Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • Wealth Taxes Are Slopulism
    Tax the Rich rally, March 2026. (Photo by Andrew Lichtenstein / Corbis.)

    When the decline and fall of the American empire is chronicled by future historians, the role played by a small cabal of radicalized multi-billionaires, taking control of the media to spew disinformation, unlawfully interfering in government operations, raving about the anti-Christ, and buying pardons from a corrupt president to avoid punishment for their criminality, will figure centrally in the account. Even among those who don’t begrudge these men their wealth, many would still be relieved if they could behave themselves somewhat better.

    Luckily, there are at least a half-dozen sensible reforms that could be undertaken in the United States that would significantly reduce the severity of the problem. Unfortunately, these sensible reforms require at least five minutes to explain, as a result of which they have no chance of being adopted in the current political environment. Progressives have therefore begun to rally around a much simpler plan: wealth taxes. On the merits this is a terrible idea, but it has the advantage of being extremely easy to explain: billionaires are bad, so let’s take away their money!

    Wealth taxes are in fact a perfect example of slopulism—policy ideas that make for quick, effective sound-bites, but that are almost universally rejected by experts. The reason that tax experts disdain wealth taxes is, unfortunately, a bit difficult to explain. The main problem is not that billionaires will pick up stakes and leave. The problem is that wealth taxes are redundant. There is nothing that can be accomplished by taxing wealth that cannot also be accomplished by taxing capital income. And yet we already have a tax on capital income. So instead of creating a new, administratively complex tax on wealth, involving completely new reporting requirements, we should just modify the existing income tax system to accomplish whatever objectives we might like to achieve with a wealth tax. Specifically, calibrated changes to the treatment of capital income and/or inheritance taxes in the United States would be sufficient to address many of the problems that have been highlighted by proponents of wealth taxes.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    One of the reasons that public opinion on the subject is so poorly informed is that most people don’t understand what wealth is, or what it would mean to tax it. Part of the reason it’s confusing is that we are accustomed to thinking about taxation in terms of the income tax, and income is a flow, whereas wealth is a stock. In order to illustrate the distinction, economists typically use the analogy of a bathtub being filled, where the water coming out of the faucet constitutes the flow into the tub (and must be measured in terms of its rate, quantity over time), whereas the water that has accumulated in the tub constitutes the stock (which can be measured as a simple quantity).

    The bathtub analogy makes it easy to see how wealth is already subject to taxation in our society. It appears otherwise only because we tax the flow of capital, not the stock. When you earn income, you must pay taxes on it, regardless of whether you spend it or not. This means that all savings are taxed (i.e. the water is taxed as it flows into the bathtub). What proponents of wealth taxes are saying is that, in addition to taxing the flow of water into the bathtub, we should perform an additional calculation, every year, of the water level in the bathtub, so that we can impose a tax on that. The big question is, why? What additional objective could be achieved by taxing the stock directly that could not be achieved indirectly by taxing the flow into the tub?

    There is, I will grant, an important disanalogy between wealth and water in a bathtub, which is that wealth grows over time, without any additional input of savings, unlike the water level in a tub, which cannot increase unless you specifically add more water to it. In some cases this is because an asset earns a return, in other cases because its market value increases. One might think that this factor provides an argument for taxing the stock of money, rather than just the flow. In reality, however, what it provides is just an argument for treating the increase as income and taxing it appropriately. This is why, under the existing system, all of the income derived from wealth (dividends, interest payments, and capital gains) must be declared as income, which generates a tax liability. Again, we tax the flow, not the stock—any increase in the water level is taxed as income.

    This treatment of capital income provides one of the most long-standing points of contention about the income tax, which is that it has the effect of subjecting savings to double taxation. Progressives generally regard this as a feature of the system, not a bug, because it discourages large concentrations of wealth. Unfortunately, it also has the unwanted effect of penalizing ordinary people who choose to save—not to get rich but just to maintain their standard of living during retirement, to purchase a home, and so on. In order to avoid this problem, various modifications to the income tax system have been made that exempt ordinary savings from one of the two rounds of taxation. (In the United States, the selective exemption from one round of taxation can be seen most clearly in the difference between an ordinary IRA, which allows one to avoid paying the upfront tax on savings, but commits one to paying tax on the accumulated capital income, and a Roth IRA, which requires one to pay the upfront tax, but exempts one from tax on the capital income.)

    Because of this, middle-class Americans who use their savings to accumulate home equity and build a nest egg for retirement are essentially exempt from one of the two rounds of taxation on savings. By contrast, Americans who are rich enough to pay off their house and max out their retirement accounts, leaving them with excess financial assets, wind up having their capital taxed twice, once when the income is earned and again on the flow of income that it generates. What proponents of a wealth tax are now suggesting is that these assets be subject to a third round of taxation.

    One might be tempted to question the fairness of such an imposition. But it doesn’t even matter, because whatever the effects of this third round of taxation, they can easily be undone just by changing the rates of taxation on the previous rounds. It’s the same goose being plucked at each stage, so it doesn’t really matter how much gets taken in any particular round. The most important objection to wealth taxes is that they impose very complex reporting requirements involving often difficult-to-value assets (e.g. how should Jeff Bezos’s new yacht be treated? Or to pick a famous European example, what is control of IKEA worth?), while not accomplishing anything that is not already being done by the income tax. No one in their right mind has ever looked at the U.S. tax system and said, “What this thing needs is more administrative complexity.”

    There is one further issue that should be mentioned. In recent years, many proponents of wealth taxes have pointed to limitations of the capital gains tax as an argument in favor of taxing the stock of wealth directly. My discussion so far has been based on the assumption that the only way to derive a benefit from wealth is to spend it, which triggers capital gains taxes on assets that have appreciated in value. But what if one could use one’s stock of wealth to produce a benefit without spending it (and thus without triggering capital gains taxes)? Would that not provide an argument for taxing the stock itself, and not just the flow? As it turns out, there is such a benefit. An accumulation of relatively-liquid assets can be used as collateral, in order to obtain credit, which can in turn be used to finance consumption. And because the income tax system completely ignores debt, in principle a rich person could use this as a way to avoid paying taxes.

    This basic idea underlies the recent conviction, popularized by ProPublica, that American billionaires use the so-called “buy-borrow-die” strategy to avoid paying income taxes. The idea, roughly, is that unlike dividends and interest payments generated by an asset, capital gains taxes do not need to be paid on an annual basis, but only when the item is sold. As a result, it is possible for an asset to appreciate in value quite significantly without generating any immediate tax liability. Furthermore, since corporations know this, they often use stock buybacks, rather than dividend payments, to disburse profits, because this allows their investors to take the benefit as a capital gain (i.e. appreciation in the value of the stock), rather than ordinary income, so that they can defer payment of taxes.

    Deferring tax, of course, is not the same as avoiding tax. One might think that the state, being patient, should be indifferent between being paid now and being paid later, so long as the effective sum is the same. Furthermore, the unrealized capital gains are not really of any use to the owner, because you can’t spend the money without selling the asset, which then triggers the tax obligation. This is where the second part of the strategy comes in. Instead of selling the asset, the owner can instead borrow against it, using the loan to finance current consumption without incurring any tax liability. (Of course, you have to pay interest on the loan, but the cost of doing that may be lower than the taxes you would have to pay for cashing in the asset.)

    Again, one might think, who cares? Anyone with a home equity line of credit is basically doing the same thing. This is where the third part of the strategy comes in. When you die in America, the value of your financial assets gets “stepped up,” so that their base value in the hands of your heirs becomes the value on the date of your death. This means that they can sell them without paying any tax on the capital gains accumulated during your lifetime, which allows them to avoid the second round of taxation on the asset. The state is robbed of the money that it has been patiently awaiting.

    Sophisticated proponents of wealth taxes usually defend the idea on the grounds that it plugs this loophole. This has given rise to debate about how common the “buy-borrow-die” strategy is. (Social media chatter might lead one to think that everyone is doing it, but a recent empirical estimate by Edward Fox and Zachary Liscow suggests that it is not as widespread as many have thought.) The more important observation, however, is that there are much easier ways to plug the loophole—as witnessed by the fact that the United States is the only Western country in which people can get away with this strategy.

    There are actually three different ways that one could eliminate the strategy without taxing wealth. At each stage—buy, borrow, and die—it relies on specific features of the U.S. tax system for its effect. First of all, on the “buy” side, the fact that growth in the value of one’s assets does not immediately trigger a tax liability is due to the fact that taxation of capital gains in the United States is realization-based not accrual-based. This means that the tax is owed, not when the asset goes up in value, but when it is sold, i.e. when the gain is realized. (My colleague Robin Morgan has a nice paper attempting to clarify this point—what people who argue for wealth taxes usually want is just accrual-based taxation of capital, which can be accomplished without creating a literal wealth tax.) One could, however, change this feature of the income tax code; several European countries have accrual-based taxation of capital income.

    Second, on the “borrow” step, the United States is unusual in the extent to which it relies on income taxes to finance the public sector. One of the little secrets of European welfare states is that they rely very heavily on “value added taxes” (VATs), at rates of around 20%, to complement their income taxes. An important feature of a VAT is that it is applied to consumption, which means that it exempts savings and taxes debt. This helps to balance out the treatment of capital in the tax code, but it also means that a person who borrows in order to finance consumption in Europe is not evading taxes to the same degree that an American is. Imposition of a VAT, while a significant step, is by far the biggest improvement that could be made to American federal tax policy—it would increase efficiency, promote fairness, and allow the income tax to be lowered.

    Subscribe now

    Finally, there is the most outrageous feature of the U.S. tax code, which is the “stepped-up” valuation of inherited assets. You don’t need to implement complex, accrual-based taxation of capital to avoid the “die” component of the strategy; all you need to do is treat death as a realization event (e.g. the way Canada does) and the loophole is closed. The state would still need to be patient, when it comes to taxing capital gains, but eventually it would get the money, paid by the dead billionaire’s estate.

    None of these fixes are politically easy. A complex coalition of forces conspired to gut the U.S. estate tax and obviously it cannot be restored without a struggle. Creating a VAT is something that in principle should attract bipartisan support, but this would require a higher degree of rationality and seriousness than American politicians currently seem able to summon. And shifting the capital income tax to an accrual basis would be complicated and probably not advisable. The important point is that any of these changes would be superior to a direct tax on wealth.

    The only significant virtue of a wealth tax is its expressive quality. For people who are angry about the Elon Musks and Peter Thiels of the world, a wealth tax offers the most immediate and intuitive way of channeling that anger. Unfortunately, the desire to punish one’s enemies is not a sound basis for tax policy. There are major problems with the way that the U.S. tax code has dealt with runaway income among the ultra-rich over the past several decades. The preferred solution, however, is not to create complicated new taxes, but to fix the existing ones (and, importantly, to complete the transition to digital record-keeping at the IRS, to make it capable of administering those taxes). A serious nation, or at least a serious political party, would focus on this task, rather than chasing after shiny objects.

    Joseph Heath, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto and writes the Substack In Due Course.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • What Ceuta Shows About Europe
    A Spanish soldier looks at a group of migrants standing in line at El Trampolin beach in Ceuta, Spain, on August 2, 2026, to drink water and fill their bottles from a Spanish Army water truck. (Photo by Ana Lopez/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The scenes of mass border crossings from Morocco to Spanish Ceuta have split public opinion. One side supports the reaction expressed by 22 EU states criticizing Spain rather than confronting Morocco for the border chaos. The other side, meanwhile, condemns those 22 for turning on Spain instead of coming to its aid.

    The usual commentary frames this as a left/right issue, but it is not that simple. What complicates the situation is the divide between Western and Eastern Europe. These differences are being exploited by external actors who are betting on internal divisions in Europe to achieve their own goals.

    So, this is about Spain and Ceuta. Left and right. East and West. Ceuta did not create these divisions. It merely exposed them.

    In years gone by, the left and right were differentiated largely, though not solely, by their economic policies—conservative voters (on the right) favored free markets and deregulation, while those with socialist leanings (on the left) supported state involvement and regulation, as well as greater equality of outcome. Religion, tradition, and attitudes to authority always played a part too, but economics was the axis around which the rest turned.

    While the economy is still a bone of contention, it has paled in comparison to the modern-day sticking point—immigration. Debate on immigration is linked to a much larger problem plaguing both sides: intolerance of opposing opinions.

    American Purpose at Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    Here it is the left, more than the right, that has closed the door to debate by refusing to question attitudes on immigration. This means that views previously held by the extreme right have now spread far beyond the fringe, reaching people who were until recently happily sitting on the fence when it came to immigration. They see uncontrolled immigration, and the threats posed by individuals from incompatible value systems, as at least worthy of discussion. Instead of debating them, however, the left has declared that anyone unhappy with the changes mass immigration has brought to their societies must be racist. This has pushed people with otherwise liberal views further right. An open debate without labeling the other side bigoted might have achieved a different result.

    At the same time, the pressure on liberal governments across Europe demands a response. Whether or not they truly believe in controlling immigration, they need to at least look as though they do. And this is where Spain was right—the reaction to Ceuta did look like political posturing.

    The refusal to debate does not just alienate voters at home. It also means Western Europe cannot hear what Eastern Europe has been saying for years. The fight between the left and right on this subject is almost completely absent in Eastern Europe. What most Western Europeans do not realize is that, while we all come from the same Christian civilization and millennia of shared history, the last century has taken its toll.

    Our understanding of what is important and what is not diverges. While Western Europe rebuilt its societies after the Second World War and enjoyed decades of prosperity, for Eastern Europe the war only really ended between 1989 and 1991. Until then, the survival of Eastern European states was under threat from what some people saw as communism, but in reality was naked and unabashed Russian imperialism.

    Until relatively recently, Eastern European countries occupied by Russian soldiers could only dream of their own nation states (or rather, national states—a term used in the constitutions of several such countries to designate a state intended for a specific nation). In some countries, indigenous populations came perilously close to becoming a minority as a result of ethnic cleansing, forced Russification, and resettlement policies. Having a national state of their own was the dream of generations for over half a century.

    In such countries, multiculturalism, which is perceived as another version of forced change, does not sell. That is why they would rather make financial contributions or provide operational support under the EU’s solidarity mechanism than accept migrant relocations imposed by new EU rules. When liberation movements gathered speed just before the fall of the USSR, there were millions of people willing to die just to get away from the demographic engineering imposed on them. While the rest of Europe had decades to enjoy their “singledom,” Eastern Europe is less trusting when it comes to newcomers. They have seen this movie; they know how it ends.

    Another element missing from the Eastern European psyche when it comes to accepting immigration is the guilt over “white privilege.” Almost no Eastern European countries had any colonies and most Eastern Europeans themselves lived under serfdom. Serfdom in Eastern Europe meant peasants belonged to the lord who owned the land they lived on. Serfdom was finally eradicated in the last parts of Eastern Europe only in 1864, just one year before slavery was abolished in the United States. And, having been sold to the Kremlin for the “greater good” by the “victors” following WWII, Eastern Europeans did not feel particularly privileged. They fought for their right to have a nation state without external help, and some of them are still fighting for that right as we speak.

    So no, we are not in this together. We are very much divided.

    This division is what makes Europe vulnerable, yet it has largely been kept out of discussions around immigration. This makes Europe prey to predator states who understand these undercurrents all too well, and so can use them to destabilize the Western world and gain geopolitical influence.

    Iran, for example, has supported the wars in the Middle East that triggered much of the refugee flows into Europe—including keeping Assad afloat in Syria for over a decade, funding Hezbollah in Lebanon, and backing other proxies in the region. Russia, meanwhile, has weaponized the flow of people. Through its proxy Belarus, Russia has pushed tens of thousands of Middle Eastern migrants to the Polish, Lithuanian, and Latvian borders, with reinforced tunnels dug under the border by Middle Eastern specialists to sustain the operation. In Africa, Russian influence has expanded through Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger following recent coups, destabilizing the region in ways that risk generating the next wave of migration towards Europe. And a similar tactic has now been used in Ceuta—though the identity of anyone who might be helping Morocco is still up for debate.

    China, on the other hand, does not send migrants. It does not need to. All it needs is to supply goods to Russia and buy its natural resources—the actions that helped the Russian economy stay afloat after it was cut off from the rest of the world. Beijing could pull the plug at any moment. It just chooses not to, because internal divisions leave Europe vulnerable to Chinese influence.

    Once the pressure immigration has created in European societies takes root, Russia does what it is best at—running disinformation campaigns targeting both sides of the immigration argument and telling each what it wants to believe. Within days of the crisis, Ukraine’s foreign minister identified more than 1,500 Ceuta-related articles across a pro-Russian network led by Pravda and Russia Today, with almost 300 in the Spanish edition alone. The left is told the far right is on the march. The right is told that the left refuses to listen. All true. Europeans direct their anger at one another.

    We are all sitting ducks—unless we remember that everything Western society has ever achieved was done through debate, not by shutting down the opposition.

    Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK. Born in the Baltics, with a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter, she writes and gives live commentary on European security and Russia.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • This Could Be the Year Germany's Far-Right Goes Mainstream
    Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD's top candidate for the state election in Saxony-Anhalt. (Photo by Heiko Rebsch/picture alliance via Getty Images.)

    In the middle of Germany lies a state that many people outside the country have never heard of: Saxony-Anhalt. Picture a conservative and underappreciated region marked by industrial decline and rural traditionalism. There is rich regional history here. Notable figures such as Martin Luther, Otto von Bismarck, and Friedrich Nietzsche were born within its territory, but in its present form, the state has existed only since German reunification in 1990. It doesn’t evoke strong associations like Bavaria, and it doesn’t often make international headlines.

    Yet at the moment, journalists from all over the world are descending on Saxony-Anhalt. They feel history could be made here, in this sparsely populated place of 2.2 million souls. When people go to the polls on September 6 to elect a new state parliament, the outcome could reverberate far beyond Germany’s borders.

    If polling holds, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) will comfortably win the Saxony-Anhalt election with around 40% of the vote. Domestic intelligence has classified the state branch of the party as “right-wing extremist,” yet this hasn’t put off voters. In fact, the current polling trajectory puts it within reach of winning an absolute majority of seats in the state parliament, which would allow the AfD to govern Saxony-Anhalt alone without coalition partners and elect the minister president—Germany’s equivalent of a governor.

    Subscribe now

    Saxony-Anhalt could thus become the first part of Germany run by a far-right party since the end of the Second World War. The AfD itself is very conscious of this as a historical moment. Its leader in Saxony-Anhalt, Ulrich Siegmund, a charismatic and well-groomed young man who appears to be smiling non-stop on the campaign trail, says he intends to “write history.” He emphasizes at every opportunity that his manifesto for Saxony-Anhalt is intended to be a blueprint for other parts of the country.

    So what would an AfD-led government in Saxony-Anhalt actually do? Much like the United States, Germany has a federal system. Power is divided between the national government and sixteen state governments. While Berlin handles matters such as foreign policy and defense, the German states have substantial responsibility for areas such as education, policing, and culture. And that’s where the AfD manifesto is notably different from the other parties.

    In the section on schooling, for instance, the manifesto bemoans that “having the correct opinion is now valued above real knowledge.” It argues for a return to “traditional education” in the form of “homework, teacher-led instruction, regular in-class exercises, systematic review and assessment, extensive reading.” In addition, the AfD argues that disabled children and children who came to Germany as asylum seekers should be taught in separate classes or even separate schools.

    The program also wants to ban the rainbow LGBTQ flag from schools, and argues that “children [should] be taught as a role model the normal family consisting of a man and a woman, from which children are born.” This is something it also picks up in its explicitly pro-natal family policy, blaming declining birth rates on the fact that “sexual deviations and non-reproductive lifestyles now enjoy greater acceptance and are promoted more aggressively than the normal family.”

    On culture, meanwhile, what the AfD is proposing in Saxony-Anhalt is a radical break from Germany’s “memory politics” (or Erinnerungskultur). The post-war approach in both East and West Germany put education about the Nazi era front and center under the slogan “never again.” When I grew up in Germany in the 1990s, we learnt three times about Hitler’s rise and reign in school, which meant we ran out of time to deal with anything after 1945. The AfD says it wants to change this, shifting the emphasis to the 19th century, when Germany first became a nation state, as an era that “can still be a source of inspiration and a role model for us today.” This would involve “rewriting the history curriculum,” “honoring the sacrifice of soldiers” in both World Wars, defunding “anti-German art and culture,” and changing the state motto of Saxony-Anhalt from “Think Modern” to “Think German.”

    Finally, while immigration is the AfD’s core issue, the party has limited room to maneuver at the state level, as immigration policy is largely the federal government’s prerogative. But the party says it would use Saxony-Anhalt’s four votes in Germany’s upper chamber to lobby for radical change at the national level, while simultaneously enacting state-level measures like refusing to take an allocated share of asylum seekers if they have entered Germany through a safe state. There is also a notable and frequent use of the term “remigration” to describe the party’s mass deportation plans. Because the term in its current political sense was coined by far-right circles, the federal AfD leadership tried to distance itself from it for a while before readopting it last year. There’s no sense of hesitation about it in Saxony-Anhalt, where the party demands a “180-degree turn on migration.”

    The AfD’s plan for Saxony-Anhalt reads like an ambition for all of Germany, and we should take that ambition very seriously. For years this wasn’t done, because an AfD government seemed unlikely. Not least due to its Nazi past, Germany has a cross-party consensus to uphold a firewall (or “Brandmauer”) against parties to the right of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU). This means no party will form a coalition with the AfD. Even when the AfD came first in the 2024 elections in Thuringia, a state neighboring Saxony-Anhalt, the center-right CDU, which came second, chose to form an unpopular minority government with parties to its left, sending the AfD into opposition despite being the largest party.

    So what’s different in Saxony-Anhalt? For one thing, the AfD is very close to an absolute majority here. Where in Thuringia it won with 33% in 2024, the latest polls for Saxony-Anhalt give it 41%—a result that would double the party’s vote share compared to the last election in 2021. Of course, this is nowhere near 50%, but the party might still get more than half the seats if smaller parties like the Greens don’t meet the 5% hurdle to enter the state parliament, and those seats get distributed among the parties that do.

    Then there’s the fact that the firewall looks shaky. According to one recent poll, the AfD could end up just two seats short of a majority. Those seats could be supplied by rogue conservatives from the CDU. Officially, this isn’t on the cards, but there would be very little to stop individual parliamentarians from voting with the AfD or even changing parties once elected. The nervousness in the CDU about this is palpable. One of its most senior figures recently threatened that he would “intervene” should the Saxony-Anhalt chapter of his party begin talks with the AfD. Meanwhile, the populist-left BSW party, a relative newcomer, has indicated that they’d be willing to work with the AfD.

    Subscribe now

    So there are many viable routes for the AfD to achieve power in Saxony-Anhalt. But parts of the German media still treat the erosion of the old political landscape as a regional—and therefore containable—development. One argument is that Saxony-Anhalt, like Thuringia, is in the former East Germany. The AfD have long polled more strongly here than in the former West Germany. Some commentators have put this down to the idea that East Germans feel uniquely “estranged from democracy” due to having lived in a socialist dictatorship for four decades after the Second World War.

    But such explanations are not only dismissive of swaths of voters—they are also misleading. For one, the AfD now also leads in the national polls. At around 28%, it may be far from an outright majority in future federal elections, but it’s worth remembering that those are figures that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. In 2021, when the AfD reached just 10% in the federal German elections, commentators looked aghast at Saxony-Anhalt, where it was polling in the twenties.

    The Saxony-Anhalt election, then, is one to watch—and not as a regional anomaly, but as a landmark indicator of a shift to the right affecting all of Germany.

    Katja Hoyer is a German-British historian, journalist and author.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Adam Bodnar on Why Defeating Populists at the Ballot Box Isn’t Enough

    Adam Bodnar is a Professor of Law at SWPS University in Warsaw, heading the Department for Rule of Law and Human Rights. He is also a Senator of the Republic of Poland, elected in October 2023, and a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He previously served as Minister of Justice (December 2023–July 2025) and as Ombudsman of Po…

    Read more

    1 hr 24 min
  • We Must Save Sociology From Itself
    The sociology section of a bookshop, April 25, 2026. (Photo by Nicolas Guyonnet / Hans Lucas / AFP via Getty Images.)

    It was in sociology classes that I first heard the phrase “white supremacy.” Quite naturally, the first thing I thought of was people in hoods. But my sociology professor defined white supremacy as something quite different: the assumption that the cultural patterns associated with white people—from clothes to food to family structure—are normal, alongside the assumption that the patterns associated with ethnic and racial minorities are inferior.

    A light bulb went off in my head. The concept of white supremacy helped illuminate whole dimensions of my life that I had hitherto hidden. For example, it reminded me of a specific event during my sophomore year in high school. My mom offered to make biryani for Thanksgiving instead of turkey. Her reasoning was sound: Thanksgiving was a holiday about gratitude celebrated with feast foods. Turkey, cranberry sauce, and stuffing were the feast foods of a particular ethnic and religious culture (white Protestant Americans). But we came from a different ethnic and religious culture (South Asian Ismaili Muslim Americans). We had feast foods too, biryani being a main one.

    The choice was easy. Turkey is tough and flavorless, no matter how much cranberry sauce you put on it. Biryani is proof of God’s existence.

    I did not tell a soul in my high school that I ate biryani for Thanksgiving. Sociology gave me the conceptual language to explain why: Because American society views the cultures associated with white people as superior to the cultures associated with ethnic minorities.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    Sociology was like an alternate universe full of concepts that helped me see parts of my life experience I had not fully explored, and professors who validated me for sharing them. My term papers as an undergraduate basically involved writing an opening paragraph about power, privilege, and oppression as it related to this or that minority identity, and then finding the data to support my thesis.

    It is important to say that this was 1993. It’s not like there wasn’t real racism. I had grown up in the white western suburbs of Chicago during the Reagan-Bush era, where racist tropes (welfare queens, Willie Horton) were commonplace. I do not remember any of the teachers in my high school in Glen Ellyn, Illinois so much as mentioning the Rodney King beating when it happened. Racism was simply not a topic of discussion or a category of analysis.

    So while my college work was one-sided and not exactly rigorous, in that time and place it was highlighting evidence-based social patterns and national dynamics that were not a part of mainstream discourse. I think this is what beginners in sociology are supposed to do.

    But professionals ought to be held to higher standards than beginners. And sociology has been a field of ideologically progressive concepts in search of supporting evidence for so long now that it is in a serious crisis.

    In 2026, the liberal to conservative ratio in sociology is somewhere around 50:1. That makes it a grotesquely imbalanced field where students are exceedingly unlikely to encounter professors who believe conservative ideas such as the importance of personal responsibility or the benefits of capitalism. As with other social sciences, there is a replication problem within the discipline—except sociology has been slower than the other social sciences to face it.

    Moreover, people are fleeing from the discipline. Membership of the American Sociological Association has fallen below 10,000, down 33% from its peak of nearly 15,000 in 1972. Undergraduate majors have fallen just as far, but even faster: to roughly 20,000 students today from over 30,000 in 2013. Sociology is often named as one of the “most regretted” majors.

    It is a case study in loss of trust. Employers don’t trust sociology enough to hire its graduates. Students don’t trust the professors enough to major in the field. Professors don’t trust each other’s research. Several college presidents I know have privately told me that they don’t trust the sociology departments at their own universities to do their work in a manner that meets standard academic expectations of rigor.

    Subscribe now

    Given all this, is it any surprise that Republican politicians are pouncing? This year, the Ron DeSantis administration removed “Introduction to Sociology” from the general education curriculum in Florida’s public colleges and universities, having earlier claimed that the discipline had been “hijacked by left-wing activists.”

    The administration was not wrong. The head of the American Sociological Association has proudly described the field as “currently undergoing a renaissance as antiracist, decolonial, feminist, queer and transnational theorizing.”

    But while some sociologists proudly claim that their field is a “weapon” for progressive causes, others have recognized the problem of adopting a narrow ideological compass to guide what is meant to be a broadly-trusted disciplinary ship. Christian Smith, one of America’s most prominent sociologists of religion, observed that wielding sociology as an activist tool “tends to produce sectarian narrowness, exclusion, uniformity, silencing, self-censorship, lack of debate, the negative sanctioning of non-conformists, and the debilitation of rigorous thought.”

    In other words, the opposite of what an academic field is meant to do.

    Not only did Smith leave the American Sociological Association. He has wondered aloud whether sociology has gone so far off track that it should simply be liquidated. The real tragedy, he told the Wall Street Journal’s Pamela Paul, is that sociology done well “really matters and makes a contribution.”

    I was lucky enough to learn what it meant to do sociology well. I started my doctorate in sociology at Oxford in 1998, entering with the hope of applying critical race perspectives to the lives of middle class South Asian Ismaili Muslims in London. My theory was that they were a lot like me: white supremacy had affected their lives in invisible ways that their parents did not understand. Secretly, I did not want to be just a researcher; I wanted to be a liberator. I wanted my research—the penetrating way I asked questions, the sly manner in which I revealed layers of my own life—to help the people I was studying to see the truth of themselves: that their identity could be neatly captured by the lens of white racism.

    Except, things didn’t quite turn out the way that I had expected. Twice a week for six months I spent time with my subjects. I listened to the conversations about what mattered in their lives. Not much talk of racism there, frankly. So I asked questions directly about white supremacy, at first taking a slight angle to the topic, and then honing in more directly. “Have you ever been embarrassed about your name, or the food your parents cook at home?”

    Everybody I talked to recognized the existence of racism. They had stories about it. But nobody reported it as playing a central role in their lives. That place was occupied by something else: the inspiration they got from their religion.

    We’re expanding our events offerings! Please check out our events page to join Book Club, Ask the Author, and Intellectual Bootcamp—and to watch recordings of recent events.

    Persuasion events

    “I’m failing at this,” I told my PhD advisor, Geoffrey Walford. “I can’t seem to be present at the moments where racism occurs, or even get them to discuss it much in my interviews with them. Maybe I’m asking the wrong questions? Maybe they don’t trust me?”

    “Or maybe,” Geoffrey offered, “your theory is wrong. Maybe they don’t see racism impacting their lives as much as you expected—or as much as you want racism to have impacted their lives.”

    He added: “Remember, sociology is meant to explore how your subjects understand their own lives, not how you want them to understand their lives. The cardinal sin of the social researcher is squeezing the world into his worldview.”

    Paying close attention to what the world is telling you, and finding or developing theories that illuminate it, is what real sociologists do. Nobody can be fully objective, but sociologists have an obligation to be rigorous. This means following sound research processes:

    • Ensuring that the sample you are studying is reasonably representative of the broader population you are generalizing from;

    • Sincerely putting your data in conversation with a range of theories to see which one best explains the world;

    • Following Karl Popper’s famous “falsifiability” test, which means proactively seeking examples that challenge the theory rather than simply looking for more cases that confirm it;

    • Never confusing correlation with causation;

    • Being extremely judicious about stating conclusions.

    Geoffrey was adamant about these principles. He believed that the integrity of sociology rested upon them, especially qualitative sociology. The reason was simple: not only are qualitative sociologists interested in the same things that everyone else is (Why is there inequality? How do the social worlds of women differ from the social worlds of men?), but we basically use the same tools that are available to other people: observation and conversation. The only way that the field of qualitative sociology can justify academic standing is if our conclusions are more accurate than the conclusions of others.

    If we aren’t more accurate than others, we’re no better than the guy on the next bar stool spouting off opinions. And then the field loses credibility. That is the beginning of the end.

    Sociology is most useful when it identifies important patterns in society that are not part of mainstream discourse. At a certain time, those patterns included racism. But by the early 2000s, talking about racism had become dogma in sociological discourse. Figures like bell hooks and Cornel West, once considered edgy intellectuals, were now standard fare.

    Except, the minority groups I was studying in my doctorate were telling me that their identities were not principally formed by being victims of racism. Rather, they were primarily inspired by their religious identities. This led me to a whole new world of sociological theory about the central role religion plays in modern society—a field pioneered by scholars like Diana Eck, Martin Marty, Scott Appleby, Peter Berger, and Robert Putnam.

    As I read their work, I realized that there were lots of civic efforts focused on bridging young people across race and class identities (this was the heyday of Teach for America, City Year, and Public Allies), but virtually none that sought to bridge the gaps between diverse religious youth groups. (That is what inspired me to start the nonprofit organization I still lead, Interfaith America.)

    I’m glad that Geoffrey forced me to do proper academic work by finding the theories that actually illuminated the data that I was gathering. I wonder sometimes: If I was doing a doctorate in sociology today, would I have an advisor who allowed me (maybe even encouraged me) to twist my data so that it fit into some version of antiracism—essentially, to play down what were clearly the most important stories my subjects were telling me about their lives, and play up the dogmas of the day? There are sociologists who have confessed to basically doing precisely that.

    There is no shortage of guys on barstools spouting crazy theories. Some of them have huge media platforms and influential government positions. In an era of tectonic changes, full of charlatans, we need sociology more than ever to do its job: to be a discipline that helps us develop worldviews that genuinely explain the world around us. Only then can we hope to improve it for the better.

    Eboo Patel, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The Eras of Francis Fukuyama: Human Nature

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In the Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column at Persuasion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama discuss why human nature has been so central to Fukuyama’s political thought, what modern evolutionary biology and anthropology tell us about the myth of primordial individualism, and whether human beings are best understood as fundamentally social creatures or fundamentally self-interested ones.

    Enjoying this discussion? In an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought at 5pm on Sunday, September 6 at The Abbey Centre, London. Find out more and get tickets here. Paying subscribers of Persuasion and American Purpose can access a code for a free ticket here.

    We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.

    This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, features content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: What we want to talk about for this part of a conversation relates specifically to two of your books, but also to themes that really pervade every part of your work, which is the role that human nature plays in understanding the social world. To start off with, I think that there is something somewhat unusual about a major social theorist of the late 20th, early 21st century putting so much emphasis on human nature in the first place. A lot of social theory in the 20th century started from the premise that there really is not such a thing as human nature and that any appeal to human nature is at best misguided and at worst dangerous. Why do you think that in reflecting about the kinds of politics we can have and should aspire to, we need to root ourselves in an account of human nature?

    Francis Fukuyama: Well, I think there are several answers to that question. Historically you cannot understand the development of modern political theories about what a just society looks like without reference to human nature, because many philosophers in the past based their theories on a substantive theory of human nature. The other one is kind of commonsensical: there are certain human faculties and capabilities that strike me as not just uniquely human, but at the core of what we regard as our humanity, and the attempt to deny the existence of that core of capacities just strikes me as a little bit crazy. I think that is actually something only academics could convince themselves of, that everything is simply socially constructed. I am struck by many arguments where people will simply default to just saying, well, that is just human nature, somebody is greedy or violent or something. I think that is the default assumption of most people, that we live in a world that is framed by a certain set of characteristics that we call human nature.

    Mounk: So that is a case for why we have to have an account of human nature. How then do we go about constructing that account? Obviously, people made claims about human nature in the past that turned out to be very wrong. They might have said, for example, that women are by their nature caregiving in ways that make women incapable of intellectual work. That has thankfully turned out to be wrong. How do we talk about human nature in ways that are true to human biology, true to the biological creatures that we are, but without actually ending up sanctifying the particular cultural assumptions of a time and saying that is just natural and unchanging and therefore we must assume that it goes to the heart of who we are as a species?

    Fukuyama: Well, here I think modern natural science actually is a big help, because we know a whole lot more about what could be the basis for human nature than we did a hundred years ago, beginning with the understanding of the role of the genome, of DNA, in encoding certain characteristics in every species that exists, including the human species. That has actually served to debunk certain more naive theories about human nature that were typically held by conservatives. The realm of gender is the most clear case of this, where there were very firm beliefs about the roles of women and of men and what women could and could not do that were based on a kind of implicit theory of human nature, and I think we have gotten a lot more empirical information, most of which goes to debunk those theories. It is pretty hard to go from an understanding of DNA to actual behavior. What we have instead are a whole bunch of empirical studies that come from a variety of fields, of human psychology, of comparative anthropology. We understand, for example, a lot of human behaviors actually have roots in primate behavior, and we know a lot more about that now, where we posit that there must be some continuity in the evolutionary path by which some creatures became chimpanzees and others became human beings. That is all based on a common ancestor that had certain characteristics that are shared by modern humans and modern chimpanzees. So there are a lot of sources of our knowledge about what might be natural and what is simply socially constructed or cultural.

    Mounk: So we can look at some of our close animal ancestors and see what we appear to have in common with other primates. We can look at what seems to be constant in humans across the historical record or across many different societies today. We can look at evolution as a kind of guide to what kind of faculties we may have developed over time. If we take those three things together, what is your account of human nature? What do you think stands at the core of who we are as a creature? In what ways does that give us great versatility? Clearly, one of the striking things about humans is how versatile they have been across different climates, across different arrangements of living, having adopted vastly different forms of political self-organization, economic self-organization, and adopted vastly different values at different times. What do you think is constant across all of that variation, actually remains the same throughout?

    Fukuyama: Well, rather than try to answer a question as gigantic as that, let me try to do it in pieces, and provide a little bit of the historical intellectual history of these concepts. One of the biggest controversies in political theory is about individualism. Do human beings by nature start out as individuals largely concerned with their individual well being, or are they more socially oriented creatures who by nature want to be in communities and share norms and behave in social groups? This was one of the big divisions in politics, because early liberals like Thomas Hobbes or John Locke or Jean Jacques Rousseau posited an early state of nature, by which they meant human nature. The state of nature in this narrative is simply a metaphor for human nature. They are trying to uncover what is customary and what is by nature. These early liberal theorists postulated that the deepest characteristics of humans were individual, that you looked after your own material well being, maybe a little bit after your family. With Locke, even the family was kind of derivative of people wanting to maximize their own self interest.

    Mounk: They obviously had huge disagreements between themselves about what that human nature was. Most importantly, somebody like Thomas Hobbes really thought that the individual desire to survive most of all, but also to strive after a form of glory, is what drove the state of nature. That is why, quite quickly, without anybody being evil, it led to a life that is nasty, brutish, and short, because it put us in competition with each other and we needed the state in order to manage that competition and create a kind of social peace. Whereas for someone like Jean Jacques Rousseau it was the opposite. Before civilization, before society, before politics, human beings were actually altruistic in a certain kind of way, and it is all of the evils of society that corrupted our nature further down the line.

    Fukuyama: Well, that was even more true of Jean Jacques Rousseau, who felt that by nature individuals were solitary, timid, and happy, and that it was only when they first came together in society that they began to compare themselves, feel envy, and then make themselves terribly unhappy. They have very different views of what human nature is, but what they do share is this belief in individualism, that you need to study individual motives. This is also embedded in modern neoclassical economics, because a fundamental premise of the economic models that are taught in your Econ 101 microeconomics course is that human beings are rational utility maximizers, meaning they think primarily about their own utility—utility meaning for the most part material interest and not altruistic aspirations. Human nature comes back in all sorts of ways that we think about the contemporary world. The point I was on my way to making really had to do with primordial individualism. You are right that Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau all have very different accounts of what those individuals were like, but they all began with this assumption that we start out as individuals and come to society only over time, and that society is a kind of artificial construct, a social contract that people arrive at because they want to figure out how to get out of the state of nature.

    Mounk: I see what you are getting at. That is actually against what the historical record suggests.

    Fukuyama: Yeah, I think that is completely wrong, in retrospect. Here there are a lot of different fields that have contributed to this: comparative anthropology, primatology, where you discover that there never was a period of primordial individualism. Certainly not anything like what Rousseau described. Human beings always lived in groups and they always had very strong natural faculties for dealing with life in society. The whole field of evolutionary psychology is really a kind of evolutionary account of how these faculties got embedded into the human genome because of the need to cooperate, way before there were modern human beings. You still had this natural superiority that was conferred by your ability to cooperate with other members of your same species, and that is very deeply embedded. When you ask me what my account of human nature is, I would say, in my view, something like modern individualism is in fact historically contingent. It is not true of most societies, either today or historically. It is something that kind of evolves over time in a certain part of the world under certain conditions, but that kind of individualism is not natural, and that has a lot of political implications, because a lot of libertarians and people on the right are very invested in that individualistic story, and a lot of people on the left believe in the social version of it. But even there, there are disagreements, because you can believe that the social human is a state-centered member of a big society, or you can believe that they are basically much more socially oriented towards friends and families. I think those are all things that modern anthropology can tell you a lot about.

    Mounk: There is an interesting argument by a biologist that humans are by nature kind of semi-monogamous. When you look at the monogamous species in the world and you look at the much larger number of species in the world that are non-monogamous, and you look at a whole set of physical characteristics they have, humans fall somewhere in the middle. That might explain why the theme of monogamy or non-monogamy, the theme of love and romance and marriage and betrayal, is so central to human literature. Could you by analogy say that humans are a semi-individualist species? You go back to the very earliest myths and stories about humanity—The Odyssey is on people’s minds at the moment because of a new movie—they very often have to do with the struggle of the individual with and against society. Antigone is obviously the most salient case. We evolved in bands of people, our membership in groups has always been a huge part of both our social reality and what made us successful. If you were incapable of cooperating with others, you probably were not able to survive and procreate. But there is also always a form of individuality and individualism that certainly distinguishes us from sheep or lemmings.

    Fukuyama: Yeah, I think that one of the things you quickly discover when you start thinking seriously about the empirics of human nature is that it is very complicated, and to say that human beings have deeply embedded social instincts is only part of the story. I think you are right that human beings also are individuals that have individual, as economists would say, individual preferences for one thing over another. There is also within every human being a tension between that kind of individual selfishness and the desire to conform in social groups. But I think in general that the idea that we are deeply, fundamentally individuals is hard to support simply by the history of the evolution of human societies.

    On the question of monogamy, that is a complicated one where you get into dangerous territory very quickly, because a lot of evolutionary psychologists have argued that male and female reproductive strategies are very different. This is a good example of where I think you have new sources of information. The basic argument that evolutionary psychologists began making in the nineteen seventies and eighties was that males just tended to be more promiscuous than females, because everybody is trying to maximize the chances of getting their genes into the next generation. For a male, the easiest way to do this was to have sex with a lot of women. For women, the path to doing this was by nurturing her own offspring, which required a lot of time and effort, much more so than in other species. Therefore women had to be much more selective about the partners that they chose, because they needed help in raising their offspring.

    It turns out I was just speaking to a biologist friend of mine who pointed out that this is a pattern that exists in virtually all sexually reproducing species, with a couple of exceptions, and the exceptions are cases in which the male has actually evolved to spend much more of its time taking care of offspring than the female. Sure enough, the roles are reversed, so in that species the males are much more selective about their partners, and the females are much less selective. It just seems to me—that does not actually fully prove the theory, but it does suggest that if something is invariant across a lot of different types of creatures, there must be something biological going on there, because presumably these kinds of simple multicellular creatures are not making individualistic choices for themselves.

    Mounk: I am struck by your skepticism about the idea that human beings are individualist, or at least by your skepticism about some of the ways in which theorists have thought of human beings as individualists. As you have pointed out, it is often the case that philosophical liberals emphasize individualism, and it is the critics of philosophical liberalism who say that really that is an abstract, wrong-headed notion and that we are really constituted by the communities of which we are part. That is, in fact, one of the interesting things that post-liberal critics on the right and the left have in common.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    When you think of Zohran Mamdani in his inaugural speech in New York talking about the joys of collectivism, or when you talk about somebody like Sohrab Ahmari on a previous episode of his podcast, claiming that liberals are obsessed with autonomy and that is a problem with them and we should value community much more—how do you reconcile those two things? Why is it that liberalism is the right governing philosophy for humans, even though we are not by nature individualists in the kind of way that people, from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls, may have thought?

    Fukuyama: Well, one answer to that is that another part of human nature is to be very plastic or very adaptable. Even though something may be an inclination that is given to you by your genes and your biology, human beings can also overcome that, and we do that in all sorts of ways. That is why we have culture: the raw material of human nature often leads to very bad outcomes. The most obvious one is violence.

    The early liberals were correct in a certain sense about the social contract, that one of the things that happens in human societies is you tend to develop cultural rules that constrain certain kinds of very dangerous behaviors on the part of the individuals making up the group. The thing about individualism is that it turns out it is very useful for economic development. If you allow individuals to make choices about what to buy, what to make, what kind of company to start, it turns out that you end up a lot richer than if everything is mired in a kind of collectivism.

    There are societies that are based on what anthropologists call segmentary lineages, what other people somewhat inaccurately describe as tribes, where you cannot sell anything except to a kinsperson. If you are looking at a store and your cousin owns a store next door and you buy from the other store because they offer a lower price than your cousin does, your whole kin group is going to get mad at you and put a lot of social pressure on you to buy things.

    Modern market economies really do depend on a kind of individualism in terms of economic decision making, where you have to get beyond the family and family ties. It turns out that if you want to run a bureaucracy and you stuff it all with your kinspeople, your brother-in-law and your son-in-law, and all the diplomats are kind of relatives of yours, you are not going to have a successful country, as opposed to picking people on the basis of a somewhat unnatural principle that merit ought to be rewarded. That is one of the tensions in modern politics, that good governance actually depends on meritocracy and the breaking of these social bonds, choosing the qualified individual over your relative or your friend, and yet there is a strong human desire to stick with family and friends.

    That is one of the tensions I talk about in my Political Order books, where the material needs of a modern society run counter to some very basic human inclinations that we have. But because humans are adaptable, we can say, okay, I am going to pick the most qualified person and not my cousin.

    Mounk: That is a great cliffhanger to a future episode of Francis Fukuyama’s Eras Tour, because I want to make sure that we devote a real conversation to the Political Order two-volume series.

    Your account here is really interesting. A lot of the time we think that liberals have an anthropology, a view of human nature that says we are really by nature individuals and we are individuals before we entered political society, and therefore those political societies should respect and honor our individualistic natures by giving us the right to speak as we please and worship as we please and assemble with whomever we please and so on.

    You are in a way saying something much more interesting, which is that human beings are not by nature individualistic, but that has some very bad consequences. If we think about everything in terms of our clan, that makes it much harder to have economic development, because you are not going to buy the better, cheaper product, you are going to buy the product of your second cousin twice removed, and otherwise you are going to be ostracized. You are not going to have an impersonal state bureaucracy that gives people services or locks them up depending on what they have done and how they have followed the rules, but on the basis of whether or not they are related. That is going to make it very hard to have a rule of law and all the institutions that have huge benefits. So we need an individualistic order in some ways to hedge against the negative elements of our collective natures.

    There is a different way of putting that same point that I associate with Jonathan Haidt, but that I think has a much deeper tradition, which is to say that we are by nature tribal people, and that has the potential for political violence within it. We are often courageous and even altruistic in dealing with people who we think of as part of the in-group, but we can very often be cruel, unfair, even violent towards anybody who we think of as a member of the out-group. Part of the aspiration of a decent society, whether that takes the form of individual rights that are protected by the state, or even a form of liberal nationalism that tries to expand the circle of who counts as part of the in-group, is precisely to go against that nature. Is that a different way of rendering what you said? Is that a third element to what you said, or do you disagree with Haidt and that tradition?

    Fukuyama: There are a couple of different aspects to the social nature of man. The one that I emphasized in my Political Order books had to do with friends and family, and there is a specific tradition within biology. William Hamilton was the scientist that articulated the idea of inclusive fitness, that we are altruistic in proportion to the number of genes that we share with other people, which explains nepotism basically, that we favor genetic relatives. Robert Trivers, who just passed away fairly recently, developed a theory about reciprocal altruism, that human beings have evolved a capacity to develop reciprocal relationships with other human beings based on gift giving and experience of mutual support. That basically tells you that friends and family is a very natural form of human sociability.

    It is absolutely the case that if everything has to depend on friends and family, you are going to have a very limited society. That works in hunter-gatherer societies and certain forms of tribal societies, but if you want to have a state or anything that goes beyond just a circle of people that you know are related to, it becomes a big liability, and therefore you have to create impersonal institutions. This is one of the biggest themes that cuts across several of my books, beginning with my book Trust, but continuing through the Political Order books: if you want to develop a modern society, you have to get beyond the family, or this friends and family circle that is natural to us. In a way, all political orders are in a certain sense unnatural, because they require us to hire the most competent individual or the best general, rather than somebody that is an old drinking buddy of ours. That is one aspect.

    The other aspect of human sociability that is more, in a way, dangerous has to do with this idea of norm following in much larger groups, where we actually want to defer to the authority of a single leader, and that we find safety and security in doing that. That goes beyond the family. That is really the basis of modern nationalism or ethnicity. Ethnicity is kind of a fake familialism, because people in the same ethnic group may have been related to each other a hundred generations ago, but they actually really are not genetic relatives. They think that they are part of a larger, homogeneous group, and they are perfectly willing to defer to the authority of people that will lead that large group.

    Both on a small scale with friends and family and on a large scale with phenomena like nationalism, you do have this human instinct to conform with social norms that are created at a variety of different levels, and that becomes both the strength of the human species—if you say why did the human species end up being so dominant in the world, it is because of this ability to cooperate socially—and why it has also become very dysfunctional, in terms of leading to wars and destruction and racism and all sorts of things. Again, it is because we have these natural characteristics that tend us towards certain forms of sociability.

    Mounk: Okay, let us get into some of the controversies. One concern with not having an account of human nature is that it might lead you, in some senses, in too libertarian a direction, making you think that human beings are really by nature individuals that need to be protected from the threats of community.

    Another way that you might think about the dangers of having too individualistic a view of human nature is that it might make you think that you can completely change human nature. That is obviously the problem with some deeply collectivist regimes. I spent some time in Cambodia, and when you look at the way in which Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge wanted to transform their society in denial of basic, I would say, individualistic aspects of human nature, that helps to explain what, on a per capita basis, was probably the worst regime in human history.

    Subscribe now

    But it might, in a totally different way, also be true of much more understandable aspirations that people within our own society have to remake or refashion themselves from scratch. Do you think that an understanding of human nature should in some way limit our ambitions, whether that is to create a collective utopia or to completely refashion who we are as individuals?

    Fukuyama: That is absolutely right. The communists in the Soviet Union wanted to create a new Soviet man who would not be interested in kinship, would devote themselves entirely to the state, and that proved to be not just a failure practically, but also a moral failure, because it meant that people had to be wrenched away from their families and their deepest personal commitments.

    Let me give you one example of how a wrong theory of human nature leads to a lot of unhappiness. There is an Italian journalist named Alexander Stille who wrote a book called The Sullivanians. This is a very strange cult that occurred on the Upper West Side of Manhattan back in the nineteen sixties. It was formed by a couple of individuals, one of whom was a licensed psychologist, but it was premised on the idea, which was shared by a number of people on the left, that the evils of capitalism were deeply rooted in the family, and especially in the kind of monogamous heterosexual family.

    What they tried to implement in these very nice apartments in Manhattan was a collective system that did not allow couples to bond over time and did not allow the mother of a child to raise that child. The children were ripped away from their biological parents almost from birth and given to somebody else in the little commune. It is a very hard story to read, because it created such a lot of personal suffering, both on the part of the parents that wanted to raise their own children and on the part of the children that wanted to have a mother and father. Instead they were put in this little collective thing that was driven by a couple of ideologues who somehow believed that they would solve the injustices of capitalism by raising children in this fashion.

    Mounk: I experienced a much milder version of this when I was growing up, rooted in the same historical period and some of the same ideas, I think, which is that many of the friends and acquaintances of my mother when I was growing up had been students in the sixties or perhaps the early seventies, and they really disliked the idea of lifelong monogamous partnership.

    They also had found partners that, despite all of their struggles, they seemed to like and wanted to stick with. The term that really was standard was that they introduced the partner as my Lebensabschnittsgefährte, my life segment partner, to somehow deal with the embarrassing fact that they seemed to be in a monogamous relationship, but emphasizing that this is really a temporary phenomenon. Of course, some of them split up or got divorced, but by and large, the Lebensabschnittsgefährte, the life segment partner, turned out to be the partner for all of the segments of their lives.

    Fukuyama: There is a Latin poet, Horace, who wrote a poem that contains the line “tamen usque recurret.” It means “it always comes running back.” In the context, in the previous line it said: you can try to throw human nature out with a pitchfork, but it always comes running back. I think these are examples of that.

    Mounk: The other striking thing is that Nicholas Christakis talks about this in one of his books, that every commune ends up going wrong in the same way. You have attempted communes in lots of different contexts, and when we go beyond just having roommates or something quite thin, when it really is trying to create this collective life, there are different stages of it, and the stages of decay they follow end up being remarkably similar across different contexts, because they are trying to do something that seems incompatible with human nature, and so therefore human nature takes its revenge in remarkably similar ways.

    What about some of the areas in which what we assume about human nature does seem to have changed a lot? Very intelligent thinkers and writers made assumptions about women for centuries that turned out to be very wrong. Of course there were people even before the advent of natural science who recognized the folly of that. John Stuart Mill pointed out that it may be true that women up until that point in history had not accumulated great achievements in many areas of human endeavor, but that was because they were excluded from full participation in society in remarkably similar ways across all those contexts. Mill made the argument that we really do not yet know what women are truly capable of when those disabilities are removed from them, and he rightly anticipated that women in fact would come to have great achievements once they were allowed and encouraged to do that.

    At the same time, there are clearly some biological differences between men and women, not just because women bear children in a way that men do not, but also because we are creatures driven in part by our genetics, and people who have two X chromosomes have a different set of genes from people with an X and a Y chromosome. How should we think about human nature in relation to gender differences?

    Fukuyama: Well, actually, before we get into gender, there is a broader issue that also applies to things like race and ethnicity. People at one point believed that there was a natural hierarchy in the different races of human beings around the world, and that white Europeans, white northern Europeans, stood at the top of that hierarchy, and black people of various sorts and brown people were at lower rungs. That was used—there was a whole school of what is now called scientific racism that developed after Darwin published The Origin of Species, that then tried to apply this very crude, I think ultimately misunderstood, version of Darwinism to human racial stratification, and argued for, for example, European colonialism on the grounds that the colonized people were less human or lacked intelligence or other characteristics that Europeans had, and that justified their being held in bondage. So it really is much broader than just prejudices against women.

    With regard to scientific racism, again, this is where I think the scientific method actually gets very useful. One figure in this movement was Franz Boas, who is really the founder of modern cultural anthropology. There had been this argument that, during the great period of immigration into the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that led tens of millions of people, mostly from southern and eastern Europe, to come to the United States, a lot of the racists at the time argued that these people were not as intelligent as Europeans, and they actually did this by measuring the head size of different racial groups.

    Subscribe now

    The thing that Boas did was use the data: the army was measuring the head sizes of recruits when they processed people into the army for World War One, and Boas continued to measure, he did a longitudinal survey of what the children of these people were like, and it turned out that there was a convergence in head size once people started eating an American diet. It turned out that this supposed racial difference was simply a matter of environment, and that once these immigrants fed their children American food in enough quantities, their intelligence, head sizes, everything else began to converge with that of native-born Americans. This was one pretty clear case where actually the scientific method is very useful in clearing up something that is simply prejudice.

    Now in the case of male-female differences, I think we have seen something very comparable to that, where a lot of people believed that women could not occupy—well, it begins with the mind. In the nineteenth century it was very common to hear men say that women are not rational enough to vote, and I think time has just proven that this is really ridiculous. Women actually have different preferences in what they vote for, but they certainly are absolutely qualified to exercise that kind of choice.

    This is a problem that our current Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has, in that he also believes women are not suited to combat positions. Empirically, again, that has been proven to be wrong, that you have a lot of female war fighters these days. As a group, in the aggregate, they may not be quite as good at lugging forty-pound packs of ammunition up big mountains, but there is no question that they can be just as tough and vicious in combat as men. So there has been a lot of disconfirmation of these earlier ideas.

    The problem is that there are certain domains in which, despite the effort to equalize outcomes and equalize the environmental conditions for young boys and girls, there still remain differences in the aggregate. People have a hard time thinking about this because the truth is that any characteristic held by either men or women is distributed naturally. There is a normal distribution where you have got a center and then two tails of the distribution. It is the case that there will always be women that are stronger, faster, have more upper body strength than men on average, but the two normal curves overlap, and the tails are different, and there are certain areas where the average performance will be different. That, I think, kind of points to the irreducible nature of human nature. There still remain certain characteristics that will persist, and it shows up today, for example, in labor markets.

    Mounk: These particular questions of gender are also related to structural changes in the economy that then went to follow on changes in society at large that you wrote about in the 1990s in your book, The Great Disruption.

    Fukuyama: My least-read book was one I published in 1999 called The Great Disruption. I did not intend to do it when I started out on this project, but I ended up writing a book about gender. One of the arguments that I convinced myself of, and I think is still correct, is that the rise of feminism and the movement of hundreds of millions of women into the paid labor force beginning in the 1960s was not a kind of autonomous ideological event where suddenly people said, women really are equal, it is morally a terrible violation to treat them differently. I think it was really driven by technology.

    At that moment you were making a big transition from an industrial society into an information society, in which the vast majority of workers were now working in a service economy which involved sitting in front of a computer screen all day. Many fewer people were involved in moving heavy objects or lifting things or working with gigantic machines that required a lot of upper body strength. As a result, women just had a much more natural place.

    If you want to think about what are the remaining male-female differences that are very hard to explain except by biology, you think about characteristics like risk taking and crime, which are, I think, unfortunately heavily correlated. It is the case that the vast majority of crimes are committed by young men, let us say between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five. This is invariant. It is invariant across different cultures, it is invariant over time, across different levels of human development. That is the case.

    One of the reasons that women are outperforming men, especially in low-skill occupations in today’s economy, is that women are just better at working in a service economy where you have to sit patiently behind a computer screen and the boss wants you to turn up reliably for work. Women will just do that much better than men. I do not think that that is necessarily a socially constructed difference. I think that is related to a more fundamental difference between the sexes.

    Mounk: One important way in which questions about human nature show up in politics is not about the foundation of politics, it is about what kind of interventions in human nature we should allow. You started to think about that going back to the big debates about bioethics in the early 2000s, and have continued to reflect on it. Today we are capable of choosing certain traits for the children we have. We can have a lot of embryos and then test them for polygenic scores, and with some amount of likelihood select the embryo that is most likely to have a high IQ or most likely to be very athletic. We can of course select for particular diseases that we want our offspring to avoid. We are increasingly able, and will soon be able, to edit our genes to say that perhaps we have some character trait that is driven by or correlated with certain genes we have, and perhaps we can just edit those to change them.

    How should you think about which of these treatments to allow and which of these treatments not to allow? There is an obvious tension between the enormous good that some of these kinds of treatments might make—when you are thinking, for example, about having some horrible hereditary disease that you want to make sure your child does not inherit—but also some real risks if you imagine a society in which half or a third or a tenth of society is genetically enhanced and much smarter and faster and so on than everybody else, and the rest of society is considered in some way a second-class, non-altered human. It is easy to imagine the kind of dystopian sci-fi scenarios.

    Fukuyama: Well, in the early 2000s I was a member of President George W. Bush’s bioethics council for several years.

    Mounk: As, I believe, was my doctoral advisor, Michael Sandel.

    Fukuyama: Yeah, that is right. He was on that council as well. James Q. Wilson, a lot of very notable people. I also wrote a book called Our Posthuman Future, because I take a pretty conservative view on this type of biological intervention. If you talk about CRISPR-Cas9 and germline editing, you are talking about altering not just the behavior of a currently existing individual, but all of that individual’s subsequent descendants. The potential for doing something that has unintended consequences is, I think, much greater.

    The other argument that I made—to answer your question about what I came to conclude as being legitimate and non-legitimate—is that, obviously, we have been intervening in our biological bodies for years and years. I had cataract surgery last year, so I have got these artificial lenses in my eyes and I do not need glasses anymore. I can hardly say that that is something illegitimate. What I had argued back then was that we ought to be open to enhancement technologies, or technologies that correct—sickle cell anemia is biologically rooted, and if you can select against that, or can actually edit someone’s genome to get rid of that horrible disease, there is no reason you should not do that. But we need to be especially cautious about enhancement technologies.

    I had a very specific reason for worrying about that, because I think that people have these fundamental disagreements and also misunderstandings about what makes a human being a human being. I talked about there being a certain factor X that is what people historically have thought gave human beings dignity. It has something to do with the ability to choose, to make moral choices, to be morally autonomous. But I think it also has to do with the way we relate emotionally to the outside world, that we feel pain, we have consciousness that allows us to sympathize or empathize with other people, that drives our altruism and a lot of factors that allow us to live in society.

    You do not want to monkey with those things that might impinge on that factor X, because fundamentally it is related to our view of human rights. You see this most clearly in the case of something like intelligence. If we could actually locate genetically where high intelligence resides and manipulate people to be smarter, I think that is going to be a disaster, because who is going to take advantage of this first? It is obviously elites that have the ability to—they are already putting their kids into private schools and giving them tutors and giving them a leg up in the race of life. If you can then also make sure from the time they are embryos that they are going to be smarter than other people, genetically smarter, that is going to create a tiered society where those advantages are going to be passed down to descendants, and that is a nightmare. Aldous Huxley talks about alphas, betas, and gammas in Brave New World, and that is exactly the kind of society that we would be heading towards.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Francis discuss trans rights, what artificial intelligence teaches us about being human, and why Silicon Valley’s focus on life extension is a bad idea. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    57 min
  • How Ukrainians Are Surviving
    Damage from a Russian drone strike in Mykolaiv, August 4, 2026. (Photo by Valentyna Gurova/Suspilne Ukraine.)

    The last ever conversation I had with my Ukrainian grandfather was grim. He had lost his apartment, the place where he lived for over 40 years, to a missile strike. Usually a man with a tough exterior, he was inconsolable. “How many buildings are destroyed only in our city? Who will rebuild all that? What do we do?” He posed questions without expecting an answer, one after another. I patted him on the back. “Don’t worry, grandpa. We rebuilt after 1945, and we’ll rebuild again.”

    What I said was true—at least partially. The full truth was: our city, Mykolaiv, located in the Ukrainian south, was damaged far less during the Second World War. Over 12,000 buildings have been destroyed since 2022, many times more than were wrecked in World War II.

    Now to the good news—we were, indeed, rebuilding. And we were doing it not after, but during the war.

    I know about it firsthand. My family suffered three nearly direct strikes in Mykolaiv—the kinds that you will read about in the news next morning, among dozens of others that happened in Ukraine that same night. But what comes next, after the headlines fade? It is nothing like what you might picture from a Hollywood movie. Losing a home during the war is more like walking through the multiple bureaucratic corridors of Kafka’s The Trial while ash from the strike is still blowing in your face. Here’s a glimpse of what life after a missile attack looks like from the inside.

    Subscribe now

    My parents’ and my grandparents’ apartments were located within five minutes of each other, separated by a hotel and its large backyard. In 2022, the first year of full-scale invasion, Mykolaiv was attacked multiple times a day—and our central area has arguably suffered the most of all. I was then living as a refugee in Berlin, waking up to the photos of new destruction in the city every morning.

    I still remember very vividly the first attack in March 2022. The missile destroyed the hotel; my parents’ building took on the impact of the blast wave. My mom was out doing her usual grocery shop in a supermarket nearby; my father was out of the country. “When you arrive at the scene of a strike, it’s absolute chaos. It’s hard to get through the crowds swarming the area,” my mother recalls. Emergency psychologists, police officers, city services, firefighters, and medics all filled up our backyard. Volunteers were there to give hot meals and psychological support to those affected, while city representatives assessed and noted down the damage.

    The outer layer of our double-glazed windows was only cracked (“that good German quality,” my mom approvingly remarked); the building’s facade was scarred as well. The electricity was restored the same day, but the gas—not so fast. To be able to cook, all families in the building were linked up to the World Kitchen UA program. The volunteers delivered freshly-prepared food to the building for three months, twice a day, until the gas system was finally up and running again.

    In the first year of full-scale war, national support for rebuilding didn’t exist yet. At that point everything depended on smaller-scale assistance organized by the local government. On the day of the strike, my mom received a one-time assistance of roughly $200, which she largely spent on replacing the damaged window glazing. Feeling that it was unsustainable, and too dangerous, to stay in Mykolaiv, my family, at my mother’s instigation, soon relocated to a village in the west.

    They returned in April 2023, when the strikes on Mykolaiv appeared to subside in their intensity… and that’s exactly when the second attack happened, hitting the nearby Admiralty building. The strike badly damaged all apartment buildings in the vicinity, obliterating the roofs, balconies, windows, and the facades. Miraculously, our apartment did not suffer. The secret—the kinds of things you learn in wartime—was micro-ventilation. Our windows were opened only slightly, which saved them from blasting out completely from the wave.

    As usual, the first phrase my mother told me on the phone was “I’m fine.” Everything was always fine—that was just the mentality people had to adopt by this stage of the war. I knew the adrenaline was still rushing through her body, helping her deal with all the logistics that came after—speaking with police officers, registering apartment damage, scheduling a window replacement for her parents. By this time the strikes had started to feel almost routine.

    The worst of it came three months later, when my mother was in her village house outside of the city.

    At 4am, she got a call from a friend crying hysterically on the phone. “Natasha, your parents’ building is burning. All of it,” was all she could make out. She jumped into her car and drove to the city during a curfew; the soldiers at the checkpoint let her through.

    Here’s another thing nobody really anticipates about the aftermath of a strike: no one tells you which hospital the victims are taken to. Amidst the madness, each service is responsible only for their specific task. So while firefighters were fighting the fire, medics loaded up my grandparents into separate ambulances and drove away… at least, that’s what the policeman told my mom when she arrived at the scene. “Are you sure there was a woman as well?” she asked, looking despairingly at the gaping hole that was previously my grandmother’s bedroom.

    “Yes, but you have to look for her.”

    First comes the shock. Then comes the logistics, always the logistics. The calls to city hospitals, asking if they admitted the so-and-so looking people, the drives to identify them, and then doing it for hospital after hospital. My grandmother was in one of the hospitals; she was only lightly bruised, but there was damage to her lungs from breathing in the ashes. It was impossible luck—the elderly couple just above them were killed by the building debris. While in the hospital, she received a call from my grandfather. It turned out he had been sitting in his wheelchair in the backyard of our apartment building the entire time with the chaos swirling all around him.

    In these several hours when she thought one or both parents might be dead, it didn’t even occur to my mother to think about damage to the apartment. And there turned out to be a lot of it—the worst impact yet. The front door was displaced by the blast wave, so she couldn’t even open it with the key. Inside, everything was upside down—windows missing, glass shards everywhere and mixed with the soil from broken flower pots. “At that point, you don’t know what to do anymore. So you just stand in lines,” she says. That was the bureaucracy of the missile strike, once again: the one-time aid, the damage registry, the window replacements. At least, she knew the procedure already. “There was something calming about it,” she says. The building burned for three more days, despite the heavy rain.

    By this time the state had caught up to the need to have a reliable reconstruction procedure. In the early days of the war, Ukrainians assumed that they would have to deal with the loss of housing completely on their own or with piecemeal help from local authorities. Over the last three years, Ukraine’s national government has learned to use the war as a catalyst for change. It supports businesses by providing one-time payments and offering low-interest loans; and it supports individuals with government-backed affordable mortgage programs and housing certificates for damaged property. The eVidnovlennia (eRecovery) program institutes a process where the government’s Architectural Committee inspects a damaged building and prepares a technical report for each separate apartment, based on which the government issues certificates of equivalent value for the destroyed property.

    It’s a good process but it still takes time and the labyrinthine Kafkaesque calculations are still there. In the hope that my grandparents’ apartment would be rebuilt, my family did not file for an eVidnovlennia certificate until 2026—at which point the Architectural Committee declared it unrepairable. By that point both of my grandparents had died of old age—within nine months of one another after a lifetime together.

    Subscribe now

    All around us, though, little by little and step by step, reconstruction is happening. Three years after the most devastating strikes in Mykolaiv, the apartment buildings in my parents’ yard look new again—new roofs and balconies, windows installed, scars on the facade removed and polished, painted over with huge sunflower art on the side.

    In the end, bureaucracy wasn’t the toughest part; it’s the memories. Having to come back to the apartment multiple times, clean it up, deconstruct her life—take what’s important and throw away what’s not—that continuous effort broke my mother. She put over twenty years of her time and energy into her apartment, watched her children grow up there, picked out exactly the furniture she wanted for it. “This was my entire life. Everything I built and everything I did there—they just came and destroyed it. It was heartbreaking,” she says. “In some ways, it was easier to lose a home completely. At least you don’t have to go back there, fix the mess, deal with the consequences. If it’s gone, it’s gone.”

    My parents’ apartment is now being rented out—at some stage, as much as it broke her heart to leave, my mother realized that she was too exhausted from the strikes to keep reinvesting her energies in the apartment. There’s a new person living there now, creating new memories. As for my grandparents’ apartment, the commission that approves the issuance of certificates meets once a month. We are soon expecting to receive ours—and with that compensation to say goodbye to several generations of my family’s life in Myoklaiv. Some things are impossible to repair. One can only start anew.

    Anastasia Lebedenko is a Ukrainian non-fiction writer. Her political and cultural writing in the form of first-person POV and personal essays explores her experience of living through a 21st-century war. She looks to bring Ukrainian voices to Western publishing and journalism.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Censorship Will Never Solve Antisemitism
    (Photo by Alessandro Bremec/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    Jewish Americans have historically been among the most principled defenders of free speech. When a group of neo-Nazis planned to march through the town of Skokie, Illinois, home to many Holocaust survivors, it was a Jewish attorney who stood up for their right of assembly. David Goldberger, then the legal director of the ACLU of Illinois, was no self-hating Jew, and he certainly harbored no sympathy for the National Socialist Party of America. But he realized that “the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press would be meaningless if the government could pick and choose the persons to whom they apply.”

    Goldberger’s position might read as the credo of a universalist Jew who prioritizes abstract principles over the interests of his group. But there was a deeper and less self-abnegating logic to his position. Like me, Goldberger was convinced that these universal principles are in the long-term interest of all ethnic and religious minorities, including Jews.

    Minorities often have good reasons to feel threatened. One understandable response to this feeling is to look to the powerful for protection. But whenever you look to the powerful for protection, you become dependent on their whims.

    This is a story that the Jews of the old world knew all too well. For a few decades, they would thrive under some tolerant monarch who gave them relative freedom to go about their lives with relatively little harassment. But when that monarch changed his mind, or was succeeded by a less tolerant heir, all those precious liberties would evaporate just as quickly. In fact, that pattern is literally as old as the Old Testament: As Exodus 1:8 notes, “a new king arose over Egypt who did not know Joseph,” setting off the chain of events that led to the enslavement (and eventual liberation) of the Israelites. American Jews have historically put their trust in a less precarious promise: that of constitutional principles which deprive the powerful of their ability to play favorites—even if the price consisted of neo-Nazis giving speeches in a community of Holocaust survivors.

    This preference for free speech has been sorely tested over the past years. Social media has brought the poison of antisemitism, largely relegated to the fringes of public debate in the second half of the twentieth century, into much wider circulation. From Tucker Carlson to Candace Owens, Hasan Piker to Jackson Hinkle, some of the people with the largest followings on social media now delight their audiences with a litany of antisemitic tropes. From coy insinuations that the Jews have once again grown too powerful to outright conspiracy theories painting Jews as the dark forces behind just about every tragedy or social failure, hateful ideas are now being streamed to millions on TikTok, YouTube, and other platforms.

    Subscribe now

    Tragically, the rise and dissemination of detestable speech has coincided with a steep increase in physical violence against Jews, from the deadly shooting at a synagogue in Pittsburgh in 2018 to the vehicular attack on a synagogue in West Bloomfield, Michigan, earlier this year. I have come to consider the rise of physical violence against Jewish communities around the country, and its psychological impact, as the Europeanization of American Jewry. When, as a teenager growing up in Germany, I first visited America, I was struck by how little protection Jewish institutions needed in the new world; now, it is nearly as easy to spot a Jewish kindergarten in New York as it long has been in Paris or Berlin: both are marked by the presence of security guards. Back then, I marveled at how much less beleaguered Jews in America seemed to feel; now, the same unceasing sense of fear and vigilance is taking hold of Jewish life in the United States.

    It is little wonder that a growing number of Jews are desperate for any form of protection, and even that a growing share are willing to discard their long-held commitment to free speech in exchange for promises that things might somehow go back to normal. And as it happens, Jews are hardly alone in responding to the rise of social media with a desire to censor its contents: many Gentiles are similarly growing tempted to drain the poison out of our politics by embracing new forms of censorship. As many politicians and political commentators are quick to claim, the principal reason for the scary times we are now living through is the omnipresence of “misinformation.” If only we could find the right way to “regulate” social media, they say, things would finally go back to normal.

    I understand the temptation. If it were possible to preserve all the advantages of new communication technologies, which make access to information so much more ample and painless, while banishing from the public sphere all the narcissistic influencers and psychopathic politicians using these tools to advance their own interests, the offer would be compelling. But I worry that the world they imagine simply doesn’t exist.

    Let us imagine, for the sake of argument, that we grow sufficiently convinced of the unsustainability of the current situation that we become willing to “creatively reinterpret” the First Amendment. One question to ask about this is whether the trade-off would prove to be worthwhile: Would we want a manicured public sphere that hands the powerful the ability to enforce their own views even if it did drain some of the poison of antisemitism? But thinking of this choice as a trade-off presumes that the promised recompense, the establishment of a more sane and rational public sphere, would actually materialize. And I very much doubt that it would.

    The case for believing that such regulations of social media would help to bring about a better public sphere rests on three tacit premises:

    • The people who make decisions about what speech is allowed and what speech is verboten will be reasonable and rational.

    • The reasonable and rational people who make such decisions will be able to enforce their preferences without making the censored content more popular than it was before.

    • The underlying reasons that bad ideas have flourished in recent years are rooted in a lack of appropriate regulation, and increasing regulation can therefore eradicate such ideas.

    The first assumption is simply that the people who are in some way empowered to make decisions about what should or should not be censored will in fact make good decisions. At a time when mainstream institutions were deeply shaped by a stable political consensus centered around a number of broadly shared ideals, such an idealized view of the world might have been tempting. But America today is more polarized than it has been at any point in recent memory. Those who advocate for points of view that, until a few years ago, would have been considered disqualifyingly extreme are no longer on the margins; they hold the reins of formal political power and enjoy some of the biggest platforms anybody could wish for. Under these circumstances, it is deeply naive to think that “letting the government pick and choose” who enjoys the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution would be a good idea.

    Subscribe now

    The smartest case for free speech has never turned on denying that some utterances are so vile that all of us would be better off if they somehow disappeared from the public sphere. Rather, it was always based on skepticism that any institution, private or public, would consistently make these determinations in a reasonable and selfless manner. The growing influence of extreme views and the immense power that extreme political movements now hold should be a reason to double down on, not to discard, that insight.

    The second assumption is that attempts to censor speech are likely to succeed in reducing the salience of terrible ideas. There is some superficial plausibility to this. While it is always important to pay attention to the ways in which political actions can backfire, the presumption should be that, most of the time, political actors aren’t so ignorant or incompetent as to harm their own cause with their efforts.

    But in the case of free speech, we have plenty of evidence to suggest that—unless repression is, as in some dictatorships, extremely severe and wide-ranging—attempts at censorship usually fail. The appeal of the forbidden fruit is so strong that many of the most successful idea entrepreneurs are forever drawn towards portraying themselves as censored even when, by any objective standard, they are not. Indeed, it is sometimes hard to know what accounts for the success of some of today’s most vile media personalities if not for this appeal; a substantial portion of the audience for people such as Nick Fuentes is as attracted to the frisson they derive from breaking the biggest possible taboos as they are to the actual claims that they make.

    Both the idea that we can trust the would-be censors and the idea that their efforts would be effective are in a sense downstream from the third key assumption: the belief that institutional changes, rather than technological realities, stand at the root of the problem.

    There may have been a time when the structure of mass communication made it possible to exclude certain ideas from broad circulation. Back in an era when reaching a mass audience took both enormous financial investment and required the cooperation of a large number of highly-trained professionals, an ethos widely shared between journalists and the owners of big television networks could, porously and imperfectly, restrict the scope of public debate.

    But those days are long gone. Nowadays, the costs of production and dissemination are negligible. Anybody can put together a near-professional studio in their own home for a few hundred dollars. The ability to reach a mass audience has been radically democratized. Established media outlets, while still influential, have lost their capacity to gatekeep. Today, a single episode of the Joe Rogan Experience draws a vastly larger number of viewers than the nightly audiences of CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News combined.

    Subscribe now

    These technological changes are the real cause of our transformed public sphere. Attempts to turn back the clock by introducing strict regulations are unlikely to rein in the conspiracy theories that have so quickly proliferated on social media. Indeed, many countries in Europe have all along had in place the kinds of guardrails for which Americans wishing to curtail the First Amendment so fervently wish. They criminalize all kinds of political speech, from denial of the Holocaust to anything that might be thought liable to incite racial hatred. They routinely compel social media platforms to delete any posts that could even remotely be considered illegal. Countries such as the United Kingdom even arrest thousands of people for violating these rules every year.

    And yet, none of these practices have marginalized the extremists or restored the placid discourse of an earlier era. Jews are no safer in Europe than they are in America. And while extremists still remain in the opposition in most countries in Western Europe, polls suggest that they may be only one election away from storming the gates of power. The reason should, by now, be obvious: the problem is not political but structural. The nature of communication in the age of social media has allowed previously fringe ideas to flood the mainstream. Short of the extreme censorship practiced by some of the world’s most repressive dictatorships, regulation can’t bring back the past.

    None of this is to say that all forms of regulation are in principle inadmissible. There are some strong reasons for (as well as some real reasons against) banning the use of social media for children, for example. And I have long believed that those social media companies that effectively do act like publishers, by favoring some content on the basis of the views expressed, should also be treated as such—which would make them much more liable for the content they amplify. But any attempt to regulate social media must conform with the letter and the spirit of the First Amendment.

    It isn’t hard to see why many Jewish leaders and organizations have lately grown less supportive of free speech. But anyone who gives in to these understandable temptations neglects a crucial historical lesson: Any power that can arbitrarily grant us rights (such as being protected from the offensive chants of antisemites) can just as arbitrarily deprive us of those same rights (such as decreeing that advocacy in support of our own causes and concerns constitutes offensive speech that must be silenced).

    Jews have historically thrived in free societies that grant rights to all of their members without regard to the groups into which they happen to be born. Free speech is among the most fundamental of these rights. Jews must remain among its most ardent defenders.

    This article was originally published in SAPIR journal.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Putin is Running Out of Troops
    A rescuer extinguishes a fire at a shopping complex caused by a Russian attack in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, July 25, 2026. (Photo: Dmytro Smolienko/Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Vladimir Putin has a big problem: He needs more bodies to throw into the Russian war machine in Ukraine. Current estimates indicate that the Russian military is losing 30,000-35,000 fighters per month on the 2,000 km frontline. A July 2026 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies calculated that the Russian military has taken over 1.4 million casualties (of which about 450,000-500,000 are thought to be deaths, with the remainder being soldiers so severely injured that they cannot return to duty). This unprecedented loss of blood and lives has evidently been mostly in vain—Russian forces have gained only about 5,000 square km since the autumn of 2023, and reportedly lost about 400 square km in April and May 2026 alone. Despite the high casualty rate of the Russian armed forces, the frontline has been in a virtual stalemate for most of the last three years.

    Considering these grim statistics, it is unsurprising that Russian military recruitment efforts have started to lag. Western popular imagination still does not fully understand that Russia’s military is no longer the conscript forces of Soviet times. Beginning in 2008, the armed forces underwent a comprehensive military reform, transitioning from the Soviet legacy conscription system to a professional service supposed to be staffed by well-trained recruits who were paid a monthly salary to serve. As a result, Russia’s military was by 2022 better trained and better equipped than it had ever been. Yet most of the most elite forces were lost in the early months of the war in what was clearly an unexpectedly strong showing by the also reformed Ukrainian military and a very supportive society and government led by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. By the autumn of 2022, the Russian military was not only recruiting convicts from prisons (who were offered freedom and exoneration for their crimes if they could survive on the front line for a year) but also activating its reserve system under a “partial mobilization” order through which the military added 300,000 reservists to replenish its losses, eventually expanding its forces in Ukraine to over 700,000 personnel.

    Even though the reserve force had been established in 2007 precisely to resolve crisis situations by having military trained personnel in waiting, the call up proved remarkably unpopular with the Russian public. In part this was because they were encouraged to think of the war in Ukraine as a temporary operation (in Russia the invasion of Ukraine is called the “Special Military Operation” or “SVO,” instead of a war), implying little to no disruption of regular life for those who were not full-time soldiers. The other reason why the 2022 partial mobilization of reservists proved so unpopular is that the system requires regional governments to manage the call up. There were reports of men in Russia’s far-flung regions being randomly plucked off the streets and sent directly to training camps, or even to the front itself, so that regional leaders could make their “target” mobilization numbers to please their masters in Moscow. Thousands of men fled Russia in the autumn of 2022 to avoid being swept up in what became a frantic and haphazard effort to produce bodies regardless of whether they were actually in the reserve forces to begin with. Even Putin admitted mistakes were made.

    American Purpose at Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    Nonetheless, support for Putin and the SVO dropped in opinion polls. Beginning in 2023, the Russian government opted instead to replace and build its forces by offering new recruits attractive signing bonuses for contract service of one year or more and monthly salaries that are higher than the national average. There are also relatively generous death benefits for the families of the fallen so that, whether living or dead, recruits and their families could benefit materially from their service. Sometimes colorfully described as the “death-onomics” behind Russian military recruitment, this program attracted a reported 420,000 new recruits, many (initially at least) from the poorer regions of the Russian south and far east. The prospect of fighting for their country for a high salary (not to mention the promised future glory) was appealing when the alternative was to remain unemployed in a remote backwater with few opportunities. In 2024, the growth in forces continued, with the Russian Defense Ministry announcing the planned recruitment of another 430,000 soldiers, and in 2025, another 400,000 were added—an average of 35,000 per month.

    But by early this year, this pipeline of the poor has faltered in keeping pace with the high death rate on the battlefield. Putin needs more men to go to war. But given the body bags and bad news trickling from the front, it is understandable that few Russians want to serve these days. So far, the Kremlin has been able to avoid relying on conscription or too heavily on the reserve mobilization forces. Can this continue?

    A New Mobilization?

    On Russian social media, in the opposition press abroad, and on countless Telegram channels, rumors abound that a “full mobilization” with a goal of 700,000-1,000,000 new recruits is in the works. In July 2026, Zelenskyy cited Ukrainian intelligence services in claiming the number called up through mobilization would be 300,000-500,000. Those who think another mobilization call is in the works think it will be in October, following the Duma elections in late September. Naturally, elections in Russia are largely meaningless in terms of allowing citizens to decide who governs them, but they are symbolically important to the regime and provide at least a gloss of legitimacy to Putin and his preferred party, United Russia. Announcing a mobilization that could sweep up hundreds of thousands of Russians across the country would undermine a calm electoral cycle and overall social stability.

    But can Russia’s president pull off any sort of call to service this autumn or in the future to staff his losing battle?

    Vladimir Putin is the most powerful leader in Eurasia since Joseph Stalin, and after 26 years in office, he has ruled almost as long. One would think that by resorting to the tools of dictatorship—fear, the threat and reality of violent suppression, and aggressive propaganda through full control of the media—the Russian dictator could easily overcome any resistance in Russian society to bring up force numbers. He could, but there are risks in doing so.

    The need for more—and better trained—recruits is clear if Russia intends to continue fighting the war as it has been since 2022. But a repeat of the mobilization drive four years ago endangers the social stability at home that Putin needs to continue his fight in Ukraine and remain the undisputed ruler of Russia. Mobilization will test the patriotism of Russians who have been exposed to anti-Ukrainian propaganda through state-controlled media. It could be that many Russians have concluded that joining the fight is the best way to end the war and recruitment through contract will increase, obviating the need for a wider mobilization. However, this would be a marked departure from the reaction to the partial mobilization in 2022, when there were open protests and defiance of mobilization efforts.

    It remains illegal in Russia to call the war in Ukraine anything but the “Special Military Operation.” Yet it is increasingly difficult to maintain this polite fiction since clearly David, in the form of the Ukrainian military, is using the 21st century equivalent of a slingshot to fight off the Russian Goliath. And Putin is having an ever more difficult time keeping the war from interfering with the accustomed relative comforts of average Russians. In the past several months, Ukraine has brought the war deep into the Russian heartland for the first time in four and a half years. Ukrainian forces have used deep strike attacks with drones and missiles in unprecedented numbers to destroy and disable key Russian oil refineries and export terminals from St. Petersburg in the north to Rostov in the south, as well as Omsk in Western Siberia, about 1,550 miles from the Ukrainian border. Average Russians far beyond the line of military contact are feeling the war now in the form of high gas prices, rationing, and shortages.

    Even more recently, Ukrainian drones have targeted almost a dozen huge warehouses belonging to the online retailer “Wildberries” (the Russian version of Amazon), destroying billions of dollars in merchandise. Much of the damage was to stock being stored for small mom-and-pop entrepreneurs selling their goods through the platform. Many of those small businesses are now financially ruined, while their customers are increasingly aware of the widening costs of the war. The question is whether they will blame the Ukrainian government or their own leader.

    Putin’s long-time spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, has slipped into the practice of referring to the SVO as “a real war.” Given how close he is to Putin, and how carefully he is known to choose his words, Peskov could be foreshadowing something—wars are long and difficult and require citizen patriotism, sacrifice, and service to the motherland. Would Russians answer the call to serve the motherland, or would they defy their dictator despite the threat of more repression?

    The answer to this question will determine the fate of future Russian military recruitment efforts—whether volunteer or through another mobilization of reservists—and therefore Russia’s ability to continue its war in Ukraine. With the economy sagging, endemic labor shortages, high prices for food and other consumer goods, and increased internet restrictions, there is every reason to believe that Russians want the conflict to end. Surveys indicate growing support for negotiations, although a third of Russian respondents to a recent poll indicated they support continuing military action. Are they, however, willing to sacrifice themselves and their children? Not even Putin knows for sure—and he does not seem to be willing to force the question just yet.

    Kathryn Stoner is the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, the Satre Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (by Courtesy) at Stanford University.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The DSA Is a Menace

    Over the last months, candidates affiliated with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) have won 35 primary races, including seven in the House of Representatives, sometimes beating heavily-favored Democratic incumbents. They appear poised to win a gubernatorial primary in Wisconsin, and DSA-adjacent candidate Abdul El-Sayed has just been declared the winner in the Michigan Senate primary. What does this mean for the future of the Democratic Party? Garry Kasparov argues that the DSA, if still small, must not be underestimated.

    Rally hosted by Democratic Socialists of America, March 29, 2026. (Photo by Andrew Lichtenstein/Corbis.)

    A version of this article originally appeared in The Next Move, the publication of the Renew Democracy Initiative.

    Whenever I write about the far left, the comments pile on quickly. And, look, I mostly talk about Donald Trump and how bad he is, because the president is the most powerful and potent threat to American democracy. Unlike the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), which regarded Kamala Harris and Trump as two sides of the same evil coin, I don’t play the false equivalence game. I do, however, care about strategy, and as Americans approach the midterms and the 2028 presidential election, the DSA is in position to exert a growing influence on the Democratic Party and reshape the electoral playing field.

    To have an intelligent conversation about this, it’s important to establish some basic facts about the DSA and the American far left generally. You can agree or disagree with my conclusions, but we need to be operating off of the same set of facts.

    Subscribe now

    Here are five things you should know about the DSA:

    1. We can’t ignore the DSA and its influential boosters. I get that the DSA has only 100,000 members and may be in the domain of a “sideshow.” With ICE agents continuing on their unrestrained rampage and a new Watergate breaking practically every day, self-reflection feels difficult for many in the anti-Trump camp. But blindness is a recipe for disaster.

    Simple statistics like the number of card-carrying members belie the DSA’s growing sway in the Democratic Party. Who is involved matters much more than how many formally pay dues to the organization.

    That “who” includes Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who is likely to be a viable candidate in the 2028 Democratic presidential primaries, and Zohran Mamdani, the mayor of America’s largest city. This is no fringe leftist book club.

    Hasan Piker, the man who addressed a College Democrats National Convention (not some classroom meeting for a no-name campus chapter) dressed up as murderous dictator Mao Zedong, is a real problem. (He has also praised Mao as a “great leader.”) Closing your eyes, clamping your hands over your ears, and repeating “he’s not real, he’s not real” won’t make him go away. Piker boasts millions of followers, has hosted interviews with multiple current and aspiring members of Congress, has intervened in Democratic primaries for DSA candidates, and, now, addressed a national gathering of young Democratic Party leaders.

    2. The DSA’s founder, Michael Harrington, was a relative moderate compared with today’s American socialists. Harrington started the DSA after breaking with other socialists who withheld support for Democrat George McGovern in the 1972 presidential election. Harrington favored backing a major party nominee to challenge the incumbent Republican president, Richard Nixon. In other words: Harrington embraced a pragmatic approach to participating in American democracy.

    3. Conversely, the modern DSA refused to support Joe Biden and Kamala Harris in 2024. It’s a morbid historical irony that during the 2024 presidential election, the DSA, the organization Harrington founded in the spirit of political pragmatism, refused to support Kamala Harris. On the eve of the most consequential presidential election since the Civil War, the DSA released a shameful statement casting a false equivalence between Harris and Donald Trump. As the specter of a second Trump term loomed, Zohran Mamdani, one of the most prominent DSA officeholders, encouraged voters to reject Joe Biden and Kamala Harris.

    Despite a long list of disagreements with Harris and the Biden administration, I endorsed the vice president in my personal capacity because I recognized the threat posed by a vengeful Trump. The events of the past year and a half leave me feeling sadly vindicated in my decision. As someone who comes from a country lacking free and fair elections, I’m deeply angry with self-indulgent factions like the DSA that fell back on the luxury of being uncommitted.

    4. The DSA has moved from a principled pro-democracy stand on world affairs to tankie turpitude. Today’s DSA includes explicitly communist factions. Yet Harrington rejected the brutality of Soviet and Chinese communism and his icons were real social democrats. In 1980, the DSA founder organized a conference attended by West Germany’s Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, and future French President François Mitterrand.

    In 1990, Mayor David Dinkins (the first DSA-member to serve as mayor of New York—not Zohran Mamdani) hosted Brandt, who was by then president of the Socialist International (an alliance of mainstream social democratic parties), at City Hall.

    Today’s DSA would regard those men as insufficiently socialist; in 2017 the group derided European social democrats who “sound the retreat and accommodate capitalist forces.” Instead, the group’s sympathies lie with regimes like China that Harrington rightly rejected. The DSA rejects aid to democracies like Taiwan and Japan in the face of aggression from Beijing, while engaging in shameless victim-blaming on Ukraine.

    As the DSA shifted, its international allegiances changed too. Most major social democratic parties—think of the factions that have governed countries like Germany, France, Sweden, the UK, and Israel—were once members of the Socialist International. In the past decade, the organization has split, with the German Social Democratic Party leading an exodus of other social democratic parties to a new Progressive Alliance to stave off the ascent of the far left.

    The DSA went in the other direction. The DSA was a member of the Socialist International until 2017. In 2023, it joined up with another new coalition—the Progressive International, launched by Bernie Sanders and Yanis Varoufakis. It’s an explicitly anti-Western organization whose answer to the war in Ukraine was a call to dismantle NATO. As they say, tell me who your friends are.

    5. I’m not the only one raising the alarm. Ten Democratic members of Congress and a number of candidates have signed a pledge, the Promise to America, declaring “we are capitalist, not socialist.”

    Meanwhile, prominent former members of the DSA have deserted the organization over its extremism. Several founding members quit in an open letter published in The New Republic after the DSA issued a mealy-mouthed statement that largely justified the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre in Israel.

    Maurice Isserman, biographer of DSA founder Michael Harrington, also left the organization after October 7. “An organization that can’t take a stand condemning a right-wing terrorist group that set out to murder as many Jewish civilians, including children and infants, as it can lay its hands on,” he wrote, “has forfeited the right to call itself democratic socialist.”

    In his resignation from the DSA, Maurice Isserman warned of “tightly organized groups who, without sharing the beliefs of larger and more loosely organized bodies, join and proceed to either wreck or, where possible, capture them for ends at odds with the spirit and purpose of the original members.”

    Isserman was speaking about the internal politics of the DSA, but he could just as well have been speaking about what the DSA is doing to the Democratic Party. What we are witnessing is an aggressive attempt at a hostile takeover of an American institution. There is still time to stop it.

    Garry Kasparov, the former World Chess Champion, is the founder of the Renew Democracy Initiative and chairperson of the Human Rights Foundation. He is a member of the Persuasion Board of Advisors.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.