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In this week’s episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk, Francis Fukuyama, Linda Chavez, and Rachel Janfaza explore whether Gen Z’s political instincts are genuinely liberal, what a renewed liberalism needs to reclaim from the republican tradition, and how to rebuild a culture of public-spiritedness in an age of anti-establishment politics.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University and the founder of American Purpose. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents.
Linda Chavez is the Vice Chair of the Renew Democracy Initiative, founded by Garry Kasparov. She previously served in the Reagan administration and has been a syndicated columnist and political commentator for decades.
Rachel Janfaza is the founder of Up and Up, where she researches and writes about the political beliefs and cultural attitudes of Gen Z.
This conversation was recorded at the Liberalism for the 21st Century conference in Washington, D.C., which is organized by the Institute for the Study of Modern Authoritarianism.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Welcome to this live episode of The Good Fight coming to you from the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C. I am joined today by Rachel Janfaza to my right. She is the founder of Up and Up.
I’m joined by my good friend and colleague Francis Fukuyama, who is of course the founder of our co-conspirator American Purpose, among many, many other things. Welcome, Frank.
And I’m joined by Linda Chavez, who is the vice chair of the Renew Democracy Initiative, which was founded by our good friend Garry Kasparov. Welcome.
So we have serious things to talk about today, but before we get to those serious things, Linda, you told me that you just ran into somebody interesting in the lobby of what I will remind listeners is the Watergate Hotel.
Linda Chavez; The Watergate Hotel, and who did I run into but Roger Stone. Now, Roger Stone and I go back many, many years because, as you know, I was a Republican and served in the Reagan administration. But when I was younger, in my twenties, I actually worked here at the Watergate for the Democratic National Committee, which was headquartered here. And I think it was my birthday in 1972. I actually ran into the Watergate burglars in the afternoon when they were trying to tape open the doorway up to Larry O’Brien’s office, which they were going to go into and steal secrets from later in the day. I didn’t know it until I opened the papers, I think it was a Sunday morning, and saw the fellow I had run into, who looked very shocked when he saw me.
So I told Roger that story, but I also reminded him that he was at CREEP, the Committee to Re-Elect the President. He was, you know, the bad boy for Richard Nixon. And among my nefarious deeds as a young person, I stole the plaque from CREEP off the offices. Unfortunately I was not able to keep it. It probably would be quite valuable today. Someone stole it from me. So I reminded him of that, and we said hello to each other.
Mounk: Was it cordial?
Chavez: Yes, Cordial. He knows I’m an anti-Trumper, but he also remembers me from the Reagan years, probably.
Mounk: I love that Washington, D.C. is obsessed with these acronyms—the SAVE Act, the USA Act, whatever. I like that the Committee to Re-Elect the President is CREEP.
Chavez: Very appropriately named.
Mounk: Well, thank you for reminding us at the beginning of this conversation that threats to the rules and norms of liberal democracy are not entirely new in this town. But today I want us to think about what the nature of the threats to liberalism are today and, more importantly, how liberalism can try to refound itself.
Liberalism from its inception was always a radical ideology. Liberals wanted to abolish the Corn Laws, to fight against discrimination against so many groups in society, to fight for the equality of women. They had a vision of society that was radically at odds with the society in which they lived. And in large part liberals succeeded. The world we live in today is not perfectly liberal, but it has very deep liberal elements which help to explain some of the things that are good about our society.
But I think that also creates a danger—the danger that we become too invested in the status quo, where we try to keep everything as it is rather than continuing to have that mission of making the world align more closely with the ideals we have. And so we want to talk today a little bit about areas from culture to immigration to AI, and envisage what a radical liberal agenda, a philosophical liberal agenda, might look like.
Let’s start with culture. Rachel, I’m wondering how you’re seeing this. You are a little younger than the rest of us on the panel. More importantly, you work a lot with young people, trying to understand the political opinions of members of Gen Z. Is Gen Z horribly illiberal, and do we have to be very grouchy and afraid of the future, or can you bring us some good news?
Rachel Janfaza: Well, first of all, Yascha, thank you so much for having me. And it’s an honor to be here with you, Linda and Francis. No, I don’t think that there is grave cause for concern, and that might be controversial compared to some of the headlines that we read about young people and their political beliefs. But when I look at it on the whole, and I hold focus groups with Gen Zers across the country, they reject labels altogether. They’re a very ideologically independent group of young people.
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When it comes to the question of liberalism, if you look at the core values that matter to young people in this country—and I think this really started to bubble up during the pandemic—it’s things like freedom of speech, individual rights and autonomy and agency, and those are all liberal ideas, liberal values. And so the jargon might go one way or another in the words that we use to describe it, but on the whole, this generation is rejecting those labels outright and really just is honing in on what they believe. And I think ultimately I’m hearing a lot recently that they want to live in a society where it is okay to hold some parts of one party’s platform to be true and at the same time other parts of the other party’s platform. And they reject the fact that that has not been the norm for their entire adult life. So I think it actually is in the culture of Gen Z to be liberal, lowercase-L liberal.
Mounk: So when you get the impression that half of young people are fans of democratic socialists and the other half are fans of men’s rights activists and so on, is that a complete misunderstanding of where most young people are? Is this just a small section of very political people? Is it that they sometimes like quite extreme people, but it’s because those people come across in positive ways that aren’t ultimately related back to those ideologies? Not to compare Zohran Mamdani to the people we just talked about, but when a lot of them like Zohran Mamdani, is it that he’s a very committed democratic socialist, or is it that they just think, you know, he seems honest and seems charismatic and seems like he’s trying to do something good, and they don’t actually buy into the ideology that may in fact be driving him?
Janfaza: So I’ve been asking this very question over the past few weeks in focus groups. First of all, I’ve been asking, who’s a candidate who you think is doing a good job in the country right now? Young people from across the country will name Zohran Mamdani as someone. And then I ask, what is it about him? They say things like hope, change—he is bringing a fresh take. The anti-establishment sentiment is real, but it’s not that they are socialists. So then I ask, how many of you consider yourself to be a democratic socialist? I have not yet found one person who considers themselves to be a democratic socialist. And I have taken a step further and said, can you tell me what it means to be a democratic socialist? I think part of the reason why they’re rejecting this is because they reject labels outright, going back to my earlier point, but they appreciate what he has brought: the energy, this sort of hope-maxing vibe that he campaigned on and is now serving with, and the fact that he campaigned on a vision and is governing with a vision at a time when so many politicians are all about being the opposite of someone else. So I think that is what is resonating from these democratic socialist candidates across the country. It’s in a vacuum of vision from other types of leaders. They are able to share what they do stand for, and not only what they stand against.
Mounk: Frank, what does it take to build a sufficiently liberal culture for democratic norms to persist? If young people have, as Rachel is saying, basically liberal instincts without necessarily having the language to articulate it, if they might be drawn to some politicians who may not be fully liberal but for reasons that aren’t deeply illiberal—how concerning is this? What kind of understanding of liberalism do we actually need to anchor in the wider culture for liberalism to persist through this day?
You could think about two very different positions on this. You might say: if people don’t have a genuine understanding of the logic of our institutions, they’re not going to be able to defend them, and we’re going to abandon them. Or you could say: perhaps it’s fine that people don’t really understand what it is, but as long as they have the instinct that if something is illiberal, if something seems unfair to them, that’s not right—that may be enough to preserve that culture and those institutions.
Francis Fukuyama: Well, I think that there’s an important cultural change that needs to take place, which has to do with the question of virtue. Liberalism is built around a theory that there’s no overarching dominant idea of virtue or the good life—as you’ve explained to Curtis Yarvin and characters like that. This arose out of the wars of religion in early modern Europe, and the fact that people couldn’t agree on what virtue or the good life was, and so you settle for life itself—that we should be able to live in peace and tolerate other people.
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But this creates a kind of vacuum that has been felt by many people. Your liberal society tells you to be endlessly tolerant, don’t be judgmental. If you say something’s better than others, or you criticize somebody on moral grounds, you’ll find some liberal scold saying, don’t be like that. What makes you think you’re so important or great that you can actually judge people? And I think that that is a misunderstanding of liberalism, because liberalism does not require that you abandon all of your moral priors. And in fact, a healthy liberal society is built around people who do have moral priors. They may not be the same, defined, let’s say, in religious terms—you tolerate people who differ from you, but you don’t say, well, anything goes, I’m just fine with anything.
But it still leaves a kind of hole for people, because they really want something to believe in, and some core that can be the source of community for them. I think that there is an older tradition, older actually than liberalism, that influenced the Founding Fathers quite strongly, which is the tradition of small-r republicanism. Our friend J.G.A. Pocock wrote a whole book about how this idea in a way begins with Machiavelli, and it develops in Europe in early modern times and then crosses the Atlantic and affects the American founding fathers.
What a small-r republican, as opposed to a liberal, believes is that there is such a thing as virtue, and that virtue is public-spiritedness—that you have to be oriented towards the public good, and that your life is not going to be fulfilling if all you care about is your friends and family and your little closed-in world. And it seems to me we’ve kind of lost that sense. I certainly see it in my students—very few of them actually want to go into public service, although that may be changing. I think that could be changing just in the past couple of years. Really, since the 1980s, they’ve been told that the government is terrible, it’s corrupt, it’s captured, and so they want to stay away from it. If they’re publicly oriented, they’ll go to work for an NGO or a public interest law firm and spend their lives suing the government to stop it from doing bad stuff.
I think that in a way we need to recapture a different kind of culture, where public service is actually seen as a virtue. For the generation that brought about the New Deal and then went on to win World War II, that was a very strong feeling. You had all these very public-spirited people who created the basic institutions that then persisted into the postwar period, and you have very few of them right now. So one of the things that a reconstructed liberalism needs to do is to reorient people towards the idea that there is a greater good. People are always complaining: I’m pursuing this life as a consultant with Arthur Andersen or whatever company, working for OpenAI, but my life doesn’t have any meaning—it’s a good career, my parents are happy that I’ve got a job, but what’s the greater purpose?
I think that one of the ways to reinstill a sense of purpose and meaning is to reimbue people with the idea that we are in a common political project. What a liberal democracy is, is not just having the government leave you alone to do whatever you want. It’s also a public project where we want to actually do things in common. That leads in all sorts of different directions. I’m a big fan of abundance. I think that we ought to have a government that can build things—we ought to have high-speed rail in California. But it’s still related to culture, because I think the idea of building public things is really about reorienting people towards that public-facing orientation, where they’re not just trying to figure out how to maximize their incomes, but they’re saying: what is the public good that we are trying to do? How do I participate in the formulation of these projects? How do I help to implement them?
So I do think that culture doesn’t exist in a vacuum where it’s just a bunch of ideas that float around in the air and one of them lands on your head and all of a sudden you have different ideas. I don’t think you build a spirit of public-spiritedness unless you actually are active in public affairs.
Mounk: One of the really striking things when you look at polling of young people—and perhaps you’ll correct me in a moment—is that the values that they have have really changed. For example, we are now at the absolute top of how much young people care about making money and having not just professional success, but really financial success. And they give relatively less importance to things like personal relationships or making a contribution to a community, and so on. That’s a really striking change that we’ve seen over the last decades.
Now, I think there’s a kind of post-liberal critique, which I think you’re sort of implicitly responding to, Frank, which is saying that perhaps liberalism has always been parasitic on a deeper set of virtues—that liberalism was a response to a very traditional society, and perhaps it had some good contributions to make, but it worked because there was that older set of virtues of duty and of caring about the common good, and that it slowly has eroded them. Now we’re left without any of them, and that’s why liberalism goes so terribly wrong. I don’t believe that. I don’t think anybody on this panel believes that. But what is the response to that, Linda? Is there a way of talking about public-spiritedness, about virtue, about, as John F. Kennedy would have put it, “ask not what the country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country,” that still respects the limits on liberalism—which is that the state shouldn’t tell you how to live, and shouldn’t tell you what moral virtues to have, and shouldn’t tell you what religious convictions to have?
Chavez: Well, I actually do believe that for a functioning democracy, you have to be steeped in certain civic virtues. You do have to believe in a sense of duty or loyalty. You have to believe that there is objective truth. You have to be able to feel compassion. A society doesn’t work without people who do not just think in selfish terms.
And when you think back about our society—I’m not a political philosopher, I didn’t even study political philosophy in school—but when I think about our founding, or even liberalism writ large, I think about my own sense that free market economies have produced more benefit, more good, for greater numbers of people than any other. I think back to Adam Smith, but I remember that Adam Smith didn’t think Wealth of Nations was his most important book. He thought The Theory of Moral Sentiments was his more important book.
And I do think that you need that kind of basis, and I think we’ve lost that. It began to unravel, I think, in the sixties, and certainly progressed all the way through to the present. It’s not taught in school anymore. It isn’t just that we don’t teach basic civics—how the government operates, what branches there are, the Constitution, the Declaration. Those things depend on certain moral sentiments. And we’re loath to do that. I think liberals in particular are loath to do that, because they don’t want to acknowledge that there is at least a universal set of moral sentiments or values that are conducive to liberal democracy, and that without those, you don’t have the building blocks.
Mounk: Rachel, I’m struck by the debate that we had ten or so years ago when Jordan Peterson became a huge shooting star and attracted a lot of young followers, and was vilified in all kinds of ways for it. It always struck me that, in a sense, his rise—which I did see with some concern—was broadly our fault, the fault of us liberals, because he was speaking to young people, giving them a vision of how to lead their lives, which is not my vision, but which was a substantive vision, which made a real offer to them. And I think a lot of people who are more moderate, a lot of people who are philosophical liberals, didn’t do that. We didn’t say: here is a really deep, meaningful, ambitious way to lead your life, formulated from that kind of liberal perspective.
So do you think that young people have models for how to lead their lives that are in tune with the kind of liberal virtues that Linda just spoke to, or do they have to look to looks-maxxers or various other interesting figures, to have some kind of vision of how to lead their lives?
Janfaza: That’s a great question. I think the reality is that the social media ecosystem is so saturated that there is no one visionary leader for anybody, because there are just too many people whom someone can listen to. Micro-influencers who don’t have many followers might be the most followed person by one individual, and so it’s very messy. But I think when I ask young people, who do you most look up to and respect when it comes to values and who you want to build your life based off of, most of the time they say someone who they have an intimate relationship with—whether it’s a teacher, professor, a parent, a grandparent, a friend, someone in their community.
I think there’s a real opportunity there to make that more mainstream, that those are the people who young people are looking up to. I think we tend to sensationalize and focus on the fact that yes, there are very popular social media content creators, streamers, influencers who have very loud voices and very big followings, but even if they do have a huge following, they are not followed by all young people, and yet every young person does have someone in their life whom they have modeled themselves off of. So when it comes to the values that are most important, and where young people are getting their inspiration from, I just think it’s not monolithic. There is no one clear answer right now, in part because their entire childhood and adult lives have been shaped by so many different voices. There’s no one source of information, and Linda mentioned the need for objective truth, and that is really hard to find right now.
Mounk: Frank, if I locked you into a room and forced you to write a book called Twelve Rules for Liberal Life, that was meant to give young people guidance about how to lead a meaningful life, written from a broadly philosophically liberal perspective, what would you tell them?
Fukuyama: Well, the first thing they’ve got to do is figure out how to get out of that room.
Mounk: Well, you’re in the room, they’re not in the room. You’re in the room until you’ve given them that advice.
Fukuyama: I don’t know about twelve virtues. I do think that there’s a particular problem with young men right now, and it is really true that they don’t have appropriate role models. I think those exist in the literature. Harvey Mansfield, who was my teacher at Harvard, wrote a book on manliness. And it was widely derided by the usual suspects as being a kind of celebration of a bad kind of masculinity. But it wasn’t. It really derives from Machiavelli’s understanding of virtù, which Machiavelli himself understood as a masculine virtue, but it was very, very different from the kind of toxic masculinity that is out there on the internet right now, because it had to do with ideas of virtue, of service, of nobility, of the ability to be courageous and use your strength, but to use it for public purposes—because Machiavelli was indeed one of the founders of the theory of modern republicanism.
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I think that if there is a way of reviving that understanding among young men about how to be both male but also virtuous in that Machiavellian sense, I think that would be very good. Take something like risk-taking. This is something I wrote about—my least-read book, called The Great Disruption, which I published in 1999, is actually all about gender relations. I didn’t realize it at the time how important this was. There are substantial differences between men and women. For example, young men between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five commit eighty percent of all the crimes in the world. And this is culturally invariant, right, so it does seem to be rooted in biology, where young men are programmed to take risks. If you think about human evolutionary history, there’s probably a good reason for that—if you’re hunting mastodons or saber-toothed tigers or whatever, you’re going to have to take certain kinds of risks that women are not going to have to take, raising young people. And you can’t have a society in which you don’t have people who are willing to do that kind of risk-taking.
So you don’t want to breed it out of human beings, but you have to orient that risk-taking towards things that are actually socially constructive. I think that articulating what a model of that would look like is important. The traditional understanding, for example, of a citizen soldier embodies something like that—that you would take up arms and risk your life on behalf of the whole community, but it was a very pro-socially oriented kind of thing, and we have somehow lost any sense that that’s a virtuous kind of life to live. Now, how you recover that, I think, is difficult, because you’ve got a lot of competing gods out there. But at least as a model of what you would want a virtuous person in a liberal republic to look like, I think that would be something like it—at least for part of the population.
Mounk: Linda, shifting the ground somewhat—we’ve been talking, in a sense, about who we should be at the deepest level, in terms of how we identify ourselves, what our values are, what we might have in common in a society that is meant to be deeply fragmented and diverse in terms of our ideas and our religions and our origins, but that perhaps could be united by some kind of common virtue. The other question is about who we are in a more literal sense—who is here in this country, who should be here in this country, who should not be here in this country. How should we treat people who have been here for a long time, who perhaps make real contributions to the country but who don’t have a legal title to be here?
So how should we think about reaching a settlement on this question of who we are, on this question of immigration, at a moment when we seem to be more divided about it than ever?
Chavez: Well, I think this has been a big divide for a while now. Immigration clearly is the driving factor in populism, not just here but around the world. I think immigration as an issue is quite different in the United States than it is in Europe. First of all, we are very fundamentally an immigrant nation, more than any other country I can think of. There are a few other examples—Argentina, Israel in a certain sense, where it’s an ingathering that creates the nation—but this has defined us from the beginning. And we did quite well for 150 years with open borders. We basically let anybody come, and we were eager to expand territorially and to create a sense of nation. We were willing to welcome all comers.
We didn’t really start seeing pushback until first against Asians, specifically the Chinese, but then in the early twentieth century, a push against Southern and Eastern Europeans. And that’s when we began to restrict immigration. So in 1965, we dramatically loosened the laws that had been put into place in the early twentieth century, and we became much more welcoming again.
But because the numbers of people we were bringing in were fixed and pretty static—they were based on family reunification, so they expanded a little bit—it wasn’t a rational system in the sense that we didn’t look at the country’s needs. There are times when you need more people, times when you need less, and we didn’t have to really deal with that, because there was a kind of flow of people that met the market but came illegally, that didn’t go through the system of legally immigrating to the United States, mostly from Latin America. Obviously, we share this big border with Mexico, and it worked for quite a while.
But starting really in the 1990s, we started to see a kind of nativism rising up again against this flow of mostly Latin Americans. And it was driven, as all of these periods have been, toward restriction, by the fear that these people were not really going to become Americans. I love to talk to audiences and hear people say, well, my grandparents came from Italy the right way. And they came before 1924, and the right way was: we had open borders. People don’t understand that. They were all Sicilian peasants, and the gap between them and the population at the time was actually greater than that of Mexican immigrants who came. So the point is, we had a market, and it worked because of illegal immigration.
Some of us, including myself, thought, well, we really need a revised legal immigration reform. We need to revise our law, make it more rational, look at skills in addition to family reunification. But unfortunately the nativist antagonism that built up—and these weren’t nativists in the sense of people who trace their family back to Jamestown or Plymouth Rock, these were people who came in the early twentieth century, but they were very fearful.
And then I think what dramatically affected this was the Biden years. I remind people that in 2015, when Donald Trump descended the escalator and talked about rapists and murderers, all these bad people coming in from Mexico, “not sending its best,” we were actually at a 50-year low in illegal immigration. The flow was not great at that time. It actually got much worse later. But I think a lot of liberals, including myself, underestimated the fear that the chaos at the border, which occurred particularly during the Biden presidency, generated. And that gave Donald Trump his opening. Sure, the economy was a big factor, and people were hoping they’d see an economy like that of 2017, 2018, the pre-pandemic economy. But fear about immigration was a large driver in this election.
So now we’re at a point where we have to make a decision, we have to do something. Trump got elected saying he was going to deport people, deport everybody. And basically what we’re seeing now is people being shot in the streets—people who are here legally, US citizens, being shot by ICE. I think there’s a kind of revulsion at that. But we still haven’t seen, out of Congress, which is where this has to happen, Democrats who are willing to sit down with Republicans—because they’re fearful too—and come up with a rational immigration policy that takes a look at what our needs are. Because we’re heading into a birth dearth—we have a birth dearth already, but by 2056 the US population would begin to shrink in absolute terms, and this is going to be dramatically bad for the people who live here now.
Fukuyama: Linda, tell me if I’m wrong, but another thing that happened in that decade of the 2010s was that a lot of the people coming into the country discovered the asylum law.
Chavez: Yes, absolutely. I had sort of hoped that in the last year of the Biden administration we could see some fixes on asylum law, because it was being exploited. People were coming for economic reasons, and that’s a perfectly good and valid reason—we need to figure out a way to legally admit those people—but it’s not what the asylum laws were made for. I initially thought that the way Biden handled it—let’s take all of these asylum seekers, give them a path to come in, have their interview, and then wait their turn for their immigration court hearing—that that would work. But it didn’t. What it did is that Governor Abbott and others, shipping all of these asylum seekers to cities like Chicago and Denver and New York, was brilliant. It made even liberals and liberal politicians say, wait a second, we can’t deal with this.
Mounk: So we talked about the United States and immigration in a way where the case should be somewhat easier in the United States, because the country has such a long history of immigration. I do think that most Americans recognize at some level that immigration is in the country’s DNA. The case that immigration is the key driver of the rise of populism is probably even stronger in countries in Western Europe, for example, where that really is at the very top of the political agenda.
One of the strange things is that there’s a lot of cycling in political and public opinion about immigration. You see in the United States that in 2015 there is a strong anti-immigrant mood, and that’s part of what gives Donald Trump the opportunity for his political rise. When he comes into office, you have the kind of thermostatic counter-reaction to that, and opinions become more pro-immigration. The Biden administration goes in and hugely misunderstands that mandate, loosens rules in such a way that you’re going to have an unprecedented number of people coming across the border, and then opinion swings right back. And now, going back to that liberal instinct, seeing the way ICE is operating in American cities, with agents that don’t identify themselves, that carry out often arbitrary stops and in many tragic cases end up killing people, you see opinion become very pro-immigration again.
One way I think about this, Frank, is that perhaps what most citizens want is something that is very reasonable. I think what large majorities of democratic citizens want is often reasonable, but it’s just impossible for governments to deliver. They want real control of a border, they don’t want illegal immigration, they want us to be able to set the rules for who comes in when, which is a perfectly legitimate set of aspirations to have for your country. And at the same time, they don’t want state cruelty. They don’t want to see people in Maine or in Texas or in other parts of the United States shot by ICE agents. They don’t want little children to wash up on the European shores of the Mediterranean because they were trying to come across. And it’s very hard to do both of those things at the same time. So when governments are overly lenient, they say, hang on a second, look at this chaos, we don’t want that. And when governments crack down, whether in the gratuitously cruel way of a Trump administration or even in a smarter, more targeted way, they say, well, look at all these cases of injustice, that doesn’t seem fair, let’s loosen up. That’s why we keep going back and forth. Is there some kind of principled solution to this?
Fukuyama: Look, as Linda knows well, there was a principled solution to it. It involved a trade where you would exert real control over the borders so that people could not simply come illegally. You really had to do that with a national ID card of some sort, because so many of the undocumented people actually weren’t crossing the border—they were visa overstayers—and you had to have a way of catching them. So on the one hand, you have real control over the border, but for the people who had come in earlier years and had built families and were not criminals and were hard-working people, you had to give them a path to citizenship. I think every major comprehensive immigration reform proposal over the past several decades has involved that trade: you really control the border, but you also have a path to citizenship. And the path to citizenship was just an absolute no-go for Republicans.
Chavez: I think that’s correct. By the way, even though philosophically I’m opposed to the idea of having a class of people who are not able to become citizens, I think as a one-time compromise, if it was what was needed in order to get real, serious immigration reform and give legal status to the people here, that’s something that ought to be at least debated.
Give people legal status. I would not want to see this be an ongoing process. I would want to see it much like the ’86 amnesty was a one-time deal—that if the price of getting Republicans to go along with giving legal status is that you’ve been here a certain number of years, and a majority of people who are undocumented in the United States have lived here more than a decade... The guy who was killed in Texas last week had lived in the United States for thirty-five years. And that’s not unusual. That’s actually quite common. There is a concept in the law of desuetude, where a law that is not enforced and is ignored for many, many years should pass away and become ineffective. That’s sort of where we were with legal immigration. We’ve known for decades how many people we had here, more or less, and how long they’ve been here, and we did nothing about it. So this idea that suddenly, in one year, we’re going to start deporting people, rounding up two thousand people a day, which is Stephen Miller’s quota—and, you know, as a former Republican who was opposed to quotas, I’m fascinated that quotas are the big thing in this administration, all sorts of quotas, including quotas for deporting people. So that would be one compromise that I think liberals have to at least consider, if it could be an honest deal that would give people some sense that we could have a path for legalization, if not citizenship.
Mounk: Rachel, is there any more agreement among Gen Z Americans about immigration than there is among older Americans? And how do you think we can talk in a broader sense about what borders mean in a country, and how to treat people who are in this country, in a way that might be able to forge some kind of consensus?
Janfaza: I think part of why we saw young people swing to the right in 2024 was because of immigration, and young men in particular—that was a top issue, along with the economy. The way this is manifesting as a political issue for young people, it is an economic issue, because young people are scared of one thing, and it’s not having a job. So for them it’s very much—there was very much a buy-in to the fear-mongering around the idea that immigrants are taking jobs that would be yours otherwise. I think this is very much related to the conversation around AI too, and how that is now an anxiety-producing issue, because it goes back to the same idea of jobs.
So I think the issue is intersectional with a lot of other political issues for young people. But then again, Yascha, you brought up before that there has been this action, reaction, culture, counterculture that has brewed throughout history, but especially in the past ten years, very quickly, back and forth.
Mounk: Do you think social media is speeding that?
Janfaza: That’s exactly where I was about to go with that—young people move at the speed of the internet, and nothing stays a trend for more than literally twenty-four hours or less. That is translating into their politics. I think it’s why this generation is as swingy as it’s shaping up to be. The immigration conversation is a part of that too, because we saw this movement to the right in 2024, and many of the young men who voted for Trump, with immigration as a core concern, saw what happened in Minnesota with ICE shooting American citizens and said, hey, that’s not what I voted for. When did that become okay? That’s part of the reason why they’ve retracted and are moving away from him.
Mounk: Just to stay on that theme for a moment—imagining that Democrats win in 2028, and perhaps they even have a trifecta—do you think there’s a danger that an incoming Democratic administration, both in immigration and more broadly, is going to overstate its mandate, is going to think, look, we’ve always thought that young people are naturally progressive, and there was a weird moment in 2024 when they helped elect Donald Trump, and perhaps we’ll deny and ignore that a little bit, but now they’ve swung back to being progressive, and whatever we do, they’re going to be on our side. Then, by the summer of 2029, they’re going to be swinging back to the other side.
Janfaza: Well, I don’t think that defection away from Trump is automatically a swing towards Democrats from young people. Democrats are not doing well with young people right now, and even if young people aren’t in favor of Trump, it does not mean they’re suddenly progressive again.
Mounk: But I think a lot of Democratic consultants believe that, even if you’re rightly pointing out that it’s not the case.
Janfaza: Yes. When it comes to the mandate that a 2028 candidate needs to govern with, but also needs to campaign on, it’s just more practicality, more willingness to actually work with the other party. Part of the frustration and the distrust in government from young people right now is because they don’t see any meaningful action. Where we see glimmers of hope and trust in elected officials is at the local level, where young people can feel the intimate effect of actions being taken, whether it’s regarding city infrastructure or housing policy or education. This might sound totally out of tune with the trope about young people, but this is what I’m hearing, and it’s where they’re actually able to see effective government. So I think there’s a lesson there that any candidate in 2028 needs to learn from, and this is actually something young people are asking for: to make their life meaningfully better, to make it feel like there’s progress happening. They just don’t see that happening right now at the national level.
In the rest of this conversation, Linda, Francis, Rachel, and Yascha discuss how artificial intelligence will impact employment, how AI is influencing young people, and how to fight for a philosophically liberal culture. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
The AI boom is already the largest capital investment project in history, running a price tag greater than the Manhattan Project, Interstate Highway System, and Apollo program combined. Estimates of the total cost of the data center buildout run as high as $7 trillion.
The issue is not whether AI will transform our economy and society—maybe it will, maybe it won’t. But the conversation around AI’s long-term impact misses the more urgent question: whether AI companies can increase revenues and profits fast enough to pay their bills.
For all the excitement around the technology, AI companies are bringing in only a small fraction of the revenues needed to cover their spending—and the gap is widening, not narrowing. That has forced AI companies to turn to skyrocketing amounts of debt to pay for the chips and data centers needed to train and run generative AI models, including $570 billion in new debt this year alone. Those numbers—irrespective of any capabilities in the underlying technology—suggest a real risk of a financial crisis.
And the stakes there go well beyond a particular industry. AI-linked companies dominate stock and credit markets in a way no industry has since the Gilded Age. Unless the AI industry quickly finds a way to produce a return on its debt-fueled spending splurge, the industry’s increasingly fragile economics could unravel—and drag the rest of the financial system and even the economy down with it.
To properly understand the precarity of the AI companies, it is important to realize that their margins are being squeezed from several directions at once. For starters, the market for generative AI models is fiercely competitive. The leading developers—Alphabet, Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta, Microsoft, and xAI (now a part of SpaceX)—are among the world’s most valuable companies, and each offers models that are very similar in their capabilities and quality. Without the protective “moat” of patent protection, as is common with new products, each company operates with the knowledge that windows of opportunity to build a lead over its rivals open rarely and close quickly. Whenever an AI developer discovers a use case with even a whiff of profit potential, such as coding or military applications, its rivals quickly jump in to offer competing products.
Such dynamics are often a recipe for price wars that make profits difficult-to-impossible to generate. Sure enough, The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reported last month that OpenAI and Anthropic were preparing to cut prices in an effort to win customers ahead of their respective IPOs—a development that was largely overshadowed by SpaceX’s record-shattering stock market debut. In the weeks since, Silicon Valley’s AI heavyweights have started offering discounts of as much as 75% for access to their models.
Launching such a price war is, in effect, a bet that the fevered competition that follows will be temporary and that the survivor(s) will establish market dominance and rake in monopoly profits. That is, after all, what happened with Internet search (Google), cloud computing (Amazon and Microsoft), smartphone apps (Apple and Google), and social media (Facebook), among others. Placing a similar all-or-nothing bet on dominating the generative AI market might make sense if intense competition were the only obstacle to generative AI’s profitability. But there are other factors in play here.
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Training and running generative AI models is enormously expensive, and it is not clear if (much less when) it will get cheaper. To win market share, developers have long offered access to their models below cost, but this has meant that AI companies lose money on virtually all of their users, including those with premium subscriptions. As a result, OpenAI and Anthropic, despite their lofty valuations, have burned through billions of dollars over the course of their existence. Thus far, they have stayed afloat because, for all of their struggles to earn money, they have had no trouble raising it from investors.
But these financial pressures will be unceasing. The physical assets at the center of previous private-sector infrastructure booms, like railroads and high-speed internet, have a useful life measured in decades. AI chips have a useful life of at most half a decade, and the data centers that house them are built for specific generations of chips and cannot easily be repurposed. These chips and data centers are tied to trillions of dollars in lease commitments, construction loans, and more complex forms of debt that drive up AI companies’ costs—even as their customers are becoming more cost-conscious.
Businesses have started to balk at AI companies’ efforts to juice more revenue out of them. In the early part of this year, model developers began moving from flat-fee to usage-based pricing for access to their flagship models, effectively raising prices for most enterprise customers. The move apparently succeeded in boosting revenues, at least temporarily, but the higher prices gave many customers sticker shock. One unnamed company reportedly racked up a $500 million Claude bill.
Unsurprisingly, many businesses are starting to question whether they are getting enough return to justify the technology’s costs, with AI FOMO giving way to economic reality and Uber’s Chief Operating Officer saying the company simply isn’t getting enough bang for the buck with its AI usage. Uber, Walmart, and other companies have responded to cost overruns not by increasing their AI budgets, but by tightening their limits on employees’ AI use, switching to open-source Chinese models, or even, like Microsoft, canceling third-party AI licenses altogether.
This summer’s price cuts may help stem some customers’ concerns, but it is unusual for companies to slash prices so soon after raising them. Perhaps Anthropic and OpenAI are simply struggling to find a sustainable price point for their products given the economic wind shear the industry is facing. Or perhaps the price hikes that preceded them were prompted by a desire to engineer a misleading one-time spike in revenues for the sake of the pre-IPO financial disclosures the leading model developers will soon have to file.
Either way, the industry’s brutal economics are not likely to improve anytime soon. Studies and surveys repeatedly show that the vast majority of businesses are not seeing any return on their investments in generative AI projects. Competition, both among the big U.S. companies and with their open-source Chinese rivals, will continue to be intense. Those forces will apply unrelenting downward pressure on prices even as high costs squeeze companies from the opposite direction. And the lease commitments for data centers remain, at least for the foreseeable future, a vast and immovable fixed cost.
If these combined pressures culminate in an AI market collapse, the fallout would likely be severe. AI-focused companies now comprise 45% of S&P 500 market cap and loans to the AI industry have become “all-encompassing” for credit markets. “The numbers are like nothing any of us who have been in this business for 25 years have seen,” a senior executive at Bank of America Corp told Bloomberg in reference to AI’s domination of available lending. The last time an industry held such sway over the nation’s economy was the 19th century, when railroads reigned supreme. When the railroad bubble burst in 1873, it led to the longest depression in U.S. history.
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We are deeply familiar with the United States’ recent financial crises—one of us was Vice Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP, the 2008 bank bailout. Certain patterns are noticeable. Before crises happen, those whose behavior brings them on always deny anything terrible is possible. When crisis nonetheless comes, the same people deny anyone could have foreseen it, and the general public suffers in ways that they claimed were unimaginable. Then, of course, the culprits demand bailouts, and the public’s confidence in democracy collapses.
Financial crises often unfold in fits and starts, and there is typically a lag before a crash spirals into a calamity. The subprime mortgage bubble burst in the summer of 2007, more than a year before it morphed into the worst financial and economic crisis in 80 years. By the time that full-blown financial meltdown hit, a number of financial institutions had already failed, and the situation was well beyond the ability of ordinary regulatory tools to fix. Fixes need to occur in advance of a crash, not in emergency fashion like in 2008.
It is not too late for regulators to act to protect the U.S. economy against the risk of the AI bubble bursting. It is beyond the power of any regulator to stop people who want to indulge in magical thinking from doing so, but thanks to legislation passed after 2008, regulators have tools to stop such delusions from endangering our entire economy and society, including through stronger oversight of AI-linked companies, financial auditing by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, inquiring into banks’ exposure to an AI meltdown, and conducting stress tests to see how balance sheets would respond if data center debt became toxic.
Regulators need to use those tools now to alert market participants to AI-related risks and prevent those risks from concentrating further. Additional legislation may ultimately be needed to stop a crash from spiraling and certainly to prevent it from recurring, such as stronger barriers between private credit markets and commercial banks and stronger measures to deter the types of financial chicanery that AI companies have used to create a misleading picture of the industry’s finances.
As it stands, however, the risks are increasing every day. Unless either regulators act or the AI industry can find a way to pay its fast-mounting bills, the future could well be bleak—not just for the AI industry, but for the financial system and, from there, the economy as a whole.
Damon Silvers is Visiting Professor of Practice at University College London’s Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose.
Matthew Scherer is a fellow at the Open Markets Institute and columnist for Hard Reset Media.
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A new ICE surge is here. After reducing operations following national outrage at the killings of Renée Good and Alex Pretti by federal agents in Minneapolis this winter, the Trump administration has re-started its campaign to cleanse the interior of illegal immigrants.
The New York Times reports that in the final two weeks of June, the White House ordered agencies to sharply increase the number of arrests, with a target of 2,000 per day. This goal—which surpasses the previous high of an average of 1,283 arrests per day in December—was easily met. Over 10,000 people were detained in the five-day period up to July 1, all part of Department of Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin’s plan for “quieter and smarter” ICE operations, to contrast with the bellicose tactics of his predecessor, Kristi Noem. The hope is that Trump’s campaign promise of massive deportations will be met without the outrage and protests elicited by the previous surge, and with the legitimacy of ICE and border enforcement somewhat restored.
That plan has already gone horribly wrong. In an echo of the Good and Pretti killings, the surge has resulted in a double tragedy—two people, one in Texas and one in Maine, have been killed by ICE or Border Patrol agents in the past week during traffic stops. Neither one was the agents’ intended target. In both cases, the government claims the agents fired on the victims in self-defense or to defend others.
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In Houston, Lorenzo Salgado Araujo, who came to the United States illegally from Mexico 35 years ago and has a wife and three children, was driving to his work at a construction site in Houston when he was trailed and eventually pulled over by agents in unmarked vehicles, who incorrectly believed the van was carrying two men wanted by immigration officials. According to the DHS, Araujo “weaponized his vehicle in an attempt to run over an ICE law enforcement officer.” But this account was denied by the three other men in the vehicle, all colleagues of Araujo, who claim that the van came to a halt and an agent fired a single shot through a side window which pierced Araujo’s abdomen. Grainy CCTV footage from a gas station shows the van pulling over and an agent pointing an object—resembling a weapon, though this hasn’t been confirmed—at the side of the vehicle. “Seconds later,” according to The Times, agents are filmed, in footage from a passing car, bending over Araujo on the ground.
Less is known about the Maine shooting: Joan Sebastian Guerrero, a Colombian immigrant who according to his father had legal status, left his house early on Monday with his 3-year-old daughter and was confronted in his car by agents in an apparent case of mistaken identity. The DHS released contradictory information, first claiming that Guerrero was the subject of a removal order before retracting that assertion. Publicly, they claimed that “the vehicle attempted to flee the scene and fearing for public safety an officer discharged his weapon.” But in a private statement to Congress, the Times reports, they claimed that Guerrero “weaponized his vehicle toward law enforcement.” There is no video of the seconds immediately preceding the killing, but photos from the scene show at least four bullet holes in the front windshield.
The government’s claims about the circumstances surrounding the killings cannot yet be verified, because in neither case were federal agents wearing bodycams. This is despite Congress having earmarked $20 million earlier this year for the DHS to purchase them. Depressingly, the lack of video probably explains why the response to these two killings has been muted compared to the Good and Pretti killings earlier this year. In those cases, graphic video footage quickly gave lie to the administration’s claims that the victims were domestic terrorists who posed a threat to officers’ lives. The public pushback was immediate and severe, resulting in the firing of Kristi Noem and the reassignment of then-ICE head Greg Bovino, as well as a months-long lull in ICE activity.
This time, there has been some pushback, with protests erupting in both Texas and Maine. The administration seems to be preempting the fallout by instructing ICE to end most vehicle stops (although Trump today attempted to overturn the order via Truth Social). But it seems unlikely that the two recent killings will prompt any sort of fundamental reset of the sort we saw glimmers of following the Minneapolis events. The administration remains determined to make two thousand arrests a day, and by all accounts ICE is going about it in a way that will minimize bad press or accountability. If Mullin manages to enforce a less-flashy version of Noem’s immigration surge—and if he manages to keep a lid on the kinds of young, undertrained recruits apparently responsible for killing Guerrero—he may just succeed in giving Trump the kinds of deportation numbers he wants to see before the midterms.
One of the greatest worries for the Founding Fathers was the specter of “standing armies”—a permanent, professional military under the direct control of the president. James Madison declared, “A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty.” He warned that “throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.” Alexander Hamilton likewise wrote in Federalist No. 29 that “standing armies are dangerous to liberty,” which is why he preferred a peacekeeping force of local militias.
Two and a half centuries later, with permanent armies and police forces very much the norm, we view such statements as a relic of the 18th century no longer applicable to the modern world. Yet the Founding Fathers were right to draw a connection between standing armies and liberty—and in this case, Madison’s comment about an “overgrown Executive” is prophetic. Standing armies are only legitimate if they are loyal to the nation rather than to any individual, going about their important tasks in a transparent and accountable manner.
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The problem is that the Trumpified form of ICE is neither transparent nor accountable. In the aftermath of the Good and Pretti killings, Kristi Noem and Stephen Miller lied through their teeth to frame the victims as terrorists who had attempted to mow down law enforcement. If the videos hadn’t been released and widely disseminated, nobody could have proven that they were lying. Operation Metro Surge proceeded with means that were at best legally obscure and at worst extrajudicial. (Last year, the feds simply changed the rules so that they could enter houses without a judicial warrant and… didn’t tell anyone.) And now Mullin’s “quieter and smarter” approach promises to add a further smokescreen. If ICE gets their way, nobody will ever know what happened to Araujo and Guerrero.
ICE also seems to lack real accountability. Congress is extremely weak and divided right now: the Republican majority lacks the will to supervise the White House’s control over ICE and the Border Patrol, while the Democratic minority lacks the means. All the Dems managed earlier this year was to threaten to shut down the DHS for a few weeks before Trump went ahead and funded it anyway. Likewise, the deaths of civilians have not resulted in firings or prosecutions. The officer responsible for killing Good was quietly reassigned to administrative work, while it remains unclear what, if anything, happened to the officers who killed Pretti. Despite ongoing FBI and DHS investigations, there is no reason to believe that the officers responsible for last week’s killings of Araujo and Guerrero—should they turn out to be equally unjustified—will be treated any differently.
What ICE in its Trumpified form is about is fear. Few would object if the feds were merely targeting the “worst of the worst”—the murderers and molesters and gang members. But the full target sheet runs into the millions, including anyone who is in the country illegally or who has overstayed their visa. The tactic of picking up immigrants outside churches, schools, courts, and now roadsides has already led to numerous cases of parents keeping children home from school, resorting to local help to buy groceries rather than face the uncertainty of going out onto the streets. And when arrested individuals reach a detention center, they may face some of the many documented instances of neglect, illness, and mistreatment. At least 21 people have died in ICE custody so far this year.
The administration’s immigration push is designed to make people fear that they could be torn away from their families regardless of how long they’ve been in the United States and what crimes they may or may not have committed. As ICE continues its summer surge, it is this cruelty and its tragic consequences which, more than anything else, characterize the second Trump administration.
Luke Hallam is senior editor at Persuasion.
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In honor of Dorothy Fields’ birthday, we are republishing Francis Fukuyama’s 2021 tribute.
Dorothy Fields, arguably the greatest American songwriter and lyricist of the 20th century, was born on this day in 1904. While her name may no longer be familiar, the songs that she wrote with composers like Jimmy McHugh and Jerome Kern—tunes like “I Can’t Give You Anything But Love” or “I’m in the Mood for Love”—became the foundation of the Great American Songbook, jazz standards, and would be familiar to anyone who has visited a bar or lounge anywhere in the world over the past 75 years. President Obama’s inaugural address in 2009 included the phrase, “Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America”—words taken directly from “Pick Yourself Up,” the song Fields wrote with Jerome Kern for Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers in the 1936 movie Swingtime.
Dorothy Fields was born into a prominent show business family. Her father, Lew Fields, was a Jewish immigrant from a shtetl in Poland who as a teenager started a hugely successful vaudeville comedy act with Joe Weber known as Weber and Fields. He went on to become an actor, writer, and big-time producer of Broadway shows; in addition to Dorothy, two other Fields siblings, Herb and Joe, made substantial careers in show business. Dorothy grew up in the febrile artistic environment of Broadway during the teens and twenties, and then decamped (with much of her family) to Hollywood in the following decade after the Great Depression as the rise of film undermined the Broadway business model. Her childhood friends and mentors included Oscar Hammerstein II, Richard Rodgers, Lorenz Hart, Lillian Russell, and Bert Lahr, and she would eventually come to know and work with virtually every big Broadway and Hollywood star up until her death in 1974.
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Dorothy Fields’ first great collaboration was with songwriter Jimmy McHugh. Her lyrics were typically witty, colloquially American, and romantic rather than sexual:
Gee, I’d like to see you looking swell, baby
Diamond bracelets Woolworth’s doesn’t sell, baby
Till that lucky day you know darn well, baby
I can’t give you anything but love.
I had always thought that this was the perfect Depression-era song, with the boyfriend lamenting the fact that he was broke, but it was actually written in 1927, before the stock market crash. The diction is from an earlier era—no one uses words like “gee” or “swell” any more, and I imagine few people under the age of 40 have ever heard of Woolworth’s. But that’s what it means to write popular music: you are embedded in the popular culture, and in tune with what ordinary people are thinking and feeling. The boyfriend scheming and dreaming of a day when he might be rich expressed an American optimism that runs through many of Fields’ other songs, like “I Feel a Song Coming On,” or “On the Sunny Side of the Street.”
Many of Fields’ best-known songs were the ones she wrote with Jerome Kern for a series of Fred Astaire-Ginger Rogers movies, like “The Way You Look Tonight” from Swingtime, or “I Won’t Dance” from Roberta.
See the more recent version with Tony Bennett and Lady Gaga:
In my view, Swingtime was the greatest of the Astaire-Rogers collaborations, but I wonder whether it will ever be shown again in a theater, since it contains “Bojangles of Harlem,” a Jerome Kern tribute to the African-American performer Bill Robinson, which Astaire dances in blackface.
In this moment, when immigration and American identity have become such fraught populist issues, we might consider how popular music has contributed to that identity in the 20th century. Much has been written about how quintessentially American musical forms like the blues, jazz, rock and roll, and hip-hop were largely the creations of African-Americans that were culturally appropriated by white musicians from Elvis Presley to Eric Clapton.
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However, the Great American Songbook—which covered the period from the teens through the 1940s—was indelibly influenced by second-generation children of Jewish immigrants like Dorothy Fields. There were Protestant Midwestern songwriters, of course, like Cole Porter and Hoagy Carmichael (both of whom hailed from Indiana), but the great majority of artists were Jews: George and Ira Gershwin, Irving Berlin, Richard Rodgers, Lorenz Hart, Oscar Hammerstein II, and on and on. One of the most popular songs of the 1930s was “Bei Mir Bist Du Shein,” a tune taken from a Yiddish production written by Jacob Jacobs and Sholom Secunda. Here it is in a contemporary performance by the Hot Sardines:
These writers and artists began incorporating the African-American experience into the story, as well as the experiences of the many ethnicities that had arrived in the first great immigration wave brought to an end by the 1924 Reed-Johnson Act. Compared to the straight-laced Protestant sensibility that characterized a lot of American popular music in the 19th century (a sensibility that brought the country Prohibition in 1920), these artists assimilated a more diverse experience regarding sexuality, drinking, drugs, and race, thereby deepening and, in subsequent years, universalizing it.
National identity is built around formal institutions like constitutions, laws, flags, anthems, and the like. But it is also built around shared memories and traditions. Popular music has always been one of the defining features of American life, exported around the world and indelibly linked with Americanness. In this respect, Dorothy Fields was one of the great architects of what it means to be American.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Across the United States and Europe, a striking shift is underway. After years spent defending liberal democracy against populism and illiberalism, a growing number of liberal thinkers have turned to a different question: what should liberalism become in response to its crisis? New books, conferences, manifestos, and policy agendas increasingly speak not of resistance but of renewal. The language has become one of reconstruction.
But there is a tough question to ask: Is contemporary liberalism genuinely reconstructing itself, or is restoration simply speaking the language of reconstruction?
The difference matters. Restoration is comforting because it promises return. It says that the old order was basically sound, that something external broke it, whether a hostile power, a demagogue, or a strongman, and that the task now is to put back what was displaced. Reconstruction begins from a less comfortable admission: that the old order was not simply defeated by its enemies, but helped create the conditions of its own defeat.
Three Interpretations of the Crisis of LiberalismEvery intellectual ecosystem looks unified from the outside and factional from within. As I read them, the three main currents of liberal renewal describe different diseases and therefore offer competing cures.
The first current can be called institutionalist-defensive, and it is the ecosystem’s center of gravity with a blistering self-confidence. Its programmatic agenda centers on courts, accountability, executive power—all that constitutes the machinery of democratic self-defense.
This current claims for itself the greatest moral clarity. Its theory of the crisis, however, is entirely exogenous. Liberalism, in this account, was a sound order breached by populist demagogues, illiberal disinformation, Moscow and its clients; the task is to repair it and strengthen its defenses. For all its rigor about the machinery of democratic self-defense, this liberalism fails to ask the simplest question: why did it keep losing elections? It lost ground repeatedly, in free elections and across many democracies, to voters who understood what was at stake and still chose parties and leaders opposed to the liberal order. A politics that cannot explain its own electoral defeats except through the cunning of its enemies is not defending democracy.
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The second current is supply-side, and this one at least has a genuinely endogenous story. Its founding text is Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s Abundance, its philosophical companion Cass Sunstein’s On Liberalism, and its wager is concrete: liberalism lost people because it stopped delivering on housing, infrastructure, energy, visible material progress, and strangled its own capacity to build under proceduralism and veto points. To give credit where it’s due: this is a self-critique, and a real one. Liberal governance, not illiberal aggression, is the named defendant.
But this account of failure is material all the way down. Once the zoning permits clear and the trains run, the meaning-deficit is expected to resolve itself, as if political loyalty were a lagging indicator of construction output. The envisioned infrastructural reconstruction leaves liberalism’s social ontology untouched. The citizen remains a consumer of outcomes rather than a situated being formed by a certain vision of what should be a shared social life. Beneath the program is still, in effect, a rational-choice theory of allegiance: give people more housing, cheaper energy, and better infrastructure, and they will return to liberalism because the bargain has improved. In the end, this is less reconstruction than a social-democratic adjustment of neoliberalism.
The third current is philosophical, and seems to me the most interesting. Its question is the one the other two currents ignore: what does liberalism mean to the people who live under it? Not what institutions protect it, and not what outputs make it legitimate, but what kind of life it makes intelligible. The philosopher Alexandre Lefebvre answers that liberalism is already our ethos, a way of life rather than a mere framework. The critic Becca Rothfeld, reviewing the abundance canon in The Point, approaches the problem from the opposite direction: contemporary liberalism suffers from a visionary lack, an inability to say what a beautiful life would be. This debate puts liberalism itself on the examination table, and unlike the abundance agenda, which diagnoses a failure of delivery, it probes something closer to the doctrine’s soul. It asks whether liberalism has failed not only as a governing system, but as a moral and aesthetic sensibility.
Yet this current has its own blind spot, and it is sociological. The problem is that this account presents a particular class culture as liberalism itself. It reflects the habits of educated and mobile professionals, for whom changing jobs, places, identities, and ways of life can appear natural and liberating. Many people do not experience the world this way. They value continuity in work, family, place, and inherited forms of belonging, not because they fear freedom, but because these provide stability and meaning. What looks like openness from one social position can look like dispossession from another.
The three currents fall differently on the restoration/reconstruction scale. The first is restoration outright: it treats the crisis as an attack on a basically sound order. The second moves partway toward reconstruction by admitting failures of delivery, but it still accepts a neoliberal order in which the citizen has been reduced to a consumer. The third comes closest to genuine reconstruction because it asks what liberalism means as a way of life, but it still imagines that meaning from the standpoint of those already at home in liberalism.
What Would True Renewal Look Like?Reconstruction requires an admission that some part of the defeat was earned. For such a mea culpa to matter, however, it cannot remain abstract. It has to take the form of reforms and renunciations one can test. A reconstructed liberalism must be able to name, specifically, what it declines to rebuild, as well as what it seeks to change. Not in the safe idiom of “mistakes were made,” but as actual commitments: which powers will not be recovered, which promises will not be reissued, which habits of rule will not return under the softer name of renewal.
The first renunciation is endlessness. Liberalism has long been most fluent in the language of expansion: more openness, more growth, more mobility, more choice, more self-invention. But much of the contemporary revolt against liberalism begins from the intuition that not everything can expand forever. A reconstructed liberalism would learn to speak of limits, ecological, technological, social, even civilizational, without equating finitude with retreat.
The second renunciation is technocracy as a substitute for democracy. The pre-crisis order too often treated legitimacy as something produced by correct procedures, expert management, courts, and platforms. But a politics administered from above leaves citizens experiencing democracy as something done to them, not something they practice. A reconstructed liberalism would have to rebuild the institutions where democratic agency is learned first: unions, schools, municipalities, civic and religious bodies, professional communities, and non-platform media. Without them, politics appears as a choice between bureaucratic management and culture war.
The third renunciation is innocence about power. Reconstruction must be able to name who benefited from the old settlement and who paid for it. It cannot be authored only by the mobile, educated, culturally affirmed class for whom liberalism is obvious. It has to ask why the same order appeared to others as déclassement, abandonment, or humiliation. That also means confronting the private powers liberalism too often treated as neutral: finance, philanthropy, universities, consultancies, and the technology platforms that now organize political reality itself. A liberalism that can regulate the state but not discipline the powers that shape everyday life has not reconstructed democracy.
My point here is not to add another set of points to the renewal industry checklist, but to make the word reconstruction meaningful, and answerable to something. Liberals should name what failed on their own side and let that reckoning shape the questions that follow. What does liberalism refuse to carry forward? How can it reinvent itself beyond limitlessness in an age of finitude? Can it recover democracy from technocratic management? Can it name the class and technological powers that shaped the old order and benefited from it? These are the questions liberalism will have to answer if reconstruction is to become a genuine reinvention rather than a brittle return to a failing order.
Marlene Laruelle is a professor at Luiss University, Director of the Illiberalism Studies Program, and an author at Vivatopia.
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John Samuel Harpham is Assistant Professor in the Department of Classics and Letters and Wick Cary Assistant Professor at the Institute for the American Constitutional Heritage at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of The Intellectual Origins of American Slavery.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and John Harpham discuss why the standard racial account of slavery’s origins misses the earliest justifications for the practice, how Aristotelian and Roman conceptions of freedom and slavery shaped the intellectual world of the first English colonists, and what this history means for our understanding of slavery today.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You’ve written a really interesting book that is based on a dissertation that you did in the same department where I did my dissertation a few years before you. We knew each other a little bit in graduate school for a good few years apart about the history of slavery in the United States and the historical justifications for slavery. Probably most people who think about this subject assume that the story is relatively simple, that these were white colonists who thought of themselves in some important way as white and had a scheme of racial classification in their minds that perhaps wasn’t fully modern but resembles ours in some key respects. They thought these black people in Africa come from, in some sense, a kind of lower race, and therefore we can be justified in enslaving them. What’s wrong about the standard story that is told about this?
John Harpham: In some sense, the standard story is very powerful and very correct and applies very well to some aspects and some periods in the history of slavery, the history of American slavery. But it is a particularly American story, a peculiarly American story about the history of slavery. It owes many of its points of reference and historical support to the nineteenth century, which is the period that as Americans we tend to think about when we think about the history of slavery. It is less prepared to explain what I want to explain in my book, which is the origins of American slavery.
The premise of the book is that if we’re going to understand the origins of American slavery, we have to move back into an earlier time period and a broader geographical space than as Americans we’re accustomed to thinking about the history of slavery, in order to understand where American slavery came from. You have to move out into a different set of contexts. That’s what I’ve tried to do in my book. I think in the course of that expansion, expansion of the timeframe, expansion of the geographical scope, we immerse ourselves in a different history with a different set of parameters, a different set of ideological references, a different set of classical examples, different understandings of slavery, and indeed different understandings of what we would call race. That new context is what I’ve tried to explore much more than I think has been done so far.
Mounk: I imagine there’s two elements of the standard story that start to look a little askew when you go back earlier in the history of justification of slavery, looking not at what slave owners were saying during the debates about the abolition of slavery to justify continuing the practice, but rather at what people were thinking, saying, and writing at the time in which the American institution of slavery was invented. The first is that presumably there is a kind of notion of race at some point, a kind of pseudoscientific theory of race that develops in the nineteenth and later in the twentieth century, that just didn’t exist in the same way in the seventeenth century. The second, I suppose, and I wonder if that’s what you mean also by the geographic focus, is that from today’s perspective, what we want to understand is how a country that claims to be rooted in liberty, to have those ideals of self-determination, could have tolerated as apparent and as tyrannical an institution as slavery. But when you go back to the incipient moments of this practice in the United States, slavery was in some way normal around the world. There were a lot of parts of the world that were engaging in forms of explicit slavery or in forms of feudal serfdom and so on that have very important distinctions but that lie in a continuum with slavery as well. Are those two things that you have in mind here?
Harpham: Look, I think from the start it’s important to say that this is a very complex field. This is a field that touches upon not only the history of American slavery—it carries great weight and implications for understanding the nature and the character and the development of the American Republic. The story of the origins of American slavery has always been understood to be freighted with contemporary implications. But it’s a story that reaches back into more obscure tenets of early modern intellectual history and the history of the Atlantic world, of Europe and Africa and Asia as well. It forces us to expand our sense of the history of slavery into fields that are unfamiliar for many Americans living today and even for many American historians and historians of American slavery. It’s a very complex field that I think needs to be treated with the care and seriousness that it deserves.
I will also say that I’ve dedicated so far my career to the writing of this book—the full ten years of work to researching and writing this manuscript. But my conviction that I would work on the history of slavery comes from, I think, a familiar place for many Americans now, which is that I was born and raised in New Orleans, the center of the antebellum domestic slave trade. Until I came to Harvard for graduate school and met you and all of our colleagues, Yascha, I had never lived outside of the American South. That’s a part of the world and a part of the country, I think, where you can’t avoid the obvious fact that the past shapes the present and that in part we live in a nation that slavery made. And yet in the field of political theory, and we can talk about this, that history of slavery is not often thought to play a major role. The field of political theory for the most part has taken shape as a field interested in conceptions of freedom and the implications of those conceptions of freedom.
Coming from the background that I came from, I wanted to see if the tools of political theory, the sophisticated tools and methods of political theory, could be turned toward the study of the history of slavery—a topic that had not often been seen to be central to the field of political theory. Obviously one of the insights of the field of political theory is the second point that you point to here, not the first point that you made about race, which we can come back to, but the second point that you made about freedom. In the early modern period, the central tenet of early modern political thought is that all people are by nature free. But that carries with it the implication that the natural freedom of all humankind does not exclude the enslavement of some people who are born free. Indeed, it’s through the mechanisms by which we define freedom, in the case of natural rights in particular, that slavery is said to arise. That is one of the really unusual features of the early modern world and early modern thought that set the background for the origins of American slavery.
Mounk: To understand really what the justification of slavery was in the early years, we need to do this very important detour of understanding how the early colonists would have thought about questions like freedom. What you’re saying here is that those conceptions of freedom in some important way coexisted with, and perhaps even prepared the ground for, justification of slavery. This justification for slavery would not have been in the first instance a racial conception—it wouldn’t have been that white people are born to be free but black people are not capable of self-government and therefore should be slaves, or something like that. It is rooted in an Aristotelian tradition, which had one kind of set of justifications for slavery, and then a Roman tradition, which had a subtly distinct set of justifications for slavery. Tell us about what sort of ancient thinkers these eighteenth century colonists would have been drawing on when they reflect on a question like slavery.
Harpham: There’s more than enough time in the history of American slavery for racialized conceptions of freedom and slavery to develop. My book is planned as the first of three volumes in a series, and I intend to follow that history very closely into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But this book, conceived as the first of three volumes in the series, is focused on the period from 1550 to 1700—the vast Atlantic context around 1619, a date now familiar to many Americans as the date when the first enslaved Africans arrived in the English American colonies. From 1550 to 1700, roughly seen as the early modern period in the history of political thought, there were essentially two conceptions of slavery, and of the relationship between freedom and slavery, that were well understood and widely shared.
The first was drawn from the Politics of Aristotle, which held that nature itself marked a distinction within the human species. Aristotle says that within any composite whole composed of parts, those parts arrange themselves into a hierarchical order. According to Aristotle, this has taken place within the human species itself, such that some are by nature meant to be slaves and others are marked out by nature to be their masters. The two parts are intimately related, and so the inequality that slavery inscribes on human life is inherent within the nature of the persons that make up the human species.
The second conception of slavery, the second broad tradition of thinking about slavery, is very different and is drawn not from the authoritative text of Aristotle’s Politics but rather from the Corpus Iuris, the essential texts of Roman law. Roman law starts from a point almost diametrically opposed to the Aristotelian, which is that there are several sources of law, and the original one is the law of nature. Freedom and equality are the rule within the law of nature. According to the law of nature, all people are free and all are equal to each other in that sense. Slavery comes in over time as a result of accident and misfortune, not as an outcome of the different natures to which human beings are assigned, but rather as a result, most often, of the wars that emerge between states, and slavery comes in as a status assigned as an alternative to death for people who are taken captive in war. In other words, on the Roman conception, freedom is the rule for all humankind, and in principle anyone might come to be enslaved.
Both the Aristotelian and the Roman conceptions were well known in the early modern period, the critical period for the origins of American slavery. But over this period, as the Aristotelian conception of slavery almost always universally came to be rejected, especially in English culture, the Roman conception of slavery was received and adapted and became the basis for the ideas about slavery that would have been on offer in the period when American slavery began.
Mounk: The Aristotelian conception does have an idea of natural slavery, that some people are somehow naturally adapted to being slaves, but it’s not one where it’s because you’re born into a particular racial group that you’re naturally adapted to slavery. It can either be because of personal characteristics, or sometimes perhaps because you didn’t grow up in liberty, because you weren’t able to cultivate the virtues of liberty due to a condition you’ve been in from the past. The Roman conception more explicitly talks about circumstance and happenstance—if you are taken as prisoner in war in certain circumstances, that justifies your condition of slavery. There’s nothing that predestined you to fall into that state, but it is legitimate as a result of you losing in a particular battle, for example. You’re saying that it’s really that conception which was more alive in the minds of colonists in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. How do they apply that to the incipient transatlantic slave trade? How is it that they take these ideas developed in the context of ancient Athens, in the context of the ancient Roman Republic and perhaps the early Roman Empire, and apply this to what seems like quite a different situation? When I think about the Romans, a lot of the time we are talking about the Punic Wars and Romans at war with Carthage, for example, and in this military contest they’re able to take some prisoners. Then they say, well, here’s the justification for why these prisoners now become people who we can use as slaves. That seems very different from: we are over here in North America, and why don’t we start seafaring to these parts of West Africa and paying locals to go and capture a bunch of people, and then bind them, put them in terrible conditions, and ship them across the ocean. It doesn’t really seem like an analogous situation.
Harpham: We can take some time to unpack this, because as I said, these are very complicated issues. We have to pay attention not only to change over time but also to difference across space and parts of the Atlantic world. What you just said, Yascha, quite correctly, is that it doesn’t seem that the institution of American slavery neatly fits with any conception of slavery developed on the Roman model. The idea and the institution seem so radically different from each other that it seems impossible for the one to have drawn support from the other—for the institution of American slavery, the origins of American slavery, to have emerged from a world saturated in Roman ideas.
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As I said, these are complicated issues. In order to understand the origins of American slavery, we have to first move beyond the borders of present-day America, North America even, the Caribbean even, and move back across the Atlantic—not to the new world, but rather to the old—and understand the complex process by which American slavery, a radically new institution, a new form of human evil which departed in many respects from any ancient precedent that there was for the institution of slavery, came from the old, from old ideas about slavery, ancient societies that understood themselves to be rooted in customs of slavery that went back as far as the classical past. That is the project of my book. It’s not a neat story. It’s not a unidirectional story, and in many ways I think it’s a surprising story for those of us who come from a background of knowing about the history of American slavery.
Two points in response to your question. The first is that the Aristotelian understanding of slavery has to be realized to have been unusual even in the ancient world. Aristotle posed his conception of natural slavery in opposition to the dominant understandings of the time, which more or less corresponded to the Roman ideas about slavery, in which slavery arose not from nature but rather convention most often—the convention that captives taken in war were enslaved. This convention was not a local custom. It wasn’t applied in small corners of the world in short periods of time.
When slavery entered Roman law, it entered not by means of the law of nature, which established freedom and equality as the rule in human relations. It entered through a separate source of law known as the law of nations. What was the law of nations in Roman law? It was thought to be a collection of the customs common to all the peoples of the world—not only to the Romans, but to their imperial rivals, and also to the ancient Israelites, and the customs of slavery described in the law of nations, at least to some extent, describe the laws on slavery set out in the Hebrew Bible. Slavery is understood to be legitimate under the law of nations not because it is just or good for the person who is enslaved, but because it is one of the common customs of the world.
Still in the early modern period, even if the English colonists and their metropolitan supporters didn’t understand themselves to be living in the legacies of the old Roman Empire, they did understand that the law of nations, best described and captured in Roman law, still adequately encapsulated the common customs of the world, slavery included.
Mounk: To what extent was that a fiction all along? To what extent did that law of nations systematize something that really existed? To what extent was that always the Roman imagination?
Harpham: Of course, my primary interest as a scholar is in imaginations and conceptions. But I can say that in the early modern world, across vast swaths of the Atlantic world, the law of nations’ understanding of slavery—most often a status assigned as an alternative to death for captives taken in wars—continued as the common practice of most of the nations of the world. This is the same period in time, 1550 to 1700, when the English became acutely aware that slavery and its later descendant, villainage in particular, had ended within the borders of the realm. They believed that their nation marked an exception to the common customs of the world, in particular with respect to the practices of slavery. Europeans did not take slaves of one another in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even when taking captives in war. They would kill each other, they would torture each other. Some observers, such as Alberico Gentili, said that wars between European nations would be less brutal if slavery persisted as a custom between them. But by the early modern period, the nations of Europe had decided not to enslave one another even when taken captive in war. We can talk about the sources and implications of that cultural consensus. But across the vast stretch of the nations of the world, you find this very clearly stated in all the surveys of the world and atlases from the time—slavery as a status assigned to captives in war persisted well into the early modern period. There’s no question.
Mounk: In some ways Europeans at this point think that they’re exceptional in that slavery did not play a big role in those societies, at least in that they didn’t enslave each other. What did the American colonists think about this? They think of themselves as English at that period, I assume. They identify with the intellectual heritage of the old world to a very large extent. How is it that they base themselves on the general world of sixteenth, seventeenth century English thought, but then say under our circumstances in the new world, when it comes to dealing with people from the African continent, slavery somehow is justified, or natural, or whatever it is that they would have said?
Harpham: Of course, as scholarship in the last twenty years has shown in a lot of detail, the enslavement of Native Americans is as important a part of the early English colonies, and particularly the early English North American colonies, as the enslavement of African Americans. We can discuss the way those stories fit together, and I think they are parts of a single complex story.
I’ll render the cultural consensus of early modern Europe in more precise terms than I just did. Europeans had believed that they had come to a consensus never to enslave one another, even when taken captives in war. But they stated that consensus not in terms of geography, in terms of the continent of Europe, but rather in terms of their membership in a religious community, which was Christendom. They believed that they had come to a consensus never to practice slavery against other peoples who lay within the borders of Christendom. For the purposes of war, for the purpose of the treatment of captives taken in war, slaves or captives taken within wars within Christendom were treated as captives in civil wars had always been, and captives in civil wars had never been enslaved, despite the obvious and well-known brutality of civil war. That said, outside of the borders of Christendom, the common law of nations’ customs of slavery continued in effect, which is to say that Europeans believed that when the Roman conditions were met, peoples who came from outside of the borders of Christendom might legitimately be enslaved, and that they might legitimately enslave them, but only when those conditions were met.
In the early modern period, those Roman customs, the Roman description of the common customs of the world, had had one exception made to it, which was within the borders of Christendom. The law of nations continued in effect in the rest of the world. In the American colonies, this was the ideological structure for ideas about slavery—even though English servants and servants from the British Isles were notoriously treated horrifically in the early British colonies, and worked alongside enslaved Africans and enslaved Native Americans, and their treatment was widely said to be more or less the same on a daily basis, the distinction between the servitude of people from the British Isles and the enslavement of Native Americans and African Americans continued in effect, drawing on this older cultural consensus that Christians would not enslave one another.
Mounk: That was an important guardrail that limited who could be enslaved in this kind of way. But what was then the justification for saying that, when you’re dealing with Native Americans, when you’re dealing with Africans that you go and search out across the sea, that is a legitimate activity? How does that constrain the treatment of people who convert to Christianity? Presumably, prima facie, you might think that if you cannot enslave Christians, then one way that an enslaved person should be able to escape their condition is to convert to Christianity. That obviously is not how the institution of chattel slavery ends up working in the United States.
Harpham: Yes, of course. This is a very important part of the story, because so many of the debates in the early English Atlantic colonies were debates not so much about slavery as such as they were debates about the implications of conversion. For background here, the most important English American colonies before 1700 were not the North American colonies—not Massachusetts, not Virginia, not even Carolina. The development of slavery and servitude, parallel developments of slavery and servitude in those colonies, have been well examined by historians and examined in minute detail. The canonical treatments of the origins of American slavery are treatments that deal with Virginia, that see slavery developing over the seventeenth century within Virginia, or Massachusetts in more recent years, or in Carolina. But in this period, the early period for the origins of the English Atlantic Empire, the most populous and richest colony in the English Atlantic world wasn’t Virginia—it was Barbados, and soon, in the second half of the seventeenth century, it was Jamaica that came to the fore. These were the sugar colonies, rather than colonies founded upon the production of other staple crops, tobacco or cotton, for example.
Anyhow, the debates about slavery in these English American colonies, as I said, were most often debates about conversion, and they sprang from the set of convictions that we have just introduced: if it is taken to be the case that Christendom makes an exception to the common customs of the world, that Christians will not take one another as slaves even when taken captives in war, what happens when certain people who have been enslaved are converted to Christ and brought within the Christian fold? Many of the metropolitan supporters of the English colonies, including the Crown—this was always the position of the Crown—believed that the conversion of people who were enslaved in the colonies was a seriously important project.
Mounk: You wanted to convert people because you have a religious obligation to spread the good word about Jesus and you want to save people’s souls. But this comes with a very big practical problem, which is that you’re suddenly encouraging the conversion of people on whom you’re relying for your economic production of sugar and other crops to be enslaved. If carrying out this religious obligation means that you’re eating into your own workforce, well, you have a problem.
Harpham: Exactly. Not just a problem, but a problem with explosive implications, which is that if it was the case that enslaved people in the American colonies were converted to Christ and could no longer be held as slaves, then it could no longer be said that the border between slave and free corresponded to the border between Christian and heathen, or Christian and outside the Christian realm. The border between slave and free had to be stated in other terms.
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With all the perverse inventiveness that characterized so much of the development of the English Atlantic Empire, the early English colonists, especially in Barbados and Jamaica and to some extent also in Virginia, said that as a result of the success of the project of conversion, the border between slave and free was not between Christian and other, it was between black and white. It’s out of this set of developments and debates, rooted in this very distinctive early modern world, that the English and English colonists first started to state the distinction between slave and free in terms of the distinction between black and white.
Mounk: How close are we here to a racial justification of slavery? As I take it, the point is: how are you allowed to take a slave? This is part of the law of nations. It’s always been the case, nothing that remarkable about it. But it would obviously be totally inappropriate to take a Christian as a slave. So you’ve taken these various people as slaves, and some of them have now converted to Christianity. How can you justify continuing to keep them as slaves, and continuing, in the case of chattel slavery, to keep as slaves people who are born as Christians, the children of those enslaved people? Is the answer here: yes, but they’re black? Is it as straightforward as that? Does it at that point just morph into a straight-up racial justification of slavery, or is it more complicated?
Harpham: We’re dealing not simply with change over time, we’re also going to have to deal with differences across space. But if we zero in for now on the English American colonies, the colonists and the planters, famously, were not interested in the project of conversion. This is especially true on Barbados and Jamaica. The Crown and the metropolitan English authorities were always convinced of the importance of conversion, but the planters themselves were notoriously not interested in any ideas at all. As one early observer said, they had made Mammon their God, the sole deity on the island of Barbados.
There were differences that emerged between the discourses about slavery in the metropole and the colonies, but let’s just focus on the colonies for now. You ask how close we are to a paradigmatic racial justification for slavery. I think the answer is we’re very close already at this point, and this is the point to which I come toward the end of the book, in the final decades of the seventeenth century. In the course of these debates about the borders set down around the practice of slavery, between slave and free, attention was fixed upon the difference between black and white as the dividing line. Some of the early colonists had started to realize that the borders around the practice of slavery could be made into a justification for enslavement themselves—that it was not only the case that the distinction between slave and free corresponded to the distinction between black and white, it could also be said to be the case that people who were black were essentially meant for slavery, that those who were white could never be enslaved themselves, that freedom was their proper condition.
But still, these are debates and a series of horrific insights drawn in small corners of the Atlantic world, in remote, mostly island communities such as Barbados and Jamaica, where some planters were starting to realize what ideas would be required from them in order to defend and justify not only the origins of slavery as an institution, but its persistence over time on a racial basis.
Mounk: In a way, this is obviously the point that is striking to us moderns about the institution as a whole—the answer is also question-begging. What is it about the fact that this person, the colonist, is white, and this person, the enslaved, is black, that justifies it? Over time, different kinds of accounts of racial superiority and inferiority have been offered. One common one is to say that members of a white race are capable of rational self-governance in a way that other ethnic or racial groups are not. What was the justification that one of those planters in Barbados would have made if we were able to travel back in time and ask: okay, well, you had this justification about Christians and non-Christians, that has a set of religious justifications. Now you’re suddenly saying it’s not about that at all, it’s about the fact that you’re white and these people you’re enslaving are black. What is it about you being white and them being black which justifies this dominion?
Harpham: Yes, and as I said, these are complex and very nuanced issues. It’s not so much a matter of, over the course of my book—I try to put it in these terms—it’s not so much a matter of there was one idea and not another idea, this idea was prevalent and that idea was never present. It’s more a matter of the balancing, the way in which you construct the relative priority of ideas that were competing with one another, that were coexisting with one another, that existed within a complex sphere of discussion and debate, that differed over time from author to author and from place to place.
As this small number of American colonists in these remote island communities, operating and innovating in a radically new plantation complex that was created over a short period of time, rapidly, and on the basis of new discoveries and innovations in the cultivation of sugar, started to formulate new ideas that would justify the novel institutions they were just then developing, they did draw upon ideas from the past that had always been available, that had always been perhaps more minor strands in the discourse about slavery. One of them is that the colonists, the planters, and their defenders started to articulate the Aristotelian doctrine that nature makes a distinction between slave and free, that the peoples of Africa are essentially slaves, and that white people, or the English, are essentially free. They also picked up on another ancient justification for enslavement and hierarchy, not from the world of classical philosophy but from the text of the Hebrew Bible, which had come to be known as the Curse of Ham. Some of the early colonists and their supporters started to say that the peoples of Africa in the present were drawn from the descendants of the person who had received the old curse pronounced upon the son of Ham, Canaan, in Genesis.
Mounk: For those listeners who are not up on the Bible, remind us what the curse of Ham is.
Harpham: I’ve laid out a debate about slavery that there was in the classical world between Aristotle and Roman law. But there was also another set of ideas about slavery available in the early modern period, drawn from the ancient world, not from texts of classical philosophy but from the Bible, from the Hebrew Bible in particular. The first mention of slavery in the Hebrew Bible takes place in Genesis, after the flood, after Noah has planted a vineyard and lies drunken in his tent, having drunk from the products of the vine. One of Noah’s sons, Ham, walks into his tent and sees him in his nakedness. When he awoke, Noah knew what Ham had done, according to the text, and pronounced upon him a curse: “a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren,” Shem and Japheth. This was often taken in the early modern period to be a curse of slavery, that Ham and his descendants had been cursed to slavery. This is the first mention of slavery in the Bible, because, as in Roman law, in the text of the Hebrew Bible freedom is the original condition of the species. Freedom is the rule at the start, in the Garden of Eden, as it was in Roman law, and slavery comes in over time. But here in the Bible it comes in not as a result of captivity taken in war, but rather as the product of punishment for a wrong act.
Mounk: So these are different ways of starting to say: there’s this curse in the Bible, and now the people we want to enslave so happen to be—isn’t it useful—the descendants of a person on whom this curse was pronounced. How do I put this? What is the evidence for that, I suppose? Is it just a free-floating idea? Is there meant to be some attribute that Ham and his descendants have that you can look out into the world and see in these people? How much substance is there to this idea, other than this kind of reference that one can grasp in a way that makes it feel logically useful to somebody who wants to claim to be a Christian and also practice slavery?
Harpham: Well, of course, Ham and his descendants were always associated with sin. They were associated with the violation of proper order. Sin has always been associated with slavery. This is a point made by one of the great scholars of the history of slavery and antislavery, David Brion Davis, that in the Christian tradition, ideas about slavery were always intimately associated with ideas about sin. Slavery, in a sense, was the result of sin because, like so many other features of the modern world, slavery was a product of the fall. Freedom was the rule in the Garden of Eden. So to tell a story about the origins of slavery, you had to go back to the original act of the fall, which was the source of all forms of hierarchy and subordination, and labor, and property as well. So Ham was associated with sin, and sin was associated with slavery.
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At the same time, you and I, Yascha, were both, in a sense, trained by, and at least exposed to, practitioners of what’s called the Cambridge School in the history of political thought. Over the course of my book I make a move that will be well known to practitioners of the Cambridge School but I think less well known to historians of American slavery. It’s a common move in intellectual history: in order to understand the history of an idea, you should first try to grasp as much as possible the context in which that idea was understood, and try to understand the question it seemed to answer. Reconstruct the questions around that idea, and then try to understand the answer that idea seemed to present. Practitioners of the Cambridge School have done this extensively with respect to ideas about liberty, and I try to do it with respect to ideas about slavery.
Now, in the early modern period, in English culture and in European culture in general, the Curse of Ham was available, and was well known. But it was used as an answer to a variety of different questions, most often not an answer to questions about how to justify contemporary practices of slavery. Rather, especially in English discourse, the Curse of Ham most often came up in response to another related question, which was the origins of black skin. Englishmen by this time took for granted that white was the natural or original color of the human species, that people were originally white like themselves, and that blackness was innate and permanent as a skin color among many of the peoples of the world. In order to explain this distinction, in order to explain the origins of black skin over time, there are many answers on offer. One of them, a well-known but almost always rejected, notorious answer, had been put forward by an author from 1578 named George Best. Best said that blackness arose among peoples who lived south of the Sahara Desert as a legacy of the original curse in the Bible—that the curse was associated not in this instance with slavery but rather with blackness, with black skin color, and emerged as a possible answer to the problem for the English of blackness.
This is an ominous development. From an early period in the English American colonies, when the colonists wanted to justify the enslavement of people who were black and the freedom of people who were white like themselves, this curse, which had been most often associated with blackness, was fastened upon as an explanation now for enslavement.
Mounk: That’s interesting, and we can see how that’s both very different from modern conceptions of race and can strangely serve some of the same purposes. Modern racism might say something like: there are genetic differences between groups of people, and this group is in this and that way superior, and that group is in this and that way inferior, and that warrants the superior group treating members of the inferior group in particular ways. Whereas here there’s this kind of quasi, semi-racial and semi-theological justification, which is something like: there’s a group of people in the world who are subject to this curse because they and their descendants are in some way sinful, and black skin is just a mark of having that curse. In a way, it’s epiphenomenal. It might be a useful sign that allows you to determine who is a member of that group, but it’s not the black skin that either causes sinfulness or straightforwardly justifies being enslaved. It’s simply a hallmark of being a member of a group that has those attributes.
Harpham: At the same time, the English in this period never doubted that being white like themselves was a peculiar privilege, and that being black in color was a mark of ugliness and inferiority as well. Not just a mark—in their view, blackness was often taken to be the opposite of beauty, and whiteness was taken to be the ultimate measure of beauty. From this early period, blackness was used as a kind of mark to draw together a variety of different strands of ideas and statuses and practices, and was fastened upon not only as a kind of ancient sign that had come from a curse, but also, in the contemporary world, as a mark used to visibly divide slave from free.
This was all in the service of the aim of the English colonists with respect to the origins of American slavery: to answer the question of why an entire order of persons who had been enslaved far away, thousands of miles off in the distance, in circumstances no one wanted to inquire into, and perhaps long ago as well, could never come to be free. What they wanted to establish was the permanence and heritability of slavery over time. In order to do so, they grounded their conceptions of slavery in what you start to describe as a racial conception—slavery built into the permanent and heritable features of an entire order of persons, into a race. But this is an idea about slavery that comes together in the English colonies. In Africa, by contrast, at the sources of slavery across the Atlantic world, the set of ideas used to describe and justify slavery were actually very different. So now we’ve started to lay out the set of ideas associated with the origins of slavery as an institution in the American colonies. But as we said from the start, a very important piece of the book is to describe the earlier world of ideas from which that set of ideas came.
Mounk: I know you have a three-volume masterpiece in the works, with two more volumes to write. Give us a little preview of how those ideas then change and transmute later on. How is it that the people in the American South who were resisting the abolition of slavery drew upon the ideas we’ve been talking about, and I’m sure changed and transformed them, in order to make a case for why that institution should be preserved? How much continuity is there between those ideas and the kind of racial thinking in which some people engage today?
Harpham: Change over time is such an important factor in describing the history of American slavery. Historians have long recognized this, but it’s a difficult point to keep at the front of our minds—that, like any human institution, the history of slavery marks dramatic changes across space and across time. The aim of this book is to describe origins, and in particular to describe a set of debates about the sources of slavery, drawn from the precedents of Roman law and used to understand the sources of the slave trade in Africa. The sources of slavery refer to those dramatic, calamitous transformations of people who are naturally free into those who are enslaved.
Already by the time of the development of slavery in the early English colonies, a different question needed to be answered with respect to slavery: why an entire order of persons who had been enslaved could never become free—the continuation of slavery over time. Into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the most important fact in debates about American slavery became the fact of American slavery itself. So many of the debates about American slavery well known to us today, from Jefferson up to the point of abolition, are not debates about the sources of slavery or the character of slavery itself; they take their starting point from the fact of the massive institution, and are debates about the possibilities of radical abolition, or the impossibility of uprooting a structure that had already been in place. Over time you see the debates about slavery move from debates about slavery itself and its sources to debates about the ends of slavery, about abolition. That is the vast narrative I think I’ll be telling in the next two volumes of this series, which will take us up to the point of abolition in 1865.
Mounk: That’s really helpful. Let me play devil’s advocate for a moment. I’m trying to get into the mind of a listener who hasn’t studied political theory and intellectual history like you and I have, and who’s perhaps less convinced of the importance of these ideas. They might say something like the following: what you’re describing here is a set of societies with very strong economic interests. If you want to make a profit producing sugar in Barbados, or make a profit producing cotton in the American South, having access to very cheap, reliable labor is of utmost importance. These are very labor-intensive processes. All that’s going on here is that Mammon was king. Ideas aren’t that important. People were engaging in the economic institution that best served the bottom line. They were cynically enslaving people in order to have ongoing access to that cheap labor, to expropriate from people any legitimate benefits they could have drawn from their hard work. Sure, as an epiphenomenon of all of that, they came up with justifications—at the beginning, when it was enough to just enslave people who were not Christian, they said this is all about Christians and non-Christians. When suddenly some of these enslaved people convert to Christianity and that justification doesn’t work anymore, well, you cast your eyes around, you come up with the next best explanation, and now you make it about the obvious fact that the people doing the enslaving are white and the people being enslaved are black, and you come up with some justification for that. But somebody who’s looking at a simple economic model here, who’s analyzing the political economy of the cotton trade or the sugar trade, is going to be able to get to ninety to ninety-five percent of everything we’ve talked about—all of these very complex ideas, these very subtle reconstructions of how people tried to make sure they could sleep well at night while engaging in these horrific practices—and ultimately these ideas are besides the point. Perhaps we get to the last three or four percent here or there. But why focus on this rather than these underlying material, political, and economic interests?
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and John discuss the relationship between ideas and material interests, and how these shaped American slavery. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
It’s a big week for Persuasion in DC! On Wednesday July 15, Yascha Mounk sits down with Francis Fukuyama to discuss how liberalism should respond to postliberal critiques. Find out more and get tickets here!
And on Friday July 17, we’re hosting drinks in the aftermath of the Liberalism for the 21st Century conference! This is your ideal chance to socialize with the Persuasion team and other readers. Note that you do not need to have attended the conference to come to this event. Join us from 9:30pm at Hive Rooftop, Hotel Hive. Just make sure to RSVP here!
Donald Trump on Air Force One on July 8, 2026. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images.)The President of the United States falls asleep in cabinet meetings and basketball games. He mixes up Greenland with Iceland and Iran with Japan. He sometimes slurs his words and gets lost wandering across a stage during a state event.
If our last president succumbed to age while in office, there’s some reason to believe that Donald Trump may not be fully with it all the way through his term.
But don’t count on it.
I watched several hours of Trump speaking at different points in his political career, focusing in particular on his gaffes. What I found is that he is older and slower, that his voice lacks the command it once had, that he does tend to ramble more than he did, but also that he is still basically himself. If, for long swathes of his term, Joe Biden made no public appearances at all, spoke only when reading from a teleprompter, and kept his appearances to short and scripted exchanges, Trump continues to interact with the press and to speak off the cuff. There’s some slender evidence that he might have suffered a neurological episode, but in his most recent speeches he is voluble and pugnacious and speaks without evident difficulty.
That’s not to deny that Trump’s age—he just turned 80—may well be a significant factor in the remainder of his second term and that a succession battle could soon emerge in the Republican Party. But Democrats who have a persistent fantasy of an imminent decline in Trump’s ability to lead are, based on the videos I watched, likely to be disappointed.
In 2015 and 2016, when first running for the presidency, Trump, more than anything else, hinged his candidacy on vitality—he was in his 70s but made over 300 rally appearances. He shouts and bellows in his 2015 speech announcing his run. The impression he gives is of barely being able to contain his energy and rage. In his 2016 and 2020 debates with Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden, respectively, he is a snarling presence on stage, quick to interrupt both his rival candidates and the debate moderators—interrupting Clinton 106 times across three debates, according to a PBS breakdown, and interrupting Biden somewhere between 70 and 120 times during their first debate. To critics, he came across as a bully—CNN commentator Dana Bash called the Biden debate a “shitshow” immediately after it ended. But Trump’s demeanor in the debates was clearly calculated—as commentators acknowledged, he appeared “pugilistic” in contrast to the far more sedate Clinton and Biden.
In his period out of power, Trump was spotted sleeping in the courtroom during the Stormy Daniels trial. And in the 2024 presidential race, mental lapses and speaking slips became almost routine for him. He confused Nikki Haley for Nancy Pelosi, claimed he was running against Barack Obama, and his speech was characterized by more tangents and repetition than before. In a discussion during the election, Fred Trump, Donald’s nephew, described a family history of dementia and speculated that Donald might have signs of the same dementia that afflicted his father, Fred Sr. “He just can’t stick to a message. And he used to be able to stick to a message,” Fred Trump III said. The conservative pundit Megyn Kelly noted, “He goes on too long at his rallies … to where you get kind of bored, you lose the thread, you lose interest, which is not something you’re used to with Trump.” And Joe Rogan, in their famous podcast interview, complained to Trump at one point during the conversation that “your weave is getting wide.”
The age question was a liability for Trump all through the election, and particularly when Kamala Harris replaced Biden on the Democratic ticket—an ABC News poll in July 2024 found that a full 60% of voters believed Trump was “too old for a second term.” The New York Times noted that Trump held only 61 rallies before November 2024, about five times fewer than in 2016. Watching Trump during the 2024 election it’s clear that he had slowed down but was still sharp. His voice was softer than in 2015/16. The tangents, as Kelly noted, often made him dull to listen to. But he engaged with interlocutors in a way that Biden seemed to struggle with and was able to stay focused for long interviews and events. Certainly, the contrast between the two candidates was on vivid display in the June 2024 debate.
The most intriguing analysis of Trump’s health is that he suffered a serious decline somewhere towards the summer of 2025. In August, the release of an older photo of himself playing golf, initially passed off as being more recent, raised widespread speculation—alongside his largely empty public schedule—that something had gone seriously wrong with the president’s health. The Hill, a bellwether of Washington political opinion, ran a piece headlined “Trump’s mental decline is unavoidable—so what now?”
And several of Trump’s public appearances into the winter of 2025/26 raised questions about his fitness. The video of his state visit to Japan in October, when he several times had to be guided by Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi, was reminiscent of moments when Biden wandered aimlessly across a stage and the clip was widely interpreted as Trump losing it in public. I find the video inconclusive. Trump does seem lost, but the sequence of bowing and saluting is actually pretty complicated and Trump’s errors may be more attributable to his not knowing his blocking and being bored out of his mind during a state ceremony than to cognitive decline.
Meanwhile, videos of him apparently sleeping during cabinet meetings are more conclusive. It definitely looks like he’s sleeping—no matter that Secretary of State Marco Rubio found himself swearing under oath to Congress that “I’ve never seen him fall asleep, on the contrary the guy doesn’t sleep.”
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Trump’s speeches at the coal event in February and at Davos in March raise more difficult questions about his neurological state. He slurs his words, lisping the word “undisputed” in the coal speech and then muttering unintelligibly for a few seconds before regaining composure. His voice lacks its usual timbre. He seems low-energy and ill-at-ease and sometimes has trouble returning from tangents, to the extent that the rumor of a neurological episode of some kind doesn’t seem far-fetched. At Davos, he also four times confuses “Iceland” with “Greeland.”
By contrast, at NATO in July, he seems to be more in control of himself. There are still moments of verbal tics like when he cuts himself off in the middle of the word “jobs.” And in a panel discussion with Volodymyr Zelenskyy he swaps the name of “Iran” with “Japan.” In general, his voice doesn’t fill up a room in the way it used to. But the slurring of his words as at Davos is largely absent. The Iran/Japan gaffe occurred during a 40-minute unscripted discussion in which Trump seemed in control of his faculties. And he was animated in delivering his speech at the end of the summit.
What’s striking in all of these speeches—maybe Davos in particular—is the way that Trump is still highly incendiary, railing against environmentalism and the European Union and agitating for the United States to take Greenland (unless maybe it’s Iceland) without having any particular conviction in his voice. It’s possible to read that not just as routine but as age—with age, people tend to become the purest distillations of their personalities, and it wouldn’t be a surprise if the pure distillation of Trump turns out to be showmanship. The content of what he’s saying often, increasingly, seems to not matter to him—whether the missiles are being fired by Japan or Iran, whether it’s Iceland or Greenland that’s to be invaded, whether he’s seated next to Zelenskyy or Putin—but the “weave,” as he describes his speech, always widens out before holding together.
Even with his voice weaker and his presence diminished, there’s the same patter—the certainty of being at the center of attention, the litanies of enemies and grievances, the not-always-entirely plausible record of his own accomplishments, the firehose of falsehoods. An episode from last year in which Trump confabulated a wholly imaginary relationship between his uncle and Ted Kaczynski, as well as a conversation between Trump and his uncle, has been cited by several outlets as evidence of Trump losing his marbles, but that somehow seems more par for the course for him—there was something that he liked about the story, something in the glimpse of Kaczynski as a young know-it-all, and he was perfectly happy to swap in a mass of wholly unlikely details and to pass it off as a fact. A story like that, by itself, doesn’t suggest much of a deviation for a figure who was documented by The Washington Post as making 30,000 false or misleading claims across his first term, at a rate of 21 a day.
If Trump’s public appearances show him to be older and slower but basically still himself, the possibility of his decline is nonetheless significant. He is not pure virality, as he often seemed to be even during the 2024 campaign—the iconic photo of him following the Butler assassination attempt spoke, more than anything else, to his perceived indestructibility. If, early in his second term, his most fervent supporters were already thinking about 2028—Steve Bannon claiming that there was a “plan” for Trump to stay in power and arguing that “a guy like this comes around once in a century and we’ve got to get everything out of Trump we can get”—that kind of fanaticism seems largely to have left even the MAGA movement. Simon Tisdall argued, in late 2025, that “we’re seeing the first signs of the battle over Trump’s succession,” with JD Vance and Marco Rubio, the two most likely heirs, carving out their separate lanes, Vance something closer to Christian nationalism and Rubio to a more neocon foreign policy.
The sense that Trump is diminished is starting to run through the conservative world. Even thinking about a succession is a far cry from what the Republican Party looked like in the lead-up to 2024 when no serious threat to Trump emerged. The impression of the administration is that it has fiefdoms within it, with Rubio, for instance, having an extensive foreign policy brief and Stephen Miller pushing an aggressive domestic agenda without obvious signs of direct control by Trump.
Democrats are fantasizing about an imminent collapse by Trump. If you watch his speeches and public appearances, that doesn’t seem likely. But, at the same time, he is not the force of nature that he was. And, as he celebrates his 80th birthday, it becomes possible—for the first time in a decade, really—to conceive of a world after Trump.
Sam Kahn is staff editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.
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Will you be in Washington, D.C. on Wednesday July 15? I will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about how liberalism should respond to the postliberal threat. Find out more and get your free ticket here! —Yascha
Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, sometimes described as “the conscience of economics,” holds the Isaiah Berlin Chair in Liberal Thought at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Deirdre McCloskey discuss why liberalism drives economic growth, how the gradual erosion of inherited hierarchy unleashed centuries of innovation, and what liberals should think about the trans debate.
We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.
That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.
This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I’m really excited to talk to you in part just because of the span of your work, and I really want to discuss your case for liberalism, but in a way that starts with The Industrial Revolution and the enormous economic progress that we’ve made over the last centuries. There is a big debate in history, in economics, about what actually caused that unprecedented economic liftoff that started some 250 years ago. You have a slightly surprising point of view on this, that ideas are actually more central to the origin of economic growth than most economists think. Tell us perhaps what the conventional story is and why you disagree with it.
Deirdre McCloskey: Well, there are two conventional stories, from the left and the right. From the left, the story is exploitation—the exploitation of the English working class, and then the exploitation of imperialism and slavery and so forth. Exploitation is supposed to result in surplus value, which then is used to invest, and investment then makes for the modern world, makes for increasing income. That’s on the left. On the right, it ends up being the same story without the exploitation. Virtuous capitalists save more, according to the conventional story, and that results in capital accumulation, just as they say on the left, and that leads to the modern world. So it’s essentially capital investment accumulation that’s supposed to have caused our enrichment.
But that doesn’t make a lot of sense. From a historical point of view, we’ve always invested. Humans always invest. We invest in paddy fields going up mountainsides, and irrigation works, and Roman roads, and then indeed even in the Middle Ages, the peasants had to save a quite high percentage of their crop for seed. So they were investing. There’s nothing new about investment. That’s the historical problem.
And the economic problem is that sheer capital accumulation—sheer piling up of buildings, machines, or indeed university educations—comes very quickly, economists have always known, to diminishing returns. If you had two cars, I guess that’d be nice. Three would be junk. Four would be a burden. Diminishing returns is very strong. So those don’t work, and I’ve written extensively on why they all don’t work. Coal is one explanation. Well, that doesn’t work either, and they all don’t work. So why? Why did we get rich? How did we get rich?
Mounk: Interesting. So this traditional story is that over time people were able to save and accumulate these things, and that then allowed them to reinvest, and so on. Okay. We’ll come back to a steelman version of that perhaps later, but if you’ve ruled that out, if that isn’t working, then what’s the alternative view that can make sense of this growth?
McCloskey: The alternative view that I favor is the creation, in the eighteenth century in northwestern Europe—first in Holland, then in Britain, and most particularly in Scotland, and then more or less accidentally at the same time in the English colonies in North America—of the idea of liberalism in a certain way, a certain ideology. This is ideology, Marx’s word, and I think it’s a very useful one. Ideology changed in this corner of the world, especially in the late eighteenth century. The idea of equality of permission became much stronger than it had been in the past. Hierarchy, in other words, was in question.
We still have hierarchies, but they’re often hierarchies of a sort that we admire and want more of. Inventors make money, good singers make money, and good football players make money. But in earlier times, hierarchy was inherited and had nothing to do with progress. The result was, I claim, and I show that innovation enormously increased. Ordinary people were allowed to have a go. This is an English commonplace, and having a go made the poor even innovative. So it’s through innovation, not through sheer accumulation, that we became rich.
Then the question is why innovation? My claim is this change in ideology. Once that genie was out of the bottle, other people in the world became interested in this matter. When you look at protests—the ones in Iran last year, or the ones a few years ago against Putin, or the Arab Spring, or Tiananmen Square—always what they’re asking for is this equality of permission. They’re not asking for special subsidies or government programs to help this person or that person. So it’s this ideological change that made the modern world.
Mounk: So let me get at the heart of why it is that hierarchy is such an impediment to economic growth, and the specific ways in which hierarchy went away. There are two kinds of challenges to this. One is to say, well, look, you can have hierarchy and have economic growth—the king still wants to be richer, even if most of the benefits of economic activity flow to a few people. So why is it that, before these new ideas came into being, the specific kind of hierarchy that existed really was such an impediment to innovation that it basically stopped economic growth for thousands of years?
And then, of course, one challenge that people are going to have is to say, but you look at 1850, and there still are very steep hierarchies between men and women, between one social class and another, between people in Britain and people in the colonies. So in what sense is the difference in the nature of a hierarchy between 1750 and 1850, or between 1650 and 1900, if you prefer, so qualitatively important—but gives you just enough non-hierarchy that this kind of innovation can start to occur in a way it didn’t earlier?
McCloskey: It’s slow. It’s gradually expanding. The first great victory of this ideology is abolishing slavery in the British Empire in 1833, and then eventually in the United States. Then the women say, well, why not us? And that takes a long time to come to fruition. And the queers—in northern Europe there’s a hundred-year reign of terror against homosexuals, especially male homosexuals. And then there’s, in the United States, this horrible continuation of slavery and so-called Jim Crow. Eventually, in the 1960s it starts to fall, but it’s reviving right now as we speak. So yes, there are these hierarchical, racist, classist, imperialist, in general radical conservative forces that keep trying to make it go away.
But as Tocqueville pointed out in the 1830s, after his visit to the United States, the great modern movement is equality—that everyone’s supposed to be the same, and there’s not to be, at least, inherited hierarchy. Now, of course, we all have bosses—at least I do, and lots of people do—but we’re free to leave if we want. We might have to leave for a much poorer job, but on the other hand, we’re free to leave, whereas a slave isn’t. A wife, under English common law, could own no property except her dress and her jewelry. That was it. So it’s slow.
As far as the earlier hierarchy, as you point out, why wasn’t it in the interest of the ruling class to allow people to innovate? Because they could themselves take the rents, say on land, that would be increased by this. To some degree, the British ruling class in the eighteenth century realized this, and indeed the aristocrats owned mines and built canals and were involved in trade, as many comparable aristocracies were forbidden to do. In France, for example, if you engaged in trade as an aristocrat, you lost your aristocratic standing, which was extremely valuable because in France it amounted to not having to pay any taxes. So you’re right, there’s a kind of stupidity that’s necessary in the minds of the ruling class, but it doesn’t see that abolishing slavery, allowing women to be free, allowing ordinary people to innovate is probably good for them too.
Now, one more point on this. The fact of the United States was very important, I think, in all this. It was said frequently by commentators in the nineteenth century, and not only American commentators, that this strange claim—which of course wasn’t true, but was slowly being implemented—that all people are treated equally, was a powerful solvent, so to speak, of hierarchy in Europe. And it worked eventually.
So it’s not accumulation, and I think many economists now are understanding this, and economic historians too. Then it’s gotta be ideas. Now, my friend Joel Mokyr, a great economic historian, thinks it’s science. He and I agree that ideas are where the action is, but his idea is about science, and I think it’s certainly true that right now a lot of innovations in the world come from science. But I don’t think Joel’s correct that in the nineteenth century very many of them did.
Mounk: So Joel Mokyr, of course, is one of the winners of a Nobel Prize this past year, 2025. Tell us a little bit more about the difference of opinion you have. In his view, it is really the beginning of the application of the scientific method and scientific progress which allows us to develop a steam engine and do all the other kinds of things that are at the heart of that material explosion that you start to get in the factories of Manchester and so on, in England of the late eighteenth and then the nineteenth century.
Now, you’re somewhat sympathetic to this idea, but you actually put broader emphasis on things like the different valuation of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois values—that once upon a time to be a merchant is shameful, whereas to be a priest is to have an honorable profession, and over time, in one part of the world, that starts to change. Suddenly, to be a merchant, an inventor, a tinkerer who comes up with things that increase material wealth, comes to be seen in a much more positive way. That is actually what presumably is also necessary for people to become scientists and these other things. So tell us a little bit where exactly the difference of opinion lies, and why it is that we should buy your ideas-based story rather than Mokyr’s ideas-based story.
McCloskey: An illustration of it is the case of the Dutch. Joel was in fact raised in Holland before he moved to Israel, and he would agree that in the sixteenth and seventeenth century this high valuation of merchants and the ending of kings—Spanish kings, most particularly—allowed the Dutch to invent many things, both commercially and scientifically, in the 1600s especially. So even from his own country, there’s an example of what I call the bourgeois revaluation, causing science to progress.
But the problem with his argument is that most of the inventions that matter to the economy have nothing to do with science in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. For example, the steam engine—yes, but it’s not entirely a scientific innovation. People had to have a notion that air was heavy, and you could call that science, but the subsequent history of the steam engine shows that it wasn’t terribly important until well into the nineteenth century. John Clapham, a great economic historian of a much earlier generation, pointed out that by the middle of the nineteenth century, most manufacturing wasn’t using steam—it was still handicraft or water power. If you look across the Atlantic, water power was crucial in New England manufacturing through most of the nineteenth century. It was important in England too, England and Scotland, in the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century.
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And then there are all these other innovations, which Joel and I agree are important, like concrete—reinforced concrete in particular—which has nothing to do with science. Road building has nothing to do with science. Canals are made much easier to maintain and to build with the invention of the steam engine, the steam shovel, but most of the canals in Britain were dug by hand. And so it goes.
Mounk: To what extent is this a disagreement about what exactly we mean by science? What I mean by that is that obviously there’s kind of capital-S science, where you’re very self-consciously applying some form of a scientific method and you’re publishing your findings in a peer-reviewed journal and so on. And then there’s a broader sense in which the invention of concrete truly stands at the tail end of a process in which people come to have a much more empirical mindset, and come to learn how to engage in experiments. There may not be a PhD scientist involved—I don’t know the history of the invention of concrete, I take it you do know it quite well—it may not be that this is happening at a fancy university by somebody publishing about it, but rather an entrepreneur playing around on the building side. But they’re still, in some broadest sense, applying something like the lessons from a few centuries of scientific inquiry to how they are advancing with technology.
McCloskey: Yeah, I understand, and since the main triumph of the scientific revolution was the discovery of the forces for planetary motion, it’s clear that high science is not practical for quite a long time. But I think it’s wrong—and I would argue in detail with Joel about this—to think that the empirical mindset is something new. People have always been trying out stuff. They just do it all the time. French cuisine, which comes from Italy originally in the court, but then the real source of French cuisine is thousands and thousands of housewives, and then men, chefs, trying out things. I think it’s a calumny on our ancestors to say that the scientific method is new. I don’t think it is.
Mounk: This relates to one of my favorite moments from grad school, when a grad student challenged my professor by saying that something was just—that means and reasoning was just a Western construct. He’s got the wonderful story of an anthropologist, whose name I forget, who was studying the customs of some tribe, I believe in the Highlands of Ghana—I may be wrong about the exact location. After many months of effort, he’s sufficiently gained the confidence of the tribe, and they’re taking him to see the rain man. He goes up to the rain man—it’s a perilous journey across the desert, and he’s hiking up this mountain—and finally the rain man says, “Well, I have a secret stone, and if I manipulate it in this particular way, then most of the time the next day it rains.” He looks at the stone, and it’s a child’s marble.
So the next time he’s getting a little bit of R and R in the next town, staying with friends, and the kid has marbles, he has an idea and asks the kid, “Could I take one of your marbles?” The kid says, “Sure, have this marble.” So he asks, “Can I go back to see the rain man?” He treks across the desert and scales the mountain, nearly falls and dies, and makes it to the rain man. He says, “This holy stone that you have, of which there’s only one in the world—well, I found another one. Look at this.” The rain man is completely astonished, looking at this marble he’s presented with. The anthropologist asks, “What do you think, if you use this stone in your ceremony, is it going to rain tomorrow?” The rain man pauses for a second and says, “I don’t know. Shall we give it a try?”
McCloskey: There you go. That’s the scientific method. This imperial provinciality of Europeans about how foolish their ancestors were—who just believed, if they were highly educated, in Aristotle, and if they weren’t highly educated, believed only in the traditions of their fathers, and those were irrational—and the assumption that people with non-white skin are inferior and stupid and just do what they do: that, as you agree, and I’m sure Joel agrees, has been entirely exploded by modern anthropology and modern history.
I’ve just finished a book on English open fields and enclosures. The theme of the book—it’s quite long, and I’ve been working on it since 1970—is that the English peasants, in their very peculiar-seeming open fields, so-called, were pretty sensible. They weren’t perfect, they got some things wrong, but they knew how to get their daily bread this way, and had every incentive to be reasonable, experimental, thoughtful, soberly observant. That’s all the scientific method is. In fact, I’ve argued in other books, along with certain philosophers and sociologists and historians of science, that in a way there is no such thing as the scientific method. That doesn’t mean I’m against science, or that I don’t believe in being careful in thinking about things. I just mean that there’s no formula. And it’s not new.
Mounk: Yeah, but the scientific method has become this kind of slightly weird, simplified slogan, and it’s interesting how that happens to science. I deeply believe in science, but part of the point of science is that science does never prove X or Y. Insofar as there is a scientific method, it is to retain the understanding that things which we provisionally believe to be right may turn out to be wrong. In popular discourse, the slogan of science is often used to say, this is beyond any doubt, and if you don’t go along with my point of view or my political opinion, then you’re against science—which is actually the least scientific way that you can think about things.
McCloskey: But observe: if you don’t have a liberal society, that skepticism—reasonable skepticism—can’t flourish. I don’t mean complete skepticism, I don’t believe in anything, I don’t believe there’s a door there, that’s obviously insane. But reasonable skepticism can’t flourish without it. That’s where to come back to the example of Holland. It was a liberal society in the sixteenth century, and no wonder it prospered in the seventeenth century. It fought against the Spanish Empire, which had the best army in Europe, for eighty years, and like the Ukrainians, it won.
You see the connection: a free society, free speech, freedom of religion is where it all comes from, of course, but free speech, free movement, free contracting, free this, free that, makes for a scientific and technological explosion. Now, by the way, there’s a problem we have in thinking about this connection between science and industry or prosperity, which is we tend to put together “science and technology” as though it were one word. That elevates the role of the university scholar and downplays the role of the guy on the Toyota factory floor making a suggestion.
Mounk: So how does all of that story fit one of the cases of the most impressive economic growth today, in fact probably the fastest economic growth in history, which is China? One way of looking at China is to say that this is a society that lacks key hallmarks of liberalism. It certainly does not have free speech. It only to some extent has some of that valuation of bourgeois virtues that you talk about. On one hand, it’s a quite materialist society. On the other hand, there’s not a lot of sanction from on high about the pursuit of money, etc. The idea of being a member of the party, a civil servant, and so on, is in some ways valued more highly. But what it did start to have under Deng Xiaoping was something much simpler, which is just the market mechanism—the invitation for the open exchange of goods. So does that indicate that your theory pitches what is required a level too high? What we need is something rather simpler, which is just the ability to profit from free exchange of goods and services and the incentives that creates?
McCloskey: Well, two points. One is that the devices such as the electric light and so forth that the Chinese adopted, actually much earlier than 1978, were invented in free societies. Slaves don’t invent as much. It’s conceivable they can invent, but ordinarily they don’t. That’s the first point.
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The second point is that the Chinese Communist Party said making money is glorious. They in fact sponsored the idea after 1978. Again, it was slow, but it finally went until 2003—being a millionaire in China was a capital offense. Now, of course, they didn’t enforce it after Mao, but they in fact had their bourgeois revaluation, except that, as you say, nothing else changed, in the sense that the Chinese Communist Party is still in charge. The same thing happened in a milder way in Singapore, which is a tyranny—now it’s a sensible tyranny, and tries not to be too obvious about it, but it is. The father and son in Singapore put people in jail for being opposed to them.
But the key point you make is perfectly true: there’s no Chinese model, so to speak. What the Chinese Communist Party did was adopt capitalism. That’s completely obvious. There was corruption involved—you had to pay off the communist party official in your neighborhood—but still, you’re allowed to open a store, or start a factory, or move. The largest migration in human history happened in China in the 1990s and 2000s. Two hundred million people moved from the interior of China to the coast, to work in the new factories. Now, again, they weren’t completely free. If you move from the interior to Beijing, you can’t send your child to university. You still have to have permission to live in Beijing, and lots of people don’t, even though they’re there.
A further point is that the Chinese, in their fifty years of experience with socialism, didn’t lose their ability to open a store and run a factory or work in a factory. Well, they’d certainly worked in a factory before. So it was by adopting capitalism that this happened.
Mounk: What about the ability to invent things? You’re talking about the fact that obviously a lot of the basis for the rapid economic growth in China, certainly in the ’80s and ’90s, was imported technology, and then perhaps in the 2000s and early 2010s, a lot of it was technology that was then emulated in China—the kind of copycat approach to a lot of technology, which allowed China to ascend the technological ladder at a very rapid pace. But at this point, China is actually able to compete and outcompete the West on many goods and services. China is probably somewhat behind on artificial intelligence compared to the United States, but is well ahead of countries in Western Europe. With a lot of robotics, the country is arguably ahead. On electric cars, China is at this point arguably ahead. In a lot of very specialized areas, the country is ahead. So if we think that kind of innovation requires liberal values or liberal institutions, do we need to say that China has liberal values or institutions, or how do we square the circle here?
McCloskey: Where liberalism is crucial: if in a Chinese research university, ideas are entertained freely—not ideas about politics or society, but ideas about the technology that they’re focusing on—then you get the same effect. Hierarchy of the old sort, which is often re-established under socialism or fascism too, those kinds of hierarchies reach down into the details of the society and stop innovation. So it’s not terribly surprising that China has become innovative in lots of fields. For example, on electric cars, what should happen is that the United States and Europe should allow Chinese electric cars to come in here and there, and that would be true liberalism, but of course there are forces preventing that, protectionism of various sorts. So in a way, in some fields, China is more free in its economy than in Britain or the United States. For example, in buildings: in both Britain and the United States, and in lots of other rich countries, we have a big problem of housing scarcity—in London compared with the north, and on the coasts in the United States compared with the Midwest. That’s entirely caused by interventions in the market that don’t exist in China. So in that respect, they’re more free economically. Not at all in other respects.
Now, this is a tragedy for the Chinese, that they’re not free, as the students in Tiananmen Square demanded—allow us equality of permission, make us free in all things.
By the way, it’s not only China that grows fast by allowing the economy to work well. I’m of Irish descent, long ago, and when I first went to Ireland in 1967, it was a third world country. When I went back in 1996, O’Connell Street was thronged with prosperous Irish people. In the meantime, Ireland had adopted capitalism, so to speak, in a thoroughgoing way, and the result was that Ireland is one of the per capita richest countries in the world. By the way, China is still quite poor. I hope it improves, and Xi Jinping is probably going to stop it from improving, but its income per capita is still about equal to that of Brazil, or about the world average.
Mounk: What do you think is the state of appreciation for the kind of bourgeois virtues that you think stand at the root of this economic progress in the West? On the one hand, you look at opinion polls, and a lot of young people value a lucrative career and making money over a lot of other things that you might think are important, like love or a meaningful private life. So it seems like we’re more materialist than we’ve ever been, in ways that perhaps aren’t always positive. On the other hand, I think there’s a lot of attacks on enterprise that are coming both from a growing share of the left of the political spectrum, but also in a weird way from the kind of post-liberal right. J.D. Vance just a couple of days ago attacked the idea of GDP as not really what we should care about, and values. So, do you think that, if you think that the origin of economic growth was in a sense a rhetorical move, a set of ideas, then are we in danger of discontent with our current reality inspiring a new rhetorical move that then casts off these ideas in ways that make it impossible to continue growing?
McCloskey: Yes, we are, and that’s why I write my books endlessly. I was a Marxist when I was young. I used to sing “The People’s Flag is Deepest Red.”
Mounk: I grew up singing “The Internationale,” whereas “The People’s Flag is Deepest Red,” in German, is the melody to the most famous Christmas song, so I didn’t sing that.
McCloskey: Well, it’s not that—I sing now “Land of Hope and Glory.” I’m not a Tory. I’m a classical liberal. Anyway, the threat comes from both the left and the right. In the United States, this lunatic we have as president is from the right. Not that this guy actually had any political ideas worth the name, but he’s gotten into alliance—he’s got people around him who are straightforwardly fascist. You can’t call them anything else. Stephen Miller, for example, and a number of others.
Then from the left, we have the kids, the young people, saying, well, let’s try socialism. Socialism sounds nice anyway. It sounds like a family—we’re going to make the country into a family, and families are socialist enterprises and should be. You don’t send your six-year-old out to work to pay for lunch. But these are young people, or people who haven’t experienced actual hardline socialism such as prevailed in Eastern Europe. So there’s always going to be a job to persuade people that neither authoritarianism, the daddy kind of model, or socialism, the mommy kind of model, is wise. I call it liberal adultism. The proposal is that people should treat themselves and others as adults.
Robert Burns’s great anthem of 1795, “A Man’s a Man for A’ That,” is an appeal to be a self-respecting adult.
Mounk: Tell us a little bit about how you think about the nature of liberalism. You’ve mentioned a couple of times in the conversation the idea that permission really stands at the center of liberalism—the permission to pursue the life you want and to do the things that you find to be particularly important. And more broadly, even though you’re an economist, we might think that you think the most important thing about liberalism is that it’s efficient, or that it leads to economic growth, but you really have a kind of deeper defense of what it is that this permission that liberalism comes with gives to people. How should we think about why liberalism is important?
McCloskey: I’m an egalitarian, and I take it you are too. I believe that everyone is equal. I believed it when I was a Marxist—it’s why I was a Marxist—and I believe it now that I’m a non-Marxist. So I think a good society is one in which we’re equal. But then the question is what you mean by equal. The first wave of liberalism, I claim, and try to show, was equality of permission alone. It wasn’t subsidies for poor people, or government projects on a massive scale, and so forth. That wasn’t the appeal. That’s not what the revolutionaries of 1776 in the United States and 1789 in France were thinking of. That’s not what they wanted. You could say it in a kind of crude way: they wanted to be left alone. But that doesn’t mean nasty, extreme individualism where I only care about myself—that’s Donald Trump. No, it’s that they didn’t want kings and husbands to rule over them.
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But there’s a second wave of liberalism after 1848, particularly in Europe, and it’s well illustrated by the personal history of John Stuart Mill, who in 1848 is a liberal of the sort I admire, this first kind, this equality of permission. But then he becomes, under the influence of his female friend and eventually his wife, more socialist. So it happens, in the middle of the nineteenth century, in Britain and also in the United States and France and everywhere else, that a statist version of equality comes to the fore. If you had to have a motto for the eighteenth century—I call it primary liberalism—it would be “no involuntary masters.” And if you had to have a motto for the second kind, socialism and the so-called new liberalism, which are both still alive in the world, the bumper sticker would be “no deserving poor.” The only way you can achieve the new deserving poor, according to the nineteenth century theorists, was to involve the state, to expand the state, to redistribute from you to me.
Whereas I claim, and I’ve been claiming for a while, that the first kind, the equality of permission—such as you see in China in the economy and not in politics—leads to enrichment, and leads to equality of important abilities. You have a roof over your head, you have some education, you’re not starving. So the equality that the mid-nineteenth century so-called liberals advocated is in fact achieved in a free society.
Mounk: I think this distinction between the two different notions of equality is very helpful. I also wonder whether in a lot of political debates, people’s instincts lie somewhere in between, or the distinction between which of these notions is actually at stake is not quite as clear as it might be. I found it striking that you describe the later John Stuart Mill as sympathetic to socialism. Certainly he writes a very interesting essay called, I think, Chapters on Socialism, or something like that. But it’s not clear to me that that essay goes all the way into the second camp, and the point here is not a disagreement about Mill, but I think it says something broader that is interesting.
The part of that essay I remember most vividly is where Mill talks about a hundred-yard dash that some sadist might imagine. He’s saying, let’s imagine that this is a totally fair race—a race in which you’re not artificially making somebody carry a heavy backpack, or one person has to jump over hurdles and the other person is running straight ahead. Even so, if the winner of this race got great riches and the last three people were shot, nobody would say that that is a good idea. Now the connection here is that you’re saying, well, actually, what happens if you have a free market and the incentives that go with that is that everybody becomes a lot richer, and I think there’s very strong evidence for that. If you look at the history of China after it opened up to the market, if you look at the history of Ireland, as you pointed out, it’s absolutely true that we need free competition, these market incentives, in order to do that.
But of course, Mill was writing at a time when there was no universal elementary school education, when if you went into debt somewhere, you might be put in prison, and so on. If you happened to be disabled and you didn’t have relatives who were kind enough to take care of you, you’d be a beggar on the street and put in some kind of poorhouse if you were lucky. And so surely there is a way of recognizing both of those values. Even the people who are relative libertarians today truly do, to some extent. They don’t want to abolish universal primary education—they might want primary education to come with vouchers from the state so that there’s competition within elementary schools, or something like that. But they don’t want to say, if you don’t happen to have parents who want to pay for your education at the age of eight, you’re just not going to learn to read or write.
So isn’t there a way to recognize both of those points? To say that part of what we want with equality is that absence of arbitrary masters, that absence of rules that constrain our economic activity for no good reason, which then allows social wealth to accumulate, and is the reason why we’re so much richer today than we were 300 years ago. But of course, we also want to make sure that everybody has the opportunity to a good education, which requires some kind of state intervention, and that those people who are most at risk of the vicissitudes of life are protected in some kind of way—whether that is help to those who are disabled, or those who had some kind of accident and were unable to care for themselves, or whether that’s some kind of social insurance scheme like Social Security, so that people aren’t destitute in old age, or unemployment benefits.
McCloskey: Yeah, well, I entertained that feeling earlier in my life, and thought, yeah, that’s right, we should have the economic and social safety net, as it’s called. I’ve become slowly convinced that it has grave dangers. The Swedes were, of course, the great example of a democratic country with free speech and free press and so forth, but nonetheless had a very big and impressive social safety net. They had a crisis in the 1990s. Seventy-eight percent of production in Sweden went through the state. Now, it wasn’t state-owned enterprises, it was very high taxation, and then very high social benefits of various kinds. In the 1990s—I’m a historian—they realized that this wasn’t working very well, and they introduced, for example, vouchers for schools. So though the state was paying for the schools, it was allowing private schools. Now one quarter of the K-through-12 students in Sweden are in private schools. In a number of other ways, Sweden liberalized. So that’s a nice example of trying to get the balance right.
But one of the troubles with social democracy is that it’s easy to corrupt. In Sweden, the standards of public morality are extremely high, and I could give you lots of examples of it. But they’re not so high in Britain, and they’re really not high in the United States. Right behind me, I have to see it all day long—that orange building in the back is at one end of what’s known as K Street in Washington. That’s where the lobbyists live, that’s where they work, and there are an astonishing number of them. With the excuse of helping the poor, or organizing this or that public service, they create wealth for the rich. There are 1,500 registered lobbyists for the pharmaceutical industry alone on K Street.
Mounk: To be clear on the lobbyists—a lot of people on the left would say, well, that’s precisely the problem with capitalism, these big companies paying lobbyists. But you’re saying actually this is because the state is so involved in the private economy that there’s something for them to lobby for and to argue for. So you put the lobbyists at the feet of a kind of deviation from capitalism.
McCloskey: I go with my left-wing friends and my former self: I’m going to protest the takeover of the government by corporations or by the rich. I want that to stop. How to achieve it? Alas, my friends on the left, and I still have lots of them, say let’s get the government to do it, which is to put the fox in charge of the henhouse. I say let’s make the government less important, let’s make the government a lot smaller. I would be perfectly happy with a small government. In France, 55% of national income goes through the government. It’s not as bad as Sweden was, but 55% of national income goes through the government, and it’s quite high in Britain—it’s in the forties—and it’s high enough in the United States. I would be perfectly happy with a ten percent government that really did help poor people and really did protect the country.
We don’t need a so-called Department of War, as Donald Trump wants to call it—which I don’t mind too much—of the size we have. It’s absurd. Most of the help to alleged poor people goes to rich people. A perfect example is publicly financed education, which is not entirely but largely operated for the benefit of the schoolteachers and the professors. That’s shameful and shouldn’t happen, but it does. That came out in COVID. When we closed the public schools—they didn’t, in Sweden, by the way, which makes my point that Sweden has become much more liberal. It’s virtually the only country that didn’t. We closed the public schools because the old teachers were afraid to teach kids who might be transmitting COVID-19, and that’s appalling. Agricultural subsidies, both in Europe, in the UK outside the EU, and in the United States, are disgraceful—they’re subsidies to rich farmers.
So I want a small, competent government that does the jobs that you and I can completely agree it ought to do—indeed, help the people who can’t take care of themselves. I’m all for that. I’m an Anglican, I’m an Episcopalian, we call it here, and I give ten percent of my income to my church, because my church is good at charity.
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Every political tradition faces the question of what constitutes a good life. But only liberalism struggles so visibly to offer a straightforward answer. Authoritarians promise order and national greatness. Socialists promise equality. Post-liberal writers promise meaning and belonging through restored religious and civilizational authority—a life ordered to faith, family, and place.
Liberalism alone points nowhere in particular. Its answer—freedom—tells you what to protect, not what to do with it. Yet that silence is not emptiness. It reflects a wise limit: no one can know in advance the forms a flourishing life will take.
That beguiling silence takes one only so far, however. And in an era when liberalism is under assault from all directions, a more muscular liberalism may be called for—one that speaks up and claims what it is, or at the very least forthrightly articulates its vision of the plane on which a good life may take place.
The case for liberal institutions begins with the distinction between the dimensions along which human beings flourish, and the specific forms their flourishing takes. The dimensions are what any life needs to go well, like the freedom to direct one’s own life and to do work with a point to it. The forms are the particular ways a life fills them in.
If the forms are varied, the dimensions can, at this stage of human history, be stated with high confidence. A long tradition of inquiry keeps returning to them. Aristotle approached the question of the good life through the nature of the human animal. He argued that such a life consists in the active exercise of distinctively human capacities—reasoning about how to live, cultivating character, engaging in worthwhile activity with others. John Stuart Mill approached it from a political angle, arguing that freedom enables what he called “experiments in living”—a process through which individuals discover and develop their own capacities. Psychologists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan set out to study human motivation empirically. Across four decades of cross-cultural research they identified three conditions without which people consistently fail to thrive: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Stated another way, human beings flourish by 1) developing capabilities, 2) forming relationships that matter, 3) engaging in work that has a point to it, and 4) directing their own lives rather than living by another’s plan. Without those conditions being met, people, even in conditions of material comfort, languish.
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That is what we know. What we cannot know are the specific forms the dimensions take in any actual life. The dimensions-and-forms distinction identifies the axes along which human lives develop or fail to develop. It does not say which capabilities a person should pursue, or in what sequence. It does not say whether meaningful relationships will be found in family, friendship, religious community, or professional vocation—or in combinations no prior generation could have imagined. And the claims about the good life rest on thousands of years of human experience—no metaphysical certainties required. That vested knowledge is at least some sort of a guide.
Why the Forms Cannot Be PrescribedNobel laureate Friedrich Hayek argued that the knowledge required to direct a complex social order is not concentrated in any mind or institution. It is dispersed across millions of individuals, embedded in particular circumstances, and constantly revised in light of changing conditions. Much of it cannot be articulated at all. His subject was economic order: prices communicate dispersed knowledge, and competition serves as a discovery procedure.
The same logic runs into the domain of human lives. The knowledge required to direct the forms of a flourishing life is not dispersed in the way market knowledge is. The planner who cannot know the relative value of steel and timber at least faces facts that exist somewhere, in someone’s hands. Whether a given person will flourish as a musician or an engineer is not a fact waiting in some other head to be collected. That knowledge does not exist anywhere yet, because it is made only in the living. No planner could gather it, because there is nothing yet to gather.
Karl Popper, Hayek’s frequent collaborator, argued that knowledge grows through conjecture and refutation. Theories are proposed, tested, and corrected when their predictions are falsified by evidence and reason. The same logic applies to flourishing. John Stuart Mill’s term “experiments in living” is not a metaphor. It describes the mechanism by which societies discover which new forms a flourishing life can take. When someone attempts a new form of work, a new kind of community, a new way of combining independence with obligation, and it fails, the failure is informative. Others observe and adjust. When it succeeds, the success is available for others to adopt and adapt.
Consider Wikipedia. Twenty-six years ago, it did not exist. Today, millions of volunteers contribute their knowledge, time, and care to a shared encyclopaedia available to anyone with an internet connection. Many devote thousands of hours to editing articles read by strangers they will never meet. They argue, edit, correct, refine. No prior generation could have foreseen this form of cooperation in this particular technology. No central authority could have designed it. It is a form of human flourishing—disciplined, social, generative—that depends on the freedoms and infrastructures (in this case the freedom of web exchange) that liberal institutions make possible. The forms are brand-new. But the underlying principles are age-old.
What This Means for InstitutionsLiberal institutions do not just happen to support human development. They protect the freedom on which the discovery of new forms depends. The dimensions-and-forms distinction carries Hayek’s insight into the content of a life. Prices communicate information no planner could gather, but the system depends on a degree of stability and openness in a market. Competition turns up innovations that no one could foresee, but that hinges on an absence of authoritarian controls and a respect for the spirit of competition. More subtly, experiments in living do the same for human lives.
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The conclusion of reflections like these is the claim—stronger than what many liberals are comfortable with—that liberalism is not one moral preference among others but the set of conditions under which a society can keep discovering new ways for its members to flourish.
The claim rests, fundamentally, on how knowledge is distributed. A good scientific institution builds on its current knowledge while standing ready to revise it. Liberal institutions do the same thing for human flourishing. They protect the conditions it requires while remaining open to emergent forms of technological and social flourishing.
Authoritarian regimes, even when they achieve economic growth, struggle to produce the broad discovery of genuine flourishing. They can deliver prosperity. They can deliver science, too, where the state has chosen to value it—for instance, the Soviet Union sponsored world-class physics. But they do not reliably deliver inquiry the state has not authorized—the open-ended search that turns up forms no plan foresaw.
Hungary has been constantly pointed to by the post-liberals as a model for their vision of a state. And there is much to learn from Hungary—but maybe not in the way the post-liberals intend. During Viktor Orbán’s sixteen years in power, Hungary’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index fell from the low twenties to 74th, among the worst in the European Union. A captured press is one of the first channels of unauthorized inquiry to close. So is a captured university: Orbán’s government moved most public universities into foundations run by boards of loyalists, with lifetime appointments and control over budgets, strategy, and senior posts. The EU responded by cutting those universities out of its Erasmus and research-funding programmes. These are the institutions through which a society develops capabilities and tries out new ways of living, and the state has brought them to heel. The young and educated felt the squeeze first. They left in large numbers, many to study abroad, with disillusionment with the country’s political direction among the drivers. Hungarians turned Orbán out in April 2026, but many of those who would have done the most with a freer country had already gone.
How to Close DiscoveryHungary’s struggle speaks to the failure of the underlying philosophy of post-liberalism. In Return of the Strong Gods, R.R. Reno calls for thick, binding loyalties—religious, national, civilizational—to be restored in place of liberal neutrality. In Why Liberalism Failed, Patrick Deneen argues that liberal societies are failing because they lack binding commitments to religion, nation, or tradition.
Their diagnosis contains real insight. Liberal societies can produce hollowness when they neglect the conditions for human development, but the post-liberals have a fundamental hubris—a belief that the forms of human flourishing are known, that the process of “discovery” is really a flip to the answers in the back of the book. The post-liberals’ usual move is to invert liberalism’s premise in their attempt to reintroduce religion into the center of public discourse. They argue that they ask only for an orientation, not a template. But the problem is that a religious orientation does not survive translation into political authority. Held by true believers, the command to love God and neighbor leaves the form of every life open. But as public doctrine, the same commitment necessarily acquires enforcers, with the operations of the state intermixed with theology, and with enforcers determining what counts as fidelity.
That is how an orientation hardens into a template. The prescription fixes the forms of a flourishing life from above—through sacred authority or civilizational identity—when the reality is that the forms can only be discovered one life at a time. In the end, post-liberalism represents a return to the closed society, where the forms of the good life are licensed rather than discovered.
For liberals, the vital difference here is that liberal institutions keep the process of discovery open—there is no one right answer to be found by reading (or correctly interpreting) the right sacred book. On the other hand, meaningful liberalism is not relativism. The dimensions of flourishing are knowable through long human experience; the forms remain open to discovery. To be successful, liberals must fight to keep the currents of freedom flowing—whether a genuinely free market or the free exchange of ideas. Protecting formal freedoms while neglecting the enabling conditions for development produces the hollowness that the post-liberals are correct to decry.
With this more muscular conception in mind, liberals should feel empowered to attend to the ecology of liberalism directly. The distinction between dimensions and forms marks the line: liberals can cultivate the conditions for flourishing without trampling on essential rights. A school can develop a child’s capacities without prescribing what she does with them. That is the difference between cultivating a dimension and dictating a form. And this is not optional maintenance. It is the price of the open society—which, as Popper argued, requires constant vigilance to survive.
We know more about the good life than relativists claim and less than paternalists assume. A good life cannot be designed. But it can be discovered—and a life discovered is owned, not imposed. Creating the conditions for that discovery is the quiet genius of liberal institutions. Sometimes, though, the quiet genius needs to speak up and be heard.
Roger Partridge is a founder and senior fellow of The New Zealand Initiative and writes on public policy, constitutional law and liberalism. He publishes on Substack at Plain Thinking.
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