. Something bigger has placed us here. If we didn’t have Trump, we would have someone else—just as we will eventually have Trump’s successor joining the show.
Lurking behind my prognostication is a wild card that I feel needs mentioning: How Trump responds to a midterm drubbing. Does he accept it like a normal politician, pick himself up off the floor, and promise to keep fighting for the American people? We have no reason to expect that he will.
But that just raises another question: What does Trump do to express his rage and frustration at being a political loser? Does he just rant and rave on Truth Social, vaguely accusing the “Dumbocrats” of cheating? Or does he try to get results reversed and even push Republicans to refuse to seat the new Congress?
In other words, does he precipitate a constitutional crisis that threatens to drive American democracy itself off the road and into a ditch?
The only thing preventing the above scenario from unfolding in the worst possible way is precisely how the election shakes out. If the Dems underperform expectations and end up winning only narrow control of either chamber of Congress, and there is a path to “victory” by cheating, Trump is almost certain to try it, just as he did after his loss in 2020.
The most dramatic scenarios involve Trump listening to the advisors and allies urging him to declare a national-security emergency surrounding the elections, with the pretext that foreign powers have been interfering in the process or have access to voting machines. Versions of this involve Trump invoking the Insurrection Act to quell protests, impose martial law outside polling stations, seize voting machines, or send ICE onto the streets for the purposes of intimidation. Trump has repeatedly refused to rule out the national-security scenario, most recently on October 1. (It should be noted that none of the experts recently interviewed by The New York Times thought such scenarios were “very likely,” and only a few thought they were “moderately likely.”)
There are also plenty of ways in which Trump could pressure state election officials or Congress itself to refuse to certify results, or bog down close races in procedural battles such that several members are unable to sit on January 3. (Again, these scenarios are generally considered unlikely by experts, though the fact that they are under discussion at all shows how bad things have gotten.)
What’s more likely than any of this is that the Democrats’ win is so substantial that cheating won’t work. Trump will probably grudgingly accept the result while “merely” lying about it day and night for the rest of his life—just like he has done with 2020 ever since. Which is yet another reason to think that these midterm elections won’t change much about the fundamental realities of American political life right now.
Damon Linker, a contributing writer at Persuasion, writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.
This article is adapted from one that originally appeared in Notes from the Middleground.
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Vacant corporate office, 1996. (Photo by Con Keyes/Los Angeles Times.)As senior editor of a medical science journal, my job was to improve the readability of articles, liaise with authors, resolve content questions, and coordinate with production staff to publish the monthly issue. It was the sort of labor that Francis Fukuyama characterized as “white-collar work that involves symbolic manipulation.” But it also involved human skills, such as interpersonal communication, native linguistic ability, imaginative problem-solving and, as Samuel Johnson put it, “integrity of understanding and nicety of discernment.”
During my twenty-year tenure, the executive director and I elevated the production quality of the publication using the New England Journal of Medicine as a model. Our efforts took a while but proved successful. The journal grew in size, circulation, reputation, and relevance to clinicians. It gave me a sense of accomplishment to deliver a high-quality publication to an appreciative readership. And it felt good to make a living in a useful trade, specifically by bringing the latest musculoskeletal science to clinical practice.
Then, in 2021, the journal’s Board of Directors hired a new executive director, a tech enthusiast. In one of our first meetings with him, he requested that we get a bid from a Singapore-based AI-driven publishing platform, Straive. It didn’t set off any alarms at the time, because the journal’s Board of Directors reassured us when they hired him that they had no intention of outsourcing the journal’s production capacity, which had taken fifteen years to develop and had significantly driven its growth.
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However, two weeks after the bid came in, and a day after we closed the March 2022 issue, each member of the production staff was called into a Zoom meeting and told that their services would no longer be needed. I’d been there for twenty years, the production manager for fifteen, the copy editor for ten, and the layout and graphics artist for five. We were each offered a measly $1,000 in severance, conditional on our signing a confidentiality agreement and staying another month to assist with training the AI. We all forfeited the $1,000, refused to sign the confidentiality agreement, and declined their request to help train the AI.
The Board’s rationale for laying us off was straightforward: machines are less expensive and time-consuming than human beings. At our parting, my colleagues and I were given the trite reassurance that the decision was strictly about finances and not our performance. Later, we learned that a critical factor was a cost-cutting bonus in the contract of the new executive director, which incentivized the swapping of higher quality for lower expenses.
My co-workers scrambled to get jobs with other academic publishers. The copyeditor was the only one who landed a better job as senior editor at a psychiatry journal. The graphic artist landed a lower-paying job at a scholastic textbook publisher where she did “a bit of everything,” as opposed to what she did best. The production manager got a job that she “did not love” and was eventually laid off again. She has since been doing temp and contract work.
Since 9/11, U.S. intelligence personnel—from analysts and law enforcement agents to interrogators and case officers—have often endured a grisly task: studying execution videos filmed by al-Qaeda or the Islamic State to positively identify the executioners.
I was one such intelligence official. In 2006, I downloaded a photograph of a man killed with a headshot by a naval Special Mission Unit and showed it to every source of mine in Iraq. I needed to determine if the deceased was al-Qaeda’s emir for western al-Anbar, a terrorist who killed a young Marine lieutenant friend of mine.
Such responsibilities were unpleasant, but they were necessary. Often, they were an important way to secure justice. Detained senior al-Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, for example, was confirmed through forensic analysis of similar images as part of the group who murdered Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002.
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Nobody despises al-Qaeda more than the Americans who fought them. And no one is more reprehensible than Nidal Hasan, the man who betrayed our country, our armed forces, and his medical profession by murdering 13 and wounding 32 at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009. Last week, it was announced that Hasan will be executed in December. Hasan deserves the death penalty—if asked, I myself would join the firing squad.
Yet there is nothing necessary or justified about Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s proposal to livestream Hasan’s execution. As I know from experience, no healthy, sane person enjoys looking at an execution, or at another human’s dead body. To do so for the crass purpose of entertainment is even worse.
The United States ought to be more civilized than to do such a gruesome thing in 2026. No U.S. government has conducted a public judicial execution in 90 years, since the hanging of Rainey Bethea for rape and murder by the state of Kentucky in 1936. Since then, things have changed for the better. In five deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, I observed American service members treat enemy dead with respect. This norm held to the extent that Osama bin Laden was buried privately at sea after receiving Muslim funeral rites. Meanwhile, old soldiers recall videos of the dead bodies of slain Task Force Rangers in Somalia in 1993 being dragged through Mogadishu’s streets. “That’s them, not us,” we said at the time.
At least, that’s what we thought.
Aside from the ethics of making the execution public, what Secretary Hegseth proposes is illegal. Army Regulation 190-55, “Procedures for Military Executions,” sets out a limited list of categories of people permitted to witness an execution, which certainly does not include thousands or millions of people at home—potentially including children, who are among those barred from witnessing an execution. As such, any subordinate of Hegseth’s, from leaders of the Department of the Army down to the sergeants and enlisted men tasked with conducting the execution, would be right to refuse to obey the order. What’s more, public executions would almost certainly be interpreted by federal courts as violating contemporary understandings of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.
Livestreaming the execution would also serve to strengthen America’s enemies rather than diminish them. Terror groups use graphic images of death as propaganda for fundraising and recruitment, celebrating their victims’ murders or glorifying their members’ supposed martyrdom. Al-Qaeda will certainly use any video of Hasan’s death for this purpose.
Of course, reasonable people can disagree about the moral legitimacy of capital punishment. As a struggling and imperfect Catholic, I believe Saint Thomas Aquinas still had the better argument when he wrote in favor of it in 1265. But I can think of no Judeo-Christian argument for livestreaming executions—and plenty against. God forbid unhealthy men watch a “snuff film” such as that and discover that they like what they see.
Part of the problem is that Secretary Hegseth served honorably in the army, but he is not really of or from the army in a cultural sense. He never attended Airborne or Ranger School, yet he wears the distinctive unit insignia of the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment in his lapel, above an American flag disrespectfully used as a pocket handkerchief. He resigned his officer’s commission in 2021 and went on to bloviate on Fox & Friends as a faux combat stud. He published a book downplaying and even bragging about war crimes. His warrior rhetoric is a stick-on hairy chest and his proposed public execution is more like an adolescent’s effort to épater le bourgeois than a sober decision by a mature and sane defense secretary.
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Hegseth should take inspiration from General Douglas MacArthur, who deplored the fact that photographs of Nazi war criminals who were hanged at Nuremberg (or who committed suicide to avoid that fate) were made public. No such photos are easily available of the Japanese officials he hanged after the Tokyo war crimes tribunal. There’s little doubt what MacArthur would say from behind his pipe and aviator glasses about Hegseth’s proposal.
I once had to watch a streamed video of a source I recruited who was, years later, executed by al-Qaeda. A proud man, he died with uncommon dignity under awful circumstances. I remember feeling not just hatred towards an evil enemy for his murder, and grief at a good man’s death, but revulsion at terrorists publicly broadcasting such an act. There’s no moral equivalence between my source and Hasan, of course—but it’s unbelievable to me that my country now sophomorically proposes to do just what al-Qaeda did.
It’s too easy to say that Hegseth’s idea is “not who we are” as Americans. Unfortunately, the evidence points in another direction. A plurality of voters reelected President Trump, even after he mused about jailing his opponents and executing former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley for treason. Now, like immature College Republicans, senior officials like Hegseth are seeking to livestream military executions in a spirit of juvenile chest-thumping in order to “troll the libs.”
Perhaps it’s more accurate to say: “this is not who we ought to be.”
Colonel (ret.) Kevin Carroll, a national security lawyer, served as an army and reserve military intelligence officer.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our ongoing series on “Liberal Virtues and Values.”
The series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, will make the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms. If you haven’t already, please subscribe today to receive future instalments into your inbox!
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That liberal democracy is in a state of terminal decline I take to be beyond dispute. Like Alice in the rabbit hole, those of us who dwell in democratic societies suffer from a nauseating sense of falling without ever landing on solid ground. The usual suspects blamed for this tumble—populism, inequality, the economy—are mere surface symptoms of an internal breakdown. We have arrived at the conclusion of a world-historical cycle. Liberal democracy is the procedural embodiment of Enlightenment ideology—and after two centuries of dominance, that ideology has lost all purchase and stands utterly exhausted.
Radical alternatives confront us. Either we reorient our system to post-Enlightenment principles or we risk staggering into the nihilist’s paradise I have called the Endarkenment.
Enlightenment philosophers placed their faith in reason and science. These are purely critical disciplines: liberal propagandists wielded criticism like a scalpel to dissect conservative laggards and utopian revolutionaries alike. Once triumphant at the “end of history,” liberal democracy turned the knife on itself—a process of self-criticism and self-doubt that has shredded its own ideals to ribbons.
The positive values inherited from the Enlightenment—equality, individualism, compassion—were always parasitic on Christianity. But Christianity, like all religions, has no place in a universe ruled by reason and science. Nietzsche long ago brought us the troubling news: the Christian God is dead. Oblivious to the implications of this calamity, liberal democracy kept marching like a cartoon character over the edge of the abyss, until the laws of moral gravity asserted themselves. So began the Great Fall.
Criticism is a force for progress so long as there are blatant irrationalities, like slavery or Jim Crow discrimination, to overcome. But under the hammer of Enlightenment ideals, modern society has been flattened, centralized, and rationalized. Deprived of obvious superstitions to debunk and totalitarian rivals to defeat, liberal democracy has been revealed in all its internal contradictions.
One such contradiction, I contend, pits the cherished principle of equality against the chosen few who actually practice reason and science: let’s call this the problem of the elites.
A second contradiction finds freedom of the press and of opinion arrayed against the need to protect objective truth: call it the problem of information.
Finally, freedom of worship and the life of the spirit collide head-on with the materialist criticism favored by Enlightenment ideology: the problem of meaning.
Each of these contradictions could prove fatal to the democratic project, but none is insoluble, and the search for solutions offers an opportunity for renewal. While there are no guarantees, we could emerge from the crisis with a better understanding of the reach and limits of equality, a more transparent information sphere, and even, it may be, a rich infusion of the transcendental into everyday life.
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The Problem of the ElitesThe intellectual founders of the Enlightenment were deeply ambivalent about the relationship between the ruling elites and the public. On the one hand, the ideology was touted as a superior alternative to the old aristocracy of birth. Equality among citizens was literally God-given and “self-evident.” The grounds for equality, however, arose in the enchanted world of Christianity, a primary target of Enlightenment hostility and criticism. All of us were said to be “created” equal. Our rights and liberties were “endowed by our Creator”—or as the French would phrase it, “under the auspices of a Supreme Being.” That made equality universal and inalienable but also contingent on faith in a vanishing perspective.
At the same time, reason and science imposed a need for special training and produced specialized expertise which the masses lacked. The line between truth and superstition—a crucial distinction for the ideology—conformed to a class division between the enlightened few and the ignorant multitudes. For this reason, the framers of the Constitution feared the tyranny of the majority as much as that of ambitious men. French Enlightenment philosophers made no secret of their contempt for “the rabble.” “We have never pretended to enlighten shoemakers and servants,” sniffed Voltaire.
The distance between the “little flock” of hyper-educated sages and a vast cognitive underclass only increased with the passage of time. Yeats noted approvingly that the Duke of Urbino, Renaissance patron of the arts:
Had sent no runners to and fro /
That he might learn the shepherds’ will
By 2016, Hillary Clinton could blithely write off millions of Americans as “deplorables”—the 21st-century equivalent of Voltaire’s shoemakers and servants, whose bigotry and brutishness placed them beyond the pale of public life.
How could the principle of equality be squared with a hierarchy of expertise? Jefferson, ever the optimist, suggested the “pure selection” of a “natural” aristocracy—one based on merit rather than birth. While this proposition created more conceptual problems than it solved, it nevertheless became the default justification of the ruling elements in democratic societies. To the question, “Why should you perch at the top of the heap?”, the elites have always replied, “Superior merit.” They were more educated, more scientific, and more virtuous than their fellow citizens. To reject their leadership, therefore, was to invite disaster.
In the conflict between equality and elitism, those who already wielded power had the advantage—they could redefine equality down until the concept was virtually drained of meaning. The industrial age, which looked on society as a factory floor to be organized on the precepts of “scientific management,” worshiped at the altar of hierarchy. Mass production, mass consumption, mass media, and mass movements in politics allowed the elites to herd the newly educated, newly affluent millions into fenced enclosures where they could cause no trouble. Progressive government built an immense bureaucracy of regulators and overseers. The deplorables were rendered inaudible. The last century was a golden age of social control.
Fast-forward to the chaos of the present moment. The digital tsunami has obliterated those tidy industrial-age arrangements. The public has gained a voice like thunder—it drowns out the edicts of presidents and the precious phrases of the intellectuals. The deplorables run rampant around the globe, intent, somewhat paradoxically, on electing “authoritarian personalities” to positions of authority. The top-down system has bled out its legitimacy and is now flatlining. The elites and their supporters are gripped by panic and despair, with good reason. The constant lamentations about the end of democracy translate into the existential dread of a class that knows it has lost control.
Media scholar Andrey Mir has observed that every system at the end of its functional life reverses itself. So it is with liberal democracy. Under the influence of the elites, freedom of expression has reversed into censorship, supposedly needed to protect the truth. Democracy has reversed into a guardian state to be ruled in perpetuity by the brightest and best. The open society has reversed into a narrow airless dungeon in which elections are nullified and inconvenient scandals are smothered in silence.
There’s no going back to before, no possibility of a “return to first principles.” The populists believe they are restoring “normie” society, but that’s an imaginary place located in an invented past. The mandarin class desperately craves a return to the hierarchies of the industrial age, but history only moves in one direction. The problem of the elites revolves around the meaning and justification of equality. The concept is grounded in Christian doctrine and requires a Creator as guarantor—yet the Creator, we know, has been pronounced dead on arrival. We can’t return to a lost world. To rescue equality, we must ground it on something new.
The same objections stick to the various doctrines that have attempted to secularize Christian ethics—utilitarianism, for example. The “greatest happiness for the greatest number” begs the foundational question of why other people’s happiness should matter. Decently concealed behind a materialist curtain, Christianity delivers the answer. Appeals to nature, natural law, and natural rights also get entangled in old religious formulations: none of these concepts are recognized by science. If we are to believe Richard Dawkins, nature treats each human being as a vessel for selfish genes—which would make Genghis Khan the perfect model of humanity. Arguments based on reason, deprived of transcendental force, fail to yield a credible doctrine of equality.
Yet we don’t prize equality because we are compelled to do so by irrefutable arguments about divinity or nature. Equality is a choice. It was first made by our ancestors and it is made by us today in every interaction with our institutions and every encounter with our neighbors. We have transformed ourselves into a society dedicated to a proposition. That entails a permanent revolt against those at the top who, in private life and public affairs, choosing differently, aim to garner special privileges and lasting power. The tension between the many and the few is eternal. The problem of the elites can never be fully resolved—but a settlement of this particular episode can take place only by choosing sides in the struggle. The public must decide the distance it will tolerate between top and bottom. By which I mean: each of us must and will decide.
True equality, once chosen, will have a shocking effect on our stratified society. It will diminish equally our institutional overlords, who will be brought into close proximity with the rabble, and the populists who have thrived by condemning the remoteness of the ruling class. All institutions, including government and corporations, will be radically flattened—AI can assist with this task. The distance between the president and the crowd milling outside the White House perimeter will be near enough for conversation, whether virtual or real.
Elected offices at every level of government will be strictly term-limited—the goal isn’t to abolish hierarchy but to render it impermanent. Federal legislation will allow for local variation—and local decisions will often be settled by Swiss-style referendums. Certain offices will be filled by lot. The surveillance state will be dismantled—citizens will no longer accept being treated like the enemy by their own government.
AI apps, available to all, will structure political debates at every level, inform the agendas of political parties, and serve as incubators of new political movements. The Trump administration’s recent launch of America.gov, the first federal AI application for public use, should be considered a humble first step in an indefinitely long march. And every advance in the direction of equality, we may be sure, will be accompanied by doomsday warnings from displaced and discontented elites.
The Problem of InformationThe liberation of truth from superstition was the supreme objective of the Enlightenment program. In theory, the gift of truth would allow the sovereign citizen to make enlightened public choices. In practice, the relationship between truth and information is, and must always be, problematic. The Old Regime polluted truth with religious fables. Totalitarians mastered the art of propaganda. Venal con artists sold snake oil to the unwary. Much news, for various reasons, was not “fit to print.”
In any case, the ideal of the “omnicompetent citizen,” Walter Lippmann observed in the 1920s, was a romantic myth. The average citizen dealt not in truth but in crude “stereotypes” that were often manipulated by commercial and political interests. The news business, to make money, could be little more than the mass production of stereotypes. In a remarkable sentence, Lippmann, founder and editor of The New Republic, concluded that “news and truth are not the same thing, and must be clearly distinguished.” News served to “signalize” a sensational event like a terrorist attack. Truth, on the other hand, was the province of “specially trained men.”
Long before the internet, the problem of the elites seeped into the problem of information. The mass audience was conceived as a voracious, primitive organism, the equivalent of Clinton’s “deplorables.” It preferred the sports pages in newspapers, silly sitcoms on TV, and loud music on the car radio. In 1961, Newton Minow, chairman of the FCC, characterized television as “a vast wasteland.” Specially trained men like Minow and Lippmann despised the public’s tastes and watchfully patrolled the parameters of truth. Their credentials vested them with authority and, as meritorious vessels of reason and science, they spoke with uncommon certainty. Walter Cronkite, twice voted the most trusted person in the country, closed his 30-minute newscast with the extraordinary claim, “And that’s the way it is.”
The consequence of this ideology was a world in which the elites held a monopoly on truth. The digital revolution, which turned the mass audience into an unruly public, made that world untenable. The elite class in democratic countries has been driven to imitate the methods of authoritarian regimes—censorship, arrest of dissidents, cancelation of elections. The ideal of equality has been discarded. This “revolt of the elites” reached maximum force during the Covid-19 pandemic, when a health bureaucrat like Anthony Fauci could maintain that public criticism of him was “dangerous” because “I represent science.”
The problem of information concerns the determination of truth—and by extension, the shared understanding of reality. Enlightenment ideology demanded, simultaneously, the free flow of information and decisive top-down control. The advent of the web exploded that contradiction. Billions of online voices, in a deafening uproar, asserted every conceivable claim on every possible subject, based on every kind of evidence and none. Institutional gatekeepers were soon overwhelmed and overthrown.
Americans, favored children of the Enlightenment, tend to think of truth as a gift from science. In fact, “truth” is largely mediated: we receive our knowledge of the world and all its wonders from trusted authorities. When trust in the mediators evaporates, that world flies apart into unintelligible fragments—and truth is up for grabs.
Life in the digital age, including politics, transpires under the condition of what has been justly termed post-truth. The consequences depend on what that condition entails. For the intellectuals who first gave the term currency in the aftermath of Brexit and Trump’s 2016 election, “post-truth” signified the ruinous tendency of the deplorables to swallow populist lies. Oxford Dictionary made post-truth the word of the year for 2016 and defined it thusly: “circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” British journalist Matthew d’Ancona equated the label with “a new and alarming collapse in the power of truth as an engine of electoral conduct.”
If this interpretation is correct, we have a plausible explanation for the Great Fall: voters in large numbers have been struck blind to reality. Elite reversals away from liberal rights appear as emergency measures to salvage something of value from the wreckage. If, under the condition of post-truth, genuine liberal democracy has become too dangerous, those in charge of the institutions seem determined to deploy state power to play-act a simulation: “our democracy.”
Philosopher Steve Fuller has a different take on the question. Fuller holds that “in the post-truth condition, what matters is not whether something is true or false but how the matter is decided.” The present epistemic crisis, that is to say, extends beyond the facts to the predicates of facts—the implicit historical frames of reference on which facts must hang. There are no rules to the game because the name of the game has yet to be decided. Fuller compares our moment to the Reformation. The truth-assigning authority of the Church of Experts has been lost, probably forever. Who or what will inherit that authority isn’t yet clear.
I find Fuller’s account convincing—and its implications far-reaching. The grounds not only of truth but of the institutions that sanctify it have been placed in doubt. Super-credentialed administrators, caught in fraud and falsehood, can no longer adjudicate reality. The Counter-Reformation of the elites, for all its abandonment of liberal ideals, will never close the breach in the public’s trust. A great culling of institutions is at hand, propelled by a Darwinian need for structural adaptation. Strange new voices come and go, some of them brilliant and useful, while others resemble the rantings of mad prophets, would-be messiahs, and pirate kings.
The diffusion of AI will compound the turmoil. In most of its possible iterations, AI will be the opposite of a truth machine. To the extent that the platforms acquire a subjective will of their own, they will simply join the melee and seek to impose their preferred frames on their creators. Superior intelligence may exalt them to a status equal to that of the oracles of the Olympian gods—attended, it may be, by a priestly caste of technologists. But to the extent that AI is a mere tool, it will place the totality of human knowledge in the hands of the least educated persons and so hasten the demise of the expert class.
In a post-truth world, every fact and text will be “contested.” That is by no means the same as a world ruled by lies. Command over frames of reference, and therefore over the validity of facts, will pass from the institutional producer of information to the humble consumer. It’s the ultimate democratization of truth conditions. Specialists and scientists will no longer speak with the voice of God. They will have to persuade. The Enlightenment political style, so full of aggressive certainty and utopian projects, will be replaced by a rhetoric of modesty and plainer but more practicable proposals. There will be less braying about “solving” social or economic “problems,” and more talk of trial and error.
I note that a state of perpetual questioning is the true mindset behind the scientific method. From Fuller’s explanation, nothing about post-truth refutes or nullifies liberal democracy. On the contrary: it places all citizens on the same epistemic plane and makes democratic agreement on the facts necessary. Under such conditions, the art of persuasion will be developed to the highest degree. Future elites will join rhetorical mastery to technical expertise. Debates will avoid specialized jargon and will have something of the Athenian assembly about them—ordinary persons will feel emboldened to speak and will be heard attentively. It isn’t a paradox to say that the way out of the post-truth condition may be to embrace it.
The Problem of MeaningBorn out of the slaughter of the Wars of Religion, Enlightenment ideology was a flight from the transcendental to the instrumental. Christianity, the faith that held Western civilization together, had lost its binding force, provoking sectarian carnage. Only an extreme reorientation of society could prevent a new Dark Age.
Enlightenment thinkers and propagandists successfully grafted Christian ethics onto a world liberated from Christian metaphysics. Reason and science became the new Scripture. The pursuit of happiness took the place of salvation. The goal of society was now, in Steven Pinker’s words, “human flourishing.” Codified in the procedural arrangements of liberal democracy and the welfare state, all of this came to be interpreted in materialistic terms. Happiness was to be measured in per capita GDP.
The lingering sense of the transcendental—church-going, prayer, an enchanted world—was converted into a matter of personal taste. Meaning was privatized. In time, inevitably, the instrumental swallowed the transcendental. The materialist worldview, invested with the prestige of modern science, was simply too powerful and persuasive for a rival outlook to survive. One was free to believe that angels fluttered in Heaven—but not if one wanted to be taken seriously. The trouble wasn’t the death of God but that nothing filled the void. A human being was officially a bundle of dead matter, obedient to the laws of physics—a machine somehow desperate for happiness.
Progress meant affluence, education, personal freedom, equality, inclusion, mobility, “experiments in living,” better health, longer lives. The existential and material success of liberal democracy was without precedent in history. Technology and commerce transformed the human condition. Contemporary society would be paradise to past generations.
Yet something was missing. At every step of its pilgrim’s progress, Enlightenment ideology met fierce opposition from reactionaries, Romantics, religious believers of every kind, and totalitarians of both left and right. Between the French Revolution and the fall of the Soviet Union, these multifarious groups waged a 200 Years’ War to reinsert a higher meaning on a transactional way of life. Hundreds of millions perished; even more lives were stunted or enslaved. The conflict isn’t quite over, and likely will never be, but after the discrediting of communism liberal democracy was the last ideology standing—and, free from the fog of war, it could be seen clearly for what it truly was. And something was missing: the system was hollow at the core.
Metaphysics is a mold into which everything in the universe is poured—a form in which every particle of existence finds a place. To the materialist mind, such grand schemes are useless fictions, but they have provided final explanations and spiritual sustenance to the human heart since our remote ancestors crawled into caves and cast their longings at the walls. Liberal democracy makes strong claims on behalf of tolerance, equality, compassion, etc., but such humanistic virtues lack any metaphysical ground. They feel arbitrary and, when tracked to their origins, turn out to be a legacy from the enchanted world of Christianity that reason and science long ago criticized out of existence.
Can a civilization subsist in a vacuum of transcendental meaning? This is an empirical question. The answer is all around us. Starved of spirit and deprived of models, personal identity has disintegrated: we don’t know who or what we are—man or woman, oppressed or oppressor, hero or villain. Anxiety, depression, addiction, obesity, homelessness, and “deaths of despair,” have taken a terrible toll, particularly among the young. Forty-five percent of Americans aged 14 to 29 “report lacking meaning or purpose or both in their lives.” Greta Thunberg, grim archangel of this misbegotten generation, confessed that she “just sat alone at home, with an eating disorder” until by organizing climate protests “I have found a meaning, in a world that sometimes seems shallow and meaningless to so many people.”
Thunberg’s trajectory is symptomatic: the emptiness must be filled somehow. Women across democratic countries have stopped having babies and flocked to radical causes. Many swoon before a cold-blooded murderer like Luigi Mangione and turn Lindsay Clancy, who strangled her three kids, into a victim of society deserving hugs rather than punishment. The meager emotional payoff from politics merely fuels the sense of grievance and the will to sterility. In South Korea, young women’s leftward lurch has opened up a 50-percentage-point ideological gap with young men; not coincidentally, the current fertility rate in that country stands at 0.76 children per woman. The problem of meaning may well be resolved by a civilizational extinction event.
No institutional fixes are available. The old religions are as exhausted as the Enlightenment and increasingly measure their own worth by profane, even pagan, standards. Nor can we will ourselves into a state of grace, any more than we can will a belief in angels. We can’t summon a metaphysical revolution as we might a political one.
So what is to be done?
The first, obvious step is to move the question to the center of our shared conversations. The most capacious thinkers of the age should contemplate first principles and ultimate goals with at least as much intensity as they invest in Donald Trump or the latest economic report. There’s nothing artificial about this. Science and reason are necessary for modernity. Meaning and moral aspiration are necessary for humanity. A balance must be struck that preserves the one and gives full weight to the other.
Materialism, we must understand, is a valuable perspective for science but not a realistic appraisal of the human condition. Scientists work as if on a geometric point, abstracted from nature and indifferent to its dispositions. In reality, however, we come from nature, we are of nature, and we are far from indifferent to our place in it. Our intuitions are internal to the system: humanity’s spiritual quest is, in every sense, nature reflecting on itself. One such intuition is agency—the belief that, at the crossroads, I am free to go right or left, and I alone make the choice. Another is faith in causation. These stances are irrational, or rather pre-rational, but without them liberal democracy as well as science itself would be impossible.
In the end, materialism is self-defeating. To say, “I choose to be a materialist” is to fall into an absurd fallacy. Either our bodies, which consist of matter, obey unchanging laws, or the mind, transcending matter, is capable of choice. There can be no middle ground.
Politics, in a metaphysical age, will resume its traditional place as a secondary activity—a means to an end. This will leave liberal democracy vulnerable to false prophets who are willing to trample on individual rights in pursuit of some apocalyptic scheme. The interesting question is whether the post-truth condition will make the peril greater or lesser. On the one hand, the lack of universal firewalls might make it easier for a fanatic to flood the system. Yet post-truth itself, I believe, is the strongest kind of firewall. In our fractured, eternally contested environment, the progress of any totalizing doctrine will be painfully slow. The quest for meaning and the struggle over frames of reference are, in the end, really one and the same.
We have inherited a rich and evocative spiritual vocabulary, but it belongs to a worldview thousands of years old. “King of kings,” to cite just one example, should sound archaic in a democratic age. Can we awaken the scientific world to the spirit? Is it possible to sanctify our largely instrumental relations? This shouldn’t entail a belief in fairies and goblins, or even necessarily in religion. Any good empiricist will admit that the richest human lives are lived symbolically. Can we climb the symbolic ladder to the mountaintop, where meaning and modern humanity come harmoniously together—anchoring, it may be, a loftier understanding of equality and social life, and of the sanctity of truth?
We won’t know until we try. Pessimism, let me suggest, is unwarranted. History moves in mysterious ways. We may be due for a second coming of historian Karl Jaspers’ “Axial Age”: preachers and philosophers who conceived a drastically updated transcendental vision, with the rational and the sacred, truth and meaning, reconciled with political freedom.
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Liberal Democracy in a Post-Enlightenment WorldFor 200 years, we placed society under the sway of universal principles. That’s gone with the wind. We have entered an era of radical contingency, in which even truth is indeterminate. The natural tendency is to retreat to the certainties of the past—but there’s no going back. If we hope to preserve the gains from Enlightenment society, and resolve its many contradictions, we’ll have to do so within a new and wildly unstable conceptual framework.
With the spell of the Enlightenment broken, liberal democracy will have to redefine what “created equal” means. This process could end in a rigid caste system, with the institutions in the hands of self-selected mandarins who wield the power of the state to impose their “solutions.” Preferably, and more likely given the thrust of the new technology, we’ll see a flattening of the institutions and the continued trampling by the public into the sacred spaces of politics and communication.
Equality, however understood, will be forged in the will of the citizenry rather than granted by a benevolent God. That will make it contingent like everything else, and so liable to variation and in constant need of defense. And if perfect equality is an impossible dream, eternal inequality requires impossible discipline. The current elite class, already under enormous pressure, may lose its cohesion and melt into the impermanence of the age, divided among the various schools and sects and frames of reference.
The structure of information will follow the definition of equality. The commanding heights will be control over AI. If AI development and deployment is a closed game, the elites could set themselves up as intermediaries in the oracle of an omniscient divinity. If AI is a competitive product, the public will gain the upper hand. In that case, we can expect a flowering of eccentric applications, the individualization of commerce and industry, and the final overthrow of the expert class. The information sphere will remain the mirror to our passions, divisions, and metaphysical longings. Freedom of speech, no longer “endowed by our Creator,” will become the battleground on which the question of equality is ultimately settled.
Here I finally reveal myself in my true colors. I’m an analyst. My task is to describe reality, and that’s what this essay is about. But I also lead an active life inside the world that I’m describing—and I have preferences. I see equality as a factor of opportunity, law, and human dignity, not of perfect outcomes. I think truth emerges from examining a subject from a large number of perspectives, even those that may seem disturbing or false. I hope that my story—as a person, a father, a grandfather—connects to other stories in the past and will connect to more in the future, in a pattern that is not entirely devoid of meaning. And I believe fervently in liberal democracy, because—born in Cuba—I have tasted the alternative.
The breakdown of Enlightenment ideology is only the latest challenge liberal democracy has faced in my lifetime. I’m not entitled, as an analyst, to downplay the perils ahead, but I’m allowed, as an American, to have faith that they will once again be overcome.
Martin Gurri is a former CIA analyst and author of The Revolt of the Public. He is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at Mercatus Center; his essays have appeared in Discourse, City Journal, and UnHerd, among other publications.
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David Deming is the Danoff Dean of Harvard College and an economist. He writes a Substack called Forked Lightning and hosts a podcast called The Context Window.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and David Deming discuss why AI may force universities into a new era focused on community and virtue rather than knowledge or expertise, whether the business model of American higher education is facing existential or merely serious pressure, and how professors and students should rethink learning and assignments in an age when AI can do much of the traditional academic work.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Tell me a little bit about what you mean by universities entering the third era of higher education because of artificial intelligence. How is AI going to transform Harvard University, and how’s it going to transform the higher education sector more broadly?
David Deming: Well, first of all, it’s a prediction—nobody knows the future. What I’m doing, Yascha, is looking at the trends in front of us and looking at how, in the past, technology and progress have changed what universities really do. I wouldn’t say “only do,” in the sense that we’ve always done a lot of things, but what’s really scarce, what you can only get at a university, and therefore what is kind of the thing that we should really lean into. My thesis was that in the first era, universities were keepers of scarce knowledge.
This is something I said in a convocation speech I gave to Harvard freshmen: the founding gift of this university was by John Harvard, our namesake, and it was a gift of four hundred books. That doesn’t seem like a lot, but it was about two-thirds the size of a Manuel College library in Cambridge, which was a very established elite British university at the time. So this was really a founding gift that put Harvard on the map. You can think of lots of examples in our history where, for example, when there was a great fire in the 1700s that destroyed a lot of books in the library, the Harvard Corporation—the governing body of the university—told students, “Go home. Without our books, what are we?” Of course that changed over time. There were more libraries. It used to be that Harvard was the location of the only printing press in the colonies, in President Henry Dunster’s house. That changed over time too, as knowledge proliferated.
We became organized around expertise rather than knowledge. Knowledge is just words written on a page. The expert curates knowledge and helps people understand how to interpret it. That, to me, is the conception of the modern university. The great universities like Harvard have organized themselves around a collection of expertise in different disciplines, and that has produced huge benefits for society, and I think will continue to. It’s just that with AI now, expertise will become relatively more commodified. That doesn’t mean we don’t have value—it just means that you can actually access the knowledge of Yascha Mounk or David Deming through ChatGPT, or Claude, which has basically downloaded all of human history and synthesized it in a way that gives people access to relatively personalized expertise.
So the question is: what can we still do as a university? I think the answer, as I said in my speech, is that we are still a learning community. There are lots of skills and habits of mind and virtues that you can really only learn in community with other people. You cannot learn them from behind a computer screen. Therefore, we should return to that really quite old idea of a university, or a collegium—a medieval learning community of teachers and learners, people learning together in community. Learning virtues like justice, integrity, and fairness is best done in community with others. I think that’s what we should double down on. Not that experts aren’t going to be important, but that this is a thing that only we can do now, in the age of AI.
Mounk: Let me disaggregate what artificial intelligence might do to universities across three dimensions. The first is that one of the key reasons why universities exist is to undertake research. We needed the kind of resources that universities had, and frankly, the strange marriage of convenience between teaching and research, in order to sustain the salaries of people who were able to do this kind of research. It now looks as though artificial intelligence is going to be increasingly capable of doing a lot of this research.
That is a positive thing, because we actually care about that research. It matters whether you have better or less good economic research in order to set countries on the path towards development, or in order to better manage a potential financial crisis, or whatever it is. It would be very strange to give up on the benefits of AI because we somehow only want humans to do this work, if we think that better medical research can save human lives. But it might raise questions about whether universities are needed in the same kind of way.
The second point is about the financial basis of the university. Is going to university still going to give the same financial benefits to people’s earnings over their lives? Is there still going to be demand for highly cognitively capable human beings in the economy? And if that’s not the case, then who’s going to pay all of the money you need from your MBA students, your LLM students, and your BA students, in order to subsist?
Then the third kind of challenge is that a lot of assignments I would have traditionally done when I was an undergrad, or that I would have traditionally assigned when I was a teaching fellow—as it’s called, not a teaching assistant, at Harvard—when I was doing my PhD there, can now very easily be done by AI. So how do we actually make sure that people are still learning? I’m sure there are other ways to cut the space, but that’s how I think about it. Let’s start with the first one and work our way down. How should we think about this in the context of research, and whether we still need universities as the employers and facilitators of this kind of research?
Deming: This wasn’t a topic of my speech, because it was to undergraduates and was focused on undergraduate life, but I absolutely think that universities should and will remain centers for research. I think that’s for two reasons.
One is a lot of the research that is being funded—let’s just take the case of AI labs, for example. A lot of the research being funded by frontier AI labs is valuable research, but the provenance is unclear. These companies have a financial interest in the research looking a certain way, so you can’t always trust what’s coming out. Not so much that anything is wrong in it—it’s just that there’s a question of whether OpenAI or Anthropic or Google DeepMind or any other lab would publish results that affected their company’s bottom line. You can’t fully understand how to interpret those results, because they’re selected on things that wouldn’t harm the company, for example. That’s just the nature of it. I think also much of that research is very applied—it’s like, how are people using AI to do X? But there’s much more basic, fundamental research that universities do, because the purpose of the university is to produce knowledge, and not for downstream commercial implications or any other implications. There’s basic work that leads to downstream discoveries that really best happens at a place like a university. I think one of the great human inventions is the university, and I very much hope that it will remain a center for research.
I think the other thing is—you mentioned this strange combination of research and teaching. I do think there’s a strong complementarity between those two. You can’t really understand a concept well until you can explain it to someone who knows less than you. I think the reason why top talent in all fields, including in computer science—we’ve seen some access to labs, but still a lot of people will come back and are coming back—the reason people want to be in universities is because teaching keeps you fresh, it keeps you engaged with the next generation. Many students here at Harvard are much more AI-native than me, and if I want to keep up with the latest developments, it’s actually helpful to be in the classroom in front of them and see how they react to things. So I do think there’s an intrinsic complementarity between teaching and research, and I personally would go long on the research function of the university in the age of AI. I don’t think that’ll go away. I think if anything, we have challenges like, can we get enough compute to do frontier research? I think there’s some kinds of research that may best be done in industry, but there’s also certain kinds of research that is best done in universities. I don’t actually see that changing. Who knows—but I don’t see it changing in the age of AI.
Mounk: Let’s speak to the second part. How concerned are you that the whole economic foundation of these universities may start to crumble?
One direction from which that could be the case is that university degrees just don’t come to be valued in the same way in the marketplace, in part because people who are able to demonstrate high cognitive skill may no longer be valued in the same way in the marketplace. The second point is that a lot of your money comes from students whose parents are able to pay for an undergraduate education, and if some of them lose their jobs, they may be less able to pay the tuition fees of their children. In something like a business school, a lot of the tuition comes from the fact that you go off to McKinsey or BCG for a couple of years, and then they pay for you to go to business school, with an expectation that you go back to the firm. Perhaps those firms no longer feel that investment is worthwhile in the same way, if they’re increasingly relying on AI tools. And finally, there may just be an expectation that the degree is not going to help you find a job, so why would you take out a loan if it’s not going to give you a job? Finally, if all of that is the case, and a lot of public finances come from payroll taxes and income taxes—and Harvard gets a lot of its money from the federal government, as we learned during some of the attacks from the administration—then that’s yet another source of financial instability. So is the period in which American universities were uniquely rich, in historical terms and in international terms, potentially coming to an end?
Deming: That’s a pretty heavy question, and I don’t really know the answer to it. But here’s what I feel reasonably confident about. I think there are serious threats to the business model of the university, but I’m not sure that those are all related to AI. I think a lot of them are related to demographics. In American universities, the cohort size of high school graduates is starting to shrink, and that’ll put pressure on the number of universities. I think that’s different from putting pressure on the basic model of whether you go to university at all. I think many universities, especially small private colleges in the Northeast where we have more population decline, will go out of business, and you’ll see more consolidation.
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I think also on the research side, some of the research happening in science, engineering, and computer science requires tremendous scale, so it’s hard for many universities to sustain that. You’ll probably see some consolidation—a little bit of the rich getting richer in the university space—and a lot of the pressures facing universities will go down the selectivity distribution, so to speak. I don’t think that’ll really hurt the public universities; if anything, those might go slightly stronger. It’ll be small private colleges that are kind of barely hanging on anyway.
I don’t think that means people won’t go to college anymore, because actually, if you look at the share of, let’s say, 18-to-25-year-olds enrolled in a traditional four-year college over time, it’s actually slightly increased over this entire period. We have this meme that college is over, but it’s not really matching people’s decisions. All of the fluctuation you see in college enrollment over the last decade is in two-year colleges, and that’s because enrollment in community colleges is highly counter-cyclical. When the job market’s really good, people stay out of college, and they go back when there’s a recession. We’ve had historically low unemployment. So I think it’s a little bit of a vibe about the end of college more than the reality. But I think you’re right that there are serious pressures on what we do, and we’re going to have to adapt—you see a lot of belt-tightening of various types, and I think that’s probably a good thing.
So I would say there are pressures on the business of university education, but I wouldn’t say they’re existential pressures. I’d say they’re serious, but kind of normal pressures that certain industries come under, and hopefully it’ll lead to some innovation—there are things we can do better, a lot of things we can do better. Especially undergraduate education—you asked about master’s degree programs, and I think those are under a lot more pressure, because they provide a product that’s much more connected to the labor market, and you can see companies doing things to replace that. But what we do in undergraduate education is really intellectual and moral formation, and there’s just not a lot of places to send an eighteen-year-old that can do that kind of formation. Another way to say it: we have a bundle of things we do, and you can find elements outside of college that do one or two of those things, but it’s hard to find something that does all of them.
So my modest prediction is that universities will survive. We will change, we’ll adapt, and we’ll probably lose some among us. But I’d go long on the university—I’m a believer in it, in what it does. This is not because I think there are no problems; there are actually a lot of problems. But I don’t think college is over.
Mounk: Let’s speak about this piece of intellectual and moral formation, because I think you’re right that that is the core proposition of universities. Of course, the ability of universities to engage in that intellectual and moral formation has been very contested over the last few years. This is partially to do with ideological factors—a sense that a lot of people have that universities are ideological monoliths, and that therefore you send your children off to campus and they’re going to come back with very different views and ideas from the ones they grew up with, which can of course also be a good thing. The whole point of a university certainly is to broaden horizons and open minds, and if nobody changed their mind about the world in the process, that would be a very worrying thing. That was true twenty or forty years ago as well, when most Americans trusted higher education. It may have changed in nature now that most Americans no longer seem to trust higher education, according to Pew and other kinds of polls.
At the same time, there are these questions around intellectual formation—a lot of how intellectual formation happened, and what that intellectual formation consisted of, may shift in the age of AI. So how did you address how universities should change what they do in response to this, in your speech? And then let’s go into more detail about some of those points.
Deming: First of all, on the issue of ideological balance, I think this is a serious problem for colleges all across the country to address. It’s a mix of perception and reality. I think it’s possible, and it is true, that faculty—not just at Harvard, but at almost every university—lean left. However, that does not necessarily mean that politics invades the classroom. I’d distinguish between those two things. The reality is: even if most faculty vote Democrat, there are relatively few faculty who bring their politics overtly into the classroom. That is somewhat rare, and it is usually not a good thing for student learning. When I teach, I never talk about my politics, and I take great pride in having students guess about what I actually think, because my point is to help them think about different issues. I always tell them, even if you’re an advocate, you need to understand the other side in order to make arguments that persuade.
So I think it’s possible to get a good education that teaches you how to think critically and to be ideologically open-minded, even if you’re being taught by mostly Republicans or mostly Democrats. I’d distinguish between those two things—I think they’re both issues, but the issue of people bringing their politics into a classroom where it’s not appropriate. There are some classes where it is, but if you’re teaching organic chemistry and making comments about a certain administration, then that’s just not really relevant. I think that’s pretty rare, actually, on college campuses, but even if it’s rare, it should be even rarer.
Mounk: A couple of words on this point. One is that I don’t think this is exclusively a problem of Harvard University or Johns Hopkins, where I teach. I don’t think it’s exclusively a problem of the United States—I think you have very similar problems in other countries in the Western Hemisphere, in Europe, and elsewhere. I actually think this is going to be a very fundamental problem for universities, but it’s going to be very hard to fix, for reasons that go a little deeper than people generally tend to think.
Fifty years ago, knowing the level of somebody’s education didn’t provide a very strong predictor of who they voted for—if anything, it probably meant they were slightly more likely to vote for Republicans than for Democrats in the United States. But there was always also a kind of hyper-educated elite that leaned a little to the left. The average educated person in America was an upper-middle-class person, and therefore more likely to vote for Republicans, who were generally the party of lower taxes and so on. But there was always the idea that the Harvard professor is a kind of somewhat left-leaning radical, and so it balanced out in a certain kind of way.
We now just live in a period in which, for whatever deep reasons—which I think nobody has fully understood and described rightly—there’s just a huge educational polarization in every developed democracy I can think of, such that the more educated you are, the more you are on the left. As a result, most professors, and most people in the pool from which professors are recruited, are going to be very left-leaning. A lot of the students who tend to come from highly educated households are also going to be left-leaning. So you end up with these institutions that are meant to represent society in some kind of way, to be in conversation with society, but they’re just way to the left of where society is.
So even before we get to all kinds of man-made, homemade problems—which I think also exist, where professors absolutely will not hire somebody known for conservative political points of view—even before you get to that, these structural reasons are driving a huge wedge between universities and the putative social elites that they’re educating and the rest of the population.
Deming: You’re saying the deck is stacked against progress in this area. I think that’s definitely true—everything you say is true about this inherent difficulty in having any kind of balance on the faculty. Here’s what I’d say too: existing alongside that is the reality that we survey our students every year and ask them questions about a series of things we’d call intellectual vitality or civil discourse. We ask them questions like, do you feel comfortable having a conversation with somebody you disagree with? Do you feel like the classroom is a space for you to express your political views, even if they’re in the minority? We’ve seen serious, positive progress on those questions over the last two to three to four years here at Harvard, even though our faculty hasn’t changed its ideology at all, to a first approximation, over that period.
I think they’re both issues. I’m just saying it’s possible to make progress on whether people feel like they can actually get an education that’s ideologically not even balanced, just neutral. A lot of the time, politics doesn’t invade everything—a lot of the time you just want to learn about things. I think that’s possible even under the structural conditions you describe, which are going to take a lot longer to fix. We still need to fix them, but they’re not going to be fixed overnight.
Mounk: Let me speak to the other point you made. I agree with you that certainly my median colleague at Johns Hopkins, and certainly the median professor who taught me when I was a grad student at Harvard, was left-leaning, but certainly did not impose their views on people in the classroom. I’m somebody who has this podcast and writes a lot publicly, so my students don’t have a huge amount of trouble figuring out where I stand politically. I think that makes it incumbent upon me in the classroom to emphasize and model that I will judge them by the quality of the argument, not on whether they say something I happen to agree with. I always explicitly tell them I would much rather they make an interesting argument I disagree with than parrot my views back to me poorly—I have no interest in that. I think students do come to trust me on that over time, but it’s very common that students tell me, thank you, I appreciate that about your class—in such-and-such class, I did not feel like that at all, and we all know you just have to echo back the views of the professor. Again, I don’t think that’s the typical case, but it’s something that deeply marks the students who are aware of those kinds of situations.
Is there something that you, in your position of authority, can do to address those kinds of situations, understanding that on the other end of that there’s a very strong value of academic freedom? You have to balance two different values here. On the one hand, I think this is an actual abuse of institutional power—the university gives me the right to grade my students, and I will defend the right to do that as I see fit, because that’s a core part of my academic competence, my academic freedom. But if I do that in order to induce my students to parrot political views they don’t believe, on pain of getting a B instead of an A, I think I’m absolutely abusing my authority. So is there something the institution can do to ensure that happens more rarely than it now does?
Deming: Great question. I think the answer is yes, but for all the reasons you suggested—which I can expound on—it’s important to do it in a way that is consistent with our values of academic freedom, and also to take a slightly patient, longer view, because many of the short-term solutions that are out there, I think, don’t work that well.
If I were to go to faculty and say, “you have to stop doing this”—we have an important principle in the university, which is that faculty are more or less sovereign in the classroom, within certain boundaries. I think that’s actually really key to progress. A lot of innovation in research and teaching comes from the autonomy we give faculty who are on the frontier of their disciplines—we give them wide leeway to teach in the way that makes sense to them. So I think that’s a really important principle, which means you have to be willing to accept that, as an administrator, you don’t have a heavy hand with the way faculty teach. As a faculty member myself, I think that’s really important. For people listening to this who are faculty or administrators—once you’re a member of the faculty and you have tenure, you’re an employee for life. We’re all partners in the firm, and we take turns in roles like this. But I think of myself primarily as a faculty member, and I ask myself, would I want someone to do that to me? The answer is usually no.
Having said that, I think you can have a lot of influence on the margins through a persuasion campaign, through hearts and minds, through modeling the way you want our community to engage with each other. It’s not a heavy-handed “hey, you’re doing something wrong, do it better”—it’s more like talking with students. I do a lot of talking with students about these values—again, we’d use terms like intellectual vitality, civil discourse. It really is a skill-building exercise. You are coming here to be challenged. My colleague Tarek Masoud loves to say—and I think he’s right—think about college like a mental gym. You don’t go lift the easy weights; you lift the hardest weights you can, because you’re trying to make yourself uncomfortable and stretch your capabilities. That is what a great university education is supposed to do.
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The more I not only say that but model it—I hold these monthly, on-the-record open conversations with students, where the Harvard Crimson comes and asks me questions, and then students ask me totally different questions, and everything is unscripted. I’ve had students come and challenge me on all kinds of things—divestment from Israel, about the Trump presidency, about whether Harvard’s going to do this or that. Sometimes I can’t answer the questions, or I don’t feel comfortable answering them, or I don’t give a great answer, but I try. I do a lot of stuff like that to show people that this is a developmental environment and you can challenge authority, and that’s totally normal, and we’re all playing our parts in this.
I also share with faculty as colleagues what some things that have worked are, and build communities around people who care about these things. We have a group of faculty called the Council on Academic Freedom here at Harvard that advocates for related changes and for us to think about them. I think all of those things, as part of an ecosystem, are good. I can play a role in saying, I’m good with being challenged, I’m good with the idea that I’m not always right. That’s the level at which I typically engage—partly for practical reasons, because I don’t want to be telling faculty what to do in the classroom, but also because I actually think that’s more effective in the long run, and it points the way forward by modeling behavior. When I teach in the classroom, I try to be this way too.
Mounk: To speak to another tension between what the faculty might wish and what might allow the university to actually live up to what it claims to do—a lot of the function of intellectual, and particularly moral, formation has been given up by faculty and delegated to a whole set of staff. Many of the staff are great at their jobs, but I do think that when you’re an incoming student at a top university in the United States today, a lot of the norm-setting and expectation-setting is not done by faculty members—it’s done by administrators at every level of the university. I think there are also some problems about the ideological composition of those administrators—statistics suggest they’re actually much more homogeneously left-leaning than faculty, and in particular more likely to be on the illiberal left rather than the more liberal left.
But there’s also really a problem here relating back to the beginning of the conversation with what the sales pitch is. The idea is that you come here, and we have these exceptional faculty members, and they’re going to engage with you as a human being and help to form and shape you. In reality, what’s happening is that your main point of contact, certainly outside of a lecture and outside the classroom, is an army of administrators—of which there are now, in some places, more than students. Now, I’m sure many faculty members might agree with this point in the abstract. But if you then come to them and say, well, this actually means you now have to run this orientation and be present at this event and so on, they’re going to say, “screw you.” So is there a way in which the university actually can, and has to, reform itself to live up to that promise in a different way?
Deming: You put your finger on it exactly—there are two sides to looking at this. One is that the growth of administration has been faster than the growth of faculty and of students, and there are too many administrators. The other way of looking at it is: why does that exist? I do think part of the reason it exists is because faculty would rather delegate these tasks to somebody else. I count myself in this—faculty want to do research and want to teach. We don’t really want to do a lot of the other things, and maybe we aren’t even particularly good at it either.
So there’s a trade-off there: if you delegate spheres of university life that are important to students’ experience to administrators, you delegate that control, and you get the benefit of spending more time on sabbatical writing books, or whatever you’re doing. I’ve experienced that myself—so I’m guessing it’s not a criticism, as you know, but I think what I would say is that I would almost always welcome more faculty engagement with the work I’m trying to do here at the college. I’d say that some faculty are deeply engaged in it, and many are deeply disengaged. I’d say to my colleagues that anybody who has a criticism should—if you accept your role as a tenured faculty member as a partner of the firm, you should not only criticize, you should engage and try to fix the problem, because that’s kind of the only way it gets fixed. If you look around and see a problem, and nobody else is solving it, you’re elected.
I would love a bargain for all universities where we say, okay, we’re actually going to spend more of the marginal dollar on the faculty-student experience—more faculty, smaller classes, whatever it is we need to do to deepen those connections—and less of the marginal dollar on administration, in exchange for greater faculty involvement in student life. I think that would be a good trade for the university, and I would love to make it. I say this as somebody who’s inhabited both roles—I got tenure ten years ago, and I’ve basically been doing some form of, not always a dean role, but directing centers or chairing committees. I do these things not because I like them, actually—a lot of it feels like a tax sometimes, because I love doing research and teaching, that’s what I got into it for. But I also think it’s important: if you’re part of an institution that you believe in, and it has been good to you personally, you serve when you’re asked to serve. I think a lot of faculty feel that way too, but sometimes I wish more did.
Mounk: Some of that is about creating a culture and norm-setting as well. I was an undergrad in Cambridge, England, which at the time still really emphasized one-on-one teaching, in which administrators were barely part of the experience, and you really had this very close contact with faculty members. It’s one of the things that attracted me to academia. When I came through my PhD at your institution, from the very beginning, the culture signaled very clearly: this is not how we get ahead in the world. Yes, of course you want to be a competent teacher—yes, of course you should teach a couple of terms while you’re a grad student, because you need to have on your CV that you’ve done some teaching. But don’t overinvest in teaching. Any term that you can get a fellowship—of which, frankly, there are many available—take the fellowship, so you can focus on research rather than teaching. And if you want to be a tutor in one of the houses, really think twice about that, because you’re going to be dealing with whatever random personal problems the students have, and that’s really going to be a distraction from getting your PhD done.
So I think there’s also a sense in which—we talked a lot, when I was a graduate student, about professionalizing, and the role of the university in professionalizing grad students to become academics. A lot of the core of that professionalization was teaching people that the marginal extra publication in some mid-tier journal is worth a lot more than a slightly higher teaching evaluation, or spending more time in your pedagogical function at the university.
Deming: I do my best to protect graduate students and junior faculty from service requirements that are not going to help them get tenure and make their way in the profession. For people who are just getting started, particularly people on the tenure track, it is important to do your research, establish your scholarly credibility. I guess the question is, once you get tenure, you should really flip that switch, because now you have won the lottery of life. If you have tenure at a great university like Johns Hopkins or Harvard, you have won the lottery of life—you have a forty-year career, God willing, of guaranteed employment. So my view is you have an obligation to give back. Some faculty, not most, but some, still act like junior faculty after they’ve gotten tenure, and are mostly about their own research program, when actually the point is to pay it back by protecting the other people in the same way that you yourself were protected at an earlier time.
Mounk: I guess this is a sense in which tenure is the worst possible system except for all the others. All things considered, I’m a defender of tenure—when it comes to questions around academic freedom and free speech, I very much value the protections of tenure.
But I also think that nowadays, the average graduate student takes six, seven, eight years to go through a program. Most of the time nowadays you then become a postdoc for a number of years. The tenure track has extended longer and longer, for all kinds of reasons. So by the time you actually get tenure, you’ve been in the profession, let’s say, fifteen to twenty years on average. If you have this incentive—that I get through all of this process, and I’m not going to challenge the orthodoxies in my field, and I’m not going to say anything that might be unpopular, because I can’t possibly jeopardize this grand life project of getting tenure—by the time you actually get tenure, you’re not going to change. You’ve been so socialized into one way of doing things that the newfound freedom, in most cases, goes unexercised. I worry that the same is true if, for fifteen to twenty years, you learn that the thing that makes you valued, the thing that is important, the thing that is at the core of your professional identity, is an extra marginal journal publication—flipping that switch, in the way you’re talking about, is going to be very difficult.
Deming: As a description of what actually happens, you may be right, often, most of the time. However, I do think if you get tenure and you keep doing the same thing you were doing before, you’re doing it wrong, because the point of getting it is to then use it to do something you wouldn’t have otherwise—that’s the whole reason to give it. I think it means different things for different people. It could be taking on a risky research agenda, making a bet that could fail, but you still have your guaranteed employment. If it fails, it could mean giving back to your community. But I think, having been given this incredible opportunity, you ought to do something interesting and valuable with it. I had always understood that once I got tenure, I was supposed to contribute in some way, and I’ve tried to do that. I think I’m not the only one—I think most faculty think this way too, but those who don’t should, in my opinion.
Mounk: I think a lot of faculty think that way. Whether a lot of faculty act that way is a different question—I might ask that about myself as well.
Deming: I could say one more thing, Yascha, actually. I know we’re going to zoom out, but I have to say, for somebody listening to this who’s a faculty member—I think you have to understand that the Venn diagram of people who can get tenure at a top research university, and people who can run anything or manage anything, is pretty non-overlapping. You don’t actually have to be that good at management to be effective in a role like this. So I would just say to people, give it a try—not because it’s going to be awesome, but because you’re actually going to give back, and you’ll feel fulfilled by that. That’s my pitch.
Mounk: Well, let me make the counter-pitch. I have a longstanding spiel about deans, and I hope you won’t take it personally, David, which is that I think being a tenured faculty member is one of the great jobs in the world. It’s the closest you can get to being a leisured aristocrat. I don’t think most academics are at leisure—they actually work very hard, and I work very hard. But you have the financial resources and the freedom to think about whatever you think is important and interesting in the world, and that is an immense luxury.
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I think being a dean is one of the worst jobs in the world. For one, as I’m sure you’ve noticed, structurally everybody hates you. Faculty members, they might be left-leaning and progressive, but more than anything else, they’re anti-authoritarian in instinct and outlook. They hate the university president, they hate their dean—some more than others, but that’s the general tendency. And then it’s a managerial role, but you don’t have any power—you can’t actually fire people or hire people. You have influence, of course, and you make certain important decisions, but you have way less power than you would as a regional manager of Trader Joe’s. So I’m very, very happy to be an academic with job protections. I would much rather be a regional manager at Trader Joe’s than be in your role. Is that unfair?
Deming: No, for your preferences, it sounds totally reasonable. To be honest with you, people ask me—when I first took this job, I was fielding questions, we were doing this new resident tutor training, and somebody said, “Was this your dream job? And if so, what did you do to get it?” I said, without thinking, “I left my dream job to take this job.” My dream job was a tenured professor at a place like Harvard. That’s what I—but the reason to do it is not because it’s going to be better than what you’re doing. The reason to do it is if you care. In my case, I took this job a week after we announced that we were suing the Trump administration. So if somebody says to you, again, if you believe in a place and what it does, and it’s been good to you personally, you could be asked to serve, and you serve. Think about it not as something that’s going to be awesome, but as a service responsibility. I am sustained by the impact I’m having, not by the consumption value of doing it every day.
That’s the reason to do it, and to not do it forever, by the way. My view is people should take turns—I don’t think it’s good to have a dean of the college for twenty years. I don’t intend to stay in this job that long, or anywhere close to that long. I think it’s good to have a rotation, and to have people with that service mindset and the mindset of a faculty member. I plan to return to teaching and research. I think that’s important for the governance of the university, to have people who identify as faculty in positions of authority, because then we get the type of university that is how faculty would like it to be governed. Somebody’s got to do it. That’s my counter-pitch—again, it’s not about personal utility. It’s about service.
Mounk: It’s the ideal of ruling and being ruled in turn. I’m very happy in this realm of life to be ruled—I have no aspiration to rule. Let’s get into the heart of some of the questions and debates about AI and learning.
Obviously, part of the core problem is that universities have this role as validators in the world. One of the reasons why a degree from Harvard is valuable is that if you have a high GPA and so on, that’s supposed to indicate something about your intellect, about what you’ve learned, about your ability to jump through a lot of hoops, and that’s valued in the marketplace. The way we traditionally assessed that was, in the humanities and to some degree the social sciences, by setting you a few days to go write an essay, and in the natural sciences, math, and so on, by asking you to do a problem set. Nowadays, Claude and ChatGPT and the like can do that for you very, very well. The deeper problem is that we, in a slightly more idealistic description of what universities were up to, also thought that learning to write well and learning to work through these kinds of problem sets were really valuable intellectual skills. But there’s a real question about the extent to which that remains the case when this machine can now do it for you.
So, before we get to how we need to change assessments and all of those things—what do you think students still have to learn? Do we still have to learn to do math and sciences in the same way? Do we still have to learn to write an essay in our own voice, if, in theory, Claude and ChatGPT could do it for them?
Deming: Basically, yes, they do. But I think that what, in the fullness of time, we think of as mastery of those concepts ought to be at a higher level. What it means to be good at writing will change. But I think the core skill of being able to formulate an argument, express yourself, think critically, interrogate different positions—I can’t imagine that no longer being valuable. In fact, if anything, I think it’ll be more valuable. I just think maybe we’ll have higher standards in terms of how you’re able to embody it in some kind of performance, whether it’s an oral exam or a presentation or whatever. I think we’ll expect people to have done much deeper research on the claims they’re making, because they have access to this tool.
So, again, it’ll be very disruptive, but I think ultimately it will raise our standards in a very helpful way. And I don’t think AI will replace us as experts, especially in spaces that are inherently contested and contestable. You write and think a lot about politics—I think it’s going to be a golden age for politics. That’s because politics, unlike, let’s say, programming, is not a verifiable domain where there’s one widely accepted correct answer. The code compiles or it doesn’t. Politics is not actually a domain where you’re debating issues with a right answer—the answer is an outcome of people’s beliefs, their values, and power structures. I just don’t think AI is a technocratic solution for what is ultimately often a political process.
So I think the people who will benefit are the ones who know how to use the tool to become experts in something, and then, having become experts, will use the skills they’ve gained outside of that expertise to persuade others of their point of view, to bring people along, to help people make meaning in ways that speak to their individual situations. So I think persuasion is likely to become much more important in the age of AI. I’m pretty bullish on the university’s ability to be a unique place where people can do that, but it does require some adaptation. That’s what I’ve been focused on, what I’ve been writing about, what I’ve been thinking about.
Mounk: Very briefly, in terms of assessment and so on, what do you think that adaptation would look like?
Deming: I want to be humble about this, I don’t have all the answers, we’re all figuring this out as we go along—what I’ll be experimenting with in my own class this spring is what I would call, and others have called, a barbell strategy, which is basically all or nothing. You can have environments where, if you think assessment of mastery is very important for your class, you want to make it fully AI-proof. That could be a return to blue book exams under controlled conditions. If you’re teaching a big lecture class like Ec 10, intro to economics, the Ec 10 professors, Jason Furman and David Laibson here at Harvard, have basically downweighted take-home problem sets and increased the number of midterms from one to three, under controlled conditions. That’s an attempt to basically get AI out of the process—that’s one end of the barbell.
I think the other end of the barbell is: if you either have assignments that are too meaty to fit within a three-hour window, or you actually want to ask something deeper and longer-term of students, you just have to accept that AI is going to be part of the process and design around it. That doesn’t mean, “let AI do the writing or the thinking for you”—absolutely not. It’s more like: understand that students are going to be at the ChatGPT window or the Claude window as part of their process of reasoning through an idea, and try to design around that reality.
The main thing, I think, is we cannot create a situation where we say on our syllabus, “20-page paper due in two months, bring it back to me when it’s done, I ban AI, and the problem is solved from my end.” Students are sitting there feeling like they have a choice: either behave with integrity, which is the right thing to do, and don’t use AI, or do the wrong thing and use it without telling anybody. Either way, if you do the right thing, you feel bad about it and disadvantaged, and if you do the wrong thing, you’re rewarded for it. So we just have to accept the fact that everybody is using AI for everything, all the time, and design around it. I think about it as trying to build a set of guardrails around education, to acknowledge that this technology exists and try to use it for good rather than ill. That’s going to mean different things in different classes.
Mounk: Speaking to the inherent positionality—to use a word beloved by our colleagues in the humanities—of being a dean, your suggestion that perhaps we could use AI, especially with some of those longer papers, has attracted a lot of controversy. I’m going to defend you on this and then attack you on something totally different.
I was struck that this is very similar to something I’ve been arguing within Johns Hopkins, and something I did in my classes over the last year or so. I think universities have to do two things. The first is to ensure that students still learn how to write. I think there’s no substitute for writing in terms of figuring out your thoughts. I’m always tempted—I never quite say this to students—but I’m always tempted to say to a student, if they say “I’m just bad at writing,” to answer, “well, in that case, you’re just bad at thinking.” Because a lot of the time when we speak with each other, I can say, “my view is this, my opinion is this,” and jump over the necessary logical steps, which is very easy to do in oral communication. It’s the moment you sit down and try to write down your argument that you realize there’s a gap between this point and that point, and it becomes hard to write because you really have to refashion your argument.
I grew up with a very poor writing education in Germany, where I was a lazy high school student, and I realized if I wrote sufficiently convolutedly that my teachers didn’t really understand what I was saying, they’d give me an A. I was very lucky to have decent writing instruction as an undergrad, which didn’t just make me a better writer—I think it made me a much, much more careful thinker. So I absolutely think we need to preserve that as a core part of instruction.
At the same time, I also think we need to teach students how to use AI tools, which are obviously going to play a huge role in their lives and professional lives. I myself use AI tools for all kinds of things—not to write prose, but for all kinds of other things, in research, creating graphics, and other things. By the way, that might be great—instead of getting fifteen or twenty seminar papers at the end of a term that are of pretty good quality, perhaps students can actually go and do something even more ambitious, even more interesting with those tools. That would be more fun for me as a faculty member too.
So I did exactly what you advocated for, in terms of thinking this should be at the level of the university education—I don’t think it needs to necessarily be the case in each course. Since I think we haven’t yet gotten there in a systematic way, over the course of an education, where you have some writing-intensive courses that are non-AI and other contexts where you’re really using AI in a guaranteed way, I now assign, for the first time in my life, blue book exams, where students have to demonstrate mastery at writing out an argument about some subject over the course of three hours, or two hours, or whatever it is. And I’ve allowed some students, in some contexts, to use AI however they wish for their final seminar papers. I think that’s worked pretty well. So I’m going to defend you on that—how do we make sure there’s still some substantial writing component over the course of an undergraduate education, in two ways? First, how do we make sure there’s actually some context where there’s going to be blue book exams, where you have to write essays? Second, how do we grapple with the fact that a lot of writing skill is not just sitting down in a time-pressured environment and being able to produce a passable essay in that context—it’s going back and revising and rewriting and improving. That’s just much, much harder to do in a blue book exam.
Deming: I completely agree with that. I’ll admit that when I sent this email out to students, if you read the whole text of the email, I was bending over backwards to say, “these are just my thoughts, this is not policy, I don’t know the answer, but here’s how I’m thinking about it.” I probably underestimated how people would just not care about that and see it as the word of a dean, therefore some kind of authority. The reality is, not only can I not tell faculty who teach writing-intensive classes what to do, I don’t want to tell them what to do, because they know better than me. So I wasn’t even really trying to—I was just saying, in the spirit of getting the ball rolling, let’s play the game. That was kind of the spirit of it. But I can see why it would be at least taken out of context in certain ways. I don’t take back the sentiment, but I do think I could see how people would get touchy about it, especially given this moment we’re in.
What I want to underscore is: when you’re in a role like mine, where you’re responsible for undergraduate education, you have to look beyond the position-taking aspect of it—AI is good or AI is bad. It’s happening, people. We have to adjust to it. It’s not that we’re trying to sneak AI into the classroom where it’s not there—it’s just the reality that students are using it all the time. There are going to be faculty who teach these classes who have better ideas than me, and many of them are already doing a lot of these things. But I think, at a high level, one solution is to get much more deeply than maybe we’re comfortable doing, or used to doing, into the process of a student’s writing. You mentioned a three-hour blue book exam—one way to do this is to say, “okay, I want you to go write your rough draft in a three-hour controlled condition. I’m not even going to grade it, I’m just going to give you feedback on it, and that is the basis of your longer paper.” Then you turn in an outline, a first draft, a second draft, and I ask you, “why did you come up with this change?” In the same way that the more you understand what an AI model can do, the more you can align it, the more you understand a student’s thought process and their writing process, the more you can ensure that it’s actually them and not the AI. So I think it’s probably going to be fine to have writing-intensive courses where people use AI, as long as faculty and the teaching staff are deeply engaged in the process of helping students improve and test their ideas and refine them.
Mounk: As long as we’re not naive about the capabilities of the AI models, right? What I’m really struck by in academia is that there are obviously many academics who are deeply immersed in AI and totally understand its capabilities, and there are many others who, for ideological reasons, or simply because they’re not on the younger side and are slower to adapt, or for whatever other reason, have no sense of what AI can do. I was in a conversation recently where somebody said, “I know how you can deal with teaching this lecture class—you just tell them they can use AI to answer the ICA prompt, but then they have to themselves critique the answer that Claude gave, and that’s something AI can’t do.” And I thought, what do you mean that’s something AI can’t do? Of course AI can do that as well.
Deming: To be fair, it probably couldn’t do it that well two years ago. The technology is just moving so fast.
Mounk: Right, no, that’s fair. But the number of times I’ve heard faculty members smugly explain to me how AI-proof their assignments are, and I’m thinking, I could get Claude to do your assignment in two minutes—it’s quite astonishing.
Deming: That’s another part of the challenge for me, too, that maybe I didn’t fully grok at the time—I’ve been studying AI as a labor economist since before I became dean, and I’ve been pretty involved in that space. Not in a “I work with” or “I have relationships with any of the AI labs” kind of way, but I’ve studied it academically and used it regularly. So I’m pretty up to date on what’s happening in the AI space and have a sense of what the frontier models can do. It’s like, this is the worst they’re ever going to be. Whatever you think it can do now, it’s going to be able to do more in a year. You just look a little bit down the pipeline here, and we have to get adapted to this like yesterday. There was a major cheating scandal at Brown last year with AI, and there’s no reason that wouldn’t be Hopkins or Harvard. I just feel a sense of urgency about fixing this.
Mounk: Tell us about that, because it was a fascinating scandal—walk my listeners through the nature of it.
Deming: An economics professor, Roberto Serrano—I may forget some of the details—he basically gave an assignment and allowed students to use, or actually I don’t even think he said you could use AI, he just didn’t say anything about it, and he got all these assignments back that were suspiciously well done. People were doing economics at a level much higher than what he was teaching—almost suspiciously so. The upper end of the grade distribution, relative to past years, was just—there were people getting basically 100% on these pretty difficult economic problems. So he decided, okay, now I’m going to give a final exam, but I’m not going to let you use AI. And he showed that the students who scored at the very top—many of them scored very poorly on the final exam. So it’s not really cheating, it’s more like compliance—maybe “cheating scandal” isn’t the right term. It’s not really cheating, it’s actually just showing how people are using AI to substitute for their own effort.
The important thing to me about that was that students knew in advance the exam was going to be in person and that they wouldn’t be able to use AI on it. So, in some ways, they were cheating their own thought process. Students thought, “I did well on this, I really get this”—in the same way that when you ask a friend, “hey, what’d you get for number seven,” and they show you, you have this instinct that now you understand it because you see the right answer, but because you didn’t struggle through it, you don’t actually understand it, or your understanding is brittle. What that showed me is that we are enabling learning shortcutting en masse in universities, if we are just silent about this. I feel an obligation to stop that from happening, because this is students’ chance to learn how to think and to learn how to write. Every year we delay is another cohort of students who are going to be harmed by this. That’s what really drove me to roll the ball on the court and, maybe, wear the black hat a little bit. I think it’s important to do—I think that’s what somebody in a position like mine needs to be doing.
Mounk: I strongly agree with you that the worst version of this equilibrium is the kind of don’t-ask-don’t-tell approach—I’m going to pretend you’re not able to do this with AI, and you’re going to pretend you did it by hand, and I’m not going to really check what you did. That ends up favoring the least engaged and the least good student. As you’re saying, in many areas now, one mark that something is done by a genuine student—we’re talking about very smart, very talented students here—is that it’s suspiciously good, because the AI models are that good now. If you know that many of your classmates are going to be using AI, and you have to pay the double penalty of, A, having to do the work when you’d rather be getting more sleep or going out and having fun with your friends, and B, getting a worse grade than them, that’s just putting students in an impossible position. We don’t have to be entirely surprised if some of them get tempted to cheat.
There’s one piece that I strongly disagreed with. I don’t know whether that’s something other people have disagreed with you on, so hopefully you’re going to get incoming from a slightly surprising direction here. I think, in general, it makes sense to go to blue book exams where we can. It makes sense to allow AI in contexts where you can do cool projects. For one of the projects I’m thinking of assigning now, I’m just going to have people build a public resource around democracy, obviously using AI tools—build a cool website that, in some way, gives these resources around it. That’s a nice different kind of thing. And then for another exam, we’re going to do a pen-and-paper one. There are going to be some contexts where we still want people to do extended writing projects that don’t use AI.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and David discuss AI detection software and the impact of the Trump administration’s attacks on Harvard. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave a speech at the Pnyx in Athens on October 7, a place just below the Parthenon that I spoke at a few years ago. It sounds as if one of his speechwriters has been reading my books, because at the heart of his address he talks about thymos (he transliterates it as thumos) as the core value of Western civilization. This is correct in some fashion, but Rubio’s understanding of the idea is very deficient.
The Secretary of State says the following:
For the Greeks of antiquity, the pursuit of excellence was the very principle of man’s existence. They organized all of civic life around contest, ambition, competition: in philosophy and poetry, in sculpture and drama, in athletics and art, in war and statecraft. The classical Greek city was an arena for great men to test and prove themselves, to hone their potential through perpetual struggle—to be the best, the strongest, the most beautiful, straining to inch ever closer to perfection.
Now I know that to modern ears, what I just described, this way of life, may sound odd; it may even sound cruel. The ideal of many ideologies in our time has, frankly, become a world of perfect safety, devoid of risk or failure, with neither the glory of victory nor the shame of defeat …
The ancient Greek city-states were filled … with intense passion and rivalry and faction and conflict. But from that constant struggle for distinction—from that came the great flowering of art and philosophy and political and intellectual energy that would transform a collective of Mediterranean cities into the birthplace of the greatest civilization in the world.
The thumos, as the ancient Greeks called it—the fire of passion, strength, courage, pride—is the heart of great civilization. And without it? Without it, nations lose their will to fight, the will to strive, the will to survive.
I spoke of thymos at some length back in 1992 in The End of History and the Last Man, and have returned to it in In the Realm of the Last Man, my new memoir. Thymos—pride, spiritedness, the desire for recognition—is indeed important for Western civilization. But Rubio has a very attenuated understanding of it, and does not understand how it is a double-edged sword.
Thymos is at the core not just of Western civilization, but, as Hegel and his interpreter Alexandre Kojève noted, of politics as a whole. The first bloody battle between early human beings was driven by the desire for dominance and recognition, by the willingness to risk one’s life. This struggle for dominance leads to a society of masters and slaves, in which neither party is fully satisfied—the slave for obvious reasons, but the master as well because he is recognized by someone who is only a slave. The solution to this problem unfolds over historical time, with the emergence of a society based on mutual and equal recognition of all human beings. Such a society was articulated for the first time in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in the French Revolution, as well as the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Both rest on a fundamental Christian idea, the universal equality of all human beings under God. Liberal societies recognize equality of dignity by granting and protecting basic human rights.
In The End of History and the Last Man, I created two neologisms, isothymia and megalothymia. Isothymia is the desire for equal recognition, which is fundamentally at the base of any modern democracy. Human beings universally feel resentful and angry when they are disrespected, when their fundamental dignity is held to be lower than that of another group or individual. Today’s polarized politics is driven by isothymia: left-wing identity politics by the demand of marginalized groups for equal recognition, and an emerging right-wing version based on a narrative of white or Christian victimization.
Megalothymia, by contrast, is Janus-faced. It can be the source either of human progress, or of the greatest crimes and tyrannies human societies have had to endure. Secretary Rubio is correct that the striving to be better than other people is the source of all human excellences, in the arts, in sports, in the economy, or in politics. But the will to be better than other people can lead to domination, tyranny, and unspeakable crimes. George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Winston Churchill were clearly driven by megalothymia—but so were Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot.
Thymos thus presents a conundrum for democracies. The equal rights protected by a liberal state rest on isothymia, the demand for the equal recognition of human dignity. But a successful society also needs megalothymia for all the reasons Rubio outlines: it needs risk-takers, innovators, and brave citizens willing to fight on behalf of their fellows. The problem is, first, distinguishing between the good and bad forms of megalothymia, and second, channeling this passion into activities that benefit the broader society.
I wrote about Donald Trump back in 1992 in The End of History and the Last Man. I was looking for positive outlets for megalothymia, and argued that a capitalist economy would bleed off the desire for dominance and channel it into business. Little did I realize that, some decades later, Donald Trump would not be content with being rich, but would want political power as well.
Trump is a perfect example of unconstrained megalothymia. He cannot distinguish between good and bad attributes that deserve recognition, nor does he care about the quality of judgment of those recognizing him. He wants his face to be carved into Mount Rushmore as one of the greatest of American presidents, but also seeks pettier acclaim like the Nobel Peace Prize or his name on the Kennedy Center. He recently showed Maggie Haberman a list of history’s most powerful rulers, whom he clearly admired and wished to equal. The list included Genghis Khan, Attila the Hun, Napoleon, Mao, and Stalin, and not a single democratic statesman.
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Secretary Rubio’s desire to stay on his boss’ good side leads him to twist reality like a pretzel. He speaks about an alliance between the United States and Europe based on shared values, gliding over a president who clearly admires Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping far more than those of other democratic countries. He talks about the wonders of science and technology created by Western civilization, even as his administration is cutting funding for scientific research across the board. He celebrates the agreement over Greenland, without mentioning his desire to grab it away from Denmark.
Secretary Rubio praises thymos without regard to the ends to which it is directed. He would do well to remember that it was an excess of megalothymia that led Alcibiades and the Athenians into the disastrous Sicilian Expedition, which Thucydides explains was the beginning of their defeat in the Peloponnesian War. The Secretary should also focus a bit on the lines from the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal.” It is this principle of human equality, and not the celebration of great individuals, that has underlined a lot of American foreign policy over the decades.
It is to this principle that the Founding Fathers, as well as many subsequent generations of Americans, vowed to sacrifice their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In The Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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