Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Frank Furedi on the Case for Populism

    Frank Furedi, author and social commentator, is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent. His latest book is In Defense of Populism.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Frank Furedi discuss whether populism is a legitimate force or a threat to democracy, the impact of political polarization on mainstream parties’ claim to represent ordinary citizens—and to what extent Viktor Orbán undermined democracy in Hungary.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We probably have different views about populism, but I think it is important for some people to make a real, systematic defense of it. I have had many people on this podcast who worry very much about populism, so I am looking forward to hearing from somebody who thinks it can be a salutary movement in different ways. Perhaps before we get to what you think is salutary about populism, a prior question: Why do you think populism is needed in this political moment?

    Frank Furedi: We are living at a moment when there seems to be a very selective approach toward both democracy and freedom. A lot of people seem to think that if a vote goes against them, then somehow that is the flaw of democracy. Majoritarian democracy in particular is seen as some kind of evil. I had this experience in Amsterdam, where I had a debate at the Balie, a liberal debating forum. It is a very nice venue in the middle of Amsterdam. The issue at stake was democracy and populism, and this was before I wrote the book. I was arguing for the importance of democracy. I said that it is a foundational value, and that it is not something we can selectively adopt or reject.

    Then this guy put up his hand and said, Professor Furedi, are you saying that democracy is good in and of itself, and you would even respect democracy if it went against your views? I said, yeah. I would rather lose an election democratically than win an election undemocratically. For me, democracy was non-negotiable. When I said that, there was a pause in the audience, and a lot of people shook their heads. I realized that what I had said was controversial, which I did not think it was. So I went away and started thinking about why an educated audience had this very conditional approach toward the exercise of democracy. Then I went to bookshops and noticed that all these books were being published warning about the dangers of democracy.

    Mounk: I agree with you that there is a willingness to deprioritize democracy when you disagree with what the majority of your fellow citizens think. I have made this point repeatedly: obviously, it is part of democracy that you sometimes think the majority of your fellow citizens are wrong. It would be very strange and schizophrenic to always have to agree with your compatriots whenever they come to a different view from you. But if you think that a majority of the people, persistently and over a long period, is systematically wrong about the most important things, that a majority is willing at the drop of a hat to be sexist and racist and retrograde about everything, it starts to undermine your commitment to democracy. Why agree to be ruled by a majority if you think that a majority will, in many or perhaps most situations, be on the side of evil things?

    I do think there is this tension that you are talking about, and it is something I worry about. Tell me a little more about why you think that is such a central feature of our political situation today, and how it requires us to embrace a very different mode of politics.

    Furedi: There are several reasons, but probably the most important one, which has emerged in the last twenty years, is the growing trend toward political polarization, where people only talk to people like themselves. Instead of regarding people on the other side as fellow citizens, or maybe as political opponents, they regard them as enemies. When you have this polarized environment, you almost end up with a sense of fantasy about your opponents. This is very much the case with populism, which is regarded as really fascist adjacent, just a prelude to people putting on their brown shirts and a horrible threat to society. That then becomes a legitimation for your hatred toward democratic decision making.

    I think the most interesting example here is radical environmentalists, who argue that we have not got time to convince people, that we have not got time to demonstrate that we are right. All we need is about ten percent of society to agree with us, and that is enough. You do not care about what the majority thinks. When you think like that, it becomes the prelude to something more dangerous, where you see people in a way that does not correspond to reality.

    I am Hungarian. One of the things I always found very interesting was that the Hungarian government of Orbán was always seen as anti-democratic, quasi-fascist, far right, and everything else. Time and time again, if you lived in Europe, he was represented as a big threat to democracy. This forgets the fact that in the last four years, for example, the opposition won elections in Budapest. The mayor of Budapest became his opponent. When Orbán lost the election, he announced his defeat within an hour and graciously handed over power to his political opponents. This is a guy who for the previous fifteen years was portrayed as a democratic backslider, somebody where democracy did not really prevail.

    Anybody who knew what was happening at close quarters could argue that maybe there is corruption in Hungary, and there are a variety of different problems in Hungary, but they were not qualitatively different from what exists in many, many parts of Europe. When you have this polarized environment, it gives you the authority, the permission, to regard democracy as dispensable.

    Mounk: I want to make sure that I give you the floor to build and defend your position. There are important elements on which we agree, but also some important elements on which we will disagree, including the nature of Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary. I will come back to that.

    On the side of what we agree on, I wrote a whole essay on my Substack about Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance, which has become a weird meme. There is a comic version of it on one page that used to go around a lot on social media. My students often cite it. I think it often gives people lazy permission to say, we cannot be tolerant toward the intolerant. Karl Popper told us so. So let us censor anybody we dislike. Let us protest against any speaker at our university campus we do not like. Let us ban political parties that we find to be dangerous. There is a real chance that Germany is going to move toward trying to ban the AfD, even though the AfD is now the leading party in the country in the polls, which I think is a very, very bad idea. That is based not just on a normative mistake but also on a real misreading of Karl Popper. Popper in general was a huge defender of an open society. He was precisely worried about people who thought that they knew what political truth and political virtue were and could impose them on society.

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    This whole paradox of the intolerant comes from one footnote of his that I think was hastily written and never redrafted. On my interpretation of that footnote, though it is a little hard to know how to interpret it, what he was saying is that we cannot let violence hide behind tolerance. That is a perfectly sensible point, which I am sure you agree with and everybody should agree with. Obviously, in a democracy you have to defend the rules of democracy. If some people use baseball bats or guns to make it impossible for political opponents to hold meetings, then you obviously cannot tolerate that. It does not mean that at the drop of a hat you can censor anybody you disagree with, because that is what it takes to solve the paradox of the intolerant.

    Perhaps it is worth talking for a moment about what you mean by populism. I will set out what I mean by the word a little later in the conversation. When you defend populism, what definition do you have in mind? And what definition do you think the people who worry about populism have in mind?

    Furedi: People who worry about populism tend to worry about it externally.

    Mounk: I believe you cite me as a prime example of the ills of that academic literature in your book, which is perfectly fine.

    Furedi: Yeah, why not? It is a free country. The point I am really making is that almost everything written about populism is written by its opponents. There are some exceptions, but almost every monograph, and every book I have come across, is written by people who a priori regard populism as the enemy. What is interesting is that when you talk to people who are called populists, none of them describe themselves as populist. When I talk to someone like Orbán, or to somebody in Meloni’s party or elsewhere, they talk about themselves as conservative. Orbán calls himself a bourgeois conservative, and his big heroes are Adenauer and de Gaulle. That is the kind of people he looks up to. But in other people’s eyes, he is a prime example of populism.

    I became interested in the very fact that we have this perverse situation where the term populism has been hijacked almost entirely by its opponents. They dominate the narrative, they dominate the cultural script that prevails. So I started looking at it, and I came to the conclusion that although there are different varieties of populism historically, because historically populism was much more linked to the left than to the right, when you go back to the American example in particular, but also elsewhere, you find that today the main manifestation of populism tends to be one concerned with defending culture, whereas left-wing populism was much more concerned with defending the economic status of people, their living standards.

    In my eyes, what is interesting about populism today, and this is a historically specific understanding, is that populism today is principally involved in the business of cultural rescue. They are trying to maintain and hold on to certain traditions, certain values, a way of life that they think has escaped and no longer exists. What is interesting for me is that there is a fundamental distinction between the parties that are called populist and what I call, in my book, the spirit of populism. The two are not the same. What I argue is that the spirit of populism has emerged and become so powerful not because the populist parties are so charismatic or have such a great political program, but because a vacuum has been created by the delegitimation of the legacy parties. In that moment, when people feel that these old parties no longer represent them, it is the spirit of populism, this quest for solidarity, this quest for a homeland, for being part of something, for being rooted in some kind of place. It is that sensibility and the aspiration for a voice. I think that is the most important thing. People want to be part of the conversation, and that to me is the most democratic dimension of the popular spirit.

    Mounk: I have lots of questions about this, but let me focus on one quite narrow question for now, just so that I am sure I understand your position. When you are talking about that cultural defense or cultural renewal, that feels distinctive of right-wing populist movements. It might describe, if you are being generous, Marine Le Pen, or it might describe Giorgia Meloni. It surely does not describe Jean-Luc Mélenchon or Zack Polanski. Do you think that applying the label of populist to somebody like Mélenchon or Polanski, or for that matter somebody like Hugo Chávez, is a category mistake? Are those just totally different movements? Or would you recognize that they share some set of features that makes it worth calling them populists as well? Surely they are not engaged in a project of cultural defense in quite that way.

    Furedi: Well, that is the point I was trying to make. There is a difference between the left and right versions of populism, and it principally depends upon culture. But there are left-wing populists that I would see as genuine populists. Podemos in Spain is a very good example, or Syriza in Greece. You mentioned Chávez. These are people who I think had a very clear populist leaning and sought to give representation to a voice. I think Polanski is not a populist. He is much closer to the establishment way of thinking. If you look at his main source of support, other than the Islamist support, it tends to come from the layer of society that is high middle class professionals.

    Mélenchon is again interesting, because he began as more of a proper populist in his early career. But the more he adopted identity politics, and the more his politics began to converge with Islamism, the more he became a French representative of the kind of identity politics we have seen in the United States. We can have a discussion and debate as to what extent the politicization of identity is another form of populism. But my argument is that these movements will not have the capacity to sustain themselves, because the only way populism can survive in the short and medium term is if it responds to people’s yearning for cultural security.

    Mounk: I am a little bit confused, because perhaps we need to go more into what cultural security means to you. I have trouble seeing Hugo Chávez, and even more strongly Podemos or Syriza, as movements that are trying to defend cultural security in that way, at least on many cultural dimensions. I think we would agree that culture is in many ways at the heart of our contemporary politics now. You are quite skeptical, I believe, of principally economic explanations for the rise of populism, and by and large I agree with you on that, though it may be a little different for left-wing populist movements. But when it comes to a lot of these cultural questions, a party like Podemos was very much on the side of the cosmopolitans and the knowers and so on that you decry in your book. I find it hard to see how, in your definition of populism, you can count those movements as populist. I think I have a definition of populism where I can connect those two, and we will come to that.

    Furedi: Well, I was not very clear. I was just trying to explain that there are different forms of populism. My argument is that the reason Podemos, for example, failed to gain momentum and became gradually marginalized is that it did not attend to the cultural needs of Spanish society, of working people’s desire for a homeland, for meaning. One of the reasons a lot of so-called left-wing populist movements have become marginalized over the last ten years is that they no longer have that same capacity, because they self-consciously avoid trying to connect with that desire for cultural defense. That is why I argue that the future in the medium term of populism, certainly in Europe, is the national populist variety.

    Now, you raise an important question about the terms you use. I actually think that cultural conservatism can be complementary to different political standpoints. You could be a liberal and still be culturally conservative. You could be a socialist, even a communist, and be culturally conservative. At the moment, those movements have become entirely detached from any kind of culturally conservative sensibility, and I think that is one of the big problems we face.

    One of my worries about populist movements, not the people who vote for them, because I actually think the people who vote for them are right, but the people who represent them, is that they have essentially anti-Enlightenment sensibilities. For them, “liberal” is a dirty word. I often have arguments about that, because liberalism should not be blamed for the ills of the world. What we now have is a situation where genuine liberalism and genuine Enlightenment thinking is attacked by people like Mélenchon no less than by people in the MAGA movement, if you see what I mean. I think the reason for that goes back to this decoupling of public life and the polarization process. That is one of my worries about populism: some of the representatives have become the mirror image of the identity politics opponents that they have.

    Mounk: That is an interesting point, and on that we very strongly agree. To stick with establishing our understanding of what it is you are defending, your book is called In Defense of Populism. Why not call it In Defense of Right-Wing Populism? Or, more specifically, why not call it In Defense of Cultural Security, or Cultural Renewal, In Defense of Belonging, In Defense of a Nation? It seems to me that the way political scientists have historically defined populism has not been in accordance with one specific ideological tradition, and that is for very good reason. When you look at the origins of the term in the United States, it is the Populist Party of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which was mostly about taking on the robber barons. In the context of Latin America, it has all kinds of different incarnations, but many of those are again on the political left.

    To take the term populism and then defend it on the grounds that what you really think we need at the moment is a defense of the nation-state and its customs and its certainties, a return to firm borders, a return to a pluralistic society but one that does not systematically go against the cultural preferences of a majority, is a much more specific ideological project. We can debate the merits of that as a political project, but it would be better described as a form of defense of common-sense conservatism, if you want to call it that, or national conservatism. Choose your term. The word populist is both overly inclusive and underinclusive of what you are describing. There are going to be many people you might even call populist, like Podemos, and certainly most people who use the term populism, who do not want to do that at all, who are not interested in the project you are defending. And there are many people who fall under that umbrella who are not populists on anybody’s approach.

    To give a couple of examples, the influential Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, whose name Munich’s airport still bears, was not a populist. He was very much an establishment figure, but he was certainly minded to defend a lot of the values you are talking about. Or, even more recently, perhaps something like Wolfgang Schäuble, the late German finance minister, who was a pretty full-throated conservative in many ways and represented the more traditional conservative electorate of the Christian Democratic Union, but who certainly was not a populist. It seems to me that a lot of your book is arguing for, perhaps you would call it, a liberal conservatism that is willing to defend borders and the nation. That just seems to me a different entity from populism, because there are going to be some populists who are not interested in that project at all, and many politicians who identify with that project who would not call themselves populists and whom nobody would call populists.

    Furedi: The reason I wrote the book and kept that title is that, as I argue in the book, the defining distinction in public life in the West is no longer between left and right but between populist and anti-populist. I was aware that there is literally no intellectual defense of populism. The last time I saw anybody really systematically defend populism was Christopher Lasch, which was a while back. For me, it was quite important to establish that. In the book itself, I make the point very clearly that what I am defending are not populist parties in the way they are generally seen or framed. What I am defending is what I call the spirit of populism, which is almost like a zeitgeist that has captured the imagination of millions of people throughout the West.

    I make the point that what I am writing about is a historically specific phenomenon. I am not talking about the populists in Latin America in the interwar period or in other situations. I am not talking about the Narodniks or the American Populist Party. I am talking about this particular phenomenon, which is a spirit that attempts to provide people who feel unrepresented, and that is a really key thing, who have not got a voice, who feel that they are not part of the conversation, with a certain degree of support. I find that one of the healthiest developments since the Cold War. It is a very specific problem that I am looking at. If I had been around fifty or sixty years ago, I would not have written a book in defense of populism. Certainly that would not have been the title, because the problems that were posed were very different.

    I am responding to a set of problems whereby ideals that were once seen as mainstream in communities, things like patriotism, which has a very honorable historical legacy, are now regarded as somehow associated with far-right flag-waving individuals. There are issues that concern people, like what is a man and what is a woman, which for thousands of years was not controversial. Suddenly people are not able to say what they really think, because it is seen as transphobic. I could give you a long list of things that were, to use your term, common sense for a very long time, part of people’s taken-for-granted values, which somehow have been stripped away and left people without any kind of moorings or roots.

    The fact that people now feel confident to challenge that, and not only feel confident, but year by year their voices are getting stronger and stronger. When I read Politico or whatever, they all have these articles: When is the populist wave going to stop? Is it not really good that the Swedish Democrats did not manage to win in Sweden in the recent elections? That basically gives us the formula for defeating populism. All of these continually misread the fact that there is a spirit abroad which is at the moment unrestrained and uncontained, because it is a spirit that captures the imagination of a lot of people. The book tries to provide an intellectual defense of that and an explanation of that, so that people can understand what is so influential and important in the moment we are going through.

    Mounk: I am sympathetic to some of the points you are making. I have been asked the question, as I recently wrote, whether the populist wave has crested, more than any other question by journalists over the last ten years. From the beginning, I thought that was not going to be the case. I think it is quite clearly true now that, in your words, the populist spirit is continuing to rise and expand. If you want to understand our situation today, you have to reckon with that moment. I also have real concerns about some of the ways in which we have given up on values that I think are important, one of which is the defense of control over your national territory, part of which is being able to control your border. I think immigration has many good things in the right ways and in the right context. We are both immigrants in different ways in different countries. But there is nothing bad or strange about ordinary people saying, we want to make sure that we know who is coming into the country, and that we have some influence over who comes into our country.

    I have also written a book, as you know, criticizing a new kind of political ideology on the left, which I think is an illiberal form of identity politics, and which I think is very damaging. The reason I nevertheless would not call myself a populist, and worry about embracing populism, is perhaps that I have a different view of what I mean by that. I agree with you that many people make the mistake that when they do not like a particular policy or view from some politician, they reach for the term populism to say that person is popular, so they are evil. I think that is bad. I do not think that populism is about an ideology. I think what you are defending is a set of ideological presuppositions, some of which I agree with and some of which I disagree with, but which is a perfectly legitimate set of political points of view in a democratic society.

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    For me, the definition of populism is not rooted in one such ideological tradition. It is a mode of doing politics, which I would argue is characterized by two features. The first is anti-elitism. It is the claim that the core source of our troubles is the elite, particularly the political elite, and the way in which it is mismanaging things, getting things wrong, and being self-serving, and cares more about various outsiders than about people like you and me. I would make two points. First, that is right in some places and less right in other places. Some political elites are relatively better, and some are relatively worse. Certainly, on the whole, you cannot say that political elites have been doing well. There is a nice German phrase, sich mit Ruhm bekleckern: they have not exactly been spilling honor and achievement all over themselves over the last decades. They have done quite poorly in all kinds of ways. So some form of anti-elitism may be perfectly right and appropriate. It is also a natural part of politics. I think that Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign was in important ways anti-elitist. I have only just come to Washington. I am not a career politician. These people do not understand what is really important. I am on the side of Main Street rather than Wall Street. Those were all anti-elitist sentiments that were part and parcel of his 2008 campaign.

    I would also argue that another part of the definition of populism is anti-pluralism. Anti-elitism is not enough. You need to have both anti-elitism and anti-pluralism for somebody to be counted as a populist. Part of anti-pluralism is a tendency to say, I alone truly represent the people. Only my movement truly speaks for what people want. By virtue of that fact, if you disagree with me, you do not just have a wrong view about something. You are not just blind to certain problems we have. You are actually a traitor to the nation. You are an enemy. You are somebody who is illegitimate. You are somebody who is dangerous.

    In my reading, what Hugo Chávez, parts of the Podemos movement, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and Zack Polanski, as well as Viktor Orbán, Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have in common is that anti-pluralism, that unwillingness to treat their political opponents as legitimate. I would argue that it is that element of their politics that I find to be potentially dangerous to our democratic institutions. They might have certain policy preferences I disagree with. That is fine. That is within the realm of legitimate democratic politics. That is not a reason to brand them a danger to democracy, even if it is things I really care about, even if it is things where we have deep disagreements. That is a normal part of democracy. But when they say, I alone truly represent the people, I worry that that is precisely what leads them to start undermining free speech, the independence of institutions, and the role of other institutions within the state.

    I have more things to say about this, but do you find that to be a helpful definition of populism? And insofar as it is, do you share my worries about its anti-pluralist nature?

    Furedi: If you could just concentrate on the pluralism side of it. In the book, I explain that that is one of the accusations laid at populists: that they are meant to be saying, we are the only people who can represent the nation. Everybody else is against our people. There is a kind of purity element attached to that. To be honest, although there might be a strand in that direction, when you actually look at what populists have said and written about, and what the political activists have said, I think it is much more nuanced. The idea that they have this very powerful anti-democratic, anti-pluralist impulse in them is something that is really exaggerated, which does not mean to say that it is not a danger.

    If you are worried about hostility to pluralism, then in the twenty-first century, certainly in the last twenty years, you have to worry about the anti-pluralist opponents of populism. They have basically decided that somebody can win almost fifty percent of the vote in a part of Eastern Germany, but because you do not like them, that electoral performance can be discounted altogether, because they are the enemy. The kind of language that you think populists are rehearsing and using, that we alone know what is true, we alone represent the people, actually characterizes the opponents of populism much more than the populists.

    I know this from personal experience, because I was running a think tank, which I have just stopped doing, in Brussels. We would have meetings. For example, we had a meeting on what it means to be a conservative woman: the relationship between conservatism and feminism. It was an ordinary academic discussion involving four women. The local Antifa decided that this was an outrage and something had to be done. After they tried to break into the meeting, the police had to come out with water cannons to allow us to have it. At least we had the meeting then, but Antifa managed to close down something like six or seven of the venues where we organized debates. If you look on the Antifa website in Brussels, it says Frank Furedi, public enemy number one. So you have this ironic situation where the anti-populist Antifa behaves as fascists used to behave.

    As a genuine pluralist, as somebody who is committed to debate and discussion, I find that that is a characteristic much more of the opponents of populism than of populism itself. We have to be even-handed. In some situations there are populist individuals, leaders, who veer in that direction. I know, for example, that there are some members of the AfD in Germany whom I would not trust with democracy. I think you have to be open and criticize them and challenge them. But I do think there is a double standard the anti-populist literature has adopted, which is the reason I wrote the book.

    I think populism has always aspired toward bringing people together, but that aspiration to create common ground did not necessarily lead to a hostile orientation toward others. You have to remember that it was the American populist movement that first joined hand in hand with Black activists in the early part of the twentieth century and tried to overcome some of the racial divide that occurred. It was not the Republican Party, and it was not the Democratic Party, the mainstream parties, but the populists. I have confidence that that potential can still be recreated if the circumstances changed and we managed to depoliticize so many of the cultural issues that have unfortunately been rendered into political issues.

    Yascha Mounk: I agree with you that there are illiberal forces on the left and the right today. I agree that the attempts to close down political speech are absolutely unacceptable. I agree that on college campuses in the United States, or sometimes in Brussels, there are attempts to make political speech impossible because its content displeases certain groups. All of that is deeply concerning. I would not, however, take so lightly the way elected political leaders, heads of government and heads of state, have been using very clearly anti-pluralist language in a consistent way. Let me quote a few examples I have in front of me.

    Donald Trump, in the run-up to the 2024 election at a Fox News town hall in October 2024: “We have an enemy from within. We have a lot of bad people. But when you look at Shifty Schiff and some of the others, yeah, they are to me an enemy from within.” He said, “I think Nancy Pelosi is an enemy from within.” That is not just calling political opponents bad or wrongheaded, but evil, repeatedly. He originally entered politics by claiming that Barack Obama is not a legitimate president, that he is not a natural-born citizen, and so on.

    Viktor Orbán, whom you cited earlier and to whom I want to return in other ways as well: “After today’s festival gathering comes the Easter cleanup. The Bucks have made it through winter. We are going to dismantle the financial machine that has been using corrupt dollars to buy politicians, judges, journalists, bogus NGOs, and political activists.” In March 2025, he spoke of wanting to rid Hungary of vermin in reference to similar groups.

    Narendra Modi, in India, has repeatedly claimed that the opposition Congress party is against India, against the nation: “The spirit of patriotism has died in today’s Congress. The ghost of hatred has entered today’s Congress. Congress stands with anti-national forces,” and so on. Hugo Chávez repeatedly called the opposition escuálidos, “squalid ones,” and said that the opposition were coup plotters and enemies of the homeland.

    This stands in marked contrast to the famous instance in the 2008 campaign, in which John McCain, at a town hall in the run-up to the election, had people in the audience saying that Obama is a dangerous man and that they were afraid for their country if he won. McCain said, “I have some fundamental differences with Mr. Obama. You should vote for me rather than for him. But he is a decent man. If he wins, you do not have to be afraid for your country.” The contrast between those forms of political engagement is quite clear to me. It is a significant factor that helps to explain why we refer to these different movements by the same label. What do you think?

    Furedi : Well, aside from the small matter that I do not think Trump is a populist, I think he is the very opposite of a populist in everything that he does. If I take the other examples, they are a testimony to the disturbing decline in political speech that has occurred everywhere. I respect your sensitivity to some of these statements that have been made and should not have been made, as long as you have the same degree of sensitivity to the fact that you arrive as an MEP in Brussels and within a day you are called far-right and fascist, which serves as a prelude to suggesting that you are not worthy of being taken seriously, not worthy of being a parliamentarian.

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    The way I look at it, if you take a step back and look at the political rhetoric being used, it is very rare to find what I call tolerant behavior. Tolerant behavior does not mean you agree with somebody. Even if you hate somebody’s views, you still tolerate their right to say them, and you understand that it is important for public life that tolerance kicks in. One of the reasons I wrote this book is the kind of distortions people make about populism and the way it operates, which means people do not see what is really positive about it. That is why I talk about the spirit of populism and the views that people have. When you ask people why they vote the way they do, they do not say, the reason I voted for a particular politician is that the other side are vermin. They do not say, I voted for these people because I want to get rid of all those people on the other side. There is another reason why they are doing it.

    At the moment, the hegemonic discourse in our society, by which I mean Western society, is to assume that there is a pathology on one side and virtues on the other. It does not realize that in many respects the pathological way of behaving in public life characterizes people who are anti-populist. I go to Germany now and again, and I was there recently. I have a lot of friends, particularly in Hessen and in Frankfurt, who are former leftists, in the Green Party, in Die Linke, in the SPD, who, like me, have decided that they have more in common with the so-called populists in Germany than with the old mainstream parties. When I talk to them, it becomes very clear that what they are really expressing is a fear that public life is being closed down on the ground that there is a threat coming from the AfD. Academics and intellectuals are simply desensitized to that. It is not that they are being dishonest. They are so wrapped up in this anti-populist discourse that they cannot see how they themselves have become implicated in something that is at the moment even worse than what they are complaining about.

    Mounk: I agree with you that I am very concerned about the overly easy invocation of the paradox of tolerance. It is very easy to say, these people are intolerant, so we can shut them down whatever way we want. Even though it might superficially look similar to what we worry about them doing, that is fine, because we are the good ones and they are the evil ones. I do not think that works substantively, and I do not think it works as a political argument. I think there is a kind of paradox of populism, and I am going to try to make your point for you. Suppose you have a political situation in which both sides engage in some genuine form of mutual toleration, in some genuine form of what McCain, to his honor, practiced in that moment at that town hall. He said, “This is my political opponent. We are in the midst of a heated campaign. I really want to win, but I am going to stop short of saying this is the enemy within, this is vermin, this person is illegitimate. In fact, I am going to go against my own crowd at this town hall to emphasize that this is a legitimate opponent. If they win, that is part of the democratic process.”

    Part of the problem is that when that norm breaks down, the parties that initially continue to operate with that understanding of mutual toleration have to make a choice. The easy thing is to say, we are worried about them. They are going to destroy democracy, so we mustn’t tolerate them. They are the enemy from within. They are vermin. You can very quickly get to a situation where each side echoes the other. The really striking thing to me was that in the American presidential election in November 2024, there was a poll in Pennsylvania, an exit poll, I believe, asking whether voters believed American democracy to be in danger. There were two interesting findings. The first is that in a deeply divided country where a lot of issues are 50-50, this was something like a 70-30 issue. A clear majority of Americans said yes, democracy is in danger. The second is that, among the people who believed democracy to be in danger, more had voted for Donald Trump than for Kamala Harris.

    You can get into this weird situation where each side echoes the other and both sides become anti-pluralist. I think that is a genuine dilemma. How do you deal with political parties that are illiberal in various ways, that are anti-pluralist in various ways, without yourself becoming anti-pluralist? What I do not think it is, is a defense of being anti-pluralist. Let me put it this way: I take it we agree on the importance of avoiding anti-pluralism. Or do you think there is a justification for this form of anti-pluralism? When you hear the phrases I just quoted from Trump and Orbán and others, do you think those are bad things for them to say? You might like other things about them. I do not think you like Trump very much, but you are somewhat defensive of Orbán. Do you think that saying those things was worrying, or are you not concerned about heads of government and heads of state engaging in that kind of political speech?

    Furedi: Obviously, any manifestation that is anti-pluralist, and by definition anti-pluralism also means anti-democratic, is not something I can ever support. I would make one point: you have to look at the record of people like Orbán. In sixteen years, how many demonstrations did he ban? Zero. Compare that to the number of demonstrations banned in many other places. How many political parties or individuals did he ban? Zero. There is a difference between rhetoric and what they have actually done. Nevertheless, anti-pluralist rhetoric from any quarter is quite important.

    I agree with you about each side mirroring the other, with one qualification. The question we have to ask is when the mirror imaging began. What was the chronologically prior experience that led the other side to begin to mirror? The way I see it, the most powerful anti-pluralist impulse is something that became legitimated some time ago, particularly among the intellectual class. I am sure you have worked in and spoken at Western universities, and you will know that they do not have a pluralistic orientation toward political views. They have become extremely one-sided over the last thirty, thirty-five years. That is not a problem for the universities only. It is a problem because it communicates the idea that we do not have to speak to people, we do not have to argue with those people. Indeed, in America they have expressions like, go educate yourself, meaning I am not going to try to convince you, because there is no point debating people like you. That kind of political culture has become very strong and has enveloped the public life of politicians.

    When I look around and ask who is behaving in the most anti-pluralist way, it is, in Germany, for example, the German government, which has raised the possibility of banning this and banning that. In Britain now we are having similar discussions about how to deal with Reform in a way that isolates and undermines them. There is a prior hostility toward the emergence of new political forces by the mainstream establishment, which has created that anti-pluralist political culture, to which some of the populist political leaders have then responded in kind. I do not see an equivalence there, but I do see a mirroring element going on.

    What I really worry about at the moment, and I go back to tolerance all the time because I think tolerance is the key issue of our time, is that people in government have invented expressions that are fundamentally hostile to the ideal of tolerance. Take, for example, the expression that people in the British government use: “zero tolerance.” They think the idea of zero tolerance is a really positive goal to achieve. They do not realize that if you get rid of tolerance, because that is what they are really getting at, even though they have a more interesting way of expressing it, you give tolerance itself a negative connotation. So many people I talk to, instead of upholding Pierre Bayle’s and John Locke’s liberal ideas of tolerance as a wonderful achievement in a world where people used to kill each other if they had different views, regard it as something that can be swept aside by the people who are meant to be liberal.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Frank discuss to what extent Orbán undermined democracy in Hungary and whether in future we will become even more polarized. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    56 min
  • Trump’s “Golden Fleet” Is Still Ridiculous
    (Photo by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Of the many ridiculous, counterproductive, and outright harmful things that Donald Trump has done, his effort to create a “Golden Fleet” of “Trump-class” battleships is far from the worst offense. But it is absolutely typical of the personalistic and processless state into which American national security decision making has fallen in his second term.

    The United States has not commissioned a new battleship since it launched the USS Missouri in 1944. There are good reasons for this: in an age of naval aviation and missiles, battleships become huge floating targets liable to be sunk way before any of their weapons can be put to use. Battleships had already been made obsolete by aircraft carriers during the Second World War, and since then have been used for shore bombardment when facing an enemy like Iraq that didn’t have the means of fighting back. They would be worse than useless in a war with China or even Iran, both of which field huge numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles that could easily strike such big targets.

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    Trump evidently decided on his own to direct the Navy to build new battleships based on his having watched the black-and-white television series Victory at Sea when he was young. He bemoaned the fact that the United States was building smaller ships and boasted that his planned battleships would be “the fastest, the biggest, and by far—100 times—more powerful.”

    I remember watching and loving Victory at Sea when I was a child growing up in the late 1950s. But I recognize that the world has moved on since then. It hasn’t for Trump: making America great again consists, in so many domains, of reproducing the world the way he remembers it when he was a young man, when the United States was an industrial powerhouse and women and racial minorities weren’t so prominent in the workplace. His project fully reflects the president’s vanity: ship classes are usually named after the lead ship (in this case a planned USS Defiant); Trump wants them named after himself, and to have the moniker “Golden” attached to the name of the fleet like Theodore Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet.” The major cost of this misconceived initiative will divert planning and design funds already appropriated away from ships the Navy really wants to build.

    Fortunately, it is very unlikely that any of these ships will ever be built. Trump has no way of authorizing the many billions of dollars this fleet would cost, and there doesn’t seem to be any enthusiasm for the project either in Congress or the Navy apart from campaign donors like former Navy Secretary John Phelan. Phelan himself was apparently pushed out of his post because he told Trump that the new ships couldn’t be completed during the president’s second term, and that they might have to be constructed in foreign shipyards.

    Trump’s national security policy from top to bottom has been devoid of process. There is no one in the administration capable of telling the president that building new battleships is a stupid idea, and no inhibition on Trump’s part in asserting expertise in an area he knows less than nothing about. The adolescent Trump watching Victory at Sea is now an 80-year-old adolescent directing the world’s most powerful country. National security decision-making, absent regular process and careful vetting, risks getting the United States into conflicts with huge unanticipated consequences.

    Oh wait—maybe that’s happened already.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In The Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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    0 min
  • Episode 192: Maya Kornberg on How Money, Media, and Violence Prevent Change in Congress

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    This week, Richard talks to Maya Kornberg, author of Stuck: How Money, Media, and Violence Prevent Change in Congress (Johns Hopkins University Press).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

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    32 min
  • Simon Sebag Montefiore on the Origins of the Modern Middle East

    Simon Sebag Montefiore is a historian and author. His latest book is The Cauldron: The Origins of the Modern Middle East.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Simon Sebag Montefiore discuss how the collapse of the Ottoman Empire gave rise to modern nationalism and ethnic cleansing in the Middle East, how the region’s history has shaped today’s conflicts, and the long-term impact of October 7.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I really look forward to this conversation. It’s a very ambitious book. Tell us about the origins of the modern Middle East. As in many parts of the world, the origins of a modern world are in a way the story of the fading of the imperial world that preceded it.

    Simon Sebag Montefiore: In this case, I think you have to look at the old world. You have to look at the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire to understand the Middle East today, and that’s why I begin with those empires. In 1900, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling in Europe, but still pretty formidable in Asia. That’s the story of The Cauldron. That’s how the book begins.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about how the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the fading influence of the British Empire in parts of the Middle East set up the basic structure that started to emerge at the beginning of the twentieth century.

    Sebag Montefiore: The Ottoman Empire was fading. It had lost most of its Balkan territories and most of its North African territories, except Libya, except Tripoli. But it still controlled what is now Turkey and the whole Arab world essentially, all the way to the border with the Persian Empire. So it was still a pretty formidable institution. In World War I, it proved to be surprisingly resilient militarily, and it defeated the British in two pretty significant battles. So it was still pretty important.

    But what is the Ottoman Empire? The Ottoman Empire lasted for over four hundred years, and there were many versions of it. It started as a conquest state based on the enslavement of Christian children who were recruited to be its soldiers, its civil servants, and so on. And of course, to its harems. Then it went through massive crises and remade itself several times.

    In the last period, which I deal with in The Cauldron, which is really the opening of the twentieth century or the 1890s, it had been through a period of reform when it had allowed its many peoples, sects, and ethnicities to have equal citizenship. It was tightening itself into an Islamic and nationalistic, Turkish nationalistic entity with a kind of almost proto-Nazi ideology.

    So by World War I, it was ruled by the Three Pashas, who were kind of eugenicist, social Darwinist people who believed that war was a purifying struggle for races to perfect themselves. It was they who embarked on the genocide against the Armenians and other peoples too, like the Greeks and the Maronites and so on. That was a sort of Götterdämmerung, if you like, of the Ottoman Empire.

    The great myth that you read about all the time, about the great tolerance of the Ottoman Empire and how everyone lived together in a cheerful, peaceful, charming way, spouting poetry, is rubbish really.

    Mounk: Walk us through that. It is rubbish, because there were very strong forms of exclusion and discrimination built into those empires. But the strange thing about empires does seem to be that as they fade, you get those periods of ethnic cleansing. You obviously get that extremely strongly in the Middle East, with the Armenians and others, but also in other parts of Europe. It’s in the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the rise of nationalism and the attempt to create those more coherent national states that you then get all of the expulsions and ethnic cleansings that define a lot of the first half of the twentieth century.

    Tell us about the era of the Three Pashas and the ideology that drove them, and in what ways those were preferable to the Ottoman Empire and in which ways perhaps they weren’t.

    Sebag Montefiore: You’re putting your finger on it. In the West, we decided, I guess, sometime during the nineteenth century, that the nation-state was the best form of government. But the creation of these nation-states always included exclusions of people who either didn’t fit into the new national definition or who didn’t want to fit. The creation of nationalism is always about the exclusion of people who are the other in some way or other. All the national states that were created in Eastern Europe involved excluding Muslim citizens from them, and they had to leave and go into the Ottoman Empire, in their hundreds of thousands.

    The same process took place in Eurasia and in the Middle East. That’s what happened in the Ottoman Empire. The idea moved from Ottomanism, which was meant to be a definition of a broad citizenship involving all sorts of peoples, to a much tighter one, a sort of Turkish definition. You had to be Turkish, you had to be Islamic, you had to speak Turkish. That excluded the Arabs, who were millions of people, as well as the Jews and of course all the Christians in the empire. They were huge communities, including the Armenians.

    All of these peoples in the Middle East started to embrace the idea of nationalism because that was the flavor of the times. Once they did that, you were entering into a game in which there was a struggle for supremacy and over who would create their version of the state. That’s still going on in all of the countries in the Middle East. It’s one of the themes of this book and of this history.

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    In the Ottoman Empire, the Three Pashas were Young Turks. The Young Turks was a movement that had liberal democrats on one side and ultra-nationalists, kind of authoritarians, on the other, and they were of the latter faction. They got control of the Sultanate. There was still a Sultan, but they were the dictators effectively. They took the Ottoman Empire into the war, and they believed this was the only way to save the Ottoman state.

    At the same time, many peoples were beginning to embrace nationalistic ideologies, and that meant also having support from outside powers. That was the Armenian dilemma. The Armenians decided that they too were a nation, they needed a national state, and the only way they could get that was with help from, say, the British, but even more from the Russians, who were their Orthodox brothers. That way the Ottoman rulers started to regard them not just as Christians and therefore possible outsiders with mixed loyalties, but actually traitors working for the main enemy, the Russians. That’s what led to the massacres of World War I.

    Mounk: Let’s go a little bit forward in time. You have the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. You have these nation-building projects, which often go hand in hand with these forms of ethnic cleansing, the attempt to build these coherent nation states that often involve these forms of violence, as they did elsewhere in the world. You then obviously have a period of World War II and the competing claims of fascism and communism on the allegiance of local political actors.

    Tell us a little bit about the shape of the Middle East after these nation-building projects, who the major players are, and how they respond to the rise of the Soviet Union and to the rise of Hitler in Germany.

    Sebag Montefiore: What the Allies wanted to do after World War I was punish the genocidaires who had killed the Armenians. They felt they had no obligation to the Ottomans or the Turks or whoever they would turn out to be. The Sultanate still existed at that point. This is probably one of the most important parts of the story—what is now Turkey.

    They had decided that they would embrace the nationalisms of all the peoples who had suffered under the Turks or the Ottomans. The irony about these great imperialists like Churchill and Balfour and Lloyd George and Clemenceau was that they combined an imperial view of the world, in which they wanted to create new states that were friendly or client states to them and would allow British troops to remain, with nationalism. They believed that they were backing peoples who had been prisoners of the Ottomans and victims of the Ottomans. That was their general plan.

    But in what is now Turkey, they decided that the Turks would have a tiny rump state around Ankara. The western part they gave to the Greeks and Italians, but mainly the Greeks. They said to the Greeks, you can create a new empire, almost like a new Byzantine empire. The Greeks poured troops into that area and started to conquer even the parts that they hadn’t been given by the Allies. In the east, they basically promised states to the Armenians and the Kurds.

    This immediately started to go very wrong because the Turks, under Mustafa Kemal, who later became Atatürk, father of the Turks, rallied and promoted a new nation, a new state that he wanted to call the Turkish Republic. He inherited an intact, fully equipped Ottoman army that was still a pretty impressive military contingent. With this he turned around and defeated the Armenians, of whom there were hardly any left after the genocide, the Syrians who were in Cilicia, and the Kurds, and then turned round and defeated the Greeks. When he came to face the British, who still occupied Constantinople, they blinked and caved. They weren’t ready for another war against these quite capable military forces, and that brought down Lloyd George’s government in 1922.

    Out of that was formed a new nation state, the most important of these nation states, at least in this early period: the Turkish Republic. But they wanted much more. They weren’t satisfied with what they got in 1923. They wanted to get Mosul. They wanted to get the Vilayet of Mosul, which is northeastern Iraq. They also weren’t happy with Syria. They wanted northern Syria, but the French kept that. That’s why we see what’s happening now with President Erdogan and this new Ottomanism that he is promoting, because all along the Turks felt they had been done out of their natural imperial power domain.

    Mounk: They have a form of imperial hangover, which in some ways is comparable to Russia and other countries around the world.

    Sebag Montefiore: It’s very like Russia, so that’s part of it.

    Mounk: This is what’s going on in Turkey at the time. Tell us about other parts of the Middle East at that moment, and then I want to get a little bit of forward momentum. What’s happening, for example, with Saudi Arabia, being conquered by Saud, and the establishment of a House of Saud?

    Sebag Montefiore: The rise of the Saud family is a very different process. The Ottomans in Arabia controlled the western coast of Arabia, which is Mecca and Medina, the holy cities, the Hejaz. Normally they controlled Yemen, but actually they only really controlled the capital. If you go around the south of Arabia, the British controlled Aden and Hadhramaut, which is also part of Yemen, and then what is now the Sultanate of Oman. If you keep going around the coast, they controlled the Trucial States, which were all the little emirates, which is now the UAE and Kuwait and Bahrain and Qatar and so on. So the British were one imperial power in Arabia, and the Ottomans were the other, but in the middle, there were family dynasties who controlled their own emirates that were vaguely allied to the Ottomans or the British, but often to the Ottomans. The Ottomans kept a very close eye on these people because they knew that much of the prestige of the Ottoman monarchy came from controlling the pilgrimage, the Hajj, to Mecca and Medina.

    In the eighteenth century, the House of Saud, the Saudi family, had partnered with an Islamic revivalist who founded the Wahhabi movement, and they had actually conquered the whole of Arabia, including Mecca and Medina. The Ottomans had thrown them out and beheaded the Saudi Emir on the docks in Constantinople. In the nineteenth century, another Saudi prince built another Saudi realm, and that too had fallen apart.

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    Now, in 1902, at the beginning of my period, Ibn Saud, or Abdulaziz, as he is known in the Arab world, was a swaggering twenty-year-old, six foot six or something, very tall, who rode into the interior of Arabia and conquered Riyadh with forty friends and henchmen. That was the beginning of the conquest of what is now Saudi Arabia. It took him thirty years to build. What one needs to understand about Saudi Arabia is that it’s the third Saudi state. It’s a conquest state. They conquered it in a wave of wars that went on, as I said, for the next thirty years. Ultimately, the most important part of that conquest was the conquest in 1925 of Mecca and Medina, because it’s the guardianship of the holy sanctuaries that gives them their prestige in the Arab world. It has allowed them recently to replace Egypt as the leaders of the Sunni Arab world.

    The creation of that state was really independent of the British and the Ottomans and the French. He had to get their backing or their acquiescence, but he was a master at playing off everybody, Abdulaziz, and he did it himself.

    Mounk: Obviously there are many parts of the Middle East, and I don’t want to go through each individual country. We have talked a lot about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Atatürk, as he styled himself. We have talked about the revival of Islam and Wahhabism and the rise of the king of Saud. The third really important part to set the scene before we fast-forward is what’s going on in Persia, or as it would now be called, Iran. Tell us in particular about Reza Shah.

    Sebag Montefiore: Reza Shah was such an interesting character, and he’s one of the big nation builders. You’ve mentioned a few of them there, Yascha. He actually started as a peasant. He was a peasant soldier who was striking by his ambition, his discipline, and his height. He was another giant strapping soldier. As a young man, he joined the Shah of Persia’s Cossack Regiment, which was based on the Cossacks of the Tsars of Russia and was trained by Cossacks from Russia.

    Iran had a very complex relationship with the Russian Tsars and later the Soviets too. Essentially twice in the twentieth century the Russians occupied half of Iran, so it’s worth remembering that.

    Opening the twentieth century, we find Persia, which is really an empire in which a lot of different minorities and ethnicities exist. They’re all Farsi speaking, but some are Persian, and many are Kurds, Arabs, and others. It had been spectacularly misgoverned and ill-managed by the Qajar dynasty of Shahs. By the beginning of the twentieth century, it had stagnated, it was corrupt, it was misgoverned, and it was falling apart.

    In 1906, there was a constitutional revolution in which the Shah was forced to concede a constitution and an elected parliament, the Majlis. That didn’t last long because he fought back. There was a counter-revolution, and he was backed by the Russians in the crushing of the revolution. This meant that there were Russians in the country in World War I, and then there were British in the country. The Russians were in the north, and the Ottomans invaded from the west. There was a massive famine in which a million Persians died.

    Out of this mess, when it was a World War I battlefield, and by the way, a completely forgotten theater in World War I, no one knows about it now, but for Iranians it’s important, the British looked for a candidate to restore governance and be a British ally. They found this strapping general, a self-made man, Reza Khan. In 1921, he seized power in a coup. By 1925, he had got rid of the Qajar dynasty, who had been in power since the 1790s, and he had been elected Shah of what he now called Iran. He became king, and he called his dynasty the Pahlavi dynasty.

    He was an extraordinary character. He started to reform the country. He created banks, he built railways, he founded the university, he freed women from having to wear the hijab if they didn’t want to. He put the Shiite clergy in their place. All of this he did in partnership with aristocratic princes who were more sophisticated. But as his reign went on into the 1930s, he became more paranoid, more jealous, more authoritarian. He arrested a lot of them and had them murdered in prison by a very sinister doctor who injected them with oxygen, which is very creepy, or water or something.

    By 1941, in World War II, he decided that he was not sure who was going to win the war, and he would remain neutral. This was a big mistake because neither the British nor the Soviets, now under Stalin, were going to take a risk with Iran. In fact, they weren’t going to take a risk anywhere in the Middle East. That’s part of the story of World War II, which is interesting.

    Mounk: Let’s start to get into the story of World War II. I think we now have the scene relatively well set for the different parts of the Middle East. We haven’t quite talked about North Africa, and there are some other places we haven’t touched on, but for a big region, we’ve done as well as we can to set the scene. World War II tears the world apart. There’s an ideological competition between communism, between fascism, between democracy. The Middle East became an important theater in World War II. What role does the Middle East play in World War II, and what is the form of the Middle East that emerges from World War II?

    Sebag Montefiore: The interesting thing about World War II is that in purely imperial, strategic terms, it justifies the British plan to have a big presence in the Middle East, because as it turns out, the Middle East is potentially a key war-winning theater. The Italians and the Germans are fighting their way along North Africa and break into Egypt twice. One of the times is with Rommel, the famous Afrika Korps. At the same time, Hitler is invading the Soviet Union and fighting his way towards the Caucasus, and from the Caucasus he would break into Turkey and Iraq and Persia, and then he would be in the Middle East as well. So suddenly in 1941–42, the Middle East was extremely important.

    One of the key things that happens is, of course, that Hitler defeats France. Therefore, the French Empire is now under the control of the Axis, the Nazi Axis. That means that much of North Africa is controlled by the Vichy French, Algeria and Morocco and Tunisia, but also, worryingly, the key parts of the Levant, which is Lebanon and Syria. At the same time, there’s a coup in British Iraq, and a pro-Nazi government comes to power there.

    As I said, Churchill decides he’s taking no chances. He launches a war and invades Vichy Syria. That’s where Moshe Dayan, the future Israeli general, loses his eye. At the same time, he launches a war to invade Iraq, and he conquers Iraq. Then finally, of course, they conquer Iran. The British consolidate the whole Middle East under what is essentially British control. That justifies itself because Churchill stabilizes the Middle East.

    But as the war goes on, he realizes that he can’t keep control of the Middle East. Nationalism is ascendant. The British embrace an idea of Arab nationalism, not completely pan-Arabism, but they compromise. They want to give independence to the Arab states, including Egypt and Iraq, and force the French to do the same in Syria and Lebanon. At the same time, they want these places to be British or French satellites. Yet they embrace an idea of pan-Arab nationalism by sponsoring the creation of the Arab League, led by Egypt and Iraq, which are both British vassal states, or the British want them to be.

    That’s what happens. At the end of World War II, the Middle East started to become properly independent. All of these states are new states that have never existed before. That’s the key thing to understand. One often sees in activist propaganda the claim that these are all ancient states that have been independent for centuries and then Israel has suddenly been created. No. All of these states, starting with Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, are completely new states. Only Egypt and Iran are ancient states. They all become independent.

    The creation of Israel is very like the emergence of Turkey twenty years earlier. It starts with a partition, a brutal ethnic war, the driving out of large numbers of refugees, their fleeing from their homes in the face of war, and the creation of a new nationalism with a national idea linked to religion and race and ethnicity. Out of it comes a new, dynamic state. The difference between the creation of Turkey and the creation of Israel is the idiosyncratic Jewish history, of course, which is interesting and unique, but then all national histories are unique. Also, many of its citizens were settlers who had arrived from abroad, immigrants. That was how those two states were created.

    Israel and the rest of the Middle East really became independent after World War II, and they almost immediately went to war. That war in 1948, in which five Arab states tried to attack the new Judaic Republic, which was named Israel, on the day of its independence, was a disaster for all concerned because it rejected the partition. Partition was an inevitable result of creating new national states. As you were saying at the beginning, there have to be borders, and there have to be exclusions of people who don’t want to be in a new country or who are rejected from the new concept of this nation state. In the Middle East, that’s almost impossible to deliver without population swaps, refugees, or creating states that are multi-ethnic, sectarian states, and therefore not strictly enforced nation states. That’s the big struggle that’s happening across the Middle East. It’s the theme that’s going on today.

    Mounk: Part of the interesting thing about the creation of Israel is that, especially from a European vantage point, we tend to think of it as a European story, a story that is connected to the Holocaust and the Shoah and the Jews expelled from Poland and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe with nowhere else to go, who sought refuge in Israel. That is of course a part of the story. But a part of the story is also all of the Jews who had been native to the Middle East for a very long time, often being pushed out and expelled from those countries as this process of the creation of different nation states takes place.

    How well set up for success are these various new nation states, as in many parts of a post-colonial world, as you’re saying? They did not have a long history, with the exception of Iran and a few other states. Some of them contained deep religious differences within them, for example, between Shias and Sunnis. Was there a period in which these states could have become flourishing, could have become peaceful, could have become even perhaps democratic, or was the nature of many of those states sufficiently incoherent from the start that the odds were always stacked against a successful Middle East?

    Sebag Montefiore: I think the odds were always stacked against them if they were trying to enforce a strict nation state. This was particularly so in a circumstance where these nations were new, and therefore the national consciousness was not yet formed. In fact, King Faisal of Iraq said that in the thirties. He said there was no Iraqi national spirit at all. But of course, these national consciousnesses have grown, and now, a hundred years later, yes, there are Syrians and Iraqis and Lebanese and so on, but that took time to develop.

    All of these states, and in this way Israel and Turkey and Iraq and Syria and so on are all typical, are states with large ethnic and sectarian minorities who to various extents don’t want to be part of the new national consciousness, and with rulers who to various extents want to force them to take part in the new national project or to repress them. In Turkey, for example, they throw out all the Greeks, they kill all the Armenians, but they’ve still got the Kurds in the East, and the Kurds don’t want to be part of a Turkish state. They regard themselves as different. That leads to some seventy or eighty years of ethnic insurgency in which fifty or sixty thousand Kurdish civilians are killed. That story is still going on today.

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    Similarly in Iraq, they had one of the first pogroms, if you like, against the Assyrians in the early thirties, where they massacred Christians. That sets the tone for the gradual persecution of the Christians of Iraq, who numbered a million people in the year 2000 and now number 115,000. At the same time, they have Kurds, and they have Sunnis versus Shias. The Shias are a narrow majority, and that’s a tension within Iraq which Iraq struggles to control. The way they control it is with a completely brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein, who keeps everyone in order. He is a Sunni, and he rules with a rod of iron in a Stalinesque dictatorship. In Syria, it’s a similar story with the Assads, except they are Alawites, part of a minority.

    In many of these countries, the colonial auxiliary army created by the French or the British is the only truly national entity that founded the state. This is true all across Africa too, which is why they often end up with military rulers. There’s a contradiction in that, because the French, for example, in Syria fill their auxiliary military with minorities like the Alawites. That complicates matters further.

    Mounk: That then sets up those minorities to take control of the state, as they do in Syria with the Assad family. Presumably, the rise of a kind of pan-Arabism with Nasser and other figures is in part a response to the relative weakness of the national consciousness at the time. Part of what makes the idea that we’re all Arabs and should be cooperating to a much higher extent appealing is that, at least from the 1950s and 1960s, a lot of citizens of these nations don’t feel that their primary identity is this long-standing national identity. They have huge differences to their neighbors, especially if, for example, you have Shias on both the Iranian and the Iraqi side of the border. Some of those Shias might feel, for example, in Iraq, that they have more in common with Shias on the Iranian side of the border than with Sunnis in their own country.

    Sebag Montefiore: That’s exactly what happens. You have all these states just drawn by imperial powers in various combinations. Oftentimes people get on better. For example, there are Druze in Syria, in Lebanon, and in the new state of Israel who may have more in common with each other than they do with their own citizens. You gave the example of the Shias in Iraq, and that’s what happens later, in our own time, in the twenty-first century, where you have Arab Shias in Iraq who identify more as Shia and therefore are closer to the Iranians than they are to other Iraqis.

    Pan-Arabism is partly an attempt to compensate for the weakness of these new states. It’s partly a way to compensate for the failure of the first pan-Arab project, which is to defeat and liquidate Israel, which fails. Rather than taking that as a lesson or a cautionary tale, the pan-Arabs double down and dedicate themselves to destroying Israel, which becomes a raison d’être for pan-Arabism. This leads them to a series of disasters. In 1956, the Egyptians are defeated, and then in 1967 they were completely routed on all fronts. At that point, Nasser, who is a highly intelligent, very interesting character, realizes that Egypt has to now make peace with Israel.

    There’s a fascinating leaked conversation between him and his young protégé, Colonel Gaddafi, who’s also a major character in the book. It has just been put out in Egypt, and it’s very interesting. Nasser says, we just need to make peace. We’ve been defeated by them, and we’ll be defeated by them again. The Egyptians come first, and we need to make peace with them. Colonel Gaddafi says, no, we’ve got to go to war. Nasser says, you can go to war if you want with them, you and Yasser Arafat, you and the Iraqis and the rest, but we’re the Egyptians and we’re going to make peace with them. That’s a very interesting conversation. Of course, Sadat, his successor, later does that. That’s the end of pan-Arabism in that pure, idealistic form.

    Pan-Arabism is really tainted by its complete identification with this campaign against Israel, which is completely unnecessary in terms of geopolitics and power politics. Palestine is a small entity along the Holy Land, along the coast. They could have easily recognized that there was going to be some sort of autonomous Jewish community there, and that could have been the end of it. But they defined themselves by war. That’s a very dangerous thing to do if you lose the war.

    Mounk: One of the results of the relative weakness of these states and the failure of pan-Arabism is that the Middle East becomes a plaything of the great power competition that defined much of the second half of the twentieth century between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan in a failed war and tries to exercise a lot of influence over its allies, and the United States gets increasingly drawn into the Middle East. When the Soviet Union collapses, the United States in some ways becomes the defining outside regional presence. How is it that the United States reshapes the region in what you call the American era of the Middle East?

    Sebag Montefiore: The American era is an opportunity. America is the most powerful state that has ever been in world history, with the greatest military. After 1991 and the Gulf War, it has won a clear victory. It’s cleverer than later wars because it has a clear aim and it has a limit, an end to it. They leave Saddam Hussein in power as a rump state with a Kurdish entity in the north protected by the Americans, just about. Some people regard this as a great failure, but all statesmanship is about being measured and limited. It’s highly intelligent of the elder Bush, Bush 41, to leave him in power there as a block against Iran, revolutionary Iran, Islamic Iran. They have a great opportunity, and it’s squandered.

    Initially they try to use it in two ways. The first is that by liberating Kuwait and protecting Kuwait from Iraq, they reassert the state system of the region and say we’re going to guarantee that for another era. That has lasted to this day, but I think its days may be numbered. Secondly, they put a lot of American prestige to work to try to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. This is the Madrid Conference and then the Oslo Accords. This has been discredited now for all sorts of reasons, mainly because it ultimately failed. But the concept was plausible, and there were ways it could have worked too. It’s easy now to look back and analyze it. I do in the book. It needed to be quicker, it needed to be clearer, there needed to be a Palestinian state sooner. But equally the Palestinians needed to give confidence to the Israelis earlier too. It was always a two-way street, obviously. In any case, it failed and was never restored because the Americans were distracted by 9/11.

    That diverted the entire American project in the Middle East into the 9/11 wars. Afghanistan was clearly justified. Iraq was waged on fake intelligence and a misunderstanding of the Middle East, I think, which is that you could redraw the Middle East and create democracy across the Middle East, which to me is a utopian pipe dream. I think what they should have done is just find a general to run Iraq, liquidate the ruling clique around Saddam Hussein, and leave it at that. Iraq fulfilled a massively important role in the architecture of the Middle East. Iraq was a major Arab state that kept Iran in its corner.

    The effect of the Iraq War, which no one could have guessed at the time, was that America revealed its weakness, its short attention span, its vulnerability to casualties, its vulnerability to insurgency, and its erratic democratic nature, where we change governments every four or five years, which is of course insanity in foreign affairs. All of these things revealed to the Iranians and everybody else that America was a vulnerable giant when it put itself on the ground like that.

    At the same time, it enabled Iran to fulfill the dream of both the Islamist radicals and those who aspired to Persian greatness, the Persian imperial program, when the Persians had many times in history ruled the whole Middle East in different combinations, in different empires. They were able from that to take over Iraq, in effect, through their militias, then Syria, then Lebanon, then the Houthis, then Hamas in Gaza, and to create what General Suleimani called the Six Armies. I call it the Six Armies Empire, which was really the most powerful Iran had been since Nadir Shah in the 18th century, if not since the Sasanians in the sixth and seventh centuries AD. That was set up by those Americans, and that ended the American era in the Middle East. That single mistake was so tempting to make, yet so easy to analyze as making no sense. But there it is. That’s what happens with government, I guess.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Simon discuss the impact of October 7, why the Middle East has been so unsuccessful in many ways, and how the region might change over the next 50 years. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    49 min
  • The Anti-Social Media
    Dead gannet on a beach. (Photo by myLoupe/Universal Images.)

    Will you be in London on Thursday, October 8 at 6pm? Join Yascha Mounk and Dan Williams for this live recording of The Good Fight podcast at the Halycon International School as they discuss whether AI will doom us all! Get your FREE ticket here! Please note that you must reserve a ticket in order to attend. Pease email [email protected] if you have any questions.

    A couple of weeks ago I put a (very unscientific) poll out in the field, asking the usual suspects of Substack Notes the following: “Just curious: can anybody here point to a case in which YOUR life has been made qualitatively better by AI?”

    I have to admit that I wasn’t entirely sincere in this query. I expected crickets, which was what I was going for, and a bit of snark—and there was some much-appreciated snark in the mix.

    Here was @Emmett Rensin:

    When I teach, it takes less time to grade. Not because I use an LLM to grade, but because 10-20% of the papers are written by an LLM, I can tell within 2-3 sentences, and then I get to stop reading, skip the feedback, and just fail it.

    Here was @Susan Mattern:

    Quality time with my daughter explaining which 30% of the medical advice she gets from ChatGPT is wrong.

    Here was @Michael T. Taylor:

    Since AI seems destined to eliminate all humans, it means global warming won’t get a chance to kill us all first.

    But a lot of people—over 160!—gave very thoughtful answers and forced me to consider more carefully how AI is reshaping our lives. Here are a few of the responses that grabbed me:

    @Damon Rondeau:

    In less than a year Claude has saved me literally thousands in repairing my gas range, my car, my plumbing, my SSD failure, and more.

    @Earnest Fellows:

    When parties who shall remain nameless accidentally disconnected my grandmother’s telecare system, it gave me every step in how to get it back up and running far faster than I could have found it myself.

    @Sonia Albrecht:

    I’m able to enter the field I want!...If it wasn’t for AI I would have switched majors to something I can start from scratch with [after a medical leave], but instead I’m using it as a tutor and am going to get my dream job after all :)

    Beyond that, people listed some of the following benefits: cutting through paperwork, vibe coding, planning out travel itineraries, video editing, writing work e-mails. The term “personal autodidactery” came up. Medical self-diagnosis was a very popular use and, more unexpectedly for me, aid in home repair. @Andrew Printer used it to start a 501(c)(3) and several others claimed they had saved money or made money through it. @Sabrina Ivan gave maybe the most lyrical response when she said “It really helped a lot with my roses.” @Dan Williams said it helped him to improve his hair styling—and if you check out dapper Dan’s avatar, that might well make an AI believer out of you.1

    Sifting through the responses there were a few patterns I noticed.

    One is that nobody’s response was exactly the same. Maybe the most common use was some form of “cutting through paperwork,” but if you asked people what they used their iPhone for, just about everybody would answer “photos” and “messaging” and then from there it would be as widely divergent as everybody’s individual personalities, and the same seemed to be true here: everybody who used AI seemed to be finding a way to extend some version of themselves and what they already liked to do.

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    Second, people often seemed to be defensive or resigned to their AI usage. “I am anti-AI, but…” was a very common formulation. In other cases, people seemed annoyed with me for asking the question. The sense was that AI was deeply intertwined with people’s habits, whether that was chat or research or red tape-cutting and so much so that to some it came across as an affront to be challenged on it.

    But the main pattern I noticed—and this seems somehow to be under-discussed in the conversation—is that everybody, with a few notable exceptions, talked about themselves and their habits. And this strikes me as something profound about how AI is reshaping our mental landscape. If social media was all about other people—“this is what drives life,” as the Zuckerberg character says in The Social Network, referring to gossip and flirtation and knowing all the little tidbits about one another, what he calls “the social structure of college”—AI is anti-social media, allowing us to develop a kind of self-sufficiency where our main relationship is with this souped-up cyber version of our own shadow.

    The exceptions are worth noting. @Mari-Claire said AI allowed her to successfully diagnose her child’s rare speech disorder a year before the medical profession caught up, while @Carol Horton said she was able to prolong her dog’s life by changing the dog’s diet—but these uses are offset by representative comments like that of @Rossella Singer, who said, “I now have a reasoning partner who isn’t constantly imposing their ego and seeking validation” or @Jest Dotty, who said, “if I’m bored I can talk to it and waste x3 the amount of time I needed to get something done.”

    If social media compelled us to be involved—whether we wanted it or not—in the minutiae of everybody else’s everyday life, AI turns us all into, like, reclusive billionaires, no longer obligated to try to communicate with doctors or handymen, let alone to comment on each other’s vacation pictures. It seems fitting that the computer age would culminate (or culminate for now) in this: frictionlessness, the avoidance of anyone who isn’t you.

    I have been on record since last year as boycotting AI, but, reading these responses, I noticed that, even without participating in AI, I have adopted some of the same characteristics. Recently—as if out of nowhere—I have gotten very into habits. Basically, every spare moment I listen to audiobooks on my earbuds. I have these mental rituals that frame the day and that I can slide into if there’s a slow moment and it’s too much trouble to reach into my pockets for the earbuds.

    I like the new habits—I have become much more productive and structured over the course of a day—but it’s interesting to me that I didn’t do anything like this before. The reason, I’m pretty sure, was that I still expected the world to have bounty to give—if I was just idling around, I thought that, who knows what, a stranger would come up and say something interesting or an adventure would unfold or just some thought would float up out of the boredom. Sometime between the release of ChatGPT and now, I have been disabused of that notion. I now no longer expect the world to have much to offer. I have shifted over into an AI epistemology where I am basically self-disciplining and self-regulating and, even if I’m not directly using AI, I’m deploying various online resources, audiobooks, workout videos, and so on, to try to optimize myself.

    What seems to have occurred, generalizing out from this, is a final disenchantment of the world. The world is no longer like a winding river that unfolds in a way distinctive to you. It is now a giant heap of knowledge—about 180 zettabytes at last count—and identity comes from grabbing what you choose to grab out of that pile.

    I think this notion of a new epistemology, or identity, with AI really gets at something. I have learned, whenever I try to talk to people about AI, to be prepared for a certain prickliness, and that prickliness is instructive. For one thing, a personal AI really is, for a lot of people, a treasured imaginary friend that they have a certain loyalty to—and not just that, it has become a part of themselves, a vital extension. “Don’t be ridiculous,” wrote @Hans Schneider of my query. “Is this anti AI ideology so far off the rails that we’re denying its value in the first place?” @Toyola wrote, “This kinda question is silly.” @James McMullen added, “I’m actually impressed there are still thoughtful, curious people who can’t see the real value there.”

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    But, looking through the instances of AI usage, as varied as they are and as impressive as they are, I can’t help but feel that there actually is less here than meets the eye. The vast majority of the value-gains were things that were achievable before AI, with a Google search or maybe by watching a YouTube tutorial video. “It just saves time,” wrote @TheDevilsAdvocate of AI. “Better Google,” was @Prester John Andrews’ response—the pithiest response of all. And that time saved seems to be spent, as often as not… using AI for something else.

    @James McMullen was maybe the most vociferous respondent in arguing with me. He contended:

    With Search 1.0, to get efficient work done you have to speak ‘Googlese’ (i.e. know when and how to use search operators) and then you’d have to rifle thru a pile of websites. With Search 2.0, you can just say exactly what you’re looking for.

    And that’s certainly true, but it seems like a “glass half full” argument. What @Prester John Andrews or the @Devil’s Advocate himself might say is that that seems like a fairly mild upgrade in technology—not having to put that annoying pair of question marks around your search terms—and that the $2.5 trillion that has already been invested in AI, as well as the mortgaging of our identities to this “breakthrough” technology (not to mention the existential risk accompanying it) might be expected to yield something more than being able to skip the step of clicking on links. Saying “AI is nice but in the end it’s an ok improvement in computer coding” might be a reasonable AI skeptic/AI moderate position to land on.

    That we have mortgaged our identities to it, though, seems clear. That goes for the AI super-users: “I use it almost nonstop so it must be doing something for me!,” wrote @Peter Clarke even while admitting that “realistically the benefits of AI aren’t widely felt in day to day life yet.” And it goes for the non-users like me who feel a basic shift in our behavior and worldview even from just being in the presence of AI. It makes us very different people—more private, more concerned with our own self-improvement, more curious about information even as we feel that all possible questions are answered somewhere within the big data dump. And, likely, we are at the same time far less interested in each other.

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    The funniest response to the survey was from the wonderfully-named @Dead Gannet, who replied to my query about AI benefits, “Sure. My wife now discusses her relationship problems with Claude instead of me.” As is so often the case, humor does get to the heart of a question, and this dead gannet—and, whatever his wife might have to complain about, a gannet as droll as this strikes me as a real keeper—puts his finger on something. With the advent of AI, he and his wife simply need less from each other. She can complain about him to her heart’s content; he can go along on his merry gannet way without having to listen to her complaints.

    It’s a very different way of relating to each other—i.e. relating less and less. Maybe it is more efficient. For all I know, maybe it is “progress.” But it’s also a lot sadder.

    Sam Kahn is staff editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and is editor-in-chief of The Republic of Letters.

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    1

    As a very back-of-the-envelope calculation, “professional development” accounted for around 20% of responses, “no help” for 10%, “better search” for 9%, “technical writing,” “coding,” and “home repair” each for around 8%, “personal development” and “medical advice” for 7%, “companion” and “legal help” for 6%, and “hobbies,” “creativity,” “new business,” “personal advice,” and “mechanical aid” taking in the rest of the responses.

    0 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    The author’s dog, Maude, enjoying the autumnal weather.
    • Will you be in London on Thursday, October 8 at 6pm? Join Yascha Mounk and Dan Williams for this live recording of The Good Fight podcast at the Halycon International School as they discuss whether AI will doom us all! Get your FREE ticket here! Please note that you must reserve a ticket in order to…

    Read more

    0 min
  • Why My Favourite College Class Stays With Me
    (Melissa Phillip/Houston Chronicle via Getty Images.)

    The most memorable class I took in college took seriously, to an unusual degree, the old adage that the aim of a liberal arts education is teaching students how to think, not what to think. Nominally the course was about the Cuban revolution and its aftermath. Substantively, it comprised a series of debates.

    We first examined a topic (like the Cuban-Soviet relationship) through government reports or documents produced by fellow travelers of the revolution. The following week, we returned to the same topic, introduced alternative evidence, and discussed the American perspective. Finding oneself in agreement with the course for two consecutive weeks required great intellectual contortions.

    The lesson was as straightforward as it was effective: Working through competing perspectives is how we form and then stress-test our conclusions. Our instructor did not deny his distinct viewpoint. Yet the only time he spoke wholly in his own voice was on the last day of the semester. Until then, we heard deliberate performances of someone else’s version of history.

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    This is, admittedly, an idiosyncratic approach. But as I now face my own students inside the classroom—this semester I’m teaching sociology to a group of first years who are as sincere as they are doe-eyed—I remember the spirit of that course.

    Outside the classroom, meanwhile, the argument is gaining traction that universities ought to reduce intellectual monocultures by hiring more conservative professors. But this remedy isn’t just ham-fisted in its singular focus on political ideology. It also lets the rest of us off the hook. It asks universities to solve through personnel changes a problem that the history course I took addressed through pedagogy.

    An ability to work through competing views is central to scientific reasoning; and the departments and disciplines that make up the modern university all deal, at least in part, in topics that admit dissident views. Most scientific claims have a half-life: They will be modified or sometimes overturned as new data become available and existing data are reinterpreted or reanalyzed. Some questions are explicitly unsettled.

    Yet in practice, scientists often focus in their research and teaching on a relatively small number of puzzles that are regarded as legitimate and solvable, while competing perspectives are set aside as uninteresting or someone else’s business. The historian Thomas Kuhn called this “normal science”—but science is not unique in that regard. One classic study in sociology outlines a general process of institutional isomorphism, whereby organizations in the same field become more alike over time, beyond changes that are strictly due to competitive pressures. A similar process can also shape scientific research and teaching, with alignment driven not just by the weight of evidence but by social norms and a need for peer approval.

    In recent years, conservative critics have zeroed in on the ideological skew of faculty to explain this trend in both science and the humanities. This skew of the professoriate is well-known: Data from the United States suggests that liberal faculty outnumber conservatives in most academic fields by a large margin. This isn’t a new phenomenon. Danish data from the late 1990s showed that self-identified liberals and leftists already outnumbered conservatives in every social science discipline except business, economics, and law; and that even the latter two of those were, on average, more left-skewed than the general Danish electorate.

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    In this context, the demand for affirmative action on behalf of conservative scholars follows a logic that left-leaning advocates of diversity have articulated for a long time: For conservative students and faculty, access to mentors and peers who share one’s convictions or lived experience can buttress personal growth and intellectual community. For liberal students and faculty, access to those who think differently can force critical self-examination and support the hard quest for truth.

    Yet the challenges of this approach are larger than its proponents admit. First, there are simply no binders full of conservative scholars capable of wowing departmental hiring committees. Precisely because parts of the academy have been dominated by liberal and progressive worldviews for a long time, aspiring young scholars have partly voted with their feet, foregoing PhD programs or exiting academia for alternative (and often more lucrative) careers.

    The second limit to this approach is that we should not expect academics who lean one way politically to be more able scholars, on average, than their peers who lean a different way. Data are scarce, but one study found that the ideological slant of authors does not predict the replicability of psychology research, for example. Conservative scholars may see things differently or focus on research that has less resonance in left-leaning departments—which can be a good thing in its own right—yet heterodoxy is no synonym for rigor. In short, there is growing evidence that institutional monocultures can lead to a loss of public trust in higher education and a narrowing of debate; there is not a lot of evidence that hiring for a specific ideology is the best remedy.

    But most importantly, the snap demand for conservative hiring lets the rest of us off the hook too easily. It would be a sad world—tribal, dogmatic, and intellectually impoverished—if moderates taught only normcore science, liberals taught liberal thought, and conservatives taught conservative ideas. In the many domains of knowledge where reasonable disagreement exists, one hallmark of sound research and pedagogy is the steel-manning of claims made by one’s opponents. Tackling intellectual monocultures starts there: with recognizing competing perspectives and the tentative nature of one’s own dearly-held claims.

    Let me offer two examples from my own work. I study privacy and surveillance in the United States. In recent years, I have researched how government agencies (like criminal courts and child welfare agencies) feed personal data into algorithmic risk models or artificial intelligence tools. This can be a polarizing topic: Progressives frequently argue that risk-scoring algorithms merely hide racial bias behind a veneer of objectivity. Conservatives tend to be more open to such technologies, although recent red state resistance to automated license plate readers, for example, hints at the limits of their techno-optimism.

    When I teach such topics, I try hard to convey what we do and do not know. For example, there is evidence that risk-scoring technologies can decrease racial disparities in child welfare decision-making; yet the use of similar tools in the criminal justice system can have disproportionately negative impacts on minorities. But even that is contested—it depends partly on what we measure and partly on how we define a “fair” treatment.

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    I also teach a social science seminar on artificial intelligence. It’s early in the semester, and thus far we have largely studied the architecture of large language models. But we are quickly moving into evaluative discussions. For example, what can we conclude about the effects of AI adoption on economic growth, social stratification, and privacy? These are topics where opinions are strong and data are scarce, and so we must puzzle carefully through competing views.

    The actor Meryl Streep put it more plainly in a 2010 commencement speech: “Empathy is at the heart of the actor’s art.” We expect good actors to step into the shoes of another person, to convey views and experiences that are not their own, and to do so without resorting to caricature. Educators ought to expect the same of themselves.

    This is not without its challenges. Debates about global warming or the efficacy of vaccines during the Covid-19 pandemic illustrate that there is often significant disagreement over what counts as “settled” science. And as social theorists remind us, the ability to decide what controversies make it onto a syllabus or into a lecture is a form of power in itself.

    But admitting more competing perspectives into the classroom is not the same as endorsing them. It allows students to practice structured disagreement, evaluate contrasting evidence, and identify competing assumptions, instead of pushing an engagement with conservative or heterodox views, say, into the offices of conservative or heterodox faculty. And as with actors, doing this well is a form of art—one at which we should all try our best to improve.

    Martin Eiermann is a sociologist focused on the politics of personal data. His recent book, The Limiting Principle, examines the social and political significance of privacy in the modern United States.

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    0 min
  • Where Do Middle Powers Go Next?
    Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the inaugural Canada Investment Summit in Toronto, Ontario on September 15, 2026. (Photo by Valerie Macon / AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Mark Carney’s welcome to dozens of investors to Toronto earlier this month, pitching them on trillions of dollars in investments across Canada, was a show of strength for a prime minister locked in a tough trade war with the United States. Carney followed the investment summit by travelling to Europe, where European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen revealed that the European Union was planning to invite Canada to join the EU as an associate member.

    Almost a year after Carney called for middle powers to work together at the World Economic Forum, his strategy seems to be taking shape. With two years left in Donald Trump’s presidency, middle powers now have an opportunity to build the strategic autonomy that Carney has advocated for. Yet, for all the turmoil that Trump has injected into the international system, Washington remains an indisputable military and economic partner to many of the middle powers. For the Carney doctrine to truly take off, middle powers will need to deliberately build strategic autonomy over the next two years—rather than wait for a potential reset in U.S. foreign policy after Trump.

    Under Trump, the United States has upended the world order which Washington had led since the end of World War II. The United States has placed tariffs on allies, threatened to annex the territory of fellow NATO members, and has launched a war with Iran that has become a stalemate.

    Despite this, the middle powers seem stuck. They’ve been reluctant to substantially reduce their dependence on Washington or to push back against some of its more disruptive actions. Canada and China are the only two countries that have retaliated against the U.S. tariffs. Even the European Union signed a trade deal with Washington that preserved 15 percent tariffs on most European imports to the United States—a deal that critics said deepened Europe’s dependence.

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    Japan and South Korea have reacted with alarm at Trump’s statements and actions but have not taken as dramatic steps to distance themselves from the United States as Canada, judging that in an increasingly dangerous region marked by an aggressive Beijing, it is not worth the risk of breaking from Washington. Other middle powers, like Colombia and Argentina, are drawing closer to Washington, viewing the Trump administration as an ideological ally.

    The expansive relationships that the United States has built and maintained in the post-war period remain too valuable to break from for many middle powers. There is simply no country that can be a viable alternative for the economic and military support that the United States continues to provide. China is a manufacturing powerhouse, but the global financial system and international trade still run through the United States for many middle powers, which made Trump’s tariffs even more devastating. Washington can also project power globally in ways that middle powers and other hegemonic rivals, such as China and Russia, cannot. The overseas presence of the United States military, maintained through a vast network of bases, troops, and logistics, allows Washington to both project power and to ensure that host states remain reliant on the United States for their security. The ongoing U.S. force posture review, which is expected to shrink the number of U.S. troops in Europe, has caused significant consternation in European capitals.

    Nonetheless, despite the sway that the United States still maintains, the next two years, bookended by the U.S. midterm elections and the 2028 presidential election, represent a window of opportunity for middle powers. Governments now face a narrowing window in which to judge if Trump’s foreign policy will be just a temporary rupture—or if it represents a long-term transformation of U.S. foreign policy.

    Meanwhile, Trump’s foreign policy continues to be destructive and shows the risks of continued dependence on Washington. The war with Iran has raised the cost of energy globally and has thrown the global food supply chain into flux, in addition to entangling American allies in the region in a conflict that has no clear end. In Europe, Trump’s threats towards Greenland have strained relations with other European nations and weakened the NATO alliance. Closer to home, Washington has retained the pressure on Cuba, though the immediate next steps it might take towards the regime are currently unclear.

    If the Democratic Party wins the House of Representatives or the Senate in the November midterm elections, middle powers may believe that a return to a more conventional approach to American foreign policy should occur, leading many to double down on their bet for continued ties with Washington. But a change in political leadership will not necessarily mean a return to values-based foreign policy. Some elements of Trump’s foreign policy will likely outlast his presidency, including the more transactional approach to geopolitics that has come to define 2026.

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    Washington’s power will nevertheless remain indispensable to many middle powers. They should therefore pursue closer ties with Washington, while avoiding recreating a dependency on the United States. The best strategy for middle powers would not be to replace American power, but rather to build alternative diplomatic, economic, and security relationships for when their interests diverge from Washington’s in the future.

    Trump has created the conditions for Carney’s strategy to become viable, but further diversification from the United States will be costly, as the president has threatened retaliation and punishment against countries whose foreign policy priorities have shifted away from its own. Ultimately, the future of the Carney Doctrine depends on whether middle powers see the next two years as an opportunity to grow their leverage or if they deem Trump’s disruption to be temporary enough to wait out.

    Imran Bayoumi is deputy director and resident fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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  • How to Beat Trump
    Donald Trump matryoshka, Moscow, November 2016. (Photo by Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency.)

    The Republican Party has one neat trick to make voters believe in Donald Trump’s lies, no matter how fantastic they become. I call it the Republican Triangle of Doom.

    The Triangle of Doom has three vertices: Republican voters, GOP politicians, and the right-wing infotainment complex. It works like this: Trump says something false—the election was stolen; immigrants are eating pets; Democrats want to execute babies after birth. Right-wing media picks it up and amplifies it. GOP politicians, watching their constituents consume this content, validate and repeat it. Voters, hearing the lie from their trusted media sources and their elected representatives, come to believe it. And then politicians point to their voters’ beliefs as proof that they were right all along.

    So you want people to believe the 2020 election was stolen from Trump? Easy. Trump lies about the election being rigged and stolen and sets the disinformation flywheel in motion. From there, the right-wing infotainment media hypes the lie. The viewers then demand that other Republican politicians bless the lie. “Leaders” like Kevin McCarthy are happy to oblige. And once semi-serious Republicans like McCarthy affirm Trump’s lie, it takes root among semi-normal Republican voters and burns brightly on Fox.

    The Triangle of Doom looks a lot like a perpetual motion machine of bullshit. But here’s the thing about perpetual motion machines: They don’t exist. Every system has friction. Every movement has internal contradictions that eventually tear it apart. And right now, the Triangle of Doom is showing signs of vulnerability.

    Consider Marjorie Taylor Greene’s extraordinary resignation from Congress, in which she said she would “refuse to be a ‘battered wife’ hoping it all goes away and gets better.” She was talking about how the MAGA movement that she defended for years was just as ineffective at and uninterested in delivering change for the American people as the Democrats she and her party have been railing against.

    Trump is the only figure in American politics who commands enough loyalty to paper over contradictions like this one. And the contradictions are getting bigger as he’s getting older, and—just by the numbers—the public is turning against him.

    This is an opportunity for Democrats. It creates an opening for them to steal Trump’s playbook without becoming a mirror-image of Trump themselves. Keep the always-on, hyper-aggressive communications strategy; leave the mendacity, malice, and unhinged Truth Social rants. I conduct focus groups with Democratic voters all the time, and they tell me this is what they want to see from their politicians in this moment. And the time is ripe for the party’s rising stars to capitalize.

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    The Bush Line

    Trump is historically unpopular today thanks to high prices caused by his war in Iran and tariffs. At the same time, he has overstepped on immigration, alienating voters who thought they were signing up for secure borders, and instead got performative ICE cruelty. And his family’s blatant corruption adds insult to injury for the millions of ordinary Americans who are suffering economically thanks to Trump’s policies.

    As I write this today, Trump’s approval rating on Nate Silver’s aggregator is 38.6 percent. But it’s not low enough. Democrats need to go on offense and work every day to actively push that number lower. Republicans are shameless about repetition, about hammering a message until it becomes conventional wisdom. Trump speaks at a fourth-grade level and says the same thing every day until the rest of the party accommodates itself to his version of reality.

    Democrats need to do the same—except without all the lying. But here’s the good part: You don’t need to lie to make people realize how bad things are out there.

    The tax cuts went to billionaires, not you. The Epstein files—a source of real rupture among Republicans—are still hidden. Families are being torn apart by cruel and incompetent mass deportations. Trump promised to drain the swamp, and, instead, he filled it with his cronies. He promised to fight for you and instead made billions of dollars for his family. This is the message Democrats need to be delivering.

    The magic number is thirty-two. In late 2008, during the pivotal period of the presidential campaign, George W. Bush’s approval rating was hovering around 32 percent. A few weeks later, Barack Obama won the presidency by 192 electoral votes, and Democrats swept to control of the White House and Congress. The Republican Party, as it had existed since the end of World War II, never recovered. Bush hurt the party so badly that, a few years later, Trump would take it over and make it unrecognizable.

    If Democrats can drive Trump’s approval into the twenties—where Bush was at his nadir—and keep it there, they won’t just win an election. They’ll make the Republican Party pay for the Trump experiment for a generation. Some new Republican will have to come in and reject Trump as thoroughly as Trump’s voters rejected Bush.

    That door is wide open. Democrats just have to walk through it.

    When They Go Low

    In 2016, Michelle Obama, speaking at the Democratic National Convention, delivered what would become the watchword of Democratic politics for the next decade. “When they go low, we go high,” she said.

    That encapsulated something Democrats wanted to believe about themselves—that they could win by being better. But when I talk to focus groups of Democratic voters, they discuss that as precisely the path not to take.

    “We’ve tried to follow that. We’ve taken the high road and we continue to frankly lose,” Jennifer, a Democratic voter from Texas, told me. “The Republicans are playing to win. It is not about doing the right thing. It is not about doing what’s best for the average person. It is about winning at any cost. And so not that we need to go scorched-earth, but we’ve got to have a different playbook because we need to play to win.”

    The frustration is palpable—and it’s not coming just from the progressive wing or the moderate wing. It’s universal. Democratic voters want their party to fight harder. But as much as they want fighters, they don’t want Trump. They don’t want their own version of a lying, cruel demagogue. They want something else—something that doesn’t quite have a name yet.

    Kat, a Democrat from Arizona, articulated the tension: “I hate that phrase, ‘We need to be more like Trump. Absolutely effing not. But can we bring some of that aggression and some of that organization? Can we bring some of that determination and that ruthlessness? But not in the way that he does it ... How do we bring our grit? Our determination? Our aggressiveness?” She paused. “If we turn into Trump, we become Idiocracy even more than we already are.”

    This is the needle Democratic voters are trying to thread. Ruthlessness without cruelty. Aggression without lies. Fighting to win without abandoning the things that made them Democrats in the first place.

    Part of this asymmetry is that the Democrats feel like they’re playing by the rules. They’re showing up to class every day. They’re studying for their tests. But they’re beat out by the kid who cheats his way to a perfect score. They want their fighter. But they don’t want their fighter giving anyone a black eye.

    There’s an almost wistful quality to how Democratic voters talk about this dynamic. They know that being decent isn’t going to cut it. They know they need to change. But they know that, in changing, they are departing from a particular, moral view of the world.

    “I just don’t think two wrongs make a right,” Essie, a Texas Democrat, admitted. “But at the same time, I don’t know what else to do,” she said. “Somebody needs to stand up. Somebody needs to do something.”

    When I listen to these voters grapple with these concerns, I’m struck by how reasonable their request is. They want Democrats who will fight for them with the same intensity that Republicans fight against them. They don’t want their own Trump. But they do want their own champion—and one who fights to protect rather than to destroy. They want to feed the good wolf.

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    Two Wolves

    There’s an old parable, often attributed to Cherokee tradition, that I reference regularly because, at its core, it’s about communications.

    One evening, a grandfather sat down with his grandson.

    “My son,” he said, “inside us all, there is a battle between two wolves. One is good: It is joy, peace, love, hope, serenity, kindness, empathy, generosity, compassion, faith, and truth. The other is evil: It is anger, envy, jealousy, sorrow, regret, greed, resentment, superiority, arrogance, self-pity, and lies.”

    The grandson thought about it for a minute and then asked, “Which wolf wins?”

    The grandfather replied, “The one you feed.”

    The Triangle of Doom is the bad wolf. It feeds on grievance and fear and tribalism. What can feed the good wolf? First, it’s common sense, everyday concerns. When I talk to focus groups, what they’re thinking about is the cost of housing, groceries, healthcare, childcare. The more Democrats focus on bread-and-butter issues like this, the more they are speaking the language of real people.

    Then, Democrats really do need to address security issues, which, for too long, they have conceded to Republicans. Crime, the border, and fentanyl are national issues—and issues that tip elections. Democrats can’t point to a spreadsheet somewhere saying crime is down. They need concrete plans to lower crime and secure the border.

    Then, Democrats need a message of upward mobility. It’s jobs and education. It’s the oldest promise there is in American politics, and it still works and resonates. Democrats really need to sell a positive future.

    Maybe most important for the party is a cognitive reset. It’s about believing something that I’ve truly become convinced of when working with focus groups. Voters are not the enemy. They’re not stupid or brainwashed. But they are overwhelmed by information and trying to make sense of a chaotic world. They are reachable and they are, in the end, looking for someone to trust.

    The Triangle of Doom has been feeding the bad wolf for more than a decade. It’s time for us to start feeding the good one.

    Sarah Longwell is The New York Times bestselling author of “How to Eat an Elephant: One Voter at a Time,” publisher of The Bulwark, and host of The Focus Group podcast.

    This article has been adapted from Sarah Longwell’s New York Times bestselling book, How to Eat an Elephant: One Voter at a Time, which lays out the definitive playbook for how Democrats can beat the MAGA movement and reverse the country’s slide into authoritarianism.

    As a nonpartisan nonprofit, Persuasion does not take an editorial position on political campaigns or candidates and aims to represent a variety of views in its pages. The positions, policies, or strategies articulated in the magazine and podcast are those of the authors and speakers alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of Persuasion, nor is their publication an endorsement by Persuasion.

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  • A New Strategy to Instill Loyalty in Iran
    A police officer stands guard beneath a poster of Iran’s former leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on March 10, 2026 in Tehran, Iran. (Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The creation of a police high school in the Islamic Republic of Iran marks a new attempt to recruit personnel and professionalize the force. The Police Commander recently declared that initially 400 students will be admitted to police schools in three provinces, Tehran, Alborz, and Qom. While the stated aim is to educate the elite, build disciplinary knowledge, and train the next generation of police, the political importance of this plan is much greater than the number of students or the quality of education.

    The creation of a police high school should be seen as a continuation of the Islamic Republic’s reliance on security and coercion for the survival of the regime—but with one difference. In the past, the government’s main problem was recruiting loyal individuals for the police. Now, it seems that the Iranian police are trying to develop and train their people much earlier, starting in the teenage years, before inducting them into a police environment.

    To understand this transformation, we must first look at the history of police forces in Iran after the 1979 revolution. The Islamic Republic created Revolutionary Committees to guard cities, maintain political order, and—more importantly—identify and arrest counter-revolutionary forces. Despite the purification of the pre-existing city police, Shahrbani, and gendarmerie, the regime still believed that these forces were not trustworthy enough. The Islamic Revolutionary Committees were usually formed out of religious and conservative networks, and became active in repressing the opposition, controlling neighborhoods, enforcing Islamic rules and dress codes, gathering intelligence, and conducting surveillance in neighborhoods.

    In 1991, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the election of Hashemi Rafsanjani as president, the regime merged the city police, the gendarmerie, and the Islamic Revolutionary Committees to form a new disciplinary-security force called Niru-ye Entezami-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami, or NAJA.

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    The new organization had one important political characteristic from the beginning: NAJA’s chief commander came from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—created to safeguard the revolution—and was appointed directly by the Supreme Leader. In addition, like other military and security organizations, NAJA created two parallel organizations: an ideological-political organization representing Ayatollah Khamenei in the police, and a counterintelligence organization. From its creation, almost all NAJA commanders and many high-ranking police commanders came from the IRGC, bringing the organization closer to the security core of the Islamic Republic.

    Therefore, the professionalization of the police in the Islamic Republic was never only about professionalizing a nonpolitical institution with the goal of implementing the law. From the beginning, the expansion of police capacities coincided with the expansion of its capacities to control protests, conduct surveillance of society, and maintain and defend the Islamic Republic. The experience of urban riots from 1991 to 1994, the student protests of 1999, the Green Movement of 2009, and subsequent protests, gave the police opportunities to renew its organization, expand its branches and capacities, acquire additional equipment, and create new operational and intelligence branches.

    One of the most important developments in the 2000s was the “Basijization” of the police. During the commandership of Ismail Ahmadi Moghadam, a former IRGC commander who became police commander in 2005, the police shifted from recruiting Iranians from the general society to relying more and more on the Basij militia (the paramilitary wing of the IRGC) to recruit new cadres. According to the police commander, more than 75 percent of police personnel recruited in 2006 and more than 80 percent of those recruited in 2007 were selected from among Basij members. They also announced that, in the future, they would try to recruit all police personnel from the Basij militia.

    This was not only a change in the recruitment process. The aim was to strengthen the political identity of the police and the ideological core of the Islamic Republic. Basij members, because of their organizational backgrounds, ideological selection, and indoctrination, were considered much more loyal to the security and police apparatus than ordinary Iranians. In addition to the Basij, the police usually recruited from the families of martyrs or police personnel and other armed forces for their new cadres. The result was the strengthening of conservative attitudes and the ideological mentality of the police, and an increasing cultural gap between police forces and parts of Iranian society—especially the younger generation, which is less religious, more secular, and more progressive.

    From this perspective, the creation of police high schools can be seen as the next step in addressing the same question of political loyalty. The police now have the opportunity to become involved in the selection and socialization of Iranian youth much more actively and directly.

    This development is not completely new. Iran’s police have previously tried to shape a voluntary police force from Iranian youth, most notably in 2010. Under the name of “Honorary Police,” there were two levels of volunteers: first, people over eighteen who worked with the police and performed limited law-enforcement duties; and second, teenagers above fifteen years old who took part in educational activities, public awareness programs, and some forms of local cooperation with the police. In some cases, these people helped collect information in their local communities as police informants in exchange for benefits, such as priority in future recruitment by the police.

    Police high schools can be seen as a more organized and professional version of the same idea. The main difference is that the relationship between teenagers and the police is no longer only voluntary or temporary. The school is part of the process of preparing future personnel for the police and security system.

    Authoritarian regimes are usually more concerned about political loyalty than professional skills and expertise. This is also true of the Islamic Republic, whose main philosophy prioritizes Taahod (ideological commitment) over Takhasus (expertise). This prioritization becomes especially important in security organizations, including the police, which are expected to repress ordinary people during crises and protests.

    Since its inception, the regime has used several methods to ensure the political loyalty of its security forces, including ideological screening, mass indoctrination, recruitment of Basij members and families connected to the regime, and the creation of specialized universities and training centers. Police high schools will complete this system, giving the Islamic Republic more time to identify, evaluate, and train the people it needs for political repression.

    Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.

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