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Will you be in London on Thursday, October 8 at 6pm? Join Yascha Mounk and Dan Williams for this live recording of The Good Fight podcast at the Halycon International School as they discuss whether AI will doom us all! Get your FREE ticket here! Please note that you must reserve a ticket in order to attend. Please email [email protected] if you have any questions.
I’ve been traveling through Germany for the past week talking about my memoir In the Realm of the Last Man (Der Letzte Mensch in German), starting in Berlin and continuing through Hamburg, Stuttgart, and Munich. As readers of Frankly Fukuyama should be aware, there has been a political earthquake in recent weeks as the AfD—the right-wing Alternative for Germany—has come out on top in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt, winning 44% of the vote. Then in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, a surging AfD wiped out the formerly dominant Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which failed to reach the 5% vote share necessary to receive representation in the state parliament. The CDU and other mainstream parties had up to now been following a “firewall” strategy of refusing to consider cooperation with the AfD, a policy of marginalization that has obviously failed to work.
In my memoir, I had argued that one explanation for the rise of populist-nationalist parties like the AfD in Germany and Trump’s MAGA movement in the U.S. was less the failure to distribute material goods than the distribution of equal respect, which led to a backlash of anger on the part of populations who felt disregarded and socially marginalized. It seems to me that this explanation applies in spades to Germany.
The AfD’s political base is in the states of the former East Germany, what used to be the Communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). After unification in the early 1990s, the former West Germany made impressive efforts to incorporate the GDR into its own thriving economy, transferring wealth and welfare state benefits to the East, as well as a rule of law that granted equal rights to the former Communist society.
This formal equality was not matched, however, on a social level. Germany, like the United States, United Kingdom, and other rich democracies was undergoing a social transformation in this period. A new elite was forming: parties of the left like the American Democrats, British Labour, and the German Social Democrats were increasingly dominated not by the working class they claimed to serve, but by educated professionals living in cosmopolitan urban centers. These elites may have espoused egalitarian policy views, but they did not perceive the huge social gap that had opened up between themselves and their less-educated peers living outside of big cities. The de-industrialization brought on by a globalizing economy and neo-liberal policies exacerbated this cleavage, with heartland jobs being outsourced or replaced by a service sector requiring a different type of education and skills.
It is against this backdrop that the rise of the AfD must be understood. Roughly 2 million people left East Germany for the West since 1990, out of a 1989 population of only 16 million. While early leavers were largely young men, after 1991 they skewed female. The GDR’s inefficient industrial base was largely dismantled; while there was new investment in the East, many workers found their livelihoods disrupted. The remaining population was therefore more male, elderly, and less educated.
These economic changes do not fully account for the social gap that opened up between East and West, however. Many Easterners felt that they were being looked down upon by their Western compatriots. They bore a subtle social stigma that showed up in phenomena like regional accents and the Easterners’ inability to speak English well. While the latter were receiving social benefits from the West, politics remained dominated by that region’s mainstream parties. Prior to 1989, there had been virtually no non-European immigration into the GDR, and therefore no experience of living in a culturally diverse society. West Germans did a lot after 1945 to educate their young people about the Holocaust and the militarism of the Hitler era, something that did not happen in the East. This omission fed the AfD narrative that Germans needed to stop feeling guilty for the Nazi era and to be proud of their history. Younger, less educated men in particular saw their social status decline in the liberal culture brought on after unification.
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This then constitutes the social and economic backdrop to the rise of the AfD. It is very similar to that of Donald Trump’s MAGA base, which is also composed of less educated and more rural voters. In both countries, young men have joined hands with the elderly nostalgic for the past in opposing mainstream parties that they feel have ignored and disrespected them.
As I said at the end of In the Realm of the Last Man, “We have means of distributing resources a bit more evenly, and should undertake to do that. What we lack is a way of distributing respect.”
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In The Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
The numbers may not be catastrophic yet, but they are hardly reassuring. The Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), Europe’s main benchmark price of natural gas, is around €72 per megawatt-hour, or $24 per million British thermal units (down from €83 in mid-September). That is eight times the U.S. price at Henry Hub, $2.97.
At first glance, the reasons for the squeeze are completely outside of Europe’s control. Qatar’s Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant, damaged in the Iran war, may take between 12 and 36 months to repair, imposing a “force majeure” on European deliveries. The Strait of Hormuz is mostly closed to routine commercial traffic. Add to this Ukraine’s fully justified campaign against Russian refining capacity, and we can see why diesel, in addition to other fossil fuels, is at record prices across Europe.
What’s more, the EU’s ban on Russian LNG imports is expected to come into effect in January, in the depths of winter, which is presumably why European buyers purchased 57 percent more Russian LNG this June than a year earlier. Yet even that might not be enough to keep European energy markets in decent shape throughout the heating season. EU storage is at just over 71 percent of capacity, compared to a seasonal norm of 88 percent. Germany, which holds Europe’s largest storage capacity, was barely above half full in late August, against roughly 69 percent a year earlier.
There is a legal requirement to reach 70 percent by November 1, which may well be missed. INES, the German gas storage association, warns that “if insufficiently filled gas storage facilities coincide with a very cold winter, Germany may no longer be able to cover normal gas demand in full.”
European Commissioner for Energy Dan Jørgensen concedes that storage is “exceptionally low,” yet sees “no immediate risks to security of supply.” The optimism is not universally shared. “The combination of Hormuz supply disruptions and below-average storage leaves Europe with very little room for error this winter,” says David Lewis of Wood Mackenzie, an energy-focused research and consultancy group, adding that the situation is unlikely to settle before 2028.
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While bad geopolitical luck is one part of it, it is not the whole story—nor is the story primarily about short-term crisis management, at which the EU can be quite good. Europe’s energy policy has oscillated between a complacency caused by the supposedly plentiful supply of Russian pipeline gas, the moral imperative of decarbonization, concerns over nuclear energy, and—more recently—the strategic need to cut the continent’s dependence on Russian energy. Juggling those choices, Europeans lost sight of the overarching need to invest at scale in expanding supply to keep their economies growing.
Take one example of policy malpractice: the Dutch province of Groningen. The Netherlands is in the process of sealing a field that still holds an estimated 550 billion cubic meters of gas—something on the order of eighteen years of Dutch consumption. Seventy out of some 300 wells have already been capped. Full decommissioning will take about a decade and cost some €2 billion.
The decision was not completely baseless—the Dutch were rattled by “induced earthquakes” caused by gas extraction—but shutting the field down was not the only option. TNO, the Dutch state research institute, proposed keeping the field as a strategic reserve instead of making it physically impossible to use it ever again.
It is not a unique occurrence. Unlike in the United States or Canada, fracking is banned across much of the continent on grounds that have little to do with any serious accounting of risk. In political life, security and abundance of supply suffers from a collective action problem, while local objections can have the effect of a near-veto. For national leaders working with short time horizons, cushioning high prices is more convenient than funding the investment in future supply that would lower them.
The bill is coming due in Europe’s industrial heartland. In March, Germany’s chemical lobby warned that the country’s industrial base was “at risk of a structural break.” Dow is shutting its ethylene cracker at Böhlen and its chlor-alkali assets at Schkopau. ArcelorMittal is ending steelmaking at Duisburg, citing high energy costs.
Meanwhile, the head of Poland’s Grupa Azoty noted this month that European fertilizer producers are again weighing cuts because gas costs no longer permit profitable production. In 2022, half of Europe’s ammonia capacity went dark because of high natural gas prices.
Germany’s growth forecast for 2027, set by the ifo Institute at 1.2 percent, may not look terrible by European standards. But the same group of macroeconomists estimates Germany’s long-run potential growth at only 0.1 percent, blaming it on a lack of structural reforms. The deficit is also projected to reach 4.6 percent of GDP in 2027, bringing gross debt to 68 percent by 2028.
In isolation, none of this may look like an emergency—but it becomes one in the context of crises affecting the continent. Every euro spent on cushioning households and factories from the impact of high energy prices this winter is a euro not spent on defense, on investment in new energy sources, or on economic reforms.
If the politics of waking Europe from its stupor look bad today, they are unlikely to get any better. The German Chancellor’s position is unsteady as the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), as well as the far left, wins elections. Marine Le Pen looks increasingly like a frontrunner in France’s presidential election next year. A cold, expensive winter across Europe’s industrial core risks being the straw that breaks the camel’s back—and it is precisely the sort of event that Moscow is counting on to erode Western unity on Ukraine.
There is no question that Europe has taken many right steps since 2022. It stopped using Russian pipeline gas without the lights going out, built LNG import capacity with impressive speed, and continued to support Ukraine. Constant improvisation, on energy or on defense, cannot be a substitute for changing the nature of the energy policy game in Europe—seeking to end the era in which the EU is dependent on sources of energy it has little control over.
Getting there is not going to be easy—and might require some compromises with Trump’s America. Last year’s Turnberry commitment to purchase $750 billion of American energy by the end of 2028 is currently running at around 41 percent of the required pace. That gap, together with the massive spread between U.S. and European prices of natural gas, is an arbitrage opportunity.
Instead of making political pledges, Europe should choose fifteen- and twenty-year contracts to buy LNG. This would mean more consistent prices as well as a motivation for Washington to continue to support the transatlantic relationship.
More importantly, the sector must focus on all energy sources—renewables, nuclear, and fossil fuels. Instead of being destroyed, Groningen should be kept as a strategic reserve, while Romania’s Neptun Deep and Eastern Mediterranean supply should be fast-tracked. And the European Commission should prioritize security of its energy supply chain over local vetoes.
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Finally, Europe must look to its long-term future. Renewables are unlikely to meet the demand opened up by decarbonization. Nuclear could—but only if it is built strategically rather than in decentralized national projects. To do this, European institutions need to include nuclear power in the next Multiannual Financial Framework, committing with real money rather than just another strategy document.
While none of this is technically difficult, it would require European governments to face up to the fact that their old energy policy rested on assumptions shown to be false over the last few years—not only choosing dependence on Russia, but also that renewable energy alone can meet the gap left by a decline in fossil fuels. The alternative option would be to stay in denial, winter after winter, until voters are pushed to find an alternative. This alternative may not be a friend of Europe, Ukraine—or even of liberal democracy.
Dalibor Rohac is the Director of Research at GLOBSEC in Prague.
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Will you be in London on Thursday, October 8 at 6pm? Join Yascha Mounk and Dan Williams for this live recording of The Good Fight podcast at the Halycon International School as they discuss whether AI will doom us all! G…
Galen Druke is the founder and host of “GD Politics,” a leading nonpartisan podcast and Substack that explains politics with curiosity, rigor, and a sense of humor. He also co-hosts the “Still Counting” podcast alongside Nate Silver and Clare Malone.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Galen Druke discuss whether Democrats are headed for a blue wave in the 2026 midterms, why the Senate map remains an uphill climb even in a favorable national environment, and what the persistent unpopularity of the Democratic Party tells us about its challenges going into the next election cycle.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I’ve followed the midterms at the headline level. I look at the various polling averages now and then, and I look at some of the prediction markets. Midterm elections are usually good for the party that is not in the White House. This year it looks like, on the generic ballot, Democrats are doing particularly well. Should we be expecting a huge blue wave? Are Democrats going to win the House? Might they even win the Senate?
Galen Druke: I think the base case expectation should be a blue wave. If you look at the generic ballot today, which is asking Americans whether they would prefer Republicans or Democrats to control Congress, Democrats lead by about nine percentage points. That would be a blue wave under basically any scenario. In the House, certainly the expectation should be that Democrats win.
In the Senate, of course, only a third of Senate seats are up for election every two years. This year the map is particularly Republican-friendly, in the sense that Republicans are defending quite red turf. The battlegrounds we’re talking about in this cycle are places where Donald Trump beat Kamala Harris in 2024 by 11 to 13 points—Texas, Iowa, Ohio, Alaska. This is not terrain that under any other circumstance would be competitive for Democrats.
I think we have to be able to hold two things in our minds at once. There is a backlash to Donald Trump—his approval rating is somewhere around net negative 23, which makes him historically unpopular, less popular than he was going into the midterms in 2018, less popular than Biden was going into the midterms in 2022. In fact, less popular than any president we have data for going back to the beginning of the modern polling era. That’s really bad. At the same time, if you see an environment where Democrats are favored by nine percentage points, but the baseline partisanship of the states we’re talking about in the Senate is more like R plus 10 or even R plus 13, that gets Democrats close, that gets Democrats competitive, but some other things have to go right for them as well—for example, having good quality Democratic candidates or bad quality Republican candidates. I think that’s the baseline for what people should expect.
Mounk: Let’s stay at the national level a little bit, and then over the course of this conversation I also want to dive into some of these particular races and dynamics.
In terms of the general numbers, I feel like there may be some reasons to think that the polls are even underestimating the magnitude of the Democratic win, and some reasons to think that the elections may turn out to be a little bit closer than we’re thinking at the moment. Let me throw a little bit of each at you and help us puzzle through which of these we should take seriously.
One reason to think that we might be underestimating the magnitude of this is that these waves tend to build. Massachusetts seems like a very obviously Democrat state that’s always going to vote for a Democrat. But if you’re in a national environment like in 2009, in which there’s a huge backlash against Barack Obama and the start of the rise of the Tea Party, Democrats are capable of losing a Senate seat in Massachusetts, particularly if they don’t have a very good candidate. In the same way, you’re looking at these races in places that have always broken the hearts of Democrats—can we really pull off something like Texas? Could we win somewhere like Kansas? I’d normally say of course they can’t, but in a big enough wave, perhaps we could.
The second argument goes a little bit in that direction as well. Historically, Democrats have always been disfavored in midterms because the Republican Party was mostly the party of highly educated and affluent people, and highly educated and affluent people tend to vote much more consistently and reliably. So in lower salience elections, Republicans had a built-in advantage. That has mostly changed and transformed—presumably posters are aware of that—and I don’t know what your assessment is of whether the models have fully incorporated that change. Perhaps we might be underestimating Democratic turnout and overestimating Republican turnout for midterms specifically.
On the other hand, you can say midterms are referenda on the sitting president. Donald Trump is deeply unpopular—I believe that part of the polls. But normally, when the governing party becomes unpopular, the opposition becomes a lot more popular. The image of the Democratic Party continues to be really, really bad. So perhaps people will sit out the election, or they won’t quite be willing to vote for Democrats for that reason.
So those are some reasons to think perhaps it’s going to be an even bigger Democratic majority than we think, and at least one reason to worry that the wave is going to turn out to be smaller than we think. Do you think any of this stuff matters?
Druke: I think a lot of it matters, and it matters at different levels of the analytical process. One is: do we expect that the polls are underestimating or overestimating one party or another? In general, we should expect polling errors. Historically, in midterms like this, we see that at the national popular vote level in the House, there’s an average error of about three points. When you look at statewide races for governor or Senate, the average error is four or five points.
As somebody who uses the polls a lot and is in some ways a defender of the polls, it’s important to impress upon people that polling error is not unique—it doesn’t mean that the scientific method is totally broken. It’s just something we should absolutely expect when we’re sampling a broad public, and there are lots of different factors that could cause the polls to be off in one direction or another.
To add a little historical context to polling error: during the Trump era, we have seen that in presidential elections, the polls have underestimated Republicans three times in a row at the presidential level. We have also seen in the two midterms, 2018 and 2022, that the polls were very accurate—they got really close to the result. We have also seen, for example, in 2025, an off-year election, that the polls underestimated Democrats. In Virginia and New Jersey last year, Mikey Sherrill and Abigail Spanberger, the Democrats who ultimately won the governorship of those states, were underestimated by the polls.
Mounk: So why is that? Is that to do with the idea that the models somehow assume Republicans are relatively good at getting voters out in these off-cycle elections or midterms, and that has changed? Or is there some other reason for this? That seems like a systematic bias in the polls—not systematic towards the left over the right, but there’s some kind of pattern to this.
Druke: I think it ultimately gets at the fact that the coalitions have been divided along what you suggested—educational lines, and also engagement lines. People who pay more attention to politics, college-educated people with a bachelor’s degree or higher, tend to pay more attention to politics, tend to trust institutions more, and tend to answer pollsters more reliably. In a national presidential year, when you have somewhere approaching 63 to 65 percent turnout of eligible voters, you’re getting a much broader cross-section of the American public than in a midterm year or an off-cycle year. Pollsters have difficulty reaching the broad electorate that turns out in a presidential year, specifically people who vote for Donald Trump who are less engaged in politics.
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Those same people that the pollsters miss in a presidential year are less likely to turn out in a midterm or off-cycle year, which means that missing them in a poll becomes less consequential for how accurate the poll may be. To be clear, pollsters have not solved this problem. You can weight to make sure you get the right number of Republicans. You can weight to make sure you get the right number of Trump voters. But what you can’t ensure is that you get the right people who are swinging or intend to vote for Trump or whoever. Even if you weight for “did you vote for Trump in the last election,” we know what the margin was—you want to make sure in the sample that Trump is winning this quote-unquote sample by 1.5 points, because that’s how much he won the popular vote by. Even then, you can’t guarantee that you’re getting the people who are going to turn out this time, the people who might be changing their minds this time.
Mounk: A lot of low-propensity voters who swung hard for Trump in 2024 because they were very disgruntled with the Biden administration, including on things like cost of living, may precisely now be activated and swing to the Democrats.
Druke: Yeah, and a couple of things may be happening there. Even if you don’t swing towards the Democrats as a 2024 Trump supporter, maybe you’re pissed off enough to not turn out. You said that Democrats are still quite unpopular—that’s true, and that means there’s a pretty steep hill to climb to get from voting for Trump in 2024 to maybe voting for Democrats in 2026. So there are a couple of options: you can not turn out to vote at all, or some people are going to say in polls that they dislike the Democratic Party and still vote for a Democrat anyway, because they’re using Democrats as a tool to punish Republicans, not as an endorsement of any particular worldview.
Mounk: Let me ask you this as a question: what is the makeup of the people missing from Democratic approvals? There are some people who are just very conservative—they’re never going to approve of Democrats, easy. There are people who should be approving of Democrats at the moment, given how unpopular Trump is, and who are not. It’s the differential between what the average rate of approval for the opposition party is when a sitting president is that unpopular, and the current rate of approval for Democrats.
One hypothesis about this group is that these are people who are more progressive than the average Democrat, and they don’t like the Democrats because the Democrats are too moderate for them. A second hypothesis is that these are people who are very comfortable with the ideological direction of the Democratic Party, pretty straight down the line in terms of political views, but who just find that the Democratic Party doesn’t fight enough for them. The third is that these are people who are more moderate than the Democratic Party, or perhaps more conservative than the Democratic Party, but who don’t like Trump because they think he’s doing a terrible job for all kinds of relatively obvious reasons—to them, the Democratic Party is just far too far left for them to like. Do you have a sense of how this group is splitting?
Druke: I think there’s a fourth option which runs through all of those buckets: people don’t like losers. We see this time and time again—when a party loses a big, high-profile presidential election, people sour on that party. A lot of the people who disapprove of the Democratic Party right now—to put this in context, approval rating for the Democratic Party is somewhere between net negative 10 and net negative 20-something, depending on which polls you’re looking at, so it’s about as unpopular as Donald Trump—a lot of those people may be people who will vote for Democrats, have voted for Democrats, will vote for them again, but are pissed off that the Democratic Party lost to Donald Trump.
A lot of voters don’t think in such ideological terms as we do. There are certain impressions, like: Democrats are weird, they’re too woke, maybe they fight for people at the margins of society but they’re never really fighting for normal people like me. I think that’s a pretty common view of the Democratic Party. It might not be that they’re too far left or too far right per se, but when I look at the Democratic Party, does it feel like a party that represents people like me, or does it feel like it’s representing an elite, a professional class, a particular gender, a particular race, a particular part of society?
I think people have gotten the impression—particularly the roughly 50 percent of voters in the middle who have swung hard towards Trump, which is to say not poor, not rich—that the party doesn’t really represent them, because the party has spent a lot of time talking about the economic plight of the poor and the cultural predilections of the rich. So if you’re somewhere in the middle, just trying to have a stable life and maybe supporting some economic populist policies—a higher minimum wage, better healthcare, things like that—but you don’t share the same cultural predilections as the left elite, you may not like their posture overall towards the country, even if Democrats are saying things you like on the economy.
I don’t think it’s just one of those things. There probably are DSA people or Democratic socialists who say the party is not left enough, but looking at the polls, it’s frequently in the single digits—the number of people who say that the Democratic Party is not far-left enough.
Mounk: That’s a very important point, because both in the media discussion in the United States, and certainly in the view that Europeans have of the political situation in the United States—I’m in Europe at the moment—the assumption is that the political center, in any meaningful sense, has totally eroded, because voters are no longer in the political center, because there’s nobody who is politically moderate. What people really want is for the Republican Party to be in the hands of Donald Trump, and for the Democratic Party to be in the hands of AOC. The reasoning goes: if the Democratic Party is way less popular than we would expect it to be, given the unpopularity of Donald Trump, the reason for this must be that they haven’t embraced the politics of AOC.
Now, I think my audience is not going to be surprised that I’m somewhat skeptical of this, and I don’t think your audience will be surprised that you’re somewhat skeptical of this either. But give us some of that evidence. When you’re asking voters, “Do you think the Democratic Party is too far left or too far right?” as a general question to the voting population, only in the single digits do people say that. So why is it then that the energy often feels to be with candidates like AOC, like Zohran Mamdani, like the candidate in Michigan whose full name is Abdul El-Sayed?
Druke: There’s a lot of important context here, which is that we’re coming off a Democratic primary season in which people feel like the Democratic Socialists are ascendant. I want to keep that in perspective. Today there are two members of the Democratic Socialists in Congress—Rashida Tlaib and AOC, just two. At the beginning of the next Congress, likely because of this primary season and DSA victories, it will likely be seven. That’s not quite a takeover of the Democratic Party, even if progressives or further-left candidates have had some high-profile victories this cycle.
Mounk: It’s worth noting that in this cycle—I looked at one kind of measure of this, though I don’t know how accurate this metric is versus others—in about forty-three competitive races between mainstream Democrats and either very progressive or explicitly DSA candidates, about thirty-four of them were won by the more mainstream Dems. Understandably, it’s a much bigger news story when an upstart challenger to the mainstream wins a primary, but it’s not actually the case that the most progressive candidate won in a majority of the primary races. Is that broadly accurate, you think?
Druke: That’s broadly accurate, and it’s even more the case that these further-left candidates have difficulty winning outside of territory that is already deep blue. If you compare it to the Tea Party in 2010—after that election there were 45 Tea Party-associated lawmakers in Congress. So if you want to draw parallels, I would say the Tea Party, at this point in the process at least, was far more successful than Democratic socialism is today in America.
The other thing to keep in mind is who participates in a Democratic primary. It’s only about 20 percent of the eligible electorate, so you’re getting the preferences of the most ideological, most politically engaged, most enthusiastic part of the electorate. Look at Maine, for example—you got this sense that Graham Platner is the Messiah in Maine, he’s so popular, there’s so much grassroots support and enthusiasm. That’s because everyone’s referring to Democratic primary polls. You get to the general election, and Susan Collins has a positive favorability rating in Maine—she’s net plus three. Troy Jackson, Graham Platner’s replacement, is net negative eight. And I think today Graham Platner is net negative forty-something in terms of approval.
In a primary season, it’s easy to get carried away, because the voting public is a small subset of America more broadly, and the party is, in particular, at its most ideological, most engaged, and most likely in this moment to be voting for more extreme candidates. This isn’t always a bad thing—I’m judgmental in the sense that it’s just not representative of the American public, and that’s important to keep in mind. But there are also angry Democrats who feel the Democratic Party has not been responsive to them, in the same way that there were angry Republicans who felt the Republican Party had not been responsive to them in the 2010s. That’s how parties work, especially when you have a two-party system where people can’t just create a brand new party. If you’re pissed off and you’re participatory in that party, you have the right to show up and make your voice heard.
Mounk: What is the actual evidence here? There’s this argument progressives often make that the reason Democrats keep losing is that they’re too moderate, too establishment—if only we nominated candidates like AOC and Mamdani all up and down the country, we would actually win. I think in the specific case of AOC and Mamdani, those two candidates are not just very far left, they also happen to be quite charismatic, and that certainly matters. But when you actually look at the track record of relatively more moderate establishment candidates in competitive House races or competitive Senate races, versus more progressive candidates in races that matter—because obviously, if you’re running in a D+40 congressional district, or running for mayor in a D+40 city, you can afford to be very progressive and you’re not going to be in danger of losing to a Republican—but when we’re talking about the Senate races and House races that will determine control of Congress in November, what is the evidence over the last ten years about whether this argument by progressives, that they’ll be better at winning in those races, holds any water?
Druke: It simply doesn’t hold up. Lakshya Jain at The Argument, the founder of Split Ticket, has done really good work on this—what he calls “wins above replacement.” How well does a particular candidate perform above and beyond a replacement-level Democrat or replacement-level Republican? He finds there’s about a four-point advantage to being a quote-unquote blue dog Democrat over being a progressive Democrat, over many different cycles.
The same thing happens on the Republican side. It’s kind of ironic that the same people who believe progressives perform better across the board in elections don’t necessarily believe that more extremist right-wing candidates, or more out-of-the-norm right-wing candidates, would also do better. You see the same punishment for the more ideological, more MAGA-aligned candidates. Republicans overall have done worse in nominating high-quality candidates over the past ten years than Democrats have—Kari Lake, twice in Arizona. Those were winnable races for Republicans, but they chose these charismatic, populist, too-far-right candidates—Blake Masters, Doug Mastriano. It goes on and on.
Those are statewide races, I should say, and generally Democrats have nominated statewide candidates in competitive races who have fit their states better, especially in those battleground states. I think Abdul El-Sayed will be somewhat of a test to that in Michigan—he’s more out-and-out progressive. He’s not a Democratic socialist, but he’s very much aligned with AOC and Bernie Sanders. For somebody who’s not really engaged in the specifics, they may not be able to tell the difference. And then there’s Troy Jackson in Maine, who is also pretty out-and-out progressive, and who replaced Graham Platner as the Democratic nominee.
Mounk: I want to go into some of the specific races in a moment, but let me propose a three-pronged theory of American politics that I just thought up while listening to Galen. Three simple facts.
Number one: very obvious in the background—the electoral system strongly encourages a two-party system. I don’t think it guarantees a two-party system; I think the two-party system could break down under certain conditions. But the fact that in congressional and senatorial elections you have a majoritarian political system, where the single candidate that gets the most votes gets elected, provides a very strong disincentive for people to vote for third parties and minor parties, because that’s basically wasting a vote in a way it wouldn’t be in a proportional system. Very straightforward point.
Second point: the primary system often produces quite extreme candidates in each political party. Because only about 20 percent of people participate in Democratic or Republican primary elections, as you were pointing out, Galen, those people tend to be much more politically engaged and much more ideologically extreme on both the Republican and Democratic side. Then, in part because of gerrymandering, a lot of people in Congress today are more worried about the primary as a threat to their job than about the general election, which also gives them incentives to move to the extremes. So what we end up with is a Democratic Party that I think is significantly to the left of the median voter in the United States, and a Republican Party under Trump that is far to the right of the median voter. Now, the corrective mechanism for this should be that the most extreme party is punished, because they keep losing elections to the more moderate party. But that’s not happening, because both of these parties have gone towards the ideological extremes. I don’t think we’re equally far from the median voter, but we’ve both drifted away from the median voter at the same time, so they’re each sort of saving each other.
Third, this is the prong I’ve just added to the previous two while listening to you, Galen: if the penalty for being ideologically extreme is four points, that’s significant—certainly significant enough that if you’re trying to take back control of the Senate, you’d be well advised to pick a blue dog Democrat rather than a progressive Democrat. But it is not prohibitive; you can overcome a four-point penalty. So to speak to El-Sayed in Michigan: Michigan is more or less a toss-up state, perhaps R+1 or R+2. In a blue wave environment, it might be D+7 or D+8. If you drop four points, because that’s what you drop if you’re below wins above replacement, you end up at D+3 and you take the Senate seat.
So it’s these three facts together: the electoral system that creates the two-party system, the primary and gerrymandering dynamics that push parties to the extreme at the same time, and this four-point penalty in the wins-above-replacement metric—which hurts, which matters, but which is not, say, a twenty-point penalty that would push the parties back towards the center. A four-point penalty allows both parties to keep making that mistake over and over again.
Druke: I think we’re mostly talking about ideology here, which is important. Sometimes pundits downplay it too much. I think voters do get a sense of who you are because of the way you talk about policy—they may not care about policy specifics, but they understand what kind of person you are based on how you talk about it.
I will say, though, that this understanding of Donald Trump in 2016 as far right is slightly complicated by how voters understood him at the time. On top of ideology, there are insider-outsider dynamics, and oftentimes when people are upset with an incumbent, being the outsider is a really powerful tool. Donald Trump got to put himself in the position of campaigning against both parties. Of course, he was trashing Democrats and Hillary Clinton, but he equally trashed John McCain, Mitt Romney, the Bush family, the Iraq War, free trade, and all kinds of Republican figures and Republican orthodoxy—that allowed him to set himself outside an unpopular two-party system in which people feel like politics is failing them. That’s not necessarily a policy position; it’s something of a different axis. Maybe that’s insider-outsider, which gets to a populism axis as well—the people versus a corrupt elite—especially when people felt like a lot of the gains after the 2008–2009 recession had gone to the top, and there had been, for some time, a hollowing out of the Rust Belt and places like that in America.
I would also say, beyond just campaigning against both parties, Donald Trump jettisoned the Republican Party’s least popular positions and doubled down on the things that were non-negotiable for Republicans. People have probably heard plenty about this at this point, but the way he basically said: no, we’re not going to privatize Social Security; we’re going to keep funding Medicare at the same levels; I want a better healthcare plan than Obamacare. He also said he was going to eliminate the debt and deficit. But he doubled down on something that was non-negotiable for Republican primary voters, which was immigration, while actually moderating on the things that made the Republican Party less popular with the general voting public.
I think it’s sometimes the case that primary voters are just ideological and will vote for the more ideologically extreme candidate. I don’t think history necessarily shows that that’s always true. I think it’s probably even more true in congressional elections than presidential elections, where the primary electorate becomes a lot bigger. Even in 2016, Donald Trump was not the Tea Party candidate—that was Ted Cruz. We saw Republicans nominate John McCain, even after the Tea Party began, then Mitt Romney, and then jettison Ted Cruz for Donald Trump, who seemed kind of out there but was not ideologically extreme in the Tea Party sense of “we’re going to privatize Social Security and cut all benefits.”
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What are Democrats going to do now? I think there are certain litmus tests that a Democratic hopeful in 2028 has to pass—it might be on Israel-Palestine or something like that. But I think they probably have plenty of leeway in some of the areas Democrats care less about. I think a successful 2028 Democratic nominee could moderate plenty on immigration. Somebody like James Talarico has already said Biden’s policies were a failure.
Mounk: Let’s get back to the primaries at the end of the conversation. I want to get a sense now of what your best estimate is for the midterms. We’ve talked about the general expectation based on generic polling, and some of the factors that might complicate it. Can we confidently say the Democrats are going to win the House of Representatives in November?
Druke: I would be pretty surprised at this point if they did not win. Currently in the generic ballot, they lead Republicans by nine percentage points. I said the average polling error was three percentage points in this type of race, and that’s in either direction. Democrats could overperform by three percentage points, be at eleven or twelve, and all of a sudden we’re talking about a tsunami. But if the polls are overestimating Democrats by three percentage points and they win the House popular vote nationally by six, they’re still winning the House. It’s also because the hurdle to win the House is quite low—even after the gerrymandering shenanigans throughout the past year, the number of seats they have to win is in the single digits. If you look at my colleague Nate Silver’s forecast right now, Democrats have better than a 90 percent chance of winning the House. I think people feel pretty clear about the direction the House is headed in. I think the Senate is a little more debatable.
Mounk: One more question about the House, and then we’ll move to the Senate. There are always questions about gerrymandering—there’s obviously been a huge gerrymandering war. There are often gerrymandering wars in American politics, but there’s been an off-cycle gerrymandering war, which is unusual and very bad. Why do these efforts at gerrymandering not undermine your confidence in the prediction? In the end, did the Republicans really gain something significant from their attempts to engage in this extra gerrymandering in between census years?
Druke: They certainly gained—they just didn’t gain enough to overcome what is a strong preference for Democrats, or at least a strong preference against Republicans. In a presidential year, or a year where things are a lot closer, this kind of stuff could matter. In 2028, 2032—well, by 2032 folks will have redistricted again—but this kind of stuff could matter. We’re talking about six or so seats that now favor Republicans. Some of those seats were drawn in addition to where they already were, and some were drawn in the Rio Grande Valley in South Texas, relying on shifts among the Hispanic population that happened in 2024 that I don’t think we’ll see replicated in 2026.
When you look at what we call crosstabs in the industry—underneath the top line, how do people feel about Democrats and Republicans, you can see who’s moving: white voters, white non-college-educated voters, Hispanic voters, young voters—we’re seeing some of the biggest shifts towards Democrats this cycle among Hispanic voters and young voters. A lot of those areas in South Texas where Republicans drew districts to advantage them are plurality or even majority Hispanic. So I think there should be less optimism there for Republicans about picking up those seats. This is not to say that gerrymandering doesn’t matter.
Mounk: Let’s say a word here about how gerrymandering works, which most of you probably know, but I think it’s worth spelling out. Generally speaking, the idea is that instead of having obvious, geographically contiguous districts where historically cohesive communities all vote for the same representative, you draw the districts in such a way that you stuff a lot of the voters for the other party into a few districts. You have to put them somewhere—you can’t disenfranchise people altogether—but you’re saying we’re going to have some districts that are 90 percent Democrat, and then lots of districts that are 55 percent Republican. That way you can maximize how many electoral majorities you get out of the number of votes you expect to receive in the state as a whole.
Now, of course, the problem with this is that a gerrymander—I think gerrymander is already a stupid term, but it might turn into an even stupider term—can become a “dummander,” where the idea is that you’ve drawn all these districts, like in the Rio Grande Valley, expecting them to be 55 percent Republican, but then suddenly you’re in a D+12 political environment, and you end up with 49 percent of the vote in a bunch of those districts—the gerrymander has actually backfired. Do you think we’re on the path to that happening in November?
Druke: We’re not on the path to that happening, in the sense that Republicans have pushed the map so far that they’re going to, I think, lose seats overall in Texas. I just don’t think they’re going to gain the five that they hoped they would. I think they might gain two, they might gain three, they might not gain any. But I don’t think they’ve pushed it so far that it’s going to backfire, unless we’re looking at some kind of end-of-times event for the Republican Party. It just might not have accomplished all that much. And again, this isn’t just for this cycle.
Mounk: One of the reasons it didn’t accomplish all that much, of course, is that Democrats in California and elsewhere then followed suit, gerrymandering their own states, or the states over which they themselves had control.
Druke: Democrats are more hamstrung, because in more blue states there are laws that prevent this kind of stuff—more nonpartisan redistricting commissions and things like that. Even if it doesn’t matter this cycle, that doesn’t mean it doesn’t matter—it could matter in the next cycle. Republicans certainly benefited themselves in a way that is outside of the norm when it comes to redistricting practices. It may just not be the difference-maker this cycle. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t matter at all.
Mounk: So you’re reasonably confident the Democrats are going to win the House, when you take all of these different factors into account. Obviously there’s no gerrymandering in the Senate. What do you think is going to happen there? Democrats need to pick up a number of seats—I think at least four—to get to 51 senators and win a majority, when only a third of the Senate is up for election, and in a year where the map is mostly in Republican territory, which insulates them a little bit. Nevertheless, it seems like some of your esteemed colleagues, like Nate Silver, think that Democrats might be able to pull it off. Tell us about your best estimate here.
Druke: Nate’s estimate right now is that there’s a 58 percent chance Democrats win the Senate. I think forecasting the Senate in an environment like this is tricky, because we have the map that you just described, we have the generic ballot at D+9 at this moment—it could still fluctuate a little bit—but we also have very different types of terrain and very different candidates.
Look at a place like Maine, which voted for Kamala Harris by seven percentage points, but the most recent New York Times/Siena College poll showed Susan Collins, the Republican incumbent, leading by three. She has a well-established independent brand in the state and can outrun her party significantly, especially with the college-educated suburban set that Republicans have been underperforming with. She’s a particularly strong candidate who can outrun the environment, so the environment is not determinative the way it is in the House.
Let’s move to Texas. You have Ken Paxton, a Republican who was impeached by his own party for fraud, basically.
Mounk: There’s an amazing little campaign video by James Talarico showing a time when Ken Paxton stole a pen.
Druke: A Mont Blanc pen—like a thousand-dollar pen—from somebody, and it’s caught on video.
Mounk: He was going through security at a courthouse, and some lawyer had left his Mont Blanc pen in the little box you put things in as you go through the metal detector, and Ken Paxton just picked it up and ran with it. It’s about as attackable a candidate as you can get.
Druke: Ken Paxton is so unpopular among Texans—I think his favorability rating is like 20 points underwater. As we were talking about with the primaries, Republicans had John Cornyn, an incumbent with his own brand, who was not the most popular but probably popular enough to win a general election. They threw him out and put in Ken Paxton—the Republican primary voters did. Now he’s fighting for his life. Right now, in the polling averages, James Talarico leads Ken Paxton by three and a half points in Texas, and Troy Jackson, the Democrat in Maine, leads Susan Collins by only two and a half points. If you told somebody two years ago that Democrats would have a better chance of winning Texas than Maine, you’d think, “What happened?”
Mounk: This is where candidate ideology and quality does seem to matter.
Druke: Absolutely. Candidate quality matters. The other thing that’s really interesting is that Maine and Texas could hardly be more different in terms of their demographic makeup. Maine is the oldest state in the country, and it’s very white. We see in the polling that some of the smallest shifts between 2024 and 2026 have happened among older voters and white voters. The biggest shifts have happened among Hispanic voters and young voters. Texas, I believe, is the second-youngest state in the country, and it has either the largest or one of the largest Hispanic populations in the country as well. So you have candidate quality issues, and you also have demographic reasons to expect Texas to be a lot more swingy than Maine. That’s why forecasting this type of thing can be quite hard.
Every state has its own unique circumstances, demographically and in terms of candidates. I don’t think somebody could confidently say—even based on those numbers from Nate Silver’s forecast of fifty-some percent—that you can reliably believe Democrats are going to win the Senate. I think it will be a tricky fight, and it’s going to depend on a lot of different factors.
Mounk: A side question here: for a lot of the 2010s, Democrats in particular seemed to believe—and I think Republicans actually also seemed to believe, in a way that was quite damaging—that demography is destiny, that white voters were much more Republican, non-white voters were much more Democrat, and so as the country became more diverse, Democrats would naturally start to win elections. That was based partly on a misreading, and perhaps to some extent an accurate reading, of the book The Emerging Democratic Majority by Ruy Teixeira and his co-author. He warned the party that they were adopting too simplistic a reading of that book, but people leaned into it a lot. I think that’s the source of, among other things, the Democrats’ defeat to Trump in 2016—the inability to read that kind of political mood.
The 2024 election seemed to really drive the last nail into the coffin of that theory, because so many Hispanic voters, and a significant number of Asian American and African American voters, shifted to Donald Trump—he did so well among young voters compared to how other Republican candidates had recently done, and so on. Now you’re saying you’re seeing a lot of Hispanic voters shift to the Democratic Party, along with young voters. Presumably, from what you’re saying, the 2026 midterms are going to be a lot more demographically polarized than the 2024 presidential election. What’s our best read on what’s happening here? Is it that the true degree of racial polarization by vote is just somewhere between 2024 and 2026, and it’s going to oscillate between those extremes? Or is it that a lot of the most reliable voters for the Democratic Party are still older African American voters, and a lot of the most reliable voters for the Republican Party are still older white voters, and a lot of the other voters are just much more swingy, and so they jump back and forth in different ways? What’s the ten-thousand-foot view of how to think about this?
Druke: I think it’s a combination of several of those things. One is a kind of “last in, first out” dynamic from the Republican coalition. People who just swung over to the Republican coalition, or to vote for Trump, who have not been voting for Republicans reliably for years, are self-evidently less partisan. We know there’s a set of Hispanic voters, for example, that turns out relatively reliably—they vote, but they don’t feel a strong allegiance to one party or the other.
We now see a world where—the caricature of a swing voter in America used to be an older white couple in New Hampshire going through the pros and cons of each candidate. I think swing voters are better thought of today as people who are a little bit less engaged in the political process, who pay less attention to political news, and so don’t have that instinctual partisanship that the fifteen to twenty percent who get spotlighted on cable news and Instagram and Twitter have. It’s people who aren’t participating in that, and don’t feel those intense, strong emotional ties to one party or against one party, who are some of the swingiest voters in American politics today. I would say young people fit that bill as well, in a slightly different way—they don’t have developed voting patterns yet, so they’re still figuring out how they want to identify. As you get older, people generally become less swingy, or at least that’s what you see in the data.
Where does this all net out in terms of racial polarization between the Democratic and Republican coalitions? We should not expect that 2026 is the new baseline, because it’s simply a different electorate. Increasingly, less-engaged voters, who are less likely to show up in a midterm election, are also a bit more Republican or Trump-aligned, or have been during this past decade, and are more favorable to Trump. So there’s going to be somewhere around 15 percent of the 2028 electorate—maybe even more—that doesn’t show up in 2026, and that will make a big difference when the electorate swells again in 2028.
I’ll point to one historical example. In 2020 we saw a significant shift to the right among Hispanics, but it seemed like there had been a little bit of a rebound, that it wasn’t so bad, that it was leveling off. Then in 2024, you just see an absolute drop-off. In total terms, Hillary Clinton won Latino voters by somewhere around 35 to 38 percentage points in 2016. Kamala Harris won them by three to five percentage points in 2024. It’s a massive swing. If you looked at 2022 as an important indicator of where the trajectory was headed, you would have been totally wrong, because it was just a slight leveling off before bottoming out. In the same vein, I wouldn’t overinterpret the results in 2026 to read something more broadly about the Hispanic electorate, or even the young electorate.
Mounk: Tell me a little bit about what we should expect in the thing to which everybody’s attention is going to turn the moment the midterms are over: the 2028 presidential election and the primary season for that. I’d say that on the Republican side, there is a kind of received wisdom—not of who the candidate is going to be, but of the idea that Donald Trump is going to determine who that candidate is going to be. If Donald Trump says it’s JD Vance, JD Vance is going to win. But if, for whatever reason, Donald Trump decides Marco Rubio is it, then Marco Rubio is most likely going to take it. Do you think that’s right? Do you think Republicans have a one-man selectorate for the 2028 presidential nomination?
Druke: I think it’s hard, because a lot could happen over the next two years. As I said, right now Donald Trump’s approval rating is net negative 23. There’s a world in which the bottom truly falls out, and we’re seeing, you know, George W. Bush-level numbers, where he could be closer to net negative 30 or worse. In that case, I still think he’s the most influential person in the Republican Party, but things get a lot more complicated, because other people have stronger incentives to get into the race as well.
Donald Trump is already quite unpopular and still had plenty of sway in this past Republican primary cycle, and I don’t see that going away. If Occam’s razor says Donald Trump is the one-man selectorate for 2028, that makes the process relatively straightforward in the Republican primary, but it makes it extremely complicated for Republicans in the general election. Because at that point—there would have to be utter peace in the Middle East, gas is $2.50, AI turns out perfectly, the stock market is booming, we have full employment, and interest rates have fallen to the point where mortgage rates are no longer above seven percent—there are a lot of things that would have to go incredibly well. I think that an unpopular president who is still the most influential person in the party, and is seen as choosing his successor, but is ultimately deeply unpopular with the broad public, puts either JD Vance or Marco Rubio in a pretty crappy position to run for president in a general election. If that remains the dynamic, I don’t envy the person who then has to run in the general election.
Mounk: On the Democratic side, there’s no one-person selectorate. The most influential Democrat is probably still Barack Obama, but he’s unlikely to put his finger on the scale, certainly early in the process. It feels like 274 candidates are going to run—in actuality, about 74 candidates are going to run. What’s your sense of the favorites? What’s your sense of who might be overhyped?
Druke: I’m torn, because if you listen to the online discourse, for example, Kamala Harris is definitely overhyped.
Mounk: It’s worth noting, for people who may not know this—correct me if I’m overstating this—that in basically every primary poll, she’s leading.
Druke: Yes. On one hand, that would lead me to believe that a lot of that support is name ID—people know who she is, she’s familiar to folks, and no campaign has actually started yet. Those numbers would fall significantly once a campaign actually did, or once somebody else’s did. But there’s also still a key part of the Democratic primary electorate that is older Black voters. It’s not as determinative as I think many people would suggest. In the Democratic primary, about 20 percent of voters are Black, about 20 percent are Hispanic or other, and about 60 percent are white. Black voters are oftentimes more coalesced around one candidate, whereas white voters are not. You see more leftist white voters who prefer Bernie Sanders or AOC, and more moderate white voters who might like a Josh Shapiro or a Jon Ossoff, and you have the resistance libs who might like Gavin Newsom. So there is power in bloc voting, which could be good for Kamala Harris if the rest of the electorate is really splintered across the different candidates.
My instinct is that she’s overhyped, but I don’t want to put her possible path to the nomination too much to the side. A lot of people have been comparing 2026 to 2006, in terms of Democrats’ overperformance and a backlash to an unpopular war, a second-term president, and so on. If we stick with that parallel, 2028 is fertile ground for a brand-new face. Even AOC will, by the time 2028 rolls around, have been a high-profile figure in American politics for a decade. Kamala Harris will have already been vice president during a very unpopular Democratic tenure in the White House. Gavin Newsom was basically running a shadow campaign in 2024, and has been out front doing a podcast and all of this stuff—people know who the guy is. Barack Obama’s strength in 2008 was that he had very little record; people didn’t know much about him other than that he gave a great speech at the 2004 Democratic Convention and that he opposed the Iraq War.
Mounk: I was going to say—if you’re thinking of the profile of a young senator who is well known but not yet truly nationally famous, probably with quite low negatives because people just don’t know that much about him, who is still able to introduce himself to the nation but has some dynamism behind him—I don’t want to overstate the similarities, but Jon Ossoff comes closer to that than most others.
Druke: He also stayed out of the mix mostly in 2020, when Democratic candidates were taking a whole host of unpopular positions, like decriminalizing crossing the border and defunding the police—things I don’t think you want a general election candidate to have a history of, as a Democrat. He stayed out of that mix, so he doesn’t have that record. He’s also about to, if the polls are true, win Georgia—a state that voted for Trump in 2024—by eight to ten points, potentially. He’s also raised more money than God—somewhere above seventy million dollars, I believe; I could be slightly off, sixty or seventy million dollars the last time I checked—and he’s not, according to the polls right now, in a particularly competitive race. That’s also helpful for him, that his Republican challenger has his own host of scandals and isn’t particularly popular.
Somebody with not too much of a negative record, coming off a big victory in a purple-to-reddish state, who’s raised a lot of money—and if we’re to believe that the Israel-Palestine issue has become more of a litmus test in a Democratic primary, he has broken with his party to some extent on arming Israel. Maybe there’s some trust he can engender by being both a Jewish senator from a Southern state who also questions Benjamin Netanyahu, and can be the person who marries the two different sides and makes everybody feel comfortable—something he can navigate more deftly than somebody else.
Mounk: You’ve mentioned some of the big candidates and the most obvious insurgent candidate—Jon Ossoff is at the moment the person who has the most chatter among those who aren’t the super obvious names, like the governor of the biggest Democratic state, or the former vice president and last presidential candidate for the Democrats. If you had to pick two or three real long-shot candidates that don’t seem absurd to you—people who aren’t usually in the conversation, but who either might run, are thinking of running, or have declared that they’re running, who, if things really line up for them, might go the distance—who do you think that would be?
Druke: Tucker Carlson. I don’t even know if he would run as a Republican at this point, but I think that would be a real wild card in the race, because he has a certain credibility that doesn’t rely on Trump. If he ran as a Republican, it could really frustrate things for somebody like JD Vance or Marco Rubio.
Mounk: While we’re on the Republican side—what about my tinfoil-hat theory of Donald Trump Jr.? We have an election in Brazil this weekend in which Jair Bolsonaro, despite having a very good option for the Brazilian right in the relatively popular right-wing governor of São Paulo, chose his own son Flávio instead. People thought, well, that’s absurd, and that’s going to cost them the election, and we’ll see how it goes—but he’s slightly odds-on to be the next president according to betting markets. Of course, you see that with Fujimori in Peru, and with many, many countries, where populists in the end trust their own child more than anybody else. I know there’s no real science to that. It doesn’t look like Donald Trump is building up his son in the way that he would need to, but do you think there’s any chance of that happening?
Druke: Chance? Sure. But it’s hard for me to imagine, especially in an environment where voters increasingly say their top issue in politics is corruption. That feels like voters would be allergic to that—not just Democrats, but independent and maybe swingier Republican voters as well. I don’t usually like to theorize on what the motivations of somebody like Donald Trump are—I mostly look at how the public reacts to him. But if the goal is to get rich, avoid the ongoing prosecution that started in 2022, and pardon yourself and all of your family members, he can just do that in 2028. Don Jr. doesn’t have to be president—they can just ride off into the sunset with two billion dollars or whatever.
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If there’s a world in which Donald Trump feels prosecution is so likely that he really wants his own blood in office—again, it’s hard to get inside his head—but if the goal was to avoid prosecution and secure the bag, he can theoretically do that without Don Jr. becoming president. We’ll see how it all goes down, but either way, I just don’t think Americans would go for that.
Mounk: What about black swan candidates on the left?
Druke: Black swan candidates on the left—I guess AOC at this point doesn’t really count as a black swan candidate…
Mounk: While you’re mentioning AOC, I was going to ask you about that. If you think that, at the very least, strong ideological supporters of political parties are getting very impatient with the establishment and want to take an ideological swing—something we’ve seen in many political contexts around the world—AOC is very young, despite at this point being famous in politics for perhaps longer than would be ideal for her. She’s clearly charismatic, she’s been out there drawing big crowds opposing Donald Trump, and she seems to be showing some signs of ideological flexibility. I don’t want to overstate the extent of that, but she laughed off “woke” in a television interview recently as a mistake, which made quite a lot of waves. A lot of people are going to be looking at this and thinking AOC is the obvious person who could run away with it, if it’s not the establishment that’s going to win. You seem a little bit more skeptical about that.
Druke: No, I think it’s possible. In fact, I did a Democratic primary draft with Nate Silver, my former and now current colleague, last year, and I chose AOC first in the draft. With a Democratic electorate that may be very motivated by anger—anger at both Trump and at the Democratic establishment—she’s somebody who could embody a lot of that anger, and could potentially win a primary without having a majority at the start. If you have a strong core group of voters that carries you through the early states as other people drop out, you can grow that coalition and end up winning the nomination even without majority support out of the gate. There’s certainly a possibility there.
I think there are open questions about whether she ends up running, or whether she runs for Senate—does Chuck Schumer stick around, does she challenge Chuck Schumer? There are more questions than answers about a potential AOC presidential run right now, but she certainly seems interested—it wouldn’t shock anybody if she did end up running.
In terms of black swan candidates for Democrats, I think Democrats are a little bit less enchanted with the idea of a total outsider coming into politics the way Republicans were in 2016. In some ways, because Democrats are the party that believes more in government, even a lot of the outsiders they’ve supported in 2026 primaries—or even the more progressive populist types—are people with actual government experience. Abdul El-Sayed, as much as he is maybe a populist left candidate, went to Columbia, was a Rhodes Scholar, is a doctor—
Mounk: I was randomly at a fundraiser for Abdul El-Sayed fifteen or twenty years ago—a long, long time ago—because he’s good friends with a grad school friend of mine, who kind of dragged me along to this fundraising event. At the time, he had clearly schooled himself in the rhetoric of Barack Obama, and was portraying himself as this kind of Obama-esque candidate for some somewhat minor Michigan office—I forget exactly what office he was running for. But that is not the equivalent of a total outsider coming into politics a year before an election.
Druke: Right—he’s not like the owner of My Pillow or whatever. And not to malign small businesses—as a small business owner myself, I think that experience is great experience to have as a potential candidate, and so do many voters. You can see that in the polling, in terms of what qualities they value in a candidate: one of the highest is small business owner, one of the lowest is podcast host. So there we have it.
I think that even when Democrats reach for somebody outside the establishment, they’re oftentimes not reaching for somebody who is so outside the establishment that they have no government experience at all. Which makes me think of black swan candidates who are already operating within the system, but who people may just not be thinking about right now. One could potentially be, say, if James Talarico wins in Texas—maybe all of a sudden he thinks, “This could be my moment.” Somebody who wins a race in 2026 unexpectedly on red turf could be a kind of black swan potential that I think Democrats would be more attracted to than, say, Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson.
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There used to be a kind of liberal parlor game in which you discussed whether America would be ready, first, for a female, black, or Jewish president. This was, oh, somewhere around the dawn of time, when WASP dynasties still roamed the land and more diverse representation in national politics appeared an unassailable barrier. It sort of caught everybody by surprise that the first black president came not too long after that—and with such impressive smoothness that it almost seemed as if identitarian politics might vanish for good. Then there were slips betwixt cup and lip in electing the first female president, and now, with Georgia Senator Jon Ossoff leading the betting markets as the likely Democratic nominee in 2028, the first Jewish president possibly comes into view.
I really haven’t thought about that parlor game in quite a while—in part because our politics has, in the last couple of decades, become something very different: the Trump circus, the infotainment wars, the bareknuckle mud fight between the two rival parties. But, with Ossoff president-maxxing hard, as Sarah Longwell put it, there’s a certain wave of nostalgia—a link to a different, more innocent era. Some of it is Ossoff’s youth and his Mr. Smith-like earnestness—the way he seems to treat every Senatorial committee hearing as a (camera-ready) civics lesson. Some of it is the direct connection to Obama’s speaking style—so much so that, when the writer John McWhorter heard his concession speech for a 2017 congressional campaign, he thought it might be a Saturday Night Live parody of Obama. Some of it is a distinctly retro take on policy. The one policy position Ossoff really focuses in on is to overturn Citizens United—the 2010 Supreme Court case that turned on the spigot for corporate money in politics—and by constitutional amendment if necessary. It’s as if Citizens United were the original sin and Trump the ensuing apple of discord, the manifestation of corruption in politics.
But what it is mostly is a certain anger, the aggrievement of a generation that had its public life stolen from it by Trump—and Ossoff’s tone and approach may well, finally, be what gets us out of the Trump era.
In looking back at how the Democrats have campaigned in the Trump years, what’s striking is that—in a real sense—they haven’t run against him at all. In a November 2016 pre-election article that didn’t exactly age well, Nicholas Lemann favorably compared Hillary Clinton’s campaign strategy to the sort of scorched earth tactics advocated by Sun Tzu—avoiding pitched battle with Trump and keeping to message. Joe Biden hunkered down in his basement for most of the 2020 campaign. Kamala Harris, in 2024, exercised an abundance of caution and ran on a platitudinous “joy” campaign that seemed to exist in a parallel universe without Trump in it. Meanwhile, Ossoff—who isn’t even running against Trump, who is running for Senate reelection against a man named Mike Collins—is pulling out all the stops against Trump. The campaign slogan is “enough is enough.” He has called Trump a “draft-dodging crook” and a “broken man” and compared him to a “Klansman.” He recently instigated a Washington fracas by saying Trump wants to “travel with Natalie,” implying that Trump was having an affair with Natalie Harp, an aide who, up to that moment, no one had really heard of. And he became, yea, biblical with his claim for the upcoming elections that “we will rebuke [Trump] so decisively that no president will repeat his abuses for centuries.”
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The inclination of Trump opponents from Jeb Bush and Scott Walker to Joe Biden and Kamala Harris has been to kind of wish him away. Sometimes there has been the “high road” that Michelle Obama encouraged. Often, as the Democratic strategist Fred Hicks told The Atlantic, there has been a tendency to “bring a term paper to a gun fight.” What Ossoff seems to have hit upon—and why he is being taken so seriously as a possibility for 2028—is the sense of real personal (and generational) aggrievement for what Trump has done to the country. “This isn’t the world I want to leave [my daughters],” he told an audience at a recent stump speech, going well beyond the usual negativity that politicians muster.
Visiting the Ossoff campaign, Atlantic writer Elaine Godfrey was struck, at a policy level, by the emptiness of what Ossoff was for. “I have never attended a political rally where a candidate’s supporters seemed quite so unable to articulate a reason for their support,” she wrote. But that didn’t stop Ossoff’s supporters from being enthusiastic. “It’s like taking a clean shower to hear these things spoken so clearly,” one rallygoer said. And, actually, more than any policy proposal, that is the message. It’s about washing away the bad juju of Trumpism and—after a rigorous exorcism—getting back to the more respectful and optimistic politics of an earlier era.
To do that seems to require a few conceptual shifts that Democrats have struggled with. They have to adapt to the entirely pugilistic nature of American politics in the Trump and, more broadly, social media era—that the point of any public interaction is to land the blow that’s then going to be circulated around the internet. They have to reconcile themselves to the entirely us versus them nature of the hyperpartisan political structure—there really are no points here for pretending to be conciliatory. And they have to be willing to really rake the sea floor in their use of language—Kamala Harris somehow spent the entire 2024 campaign carefully modulating her language until she finally used the word “fascist” a couple of weeks before the election and got nothing out of it, and this at a time when Trump regularly curses and throws everything he can think of at the Dems.
Uniquely among the Democratic Party leaders, Ossoff seems to have developed a comfort with all three elements of the new communications playbook. There’s a sub-genre on YouTube of Ossoff committee hearing videos, in which Ossoff has some member of the administration in front of him and has five minutes of question time to, in the words of the people who give YouTube videos their titles, “shred,” “destroy,” and “torch” the Trump officials. There’s little attempt at genuine substance and none of civility, and the language is carefully calibrated to really perk up the YouTube comments section.
One video, with Director of National Intelligence nominee Jay Clayton, can stand in for the rest. Ossoff opens by asking Clayton “you have an obligation to be honest and forthright with this committee, correct?” to which Clayton takes quite some time replying and then, setting maybe the world’s record for shrugging, says, “Yes,” after which Ossoff moves on to his main point of business. “Who won the 2020 election?” he asks. Clayton’s response, at a rough transcription, is something like “You’re know we’re not uh, I’mma, I’m not going to do this with you.” There’s a bit of a back-and-forth at this point, with Ossoff asking the question five times, Clayton claiming that he’s already answered the question, Ossoff pointing out that he hasn’t at all answered the question, Clayton, as a threat of stalemate saying, “We can keep doing this,” Ossoff as a threat of YouTube evisceration saying, “We’re going to keep doing it because you’re not being honest or forthright,” Clayton sinking into petulant silence, and then Ossoff rounding for his kill by saying, “Isn’t it humiliating to be unable to answer this question, to have to indulge the president’s delusions?”
“That’s a political athlete right there,” crowed MS NOW commentator Joe Scarborough of one of Ossoff’s clips. In The Atlantic’s campaign trail piece, a rallygoer, Judith McWillie, said of an Ossoff speech, “I’ve been waiting for the Democrats to do that for fifteen years.” It’s a bit surprising that an approach like this should be a revelation—Trump and the FOX ecosystem have, for a very long time, driven the thermostat of American politics way up—but McWillie’s sense of exhilaration is understandable. For fifteen years, the Democrats haven’t managed to do what Ossoff is doing, which is to really take the gloves off—but to do it from the position of the wronged center rather than a radical wing.
Whatever else comes of Ossoff’s career, this seems like his most meaningful contribution: finally hitting on the right communications strategy. For a full decade, the Dems have found Trump a frustratingly elusive target to hit—ignoring him doesn’t work, demonizing him doesn’t particularly work, the usual playbook of throwing dirt and getting it to stick doesn’t work with someone already unabashedly coated in dirt, and just nattering on about middle class tax cuts and middle-class values doesn’t match the inflamed rhetoric of the times. What Ossoff has come up with is to:
Directly, forcefully, and theatrically confront the administration whenever possible.
Acknowledge some essential justice in Trump’s populist critique. (“So Trump promised to attack a broken system. I get it,” Ossoff said in a recent speech in Atlanta. “Ripe target. Yes. The system really is rigged.”)
Take aspects of Trump’s populist approach but emphasize that Obama-style reform, and a sense of basic decency, is the best way to fix what’s broken. (In the same campaign speech, Ossoff seemed to find himself talking a great deal about the 2000s. “So many broken promises,” he said. “We were promised tax cuts for the rich would grow the middle class. We were promised Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. We were promised fairness, only to see banks bailed out while millions lost their homes. Do you remember that?”)
The idea—and the trip down memory lane seems as deliberate as it is when Trump trots out his own version of it—is that there really was an America going in the right direction, in the halcyon period of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, when The West Wing was on the air and Jon Stewart was the voice of reason; that there was a worm in the apple with Bush II and Citizens United; that Trump is a symptom of the broken political process, but that it really is possible to stamp out the evil and get back to the lost paradise.
As a message, it’s really not bad at all, and other Democrats will have a great deal to learn from what Ossoff is doing. The next—the inevitable—question is, of course, whether Ossoff will run in 2028 and, if so, whether he can win. Ossoff for his part says he has “zero interest” in running and he does, also, have a Senate campaign to win first (until a few weeks ago the race was considered a “toss-up”). But nobody believes him, and the draft seems to be occurring across party lines. “Why Everyone Wants Jon Ossoff to be President” was the self-explanatory title of a Michelle Goldberg New York Times op-ed on the subject. “He’s their new Obama,” said Fox commentator Laura Ingraham, which I take it is meant to be an insult. Potential rival Gavin Newsom, put on the spot, seemed compelled to call Ossoff “a generational talent.”
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And, if we do exactly what Ossoff has cautioned against doing and “take our eyes off the ball” and try to game out the 2028 campaign, it seems like Ossoff would be pretty close to the complete package. He’s very young and would be in that Kennedyesque sweet spot—Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were there too—of running in his early 40s and before too much of actual politics had caught up to him. He is squeaky-clean from a personal perspective—a Republican attack ad from his 2017 congressional campaign seemed to uncover little more than the fact that he had once been a college student. His positions are absolutely, unassailably centrist. He’s as cerebral as one would expect from somebody who graduated from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service and then did his master’s at the London School of Economics. But he’s also from Georgia, and, in his campaign trail speeches, he has that old familiar burr of Southern smarm and charm—that classic tune of American politics that, come to think of it, we haven’t heard in quite a while. Not only did he address his Atlanta crowd by saying “Did y’all see Hegseth in front of that committee?”—with the “y’all” pretty flawlessly accented—but in a speech in an Atlanta church he managed to discuss the fate of Ahab in The Book of Kings and to offer the choice apercu that “scripture is full of kings brought low by their own arrogance.”
So you can see what a dangerous contender he is. But, to my mind, there is a real limitation to Ossoff, and you get to it fairly quickly if you start plowing into his backstory. Basically, he is that guy. He was the kid running for president from the time he was 14 or 15. A school administrator recalled that he was reading The Economist in high school. He had the sort of charmed existence where a family friend, someone he had really impressed as a teenager, handed him his company when Ossoff was 26 —and Ossoff, for fuck’s sake, made award-winning documentaries for the BBC about child soldiers and ISIS death squads before, essentially, walking away from the company to run for a congressional seat in Georgia.
When he entered the national spotlight during his 2021 Senate run, reporters gleefully descended on his Twitter account—the Onion had predicted that social media would disqualify Ossoff’s entire generation from office—only to discover… nothing incriminating at all. Ossoff seemed to really know a lot about Star Wars and was approaching “zero inbox” and, more to the point, he wrote, “I was going to link to a lil Jon song but I don’t want to anyone to ask why I used profanity in 15 years so instead I wrote this.” There you have it. While Obama, at a comparable point in his life, was merrily snorting coke and riding the waves in Hawaii, and while Bill Clinton’s mouth was filling up with marijuana, Ossoff wouldn’t even link to a song with curses in it in case he one day ran for office. And, possibly even more disturbing than that, The New Yorker reported that, when Ossoff was the Economist-reading guy in high school and the school’s headmaster had declared a snow day from a very mild flurry of Georgia snow, Ossoff wrote to him to say “Wuss.” That seems to encapsulate Ossoff’s political instincts. Yes, that’s a cool thing to say to the principal—and you can see the adversarial talent that enabled him to go toe-to-toe with intelligence directors in his future—but, more to the point, he was buddy-buddy enough with the headmaster to be comfortable enough to write a personal email to him. And, of course, everybody knows that you never, ever challenge an administrator on a snow day—you take all the snow days you can get.
There was a bit of that in the Senate committee hearings. As much as Clayton and his ilk really were thoroughly humiliated in their Ossoff cross-examinations, it’s possible, watching the clips, to feel a degree of sympathy for them. Everybody knew that these were going to be party line votes, just as everybody knew that Clayton couldn’t answer the question Ossoff posed to him about the 2020 election because Trump’s approval of him mattered more than what the Senate minority thought. But Ossoff was still the guy writing to the principal on a snow day, asking a Trump official to be “honest and forthright,” refusing to acknowledge the fait accompli of Clayton’s confirmation. It was “theater,” as Clayton justly noted.
In other words, what seems to be missing from the package—surprisingly, for someone who could be the first Jewish president—is any irony or humor. I remember attending the first “Unity” rally with Obama and Hillary after the 2008 primary, when there was still bad blood between the two campaigns, and the guy standing next to me had been a fervent Hillary supporter. Obama, as part of his speech, directed the crowd to a hot dog stand “just under the sign saying ‘Change you can believe in’” and something about that the lightness of that seemed in a moment to win over my companion. “There’s someone who hasn’t bought too much into his own rhetoric,” he said. It’s somehow impossible to imagine Ossoff doing that, having that kind of detachment from himself or his political rhetoric.
And, by the way, if you watch enough of the committee hearings back to back, the shtick does start to get a little tired. It’s always Ossoff asking his interlocutor a “yes or no” question that he knows they can’t answer given their administrative loyalties. It’s like the revenge of the squares—the guy who’s friends with the principal cutting through all the social nuances to impose his squeaky-clean vision of right and wrong.
I don’t know if irony is really the most important quality in a presidential candidate—but there is a real question if Americans are willing to vote for “that guy.” There’s a tendency to prefer someone who knows their way around a toke and a coke, who’s maybe had a DUI or two, who has at least some scandal more than (as that 2017 attack ad dredged up) the fact that Ossoff dressed up as Han Solo during college and once sang a cappella. Ossoff is so squeaky-clean that not only is he married to an OB-GYN, but she didn’t even take off work on the night of his Senatorial election victory. If he’s up against, say, Gavin Newsom in 2028, it will be the guy who is friends with the principal and whose wife goes to work on election night against a guy who once had a thriving wine distribution business and admitted to banging his secretary—and in a race like that one, Ossoff may well find himself swimming against the very deepest tradition of American political morality: that we always choose the merry swindler over that guy.
But, anyway, all that is years away. What matters for now is that Ossoff has emerged as—as he might put it—“A New Hope” for the Democratic Party, and the reason he has done so is instructive: he has hit on a messaging structure that really can work. It’s not about promising something new, and it’s not about evading or imitating Trump. It’s about treating Trumpism as an evil that must be fought and squashed—and, out of that, returning to the shining future that seemed to be promised before Trump came onto the scene. Follow that line and we may well find ourselves with the first Jewish president—and, far more astonishing than that, a Jewish president without a sense of irony.
Sam Kahn is staff editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and is editor-in-chief of The Republic of Letters.
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Gen Z men are sadder and lonelier than any generation before them—but damn, they look good while doing it. While previously men turned to drink, drugs, or ill-advised sex to cope with the pressures of being young, today men in their 20s are heading to the gym more than any previous generation.
Wellness is a big topic for younger generations today. A 2025 survey showed that Gen Z and Millennials account for over forty percent of wellness spending, with Gen Z consumers counting a “better appearance” in their top three wellness concerns after sleep and health. As with any interest in this day and age, the concern with appearance is expressed as much through consuming as by doing. Gen Z consumers show a keen interest in wellness products such as health-tracking devices, mindfulness apps, and massage tools.
What in the 1990s would be described as “metrosexual”—a man interested in his appearance, with a certain personal style and a passion for skincare—has transformed into a new pressure on men to strive to be their best physical selves. Men’s health and wellness have gone mainstream, with the market projected to double by 2030 to nearly $3 trillion. Gen Z men are also encountering beauty products differently: while previous generations tended to buy products in response to obvious needs such as shaving or requiring deodorant, today young men begin their beauty journey with general skincare. Men are also increasingly searching for particular brands online, suggesting active decision-making rather than grabbing the first vaguely suitable product they find in the grocery store.
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Of course, beauty is more than skin(care) deep. In 2025, adults aged 18-24 accounted for 54% of all new gym memberships, with men making up a higher proportion. With the well-documented decline of “third places” such as malls or bars for young people to hang out in, the gym offers a place to spend time outside of home, work, or study. This interest in fitness has been enhanced by the trend for wearable devices, from smartwatches to smart rings, making it easier than ever to track results. And in many ways, this is all positive. Who doesn’t want to be healthy? Developing habits such as gym-going and a balanced diet in your 20s sets you up well for later in life.
But there’s a dark side to the wellness fad. Today’s beauty standards for men are arguably as punishing as those for women.
While women are expected to be as thin and as smooth as if they were wearing a real-life Instagram filter, men are pushed to be athletic and chiseled, with angular features and defined abs. Which perhaps helps explain why Gen Z are unhappier than ever. Part of why they recognize the importance of mental health is because they struggle so much with it. 40% of Gen Z report that they feel “almost always stressed.” This is exacerbated by high levels of screen time, leading to constant reminders that others’ lives are going better than theirs, compounded by a fear of missing out (FOMO).
Just as many women have already discovered, the hyperfocus on appearance, far from providing a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction at having achieved the “ideal” body, is making men unhappier.
Male beauty standards saw a huge shift around 2021. Male spending on self-care took off in the spring of that year. For those stuck at home with nothing to do except doomscroll and buy products online, self-improvement became an easy hobby. This trend has continued: 19% of men report caring more about beauty now than they did ten years ago.
This trend is in part driven by the market: at the same time as women were embracing the viral “clean girl” aesthetic, which required fewer (but not zero) products, the beauty industry moved to meet men’s needs, too. COVID saw a rise in sales of skincare products, as these were not only a distraction but made skin feel healthy at a time when consumers wanted to decrease stress and look well. Skincare is an easier sell to male consumers than makeup, which allowed this trend to cross the gender barrier.
But the biggest driver of changing male beauty standards by far is social media and influencer culture—particularly trends such as “looksmaxxing,” a subculture within the manosphere in which young men and boys encourage each other online to maximize their looks to an extreme degree. According to proponents, there are two types of looksmaxxing: softmaxxing, which can include skincare, diet, and a healthy gym routine, and hardmaxxing, which is much more extreme.
As with anything, softmaxxing can be healthy in moderation—though making an identity out of the pursuit of perfection is likely to fail, regardless of how healthy the activities are. Hardmaxxing, on the other hand, involves dangerous or invasive procedures to get extreme results. This could mean steroids, plastic surgery—or worse. One of the most famous influencers is Clavicular (real name Braden Peters), who chronicles his attempts to achieve the “perfect” face for his 1.2 million subscribers on TikTok and another 437,000 on Kick, mostly young men. The 20-year-old has said that his mother confiscated his hammer as he kept using it to smash his face into a more preferable shape. He also claims to have injected himself with so much testosterone that he is now infertile. His videos, and those of other hardmaxx influencers, hyperfixate on small details about the face such as chin measurements and ratios, desperately trying to fix every perceived flaw.
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Looksmaxxing has its origins in online incel, “black pill,” and alt-right communities that have grown more mainstream since the pandemic. Such communities push the idea that women are superficial and that men must go to extreme measures to be sexually attractive. In this telling, looks are everything—a message that’s amplified across social media. Of course, not every young man who’s really into fitness takes their cue from these communities. But their prevalence shows the dark side of a culture that is taking advantage of a generation of lost and lonely young men.
This is the ultimate irony behind looksmaxxing: it derives from and feeds the loneliness epidemic. Gen Z are famously having less sex than any previous generation. Courtships start—and often stay—online, meaning potential romantic partners are kept at a safe, virtual distance. Sure, the lack of dating gives young men the time—not to mention the energy—to hit the gym, but it comes at the expense of genuine connection.
Spend even five minutes reading about modern dating online, and you will be presented with caricatures of both sexes: men are pathetic and entitled, while women only want rich men over six foot tall. Neither is true, yet because Gen Z men and women now inhabit different spheres of the internet, these same-sex echo chambers reinforce myths about the opposite sex, and toxic ideals which both sexes are expected to attain. Yes, some women like six-packs, but plenty don’t—at least half of women prefer “dad bods”—and many will actively be put off by partners too steeped in online wellness or manosphere spaces. It should go without saying that no one wants to date someone who thinks the only way to look attractive is to take a hammer to the face.
Gen Z is struggling. Social media reinforces not only the feeling that you’re not good enough, but also that the future is hopeless. Eating disorders and self-harm have long been destructive ways for young women to cope with external pressures that feel overwhelming. Now, a new generation of influences is preying on the same urges in men. As both sexes turn away from each other, seeking refuge in social media rather than the real world, more and more young men will find themselves trapped in a cycle of painful improvement—instead of finding happiness in themselves.
Leonora Barclay is Head of Podcasts at Persuasion.
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Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who has effectively been in power since 2012, resigned on September 27 to pursue a bid to become prime minister in an early parliamentary election on October 25. Whether his ambition becomes a reality will depend not only on the will of Serbian voters but also on the positions of major foreign powers.
In Serbian opposition circles, as well as in some Western political discourse, Vučić is often portrayed either as a “dictator” or as the European Union’s “favorite autocrat.” While it’s true that around 90 percent of media outlets in the country are directly or indirectly linked to his political network, political pluralism and an organized opposition still exist in Serbia.
The main problem is that over the past 14 years, the opposition has been fragmented. As a result, when a railway station canopy collapsed in the city of Novi Sad on November 1, 2024, killing 16 people, it was students from universities across Serbia, rather than opposition parties, who launched a wave of anti-corruption protests.
Their initial demands focused on ensuring the proper functioning of state institutions, upholding the rule of law, and securing justice and accountability for those responsible for the Novi Sad tragedy. Later, however, their agenda took on a political dimension. Students organized regular blockades and rallies, including blocking access to Serbia’s public broadcaster, RTS, accusing it of biased coverage of the protests.
On March 15, 2025, the students held what is widely believed to have been the largest protest in Serbian history, drawing hundreds of thousands of people to Belgrade. After Vučić refused to fulfil any of their demands, they began calling for early parliamentary elections. As an experienced politician with more than 30 years in politics, he ignored their calls, waiting until September 9 to call snap parliamentary and presidential elections.
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Opinion polls suggest that Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) is currently around 10 percentage points ahead of the student-led movement. Rather than forming a traditional political party, students are running a non-partisan electoral list, “Student List—Students Are Winning,” with 250 candidates, including university professors, medical experts, and other professionals chosen by student groups. The problem, however, is that even if two or three other nominally opposition parties clear the three percent electoral threshold, it remains highly uncertain whether they, together with the students, would be in a position to form a government.
Vučić is a master of the art of political maneuvering. Having been in power for nearly 15 years, he knows how the system works. More importantly, he firmly controls the entire electoral process. Given the allegations surrounding his ties to figures from Serbia’s shadowy underworld, he may also have considerable informal leverage at his disposal, potentially allowing him to win over opposition lawmakers when necessary.
Thus, under the current circumstances in which elections can hardly be described as free and fair, it will be very difficult for the student-led movement to win the vote. Given Vučić’s history of systematically rigging elections, if he declares victory on the evening of October 25 the students and other opposition groups are expected to take to the streets and hold protests. And that could be the moment of truth for Vučić’s relations with the foreign powers that have significant interests in this Southeast European country.
Aleksandar Vučić is perhaps the only world leader to have received firm backing from the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China. While refusing to impose sanctions on Moscow, he has supplied ammunition to Ukraine. According to Christopher Hill, former U.S. ambassador to Serbia, such arrangements were coordinated directly with Washington. At the same time, while keeping Serbia on the path toward European Union membership, he developed closer economic ties with China.
His “delicate balancing act” in foreign policy has allowed him to build a soft authoritarian system in Serbia, while Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing have turned a blind eye to his domestic policies. There are, however, indications that this could change.
Even though Vučić has actively worked to improve diplomatic and economic ties with the Trump administration, Republican Congressman Joe Wilson has become a vocal critic of the Serbian leader. At his initiative, he and Democratic Congressman Bill Keating recently introduced bipartisan legislation that would impose sanctions and visa bans on individuals involved in corruption, serious human rights violations, and undermining democratic institutions in Serbia. Could this be a message to Vučić that Washington will not tolerate election irregularities?
What should also worry Serbia’s de facto leader is the signal coming from Moscow. Although shortly before announcing his resignation he spoke with Vladimir Putin in an effort to secure relatively cheap Russian gas for Serbia, there are signs that Moscow may be preparing to establish ties with a post-Vučić Serbia. Russian Telegram channel Rybar—which is believed to have close ties with the Russian military and intelligence services—argues that the Kremlin should work “not only with Vučić, but also with the opposition, the student-led movement, and the Serbian people in general.”
The situation, therefore, does not seem to be as favorable for Vučić as it might appear at first glance. At this point, it remains highly uncertain whether he can still count on the support of foreign powers. Domestically, he is facing a political force that is far more popular than the fragmented “traditional” opposition.
His main opponent, the student-led movement, is using the same strategy he used before coming to power—steering clear of key geopolitical questions and instead focusing on broader concerns such as the fight against corruption and the pursuit of justice. They also avoid public debates with him, just as he has avoided participating in debates throughout his 14 years in power.
Thus, for the first time since 2012, the outcome of the elections in Serbia may genuinely be uncertain. But the vote is unlikely to fundamentally alter the country’s overall geopolitical course, regardless of the result. Surrounded by EU and NATO members, Serbia has limited room for geopolitical maneuvering. It will almost certainly remain on its pro-Western geopolitical course.
Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher, and analyst based in Serbia.
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Star Trek, “The Omega Glory.”We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our ongoing series on “Liberal Virtues and Values.”
The series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, will make the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms. If you haven’t already, please subscribe today to receive future instalments into your inbox!
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The production of Star Trek (The Original Series) was chronically short of money, so the “This planet hundreds of light years away is exactly like Earth!” trope was a convenient way to save on sets and costumes. Thus, the Enterprise was always finding the planet that’s just like Nazi Germany or the planet that’s just like a twentieth-century Roman Empire.
No episode pushed “Hodgkins’s Law of Parallel Planetary Development” further than “The Omega Glory.” On Omega IV, peaceful Chinese-appearing villagers called Kohms are being terrorized by white-skinned “savages” called Yangs. So the Yangs are the bad guys? Well, surprise—they’re this planet’s Americans (Yangs=Yankees), fighting to reconquer what was taken from them by the “Red Chinese” (Kohms=Communists). And in case that’s not implausible (dare I say illogical) enough, they have the exact same flag, the exact same Pledge of Allegiance, the exact same Constitution (with the exact same calligraphy), even the exact same Bible.
The problem is that the Yangs have forgotten their heritage (for example, “We the People” has degenerated into “E Plebnista”), so obviously the solution is a Captain Kirk Speech: “Hear me! Hear this! ... That which you call E Plebnista was not written for the chiefs or the kings or the warriors or the rich or the powerful but for all the people!” What’s more, “These words, and the words that follow, were not only written for the Yangs but for the Kohms as well … They must apply to everyone or they mean nothing!” The Yang chief swears “The holy words will be obeyed.” We close with a shot of the flag, while the music plays the Star Trek fanfare followed by “The Star-Spangled Banner.”
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“The Omega Glory” was first broadcast in 1968, just as the old-school liberalism that was willing to provide that sort of simplistic patriotism was yielding to one that would find it (in the language of a later day) cringe. To many critics of post-Sixties liberalism, that was a big mistake. After all, The Sainted Working Class loves that sort of uncomplicated flag-waving, and if liberalism isn’t willing to give it to them, the Donald Trumps of the world will be happy to. Would it be so wrong to return to the wisdom of the ancestors?
Well, yes it would, at least in that simplistic form—and precisely because, as Kirk himself said, “Liberty and freedom have to be more than just words.” If freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two is four regardless of who’s offended by it, then it’s a good thing that nowadays it’s impossible to watch “The Omega Glory” without imagining a sequel where the Enterprise goes back in time to Philadelphia in 1787 and Kirk lectures the Founding Fathers that “These words must apply to your slaves or they mean nothing!”
My generation was taught that what made us different from the Commies is that we had the right to protest and criticize, and then were called traitors when we actually did it; can you blame us for feeling betrayed? We’re not talking about some easily forgivable peccadilloes that young people weren’t mature enough to put into perspective; this country has committed real capital-E Evils. Slavery-level evil. “The only good Indian is a dead Indian”-level evil. If in order to be accepted we have to deny those evils, or justify them, or no-big-deal them, we’d be betraying everything we’re supposed to be about.
No denying it, there were times when the pendulum swung too far the other direction. If you’re raised in what I’ve called elsewhere “polarized morality,” what could be more natural than to think that the way to reject “America right or wrong” is to embrace “Anti-America right or wrong”? (The Khmer Rouge should have been a big clue that this is not the way.)
But if you managed to learn that life is more complicated than is dreamed of in polarized morality, you might be open to the possibility that this country that so loves bigness could have both big crimes and big virtues.
Maybe, then, you could approach patriotism through the “Don’t Compare Me to the Almighty, Compare Me to the Alternative” principle: for the past century, America has been on a pretty solid streak of being better than its main enemy. Or the “We Are Here and It Is Now” principle: to deny that America is a much less racist sexist homophobic etc. country than it was fifty or a hundred years ago is to deny reality. Or the “Don’t It Always Seem to Go/That You Don’t Know What You’ve Got Till It’s Gone” principle: the fact that Trump is trashing and threatening so much of what Americans used to be able to count on is underscoring how valuable they are. And let’s not forget the “Let Me In, Immigration Man” principle: just as it’s a good indication that a country is a tyranny when people are willing to risk their lives to get out, doesn’t it say the opposite when people are willing to risk their lives to get in?
Which makes a great deal to want to preserve, to appreciate, and yes, to be proud of about our country.
But how do you get to love of country without throwing the evils down the memory hole? For crimes of that magnitude, “Our slavery was really no worse than the Middle Eastern version, and besides we were way better than Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union” just doesn’t cut it.
The standard liberal answer—that the glory of America is that it’s our right, our patriotic duty, even, to use our principles to fight against the times America violates them—has a lot going for it. It’s morally admirable. From Lincoln to King to Obama, it’s been articulated magnificently. And if there’s one area where America unquestionably is the greatest country that’s ever been, it’s our ability to use the good parts of our heritage as a weapon against the bad parts.
But that standard liberal answer is also morally complicated. You have to think about it. And it seems to me that what most people want is a patriotism that they don’t have to think about, that they can (to use a Newspeak word) bellyfeel. Which is more likely to achieve that: “Greatest country in the world” or “Flawed but admirable”? (When my mom was a schoolgirl they made her memorize a song that went “First in war, first in peace, first in the hearts of his countrymen/This the story of Washington/This is the glory of Washington.” Try to write a song that praises Washington for stepping down from power voluntarily while acknowledging the moral stain of owning slaves. )
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In other words, this is one of those areas where amygdala trumps neocortex. Do liberals therefore have to choose between losing and selling out?
Not necessarily. A frontal assault on the amygdala may be a losing tactic, but one of the advantages of neocortex smartness is that it allows us to imagine other possibilities. Given that stories are perhaps humanity’s most powerful technology for establishing a worldview, let’s see if we can tell a story about America that’s compatible with liberal patriotism. Unlike so many national myths, to be true to ourselves we have to ensure our story is at least compatible with our true history. And if you remember my previous piece in Persuasion, you might be able to guess where I’m going.
That’s right: Darwinian evolution. There’s something, well, creationist about both the right’s Founder-worship and the left’s revolution-romanticizing. The right sees the Founders as a collective God who created an Eden of a country, where all would live in Paradise as long as they obeyed the sacred Constitutional Commandments. Everything that’s wrong with America today is because we let the serpent of liberalism tempt us into believing that we could know better, and thus all we need to do is return to the True Way and we’ll all live happily ever after.
On the other side, the people who call themselves “progressives” refuse to acknowledge any progress, and believe that there was some lost Paradise (though they can’t seem to agree on what it was; candidates run the gamut from the New Deal to hunter-gathering.) They also believe that some demonic force (capitalism, whiteness, Western civilization, civilization in general) drove us out of that Perfection, and that all we have to do is burn the evildoers to the ground and the bombers will magically transform into butterflies and we’ll all live in peace and love.
Two supposedly nonreligious worldviews, then. Both are based on the assumption that there was (at the very least, something kinda sorta like) a Garden, a serpent, and a Fall.
But if I can quote a character from a poorly-selling 1983 novel called The Armageddon Rag by a then-obscure writer named George R. R. Martin, “What if there never was a garden, ’Nanda? What if there never was a garden at all?”
And what if that’s a good thing?
It’s not just that evolution rules out a literal interpretation of the creation story in Genesis; it disproves the moral of the story. The reason this world is such a bloody, brutal place isn’t because we were kicked out of the Paradise that our Loving Father had prepared for us for being bad; it was like that long before humans ever existed. It’s because, like abused children, we became what we are in order to survive the world we had to adapt to. And Doing the Right Thing becomes a lot more complicated when it’s not just following orders handed down from On High but something that has to be figured out.
Slavery and genocide are a perfect illustration of the point. If the only way to be sure of what’s right and wrong is to follow orders handed down from some Higher Authority, we would have had no valid reason for concluding that they were wrong, let alone Ultimate Evil-level wrong. The Bible treats slavery as perfectly normal and commands genocide as a moral duty. The people who say, based on other parts of the Bible, that of course the God they believe in would want us to oppose such obscenities are not following an unambiguous Divine Will. They’re drawing their own conclusions and picking and choosing which parts of the tradition to base it on. As do we all.
Liberalism—the “mutation” that arose in Western Europe a few centuries before America was founded—certainly repurposed existing memes (Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and though it’s often overlooked, Nordic), but the morality that originated in reaction to the European Wars of Religion was something new in the world. There’s no shortage of ways to define the principle it sacralized; my favorite comes from Robert W. Fuller’s Somebodies and Nobodies, that “all human beings are of equal dignity.”
How do you advance a belief like that? A belief that’s so not the way people are used to life working?
Trying to do it all at once has an unfortunate tendency to lead to lots of dead people. Better to go in a more evolutionary way, step by step. Freedom of religion was the starting point, and if we’re entitled to that, doesn’t it also make sense that we have a right to free speech? And if we’re entitled to that, doesn’t it also make sense that we have a right to freedom of the press? And if we’re entitled to that…?
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The formal declarations of rules and principles would come later; at first they were simply reacting against whatever the powers that be were doing that made them feel like they were being treated like nobodies. Sometimes what they came up with, such as the Third Amendment’s prohibition against quartering troops in private homes, has no relevance to the modern world. (I can’t resist quoting Dave Barry: “‘You troops are just going to have to sleep on the patio’ is a perfectly constitutional thing for you to tell them.”) Some things that seem to people today to follow logically, like feminism and gay rights, would have seemed insane to them.
But that’s what happens when you acknowledge that the rules are not just handed down from some Always Right Source, that the details have to be figured out. They didn’t call it the American experiment for nothing, and when you experiment, failures are part of the deal. Wouldn’t anyone who was trying to create something different from everything else in the world screw up some?
Maybe taking that into account in judging the Founders is fair. Because it’s accurate.
Another thing the Founders had to figure out was how to translate their proclaimed ideals into real-world governance and live with the consequences. To use the most obvious example, the way the Constitution kicked the can down the road on slavery wasn’t just moral cowardice; there was also a very accurate fear that confronting this obvious violation of their principles would rip the new nation apart just as it was getting started. It’s fair to say they made the wrong decision. It’s not fair to pretend that, at the time, it was an easy choice.1
As a baby boomer, here’s an analogy I can’t resist. When we began to question the simplicities and denials and outright lies we were taught about American history, we were told we were being a bunch of spoiled brats and we needed to know our place, shut up, and obey. When we reminded them that they’re the ones who taught us we had the right to question everything, they had a condescending laugh at our naivete. We didn’t mean kids. Isn’t that obvious, isn’t that just common sense, isn’t that just the natural order of things?
Is that so different from how England reacted when the colonists acted on what their culture had taught them about their rights as Englishmen? As Samuel Adams put it, “We talk the language we have always heard you speak.” If you think I’m dragging that analogy in where it doesn’t belong, I suggest you check out the part of Gordon Wood’s The Radicalism of the American Revolution where he talks about how patriarchal authoritarianism was being challenged in the family as well as in government. “The new ideas about parent-child relationships developed slowly, erratically and confusedly, and they were largely confined to the literate and educated elements of society.” Still, demanding that the powers that be practice what they preach was an important part of the cultural DNA that founded America from the start.
Hmm—could that be a basis for a patriotism that’s not only true to liberalism but also firmly anchored in America’s mythic story? That could tell us that “America right or wrong”; that a “patriotism” of gestures of submission and obedience; that the view of greatness as something to be proclaimed rather than earned—that all of that is profoundly un-American?
So what if—Spock, what if we look at America’s story like this: Like all peoples, we’ve had to struggle to survive a bloody, brutal world that I think it’s perfectly reasonable to call abusive. Unlike many other peoples, we not only felt like we deserved better but decided to do something about it. Like anyone coming out of an abusive background without mentors or role models, we had plenty of blunders and hypocrisies, and like many people coming out of such a background we found ourselves committing the sort of wrongs that people like us should never have committed.
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Yet what’s equally true is that we’ve got a long history of striving to make it better, and (with plenty of stumbling, bumbling, and backlash) we’ve made enough progress to make a real difference in the lives of our people, enough so that we could, if that’s how we choose to look at it, inspire future generations to believe they can do even better than we did.
So what if we regarded a country with our history with the sort of compassion we might show a person with that sort of history? Judge it not by an unrealistic standard of perfection but by something that’s more true to life? Realized that, like a person, when a country that’s made partial but real progress is treated as if that progress doesn’t count, the more likely it is to revert to its worst self?
Well, as the Keptin (with apologies to Mr. Chekov) put it in a different episode: “Wouldn’t that be something … to be a part of?”
Wayne Karol is the author of The Sixties as Science Fiction: An Appreciation of Paul Kantner.
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1And sometimes the Founders were wrong because they didn’t know as much as we do. You don’t believe me? Benjamin Franklin was considered one of the smartest men of his time. It’s jarring, therefore, that he could sound like Tucker Carlson: “Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglicizing them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more then they can adopt our Complexion.” (Wait a minute, you might say. Don’t English people and German people have pretty much the same complexion? Not according to Franklin: he thought that non-Saxon Germans weren’t white, and he also thought that peoples with a “swarthy Complexion” included—*checks notes*—Swedes.)
The point is that there was no Great Replacement in Pennsylvania; Franklin was wrong about that. Abraham Lincoln—and this doesn’t make his moral abhorrence of slavery any less real—didn’t believe that whites and blacks could live together in peace and equality, and at least for most of his career (historians continue to argue about whether he changed his mind toward the end) he advocated “colonizing” black people somewhere far away. He was wrong about that. Even a generation ago, in the 1990s it was taken for that’s-just-how-it-is granted by people on both sides of the issue that soldiers would want to murder a gay squadmate. They too were wrong.
We don’t know what the next “That’s never going to happen, it goes against human nature” is going to be, but we can be sure it’s coming. The better our understanding of how life works, the better will be our judgment about when that’s true and when it’s not. And no matter how much we refuse to believe it, we are getting better at making those judgments.
Will you be in London on Thursday, October 8 at 6pm? Join Yascha Mounk and Dan Williams for this live recording of The Good Fight podcast at the Halycon International School as they discuss whether AI will doom us all! Get your FREE ticket here! Please note that you must reserve a ticket in order to attend. Please email [email protected] if you have any questions.
The debate about DEI has shifted. It is no longer principally about the problem of demonizing straight white people. It is now about how much DEI demeans minorities.
This is the tale that Tyler Austin Harper tells in his cover story for The Atlantic, “Confessions of a Token Black Professor.” The striking thing about Harper’s essay is that nothing especially headline-worthy happens under the DEI regime at Bates College, where Harper had reached his dream of becoming a tenure-track professor. There are no high-profile public shaming incidents or shout-downs of speakers, as happened at institutions from Hamline to Stanford. It is simply the ordinary dimensions of the DEI structures that Harper found intolerably degrading: the excellent candidates who should have gotten jobs but didn’t because they were not considered ideologically pure enough by the activists in charge of the committees; the inane directives from senior administrators, such as doing a curriculum-wide audit for oppressive content, which made Harper feel like an “antiracist truffle pig”; the use of skin color as a job qualification.
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It’s not that Harper thought that race was irrelevant: he was broadly supportive of affirmative action and happy to be a mentor for minority students. But when ordinary situations are presented as incorrigibly racist (one of the DEI administrators on campus shared her persistent fear that the “crackers” in their idyllic college town were just waiting for their opportunity to kill the black people), it meant that the only role minorities could play was fragile victim, when what Harper wanted to be known for was his excellence as a scholar and teacher.
Frustration about being assigned the role of victim is precisely the story that David Treuer tells about his experience at Princeton in the 1980s. It was an era in which the spirit that would one day harden into the DEI regime was starting to take root on many campuses. Treuer describes growing up on a Native American reservation in Minnesota that he felt had limited his horizons. When he stepped out of his mom’s Dodge Caravan for his first day at Princeton University, it felt to him like he had arrived “onto America’s shores.” Finally, a place of possibility, where his talents would be recognized and developed.
Unfortunately, when people found out that he was an Ojibwe Indian they treated him like “a wounded bird — gorgeous and vulnerable and not long for this world.” People would express their sorrow at his upbringing on the reservation, even when he had shared that his childhood was quite ordinary and not especially bad. Unable to pin him as a victim, many of his classmates just ignored him. He felt as if he had “evaporated.” And so Treuer would make up lies about how much he suffered, simply so that his classmates and professors would pay attention to him.
But being viewed as a victim meant that he wasn’t recognized for his gifts. The title of his essay is “I Went to Princeton in Search of Greatness and Came Back Mediocre.” Here is the real tragedy: going to an elite university and leaving with your gifts undeveloped because the people there preferred that you be a helpless victim rather than a talented human.
Roland Fryer did not have this problem at the University of Chicago. He describes his experience in the Economics Department as a constant mental workout. His papers would routinely be destroyed by fellow academics. Fryer was grateful for this: it meant he was being taken seriously, it was how his work improved.
“Be careful of the liberals,” one of Roland Fryer’s mentors told him when he left Chicago. This was not a dig at people who advocated for a higher marginal tax rate. This was a warning against people who would accept second best from Fryer because they thought that was all that black people could produce. Here is how he puts it: “that the people around me would want so badly for me to succeed, and for themselves not to be mistaken for bigots, that they would flinch from the uncomfortable things required to make me better.” At Chicago, nobody thought Fryer’s black skin was a reason to go easy on him during academic presentations. He was an economist amongst economists: they dignified him by treating him as a peer.
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It was a lack of precisely this kind of dignity that led Tyler Austin Harper to leave his dream job as a tenured professor. As he notes, “I have seen, firsthand, the way a certain kind of white progressive treats Black men who have overcome obstacles. They cannot conceal a certain blend of pity and glee when they learn, for example, that my biological father left before I was old enough to walk, or that I was raised for a time by a single mother. It is a look that says, How far you’ve come, and how kind I am for helping you go further.”
Harper puts his finger on a core insight about DEI: it provides white progressives with a safe script for how to navigate the complicated world of American race relations. No white person in a liberal institution risks censure by focusing too much on racism. Unfortunately, nothing about a script centered around pity gives people the kind of dignity that David Treuer was looking for at Princeton, or encourages the kind of rigor that helped Roland Fryer become a tenured professor at Harvard at the age of 30. What for progressive white people might be a script that keeps them from being canceled turns out to be a form of entrapment for minorities. By encouraging stories of victimhood, you are undermining the agency and effort required for people to excel. If you want to be a pilot, you have to put in the work to learn how to fly a plane, not simply call out all of the slights you are experiencing in flight school.
I do not want to leave the impression that there was nothing positive about DEI. At one point in his article, Fryer shares that one of his professors joked that not only did he not believe in affirmative action, he actually held Fryer’s race against him. I don’t think that joke is funny. I’ve had too many racist insults directed my way because of my skin color to laugh at comments like that.
One of the great contributions of DEI is to highlight that such comments should be unacceptable in professional situations, especially if they are made with the intent to slight. It also created space for people to talk about how a lifetime dealing with such comments impacted them. Most important of all, the DEI regime did us the great service of putting systemic racism at the center of our public discourse. It is simply foolish to think that slavery, segregation, and racist education and housing policies have nothing to do with the current state of inequality in our nation. Learning about systemic racism is an essential part of an honest education.
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But the great tragedy of DEI is that it opened up so much space for talk about racism that it crowded out any room for the kinds of activities that help people excel. Indeed, it did just the opposite. By building programs on concepts like white supremacy culture (which explicitly states that good writing, punctuality and following protocols of excellence are “white supremacist” values) it created the impression that lowering standards for minorities (rather than raising expectations and supporting people to succeed) was morally superior and intellectually sophisticated. In fact, the DEI regime’s singular focus on racism and other forms of discrimination created perverse incentives: the more minorities failed, the more evidence there was for the ideology that the system was set up for minorities to fail.
Here’s the bottom line: those of us who view our identities as a source of pride rather than a status of victimization, and who love the feast of diversity, should not have to settle for the thin gruel of DEI.
Eboo Patel, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.
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