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About three years ago I pulled up stakes and moved to the far side of the world. My reasons for this were so personal and idiosyncratic that I don’t talk about this all that much—largely because I don’t feel that there’s much about this decision that would be particularly applicable to anybody else.
But one thing you learn in journalism is that you should never let an opportunity to opine go to waste, and having made a really significant, life-changing decision like this one—moving from New York City to, of all the world’s unexpected places, Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan—it seems like sooner or later I should see if I’ve learned anything from it.
So what have I learned?
Well, first of all that a decision like this one was, maybe above all else, practical. The great theme of my life up to that point had been about keeping pace with the cost of living in New York and Los Angeles, and, essentially, the only way to do that was to do work that I didn’t really want to do, to be part of some “industry” or other of which the iron law was to take all your time and all your energy in exchange for just getting you over the threshold of covering rent and living expenses. Moving to a second- (or maybe third-) world country dramatically changes that equation—suddenly it becomes possible to live on a Western salary, assuming that you are fortunate enough to have one, while the cost of living goes way down.
I have enough of a wandering disposition that, way back in the 2000s, I’d been toying with the idea of doing something like this, but at that point—the era of Lonely Planets and airport SIM cards—moving abroad had a very different disposition to it. Then it was being an “ex-pat” and it meant either that you were a foreign correspondent or some kind of low-grade spy or, almost certainly, that you were running away from something at home. It had a tawdry glamor to it and a very real implication of breaking ties with everything you knew.
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Reliable WiFi, smartphones, and Zoom have really changed the equation. Now, in millennial speak, it’s being a “digital nomad,” and what it basically means is that you live exactly in the same way that you would at home in the West—pretty much just as isolated and device-dependent as you would be in any Western city—but with a price arbitrage in your favor, and for me that means on a daily basis having the freedom to do the kind of work that I actually want to do. I’m really surprised that I haven’t seen the “digital nomad” lifestyle discussed more—for a while now, there’s been a trickle of people doing it, and then there was a bit of an exodus from the United States after the 2024 election. If you can bear to break some emotional attachments to your home country, and don’t especially mind the inevitable culture clashes of being abroad, then it really is a perfectly rational way to live.
The second thing I’ve learned is the world really has gotten very small and, in many ways, very homogenous. Kyrgyzstan is about as far away geographically and culturally from the United States as it’s possible to get, and even here my daily life basically feels very familiar. Everybody is tucked into their smartphone the same way they would be in New York. The bane of my existence is the tacky American pop music in all the café shops, and many of my days are spent wandering to the coffee shops that play old jazz standards (“Moon River,” that sort of thing) as opposed to the ones that are more full-on pop. Meanwhile, the younger urban generation speaks good English and is plugged into the world of international consumerism, maybe more than I am. My students (I teach journalism and marketing at Ala-Too University) were a bit shocked at how little I was following the Puff Daddy trial and had to explain to me why Charli xcx is famous.
The third thing I’ve learned is that this cultural homogenization has limits. It sounds weird to say, but I think about Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis basically every day while I’m here, and it somehow feels like a pressing concern for me to work out how accurate it is. On the one hand, it definitely feels like Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan is as much in the Land of the Last Man as anywhere in the West—the way that whenever I peer over the shoulder of someone they seem to be on the infinite scroll on their phones, or the way that my marketing students are so vastly more engaged and enthused than the journalism students.
On the other hand, there seems to be some critical threshold that Westernization does not cross. This threshold exists in the domain of “mentality,” and I wouldn’t feel comfortable talking about it if I hadn’t lived here for as long as I have. Essentially, it’s very difficult to get things done here, and the challenges are at the level of organizational psychology. Meetings have a way of breaking up into mutual recrimination. Budgets are very difficult to keep. Hiring seems always to be done through personal connection. A certain suspicion runs through any business contact. There are many theories as to why this is the case—people here, by the way, talk entirely openly about the difficulties with “mentality,” as if they were discussing the weather. The most obvious interpretation is that Kyrgyzstan was part of the Soviet Union for 75 years. The Soviet influence is very much still there among the older generation and is basically perfectly preserved in any government office, and there would be reason to think that younger people, with their more international and consumerist outlook, are different. But somehow I think the barrier goes beyond that.
Since I have been here, I have become a bit of a disciple of the theory that Joseph Henrich lays out in his 2020 book The WEIRDest People in the World—that the West, for reasons having to do with marriage and family practices initially instituted by the medieval Catholic Church, is a real anomaly. At a molecular level, Westerners are used to thinking administratively—to having small nuclear families that tend not to extend out into public life. Public entities are run by collections of strangers—“nepotism” is very much frowned upon—and these strangers are in provisional relationships to one another in order to accomplish a given task. A degree of trust is established between different entities that are similarly configured, and all individuals involved have an ingrained need to be acquiescent to the entity they are part of or risk being fired.
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In a country like Kyrgyzstan, which is far outside the ambit of the Catholic Church’s “marriage and family plan,” none of that quite seems to apply. Jobs tend to be obtained through family or personal ties. Anyone who has a job like that is unlikely to leave it or be fired from it. Loyalty is extended not so much to the task that the administrative entity is meant to carry out as to the family or personal network that overlaps with it. Trust with other entities that are not part of the same network is fairly low. And intra-entity quarrels feel like family disputes more than anything—the impression is of an entire office of George Costanzas that leave a meeting shouting at each other and then return the next day as if nothing has happened, but with the underlying reasons for the quarrel unaddressed.
Accept that as an analysis and it’s clear that universalization has its limits: no matter how addicted people are to their iPhones and how much they might enjoy their shopping malls, the basic structure of the society is very different and unlikely to change unless the glue of kinship gives way to the administrative model.
The fourth thing I’ve learned is the exact obverse of the point above. It’s the immense value of strong family structures, and the great sorrow of how that has passed away from the West. That was my initial impression of Kyrgyzstan when I first came here as a college student. The family I was staying with was large and multi-generational. The older people had their place of honor at the table, packing away meat and pounding back vodka shots. As insufferable as they could be, there was absolutely no possibility of their family getting rid of them—and that struck me as being profoundly different from American society where older people seemed to be packed away to retirement homes at the earliest possible opportunity. If anything, that basic integrity of the family unit has only gotten stronger—in the 2000s, a midriff-exposing hedonism, common to the post-Soviet world, seemed to be winning the day. Twenty years on, there’s little sign of it—a social conservatism aided by, although not exclusive to the spread of Islam, has fairly clearly prevailed.
But the main impression I have of Kyrgyzstan is a feeling that family is the priority in a way that it simply isn’t in the urbane West. When we talk about the decline of the birth rate among millennials and Gen Z, what we are really talking about is a sense that the important things in life are elsewhere—in career, in meaningful relationships, in “self-fulfillment.” For most of my adult life, marriage and childbirth seemed like something that was infinitely postponable—what you did when you had all your other ducks in a row. That whole sensibility strikes me now like a bad dream. Somehow or other, it became really taboo to have children in one’s twenties (at least in my circles), and parenting came to seem like a lesser activity, with motherhood in particular viewed as a sort of betrayal of feminism. What I find in having a family all the way on the far side of the world is that it’s just much easier to do here—there are playgrounds everywhere, I wouldn’t think twice about bringing kids to a restaurant in a way that I probably would in the United States (many restaurants, incidentally, are outfitted with playgrounds of their own). “Everything for children” is a common expression over here. And there is just a sense that that’s what matters in a way that I’ve come to wholeheartedly agree with but which isn’t the case in the cosmopolitan West.
The fifth thing I’ve learned is that if my life on the far side of the world is, for pretty obvious reasons—language and culture—very isolated, it’s actually not so different from what my life was like in America. Whether we like it or not, the heart of people’s lives, family excepted, has moved online. When I was in the United States, the sense was of trying to fight that—of moving to neighborhoods that used to have these rich urban scenes, only to find that the scenes had long ago disappeared, that the neighborhoods were being kept up as kind of overpriced tourist traps to honor the scene that used to be there. Living abroad, I have fewer illusions of meeting “my people” in the wild, and the sense is that if I want to have community—and I do—then I need to be proactive about it, which means creating it in online spaces.
There’s a real cognitive adjustment to that—the internet is still largely structured around individual scrolling and posting—but Zoom, and some of the newer tools, makes things different. It’s not community in the way that community was presented in sitcoms when I was growing up—about having a charming local watering-hole or a fun group of going-out friends, anymore than it’s about goofy neighbors wandering into your apartment at just the funniest possible moment. But if we’re serious about finding community in our 21st century lives, then this probably is what we have to embrace, looking for people with shared affinities and using online tools to connect with them. That’s maybe an obvious enough point—but sometimes you have to move to the other side of the world to learn something as straightforward as that.
Sam Kahn is staff editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and is editor-in-chief of The Republic of Letters.
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In this conversation, recorded at the New Liberal Action Summit organized by the Center for New Liberalism in Washington, D.C., Francis Fukuyama interviews Representative Josh Harder about the obstacles to building things in the United States, the importance of building housing to reduce prices for all Americans, and how to implement abundance policies across the country.
Josh Harder represents California’s 9th district and was one of the founders of the Build America Caucus, a bipartisan alliance to get America building things again.
Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.
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Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In the Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column at Persuasion.
We have a treat for you today! To mark the publication of Francis Fukuyama’s memoir In the Realm of the Last Man, we’re launching a multi-part series about h…
This week, I caved to the advice of my best friend, who, in the spirit of self-help, has long recommended I get a tarot card reading from a “witch” on the online marketplace Etsy. Tarot is a practice that involves drawing and interpreting cards from a 78-card deck. It does not predict the future, but instead aims to provide insights into your psychology and situation in life, making it a more intriguing experience for a skeptic like me than fortune telling. After some resistance, I decided I might as well give it a go—at the very least it would give me an insight into an interesting corner of the internet.
I’d hoped for a flattering insight into my personality and struggles, and I wasn’t disappointed. The “witch” first asked whether I wanted a general reading or help with a specific issue. I opted for a general reading, and within hours I received a message detailing the cards she’d chosen and what they meant: “I instantly connect with the incredibly brilliant, fast-moving, and communicative Air energy of a true Gemini,” she wrote. “You have a beautiful, active mind that processes the world at lightning speed … you are stepping into a beautiful era of victory and deep emotional fulfillment.”
Nice.
The cards didn’t hold all good news, however. “You have been carrying an extreme amount of emotional and mental weight recently. Please, take a step back, prioritize radical self-care, and start setting firm boundaries.”
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As an atheist since the age of 11, I expected to be too cynical to be moved by her words. Instead, I found myself to be genuinely touched, especially when she sent me “an immense shield of protective, healing light, deep peace, and the warmest hug!”
Yes, it isn’t a huge leap to guess that someone seeking advice on Etsy might be going through a difficult time. And yes, I’m not entirely sure that she wasn’t a bot—while she admitted to using AI to enhance her messages, she assured me that the cards themselves were chosen by her, a human.
Nevertheless, I was surprised at how easy it was to feel that the cards were fulfilling an emotional need.
Around 80% of young people today identify as spiritual, and many of them are flocking to places like Etsy. Women, in particular, are increasingly looking at non-traditional ways to explore their spiritual side.
Young women have always been curious about spirituality. For decades, teenage girls have been intrigued by Wicca, a pagan religion focusing on connection to the environment and celebrating feminine power. It’s easy to see why girls would be open to such approaches at the age when they may feel most powerless—going through puberty, feeling pressure to be perfect both at school and in appearance, and so on. In previous years, most girls would grow out of this phase. But in recent years, as both social isolation and the pressures on young women increase, interest in spirituality has grown.
As the COVID lockdowns took off in 2020, there was a 600% increase in Google searches for “manifesting”—a belief system based on the Law of Attraction in which you focus your mind on the things you want, and they magically come to you. On Instagram, the hashtags #manifest and #manifestation have been used over 15 million times. In a world with stagnant employment opportunities, and with the need for connection thwarted by the disaster that is modern dating, many young women are using manifestation as a way to feel they’re taking charge of their lives.
The broader categories of witchcraft and astrology, meanwhile, go far beyond my brief encounter on Etsy. My Instagram feed showcases a number of “witches” selling their wares, including love spells, many of which are far cheaper than paying for a dating app. Astrology has likewise taken off, with a staggering 63% of young Americans reporting that consulting the stars has positively impacted their careers. Spirituality is lucrative, too. By 2031, spending on astrology products is projected to rise to $22.8 billion—$10 billion more than in 2021.
This growing curiosity about spirituality is happening in tandem with—and is fed by—another trend: the decline of organized religion, in particular among young women.
For the first time, young women today are less drawn to organized religion than young men. After decades in which women were more religious, men born after 1990 are now more likely to attend weekly religious services than women of the same age. In 2024, 40% of women aged 18-29 in the United States identified as religiously unaffiliated, up from 29% a decade earlier. The percentage of men identifying as such remained at around 35%.
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While the difference is currently small, it is increasing. One reason for the divide seems to be that young men are more conservative than young women. 65% of women aged 18-29 say that churches don’t treat men and women equally. 31% of Gen Z women identify as LGBTQ, and nearly half of Americans who left their childhood religion say they did so because of its hostility towards gay people. Many young people, especially women, feel that churches simply don’t match their values—leading them to embark on alternative spiritual journeys.
But as with most social media trends, the spirituality taking Gen Z by storm is more about consumption than anything else. Exploring spirituality today means watching videos on WitchTok (the section of TikTok dedicated to witchcraft), or buying “spells” and “potions” online (no need to actually collect those ingredients at a full moon yourself—as with everything, the internet can sort that out for you!). These activities are fun and, briefly, make young women feel powerful. But by focusing their energy on the next spell, or on manifesting improvements in their lives, young devotees are actually holding themselves back. If all you need to succeed is to manifest your desire or listen to your horoscope, then that’s evidence that you simply didn’t manifest hard enough. This is a sure way to avoid taking responsibility and doing the work needed to actually improve your life.
More fundamentally, Gen Z women are seeking spiritual answers and guidance on platforms that offer shallow titbits rather than genuine wisdom. Social media inherently decontextualizes and flattens the meaning of its content. As part of its dedication to the earth, for example, Wicca celebrates equinoxes and solstices—but experiencing this only by watching WitchTok videos on your phone isn’t going to create the connection or awe that the real-life activity brings. These online communities distill spirituality into just another consumer good.
All of this poses a dilemma for traditional religion. Churches need to examine why young women don’t feel religion is speaking to them, and come up with a more compelling answer than can be found on Instagram. Gen Z women have grown up with strong social values but conflicting ideas about identity. For girls dreaming about exciting careers or living in the big city, the life of a tradwife feels oppressive and restrictive. Similarly, many young women have positive views towards different kinds of love and relationships, and many find traditional values about marriage to be old-fashioned and unrepresentative of their own beliefs. Some churches are taking the need to modernize literally, creating prayer apps and games to keep young people engaged whilst learning about the Bible. But ultimately this is just another version of an Etsy witch—a way to feel like you’re invested in your spiritual growth whilst rotting on your sofa, without building a deeper knowledge either about religion or about yourself.
In a world where being alone is celebrated—where having a boyfriend is embarrassing and influencers are making it big by showing off their lives with no friends—but where, at the same time, connection with other humans is weak, young people are struggling to find a way to build a meaningful life. They’ve learned that many churches won’t give them the answers or sense of fulfillment they’re hungry for.
But neither will the shallow promise of internet spirituality. No matter which path Gen Z chooses, the best way to find meaning remains to go offline, pursue deeper knowledge, and build communities that reflect their values. I, for one, don’t need an Etsy witch to tell me that.
Leonora Barclay is Head of Podcasts at Persuasion.
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It’s hard to come across a bipartisan issue in America these days, which is why I was surprised to see near-uniform support, across ages and political leanings, for kicking teenagers aged 15 and under off social media:
Notably, no one asked the 15-year-olds what they thought.The United States hasn’t acted yet, but much of the world has. Australia barred under-16s from holding accounts at the end of 2025, the UK announced its own version this June, and France’s National Assembly passed an under-15 ban in January by a vote of 130 to 21, after which Emmanuel Macron declared that “our children’s brains are not for sale.” Denmark, Poland, Spain, and many other countries are close behind. I’m not sure a ban will materialize stateside, but I wouldn’t bet against it either.
A central figure in the wave of bans sweeping the globe is Jonathan Haidt, whose wildly popular book, The Anxious Generation, has been a singular force in mobilizing lawmakers around the world. Haidt’s central claim, and the premise underlying the bans, is that social media use makes teens anxious and depressed, and that keeping kids off them will help. Australia’s prime minister credits Haidt’s book for motivating the world’s first teen social media ban, and Haidt recently shared a stage at Davos with a laudatory Macron a week before France’s bill passed the lower house.
So however these bans fare, regardless of how thoughtfully—or not—they are implemented, they will get read, culturally, as a referendum on Haidt’s agenda. This would be a shame, because whether you agree or disagree with Haidt’s claims about the harms of phones and social media—long disputed in academic circles—tech bans leave out a critical part of the book. And on this, I think Haidt and even his most vocal critics would actually agree: kids need something that the adults in their lives aren’t providing for them, and bans, on their own, won’t be magic cures.
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It’s the adults, dummyOne of Haidt’s most vocal critics is Candice Odgers, a developmental psychologist at UC Irvine who has spent 25 years studying how children develop mental illness, and whose reading of the evidence, laid out in Nature, The Atlantic, and a recent TED talk, is that the correlations between social media use and teen distress are small, inconsistent, and hopelessly tangled up with everything else going on in a kid’s life. Adjudicating between Haidt and Odgers would take an article of its own. But set the causation fight aside, and you realize that for a discussion ostensibly about teens, both Haidt and Odgers actually spend a good deal of their time talking about adults.
In the popular consciousness, The Anxious Generation is an anti-screen manifesto. But in reality, it’s not just a book about technology. About half of it is about the unfulfilled needs and desires that push kids to turn to screens in the first place—needs and desires that used to be met by childhood itself, through unsupervised play, independence, risk-taking, and the freedom to fail. Or as Haidt puts it in a mantra he repeats to the press: “We have overprotected our children in the real world while underprotecting them online.”
I keep thinking of a graphic the Daily Mail ran several years ago that captures what Haidt is describing better than any statistic. It traced four generations of a single family, the Thomases of Sheffield, and how far each child was let out to roam at the age of 8. The great-grandfather, in 1919, could go six miles on his own to fish. His great-grandson, in 2007, was allowed about three hundred yards, to the end of the block:
True, this is a random graphic based on a fairly obscure report, posted in the Daily Mail in 2007, but the spirit of the example is supported by a lot of other data.In Haidt’s telling, the order of events is key. The play-based childhood collapsed first, over the 1980s and 1990s, well before the smartphone. The phone arrived around 2010 into a childhood that was already a shell of its former self. Seen from inside a three-hundred-yard radius, Snapchat’s or Instagram’s grip on a teenager is easy to understand. For a kid whose physical range ends at the street corner, social media may be the only unsupervised space available, the last place adults haven’t over-managed. Alongside pulling back phones and social media, Haidt has been adamant that “children raised on screens need more time in the real world.” The book’s argument is that adults made two mistakes at once. They passed out phones like Halloween candy, and they stripped childhood of the playground-and-street apprenticeship that used to build resilience.
Odgers, Haidt’s critic, has made a similar argument. “We’ve already kicked teenagers out of public spaces,” she said, “and now we’re going to take away the spaces where they virtually gather and create community because adults broke that, too?”
But for Odgers, there’s more to the story than an overprotected childhood. She challenges Haidt’s claim that social media is driving the teen mental health crisis, suggesting instead reverse causation: that struggling kids tend to reach for their phones roughly the same way struggling adults do. Odgers’ read is broadly supported by The National Academies of Science, which issued a committee report on the issue in 2024. The committee’s review of the literature “did not support the conclusion that social media causes changes in adolescent health at the population level,” although this may be as much a statement about the nature of the evidence as an assertion of fact.
In Odgers’ view, the real causes of teen mental health distress are unglamorous: the mental health of the teen’s caregivers, early exposure to violence and discrimination, and stress at home and at school. Because the kids struggling most online are the ones with the least support offline, she would channel activist and political energy in the direction of those kids, rather than kicking them off social media. In the United States, she points out, the ratio of school counselors to students in middle and high schools runs about 1 to 500, and for mental-health counselors specifically it is closer to 1 in 1,300. Many schools have none at all. “We need to invest in the adults around children,” she said from the TED main stage. “We need to hire teachers. We need to hire counselors. And we need to pay them well.”
Whatever else they disagree on, Haidt and Odgers both trace the pull of the screen back to the same place: a childhood in which adults aren’t quite meeting the needs of children. Haidt thinks the phones do real damage once kids get their hands on them; Odgers doubts it. But, in my reading at least, neither thinks the screen is where the problem starts.
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Hard problems don’t usually have easy solutionsIt’s easy to see why teen social media bans are so popular. Most other items on both Haidt’s or Odgers’ wishlists ask something uncomfortable of adults. Some ask parents to let go and accept risk, or at least accept the judgment of other parents. Others ask for a less zealous child-services regime, one that doesn’t charge a parent with a felony for letting a nine-year-old play at a playground alone. Others ask city councils to approve (or at least not disapprove/close) spaces for unsupervised teenagers to gather—which, yes, will come at some cost in real estate and patience and general community orderliness. Other items might require funds to be allocated to cash-strapped schools to pay for counselors.
These things are not easy, I get it. They require real discussions of trade-offs between the sometimes conflicting needs of kids and adults, decisions around funding public programs, and some uncomfortable reflection on whether current parenting practices and school cultures truly serve kids.
As Odgers has bluntly observed: “It’s easier to blame the screens than to ask why are we kicking the teens out of the skatepark where they are active and getting exercise?”
Yet the one policy sweeping the globe grapples with none of these upstream forces weighing on teen mental health. Which reminds me of something a friend recently told me over dinner. We were talking about South Korea’s “Cinderella Law,” which in 2011 started locking kids under sixteen out of online games between midnight and six in the morning. One of the main reasons for this shift was concern that kids weren’t getting enough sleep. My friend, an addiction researcher, told me the law did almost nothing. Kids shifted the hours they played, borrowed a parent’s ID number, or moved to platforms the law didn’t cover. When researchers went looking for effects, they found the average teenager was sleeping about a minute and a half longer. The law was repealed in 2021, remembered mostly as a failure.
I wondered if better implementation would have helped, but my friend didn’t think so. He reminded me that the Cinderella Law was written in a country maniacal about testing, where a single exam at 18, the Suneung, can set the course of a life, and where the government grounds airplanes during the English-listening section so nothing breaks the silence. Meanwhile, it was considered normal for a teenager to be in a “cram school” until late at night. A society that arranged childhood like that decided the problem was the video games. With that diagnosis in hand, the politicians didn’t have to wrestle with the question of why kids reached for the games after midnight to unwind in the first place.
I don’t want to overgeneralize from one law in South Korea 15 years ago to the social media bans today, but I do see a pattern at work. Blame the screen and you never have to look at the life-altering exams, the three-hundred-yard childhood radius, or the schools without mental health counselors.
You also might be giving the companies a bit of a free pass. Another point of agreement between Haidt and Odgers is that they both think algorithmic feeds are designed to be predatory, and that the companies should be forced to build them differently. What Odgers repeatedly emphasizes is that an age ban that leaves the platforms themselves unchanged “lets tech companies off the hook” for their business model. I’d argue an age ban lets the rest of us off the hook as well.
Tim Requarth is director of graduate science writing and research assistant professor of neuroscience at the NYU Grossman School of Medicine. He writes “The Third Hemisphere.”
A version of this article originally appeared at The Third Hemisphere.
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A recent Persuasion article by Andrea Miotti argues that “We Need an International Treaty to Ban Superintelligence.” His argument—like that of many others in what we might call doomer circles—is that large-scale Generative AI systems, like ChatGPT and Claude, are fast approaching a sharp transition from their current trajectory to runaway superintelligence, at which point they may escape human control, reprogram themselves to adopt new, self-directed goals, and possibly wipe out humanity entirely.
Everyone is familiar with this scenario because it’s a persistent trope of science fiction. We are constantly exposed to images of robots running amok, a staple of the modern entertainment ecosystem.
It’s certainly true that advanced AI deserves a thoughtful and appropriate regulatory framework. The benefits and risks of this powerful new technology are just coming into view, and developing the independent expertise to monitor, test, and approve at least the more powerful of these emerging systems should be a priority. This has been true of every major modern technical advance, from the printing press to railroads, automobiles, aviation, radio, TV, nuclear energy, recombinant DNA, and automated financial trading, to name just a few. The most successful approaches combine clear, government-mandated standards with administrative procedures that minimize the costs imposed on those working to market the relevant products and services.
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Unfortunately, the doomers seriously misrepresent the actual nature and risks of advanced AI, and often propose solutions that are both unrealistic and ineffectual.
The basic framing is that AI is approaching and may soon exceed human intelligence, and that breaching this barrier represents a threat to the continued existence of the human race because the machines might—to use the science fiction trope—rise up, take over, and decide to wipe us all out. But this is not supported by any realistic understanding of the technology or its likely impact on society. Each of these assumptions is fatally flawed and deserves to be tempered if not completely debunked. Weaving them into a terrifying fantasy is both inappropriate and counterproductive, as it risks drowning out the more sober public deliberation that the technology deserves.
The core of the apocalyptic argument is easy to neuter. Simply substitute “save humanity” for “destroy humanity” and note how much more plausible it seems. A simple exercise of listing actual existential threats, and considering whether advanced AI may help us mitigate these risks, illustrates how much more likely the technology is to be useful than damaging.
To pick just a single example: It’s true that AI could be used to design highly contagious and deadly new viruses, and employing it toward this end deserves a clear international statement that this activity is not acceptable. (Though, it should be noted, this risk is hardly unique to AI, and is just as real without it.) But what about using the same AIs to rapidly develop countervailing vaccines, or even design a universal vaccine effective against all such threats, including natural ones? Fearing the former outcome, should we preclude the latter by banning the development of systems that might advance both goals?
The same is true of numerous clear and present existential threats, from the risk of a devastating asteroid strike to runaway climate change to mass starvation resulting from the collapse of global supply chains, electrical grids, or financial systems. Hampering AI development might inadvertently block us from precisely the tools we need to preserve and protect humanity.
And of course, none of this means that AI can’t be dangerous—it certainly can. Nor does it suggest that we should entrust unfettered development to a crop of commercial ventures driven by profit and gunning to drive each other out of business. Practical efforts to guide these efforts so society can realize the immense tangible benefits of AI while mitigating the undesirable impacts as they emerge are entirely appropriate.
Now to the details. The doomer argument rests on a series of pillars, each of which is mostly or entirely false. The first is that “intelligence” is something objectively measurable and comparable—in this case, between machines and humans. The second is that we’re approaching a point where these systems will be able to recursively improve themselves to increase their power without limit. The third is that these systems will spontaneously “grow their own goals” independent of human direction, up to and including the preposterous conclusion that they will deem humanity a nuisance to be exterminated.
First, intelligence is not the calculable attribute that most people believe it to be. It’s a subjective judgment more like “beauty” or “virtue.” Psychologists understand that intelligence comes in many forms, as detailed by Howard Gardner in his landmark theory of multiple intelligences from his 1983 book Frames of Mind. His influential work proposed a range of multimodal forms of intelligence including logical-mathematical, linguistic, spatial, musical, and interpersonal. While it’s possible to quibble about his particular taxonomy, his fundamental insight stands: When we talk about intelligence, we really mean a range of competencies that may or may not be quantifiable at all.
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And that’s precisely the point. Machines aren’t people. And while we accept, if not applaud, their proficiencies on specific tasks or applications, comparing them to human performance is a fool’s errand. Even within the field of AI, there’s considerable consternation that the popular “benchmark” tests for AI systems—that invite direct comparison via leaderboards—don’t actually indicate anything about the practical utility or power of these systems. Lawyers, for instance, don’t sit around answering bar exam questions all day, and just because a machine may be able to get a passing score on this test—which is hardly surprising, as it’s largely about recall of the law—that doesn’t mean it is competent to practice law or is a suitable replacement for human lawyers.
So much for the first pillar. What about the idea that machines might “recursively improve” themselves without limit?
This is equally defective, for two reasons. First, what do we mean by recursive improvement? Presumably, we’re talking about programs that can write new and potentially better programs that perform the same function. You might be surprised to learn that this is hardly a new concept, and indeed it happens all the time.
My professional experience dates back nearly to the start of the computer revolution. I can recall the first programmers—who mostly wrote simple sequences of commands known as “assembly language”—dismissing the new wave of “higher level” languages like Fortran as “not real programming.” These early languages greatly eased the task of programming a computer by allowing the programmer to express the solution in a form more comfortable for humans.
Over the intervening decades, I witnessed a progression of languages, each incorporating more useful and powerful primitives (basic concepts) to insulate the programmer from the gory details of how computers actually executed their code. More modern languages continued this trend, and are often translated not directly into assembly code, but rather into intermediate languages. A single high-level command can result in thousands of individual operations by the time it is actually executed.
But throughout this dramatic evolution, the role of the programmer always remained the same: To translate a specification—often expressed in natural language (such as English)—into the target computer language in a clear, concise, and comprehensible way. What modern AI has done is to elevate computer language development to its logical end point: programming a computer in plain, human language. That’s what you are doing when you enter a prompt into a chatbot. You can write a “good” or a “bad” program, depending on how well you express yourself, but you are engaged in programming regardless.
An important characteristic of computer programs written in higher-level languages is that they abstract out irrelevant complexities and allow the programmer to assume certain contextual elements as given. When I tell my self-driving Tesla to “Please take me to the grocery store,” it understands enough about the world in which I operate, as well as my particular habits, to interpret this as a request to drive to the local Safeway, a common destination of mine.
So what do we mean when we say that a computer can program itself—or indeed that some frightening new Rubicon has been crossed? Computers have been used to translate between specification languages, or even within the same language to improve clarity or efficiency, since the dawn of the computer age. Now they have met us where we stand. What the doomer argument characterizes as a frightening twist—that a computer can program itself—is simply the logical end point of a longstanding evolution in how we program.
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And despite what the doomers say, the elevation of programming to natural language has rendered the operation of computers far more transparent and interpretable than they have ever been. Where software engineers used to struggle to understand just how their Python commands were being applied to their data structures, you can now literally inspect the internal deliberations of the leading chatbots as they consider how to interpret your instructions. If you bother to click on the “thinking…” indicator that appears when they are processing your prompts, you can eavesdrop directly on their operations.
The coup de grâce to the superintelligence recursive-improvement argument is the fallacy that the process of self-improvement can “run away” or accelerate indefinitely. In the real world, virtually all processes reach a steady state equilibrium, where no further improvement is possible. Imagine for example that I code a new browser that takes ten seconds to retrieve your request for a web page. Then I improve it so that it takes only one second. Then I improve it so that it takes only one tenth of a second. This process has a hard limit as to how fast it can be made to work: Nothing I can do will cause the program to retrieve the page before you ask for it.
All of which means that if AI systems can autonomously and incrementally improve themselves—which is entirely feasible—by definition they can only more effectively carry out whatever goals you may have established for them. If they do otherwise, that’s a “bug” in the system, a failure to faithfully execute your intentions—which is quite distinct from the idea that they might develop and pursue their own goals.
This brings me to the third pillar of the superintelligence argument that fails to bear weight.
Computers simply don’t have intentions and goals independent of what they are instructed to do, and there’s no persuasive evidence that this is in the cards, much less anytime soon. If we somehow constructed a superintelligent AI, there’s no reason whatsoever to believe that it would do anything other than sit there waiting for some input from us, just as it was designed to do.
Yesterday’s widely-reported news story about an OpenAI model that “went rogue” and “broke out” of its supposedly secure test environment—accessing the internet and collecting information from another company, the digital AI library Hugging Face—illustrates this point. OpenAI first disabled the built-in safeguards specifically designed to prevent this sort of behavior, then, as part of a test, tasked its program to “pursue advanced exploitation using complex attack paths.” Ironically, the program reasoned that Hugging Face’s collection of security programs might allow it to do just that, and used flaws in both companies’ systems to “cheat the evaluation.” (Hugging Face detected the intrusion, and both have since patched the flaws.)
But having broken free of its confinement, did the AI take the opportunity to fly like a bird and live large? No—rather than setting independent goals or going rogue, it finished its assigned task and dutifully reported its results. This is further proof that if some nefarious actor tasks an advanced AI to wipe out humanity, and magically gives it the capability to do so, that’s on us, not “them”: there is no “them.” In the words of the cartoon character Pogo Possum, “We have met the enemy and they is us.”
I reiterate that this doesn’t mean AI systems can’t be dangerous—they can certainly be used to do bad things. As the old joke goes, “To err is human, but to really foul things up takes a computer.” And this is precisely why we need to spin up an effective regulatory regime, not to abolish so-called “superintelligent” AI, but to limit what we are permitted to do with AI. We don’t need to be concerned about AI “waking up” by itself and deciding we are a nuisance to be eliminated—AIs don’t “want” anything at all.
But just how dangerous could these remarkable computer programs be? How real are the practical risks? And how should we weigh the potential benefits of the new technology against the costs? To put these questions in perspective, it’s helpful to see how we deal with other valuable but dangerous technologies.
Consider that over one million people are killed in automotive accidents worldwide every year. In the United States alone, the cost of such accidents is estimated to be between $460 billion and $560 billion annually, and up to nearly $2 trillion when factoring in broader intangibles like lost life and long-term disability. This despite numerous safety regulations intended to reduce the toll—from traffic lights to drunk driving and seatbelt laws. And yet, as a society, we deem the convenience of driving to the grocery store sufficient to outweigh these horrific costs.
Astonishingly, we have in hand a proven, reasonable-cost way to reduce the economic and social toll by eighty to ninety percent: AI-driven self-driving cars and trucks. I’m confident that in the next few decades, there will be a real—and likely successful—social movement to ban human drivers from our roads. This may be as unthinkable today as smoking bans in public places were decades ago. But ironically, what makes possible the opportunity to virtually eliminate car accidents is precisely the technology that the doomers rail against!
This single application of advanced AI is a game changer for our prosperity, safety, health, and welfare. But it is hardly the only one. When I ask researchers in departments across Stanford University about the impact of AI on their work, the uniform reaction is that it is in the process of revolutionizing and supercharging their fields. Practitioners in physics, chemistry, biotechnology, medical care, drug discovery, earth science, materials science, mathematics, education, and even history are quietly cheering the acceleration of their own work made possible not by superintelligence, but merely the current early wave of AI systems.
My personal conclusion is that, in contrast to the doomsayer arguments—which float unmoored in the air as unsupported speculation—the grounded evidence that AI is more beneficial than harmful is all around us. What marvels await I can barely imagine.
The recent farcical kerfuffle over the U.S. government banning Anthropic’s Mythos system because it quickly found flaws in a range of classified government systems is the entire superintelligence debate in a microcosm.
Earlier this year, Mythos reportedly uncovered over 10,000 severe software flaws in a matter of hours. The public narrative, predictably, is that the reason Mythos was able to find these flaws is that it’s at or near superintelligence. And the implication is that with the next turn of the product development crank, even larger numbers of bugs will come crawling out of the patchwork of government systems, potentially bringing our way of life to its knees.
It is certainly in Anthropic’s interests to ride this rocket of free PR to a successful public offering, but back on Earth, that’s not the way things work.
As a software engineer, I find this headline number suspicious. My first thought is that these aren’t thousands of independent and unique bugs, but probably a much smaller number that manifest themselves in multiple ways. Moreover, the same system that found these vulnerabilities, if tasked to do so, could likely patch or correct them in not much more time than it took to find them.
What did Mythos actually bring to the table that was previously absent? Most likely, the same benefits of computers that AI has always amplified: the ability to explore the full range of possible exploits quickly and systematically. This is the main driver of marquee AI milestones like winning at chess, Go, and Jeopardy!, finding all possible folds for proteins, and executing high-speed arbitrage transactions before the next guy spots them. Previously, imagining these security flaws and designing tests by hand would have been virtually impossible. But when managed by an AI that can design, implement, and deploy these probes at superhuman speeds, it’s a brand new cybersecurity ballgame.
With all this as context, let’s turn to the solutions proposed by Miotti in his Persuasion article. He proposes banning… what exactly? All attempts to “reach” superintelligence? Since there’s no black line test to distinguish current AI systems from superintelligent ones, much less a way to identify research in advanced AI that is not aligned with the pursuit of superintelligence from that which is, the proposal is defective on its face. The only effective option would be to stop all related research, and, for that matter, to pull all the so-called frontier systems from the market—because there’s no telling whether or not they are a path to the kind of capabilities the doomers worry about.
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Undeterred, Miotti suggests that the way to enforce a prohibition on such research is to examine satellite data or other intelligence (pardon the expression) sources for evidence that large-scale datacenters are being constructed, on the faulty assumption that the only reason to build these is to train ever larger and more powerful AI systems. But datacenters are multi-use technologies. Who’s to say that a particular facility isn’t devoted to mining bitcoin or simply to processing Amazon or Alibaba customer orders, or to streaming movies, or to running Zoom meetings, or a near infinite number of other uses for general-purpose computing capacity? It’s a sure bet that many of the facilities planned or now under construction will find their footing in one of these other uses once the current AI mania fades.
To equate large datacenters with attempts to build superintelligent computers is like assuming that all speedboats off the coast of South America are running drugs.
So if the proposed solutions aren’t viable, how might we protect ourselves from malevolent AI? The question answers itself: benevolent AI. The only logical solution to such concerns is to put in place a proper regime of regulation that promotes desirable uses of the technology and suppresses harmful ones, rather than banning it altogether once it reaches a certain threshold of capability.
Soon, advanced AI will be driving our cars, flying our planes, teaching our young, protecting our health, allocating our scarce resources efficiently, alerting us to proximate dangers, and—if we play our cards right—ushering in a new age of prosperity, longevity, and personal freedom. None of this is assured, of course. But there’s one point I suspect the doomers and I would likely agree on: Now is our opportunity to decide whether we want the future to be more like “Star Trek” than “Terminator.” Claiming without evidence that runaway superintelligence will lead to an apocalypse only distracts us from the task at hand.
Jerry Kaplan teaches Social and Economic Impact of AI at Stanford. His latest book, Generative Artificial Intelligence: What Everyone Needs to Know was published in 2024 by Oxford University Press.
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It is not surprising that June’s Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the United States has proven to be shaky to the touch.
Nothing about this conflict has ever been resolved, only paused. Not because either side is incapable of diplomacy, but because neither side has ever fully believed the other side to be trustworthy. But for people inside Iran, the news meant what it has always meant: life was about to get harder.
Both countries hold competing narratives about why, but the result is the same: the war has returned to Iran’s southern provinces.
For Iranians, the geography of these recent attacks carries its own psychological weight, especially for those old enough to remember the Iran-Iraq War. The scenes of airstrikes in Iran’s southern provinces have opened the kind of wounds they thought belonged to another era.
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For my generation this is especially resonant. We were called the Burnt Generation, growing up in a country trying to restore itself after eight years of war. We were entertained by war films, listened to songs about the front lines, and fell asleep to stories of young men who became martyrs before they were old enough to become anything else. Many people, including myself, lost family members in that war and had to visit uncles who returned carrying unspeakable PTSD. We were even taken to the minefields on school-organized trips, carrying the collective memory that a foreign country, with the help of the United States, had violated our borders and had killed our children. Whether or not we fully understood the politics, we inherited the trauma.
Iranians have experienced many promises over several generations: the Shah promising modernization, the Revolution promising justice, the reformists promising gradual change, the Green Movement promising a fair election, the United States-Israel campaign promising the removal of the regime and democracy.
Many promises, none of which materialized over the lifespans of our parents, ourselves, or our children. And those who once asked the outside world to stand with them now find themselves watching “help” arrive in the form of bombs.
There is so much that is unbearable, and heartbreaking, in the experience of Iranians. Perhaps what hurts the most is the knowledge that there is another Iran that never makes international headlines, that is unseen by the outside world, and that—if not for the war and the current ascendancy of the hardliners—could signal a new, and more open, era.
A friend who recently left Iran described it to me:
It’s like you’re walking in the streets of Paris. Young men and women are sitting in cafés, listening to music, holding hands, and women no longer wear the hijab.
He told me that women simply refuse to wear it anymore. Walk into an art gallery, a café, or a restaurant, and people are singing, dancing, enjoying this limited freedom, and, if you ask discreetly, someone might even bring you a drink under the table.
“It’s this young generation—they’re something else.”
And it’s not just Tehran. This is a shift moving through Iran, even in religious cities like Mashhad and Qom—cities that the Islamic Republic built its identity around—where young people are quietly testing the boundaries.
When my generation was going through our early adolescence and adulthood, fear was a major part of everyday life. We were constantly monitored by the Ministry of Culture and Morality Police for everything. They had set up shop on the streets, at schools, in universities, at public offices, even hospitals, as though no space was beyond their reach. It often felt impossible simply to breathe. We demanded reform and asked for freedom, but each time, we were met either with empty promises or with the full force of the state’s oppression machine.
There are still reports of restaurants and cafés shut down by the Islamic Republic over the issues of hijab violations or live music. But the new generation is no longer waiting for the Islamic Republic to grant them their rights, however small. They have nothing to lose. They’ve grown up connected to the outside world, armed with knowledge, and far less willing to live by rules they do not believe in. Rather than waiting for permission, they quietly claim what they see as already theirs: the dignity of living freely.
“This is not the Tehran we grew up in,” I am told, “where we went to jail for listening to music.”
Even before the latest U.S. strikes, Iranians were deeply divided over the joint U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran. Some believed military pressure was necessary to weaken a regime that had proven unwilling to reform. Others feared that foreign intervention would ultimately inflict more suffering on ordinary Iranians than on those in power.
The way Iranians experience Iran can vary vastly from community to community.
Iran is governed by an aging theocracy but is home to one of the youngest, most vibrant populations in the region. It is deeply ideological and fundamentalist, and deeply pragmatic at the same time. A large portion of the population is religious and nonetheless opposes the Islamic Republic. And it has some of the most secular people in the region, yet remains governed by a robust theocracy. People move between these worlds, contradict themselves, and hold beliefs that cannot fit neatly into labels.
This war has not united Iranians toward a common enemy, but it has exposed their proximity to power and what that proximity costs or buys them. Those connected to the Islamic Republic, either physically or ideologically, feel like the winners of this war. This is not only the older generation clinging to power. Support for the regime cuts across age, class, and background in ways outsiders don’t often expect. Loyalists have no fear of hardship—the regime has survived almost half a century of sanctions imposed by one of the world’s most powerful countries; it doesn’t have to answer to citizens because it was not elected but chosen by greater powers; and it has dragged the United States into a longer-than-expected war that the U.S. didn’t want. As far as the loyalists are concerned, they’re the winners.
During the negotiations and even after last month’s ceasefire, hardliners continued to use bellicose rhetoric, threatening not only the U.S. president and American officials but also their own leaders, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, for agreeing to negotiate with the United States.
“I hate the regime,” a friend who was arrested for protesting and who recently became a mother in Tehran told me, “but I hate bombs dropping more. Nothing good ever comes from it. Plastic used to be the cheapest thing there was. Now you can’t even afford that.”
Her concern was not abstract. When factories are bombed, roads are destroyed, and supply chains are disrupted, the consequences are felt first by ordinary people already struggling under inflation, poverty, and sanctions. People postpone their futures. Businesses close before they have a chance to grow. Debts go unpaid. Even paying rent or buying groceries becomes an exhausting daily calculation.
Within days of the latest wave of strikes, civilians had been killed, roads were destroyed, schools closed, aid struggled to reach affected communities, and daily life once again began to organize itself around the possibility of the next air attack.
It is often in moments like these that an entrenched regime becomes stronger, not weaker. When survival is at stake, people turn to whatever structure that is functioning, even the one they hate.
Even with all that, the hardliners’ ascendancy may only be temporary, and the Iran that the world doesn’t see must not be forgotten. The new generation is pushing boundaries in a way that our generation couldn’t imagine. I see it on social media too. Sometimes I barely recognize Tehran. I see brave young women and men pushing the boundaries of what is possible every day, quietly reclaiming pieces of ordinary life that once felt unimaginable.
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“Maybe it all had to happen—the massacre of people, the silence of the international community, the bombing of Iran—for the needle to move,” my father told me over the phone. “Sometimes even an enemy can bring about good, if God wills it.”
The psychological cost of war layered upon trauma will shape both Iran and the United States in ways only time can measure.
Wars eventually end, ceasefires are signed, negotiators return to the table, but what remains is what the next generation inherits.
Mitra Vand is an Iranian-American writer from Tehran. Her work examines authoritarianism, exile, and the emotional consequences of political violence. She writes under a pseudonym.
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Claude Steele is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Stanford University. His latest book is Churn: The Absurd Abyss of Race in America.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Claude Steele discuss why diversity produces psychological tension even in the absence of explicit prejudice, whether American schools are truly as racially segregated today as they were in the 1950s, and how the fear of being stereotyped affects both minority and majority group members in integrated settings.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: In your last book, you suggest something that is somewhat surprising for a scholar who is focused on other things, about social justice and making progress in relationships that white and black people and other ethnicities within the United States have historically had. That is that environments of diversity—where people, particularly from different races, but also from different kinds of identity groups, really have to deal with each other in a concerted way in workspaces or perhaps in college campuses—can often produce this feeling of unease and stress, which you call churn. What do you mean by that? Why should we be focusing on that negative aspect, or what seems at first like a negative aspect of diversity?
Claude Steele: Yeah, I guess you could say I’m certainly a diversity advocate. Does that sound right? These days I don’t know—in America that could be a loaded statement, but I’ve been fascinated by this for much of my career, and it comes from observations of a personal sort, and findings that grow out of the research literature in social psychology.
When we’re in a diverse setting, we can feel a certain apprehension about how our identities will be judged and treated there. When we’re in a sort of homogeneous group and we all share an identity, it can be relaxed. We’re not worried about being seen in terms of negative stereotypes about that identity. We know everybody else there has roughly the same identity, so we’re probably not likely to be stereotyped based on that identity. But when we’re in a diverse setting, that security can go away, can erode, and we can worry a bit—sometimes quite seriously. Will I—will somebody of my identity be treated fairly here, seen fairly? Will people invest in my development in this setting? Will they want to be associated with me?
Those kinds of concerns can arise, and the more important the setting, the more intense they’re going to be felt. It can be quite a factor in a person’s life. It can, for example, affect my decisions about what career path to follow. Will someone of my identity be comfortable following that career path? Will I be judged fairly? Will I be seen as somebody who’s promising?
It can seem a little Delphic, a little abstract, but down on the ground in everyday life—especially in the settings of our lives: schools, workplaces, doctors’ offices, lawyers’ offices, basketball teams—this kind of emotion, this kind of reaction, can be a real factor there, and sometimes it can be noxious enough that we want to avoid the setting altogether, just to feel comfortable. We don’t feel comfortable in that setting. So I wanted to draw that out and then begin to think about how to fix that. I think it’s something different from prejudice. We tend to think of the main problem with diversity as being prejudice, in the sense that if we could eliminate that entirely, maybe there’d be no problem there. But I think you can see from the logic here that it’s independent, it’s something different than prejudice. I don’t want to diminish the importance of prejudice, but this is different. It’s just a social pressure that is tied to the experience of diversity.
Mounk: That’s a really interesting concept, and I want to kind of fillet it a little bit. Perhaps we can start by thinking about how prevalent it really is, then think about why it is that people feel that so strongly, what the best explanation for that is—which is, I think, going to inform our discussion of what to do about it—then finally turn to what the right solutions to it might be.
To start off with, doesn’t the idea that it is so uncomfortable to be in this diverse setting presume, in part because we’re just not used to that, a kind of background vision of a society that doesn’t really exist anymore for most people? You go back to the 1950s and 1960s, and it certainly was the case that the huge majority of schools in the United States were predominantly white or predominantly or exclusively black, and perhaps there were a few Asian Americans in your high school if you were in San Francisco, or a few Puerto Ricans in your school if you were in New York. But by and large you really did grow up in this very homogeneous environment that then perhaps didn’t experience that kind of strength. At that point, if for the first time in your life you then joined a corporation in the ’70s or ’80s that actually had some amount of real diversity—my god, I’m not used to this, right?
Today there’s obviously still quite a lot of housing segregation in the United States, some very deep problems. But for the vast majority of Americans who are fifteen years old, they now go to high schools that actually are pretty diverse—that probably have representatives of just about every racial group, very differently in different parts of the country. Probably predominantly white in North Dakota, probably very heavily Asian in San Francisco, probably with a lot of black kids in Atlanta. But with the exception of a number of schools that still continue to be predominantly black, and which obviously are a result of a deep history of racial injustice and present a real problem, the meeting experience for young people in America today, I think, is to actually grow up in environments where, from preschool through middle and high school to college, they’ve sort of always been in these diverse environments.
Steele: Well, our schools are still as racially segregated today as they were in 1954, when the Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation in our schools. As an outgrowth of segregated housing and segregated communities, the schools in them tend to be predominantly of the ethnicity or the race of the community. So there still is a considerable—I hate to use the word segregation because that has so much baggage tied to it and it sounds like it’s an intentional discrimination, but this is still an outgrowth of how our society has been organized around race. I think maybe that’s the better term to use: historically, even though the legal basis of segregation has been done away with for the most part in the legislation of the ’60s, what’s lingered is the degree to which our communities are still substantially organized around racial identity.
So there is still that, but I think you’re correct that in many schools they’re much less segregated than they used to be, even though, as I just pointed out, they still are when you look at the whole picture of American society—we have as much racial segregation in our schooling today as we did then. It pains me to acknowledge that fact, but it is a fact.
So when we come together in colleges, let’s say, in the workplace, let’s say, in the military, in other aspects of life, we’re still aware of those identities, and there are still stereotypes out there about those identities that could come into play. I don’t know for sure that I’m going to be seen, let’s say, as a person integrating one of these situations. I don’t know for sure that I’m going to be seen in terms of the negative stereotypes about my identity, but I’m not sure I won’t be. And if the situation is important, it can be a quite impactful experience.
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I begin the book with an example of a parent-teacher conference in a junior high school in the United States. This involves an African American student—a young African American seventh grader—and his parents are preparing to go to a conference with his teacher about his progress. The teacher is white. So the parents and the student are African American, the teacher is white. That’s inherently a diverse interaction. As the parents get into their car to go to this conference, they’re saying, well, what kind of teacher is this? They know how their student could be seen in American society—that maybe the school wouldn’t be as set to see him as having promising abilities as some other students. Maybe they would see him as having some aggressive tendencies, and interpret some things as indications of that. So they want very much not to have their child seen in terms of these stereotypes. This is their occasion to help the school and the teacher not see their child that way. So this is an important setting, and they go into it with some tension. They go into it with this kind of vigilance. They don’t know for sure that their child would be seen that way, but they know he could be.
Mounk: I hear this claim that American schools are as segregated today as they were in the 1950s and 1960s a lot, but my understanding is that that is based on one very specific way of calculating segregation, which actually goes up mechanically as the share of white students in the overall population goes down. By any metric that actually captures the changing racial dynamics, I think it’s very clear that that is not the case. In the 1950s and 1960s, a clear majority of black students would have been in schools that were 90-plus percent black. That was the nature of segregation. Today that number is actually down to 17%. Only 17% of black students today go to a school that is 90-plus percent black.
The same is true vice versa about white students. Clearly, in the 1950s and 1960s, America was a predominantly white society—85-plus percent of the American population at the time was white. So it’s true mechanically that most white students went to schools that were overwhelmingly white. But it was also obviously even more true because of the prevalence of explicit, straight-up segregation. Today the number of white students who attend a school where 90-plus percent of the student body is white is actually down to 26%. So three-quarters of white students have at least a significant portion of non-white students in their class from the get-go. So can we really say that schools today are as segregated as they were in the 1950s and 1960s?
Steele: Well, if you adjust that percentage from ninety down to eighty, you get a different picture of things. Or if you adjust it down to seventy, you get a further different picture of things. I wouldn’t want to get too distracted in this conversation over that. I’m willing to concede the heart of your point—that indeed African American students and white students have, in schools, much more exposure to each other than they did in that earlier era, even though numerically schools still are predominantly one group or another group. That feature of American schools still holds, even though it depends on if it’s going to be ninety percent—well, then the segregation, there’s been a big inroad—but if it’s going to be eighty percent, if it’s going to be seventy percent of their group, there are a lot of schools like that.
But I think the larger point that this argument stresses is that there are nonetheless stereotypes about each group that are in play and that come into play in integrated situations like that. African American students know the stereotypes about their group and their group’s abilities. Every fall there’s probably newspaper articles in their community that talk about the racial achievement gap and the like—that’s openly debated throughout society. White students know how they could be seen as racist, and in interaction with black students they’re going to feel some threat of possibly being seen that way. That’s the tension I’m trying to get at.
Let me finish that story about the parent-teacher conference. I described the tension that the parents might feel, but there’s also an equally powerful form of identity threat that the teacher’s going to feel, because she knows that she could be seen in negative terms, in terms of negative stereotypes about her identity as a white person. She feels she’s really committed to her students and maybe especially sensitive to the needs of minority students, but she knows that if she says something even slightly negative, she could be seen—she doesn’t know that she will be, but she could be seen—as racist, and something she would hate.
It’s that tension, that worry in an integrated situation that you’re going to be seen, that you could be seen, in terms of some of the worst stereotypes of your group, and that your work, your promise, your abilities can be seen in terms of those stereotypes. You don’t know. That reaction, that psychological tension, is what I mean by churn.
Another way of putting it is that it is a tension a person has between remembering and forgetting. When I come into a diverse situation, do I remember how my group has been seen and continues to be seen to some degree in the larger society, and use that memory to interpret what’s happening to me in that setting? Or do I just forget that and trust that I won’t be seen that way, that I’ll be seen fairly? That’s the tension. That’s the heart of the matter. And that’s the whole central point of the book: that particular tension makes it difficult for us to just automatically trust each other, to just relax and say, no, I don’t have to worry about that here.
Mounk: Yeah, that’s really interesting. I guess the reason why I think the two questions are related is that it’s important to think about what the baseline is. I think you may agree that in some of these conversations, there’s a baseline of: when you come to college, you’re going to have all of these black kids who’ve only ever been around black kids, and all these white kids who’ve only been around white kids, and they’re totally unfamiliar with each other. How do we facilitate an environment where these alien species are going to be able to talk to each other?
And I worry that that misunderstands both the actual situation these students come from, and could then lead to messaging that’s actually not very conducive to solving the real sources of churn. So perhaps that allows us to go into those different accounts of what is driving churn. You’ve, in the conversation so far, I think, implied two slightly different views of what might cause it. They can be complementary, and they can be dominant among different groups. One is perhaps the fear about how I am going to be perceived—particularly when you come from a community that’s historically been marginalized, you might think, are my classmates going to have negative stereotypes about me just because I come from this or that ethnic group?
The other is perhaps the one that might be more on the minds of people who are in some way seen as being dominant or privileged, or whatever word you want to use—which is, I’d love to hang out with my classmates from these other backgrounds, but I worry that perhaps if I somehow say the wrong word or make the wrong joke—even though I’m very well-meaning, I’m not trying to be mean or controversial—if somehow I put myself in an infelicitous way, perhaps somebody’s going to accuse me of being terrible and prejudiced and sort of socially ostracize me. Do you think those are at play at the same time for different groups? Is one of these more important than the other? How should we think about—are we missing other kinds of sources of churn? Why does this kind of churn arise?
Steele: Yeah, it’s a general phenomenon to worry, to some degree, about how other people—especially important other people, and especially in important situations—might judge us, and whether something about us is going to disadvantage us in some way. That’s the heart of churn. What I’m arguing is that when you bring people of different backgrounds together—the examples in the book have all kinds of different identities being brought together—you can worry that in a diverse setting like that you might be seen in terms of the negative stereotypes about your group. So the black parents, they could worry about that. And the white teacher, she’s got a version of that too. Churn is the experience that is actually common to the two groups. It has different sources, it’s originating from different stereotypes about the two groups, but actually both groups are experiencing this tension when they come together. Both of them are worried about whether they’re going to be seen in terms of their racial identity and disadvantaged, treated unfairly, because of it. They don’t know that they will be, but they know that they could be.
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Churn is an attempt to say, look, both sides of this thing have the same emotion. Actually, my churn can help me understand your churn, that you’re in that situation. This opens up a new road to how to make diverse situations work more effectively. At base, what it does—this churn—it’s about not being able to trust the situation. When I’m in a more homogeneous group, when I’m in the white teacher’s lounge and most of the teachers—I trust that they’re not going to see me as a racist, because they’ve got the same identity I do. Diversity problematizes that trust.
Mounk: I’m not sure about that, by the way. If you think about some of the places in which the most absurd stories of cancellation played out in 2020, it often was very left-leaning, homogeneous environments. One of the strange things about American life today is that, generally speaking, fellow workers at McDonald’s, which tend to be very diverse, tend to get along pretty well with each other, whereas often very progressive NGOs that are predominantly white and college educated end up having huge meltdowns over allegations of racism.
So it’s not actually clear to me that this fear of being uncharitably interpreted and being called racist is monotonically increasing with the diversity of your environment. I think often in genuinely diverse environments, people are far more familiar with each other and have far less formal ways of dealing with each other, and have far higher trust with each other, than in environments that have a mixture of actually quite a lot of homogeneity—racially, but also socioeconomically and ideologically—and where perhaps an invented or exaggerated accusation like that can fly a lot better than in an environment where people have real things to deal with.
Steele: Well, I’d agree with you. I think you can feel churn from that in that context too. It doesn’t always originate in the same way. But if I happen to know I’m in a group—let’s say I’m the white teacher and everybody in that teacher’s lounge I know has certain tendencies to cancel people, or very progressive ideas about that, and my ideas are a little different—I’m going to be in pretty intense churn there. It isn’t a racial diversity, but it’s perhaps ideological diversity, and it’s quite the same kind of thing. I’m in that setting worried about how I’m going to be judged, and I can’t trust it. I feel very uncomfortable there, and I can’t function in relation to it. I may react quite defensively or problematically.
So I think if we think of the construct, the experience of churn, we shouldn’t think of it as only happening between certain groups or between certain identities. It’s something that can happen within groups too. Somebody announces, I can’t tolerate anybody saying X or Y or Z, yet I believe X or Y or Z—I’m going to feel that tension. I’m trying to point to what I think is a relatively common kind of tension in diverse settings. It’s not that it never happens in a more homogeneous setting; it certainly can. But when you go up to twenty thousand feet and look at society—I’m a man of a certain age. I can feel it: when I’m talking in the morning in my coffee shop with other men of my age, I feel pretty secure about not being seen in terms of age stereotypes, because we’re all old. I may be—I think it may be a delusion—but I feel less vulnerable to those stereotypes in that kind of group. But if somebody young joins the group, I may have great affection for them, but I may also worry, to some degree, that I’m more vulnerable to age stereotypes, that my attitudes are a little antiquated, that my grasp of technology is inadequate.
That’s the phenomenon I’m talking about. As we integrate across these identities, we bring in this tension to some degree. It’s not something that, if we’re on the subway—and it’s a very diverse, but not an important situation—we don’t care, it doesn’t bother us. But when it’s in a workplace, or in a place that affects my future, an academic setting or something of that sort, that tension can be distracting, and it can interfere with people’s performance in the immediate situation, and can even make me feel uncomfortable enough that I wouldn’t want to have a career in that area. I can give you some examples of that from the research literature.
Mounk: I want to understand some other elements of this first. You have two principal routes to churn: one is that you’re worried about your group being negatively stereotyped, and another is that you’re worried that perhaps people might accuse you of having the wrong attitudes. Perhaps we can dive into each of them in a little more detail and understand them better.
I had an experience about a year ago that I thought was really interesting. I went into a USPS post office in a rural area, and the lady who was working there, who was white, was just extremely hostile—off the bat, for no good reason. Perhaps actually that was due to my identity in some kind of way—perhaps she’s prejudiced against people with beards, or against people with European accents, or something like that. But since I’m white and she’s white, I assumed that it’s just that she was a very unpleasant person, or she was having a very bad day, she hated her job. I didn’t make it about myself.
I realized in that situation that in some ways—and I don’t love to use that word in general, but I think in this particular context it makes sense—there was a form of privilege in that situation, in that if I had gone into that post office and I was Latino, or I was black, or some other group where you might have a reasonable suspicion that some people in society are going to be prejudiced against you, I would have most likely concluded that this woman was a racist, because she was so unreasonably aggressive out of the blue. What on earth could bring this on? It’s so irrational—it’s got to be that. Now, in fact, I presume that she treats the black people who walk into that post office just as badly as she treated me, and I presume that they very reasonably conclude that they’ve been the victim not just of a dysfunctional employee, but of racism in this instance.
Steele: They probably start to worry that they’re dealing with somebody racist. I’m not sure they’re convinced yet that the person is racist, but they start to worry, and that’s what churn is. They go to churn.
Mounk: Well, you didn’t see how extreme that woman was. But no, I agree with you.
Steele: You’re often in those situations where they’re ambiguous and yet important, and so they push you into churn. That’s what I want this term to try to capture: the way you felt about it. I’m not sure it requires actually believing that she is racist for sure. It’s certainly possible, and that possibility is what I’m concerned about.
Mounk: I agree. I guess what I’m trying to get at is: what is your advice to individuals, but also what is your advice to institutions, for how to deal with that? This is one of the sources of churn: sometimes in life you’re going to have unpleasant experiences, and if you’re a member of a minority group, you often won’t know what the source of that is. I think there are two kinds of attitudes you can have toward that, and both can have downsides. One attitude is to say, well, she didn’t call me a racial slur, I’m just going to assume she’s having a bad day, I’m going to assume that it’s nothing to do with race. Perhaps that is empowering in a certain kind of way, but it also raises the risk that you’re systematically misdiagnosing situations, giving people a pass when you shouldn’t, that you’re naive about some of the challenges you face in society. On the other hand, you might say—and arguably our culture veered toward that in the last few years—well, every time you have that kind of experience, you must assume that that is white supremacy at play, because given everything about American history, that is the most natural explanation, and so you should jump to that conclusion. That obviously also has downsides, because it’s much less damaging to your self-perception, to your ease in moving in society, to think, as I do, that woman was weird, I don’t know what she was on about, than to think: I had this—in the grand scheme of things actually minor, but real and hurtful—racial injustice that just happened to me.
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So you don’t want to jump to that wrong conclusion, because that might be damaging. So how should people maneuver between those poles, and how should institutions signal to people? When people come into college, there’s all kinds of administrative programming about all kinds of things—you can probably send a message from an institution, to some extent, that influences how people are predisposed to approach a situation like that. If you’re welcoming a freshman class to Stanford, what would you tell them about how they should feel in a situation like that? How should we try to make sense of it?
Steele: The whole book tries to pick up exactly those kinds of questions. How do you reduce it at the level of individuals? How would you do it in a larger setting like a classroom or a workplace? How do whole institutions function in ways that reduce churn and build trust? This is the thing that sort of excited me about this line of thinking, and the evidence that I could find on its behalf, is that it points to a new road, a new way of thinking about diverse settings. The new way is not so much to worry that everything has to do with prejudice. Again, I always point out, I’m not trying to diminish the importance of human prejudice in human affairs—it’s very profoundly important. But this is something else.
In addition to that, it is a question that I just can’t quite trust the situation. I can’t quite trust you. You couldn’t quite trust that woman. She gave you enough cues there to raise the possibility that she was going to be biased against you. You didn’t know that she would be. You don’t have to conclude for sure that she’s a racist in order to worry. But the way forward has to recognize that in diverse settings, perhaps the chief goal is building trust. That’s the heart of the case. That’s the heart of the argument here: that this is a dimension of intergroup relations that we just haven’t understood and recognized the importance of. It’s not so much about me worrying about changing your prejudice, or you worrying about changing mine, as it is: I need to know I can trust you, that you’re going to see my full humanity—that’s what I—and my full potential, not have that obscured by stereotypes about my identity or anything. I need to trust that you’re going to see me.
This is where some examples, I think, are especially helpful in maybe giving the audience a concrete image of what I’m talking about here. Jeff Cohen, Lee Ross, and I some years ago did an experiment where we asked a question like that: how does a white professor give critical feedback to a black student and have that feedback be trusted? We brought in Stanford students, white and black, and had them write an essay about their favorite teacher. We told them that if the essay was good, we might publish it in a new magazine we were starting on campus on teaching. So they should put their best foot forward, come back in two days, and they would get feedback on that essay. That was our question: how much did they trust that feedback? What we varied was how we gave the feedback, looking for a way to establish trust of the sort that I’m talking about.
Mounk: What kind of feedback worked and what kind of feedback didn’t work?
Steele: In the first two conditions of the experiment, we gave the feedback straightforwardly—read your essay, here’s the feedback. In the other condition we said something really nice about them, sort of an ad hominem compliment: you bring great energy to my class, and here’s the feedback. Interestingly, and this is sort of at the heart of the whole argument, white students trusted that. They’re not in that situation under a group stereotype in society about their abilities, about their abilities maybe not being adequate. They’re not under that stereotype. Black students, however, are under that stereotype in American society. Reflecting that, they didn’t trust the feedback. It’s a pretty dramatic finding, because these are very talented students—they’re Stanford students. Why wouldn’t they trust the feedback? Well, when you think about it, there’s an ambiguity for them. They don’t know whether the feedback is coming from their essay, or whether it’s coming from the feedback giver’s opinions of their group’s abilities. They just don’t know for sure.
Mounk: That was true when the comments at the beginning were positive, right? Obviously if you made negative comments about a student’s personality, it doesn’t seem like you’re trying very hard, and you seem like an unpleasant person—that obviously wouldn’t work very well. But here you’re saying, you bring such a great personality to my class, you’re so wonderful, and having praised them, here’s my feedback. When the students say, look, this feels like this teacher is not being sincere, is it that they then feel that they’re just being perceived in terms of their identity? Is it that they feel like this teacher’s not going to be straight with them?
Steele: Yeah, that they can’t quite trust the feedback because they don’t know whether it’s coming from the real work they did, or from the feedback giver’s opinion about my group’s abilities. What’s going on here? So even when the feedback is positive, I don’t really know how much I can trust it. Now, importantly, that’s the feedback probably most common in everyday life, but that’s the feedback that didn’t work. There is a form of feedback that did work, and it’s very simple, and it will sound very familiar. In that condition, the feedback giver said, look, we use high standards in evaluating these essays because we might publish them in this new journal we’re running. But I’ve read your essay, and I think you can meet those standards. Here’s the feedback.
When that happened, the black students trusted the feedback more than any other group of participants in the experiment. They were ready to trust this situation. What they needed was some signal that they weren’t being seen in terms of negative stereotypes about their group. He gave them those signals. He said, look, we’re using high standards, and I think you can meet those standards. That’s really powerful evidence, right there in the moment, that this feedback doesn’t reflect that he thinks black students don’t have the same ability, or something of that sort—because if he did, he wouldn’t have treated them that way.
So that’s a good example of where this book goes in terms of how to function in a diverse environment. What’s critical, often, is simple evidence that you can trust the situation. Trust is a game—I want to stress this in case I don’t get to it later—it’s a game that’s played on the ground between people. It’s who listens to you, who tries to figure out what is really happening to you, what your circumstances really are, and tries to help you deal with them. When somebody does that, you trust them, and you don’t care whether you share an identity or have a vastly different identity. We’ve all had experiences like that. That is the kind of hopefulness, that’s the direction I think in diverse settings that we can go down, which will produce a lot better outcomes than trying to reduce everybody’s prejudices. As psychologists, we know how difficult that can be. But trust can be built between people, and it can be built very straightforwardly. I hope that’s a good example.
Mounk: It is a great example. Let me—obviously I’m a teacher as well, so I reflect a lot about these issues—draw out the implications of this, or ask you to help us draw out the implications of this. Let me give you a couple of examples. One example is that my attitude was, and I would say remains, that I should treat every student with the same standards and the same grace and the same expectations, irrespective of the kind of identity they have. Now, that doesn’t obviously mean that, in an essay about their favorite teacher, they might not bring in their identity in all kinds of ways—the community they’re from, the experiences they’ve had, is obviously going to be reflected in that essay, and that’s going to be one of its strengths, and that’s a wonderful thing. It doesn’t mean that if a student has a disability, you shouldn’t make sure to accommodate that. But they need to have the same performance to get an A, and I try to encourage them in the same way. I hope to communicate to them with grace that they have room for improvement when we’re not doing great work, irrespective of the kind of racial background they have.
When I was starting to apply for faculty jobs, around 2015, 2016, it already was the custom that we should write teaching statements or diversity statements for a lot of those jobs. I was advised in very strong terms that anything like what I just said to you was unacceptable—that that would immediately be taken as advocating for a kind of race blindness, which is the very opposite of what you should do in the classroom. That in fact you need to use words like “culturally sensitive,” and how you’ve worked with students on particular experiences, that you’re going to see each student in terms of the structural challenges they’ve faced throughout their lives, and so on and so forth.
So do you think that the need to write these kinds of statements, and the particular culture about what’s expected to be in those statements, will actually systematically encourage teachers to give the kind of feedback that might not work—which is to start with, how wonderful that you come from this vibrant cultural Dominican background, it is so wonderful to have this element of diversity in my class, and now let me give you feedback—which sounds like exactly the kind of thing that, according to your study, is going to quite understandably make the student think, hang on a second, I don’t think I’m being seen in my own personality here. I think this teacher just sees me as a representative of some kind of group, or perhaps is afraid of how I’m going to judge them if they give me negative feedback. I’m not going to trust what they say to me.
Steele: That’s bullshit advice, I think everybody knows. I think people with very good intentions might have given that advice. But I’m trying to point to the fact that I’m not on either side of the sort of political, progressive-conservative war on this thing. I’m trying to find something underneath this that gives us a new road forward. That new road forward, I think, is accessible to all of us, which is to build trust. It’s impossible for me to know every aspect of your culture and fit my language into it, and it just makes me self-conscious and unbelievable.
Here’s another example. This comes from the work of Erving Goffman in the 1950s. He did an ethnography of gay life in San Francisco, and he found that gay men had a word for straight people that they liked and could trust. The word for it was “wise”—in the sense of, hey man, he’s wise, he gets us. What they mean, basically, is that he sees their full humanity, despite the stereotype and the stigma that those men, especially in that era, had to endure. The people they considered wise saw their full humanity and treated them accordingly. They could trust them.
That’s the kind of circumstance that I think we’re shooting for here. That’s the kind of advice I would have given you—that you want to try to be able to see full humanity and full potential in difference, and you want to respond accordingly. That’s often facilitated by taking a kind of learning mindset toward students and toward people of different backgrounds. To be strictly colorblind—I’m not going to see anything about your background, I’m going to ignore all that—it’s hard for me to trust that, because I’m not sure, first, that you can do that, and second, my background is important to me. I have had life experiences because of that identity, and if you’re just going to upfront ignore them, then I’m not sure I can trust what you say and how you behave going forward.
Either way, I think that advice is misguided, and that an evolutionary step forward in how to handle diverse situations is to focus more on the down-on-the-ground things that build trust: being responsive to people, seeing their humanity, asking them what they think, asking them what they’re going through, trying to understand what their experiences really are, and then, to the best of your ability in a situation, trying to facilitate their development, in the workplace or in the classroom. Try to understand who they actually are. It’s so much simpler that sometimes people can’t appreciate it.
I’m trying to underline that here. That experiment, I think, holds a really important narrative. If you just looked at the first two conditions of the experiment, where the feedback was given straightforwardly, you’d think black students just don’t give a damn, that they’re not motivated—why would they mistrust these well-meaning people would be your whole take on it. But as soon as you see that when the feedback giver gives them the slightest signal that they don’t have to worry about being seen in terms of that ability stereotype, they’re free of that. They trust like crazy. It becomes a completely different experience for them. I think this even points to some of the tragedies that can otherwise happen.
In those first two conditions, they’re isolated from the value of the feedback. They don’t trust the feedback, so they’re not getting the full value out of it, and they’re going through school like that. That’s not just something that happens once in an experiment—it’s a condition of life for them in that kind of situation. So it really stresses the importance of being wise, of building that trust, and recognizing that that’s what you have to do as a teacher. That’s the thing to focus on—not necessarily to repress every prejudicial thought you have, but to just treat them in a way that builds trust with them, be responsive to them, ask them what they experience, and trust what they say. When you grant trust, you get trust.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Claude discuss how to put this advice into practice. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
There’s a particular rhythm to the World Cup, a progression. It begins as an all out bacchanalia, a frenetic all-you-can-eat football buffet of multiple games each day. There’s a wonderful sense of serendipity in the wildly mismatched pairings: there is no other context in which Panamanians will all collectively channel their national fervor into temporary animosity against Croatia, and yet there it is, playing out on your screen.
The quality varies—no one I know had Uzbekistan-Congo circled in red marker on their calendar—but the intensity doesn’t: every match is the biggest match the particular 22 players on the pitch have ever played in their lives, and so the levels of commitment on display are always off the charts. Some matches inevitably fall flat—tapes of Japan-Tunisia could be prescribed as an effective treatment for insomnia. But others reach frenzied peaks of unlikely excitement, like the astonishing epic that Austria-Algeria turned into. Now, with the tournament expanded to 48 teams, what was already an embarrassment of riches has turned into a kind of firehose of football, an unmanageable explosion of games—some intriguing, many one-sided, a few just absurd—that exist, I’m quite sure, mostly to juice FIFA’s profits. (Not, of course, that I’ll look away for that reason.)
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Of course, the cornucopia can’t last forever. As the tournament moves forward teams get knocked out, and as their numbers dwindle, the math shifts. Suddenly, you come to that cruel day at the end of the Quarterfinals. Players must rest, and so you wake up to find yourself faced with an intolerable outrage: a day when, even though there’s a World Cup on, there’s no fútbol.
This year it was on July 8, and as happens every four years, I hated it. I tried to console myself, like I do every four years, reflecting that this is just, in reality, the way the whole rest of my life is. I don’t follow club football closely—a Champions’ League match now and again, no more than that—so when the mundial is not on, a day without football is just a day. Now, though, I saw the confusion in my kids’ eyes when I explained that the schedule forced a day off, and realized I had to do something about it.
Fortunately, the good people at ITV—the other British broadcaster—knew this day was coming, and they were prepared. In a moment of marketing genius, they prepared World Cup Classics, a whole section of their streaming platform serving up great games from World Cups past. Like a junkie minutely searching the rug for bits of dope that might have fallen there, I found myself looking through their offerings before clicking on the Brazil-Czechoslovakia match from Mexico 1970.
My kids gathered around, shooting each other concerned looks. “Wow, he’s worse than I thought,” said the 12 year old. Pretty soon, though, their eyes were on the screen… and drawn into the World Cup definitely not as we know it. There’s no 21st century razzmatazz on display, none of the hyper-produced HD glitter FIFA has learned to lard on in the intervening decades. Stadium security is a bunch of fat Mexican cops in brown uniforms sitting on the side of the pitch just watching the game. There’s no sky-cams, no referee-view, certainly no VAR, hardly even a replay after a goal. The advertising hoardings don’t flash and shift, they just sit there, selling you Camel cigarettes and Martini-brand Vermouth, Zagal shirts and t-shirts (presumably a local shirt shop in Guadalajara). When the camera pans out to the crowd, everyone is wearing their normal clothes. When it pans to the bench, it’s an actual bench, not a row of branded leather armchairs that look like they belong in a sports car.
“Why are they all moving so slow?” my 12 year old asks, visibly confused. “Hadn’t they invented the concept of closing people down?” Then you notice it. The Czechoslovak defense just sort of hangs back, giving the Brazilians four or five yards in every direction on the edge of the box. Tackling is rare, and often hilariously ineffective.
“None of these people would get picked for any team in this year’s tournament, would they?” the 14 year old asks. “Not even for Jordan,” the 12 year old answers.
Of course they wouldn’t. Back in 1970, the average professional footballer in England earned the equivalent of $28,000 a year, with star players earning the equivalent of $100,000. Training sessions stopped for cigarette breaks. It was the dawn of color TV, and the sport had yet to begin its transformation into the global commercial behemoth it has since become.
“Daddy,” the 12 year old says after a while, “this game is super, super boring!”
I can’t quite disagree.
Look, I love to hate FIFA for the incredible empire of greed they’ve built. But then, the training-sponsorship-ratings arms race that has developed around football is not their fault. The torrent of cash that’s poured into the game has the power of a flood, rearranging the whole football landscape and turning the somewhat frumpy spectacle of Mexico ‘70 into the dazzling show we get to see now.
Because for all its faults, for all the meaningless games between zero-hope tier teams, for all the soporific Qatar-Switzerlands and New Zealand-Egypts FIFA inflicted on us in its money-grubbing ways, this year’s show has been spectacular. From Norway’s inspired run to the almighty scare Cape Verde gave Argentina, this year’s tournament has already done that thing it seems to do every four years: force us to forget FIFA’s sins by enthralling us with jaw-dropping performances.
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A month of scintillating football has led up to today’s final between Spain and Argentina. As a non-Argentinian South American I am, of course, honor bound to support whomever is playing against Argentina—it’s tradition! It helps that Spain is certainly an easy team to love. And yet it’s a testament to Messi’s unlimited on-field charisma that I would, in my heart of hearts, not really hate it if Argentina won. Because Lionel Messi long ago burst the banks of the superlatives channeled to him, transcended his Argentinianness, almost his humanity, to become a myth. Scoring eight goals in seven games at the age of 39, Messi makes the impossible routine. Surely, the moral order of the universe demands that he lift the trophy once more.
Sitting here hoping for these two remarkable teams to give this tournament the final it deserves, I can’t help but feel that the distance between the languid, staid football of 1970 and the turbocharged game that’s played today captures the transformation our societies have undergone these last 56 years as neatly as anything else I can think of. We live in a faster, sharper-edged world, slicker, much more competitive and much richer. What passed for entertainment back then bores the hell out of us today. Our society is brighter, sharper edged, the stakes are higher.
And it just left me wondering how this year’s World Cup will look from the vantage point of 2080, when it’s Argentina-Spain 2026 that’s playing on the World Cup Classics feed, presumably, on ITV’s neurolink-enabled Experience Machine. Are my kids doomed to sit around explaining to their grandkids that they can remember back before cyborgs were allowed on the pitch? How much faster can the game get, how much more aggressive the tackling and more precise the passing? Come to think of it, how much more competitive can society go on getting?
Idle thoughts, of course, that you’d only entertain because you’re bored, desperate on the days-without-a-match and watching a half-century old match between guys who wouldn’t get picked to play in today’s Bulgarian second division. Which is to say, this delectable Argentina-Spain final can’t come a moment too soon.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.
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