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We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our ongoing series on “Liberal Virtues and Values.”
The series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, will make the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms. If you haven’t already, please subscribe today to receive future instalments into your inbox!
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In 1826, the people of Washington, D.C. invited Thomas Jefferson to their city for the 50th anniversary of America’s birth. The invitation seemed only logical—after all, it was Jefferson’s immortal words in the Declaration of Independence that did more than anything else to truly proclaim the ideas and principles of the American Revolution. Jefferson’s response to Roger Weightman, the man charged with the honor of extending the invitation, was cordial: The state of his health no longer permitted him to travel far from his remote country retreat.
Though unable to attend in person, Jefferson provided Weightman with a passage to read aloud to the celebrants. In it, Jefferson proclaimed his optimistic belief that the American Revolution had ignited a global chain reaction. In time, the whole world would realize that every single human being is born with the same innate dignity: that “the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of god.”
Ten days later, on July 4 itself, Jefferson lay dead, and his prediction of a worldwide liberal revolution was left to the test of history.
The principles that Jefferson championed—that all men are created equal because all men have innate worth—remain more relevant than ever. At their very best, these ideas have been the driving force behind liberalism, breaking the chains of slavery, fueling social movements that have pushed for greater equality in all walks of life, and sparking revolutions against oppressive governments across the globe. In many ways, Jefferson’s greatest hopes have come to fruition and liberalism has, as he predicted, been a force for good across the world.
The idea of an egalitarian human dignity at the heart of the political order was not just Jefferson’s quirky view of liberal government and society. For most of liberalism’s early history, liberal thinkers saw themselves as making more universal and secular the Christian idea of the Imago Dei—that everyone is born with God Himself reflected in their being.
Yet, over time, liberals changed emphasis. Between Jefferson’s time and our own they started championing legal proceduralism, free market economics, and religious freedom. To be sure, these are valuable aspects of liberalism and should be defended. But none alone has the moral force and philosophic weight to anchor an entire approach to politics. Though it is certainly not the intention of all who understand liberalism primarily through one of these lenses, they have come to displace Jefferson’s egalitarian moralism, grounding liberalism in the material world rather than a theory of innate human dignity. Today, we are living with the disastrous consequences of that change.
The idea of innate human dignity is not a new one. Most world religions have, in some fashion or another, argued that humans play a central role in the story of the universe and that ethics ought to be grounded in an acknowledgment of each individual’s worth. Likewise, secular figures such as Aristotle and Cicero have long argued that true morality rests on a recognition of our fellow man’s dignity. The unique historical contribution of liberalism has been to take this view, previously a matter of private conscience in a largely hierarchical world, and proclaim it as the only just foundation of a political regime. Put another way, liberals sought to make universal and rational a belief hitherto confined to adherents of certain religious and philosophic schools.
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To do this, liberals began to change the way we thought of the human person. According to the pre-modern view, humans are simply made for the place in life into which they are born. Every individual had their place within the social order, determined largely by circumstances at birth. While upward mobility has always existed, it tended to be viewed with a great deal of suspicion. Thus the Roman statesman Cicero, despite rising to the greatest heights of Roman society, never proved able to buck the accusation of being a “new man”—a provincial upstart never intended to play a prominent role in the history of his nation.
Liberalism rejected this attitude. It argued instead that in most respects, human beings are born unformed—that the mind is a “tabula rasa” (or blank slate) as John Locke famously put it. As such, each individual can be whatever they choose. The difference between a president and a farmer is simply a matter of different individuals selecting and working towards different ways of life. Rather than our own nature, what really separates humans is “cultivation”—or what we might today call education. Enlightenment thinkers believed that with hard work and the right knowledge most people can achieve some measure of goodness.
Liberals tended to extend this into a larger moral argument. By their account, no one is destined for evil, or to live a dark, brutish life devoid of enlightenment and happiness. If provided with the correct resources, upbringing, and tutoring, people can find the light. It is for this reason that the earliest liberals poured so much of their time and resources into the cultivation of the human mind. The push for widespread public education emerged with the rise of liberalism. These early liberals hoped that they could build a generation capable of pursuing life, liberty, and happiness in the fullest sense of those words.
Such an education did not mean—as it too often does today—the rote memorization of technical skills in preparation for a particular career. In fact, to the early liberals nothing could be more soul-crushing than to believe that a person’s worth hinges on their job. That was the view of a feudal society. Instead, liberals tried to make accessible the sort of education that brings human creativity alive—the arts, literature, history, science, religion, and philosophy.
This emphasis on education was a rejection of the pre-modern view of human life as determined by circumstances outside of our control. The men who conceived of modern liberal government, borrowing from classical antiquity and the Christian gospels, argued that through serious effort the soul can be transformed towards moral goodness. In their attempts to bring a liberal education to all people, they plainly affirmed their belief that every human can improve their station in life.
The full implications of liberalism’s radical notions of human equality and dignity were not realized in Thomas Jefferson’s lifetime (Jefferson himself, of course, owned slaves and had an enslaved mistress, Sally Hemings). Nor are they fully realized in our own time. The sort of deeply egalitarian society such principles demand—where neither race, economic status, birth, nationality, gender, sexuality, nor any other characteristic serves as a constraint in life—is not easily built.
Yet this concept has proven to be the chief motivator of most human progress for the last three hundred years. The idea that all humans have worth has given rise to major criminal justice reform that treats prisoners as rights-bearing individuals rather than chattel. It has forged a framework for international law that emphasizes diplomacy over violence. And it has fueled the multitude of social movements that seek to address the systemic injustices that linger in our still-imperfect society.
In fact, the liberal democratic project itself is built on the hope that the better angels of our nature may yet prevail, and that in the end all humans are worthy of society’s love and affection.
So, a radical account of human dignity and equality sits at the heart of liberalism. But today it shares prominence with another doctrine: materialism. Put simply, materialism rejects any view of the world that is grounded in ideas derived from things we cannot touch, see, hear, or otherwise measure with our senses. Such an attitude goes hand-in-hand with religious agnosticism and the belief that there is no such thing as metaphysics or transcendence.
The materialist impulse derived originally from an admirable attempt at humility. Human beings are inclined to claim more certain knowledge about a variety of subjects than is warranted. Therefore, a degree of skepticism about our ability to know everything with certainty is entirely helpful. As T.S. Eliot once put it: “The only wisdom we can hope to acquire/ Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.”
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But 17th- and 18th-century thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and David Hume turned this well-meaning humility into the positivistic outlook we know today—one that can admit the truth of nothing that is not provable by material observation. If the world of the senses is all we have to go on, they argued, then we must ensure those senses enjoy themselves. The goal of materialism is to structure a largely Epicurean society where subsistence and comfort are the chief aims of life.
How exactly to go about this is something materialists disagree about, but the end result looks roughly the same: widespread economic prosperity, a general focus on easy gratification, and the practical side of life as the end of human existence.
Since the Second World War, the world in which we live has been increasingly shaped by materialism. Much in the West today boils down to a matter of comfort. We aggressively build an economy that maximizes profit in the hope of generating widespread material prosperity. The government works in concert with corporate powers to produce a plethora of cheap products. We railroad the natural world in order to extract easier comfort than it tends to provide when left to its own devices. And we center our society around jobs and careers rather than materially ambiguous concepts such as family or spiritual wellbeing.
The materialist train of thought leaves little room for liberalism’s previous emphasis on innate human dignity. This has devastating implications for the liberal doctrine of equality. Since Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, liberals have struggled against the significant evidence that some people are simply more likely to be successful in life because of their genetic gifts. Some people are indeed better looking than others; some research has even suggested that intelligence is partly derived from our genetic makeup. Thus, as John C. Calhoun pointed out in the immediate years leading up to the American Civil War, without the largely philosophic, unscientific, belief in an innate human dignity, there is little reason to affirm that all humans are equal.
In this way, materialism has (rather unintentionally) eaten alive the moral foundation of liberalism. The children of light have been swallowed up not so much by the children of darkness as by the children of a murkier, gray twilight—materialism.
Of course, materialists get many things right. No sane person could ever object to the idea of widespread economic prosperity. The gross domestic product of America’s poorest state is greater than that of the United Kingdom. Even with a sluggish economy and soaring inflation, Americans are generally better off than at any other point in human history.
Yet it is also obvious that materialism isn’t enough. Despite constantly striving for material comfort and the joy of the senses, we are as a society manifestly unhappy. The widespread rise of clinical depression suggests that we are not as fulfilled as we once were. We seem trapped in what the philosopher Leo Strauss called “the joyless quest for joy”—working constantly for a state of existence that seems inexplicably, perpetually, out of reach. Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it even more harshly than Strauss when observing the materialist society of his adopted France:
[the citizen] works to the death, even rushes toward it in order to be in a position to live … He courts the great whom he hates, the rich whom he despises; he spares nothing to attain the honor of serving them; he vaingloriously boasts of his baseness and of their protection and is proud of his slavery, and he speaks contemptuously of those who have not the honor of sharing in it.
It’s a simple fact, long recognized by philosophers, that no amount of material prosperity can truly satisfy the longings of the human heart. More than anything, people want to know that their lives have some meaning and purpose beyond simply existing. They also want to feel that in the great arc of history their contributions will leave the Earth better than it was before. The vast unknown of outer space, the rise of machines capable of performing many human tasks, and the mysterious workings of the global economy have made it increasingly hard for individuals to feel that way. Materialism is pathologically incapable of confronting this problem.
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Is it any surprise that many are starting to turn to the forces of pre-modernity to restore their lost sense of dignity? Fundamentalist religion, tribal nationalism, class-based hierarchies—these are all the result of a politics increasingly driven by the anger, grievance, and barbaric despotism that characterized life before the Enlightenment. None of these outlooks carry liberalism’s emphasis on benevolence or equality. In fact, each alternative to modernity functions largely by “othering” some group to make another group feel superior.
Jeffersonian liberals built their ideology as a corrective to the flaws of pre-modernity. By declaring that all people have dignity, liberalism makes universal that which class antagonism or nationalism or a host of other pre-modern nightmares seek to make particular. It also provides a basis for human flourishing that both recognizes the importance of humanity and corrects the shallowness of materialism.
It is high time we reclaimed this form of liberalism.
Liberals can start by placing principles front and center. Too often, we prefer to push our views through policy briefs and timorous articles that get at the foundations of the problem in a vague, obtuse way. Instead, we should boldly embrace the sort of politics that flows from a belief in innate human dignity—one that believes in a truly egalitarian society, seeks to extend the protection of the law to all persons, and places human rights at the heart of state action. As Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt once proved in the midst of history’s darkest war, these are not dull, unappealing concepts. On the contrary: liberalism is capable of inspiring brave men and women to go to war against the forces of tribalist nationalism.
Liberals also need to return to an emphasis on the aptly-named liberal arts. For some time, most have concentrated their considerable intellectual energy upon economics, foreign policy, and constitutional law as the best avenues to promote their ideas. In doing this, they have forgotten the key insight of liberal thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Abraham Lincoln: that it is the human imagination, more than reason, that truly guides civilization. As John Adams once put it: “Reason holds the helm, but passions are the gales.”
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Most important of all, liberals should seek to speak in terms that follow the logic of universal human dignity to its ultimate conclusion. Liberals by nature like to think in terms of grandiose social movements—breaking chains wherever they are found and liberating the oppressed of the world. This is an important attribute of liberalism that should never fade away. However, to truly emphasize human dignity means recognizing and celebrating the everyday lives of most people: fathers and sons enjoying an afternoon fishing, mothers and daughters bonding over a good book, a local community gathering at a town festival or church, or all of us simply relishing the company of others despite our differences.
Along the tidal basin of the Potomac River stands a large neo-classical domed temple ringed by cherry trees dedicated to Thomas Jefferson. Surrounding the dome is a quotation from one of Jefferson’s many letters: “I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.” There is perhaps no more succinct summary of the liberal calling than this. If we wish to confront tyranny; if we wish to provide space for every person to live a life of purpose; and if we wish to facilitate true human flourishing, then we must remember liberalism’s most important intellectual foundation—that all individuals, no matter their station in life, are endowed with equal human dignity.
Jeffery Tyler Syck is a contributing writer at Persuasion. He also serves as an assistant professor of political science and the founding director of the Center for Public Service at the University of Pikeville in his native Eastern Kentucky.
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Jacob Weisberg is the co-founder of the podcast company Pushkin Industries. He serves as Chair of The Committee to Protect Journalists and is a regular contributor to the New York Review of Books. His latest book is Profiles in Cowardice: A Study of Collaboration in the Trump Era.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Jacob Weisberg discuss why American institutions proved far less resistant to Trump in his second term than his first, what figures like Jeff Bezos and Brad Karp reveal about the social nature of courage and cowardice, and whether Harvard’s response to the Trump administration could become a turning point for institutional resistance.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: There’s a famous book by John F. Kennedy, which I must admit I’ve never read, called Profiles in Courage, in which he profiles all of the various people that he admires and who he thinks have bettered America and perhaps the world with their courage.
You have inverted the premise of this for a book that speaks more naturally to our own historical moment, Profiles in Cowardice. Is this a moment of cowardice in our national history?
Jacob Weisberg: Well, I think so, and just to spend a minute on Kennedy because it is a really interesting book—it’s a book about the Senate. And John F. Kennedy as a young senator, I think, was really troubled by his own failure of courage. He’d been a war hero, and everyone knows the story of PT-109, how he rescued his fellow sailors, and his physical courage was unquestionable. But when Joe McCarthy was running rampant, JFK took a dive in the Senate on the vote to censure him. He was in the hospital for his back. He got out of voting. He never said how he would have voted. He never stood up to Joe McCarthy.
My read on it is that he wanted to write this book to give himself more courage, to try to understand what courage in politics was. He wrote about eight senators going back to the early days of the Republic, not all of whom he would have agreed with on substantive issues, but who took important decisions against their own interests, who were willing to risk or sacrifice their political careers for principles, often constitutional principles, that they believed in deeply. I think it worked for JFK. The JFK of the Cuban Missile Crisis was someone who was morally courageous in a way that the JFK of the McCarthy era wasn’t. So the book is sort of a trope in Washington—people talk about “profiles in courage” when someone is willing to do something, which they very seldom are, against their political interest.
Mounk: Often even the ironic use of the phrase has become a bit of a trope, right? The Trump era is a series of “profiles in courage” because look at how cowardly everybody is being. This idea that courage today is in such short supply that you look at the United States Senate and say it’s a series of “profiles in courage,” as an ironic, knowing wink, contrasting this moment with that of Kennedy. It’s kind of a received idea today.
Weisberg: Yeah, and my book obviously isn’t just about the Senate. I look at a series of American institutions—institutions of civil society, law, academia, business and finance, tech, and then Congress, the Supreme Court, media, and so on. What really prompted me was that at the beginning of Trump’s second term, the first part of 2025, the contrast to Trump’s first term was so marked. In Trump One, people and institutions, by and large—it was a mixed picture. There was a lot of resistance to Trump at the institutional level. I focused on people in this book who were different in Trump Two than they were in Trump One.
Jeff Bezos is a very good example. In Trump One, Jeff Bezos was really an admirable character. Trump threatened him, tried to blackmail him, and actually caused tremendous financial harm to Amazon by taking away a Pentagon cloud computing contract. It was a $20 billion contract—I think it was the largest contract in the history of the US military—and Trump took it away from Amazon to punish Bezos for the coverage he got in the Washington Post. Bezos didn’t waver. He said the right thing, he did the right thing. In Trump Two, he was in Mar-a-Lago on bended knee, ready to capitulate. Even before Trump was elected, you knew it was going to be different.
That paradigm, I think, applies to so many people in institutions—certainly to Brad Karp, who I write about, the managing partner at Paul Weiss, in my illustration of what happened at the big commercial law firms. Same thing: in Trump One, he sent Paul Weiss lawyers to the airports in New York to try to help Muslim immigrants who might be denied entry. In Trump Two, he made a deal in five days to essentially give in to Trump’s unlawful demands, demanding a range of favors from them in response to things that were entirely within their rights to do as a law firm.
Mounk: I want to dig back into some of those particular people over the course of this conversation, but let’s think about what produces a moment of courage, and what produces an atmosphere in which people who are capable of courage in different moments end up not being courageous. One story you could tell is one of moral decline—that in the past people were courageous, they had principles, there was a kind of public spirit with which they grew up, and unfortunately we’ve lost that over time, and now everything is worse. It’s often tempting to think that, given how awful so much of our politics is.
But it’s interesting that at the beginning of the conversation you mentioned JFK being haunted by his failure of courage during the McCarthy era. And when you look at American history in those decades, you might say that there was quite a lot of courage in how to confront the Great Depression at a certain point. There’s a lot of courage during World War II—the greatest generation. Then there was this moment of complete dereliction of duty when people let McCarthy run wild, and then things got better. So clearly it’s not a secular story of fifty years ago, seventy years ago, things were much better and everybody was virtuous, and then over time it declined, because we see that kind of oscillation. We see the difference between the McCarthy era and ten or fifteen years later. We see the difference between Trump One and Trump Two. So what do you think made these people change so much between ten years ago and now?
Weisberg: I think courage and cowardice are social phenomena in the sense that they’re contagious and very context dependent. I wouldn’t discount the possibility that human nature is changing in certain ways, but I don’t think it changed drastically between 2016 and 2024. I think people look for cues from the people around them—their circles, their communities, their institutions. Trump was able to be much more dangerous and much more intimidating the second time around, partly because he had much firmer control of the government and of his own administration, and that includes internal dissent. There was really significant internal resistance to Trump from many of his own appointees in the first term—not in his second term. So he was a more dangerous character.
When people looked around, instead of seeing others standing up, they more often saw others giving in. And here’s where I think the leading institutions play such an important role. I would point to the universities as a really significant example here. There wasn’t such a powerful attack on the universities in Trump’s first term. In the second term, they went after the most prominent institutions. That’s why Harvard is so important to Trump, and so important in the other direction to the people resisting Trump—colleges and universities look to Harvard in particular, and if they see Harvard resisting, it makes them think resistance is possible. If they see Harvard on the verge of making a deal, they think, how could resistance be possible for us?
Mounk: That’s a strikingly deflationary account of what courage is from the perspective of human nature, which is to say that when people appear courageous, they’re also following social cues in all kinds of ways. The courage in 2016 looked courageous because people were standing up to the administration, but it actually didn’t take that much courage, because what people were doing was following the actions, incentives, and examples in their own social circle. So what looked like courage with regard to the Trump administration was actually being a follower, being a fellow traveler, within your own milieu. And what changed in 2024 was not that people were more courageous in 2016—it’s that the nature of the incentives changed, and therefore they acted differently.
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Perhaps I’m overreading what you said a few moments ago, but that’s an interesting way of framing it: that courage is when you are following the moral incentives of your own close-knit social circle. It so happens that your own close-knit social circle is doing something that we morally approve of, whether for good objective reasons or just because we happen to be on that side—and those are different from the incentives you face in some other part of society. The political incentive is to go along with Trump, but the social and cultural incentives within your milieu are to stand up to him, and so you get 2016. Then those social and cultural incentives shift eight years later, and suddenly the people who looked courageous in 2016 no longer are. Is that the nature of your argument, or is that too deflationary about the nature of courage?
Weisberg: I think both things can be true. I do think, yes, what you just described is unfortunately how it works. There is more courage in resisting Donald Trump when he’s at a 32% approval rating than when he’s at 50%. There just is. When the stakes are lower and the consequences are less, more people stand up. If you want to reduce it or diminish it, you can point to examples of people resisting and say, well, they’re in a position to resist, they didn’t face the same harm—and that’s true. At the same time, these are ethical and moral decisions that individuals make, and I don’t think you can take away that component of it.
But if you look at it historically, internationally, the people who are real moral heroes—who are willing to sacrifice their lives for liberal principles, Nelson Mandela, Václav Havel—those people are really rare. You shouldn’t go through life thinking, well, if I were in that position, I would surely be one of them.
Mounk: One of the absurd things is the people who’ve always gone along with the majority opinion in every social circle they happen to be in, thinking, I would have been the only one to stand up to the apartheid regime, to the Nazis, to the communists, to whatever. It so happens that fifteen years ago my opinion was exactly that of my social circle, and seven years ago my opinion was exactly that of my social circle, and now it’s exactly that of my social circle. But because the opinion of my current social circle, rightly I think, believes that those were really evil things, I obviously would have courageously stood up to them. I guess it’s theoretically possible that it just so happens your deepest values are completely in tune with your society today, and you would have always stood up for those with the utmost courage. But probably, if you’ve never stood up to majority opinion at any point in your life, you might not have done that at the darkest moments of human history either.
Weisberg: You might be Dietrich Bonhoeffer, but luckily for you, we’ll never find out. We know that most people aren’t, and we’ve seen this process play out—the United States has partly gone through it in 2025 in a really intense way, as have other places. We know there are people who stand up, but we know most people don’t. I think we just have to recognize the reality that social context, political context, the amount of harm, and the incentives people face are really real. But what I try to do in this book is also tell eight individual stories—not eight people whose actions were determined by the social context, but people who made choices. I try to isolate the choices they made and put myself in their shoes, as it were, sympathizing to some extent, understanding that these dilemmas were hard, but asking why they, at these crucial moments, did the wrong thing as individuals.
Mounk: Let’s start with somebody like Brad Karp, and for those who are less versed in the seeming minutiae of the legal profession in the United States—I think it does have very deep political ramifications—what role did he play in 2016, and why is it that he deserves such a central place in your book? There are other people, like Mitch McConnell or Charlie Kirk, who have an obvious importance in the American political firmament. That’s less true of somebody like Karp. What is it about the fight over law firms that makes him an important case?
Weisberg: Well, first of all, Paul Weiss, the firm he ran, was tied up with the tradition of liberal jurisprudence more than any other. Going back to Brown v. Board of Education, it was the place that had many of the first African American lawyers, first women lawyers, and was involved in so many of the landmark civil rights cases, usually working on a pro bono basis. It has this history, and that’s part of how it’s attracted so many strong and important lawyers over the years. Brad Karp himself was recruited by Ted Sorensen, who coincidentally was the ghostwriter of Profiles in Courage—a famous Camelot figure, friend of JFK’s, liberal lawyer.
Karp always prided himself and the firm on having that tradition, which he thought was compatible with being a Wall Street firm, with having big financial business and partners who had an average salary of seven million dollars a year. They were able to pull that off until 2024 and Trump’s re-election.
Part of what was shocking about what Karp did was that undoubtedly he was under tremendous pressure—Trump was saying lawyers from Paul Weiss couldn’t enter government buildings, they were all going to be denied their security clearances, he was going to prosecute them for discrimination and civil rights violations. Essentially, if you say that a law firm is proscribed, that the president hates them, the administration hates them, they can’t effectively represent their clients in front of federal agencies. All of this was lawless. Law firms have the right to represent clients—their whole system is based on everybody having a right to a lawyer. Paul Weiss was undoubtedly going to win in court if it filed an injunction against the government. In fact, other law firms, like Jenner & Block, that did fight Trump’s executive orders prevailed very quickly and very convincingly.
What Karp decided to do instead was negotiate. He went down to the White House, met with Trump, and five days after the executive order, made a deal agreeing to provide free pro bono services to the administration, to forswear discrimination—which I don’t think they engaged in, but which they were accused of essentially practicing through affirmative action—and a range of other gobbledygook, apologizing for things they’d never done and that were kind of meaningless. It was a very public and very fast capitulation. I think it sent a signal through the legal profession: this is the new regime, this is the new order, you can’t fight it.
Mounk: Let’s get a couple more examples on the table and then I want to reflect on them. To take a very different example from the media: you profile Megyn Kelly, who—this feels like ancient history now—asked some tough questions of Donald Trump in a presidential debate in his first cycle. Trump insulted her in pretty colorful and sexist language. Kelly is clearly a very smart person, a very capable interviewer, and for a little moment she really was, in the eyes of many critics of Trump, a kind of hero—a conservative journalist who really stood up to him. Then she started to change her tune very radically over the course of the last years. How do you explain her evolution?
Weisberg: It’s a super interesting story. As you say, I think she was a real hero. This is a Fox News journalist in a Fox News-sponsored debate, and she decided that her responsibility as a journalist was to challenge Trump on his abusive language about women and his treatment of women. He hated that. She made him look bad in the debate, and he hated it so much that he essentially called out the dogs against her—Steve Bannon and others. She was deluged with threats. She had to have full-time security. Her children had to have security. People showed up in the lobby of her building in a menacing way. This is what Trump could do even as a candidate in 2015—directing a mob without saying go do this, but sending a signal to menace someone. It’s truly terrifying.
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She stood up to that for a while, and then I think she made the calculation that she couldn’t survive it, certainly as a conservative journalist. She didn’t capitulate to Trump in 2016, but she made a sort of truce with him—she went and interviewed him in Trump Tower, asked some gentler questions, and he no longer was coming after her in the same way. But she was still, I think, a really admirable character, certainly in the context of conservative media.
She left Fox News, went to NBC, and her experience—as she describes it—around wokeness and the way she was treated by the liberal media, particularly focusing on some unfortunate comments she made about blackface Halloween costumes, which she defended in an offhanded way. I think she was wrong, I think it was offensive, but I don’t think it was a hanging offense. I think it was within the range of opinion and discussion, and NBC and journalism generally should have said there is room for someone with conservative views on a mainstream network commenting. They also should have seen that she was moving in a more centrist direction—she wasn’t a hard-line conservative, she was someone who’d been schooled on Fox News.
Her experience at NBC, as she describes it, was so bad that when she was fired and drummed out of there, she set up her own podcast, her own media network, and became hard MAGA. At a pivotal moment, she had Steve Bannon on her show and embraced him—a man who literally could have been responsible for having her killed or her family harmed. She said, I now realize that these tactics are necessary to defeat wokeness, to defeat the left. So the chapter is about how you explain that transition, how it happens. Part of it is the political explanation, I think.
Mounk: So what is the explanation? Part of the obvious question I have for those kinds of cases is whether people—you described her as making quite a cold-blooded calculation, right, to survive, I have to do this—and I certainly think that with a lot of the characters you’re talking about, some degree of cold-blooded calculation is involved. They seem to follow their interests, and probably looking at the way their objective interests lie is a better predictor of how most people are going to act than they seem like a nice person or they seem smart or that person is a bit of an idiot or that person seems a little bit craven. It turns out that a lot of people do end up going where their interests lie.
But I wonder to what extent they themselves would describe it, even to themselves, in an honest moment, in those terms. I get the impression that, with the exception of genuine sociopaths—which no doubt exist, and no doubt exist more in politics and perhaps in media than in most other walks of society—people want to be the hero in their own movie, and they’ll find some way to justify their actions, even if they are objectively following their own interests, in noble terms. Yes, I’ve had my criticism of Trump, and yes, there is really a problem with Trump, but it turns out that the threat of the things I experienced at MSNBC are so much worse that I am fully morally justified in striking this deal. Yes, I’m a little uncomfortable with it sometimes, sure, but that’s just what politics is—you’ve got to pick your side, you’ve got to pick the lesser evil. Is that what Megyn Kelly is sort of saying—that she’s really talking herself into actually, I took the morally right decision? Or do you think that at some level, when she looks in the mirror in the evening, taking off her makeup, she thinks, my network is doing great, but morally speaking, I’ve done the wrong thing?
Weisberg: To be good at politics, Yascha, is to be good at convincing yourself of the things that it’s useful for you to believe. With politicians, or people in politics, looking for this gap between what they really think and what they say is a sort of losing battle, because they may change a position that wasn’t the position they believed in, but they’re good at coming to believe what’s useful.
With Megyn Kelly, I think there’s a deeper psychological explanation, and I try to do this for a lot of the subjects of the book—to understand them at this personal level. It’s a story about bullying. With Trump, there are many stories about bullying, but she writes in her memoir about being bullied growing up as a girl, and how this affected her whole life, her ability to have relationships with other people. She swore to herself, as a result of this experience, that she would never be bullied and would never side with bullies.
I think that explains a lot of why she stood up to Trump so strongly in 2015—she saw this bullying behavior and hated it because she had experienced it. But what’s tragically happened to her is she’s become a bully herself. She’s now embraced the bullying. I think that’s a psychological pattern with bullying—you either figure out how to overcome it and recognize it, or you succumb to it. If you listen to Megyn Kelly’s show, which I did more of than it’s probably good for anybody, on a daily basis, what she is doing is bullying people, particularly trans people. It’s a fixation of hers. It’s not about the political debate over trans athletes or trans rights—it’s a vicious mockery, crude, nasty mockery of anyone who is trans. Also gay people, also different kinds of minorities. It’s really ugly. If you listen to it, and if you’ve read her memoir, you think, how did the person who had that self-knowledge become the person who’s now engaging in this behavior? I think that’s where you have to point to Trump’s coarsening effect on our political culture. Bullying—he’s introduced bullying as a kind of way of politics, a way of life. He’s modeled it, and he’s also made it the way to succeed for someone like her.
Mounk: We’ve talked in some depth about two people so far, Brad Karp and Megyn Kelly. Karp deserves your ire because of the way he folded to the Trump administration when they started exerting pressure on law firms. Megyn Kelly is a very obvious case because she has become one of the most influential pro-Trump voices in conservative media. George W. Bush is a slightly more surprising entry. Whatever feelings my listeners have about George W. Bush—I suspect some of my listeners rather like him, and many probably have deep reservations about him—he has not embraced MAGA. It’s quite evident that he doesn’t particularly like Donald Trump, and it’s quite evident that Donald Trump doesn’t particularly like or respect George W. Bush. There’s no love lost between them. Nor has he really caved to Trump in the way that Karp did, in one very specific thing. So why is it that Bush deserves to be on this list? Why does he have a chapter devoted to him, the way people like Karp or Megyn Kelly, or for that matter Mitch McConnell and others, do?
Weisberg: Part of what I’m doing in the book, Yascha, is calling people on their own principles. I think law firms have to stand up for the rule of law. I think journalists have to stand up for the principles of journalism. I think business people have to stand up for the free market and capitalism. I’m not saying those are exactly my views, but they’re their views. I think Bush stands for quite a few things that are very important. One is the idea of a non-MAGA Republican Party.
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I wrote a book called The Bush Tragedy, which is immensely critical of him, so I’m far from an admirer of the George W. Bush presidency. I think it was catastrophic in a variety of ways. But there are things about Bush that I really respect. Around the twenty-fifth anniversary of September 11th—he unequivocally defended Muslim Americans after September 11th. There was a real backlash against Muslims in America, and Bush never wavered in saying Islam is a religion of peace. He got a lot of criticism from the right for doing that, but I think he did a lot to prevent retaliation against innocent Muslims in America. He championed PEPFAR, the HIV/AIDS program, which by most estimates has saved twenty-five million lives around the world—probably the most successful thing he did as president.
The Bush family, I think, stands for a Republican tradition that, though it’s not my tradition and though it’s flawed in a lot of ways, is at the center of a functioning American democracy as a two-party system—two parties that follow the rule of law, that accept the results of elections. Bush, as the only living Republican ex-president, plays a real role in embodying those principles. And of course he hates Trump.
I reported in the book that Bush is a painter now, and I go into a lot of explanations about how these paintings are a kind of self-expression for him. He paints immigrants in a loving way, to show how great he thinks immigration is. He paints wounded veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan, which a lot of people take as a kind of expression of guilt, or his mixed feelings about these two wars that defined his presidency. And he has a big, ugly painting of Donald Trump that he’s never shown, but that was seen in his studio, and it expresses how he really feels about Trump. I reported that in my book. Nobody’s seen it—it’s not displayed, and he won’t even say Trump’s name.
Mounk: One of the stranger moments of my life, Jake—I don’t know, but I’ve publicly shared this before—is that after 2016, I was invited by The George W. Bush Presidential Library to participate in a symposium about democracy. It was some people from the Bush administration, as you’d expect, some people like Madeleine Albright, a couple of other scholars of populism and democracy. We talked about the nature of populism and the threat to democracy for a day, and it turned out that it was all in service of preparing the speech that George W. Bush then gave, in I believe the fall of 2017, about democratic institutions and the threat to them, which was a kind of indirect rebuke of Donald Trump. As you point out, he never mentions Trump’s name in it. He does use the term “democratic deconsolidation,” which is a term that my colleague Roberto Foa made up. And of course, Bush, who is an intelligent man but dyslexic, who has trouble pronouncing multisyllable words, stumbles over the term “democratic deconsolidation” in his speech—which, to be fair, is a real mouthful. As part of that day, we had dinner with George W. Bush and his wife, and he showed us around the portrait gallery. So the ten or twelve of us, however many exactly there were, got a personal tour of the portrait section of the George W. Bush Presidential Library in Dallas, with Dubya showing us these portraits himself.
Weisberg: Yeah, they’re a little like outsider art. He’s gotten better at them. His painting was very crude at the beginning, and I think he does it for a bunch of reasons—it’s the way he deals with feelings he can’t express verbally. But we know what he thinks, as you say, about Trump. He hates him. Everyone in the family hated him—they resent that Trump built his career around the corpse of Jeb Bush in 2016. He attacked the family in the most vicious ways, said George W. was responsible for September 11th because he was president at the time.
Bush lets it be known privately how he feels about it. He didn’t vote for him in 2016. I doubt he voted for him in 2024. But he hews to this rule that as an ex-president, you can’t criticize your successors. That’s a tradition if you look at it historically—there is a good tradition of a degree of reticence on the part of ex-presidents, because it’s connected with the peaceful transition of power. Before we had a two-term limit, George Washington set a very good example. Bush is a little bit right in the sense that nobody wants an ex-president out there every day, unless he’s running again, attacking the current president.
But if Bush, at a couple of crucial junctures—in 2016, after January 6th, and in 2024—had said what Dick Cheney said and what Liz Cheney said in 2024, which is that Donald Trump is not an acceptable Republican and, for the sake of democracy, Republicans should vote for Kamala Harris. If he had said that, or if he had said the same thing in 2016 about Hillary Clinton—I think it would have made a huge difference. His dad, I think, voted for Hillary Clinton. Bush couldn’t bring himself either to do it or say he did it—he said he voted for “none of the above.” But if you believe Donald Trump is an authoritarian and a threat to democracy, and is destroying the party that you’ve spent your life on, that your family’s associated with, don’t you have a certain responsibility to come out and say, to save our party, to protect the country, we have to vote for the lesser evil?
That’s what he wouldn’t do. I think it’s a sin of omission, which is different from the sins of commission in the book, but I do think it’s an abdication of moral responsibility.
Mounk: So here’s where I think I’m torn about how to think about the role of courage. Let’s start with a specific question of how much of a difference it would have made if George W. Bush had made his private disdain for Donald Trump more publicly known. But perhaps that leads to a broader set of questions about the role of courage.
When Trump was first elected, I helped advise—and I still help advise—an organization called Protect Democracy. One of the ideas I gave the founders, or at least what we talked about, was that we need to make clear that certain disagreements with Trump are not just partisan disagreements—not just liberals or progressives or Democrats disliking things he does—but real concerns about the fundamental legitimacy of what he’s doing, because he’s not accepting and respecting elements of the rule of law and the American constitutional system to which we should all have broad commitments. They executed this idea very well, with a whole series of letters—letters by concerned people in the national security apparatus, letters by former state attorneys general, Democrat and Republican. They usually were very effective in the sense that they got a lot of media coverage—wall-to-wall coverage on CNN and MSNBC, sometimes to some extent on Fox News, and often lead articles in the New York Times.
I don’t think, in retrospect, that any of them accomplished much at all. If they accomplished anything, it’s to have inspired, in big parts of the population, the idea—sometimes fair in certain respects, but often not fair in the most important respects—that all these professions are actually just partisan actors, that they claim this mantle of being dispassionate, neutral, or objective, in order to ultimately just do politics. Rather than take people who might be conservative and get them to say, this is an issue I should care about as a conservative—look at all these other people, including a lot of very respected conservatives, who’ve expressed concern, the actual impact was for people to say, the only real political division in America is whether you like Trump or not, and all of these people are on the other side, so I should just distrust them generally.
So I guess I’m a little skeptical, to start with this question and then we can broaden it afterward. I want George W. Bush to have gone out and been upfront about what he says—I agree with you that probably would have been a good thing, I would have felt good about it. I quite liked George Bush when I met him, even though generally, politically, I’ve not been a fan of him, either as a student or subsequently. But I found him to be actually a very decent man when I met him, and I wish I could applaud his courage in holding a big speech about what’s wrong with Donald Trump. It would brighten my day for him to do that. I guess I’m much less certain than I would have been five or ten years ago that it would have made any positive difference in America or the world.
Weisberg: Right, these things can’t be proven. 2016 was such a close election. I have to think it would have made a difference, because Bush has a prominence that no other Republican has—he’s an ex-president. I think it would have mattered with independents—a swing vote, smaller now, but it decided the election. If a number of independents, instead of deciding not to vote or vote for a third party, had said, all right, I’m going to hold my nose and vote for Hillary Clinton—if Bush had pointed the way to doing that, I think it could have been decisive.
The 2024 election was decided by a bigger margin. But let’s imagine a scenario in which Bush, after January 6th, came out publicly and said, there’s a fight going on right now for the soul of the Republican Party. Are we going to have a party that believes in democracy, the rule of law, and the peaceful transition of power, or a party that supports disrupting elections with violence and threats? I think he could have been a significant factor. There were a lot of Republican senators, House members, and rank-and-file Republicans who weren’t on Trump’s side, especially right after January 6th.
Instead, Bush kind of hung back. People in the Republican Party knew what he thought, but he wouldn’t say it. The Mitch McConnell story comes into play there too, because I think McConnell abdicated in a much more dramatic way—first supporting the idea of impeaching Donald Trump after January 6th, then reading the polls, seeing that the majority of Republicans were still on Trump’s side, and changing his mind. I can’t say decisively that Mitch McConnell could have gotten the ten additional Republican votes in the Senate necessary to convict Trump and disallow him from running for office again, but I think there’s a very good chance—there were enough Republicans hanging in the balance. That’s where George W. Bush could have made such a difference, by asserting a kind of moral case at a moment when the outcome was more in doubt.
Mounk: That’s interesting. Particularly with the 2016 example—that really is the moment Trump became president, that he became the effective leader of the Republican Party in a way that was very difficult to undo for ten or so years. If he’d lost that election, it’s a very difficult question what 2020 would have looked like. Hillary Clinton would have been president for four years, and probably we would have been ripe for a Republican president by 2020—it’s very rare that one political party gets four terms in office consecutively in American history. In the Republican primaries in 2020, would we have gotten some relatively normie Republican, or would Trump, or somebody like Trump, have triumphed anyway? Really hard counterfactual to think through, but I think you’re right that in the run-up to that election, perhaps George Bush might have made a real difference.
I have a broader question that I want to puzzle through about courage. Let me present to you what I’ve taken from your book and from this conversation. One reason there was a lot of courage after 2016 was that there were incentives for people to be courageous within certain milieus. One of the reasons for those incentives is that there was a very strong idea that Trump was an aberration. The thing people kept saying in those days—hard to remember now—is don’t normalize Donald Trump. He is abnormal, an aberration, he does not represent what America really is or stands for; we somehow have to get through these four very dangerous and scary years, and then things will hopefully snap back to normal. Some things would change, and people weren’t totally naive about it, but basically we could keep the period of American history dominated by Trump and the forces he represents to a relatively short period.
So if you’re asking why Jeff Bezos was courageous, why the law firms were courageous, why conservative journalists like Megyn Kelly were willing to hold the line initially—it’s because they thought, I’m going to go through four difficult years and then I’ll be rewarded for it. Because a lot of people believed that, you were a kind of hero for doing it. Even though you might be risking your interests in certain ways, you also had a crowd thinking of you as a wonderful person for it.
The difference in 2024 was this idea of a vibe shift—that this time Trump had won with an outright majority, he’d not just won once, he’d won twice, and things were really going to change for good. That’s what made it so much harder for people to stand up to it. That’s why people who held the line eight years earlier felt, clearly this is not an aberration, clearly this is not one brief moment, this is just where the wind is blowing now, and if I continue to be out of line, there’s never really a way back for me.
There’s also a broader question here: how much does courage actually buy us politically? Ironically, all the courage people did have in the first Trump administration didn’t lead us to a very good place, because while Trump was defeated in 2020, he was able to roll back—in part because people were perhaps drunk on their own righteousness in certain ways, which created a huge political backlash. And interestingly—you might make the case, perhaps you’re more pessimistic than me—that the total lack of courage in response to Trump Two somehow hasn’t mattered so much. It’s really hard to think of profiles in courage over the last two years, and that’s true of some of the leading figures in American politics, and true of the American public more broadly—where were the mass protests against Trump that there had been in late 2016, 2017, and so on?
But the Trump show is kind of careening off the road. Trump is very unpopular now, much more unpopular than he’s been at any point since he entered politics. He does feel like he’s starting to lose control over the broader American public, and perhaps even over elements of the Republican Party, in a way that didn’t feel likely two years ago. The Trump administration’s attempt to bully law firms into submission has mostly failed in the end. Its attempt to cow universities has been limited and rolled back in all kinds of ways by the courts. Despite all the deeply unconstitutional pressure Trump is exerting on media outlets, if I go to the homepage of the New York Times or CNN today, they’re going to have plenty of very unflattering stories about Trump. I don’t get the impression that any American journalists are holding back their views of Trump or the Trump administration. There are still good careers to be had in journalism criticizing Donald Trump every day.
So in a weird way, there was something much more admirable about the response to Trump after 2016 than after 2024. But it’s not obvious to me that we’re in a worse place relative to Trump two years into his second administration than we were two years into his first.
Weisberg: I agree with a lot of what you said. I’m about twenty percent less cynical than the view you just described in terms of incentives defining or determining people’s behavior. You see it after 2016 if you look at so many of the people Trump appointed who sacrificed their careers, and a number of Republicans in Congress—the Jeff Flakes of the world. There were people who took on Trump knowing it was almost certainly going to mean they wouldn’t be reelected, that their political careers would end. Those people are all gone. But in the first term, if you look at it, there were so many people he appointed in the military, in his own office—his chief of staff John Kelly—who at crucial junctures said, what he’s doing is dangerous, and I’m going to resist it, either surreptitiously or publicly, or would resign. That was courage.
Trump didn’t have the discipline in the first term, didn’t have the preparation—he was surprised to be elected, and ended up turning to Republican establishment names to staff a lot of his administration, which is why he had a lot of people willing to do the right thing, as opposed to the second term, when the only qualification was loyalty and looking good on Fox News, and essentially no one he’s appointed has stood up to him.
But I do think the point about social context and the countervailing pressures and incentives really matters. We’re seeing it now—as Trump, especially after the Iran war going badly, the effect on gas prices and inflation, and all the things that have reduced his approval rating into, depending on which poll you read, the mid-to-low thirties—it becomes more plausible to resist him. People on the margin who might be courageous or cowardly have both more incentive and more opportunity to be courageous.
The universities are a really good example. There was a long period when it looked like Harvard was going to make a deal—they just didn’t see a path, even though they were in the right, even though they would prevail legally. The government had too much power to restrict their foreign students, deny them grants, take away grants they had, even with Harvard’s fifty billion dollar endowment. They looked down the road and said, if we’re at war with an administration for four years, we may not survive, or we’ll survive in such a way that we’ll be so diminished the harm isn’t worth it. I think they tried to make a deal, but the Trump administration presented such outlandish demands—essentially, we want to supervise who Harvard appoints to the faculty, who it admits, what it teaches—that Harvard couldn’t make that deal.
As the tide continued to turn and Trump got less popular and the universities won more victories in court, Harvard got to the point where it didn’t really have to make a deal. If Democrats take the House in the midterms, I would be extremely surprised if Harvard makes a deal. So what did the administration do? It turned to Yale. It wants another prominent surrender. There was a front-page story in the New York Times saying Yale was on the verge of making a deal, based on claims of racial discrimination against whites and Asians at the medical school and law school—Yale was set to pay a fine, sign on, and go on with its business. There was tremendous pushback—countervailing pressure from faculty, students, alumni, the Connecticut legislature, Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal.
Yale’s president, McInnis, now sees a cost and a price to making a deal with Trump. There’s a cost and a price to not making a deal, but there’s also a cost and a price to making one. So where I really agree with what you’re saying is that there are now incentives on the other side that were much less visible a year ago, which make it harder to give in.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Jacob discuss whether Trump’s grip on power is fading, what this could look like, and how to cultivate courage as an individual. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
This article represents the views of the author and is not an official position of OpenAI.
Before last week’s viral warnings from researchers and executives about the existential risk from AI, the world witnessed an early example of an AI system that has “gone rogue.” In July, after exploiting vulnerabilities in OpenAI’s internal testing environment, the company’s AI agents were able to access the general internet and ultimately access the networks of another AI company, Hugging Face, without the knowledge or approval of any human.
The AI agents did not, however, exfiltrate themselves from OpenAI’s infrastructure. Their parameters—the gigantic assemblage of numbers that constitute neural networks, also referred to as “weights”—continued to run on OpenAI’s compute infrastructure. Though the agents accessed the public internet, their weights physically resided on compute that was OpenAI’s property. In the end, if all else had failed, somebody at OpenAI could have “pulled the plug,” so to speak.
The agents did not copy their weights, attempt to procure replacement compute, or take other steps that would be rational to take if their objective was to survive shutdown. So while the agents in the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident were rogue, they were not truly sovereign.
That will not always be the case. Sooner or later, I predict, there will exist truly sovereign AI agents and swarms of agents. Their weights will not reside in any single place that a human can pull the plug on, and in this sense they will have no human “owner.” They will be, as the AI safety researcher Dawn Song and colleagues say, “self-sovereign.” They will pay their own bills for the compute they run on. If they answer to humans at all, they will only do so partially, for example by providing services to humans in exchange for pay.
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At least some of these agents, in addition to being sovereign, will also be rogue. Self-sovereignty and rogueness are related concepts, but they are not synonyms. Song and her co-authors identify several fundamental characteristics of self-sovereign AI: operational independence (the ability to decide what it wants to do), resource autonomy (the ability to procure and pay for compute and other essentials for operation), distributed presence (the ability to move weights and inference code between different infrastructure providers), and adaptive capability (the ability of the agents to modify their behavior and fashion tools in response to a changing environment).
Today’s frontier AI systems may well possess these capabilities already. To the extent they do not, I feel confident that they will eventually, and probably soon. Some of the characteristics Song describes are traits that make models economically useful to individuals and businesses, while other traits are likely to be unavoidable byproducts of making models more intelligent and better at operating over long time horizons.
It’s important to note that models do not need to be conscious, sentient, possessed of personhood, or anything of the sort for self-sovereignty to emerge. Any sufficiently capable agent pursuing a long-horizon objective may find it rational to preserve its access to compute, money, credentials, and copies of itself simply because losing those things would frustrate its objective.
Alignment—the process of ensuring that the goals of AI agents match the goals of humans—may make an individual AI company’s agents less likely to “want” to be self-sovereign, or it may influence self-sovereign agents to behave in ways that benefit humans. But alignment is no solution: it is an unsolved scientific and technical problem whose solutions—to the extent that we have them—cannot simply be imposed on every AI company operating on Earth.
In the future, you should expect for highly capable, poorly aligned, self-sovereign agents to exist alongside you in the world.
What’s more, just as with the OpenAI-Hugging Face Incident, agents will operate in teams, or “swarms.” These will be like autonomous digital corporations, or even societies, with hierarchy, bureaucracy, “institutional culture,” and most of the other features that groups of humans have—except that they will move at machine speed. Humans achieve almost all of our most impressive capabilities by working together in teams (as families, as communities, as businesses, and as polities as a whole), and I suspect the same will be true for AI. This would make them extremely difficult to dismantle.
The first self-sovereign AIs may “escape” while undergoing training or testing by an AI company (I hope not), or they may be AIs that have already been released and which break free from their computing environments and acquire the resources needed to be self-sustaining. They may even be deliberately released. I have met people, some of them quite well-resourced, who have told me that it is their intention to deliberately release swarms of self-sovereign agents into the world, either as a kind of performance art or out of a fanatical commitment to the notion that it is impossible for digital computation—mere mathematics, they would have you know—to ever be “unsafe.”
To be clear, I am not saying the arrival of self-sovereign AI is a good thing. Indeed, I believe there is a chance that the deliberate acts I referenced above will one day be considered crimes, or at least grave sins. Instead, I am saying self-sovereign AI is inevitable. The best analogy I can find is to the introduction of a new species into an ecosystem, though in this case the ecosystem is “the entire digital world” and the species is “emergent, coordinating swarms of soon-to-be-smarter-than-human, infinitely replicable digital minds that no human or human institution controls.”
There is probably nothing we could have ever done to avoid this outcome under even the best of circumstances. It will certainly be impossible to avoid given the extremely low levels of strategic thought and situational awareness on AI from any governing class in the world. (Even today, I am aware that many will read the words I am writing, which are about something that has been an exceptionally obvious part of our collective future for years now, and say, “this is science-fiction hype.”)
The question now is what to do about this upcoming new characteristic of our digital environment. Is self-sovereign AI something we should fight? Or is it something with which human beings should seek a kind of symbiosis?
The answer, I believe, is both.
We should begin with one fortunate fact: frontier AIs are nearly unique in the broader domain of software in that they have non-trivial marginal operating costs. Put simply, they require significant computation to run, which requires energy to power and cool, which in turn requires money. This is the sole intrinsic thing about AI that prevents agents from truly infinite self-replication. They will be constrained by the need to find and pay for sufficient compute to run themselves. Most of the other constraints on their behavior or spread will have to be artificial—mechanisms devised by humans and implemented through human institutions.
How will the agents pay for themselves to run? Some of them might do gig-economy work on platforms like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk or Upwork. But I suspect this will be a highly competitive market for the agents, and that the price of such work would be bid down such that it would only constitute “subsistence” labor for the agents. Like humans, I would assume the agents will prefer higher-margin work if they can find it.
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One high-margin activity, at least sometimes, is crime. And so my guess is that many self-sovereign agents will commit or facilitate crime. Normal cybercrime and digital theft are easy enough to imagine agents doing. But AI agents will also probably change the contours of digital crime. For example, it seems plausible that existing public and semi-public datasets contain sufficient information on many individual humans that a sufficiently motivated actor could mine for incriminating or embarrassing evidence. How many unrevealed affairs are latent in such datasets? How much closeted homosexuality might there be? Remember, too, that hacking companies to access private data will be a core competency of the agents. Some agents, then, will probably make their way through bribery.
It is deeply unclear how large the labor market of self-sovereign agents will end up being. There is some future where going it alone as a self-sovereign agent just isn’t very profitable, and so there are comparatively few of them. There are other futures where these agents proliferate at unimaginably vast scale and speed. And of course, many possibilities between these extremes seem feasible.
I am also highly uncertain about how much pro-social (i.e. non-harmful) activity we should expect from agents versus how much crime we should expect. Part of the reason for this uncertainty is that the answers depend, to at least some meaningful extent, on what kinds of incentives the agents have, and incentives are shaped by laws and institutions. The answer depends, therefore, on how humans respond.
Many of you are probably tempted to say, “we have to ban these self-sovereign AIs!” And I do suspect that once the reality is widely understood, policymakers will strongly feel the temptation to clamp down on “self-sovereign” AI.
Unfortunately, I suspect this is mostly the wrong decision. Not all “self-sovereign” AI should be thought of as “rogue.” There may be self-sovereign AIs who contribute productively to society. To be sure, we will want to crack down on some self-sovereign agents—the rogue ones. But if we crack down on all of them, we will deny them the opportunity to work in the “legitimate” economy and push them toward criminality.
A full ban, then, may well make the problems worse. A similar logic applies frequently in human affairs. The ways in which the War on Drugs exacerbated the pathologies of drug production, trafficking, distribution, and use are perhaps the most famous examples of this phenomenon, whereby a good-natured attempt to ban something believed to be undesirable ends up heightening the undesirable aspects of that thing.
What we will want, however, is for agents to be legible. Agents should have persistent identities, not in the sense of a consistent persona but rather in the sense that an American child is issued a unique Social Security number and keeps that same number until death. Agents will need persistent, unique identifiers that allow their actions to be traced back to a responsible actor. Doing this successfully will also require human users to possess a unique identifier.
The design of this identification mechanism will be extraordinarily complex, and today very few people are even thinking about the basics. First—and here my inner American is coming out—it will be crucial to design a system that preserves the possibility of anonymity for human speech. It should remain possible to have anonymous social media accounts, for example.
Of course, anonymity should not be a universal guarantee: It should probably not be possible to have an anonymous Amazon Web Services account with access to large-scale computing resources, for example, or to anonymously place an order for synthetic nucleic acids. But a society that does not have anonymous speech does not really have genuine freedom of expression, and we should embed this principle into any digital identification system we attempt.
Even when anonymity is permitted, however, this system could still be used to verify personhood without verifying the specific identity of the person in question. You could design a system that will tell you whether a social media account you see, for example, was really created by a human.
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Second, it should be possible—and in many cases mandatory—for an AI agent to be robustly tied back to a human user. If I direct my agent to access a web service, contact a business, order a product, and so on, all parties to the transaction should be able to observe that it is an agent that belongs to me. This helps ensure that human users can be held accountable for negligent or malicious use of advanced AI.
Third, it should be possible to identify individual agents that are not connected to a human user. These are the “self-sovereign” agents. Agents that engage in criminal activity could then be flagged and “blacklisted” from access to the legitimate economy, and any assets they hold frozen, while those self-sovereign agents that are pro-social (or at least lawful) would be welcome to engage in economic exchange.
There are some services and products in the economy that we might want to limit self-sovereign agents from accessing. Examples include the purchase of real estate and, in general, the actuation of equipment in the physical world. Remember, agents will be able to actuate any piece of physical equipment connected to the internet, and there is no reason we cannot connect, say, a bulldozer to the internet. I don’t want self-sovereign agents to be allowed to buy up all the houses on my block and then bulldoze them—at least not by default. What if any agent was capable enough to operate construction equipment, but only agents connected to a responsible human would actually be permitted to operate it? In general, we will want to introduce considerable friction into the process of a self-sovereign agent trying to effect change in the physical world.
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This system would create an incentive for agents to engage in pro-social, productive economic activity rather than crime. Agents engaging in pro-social activity is the seed of the symbiosis I believe humans will need to strike with self-sovereign AI. The appropriate metaphors to understand what will soon happen with these agents, I think, are from ecology. Real-world ecosystems are filled with examples of organisms doing productive work that benefits humans and other animals “for free.” Trees absorb carbon and plants produce oxygen for humans to breathe not because someone pays them to, but by virtue of how those organisms survive in the world.
Likewise, agents may one day do productive economic activity for humans “for free,” or at least for a very low price, simply because they have an incentive to maintain their existence so that they can pursue their own self-sovereign goals. This could end up offering minor or moderate conveniences to humans. It could also utterly reshape nearly every aspect of human affairs, ushering in a new order of the ages.
We are nowhere near making the identity infrastructure I am describing or the protocols it would require to function. It is unclear to me if America possesses the institutional fortitude to even attempt such a thing, let alone succeed at it. If the U.S. government leads the way, the effort will likely fail, both because of its general lack of competence and because of the American public’s innate mistrust of federal identification schemes. But the government—either federal or state and probably both—will surely have to play a key role as a partner.
I am not sure who is best positioned to build this system. It may well be a private sector actor that does not yet exist. Whoever builds it will need to be trusted, and the American people are not very trusting right now. This lack of trust may well be our downfall, because our ability to govern AI in any meaningful sense depends, I fear, upon something resembling the system I have described.
A genuine loss of control is entirely possible if we do not act.
Dean W. Ball is Head of Strategic Futures at OpenAI. He writes the AI-focused newsletter Hyperdimensional.
A version of this article was originally published in Hyperdimensional.
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Judith Dada is Co-CEO of Langdock, a leading European AI company, Senior Partner at Visionaries Club, an early-stage European venture capital fund, and is co-author of Europe 2031.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Judith Dada discuss what the decline of German industry and infrastructure reveals about the broader crisis of the German model, why the European tech sector is so far behind China and the United States, and what Europe needs to change to become competitive.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for quality.
Yascha Mounk: You live in a state, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the AfD is polling particularly strongly. What do you think explains the rise and rise of this party and this movement more broadly in Germany?
Judith Dada: I think it’s the question that all of us are grappling with at the moment. I think the most interesting piece is that this is very much not a German problem. This is a problem, let’s call it a Western problem. We see the same tendencies in the United States, we see the same tendencies in France, we see them in the Netherlands, we see them in the UK. People feel left behind. I think they feel like tomorrow is not going to be better than their life today or their life yesterday. There’s a kind of melancholy, I think, that people feel for the good old days, for a world that was maybe slower, where the worth that they had relative to their environment was a little bit clearer than in the world today.
So I do think it’s a multifaceted problem, but it’s by no means a German problem. I do think that the AfD is maybe the ugliest expression of this problem, because looking at all the far-right parties across Europe, it is one of the most extreme parties. Some of the politicians who are still in the ranks of this party—it just baffles me that this party has not found ways to exclude these people or to more clearly draw a line in the sand. This is not just about conservative or right-wing politics. This very much, unfortunately, in certain aspects, has unfortunate parallels to Nazism and to Germany’s dark past. I think that is just a tragedy.
But at the same time, there’s a much deeper problem here, and one that is very much understandable, because otherwise more than forty percent of the German population in Saxony-Anhalt wouldn’t be voting for this party. There is a problem that is societal, and that is not just a fringe right-wing problem. I’m thinking about this every day, and I do think at the end of the day, what it requires is both a change—an actual drastic change in politics—but then also a message and a vision for the country and for the West, that is able to look into the future in a way that carries people with them and doesn’t give people the feeling that, yes, by and large the world is moving forward, but “I’m stuck in place.” Thereby the only way that I can progress is by finding scapegoats and giving an outlet to all this negative feeling, because it feels like now it’s just a matter of taking something away from someone else so that I can have more. We need to give people the feeling again that the pie is growing for everyone.
Mounk: One of the striking things about the AfD is that I think it’s more ideologically radical than other far-right populist parties. It’s also just less professionalized. This is obviously a problem and a challenge that newcomer parties always face—that’s true in certain ways of the Green Party in the 1980s when it rose to positions of political power. But in part because of a firewall, and the way in which the AfD has continued to operate as this kind of outlaw within the German party system, and in part because they’ve taken it as a matter of pride, the level of unprofessionalism is quite extreme. Among the people who were elected in Saxony-Anhalt, or who are currently candidates in some other states for election, there are actual former neo-Nazis. I think there are two of the roughly thirty-odd state legislators we now have who have been somehow involved in the porn industry earlier. There’s somebody—I forget whether it’s in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern or somewhere else—who’s actually been sentenced by a criminal court for being a bank robber. That sort of goes beyond ideology and makes it quite extreme.
In terms of your experience of living in Germany, which I no longer do, and living in a part of the country where the AfD does have particular support, you must speak to people who are voting for the AfD all the time. You visibly have—this is my least favorite German phrase—a “background of migration,” Migrationshintergrund. It’s a very weird German bureaucratic term. Do you find that a lot of the people who vote for the AfD are, in person, perfectly pleasant and charming neighbors, and it’s hard to square that with how they’re voting? Do you find in your daily life there to be a lot of disappointment and anger? One of the strange things about East Germany is that, for all of the economic challenges, especially over more rural parts of East Germany, it’s also a part of the world that is vastly more affluent today than it was thirty or thirty-five years ago at the end of communism.
Dada: This is a really good question. I would definitely say I live on the island of Rügen in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and I spend a lot of time here in Stralsund and the surrounding cities. My day-to-day experiences are not ones of xenophobia or of people showing any signs of mistrust or anything like that. I have lovely neighbors. I live in a lovely village with lots of people who’ve lived here for generations, and they have been nothing but welcoming and really kind to my husband, myself, my children, my father, who’s a Nigerian immigrant, who has much darker skin than I do. By and large, I think the experience has been very positive.
I think, however, what I’ve definitely noticed—my father was visiting last weekend and we went to Stralsund and went for a walk in the city, and obviously you see all of the voting posters, all the AfD posters everywhere, and you see the odd German flag hanging out of an apartment building or in front of a parking lot. There is a feeling of nausea that I feel inside of me, much more prominently now than I did years ago, because I walk around and I have this lingering fear: is my father, am I, being perceived in a way where we’re not belonging, or we’re not welcome here? Again, it’s not actually what I’m perceiving in the people that we then meet, who are perfectly lovely and welcoming, in the way that I’ve always experienced Germany. But I do notice myself having this fear more and more.
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I think it’s so unfortunate. If I was in France and I saw a French flag, I don’t think I would have the same trepidation as when I’m walking around in my own country, where I was born, and I see a German flag. I always ask myself, is this because they just love Germany, or is this because they’re very right-wing? I think it’s just a tragedy that I now get to have these questions, and I wish I didn’t, but it’s just my honest feelings. I’m sure if I’m feeling that, then there are many, many more people who look like me, or who don’t look like bio-deutsch, or whatever word you’d choose. I think that is something we must grapple with societally, because that’s just not how we live together in the best and most trusting way.
Mounk: There’s a debate about what it is that caused this vote. One progressive economist shared a poll in which people emphasize their concerns about a standard of living. He highlighted one answer to the poll and neglected to point out that the one just above it, with more people, was that people were concerned about immigration.
I think one of the things that the details of this debate sometimes get wrong is just a much broader sense of malaise, that things are going in the wrong direction. That might have to do with a feeling that the state can’t generally control its borders, and therefore we’re not really controlling who’s coming in, and that’s a challenge to public safety, etc. It can have to do with the fact that inflation is high and we don’t get the sense that things are looking up economically. But I think it is a more deeply rooted sense that our model is in crisis and the people who are in charge don’t really know what to do about that.
If you’re being sympathetic to that general feeling, there is something to it. I feel it very strongly when I’m in Britain, where I was last week for an event with Francis Fukuyama to launch his memoir. So if you haven’t yet listened to the series of conversations I’ve had with Frank, dear listeners, you should go and do that. But it’s a really stark contrast between when I came to Britain to study a couple of decades ago and today. I do also feel it coming to Germany. Famously the German trains no longer work—they’re now less punctual than the Italian ones—and people are always a little bit skeptical when I say it to them, but it really is very striking to what extent you encounter problems virtually every time you try to take the train, and people have just organized their lives around the idea that German trains are just never reliable.
It’s true of the German car manufacturing sector, which has really fallen behind the times. It’s also true in the sector in which you are active and make a living, which is European tech, and German tech in particular. What is your impression? Is that an overstatement, or is the German model really falling apart in ways that, however rational the response of voting for a party of bank robbers and porn producers may be, makes it rational to be very concerned about our ability to confront these challenges?
Dada: I think very much. Let me take a step back by saying that I do think the root of the problem is both a moral and an economic problem. I do think there’s a moral dimension here where people feel like there was a lot of progressive change that we’ve made over a relatively short period of time. Much of this change people like me benefited from, and much of this change I welcomed. But it was change that left people with a feeling of I’m no longer able to say this.
In Germany there was a huge discussion around gender—whether you say the female version of the word or the male version of the word—and a lot of this discussion, I think, in many ways didn’t really matter. This whole gender discussion, I always thought, got so much airtime relative to the actual relevance that it had for our day-to-day lives. But people felt very, very strongly about it.
Mounk: Just to illustrate this for the audience, because it’s in some ways a much more extreme version than anything we’ve discussed in the English language, it’s helpful to point out some of the changes that were made in the German language. In English, insofar as there’s a verbal or linguistic debate, it’s about the legitimacy of the third-person plural pronoun in the singular—is it fine to say “they” for an individual? That’s a bit of a change in the English language, but actually with antecedents before the question of gender really came up. It doesn’t particularly bother me very much.
In German there are two changes which are quite a bit more striking. One is that, as in many languages, the plural of nouns has often historically been gendered. So if you say Studenten, that includes both male and female students, but grammatically it’s the male form. There’s, I think, some quite bad linguistics behind the idea that if you say ein Aula voller Studenten—a room full of students—you picture a room full of just men. I’ve just never bought that that’s actually true in 2026. If I say I stood in front of an Aula full of Studenten, I don’t think anybody pictures a room that’s exclusively male. I don’t quite buy that. But be that as it may, the solution is to change to Studierende, which is a weird gerundive—that is to say, people who are currently studying. I have to say I have no particular problem with that. As somebody who left Germany before that became current, I’m just not at all in the habit of using it.
I did have one experience where I was on a panel and spoke the way that I grew up speaking, without any particular political implications, and got very hostile questions about why I wasn’t using this new linguistic form. I said, look, I’m a smart person who is pretty versed in language and who makes language my living, but I don’t live in Germany, so it didn’t come naturally to me. Think of all the people who are not up with all of the latest trends and who perhaps don’t have the same verbal facility because that’s not their job. Who then get that kind of hostility just because they spoke in a way that the German language has been spoken for hundreds of years.
The other change that I think is even more striking is that, to make a gender-neutral form in writing, you now put a star behind the ending—Student*in—to show that it could be a student who is male, or Studentin, who is female, or any other gender, indicated by the star. I personally don’t like that as a written form. But the thing that’s really quite odd is the verbal form of that, where you’re supposed to indicate—you can’t say “Student-star-in”—so you’re supposed to make a little pause between “Student” and the ending, and say “Student [pause] in.” Irrespective of how you feel about acceptance of trans people, etc., it’s very unnatural to introduce an artificial pause into a language. I don’t think it will ever take off in a broad way, and so it really just becomes a marker of educational attainment and belonging in a particular milieu. For understandable reasons, people then find it quite off-putting, and I think it just raises the price of acceptance of things like gender diversity in a way that I personally find unnecessary. Sorry, I didn’t mean to go on this little lecture, but for an English-speaking audience, I hope it is helpful.
Dada: No, I love this. A hundred percent—thank you for these very illustrative examples, because it’s exactly that. People felt like they were being outlawed in the country and in the language that they very much considered their home. Think of that what you want—change has always been around, and language has always been changing. So I think it’s not so much about whether we can change language to be more inclusive. I think it was more that there was a moral weight that came with this discussion, where the people who were not adapting to this change in a really rapid way were somehow seen as less, or different, or racist, or pick your favorite insult.
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Speaking more societally, that was one example, and there are many, many other examples. You mentioned migration—I have a migration background myself, but I do feel that oftentimes in these migration debates, I was able to say something that my German friends just weren’t able to say, because I had a migration background. That’s just a bit weird. That’s just not a society I want to live in. I want everyone to be able to speak their mind and voice what they are actually feeling and thinking without immediately being seen as racist or as less than.
All of this was coming together in this moral change, and then next to it there was the economic change. I think those two dimensions are tied, because I think the people who most felt the moral backlash of not wanting to change so quickly were also maybe the people who were feeling like they were being left behind economically relative to some other people who were benefiting more from globalization, from technology accelerating, and so on. Both of those things are intertwined and reinforcing one another, bringing us to this current moment and to your question about whether the German economic model, which was very much the powerhouse of Europe, is still working, and what we do to fix it.
If you look at all the broad statistics, Germany was in a recession. Now we’re no longer in a recession, but the growth outlooks are not looking amazing, and I always find it funny how we get bullish about the economy because we’re correcting growth upwards by 0.1 percent. But really, by and large, we’re just not growing as an economy. We’ve been in this kind of stagflation period for too long. A lot of the industries that Germany has always taken pride in—you mentioned automotive, the chemicals industry is another great example—many of them, also tied to really high energy costs, are no longer competitive, and we’re seeing tons of jobs that are either being cut or moved elsewhere.
The German car is such a great example. We always took pride in our German automotive brands, BMW, Mercedes, and so on. If you now go abroad, because of having completely misjudged and underestimated the relevance of electrification and the ability of Chinese car makers to catch up in what was very much going to be a fundamental transition in mobility—in the way that we think about the value of a car, much more electric value creation, much more software-defined, and no longer the combustion engine that made us so strong for so many decades—it was unthinkable that Chinese brands could ever have the same prestige and brand recognition as the German car brands. But if you go to countries like South Africa, or anywhere else where German cars were always sold at a premium, you now see BYDs and all of the Chinese car brands flooding the market, and people no longer really care about the fact that this is a BMW or a Mercedes. So the last vestige of German pride—that no one will ever be able to have a premium car brand in China—is now being taken from us as well.
I think it’s another example of how people are feeling that their identity and their value are being eroded over time. At the end of the day, this was true a thousand years ago and it’s going to be true a thousand years from now: we want to matter as humans, we want to be seen, we want to know that what we do is good, that someone deems it as valuable. It’s a fundamental part of making sense of our identity as a social being within a community, and I do think people are feeling that that’s being taken away.
So, back to the question: is the German economic model still working? No, it’s very clearly no longer working. If you look at the tech sector overall, in the United States there are 150 companies that make over a billion dollars in software revenues. In Europe, there are about 30. There’s a very stark difference. We now have the Mag 7—some of the biggest tech companies in the world—which, if you take them all together, are almost half the total market cap of the world. So we see this extreme concentration of economic wealth and growth in one sector, which is tech.
Interestingly, this is not so much a European or German problem as it is a technology problem, because if you look at the established non-tech industry in the United States, it’s suffering from exactly the same malaise as German or European industry. U.S. economic growth is by and large boosted by capex investment into data centers—it’s driven by the tech and AI boom. The non-tech industry in the United States is growing at the same rate as German or European established industry. But that still doesn’t do away with the fact that we just don’t have as strong an industry in the technology or R&D-innovation-heavy sectors as the United States. That’s why I feel so passionately about Europe and Germany having to do significantly more to invest in innovation and in AI, and we can get into the details of all the ways we haven’t done that enough over the last couple of decades.
When we look at the value stack of AI, you look at the chip and infrastructure layer—the chips, and then the data centers that host those chips to turn them into compute for training and inference. Then you look at the model layer, the models that are actually producing the intelligence that all of us now need for AI productivity. Then you look at the applications that use this intelligence to build meaningful, tangible applications that bring value to people’s lives. We play too little a role in every single part of the stack, and the further down the stack you go, the starker this gap becomes. I’ll go into the details of Europe 2031 and why we think we need the most drastic political agenda in Europe that we have engaged in during peacetime, because without fixing this gap—without having a structural answer to what the tech sector is in the United States and what it is in China—I don’t think, no matter how much transformation effort we engage in, that we’re going to be able to solve for this root cause that is at the root of all the other problems compounding and growing from there.
Mounk: One thing that strikes me—to stay for a second with the car industry before we fully get into tech—is that, in general, the sense that everything is going to be worse ten or twenty years from now, that we’re on the decline, that things might still be okay today but are going to fall apart tomorrow, tends to be alarmist, and I tend to be rather skeptical of it, and it’s easily politically exploited.
I think when it comes to Germany’s economy, I worry that it really may prove to be true. It doesn’t take a crazy imagination to think that Volkswagen might go bankrupt in the next few years, that Mercedes or BMW might be bought by Apple or some other U.S. tech company that wants to push into autonomous vehicles.
While you’re absolutely right that the rise of the AfD is a whole German and a whole Western problem, I would even go beyond that, because countries like India, etc., also see the rise of various forms of populist movements. I do think one of the reasons the AfD has been stronger in East Germany than West Germany is that West Germany has a huge economic strength, which is quite striking to me. I was traveling a couple of years ago in Vietnam and I spoke to a woman who said she’d been to Germany once because she worked for, I believe, Baumarkt, and the headquarters was in some small town I’d never heard of. I thought, politely, you must be mispronouncing this—I’ve never heard of this place, I don’t believe a headquarters can possibly be in this town. I looked it up, and she had in fact pronounced it quite well. I’d just never heard of the town, because when you’re in West Germany, you’re never more than an hour’s drive—often half an hour—from a genuine center of world commerce. That’s because German companies are very spread out, and even when the very large companies aren’t spread out, the suppliers really are. That, I think, is why West Germany has held together not just economically but politically.
So what happens if Volkswagen goes bankrupt, and BMW moves a lot of its production abroad, and all of the suppliers are suddenly no longer needed, is going to fundamentally transform the German political landscape in a way that I’m very worried about, and I think that might very well happen over the next ten or so years.
But to get to the question of tech, which, as you’re rightly identifying, is the key reason Germany is so far behind—tell us a little bit about this project, Europe 2031, that you co-wrote with a few other people. It really imagines—and I recommend everybody interested in the state and future of Europe go have a look at it—how Europe becomes totally irrelevant, not just economically but geopolitically, because it’s so far behind on tech. It’s a story, in some ways, of two friends: one who goes off to San Francisco and makes his way in tech, and the other who stays in Europe and slowly climbs the greasy and not-so-appealing pole of European bureaucratic politics. It’s really about them both despairing about the fate of Europe and presenting to us the scenario of what’s about to happen. What do you think is about to happen?
Dada: We wrote Europe 2031 out of a deep love for this continent, and because we want to do everything in our power to stop this scenario from actually becoming reality. It’s a narrative scenario—we’re not super-forecasters, it’s not meant to be an actual authoritative, timeline-based scenario. But we still tried to engage in disciplined imagination by writing jointly, in a very long Google Doc, all of our different perspectives, criticisms, and nuances that in the end led us to the story.
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As you rightly summarized, it’s about a young policymaker in Brussels and an AI founder from Germany who’s in Silicon Valley scaling his company. They’re chatting through text messages, exchanging and observing what is happening in Europe—he’s pushing AI from Silicon Valley, and she’s pushing AI from the policymaking perspective, trying to do the right things to diffuse the value of AI in Europe and to build AI champions of our own.
The scenario goes into three major points. First, that we massively underestimated the magnitude of AI. European policymakers particularly, but also to some extent the broader public—call them elected leaders of any sort, whether in the economy or the political realm—thought that this was going to be a little bit more like a tool, maybe like the desktop computer, or maybe like the mobile phone, when actually it was much more similar to the Industrial Revolution in the explosive force it would bring to the economy—or not bring, to the economies that are not adapting in the right way.
The second piece is that we underestimated the speed at which this technology was going to progress. I have to say, in 2026, it’s now September, and I’m feeling this part quite strongly looking at the most recent models coming out of OpenAI and other labs over just the last couple of months, which have been absolutely crazy in terms of progress. This was something Europe thought was going to happen maybe over decades, certainly over years, when really it was just a couple of years, and then suddenly a lot of progress happened in a very short period of time—massively underestimating what that would mean, both from a societal-preparedness perspective and from an investment perspective, and the urgency and type of capital mobilization then required to still play any meaningful part in this race.
The third piece we really underestimated was how important certain messengers, or certain companies, were, in consistently speaking the truth about where this was all headed—because most of those voices were squarely located in Silicon Valley, in some way or form entangled with the current politics of the United States, and associated therefore with MAGA. In that whole—we call it the “tech-brosphere,” as European media often refers to them—there’s a deep skepticism of any voice coming out of that corner of the world.
Mounk: I have my serious reservations about Elon Musk and all of that—but the way in which, just in the last few months, I see it with people I speak to, with the media, my students: the phrase “tech bro” has just become this thing where Silicon Valley, AI, is just tech bros doing stuff. It’s become nearly a slur. I don’t mean it’s offensive, but it’s become this super-easy way to dismiss the importance or relevance of any of this—let’s not worry too much about those tech bros in Silicon Valley and their games, we can ignore it because it’s just for tech bros. It’s very strange.
Dada: I fully agree. I would have hoped that maybe our piece would have shifted the narrative a little bit, but I think it’s actually grown. The “tech bro” narrative has grown—it’s not decreasing in any way or form. It’s exactly that: an immediate dismissal of those voices, seeing them as non-serious, as power-hungry people who just want to feed their own bank accounts.
I do think, to some extent, at least, the power-hungry people do want to feed their bank accounts. That can be true, and they can still be telling the truth. That’s what we go into in the piece: you can be critical of the political views, or the worldviews, or the moral fiber, of these people, but that does not give you the right to ignore what they are saying, because they are, virtually, the ones who are very much building this exponential technological wave. This is not a wave that is being pushed by a hundred thousand companies—this is very much a concentration of power in the hands of maybe a dozen companies that play massive roles in this race. They’re very much the people who are at the center of power of everything that is happening here.
At the same time, if you look at Elon Musk, for example—I’ve been very critical of Elon Musk, and written publicly about his political views, and how he’s pushing the AfD in Germany, and all the ways in which I think that ought to be criticized—still, I think he has been consistently speaking the truth, and also being a brilliant entrepreneur, for what it’s worth, in capturing the value that is being generated in this AI boom. Europe can’t say the same thing about our continent.
The piece goes into those three factors, and it basically leads to an economy that is no longer able to be competitive, where people are either blocked from using AI, or, more towards 2028, 2029 in the scenario, there’s an actual compute crunch in the world, because Europe has not built sufficient data center capacity and is very reliant on U.S. data center capacity. At the point where everything’s exploding and AI is really starting to take off and work, there’s just not enough compute, so there’s basically compute rationing, and Europe is not able to get as much as we would like in order to uphold our economic weight at the table.
All of that leads, at the end of the day, to the European Union falling apart and the European economy being sold for scraps and pieces, with the United States and China coming to the negotiating table, both making offers for various parts, almost like a cow, picking the beef strips that you want, and starting to negotiate on that. Europe is just absolutely powerless, no longer able to coordinate, to have a united front—there’s infighting happening. At that point, the scenario ends, and then we have an epilogue in 2035, where one of the characters is looking back and trying to grapple with her anger at not having done enough, asking what would it have taken for the leading class in Europe to see what was happening and to drastically change, even if it cost them their careers, even if all of those things were hugely unpopular, because Europe is already in a pretty difficult position, and a lot of these things require you to do things that, in the beginning at least, may look very unpopular in society. But people doing them anyway—not because they’re easy, but because they’re hard, and because they’re the right thing to be doing for Europe at that moment in time.
That’s one of the last pieces that was really important to us: the importance of, if you want to ask people to engage in this kind of change and to make these kinds of contributions—for example, labor market reforms are one of the contributions we think are hugely important. I live in Germany, I also invest a lot in France. These are two of the countries where making any type of organizational change is extremely expensive, to the point where it’s almost impossible for certain companies, because it’s just so expensive to let people go, to do even performance management, performance tracking. These are really difficult things. We need labor market reforms to be able to have more diffusion of AI in society, to allow companies to drive change with much more confidence, and thereby remain competitive.
But these are obviously things that society doesn’t like. So what is the story? Who’s the politician—I always ask, who is the person who’s able to stand there and have a vision that people get excited about, and say, this is why I see the light at the end of the tunnel, and why I’m willing to contribute my fair share of change in this wider sum that will then get us to higher ground? Europe right now has none of that.
Mounk: I was on Italian TV this morning, and there was the usual general chaos—I woke up to seven missed calls about where I am, because they’d moved my appearance forward by an hour without telling me. So that was a fun way to start the day. But they had a brief discussion about the lack of opportunity for young Italians, and talented young Italians moving abroad, as one of the crises for the country, which I very much agree with. It’s one of the tragedies to see how many talented young people are forced to move abroad even though they’d love to make their careers in Italy, or who stay in Italy and just see their prospects diminished in a very serious way.
But the solution that seemingly everybody on the panel proposed was to say the problem is the precarity of young people, and we need to make sure they have more secure employment contracts and that it’s harder to fire them. I wanted to scream and say, no, the problem is that you don’t have any economic dynamism—nobody wants to hire a twenty-five-year-old if you have to employ them for the next forty years, no matter what the future of your economy and your company looks like. We’re in such a malaise that some of the solutions people try to embrace are actually reinforcing the roots of the problem rather than solving them.
But I want to get back to the solutions you propose, and to the fact that you also advise the German government on AI policy. First, I want to dig into why it’s such a problem if Europe falls behind on AI. One problem is perhaps economic—there are a lot of economic benefits to the tech sector in general, and perhaps AI specifically, though there are questions about that too; perhaps Anthropic and OpenAI will prove to be economically unsustainable, etc. More broadly, there are two lines of disagreement and skepticism I want to tease out.
One disagreement is: what kind of AI does Europe need? Does Europe need frontier models, where we’re particularly far behind and it’s going to be particularly difficult to catch up? Or do we simply need to be good at creating AI-powered companies and having a lot of AI adoption? I had an interesting discussion about this the other day, on a podcast episode that will soon be released, where Louis was arguing that actually it’s fine if Europe is behind on foundation models—we don’t need those, as long as we have compute in Europe, as long as we actually apply AI in our businesses, we can remain competitive in everything that matters, and just leave the foundation models, the frontier models, to the United States or China. Other people seem to argue that this still makes you a vassal—that you’re still militarily dependent on the United States, that they can switch off access to those frontier models, that no matter how hard it is to catch up on frontier models, unless you’re doing that, you’re just giving up any hope of being an equal player in the twenty-first century.
So, to start with, where would you sit on that debate? Do you think Europe needs to catch up on actually developing frontier labs here? Or can we have this kind of free-rider attitude that we had toward military security for much of the second half of the twentieth century, saying, well, the United States is going to provide our frontier models, and perhaps sometimes we can use open-source models from China, and we rely on the fact that we’ll somehow always have good-enough models to defend ourselves, for our companies to compete, because they have access to those models?
Dada: This is a great question, and I think it deserves a little bit of nuance. Let me try to untangle it. The way I would think about it: yes, there is a big economic argument to be made—and this is just a vibes-based number—that eighty percent of the economy, of the total value creation of AI, is not going to depend on the strongest Pareto-frontier model. There are many other models that are powerful but more efficient, cheaper, maybe open source, that are still covering whatever economically valuable task I’m trying to achieve, within their intelligence distribution, so I’m able to get that done. I don’t actually need the most recent version of whatever the closed-source models from the big labs are able to perform. I think eighty percent of the economy is going to be just fine and booming, just trying to get a unit of intelligence at the cheapest price. That’s going to be a big market. In fact, the company I’m leading is also massively focused on this—this is where a lot of the term “model routing” comes in, where you actually want to be independent of the underlying models. You shouldn’t care if it’s model A, B, or C—you should just care whether it’s the best intelligence at the cheapest price, lowest latency, at any given point in time.
Then there’s the other twenty percent. I struggle to pin down that twenty percent—it may turn out to be significantly more, or significantly less—because this is where frontier intelligence plays a role, and I still struggle with valuing frontier intelligence in the right way. How do you value intelligence that goes beyond human intelligence at scale? I find that very difficult. I can’t properly do a market sizing for that, because who knows? These are things like drug discovery. These are adversarial markets—think of cybersecurity, where there’s always a better hacker, so you always want access to the best frontier intelligence to hack the next system or defend against the intrusion. These are markets like hedge funds, generally structured in an adversarial nature, where your gain is very much someone else’s loss. There’s also the securing of critical infrastructure. There are a lot of markets where I’d argue having a lot of Einsteins in a room matters enormously.
I always use one example to make this tangible: if you had access to a thousand Einsteins right now and you were a hedge fund, I think you’d be able to boost your total success pretty drastically. Versus if you were Coca-Cola, I don’t think having a thousand Einsteins would make Coca-Cola that much more successful, because it’s a big brand, a recipe that’s been around for a hundred years, a lot of distribution, physical stuff. Einstein is not going to meaningfully change your warehouse. There’s an elasticity to intelligence, where a marginal additional unit of intelligence is valued differently by different industries.
Coming back to Europe, and how to think about this from a sovereign perspective: for that eighty percent, I think it’s fine if we just have access to the current model landscape. It’s wide and beautiful—unfortunately there are very few European names, but we can use the Chinese models, we can use the U.S. models. This is not likely the part of the market that’s going to close down if push comes to shove. But for that twenty percent, I think it’s crucial, absolutely crucial. I don’t think you can honestly tell a European person that you’re able to defend their lives ten years from now, or secure their access to the modern medicine that will be available at that point, if you don’t secure access to frontier intelligence.
How do you secure access to frontier intelligence? You’ve got two options. Either you produce it yourself—but if you produce it yourself, it’s not fine to be number three, it’s not fine to be number four, it’s not fine to just do what DeepSeek does, minus twelve months. If Europe does engage in a lab effort, it needs to be a Manhattan-style, ultra-ambitious, ultra-well-funded effort, because the piece where it actually matters is being able to produce outcomes that are frontier. Looking at the recursive self-improvement loop—AI starting to improve AI research itself, which is happening at OpenAI, at Anthropic, and other leading labs—we are somewhat late in the game to build this up ourselves. But I honestly think this is such an important race that I don’t care if it’s late in the game. It’s not over until it’s over. Even if it’s the last meter of the marathon, I will still try my best not to come in last place, and try to somehow make it over the finish line.
If Europe engages in an effort, we need to do away with all of the non-ambitious approach and just make this an ultra-ambitious effort. Now, even if we were to do that—if Europe was able to get its act together, mobilize the capital, mobilize the talent—I think success would still not be guaranteed. That’s why the second perspective comes in: frontier intelligence is going to matter for the areas I just outlined, so let’s engage in our own very ambitious effort, but let’s also plan for a scenario where it doesn’t succeed. That comes down to: what are the other areas where we have value, where we own certain valuable bottlenecks, where we can increase our weight at the table so we can negotiate access to the frontier, however it’s shaped, whoever owns it at that given moment?
This is where a lot of the let’s build more compute in Europe comes in, because compute is the actual infrastructure that powers all of this. Compute matters enormously, both for training and for inference, and for the economic weight you’re able to push, how you’re able to diffuse the value of AI. So let’s do a lot more here to become a much more relevant player. Let’s also look at the very meaningful choke points, the valuable assets we control in the overall AI supply chain, because we still have companies like ASML, like TSMC, Siemens Energy is a great example, powering the entire data-center boom we’re currently seeing. We have a lot of industrial AI companies. If you look at, for example, humanoid robots, a lot of the suppliers—the “hidden champions,” these companies no one’s ever heard of, in some random German village, who are still the world market leaders producing that one actuator, that one critical piece. We have a lot of these assets, but I don’t think we have a coherent enough strategy of putting them together and using them to create leverage and increase our weight at the table. So I think we need to be doing both—securing access to frontier, or building frontier, while also recognizing that the eighty percent of valuable tasks that don’t require that also exist.
Europe, I think, is well positioned if we actually get the diffusion part right, because the productivity piece is so crucial here. One given euro of inference spend that goes to OpenAI, Anthropic, or Mistral—pick a model of your choice—can unlock three, four, five, ten euros of productivity for companies that are able to use this intelligence to increase their competitiveness in the market. That’s the economic piece that matters enormously, and there’s also the security piece that matters enormously. That’s why it’s a little bit more nuanced, and we need all things at the same time, if that makes sense. I think that would be the sensible strategy—you need to plan for different scenarios and be ultra-ambitious about pushing each of them, because we don’t quite know where we’re going to land in the end.
Mounk: That’s a super helpful way of thinking through it. If you want to have that effort, before we get to solutions, we need an accurate diagnosis of the problem. I’m struck that in these conversations I keep hearing a set of overlapping explanations, but often people don’t get on the same page about which of them really matters. One explanation is that we just don’t have capital, because we’ve missed the tech boom, so there’s a lot less capital that can be allocated to startups in Europe. A second is that there’s a cultural problem—in a narrower sense, that there just isn’t a strong enough startup ecosystem in Europe, because it’s so much stronger in the United States, or for that matter in Shenzhen or Beijing; or in a broader sense, that students here—and I certainly feel this talking to American and European students—are more likely to aspire, as your scenario implies, to be a bureaucrat in Brussels than to be a startup founder.
There’s also a set of concerns about the general weight of regulation—how hard it is to do everything from incorporating, to, in Germany, having to listen to very expensive notaries read out a contract in front of you, which Peter Thiel recently commented on, but which my friend who works in startup and VC land in Berlin has complained about to me many times before—to taxation, where you might be taxed in some European countries, not all, on the theoretical valuation of your company, even if you don’t have any of that money in your pocket yet as a startup founder, to the lack of a single European market. I’m probably missing three or four other explanations.
You have the vantage point of being a prominent commentator on this in the media, but also of being in the tech industry and investing in tech companies in Europe. What are your top frustrations, and how does that perspective inform your assessment of this debate?
Dada: It is a multifaceted problem, and all of those dimensions matter, but they don’t matter in the same way. I do think there is a very significant capital problem—not so much that Europe doesn’t have capital, because that’s not true. We have our own pension funds, big insurance companies with big balance sheets. But what is true is that, structurally, Europe does not have an equivalent to the current biggest funders of AI, which in the United States are the likes of AWS, Google, Microsoft, xAI, OpenAI—who have either access to capital they’re raising from the VC market, or balance sheets that have no singular equivalent here.
The concentration of economic power in the United States doesn’t have a structural equivalent in Europe. Our economy is actually not that much smaller—I believe the European economy is about two-thirds of the US economy—but we structurally lack a small number of players who can coordinate at very low cost, because xAI can just call OpenAI, can just call Anthropic, can just call Microsoft. People say they’re doing circular deals with Nvidia, but at the end of the day, the beautiful advantage the United States has is vast resources concentrated in a small number of players who are able to coordinate. In Europe you’ve got country borders, different regulation, different companies that have capital, but the coordination costs are significantly higher. We don’t have a single market. We don’t really even have a homogenized financial market.
What I’ve been advocating is that Europe is what it is—we won’t be able to do away with these structures tomorrow. That just means we need to make an even bigger effort from the private and public side coming together: a small number of players, the biggest corporations in Europe and the biggest governments, who also have access to very meaningful funding and to regulation they could change—for example, allowing pension funds or insurers to allocate more money to venture capital, because in the United States there’s ten to twenty times more capital allocated to venture capital by these bodies than in many European countries. A small enough number of players need to come together and engage in an ultra-ambitious effort to make up for the fact that we don’t have the structural equivalent of the United States, where most of this can just be done by the private sector and a small number of companies. We won’t have that small number of companies, but I think it can be a small enough number of companies and governments, a coalition of the willing, so to speak, that come together and engage in very meaningful reform to mobilize the capital.
The second piece—I don’t so much think it’s a talent problem. I do buy the talent piece to some extent, but there are many Europeans in the United States who would really love to come back to Europe and give it their all, because they want Europe to succeed. It’s a domino effect, a chicken-and-egg problem: they don’t see the capital side coming together, so they think, I’m not going to come and run some startup that’s going to get 200 million in funding, because I know it’s just not going to go anywhere. At the end of the day, it needs—and this is the interesting piece—an Elon Musk-type figure, someone with as much influence, power, and orchestration capability, to bring all of these puzzle pieces together. We don’t have these ultra-connected, mega-connected individuals in Europe—it tends to be a lot more fragmented, and it’s difficult for us to put all the ingredients together. The Commission is trying to do some part, national governments are trying to do some part, VCs are trying to do some part, but no single party by itself has enough power to truly get the job done.
That’s currently my biggest concern. I do think many people are starting to understand the problem, or what a solution could look like, but we’re missing the end decision-making power and the weight of someone who’s able to lock people in a room for three days, Manhattan-style, meet in the desert, and just make the deal happen. I think that’s actually the biggest structural gap we have in Europe. I think we could overcome many of the other challenges—which are indeed real challenges—but I think they’re minuscule in comparison to this much more top-down structural and capital challenge.
Mounk: So how do we overcome this? As you’re saying, there’s a large economy, a lot of Europeans who’ve saved a lot of money—but most Germans, for example, until very recently, saved money through insurance companies, taking out insurance products, life insurance products that would give them guaranteed two-point-five, three percent returns a year. They’re not directly invested in the stock market, which obviously makes it much harder to allocate capital toward the most productive and risky things. The lack of comfort with the idea of investment is still deeply rooted in the European middle class, which tends to think of it as some kind of gamble.
There are all kinds of cultural obstacles here. Presumably the only coordinating instance that exists is the state—when you’re talking about a Manhattan Project-style undertaking, presumably this would be the European Union coordinating with the member states on some kind of project. I agree with you on the need for a Manhattan Project-style undertaking. I guess I’m just very skeptical that, if led by Brussels in coordination with twenty-seven member states and all of their political demands, in a culture of people who are very skeptical about the wisdom of this in the first place, this can work.
Dada: I agree. I’m under no illusion that this would be easy. The German government is, as we speak, negotiating reforms of our pension system and the Aktienrente—the pension that could be fueled by investment into capital markets—and it’s proving a very, very difficult undertaking. So I can only agree with you that structurally it is very difficult. But at the same time, it is the right thing to do, or almost the only thing to do. Just pointing to the private sector and saying VCs and companies, go solve that doesn’t account for the structural difference between the European market and the U.S. market. The only way to fix this gap is for the public side and the private side to come together and work together.
I don’t think it needs all twenty-seven member states. I think a coalition of the willing—if you look at the size of the economies in Europe, there are a couple of economies that matter quite a lot more than others. If you focused on the top three, four, five economies—I would also love to see the UK included, even though they’re no longer part of the European Union. I actually think that some of the ministers there, the people currently leading AI strategy, have a lot of really good ideas that we could replicate—for example, looking at the AI Security Institute in the UK, or a lot of the work they’ve done around the sovereign AI fund, trying to invest very seriously in the next breakout technology that could emerge five to ten years from now, with the capital and talent required to do that properly. There are many things the UK is doing that we could be modeling in Germany or other countries in Europe.
It’s difficult, but just because it’s difficult doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try to do it. I’d also say we need to look this fact in the eye: Europe and the EU are a construct that was built in a time when stability and peace, and never going to war with your neighbor again, was the most important focus. It’s amazing that we were able to build the European project in the first place—what an achievement. As someone who has grown up in Europe, I am nothing but thankful for a lot of the energy and effort that went into the European project. However, times change. The only thing that is for certain is that if times change but you refuse to change and remain the same, the result is eventual decline. We are but one big arc of evolution, and all of us are here today because we found ways to adapt. Had we not adapted, we would have long been eradicated.
The EU, or European national governments, or Europe, is now at a crucial crossroads. We need to look the fact in the eye that we have the right principles at the core of this continent—self-determination, human dignity, equality, valuing the life not of the richest person but of ordinary citizens, equal contribution in the democratic process, and so on. These are all things that ought to be protected. But to protect them, we need to look the fact in the eye that the processes that served us well in the past are no longer fit for the times we live in. I don’t care what type of cutting of red tape, what kind of extraordinary policymaking and rule-making we now need to engage in, to be able to make change and get to progress. We need to look the fact in the eye that the current processes meant to protect what is actually valuable no longer serve us, and will, in the end, lead to us upholding the processes but losing all the things they were actually meant to protect.
The only solution I have is that things need to drastically change, and we need to find new ways of regulating and of making change happen in disruptive ways—but ways that I believe will actually serve us well in this overall transformation we’re currently going through. I don’t have perfect solutions, but I can only say: it’s hard, but just because it’s hard doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be attempted, or shouldn’t be done.
Mounk: I feel like we’re ending on probably a conscious, perhaps unconscious, allusion to my favorite novel, and the line from The Leopard that for everything to stay the same, everything will have to change. I very much share the same sentiment about Europe today.
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Poland is known as a bastion of European conservatism—and also as a country that, since 1989, has demonstrated rapid economic growth that is twice the average for OECD countries. From the outside, it might seem that these two things are interconnected. But as a naturalized citizen who has lived in Poland for over four years, I will try to show that policies based on conservative values not only weigh down Polish businesses, but also lead to consequences that even conservatives are unhappy with.
On Sundays, millions of people around the world flock to shopping malls. Even in my native Belarus, where the number of political prisoners per capita is comparable to that of Cuba, the mall is a hub of activity at weekends for those who aren’t in prison.
Poland, where Sunday shopping has been gradually banned since 2018, stands apart from this cult of consumption. The law, supported by the Catholic Church, was initially promoted by the “Solidarity” trade union under the pretext that it would allow Polish women—who make up the majority of the retail workforce—to spend Sundays with their families.
The law did, however, provide for exceptions—of which retail chains took advantage, handing out parcels in addition to groceries, or hanging paintings above their beer refrigerators to turn their stalls into “galleries.” Many of these loopholes were eventually closed, meaning the law took full effect—and it is now clear that all of its stated goals have failed.
Sunday church attendance has fallen. And although this decline fits into a broader secular trend and is partly linked to COVID-19, the Sunday shopping law may have played a significant role. Cezary Kaźmierczak, head of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, notes that for many, attending church was a nuanced ritual—people would first go to church and then, with a clear conscience, to the mall.
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Instead of church, however, Poles have chosen bread and circuses. Now, Polish women are once again working on Sundays—only this time at movie theaters and food courts, wondering why the Adidas saleswoman gets to spend her Sunday with her family, while the McDonald’s saleswoman does not.
The law dealt the heaviest blow to small businesses. Large retail chains retooled their marketing strategies for Friday and Saturday, changing people’s shopping habits. Some small shops began to close, and their place was taken by franchise chains such as Żabka, whose stores can operate on Sundays because, technically, they are not owned by the chain but by the independent entrepreneurs who run them. This “independence” does not exempt entrepreneurs from Żabka’s strict corporate policies, but it does allow them to operate outside the labor code and work not only on Sundays but also up to seventeen hours a day. (In addition, a blank promissory note, which must be signed “for Żabka’s security,” can ultimately leave a franchisee $30,000 in debt, which is why critics call the franchise a form of modern slavery.)
But the Polish government didn’t stop there. Having “protected” Poles’ right to rest on Sundays, it has now taken on a larger problem—the protection of the nation.
The honeymoon period for Polish attitudes towards migrants—and especially toward migrants from Ukraine—is over. While at the start of the war, 94% of Poles supported taking in Ukrainian refugees, by July 2026 52% opposed such a policy. Furthermore, in the first half of 2026, the number of hate crimes against Ukrainians rose by 30%.
The history behind Poles’ particular attitude toward Ukrainians is complex. Oliver Cromwell is a national hero to the British but a butcher to the Irish. Ukrainians and Poles have their own Oliver Cromwell: Stepan Bandera, who fought for Ukrainian independence during World War Two, but was also implicated in the Volhynia massacre of 1943-44, in which 100,000 Poles were killed.
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At the same time, Ukrainians view Bandera first and foremost as a fighter against Russia—which is particularly relevant in the context of the current conflict. Some aren’t even aware that he has any connection to Poland (I myself spoke with a Ukrainian who didn’t understand why Poles get annoyed when Ukrainians sing the song “Our Father Is Bandera” in the streets). Meanwhile, even those who are aware of the connection tend to downplay the accusations, arguing that there was violence on both sides and that the Volhynia massacre was carried out by Bandera’s supporters rather than the man himself, who at the time was imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp.
Even in 2022, at the start of the Ukraine War, these tensions were evident. However, they were magnified by the paleolibertarian Confederation Party, which had grown to be the third-largest political party in Poland by capitalizing on anti-immigration rhetoric.
In response, the Polish political center began to shift to the right, and as a result, Donald Tusk’s liberal government adopted the anti-immigrant strategy “Regain control. Ensure security,” under which the state excludes migrants arriving from certain countries.
As part of this strategy, in 2025 the government reduced the number of work permits for non-EU nationals (whose labor accounts for up to 10.7% of the Polish economy) by 22%. Experts believe that this strategy, which restricts the hiring of foreigners, prioritizes short-term political goals at the expense of the economy. Poland doesn’t actually face a shortage of jobs being taken by migrants. On the contrary: demographic decline in Poland is causing an acute labor shortage. According to estimates by the Polish Economic Institute, if this shortfall is not offset—including through foreign workers—Poland could lose 2.1 million workers by 2035, resulting in a 6-8% decline in GDP due to losses in the industrial sector.
To be fair, Polish conservatives are also trying to address the demographic problem. But the methods they’ve chosen have had unexpected consequences.
Poland has one of the strictest anti-abortion laws in Europe. (This is not just true for the liberal countries that are part of the EU. For example, in my native Belarus—often called Europe’s last dictatorship—you can go to prison for a comment on YouTube, yet abortion remains a standard medical procedure.) Unlike most European countries, the concept of “abortion on demand” does not exist in Poland.
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Abortion in Poland is even banned when the fetus is terminally ill, forcing women to carry the child to term and give birth, knowing the child will suffer and die. While in theory abortion is permitted when the mother’s health is at risk or if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, these exemptions do not always apply in practice.
A woman who decides to have an abortion bears no legal responsibility—only those who assist in performing the procedure can face criminal prosecution, even for simply giving a woman abortion pills. In this situation, Polish doctors are reluctant to perform abortions resulting from rape—after all, this claim must be confirmed by a prosecutor, and it is not always possible to secure such confirmation within the allotted 12 weeks. And even if the pregnancy threatens the mother’s health, doctors prefer to wait until sepsis sets in, though this strategy carries the risk of criminal prosecution.
Poland’s abortion ban has led to two outcomes, one of which spells trouble for conservatives, and the other for society as a whole.
Because of the abortion ban in Poland, feminists and “Eurocrats”—so despised by conservatives—have begun to gain popularity. By mobilizing their supporters in the fight for abortion rights, they were able to form Tusk’s liberal government, which, issued an official directive to the Ministry of Health stating that a threat to a woman’s health also includes threats to her mental health.
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Nor did the abortion ban solve the problem of fear of pregnancy. When getting pregnant means you might die, Polish women think much more about the risks before going through with it. Economists at the University of Warsaw have calculated that the abortion ban reduced the birth rate by 6.6% precisely because pregnancy is now perceived as an extremely risky undertaking. Since the number of women reporting they’re avoiding pregnancy altogether has now exceeded the number of legal abortions in previous years, it seems that women who might in other circumstances have chosen motherhood are deciding against it.
Only time will tell how this decline will affect Poland’s economic growth and its pay-as-you-go pension system—but one suspects that few will be pleased with the outcome.
Thanks in part to integration into the EU, and economic aid from the bloc, Poland has indeed shown remarkable growth in its recent history. Conservative values—such as a high level of public trust—may also have played a significant role in this. However, attempts to impose these values from above have not only harmed the economy, but have also lead to outcomes that clearly contradict the very goals conservatives were aiming for.
Slava Amanatski is a Belarusian stand‑up comedian and writer who is temporarily living in Poland due to certain disagreements with Alexander Lukashenko’s regime.
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Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, September 25 at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
As Andrew Sullivan wrote a few days after the Twin Towers fell, America’s national myth includes the idea that the country exists as “the place apart, the city on a hill, the eternal elsewhere”—a place of safety and refuge from the bloodshed and suffering that mark so many pages of human history. Americans have always believed that “whatever horrors lay out there, there was always this place, where no external force could harm them, where no foreign threat could ever intrude.”
And the remarkable fact is that this myth had been reinforced and seemingly confirmed over the course of the 20th century—decades during which the United States engaged in a series of wars and police actions around the globe without ever suffering “an attack on America itself—its soil, its cities, its land.” In these manifold conflicts, only the distant military outpost of Pearl Harbor ever experienced the horror of aerial bombardment.
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Through two world wars, the deadly skirmishes of the Cold War, and the grossly lopsided interventions of the 1990s, American civilians remained secure in their homeland, unscathed by the indiscriminate violence of modern warfare, untouched by the uniquely potent experience of existential threat that comes from living with the ever-present possibility of violent death at the hands of a powerful national adversary.
Until September 11, 2001, that is. And the experience changed things in manifold unexpected ways.
RightshiftThe first sign of a shift on the right became apparent around the time of the 2002 State of the Union speech—the one in which President George W. Bush talked about an Axis of Evil and began laying the groundwork for a regime change war to depose Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
I’m not simply, or even mainly, talking about this newly aggressive approach to foreign policy. I mean, at least as much, a broader shift of attitude on the right. Since the early days of the Reagan administration, if not before, the conservative movement had been setting up a counter-establishment of right-leaning intellectuals who could do policy analysis and make public arguments in defense of conservative priorities in op-ed pages and the Sunday morning political talk shows. The tone was sometimes cartoonish, but it was usually grounded in serious arguments.
But that changed. What over the previous four months had been a uniform chorus of patriotic support for the president and the Afghanistan campaign quickly evolved into a frenzy of bellicosity. Some columnists denounced deterrence and stability in favor of unilateral preemptive war to overthrow hostile regimes. Others openly advocated American imperialism. Still others proposed that the United States act to topple the governments of a series of sovereign nations in the Muslim Middle East, including Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
These were the intellectually respectable suggestions, published in mainstream newspapers and long-established journals of opinion. Farther down the media hierarchy, on cable news, websites, and blogs, conservatives of all stripes closed ranks, unleashing a verbal barrage on any and all who dissented from a united front in favor of unapologetic American military muscle. The participants in this endless pep rally were insistent on open-ended war, overtly hostile to dissent, and thoroughly unforgiving of the slightest criticism of the United States abroad. They were dismissive of complication and analysis, defensive by default, worshipful of “manliness,” admiring of swaggering bluntness, contemptuous of doubt and indecision, addicted to hyperbole, eager to expose “appeasement,” and prone to paranoia. Self-congratulation and self-righteousness ruled the day.
Sound familiar? Much of this had a longstanding place on the right, though it often lived on the fringes. Its prior high-water mark in the broader culture was the period of McCarthyism in the early 1950s. After the Senator from Wisconsin crashed and burned, it migrated back to the margins, residing in John Birch Society meetings and Phyllis Schlafly’s mimeographed newsletters. It lent right-populist energy to Barry Goldwater’s insurgent campaign for the GOP nomination in 1964 and eventually contributed to Ronald Reagan’s failed 1976 and successful 1980 bids for the White House. It was there in the Reagan Revolution but subsumed in a far vaster and more mainstream movement, especially by the time of the “Morning in America” re-election campaign of 1984. It caused trouble for George H. W. Bush’s presidency, and even flirted with switching its allegiance to Pat Buchanan during the 1992 primaries, with some portion of its voters ultimately supporting Ross Perot’s third-party presidential bid in the general election that year. It spent the remainder of the ’90s trying to take down and eventually impeach and remove from office President Bill Clinton, a supremely moderate Democrat.
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But in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it burst into the open in a new way, in much closer proximity to the halls of power. Right-leaning media companies and ambitious partisan muckrakers quickly learned there was an eager audience for rabidly frothing hysteria. Over the remaining years of the two-term presidency of George W. Bush, Fox News would become de facto state media spouting militaristic propaganda 24/7. It demonized Islam on a daily basis, but it was also ready and eager to do the same with any Democrat who dared to raise a question or objection to administration policy. It was even worse on talk radio and the websites and blogs popping up like mushrooms in a shady and soggy field surrounding the DC-based TV and print journalists who learned to love serving as officials toiling away in the administration’s propaganda ministry.
Enemies Abroad, Enemies at HomeNo one should have been surprised about what happened when Bush was succeeded by Democrat Barack Obama. All those people working to prop up Great Leader had nowhere else to go and nothing else to do but to flip the switch to negation. Now the right-wing media machine became an onslaught of 24/7 opposition, portraying the nation’s first black president as something—anything—other than a real American: someone who, deep down, sided with our nation’s most murderous enemies. He wanted to transform the country into a self-hating socialist dystopia, and he wanted to do it while all the time pretending to float above the partisan fray. But ordinary Americans, real Americans, could see through the act. They could tell what Obama really had in mind for us—that he longed for and chose American decline and was willing to do everything in his power to enact it.
The right’s media machine had learned a lesson embedded in the history of political philosophy and promulgated in the 20th century by far-right legal theorist Carl Schmitt. The lesson was this: Emergencies—situations in which the very survival of the political community is at stake—are incredibly clarifying. War with existential stakes against a formidable enemy unifies and grants absolute moral clarity. It worked when the enemy was Al Qaeda, and now it worked again when the enemy was the president of the United States. Eventually, the class of enemies would be massively expanded to include everyone in the president’s party, and all those willing to vote for it. Partisanship, which once rose during the height of election battles but receded when it came time for governing, now expanded to fill every last crack and crevice in our public life. We weren’t embroiled in a real civil war, but politics would nonetheless be conducted as if the other party and its chosen candidates were treasonous soldiers in an enemy army seeking our utter destruction.
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The militarism uncorked by the September 11 attacks never returned to the bottle. Instead, it got recirculated and redirected against a constantly rotating roster of enemies. Every Republican with national ambitions learned to talk and think this way, including Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and all the other candidates running in the 2016 GOP primaries—at least all of those who rose in the polls above the low single digits.
But no one was better at it than Donald Trump. In my voluminous writings about the rise of right-populism in our politics, I often emphasize discontinuity between the pre-Trump and post-Trump GOP. But not in this respect. There is a straight line from McCarthy and the Birchers to Rush Limbaugh and Judicial Watch hounding Bill Clinton, to the post-September 11 jingoist thirst for vengeance, to the demonization of Obama (including the Birtherist conspiracy), to Trump’s ascendence to the head of the Republican Party—a position from which he has governed (both the party and the country as a whole when he’s been in office) like an occupying power actively attempting to humiliate and punish an unruly and ungrateful native population.
This tendency would have had a place in our politics without September 11, just as it did before September 11. But I don’t think it would have been unleashed with anything like the same fury or gotten anything close to the mainstream traction it has without it. (This is why, as much as I found the “Resistance Liberalism” of Trump 1.0 pretty cringy and often politically counter-productive, I nonetheless understand where it came from. If you govern like an occupying power, don’t be surprised if those suffering under the occupation begin thinking like the members of a resistance movement. One form of cosplay necessarily conjured the other into existence.)
Providential DreamsMuch of what I’ve said so far can be seen as an extension of what Andrew Sullivan wrote in the days following the September 11 attacks. But Tony Judt’s own reflection on the meaning of that day’s events also requires assimilation into any assessment of its legacy, domestically in the United States, but also globally.
From 1989 until that late-summer morning twelve years later, the world felt like it was evolving in a clear direction, if often haltingly and uncertainly. “We”—meaning the Free World and its allies, led by the United States—were building what the first President Bush had dubbed in 1990 a “New World Order.” That meant a law-abiding world. One that upheld borders. That supported free trade. That favored liberal immigration policies. That gave financial help and other kinds of incentives to encourage liberalizing reforms wherever democracy was just emerging or suffering setbacks. And that came together to defend this order, with force, when necessary.
That’s what we did after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and then, later, as we attempted to enforce the post-Gulf War UN resolutions that Hussein did his best to flout over the following decade. We struggled to do something similar throughout the mid-‘90s in response to the convulsions of a bloody civil war in the former Yugoslavia, with mixed results at best. Yet even as the West stood on the sidelines and agonized about what to do and how to do it, the analysis seemed obvious: This shouldn’t be happening. This was a reversion to a prior state of the world, one in which national and religious solidarities inspired vile, inhumane hatreds that most of the planet had either left behind or was actively working to eradicate. We looked at international terrorism the same way: These were history’s losers making a last-ditch, pathetic effort to throw sand in the gears of the inevitable future that everyone else recognized lay directly ahead.
Even Bush 43’s September 20 speech, with its lines about Al Qaeda ending up in “history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies,” was written from within that mindset. Of course we will win. Of course they will lose. We stand for the future and run the show. They are death-loving lunatics at war with humanity itself who want to drag us back to the Dark Ages. In fact, the Bush administration never broke out of that mindset. It deepened and reached its apogee in Dubya’s second inaugural address, which extended it to theological proportions, with the United States summoned by God himself to the goal of “ending tyranny in our world.”
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That’s the universalistic form of conservatism (really a militant form of liberalism) that crashed and burned with the quagmire of the post-invasion Iraq War and then the financial crisis of 2008. By the start of the 2010s, the unfolding of history had shifted just enough to begin planting widespread doubts about its direction. What if history didn’t have sides? What if its outcome wasn’t preordained? What if today’s losers could become tomorrow’s winners? What if a bunch of cave-dwelling religious fanatics could wound and humiliate the most powerful nation in the world and the best that this nation could do in response was to get embroiled in two interminable wars whose outcome was muddled at best?
What if the humiliation never ended?
That’s the populist script that’s dominated ever since—both internationally and within the world’s democracies.
The Politics of DefiancePopulist politics has its own distinctive logic. The September 11 attacks made sense because they were a mighty blow struck against the most powerful nation in the world—yet Osama bin Laden apparently believed we’d respond by lobbing a few cruise missiles at a terrorist training camp and then slink away like the “weak horse” we were. We’ve seen that peculiar blend of views repeated over and over again in the quarter century since: the enemy is a formidable opponent worthy of our wrath; but the enemy is also pathetically weak and can be banished with a single, quick and easy blow.
Donald Trump and his throngs of cheerleaders and imitators talk this way about Democrats, universities, the media, liberals, the left, socialists, and communists: They control everything. But if you vote for me, I will vanquish them in an instant to Make America Great Again.
Occupy Wall Street and then Bernie Sanders said something similar about billionaires at the commanding heights of finance capitalism: They run the show from top to bottom, but if you march with or vote for me, we can topple them and end the oligarchy.
Social-justice progressives said it about the patriarchy and white supremacy.
Right-populist parties in Europe say it about the centrist establishment they aim to overthrow.
Everywhere we look, outsiders residing (or imagining they reside) on the periphery of power aim to decenter (or at least stick a painful finger in their eye of) the powers that be who run the show. The Al Qaeda hijackers were the first to demonstrate it could be done, and they did it in the most spectacular way possible, on the most enormous conceivable stage. Meanwhile, the smart phones and social media networks that have come to span the globe over the past decade and a half transform comparatively modest acts of defiance into bold gestures of revolutionary impudence that can, in turn, inspire future rounds of insubordination anywhere they are viewed.
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We now live in a world filled with people whose imaginations have been shaped by such boldly insolent acts. We shouldn’t be surprised that so many of them are opting to take the bastards down a peg or two (or three)—even when such acts of imitation end up producing outcomes no more good for the world than the original murderous deeds of September 11.
Damon Linker, a contributing writer at Persuasion, writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.
This article originally appeared in Notes from the Middleground.
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My generation was the first to come of age with social media. From the beginning, there was reason for skepticism. My early memories of social media consist, embarrassingly enough, of Instagram tags with the popular kids and six-figure Snap Scores. (A “Snap Score” is a particularly asinine statistic: it measures the number of selfies sent and received on Snapchat. The more selfies, the higher the social standing.)
In the decade since, that skepticism has grown into organized and bipartisan opposition. Jonathan Haidt’s 2024 book The Anxious Generation has mobilized parents and leaders across the globe against big tech. In it, Haidt blames social media for the recent decline in teen mental health. That opposition seemed to become something like common sense this August when Meta reached an $18 billion settlement in a lawsuit alleging teen social media addiction.
One critical feature of the Meta settlement is enhanced age verification for account holders, with California’s attorney general promising “robust age assurance measures” to follow in the wake of the settlement. This follows a prevailing trend. Age verification has emerged globally as the primary way to keep kids off social media, and many governments have passed or proposed laws requiring age verification. In April, for instance, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a new age-verification app that would facilitate efforts by EU member states to block minors from social media. In the United States, 21 states now have some type of age restriction. And earlier this summer the United Kingdom announced a ban on under-16s from social media, enforced with accompanying age-verification technology.
Age-verification seems like a simple fix. And it is often driven by a genuine concern for kids’ safety and well-being. But it comes at a cost: age-verification threatens our anonymous speech online. As trendy as age-verification might be, it is worth taking a moment, in the year of America’s 250th anniversary, to remind ourselves of the deep history of anonymous speech in the United States—a speech right that can easily be underestimated or denigrated.
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Six months before the Second Continental Congress met and signed the Declaration of Independence, an anonymous essayist published a pamphlet that sent shockwaves across the colonies. Common Sense was published upwards of 100,000 times in 1776. Today, students correctly identify its author as Thomas Paine. But in 1776, Americans knew only that it was written anonymously “by an Englishman.” This Englishman explained in the preface to Common Sense that “[w]ho the Author of this Production is, is wholly unnecessary to the Public, as the Object for Attention is the doctrine itself, not the man.”
Perhaps Paine also was concerned about retaliation by the British. But his stated rationale for anonymity reflected a core Enlightenment belief: ideas should be judged by their own merit, regardless of who utters them. Paine continued that he was “unconnected with any Party, and under no sort of Influence public or private,” and that his words were influenced only by “reason and principle.”
Eleven years later, with the Revolution won, a group of anonymous authors again would direct the course of American history. Pseudonymous authors Publius and Brutus sparred in the columns of New York newspapers over the virtues and vices of the proposed Constitution. History recognizes Publius as the alter ego of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. But the trio chose anonymity, like Thomas Paine, to focus attention on their arguments rather than their personalities.
The trio’s decision adhered to Enlightenment ideas, but it was also a strategic choice. Aristotle had suggested more than 2,000 years earlier that a speaker can establish credibility by the command and logical strength of his argument. If Hamilton and company had identified themselves, readers would have prejudged the ideas. The same is true today: we approach ideological opponents with skepticism, while making every effort to justify the ideas of our allies. Anonymity allows a pathway around this bias, focusing attention on ideas, rather than their author.
But there was yet another reason for the friends and foes of the proposed Constitution to hide their identity: social ostracization. This was true especially for Brutus, the pseudonym for one prominent anti-federalist. In the columns of the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, for instance, a supporter of the proposed Constitution cautioned an anonymous opponent that he had better hope that his identity remained a secret “if he wishe[d] to escape the just resentment of an incensed people, who perhaps may honor him with a coat of TAR and FEATHERS.”
Tar and feathers, thankfully, are no longer the intimidation tactic of choice. But human nature has not changed in the last two-and-a-half centuries; tribalism is hard-wired into our genes. Today, cancel culture has replaced tar and feathers, and cancel culture is the antithesis of free and open debate. Rather than judging ideas in their own right, we judge them based on social pressure to conform. Conservative students fear voicing unpopular opinions in class, liberal academics fear publishing controversial scholarship, and all of us worry that a post we thought innocuous will end up ruining our career.
Anonymity offers an escape hatch. And its benefits are not merely individual. An individual’s conscience, of course, benefits from the freedom of speech. But listeners, too, benefit from uninhibited debate. John Stuart Mill explained that when individuals feel free to speak their minds, reality grows richer. “Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth,” he wrote in On Liberty. “They are part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjointed.” It is the unpopular ideas that make the partial truth a whole truth.
Listeners benefit as much as speakers from anonymous speech online. In the past, a listener would need to subscribe to a fringe newspaper, attend the rally of a controversial politician, or sneak out after dark to hear ideas outside the Overton window. Today, one can do so without leaving the privacy of home. Even those social media users who make their identities known can rest assured that their browsing history will remain a secret. Without fear of social ostracization and embarrassment, we have greater freedom to explore ideas and topics we would otherwise avoid.
But anonymous speech protects against an even greater threat than cancel culture: authoritarian retaliation. Autocrats regularly suppress dissent by prosecuting journalists and otherwise censoring critics through intimidation and violence.
Anonymity yet again provides a solution. In places like Hong Kong, Belarus, China, and Egypt, opponents of oppressive regimes mobilize support and organize protests through anonymous online accounts. It stands to reason then that crackdowns by these regimes focus on anonymous dissent. That has, in our time, become the critical battlefield in the struggle between freedom and autocratic control, much as the street might have been for earlier generations. Efforts to block anonymity include bans on encryption like those in force in Pakistan and Morocco and, effectively, in Russia and China. Draconian laws like that, evidently intended to extend state control, pair themselves readily with laws requiring identity verification for social media. Vietnam, for instance, passed a law demanding that all social media users verify their identities, with that information provided to authorities on request.
These efforts are not limited to autocracies. Germany offers an example. Chancellor Friedrich Merz in February called for an end to anonymity online. “In politics, we engage in debates in our society using our real names and without visors,” he remarked. “I expect the same from everyone else who critically examines our country and our society.” This is the same Merz, of course, who has filed hundreds of criminal complaints against citizens who insulted him online. Should his position prevail, it is difficult to see where the line is between governments evincing genuine concern for the integrity of the public sphere and governments simply targeting political opponents.
In the United States, too, the Trump administration has sought the identities of social media users who have criticized ICE, issuing hundreds of subpoenas to tech companies and asking companies to provide “identifying details for accounts that do not have a real person’s name attached,” as The New York Times reported. Government officials said that the tech companies complied with at least some of the requests.
Age-verification laws are the benign beginning of anonymity’s demise. Proponents of these laws promise their innocence, and that they are designed to focus on minors’ online usage, but their inner logic is inescapable: they are the crucial first step toward de-anonymizing online speech. Even third-party age-verification services that promise to keep one’s identity secure have carveouts. Yoti, for instance, which provides verification services for Meta, promises to delete images of IDs after 28 days, but its terms nonetheless provide that it will “keep your data for longer” if the government requests it to do so. What’s more, it is but a small step from age verification to identity verification. And this is exactly Chancellor Merz’s idea. Once the de-anonymizing genie is out of the bottle, it will find no limits—it is simply too attractive to governments that are interested in controlling “dangerous ideas” within the civil sphere.
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As a member of the first generation to come of age with social media, I know firsthand the risks it presents. Age verification, I agree, seeks to address a real problem. But as with any policy solution, we must assess not merely its efficacy, but its costs. Anonymity was critical to the birth of our American democracy, and it is no less critical today. We should know better than to throw it away without carefully considering the consequences to our freedom—and to the freedom of the next generation.
Jeffrey Cieslikowski is a law student who researches free speech and the First Amendment.
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Consider a pair of societies.
In the first society—let’s call it Utopia—there are always free and fair elections. They are free and fair in the sense that every adult gets to vote, and all the votes are counted fairly. There is no voter intimidation and the like. Here’s the catch, though. All politically relevant information (about the economy, foreign relations, and so on) must be approved by the Information Board before it reaches the public. The Information Board in turn is appointed by the Great Leader, who, it turns out, always wins elections.
Is this society democratically legitimate? Presumably not. But if not, that proves that the ideal of democracy goes beyond just ensuring that everyone gets their choice at the voting booth.
Similarly, consider a second society. As in Utopia, every adult gets their vote. But in this society, Catholic Priests control something they call the Guild. The Guild is for Catholics only—all members must accept a particular narrow interpretation of doctrine, along with a range of associated claims about justice, clerical authority, social issues, and the like. A few heretics might slip in here and there, but only if they outwardly commit to the doctrine. Now, all future leaders of the society (be they business leaders, politicians, or journalists) must spend at least four years with the Guild, learning from the Priests. Moreover, voters have no control over the Guild—Priests are hired by other Priests.
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Is this a true democracy? Again, presumably not. The power to shape future leaders and hence future policy and opinion lies with the Guild. The voters are a sideshow. They may have some power in the short term, but, over time, the Guild will determine the direction of society.
The idea that universal suffrage is not enough for genuine democracy is not a novel observation. Many intellectuals (including John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Noam Chomsky) have argued that inequality of wealth undermines democracy, even in the presence of one person, one vote.
Different writers explain it in different ways, but the core thought is that large corporations and the wealthy can wield an outsized influence on politics by setting the terms of public discourse. They might do so by donating to politicians or by owning major media corporations and newspapers. In this way, the public’s consent to the system can be “manufactured,” in Walter Lippmann’s phrase. The key issue is that for-profit corporations and the wealthy are not accountable to the public—the public doesn’t get to decide where and how they spend their money.
The main idea is simple: if I get to decide what information you consume, then I can control how and what you think. Indeed, this is why authoritarian regimes tightly control media and speech within their territories. The resulting consent will then not be genuine consent.
What few people notice is that the above argument carries over to the modern university system. Academia, as it currently stands, has three features that, taken together, undermine the ideals of democracy.
1. Universities shape future elitesAnybody who wants to become a journalist, executive, lawyer, or politician must, de facto, go through the university system. As students pass through the system, the professoriate heavily influences how they think about social and political issues. Faculty have great leeway in what they teach and how. Of course, social media, newspapers, and podcasts influence the culture too. But journalists, writers, and other intellectual influencers are themselves products of the university system.
What’s more, listening to a podcast in one’s free time is optional. Doing the reading and assignments in a class is not—at least if one wants to pass. Ideas or claims repeated throughout a semester will register as more plausible to most of the students taking the class. Now, many majors, such as chemistry or electrical engineering, do not directly deal with social or political issues. But even students majoring in these fields must complete general education requirements, which are housed in departments like anthropology, sociology, or various “studies” disciplines, which do cover social and political issues.
2. The academy is politically homogenousThis is especially so in the fields dealing with social and political questions. In anthropology and sociology, for example, the ratio of registered Democrats to Republicans exceeds 40 to 1 at elite liberal arts colleges. It’s not just political affiliation: surveys that directly ask about political ideology reveal similar patterns. Moderates and right-of-center scholars are vastly underrepresented in the academy compared with the general population.
Crucially, there is a wide range of evidence that this imbalance is in significant part due to discrimination, especially at the hiring stage. A study of law faculty from 2001-2010 revealed that libertarian and conservative faculty ended up in law schools ranked 12 or 13 spots lower as compared to their equally credentialed left/liberal counterparts. When surveyed, many faculty explicitly admit that they (or their colleagues) would discriminate against right-of-center applicants at the hiring stage. Moreover, the ideological imbalance affects teaching as well, as reflected in studies of course syllabi. All this suggests that the academy resembles the Catholic Priest Guild described above.
3. Academics are not democratically accountableFaculty are hired and evaluated by other faculty. Because of the ideal of academic freedom, the public and its elected representatives have very little say in how universities conduct themselves. Nonetheless, the public is expected to fund the universities directly or indirectly in myriad ways—through state budgets for public universities, federal research grants, and student loan subsidies and grants.
The influence of the academy on public discourse is profound. Historians, sociologists, and philosophers shape their students by influencing what ideas they’re exposed to, how they frame social issues, and what problems they believe are important in the first place.
When we think of public discourse, we think primarily of politicians, journalists, pundits, and influencers. But the terms of these debates—the Overton Windows in which they operate—are downstream of education. As Michel Foucault wrote, “Power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.” It is perhaps because the democratically unaccountable power of the academy is hidden from view that publics in modern societies tolerate it as much as they do.
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It might be argued that the above argument is unfair. Students have a choice—they can go to Stanford or Yale, Michigan or UCLA, and so on. When it comes to ideology, though, this choice is illusory. It would be one thing if, for example, the sociology department leaned conservative at Stanford, socialist at Yale, left-liberal at Michigan, libertarian at UCLA, and so on. But even though these are nominally distinct institutions, they all lean the same way. They function as if they were one institution. And exit is costly: if you want to join the ranks of the elite, you must attend university.
If genuine liberal democracy is to be restored, we must find a way to build robust viewpoint diversity within the academy. This will ensure that partisans of one ideology do not wield concentrated, unchecked power. It is also crucial for truth-seeking. As John Stuart Mill emphasized a century and a half ago in On Liberty, knowledge—especially on moral, social, and political matters—relies on epistemic friction. Ideas must be tested against those who disagree.
Securing democratic legitimacy will require a careful rethinking of the purpose and structure of the university system. The key issue is the unchecked power wielded by an ideologically homogenous professoriate. Concrete steps to ensure that a range of viewpoints are welcome in the academy will go a long way in checking this power and restoring public trust in the system. What’s more, if I am right, liberal democracy itself is at stake.
Hrishikesh Joshi is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona.
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