Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Liberalism is a Habit Not a Principle
    Painting by Cesare Maccari depicting Cicero. (Photo by Universal History Archive.)

    We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our ongoing series on “Liberal Virtues and Values.”

    The series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, will make the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms. If you haven’t already, please subscribe today to receive future instalments into your inbox!

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    On December 13, 1790, just one week after Philadelphia became the U.S. capital, President Washington wrote to several Hebrew congregations across the fledgling nation to respond to the congratulations they sent him for his inauguration as president. Washington opened the letter by invoking a word that today is almost lost to history. He praised the congregations for their “liberality of sentiment” concerning religious tolerance, arguing that “the affection of such people is a treasure beyond the reach of calculation.”

    The virtue Washington identified—“liberality”—is the progenitor of modern political liberalism. To understand why Washington held this ideal in such high regard, we must return to the ancient Romans who inspired him, and follow the history of liberality from antiquity to the present. In this ancient virtue lies the seeds of modern political liberalism—and quite possibly an antidote to the crisis of meaning that plagues liberalism today.

    In her 2018 book The Lost History of Liberalism, historian Helena Rosenblatt expounds on the history of the concept of liberalitas (“liberality” in English). In ancient Rome, liberalitas was a political virtue characterized by financial and interpersonal generosity, fearless public speaking, and moral education. The Romans saw the reciprocal connections of liberalitas as a kind of social glue that held social and political life together. In De Officiis, Cicero—who had a profound influence on the American Founders—noted that if people “contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness,” those acts would “cement human society more closely together.” Cicero’s liberalitas played out largely in the Roman aristocracy, and its system of reciprocity was said to hold the bonds of the res publica together.

    Seneca in De Beneficiis, meanwhile, argued that the generosity that binds society cannot be truly liberal if the giver expects anything in return. More radically egalitarian than Cicero, Seneca believed benefits could be given across class lines, and that from the perspective of virtue and social bonding, a giver’s good intentions matter more than the gift.

    The ancient Romans were wise in their view that acts of benevolence and giving foster social cohesion. In social scientist Robert Putnam’s books Bowling Alone and Making Democracy Work, he discusses the concept of “generalized reciprocity,” in which members of a community are confident their good deeds to others will be returned to them—not necessarily by the immediate recipient, but by someone else in the community down the line. Norms around reciprocity emerge when people frequently associate with each other in organizations such as clubs, sports leagues, choirs, and churches. According to Putnam’s research, societies with high rates of generalized reciprocity are less corrupt, have more functional governments, and are more civically engaged—something Cicero and Seneca both recognized.

    The Roman view of liberalitas later evolved into a similar but Christianized concept in medieval Europe. Priests encouraged their flocks to be as liberal with their mercy as God and as liberal with their love as Jesus. Through the tradition of the liberal arts, liberality became associated with a sense of open-mindedness and eventually tolerance of other religious beliefs. At the tail end of Europe’s brutal wars of religion, John Locke championed “charity, bounty, and liberality” as necessary partners to religious tolerance, invoking the Biblical obligation of human fellowship.

    Later on, the development of modern liberalism in revolutionary France transformed liberalitas from a private virtue into a political project. The values of generosity and fair treatment became fundamental to the design of the liberal state and its guarantees of equal rights, free expression, and religious toleration. Echoes of libertalitas continued to appear in the early political liberals’ obsession with the moral education of the people and their concern for “the social question,” targeting poverty and destitution with social and welfare programs.

    But by the 20th century—and especially following World War II—liberalism had changed. It became less about “What do I owe others?” and more about “What am I owed?” The relational quality that is a vital part of a meaningful life almost disappeared from the liberal project. When Aristotle spoke of eleutheriotēs (liberality in Greek), he said that we should strive for a discerning form of generosity that favors giving and receiving in the right proportions. Modern liberalism, many would argue, has failed to find the right balance.

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    Friendship is one of the most striking examples of this trend. Fewer people today associate with each other in spaces that promote a sense of obligation among friends, such as sports clubs and churches. Friendship in many ways has evolved from something reciprocal to something that is chosen and revocable. Contemporary men, in particular, have experienced a staggering decline in close friendships, and nearly 40% of Gen Z say they feel little to no purpose in their lives.

    Although liberalism is not responsible for this crisis, it has failed to provide an adequate response. In fact, liberalism from the very beginning has been denounced for threatening the traditions and bonds that give life meaning. A panoply of popes impugned it for its supposed satanism and desire to destroy the church and family. In the 19th century, Nietzsche warned of the “last man” (letzter Mensch), a product of liberal democracy who seeks only pleasure and strives for nothing greater than comfort. The 21st century’s post-liberals on the political right echo the same fears: that liberalism is destroying family, church, and community.

    The contemporary challenge for liberalism, then, is to answer its critics by reviving the spirit of liberalitas and bringing it back down to the level of individuals. One way to achieve this is through education. The virtue of liberalitas is precisely what an ideal moral education taught in ancient Rome—and millennia later, a similar spirit of generosity was taught to America’s fledgling citizens in its early public education system.

    Yet it matters what form that education takes. However well-meaning the early Common School system was, it taught students through recitation, memorization, and stories from the McGuffey Reader and New Testament. This top-down method is ineffective at restoring the spirit of liberalitas. Even if every child in America was taught the apocryphal story of a young George Washington confessing to chopping down the cherry tree, its widespread dissemination alone will hardly make pupils more honest.

    Another founder, Benjamin Franklin, charted a different path, placing emphasis on the process of habituation over recitation. He kept a daily log of thirteen virtues—including temperance, justice, and humility—that he practiced weekly on a thirteen-week cycle. He would mark when he violated one of these virtues in his log. Franklin even formed a group, the Junto Club, whose members focused on personal and social improvement—essentially a place to habituate virtue in the company of others.

    To rescue us from the crisis of meaning, we need to find new ways for Americans to habituate liberalitas in their everyday lives. If this seems like a tall order, just remember that it’s been done before. In his book The Upswing, Putnam explains how America was in a similar period of social disconnectedness during the Gilded Age in the late 19th century. The development of a plethora of associations, activist organizations, and the modern high school under the banner of the Progressive Movement began the upswing out of that low period. Americans did not simply become more virtuous by reading the classics; they built civil society organizations in which reciprocity and strong bonds emerged naturally. As one Progressive Era rallying cry put it: “We prefer doing to Dante, being to Browning.”

    The cleverness of virtues like liberalitas is that they function like pro-social software wrapped in an exalted ideal. Most people won’t be inspired to generosity by scientific papers on the benefits of restoring social connectedness. But they might just be inspired by an over two-thousand-year-old story about the highest form of generosity that once bound together our society—and might do so again.

    Joey T. McFadden is a writer whose work appeared in The Daily Beast, Queer Majority, and other publications. He is also the Blue Co-Chair of the Braver Angels NYC Alliance.

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    0 min
  • Bob Wright on the Future of Artificial Intelligence

    Bob Wright is a journalist, author, and podcast host. His latest book is The God Test.

    In this conversation, Francis Fukuyama and Bob Wright discuss why artificial intelligence may be more transformational than any previous technology, how AI systems can develop unintended goals that escape the control of their creators, and whether we should take the “doomer” case for catastrophic AI risk seriously.

    In an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought at 5pm on Sunday, September 6 at The Abbey Centre, London. Find out more and get tickets here. Paying subscribers of Persuasion and American Purpose can access a code for a free ticket here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.

    Connect with us!

    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Frankly Fukuyama & Persuasion

    47 min
  • Abigail Marsh on Psychopaths (Rerun)

    We’re on vacation this week, so are rerunning a fun “beach read” episode exploring if your nearest and dearest could be psychopaths.

    Miss us already? In an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought at 5pm on Sunday, September 6 at The Abbey Centre, London. Find out more and get tickets here. Paying subscribers of Persuasion and American Purpose can access a code for a free ticket here.

    Abigail Marsh is a professor in the Department of Psychology and the Interdisciplinary Neuroscience Program at Georgetown University.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Abigail Marsh explore what to do if a child you know might be psychopathic, whether psychopathy is linked to charisma and success, and how to protect yourself.

    Wondering if you or a loved one might be a psychopath? Take the quiz!

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: How should we think about what a psychopath—or do you prefer sociopath—actually is?

    Abigail Marsh: That is a great question. There is this weird dichotomy in how people talk about the disorder. The term sociopath is vastly preferred in the media and literature. There are a couple of very famous memoirs that came out about people who were self-described sociopaths. It is not a term that is used anymore by clinicians or researchers. We primarily use the term psychopathy. I do not even use the term psychopath anymore, mainly because it occurred to me that we do not refer to any other people by their disorder anymore. We do not refer to somebody as “a schizophrenic” or “an anorexic” anymore. We have switched to a kind of person-first language, and I have thought that people with psychopathy probably deserve the same.

    All that said, psychopathy is a personality disorder. It is not in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, the DSM, that is used to define and diagnose other personality disorders, for complicated reasons. It is a clinical disorder, and it is characterized by three main types of traits. One, a bold, fearless, dominant and socially dominant personality. Meanness or callousness is probably the trait people most closely associate with it: lack of remorse, lack of guilt, lack of compassion, etc. Finally, disinhibition, difficulty sticking to a plan, difficulty keeping promises, irresponsible behavior, sometimes very spontaneous, clearly poorly planned antisocial behavior that lands people in trouble.

    Mounk: I once had somebody explain to me the difference between a sociopath and a psychopath as being that a psychopath is somebody who has, I guess in your language, all three of those sets of traits, who is disinhibited, who wants to dominate the world, and who ends up doing really bad acts. A sociopath may be somebody who does not have fellow feeling, who does not feel remorse if they have hurt somebody, who does not feel bad about things they have done in the world, but who may be relatively well adjusted, who may think that it is in their interest not to hurt others because they might go to jail or other bad things might happen, but is still lacking that dimension of fellow feeling.

    You are saying that there is not this principled distinction between the term sociopath and the term psychopath. Is there a distinction between those two types of people? Would you say that there are some people who have this one set of traits quite strongly but not the other sets of traits, or are they really correlated with each other?

    Marsh: Such good questions. That is a really interesting description that you were given about the difference between the two. That is even a new one. I have heard probably 20 different descriptions, including clinicians and researchers describing the two terms and what distinguishes them. You will get many different explanations.

    First, it is totally possible for people to be persistently antisocial but not because they lack the capacity for empathy or remorse. I would say that for most people with psychopathy, it is not that they totally lack the capacity for empathy or remorse, but it is very suppressed. They feel these emotions very mildly or very rarely, maybe only with reference to one or two people.

    Mounk: That is interesting because I think we do also tend to think about it like it is a switch. Most people have it, and then some people do not have it at all, whereas you are talking about it nearly as a normal distribution. Most people have it to a relatively typical degree, and then a bunch of people have it less than others, but they might still feel it for their mom or for their best friend or for the person they love, but not for anybody else. They might feel it more dimly than others. What do you think is the distribution? Is it something like a normal distribution, or how should we think about this?

    Marsh: I think it is certainly a distribution. It has that classic bell-curve shape. It is probably shifted so that most people are on the plenty-of-empathy side of the distribution. The tail of people who experience very little empathy and compassion is a long tail, but a very small number of people are down there. I have worked with people who say they have never experienced anything like what most people describe as empathy or remorse or compassion. They exist, but that is a small percent of people, much smaller than the percent of people who say they wish that they could experience less empathy and compassion for others.

    Mounk: Interesting, because that too can be debilitating if you inadvertently step on a bug and you are so empathetic for the natural world that you are terribly guilt-ridden about having inadvertently done that. That also seems like a kind of ill-adjustedness.

    Marsh: It can be. Empathy, compassion, and guilt swim together. That is the downside of being a compassionate, empathic person: you often feel guilt about not having done even better, even though you are probably a nicer person than average.

    Mounk: Let us get back to empathy and what people who have really strong empathy feel as part of a conversation as well. Sticking with the other end of the spectrum, obviously one reason why we are interested in this topic is that it drives bad behavior. A lot of criminals, people who are serial killers, and perhaps some politicians who do terrible things seem to suffer from some form of psychopathy. What drives bad behavior here? Is it primarily this question of whether you have empathy for others? Or is it whether you have empathy for others plus those other ingredients? What do you think is predictive with the patients you work with? When do you think, oh dear, I’m worried for the people in their life? Is it just how little empathy they have for others, or is it that plus some other thing about them?

    Marsh: Each one of these prongs that makes up psychopathy—the bold, socially dominant personality; the low empathy and compassion; and the disinhibition—can drive antisocial behavior for different reasons. I think of them as different kinds of gas or brakes. You can be a very antisocial person who has at least the capacity for empathy and compassion simply because you are so disinhibited: you see something, you want it, you act. Or you may be very bad at controlling your anger. You may have something like intermittent explosive disorder, where it is easy for things to get under your skin and you blow up in a disproportionate way, and afterward you feel awful. Each time this happens you think, I cannot believe I did this again, but it is too hard to control those emotions.

    There are also people driven by status goals. People who are very bold and socially dominant often like having higher status than others. Sometimes those goals can drive antisocial acts even though the person has the capacity for empathy but chooses not to deploy it. They may view certain people as unworthy of empathy or compartmentalize their empathy.

    There are many people who are functional in their normal social lives. They have a normal family life and long-term friendships—relationships that typically do not emerge in people who are truly, pathologically psychopathic, because it is very hard to maintain friendships when you view others as instrumental means to achieve your goals.

    Mounk: At some point they’re gonna figure that out, feel used and won’t want to be your friend.

    Marsh: Right, because in people who are highly psychopathic, the “friendship” was only ever based on a desire to get something out of it. It is not a typical way of bonding with others. But there are people who can form close bonds while still being so driven by their need to dominate or to acquire that their empathic capacity gets switched off or suppressed by those goals.

    Mounk: I’m trying to think about what this model looks like. One perhaps overly simple way of describing it is that we have desires in the world, and we act in order to serve those desires. Then we have inhibitions. One obvious inhibition is empathy for others: I’m not going to do this because it will upset someone. Is the relationship between desire and inhibition something like one minus the other? How should we think about that relationship?

    You can imagine someone who is highly empathetic but has uncontrollable rages and therefore behaves badly, or someone who has very little—perhaps no—compassion for others but is so impassive, so lacking in strong desires, that they calculate it is in their rational self-interest never to break the law or cause drama because they prefer a quiet life of sitting at home watching Netflix.

    Marsh: There are plenty of psychopathic people exactly like that who do not particularly care about other people. They just want what they want. The stuff that they want is pretty easy for them to get for whatever reason. Maybe because they have particular cognitive skills and talents that make having a pretty easy life not that big of a challenge for them. I will say the other thing that makes psychopathy such a challenge is that the bold, dominant personality is associated with being fearless, which means being unafraid of being punished. The other thing that keeps people who are psychopathic from behaving in pro-social ways is that they do not fear the punishment that comes from behaving antisocially, so it is very difficult to contain their behavior using threats of jail or other serious punishments. They just want what they want.

    Mounk: What is it that makes them unresponsive to that fear of punishment? Is it that they do not care that if they end up in jail for 20 years, they are just as happy in jail as they would be somewhere else? Or is it that they do not have mechanisms of self-control, that they basically fail the marshmallow test? How should we think about what drives that behavior?

    Marsh: Many of them would definitely fail the marshmallow test. That is true of people who end up in jail in general. Even in a typical jail or prison, only a minority of people would be considered clinically psychopathic. Close to half, but not most people. Disinhibition and failure to control impulses or difficulty balancing risks and rewards is a major factor that puts people in detention. That is true of people with psychopathy too.

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    They do not like jail. It is not that they want to be there. There does seem to be neurodevelopmental differences in them such that in their very early life they do not fear the punishment ahead of time. They do not like it when they get it, but they do not fear it ahead of time, and they do not do things to avoid the threat or the punishment even if they will not like it when they get it.

    Mounk: You just mentioned a stat by the by that is striking. You said close to half of people in prison, as far as we know, have those psychopathic traits. How does that relate to the general population?

    Marsh: Yeah, because psychopathy is a continuum. It is hard to put a clear marker on exactly what proportion of the population has psychopathy because it depends on where you decide to draw the clinical line. Most people estimate it is about one or two percent of the population that has clinically significant levels of psychopathy. That is in the general population. Of course, it is much higher in populations where people are doing enough antisocial things that they have ended up punished for it.

    Mounk: It is, to the tune of 25x or 50x, more likely for someone who is psychopathic to end up in jail. Do we know something about what percentage of people with psychopathy will be imprisoned at some point in their lives?

    Marsh: We do not know this at all. We do know there is something called the Pareto Principle, the 80-20 rule. For example, 20% of people are responsible for 80% of absenteeism in the workplace. That is true for all antisocial behavior. A small minority of the population is responsible for most antisocial acts. When you look at violent crime, some people have estimated that maybe 1% of the population is responsible for two thirds of all serious violent crime.

    We do not know the odds that any particular person with psychopathy will offend over their lifetime. It is definitely higher than the average person. We did recently a big population study of psychopathy, and rates of offending were twice as high to 10 times as high as the general population, depending on the specific antisocial behavior in question. This is a paper that is about to come out. We found that the most common kinds of antisocial behavior that very high psychopathic people engage in, in terms of what they are most likely to have done, is risky, reckless driving.

    Driving under the influence, not obeying traffic laws, driving way too fast, et cetera. The vast majority of highly psychopathic people have done that. Somewhat smaller percentages have been convicted or punished for it, but they all do it. A much smaller percent have committed assault, maybe 40%. Smaller proportions have been arrested for it.

    Mounk: If we think again of these three different classes of character traits that are necessary according to the DSM to classify someone as psychopathic, are they correlated with each other? If you have one of these three character traits, does that make it more likely that you have the other two as well? Or are we simply saying that 15% of the population have each of those character traits, and the people who end up having psychopathy are the ones who happen to have 0.15 x 0.15 x 0.15, you probably end up with a little bit lower, so you would say 20% of each, and they are not correlated with each other? Does having one of these sets of character traits also drive the other or is it genetically related in some kind of way or related in terms of your upbringing? Or are they independent of each other?

    Marsh: The top question is whether these three clusters of traits are correlated with each other. Yes, to some degree. The meanness and callousness and the disinhibition are strongly correlated with each other, maybe 0.4. Not 0.7 or they would be the same thing. The bold, dominant personality less so, as low as 0.15 probably. Although when you do the developmental studies that follow kids over time, that does seem to be the core trait. That is the first trait that we see emerging early in childhood that puts the child at risk for all the other sequela of psychopathic traits.

    I will also mention that this triad of traits is not in the DSM diagnosis that is closest to psychopathy, which is antisocial personality disorder. Why they changed the name when they put it in the DSM, who is to say. I am sure you are aware of what a book created by committees the DSM is, and it has some flaws. A lot of these traits are in there, but you will not find this exact triad of traits in the DSM, nor will you find the term psychopathy.

    Mounk: I would venture that a term invented by, I believe, your doctoral advisor, Steven Pinker, and a former guest on this podcast has something to do with this, which is a “euphemism treadmill.” If you find a term for something that has negative associations, the term itself will start to be negatively charged over time. Therefore people will say there is something offensive about the term, so let us not go with it. Even if something like psychopathy or sociopathy was invented as a relatively neutral term, over time we associated it with the underlying behaviors. It comes to seem like a slur word. Perhaps someone in the committee said, “We cannot call people that. Let us find a new term.”

    Marsh: Yes, Steven Pinker was on my dissertation committee. I should mention he was not my advisor, but I appreciated his fantastic advice then. I appreciate this term, “euphemism treadmill,” which is a huge problem for psychopathy because it is an incredibly common disorder, and it is antisocial behavior. I should reinforce that the psychopathic traits that we see in adults are almost without exception present in adolescents and childhood in people who develop psychopathy. It is a disorder that occurs throughout the lifespan. It is the most common reason that children are referred to psychiatric care in childhood, antisocial behavior problems, not all of which is related to psychopathy, but a big chunk of it is.

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    Yet there is very little help for the affected kids and families out there. There is so little in the way of resources or clinical training devoted to helping clinicians help these kids. On top of that, the clinician and researcher community does the population of patients a double-diservice by coming up with 8,000 terms that all mean more or less the same thing. “Sociopathy” was in part a remedy to the stigma that the term “psychopath” had. “Antisocial personality disorder,” same thing. It is, “Let us try to get the stigma away from having a disorder that causes you to do antisocial things all the time.” The reality is you are never going to take the stigma away from the disorder. Of course, if you do antisocial things persistently, that is going to be stigmatized. There is no getting around it.

    The way we get rid of the stigma is by finding treatments for it so that people do not continue to perceive this as some sort of a “bad seed” moral disorder that is a permanent stain and we should just lock you up forever. That is how to get rid of the stigma.

    Mounk: You mentioned that one of the first things you can diagnose in children is this desire to dominate, and that is the predictor of the other character traits emerging. At what age in a child’s development do we start to see warning signs, and how predictive are they? If you go and visit some relative of yours or the child of some friend, and they have some concerning set of behaviors, at three years old, at seven years old, at 10 years old, at what point can you say, hey, I am not a trained psychologist, but I am starting to be concerned here, and I am not being crazy?

    Marsh: It is hard because the age two to three is statistically the most violent period of the lifespan because it is typical for little kids to have terrible tantrums and be quite violent in some cases, biting and doing things that do not happen later in life. It is hard. The thing that you are looking for in kids who are two to three years old, which most parents of kids who develop psychopathic traits will say is when they started noticing something was different, is this fearless personality, which mostly manifests in the kid not seeming scared of things that other kids are scared of: Big dogs, the dark, being alone, very high places, doing things that are unusually risky, and that includes not being afraid of punishments.

    Mounk: But some of those might be good traits. How do you know? Where is the line? You want your kid to be happy-go-lucky and relatively fearless. It is a big dog, but it is our friend’s dog. You don’t have to be worried about it. You’re going to be proud if your kid says, hello, big doggy. What makes you know where the line is between having a kid that loves the world and has not had anything bad happen to them, and so they do not have a lot of fear, versus thinking, my God, perhaps I’m raising a little psychopath?

    Marsh: This trait by itself is probably not enough to worry you. I will say that being afraid of something and loving something are two different axes so that people who love something will override their fear for it, even if they have a normal amount of fear. Alex Honnold, the free solo climber, is a famous example of this. He is not a fearless guy at all. He talks about how terrified he was before giving his TED Talk. People assume he must be fearless because of the climbs he does. The reality is he loves to climb. It gives him so much joy, he is so driven to do it that that overwhelms the regular amount of fear. That is how I am about dogs. Big dogs, small dogs, barking dogs, whatever. When I was a little kid, I would throw myself at all of them. It was not fearlessness; it was love.

    You are looking for fearlessness across the gamut, including when it comes to punishment. For many little kids, having mom or dad get mad at you when you have done something you should not do is enough to make that behavior less likely going forward. Some kids might need a more structured reinforcement system like the “one, two, three magic” system, which I highly recommend, which results in timeout. One, Two, Three Magic is a book about how to use principles of behavioral psychology to help kids manage their behavior in a way that does not involve arguing or yelling or harsh punishment. It is behaviorism. When a child does something disruptive that they should not do, you count them. “That is one.” The first time they do it. “That is two.” The second time they do it, and on three, they have a mandatory timeout. No talking, no arguing, no explaining. They have a timeout. Kids hate timeouts. It is boring. That works.

    Mounk: This is true in discussions of criminal law as well. When punishment is certain and immediate, that is the most likely deterrent, and this is applying the same thing to kids. Do not shout at the kid, but make sure you punish the kid.

    Marsh: Yes, it should be swift, it should be certain, it does not need to be harsh. It should be annoying. Punishment has gotten a bad name. Punishment is any response that reduces the likelihood of that behavior in the future. When you are a parent, there is no possible way to only use reward and reinforcement to shape your kid’s behavior. Kids will do things they should not do sometimes. Using simple, swift, certain, annoying consequences like a timeout, for most kids that is plenty and that will shape their behavior fine. For kids who have this bold, fearless personality it will not. One of the problems is that most parents have no idea what they are dealing with. They think, I do not understand, I have other kids and this worked fine for them, why is this kid not responding to these mild punishments? Unfortunately, what happens is the parents ratchet up the punishment. The timeout did not work, now I am going to lock you in your room. Locking you in your room did not work, now I am going to start screaming at you. Maybe I am going to use physical punishment. The problem is if the kid does not fear the punishment in advance, none of that is going to work.

    Now you have a kid who is fairly fearless and thinks that everybody around them is a jerk. They are being treated unfairly. They are being treated differently than the other kids around them, including their siblings. The reason is their behavior is different, but a little kid is not going to put that together. This is the developmental cycle it leads to. The fearless temperament sometimes is coupled with low affiliative desires. We do not know if those two things are intrinsically linked or if having both is extra bad. Low affiliation means they do not find affection as rewarding as other people.

    Parents sometimes try to be respectful of the child and dial back on the affection. Not as many hugs, giving them their space, not snuggling with them because they do not seem to like it as much. That is the opposite of what you should do. Kids do not always know what they need. Kids who are not that sensitive to affection need extra of it. You do not want to lock them into bear hugs while they struggle. You use big warm smiles, lots of affectionate touches because that is what it takes to get through to them.

    Mounk: Just to go back to how you are facing this three-year-old and you are trying to figure out, is a three-year-old just an asshole like many three-year-olds are assholes, or is it a special asshole? One thing I have observed with kids, friends and family members, et cetera, is that kids at that age, terrible twos, will behave in horrible ways. They will bite their parents and whatever. They will afterward feel obvious remorse. They will look crestfallen, they hurt mommy or daddy, and they will be hurt by the punishment, and you will see that they are thinking, what did I do? Is the absence of that a reliable indicator at that age? Is that something that even at that young age you can observe, or is that not a key thing to look out for?

    Marsh: I would say it is a slightly less reliable indicator because that is something you also might see in a child with autistic traits. You might not see as much of that attention to other people’s sadness or anxiety or stress. If you couple that fearless personality with the lack of seeming to care if you have hurt somebody, it is normal for a two- or three-year-old who one minute is a screaming terror, if mom starts crying or seems sad, to say, oh, mommy, are you okay? Not in the middle of a tantrum necessarily, but most of the time you should see a little of that. That means the child is coming to intrinsically value other people’s welfare.

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    That is a normal human trait that should develop. When the people you love are doing well, that should bring you joy automatically. When they are in distress, that should bring you distress automatically. Children need to develop that. Kids with psychopathy do not have that. Other people’s welfare does not have intrinsic value to them.

    Mounk: You are starting to speak about how some parents understandably step back from expressing affection for kids who do not seem to value affection in the same way, but that is the wrong thing to do. How much agency is there? If by the age of a two- or three-year-old there is something wrong and you do everything right, you take the kid to a doctor first and a specialist, and they are diagnosed with, this kid is in danger of developing psychopathy or they may have inclination toward that, what can you do and how much of a difference is that going to make? If kids are born without that sense of empathy for others, is that something you can give them through treatments and therapy and the right behavioralism, or is the best you can hope for to manage that condition so that the outcomes are not as terrible as they often turn out to be?

    Marsh: It is treatable. You are not going to bring a kid’s personality from one end of the spectrum to the other. If you are a parent of a child who is three, four, five years old and you are noticing punishment does not seem to do anything to your kid’s behavior when you punish them consistently, swiftly, and not too harshly for their behavior, they do not seem to care, they do not seem affectionate, they are misbehaving more than their peers, they are lying more often than usual, they might be starting to steal things, what do you do? Most people start out taking their kid to a pediatrician. It is likely the pediatrician will have no clue what is going on. They have not been trained to assess behavior problems in children, but hopefully they will assess. This is something. I co-founded an organization called the Society for the Prevention of Disorders of Aggression to try to work on some of these problems, but the problems are big. Hopefully they will recommend a child psychologist or social worker to assess the child next.

    They may or may not know how to assess these problems in kids. They may, even if they recognize that your child probably qualifies for a diagnosis of conduct disorder, which is the child equivalent of psychopathy, or at least some of it is, or oppositional defiant disorder. Those are the major disorders names that we give kids who look like they are on a trajectory toward persistent antisocial behavior. They may deliberately give you a different diagnosis because there is fear of stigma, there is fear that families will reject these diagnoses. There is a misperception among many clinicians that they are untreatable. They may want to give a diagnosis like autism because resources will come your way if you have that diagnosis. They may give ADHD because it is a light definition and it is not offensive. Maybe even depression. They may decide the reason that this kid seems cold and unemotional is because they are depressed. It is common that parents get a wrong diagnosis. Even if you do get a right diagnosis, the odds of finding somebody trained to use a therapy that works is not high.

    There is therapy that works. PCIT, Parent-Child Interaction Therapy, is therapy where the parents are trained in techniques that will bring out the best in the child, that will over time eliminate their antisocial behavior, show the kid warmth, more warmth than you think you need to show them, to develop a bond between you and the child so they care about you and they care what you want and they care what you think.

    Mounk: Without going into too much detail, what kind of behaviors are there? What can you do as a parent? You were saying one thing is to show even more warmth to your kid. Most parents give a lot of warmth to most of their kids, right?

    Marsh: I am sure you are familiar with the pop psych book about love languages, which has a kernel of truth. Sometimes parents fail to realize that the way they are showing their children love is not as interpretable to the child as they might think. For example, taking your kid to swim lessons and piano lessons and doctor’s appointments and PCA stuff is love. That is very much love. It does not feel like it to the kid. Being taken to the doctor is not feeling love. Making sure their clothes are clean and that they have had breakfast and get out the door on time are things loving parents do, but to a kid it feels like being harassed and nagged.

    One of the things that PCIT entails, and many good behavioral therapy programs involve, is something called floor time, where you set aside five to ten minutes every day with your child to engage in behaviors that show that you care about your child, that you like them, that you approve of them, and that you feel positively about them. They involve things like, while your child is playing on the floor, imitating what they are doing, playing alongside them, narrating what they are doing, and positively commenting on what they are doing.

    It feels simple and dumb, but in reality that is a moment when you are not nagging your child, you are not hustling them from one thing to another, you are not telling them what to do, you are not asking them questions, which many parents interpret as a sign of care, which it is, but to a child being endlessly peppered with questions—what did you do in school today? What did you have for lunch? Who did you sit next to?—feels like an interrogation. Floor time is an isolated time when you are showing approval and positive regard. It is amazing how much just ten minutes of that a day will do. A seven-minute workout does not seem like it should be enough to improve health, but it does. Ten minutes of floor time can do wonders for a child.

    That is the baseline. Then there is a separate set of behaviors that parents engage in that help their child learn to avoid bad behaviors and adopt good ones through reinforcement.

    Mounk: Interesting. In the best case, you can take a kid that has a tendency toward psychopathy and avert the worst kinds of outcomes. Tell us about how the life of a kid like that is likely to go. Then tell us what happens if you do not intervene in that kind of way and how the problems of misbehaving when you are three years old turn into the problems of misbehaving when you are 13 or 23.

    Marsh: I will say that parents of kids with these problems are blamed and shamed routinely for their kid having this callous, remorseless personality. It sometimes does not help to say the solution is parenting management training, which reinforces the idea that you must be a really bad parent. That is not true. In general, the kids who develop these traits who are raised by parents who get them into some kind of therapy, or sometimes just figure out a way to manage their behavior, end up as kids who are not going to be the warmest, most cuddly people in the world.

    They usually have learned good habits and strategies to get what they want that do not involve overtly breaking rules or hurting other people. They may end up in professions that attract extroverted people that are high risk, high reward, and offer a lot of status. There is evidence that jobs in finance and banking might attract a higher proportion of people with psychopathy than teaching, for example, just to name a quite different job.

    Mounk: This is one of the questions that my producer Leo tasked me with asking, which is that there is a stereotype in our culture that certain kinds of successful people may be more likely to have traits of psychopathy, whether that is banking or surgeons or CEOs. Is there something to that, that having psychopathic traits makes you less likely to be successful, but that among some subsection of highly successful people the share of psychopaths is higher? Politics?

    Marsh: My sense is that there is not a ton of great data on this. There is at least one very good study that found that among executive-level people in the business world, the proportion of people estimated to have clinically significant psychopathy, that top one or two percent, is about four percent. So double the regular population, maybe four times the regular population, but that is also 96 percent of them who do not have clinical psychopathy.

    Mounk: Among the prison population you said it is close to 50%, and among these people it is 4%.It is a little elevated, but not enough to look at your cousin who is a CEO and say, you’re probably a psychopath; that is why you’re a CEO.

    Marsh: People who go into high-risk, high-reward professions—surgery, politics, business—are more likely to be men for various reasons. Men score a little higher in psychopathy than women on average. There are more men than women at the very high end and more women than men at the very low end, but the average psychopathy scores of men and women are not that different. Professions that attract more men will have a higher level of psychopathy because they have more men. Even if you correct for that, there is probably a small effect.

    A lot of those professions attract people who are high in the boldness trait that is characteristic of psychopathy: boldness, social dominance. That is sometimes called the adaptive arm of psychopathy or the adaptive feature of psychopathy that may help explain why some level of these traits persists in the population over evolution.

    Mounk: Right. Risk-taking, bold, fearless. Someone who is a rock star performing for 150,000 people is going to be more fearless than the average person, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. It would explain some of that statistical correlation.

    Marsh: Most personality variation is what makes the world go round. It is what makes life colorful. Most personality traits have a wide range that can be adaptive in particular contexts. Some contexts make it more adaptive to be introverted and some extroverted. That is true for psychopathic traits until you get to the very high end. That is not adaptive in almost any context because you burn bridges with everybody everywhere by mistreating them and using them for instrumental purposes. Bernie Madoff is an example of someone who, based on what is available biography-wise, was probably a psychopath. He was using people to meet his instrumental goals.

    Mounk: What is the evidence for that? From my understanding of it, at the beginning he was running a relatively normal investment business. Then he made promises that were bigger than they should have been. Then he thought, damn, in order to keep this going, I have to take in more money, and it turned into a Ponzi scheme.

    I do not know the details of the case, so I am probably missing elements of it. That seems like something an average asshole might end up in. He did not set off saying, I’m going to perpetuate the biggest financial fraud in history. He thought, I’m going to invest these people’s money and make a lot of profit. Then he thought, shit, either I go bankrupt now or I fudge the numbers. Ten years later, he’s in way over his head. What element of what he did indicates that there was more to it than that?

    Marsh: It is a good question. I will say it has been a while since I dug into his biography. What you are looking for is never one thing, because you are right. It is plausible that someone leveraging the money they have to invest and trying to build up a bigger portfolio could get in over their head, not because they are trying to use people, but because they were trying to do the right thing and ended up getting people bankrupt. That could happen.

    Information you look for to distinguish between someone who did one bad thing, even if it is a big bad thing, and someone who is truly psychopathic is patterns of behavior throughout different parts of their life. Here I am not talking about Bernie Madoff in particular because I am not confident enough about my memory of his biography. If you are looking at someone’s life to assess psychopathy on the basis of some antisocial thing they have done, you first want to look at their relationships over time. Do they have evidence of real friendships, friendships based on mutual affection and reciprocally benefiting one another? Romantic relationships, relationships with their children. Do those seem to be characterized by sincere affection? When something bad happens to someone you love, are you truly upset about it?

    You want to look over time biographically. For people who are psychopathic, there is almost always evidence in early childhood that their behavior was difficult to control. For example, children who were sent to special schools that were trying to manage their behavior might indicate their behavior was unmanageable to their parents. It is not the only reason kids get sent to special schools, but it is a characteristic thing you might see. Was there evidence that they engaged in juvenile delinquency? Were they underperforming in school?

    Those sorts of biographical details are helpful to look at. It is rare that people who are doing fraudulent, dishonest things in the business realm are not also doing things like that in the personal realm, maybe in romantic relationships. You want to look at multiple prongs to get an overall portrait of someone who does not care about other people’s welfare and is using other people to get what they want.

    Mounk: We have another set of questions from Leo. One part of this is whether it is true that psychopaths are often particularly charismatic, that they have an ability to manipulate people that goes beyond that of the average person. Relatedly, we have the holidays coming up. If you go to your Christmas gathering or whatever your favorite holiday may be, and your cousin’s significant other that they are bringing over for the first time seems to have behaviors that may be indicative of psychopathy, how do you think through whether you are talking yourself into a rage and need to touch grass, or whether you have to be concerned for the well-being of your relative?

    Marsh: This is what is confounding about psychopathy: how hard it is to detect in a casual interaction. It is impossible. I do not think any psychopathy researcher says there is any tell in casual conversation that reliably indicates someone is psychopathic because people who are psychopathic are shapeshifters. This is not true of everybody, but most of the psychopathic people I have worked with will say that they mask in most interactions. They present the face to the people they are interacting with that they think those people want to see. That often results in their being some of the most charming, likable, friendly people you will ever interact with. They do not seem fake. Most of us have too much confidence in our ability to detect deception in regular life. We are not good at it. Everybody I know who works with psychopathy has found themselves duped at least once.

    You are out of luck when it comes to detecting psychopathy in your cousin’s new boyfriend unless you know someone who knows him and can say, that guy is not trustworthy. He talks a big game, and half the stuff he says is not true, and it is not clear why he was making it up. He has had six different jobs in the last two years, and nobody knows why. He cheated on his last girlfriend. That is the kind of biography you are looking for.

    Whether people who are psychopathic are usually charismatic is hard to say. There is not good data on this. They certainly report that they are. They will say, yes, I am. That is not satisfying. It is possible that if you want to manipulate people, being charismatic is a good tool to do it. Many people who are psychopathic may develop a more charismatic demeanor in an effort to do that. It may also be the case that it is people who are very psychopathic and charismatic who cause trouble. Those are the ones you do not detect.

    Mounk: Right. It is an availability bias where if there are a hundred people with psychopathy, the ninety who are not particularly charismatic are less successful, less likely to become celebrities, less likely to become elected office holders. The subset of psychopaths we think about when we consider the condition are the ones who are charismatic. That is a very good point.

    Marsh: That is possible. There is not as much good data as I would like on whether having a conversation with the average person who is high in psychopathy makes them come across as more charismatic. What they come across as is a genuinely likable person who does not seem particularly antisocial. I have done a little research on this, not published, that people tend to conflate how nice a person is, how good a person is, with whether they personally like them. For example, we are overwhelmingly likely to assume that political figures on the opposite side of the aisle from ourselves are psychopathic. That is why I always urge people: just because this person has politics you do not like, whether they are a national politician or a voter, that is not a sign they are psychopathic. You do not like them, and I get that, but they may think they are doing the right thing sincerely and honestly.

    Mounk: That is true for ascriptions of psychopathy. It is broadly true for ascriptions of moral evil. It is tempting to think that my way of seeing the world politically is so obviously true that anyone who disagrees with me must be stupid or a bad person. That is an assumption I see people make all the time. One of the things you get from attending focus groups and listening to people of very different political points of view is that they seem genuinely to be struggling to think about what is right. In a different way, one of the things you get from reading the most brilliant political thinkers of the past, who lived in different moments and therefore had different political assumptions and different values, is that there are many well-intentioned, smart people who have views that are very different from those that I have. That is the core to beginning to have any productive form of politics.

    Marsh: Exactly. People can do things that you dislike, have beliefs that you dislike, and be a sincerely well-intentioned person who is trying to be moral and is being moral according to what they view as moral. That is important when trying to explain what psychopathy is and is not. It is not everybody who disagrees with you politically.

    I have had more than one conversation with academics who say, well, I will tell you where you can find all the people with psychopathy. They are on the Republican side of the aisle. That is not how it works. The most famous social psychology experiment of all time, the Milgram study, was designed to dispel the idea that Germany was a nation full of psychopaths. The belief at the time was that you could never have had such a thing happen in Germany as what happened in World War II unless German people were unusually callous and heartless and cruel. That was not true at all.

    Mounk: Well, obviously there is the historical point that it is hard to understand why Germans in 1925 were not psychopaths, and in 1943 they were all psychopaths, and by 1970 they were back to having normal psychologies. It is not a convincing explanation. You spend a lot of time with psychopaths. You spend time studying them in research setups where there are layers of confidentiality so that you elicit honest responses. Tell us what it is like, as best you can tell from speaking with those people, to be a psychopath. How do people think about their own condition? How do people think about the world?

    Marsh: One thing I should mention is that there are a couple members of the organization I created who have been diagnosed with psychopathy. They have written well-known memoirs in the last couple of years. One is Patric Gagne and the other is Amy Thomas. I have valued them as colleagues. Part of the interactions I have with people with psychopathy is as colleagues. I come at this from different angles. The first work I did in people with clinical psychopathy, or callous unemotional traits, which is the euphemism we use for children, was in my postdoctoral research when we were doing brain imaging research trying to understand the neural basis of psychopathy. We interviewed kids from all over the greater Washington, D.C. area and interviewed their parents to get a better sense of what made these kids tick.

    One of the interesting discrepancies we found was that there was a wide range in how aware the kids were that there was anything different about them. This is true of adults with not only psychopathy but conditions like bipolar disorder or stroke. Some people recognize that there is something different about them, and some people think there is nothing different about them and that everybody else is just like them. That makes a big difference when it comes to treatment. If someone has no idea there is anything different about them, it is hard to convince them to get treated.

    The kids who recognized there was something different about them had reasonably good insight about the fact that they found themselves doing antisocial things repeatedly that other kids did not do. Some of them said they wished they knew how to stop because they could tell that it was not working out for them in the long term.

    Mounk: They did not say, I wish I knew how to stop because it makes mommy and daddy sad. They said things like, I realize I keep getting punished for it, or, nobody seems to like me. What is it that bothers them?

    Marsh: They say, this is not the life I want. I have talked to adults who say the same thing. They say, this is not the life I want. I want to have friends. I want to have a regular job. I want to do well in my life.

    For many of the kids I worked with, they had been kicked out of multiple schools. This was not the life they wanted. Many of them had an image of what a good life looks like, and that was not it for almost anybody. Some of them did not care. There was a subset of kids who did not care. They found school boring. They did not see the point in doing well. Getting kicked out of multiple schools would hopefully end with no school, and they would have been happy. People who are psychopathic and in their teens or twenties are the least likely to appreciate that they are the source of their own problems and want to change. As time goes on, it is more common for people to say, I’m the problem. It’s me, to paraphrase Taylor Swift, and to have some sense that they could learn how to do better. Some of them do learn how to do better.

    Some of the people I have talked to, out of a desire to not lose a romantic partner they realize has been a lucky outcome for them, have said things like, I was a way worse person before I started dating this woman. I do not want to lose her. I tried to act like a nice person for a year and a half, and then it started to click, and I started to want to be a nice person. It is almost like they gave themselves therapy, exactly what a therapist would tell you to do. You need to start acting like a nice person. Do the things a nice person would do. Learn how rewarding and beneficial that is, and eventually it becomes a habit and feels natural.

    Mounk: When they succeed at that, do they now genuinely love their partner and genuinely have remorse when they act in ways that upset their partner? Or is it that they have, in a way Aristotle would have described, developed a habit of acting in a certain way until it becomes an automatism, and they have gotten out of the habit of acting in ways that upset or hurt the partner? But deep down, when the partner is upset, it still does not create the wrenching feeling that you and I have when we have done something to make somebody sad.

    Marsh: I have talked to people for whom both are true. Some are one and some are the other. I have talked to people who said that the only time in their life they have felt something that approached love was when something bad happening to this person made them feel emotional, and they felt bad about it in a way they had never felt about anybody else. I think there are some people with psychopathy for whom there is a lingering latent capacity to experience something akin to real love. It just takes a lot. That person has to be very nice and a kind, affectionate partner. Other people never approached what I would call love, but there was mutual understanding and reciprocity in the relationship. It was a stable relationship where both people were glad they were in it. This person was motivated to keep up their end of the bargain, something like loyalty. I have talked to people who are psychopathic who say that over time they learned to feel something like loyalty, even if not love in a more emotional way. Are these people the norm? It is hard to say, maybe not. They give some cause for optimism about what is possible.

    Other people with psychopathy who are less insightful will say, I just want to get what I want. All of my relationships with people are aimed at getting what I want and figuring out what they want from me. I give them what they want to the degree that I have to in order to get what I need. I do not like my job. I do not like people. I take a lot of drugs to feel something, to feel some sense of enjoyment. I engage in risky behavior like reckless driving to feel something. This is a crappy life, but this is the way I am.

    Mounk: How honest and open are people about the lack of remorse for bad actions or some of the things they have done? I understand this is a context in which they know you are not going to report what they say to the police. What are the things they would tell you in that context? What are some of the shocking things people have told you?

    Marsh: I cannot tell the details. Pretty shocking things. I have been shaken by some of the things I have heard in conversations. I wish I could tell the details, but I cannot. The research that we do is protected by a certificate of confidentiality from the NIH that protects us from having to reveal what we are told under subpoena, because we would never be able to do this research if the people we work with thought that we were going to reveal what they told us. We are mandatory reporters if they tell us about something they are going to do, if they are planning on hurting somebody else or themselves, or if there is any indicator of child or elder abuse. We have to report that. We tell them that. We say, if you tell us anything about these kinds of items, we are mandatory reporters, just like many professionals are. If it is something they did in the past, we would never be able to do this research if we could not guarantee that.

    Mounk: If they have confessed to terrible crimes in this context, what do they sound like? Do they tell that to you the way I would say, oh yeah, today for lunch I went to a Japanese restaurant? What is the tone?

    Marsh: Casual is the best way to describe it. Yes, this is something that I have done, because there is always a reason. One of the things that people with psychopathy are good at is externalizing blame. It was not, I did it because I wanted to. It was, they put me in this position. The classic line of abusive partners in domestic settings is, they made me do it. They pushed me to it. Domestic violence is something that people with psychopathy are more prone to. It is never your fault if you are psychopathic. Everything is somebody else’s fault. You get explanations like, they put me in this position. They told me they were going to tell on me, so I had to do what I had to do.

    I have worked with people who explain what they do through a moral framework they created, where a “good person” will only physically hurt people who do racist things. I only hurt people who say or do things that are racist. It is an interesting moral framework because it channels their antisocial impulses in ways that are, in their view, relatively prosocial.

    Mounk: That is interesting. There is some research suggesting that people with dark triad personality traits are attracted to political extremes because those are a cover or an excuse for engaging in these kinds of behaviors. The explanation would be the other way around because those extremes give an excuse for saying, most Americans are terrible human beings. That allows someone to engage in wanton cruelty online, participate in cancellation campaigns, or other kinds of things. It is a way to live out this desire within a socially sanctioned sphere.

    Marsh: I have not talked about politics much with most of the participants we brought through, but it fits with what we know. We know that people who are very antisocial online are more likely to have psychopathic personality traits. It is not that you become a different person when you go online. That would have been a reasonable hypothesis, but it seems that people’s online behavior is a reflection of their real personality, even if they put on a more prosocial front in in-person settings and act under the cloak of anonymity online.

    Mounk: I know that you also are interested in altruism, and we have talked about it a little earlier in the conversation. It strikes me from what we have talked about so far that the problem of altruism is somewhat ill-posed in philosophy and in biology. The basic paradox of altruism is why we evolve to have altruism. You could expect people who serve their own interests to be the most successful at passing on genes to the next generation. Over time, altruism would be selected out in a population. There are various ways of trying to explain that, group-level selection versus individual-level selection, et cetera. It strikes me that what you are describing is that if you have somebody who is not altruistic at all, who has no sense of care for others, the life outcomes end up being poor. Perhaps some amount of altruism is necessary for success, which seems paradoxical but gives a more straightforward explanation for why altruism has evolved as a human trait.

    Marsh: Absolutely. I think that is a good way of putting it. To me, one of the strongest arguments for the idea that humans on average have the capacity for altruism is the existence of psychopathy. Psychopathy fundamentally boils down to not caring about other people’s welfare for its own sake. That is the trait that is important.

    Mounk: One way of being skeptical about the existence of altruism is to say, well, people seem like they care about others all the time, but because you can get things out of seeming like you care for others, perhaps deep down we are not altruistic. You can make the same argument about pets. Your dog seems like he loves you, but he has realized this is a smart way of getting food and does not care about you. What you are saying is that if that were what everybody was like, everybody would suffer from psychopathy. That is what this would be, but we clearly see in the population that psychopathy is rare. Interesting.

    Marsh: I will say that a cynical, untrusting personality tends to go along with being relatively untrustworthy and callous yourself. When I talk about my research with altruism in general audience settings and people ask questions that reveal fundamental disbelief in the possibility that people could be altruistic, I usually give an answer along the lines of, this question does not say much about what people are like as a whole. There is a spectrum of altruistic capacities in people, but your question has told me a lot about you.

    Every so often, if they push me, because some people are very cynical about whether it is possible for people to genuinely care about other people, many of those people do not have that experience themselves. They do not care about other people. Some of them may live lives that are ordinary enough or prosocial enough that it has not occurred to them that there is something unusual about them. They think they are like everybody else. “We are all like this to some degree.”

    Mounk: If anybody in the audience now thinks, oh my God, I am skeptical about altruism. Am I a psychopath?, how can people self-test whether they are or are not?

    Marsh: Yes. You can go to my organization’s website, disordersofaggression.org, and there is a link you can click on for some screeners for psychopathy, totally anonymous.

    Mounk: What kind of screeners or questions do you ask?

    Marsh: The psychopathy screener we have for adults is called the TriPM, the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure, and it assesses those three bins of traits we asked about before. There are questions along the lines of, I have the ability not to let my emotions dictate my behavior, I like to do risky and dangerous things for fun, I am more competent and capable than the average person. It is questions that get at all the traits we have been talking about.

    Mounk: I realize the pull of psychopathy is such that we have gone away from altruism again. One of the questions to ask about both of these traits is whether it is nature or nurture. Is there something in the constellation of the particular genes that a child has that makes them more likely to display these psychopathic traits, or on the other hand to be an ultra altruist, somebody who is particularly altruistic? Or is it something about the early childhood environment that triggers this in some way?

    Marsh: I would say the best estimates are that about half the variation in these personality traits is genetic, which is true for most personality traits. The estimates always end up about there. About half the variation is genetic factors and about half is environmental factors, although not in a simple way, as you know, like shared environments. The socioeconomic status of your family and what kind of school you went to and whether your mom worked are none of the things that are terribly predictive of life outcomes in general, mostly because different kids respond differently to the same environmental variable. They do not affect every kid the same way, and you cannot make simple predictions. There is a strong genetic component to psychopathy, which I think is hopefully a relief to parents of kids who have these traits, that it is not like you caused the kid to have these traits.

    Because there is a big non-genetic component, there is the capacity for environmental variables to help treat them. That is the good and the bad news.

    Mounk: Sometimes the idea of genetic traits seems harsh or mean, but in a sense it is not. If we said this is all about upbringing, then if somebody has psychopathy it is probably that the mom was not loving enough or whatever sexist tropes you can immediately bring out. If there is a strong genetic component, and it is a polygenic trait, it is not one gene where you have one thing that is passed down and because of this gene you are a psychopath. It is a combination of many genes, and some of those combinations are more likely to result in these traits. You can have one sibling that does not have any inclination toward that at all and another sibling that does by random combination of genes. In a sense that is a less harsh view of the world, or at least a less harsh view of the responsibility of parents.

    Marsh: I completely agree. Parents give themselves more credit and blame than they deserve. Children are agents of their upbringing in a way that is not clear in parenting books. Children elicit parenting from parents. They are not passive receptacles of things done to them. Children are also fairly robust. This is not an invitation for people to treat their children harshly. Your child will be attracted to certain kinds of outcomes, and they will want certain kinds of behavior from parents in ways that shape you in a complicated dance. Your job as a parent is not to shape your child to turn out some particular way.

    There is the analogy of the gardener and the carpenter by the psychologist Alison Gopnik that I like. Parents think of themselves as carpenters too often, that they are trying to build a chair, and if they do this and they do that, then the chair will have a nice sturdy frame and strong back. That is not it. Throw away the wood. You are a gardener. Your child is a seed that could be a geranium seed or a marigold seed or a zinnia seed, and you have no idea what they are going to be. Your job is to try to help foster and let that seed grow as best you can. They are going to turn out the way they are going to turn out to some degree because genetics are powerful.

    Mounk: That is a lovely analogy. I have a dear friend who is an avid listener to this podcast who studied sociology and used to ideologically believe that most outcomes are due to culture and social factors. Now, as she has children, she told me recently, I was wrong. Kids just come out one way or the other. Bringing them up in the right way, nurturing them, is important, but they are different from each other, and it is not because you treat one one way or the other another way.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Abigail discuss what to do if someone in your life may be psychopathic. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    1 hr 15 min
  • What Our Heroes Tell Us About America
    Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. waves to the crowd after delivering his “I Have a Dream” speech in Washington, D.C., on 28th August 1963. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The spot at the Lincoln Memorial where Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered “I Have a Dream” is easy to step over without noticing. The engraved inscription is nearly invisible in the granite, beneath the giant, looming statue of Abraham Lincoln. But it marks the place where King stood on August 28, 1963—63 years ago today—and spoke one of the last pieces of moral language Americans across the political spectrum can still quote without irony.

    That marker was installed in 2003 with broad bipartisan support and spearheaded by a Republican congresswoman from Kentucky, Rep. Anne Northup, whose constituent wrote to her noting the absence of any indicator of hallowed ground. Today, there is a private effort to make the marker more visible in time for the 65th anniversary of the speech in 2028. This sounds like the kind of everyday campaign no one could reasonably oppose—perhaps brass footprints on the step, a resonant visual to evoke public memory.

    But shared memory is more complicated in America than it used to be—for both good reasons and bad. We invite many more perspectives into our national story than in the past, which is good. Institutions are also frequently mistaking the loudest voices as public consensus, which is not. In recent years, we have seen statues toppled and names removed from buildings. Our founders are being reassessed in parks and museums across the country. While activists on the left treat the past like a crime scene, some on the right treat any widening of the historical lens as a betrayal of America.

    Caught in the fray, our institutions have grown skittish, citizens suspicious of each other’s motives, and the act of honoring anyone has begun to feel less like gratitude than divorce proceedings. Which raises the question that the granite step may soon force on us: When we mark the place where King spoke, what exactly are we honoring? The flesh and blood man who left a family behind when he was assassinated? The text of his speech? The greater movement he symbolized? The dream he projected? America’s aspiration to become what the speech demanded?

    The question of the step’s meaning is about to become less theoretical. In January 2027, the court seal on King’s still-sealed FBI surveillance recordings and transcripts will expire. While a large cache of FBI and other agency documents relating to King’s assassination were made public on July 21, 2025, the FBI’s electronic surveillance recordings of King, along with related transcripts and logs, were not. These particular materials were gathered as part of one of the ugliest campaigns of state surveillance and harassment in modern American history. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI wiretapped King, bugged his hotel rooms, spread allegations about his private life, and sent him an anonymous threat to reveal what they knew in an attempt to push him to suicide.

    The allegations described in Pulitzer Prize-winning King biographer David Garrow’s 2019 Standpoint article—mostly of libertine sexual activities but also of King’s entanglements with Communist Party members—are grave, lurid, and, crucially, based on evidence not yet fully reviewable by the public. Garrow’s telling draws from then-newly available Bureau summaries of still-sealed recordings, related investigative material, and a 1977 Justice Department review that found the FBI transcripts it examined to be accurate. Garrow writes these materials “slipped into public view on the [National] Archives’ lightly annotated and difficult-to-explore web site,” due to the provisions of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

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    The original FBI tapes and documents still under seal were created between 1963 and 1968. They were ordered into the custody of the National Archives after litigation brought by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and King aide Bernard Lee, and sealed in 1977 for fifty years. In 2025, the government tried to bring them into the declassification process early, arguing they were relevant to President Trump’s order to fully disclose files related to the assassinations of King, John F. Kennedy, and Robert F. Kennedy. The SCLC and King family have objected, arguing that records born of illegal surveillance should not be rushed into public view as spectacle and should, in fact, be destroyed. A federal judge ultimately declined to lift the seal ahead of its January 31, 2027 expiration.

    As Garrow notes, neither he nor the public has heard the original tapes or seen the full transcripts. The most explosive claim—that King was present during an alleged rape perpetrated by a friend, and reacted with laughter while offering advice—appears, according to Garrow, as a handwritten annotation on an FBI document. Until the underlying recordings and full transcripts can be independently examined, the accuracy of the allegations is impossible to judge. So today they sit like Schrödinger’s cat, both alive and dead, subject to a morbid anticipation of what will be revealed once they are opened to public view.

    To be sure, it remains entirely possible that, once the recordings are no longer under court seal, the allegations related to the rape will not be supported. But will that be enough for the loudest and most conspiratorial minded among us? The FBI report and handwritten note will remain in the record. Some will shout “coverup,” and enough will believe them to disrupt a legacy as the attempt to augment the Lincoln Memorial marker stirs the waters and asks for votes from the glorified group of social media trolls that Congress has become.

    In 2019, Garrow wrote that “Some of us now ageing King scholars ‘may not get there with you’ come 2027, but there is no question that a profoundly painful historical reckoning and reconsideration inescapably awaits.”

    Ultimately, these battles are never only about an individual’s virtue. They are power struggles over what stories we will allow one another to tell about ourselves and our culture—about our past as it implicates our present and future. The thought that some may come for King as they have come for Washington and Jefferson can seem impossible—until one remembers how much of our current politics depends on virtue signaling and proving that the other faction’s saints were villains and frauds.

    So let’s not pretend that it isn’t coming or that we know what we do not know—again, much in the FBI reports may not be corroborated when the audio recordings are finally released. Instead, let’s indulge a thought experiment for what awaits, be it for King or any of our remaining heroes.

    Suppose some of the allegations are true, or that they’re all true, or that they’re ambiguous and disputable. Meanwhile, millions of Americans—prodded by conspiratorial media, social media amplification, foreign influence campaigns, and our appetite for desecration—decide that the truth is being hidden. What if the King we hear in those recordings is not merely adulterous or human in the imperfect way to which we have become accustomed? What if he is morally compromised in ways we can’t dismiss as private failings in a moral leader? What then?

    America has played out this drama on easier questions of Confederate monuments, slaveholding founders, presidents, generals, artists, and entertainers whose lives reflect some mixture of impressive achievement and depravity. Some of our founders exist alongside profound moral contradictions: Jefferson and the ideals embodied in the Declaration he wrote, for example; or Washington who fought and governed in the name of those ideals. We question whether a nation can honor the achievement without denying the obvious contradictions of men who held human beings as slaves. Some of us call for total public erasure while others want things left just as they are. Some treat revelations with some sense of retributive vindication—the dirty truth, finally proved—while others accuse them of hating America.

    But in our thought experiment, King presents a more challenging test. His public actions helped awaken America’s moral capacity. His legacy is human dignity, inclusion, and calling America to its own, highest promise. If even King cannot remain a shared hero, then our question is if any real human being can still carry public meaning in a culture that treats imperfection as disqualification. Can absolutely anything be excused because of who King was? No. The bargain of civic mythmaking had been, anything to keep the symbol on the pedestal. But in our technological panopticon, that bargain can no longer hold. Hero worship has often been a practice of concealment. Nor should the fact of the FBI’s corruption erase facts, no matter how they were acquired. Even in the context of Cold War communist hunting, the state’s campaign against King was unique and despicable. But it was also real.

    Information created as a weapon must be handled as such, but parsing such distinctions is not our public culture’s greatest strength. We prefer flattening, which certainly travels better online. Flattening stories also satisfies our biases. It allows the extreme right to say, “If our heroes must be judged at their worst, then so must yours.” Partisans can try to disqualify narrative ruptures by calling them racist. Meanwhile, cynics call all our heroes frauds, and our more cowardly institutions join a team or stay silent.

    But the adult question for us to ask is not whether King the man was spotless. He certainly wasn’t. The adult question is how we decide what a life finally means—especially once it has ended and all that is left is story.

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    Public honor cannot mean the canonization of an individual. By that standard, who would survive? Not Washington, Lincoln, or Gandhi. Not the artists whose work reflects us, the visionaries who built our societies, the parents who raised and loved us. And certainly not ourselves.

    A hero, at least in a mature culture, is not someone who remains unscarred by scrutiny, but someone whose life, once stripped down and examined in full, can still call us to our highest selves.

    That does not solve every case. Some crimes are too proximate to the honor bestowed. Some monuments really are lies given solid form. I can imagine commemorations that deserve to come down. A lawless FBI director’s name still on FBI headquarters should not be a hard case, whatever his contribution.

    But for our experiment, the case of King is more complex. If the step at the Lincoln Memorial honors only the human man, then whatever we learn about him may threaten it. If it remembers only the speech, then we risk jettisoning the dream from the greater struggle from which it came. If it memorializes the movement, then it’s about the many thousands of participants King inspired. If it stands testament to America’s aspiration to be its best self, then perhaps the marker is not ultimately a memorial to King at all, but a mirror held up to a country still deciding how to manifest the dream he expressed. The coming release of the FBI material and our reaction to the embellishment of the step will test whether we can hold these meanings together.

    It will also test whether everyday Americans are better at this than the self-appointed activist class that claims to speak for them. My suspicion is that many are. Stand on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and ask visitors who their heroes are. You will hear about mothers, grandfathers, veterans, teachers, social media influencers, Jesus, Obama, Trump, Dolly Parton, firefighters, and King.

    The danger we face come 2027 is not only that King will be “cancelled,” which would be damaging enough to America’s sense of self, but that we will forgo seriousness and turn the released materials into ammunition. We’ll see the tapes used to delegitimize the civil rights movement itself, as if the rights of millions depended on the moral purity of one man. Or they will be dismissed as sacrilege, as though the greater good requires us to bury our heads in the sand. Both reactions would betray King’s gift to the country.

    Memorializing King was not sanctifying a saint. For America, the meaning of King’s life is that at a decisive moment, he helped it be true to its conception of itself and see human dignity where it had refused to look. When the tapes come and we hear King the human—with sins at any scale—the question will be whether the dream remains meaningful if the dreamer was flawed in ways that we can now see.

    We have no choice now but to tell the truth about our heroes and tell all of it. Of King, we should tell of his greatness, his radicalism, and his failures; of the movement that made him possible, the women marginalized by the greater story, the FBI that tried to destroy him, and the country that has used him—sometimes nobly, sometimes cheaply—to narrate its own progress.

    We should treat this seriously, then ask what remains. If nothing, then our problem is greater than King. It means we have evolved into a culture in which the only usable heroes are fictional, dead with not-yet discovered secrets, or politically convenient everymen placed on pedestals not because they enlarged the moral imagination, but because they can be made to serve the message of some fleeting campaign—Joe the Plumber or Frank Capra’s John Doe, both ultimately fictional in nearly equal proportion. Worse, perhaps we have become a culture that no longer wants heroes at all, only defendants through which we can playact our personal dramas and occupy ourselves tearing down. It may also mean we can no longer imagine ourselves as heroic, which is one way a culture begins to die.

    But if after sober examination something resonant remains of King’s legacy, then perhaps we will have learned something incredibly useful. A mature culture does not need pristine heroes, but truthful stories about real people taking heroic actions.

    Whatever happens, Americans and tourists will continue to mingle on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. Some will look down and see the engraved words, “I have a dream.” Most will not.

    The marker is just a few words cut into stone. In 2003, its absence suggested an addendum missing from Lincoln’s American promise, chiseled in the walls above it. To refuse now, without serious practical reason, to make that marker more visible would say something larger than its absence ever did. At 250 years old, after the adolescent rage of the past few years, perhaps this is one small place to see whether America is capable of growing up.

    Rob Feld is a filmmaker and journalist. His writing appears regularly in film industry journals, and he teaches screenwriting and directing at New York University.

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  • The Eras of Francis Fukuyama: Building Things

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In the Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column at Persuasion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama discuss why building things with your hands is an antidote to dependence on big tech, whether AI will erode the practical skills future generations need to survive, and what hobbyist robotics has in common with Ukraine’s battlefield ingenuity.

    Enjoying this discussion? In an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought at 5pm on Sunday, September 6 at The Abbey Centre, London. Find out more and get tickets here. Paying subscribers of Persuasion and American Purpose can access a code for a free ticket here.

    We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.

    This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, features content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We started this series on a personal note, with the story of your family and your childhood. I thought in a sense we could end on a personal note. We’ll talk about some big issues, like artificial intelligence and the difficulty of getting things done in contemporary democracies, as well. But those are both related to some of your personal hobbies, which are varied and more manually dexterous than I certainly would be capable of.

    Francis Fukuyama: Yeah, well, one of the reasons for writing a memoir is that I actually wanted to have the opportunity to write about my hobbies, which have consumed an awful lot of my time during my life and actually are the things I am most interested in—just like Trump is obsessed with his ballroom, not the Iran war. There’s something comparable going on with me.

    Mounk: Well, so tell us about some of these hobbies. I see pictures of them cropping up on your Instagram every now and again.

    Fukuyama: I’ve cycled through a whole bunch of different ones. Probably the longest-standing one was building furniture, which I started when I was living in Virginia, working at the State Department. That involved learning quite a lot of different skills, and I got into making some fairly ambitious things, like reproductions of Federal-style furniture. It then shifted—I’ve always had this tech hobby too. I’ve built computers, my own PCs, for myself ever since the mid-1990s. I’ve written my own software. I’ve gotten into flying FPV drones and so forth. There’s a lot of stuff I’ve spent time doing over the years.

    Mounk: I want to get into some of these in particular, but what draws you to that? I guess the first question is, I think a lot of writers and thinkers of your stature are just consumed by the writing and the work. Before we get into why a manual hobby, and why these particular manual hobbies—did you always just have a need for something in a totally different realm? Did you discover at some point that it was good for your happiness, or your productivity? What made you first think, I should get into making furniture?

    Fukuyama: Well, as an intellectual, what you do is just produce words. You sit in front of a computer screen, you write things, you give lectures, you talk to people. I became a professor, so I teach. But it’s very hard to know what the concrete outcome of any of that stuff is, because it’s all very ethereal in many ways. Maybe it did have a profound influence, but you’re really not going to know that. On the other hand, if you build beds for your children, as I did, they’re all sleeping on them, and you know it’s actually something useful. I built a kitchen table probably thirty years ago, and we still use it every day. There’s something very satisfying about producing a material object that is useful in a more immediate way than any of the stuff I’ve written or talked about. That was one of the motives.

    Mounk: Is that a kind of personal satisfaction? I have hobbies like playing soccer, and recently I got into playing poker and things like that. In terms of producing things, I really don’t do much other than cooking, and I enjoy cooking for some of the same reasons—it’s a very concrete result, and it’s also a very fast result, unlike writing a book. You take a bunch of raw ingredients, and an hour later you have a meal that’s sometimes a little disappointing and sometimes, hopefully, delicious, and there’s a great satisfaction in that. Is it just kind of that? How do you feel about some of the more philosophical takes—Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and so on? There’s a whole niche of books that depict this as a personal virtue, but also try to derive some kind of political significance from the act of creating something with your hands.

    Fukuyama: Well, I’m not sure I would attribute any philosophical significance to it. I do think there’s a certain practical side to this, and it really has to do with individual autonomy. We are living in a world dominated by these giant tech companies—Meta, X, Apple, Amazon, Google, and so forth—and you become very dependent on them. If you are a tech-savvy person, all that means is you know how to operate their software, you know how to use your smartphone, but you really don’t penetrate any deeper than that. I’ve always thought that was a big mistake, because you really needed to understand how this stuff worked on a deeper level and be able to manipulate it yourself.

    For example, I hate Apple. I have an iPhone and an iPad, for which there’s really no substitute. But what I hate about Apple products is that they deliberately make it impossible to hack into their machinery. Even to get an Apple computer open, you have to have a proprietary fastener that only Apple uses—it’s not modular. Whereas with PCs, you can take them apart. I frequently run into these problems that other people do, where your computer just stops working, and with Apple you have to take it into the Genius Bar and have them take it to the back room and tell you it’s going to take two weeks to get the thing fixed. With my computer, I just take it apart. I recently had to rebuild my big PC at home because something was screwed up with the operating system, so I basically took the whole thing apart, reinstalled the operating system, put everything back together, and it was working again.

    I think that dependence on big tech is a problem for society as a whole. I do have this worry about the coming AI age, because we’re already getting very dependent on these AI systems, and I think as time goes on, we could raise a whole generation of people who basically don’t know how to do anything if they don’t have access to an AI. We’ve already experienced degrees of this. Most young people don’t know how to read a map—they’ve grown up with GPS and all these apps on their phone that let them get from one place to another. Suppose the global GNSS system goes down and you don’t have access to that anymore—how are you going to know how to get across town to visit your friend? You won’t have a map, and you won’t know how to read one even if you had one in front of you.

    The way I think about it, there’s a kind of survivalist instinct at play here. If you think about survivalism, there are a lot of states of the world you could regress to. A lot of them, like Cormac McCarthy’s The Road or Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower series, you’re basically going back to caveman days, where you don’t have any access to technology, or maybe the gun is the highest level of tech you’ve got, and if you don’t know how to shoot a gun, you’re not going to be able to defend yourself. Nobody can prepare for that kind of future. What is more realistic is the situation the Ukrainians found themselves in after 2022, when they were invaded by Russia—all of a sudden they’re confronting a much more powerful enemy, and they really have to rely on their own wits to do that. It turns out they’re very good at things like robotics, like drones, like building a command-and-control system to coordinate all of their activities, and they did this all on their own.

    That’s the level of tech ability I think I have. I know how to build robots. I know how to use Arduinos and Raspberry Pis to take inputs from sensors and control servos. I’ve built a whole bunch of robots—not lethal ones, the way the Ukrainians are doing—but I have a grounding in all of that stuff. If you’re cast into a situation where you actually have to use that level of technology to do something for yourself, you can do it. So I think that autonomy is the big issue for me.

    Mounk: Fascinating. I’m not going to risk breaking into your home in case one of those robots does turn out to be more lethal than you say. What advice would you give to somebody listening to this who’s saying, I would love a hobby like that—I would love to really get into making furniture, or making these robots—but I don’t have the background in that? Certainly the education I went through at no point emphasized these kinds of skills. I guess I could have—I went to college in England, so I just studied one subject; it wasn’t really a liberal arts education. I tried to make up for that during my graduate school time. If I had been an undergrad in the United States, I could have taken courses in robotics or something like that. But if you haven’t done that, if you’ve gone through a pretty academic education, and you don’t feel like this is an area where you have a ton of experience—how do you start? How do you pick what to do, and how do you develop those skills?

    Fukuyama: Well, picking what to do, I can’t give much advice on, because that’s a very personal issue. But the question of how to learn the skill—it’s YouTube. I never took a class in woodworking, in robotics, in any of this stuff—I just picked it up on my own. Furniture making, I actually started in the 1980s. At that point it was TV, not YouTube—it was before YouTube. PBS had this long-running program, This Old House, and the carpenter from This Old House had his own show about making furniture, so you could watch him build relatively simple tables and desks and this sort of thing. That’s how I got my start.

    But YouTube is just unbelievable. There isn’t an obscure hobby in the world where there isn’t a whole series of instructional videos on how to do things. For some reason the visual aspect is really important, because I think any kind of hobby that involves manipulating material objects—if you don’t actually see a video of how people are doing it, you’re really not going to know how it works. That’s true of auto repair, it’s true of fixing computers, it’s true of making furniture. That’s really the path I followed.

    Mounk: You mentioned AI, and I want to get to AI as a substantive topic later in the conversation, but do you use AI at all now when you run into a problem—when you’re unable to fix the robot, or install the operating system? Do you use an AI tool and say, hey, what am I doing wrong?

    Fukuyama: Yeah, Claude has been very useful. For example, I had to migrate a couple of big databases. I had written a database program in Python on my own, which is really a stupid thing to do, because it didn’t use SQL—the structured query language that’s standard on databases. So I figured I needed to move it into a more robust, open-source product, and I couldn’t have done that without the help of ChatGPT at first, and then Claude. Claude is really great. I wrote pretty ambitious programs in my life—programs that were several thousand lines long—and you’d always get to a point where there was something you wanted to do and you couldn’t quite figure out, by reading the manual, how to get there. Now, with Claude Code, you just say, okay, add a button that will do the following, and it’ll just do it. You can run the thing right away and see that it works or it doesn’t work, and you go back and say, can you fix that? And you’re done.

    But you can see the danger in this, because you don’t really have to—I’ve forgotten a lot of the coding I used to know, simply because I don’t need to use those abilities anymore. I think down the line there are going to be dangers there.

    Mounk: It’s very interesting how quickly skills atrophy when you don’t use them. I wonder whether they also come back quickly if you had to use them again. I feel that languages are sometimes like that—a language like Spanish, which I’ve never really formally learned, but I speak a bunch of Romance languages and I’ve spent a little bit of time studying it on my own, and when I’m in Spain, quite quickly I start to be able to speak rudimentary Spanish, and I certainly understand it quite well. When I don’t use it for a while, it totally goes away. I wonder if skills like coding are similar—if you’ve done it a lot in your life and then you don’t do it for a while, it does go away, but it also comes back.

    Fukuyama: Well, that’s true with software. There was a period in my life when I was building virtual furniture that I was putting inside virtual houses. I learned how to use this CAD software, like AutoCAD, because I could get access to a cheap educational version of it beginning in the 1980s, and I would draw the plans for my furniture on the computer before I built them in wood. It turns out there are all of these 3D graphics programs—like what used to be called, I think it’s now just called 3ds Max—where you can actually build an entire house. That’s what I did. I designed a Georgian house—I was building Federal-style furniture, so I needed a colonial house. I built the house in software, and then you can light it, so you can say, early morning in midsummer, when the sun is just coming over the horizon in this particular area, what’s it going to look like? The graphics program will actually show you the lighting coming through the window and falling on your piece of furniture, and then you can make a video where you walk around the house and see what it looks like in that particular environment.

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    This is a long-winded way of saying I can’t do that now, because you have to be immersed in this highly complex software. There are people who spend their entire lives inside Adobe Photoshop or Premiere, and they know all of the little tricks, but if you go away from it for any length of time, you’re lost, and you really have to relearn the skill. So yeah, there’s definitely this problem of skill atrophy.

    Mounk: Skill atrophy is a great bridge to what I want to talk to you about next, which is the difficulty of building things in the United States today. There’s a remarkable way in which our ability to construct physical things in the world—or even non-physical things, in certain kinds of ways—has deteriorated. It’s amazing when you look at how quickly something like the Empire State Building was built, with what rapid speed railways were struck through the wilderness, how quickly America went from realizing we were behind in the space race to having a man on the moon, or even something as simple as building a highway or a railway in blue states like California.

    Fukuyama: The loss of manufacturing capacity in the United States is not something that had to happen. We are suddenly discovering the dangers of being completely dependent, for the ability to manufacture a whole range of goods, from electric vehicles down to little keyboards for computers. All of that has moved to East Asia, and it didn’t have to. I would blame the economists for this, because the whole outsourcing craze was just driven by the economist’s concern for efficiency—if somebody else in the world can put together a computer mouse more efficiently than you can do it in America, then why not buy it from somebody else?

    They didn’t understand the intimate connections that exist between high-level skills, like designing a computer or writing a very complex piece of software, and the low-level skills of actually translating that into a material product. It involves complex supply chains, where you have to have a good relationship—a social relationship—with the people who supply you, because you have to communicate what you need to the suppliers, and they have to be able to tweak their products. It also has to do with basic engineering skills, because a lot of that stuff is based on a kind of tacit knowledge, and once you lose that tacit knowledge, it’s gone, and it’s really, really hard to recreate. Anyone who’s worked on an engine knows that when you’re trying to take a bolt off of a gasket cover or something, if it’s stuck and you apply too much pressure, you’re going to strip the bolt, but if you don’t apply enough pressure, you’re not going to get it off—it’s just a matter of feel. A good mechanic knows exactly how to do that. Once you outsource a lot of those manual skills to other places, they learn them, and you don’t realize what you’ve lost, because you’re really not able to reproduce a lot of that mechanical ability.

    One thing I think is interesting is that not every industrialized country has done that. Both Japan and Germany have held on to a lot of their mechanical skills much longer than the United States did. In Japan they’ve got this award—they’re called Living National Treasures—and there are maybe a hundred people the society honors for particular skills. Those could be culturally specific, like the tea ceremony, but they also give it to machinists—a machinist who can actually fabricate a very complex part with high precision is honored in that society. Germany has held on to that stuff much longer than the United States too. It’s funny that even though America is a democracy, we still have a very hierarchical sense about education, where there’s a sharp division between what people who go to university know and what people who work with their hands know. One of the great marks of social mobility is that you no longer have to work with your hands. I think other democratic societies have appreciated, to a much greater extent than the United States, the importance of some of those more traditional manual skills, and they’ve arranged things so that, economically, they can preserve them.

    Mounk: That is really interesting. There are different kinds of theories you might have about what ultimately drives that decline. One that we’ve talked about, including in the last episode, is vetocracy and bureaucracy—anybody can sue against a project, there has to be a prolonged environmental assessment, you have to get building permits for everything, and so on. Another one you’re invoking now is just the actual loss of manual skills, which might be driven more by technological change, by free trade agreements, by China’s entry into the WTO—that’s a different set of explanations. Then, sometimes people think it’s just a kind of lack of ambition—that in the 1960s, when JFK said we’re going to send a man to the moon, by and large this was seen with great enthusiasm.

    I recall a line from Tom Lehrer, whom I love—a wonderful American mathematician and pianist who wrote these great satirical songs in the 1960s—in a song about Wernher von Braun, the Nazi engineer who eventually went to NASA to help with the space mission. He asks who’s helping us spend seventeen billion dollars, or whatever it was, to send “some clown” to the moon, and answers: “good old Americans like Wernher von Braun.” So you can see skepticism about this project, even in the 1960s, from Tom Lehrer—why should we be spending billions of dollars to send some clown to the moon? Though you might think that attitude has grown today, that we’ve become less collectively ambitious. Between those different strands of explanation—do you think they’re in competition with each other? Do you think it’s all of the above? How do we think about this?

    Fukuyama: I think it is a bit of all of the above. Part of it is this big political change that came about beginning in the 1970s and ‘80s, with the rise of politicians like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, because there was a big shift in the way Americans thought about their relationship to their own government. In the Progressive Era, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and during the New Deal, Americans actually had a lot of faith in their own government. If you were an ambitious young progressive in the 1930s, you would want to go to work for the Roosevelt administration and head a federal agency—electrifying the upper South through the Tennessee Valley Authority, or being an engineer working on the Hoover Dam, or any of the big infrastructure projects they had. But by the 1960s, you had this big reaction, where a lot of Americans began to see the government as the problem. This was codified by Ronald Reagan—in his inaugural address he said the scariest words are, “I’m from the government, and I’m here to help.”

    Some of that reaction was well taken. Robert Moses was seen as a villain in New York City for bulldozing neighborhoods in the interest of his big, ambitious infrastructure projects. There were concerns that many government agencies had been captured by corporate interests, and all of that was true to some extent. But I think it led to a general turning away from government, and frankly, government is the only social organization capable of undertaking projects like going to the moon. I think we’re still living in the aftermath of that. If you are a progressive person who wants social justice, over the last generation, if you graduate from Yale or Stanford Law School, you’re not going to go work for an agency—you’re going to go work for a public interest law firm that’s going to sue the government and stop it from doing things. That’s a shift in our ambitions. We now think the private sector has to undertake everything ambitious, and quite frankly, they’re doing some amazing things in data centers and AI and so forth. But it’s not the government that’s pushing the agenda of going to Mars—it’s Elon Musk. By the way, he’s never going to make it as a private company alone—that’ll never happen. But it might happen if NASA had that more clearly in mind, and if Congress were willing to fund it adequately.

    I think all of the stuff—the excessive permitting, the loss of skills—all of that is part of the story. But there’s this larger meta-story about the ability of our democracy to imagine collective goals and actually see them through.

    Mounk: It feels a little bit like a chicken-and-egg problem, where people don’t trust the government, which makes it very hard for the government to do stuff, but the government also has real trouble doing stuff, so it’s natural that people don’t trust it. I think Elon Musk is a great case of a rule I have about American politics, which is that people always live up to the worst stereotype of themselves. Many of his choices over the last few years, I find ridiculous and sometimes disgusting. But to be fair, you look at NASA’s budget and what they’ve accomplished in spaceflight, and you look at SpaceX, which now has a huge budget after the IPO but was a pretty scrappy company when they started, and how much they’ve been able to achieve technologically, and you say, well, why should I trust the government? Is there a way out of this chicken-and-egg problem?

    Fukuyama: An economist would describe the chicken-and-egg problem as being trapped in a low-level equilibrium, where people don’t trust the government, they don’t want to pay taxes, therefore the government doesn’t have enough revenue to do the things it wants to do, and that confirms people’s view that the government can’t do anything. We’ve been in that trap really since the 1980s. It’s important to be fair and accurate about where a lot of this decline comes from. The one Elon Musk venture that’s really pretty spectacular is the space launch and Starlink capacity he’s put in place. A lot of the decline actually isn’t in NASA and the government—it’s in these old-line aerospace companies like Boeing, which has been a disaster over the last ten or fifteen years.

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    There was a vehicle that could go to low Earth orbit to retrieve people from the International Space Station, and there was an open competition—SpaceX bid on it, and Boeing bid on it. The Boeing Starliner was a disaster. They flew one successful mission to the space station, and then something malfunctioned, and they couldn’t bring the astronauts back, so they had to rely on a SpaceX Crew Dragon vehicle to actually rescue the astronauts. There’s no question a more Silicon Valley–oriented, innovative private company can do better than one of these old-line manufacturers, and that’s part of the story of American decline. But I do think that ultimately, in terms of setting goals, the really ambitious ones still have to be set by the government itself, representing the whole of society, and you need the kind of social buy-in necessary to really achieve them. Going to Mars is going to be unbelievably expensive, and where is that money going to come from? It isn’t going to come from private investors—it’s going to come from taxpayers, funding it through an agency like NASA.

    Mounk: Let’s talk about artificial intelligence more broadly, though there’s an obvious link to our ability to build stuff. The optimists say AI is going to allow us to cut through this Gordian knot, and it’ll be so much easier and cheaper to build everything. I remember being in a room with Sam Altman as early as, I believe, 2017—it may have been 2018. I barely knew who he was at the time, but he had already founded OpenAI, which was an obscure company then, and he pointed out the window of a fancy conference room in Silicon Valley and said, “Two years from now, out here on the field, there are going to be robots building houses.” It’s nearly ten years after that, and that is not happening. But it is obvious that this is a transformative technology that can allow us to do many things.

    At the same time, perhaps that line also indicates some of the ways it’s going to be hard for AIs to build things—not only have they not yet learned the kind of manual skills they’d need to single-handedly build those houses, but also they wouldn’t be allowed to, because a cop would come and shut them down and say, you don’t have a building permit, this hasn’t gone through environmental review, what about these seventeen regulations, you actually have to have members of trade unions present for a building of this size. So what about these robots? Can AI help us build things, and how do we need to rethink the regulatory state if we’re to take advantage of some of AI’s positive potential? I’m quite worried about its negative potential too, and perhaps we can talk about that later.

    Fukuyama: I think the weakest part of the AI revolution has been the interface between, let’s say, LLMs and the real material world. There’s one element of this that gets into the really ridiculous and absurd—Elon Musk just gave this interview with Zanny Minton Beddoes of The Economist, where she asked what’s going to happen to money in ten years with this AI revolution, and he said people aren’t going to need money, because everybody will have everything they want. It’s such an absurd idea, because it completely abstracts from the material requirements of economic growth. We see this in the closure of the Strait of Hormuz—a simple act that basically sets the entire global economy on its heels, because it doesn’t have access to this one material resource, oil and gas, that it’s really dependent on.

    I really think a lot of the speculative fervor behind AI is driven by people who are very smart, but in one rather narrow way—mathematically smart—and they overvalue intelligence, by itself, as having the ability to solve all problems. What they don’t get at is how that intelligence then interfaces with a world full of material constraints. I heard a briefing from an OpenAI engineer talking about how this was going to end global poverty, so every developing country could have clean water in every village. This is a subject I actually know something about—we teach several cases on water supply in South Asia. If you look at a South Asian city like Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, the knowledge of what a good water supply looks like isn’t rocket science—people know what it should look like. The reason it can’t be built is that there are water mafias—criminal gangs that control the existing water supply and make a lot of money off of it—and the Bangladesh government isn’t strong enough to enforce the law on them. How is a smart machine going to solve that particular problem? It’s simply a political constraint that no amount of intelligence can get around—the intelligent machine will say, boy, this is a really stupid political system, but it’s not going to have a way of getting around it.

    I think this material interaction is going to be the slow part. They are building world models that will allow these machines to interact with the real world, but ultimately there are going to be really big constraints—raw materials, simply the carrying capacity of the Earth. Can you imagine—what are we up to now in terms of world population, eight billion people? If eight billion people started living at an American standard of living, the material strain that would put on the world—it’s just not going to happen. It’s simply not going to happen. That’s one of the big limitations I think a lot of AI prophets aren’t really taking seriously.

    Mounk: What kind of world are we entering here? Clearly AI is going to be transformative—let me ask you that as a first question. At this point, do you think AI is going to be the most important technology that people remember about the time span from, let’s say, 1950 to 2030? I don’t want to project too much into the future, because who knows what’s going to come down the line in ten or twenty or thirty years. Or do you think it will look minor compared to the internet, or perhaps social media, or mobile telephony, or cable news, or the invention of fertilizer in agriculture, which certainly was a major technological turning point for the human species? I’m trying to think, off the cuff, of other competitors during that time period.

    Fukuyama: In my humble opinion, the single biggest transformative technology was indoor plumbing. If you didn’t have indoor plumbing, you’d have to shit in an outhouse, and it would be really, really disgusting. That’s my candidate.

    But, Yascha, I should be asking you this question, since you’re writing a whole book on this subject—I’ve started to read an early draft of it, and I think it’s very good. I would agree with you that this is absolutely going to be completely transformative. All of the complaints about interacting with the material world that I just mentioned abstract from the fact that most of the wealth in a modern economy like that of the United States is not produced by material interaction—it’s produced by people sitting in front of computers, providing services that are largely cognitive-based, and these machines are actually going to replace human beings. I think it’s going to be far more transformative, partly because it’s a general-purpose technology that can be used in virtually every aspect of a modern economy, unlike indoor plumbing, where you don’t necessarily need it in all situations.

    Yes, I think it is going to have a huge economic impact. I think people are understating, for example, the job loss—the threat to service-sector jobs from these machines is going to be huge. I think a lot of the people pushing the technology are trying to soft-pedal the impacts it’s going to have, because it is going to take away the livelihoods of a whole lot of people in society.

    Mounk: Let me put the question in relation to one of our early episodes. Liberal democracy, you argued in The End of History, is the set of ideas that can best honor the ambitions of human beings at our stage of history, and is better able to resolve the internal contradictions of political regimes than its ideological competitors. Was all of that based on a particular kind of technological stage, a technological age? If artificial intelligence radically remakes our world—in whatever exact way that turns out to look—but if it’s as fundamental a technology as I think you and I agree it is, might it erode the technological, and ultimately material, economic, and political, preconditions for a world of liberal democracy in such a way that we’re either likely to abandon this ideology, perhaps for the worse, or that the ideology will need to evolve and transform itself so much that we should start calling it by a different name?

    Fukuyama: Here I hesitate to tread on the terrain you are plowing in your book, but I think that in all of my writings about the large arc of history, beginning with The End of History, technology was always at the core of it—you can define the social order that exists based on the level of technology. The invention of agriculture leads to the first rise of states in alluvial valleys, like the Nile River Valley or Mesopotamia, which leads to a vast increase in human inequality, because states are hierarchical and they can do things like enslave populations and use them to extract value for the elites.

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    When I wrote The End of History and the Last Man in the late ‘80s and ‘90s, I thought we were at the cusp of a digital revolution that was actually going to aid democracy. The earlier industrial revolution, based on gas and oil and mass production, actually supported a certain degree of state centralization—states could deploy the technology. You saw this in the former Soviet Union—the Soviet Union in the 1930s was the fastest-growing economy in the world, because Stalin could simply put a lot of capital behind building Fordist factories, imitating what had happened in North America and Europe. He was very successful at that, and it concentrated power. I, along with a lot of other people, thought that the invention of the personal computer, and then maybe later the smartphone, would reverse that trend, because it provided information much more democratically—people would have access to information. It’s true, people do have much better information, but they also have access to bad information, because you’ve wiped away all of the elites, the intermediaries who used to certify the credibility of information. That’s what we saw with the rise of social media.

    Now, with the rise of AI, it seems to me the most obvious immediate effect is that this is, above all, a technology that benefits from economies of scale, and I think a lot of our problems have to do with these scale economies. The reason we’ve got these monstrously large tech companies, like Meta and Google, is that they’re all based on software, and software scales much more easily than, let’s say, manufacturing does. That’s why you’ve created these incredible fortunes. AI is a little bit different, because it does have a material base—you’ve got to build these big data centers—but it is going to have, I think, a huge effect on income and wealth, because the rewards for building these systems are going to go to the people at the top of the hierarchies of the companies that build them, and it’s going to take away the livelihoods of people in the middle—maybe not everybody at the bottom, because you’re still going to need plumbers and electricians, but all of the people sitting behind computers are going to see their livelihoods disappear.

    That’s bad for democracy. That kind of inequality and concentration of wealth will get you to a point where the state itself may not be able to counterbalance the power of these private companies. We were in a somewhat similar situation in the late nineteenth century, with the rise of these big cartels and monopolies like the Standard Oil Trust, and that led to a political pushback, in terms of antitrust, where the government undertook to disassemble some of these big concentrations of wealth. I think that was an important move. It’s not clear to me that governments in the future are going to have the power to actually control these big companies, and that’s something I find rather troubling.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Francis discuss the long-term impact of Francis’ work and his (unexpected) post-retirement plans. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    49 min
  • The Eras of Francis Fukuyama: How States Form

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In the Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column at Persuasion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama discuss why Fukuyama initially supported the Iraq War and what changed his mind, how the neoconservative movement’s experience of Eastern Europe shaped its disastrous assumptions about the Middle East, and what his break with former colleagues cost him personally and professionally.

    Enjoying this discussion? In an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought at 5pm on Sunday, September 6 at The Abbey Centre, London. Find out more and get tickets here. Paying subscribers of Persuasion and American Purpose can access a code for a free ticket here.

    We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.

    This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, features content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We left in the 1990s, or I suppose the early 2000s, with your writing about human nature. So I think we’re going to try and cover the next fifteen or twenty years in this conversation. The starting point to a lot of political debate, and perhaps to some big changes in your reflections about the world, was the terrible terrorist attacks of September 11th and the decision by the administration of George W. Bush to invade Iraq. You initially supported that idea and then changed your mind about it. Tell us about that time.

    Francis Fukuyama: Well, I had fallen in with a group of people that later became known as the neoconservatives—people like Bill Kristol and his Project for the New American Century, which started in the 1990s. It was a pretty hawkish group of policy intellectuals. I frankly hadn’t been thinking about foreign policy all that much in the 1990s. I was more interested in things like the wars in Central America, or the peacekeeping missions that had been undertaken in that period. It’s so long ago—we had this thing called the responsibility to protect, at a time when the West seemed so overpoweringly powerful and influential. And the question was: when were we going to intervene to restore order to disorderly developing countries?

    Mounk: That now seems incredibly hubristic. I remember being quite skeptical about that idea when I first came across it as a young student. But of course, this came out of the failure to intervene in Rwanda—the sense that we had let these horrible genocides go on without doing anything. And so, if we had the power, if we had the ability, why shouldn’t we go in and save people from genocide? And we have the ability to do that—well, why shouldn’t we take it one step further and spread the joys of democracy and good government around the world? You have to give it its due—you have to place it in the historical context of where that instinct came from.

    Fukuyama: I had been thinking about developing world conflicts, civil wars, intervention, and I hadn’t paid that much attention to this ongoing crisis over Iraq—even though when I was an intern at the RAND Corporation back in 1978, that’s what I did. I wrote a whole study that summer about Iraq’s—Saddam Hussein’s—relationship to the Soviet Union, which at that time was the most radical Arab rejectionist country. So I did sign on to a letter that Bill Kristol had sent around urging intervention in Iraq. To my embarrassment, I actually hadn’t thought that carefully about it.

    Then September 11th happened. I was sitting in my office at SAIS on Massachusetts Avenue when the Pentagon was struck. One of my colleagues came into my office and said, “You’d better turn on the TV, because something big is happening.” And we watched the second plane go into the second tower, and looking out the windows we could actually see the smoke rising from the Pentagon, which had also been hit that morning. Everything seemed to change. And the question then was: what do we do about this? This led to this really bitter and prolonged debate over the causes of September 11th, and the inclination of a lot of my conservative friends to try to link this to Saddam Hussein and this longstanding problem that they’d had with Iraq and its attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction.

    I don’t know that it’s worth going through all of the ins and outs of that latter issue. The elder Bush had intervened to get Iraq out of Kuwait back in 1991. In the subsequent years, they discovered that Iraq was actually working on a nuclear program. They sent nuclear inspectors in, and Saddam Hussein kicked them out. And it did look like he was trying to do his best to deceive the outside world as to the existence of these WMD programs. But after September 11th, there was an attempt to link all of this to the September 11th attacks, and that laid the ground for the disastrous intervention in 2003. So that was the general background out of which I was operating back then.

    Mounk: So at the time when you favored this intervention, which of the different kinds of justifications for the war did you find to be most compelling? There was the most idealistic, neoconservative one—we’re going to turn Iraq into a flourishing democracy, and that’ll be an example to the rest of the Middle East, and if it means that all of these other countries also become flourishing, democratic, prosperous nations, that’s worth it. There was a more security-minded, hard-nosed one—Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. I believe one of the reasons why American intelligence was convinced that he had weapons of mass destruction is that he lied to his own generals about it—they had recordings of him telling his generals, “We have these amazing weapons of mass destruction that you don’t know the details about.” So there was a kind of security-based reasoning for it. Then, of course, there was a kind of cynical reasoning, which I assume was not what was driving you, but which may have been driving certain parts of the American state—I wouldn’t overstate this—which is that Iraq had oil, and America needed a stable supply of oil. Of these different reasonings, what was your initial reasoning, and what made you then change your mind?

    Fukuyama: Well, the oil thing, I don’t think, was ever the driving force, either for me or for the administration. It was the weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that Iraq would get them. The idea of democratizing Iraq was really not on anybody’s radar at that point. That was a justification that George W. Bush began pushing after the failure of the intervention, when he was in the midst of an insurgency and had to come up with another reason for why he’d launched this war. That’s the only point at which they started saying they were going to bring democracy to Iraq, but I don’t think that was on anybody’s agenda back in the late nineties, early 2000s.

    For me, I didn’t have a problem with the use of force to topple a dictator. It had been done—we toppled Hitler, we went to war with Japan, and we did all of these things using force that brought about good results in the end. My real objection had to do with the practicalities of actually restoring order in the countries we had intervened in, because my observation from Central America, from Vietnam, from the Philippines all the way back in the early twentieth century, was that that’s the point at which American foreign policy failed.

    I had a mentor at the RAND Corporation, Steve Hosmer, a former Air Force officer who had worked very intensively—RAND at one point had a Saigon office when the Vietnam War was going on. He was a very wise person about third-world interventions, and his general warning was that the United States would get very invested in an intervention. The war would get a lot of support in the first year or two, but as time went on and we discovered how difficult these interventions were—to stabilize the country we were trying, ostensibly, to help—the American public would lose interest, and then we would pull out, and the whole thing would go to hell.

    This has happened repeatedly in American foreign policy. It happened in the Philippines. It happened in El Salvador, or in Central America more broadly, in the 1930s, when we sent the Marines into Nicaragua. It happened in Vietnam, where we got tired after about five years and then decided we wanted to pull out. So my real concern was: okay, you’re going to take out this dictator—what is your plan to actually stabilize Iraq after that?

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    This is the point where I think the backgrounds of my neocon friends were really kind of a hindrance to clear thinking about this, because they had all been in power in the first Bush administration, at the point when the Berlin Wall fell. That was a historically unique moment, where there actually were crowds in the streets demonstrating to celebrate the downfall of these communist dictators in Eastern Europe. That was their experience of American power and influence, and I think they believed at the time that the same thing would happen in Iraq—that the moment you toppled Saddam Hussein, people would come out in the streets cheering the Americans on.

    It failed to take account of all of the accumulated Arab grievances against the United States for its support of Israel, the general distrust, and just the sheer cultural difference. Eastern Europe had been part of the West for centuries, but the Middle East was a very different place—you had radical Islamists running all over the place, which you didn’t have in Eastern Europe. So I just think my friends in the administration had a rather naive view of the likelihood that this kind of intervention would actually work, or that they had enough cultural and political knowledge to pull it off. That was the situation, and that was my reason for becoming increasingly skeptical about the wisdom of the Iraq War.

    Mounk: Obviously one other factor that was very important was the split between Sunnis and Shias, and the fact that even though Saddam Hussein was extremely unpopular among Shias and among many Sunnis—he was a terrible dictator, and that’s something we shouldn’t forget in retelling the story—the moment Sunnis felt like their power was being taken away and Shias were going to be in charge of the state, they had a very strong reason to try and organize against the new regime. That’s part of what then drove the civil war which ensued. At what point did you start to think this was really going the wrong way? And how did you decide to break with what at that point was the crowd of your friends, intellectual collaborators, and professional network? This was a time at which your feelings about the Iraq War were perhaps the most important litmus test in American politics. You broke with not just what had been the prevailing consensus of the Washington establishment and the media in the run-up to the war, but in particular with the project of some of the people who were your closest associates. That must not have been easy, professionally or personally.

    Fukuyama: Well, as we got closer and closer to the actual invasion date, I was more and more skeptical. I wrote a piece in the Washington Post saying that we really shouldn’t intervene unless we got a Security Council resolution, which we never ended up getting. But I guess the real moment when I went public about all this was sometime in 2003. But at this point, an insurgency had already begun. American soldiers were already getting blown up by roadside bombs. There was a big conference to celebrate the war at the American Enterprise Institute, which at that point was the hotbed of neocon support for the war. My former SAIS colleague Fouad Ajami was there, and Bernard Lewis, the Arabists, both of whom had been counseling President Bush to do the intervention.

    I was at this dinner—this very fancy, formal dinner—and everybody was talking about what a great success the war was. I remember Norman Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary, for whom I’d written quite a few pieces, said this was the biggest advance of democracy in the twentieth century. And I just looked around and said, what are these people smoking? Don’t they understand that this is not going well, and it’s not going to end well? That’s the point where I wrote a big piece for the New York Times about why this was a big mistake.

    Mounk: What was the fallout from that?

    Fukuyama: Well, I didn’t speak to a lot of my friends for several years. Some of them I never spoke to again, like Charles Krauthammer. I had a big break with Bill Kristol—Bill had been a friend of mine from graduate school; I actually inherited his apartment in Cambridge, since I was a year behind him—and we kind of broke off relations. I’m glad to say that we’re back together again now that he’s become a very enthusiastic Never Trumper. I think he also had a big shift in his orientation toward a lot of political issues in the aftermath of that. But yeah, I just had to hang out with a different group of friends at that point.

    Mounk: One of the things that happened intellectually is that you started asking yourself questions about the origins of stable political orders. Am I reading too much into the relevance of these events to think that the failure of state building in Iraq—the failure of being able to impose, at least at first, a durable, peaceful, democratic order on Iraq despite the overwhelming military strength—is part of what got you interested in this mammoth project you end up publishing over the course of the 2010s?

    Fukuyama: Well, that’s right. It wasn’t just Iraq, it was Afghanistan too. We did two interventions, in 2001 and 2003, where basically we succeeded in collapsing an existing state. In both countries, the famous Max Weber definition of the state—a legitimate monopoly of force over defined territory—had disappeared. They both fell into civil war. There were armed militias; there was no legitimate, single monopoly of power. And what I immediately recognized was that Americans had absolutely no idea how to deal with this. They kind of assumed the state would always exist, and the main problem was to limit the power of the state, not to actually create state power in the first place. They were at sea trying to do this in both of these countries—to create a state is really about force, so you have to have a police force and a military. The United States was busy trying to create these state structures in these extremely chaotic conditions.

    But this is the point where I also realized the fault went deeper—at another level, in my home discipline of political science. Nobody at that point was thinking about state capacity, state building. For example, at Stanford, when I finally got there in 2010, everybody was into rational choice political science, in which they said, well, the state is predatory, and the main question is how do you restrain the state. Nobody was thinking about how you create state power in the first place and how you exercise state power legitimately.

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    That is further encased in an American political culture that is very anti-statist. One of my other great mentors was Seymour Martin Lipset, the great political scientist and sociologist who spent his whole career writing about American exceptionalism—about how America was really different from almost every other rich democracy. One of the dimensions of that was anti-statism. Lipset argued that this is one of the deepest aspects of American political culture: distrust of the state. In Europe, in Japan, in Korea, in other democracies, people see the state as something positive—the state is what protects them from foreign enemies, from the rigors of market capitalism, and so forth. But in the United States, both on the left and the right, there’s a distrust of the state that runs extremely deep. And that extends to American political scientists, who at that time weren’t that interested in studying the state. They wanted to study voting and legislatures, public opinion, all these other topics, but not really how you construct state authority and how you make it work more effectively. That’s what made me realize this is a big gap, and it needs to be filled, both on a theoretical level and on a practical level.

    Mounk: So these two books actually were my introduction to your work. They came out while I was in graduate school, and I read them cover to cover at the time—The Origins of Political Order, which was published, I believe, in 2011, and then Political Order and Political Decay in 2014. It’s a two-volume series that really tries to understand, first of all, how the modern state arises, and then, secondly, how you get certain states—calling this somewhat seriously and somewhat jokingly—“getting to Denmark,” which have a lot of the positive attributes we might wish to have from a state, and what might eventually undermine those—how it is actually very difficult to sustain those states, and what kind of dangers that poses to contemporary democracy, particularly in the United States. Let’s go from the beginning. Why is it that the United States or France or China have capacious states that are able to shape significant parts of a social world in accordance with their will and their preferences, whereas in a place like Somalia we never got the emergence of a capacious state able to do that to a comparable degree?

    Fukuyama: Well, it’s very interesting. There’s been a big academic debate over early state formation, and a lot of it arose in this period that I was writing in, because it was not a topic that was addressed by political scientists by and large—it was addressed by a lot of anthropologists and archaeologists, and there were various theories of state formation. There’s the hydraulic theory, associated with Wittfogel, that said states were needed to create irrigation systems, manage rivers, and so forth. That’s not really believed very much anymore. Probably the most prominent theory is that of the sociologist Charles Tilly, who talked about early modern Europe and the pressure of military competition in forming states.

    So you had political orders that were basically based on kinship—some marauding band of roving bandits conquers a territory, kills off the men, marries the women, and settles down, and it’s all based on friends and family. The question is: how do you get to a more modern state—one that is more impersonal, that has permanent bureaucratic structures that can administer a territory, and isn’t dependent on the single charismatic authority of the guy who led the marauding band in the first place? Tilly’s thesis was that this was the result of military competition—if you hired your cousin to be your commanding general and he was incompetent, you were going to lose the war, and you and your family would get killed. That’s a pretty powerful incentive to pick a competent person. So the idea of meritocracy, for example, arises under these circumstances, where you desperately need people who actually know what they’re doing—and if your friends and family can’t provide that, you’re going to have to go out to somebody different.

    As I started looking around the world, this became evident as a general problem—you have to get beyond kinship. The earliest types of social formations are all kin-based. Hunter-gatherer societies have basically very small groups of relatives, bands of forty or fifty people. The first states are created with a hierarchical and centralized form of authority, but again, they are what Max Weber called patrimonial, because they all arise out of the household of the ruler—the bureaucracy is just the cousins, sons-in-law, and so forth of the ruler. But it was only in the early modern period, when you had intense conflict between these European early states, that they suddenly realized: we need tax collection. That means we need a cadastral survey to find out who owns property, because those are the people we want to tax. We need a bureaucracy to collect the taxes; we need an army recruited based on merit rather than simply kinship ties. That’s really his explanation for how the modern state began to originate.

    When I started looking at this, I suddenly realized this is absolutely true in China as well, and that China had followed this exact same path, but a couple thousand years before any society in Europe had gotten there. You had a very decentralized Chinese political system in 1000 BC—maybe a thousand political units—that consolidated down to about seven by the time you got to the Warring States period. Then, after the Warring States, a single one of those seven states, the state of Qin—like the Prussia of Chinese history—consolidated everything into a single Qin Empire. The word “China” comes from the state of Qin, this Chinese Prussia, and ever since then they’ve had a centralized state.

    The one thing I began to realize is that the Tilly process had driven modern state formation in China in very much the way Tilly anticipated had happened in Europe. They developed the same sorts of ideas—meritocracy is one of the deepest aspects of Chinese culture. Everybody takes a civil service exam. If you’re a poor boy growing up in rural China, if you take the exam and you do well, you could end up as one of the most powerful men in the empire, because they promote on the basis of merit. And all of these modern features of states—centralization, uniform weights and measures, cadastral surveys, trying to know where your population lives and how you can tax it—all of these things happened in China after the Qin unification.

    Mounk: Your argument here is that basically this mechanism that Charles Tilly identified—whereby states rise because they are in competition with other geographical areas, and unless you’re able to run an efficient military, unless you’re able to raise a budget for that military, unless you’re able to put competent generals in charge, this other state is going to conquer you—we could think of this nearly as a kind of evolutionary competition between different kinds of states.

    Fukuyama: By the way, let me give you one more example of that. The United States in the nineteenth century did not have a modern state. At the time of the Civil War, we were in the midst of what was known as the patronage or spoils system, where basically every public official got there by supporting a politician. And the politician promoted—sometimes it was friends and family, a lot of times it was just political supporters. Abraham Lincoln was absolutely overwhelmed by office seekers, and a lot of his senior generals early in the Civil War were basically politicians he owed favors to. As a result, the Union side lost a whole series of battles. It was only a couple of years into the war that Lincoln discovered Ulysses Grant, who was actually a competent soldier, and began to promote people for competence rather than political connections. So this China–early modern Europe story played out in America not that long ago. That’s how we got to this idea that you actually need competence rather than simply loyalty or family connections.

    Mounk: Now, some of this process is similar in the United States, in Prussia, in China, but there are obviously very important differences between them. In some of these countries, you end up getting a very powerful state, but not the rule of law—China might be an example of that. In some places, you get a form of rule of law, like you did for the Brahmins in India, but you don’t get very strong state capacity. What mix of attributes do you need to get to something like what we think of as the modern state? Why is it that in some places you get certain elements of that but not the whole gamut of these characteristics?

    Fukuyama: Yeah, so that’s the biggest, I think, meta-historical question that is still being debated. In my Origins of Political Order book, the story about the state is really the story about military competition. The rule of law is all about religion, because to have a rule of law, it can’t simply be the commands of the executive. That’s what they had in China—they promulgated legal codes; the emperor promulgated a legal code, and if you disobeyed it, you’d get this very severe punishment, you’d get your nose cut off or something like that. But that’s not really the rule of law. The rule of law, properly speaking, has to apply to the state itself—the ruler can violate the rule of law and be held accountable for that.

    So the question is: how do you get an alternative source of authority when the state has a monopoly over coercive force? They control the police and the military. The answer, I think, really lies in organized religion. In Europe, this comes out of the Catholic Church. There’s a very big, important, and I think underappreciated conflict known as the investiture crisis, which occurred in the twelfth century, when you had a very powerful pope who challenged the Holy Roman Emperor over the question of who gets to appoint priests and bishops within the Catholic hierarchy. The Pope said it should be the church; the emperor said no, it should be me. They fought a prolonged, multigenerational war that only ends with something called the Concordat of Worms, which was negotiated sometime in the early 1200s and allowed the church to remain independent and autonomous. I don’t think people appreciate how important the Catholic Church was for modern institutions—they point to the Protestant Reformation instead—because that’s where law comes from.

    Mounk: Is the idea here that if you don’t have a separation between temporal and religious power, then you always have everything flow down from the will of the emperor or the king or whoever is at the top? The thing that this fight—which seems obscure to us today—over who gets to appoint the local priest really gets to is that you start to develop a kind of separation of powers. It’s not a separation of powers in our modern sense, but there’s this one set of things over which obviously the king of a particular realm makes the decisions, and another set of things which this other power gets to make decisions over. So you need to start having this apparatus for figuring out which kind of decision belongs to whom, and what is an appropriate thing for each office to decide on. That’s the origin of taking away that absolute power.

    Fukuyama: It’s also a question of legitimacy—who has legitimacy to make laws. What happened in Europe was that at the time of the investiture conflict, they discovered a copy of the Justinian Code in a library in Italy. The Justinian Code was this highly developed set of laws that had existed for centuries in the Roman Empire, codified under the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian, and then they were lost. But the Europeans found them—the Catholic Church found them—and they began to create a series of law schools, in Bologna, in Paris, that would teach what has now become the civil law. This is really the origin of the civil law, completely independent of earthly power—no prince controlled the church’s ability to promulgate this law, so it had moral and then legal authority that could stand against the authority of all the princes in Europe.

    Now, the other really big thing that I think leads to the European outcome is the decentralization of power. In the Byzantine Empire, you also had the same legal code, and you had an emperor, but they were fused—the emperor could control the patriarch in Constantinople, and there wasn’t this kind of separation. In Europe, you did have a separation, because you did not have a centralized empire in Western Europe. I think that’s just an accidental result of geography and climate. Western Europe is cut up by mountain ranges, by big rivers that are very hard to move armies across, by very dense forests—in Central Europe and Germany, you could barely move a wagon through it because there were too many trees. So it was very hard to create a highly centralized political authority. And you had this source of religious authority sitting in Rome that was promulgating law. So you had this very long-term conflict between church and state of various sorts in Europe, and you never had the single unification of earthly and spiritual authority in a single individual the way you did in the Byzantine Empire, or in China, or in other civilizations.

    Mounk: Another important element of this is the fact that the Pope is at least supposed not to have a family, and therefore cannot pass that power on to his blood relatives, to his immediate descendants. What significance did this—again, in some sense theological happenstance, but this is the way the Catholic Church is organized, which is not the way that most institutional religions in the world are organized—have on the development of the European state?

    Fukuyama: Well, it’s not quite true that you don’t get parallel institutions in other civilizations. A common way of avoiding nepotism was eunuchs—you had eunuchs in China, you had eunuchs in the Byzantine Empire, and the idea was you wanted your civil administration to be run by people who couldn’t have children and therefore couldn’t want to pass their power on to their children. So it wasn’t completely unique.

    There’s a whole other story—I’m not sure we want to get into it in this podcast—about a chapter I have in the Origins book called “Christianity Destroys the Family,” in which a series of decisions made by the Catholic Church in the eighth or ninth centuries established all sorts of rules against divorce, against cousin marriage, against basically all of these nepotistic practices that allowed kin groups to hold power within the kin group. That’s really the origin of individualism in Europe, where, for example, women under this system were allowed to inherit property, which wasn’t permitted in many other civilizations.

    Mounk: So explain—I think it is very interesting, and some people like Joe Henrich pick up on that and make it crucial to their story about WEIRD, about how the West is different from many other parts of the world—why is this prohibition against cousin marriage so important?

    Fukuyama: Well, you have to understand the motives for cousin marriage. In virtually every society, they go through a stage of segmentary lineages, which we call tribalism. The word “tribalism,” the way we use it today, isn’t anthropologically specific enough, but a truly tribal society is based on ancestor worship and the belief in descent from a common ancestor. Now, the way to keep property within a kin group like that is by having limitations on who your children can marry. Cousin marriage was important in this respect because it guaranteed that you would marry within your kin group—you wouldn’t be going to the next village to look for some non-relative to marry; you would have to marry somebody within this very small circle. That, of course, creates a lot of problems genetically, because it produces a lot of mental illness and so forth. But disallowing cousin marriage was something that really forced what anthropologists call exogamy—meaning you marry somebody from a completely different lineage—and that put the burden of choice on the people wanting to marry, and not on the kin group that was forcing you to marry somebody they approved of. Again, this is one of the long-term cultural grounds for the kind of individualism that then emerged in Europe in later years. Most social theorists, beginning with Karl Marx, dated this way too late—he said this was the result of capitalism. That’s just wrong. It really happened eight or nine centuries before the rise of modern capitalism.

    Mounk: So help us bring together these different strands. You have the split of authority between the church and the state, between the pope and the local king or the emperor. You have the changes in family structure, which start to push you toward a certain kind of individualism and which also protect against certain kinds of nepotism. You have competition between different states, which forces states to expand their bureaucracy, raise more money, and professionalize the armies. How do those three forces come together to create the modern state?

    Fukuyama: Well, it’s largely a matter of accident. I think that in the early modern period you had ambitious monarchs all over Europe trying to reverse some of these processes and get everything under the control of a single absolute monarch. This is true in France, in Spain, in Russia, and many other places. The one country where this didn’t happen was England, where the English monarch—the Stuart monarchs, in the seventeenth century—wanted to consolidate power, including the power to tax. England was unique in the sense that it had a very powerful aristocracy and merchant class. They were the ones who had money. The king wanted to get money from them; they didn’t want to give it to the king unless they could exercise influence through this institution called Parliament.

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    Parliaments existed all over Europe at this point—this was a medieval institution of estates, where the clergy, the aristocracy, and the bourgeoisie were all organized in separate orders. But in England, the people with the money had enough power and influence that they said to the king, “No, no taxation without representation.” They fought a civil war over this in the 1640s, which led to the beheading of Charles I, the Stuart king, and a prolonged period of instability. At the end, you had something in 1689 called the Glorious Revolution, in which England for the first time uniquely established the dominance of Parliament, and the king became something of a figurehead—to unite the country—but the real decision-making body was the taxpayers. That’s really what created the basis for what we now understand to be modern democracy, based on this principle: no taxation without representation.

    Now, of course, ideas were important. You had writers like John Locke, who talked about the legitimacy of governments, and he contributed another important idea: that legitimate, just government lies in the consent of the governed. By strange coincidence, both the idea of no taxation without representation and government resting on the consent of the governed turn up in something called the Declaration of Independence, penned by Thomas Jefferson, who was a close student of John Locke’s. There’s a direct line that connects all of these different developments to American democracy.

    Mounk: So roughly speaking, I think we’re now at the end of the first volume of this two-volume work. The second volume, as I briefly mentioned earlier, is devoted to the question of how to get to Denmark. I’ve read—you’ll correct me if this is wrong—that you actually borrowed that phrase from Lant Pritchett, who was on the podcast a little while ago. It’s motivated in some senses by a kind of paradox, which is that what the World Bank, USAID, and all of these development institutions are trying to do is help Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, all kinds of other places in the world, get to Denmark. But it’s not like Denmark actually implemented a World Bank program for how to build the core institutions you’re trying to aim at. So how is it that Denmark got to be Denmark, and how useful is it for us to know about that, since we’re not going to be able to speed-run the various stages of Danish history that got the country to where it is?

    Fukuyama: Well, nobody’s going to replicate that story. There are all sorts of contingent historical facts. For example, the Protestant Reformation turned out to be very important, because the Protestants believed that every individual should be able to read the Bible and have a direct connection with God—you didn’t need a priest to mediate your relationship to God. That meant Protestants spent a lot of time and effort training peasants to learn how to read the catechism. That literacy meant that when the economy turned to a point where you could actually start doing things like export your surplus grain, in Scandinavia you had a whole peasantry that was really quite well educated and able to adopt these modern methods—whereas in neighboring Eastern Europe, and especially in Russia, you had a completely illiterate, uneducated peasantry that could simply be exploited by their lords.

    So there’s just a lot of things that go into the specific story of Denmark. But ultimately, I think it comes back to this competitive survival, because if you don’t have a modern state, you really can’t wage war, you can’t defend yourself. Then, when you get to the modern era, if you don’t have a rule of law, if you don’t have property rights, if you don’t have contract enforcement, you can’t have a modern economy. So I do think there are these broad incentives that existed for state modernization, and they acted differently in different societies, but they really pushed everybody in that direction.

    Mounk: But those incentives, roughly speaking, exist everywhere. Obviously it depends on how developed your neighbors are—if your neighbors are more developed, then you need to keep up in order to be able to compete; if your neighbors are less developed, perhaps there’s less pressure on you. But roughly speaking, there are huge rewards to having the best rule of law, the best ability to raise taxes, the most professional army, and all of those other things, and the biggest economy, which is the key factor in driving the sophistication of your weapons and your offensive capabilities. Those incentives existed everywhere. Yet you end up with a country like Denmark—to use your metaphor—because it is prosperous and democratic and reasonably well governed and has the rule of law and all of those kinds of things, and you have lots of parts of the world that clearly are doing a lot less well. So what explains the emergence of this cluster of characteristics in some places but not others?

    Fukuyama: Well, this is where the contingency of history comes into play. For example, there’s been a lot of attention paid to climate and geography—the most successful states actually came about in areas that were fertile, alluvial valleys like the Nile River Valley, the Tigris and Euphrates delta, and so forth. But they also had to be constrained by physical geography so that peasants and slaves couldn’t just run away and escape the control of the state.

    There’s a whole literature on slavery in the Western Hemisphere and the role of plantation agriculture—in the South, in the Caribbean, they grew a lot of sugar, and sugar is something that can be produced on an industrial scale with slave labor. In the northern part of the United States, it wasn’t conducive to sugar or these other plantation crops—you had a lot of family farming instead, where individual families just had a plot, and that was enough to keep them alive and produce a surplus under the right circumstances. That’s why you had this big institution of slavery in northeastern Brazil, in the Caribbean, and the American South—this triangular trade that brought slaves from Africa, then rum and sugar back to Europe. So, again, that’s just a kind of economic, climatic, geographic factor that explains the rise of this peculiar institution in that part of the world.

    But ideas also played a role. One of the little anecdotes I like to tell is a comparison between Argentina and the United States. Climatically, Argentina is very much like the United States—a temperate climate, very good for all sorts of agriculture. In the 1860s, the United States was racked by civil war, but the winning party were the Republicans, and they did a couple of things. They passed something called the Homestead Act, which was based on a democratic idea: you had all this open land in the West, you wanted to settle it, but you didn’t want to concentrate power, so you gave forty acres and a mule to individual families. The state actually promoted the spread of family farming in the American West.

    In Argentina in the 1860s, you had this dictator who arose in Buenos Aires province called Rosas—Manuel de Rosas—who did the opposite. He said, no, we should have big farms; I have a lot of rich friends, and I’m going to give them these huge haciendas, involving thousands of acres, and one family will control it. Despite the similarity in climate and geography between these two countries, Argentina ended up with a highly concentrated agrarian elite that then became one of the conservative obstacles to democratization. In the United States, you had a lot of family farms and people who were tough, independent, and self-reliant, and that dramatically helped the emergence of democracy in the United States.

    So this is a long-winded way of saying I can’t give you a clear explanation for why certain institutions do better in certain countries. It’s just a very complicated mix of all of these different environmental, cultural, and ideological issues that sometimes come together.

    Mounk: Let me draw out a similarity and a contrast with an alternative attempt to explain some of the same things. There’s a famous book called Why Nations Fail, by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, which tries to explain a slightly different question. It is mostly about economic prosperity rather than the political dimensions you are mostly focusing on, but obviously those are related and, to some extent, overlapping. They might point at some of the same stories that you told and say that the founding institutions in particular countries or regions are especially important—so if the climate just lends itself to the institution of certain forms of slavery, that is going to lead to a set of extractive institutions that are not going to be very conducive to long-term economic growth. When you were talking about the climatic reasons that led to the triangular trade and so on, that sounded like it would be quite compatible with the story that Acemoglu and Robinson tell. But then, when you say that ideas really matter, and happenstance matters—that Argentina could have had the Homestead Act, and perhaps, if the Civil War had gone a different way, if Abraham Lincoln had been a less honorable man than he was, the United States might have just given most of the land in the West to a few big oligarchs, and that could have gone very differently—that perhaps starts to pick a fight with them in a certain kind of way. Help us situate your grand historical overview in relation to their grand historical overview.

    Fukuyama: I’ve had something of a contentious history, especially with Daron Acemoglu. I wrote a very negative review of Why Nations Fail when it first came out, and he got really mad, and we had an exchange. But I would say there are certain parts of their story that they don’t take seriously. Ideas is one—ideology as shaping people’s preferences and explaining why certain nations, as in the case of the Homestead Act, make decisions that push real property rights in a certain direction.

    The other general problem I have with their explanation is that it’s very elite-driven. They have this one book on inequality where it’s all a question of elites who own property and how they interact with each other. They don’t have a sociology that talks about grassroots organization and movements—political movements springing from, let’s say, economic modernization. That’s really the story of the nineteenth century in Europe and the twentieth century in Asia, where you get technological change that produces employment for people, which then leads to their organizing, labor unions, and a push for democracy. Those sorts of processes are largely missing from their account of historical development.

    For that reason, I think—they’ve got this book called The Narrow Corridor that actually says there are so many contingencies involved that it’s just a matter of luck that certain countries ended up rich. I’m not sure I agree with that, because it does seem to me that, first of all, there’s a lot of social learning—one part of the world sees that something is successful, they imitate it, and then they become successful. I do think there are larger imperatives that drive countries toward the development of institutions, and it’s a little less contingent than they think it is.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Francis discuss the challenges of state building, why the United States is at risk of repatrimonialization, and how to reform the civil service. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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  • This Week at Persuasion
    Surprisingly, this is not what the Persuasion team looks like, but like these models we will be on vacation for the next two weeks. See you on the other side! (Photo: Thomas Barwick via Getty.)
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, September 25 at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to at…

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  • What Locke Knew About Elites

    In an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought at 5pm on Sunday, September 6 at The Abbey Centre, London. Find out more and get tickets here! Paying subscribers of Persuasion and American Purpose can access a code for a free ticket here.

    Three studies for a statue of John Locke, circa 1754, by John Michael Rysbrack and Sir James Thornhill. (Photo by Heritage Art/Heritage Images via Getty Images.)

    We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our ongoing series on “Liberal Virtues and Values.”

    The series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, will make the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms. If you haven’t already, please subscribe today to receive future instalments into your inbox!

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    In early September 2019, the former Prime Minister of Belgium tweeted: “This week, the most important event was … the discovery of an unkown [sic] text by the Father of Liberalism, John Locke, on tolerance.” That the text in question—a 1667 manuscript memorandum entitled “Reasons for Tolerating Papists Equally with Others”—was not, in fact, a defense of tolerance towards Catholics, but rather a systematic outline of Locke’s reasons against it, didn’t seem to matter. For the purposes of social media, what the “Father of Liberalism” actually had to say about tolerance, or its limits, was beside the point.

    Of course, understanding who Locke was, or what he actually believed, has always been more difficult than proclaiming what he represents. Despite his qualms about Catholics—and atheists, too, as we shall see—Locke is still commonly celebrated as the inventor of the modern liberal approach to tolerance, understood as a commitment to separating church and state and protecting individual rights.

    For Americans, especially, “Lockean” toleration implies a principle of disestablishment, according to which the state has no business telling citizens what to believe, let alone publicly favoring or disfavoring any particular religion. Accordingly, “Locke the Liberal” has long been credited in the United States as an unofficial author of the opening clauses of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

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    And yet, if one looks more closely at Locke’s famous 1689 Letter Concerning Toleration—and the peculiar circumstances in which it was produced—what emerges is an unfamiliar vision of “Lockean” toleration as a project of religious and political establishment, one focused on accommodating some (albeit limited) dissent from public orthodoxy, while also promoting a more reasonable, liberal, and tolerant approach to religion supported by the state.

    Recovering this alternative vision matters for more than just historical reasons. Specifically, it sheds light on the curious way in which modern democracies have continued to generate liberal “establishments” of their own. In universities, the law, journalism, and the arts, we have seen the rise of institutions populated by a class of highly credentialed (if not always well-educated) individuals fluent in the language and ideological assumptions of liberalism—not only with respect to tolerance, but also personal autonomy, diversity, and “reasonable” dissent. Contemporary liberals would thus do well to recognize that when populists and demagogues rail against the “liberal elites,” they often have this authentically Lockean form of establishment in mind.

    Locke Is Not Who You Think He Is

    So important is the supposedly “Lockean” principle of disestablishment to modern tolerance that American liberals are often surprised to discover that some form of state-involvement in religion remains the rule in Western Europe, not the exception. In Belgium and Luxembourg, for example, public funding for recognized religions is raised through general taxation, while established national churches remain a going concern in many Nordic countries, as well as the United Kingdom.

    An American studying abroad at Oxford or Cambridge will not be alienated by the sacred architecture, copied countless times at home; yet the centrality of Anglican chapels to college life in a public university cannot help but seem strange. Even worse: Locke’s own Oxford college, Christ Church, doesn’t have a chapel, it has a cathedral, and its “Dean” remains an ecclesiastical appointment.

    This fact, among others, ought to remind us that the historical context in which Locke originally wrote his Letter was an emphatically establishmentarian one. Take the so-called Toleration Act of 1689, which passed shortly before the Letter’s publication. Officially entitled “An Act for Exempting their Majesties Protestant Subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the Penalties of certain Laws,” this legislation did exactly what it said on the tin: namely, suspend some (but not all) of the existing English laws criminalizing dissent from the established church… but only for Trinitarian Protestants. Catholics, Quakers, and so-called “Socinians” or non-Trinitarian Christians were intentionally left out.

    The continued dominance of the Church of England meant that Locke and other proponents of toleration in the period generally had two policy options in view. The first, known as “indulgence,” proposed to repeal or otherwise suspend the laws punishing non-attendance at public worship, as well as banning private religious meetings. The second, known as “comprehension,” proposed to accommodate diversity within the established church by paring back its doctrinal orthodoxy in order to welcome many (if not most) Protestant dissenters back into the fold.

    Needless to say, neither form of toleration proposed to disestablish the Church of England. Rather, both presupposed the continued existence of an established church.

    Given this, one might wonder whether the rigidly disestablishmentarian vision of tolerance attributed to Locke by modern liberals comes anywhere near to being his own. We know, for instance, that despite his well-attested heterodoxy, Locke remained a communicating member of the Church of England throughout his life. Moreover—and much like his fellow patron saint of modern liberalism, John Rawls—it appears that Locke originally intended to take Holy Orders while at Oxford, although he later sought, and received, an exemption from this academic requirement.

    How to square these facts with the more radical sections of his Letter? Take its preface “To the Reader,” which explicitly rejected the establishmentarian policies of indulgence and comprehension as insufficient:

    It is neither Declarations of Indulgence, nor Acts of Comprehension, such as have yet been practiced or projected among us, that can do the Work … Absolute Liberty, Just and True Liberty, Equal and Impartial Liberty, is the thing that we stand in need of.

    This passage is often cited as evidence of Locke’s own disestablishmentarian commitments. The only problem is that Locke didn’t write it—nor, indeed, did he compose the English text of 1689 still routinely published under his name.

    Locke had written his original Epistola De Tolerantia in Latin for a European audience while in the Netherlands, where he had taken refuge as a political exile. The celebrated English Letter published four years later was, in fact, an unauthorized and somewhat loose translation of this Latin text, along with an entirely new preface, written by an obscure Yorkshire wine merchant named William Popple. Although they would later become friends, Popple evidently undertook his translation of Locke’s Epistola without the author’s knowledge or permission—and with his own recent experience of persecution in France in mind. By then, Popple was already on record as viewing the establishmentarian policies of indulgence and comprehension as insufficient, in a way that Locke was not.

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    In other words, the plain-speaking and commonsensical English voice of the Letter begging to “speak the Truth, as becomes one Man to another” and pleading for “Absolute Liberty” in matters of religion was not Locke’s—it was Popple’s. And the latter has yet to receive his due from intellectual historians.

    But what of the Letter’s other famous declarations, for instance that “no body is born a Member of any Church,” and that “there is absolutely no such thing, under the Gospel, as a Christian Commonwealth”? Certainly, a separation of church and state is implied here, but in what sense?

    Such statements might, I think, be understood to imply a principle of “nonestablishment,” as the political theorist Cécile Laborde puts it—for instance, in a colonial context where there was, as yet, no established church. But they do not seem to me to imply the necessity of disestablishment in cases where there was already an established church—certainly not in the way that Popple’s preface suggests. Indeed, Locke would later praise the Toleration Act directly in a private letter addressed to the Epistola’s original dedicatee as laying “the foundations … of that liberty and peace in which the church of Christ is one day to be established” (emphasis mine).

    Recognizing that the historical Locke’s preferred approach to toleration was less radical—and indeed less tolerant—than is often assumed can, in turn, help us to make sense of some of the Letter’s less comfortable features, including its notorious exclusion of Catholics and atheists. Both exclusions suggest that while Locke was straightforwardly opposed to penal laws of the kind that had hitherto afforded the Church of England a monopoly on public worship, he nonetheless accepted the continued use of civil oaths and Test Acts as a way of ensuring that only those who were sufficiently supportive of the newly tolerant status quo could participate fully in political life.

    That Locke envisioned a continued role for the state in policing religious doctrine is clearest, perhaps, in the Letter’s insistence that only those churches that “own and teach the Duty of tolerating All men in matters of mere Religion” could themselves claim to be tolerated. Here, Locke’s emphasis on a minimal, but necessarily creedal, kind of conformity complemented his conviction that an established church and its clergy might still play an important role in a tolerant society—specifically, by serving as ethical exemplars and modeling a more tolerant and civil approach to Christianity for laypeople.

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    Locke’s largely cultural approach to religious establishment was thus dependent on the training of “reasonable” clergymen who would “own and teach” the duty of toleration to others, while also acting as moral censors from their institutional perches in parish churches and (more importantly) the universities. Under this system, Oxford and Cambridge would continue to function as they had done for centuries—namely, as the key credentialing bodies for the state-sponsored clergy, among other educators. (Locke’s notorious 1697 Essay on the Poor Law likewise argued that children caught begging should be sent to “working schools” and forced to attend church to improve their morals.)

    Here, we encounter a much broader understanding of establishment—or better yet, “The Establishment”—than the one usually at work among contemporary liberals. On this more authentically “Lockean” understanding, a high (but not unlimited) degree of nonconformity should be made not only legal, but socially acceptable. At the same time, however, there should also be an established clerisy, firmly ensconced in public institutions, around whom others might conform, thereby setting the moral tone for society at large.

    A New Liberal Establishment

    Taking a step back: What might my admittedly unorthodox reading of Locke’s Letter tell us about tolerance today?

    First, I think it should alert us to the ways in which the assumptions of established religion continue to shape not just how American liberals think about tolerance, but how we speak about it, here and now. One finds tell-tale traces of this influence in our vocabulary—for instance, “dissent” and “nonconformity”—as well as our persistent preference for the term “disestablishment” (as opposed to the more accurate “nonestablishment”) when describing places like the United States, where there was never any national church to be disestablished in the first place.

    Secondly, it may help us recognize that the public governance of morality in America has long relied on a largely informal cultural establishment of the kind envisioned by Locke. Today, this “liberal establishment” has taken root not just in churches, but across increasingly broad sectors of society. Universities, in particular, have continued to perform the same credentialing function that they performed in 17th-century England, for instance by making sure that the nation’s elite are—or at least profess to be—orthodox on questions of public morality. In other words, they must be sufficiently “tolerant,” in the increasingly narrow sense of being supportive of racial and cultural (but not necessarily intellectual) diversity, minority rights, sex and gender nonconformity, and so on.

    And so I don’t think liberalism’s critics, whether on the left or on the right, are wrong when they complain that a liberal ideological impulse has taken root in the halls of higher education, nor when they link this impulse with John Locke. As the historian Claire Arcenas has shown, Locke’s works took especially deep root in American colleges and universities starting in the 18th century—and there, until recently, they’ve stayed.

    The political philosopher Leo Strauss once described Locke as “the chief and perhaps sole idol in the temple of liberalism, and whoever questions that idol is guilty of what the liberals themselves call ‘unorthodoxy.’” Without endorsing Strauss’ reading of Locke, I think his language of “orthodoxy” captures something important.

    Critical and postcolonial theorists used to argue that the United States and other supposedly secular liberal democracies had an established religion after all—namely liberalism—even if they didn’t have an established church. But I think it may be more accurate to say that liberalism in America functions less like a religion and more like an established church in the Lockean sense: as a set of publicly privileged institutions charged with transmitting and maintaining a public creed, while also cultivating a common culture and moral sensibility among the nation’s elites.

    On this view, 20th-century liberal academics were emphatically rooted cosmopolitans: their “parish” bounded not geographically, but institutionally and ideologically, through the shared texts, conceptual vocabulary, and social networks of elite universities. Those universities, in turn, taught successive generations of students to think—and speak—in terms of individual rights and personal autonomy, and to valorize anti-establishment attitudes like dissent and nonconformity as essential political virtues. But even as these universities encouraged young people to rebel against “The Establishment,” they also launched their graduates into influential careers—not just in governmental institutions, but perhaps more importantly in non-governmental ones like law, journalism, the arts, and academia.

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    And from their institutional perches, those students continued to preach the liberal individualism and social justice gospel they had learned at university—not as an official orthodoxy, or even a self-conscious one, but as a broad, and often unarticulated, moral consensus about what counts as a “reasonable” belief or socially acceptable opinion. Within this informal cultural establishment, dissent of the right kind is not only permissible, but admirable—as long as it knows its place. (As an erstwhile campus conservative myself, I have experienced this process firsthand.)

    No wonder, then, that conservatives and leftists alike complain about the liberal establishment and its particular entrenchment in American universities. It remains to be seen whether this establishment can survive ongoing attack from both the left and right with any of its historic social, cultural, and economic privileges intact. In particular, conservative critics of the university are now (with state support) establishing their own institutional footholds on campus, from which they hope to shape undergraduates in their own image and reform the country’s Lockean establishment from within.

    How tolerant this newly conservative cultural clerisy will be of ideological dissent or nonconformity, it’s too soon to tell. Either way, the debates that shaped Locke’s arguments remain closer to our current predicament than many modern liberals like to admit. As Locke knew well from personal experience, universities have long played an important role in the politics of establishment. Why should it be otherwise today?

    Teresa M. Bejan is Professor of Political Theory and Fellow of Oriel College at the University of Oxford.

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  • On Executive Authority

    Francis Fukuyama explores how President Trump has tried to expand executive authority, the impact of his actions on how America will be governed in the future, and the choice facing the next U.S. president.

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    14 min
  • Serbia Turns Toward the West
    Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on July 13, 2026. (Photo by Magali Cohen / Hans Lucas / AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Serbia—Russia’s strategic partner and historic ally—now aims to develop closer ties with Ukraine. While the European Union is encouraging Serbia’s foreign policy shift, the Kremlin is so far turning a blind eye to Belgrade’s outreach to Kyiv. But how does the United States view Serbia’s new diplomatic direction?

    Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić was in frequent contact with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, both by phone and regular in-person meetings. But after the West imposed sanctions on the Kremlin following Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, he significantly reduced his communication with his Russian counterpart.

    At the same time, over the past four and a half years, Vučić has met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on several occasions. Most recently, on July 15, he traveled to Kyiv for the first time since the war broke out to participate in the fifth Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit.

    Even though he was the only Southeast European leader who did not sign a joint declaration calling for increased international pressure on Russia, relations between Belgrade and Kyiv have continued to grow closer. Last week, Zelenskyy made his first-ever official visit to Serbia—a move that could, in the long-term, have a serious impact on Belgrade’s cooperation with Moscow.

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    Although Vučić said he did not discuss military cooperation between Serbia and Ukraine with Zelenskyy, Russia undoubtedly has reasons for concern. In 2024, despite its declaration of military neutrality adopted in 2007, the Balkan nation indirectly supplied Kyiv with ammunition worth €800 million. Such arrangements, according to former U.S. ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill, were coordinated directly from Washington. As he recently stressed, Serbia’s military cooperation with Ukraine is far more important for the United States than Belgrade’s decision not to formally join anti-Russian sanctions, regardless of the European Union’s repeated demands.

    Moscow turned a blind eye when Serbian ammunition was sent to Ukraine, taking a year to react and accuse Belgrade of “betrayal.” Although Serbia, under pressure from Russia, halted ammunition exports, there is no guarantee that it will not eventually resume arms exports to Ukraine through third countries.

    Given that Russia has demonstrated serious weaknesses in Ukraine and failed to achieve any of its strategic goals there, Belgrade has little reason to worry about potential retaliation from Moscow. Hypothetically, if Serbia continues to strengthen its ties with Ukraine, Russia could respond by ending its gas arrangements with the Balkan nation. Such a move could indeed have a serious impact on the Serbian economy, which is heavily dependent on Russian gas.

    However, after the United States Senate passed a bill allowing sanctions to be imposed on countries that purchase Russian energy, Serbia may soon be forced to end its gas cooperation with Moscow anyway. After the Trump administration cut tariffs on Serbian goods entering the United States from 35 percent to zero, the last thing Belgrade needs is to face tariffs of up to 100 percent for continuing to buy Russian oil and gas.

    Aware of that, Belgrade seems to be laying the groundwork for closer energy cooperation with the United States. But Vučić faces a problem: his voters have strong pro-Russian sentiments. Ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections, which could take place later this year or in 2027, he will have to find a way to gradually steer his voters away from their pro-Russian views and toward a more pro-American outlook.

    The process seems to have already begun. On August 1, the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), an American mixed martial arts promotion with a relatively limited following in Serbia, held its first-ever show in Belgrade. It seems that one of the main reasons for bringing the event to the Serbian capital was to provide a platform for Vučić’s supporters to display a large banner reading, “President Trump, Serbia welcomes you.” Trump later shared a photo of the banner on his Truth Social account.

    Like Russia’s allies in Central Asia, Serbian officials have chosen to describe Vučić’s efforts to strengthen ties with Washington as a “balanced foreign policy,” a term often used to signify building a relationship with the United States. However, Vučić’s motivation is different to those countries’: while their economic reliance on Russia makes them fear Moscow’s reaction to this cooperation, Vučić’s concern is his voters.

    This enthusiasm of Vučić’s base for Russia is why he is very unlikely to completely sever relations with Moscow, at least until the elections are over. In the meantime, if necessary, he can even travel to Moscow to meet with Putin, which his voters are likely to interpret as a sign of the Russian leader’s support for Vučić. Such a move would almost certainly help his party win the parliamentary elections, after which he could continue pursuing his policy of “pro-Western neutrality.”

    The fact that Moscow did not immediately react to Zelenskyy’s visit to Belgrade and that pro-Kremlin analysts tried to downplay his meeting with Vučić suggests that Russia hopes to continue business as usual with Serbia. By remaining silent about Vučić’s moves, the Kremlin provides the Russian population with the illusion that Serbia is allegedly defying Western pressure and refusing to impose sanctions on Moscow.

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    As long as Vučić remains on this course, he can count on Russia’s de facto support. At the same time, he is expected to keep flirting with Trump. But if he is eventually forced to make a definitive choice between Moscow and Washington, he will undoubtedly choose the latter. Until then, he is likely to continue balancing between all the major foreign powers vying for influence in the Balkans.

    Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher, and analyst based in Serbia.

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