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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
Writing about the end of the Middle Ages, Johan Huizinga observed the continuance of forms whose relationship with the world around them had already begun to fade. The Gothic cathedral did not disappear; it remained in place, eventually blending in amongst the increasingly vertical skylines of Early Modern Europe. The result was not an immediate rupture, but a slow cleavage between inherited forms and everyday meaning.1
There is something reminiscent of Huizinga’s remarks in the world around us. Many of the assumptions framing public debate retain their authority, while their relationship with the set of facts they are intended to structure appears increasingly improbable. The lens through which Western societies have understood progress, prosperity, and political order remains familiar, yet the images it produces are increasingly blurred.
This invites a simple question: what are the Gothic cathedrals of our own intellectual landscape?
Western societies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have looked at the world through the prism of a family of “end-of-history” narratives. These narratives do not necessarily imply an uneventful future and, more often than not, the end refers to directionality rather than to a hypothetical terminal point—but they do not necessarily rule it out, either. For now, these narratives can be seen as structured around the claim that the major ideological alternatives to liberal modernity have lost their plausibility and that history would remain circumscribed within twentieth-century liberalism.
The intellectual scaffolding of these end-of-history narratives was based on a set of assumptions which became so deeply embedded in the post-Cold War settlement that they are no longer recognized as assumptions at all. Oftentimes, disappointment with or criticism of these narratives is grounded in the taken-for-granted end-of-history paradigm, and as a result seems directed at the failure of these narratives to live up to the standards of fortune-telling rather than addressing their own underlying logic. Revisiting the set of assumptions that underpinned them will allow us to understand what made these narratives plausible, why the equilibrium they were pointing towards may not have been stable, and, finally, what the possible responses may be.
Writing at the close of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama provided the conceptual framework for the argument that liberal democracy is the likely permanent destination of modernity. This argument echoed a broadly-shared intuition at a time when liberalism emerged as the winner of the 20th century’s ideological contests. Having resolved the tensions that had propelled history forward, liberal modernity, so the argument went, represented a stable and unique equilibrium. Fukuyama’s thesis has been read either as a philosophical provocation or as a geopolitical prophecy, tainted in the eyes of its critics by what they saw as Western triumphalism and, more recently, hubris—yet his optimistic vision eventually shaped the West’s understanding of itself as the culmination of the process of modernization.
The deeper structure of Fukuyama’s argument was always subtler than the reductionist interpretation offered by its critics. His claim contained two distinct strands. The first centered on the universality of the human desire for recognition (thymos in Greek) and can be traced back to the earlier end-of-history accounts of Hegel and Kojève. The second emphasized the stabilizing role of liberalism’s capacity to sustain economic growth. While these aspirations were distinct, they were mutually reinforcing within the institutional framework of liberal democracy. This framework implies that by channeling the desire for recognition, which throughout history has often displayed zero- or negative-sum dynamics, into positive-sum forms of economic competition, liberal democracy could produce a stable political order.
There is also a geopolitical dimension to this mutually reinforcing relationship between recognition and growth. Since liberal democracies tend to produce more dynamic economies, they would be expected to command greater fiscal resources for their own defense, and more broadly for sustaining their international position. Seen from this perspective, recognition, prosperity, and power went hand in hand.
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The importance Fukuyama assigns to continuous economic growth may seem surprising, given its relative detachment from his main argument centered on recognition. It is better understood, in my view, when considered alongside another intellectual tradition that sees in the overcoming of scarcity an opportunity for individuals to turn toward the “art of life”—the cultivation of relationships, beauty, and contemplation. In his 1930 essay Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, John Maynard Keynes imagined a future in which technological progress would free humanity from the necessity of labor. In such a world, individuals would de-emphasize the importance of work and the accompanying increase in material living standards. Working as little as fifteen hours a week, they would devote the remainder of their time to leisure, which Keynes understood broadly as the cultivation of friendships, culture, and contemplation. Keynes’s vision was an end of economic history—economic activity was not so much an arena for the quest for recognition as a problem that ultimately required a solution.
Not that Fukuyama’s thymos would necessarily be incompatible with the pursuit of intellectual or artistic excellence. If we were to look for a counterexample, Renaissance Florence springs to mind. But by emphasizing recognition as a central human motive and by locating it in socially valued activity, Fukuyama’s framework lends itself to tying dignity to participation in economic life.
At first glance, these visions appear to belong to different intellectual registers. Keynes answers an economic question, while Fukuyama’s work is firmly grounded in political philosophy. But a side-by-side comparison of their broader frameworks reveals not only a difference in the predictions they made but, more importantly, a difference in their underlying anthropologies. Keynes assumed that, once scarcity was overcome, individuals (as well as societies) would convert productivity gains into leisure, understood as “the art of life.” While aware of the danger that such leisure could easily devolve into passivity, dissipation, and ennui, Keynes advocated a more active role for society in educating individuals to make meaningful use of their soon-to-be acquired freedom. Fukuyama’s framework, by contrast, implied that work would remain central to social life, not so much because it was economically necessary, but because it offered a socially legitimate arena for the quest for recognition.2
A post-scarcity and post-work society would represent an alternative end of history, yet this emergence means we are confronted with the problem of multiple equilibria and historical indeterminacy.
Nested within the opposition I have been sketching out is a certain ambiguity. One way to look at this opposition is to see it as fundamentally structured around the question of the intensity of societal mobilization. In this interpretation, Fukuyama’s account points towards a society that remains mobilized even once it reaches the end of history, with this mobilization being primarily sustained through market participation. Conversely, a Keynesian society may appear to us as relatively demobilized precisely because mobilization would historically have been necessary only as a solution to material scarcity. On closer examination, we can also see this opposition as stemming from the object of mobilization rather than its intensity. In Keynes’ view, mobilization should be directed towards intrinsic goods rather than towards market-mediated recognition.
The divergence between the Fukuyamian and Keynesian horizons points towards a deeper structural problem confronting modern liberal societies. A society focused on leisure faces two distinct dangers, even when it is economically stable. Internally, the emphasis on leisure may lead to passivity and feelings of dissociation, while externally, rivals who prioritize economic expansion, industrial capacity, and military power may have their own plans. The postwar West, and subsequently the post-Cold War order, can be seen as a continued effort to reconcile these pressures—an effort that has proven increasingly difficult to sustain over time.
This process of reconciliation took broadly similar forms on both sides of the Atlantic. During an initial phase stretching roughly from 1930 to 1970, policymakers—drawing on the ideas of Keynes himself—focused on maintaining full employment through expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, automatic stabilizers, and financial regulation. The extraordinary circumstances in which this response initially took shape—overcoming the Great Depression, sustaining the war effort during World War II, financing the reconstruction of Western Europe, and supporting the military expenditure of the early Cold War—meant that it crystallized through a series of piecemeal solutions to major challenges rather than as a result of a grand strategy, though there was certainly an internal coherence.
Beginning in the 1970s, however, rising energy prices, stagflation, and growing labor costs placed increasing pressure on the Keynesian model of demand management. Western governments gradually shifted toward market-led growth, centered on trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, labor market liberalization, reductions in top marginal and capital tax rates, monetary tightening, financial liberalization, and the promotion of new technologies and the knowledge economy.
The resulting outcomes were somewhat different on each side of the Atlantic. In the United States, economic growth and technological innovation were accorded greater priority relative to competing policy objectives. In Western Europe, these two objectives were balanced against a stronger emphasis on social protection, shorter working hours, and the resulting expansion of leisure. In this respect, Europe remained more aligned with the world imagined by Keynes for his grandchildren, while the American policy landscape assumed a more Fukuyamian character. But beneath this divergence, there was also significant overlap.
This reconciliation of the Fukuyamian and Keynesian horizons was premised on the absorption of productivity gains into the market domain rather than on converting some of these gains into the substantial increase in leisure once imagined by Keynes. That said, economic growth cannot consist indefinitely in producing more of the same within traditional sectors. Further economic expansion would presuppose the emergence of new sectors, and here Keynes’ key intuition in his Economic Possibilities has turned out more insightful than his critics generally give him credit for, albeit in a form he did not anticipate. Rather than undergoing a transition from labor to leisure, from striving to detachment, or from the extrinsic to the intrinsic, economic activity increasingly incorporated leisure-like pursuits within itself. In the United States and other advanced economies, this took the form of a gradual shift away from manufacturing toward technology, finance, business services, and a wide range of cultural and symbolic industries, even as employment also expanded in lower-skilled sectors such as construction, trucking, retail, hospitality, and care work.
Many of Keynes’ grandchildren may never have arrived at the leisurely Bloomsbury existence he imagined for them, but they did embrace the opportunities offered to them by the emerging symbolic production economy, where creativity, self-expression and status could increasingly be pursued within the sphere of economic activity itself.
But embedding leisure and symbolic production into economic activity only superficially mirrors the earlier shift from farming to manufacturing. The earlier shift brought about by the Industrial Revolution relocated labor within established economic domains. By contrast, the creative economy incorporates into economic circuits spheres of activity that were only partially governed by market norms.
Contemporary critics had already signaled this mounting tension between the traditional ethos of capitalism, centred on discipline and efficiency, which tended to be associated with the production side of the economy, and the new consumerist outlook, which celebrated self-expression and self-indulgent hedonism. It is against the backdrop of this growing malaise that the Nietzschean figure of the “last man” emerges as a contrapuntal theme in Fukuyama’s narrative, surfacing even in the almost forgotten second part of his book’s title.
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These tensions stem not only from the need to stimulate simultaneously the supply and demand sides of the economy, but also from frictions introduced by the expansion of markets into domains that have traditionally been associated with leisure, civic participation, and cultural life. As a result, to the old disagreements focused on distribution—who gets what—the new symbolic economy added a new set of disagreements over legitimacy—is what is being produced recognized as valuable?
This was not powered by consumer demand alone. It also reflected an institutional bias toward full-time labor participation with its accompanying high levels of consumption, reinforced by public policies promoting continuous labor market engagement. While liberal states see themselves as neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the good life, they tend to interpret this as compatible with continuous market expansion. Monetary policy has been oriented toward maintaining employment and price stability; tax and benefit systems were frequently structured around continuous labor market participation; retirement policies increasingly sought to extend working lives; regulatory frameworks facilitated the proliferation of new forms of economic activity. While most of these measures could be justified individually on technical grounds, they collectively reveal a strong institutional orientation toward economic growth.
The result was a system in which recognition, income, and social status became increasingly dependent on one’s standing in the evolving market economy. Cognitive and expressive skills, as well as cultural capital, tended to command high economic returns and enjoyed a privileged position in a new status hierarchy brought about by the knowledge economy. Conversely, those whose skillsets were rooted in the older industrial economy, local knowledge, and traditional forms of expertise experienced a loss of material security and social standing.
Furthermore, post-industrial economies saw not only an increase in consumer-facing symbolic forms of production, but also a proliferation of administrative, managerial, compliance, and coordination functions whose contribution to productivity, let alone human flourishing, often appeared uncertain. David Graeber’s Bullshit Jobs (2018) may have been provocatively titled, but it nonetheless captured a growing unease with forms of employment whose social value had become difficult to articulate even for those performing this work.
The emergence of a post-industrial economy was accompanied by a new division of labor that had both a domestic and an international dimension. In the United States, the high value-added knowledge- and culture-based economy tended to cluster in a number of coastal metropolitan regions, while the industrial hinterland experienced relative economic decline. But the expansion of the knowledge economy was both enabled and constrained by the relocation of manufacturing to countries with lower labor costs, most prominently China. This division of labor allowed the West, and particularly the United States, to specialize in abstraction (technology, finance, business services, and cultural production) while China and other emerging economies performed an increasing share of global manufacturing and pursued an export-led growth strategy. As these emerging countries recycled their trade surpluses into the U.S. financial markets, Western economies could expand their post-industrial sectors without immediately confronting the full implications of deindustrialization. And the resulting low interest-rate equilibrium to which these capital flows contributed allowed the U.S. economy—both its consumers and its government—to act as a consumer of last resort.
Both domestically and internationally, this division of labor had ramifications that went beyond economics. States with regional or global power ambitions saw the growing American technological platforms as a form of dependency, constraining policy autonomy and shaping social norms. Their preference for running trade surpluses and pursuing export-led growth can also be interpreted partly as a refusal to solidify this division of labor and accept a position of structural subordination within a U.S.-centred system. Within Western societies, constituencies anchored in more traditional economic sectors, and particularly in manufacturing, resisted an internal hierarchy that appeared to privilege metropolitan post-industrial lifestyles and worldviews. In both cases, the fault line runs between one economic ecosystem grounded in abstraction and another grounded in material production.
Lastly, the sources of dissatisfaction with the expansion of markets into symbolic production were not confined to displaced industrial workers. Leisure, information, and self-expression are domains in which market incentives tend to clash with social expectations. The commodification of information brought with it heightened anxieties about data extraction and attention capture. Clickbait journalism and algorithmic feeds are often at odds with social expectations of autonomy and meaning, tending to be seen as intrusions rather than information abundance. The new digital economy is also more difficult to measure.
The institutional architecture of the postwar West was designed to absorb productivity gains through the expansion of market activity rather than through an increase in leisure. Perhaps as an attempt to satisfy the Fukuyamian aspiration to recognition and material abundance and the Keynesian quest for meaningful leisure—or perhaps because this was simply the path of least resistance—Western economies increasingly incorporated leisure-like activities within markets.
Why did the end of history end up being a far less stable equilibrium than once expected? Fukuyama’s central argument—that liberal democracy offers the most compelling institutional response to the human drive for recognition—has proven remarkably resilient. Yet, at the same time, his confidence in economic growth to overcome social, cultural, and geopolitical tensions appears in hindsight to have been excessive. Thus the liberal democratic order has found itself confronting multiple sources of discontent—geopolitical, economic, and cultural.
In his late work, Titian increasingly abandoned sharply defined contours and adopted a more loose style focusing on patches of colour, light, and shadow. Close up, these paintings appeared chaotic, but as the viewer stepped back, each painting became clearer.
A similar approach should guide our outlook on the post-Cold War era. Seen from close range, a number of recent trends—rising inequality, migration, cultural polarization and fragmentation, geopolitical rivalry, technological disruption—can each provide an alternative causal explanation for the erosion of the post-Cold War settlement. Seen from a greater distance, however, these trends appear less as likely ultimate causes than as manifestations of deeper structural instability.
Western liberal democracies have sought to reconcile (or, at the very least, balance) Keynes’s vision of a society increasingly oriented toward leisure and self-expression with Fukuyama’s vision of a recognition-based liberal order sustained by economic growth. This synthesis was premised on the notion that recognition, growth, self-expression and geopolitical power are mutually reinforcing. During the 1990s and 2000s, this assumption appeared prima facie plausible. But more recent events have revealed that the dynamics between these aspirations are characterized by trade-offs just as much as by alignment. The post-Cold War order, whose self-understanding took the form of an end-of-history narrative, represented a historically specific equilibrium between these overarching objectives. As these trade-offs became increasingly apparent, the end-of-history narrative began to lose its plausibility.
What comes after the end of history? Historical transitions are rarely experienced as clean substitutions of one model for another. Often, inherited institutions persist while their underlying rationale appears increasingly uncertain. Several tendencies are now becoming increasingly visible.
Liberal democratic governments are already becoming less willing to rely on market dynamics alone to mobilize resources for specific policy objectives, particularly in areas related to industrial capacity and strategic autonomy. There is a growing recognition that post-industrial liberalism was premised on a global division of labor that, however efficient it may be, can become a geopolitical vulnerability. The ability of advanced economies to specialize indefinitely in abstraction while outsourcing material production appears questionable today.
A parallel trend, driven by similar underlying concerns, is also surfacing in the information sphere, with a laissez-faire approach to the digital ecosystem proving vulnerable to foreign interference. And perhaps the problem is broader: market dynamics in the information space may be driving polarization, disinformation, and algorithmic manipulation even in the absence of an active foreign actor.
There is also a growing understanding that economic growth is, on its own, less likely to deliver political legitimacy than previously imagined. Conflicts over social status and cultural cohesion, which sustained economic growth was assumed to mitigate, started to resurface within liberal societies. If growth provides less political legitimacy than it once did, the politics of the coming decades may become less centered on distribution alone and instead focus on competing conceptions of social value. Moreover, contemporary technological change related to artificial intelligence, insofar as it reduces the social relevance of work and perhaps further orientates economic activity towards the more abstract, may reopen the tension between the Keynesian and the Fukuyamian horizons.
Huizinga observed the emergence of a cleavage in the late medieval world between inherited forms and the world around them. We are likely observing a similar dissonance today, as the relationship between our end-of-history narratives and the world around us begins to weaken. It is too early to tell what will replace this set of assumptions, but recognizing that they are assumptions—rather than features of a permanent settlement—is a first step in understanding the world to come.
R.M. Anghel holds a PhD in economics and has worked as an economist across academia, public policy, international organizations and private-sector advisory roles.
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1I am grateful to Casa Paleologu for the opportunity to explore some of the themes developed in this essay in a course I taught there in July 2025.
2While such aspirations can be traced back to classical Greek thought, the second half of the nineteenth century made what John Stuart Mill called a “stationary state” appear technologically conceivable.
This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
In less than three weeks’ time Israelis are scheduled to vote in national elections they widely view as the most consequential of their lives. The most common term used in the country these days to describe the salience of the upcoming election is “B’hirot Goraliot”—literally, fate-defining elections. According to a September survey by the Jewish People Policy Institute, 81% of Israelis regard the October 27 election as either “the most important in the country’s history” (40%) or “especially important” (41%).
Popular awareness that the stakes are high, however, has not translated into clear political choices. On the contrary. In its fragmentation, mercuriality, conspiracism, and cast of fantastical characters, contemporary Israeli politics makes Game of Thrones look like The Golden Girls. The political waters in which Israelis are swimming—domestically, in the Palestinian arena, in the region and the wider world—are all swirling.
This translates into chaotic electoral politics. In a country of ten million people, no fewer than thirty-eight parties—including The Pirates Party and a list dedicated to achieving national unity through marijuana consumption—are running for seats in Israel’s 120-member parliament, the Knesset. Even the most dedicated students of Israeli politics have abandoned all hope of remembering the names of its political parties; as they sprout in the morning, then merge, splinter, and defect in the afternoon, or evaporate by nightfall. In this electoral season there is even a character called “Winter,” and Winter is coming, but only if he passes the electoral threshold.
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Of the thirty-eight parties in the race, somewhere between eleven and fourteen are expected to achieve the magic 3.25% threshold of valid ballots cast and make it into the Knesset—a minimum of four seats, which means roughly 172,000 votes. The outcome of the elections may well hinge on one or two small parties failing to clear the threshold by a few hundred votes.
But who will sit with whom in what kind of coalition government, under what conditions, and under whose leadership? The range of possible permutations is near infinite, yet some measure of order can be imposed on this shape-shifting mess using scenarios. Five such scenarios are structurally possible. Each needs to be taken seriously, none are inevitable, though some are more likely than others.
Before proceeding to outline each scenario specific to October 27, a word about what the existence of this degree of uncertainty means. Sometimes, to paraphrase George Orwell, the first duty of a sober observer is the restatement of the obvious. Functional democracies do not normally face five alternative outcomes less than three weeks before a crucial election. With rare exceptions, two-party systems produce binary results—either one party wins, or the other. In multi-party systems, like Israel, the range of the possible should extend to no more than a third scenario—the establishment of some form of coalition government. The fact that electoral politics in Israel now deviates from this bounded set of options indicates a degree of democratic volatility and fragility both novel and concerning. Only one scenario points to a path towards national recovery and repair after the terrible traumas of the past few years.
Scenario One: DisruptionThe first scenario is one in which the election is postponed, interrupted, or contested so severely that its legitimacy is seriously questioned. This has never happened in seventy-eight years of modern Israeli statehood and would have been unthinkable even five years ago. After three years of a multifront war that is essentially ongoing—Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, none of which are resolved—and amidst a combustible internal atmosphere, however, disruption is not a hypothetical and could come from multiple sources. Israelis certainly fear the prospect. An Israel Democracy Institute survey in July found that 72% of Jewish and 58.5% of Arab Israelis believe the integrity of elections is in danger, and that was before repeated warnings in recent days by security chiefs that Israel’s enemies are seeking to subvert the election or exploit it as an opportunity for an armed attack.
We should distinguish between two categories of disruption. The first, and less likely, is formal postponement or the prevention of viable elections due to internal or external violence. Israeli law does not contemplate the possibility of elections being cancelled and a military coup in Israel is outside the realm of credible scenarios. The law does, however, provide for the possible temporary postponement of elections in the event of an extraordinary national emergency that makes voting impossible. There is no exhaustive list for such circumstances, but it would certainly include a large-scale missile attack by Iran and/or its remaining proxies—Shi’a militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or the Houthis in Yemen. It would also certainly include a surprise attack from a less predictable source, such as Syria, Sinai, or Turkey.
It is unclear whether the outbreak of a Third Intifada in the West Bank, rocket-fire from Gaza, the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers or civilians, large-scale rioting by protestors, or a high-level political assassination taking place shortly before or on elections day, would constitute grounds for postponement. The disruption would have to be widespread and debilitating enough to stymie the process in large parts of this small country. In any case, Israeli law sets strict limits on postponement. Delaying elections cannot be decreed. It requires the passage of Knesset legislation by a supermajority of two-thirds (80 members of Knesset) and the delay caused must be as brief as practicable—a condition that will be closely supervised by the courts.
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Disruption may also come in the form of a breakdown of trust in the electoral process or the announced outcome, either as the result of active subversion or, more corrosively, a large proportion of the Israeli public coming to believe that the election was “stolen” by the opposing camp and is therefore illegitimate. The latter is more likely to come from the pro-Netanyahu right, which is less concerned about the risk of voter suppression among Arab Israelis than it is about preventing initiatives helping Israeli expats fly home to vote in the upcoming election.
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Likud party has already petitioned Israel’s Central Elections Committee—the non-partisan national body responsible for conducting elections—to demand it blocks such initiatives, alleging that they constitute voter bribery. If the anti-Netanyahu camp wins by one or two Knesset seats, it is likely that at least some of his supporters will point to the expats and cry foul.
The Central Elections Committee is far better prepared to manage the threat of attempted subversion on the part of external actors than the more nebulous risk of internal conspiratorial mistrust. David Zini, head of the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security agency), recently told legislators in closed session that Iran is the leading foreign actor seeking to interfere in the Israeli vote—with Russia, China, and Turkey also involved—and that candidates themselves may be targeted.
The raw material for an Israeli version of the January 6, 2021 assault on the U.S. Capitol is in place and may or may not be kindled on October 27. If it does, and trust in the essential integrity of elections is destroyed, Israel will find itself in a constitutional crisis that it has no agreed rules to resolve.
Scenario Two: StalemateThe second scenario—inconceivable a year ago, improbable two months ago, but now perhaps the most likely—is stalemate: an outcome where neither bloc obtains the sixty-one seats needed to form the barest majority; no combination of parties manages to negotiate a coalition; or the anti-Netanyahu camp decides it is better off going to another round of elections than attempting to form a minority government.
Israelis are intimately familiar with this situation, having lived through it repeatedly in recent history, and many now believe it is about to happen again. A survey published by Haaretz on October 1, for example, saw 49% of respondents express the view that the elections will not be determinative and that the country will likely go to another round.
Israel held five rounds of national elections between April 2019 and November 2022. Of these, two ended up in stalemate, but for different reasons. The elections of April 2019 saw Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc nominally achieve a majority, but Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party refused to join over the Haredi miliary draft issue, leading to another round of elections five months later. Those produced another stalemate, with neither Netanyahu’s nor Benny Gantz’s Blue and White bloc able to reach sixty-one. The Knesset promptly dissolved, forcing a third election in March 2020, just as the world plunged into the Covid pandemic.
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Current opinion polls suggest a stalemate, with neither the perennial Netanyahu nor his maiden chief opponent, and Gantz’s erstwhile party member, Gadi Eizenkot, likely to secure more than 52-55 seats for their respective blocs. If the polls are correct, Eizenkot can rely on 54 seats—23 for his own Yashar party, 12 from Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid’s combined Beyahad party, 10 from Yair Golan’s The Democrats—remnants of the old, once hegemonic, Israeli Labor Party, plus left-secular-cosmopolitan Meretz—and 9 seats provided by the seasoned Avigdor Lieberman, still at the helm of Yisrael Beiteinu (more about him in scenario four).
Facing Eizenkot’s 54, under this scenario, will be Netanyahu’s 52-54: a diminished Likud with 20-21 seats, the Ashkenazi Haredi party United Torah Judaism (UTJ) with 8, the Sephardic Haredi party, Shas, with 7, and the three ultra-nationalist parties, Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit, 7-8, Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist party, 6, and Ofer Winter’s Amcha Yisrael party, 4. Neither bloc would be able to reach sixty-one, even if they include the only Arab party that would agree to sit in a Zionist coalition government, Ra’am, or in the unlikely event that every single one of the right-wing satellite parties currently hovering just above or below the electoral threshold make it through.
For Netanyahu, stalemate would represent a “win on points”; for Eizenkot, it would spell disaster. Under Israeli law, Netanyahu continues to serve as prime minister unless and until a new government, headed by an alternative PM, is sworn in by the Knesset. If he can force a stalemate, Netanyahu remains interim PM after October 27 and can then use all his skill to set the agenda, divide and rule, and take the country into another electoral round in April 2027 (then another and another still if he needs to) until he does to Eizenkot what he did to the now politically defunct Benny Gantz—grind him down to irrelevance.
Gadi Eizenkot has one shot to slay the dragon; if he does not win this round, he will be weaker in the next, as the anti-Bibi camp searches desperately for the next Benny, the next Gadi, to lead the charge against Bibi. Eizenkot, more politically savvy than Gantz, knows this full well, and will do everything in his power to avoid the stalemate trap. But there is another trap waiting for him in scenario five.
Scenario Three: A Netanyahu-bloc VictoryUnder a third scenario, Netanyahu’s camp would win a majority to form a narrow but viable government. This could happen through a combination of several factors. First, voting rates in favor of the pro-Netanyahu camp will need to be substantially higher than for the anti-Netanyahu bloc. A low Arab-Israeli voting rate would reward the pro-Bibi camp by increasing the likelihood that small far-right parties manage to cross the electoral threshold.
Second, Netanyahu could eke out a victory if the existing members of his coalition, especially Likud, do dramatically better at the ballot box than most polls predict. Channel 14—roughly speaking, Israel’s version of Fox News—wishcasts exactly this, with Likud winning 31-32 seats, rather than the 20-22 recorded by other pollsters.
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Third, the Netanyahu bloc could win if its existing members do substantially better than most polls predict and the two new right-wing satellite parties cross the electoral threshold and join a Netanyahu-led coalition. The most significant of these is Ofer Winter’s new far-right party, Amcha Yisrael, which could give Netanyahu the crucial 4-5 seats he requires to retain power. Similarly, Netanyahu could end up on top if, during coalition negotiations, yet another small satellite party, The Reservists, crosses the electoral threshold and breaks its promise not to sit in government with the ultraorthodox. Lastly, in the cauldron of post-elections coalition negotiations, Netanyahu might poach a party from the opposing camp, for example Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu, or Naftali Bennett’s Beyahad. An outright Netanyahu victory remains a tall order, but it is far from inconceivable, and the momentum of the past few weeks is drifting exactly in this direction.
A Netanyahu bloc win, even if by a bare majority, would amount to a vote of confidence in the same government that orchestrated the attempted dismantlement of the rule of law in Israel and then presided over the country’s worst security disaster—a multilayered failure it has consistently refused to impartially investigate—which was followed by three years of unresolved war.
To the Israeli soft right this would be explicable in terms of Netanyahu’s grit and experience: After being punched in the face by Yahya Sinwar in the brutal terrorist invasion of October 7, 2023, the logic would be, Bibi got himself off the floor and, despite intense international pressure, proceeded to fight a determined multifront war against Israel’s mortal enemies, all of whom are now either gone (the Assad regime in Syria), broken (Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon), or diminished (Iran). The vote for Netanyahu, for this sizeable portion of Israeli society, would be justified because the war is not over and because they believe that none of the alternatives to Netanyahu—not Eizenkot, Bennett, or Lieberman, let alone Yair Lapid—would have withstood the pressures of the past three years.
Under this scenario, Netanyahu remains the default choice for the Israeli electorate—an electorate that has moved strongly to the right after October 7—not because they believe he is blameless for October 7, but because, when push comes to shove, they conclude that in the face of continued existential dangers no one is better qualified to navigate the ship. Netanyahu’s main campaign message is directed precisely at this narrative. Strewn across Israel are giant posters with his image next to a two-word caption: “Doesn’t Surrender.”
To the nationalist-religious camp, a Netanyahu victory would mean vindication and license wrapped in messianic cellophane. Like the son of the widow of Zarephath, whom the prophet Elijah brought back from the dead, Netanyahu is resurrected in an astonishing feat of political revival. The true sons of Israel are with him and have been handed a popular mandate to complete the judicial overhaul, sweep away the last remaining bastions of the liberal “deep state,” extend efforts to drive Palestinians out of Gaza, and annex Judea and Samaria.
For liberal Israelis, this outcome would signal that the Israel they were born and grew up in is no more; that the country’s DNA has irrevocably mutated to illiberalism and that—given the steady demographic tilt in favor of the nationalist-religious—they are unlikely to win another election ever again. If not now, when?
In retrospect, under this scenario, we would look back at the November 2022 election as the crucial tipping-point at which a certain Israel perished, and another was born. Viewed through this lens, October 2026 would be seen as the mere consolidation of the historic triumph of Israel’s religious right. Judaism has beaten secular Zionism; conservative Judea has vanquished liberal Israel.
For secular-liberal Israelis the loss would also mean diminished faith in the capacity of the state—a state they fight for and disproportionately fund through their taxes—to provide long-term physical and ontological security to their children. It would be read as a clear signal that the essential link between government performance and democratic accountability has been severed, and that, going forward, tribal identity politics would be so dominant that the fundamental corrective mechanisms of democracy no longer work in Israel.
Some liberal Israelis—the most cosmopolitan and mobile—will give up and leave, emigrating reluctantly into an increasingly antisemitic world. Some will take inspiration from Hungary and continue to struggle for a liberal-democratic Israel. Others will stay to defend their gradually shrinking enclaves; others still will try to moderate the transition to a religious-nationalist Israel or will join the successor regime.
Scenario Four: An Anti-Netanyahu VictoryA fourth scenario would see a narrow victory for the opposing bloc, which is united by one goal and one goal only—the removal of Netanyahu from power. The anti-Bibi camp, referred to as Gush Ha’Shinui (“the Change Bloc”) is composed of four core parties—Yashar, Beyahad, Yisrael Beiteinu, and The Democrats—the leaders of which, with the exception of Yair Golan of The Democrats, all see themselves as the most qualified to replace Netanyahu as PM.
Until a month ago polls suggested the combined strength of the four might just achieve the 61 seats required to form a narrow but viable majority or at least reach the 57-60 seats needed for a minority government propped up from outside with the backing of the Arab-Israeli parties, who are desperate to dispatch Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, and Smotrich.
That is no longer the case, as the momentum has drifted away from the Change Bloc over the past weeks. The polls may be off, and we can envisage a reality in which the Change Bloc wins a bare majority through a combination of a dramatically high anti-Netanyahu voting rate (here again the Arab-Israeli voting rate may prove decisive) coupled with a low pro-Netanyahu one, as disappointed Likud voters stay at home on elections day. But if the latest polls are to be believed, even if the four core members of the Change Bloc bring in Ra’am—and all except The Democrats have vowed not to do so—they are unlikely to rise above 60 seats.
To comfortably clear 61, therefore, the Change Bloc would have to first hope that Ofer Winter’s Amcha Yisrael and The Reservists cross the electoral threshold and then manage to persuade both that—in order to avoid a stalemate, and for the sake of establishing “a Zionist government” that would exclude the “anti-Zionist” Arab and Ultraorthodox parties—they have no choice but to join the Change Bloc. Israeli journalist Raviv Drucker has recently argued that Eizenkot may be able to bring Winter into his coalition by first trying to form a national unity government with Likud, and failing, so that Winter can justify his switching camps as being both reluctant and necessary to prevent Ra’am from being in government. Under such a scenario, Drucker observes, Amcha Yisrael and The Reservists would be able to demand senior cabinet positions, with Winter likely becoming Israel’s next minister of defense.
A less likely, but not entirely inconceivable, variation would have the Change Bloc poach a party currently solidly in the Netanyahu camp, possibly Shas, by bestowing lavish budgets and ministerial appointments upon it while violating their own campaign promises on key policy issues, such as a major compromise on the Haredi military draft.
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The question of Haredi military service is worth lingering on for a moment as it stands at the core of the identity-based fissure between the contending camps and is by far the anti-Netanyahu bloc’s most salient argument for his replacement. The Haredi draft dispute pertains to the question of whether ultraorthodox men, long exempted from compulsory military service so they can study Torah full-time, must serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) like all other Jewish Israelis. The rapid demographic growth of the ultraorthodox—a population that grows by about 4% per year, the fastest rate among any population in the developed world—means that what in 1948 appeared to be a token concession by David Ben-Gurion to four hundred yeshiva students, now extends to tens of thousands of draft-age men. After two decades of failed attempts to legislate a consensual formula, in June 2024 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Haredi draft exemption has no legal basis and cannot continue. At the same time, the heavy burden imposed by the post-October 7 wars on the rest of Israeli society, particularly the reservists and their families, turned a simmering chronic grievance into an acute demand to sanction those who do not serve.
The IDF has since issued roughly 24,000 call-up orders, to which only about 1,200 Haredi recruits responded, while polling shows 85% of non-Haredi Jewish Israelis favor sanctioning those who refuse to share in the national defense burden. The pro-Netanyahu coalition depends on the ultraorthodox parties (United Torah Judaism and Shas) and has therefore tried to legislate the exemption back into law. Yet the pro-Netanyahu bloc itself is deeply divided on this issue, since Likud and religious-Zionist voters (Otzma Yehudit and the Religious Zionism party) serve in large numbers. In fact, the religious-Zionist community, which makes up roughly 10% of Israel’s population, has sacrificed disproportionally in the post-October 7 wars, with roughly one-third of all fallen soldiers coming from this community.
If anything can make right-leaning Israelis switch camps and side with the Change Bloc, it is the absolute knowledge that every single one of its leaders—particularly Eizenkot, who lost his son, Gal, in the December 2023 battle of Jabaliya in Gaza—is determined to increase Haredi service rates as part of a broader drive to integrate the ultraorthodox into modern Israeliness.
An outright victory for the anti-Netanyahu bloc remains a tall order, but not an impossibility, especially if it is Avigdor Lieberman who will emerge as PM under this scenario. It is Gadi Eizenkot’s Yashar party that is certain to be the largest opposition party. But this does not automatically mean Eizenkot will stand at the head of a Change Government. Israeli law provides that it is not the head of the largest political party, but the head of the party most likely to be able to form a stable government, that is invited by Israel’s president to attempt forming a coalition. In 2021, Naftali Bennett became prime minister at the head of a party with only six Knesset seats.
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Something similar could happen with Lieberman this time. With his hawkish reputation, close personal ties to Ofer Winter (who reputedly despises Eizenkot), distance from the October 7 debacle, and decades of experience in senior roles—including minister of finance (2021-22), minister of defense (2016-2018), and deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (2009-2012 and again in 2013-2015)—it is Lieberman, not Eizenkot or Bennett, who may prove to be the only enzyme capable of the alchemical feat of ousting Netanyahu.
Whether headed by Lieberman, Eizenkot, or Bennett, a narrow Change Bloc government that will see Netanyahu deposed and his current coalition partners sent into opposition will be greeted with relief by Israeli moderates as well as most international audiences. Yet unless it can be quickly enlarged—by poaching a few members of the opposition or bringing in another party—a narrow Change Government will be immediately vulnerable to internal fissures and the risk of defections. Unlike the pro-Netanyahu camp, there is no ideological glue holding an anti-Netanyahu coalition together, and the fate of a 2026 Change Government could easily replicate that of the 2021 Change Government, which disintegrated after a year.
In the longer term, the most demoralizing and dangerous outcome for the liberal camp in Israel may not be a stalemate that drags the country into another round of elections, but a fragile anti-Bibi victory that then produces a dysfunctional coalition paralyzed by endless bickering and is liable to crumble in the face of its first serious internal or security challenge.
Scenario Five: A Broad Centrist Coalition (with or without Netanyahu)Which brings us to the final scenario: the dissolution, or at least temporary suspension or blurring, of the pro-Bibi/anti-Bibi firewall that defines all other scenarios, and the emergence of some form of broad centrist coalition.
At its broadest, such a coalition would extend from Ra’am—an Arab party whose number two is now Yoav Segalovich, a Jewish, proudly Zionist former police commissioner—and The Democrats, on the left, through Yashar, Beyahad, and The Reservists in the center, to Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu on the right. Based on current polling, such a coalition would command 82 Knesset seats, more than two-thirds of members—an enormous majority capable of passing any legislation it can agree on.
Even a somewhat more limited, but more ideologically aligned, center-right coalition composed of Yashar, Likud, Beyahad, Yisrael Beiteinu, Amcha Yisrael, and The Reservists—which would exclude the more divisive Democrats, Arab parties, and Jewish ultranationalists and ultraorthodox parties—would command some 70 seats. It would be a broad coalition capable of far-reaching reforms, including in politically sensitive areas such as military conscription, constitutional changes, and law enforcement vis-à-vis settler violence and organized crime in the Arab-Israeli community.
The temporary suspension of rivalry between antagonistic political camps is familiar to Israelis. In 1967, four days before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (of the Mapai party, the predecessor of Labor) brought the Menachem Begin-led opposition Gahal bloc (precursor of Likud) into the government, uniting 111 members of Knesset in the face of an imminent existential threat. National unity governments built on Labor-Likud cooperation were also formed to save Israel from hyperinflation (1984-88) and manage the crisis presented by the collapse of the Oslo Process and outbreak of the Second Intifada (2000-2002).
What are the prospects of something similar taking shape in late 2026? The answer depends, first and foremost, on whether Israel faces either an extraordinary national emergency or an exceptional geopolitical opportunity sometime between October 28 and mid-December. War with Iran-Houthis or Turkey would constitute an example of the former, but so could the outbreak of a Third Intifada in the West Bank. The world of 2026 is, sadly, defined by the proliferation of known unknowns and unknown unknowns that could force even Netanyahu and Eizenkot together. Conversely, the imminent and credible prospect of a regional “deal of the century”—involving normalization with Saudi Arabia that is conditional on progress towards Palestinian self-determination—is an example of a positive game changer that could drive the Israeli center left and center right to temporarily unite.
Barring such a deus ex machina, the prospect of a broad centrist coalition increases dramatically if Netanyahu exits the political scene. This could happen for health reasons, by Netanyahu agreeing to a plea bargain in which he receives a preemptive presidential pardon for his criminal indictments, or through some force majeure. All three heads of the Change Bloc who are credible candidates for PM—Eizenkot, Bennett, and Lieberman—would be willing to make far-reaching concessions to a post-Netanyahu Likud, including offering his successor the prospect of a rotating premiership—a power-sharing arrangement in which two coalition leaders agree to split a government’s term, each serving as PM for part of it.
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None of them, however, would be so naïve as to enter a rotation agreement with Netanyahu, who has repeatedly destroyed his opponents by making, and then breaking, rotation deals. Eizenkot in particular has had a front row seat to the undoing of his colleague, Benny Gantz, who broke his promise to his electorate and signed a rotation agreement with Netanyahu in the early months of the Covid crisis. The Netanyahu-Gantz “emergency government” was sworn in on 17 May 2020, with Netanyahu as PM and Gantz as “alternate prime minister” and defense minister, due to rotate into the premiership in November 2021. It never happened. Netanyahu let a budget vote fail and dissolved the Knesset in late December 2020, taking Israel to another round of elections in March 2021. Benny Gantz never recovered. The man who, in April 2019, stood at the helm of the mighty Blue and White party with 35 Knesset seats is now being urged by the Change Bloc to announce his withdrawal from the race; Blue and White is now utterly defunct, scoring 0% of the projected vote.
After seven years of political instability, toxic polarization, and war, Israel desperately needs a government broad enough to possess the legitimacy and stability necessary for the country to heal, reform, and rebuild. Assuming the elections scheduled for October 27 are not disrupted, a stalemate on October 28 may, just may, compel a torn and exhausted Israel to negotiate the formation of some kind of unity government.
As one wag put it after three Israeli passengers rescued Fly Dubai flight 1073 from being hijacked and crashed last month, it is Netflix that should take out a subscription on Israel.
Amichai Magen is the founding director of the Jan Koum Israel Studies Program at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.
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Owen Zidar is a Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University.
Eric Zwick is the Joel F. Gemunder Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk, Owen Zidar, and Eric Zwick discuss why the real concentration of American wealth lies with small business owners rather than tech billionaires, and whether entrepreneurship remains a viable path to upward mobility.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: When we talk about the rich people in America, we think about Elon Musk, and you know, Sam Altman perhaps nowadays, and Mark Zuckerberg, and perhaps the Waltons and so on and so forth. But that is not where the real wealth lies in America, you argue. How is that the case?
Eric Zwick: We open the book with a very glamorous wedding. It’s a sixty million dollar wedding where the father of the bride and the parents of the bride flew all their guests by private jet to Paris. They rented out Versailles. They had Adam Levine sing the first dance. It was called the wedding of the century, and it was more expensive than Jeff Bezos’s recent wedding to Lauren Sanchez, at least per estimates from social media.
So you might have thought the road to wealth, how they got the money to have that wedding, was through Silicon Valley or through Wall Street—basically tech or finance, because that’s the typical path to prosperity that I think people have in their minds when you ask who’s really rich in America. Turns out that wealth came from a third generation car dealership. So the story of our book is a microcosmic version of that story, which is that there’s a tremendous amount of wealth that’s both more abundant than these Forbes 400 stories of tech and finance that we hear so much about, and also closer to home for many Americans than they think. Those are the everywhere millionaires that we write and talk about in the book.
Mounk: Give us some numbers on that. In your book, you take people with a net wealth of more than about five million dollars—how many of those are there in the United States? And when you put all of their wealth together, how does that compare to the wealth of, you know, the Forbes 400, the Forbes list of the wealthiest billionaires and trillionaires?
Owen Zidar: There are three million everywhere millionaires in the United States. Those are private business owners who have at least five million dollars in net worth. And if you add up their collective net worth, it’s thirteen times the total wealth of the richest four hundred people in the most recent year that we can measure, which is 2022.
Mounk: Help me understand that. You’re saying it’s business owners who have more than five million. What about a whole other category of people who are partners in law firms, on Wall Street? I was really struck—you’re political scientists, I’m a political scientist for my sins. At some point I tried to escape and did an internship at McKinsey, which obviously I didn’t tell anybody about at the time. The project that I was on that summer, for part of it, was for a pretty shitty software company that was basically fading. But the top salesperson each year would make more than a million dollars in commissions. This is not Google. This was not a software company you’ve heard of. It was not a software company that was thriving. And the top salesperson made a million a year. So presumably, do you exclude those kinds of people from that statistic? What role do they play?
Zwick: In the wealth data, when you think about how many people have more than five million in net worth—from the Survey of Consumer Finances we can get a good estimate of that—there are about five million households with that figure. Of that group, three million are private business owners, so the majority are. If you move further up the threshold, from five million to twenty-five million, then you see those working professionals who have accumulated substantial savings but maybe don’t own a stake in a company—they disappear. So private business ownership becomes more and more important the further up you go. At the $25 million, the $50 million, the $100 million threshold, you get to a point where pretty much they’re all private business owners.
There is a class of private business owner that we call a skilled service business owner, which your law firm partner would fall into. That’s an important element of the story of the rise of these everywhere millionaires—the skilled services companies where they own a stake in the upside. If it’s a boutique law firm, maybe there’s something more entrepreneurial about that than being a partner at Kirkland & Ellis. So we could have a nuanced conversation about how to interpret the behavior of those people. It’s relevant for some of the other arguments we make in the book about whether it’s labor versus financial capital that’s driving the rise of income inequality, but it is important to distinguish them for some of the conversation.
Mounk: Tell us a little bit more about where these people make the money and how they make the money. The lead example you give is an intergenerational car dealership. In a way you can say that seems like it’s inherited wealth—presumably the car dealership may have continued to expand over the generations, and in order to be able to pay for such an expensive wedding, the person running it at the moment must be doing a pretty good job. What share of these businesses are relatively new businesses? And by and large, are these people with fancy degrees from Ivy League universities? Are these people who studied marketing at the local community college? Are these working class people who started off as plumbers and then decided to take a risk and do their own plumbing company? What kind of composition does this group have, and how does that reinforce or complicate our picture of what kind of person rises to this quite remarkable wealth in America today?
Zidar: That’s a great question. In terms of inheritance, we estimate about a quarter of people in this group inherited their business. So the typical person either founded it or acquired it. And it’s a broad swath of people. The example you gave of a plumber working for ten years and then running a plumbing company is much more common. There are a lot of mundane businesses—ranging from a guy who started as a repo man repossessing cars to running one of the largest repossession companies in the country. There are some pretty large industries, like auto dealers, beverage distribution, realtors, contractors. There’s a guy who sold his business for two billion dollars in Phoenix for servicing garage doors. So it can be pretty mundane. Not all of them went to college, and especially not to advanced degrees. I think the typical one did go to college, has a college degree, but it’s often not a fancy school, because that’s just a smaller number of people. And most of them do not have advanced MBAs or other things, but the skilled services—the lawyers and that group—that subset do have advanced degrees.
Mounk: How should we think about this? I mean, one response to this is America is awesome, right? It’s a country with enormous opportunities. Even though we talk a lot about the downsides of a meritocracy, and you have to make it to Harvard in order to enter the most prestigious institutions in the country—much of which is true for a certain set of institutions and a certain set of career aspirations—here are these millions of people. You start out as plumbers, or servicing car garage doors, or saving up a little bit of money, investing in some business, being very good at running it, who are able to become richer than 99.99% of humans in the history of the world. What’s not to love? And hopefully some of these businesses actually do good jobs, right?
On the other hand, you might think that this amount of concentration of wealth, even if it’s not the Forbes 400 but the everyday millionaires, can have negative downstream social consequences. Perhaps sometimes they’re able to make money because they’re exploiting relationships with governments, closing off business opportunities to other people. Are you two cheers, one cheer, fifty-fifty, glass half full, glass half empty? How do we think about this?
Zwick: We were told, when we were having an earlier pitch about this book, that this is a unique time in history where being optimistic is also provocative.
Mounk: People hate nothing more than optimism. It provokes people to the bone.
Zwick: It’s amazing, right? So we’re having a little bit of fun with that, because we’re not trying to shy away from the part of the story that is kind of optimistic. There’s a part of the story where you think about the American dream—we’ll define that as people who start out with their parents in the bottom quintile of income and rise to the top quintile, achieving that kind of upward economic mobility. Going that way through an Ivy League school is a very, very rare outcome. It’s just a really small number of people who go that way, and it’s not a huge force multiplier in terms of the relative rate at which people achieve the American dream versus the base rate.
If you look at starting a business or being an entrepreneur, it’s almost an order of magnitude more common, because it’s much more accessible as a path, and it seems to be a force multiplier in the sense that if you’re up there, you’re much more likely to have been an entrepreneur than the base rate in the population. So this kind of risk-taking—starting out with relatively little, and not necessarily taking the credentialed labor market approach, the 1600 on the SAT path—seems to be a pretty important way to achieve upward mobility. And that’s something we should celebrate when people get there in ways that aren’t doing damage to society. But we should ask what are the precise ways in which they got there. That’s where there’s more nuance in the story, too.
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There are certain industries where folks at the top get really rich through maybe getting there but then erecting barriers behind them to entry or competition, so they achieve some local monopoly power. Some examples of industries we try to profile in the book would be that car dealer example, would be beer distributors. We talked about doctors and dentists, and the guilds that try to restrict what nurse practitioners and oral hygienists can do, which makes it harder to get those services and makes them more expensive. And then we get into tax policy, where we see the fingerprints of these “everywhere millionaires” littered across the tax code in ways that we find counterproductive and important for our fiscal position. So the optimism shades into realism, and it reveals problems that I think people are trying to solve, but maybe not understanding the problem as well as they should.
Mounk: One of my proudest achievements is that I was denounced in a public press release or letter or whatever by the president of the American Optometric Association for saying that you should not have to have a doctor’s prescription to get contacts, which you don’t have to in most European countries. I think some everyday millionaires took that as a threat to their ability to throw lavish weddings for their children, so they got quite upset.
But your book is very interesting to a lay reader, but it’s also a scholarly book. Tell me a little bit about the numbers here. When I’m thinking of this group of people who have over five million dollars of net worth, most of whom are business owners—how many of them grew up with a silver spoon in their mouth? How many of them worked their way up from the bottom of society in some kind of meaningful way? How many of them fall into the large middle category?
Zidar: There are different categories of how they did it. We have the set of people who started businesses, and the set of people who inherited. And it’s easier to track the people who founded a business. We have, underlying the book, the best data that anyone’s put together on entrepreneurship in America in the twenty-first century, where we have ten million entrepreneurs and can link many of them to where they came from to answer your question. The typical one did not come from a rich family—they’re often poor and middle class. Now, that’s not to say that richer kids don’t have many advantages for starting businesses—they start successful businesses at a much higher rate. But the key point is that there are so many more middle class and poor kids that even though rich kids have an advantage, once you have a large population of people, you get more numerous outcomes, even though their rate of starting one is lower than a rich kid’s.
Mounk: To make this plastic for the audience—let’s imagine that, well, by definition, 10% of people are in the top 10%. Let’s say they have twice the chance of the average to start a successful business. That’s an unfair advantage, right? We might think that’s a waste of talent and potential. We wish that everybody had the same opportunity to start a business. But even if that’s the case, then 20% of successful businesses are going to have been started by people in the top 10%. So they don’t end up taking up the majority of those successful businesses, even if they’re disproportionately likely to have done so, even if they got a leg up from having grown up in affluence.
Zwick: I can offer some specific numbers on that. That top 10% group, we think, accounts for about a third of star entrepreneurs, which we define as being in the top decile of firm performance after a few years—which is a good predictor of where you’re going to be in a decade, as a measure of star performance. And then we call the middle class, which is from the 33rd percentile of parent income up to the 90th percentile—I don’t know what your preferred definition of middle class is, but I think that’s a decently acceptable one—that’s about half, or a little bit more than half, of those star founders, coming from a group that’s about sixty percent of the population.
That gives you a sense that the relative odds from that top 10% group, compared to the bottom third group, are about six times the rate at which they become star founders. So there’s quite a lot of inequality in terms of the rate of success, which suggests that rich families are providing something to their kids. Is it financial resources? Is it occupational networks? Is it education? These are some of the questions we try to tackle and engage with, because they are founding successful companies at much higher rates than we think the underlying distribution of talent looks like.
Mounk: What about the middle group relative to the bottom group? The sort of stereotypical image of the American dream from—I was going to say the last century, but perhaps the previous century—is you start off washing dishes in a restaurant and you become a millionaire. Are people who are born in the bottom third just without a chance of making it into that group, or do they actually do pretty well too?
Zwick: About less than twenty percent of people from that bottom third become star founders. But there’s still a lot of them in that population.
Mounk: Well, obviously a lot less than twenty percent become star founders in general, presumably, but I take it you mean of the total population of star founders.
That’s a lot less depressing than you’d think, which is to say that their batting average is still more than fifty percent of the batting average of the population as a whole, if the bottom thirty-three percent end up representing twenty percent of star founders.
I have a reaction sometimes to Raj Chetty’s data where, obviously, the social origin of your parents influences your social origin, and some of his stats I’m like, yeah, that looks really bad, and some of his stats I’m like, that looks pretty good—that’s better than I’d expect. Now, obviously, we’d love to have equality totally, et cetera, I’m not saying normatively this is great, but I would bet that if I gave a multiple choice test to my very smart students and said, do you think that the bottom thirty-three percent of the income distribution has children that represent fifty, twenty, ten, five, or one percent of star founders, they would end up choosing something below twenty percent.
Zidar: I agree with you. One of the fun things about the book is that we could talk to some of these people and we include their stories. One is Dick Portillo, who grew up in the housing projects in Chicago and ended up not going to college and selling a hot dog business for a billion dollars. And then there’s another one named Saad Khan who, almost exactly like the situation you described, is an immigrant—was washing dishes, had five hundred dollars in his pocket when he came to the country to go to UIUC, ended up working at a car bumper company and becoming an owner of such a company. Toyota was an early client, and that really helped his business, and he ended up buying the Jacksonville Jaguars.
Mounk: Once you’ve talked about the social origins in all these different groups—what do they do with their money? We’ve talked about lavish weddings and so on, but what actually is the social impact of having this very large group of very affluent people? Here again, I could imagine telling a positive story where they become the sponsors of a local Little League team, very civically minded, engaged in their communities, the kind of pillars of why smaller towns—that aren’t where Wall Street is, that aren’t where the Hollywood studios are, that aren’t where Anthropic and OpenAI are located—still are able to provide amenities and have a society that holds together.
On the other hand, you could also imagine a very negative story where they use that money, first of all, to entrench their economic interests, to make sure that nobody can get contact lenses if they haven’t been to an eye doctor in the last two years. But even beyond that, to try and give their children a leg up in turn. I think there’s an interesting echo between your book and a book by Richard Reeves called Dream Hoarders—both some similarities and some differences of emphasis. Richard Reeves looks at a slightly broader group, the top 20 percent of society, and says, yes, if you’re Mark Zuckerberg, you can probably buy your kids’ way into Harvard, and that’s unfair. But when you look at why it is that the average social origin of people at Harvard is very high, that’s not Mark Zuckerberg—there aren’t that many billionaires, they don’t take up that many spots.
It is people growing up in super zip codes around Manhattan, around Washington, D.C., who have relatively ordinary jobs, make a good income, send their kids to very good schools, invest hugely in creating those opportunities for them. That’s the hoarding of opportunities—that’s actually what makes American society less mobile than it would be. So how does your argument relate to that argument?
Zwick: On your last point, I think we are suggesting that this credentialed path up through the Ivy League, those very scarce seats at those top schools, is way overweighted by this top twenty percent group when they’re thinking about how to make sure that their children have opportunities to at least become economically prosperous. That’s almost a status good more than it is a guarantee of economic success. That obsession is probably a little bit counterproductive, but it generates all kinds of weird, perverse behaviors that we see in the Varsity Blues scandal, or in some of Richard Reeves’s descriptions of that group.
Mounk: I don’t know how much of a sense you have of this, you probably don’t have statistics on it—but some of the members of this group may have aspirations of educational climbing, where they feel like if my kid goes to Harvard, that really is a feather in my cap. A lot of them may feel like, no, I want them to stay in state and get a sensible education, I want them to go and study business at the close-by campus of a state university or something like that.
Zwick: We say that they’re everywhere because, especially off the coasts, you really do find them in most cities and towns across the country. And in these places, you don’t see the same emphasis on a small number of elite schools as the goal for their kids—it’s not “Yale or die” or whatever. I think that’s an interesting observation, just thinking about what these kids end up doing. They do kind of aspire for their kids to take over the business, which is itself a challenge, because it’s hard to get your kids to be as excited about distributing garbage trucks as you maybe were. But they often stay closer to home, the kids of a lot of these everywhere millionaires, which is a different picture, but maybe not one that a lot of your listeners or folks who live in coastal markets have as much exposure to. Maybe you have some thoughts on the consumption habits, especially the first generation, this life cycle—we do spend a lot of time on that.
Zidar: It’s hard to systematically measure how people are spending their money, because one fact about the wealthy is that wealthy people don’t answer surveys. So we’ve pieced together things from real estate data, private jet data, super yacht data. And one thing that’s kind of striking is that you see inherited family firms—second and third generation folks—much more readily in this kind of high consumption, private jet and super yacht data. For some of the first generation people we talk to, often they’re rolling up their sleeves and working pretty hard initially, reinvesting a lot of their money in the business, and then as they get older you start to see more consumption. So it’s, as Eric was saying, a life cycle question of when this consumption is happening. But there are several decades when it does not look like they’re flying around on private jets.
Mounk: That’s interesting. You talked about the aspiration for the children to take over. I’m thinking about one of my favorite businesses in the United States, Absolute Bagels, up on Morningside Heights in New York. I’d thought about it previously in the context of cultural appropriation, because it was founded by Jewish refugees or immigrants to the United States, and became a very popular business. I assume it was quite financially successful—I don’t know how much money you rake in selling boatloads of bagels to people on a Sunday morning, I don’t know whether they would make the five million dollar net worth mark or not. But at some point their children decided that they didn’t want to take over the business and became, I believe, a lawyer or a doctor—or perhaps that’s just a cliché I made up in my mind. And instead the mostly Thai employees of this bagel shop decided to buy out the owners and have been running the company since. So that’s an interesting trajectory.
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By and large, do the owners of these businesses aspire for their children to take them over? And by and large, do the children of these businesses take them over? Or do they say, I stand to inherit a good amount of money from mommy and daddy, and there’s no need for me to go around making sure that my crews are repairing garage doors in the right way?
Zidar: Eric likes to say private equity is the child that many of these founders never had, because if they don’t want to have their kids checking on garage doors, they can sell it to private equity. I do think there’s a lot of complexity, and we explore that in part of the book—for these family-run firms, it can sometimes tear families apart if some people want to treat it like a serious business and other people want to treat it like a bank account. That creates enormous tension, and some founders want to avoid that. So it’s not always the case that they want this to stay in the family, and there’s a huge appetite among private equity firms, and also people graduating top business schools, to buy profitable businesses and take the reins rather than starting something from scratch.
Mounk: Tell us a little bit about this private equity part of it, because I think that’s something that has really developed over the course of the last few years, or at least decades. I think most listeners, when they think private equity, imagine billion dollar deals in which a company, maybe a household name, is being taken over by private equity, and in the worst version of it, sold for scraps, has a bunch of debt loaded onto it, and the PE firm somehow makes money off it and nobody else does. I think that’s often a kind of unfair caricature. But it is true that historically, when you go back thirty, forty years, the average private equity deal was quite sizable. And what you’re alluding to is that we increasingly have had private equity firms entering into these comparatively much smaller businesses—partially with PE firms that specialize in this, and partially, as you’ve pointed out, some people who’ve gone to business school think, I know how to run a business, I don’t want to build one up from scratch, that’s a risky proposition, I don’t want to go and work for Procter & Gamble as the deputy head of strategy. Why don’t I get together some money and buy out one of those businesses, professionalize it, especially if the owner is a little bit older and hasn’t kept up over the years, hasn’t brought the business fully online, hasn’t used the latest technology, and then I can make a killing that way. So tell us about that trend, that transformation, and how it’s changing the nature of these kinds of businesses.
Zwick: We think one way of understanding the ubiquity of the everywhere millionaire phenomenon is to think about how it’s changed different institutions in society. In this chapter, we go through this transformation of private equity, which initially started, like you said, targeting large public companies where the private equity investors perceived inefficiency—your listeners might interpret that correctly as there being high-cost workers there that they want to replace with low-cost offshore workers, and doing some other things to cut costs, but without growing the business very much. That was the first generation, with a lot of debt that made it very costly, maybe for those businesses to even survive.
As that became very competitive, the returns came down in private equity in that very large part of the market, and the private equity firms looked around: where is there lots of profit, where is there a lot of growth, where are there ways to apply some of our strategies elsewhere? There are tens, if not hundreds of thousands, of mid-market businesses that are private, often first generation founders, that have grown into very successful operating businesses, but where they don’t have natural successors—the kids don’t want to take over, or aren’t there, the workers don’t want to buy it out, or maybe aren’t willing to pay anything close to what the private equity firm will, like a kid who wants to take over but also pay you for the right to do so.
So private equity has emerged in the middle market. It’s still maybe 10 to 15 percent of all employment that’s in private equity-owned companies, or something like that—it’s not the dominant ownership structure in the American economy, but it’s much more common here than in a lot of other countries, as a sort of escape valve for these businesses which might otherwise shut down if there’s nobody to take over. In these middle market cases, there’s more opportunity, maybe, to grow the business regionally or product-wise, or to professionalize aspects of it that the family hadn’t professionalized, where it’s a little bit less ugly in terms of implementation.
Although sometimes you might find the inputs are being cut on in ways that you can’t really tell—buying the cheaper salt instead of the nice Morton salt, or something like that. So you do worry sometimes that when private equity takes over, the quality of the product degrades. I think of that as a double-edged sword that creates an opportunity for a new entrant to come in and make better bagels. I was very excited to see H&H Bagels in my neighborhood, and less excited when I learned that it was because of some financial exit that maybe made it less likely that the bagels were going to be as good as the original H&H back in New York.
Mounk: How should we think about the influence of private equity here in general? I think one of the interesting things about your book is that it cross-cuts ideologically in interesting ways. You’re a social scientist just presenting this information, but in each aspect of it I find myself a little bit torn. Again, the temptation is to say this used to be honest local businesses started up by some hopefully charismatic and perhaps even charming person who worked their way up or whatever—they took a risk, they started these businesses, and now they’re being sold off to these faceless PE guys coming in from Manhattan, and they don’t care about the local community, they don’t care about the quality of a product, they just want to turn a quick buck.
On the other hand, you could say, well, actually, a lot of the time these companies are going to get bought because people see a real opportunity to grow it in some kind of way. In certain cases, that may be financed in a way that actually is free riding on various weird aspects of a regulatory framework. But a lot of the time it may be that, hey, you’re serving this area, but actually this other area would love your services. If you’re really good at providing the services, if the company has something really to offer, the company’s going to make more money and the customers in that new area are going to be happy, right? If it’s professionalizing the service—somebody set up the shop in a particular kind of way, and perhaps they have a website now, but all of a sudden you’d have a phone app and so on—well, perhaps that just makes a business better and makes customers more satisfied and so on. I assume it’s a double-edged sword. How do you puzzle through the positive and the negative ramifications of the PE revolution?
Zidar: One of the things we try to do in the book is just describe the economy as it actually is. You see many of these aspects, both of which are true. There are many cases—we’re talking about three million everywhere millionaires, and there are many industries, and there’s nuance. We’re not trying to sell a particular agenda. We’re trying to describe the wealth in America, and you see cases of both of these things. I think that’s part of the difficulty some people have digesting news, because if it doesn’t fit in a three word slogan, some political party might not run with it. But both of those features are true features of American life and private equity today.
Zwick: We have the Outback Steakhouse case, which I think is a very salient example of private equity coming in, buying a business that people kind of love the brand. I don’t know if you’ve ever been to an Outback Steakhouse, it’s probably not quite your vibe.
Mounk: I have not. At some point I need to go on a tour of fast casual restaurants, I guess. Outback Steakhouse is like at the upper end of fast casual or something like that. At some point I need to do a five-day tour where every day I eat at Chili’s, Outback Steakhouse. I’ve never been to an Olive Garden. I really can’t call myself an American until I’ve done that.
Zwick: I like to think of myself as sort of—what is the best thing on the menu at this place? And you might actually enjoy that. There are things at each of these places where you can kind of enjoy it, but it is slumming a bit. I sort of grew up in that world and kind of quite enjoyed it, and I still get back to it and have a bit of childhood memories tied to it. In that case, when the private equity company took the firm, they brought in some consultants because it was actually Bain Capital, and they brought in Bain consultants to value-engineer the menu. Instead of Swiss cheese from Switzerland, we’re going to have generic cheese. Instead of having the salad dressing made in-house so it’s fresh, we’re going to ship it in jugs. They did those kinds of hard-to-observe cost cutting things at the margin that might improve the profit margin of the business, but maybe at the expense of customers, not just at the expense of workers. We tell that story and talk about it, so people understand here’s what private equity is doing.
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Then we tell the story of a different company where it was sort of a salumi manufacturer, a multi-generational business, but the next generation wasn’t really sure what to do with it or wasn’t sure about carrying it on. In this case, there was an opportunity to go national and to put it on shelves through distribution networks in places like Costco or other types of big stores that this family, which was sort of a regional business, wasn’t able to do. They didn’t necessarily sacrifice the product in that case, because the product was actually about a high quality salumi—a whole muscle salumi, not the chunks from the meatpacking kind of salumi that you’d associate with Upton Sinclair. I think they tried to preserve that aspect of it and just grow it. That’s a more positive angle. What is private equity doing there? They’re bringing a lot of capital externally. It might have taken the family fifty years to grow the business in the way that private equity is going to try and do in five to ten. Both can be true.
Mounk: Well, obviously there’s going to be enormous heterogeneity here, both in terms of individuals involved and in terms of the communities involved, but is there a way to describe the relationship between the everyday millionaire and the community in which they sit? One of the interesting things about the billionaires we imagine is they’ve kind of deracinated—they might sit in Silicon Valley or whatever, they fly around with a private jet, they probably grew up somewhere, went to college somewhere else, did the business somewhere else. There’s this idea of a homeless, elite overclass, and I think that’s actually not even true of the very richest people in the world, but it is somewhat true of the very richest people in the world.
Presumably for the most part here, we’re talking about people who have pretty strong local roots, many of whom I imagine still live in the communities they grew up in, certainly have been living in that same community for decades. By and large, we’re not talking about them living in Manhattan, despite my example of Absolute Bagels, or living in LA—they’re living all over the country. So they’re really deeply anchored in those communities, they’re in a position to do a lot of good for those communities. They also might be sort of local notables in ways that might be negative—they might lord it over those local communities in all kinds of ways. What can we say about what that looks like in day-to-day social practice?
Zidar: I think that’s exactly right. If you look at auto dealers, for example, auto dealers bring in about twenty percent of state sales taxes. They are very much rooted in place—it’s not like you’re moving an auto dealership from this place to that place. They are in town, they’re often sponsoring Little League teams, and they also have, along with other small business owners, a large amount of trust. Small business is one of the most trusted institutions in America, way higher than Congress and other institutions. That’s a very powerful force, and I think some of that reflects some of the good aspects you were talking about. But one of the things that we try to highlight in the third part of the book is that, like all successful people, many of them try to bend the rules to their own benefit. There are tremendous advantages that auto dealers have enjoyed, and I think some of those things are things that we can shine a light on.
Mounk: The most important of which—I believe you’ll know the details much better than I do—is that in most states you cannot sell a car directly to a customer. You have to have a physical dealership. I can’t just set up a website in which I sell cars. Tesla, for example, can’t set up a website where it sells cars directly in many states. You have to have these physical dealerships.
Zidar: Yes, that’s right. There are also other things like servicing a car. If you have a dealership and say you have a Jeep, and Jeep has some recall on some part of the car, it’s very much in the dealer’s interest to bring those back, service them there, and they’re paid quite handsomely for those warranties. It can be the type of thing where they’re charging a thousand dollars, or they get a thousand dollars for every repair, but it only costs them five hundred bucks. So it’s in their incentive to just bring in as many as they can. That proprietary relationship means other competitors can’t bid down the price, and it’s quite expensive. Similarly you see that for financing—it’s often pretty hard for people, and they end up signing up for all sorts of things when they try to buy a car. Car prices are quite high in America right now, and we’re in an era of people struggling with the cost of living, and I think this is the type of stuff that actually would help address affordability in America.
Zwick: One of the things we’re wanting to do is paint this picture of the political influence of this group of people, and to put them on the map. There’s never one millionaire—there’s several in every congressional district. They’re not geographically concentrated in the same way that tech and finance as an industry, through agglomeration, are concentrated, or these billionaires who are stateless, as you say. They don’t have the same local power as this group of people who are so rooted in their communities, both in terms of employment and in terms of where their businesses are. They have natural fundraising advantages when they’re running for office.
One of the things we were so struck by was their overrepresentation in public office relative to the general population. In Congress, we estimated that about a quarter of members are private business owners. If you add law firm partners, you could get closer to 40 to 50 percent, depending on how you want to characterize some of those law firm partners. The representation at the state and local level is maybe even a bit higher in terms of its skew towards business owners. It cuts across political parties, though they tend to be more Republican. We think recognizing the natural advantages they have in running for office, what their worldviews are, what they bring to office in terms of choosing policy priorities, implementing policies that directly benefit them, or that just reflect their worldview—I think that is something that really is eye-opening for people when they think about political power in the country, because we’re so indexed on the oligarchs right now as a national conversation on political power, especially on the left, I would say. We call these people the middle-garchs, because it’s like the oligarchs in the middle market, or the Mittelstand, I guess, is your German example of that, although I think that’s a different category of people with different historical relevance. But I think that’s an important part of the book that we want to talk about.
Mounk: One kind of provocative way to put that, to sharpen the point, is that we think of the Gilded Age as the era in which the Rockefellers and the railway barons and so on dominated American life. A lot of people on the left want to say that we’re now in a second Gilded Age—that the people who are really dominating the country are the tech billionaires and perhaps a few others: Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg and all of those kinds of people. I take it that you’re saying that is really the wrong way of thinking about this moment—that, yes, they have a lot of wealth and they’re politically influential, and I don’t think you would argue we shouldn’t be thinking about them, but a much higher share of the wealth is dominated by these other people.
How does that change our characterization of this political moment? What follows if we think that this is the second Gilded Age? In what way does that misdescribe the world? In what way do we understand the world in a more helpful way if we follow your characterization?
Zidar: One concrete way to take this on is to think about the main legislative accomplishment of the Trump administration, the One Big Beautiful Bill. If you look at what it did, Elon Musk was a bit of a loser in that bill—clean energy was gutted, electric vehicle credits were not favored—and the more mundane private business owners got a twenty percent deduction preserved that made their tax rate seven percentage points lower than everybody else’s. Auto dealers got a new deduction for no reason, kind of like the mortgage interest deduction. These things added up, this plus some estate tax relief, to about a trillion dollars of tax cuts that no one talks about. The legislative action is very much a broader thing, and we want to broaden the aperture.
I totally agree that if you look at the news as of just yesterday, or even I think it was this morning, you had every AI executive at a press conference with the Speaker of the House and Donald Trump. But one of the points that we want to make is that even the Speaker of the House, funnily enough, lives in the house of an auto dealer, and there’s this broader influence if you take a step back and think about wealth and power in America. I think that helps point to some solutions that you might not get if you think it’s only a handful of people. For example, if you want to think about broadening opportunities or increasing the tax base, the tax base is much bigger when you think about fifty trillion dollars of this group rather than five trillion dollars of a small handful of billionaires.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Owen, and Eric discuss the policy implications of everywhere millionaires, how artificial intelligence may affect these businesses, and whether Owen and Eric were ever tempted to pack in academia to become millionaires. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
If a crisis can also be seen as an opportunity, the United States Department of Defense is staring at the greatest opportunity of its existence. In the last eight months of warfare with Iran, the U.S. military has produced arguably the worst performance in American history. It had many months, if not years, to prepare for an air campaign against Iran. It was facing an enemy with an already devastated air force, which had been bombed heavily by Israel and once by the United States the year before. The United States had the benefit of an advanced mixed force of land-based and sea-based air power, missiles which the Iranians could not intercept, and excellent intelligence on Iranian activity. Furthermore, the U.S. military also had access to supposedly world-leading, cutting-edge artificial intelligence capabilities, with which it helped construct much of its air campaign. Finally, the United States had the support of the Israeli air force and Israeli intelligence, pound for pound the two best services of their type in the world.
And the U.S. military failed miserably. In only a few weeks of fighting (from February 28 to April 7), the United States flew 36,000 military sorties and supposedly hit 13,500 targets. Yet, while it damaged the Iranian military, it left it able to recuperate surprisingly quickly. Within weeks of the end of the first phase of the U.S. bombing campaign, the Iranians were rebuilding their missile stock and even improving their technical capabilities. Even more depressingly, the U.S. military showed itself woefully unprepared to defend some of its most important military facilities, from Bahrain to Kuwait to Saudi Arabia. In just a few weeks it lost the ability to operate efficiently from bases that it had used for decades to patrol the Persian Gulf. Soon, the United States would have to start pulling its forces further and further away from Iran. Now, the U.S. military is admitting it may never come back.
This military failure, for that is what it is and must be admitted to be, did not come out of nowhere. It was aided and abetted by a series of destructive policies over the last 20 months, but it was built on years, arguably decades and decades, of mistakes. This brings up one of the most uncomfortable truths about the U.S. military since the end of World War II. Repeated failure has occurred even though the United States has had in most cases overwhelming economic and technological power and the ability to build and deploy the most advanced weaponry the world has ever seen, all supported by expenditures of trillions and trillions of dollars. In FY 2025 alone, for example, the U.S. spent $850 billion on the military.
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Yet, even with all these immense advantages, the U.S. military has failed repeatedly and arguably more emphatically as time has gone on. The war against Iran was preceded by a 20-year War on Terror in which the United States did not lose a battle but ended up withdrawing chaotically from Afghanistan (and it just pulled its last forces from Iraq a little over a week ago). The past decades have also seen the United States lose the Vietnam War and undertake a number of quixotic and less-than-successful military endeavors.
The last two years have seen matters decay at a quickening rate. The U.S. military has been used in a campaign of dubious legality and little if any strategic effect against boats in the Caribbean. It has most likely assassinated civilians while clearly killing people who posed no imminent threat to U.S. forces. It has even tacitly admitted its own doubtful activity by returning some captured fishermen to their country of nationality. Even U.S. successes have been of little or arguably no strategic value. Yes, the U.S. military seized and spirited off Nicolás Maduro, the dictator of Venezuela. However, in his place, Venezuela has been left under the rule of a number of Maduro’s henchmen, including some reputedly even more ruthless.
Then we have the Iran war, which has seen the United States lose large amounts of advanced equipment and achieve nothing of strategic value. Indeed it is probable that the United States will find itself in a much diminished strategic position in the Persian Gulf region when the war is ended, when compared to where it was on February 27, 2026.
One of the major reasons for repeated American failure, which has gotten worse over time, is a dangerous combination of arrogance and hubris. For instance, the United States might have the best weapons systems in the world, but they can be cripplingly expensive to use. Thus, the United States ran into trouble fighting Iran because it did not have a cost-effective way in which to shoot down cheaper Iranian drones—relying on very expensive Patriot and THAAD interceptors. These it has burned through at an unsustainable rate—compelling the United States to pull forces further and further back from Iran.
One of the greatest reasons to doubt that the present Pentagon can save itself was that it had an example of warfare changing right in front of its face—in the Russo-Ukraine War—and failed to adjust. It could have overseen the growth of cheaper, numerous attack drones and missiles, which are daily fired in large numbers by Russia and Ukraine, and it did not prepare to face a similar counterattack from Iran. This was hubris, a perennial military failing to understand that the rules of war apply to U.S. forces no less than anyone else.
The assumption here seems to have been that the U.S. military did not need to learn from others—poorer, less advanced militaries that could not possibly contend with American might. That is the only way to explain why, even after repeated Ukrainian offers, the United States did not adapt to cutting-edge drone tactics. Recently resigned U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll admitted it was “humiliating” to see how much more adaptable the Ukrainians were to the conditions of modern warfare.
The long-term and short-term failures of the U.S. military needs to be put into context. Arguably no other superpower of its era, from the Roman Empire to the Chinese in the high Ching era to the British Empire, has experienced so many military failures while at the height of their power.
Moreover, the United States cannot afford to spend the kinds of vast sums that it has on its military—especially considering the very poor returns. The trillions spent on the U.S. military have resulted in neither military success nor global security, and a breathing space and period of reflection is called for. Though the Trump administration has a request in to Congress for a budget this year of $1.5 trillion, the reality is that the United States should probably spend less on its military, not more. The national debt is rising at what looks to be an unsustainable rate, and interest rates on that debt are back to highs not seen for decades (when the debt was much lower as a percent of GDP).
Pumping even more money into today’s Pentagon, and adding even more national debt in the process, will, if anything, hamper and hold back U.S. defense resources going forward. What the United States needs to do is recalibrate and think, reduce the size of the military and the vast procurement structures that underpin it, and learn to adjust to this new world sensibly and prudently.
This is the opportunity the present era of failure presents. There are so many things that need correcting that small alterations will probably make little difference. The United States needs to look at itself and the relations with allies differently. It needs to see how corruption has entered the procurement process, it needs to see how arrogance has led it to over-invest in showpieces of advanced weaponry while allowing its defense industrial base to whither.
Getting rid of the physical building of the Pentagon could even be a step in this process. The Pentagon was put together in an era of U.S. dominance, in the thick of World War II, when America emerged as the world’s unchallenged economic powerhouse and the country maintained massive traditional services (armies, navies, and eventually air forces). It is not clear now whether it is helpful to maintain such a vast and bulky infrastructure.
The present ossified structure makes rethinking defense exponentially harder. What the United States needs to do is assess what technology it needs and, just as importantly, what older technologies and platforms it can rid itself of. There is a real discussion about whether large warships, tanks, even manned aircraft are the best way to defend the country. Thinking honestly about these questions is not easy in a vast building set up to create a military along exactly those lines.
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So what would be the best way forward? I write this primarily for Democrats who might soon have the power in Congress to enact these reforms, and for those Republicans who are brave enough to admit the problems that now face the U.S. defense structure:
Freeze at its current levels or even reduce the funding of the U.S. Department of Defense for as long as the present administration is in charge.
Start immediate plans to rehouse the Department of Defense in a different building(s)—something smaller, more modern, more conducive to the integration of technology and national strategy.
Start a serious discussion, as non-partisan as possible, about the shape of a new U.S. military, one that has no interests in lobbying for the continuation of older, legacy systems. This conversation would include:
A serious study of the technological, productive, and adaptive lessons from the Russo-Ukraine and U.S.-Iran war, with an honest admission of U.S. failures in these areas.
A serious study on the structure of the U.S. military, with no automatic assumption that the older, domain-conceived organization (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and Space Force) is the only way to be organized.
Planning on how best to transition the U.S. military away from always expecting to lead its allies to one of being a helpful support.
Planning on the best way to root out and stop the return of corruption to the Department of Defense procurement process, including preventing close members of the president’s family from playing roles in the award and reception of Pentagon contracts.
Planning on the best way to reverse the politicization of the military and to prevent the influence of overt religiosity in the services going forward.
This is not a process for the faint of heart, and it cannot bear positive fruit for many years. The U.S. military seems, at present and probably for the next two years or so, determined to follow an anti-intellectual, anti-reflective, pro-zealotry, even pro-corruption mindset which stresses mindless aggression, testosterone shots, fighting in the service of some vengeful lord, and extreme loyalty not to the Constitution but to the administration of the moment. The Secretary of Defense made that clear in his bravado-dripping “State of the Force” speech delivered in late September in which he said of Trump administration measures: “Those generals who did not [get the message]—who clung to the ‘Woke Department’ or seem to think civilian control of the military is simply a suggestion, well, they no longer work here.”
Sentiment like that means that real change will have to wait until the military comes under leadership that will allow it to look honestly at itself and into the future.
The U.S. military has, for its size and strength, had more than its fair share of failures, and the trend line is spiraling downward. The best way to respond is to fully clean house, downsize, and honestly rethink the way the United States conceives of (and funds) its military. In other words, “blowing up” the Pentagon might be the best way to save the Department of Defense.
Phillips O’Brien is Chair of Strategic Studies at the University of St Andrews and author of War and Power: Who Wins Wars and Why (2025). He also writes one of the most read substacks in the world: .
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I see the story about Trump directing the government to use Federal money to buy nakedly political ads, lightly disguised as Public Service Announcements. You see those stories too, of course. Like me you’re outraged and shocked at the corruption. Like me you fret over who, if anyone, is going to put a stop to it. But when I see it, there’s something else: déjà vu.
My mind casts back to Venezuela 25 years ago—when our democracy was beginning to totter—and looks for parallels. I remember the cadenas—when Hugo Chávez started commandeering air time on private broadcasters for nakedly political harangues. The Venezuelan governments had always reserved the right to issue all-channel broadcasts, mostly invoked in case of natural disasters. Just like the U.S. government has always run PSAs, for legitimate purposes. The move, in both cases, is the same: manhandle some power that has always been in the books and turn it nakedly political, disfiguring it in the process.
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Look, I realize that Hugo Chávez, the socialist revolutionary, has exactly nothing in common ideologically with Donald Trump, the hard right reactionary. But then, why is watching American news such a minefield for the Venezuelan exile memory?
Because, I think, what Chávez and Trump share matters much more. They share a visceral sense of power—what it is, and what it means to wield it.
For Trump, like for Chávez, the only kind of power worth having is untrammeled power. Power with an asterisk holds no appeal to him. Power within-agreed-bounds, power that must account for itself, power that is divided or circumscribed or in any way hemmed in by what anybody else thinks, is no power at all. The layers and layers of constraints that constitutionalists and scholars and lawyers always want to wrap power in are, to them, the negation of power.
In Spanish, we have a word for the man who wields power in this way: caudillo. Limply glossed as “strongman,” a caudillo is so much more: a messianic figure locked in a strange, quasi-mystical transaction with his followers. In a famous column, Carlos Alberto Montaner described it as an “abdication” of people’s sovereignty: “the people, exhausted by the failure of the system … find an illuminated man and deposit in him all the power needed to fix the problems that stubbornly refused to be fixed by other means.”
What people like Trump, and Chávez before him, grasp is the atavistic thirst that people have for a caudillo. That some people want to be led this way, that they simply don’t buy the story that limited power can solve their problems. Those people are not simply there to be exploited. The caudillo shares their view of the problem and makes his pitch: only I can fix it. The caudillo and his followers share a transcendent goal: to establish untrammeled power, first, in order to put all downstream objectives within reach.
Which is why Trump, like Chávez before him, seems to spend so much time on symbolic fights about who is allowed to say “no” to him. Otherwise inexplicable controversies fall into focus when you see them in this light. The decision to bulldoze the White House East Wing, and threaten to do the same to the Kennedy Center, seem like strange side-quests in a normal political frame. But the caudillo’s frame is not normal, and he finds establishing that no-one is allowed to stand in his way infinitely more important than the minutiae of governing. The bizarre fight over the naming of the Kennedy Center is not, then, a sideshow: it’s the center of Trump’s program, a determined push to establish power fully unconstrained by law, or precedent, or common sense.
These types of symbolic fights were constant in the early years of chavismo, and they served the same goal. At one point, Chávez decided he was going to change the Venezuelan Coat of Arms because his elementary-school-aged child told him to, and he did it: the stupid little horse now runs towards the glorious revolutionary left, rather than towards the right, like it used to. Which might sound like an insane little Venezuelan culture war detail, except it wasn’t a detail: the caudillo must exercise power idiosyncratically just to make it plain to everyone that it is his personal will that’s being enacted, and not anyone else’s.
Seeing the stable democracy you grew up in sputter and fall apart does things to a person. I don’t follow Venezuelan politics closely anymore, but Venezuelan politics follow me. The loss stalks me every time I open the news.
And look, I know. Believe me, I understand that projecting my own lived trauma onto the very different reality of 21st century America is foolish and intellectually indefensible. I seldom voice the parallels as I notice them, because I don’t want to come across as arrogant, or dismissive, or Cassandraish. Nine times out of ten, I don’t say anything.
But still, I notice. I can’t help but notice the correspondences, one after another. My mind does this thing automatically where it matches Trump’s latest outrage with the parallel moment in Venezuela’s slide, in the background, as it were.
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Take the FCC’s ongoing feud with Jimmy Kimmel. The U.S. telecoms regulator has made no effort to disguise its campaign of intimidation against Kimmel, who if this was happening in any other country we’d describe as “an opposition-aligned comedian.” First, ABC announced it would suspend Kimmel’s show, then it had to back down following a public outcry. Then, the FCC began to hassle ABC’s Texas affiliates, warning them that if they showed Kimmel’s interview with Democratic Candidate for Senate James Talarico, they’d have to do the same for Ken Paxton, the Republican candidate.
There are, for sure, rules about broadcaster neutrality in the months before an election that do, in fact, give the FCC a plausible-ish case. Except, of course, there is no conceivable world where a Trump-aligned broadcaster decides to interview only a Republican Senate candidate and the FCC steps in to demand fairness for the Democratic candidate. The nakedly political intent of the FCC’s intervention is the point of the FCC’s intervention.
We’re all adults here, nobody is deceived.
The déjà vu in this case was the bitter memory of the way Hugo Chávez first hassled opposition media, sending in tax inspectors, then began shutting down opposition broadcasters and buying up opposition newspapers, until what had been a free, rambunctious public sphere went entirely silent, and stopped holding power to account in any way. I cannot see Brendan Carr push Disney/ABC around without the whole movie of the collapse of Venezuelan free speech playing out in my head.
And look, I know the collapse of free speech feels far away in America right now: you can find a harsh attack on Trump on the air and in the press—to say nothing of the internet—at every hour of every day. But then, I remember how impossible it had seemed to me that Chávez could ever successfully silence Venezuela’s wild, rambunctious media when he started trying—and in a few years, he’d done it.
Once you’ve seen a few impossible things happen, you stop believing in impossibles.
The routinization of law-breaking, the increasingly unembarrassed graft, the personalization of, well, everything—all of it serves the caudillo’s purpose. Lawlessness has to be bold, in your face, ostentatious to have the desired impact: to shock friend and foe alike into realizing that the rules of the game have changed for good. That a caudillo is not like a normal human being, and will not be held to normal human standards. That none of yesterday’s certainties hold, because the people in power do not recognize the legitimacy of any measure aimed at curbing the caudillo’s power.
Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump are different in every single way, except the one that matters. They are profoundly, personally affronted by any attempt to limit their power. Their deepest ideological commitment is their determinismo to be the caudillo. It’s not a matter of convenience. For once, it’s a principled commitment. This they believe in.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.
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Flavio Bolsonaro, the son of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, finished first in Sunday’s presidential election with 47 percent of the vote. He beat incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—known universally as Lula—on 45 percent, while his right-wing Partido Liberal (PL) also dominated the votes for both houses of Congress. Brazilians will now head for a runoff election between the two men on October 25.
Despite being a country where citizens say they are angry at the status quo and want change, Brazil just voted in favor of… rerunning essentially the same political fight it saw in both 2018 and 2022. The country’s politics, in other words, is stagnant.
To understand how we got here, we need to go back a few years. Lula, a union leader who became a political activist during Brazil’s cold war dictatorship, has been on the presidential ballot directly or indirectly in every election since 1989. He served as president from 2003 to 2010, and in 2009 was called “the most popular politician on Earth” by Barack Obama.
After Lula successfully helped his preferred successor, Dilma Rousseff, get elected to the presidency in 2010, the country saw the rise of anti-corruption protests, Rousseff’s impeachment, and the growth of a populist right-wing movement. Lula’s defenders say that the political right took advantage of his leaving the presidency to destroy what he had built. Lula’s critics say his left-wing policies of unsustainable social spending and support for clientelism (and outright corruption) came home to roost.
It was Jair Bolsonaro, a backbench member of Congress, who took advantage of the anti-incumbent moment to present himself as a political outsider who could bring security and traditional values back to the country. In 2018, Bolsonaro courted agribusiness and the evangelical community. Lula, meanwhile, spent 580 days in prison on a corruption conviction that would be annulled a few years later on procedural grounds. Lula was barred from running in 2018, and his stand-in candidate lost to Bolsonaro.
Yet the same public anger that led to Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency in 2018 also led to him being a relatively unpopular president. He didn’t help himself through numerous unforced errors, including the fact that he mismanaged Covid, got mired in corruption scandals, broke the country’s budgeting rules, and behaved clownishly on social media. Lula, out of prison and eager to retake power, narrowly defeated Bolsonaro in late 2022. After Lula was inaugurated at the beginning of 2023, Bolsonaro supporters protested in Brasilia, invading and defacing government buildings—Brazil’s version of January 6. Except, unlike in the United States, Brazil took a different path, investigating, arresting, and prosecuting Bolsonaro for leading the riots and attempting a coup.
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Enter Flavio. At forty-five, Jair named him as the family’s candidate after the former president was detained and barred from running this year. While much of Brazil’s right would have preferred a more establishment candidate, the field largely cleared to avoid splitting the vote. Flavio ran on his father’s themes of crime and traditional values, with an even closer embrace of Trump. He met Trump at the White House in May, discussed tariffs and rare earth minerals, and pledged to join Trump’s “Shield of the Americas” alliance if elected.
This election was also about Lula’s fitness for office, a story which closely parallels Joe Biden’s in the United States. Now 80 years old, Lula faces health issues. The country has struggled with inflation under his presidency. And even though homicide levels have declined to their lowest levels in over a decade, he was blamed for the perceived worsening of the security situation. Furthermore, he never successfully cultivated a successor, choosing to run in this year’s election believing he was the only person who could win against the Bolsonaro family.
But the main issue—on both sides—was corruption. The collapse last year of the financial services firm Banco Master was arguably the country’s biggest financial scandal in history, and caused over $10 billion in losses. It led to revelations that its owner, Daniel Vorcaro, had financial ties with the Bolsonaro family, Jair’s former chief of staff, former Lula cabinet ministers, several Supreme Court justices, and multiple members of Congress from the left, center, and right. Recordings of Flavio demanding over $20 million from Vorcaro for a biopic about his father threatened—though ultimately failed—to sink his campaign back in May. By then, the scandal had become so widespread that it touched nearly every corner of Brazil’s political system, and made corruption feel endemic.
More than anything else, it’s this issue that will become the anchor weighing down the next government. If Flavio wins the second round, as he is favored to do by betting markets, he will take office with two open inquiries into his dealings with Vorcaro. Meanwhile, his party—now the largest in both chambers—will likely launch messy impeachment proceedings against the Supreme Court justice who oversaw his father’s conviction and detention in 2025. They will also likely attempt to crush the investigations currently underway against Flavio.
On the other hand, if the aging Lula pulls off an upset and wins, he will govern a polarized and angry country, with his own Senate leader under investigation for corruption, and his opponents holding the largest bloc in Congress—a recipe for a failing final term for the longtime leftist icon.
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The real losers are Brazil’s voters. No matter which candidate wins, the country will end up rehashing the same old fights it has suffered through for years. Politicians who are too busy in-fighting and dodging corruption investigations rarely make the effort to rewrite the rules that would reform the system itself. Which sets the stage for new outsider populists to run in 2030 against whatever mess is left behind after the next four years.
James Bosworth (Boz) is the author of the Latin America Risk Report and a non-resident fellow at the Stimson Center’s Latin America Program.
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The smart money in American politics has always bet against the rise of third parties.
The reasons are both obvious and numerous. The two-party system has been firmly entrenched for 200 years. America’s electoral system makes it very difficult for candidates who are neither Democrats nor Republicans to gain traction because voters are rightly worried about “wasting” their votes. And while many people are deeply unsatisfied with the current offerings, they don’t necessarily agree on the alternative they would prefer: Just because Jane and Jill might both like the idea of a third party doesn’t mean they will ever agree on the same candidate.
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That helps explain why third-party candidates usually fail, often helping to elect candidates who are ideologically very different from those third parties in the process. Ralph Nader’s third-party run likely helped put George W. Bush in the White House in 2000. Jill Stein may have rendered the same service to Donald Trump in 2016. Even Ross Perot, the most successful third-party candidate of the past decades, ultimately helped Bill Clinton win the White House in 1992.
The supposedly smart money is often based on conventional wisdom. But the problem with the conventional wisdom is that it is usually right for a long stretch—before suddenly proving to be disastrously wrong. Take, as an example, the longstanding conviction among political scientists studying the American primary system that party insiders ultimately decide who gets the presidential nomination—a supposed certainty that blinded large parts of the field to Trump’s rise in 2016.
When it comes to third parties, we may now be approaching a similar paradigm shift. Both in the United States and around the world, structural conditions once favored a duopoly of incumbent parties. But these structural conditions have since eroded to such an extent that the old certitudes no longer apply. A successful third-party bid is much more likely now than it was in the past.
Throughout the history of France’s Fifth Republic, two political parties dominated the country’s politics: the socialist left and the moderate right. These two movements drew the vast majority of votes, occupied the lion’s share of seats in the National Assembly, and won every single presidential election.
Support for these two parties had been eroding steadily for years. In 2002, for example, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the far-right candidate, surprisingly edged out Lionel Jospin, the candidate of the center-left, in the first round of the presidential election (though Jacques Chirac defeated Le Pen in a landslide in the second round). In 2017, lightning struck: Emmanuel Macron founded an upstart centrist movement and rose to power on a wave of discontent with the established parties. His star has faded since then—but the traditional parties have failed to recover. Opinion polls suggest that neither the leader of the traditional left nor the leader of the traditional right has any realistic chance of making the runoff of next year’s presidential elections.
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Germany is undergoing a similar political metamorphosis. For much of the country’s postwar history, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats split the lion’s share of the vote. Between them, they usually took 70, 80, and at times even 90 percent of the vote. But support for these so-called people’s parties has cratered in recent decades. At the last federal elections, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats received markedly less than 50 percent of the vote, a record low. They have fallen even further in recent polls, to about 33 percent.
What is true in France and Germany also holds in scores of other democracies around the world, from Austria to Australia. In all of them, two parties once dominated politics. In all of them, these long-established parties have shrunk or altogether disappeared. The number of countries with effective duopolies is vastly smaller now than it once was.
In each of these countries, a similar set of causes has driven the gradual demise of the political duopoly: Voters are unhappy with the direction of their country, making it harder for traditional parties to retain their loyalty. The public sphere is increasingly fragmented, making it harder for a couple of catch-all parties to speak to most voters. Social media favors charisma and authenticity, making it much easier for new political entrants to storm the stage.
All of these factors are just as strong in the United States—which helps to explain why popular support for both Democrats and Republicans is rapidly eroding. The easiest way to see how much worse the two main American political parties have become at satisfying their voters is to look at partisan self-identification over time.
As recently as 20 years ago, the number of Americans who identified with either Democrats or Republicans was about double the number who thought of themselves as independent. Under these circumstances, third-party candidates would have needed to win over a large share of voters with strong partisan identities to be competitive—an all but impossible task.
Since then, the number of self-identified Democrats and Republicans has shrunk significantly. There are now nearly as many independents as there are Democrats and Republicans put together, creating more favorable conditions for third-party candidates: If a third-party candidate can win over a lot of independents, they can, in principle, be competitive with the support of a small fraction of traditional Democrats or Republicans.
Third parties are most likely to gain momentum when voters are deeply unsatisfied with the traditional options on offer. And as it happens, discontent with both traditional options is at or near record levels today. Trump is less popular now than he has been at any prior point in his first or second term: Polling averages show that around 60 percent of Americans disapprove of his performance in office, with only about 38 percent thinking he is doing a good job. Trump’s unpopularity has also dragged down support for the Republican Party as a whole. In a recent NBC poll, only 36 percent of respondents reported viewing the Republican Party positively, with 49 percent viewing it negatively.
In a well-entrenched two-party system, one party falling from grace to such an extent would usually boost the popularity of the other party. For much of the second half of the 20th century, approval ratings for Democrats and Republicans usually moved in opposite directions. Strikingly, that no longer seems to be the case. Even as independents soured on the Republican Party over the past 18 months, they have not become any more enamored with the Democrats. According to that same NBC poll, only 29 percent of respondents saw the Democratic Party positively, with 50 percent viewing it negatively. Net favorability for Democrats is even worse than it is for Republicans.
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For now, elections remain a choice between two unpopular options. Though Democrats have a worse image than Republicans, the minds of most voters are unsurprisingly focused on the failings of the man in the White House. This year’s midterms are likely to produce a sizable, perhaps even a huge, blue wave. But Democrats would be fooling themselves if they took this to mean that most Americans have a positive view of the party or will necessarily stay loyal to it over the long run.
So long as Trump remains toxically unpopular and there are no realistic alternatives, voters will reluctantly flock to the Democrats. There is absolutely no guarantee that these two conditions will remain true forever.
Both Republicans and Democrats are very unpopular. So why has a third party so far failed to materialize? Why does virtually every representative and senator remain affiliated with one of these two parties? The answers have to do with the nature of the American electoral system.
In countries with proportional representation, such as Germany, voters can pick a small political party without feeling that they are wasting their vote. Even if a new environmentalist or pro-business party gets only 7 or 8 percent of the vote, it will still send some representatives to parliament and may even enter government as part of a broader coalition.
However, in countries with a majoritarian electoral system, such as the United States, a vote for a smaller party is usually “wasted.” If you vote for the Greens or the Libertarians this November, you almost certainly won’t affect the composition of the House or the Senate since those parties are very unlikely to win a plurality of the vote in any district. Even voters who might prefer the ideological profile of a local third-party candidate are therefore likely to “hold their nose” and instead support the major party candidate they dislike the least. (In addition, electoral rules are set by the incumbent parties, and those are unsurprisingly keen to make it harder for third parties to get off the ground; in many states, there are consequently major obstacles to even getting on the ballot.)
This helps explain why countries with a majoritarian electoral system have traditionally tended toward especially entrenched party duopolies. In the United Kingdom, for example, Labour and the Conservatives have for the past century split the lion’s share of the vote between them. Even if you liked other parties better, you opted for one of the two main parties.
But despite the structural obstacles to the emergence of third parties in the United Kingdom, that has started to change in recent years. While Labour and the Conservatives often took more than 90 percent of the vote between them in the postwar era, their cumulative vote share fell to 57 percent at the last general election and was as low as 37 percent in polling averages earlier this year—a development that looks strikingly similar to those in Germany and France. (Labour has somewhat recovered since Andy Burnham replaced Keir Starmer as prime minister, but it is too early to tell whether he can convert his honeymoon phase into lasting support.)
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These changes are not yet reflected in the composition of the House of Commons. In a majoritarian system with five or six viable political parties, it is often enough to gain 30 percent of the national vote to sweep to a large majority. But by the same token, a new party can gain a majority at astonishing speed if it is able to rise to similar levels of popularity. If the far-right Reform UK party, led by Nigel Farage, recovers from recent funding scandals and gains 30 percent of the vote at the next election, it could well win an outright majority of MPs.
Majoritarian electoral systems, like the one used in the United States, create serious structural obstacles to the rise of third parties. But when voters get sufficiently disillusioned with the traditional duopoly that this system creates, these obstacles aren’t insurmountable, as the case of the United Kingdom shows. Could America be next?
America, unlike the United Kingdom, has a president who is directly elected. This means that voters pay comparatively less attention to parties and legislative elections, and comparatively more attention to personalities and presidential elections. It is therefore unlikely that the rise of new political parties would take the same form as in Britain or most other parts of Europe. I don’t anticipate that longstanding third parties like the Greens or the Libertarians will succeed in upending American politics by winning a succession of congressional races.
Instead, the most likely scenario for a third-party breakthrough would resemble some of the close misses of the past: A charismatic and (probably) rich individual would run for president without the backing of either the Democratic or the Republican Party, possibly succeeding in electing a number of senators or representatives on the candidate’s coattails.
To beat the odds, this kind of candidate would need to start with high name recognition and have tremendous financial resources at their disposal—in short, a celebrity who is famous for something other than politics. Billionaires are the obvious possibility, since they can finance their own campaigns. But a sports or movie or music star with a base of fervent supporters and a strong network of high-net-worth friends is also an option.
These conditions constrain what a successful third-party bid would look like. But they are hardly insurmountable. In a country as large, rich, and raucous as the United States, there is no paucity of charismatic celebrities with outsized ambitions and access to money.
In this respect, Trump proved to be the model. But while he staged a kind of hostile takeover of an existing political party, his spiritual successors may choose to assail the traditional parties from the outside. In part because Trump for now retains a sufficiently large fan club to block the way to any competitor on the populist right, future third-party candidates may choose to challenge the MAGA movement from outside the structure of the Republican Party.
Many readers will think that the fading hold of the duopoly is a good thing. Since most Americans now feel disaffected with both Democrats and Republicans, many of them understandably hope for a third party. I should in theory feel the same way: While I don’t have any difficulty choosing between the existing options, I don’t feel especially well-represented by either. Surely, I should be giddy with excitement at the prospect of having more choices!
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But that anticipation may prove to be premature. The views of independents are highly heterogeneous, and many of the people who now long for the day when they have a third option may find themselves deeply disappointed when the day comes. While I personally would love to have a political option that has moderate views on cultural issues and recognizes the danger posed by authoritarian regimes like Russia’s, I fear that it is much more likely that a successful third-party candidate would combine extreme cultural views with deeply isolationist tendencies.
And then, of course, there are the perils of celebrity politics. Given the nature of America’s political system, a third party is likely to be led by a charismatic leader with little prior experience in politics. Even if I should find the program on which they run to be congenial, it is far from clear whether the candidate would, should they succeed in entering the White House, enact a principled political alternative to the status quo or simply use the office as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement.
Sooner or later, the day of the third-party candidate is likely to be upon us. But when it comes, many who now find that idea to be exciting may be in for a rude awakening.
A version of this piece originally ran in The Dispatch.
Luis Garicano is Professor of Public Policy at the London School of Economics and a co-founder of The Rhine Group.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Luis Garicano discuss why Europe has failed to produce world-leading technology companies, whether labor market rigidities and a fragmented single market explain Europe’s innovation deficit, and whether culture versus institutions are to blame for European risk aversion.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You co-founded very recently something called The Rhine Group. If I can put it in somewhat blunt terms, the idea of The Rhine Group is to unscrew Europe. Why is it that you think that Europe is screwed in the first place?
Luis Garicano: If you try to picture Europe, let’s say in the 1970s, in terms of technology and innovation, you see everything from trains, Siemens and Alstom, to planes, Concorde, to nuclear plants. We were at the forefront of technology. Basically, what has happened since 1990 is that nothing has happened. There’s been an information technology revolution and now an AI revolution, and Europe has missed the first.
And it looks like it’s going to miss the second. There are many ways to see this. What is the proportion of innovative firms? What is the market capitalization of European startups? One of the ones I like most is to think of who were the three or four biggest companies by market cap, or by research intensity, in Europe in the 90s, in 2000, in the 2010s, in the 2020s. You get three or four top German car manufacturers all the time. You look in the United States and you get entirely different firms per decade. You get Facebook, you get Microsoft, you get IBM, which goes up and then down, and you get the car companies, which disappear from the top rankings. So you get a very dynamic industry in the United States and a very static picture in Europe.
Mounk: The striking thing, by the way, is that this shows that Europe has over-invested in the car sector, that it hasn’t had enough innovation outside the car sector, which would be worrying but somewhat forgivable if European cars were at the technology frontier. But I just spent a few weeks in Beijing. I went to the Robot Olympics. I wrote about it on my Substack. The robots were very impressive, and some students from one of the leading European universities, ETH Zurich, who I spoke to, who happened to be in the audience, said we have nothing like that at our university. But when I was walking home, I went to the display of BAIC, one of the minor Chinese car companies, state-owned, not renowned to be particularly innovative. And they showed me the newest models, which were far more impressive than European cars at a fraction of the price. So even in the one area that they’ve invested in, they’ve fallen behind.
Garicano: Yes, because I think the problem doesn’t have to do with the sector. It has to do with the form of progress. We are good at incremental innovation. We have this three-year cycle: you do something better, you never fire anybody, you hire just a few people, you continue in that path, and that path kind of carries you over the line. But you don’t suddenly shut this sector and open this other one. You don’t get rid of this industry to get that industry going.
Because it’s very hard to fire and hire, because it’s very hard to create and destroy businesses, because bankruptcy proceedings are very difficult, because scaling up is very hard—all of those things mean that if it’s all about continuing to do what you were doing before, we’re pretty good. If it’s about changing directions, we are terrible.
Mounk: Part of the problem is that these challenges compound, right? The tech revolution has created so much wealth that the United States—and now, in a very different way, China—has a lot of investment capital lying around. So when there’s somebody, an 18-year-old with a bright idea who wants to create an AI company or a biotech company or whatever company, there is just this huge pool of money in Silicon Valley that can be devoted to taking out a lot of lottery tickets. And as is the nature of VC, a lot of those lottery tickets don’t work out, but some do. And that then is the next set of big companies that creates new capital. At this point, has Europe fallen so far behind in the capital game that it’s just very, very hard to catch up?
Garicano: I’m skeptical of the capital explanation. It looks more like good Europeans going to Silicon Valley to be married with good European capital—the human talent and the capital going away. I think there’s something very related to what you’re saying that is going on, and we can see it in Sweden. In Sweden, you have Spotify and the children of Spotify, and Estonia and Sweden are in the same boat. The founders have the capital, but they also have the knowledge—how do you scale up, how do you start, which doors do you need to open. The person who is the angel investor in the next generation of startups is somebody who has the money, as you’re saying, but also has the knowledge of how to navigate this. So in Europe, once you don’t have that, it’s very hard to get started. In Silicon Valley, it is this knowledge which is allowing the next generation to succeed. And yes, we are pretty behind, except for a couple of countries, in terms of unicorns, startups, and this ecosystem.
Mounk: That’s very interesting. So you’re saying it’s not just the lacking capital, it’s also the lacking human capital in a sense—which doesn’t mean that Europeans aren’t very smart, that they’re not very talented in those industries. When you look at Silicon Valley, there’s a lot of Europeans who have risen to important roles there. But that ecosystem doesn’t exist within Europe. And part of the ecosystem is financial capital, but part of the ecosystem is having people around who said, well, I did a startup and I made this mistake, and I know this person who could be good for you, and all of those kinds of informal things.
What about other kinds of obstacles that exist in Europe today? You said in America, you might say let’s try this as a big company, you hire a bunch of people, and if you decide that this investment didn’t work out or this area of business didn’t work, then you fire a lot of those people. That seems cruel, but because there are so many companies doing that, those people are likely to have other opportunities, and on the whole, the wellbeing of talented workers in the United States is a lot higher than that of talented Europeans. Arguably, at this point, the average American has a much higher standard of living than the average European. One of the reasons for this, of course, is that in Europe you simply can’t fire people in the same kinds of ways. So there are labor market obstacles. There’s a question of whether there’s a truly unified single market, where in many areas it’s actually still very, very difficult to scale a company at the European level because of all kinds of informal and formal obstacles.
There’s a question of culture and mindset, too. I notice this: when I speak to European students, they dream of joining the European Commission. When I speak to American students, they dream of joining Anthropic and OpenAI. I’m slightly exaggerating, but not fully. There is really a difference in what the modal student thinks they can aspire to, and does in fact aspire to. Are those the explanations you’d reach for, or is it really other kinds?
Garicano: I’m not a big fan of cultural explanations—of the last set of explanations you mentioned. It seems to me that there are good, solid institutional reasons to explain what we observe. In terms of the firing and hiring regulations, the first one you discussed, I think is really important. Creative destruction, which is what we’re talking about, is a crucial aspect of progress. Two Europeans, Cost and Controlem, have been making the following point: if you have very big firing costs, it’s very hard to change course. If Facebook decides that the metaverse is the future, invests in the metaverse, changes the name to the metaverse, then decides it’s a completely stupid idea and instead they should be doing AI—they just, one day, fire all the metaverse people, the next day hire all the AI people, and they’re gone. If you do the calculation for how difficult that is for Ericsson or for Nokia, which are examples these two scholars are studying, it’s very difficult. You need to talk to the committee on this and that, you need to pay this, and the unions have to agree. You need to get it all approved. And all of that takes months—but also, more importantly, all of that means that before you take a crazy bet, before you try for something that might work or not, you’re going to think twice, because if you make a mistake, you cannot rectify it.
So to me, this kind of problem is more important. We’ve written a lot about this in Silicon Continent, our Substack, which I have with my son, and we have a lot of evidence that this could be important. There are indeed problems with scaling up in the single market. It’s very hard for a company in Germany or Czechia to grow into France and Italy, because many regulations are different. And even when we have single market rules that are the same, the regulators apply them in different ways. If you talk to VCs, what they tell you is the way they recommend their companies scale up is: you start in Austria or you start in France, then you scale up in the United States, and then we’ll do more of Europe. Don’t start trying to go through all these little markets, because it’s going to take you too long.
Mounk: Let me be a stand-in for my sociologist friends here. Why is it that you argue that culture doesn’t matter? Now, it may be that culture is downstream from a lot of those institutional things, and that if we fix those institutional things, then over time the culture could adjust. But surely it’s not implausible to say that there’s been outsized returns to being a startup founder in the United States—that this has created an ecosystem and a cultural ethos where going out at the age of 18 or 21 or 25 to do a startup is something that is prized, for which there’s all kinds of cultural resources, people understand what it is to be doing a startup, your parents are not going to fall unconscious and say “what on earth are you doing,” and so on. And because in Europe there’s been all of these obstacles to the creation of a startup culture, which may have been institutional, now there’s a lacking culture.
Presumably that problem is not going to disappear overnight. So even once we have managed to fix some of those institutional obstacles, there’s still going to be some parents who say, well, I’ve never heard of anybody doing a startup, this is really not what you should be doing. And there’s still going to be a lack of cultural knowledge about how to engage in this and why you would do that. And there may still be a generation of people who share the aspirations of their elders and who think that perhaps being a functionary in Brussels is more honorable, or somehow a better way to serve Europe, than to go and try to become what continental Europeans like to call, in their favorite English phrase, a “tech bro.” Like, that’s betraying Europe, right? You’re serving Europe by becoming a good bureaucrat.
Garicano: I would say two points on culture. First, yes, norms and beliefs matter, and there are norms and beliefs that societies have, and you marry or you don’t marry young or old, and all these things change. I am not a big fan of looking at those as a policymaker, or as a policy analyst, because there is not much we’re going to be doing about that.
You also talk about cultural knowledge, and I certainly think that’s the part I was talking about with business angels—the knowledge part, the cognitive part, is very important. And that one we can change. So, there’s no business angels, so we don’t get a transmission of knowledge on how to get started. Okay—how did Sweden change this? That was the third point I was going to make, which is that we have seen these things change. Sweden did a reform in 2003 or 2005, one of those dates, where they decided to allow the capital gains from one generation of startups to be reinvested in the next generation without taxation. So if you create a new startup, you can save yourself the capital gains. If you do that, then suddenly everybody wants to reinvest, and then suddenly you have a culture. You’re like, the Swedes do have a culture. Well, why do the Swedes have it and the Norwegians or Danes don’t? Because the Swedes changed the law. So I think that sometimes we use culture as an easy crutch to say Europeans can’t do it because they’re not risk-takers—and yeah, we might not be risk-takers, but it is indeed, as you put it, to some extent downstream of all the other things we have, which are taxes and which we can change.
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And for sure, there is one thing that does explain risk aversion, which is crucial, and I’m not going to deny it, which is demographics. Europe does have aging populations. And if you ask my mom, or the mom of my wife, or somebody else in Europe, they don’t care so much about innovation and all these things, because they think life is good as it is and they want to just get their pensions and continue the way they are. And the older the population is, the more important those voters—who are saying “please keep everything as it is, we’re doing fine”—become. That part is crucial.
Mounk: Yeah, I think there’s a second way in which it matters, which is for the ability to make political change. If you have political change that changes the institutions and the incentives, downstream from that, you probably get cultural change as well. But part of the problem is that you have a political culture that makes those policy reforms difficult in the first place. And I’m struck that this is true of older Europeans who have generous pension schemes and who want to defend them. That’s very understandable in politics—maybe a challenge for Europe, but it’s certainly straightforward that people who have high pensions don’t want to give them up.
What I’m really struck by is that a lot of young Europeans I speak to actually have the same outlook. A lot of elite students in countries like France, for example, seem just naturally convinced—we haven’t sort of analyzed this in a deep way, by and large, but it’s just obvious to them—that defending France’s generous pension scheme, and opposing the kinds of reforms to that scheme that Emmanuel Macron was trying to put in place, is in fact in their generational interest. That their parents’ generation is trying to take away something from them. And they don’t see the connection between that and why they’re earning so little, and why they pay so much tax and other social charges, and why that makes it so hard for companies to innovate and therefore to create positions that would give them opportunities in life.
They reject all of that and just say, our parents had something that’s going to be taken away from us, it’s in our generational interest to go defend this extremely generationally redistributive scheme—one that is continuing to feed the comparatively good lifestyles of older French people, who, retired, now on average make more money than people who are in the workforce, in a way that’s going to be completely unsustainable 30 or 40 years from now, when those people themselves might start to go into retirement.
Garicano: Yes, I agree that there is a tendency not to look forward on this. I also think the media, which is kind of oriented to the needs of the majority of the public, and often that public is older, has been reluctant to talk about the generational divide. I think that has changed. In Spain, there was one account on Twitter which picked up on all these things economists were saying, did it very well in putting out the graphs, etc., and got an enormous following. He had to be shut down by his bosses—there was demand for this. And in France, there is the one called “Pierre qui paye”—”Pierre, the one who pays.” There is an increasing kind of demand for these stories. I think when you look at recent gains by populist parties among young voters, among male voters, among working-class voters—that we saw with the recent elections in Germany, the regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt—you do see a lot of people who are paying those contributions, who are probably not thinking of their standard of living without necessarily understanding exactly why it’s so low, but being upset that they’re paying so much. So I do think there is some backlash, in part, in the populist reaction we have seen.
Mounk: I think what’s interesting about that reaction—one thing that people sometimes say about populism, which I think is fair, is that it can be a kind of disease, it can be very damaging to democratic institutions, but it’s also a symptom of an underlying disease. When populists rise as much as they have, particularly in Europe over the last 25 or 30 years, we should probably take it very seriously as a signal that something is off, that people are upset about something. We shouldn’t be too quick to dismiss that.
I find that to be fair. What’s really striking about many of these populists, though, is that they are actually even less willing to rethink the European social and economic model than other political parties. The Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen in France has been effective in part by totally refusing to countenance anything like a pension reform. And the AfD in Germany—which sometimes scores points pointing out some of the real problems of the country—itself has a set of policies that, in general, are not going to help the future of Europe or the future of Germany, particularly on the economy. They were, for example, mobilizing against the building of a large Tesla plant in East Germany, where a lot of their voters are. So they’re firmly part of the anti-future coalitions.
Garicano: No, I think you’re completely right. I read the populist vote as a protest vote, not a constructive vote, and most of these people don’t know what they’re doing. A lot of people are giving too much credit to the AfD as representing something about change. The truth of the matter is the AfD is just a symptom that people are upset, but they don’t have any human capital, they don’t have anybody who knows what they’re doing, and there is no chance that they are going to be able to provide for the population in terms of actually doing things better.
Mounk: Laurenz Guenther, who’s been on the podcast in the past, talking about this paper—that the average member of the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, for example, before the rise of the AfD, was to the left of the median voter in Germany on issues like immigration.
Garicano: Yeah, exactly. The thing that he observes, which I think is very smart, is: on the economics, as you’re pointing out, more or less it does look like the parties are following the voters. So, on pensions—the French parties are defending the pension system, the French voters are defending the pension system. On the cultural issues, though, and that’s the key point, you see that there is a humongous gap between where the voters are on immigration and things like that, and where the mainstream, right-wing politicians are. That gap opens up a space.
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In his view, it’s like an industrial organization model—an entry model, like in a market. There’s no supermarket in this part of town, so somebody should come in and put a supermarket there. The idea that voters want the migration problem solved in a different way than the traditional political parties in Europe are offering, and that new parties are coming in to offer those solutions, seems to me obvious. It’s been the case in the United States, and it’s probably the case in Europe. Spain’s been having a huge problem with the southern border, where an enormous amount of uncontrolled migration came in. There is no real separation, no real wall between Europe and Africa in those cities, and the voters want proper borders, and they want people who enter illegally to be thrown out. That’s how people see it. And if voters don’t get this from traditional parties, they are going to get it some other way.
Mounk: One thing that I find striking about this is that it has somewhat changed in the United States, but in Europe I think it’s still true that, first of all, political parties aren’t acting on the very evident anger about immigration in huge parts of the population—nearly as much as perhaps they would be if they really meant seriously that the rise of these populist parties is a threat to democracy, as I believe in certain places it is. But secondly, that perhaps outside of leading politicians who have somewhat changed their tune over the course of the last 10 years—basically, Europe’s left-wing and center-left parties are now to the right on immigration of where Europe’s conservatives were 10 years ago—in many elite spaces, I’m struck by the unwillingness to acknowledge that an inability to control the border is one of the causes of populism.
I teach classes on populism and democracy, and one of the questions I ask is: what do you think drives the rise of populism? That’s always a great, lively debate, and I think the causes are not obvious. Some people think it’s to do with technology and the internet and social media. Other people think it’s really about economic grievances and economic stagnation, or perhaps inequality, which I think are two slightly different explanations. Some people might say it’s because people don’t like that women now have equality and gays and lesbians are treated better than they were in the past. They’re kind of willing to acknowledge that. Immigration never comes up. What is it that Donald Trump speaks about the most? What is it that Marine Le Pen speaks about the most? What is it that 91% of people who voted for the AfD in the state elections in Sachsen-Anhalt recently said was the primary reason they voted for the AfD? It’s immigration. Well, perhaps that’s something to do with it.
It’s not that people are totally unwilling to accept that as a possible explanation once you raise it, but it never comes up spontaneously. And even then, people are very quick to say, well, that’s really only because of social media, or because the media reported it wrongly, or because Russian propaganda is exploiting the issue, etcetera. There’s a strange unwillingness to confront this as one of the reasons for the political troubles Europe is finding itself in.
Garicano: I think that’s exactly right. I’m a cosmopolitan liberal, pro-open-borders and all that. I’ve lived all my life abroad. And yet I can see that if we don’t give an answer to these grievances, as you said at the start, our liberal democracies are at extreme risk. Isn’t this obvious?
So I agree with your initial point that liberal democracy can be at risk if we don’t address this issue. And I am also surprised. The first function of the state is—just think of it from the perspective of someone who’s seen on TV in Spain, all the time, these thousands of people who crossed the border from Ceuta in one day, in some mass move. People are looking at them, seeing them on the beach, complaining that they don’t have a place to sleep, and people are thinking, okay, well, just go back to your home in Morocco.
And the fact that voters are not understanding what’s going on—not understanding that if a liberal state can’t give an answer to “somebody violated your territorial integrity,” then you respond by either making the frontier stronger, expelling the people who shouldn’t have a right to stay, etcetera. No—you don’t do any of those things. This has been a huge reason Donald Trump came to power, causing enormous trouble for the United States in many ways. And it can be a big reason Le Pen or the AfD or the extreme right in Spain gets to power, and that would be equally problematic for Europe. This is a problem we should solve before it explodes in our hands.
Mounk: David Frum wrote an article long ago that has become a kind of little slogan in my mind, but I think it’s a helpful one: if liberals don’t enforce borders, fascists will. I’m not sure I would use the F word, but I think if established political parties persistently refuse to listen to these very strongly articulated views by voters on immigration, people are going to go to others who will listen to those views.
There’s certainly a substantial portion of the population that has quite extreme views on immigration. But most people have, I think, quite reasonable views. They see that immigrants are making real contributions to their countries. Many of them have genuine friendships and social relationships with people who have origins outside the country, because much of Europe is now very diverse. But they want their country to have control over its borders, which is, I think, not an unreasonable preference.
I wrote a piece about the election in Saxony-Anhalt in The Washington Post, in which I made an argument that is somewhat specific to Germany, but I wonder if there’s a broader European version of it. I’m really struck by the fact that Germany, out of all European countries, has had an economic, social, and political model that has worked surprisingly well over the last 75 or 80 years. That is, of course, a stark contrast to the earlier history of Germany. In the first half of the 20th century, Germany, with utterly disastrous consequences for the world but also for Germany itself, failed to settle upon a working political, economic, and social model, which led to World War I and certainly to World War II and the absolute disasters that entailed.
So I think, quite understandably, when after World War II a better model was partially imposed on the country, partially achieved by its post-war elites, partially a matter of choice and partially a matter of luck, the operating system became: don’t change it in any way. Konrad Adenauer won re-election famously on the slogan keine Experimente—no experiments.
What I think is striking is that today Germany’s post-war model is really unsalvageable. As Constanze Stelzenmüller has said, it used to outsource its security needs to the United States, its energy needs to Russia, and the creation of economic growth to exports to the huge Chinese market, over the course of the last few decades. And each element of that model is now very much in doubt and probably unrecoverable. It’s not clear to me that, whoever succeeds Donald Trump, Europe can ever rely on the United States for its security to the extent it has over the last 50 or so years. Europe is far behind on energy, which is very troubling, especially for a country that relies on manufacturing as much as Germany does, because that’s a major input cost. And China has gone from having huge demand for high-quality manufactured goods like luxury cars, to being able to produce such strong ones of its own that we’re now in the second China shock, which is affecting Europe more than it is the United States. Suddenly Volkswagen, Mercedes, and so on have gone from thinking of China as a wonderful export market to fearing the innovation of Chinese car companies that can outcompete Volkswagen and Mercedes.
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So I think this would require a genuine rethinking of Germany’s model, but the operating system of the post-World War II era makes it very hard for German elites to actually engage—first of all, to admit that the model no longer works and that it needs not just a little reform here or there, as the Red-Green government did in the early 2000s to reduce labor costs, but a genuine change of model. And it makes it very difficult for people in Germany to genuinely think about what that change might look like. I’m surprised by the paucity of debate about how Germany can reinvent itself, given how urgent the need for that is.
Now, that argument perhaps doesn’t easily translate to Spain or to France or to the UK, because those countries don’t exactly have the same historical baggage, or have different kinds of historical baggage. But do you think it’s true that, at the Europe-wide level, it’s still disconcerting how little awareness there is of the depth of the European crisis—and that, despite important efforts like yours with The Rhine Group, how little really serious, genuine debate there is among European elites about how Europe can catch up?
Garicano: Yes, I think Germany does have something peculiar over the last few years, which is the fact that it has been governed by a grand coalition and alternation between left and right, which naturally makes change very difficult, because we have the extreme left on one side and the extreme right on the other, and everybody else has to be in government in some sense or another. This is true for Europe as well. At the European Union level, we basically also have a grand coalition of Social Democrats, the Popular Party, the Greens, and the Liberals. And that makes change hard.
But this is just a fact of the arithmetic—as the populists get stronger, the center has to stay together, and that means there is less and less room for debate. But it’s also true, as you said, that there is a lack of awareness among citizens of the need for change. In some ways, we have it too good in Europe. The truth of the matter is life is great. Life is comfortable, people have long vacations, etc. And the stimulus for change usually comes from a crisis.
Of course, the truth of the matter is: who has it very well in Europe? Not the young people, who cannot start a life—in many places they cannot get a house, they have very low salaries. Wages in Spain, for example, haven’t really gone up since the 1990s; in Italy either, in real terms. In France, the real wage is below what pensioners get. So there is a generation which has it pretty well, and I think that is the crucial element in this debate.
European politics, to me, are demographics—that’s it. If you understand the age of the median voter, you understand how close to retirement the median voter is, you understand the trade-offs between investments and pensions. The marginal dollars always go to pensions and health, not to education and investment. And you understand everything else about change and reforms in the economy, which is that that voter doesn’t want to change. The problem with demographics is that they’re slow-moving and very hard to change. We see it in France, where the political debate at this point—in the year of the presidential election, at the start of the term that will end at the presidential election at the end of spring—is dominated by solutions proposed by the extreme left or the extreme right, which are not solutions to any of the things we’re discussing. Like, let’s not pay the debt—which is just a crazy solution. So I think that demographics are the story, and that’s what makes me worried about how to change it.
Mounk: Let’s talk about what some of the solutions might be. I think part of the aspiration of The Rhine Group is to search for solutions and help build the capacity to implement them. Demographics are very unlikely to change—if anything, the demographics of Europe are likely to be more challenging 25 or 50 years from today than they are now, and it doesn’t take a crystal ball to say that. There’s demographic momentum, and if the generation of people who are fertile today is significantly smaller than the generation of people who were fertile 25 or 50 years ago, then unless suddenly every 30-year-old decides to have five children, we can basically guarantee that there’s going to be fewer children over the next years, and fewer people in their 20s and 30s 20 or 30 years from now.
So where are the levers? If you were dictator of Europe for a day, what do you think we should do? What do you think we could do to address all of these deep-rooted problems we’ve been talking about for the last 30, 35 minutes?
Garicano: I would start with practical things. I wrote a piece with Bengt Holmström and Nicolas Petit called The Constitution of Innovation, in which we started from practical things to get innovation and scaling up going. The first thing I would do is... are you having trouble with the noise?
Mounk: Normally we try to deal with all of the noise problems on the back end in this podcast, and it’s always challenging to get the audio right. People are traveling in different kinds of places. But Luis, if you don’t mind, let us talk about this noise for a moment. Are you at the moment in your office at LSE?
Garicano: I am in my office at the LSE. It’s a very European problem. There is a window there that you can see on top. That window is part of this very modern intelligent building, in which there is no air conditioning, and the building decides when it opens those windows and when it closes them. This system didn’t work, because the window starts opening when you’re in the middle of a Zoom call. The result is that it either stays open or closed, and you have no control over it.
Mounk: I think this is actually a beautiful case study of the problems of Europe. First of all, it’s kind of amazing that we call this building intelligent, when there are still a lot of people who are reluctant to acknowledge that artificial intelligence is intelligent. But it’s just such an amazing thing. Obviously sometimes you’re going to want the window closed, because you’re in a confidential conversation, because you’re recording a podcast and you need to not have street noise, for any number of reasons. So the idea that there’s anything intelligent about a building that doesn’t allow its occupants to close it is astonishing. I’ve been to the building. It’s a nice-looking building, but it’s very recent. So five years ago they decided, let’s not have any air conditioning in this building, because obviously air conditioning is evil and environmentally unfriendly, and let’s make sure that people suffer through the summer. Miraculously, nobody says that Europeans shouldn’t heat their homes in the winter, even though that uses as much CO2, or more, than it does to cool buildings in the summer. I think it’s a great example of central planning. The idea that it’s somehow going to be more environmentally friendly for this building to decide on its own when to open windows and when to close them, that we’re not giving you the choice to open or close windows... I don’t want to relitigate an earlier part of this conversation, Luis, but how is this not a cultural problem?
Garicano: I come in the winter with a space heater, because the heating, which is also intelligent, doesn’t do anything of what I need in terms of temperature. So yes, it is a disaster.
Mounk: I wish I had a photo of every senior British official and ex-official I’ve met with a space heater in the room. It’s something I haven’t encountered anywhere else in the world.
Garicano: It’s insane that now the temperature’s pretty cool and they still haven’t pressed the button, or the building hasn’t decided it’s cool enough, to close my window. So you asked what we would do, and this is a good one. I like this one. The first thing is scaling up. I would like to have an interstate commerce clause for Europe, which means if you can sell something in Madrid, you can sell it in Brussels. End of story, no questions asked.
There was a big decision by the Court of Justice, called Cassis de Dijon, which said you cannot put obstacles to trade. If you can sell in one place, you can sell in another. But eventually there were exceptions for cultural reasons, for hygiene, for environmental reasons, for security in the workplace, which means, at the end of the day, any country can put any barrier on any other. That’s the truth of the matter. So I would like to say: from now on, if you incorporate a company in any country, you can sell in every other country, end of story. True for services as well. If you’re an engineer and you’re allowed to build bridges in Germany, you’re allowed to build bridges in Spain. Not only between countries, but even within countries. If you’re an industrial engineer in Spain, you should be able to sign off on projects even if you’re not in the exact same specialty. All these professions and services and goods are very difficult to trade.
But let’s go to the windows of the buildings. In Europe, something happened in the seventies. All world citizens in the Western world realized that we had done some damage with excessive development, and Nixon established the EPA, and it grew and grew to the point where nothing can get built. This is now the case almost everywhere in Europe. You cannot build housing. I’m in London now. You cannot build housing. There’s a huge need for housing in London. There is this green belt, which is nothing but old industrial areas where you can’t build, because there’s one mouse that appeared, and then the whole biodiversity legislation kicks in. It’s insane.
In Germany, my son Peter wrote a post on the blog about the toads in Berlin. Do you know about these toads, Yascha? There is some toad which came in a truck twenty years ago, and it’s in a site where there’s a zone planned for a lot of apartments. People have been suing, because this toad is now protected. You cannot do anything, you cannot move it. The developer wanted to create a kind of refuge for the toads, all sorts of things, and nothing was acceptable. So there are thousands of people who don’t have a place to live because this toad is there, and the toad isn’t even native to Germany, or native to this site, or anything.
I think when people thought about biodiversity, they weren’t really thinking about the toads on a building site, or the grass between two lanes of the highway, all of these places like old industrial areas where some species starts growing, some mouse or some bee. No bees, I can’t say, because bees are sacred. But many other things. We could do better. We could have more true biodiversity, more true nature, by building nature. Instead it seems like we protect the nature that happens to be in the exact place where we want to build. That nature gets enormous investment in the form of the opportunity cost of not building, and we don’t protect nature in places where we could be actually generating more nature. This would be something that if I were dictator for a day, I would radically change.
Mounk: So we need an abundance agenda for Europe. This is one of the huge changes, certainly in Germany, which was always renowned for its efficiency around the world. When you now look at the famous German stories, it’s not just that trains are now less punctual than Italian trains, because they’ve fallen so far behind on investment, but the fact that remodeling the train station in Stuttgart is taking decades and costing billions, that building an airport in Berlin, which still has problems, cost an enormous amount of money and took twenty years longer than people anticipated.
Garicano: Yeah, years and years. Because people are not protecting the environment, they are anti-growth. They hate growth. They don’t want things to change, and they are going to put any obstacle in the way. The moment that something is urgent, like the liquefied natural gas terminals in Germany once the Russian gas stopped coming, you remove this legislation and you can build it in nine months. The legislation is done on purpose to stop these things from happening, and it’s completely crazy. People are dreaming of a world where you have your own apple tree, this Greta Thunberg-type of green attitude, where you eat your own apples and don’t trade with anybody and live in autarky forever. That is just insane.
Mounk: I really did not mean to make this a methodological seminar about the relative importance of institutions or economic incentives versus culture, but it strikes me that there is a cultural element to this. I have so many friends and acquaintances in Europe who use a lot of CO2 in their lives, who don’t live, by global standards, particularly environmentally friendly lives, because they’re quite international, they travel a lot, they use the plane a lot, they live in big, nice apartments, some of them have second homes, all of the things that actually drive CO2 emissions, which is understandable. But they don’t have a car in Berlin, because you can get around very nicely on public transport and a bicycle if you’re in the center of Berlin, and every now and again you call a cab if you’re being lazy, so you don’t really need a car. They somehow feel that because we’re making those sacrifices at the margin, which probably account for a difference of one percent in the CO2 for which we’re responsible over the course of a year, they lead this deeply environmentally friendly lifestyle.
If this was just some form of personal expiation for the guilt of being a modern-day human, and sometimes in the rain they bicycle and feel virtuous about it, and they think that’s changing the world even if it’s not, let them have their fun. But they then want to impose that lifestyle in a normative way on others. Those are the people who will say, well, we don’t want more housing in Berlin because that would be really bad for the environment, even though people living in cities consume less CO2 than people in more suburban places or in the countryside, so actually this is driving up CO2 consumption. But it is that set of cultural and political attitudes that helps to explain the existence of this legislation, is it not?
Garicano: Yes, there are definitely these luxury beliefs, very widespread, particularly among German elites. I wouldn’t say it’s a particularly European thing. We got the NEPA, and this environmental legislation, the habitats legislation, from the United States of America, and this emphasis on process. This legislation is not so much about allowing things, but about documenting that you’ve done all the steps, that you’ve done the environmental impact assessment. It takes years, and somebody can cancel the whole procedure because you jumped one step, you didn’t measure the impact on this particular species or whatever. All of that is American. All of this process obsession is American. So these luxury beliefs are not necessarily just European. But I wouldn’t disagree with you. Luxury beliefs exist, and people will get a belief like, you know, AI uses water, and it’s like, okay, that’s a completely crazy belief, and almond milk, which you drink every day, is much worse. But almond milk feels green to people, whatever.
So yes, they do have the luxury beliefs. My view, and the view when I’m thinking of this group and these efforts to change European policymaking, is that yes, we need to make a big effort at communicating, but it’s going to be hard to change the culture. What we need to do is look for low-hanging fruit, a set of institutional changes that can then lead to all these other downstream changes. For example, we were talking about whether we can get the taxation on business angels’ gains from exiting a startup and re-entering another startup modified, so it’s easy, or even eliminated, to convert one startup into the next. I think it wouldn’t be too difficult. I think it’s something we could try. Sweden managed it, and this would generate change.
Beliefs matter, and these norms are there, and people have these crazy views, like you were talking about CO2 and nuclear. Killing nuclear is the least environmentally friendly thing Germany has ever done. It’s driven up gas consumption and coal consumption through the roof. Germany consumes much more CO2 than anybody, and more than it would have otherwise, and yet it’s not even a debate. Nobody’s talking about nuclear except for the extreme right, because it’s a luxury belief. We can try to find those models, we can try to modify those beliefs, and you and I do that through our Substacks. I write a Substack, people read it, but I have like twelve thousand readers, so is that going to significantly change how everyday Europeans see the world? Probably not. So let’s go for those practical, low-hanging-fruit changes.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Luis discuss why Europe is behind on artificial intelligence, how the continent can change its approach, and what Europe can learn from Ukraine.
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Our journey out of the dark political wood begins in an unlikely place, by taking a closer look at the fairy tale Hansel and Gretel to explore an often obscured but deep-seated tension.
The basic plot seems straightforward enough: A humble woodcutter (or broom maker) and his second wife—now stepmother to his son and daughter, Hansel and Gretel—confront a severe famine. The stepmother argues there’s not enough food to keep them all from starving. Her solution is to reduce the number of hungry mouths by abandoning the children deep in the forest, so that at least she and her husband might survive the hard times.
After some bickering and negotiation, the parents agree and, on their second try, succeed in leaving the children to fend for themselves. Hopelessly lost, the famished brother and sister stumble upon a house made of gingerbread and candy, where they are captured by the resident child-eating witch. But before the witch can serve them up for supper, Gretel outwits her—by popping her into her own scorching oven. Now safe, the children gather as much of the witch’s hoard of gold and jewels as they can carry and set off for home. At last, they succeed in reuniting with their father, who has been pining (or searching) for them all along, the stepmother having died (or been sent away, or simply run off). The children joyfully fall into their father’s arms. And then, enriched by the ex-witch’s treasure, they all live… well, you know.
But, despite the happy ending, the question remains: what is the moral status of the father in this story? Even though he initially resists the stepmother’s plotting, he eventually participates; so clearly, he must join her in being a bad character. Right? And yet, in the story, the father ultimately emerges as good—as underscored by the children’s loving reunion with him at the end. Whatever culpability the parents might have shared for abandoning the children has been wholly given to the late stepmother, with the (contrite) father effectively escaping blame.
How does the narrative accomplish this moral displacement? As we would expect, when the father first hears the stepmother’s scheme, he reacts with horror—rejecting it out of hand and refusing to go along with it. So far, so good. But his wife keeps at him… incessantly. As Stephen King writes in his recent imaginative rendering, “she would give him no peace until he agreed.” Another modern version puts it even more bluntly: She nagged him until he was forced to concede.
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From a rhetorical standpoint, the variations on this theme do the trick. Their primary implication is that the father was eventually worn down by his malevolent wife’s persistent badgering, to the point where he could no longer oppose her. He simply had no choice but to join the conspiracy. Since one cannot be held responsible for something they’re forced to do, her strongarming provides him a valid excuse. He’s off the ethical hook.
But once the question of the father’s culpability has been brought to the foreground, the moral tension that haunts the story calls for a second look. Is Dad really in the clear? Does the nagged-until-forced-to-agree excuse hold up to closer scrutiny? Hardly. In fact, to describe it is already to lay bare its absurdity. We can imagine many forms of coercion, but nagging doesn’t even make the list! Even if we regard “nagging” as a proxy for dependency, emotional blackmail, or fear of abandonment, it remains at best an influence, not a compulsion. In short, the father was as responsible for his actions as the stepmother was for hers.
Here’s the key point: Our story’s customary treatment of the father exemplifies what I shall call the Hansel and Gretel fallacy. This device is a rhetorical move that treats pressure as compulsion and influence as inevitability, such that someone’s compliance is portrayed as though no real alternative existed, thereby providing an excuse that cancels out their responsibility—and accountability—for what they have done.
This form of responsibility-reassignment/excuse-making occurs all too frequently, not just in cherished children’s stories but in real life, as well. Most often, the moral stakes are low (“She made me go to the grocery store with her”) so it doesn’t matter much. But on other occasions, the ethical implications can be more significant, sometimes extraordinarily so. Consider the Nuremberg trials. In that context, the “I-had-no-choice, I-was-merely-following-orders” defense rightly fell on deaf ears. The challenge arises in the broad range of quotidian instances between those two extremes—especially in our public or corporate life, where the “I-was-forced-to-obey/agree” excuse is too easily invoked, either explicitly or, more often, implicitly. And here it can be far from harmless.
For example, consider institutional capitulation: At the beginning of President Donald Trump’s second term, certain universities, law firms, and news organizations quickly caved to pressure. They agreed to actions (e.g. dismantling DEI programs or championing certain causes) incompatible with their basic institutional values, or paid monetary tributes, or both.
When they are cloaked in rhetoric intended to deflect responsibility and accountability, such events often escape scrutiny in ways quite analogous to the fairytale. Evil stepmothers and would-be autocrats alike aim to short-circuit ethical decision-making by promoting narratives serving their purpose. So long as their storylines go unchallenged, they tempt us to assume that there is no alternative but to acquiesce in bending our wills to theirs.
To interrogate this assumption, it is instructive to return to Hansel and Gretel and look more closely into just where and how the father went off the ethical rails. The first thing to recognize is that the father’s scheming wife confronted him with a false dilemma. Although this premise is never questioned within the framework of the story, many more ways forward were at least conceivable, had he engaged his imagination to identify them. Indeed, he could have banished the stepmother into the woods, and injected a welcome dose of irony into the tale! The father’s ethical duty to his children should have led him to seriously entertain this and other options. In sum, the father lacked both the creativity and the moral courage to do what he knew to be right.
Our reflections are grounded in the concept of freedom. The strong presumption of accountability for our actions emerging in my account aligns with the 20th-century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre’s commitment to a rigorous concept of human freedom. Following directly from Sartre’s analysis of consciousness, freedom is central to his definition of human existence. He argues that our experience reveals an undeniable gap between thought and action—a gap we fill with personal decision—and he draws a forthright conclusion: “[We are] condemned to be free. Condemned … because, once thrown into the world, [we are] responsible for everything [we do].”
Sartre’s use of the word “condemned” underlines his realization that embracing such a radical notion of freedom imposes a considerable burden—that it’s far from trivial to accept such an elevated level of personal accountability. Once we acknowledge that we are free in this strong sense, it becomes difficult—if not impossible—to draw a line where freedom and responsibility end. From Sartre’s perspective, there is no such line, and therefore, in the end we are “without excuse.” Letting someone off the ethical hook for their actions, for example by invoking the Hansel and Gretel fallacy, is tantamount to denying their freedom, and by implication, our own.
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The political space is, first and foremost, a realm of discourse. All too often, our political leaders speak to us in their own fairytale dialects, which conceal darker realities beneath an innocent-looking surface. We need to critically evaluate and, when necessary, replace such narratives with the language of responsibility and accountability. Identifying and calling out such linguistic cover-ups—“You’re invoking the Hansel and Gretel fallacy!”—would be a start.
Philip A. Glotzbach is President Emeritus of Skidmore College, where he served as president for 17 years. He is the author of Embrace Your Freedom: Winning Strategies to Succeed in College and in Life.
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