Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • What the Politics of Tears Means for Iran’s Future
    A woman weeps as people gather at the Imam Khomeini Grand Mosalla for a farewell ceremony for Iran’s late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on July 4, 2026 in Tehran, Iran. (Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    “We are a nation of political tears; we are a nation that, with these same tears, creates floods and shatters the dams that stand in the way of Islam.” So declared Iran’s first supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. For Khomeini, crying was never merely shedding tears. In his revolutionary interpretation of Shia Islam, mourning for Shia imams is more than a private emotional act; it is a public form of mobilization to turn a dispersed community into a massive, organized political force.

    This is the logic behind the Islamic Republic’s massive funeral for Ali Khamenei, which concludes today. The regime is not only burying a former supreme leader but, more importantly, trying to convert his death into a staged affirmation of authority, legitimacy, and transnational Shia leadership. Through orchestrated processions, black banners, ritual lamentation, foreign delegations, and ceremonies extending beyond Iran into Iraq’s Shia holy cities, the regime seeks to present Khamenei not only as the leader of the Islamic Republic, but as the symbolic head of a wider Shia ummah. That is why the banners all over Iran and Iraq called him not Iran’s supreme leader, but the ummah’s martyr leader “Qaed Shahid Ummat.” Ceremonies are planned across Tehran, Qom, Iraq, and Mashhad, with major logistical mobilization for mourners.

    The geographic arrangement here is interesting. Tehran represents the state; the city of Qom represents clerical authority; the Iraqi cities Najaf and Karbala represent the sacred geography of Shia memory; and Mashhad, where Khamenei is to be buried, links the leader to Imam Reza, descendant of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, and to a sacred geography through which the Islamic Republic tries to present state authority as Shia authority. By moving the funeral through these spaces, the regime is trying to inscribe Khamenei into the sacred map of Shiism.

    This matters because Shia political identity has long been organized around the memory, mourning, and martyrdom of their imams. The annual lamentation for Imam Hussain, the third Shi’i imam, was the turning point in the formation of Shia Islam, and distinguishes Shia communal life from many Sunni traditions, particularly those orthodox and Salafi currents that view excessive shrine-centered devotion and ritual lamentation with suspicion—sometimes even as religious innovation or shirk. Understanding this distinction, the Islamic Republic has used mourning not only to separate “the faithful” from enemies, but to create a disciplined public that appears emotionally unified and ideologically mobilized.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    Khamenei’s funeral is therefore designed to send two messages simultaneously. First, the message to Shia communities in the Middle East is that Khamenei was not only Iran’s ruler but also the defender of the Shia cause from Lebanon to Iraq, from Yemen to the Persian Gulf. But more importantly to foreign governments, the message is that the Islamic Republic remains powerful, mobilized, and socially rooted despite war, sanctions, and succession uncertainty. From the regime’s point of view, this is an opportunity: the mourning and tearful crowd becomes a referendum on the regime’s popularity and legitimacy.

    This is especially important because the regime no longer trusts the ballot box as a reliable source of legitimacy. Elections in the Islamic Republic were never free or fair, but since 2005 they have become increasingly engineered, narrowed, and emptied of meaningful competition. Participation in recent elections has declined; fewer than half of eligible voters cast ballots, widening the gap between the state and society. In this context, the funeral procession serves as a substitute for electoral legitimacy, with the regime filling the streets through a combination of ideology, reward, and repression.

    This is the street show of authoritarian legitimacy, in which the regime will point to millions of mourners and say: look, the nation is with us. It will present organized crowds as spontaneous love, logistical mobilization as popular devotion, and ritual participation as political consent. It will use the camera, the drone shot, the black-clad procession, and the choreographed lament as proof that the Islamic Republic remains the authentic voice of Iran and the Shia world. It’s an art that the Islamic Republic has mastered.

    This “street show” can also be used in negotiations with Washington and can enable Tehran to continue negotiations with the image of a regime strengthened by martyrdom rather than weakened by succession. The regime will use the funeral to counter the narrative that the Islamic Republic is a collapsing regime begging for concessions—and to claim that the Islamic Republic remains popular and strong even after 40 days of bombardment and the death of its leadership.

    This is likely to impress some Western audiences, particularly those who often confuse mobilization with legitimacy and mistake crowd presence for genuine consent in authoritarian regimes. They will interpret tears as devotion and religious symbolism as social unity. But inside Iran, many understand how the Islamic Republic manufactures participation through state institutions, public sector networks, mosques, the paramilitary Basij, transportation systems, schools, municipalities, and welfare organizations. To be clear, it doesn’t mean the crowd is meaningless, but it’s not an expression of national free will either.

    This is what separates Khamenei’s funeral from Khomeini’s in 1989, when I was just a kid. I vividly remember thousands of Iranians mourning in the streets of Tehran. However chaotic, that funeral emerged from a revolutionary generation that still contained deep reservoirs of genuine belief and love for Khomeini and his ideology. Khomeini was popular; he was the founder of an Islamic revolution, a religious authority, and a charismatic leader. Ayatollah Khamenei, by contrast, died as the leader of a repressive, corrupt regime that left behind nothing but economic decline and social alienation.

    This does not mean that all mourning is fake. Khamenei still had real supporters among ideological loyalists, families of the security forces, clerical networks, parts of the older revolutionary generation, and transnational Shia movements that benefited from Iran’s patronage.

    But the central political fact is that the regime needs the ceremony to appear larger than its actual constituency. That is why the regime has tried to transform an Iranian loyalist funeral into a transnational Shia one.

    But beneath the surface of a country covered in black banners, and chest-beating displays of loyalty, there are millions of youths who are alienated from clerical rule and have repeatedly protested against the ayatollahs. Behind the fabricated image of a popular regime is a regime that increasingly relies on repression and spectacle because it cannot attain genuine consent.

    Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The Next 250 Years (of Persuasion)

    America just turned 250… and Persuasion just turned six!

    Yascha founded Persuasion in the divisive summer of 2020. Our mission was to revive the tradition of philosophical liberalism at a time when polarization and groupthink were taking hold of the country.

    That same year, Frank launched American Purpose. Its founding mission was to track the rise of authoritarianism around the world and to offer a vision of liberalism reimagined for the 21st century.

    Driven by a shared sense of purpose, the two joined forces in 2024. Since then, our community has grown to 130,000 subscribers representing 174 countries around the world. We’re grateful every day for the trust you’ve placed in us.

    Paying Persuasion subscribers are invited to join our Intellectual Bootcamp, where we read classic articles and books that help make sense of the modern world. So far it’s been an enormous success! Check out our events page to learn what we’re reading next.

    By now, you know what we stand for. Liberalism, not authoritarianism. Pluralism, not conformity. Free speech, not censorship. We disagree and debate but don’t troll. We write about the liberal values that animated the Founding Fathers 250 years ago precisely because they light the only path out of the mess we find ourselves in today. We also cover AI, elections, campus dynamics, and so much more, because these are the fights that matter.

    And we do it all with good humor and a sense of moral purpose.

    The last year has been a big one for Persuasion. We significantly expanded our output—new articles, episodes, and events now reach you six days a week. We formally welcomed a new group of Contributing Writers to the team, including Steven Pinker, Cathy Young, Joseph Heath, John McWhorter, and many more. They’ve been frequent guests in our pages, and their writing epitomizes our commitment to rigorous yet lively content that challenges our thinking and expands our understanding. They help us keep a disciplined eye on what’s truly important, not just trendy narratives and flash-in-the-pan clickbait. You’ll find some of our all-time favorite pieces from these writers below.

    We’ve also relaunched our events lineup and programming—including Ask the Author, Book Club, and Intellectual Bootcamp—to offer you more opportunities to talk to our writers, engage with the Persuasion team, and connect with one another.

    In celebration of Persuasion’s 6th birthday, we want to thank you for your support. Persuasion is growing and thriving because you read our pages, listen to our podcasts, and participate in our events.

    But here’s the truth: this work is only possible because some of you pay for it. Of our 130,000 subscribers, a small fraction of paying supporters funds what you receive here—the essays, podcasts, and events we produce. If Persuasion has challenged your thinking, given you a political home, or simply helped keep you sane these past six years, this is the year to join.

    If you’re a free subscriber, upgrade this month and we’ll knock 15% off your first year. Our birthday offer ends July 31. As a paid subscriber, you’ll get full access to our archives and exclusive programming like the Intellectual Bootcamp. But more than that, you’ll be one of the people who keeps this work going.

    Get 15% off for 1 year

    Do you know someone who feels politically homeless, or a student who could use a dose of sanity on a fractious college campus? Give them a year of Persuasion.

    Give a gift subscription

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit, so if you’d rather support us with a one-time, tax-deductible donation, every gift helps.

    Make a donation

    And if you’re able to make a significant gift—or you’re a program officer at a foundation weighing where to invest—please email Laura Berlind directly at [email protected].

    Help us make sure the values that built America’s first 250 years are still standing for the next 250.

    With thanks, as ever.

    – Yascha and Frank

    P.S. The 15% birthday discount ends July 31—upgrade here and join the readers who make Persuasion possible.

    The best of the contributing writers:

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • What If the Next French President Had to Wear an Ankle Monitor?
    Marine Le Pen during the news broadcast announcing her candidacy on July 7, 2026. (Photo by Christian Hartmann / Pool / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Yesterday, a Paris appeals court upheld Marine Le Pen’s conviction for embezzling European Parliament funds. Le Pen’s party, the Rassemblement National (RN), had embezzled €2.8 million by using a fund designated for parliamentary assistants to pay party staff between 2004 and 2016.

    In an unexpected twist, the court sharply reduced the political consequences of the conviction, trimming her prison term from four years to three, with two of those years suspended and the final to be served at home under electronic monitoring.

    More consequentially, the court cut the ban on her holding elected office to 45 months, with 30 months suspended. The remaining 15 months are to be treated as already served under the provisional enforcement of the initial March 2025 verdict, which means Le Pen now appears eligible to stand in the 2027 presidential election—something she quickly announced she plans to do.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    Under the current ruling, Le Pen would be severely limited in her movements and need to wear an electronic ankle monitor during much of her campaign. In an attempt to sidestep these handicaps, she has announced that she will appeal to the Court de Cassation, France’s highest court. This should allow her to campaign freely until the court rules on her case and (if it confirms her guilt) makes a final decision about the penalty she will face. It initially looked unlikely that all of this would happen before the first round of presidential elections next April; but judicial schedules are unpredictable, and there is a chance that a final decision would suddenly deprive her of her ability to hold rallies in the weeks or months before the decisive vote.

    The trial and verdict—and now the uncertainty about whether and when Le Pen will face home detention—have created considerable malaise in French politics. A year before a presidential election, is it possible that the frontrunner and leader of the opposition will have her chances scuppered by judges?

    One way to look at it is that Le Pen has become a victim of the paradoxes of populist politics.

    Populists frame themselves as political outsiders to denounce the corruption of the existing regime and call for more morality in politics. The harshest critic of crooked politicians is perhaps Le Pen herself. Her father, Jean-Marie—who founded the Front National, the ancestor of the RN, in the 1970s—long made corruption a central plank of the party’s platform. In the 1993 legislative election, his slogan was the brash “clean hands, head held high.” For decades the party surfed on a catchphrase claiming that mainstream politicians are “all rotten” (“tous pourris”).

    Likewise, in 2013 Marine Le Pen bulldozed the then-dominant center-right and center-left parties for fielding convicted politicians. She asked: “When are we going to actually implement lifetime ineligibility for all those who have been convicted for acts committed thanks to, or during, their mandate?” Then she added: “They will never do it, because if they do, half of the political class will no longer be able to do politics, given the state of corruption and immorality of the political class in France.”

    Those words are now coming back to haunt her. Her best defense has been to counter-attack, pointing out that she enjoyed no personal benefit from the scheme since it was used to pay party staffers (which is true). More pointedly, she argues that many other politicians in France allegedly built similar schemes while in the European Parliament, including François Bayrou, Emmanuel Macron’s former prime minister, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the left-wing party La France Insoumise. While the sums involved in these two cases were considerably smaller, Le Pen does have a point.

    Still, for the leader of a party that for decades barked that politicians were “all rotten,” she is dangerously close to admitting that she is now part of the same barrel. This uncomfortable realization has led Le Pen to lean into the second leg of populist politics: that the democratic will of the people cannot be shackled by unelected entities like courts. In this vein, her ally Jordan Bardella, the party’s young rising star, has denounced the existence of politicized “red” judges.

    It remains to be seen how much of an impact the ruling will have on the electorate. Early polling found that 51% of the population think Le Pen is right to run in 2027. She will no doubt lean into the persecution angle, claiming to be a victim of the establishment. Le Pen’s opponents will be keen to attack her on the issue, despite the risk that she could gain electoral support as a martyr.

    More fundamentally, there is a lesson to be learned for opponents of populism. The battle against the RN needs to take place first and foremost in the democratic arena. Distrust of political institutions in France is at its highest in two decades. The state’s inability to improve living conditions or control immigration is fuelling genuine discontent.

    Subscribe now

    Against this background, hoping that your opponents will be swatted away by judges is a losing strategy. This case shows that judges appreciate the potential costs of being seen as a barrier to the functioning of democracy, and may resort to a politically crafty compromise that falls short of banning candidates outright. In this circumstance, it’s far from clear that Le Pen will step down, and in fact the possibility of her confined to her home for a number of hours every day during an election campaign could galvanize voters who would not otherwise be sympathetic. But even if Le Pen chooses to stand down—an outcome many hoped for in the run-up to this ruling—it’s even less clear that Bardella, as her likely replacement, would be easier to beat in a presidential election.

    Trying to choose your opponent rarely ends well. Giving them ammunition to claim that they are being targeted by judges is even worse.

    François Valentin is a senior consultant at London Politica.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Why Russia Is Running Out of Time In Crimea
    A worker hangs a Russian flag on the wall of the Spasskaya Tower of the Moscow Kremlin, on March 18, 2026 in Moscow in memory of the annexation of Ukrainian regions in 2014. (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Crimea was the opening shot in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The region was snatched at the country’s most vulnerable moment, just after a popular revolt and without a functioning government. Twelve years on, however, it is Ukraine that holds the stronger position—and Kyiv now intends to turn the tables on the Kremlin. Suddenly, Crimea could change the fate of the war.

    Unless Russia very quickly finds a response, the only way the Kremlin keeps Crimea is to sue for peace—and even that option is closing.

    The Imperial Bug

    To see why Crimea can decide the war, we first have to understand two things about it: what it means to Russia, and what it takes to hold the peninsula. Unlike other countries, where national purpose now rests on the prosperity of a people and its cultural and scientific achievements, Russia never moved beyond empire. Its most prolific leaders—Peter I and Catherine II—were named “the Great” for conquering new territory. Sevastopol has been the home of the Black Sea fleet since Empress Catherine’s reign. It is where the Crimean War was fought and where the Soviet Union’s most celebrated siege took place in the Second World War. In 2014, Putin justified the annexation by calling Crimea “sacred land” and invoking Chersonesus, where Vladimir of Kyiv was baptised—a civilisational claim.

    However, Crimea was never Russian land. Its indigenous people are the Crimean Tatars, a Turkic people with their own language and culture. After Catherine annexed the peninsula in 1783, Russia set about cleansing them from it; a century and a half later, in May 1944, Stalin deported almost the entire Tatar population to Central Asia and resettled Crimea with Russians and some Ukrainians. The Tatars were allowed back only as the USSR collapsed, and since 2014 they have been persecuted again—their language and culture suppressed, their literature banned under extremism laws, the people themselves jailed on fabricated terrorism charges.

    Colonial Myth and the Logistical Reality

    After Stalin’s death in 1953, Khrushchev attempted various reforms, including redrawing internal borders. In 1954, Crimea was handed to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. At the time the change was purely administrative—it was all the USSR. When the Union collapsed, that internal border became an international one.

    The transfer made logistical sense. Crimea has limited resources of its own. Everything it needs to sustain modern life, water included, was supplied from the mainland—which was Ukraine. Delivering it within one administrative district and budget was simpler than routing it around several.

    American Purpose at Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    In every war fought over Crimea across the centuries, no power has held it without also holding the mainland. Without the supply routes, those defending the peninsula from within invariably failed and abandoned it. In the Crimean War, the Russians held Sevastopol for eleven months, then gave up the city once their supply ran out, scuttling their own fleet as they left. In 1944, the Germans lost the peninsula the same way, once the Red Army cut them off and trapped them against the sea. This is why Crimea could not sit within Russia and had to belong to Ukraine.

    As a result, Russia built a land corridor to Crimea along the Azov coast. The failed Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023 was meant to take back that corridor and with it liberate Crimea. When it did not, Ukraine settled in for the long game.

    Plans Within Plans

    Two strategic decisions explain the situation in Crimea. First, early in the war Ukraine poured a large share of its limited resources into unmanned forces and drone technology. Second, Kyiv pushed weapons decisions down to unit level and gamified combat. Units choose their own weapons by task and performance; a weapon that is not good enough is not picked, which drives development without the kickbacks and cronyism of central procurement. And every kill now earns points to spend on more weapons.

    This in turn let Ukraine pursue a long-term plan to destroy Russian front-line and rear logistics.

    As early as the end of 2022, Ukraine began a campaign against Russian air defence. Unlike the “genocide against the artillery,” as Russian war bloggers called it, this one was not flashy, and it took a few years to notice. Where the radars and systems destroyed in Crimea—the S-400s, the Pantsirs, the Tors—had once been replaced, by 2026 their numbers had finally shrunk. And because Ukraine could now reach Moscow, what remained was sent to reinforce the defenses around the capital rather than to replace the dwindling cover over Crimea.

    As the drone programme and the system behind it matured, Ukraine began striking deep inside Russia, with oil storage and fuel production particular targets. The resulting shortage is spreading slowly across Russia and is acute in the border regions and the occupied parts of Ukraine.

    Alongside the long-range strikes, Ukraine has built a fierce mid-range capability reaching 150 to 200 km behind the front—essentially the whole logistics path. Russia’s capability here has not improved. The advantage is considerable: it has become almost impossible to supply the front with anything, fuel above all. Ukraine has meticulously destroyed the rail and road links running through the occupied territories along the Azov coast.

    Every land route in and out of Crimea is now inoperable or severely disrupted, leaving the Kerch bridge as the only way to supply it—and the obvious next target.

    Ukraine has also struck the thermal plants and the cables carrying electricity to Crimea. Before the annexation, the peninsula drew power from the Ukrainian grid and water through the North Crimean Canal. In 2019, Russia built two thermal plants to replace the grid, but they run on gas piped from Russia—and that supply, too, has now been interrupted by Ukraine. Planned blackouts are already in place in Sevastopol.

    Decay and Acceleration

    Ukraine’s upper hand rests on several things at once. Even if Russia developed its own mid-range strike capability—difficult, for a centralized and corrupt system that does not reward ingenuity—that would not conjure back the air defence destroyed over Crimea, nor rebuild the bridges and railways leading to it. Although Russia can continue the war for a while, it cannot keep Crimea supplied, nor easily improve its defenses. Quite the opposite: the peak of its defensibility has passed, and from here it will only worsen. On their own, none of these developments would have been catastrophic for the Kremlin. Together, they have created a situation in which too many things are happening at once. Meanwhile, Ukraine is only gaining strength: its defence industry is among the fastest developing in the world, and it has secured EU funding for the next two years.

    Without fuel, the Russian military cannot move, cannot run the generators that power its command posts, and cannot keep its drones in the air. The Dnepr Grouping holding the line in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson will run out of supplies and become sitting ducks, exactly as in 2022, when relentless strikes on Russian logistics made the right bank of the Dnipro untenable and forced the retreat from Kherson. Crimea will then become the poster child of the modern blockade.

    If Russia cannot find an answer to Ukrainian drone advances (soon to be joined by ballistic missiles) that its air defences are ill-equipped to stop; cannot find alternative supply routes to Crimea and the territories around it; and cannot pause an economic collapse driven by record military spending, falling energy revenue, and shortages of investment and manpower—then it cannot sustain its forces in Crimea and the areas around it. Without supplies, the Russian army must withdraw or be destroyed where it stands.

    The Irresistible Force and the Immovable Object

    In these circumstances, the only way the Kremlin keeps Crimea is if Kyiv stops attacking it. Under the Biden administration, Ukraine depended heavily on U.S. supplies—and therefore on American goodwill. Donald Trump, having stopped all aid and sold weapons to Ukraine only through the NATO-backed Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List program, under which allies buy U.S. weapons for Ukraine, now has very little leverage. Washington can withhold the air defence missiles, but it would have to own the resulting civilian death toll, and even then, it would not touch Ukraine’s offensive capabilities.

    Before the change of administration in Washington, Ukraine insisted on ending the war only when all its territory was liberated. After Trump returned to power, it reluctantly agreed to halt the fighting along the current battle lines. Not many remember that this was a compromise on Ukraine’s part—and one that bore no fruit. The longer Ukraine degrades Russian logistics around Crimea, the less reason it has to offer any compromise at all.

    At some stage, Ukraine will change the offer from stopping at the battle lines to letting the remaining troops flee Crimea. If Russia wants to keep Crimea—for however long—it must give up its claim to the rest of Ukraine and stop the war while Ukraine still allows it to. That would be the prudent thing to do. Then again, if Russia acted prudently, it would never have invaded Ukraine in the first place.

    Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK. Born in the Baltics, with a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter, she writes and gives live commentary on European security and Russia.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • “Social Media Addiction” Is Way More Complicated Than You Think

    We apologize for the technical problems that meant we were unable to go live on Substack with Nils Gilman last month. But we’ve solved them, and we are delighted that Nils will join us TOMORROW at 1pm EST for Ask the Author to discuss his hit article “The University As We Know It Is Finished.” Click here to add to your calendar or join the stream!

    Parents outside a courtroom after Meta and YouTube were found liable for the addictive design of social media platforms. (Photo by Frederic J. Brown / AFP via Getty Images.)

    The era of social media addiction litigation is upon us.

    In a case heard this March, a Los Angeles jury decided against Meta (the parent company of Instagram) and Google (the parent company of YouTube), finding them liable for negligence and defective design. The plaintiff was 20-year-old Kaley G. M., who claimed that her decade-long addiction to social media caused her to suffer anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, and body dysmorphia. In her complaint, Kaley said she developed a “dangerous dependency” on the platforms.

    Kaley’s lawyer opened the trial by telling jurors that the case is as “easy as ABC”—“addicting the brains of children.” He accused the defendants of creating “addiction machines” designed to keep solitary teens hooked through features such as infinite scroll and other rapidly rewarding methods.

    For the defense, the Meta team argued the plaintiff’s psychological distress predated her use of Instagram and rejected claims that their apps were “clinically” addictive by design.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    Kaley won $3 million in compensatory damages, and $3 million in punitive damages. Meta is appealing.

    The same basic arguments used in Kaley’s lawsuit are driving lawsuits against Meta, Google, Snapchat, and ByteDance (owner of TikTok), filed by over 2,500 individuals, states, and schools. One study suggests that the compensation sought by more than 1,200 school districts totals nearly $500 billion.

    Meanwhile, the California court system has coordinated a large group of plaintiffs—representing more than 1,000 cases from across the nation—suing social media companies under a collective known as Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding. The earliest cases will soon come before a California judge.

    School districts and states will argue that they have had to bear the costs of treating a generation of adolescents suffering from the effects of addictive social media use. But there’s a problem: there are real questions about whether social media addiction actually “exists” in a legal sense, and if it does, whether it is the cause of psychological problems or the consequence of them.

    Let us say first that we feel particularly well-suited to offer a view on this issue. One of us is a clinician who has treated people with drug addiction for many years. The other is a lawyer and psychologist who has treated addicts and has been studying addictions for decades.

    To us, the answers to the question of whether social media addiction is real are not simple. They differ greatly depending on whether social media addiction is being treated in a clinical setting or adjudicated in a courtroom.

    Consider this: Many teens suffer the same problems as Kaley even in the absence of social media use. Some go to therapists. If social media is among their problems, they will tell the therapist that they are worried about spending too much time on social media and feel unable to stop.

    Although social media addiction is not a disorder recognized by the American Psychiatric Association, the clinician might well diagnose the young patient with social media addiction, along with anxiety, depression and other problems. And with good reason: the pattern of excessive social media consumption resembles the standard criteria for addiction to drugs, namely, persistent use, often accompanied by craving, difficulty stopping, and adverse consequences of use.

    There are therapeutic similarities, too. Clinicians routinely employ cognitive behavioral therapy to help patients recognize the cues that trigger the desire to use—whether they’re using heroin or TikTok.

    Should depression or anxiety accompany problems of compulsive use, medications and other therapies are offered. Training in time management, impulse control, and goal setting cuts across treatments for persistent unhealthy habits. (Notably, Kaley did see at least two therapists. One testified in court that social media use rarely came up in their therapy. The other said it was one of several problems she discussed.)

    But what happens when teens or their proxies, like school districts, walk into a courtroom instead of a clinic?

    Subscribe now

    The courtroom is a domain where the claim of being “addicted” should be held to a different, more stringent standard. Addiction is not a disease in the usual sense; its criteria are all behavioral rather than physical. The course of addiction can be altered by completely changing one’s habits of mind and behavior; this is not true of conventional disease.

    This is not to deny that habitual or addictive behavior has a biological basis. All behavior has a biological basis. The neurotransmitter dopamine appears to play a role, but its importance has been wildly exaggerated by professionals, including a Stanford psychiatrist who served as an expert witness in Kaley’s case and has called smartphones “the modern-day hypodermic needle, delivering digital dopamine 24-7 for a wired generation.” The so-called “dopamine theory of addiction” has been harshly criticized as too simplistic.

    Most relevant to legal action, however, is that we cannot distinguish between an urge to scroll that wasn’t resisted and one that could not be resisted. Vexing questions abound. Is there a clear way to disentangle the role played by social media “addiction” from the influence of preexisting psychological problems, especially since such problems are ubiquitous among teens? Is it possible that teens’ distress caused them to turn to intensive social media use in the first place, rather than the other way around?

    We cannot know. Nothing—no brain scan, blood test, or psychological measure—can validate anyone’s capacity to control an urge, or identify the specific cause of psychological harms.

    Making such determinations is not essential for treatment, where the goal is to help people no matter the cause of their distress. But they are vital for adjudicating liability for defendants accused of addicting people, because this could be the basis of lawsuits that can cost companies millions of dollars and extensively expand civil liability.

    They might also infringe on free speech rights. There is a danger of chilling constitutionally protected, legitimate advertising and other standard practices in the media and other industries. Enterprises that provide goods and services that countless consumers desire will potentially be forced out of business—or compelled to raise prices to unsustainable levels.

    This is why the standard in a courtroom should be more stringent than the standard that satisfies therapists. The law should not promiscuously expand civil liability, opening the floodgates not just for social media companies but for other industries such as gambling or fast food which meet the loose addiction criteria.

    Social media addiction—invoking notions of uncontrollability usually associated with physical disease—is a sound concept in the clinic. But where the law is concerned, it goes too far based on too little knowledge.

    Sally Satel, MD is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, medical director of a methadone clinic in Washington, D.C., and a lecturer in psychiatry at the Yale University School of Medicine.

    Stephen J. Morse is a professor of law and psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania. He is an expert in neuroscience in the courtroom.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Arvind Narayanan on Why AI Isn’t All That Revolutionary

    Arvind Narayanan is a professor of computer science at Princeton University.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Arvind Narayanan discuss why AI’s transformative impact will unfold over decades rather than months, whether human accountability can survive the rise of AI agents in the workplace, and what the economy will look like once AI has automated every task that can be precisely specified.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You have coined a phrase that really is central to some of the debates about artificial intelligence, but what you mean by it goes a little bit beyond what you would intuit just by looking at the phrase. The phrase is “AI is normal technology.” What does it mean to think about AI as normal technology?

    Arvind Narayanan: “Normal technology” doesn’t mean this is mundane, boring, nothing to see here, move along, we’re not AI skeptics. The paper starts out by acknowledging that this is, and is going to be, a transformative technology, perhaps on the scale of electricity, the various industrial revolutions, etc. We do think that it’s a transformation for cognitive work in the same way that in the past we had transformations for mechanical work. But I think that historical analogy gives us a lot.

    We do think that there are deep lessons from history to think that just because this technology is so powerful, it’s not going to transform the world over a period of a year or two. There are many technologists, tech leaders, and business leaders predicting that just because numbers are going up on the charts they’re looking at, AI capability charts, it’s going to make human labor unnecessary, put people out of work, even end the concept of money, or pose existential threats to humanity. We think these are all valid things to worry about. We’re glad people are doing research on them. But we think there are so many bottlenecks between AI capability increasing and it having these impacts, both good and bad, especially if you want to really integrate it into the economy and derive something useful out of it. There are so many things that have to go right. We think those are going to happen over a period of decades, not months or years.

    We have a lot of collective agency in shaping how AI is going to transform various professions, the economy, democracy, etcetera.

    Mounk: I find this to be a really useful way to think about this. Again, you’re very careful to say you’re not an AI skeptic. I guess I’m a little unsure about what exactly we mean by the term “normal” in this context. When you look at electricity, even when you look at the internet, these were technologies that did transform the world in a very fundamental way.

    Now, when you’re comparing that against the most naive kind of pronouncements that some people in Silicon Valley are making, where in eighteen months, everything is going to have changed—I remember sitting in a conference room with somebody who’s now very famous in Silicon Valley in 2017, pointing out of a window at a green field and saying, in eighteen months, robots are going to be building skyscrapers over there. It’s 2026, and the housing crisis in California is as bad as it ever was. So I’m very sympathetic to that point. But even if this is going to take decades rather than years, and the way in which the technology shapes the world is obviously going to be inflected by all kinds of human choices, institutions, and regulatory obstacles, something on the scale of electricity still feels, in some senses, pretty abnormal.

    Narayanan: It is a technology to be taken seriously. I think individuals, businesses, and policymakers should all be taking it seriously, and that’s why we have been working in AI. My co-author Sayash Kapoor and I have a long history of advising policymakers on how to respond to these changes. If we weren’t taking it seriously, we wouldn’t be spending our own careers doing all this work. But to put my finger on some of the disagreements—exactly like you pointed out—there are so many claims that this transformation is going to happen over a year or two. And if that’s the case, then all the kind of more normal policy levers that we might have—help people find new skills given this new technology so they can find new jobs—all of that goes out the window because nothing can happen fast enough on this time scale. The only thing we can prepare for is mass joblessness. So we should be talking about anything less than the scale of universal basic income being completely disproportionate to the scale of the problem. That’s exactly what tech leaders are advocating, and we’re strongly against that.

    We do think the normal tools of policymaking, business, and human adaptation can work with AI as well. We do need to fix some problems. Even “normal” policymaking, even when you have a technology that’s not advancing as fast as AI, often takes a very long time to acknowledge problems. With social media, for instance, it took well over a decade after it started having these massive impacts on society for the research to actually get there, for policymakers to wake up, etcetera. Those are problems we’ve had, and we’re going to have those problems with AI as well. We do need to improve the speed at which we respond to these changes, but it’s not as if it’s a one or two year thing and we have to throw out our entire existing playbook and prepare for either some utopia or catastrophe.

    Mounk: Let’s distinguish between the speed with which the transformation is going to happen and the scale of the transformation that will ultimately come. I think we strongly agree about the speed. Having read a lot of your work, I’m not yet sure whether we agree about the scale. But let’s start where it’s easy, which is the speed. Why, in precise terms, do you think the impact of this technology is going to take much longer to materialize in the real world than a lot of these people in Silicon Valley seem to believe? Why is this a question of decades rather than years or even months?

    Narayanan: Let’s take a concrete example: software engineering. That’s the area where AI adoption has been most rapid, and AI capabilities are furthest along. There has been this prediction that AI is going to automate software engineering once AI can write all the code. We already have enough evidence now—we just put out an essay on this—to reject this model. AI is writing most of the code now already, and it has not made software engineers obsolete.

    Software engineer hiring—the number of employed software engineers is still growing, maybe slightly slower than before, but even that is disputable, because it’s also allowing software engineers to more easily become entrepreneurs, for instance, and that’s not quite captured by the data. We looked into why this is, and we have a model to explain it. It’s what we call the “decide, execute, deliver sandwich.” These are three layers that we think apply to most kinds of cognitive work.

    Cognitive work—thinking for a living—is the kind of work people are saying is going to get automated with AI. Our analysis is that most of those jobs, whether you’re a software engineer or a lawyer or a researcher, or many other kinds of cognitive work, a good third of it is just figuring out what the problem is and making decisions about whether the problem is worth solving, how we’re going to solve it, how we’re going to build the software, design the system, etcetera.

    Then maybe another third of it, again in the software engineering context, is writing the code, fixing the code, etcetera. And another third of it is delivering the code—verifying it, making sure it passes quality checks, being accountable for it, integrating it into the customer’s systems, maintaining it over time, especially when you’re thinking about enterprise software rather than consumer software. This is a big chunk of it. What we’re finding is that AI is compressing the middle of the sandwich. It can do the writing of the code, but the other parts of it that require a human to be accountable for what is ultimately delivered—it has not taken the human out of that process. If anything, those layers of the sandwich have expanded to fill the gap of the time savings that you get from having AI write all the code. There’s more to say, but I’ll stop here, and I’m curious for your thoughts.

    Mounk: To what extent is that a function of the stage of the technology? ChatGPT 3.5 was rolled out, what, three and a half years ago? The progress in what these systems are able to do has been astonishingly rapid. Clearly, on the core task of writing code, they now rival the very best human engineers. But of course, in terms of putting in place the structure for AI agents to be able to reflect on what actually is a worthwhile problem to solve within an organization, or thinking about how you set up AI agents that are actually able to reliably test the quality of code in the context of the company’s needs, we’re not there yet. That certainly speaks to your point. But what is to say that they won’t be rolled out over the next three, five, or ten years?

    More broadly, when you’re thinking about a lot of these essentially political demands within a corporate context—somebody needs to be responsible. If this leads to some terrible outage, you’ve got to have somebody you can fire, somebody you can blame. That’s certainly true in current organizations, and it’s very hard for those organizations to reform themselves. But surely, when we think about a longer timescale, we might imagine AI-native corporations that have a totally different setup, one much better able to use AI technology to replace some of that human judgment.

    Narayanan: That’s a great question, and I think this is a key point of disagreement—this is where we disagree with a lot of our critics who might agree about the timescale but disagree about the scale of transformation. Two points. Like you said, political demands—I don’t think these will change simply because the capabilities improve. One of our key points is that we have agency to insist that humans ultimately remain accountable for what is delivered. That might be true even if, in some narrow sense of capability, AI could do a better job, precisely because AI is not something you can punish, so to speak, or keep accountable. It does not have some of the limitations that humans do. I think the right thing to do is to insist that humans remain accountable. There is something inherent about human accountability that you cannot get with AI. That’s not up to the AI companies—that’s up to the downstream organizations who are deploying AI, and, if it becomes necessary, regulation to insist that this be the case. This is what we’ve done historically with many technologies that are very powerful but dangerous. I like the analogy of a crane operator. The crane can do the heavy lifting in construction—we don’t need human physical labor. But even though we could, we don’t let the crane operate autonomously. We put an operator in it, and the crane becomes a massive amplifier of human ability. That’s the model we think is the right one, and we can choose to keep it that way. We can’t guarantee that it will be that way, but I don’t think it’s a matter of the tech companies themselves deciding.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    The second point is where a lot of these disagreements come from. We do think it’s true that gradually, over time, the set of tasks you can delegate to AI is going to expand. But what that means is that once AI can do something, it’s no longer a source of competitive advantage in the enterprise. It’s not a fixed amount of things we’re trying to build, and then once you can build those things with AI, you’re done, there’s no need for work. That’s not how the economy works. Once you can automate certain things, delegate those things to AI, that becomes a common capability that every firm has. Then what firms are competing on is what is scarce. Human labor will always be scarce, because you can’t make infinite copies of it. So those remaining pockets of judgment that AI is not yet able to perform, that is what will be in the domain of human judgment and expertise, and that’s what companies will compete on.

    In the distant future this might change, several decades down the line, but for a long time we’re going to be in this period of a constantly upward-adjusting equilibrium.

    Mounk: I take these arguments very seriously. Just two observations. The first is that you slipped in “several decades.” I’m trying to think about this at the timescale of history and at the timescale of the challenges our society is going to face. Are people who are today in their 50s or 60s likely going to be fine? I think so. Are people in their 30s and 40s going to be fine? I think it’s a more open question. What is the world going to look like for people in their 20s today who are about to go to college? I think that is much, much more challenging. Insofar as the answer is it’ll take several decades, that is reassuring in some sense, and it certainly is totally in line with the evidence from the Industrial Revolution, from how long it took for the invention of the printing press to have a major impact on European culture or society. I absolutely buy that. It’s just not clear to me that several decades is as reassuring as it might be. Go ahead.

    Narayanan: Sure. Look, the “AI as normal technology” framework is reassuring to some people, and it’s not reassuring to others, and our goal is to give this framework for people to do with it as they will, not necessarily to provide reassurance. The reason it’s reassuring to me is because over a several-decade timescale, I do think people can adapt. Almost everyone can adapt. If it’s one or two years, then most people can’t adapt. If it’s several decades, then we can use game theory, if you will, to think about what that equilibrium is going to look like whenever it happens, and try to see what we can start doing now to prepare for that.

    One way things might turn out—and the equilibrium part is something we’re only now starting to think about, it’s not in the essay itself—is that any task in the economy that you can specify precisely enough for it to even be legible as a task is going to be done by AI. So most of the things now that make up my job—okay, my job consists of these ten things—all those ten things are going to be done by AI. What jobs will mean in the future is what economists sometimes call interstitial tasks: the things that lack a precise specification, where maybe part of the task is even to figure out what should be done next, things that maybe have never been done before. Those are the kinds of things we think will be in the domain of humans. The reason I think we will be very unlikely to leave those things to AI is because of unknown unknowns. You can’t be sure that when you task AI with doing something so different from anything that’s been done before, it’s going to do a halfway reasonable job. That’s one way to think about what a new equilibrium might look like.

    Another, perhaps even more radical shift, is that maybe everything that’s a commodity—and a commodity, not just a physical good, but even cognitive labor—a commodity is one where you don’t care which particular human or AI produces it. A lot of what we produce now are commodities. I produce research, I write these articles—it doesn’t matter that it came from me, it’s really mostly the ideas that matter. Maybe that’s mostly going to be done by AI in the future. We should be prepared for radical shifts, like professors having a lot of status because we can produce something that is unique today might not be unique in the future. There’s going to be no need for people doing podcasts like this—this sort of stuff is all things you can get from AI, maybe. I think we should be ready for that.

    Mounk: I think the three Ps are always going to survive: professors, podcasters, and prostitutes. But we’ll see.

    Narayanan: Nice. I’ll bet against that. But those things are very different. I think some of those services are very different from others. Sex work, for instance, is inherently relational—it’s about a particular person. There are many kinds of jobs in the economy. Even some low-status jobs, like barista, for instance—Alex Imas has nicely written about why some of those jobs have been very resistant to automation, because human interaction actually matters there. What the economy in the future will look like, maybe, is basically people paying each other for their time, for the unique relational value they can give. The value of going to a coffee shop will be the customer service. If you have good coffee and shitty customer service, that’s totally useless, because robots can make good coffee, but it’s the good customer service they can’t replace.

    Mounk: Let’s take a step back here, because there are a lot of really interesting ideas in this. A few thoughts. The first is, it’s not clear to me why an AI system that at this point is very good at writing short stories—we’ve recently learned that an AI-generated text won a major literary prize, with judges being unaware of this fact at the time—that increasingly does have good judgment about medical conditions, for example, looking at a lot of contradictory data and coming up with the best kind of adaptation of what’s happening—won’t also be able to learn these kinds of interstitial tasks. So there is some kind of future where AI systems actually prove to be as capable as the most intelligent humans, even at a task that looks slightly ragged or irregular.

    The second kind of possibility, surely, is that there are some human beings who have exceptional skills that will still be required. There may, in fact, be some human beings who are able to command tremendous wages because they are so good at orchestrating these AI swarms to accomplish tasks relative to others. But it may be that the number of people capable of those kinds of cognitive skills remains very limited, leading to a kind of class or caste of super-earners from AI, and a large portion of the population whose skills are much less valuable.

    A third kind of possibility—and to some extent you can mix and match these—is to think that perhaps there’s still a need for relatively ordinary human skill. Obviously, being a great barista or a good bartender is a genuine skill, and I admire the people who do it, but it’s a less rare skill than somebody being able to code at the very highest levels was a few years ago. Perhaps the number of positions we need for that is just much less than the extent of available human labor. It may be that nine out of ten times, I’m very happy to take my excellent robot-made or coffee-machine-made coffee for 10 cents, and once a week I want to go and meet somebody for coffee in a really pleasant environment, and I’ll definitely want a super cheery, nice barista to make my coffee on those occasions. But that just may not create enough work for people to keep going. And in that kind of world, there’ll be an army of people who are out of work who are very happy to take that job as a barista, depending on the kind of socioeconomic arrangements and background conditions that hopefully would cushion poverty. In that case, even the people whose skills are still in demand may not make a very good salary.

    I think here we need to be careful not to go into a world of either no human being ever is going to have a job anymore—which I think the two of us are going to agree is a kind of weird Silicon Valley dystopia, though some would probably call it a utopia—but then to say, well, if that’s a one, then the zero is some jobs are still going to be needed, and so therefore the problem is solvable. There are all kinds of worlds in which certain kinds of jobs are needed, but they’re not the ones that create the most economic value, they’re not the skills that are actually scarce, and therefore they fall very far short of creating the structural preconditions for an affluent middle-class society.

    Narayanan: Yeah, look, all of those are possible. And I’m glad that we’re talking about them. People are looking at leading indicators for which way things are trending. I do think these are solvable problems over a multi-decade time frame. Over that kind of time frame, even if the answer turns out to be universal basic income, we can plan for that over the long term. That’s not something we can make happen in 18 months, but it is something we can make happen over a several-decade period.

    I genuinely don’t think something that radical will be required. I agree with most of what you said. Maybe the key disagreement is that I don’t think the set of jobs that are necessary in the economy versus not necessary is that helpful, at least to me. In my view, the vast majority of jobs today are already doing things that are not near the bottom of Maslow’s hierarchy. The things that we need, like agriculture and shelter, that’s maybe something like 5% of jobs. And all of the other stuff—if you just took yourself away from the everyday intensity of life and the economy and really thought about it from an alien’s perspective—it’s all just stuff we do to amuse ourselves. I really like David Graeber’s book on this.

    Mounk: I do have to say, sometimes I walk through the streets of Brooklyn and I say, there’s so much wealth here. What does everybody do? What makes this perpetual motion work? It’s just people selling each other goofy services and somehow living well off of it.

    Narayanan: In many parts of the world there’s obviously genuine crushing poverty. In affluent societies, 95% of jobs are things we do because we need things for people to do, not things we do for people to survive. I’m saying that in the future, that 95% will go to 99%, maybe even 100%.

    Mounk: I’m torn on this. I do have that feeling walking through the streets of Brooklyn, but when I think about this example a little more carefully, one of the huge reasons why New York is so affluent is that finance is headquartered in New York, and of course many other industries, from fashion to media, have a huge presence in New York as well.

    We can have a big debate about whether finance really is a productive enterprise or whether it’s not, but the point is that that is where a lot of the value in society is created at the moment. And in order to run Goldman and JP Morgan and all of those companies, the owners of that capital currently require a lot of scarce and very high-skill labor. One of the reasons the streets of Brooklyn are full of expensive yoga studios is that a lot of the people who go to those yoga studios work for those banks, or they work for people who work for those banks. And so this is where the tremendous wealth of the city diffuses.

    Subscribe now

    In an economy in which AI systems produce the huge majority of value, and human beings are then left in the role of educating each other, looking after each other when we’re old, and “putting on concerts” for each other—all of that is kind of peripheral to the core activity. Can that sustain itself? I think perhaps, in a somewhat simplistic way, that depends on whether the first image I painted of Brooklyn is right, or the second image is right. And much as I like to hate on Brooklyn—which I love to be in—I think perhaps the second image is a little closer to the truth than the first, which is somewhat troubling in its implications for what that world would actually look like.

    Narayanan: Again, it’s a possibility. I think the reason I’m betting against that is when you look at what actually has value, it’s just very contingent on what happens to be scarce at any particular point in history. Things like light and clothing—things at the bottom of Maslow’s hierarchy—used to be extremely scarce because they were hard to produce, and they employed a very large fraction of the workforce.

    Their costs have fallen by a factor of well over a thousand over a period of a couple of centuries, and that’s because of automation, and because of larger-scale energy production and cheaper costs of energy. Well over a thousandfold decrease in the cost of lighting—it could be closer to a million, I forget the exact numbers, but it’s many, many orders of magnitude. I think a lot of the things people do today are scarce and valuable precisely because human labor is scarce. I disagree with the premise that in the future AI systems will be creating most of the value. That’s not consistent with my understanding of economics. I agree that AI systems will be doing most of the work. But any work AI can do is infinitely reproducible, and when it’s infinitely reproducible, it doesn’t have a lot of value, because its cost is going to come down to the market—anybody can provide it at very low cost. So the value is going to shift to the kinds of things that are scarce.

    Today, the labor of caring for the elderly, for instance, is very low status and very low paid. But the argument is that in the future, a lot of the things that are higher status and higher paid today—maybe like the things we’re doing—are going to become very easily reproducible. So what is considered valuable in the economy is going to shift.

    Mounk: How does that work mechanically? You’re saying taking care of the elderly is going to be the thing that is really valued, and presumably that’ll command a salary more generous than what a professor at Princeton gets today, hopefully. But where does the elderly person get the money to pay the person taking care of them such a handsome salary?

    Presumably, the answer is that they themselves must have done something in the economy that accumulated that money for them, or that we have something like a system of universal basic income—which I take it you’re mostly opposed to, and that’ll be interesting to go into—that provides them with the money from a third party. Again, looking at Brooklyn today, the intuition is that it’s a kind of weird perpetual motion machine where everybody’s just selling stuff to each other. But when you look at it more closely, you can say, no, there’s actually a way in which the banks are financing manufacturing companies and agricultural companies and all kinds of other things that produce things, and there are a lot of very well-paid employees at those places, and they’re the ones that explain why people can pay $10,000 to go see the Knicks in the NBA finals.

    You take that link to the underlying economy away, because so few humans are required to run that underlying economy—because whatever the most productive firms of the future are, they just require so many fewer human beings working in them. And it’s unclear how that money is going to diffuse into the economy, such that even if socially we say, what a wonderful task, to look after elderly people, that elderly person actually has the money to pay a good salary to the person taking care of them.

    A very different way of putting this point: you compare Walmart, which has a valuation of about a trillion dollars—a little less, I think, depending on exactly when you look—and has two million employees, to Anthropic, which probably is going to be valued at about a trillion dollars when it IPOs, and at present has about 5,000 employees. That is a really striking difference, and that surely is going to have a huge impact on who can actually pay for these kinds of human-centered skills to be valued in the labor market.

    Narayanan: Yes, it won’t automatically happen. I’m just saying that we will have the means to solve it, even though it will require a lot of work to solve it. The reason I’m saying that is that we’re making kind of fantastical assumptions in one dimension—that AI is going to be able to automate nearly all work—and we’re assuming that the world is going to stay the same in all the other dimensions. I think that’s a bit of a pitfall.

    This future might not happen. It might be that even though I’m on the more “slower transformation” side, maybe even I’m being way too optimistic, and maybe there are really fundamental barriers to AI being able to take over a lot of this work even over a multi-decade timescale. But let’s assume that all of that happens. Then clearly it’s going to be creating an incredible amount of benefit to humanity, because so many of our material needs are going to be taken care of. And there is going to be, I think you’d agree, some accumulation of wealth. That’s the distributional question that is unclear. So if greater and greater amounts of wealth are going to be accumulated, we can start putting policies in place. I’m not opposed to UBI. Maybe UBI is what we should be talking about again, over a multi-decade timescale. I just don’t think it’s the sort of thing that can happen if we’re talking about a one- to two-year timeframe.

    On the point about Anthropic being a small company that might have a trillion dollars in value—yeah, maybe we’re headed to a dystopian future where only three companies are going to be able to do that. But actually, maybe what’s going to happen is that entrepreneurship is going to become so much easier that there are going to be many millions of millionaires—maybe not Anthropic-level wealthy, but far more millionaires than there are today—because you can have one or two people owning firms that use mostly AI to accomplish a lot of valuable things. And then it’s still challenging, but at least it’s possible to think about, politically and economically, how you distribute that wealth throughout the rest of society.

    Mounk: This is a side note, but there is something strange in these discussions where we want to assign this deep value to the kind of human tasks that in one future may still be required. Of course, I do think that relating to humans is something incredibly meaningful, and that often people who are in jobs where they relate to others actually have high job satisfaction. But there is at least something melancholy about imagining a future in which all of the kinds of tasks by which humanity has historically distinguished itself from other animals—tasks we thought were distinctive to us, our ability for higher-order reasoning—go out the window.

    Even just in a social sense, the way in which, for the last century or two, for a huge number of human beings, their pride and their sense of self-development came from acquiring an education, acquiring skills, becoming expert at some kind of mental work—and we’re saying the most primal human skills and abilities, to take care of babies and to take care of old people, are now the thing that’s left, and that’s what we really value. I do not mean by this to devalue the incredible work done by nurses, or people who work in old people’s homes, or mothers and fathers taking care of little kids. But it is perhaps less than a wholly full-throated endorsement of a future to say that’s the one kind of thing that’s going to be left for humans.

    Narayanan: Yeah, that’s totally fair. Again, I’m not saying that this framework for thinking about the future should necessarily be reassuring to everybody. I think there’s lots that we will lose, that we like about our current society. There’s lots that we will mourn, and I think that’s a very valid reaction to all of this. But again, it is parallel to what has happened in the past with the valorization of physical strength.

    If you think about a Roman general, they moved up the ranks economically and politically because they started from their physical strength being very valuable in the army, and that’s how they rose up the ranks. We’re talking about professors in academia—the word “academy” comes from the ancient Greeks.

    If I recall correctly, we’ve been talking about professors in academia, and you probably know this better than I do, but the original Academy took its name from a garden where the educational component happened in parallel with the development of physical strength. Those two things were really valued in very much the same way. But over time, we’ve lost that. We still have athletes, for instance, having high-status positions in society, but not because they directly contribute to the economy using their physical strength. It’s just something we like to appreciate in a competition setting, precisely because it’s lost its direct economic value. Now it’s become sports.

    Maybe what will happen with intellectual ability, just as has happened with chess, for instance, is that it becomes a sport we enjoy. Similarly, people will in the future present their manually handcrafted ideas without AI in a format we can all enjoy, to appreciate the strength and limits of human cognitive ability. But it’ll be kind of disconnected from the economy, and there’s genuinely a reason to be sad about that.

    Mounk: I wonder to what extent the Roman general was prized for physical prowess or for mental skills. In a very different context, about twenty years ago I was dragged to a bullfight, and I was quite reluctant to go, because I thought it would be quite ugly. In part because I thought it would be a kind of macho spectacle about how strong the bullfighter is and how big his muscles are.

    It turned out that, at its best, and to my surprise, I rather enjoyed the spectacle. What I enjoyed about it specifically was that I came to understand it was actually a medieval, perhaps only modern, form of celebration of mind over matter—which is to say that the bull is fifty times stronger than the strongest man in the world. There’s no way any human being, no matter how often they go to the gym or how many protein shakes they take, can take on a bull in a competition of strength. What a good bullfighter does is demonstrate that they can use their human skills—their ability to understand how the bull operates, which is that he goes after the red thing—the ability to wave the flag in such a way as to direct the bull’s movement, to do a kind of dance with the bull in which they demonstrate: look what I have is intelligence, and using that intelligence I can prevail against this beast that is vastly stronger than me. The cruelty of it is nevertheless something that troubled me. But I found that to be actually very interesting.

    You are right that we have historically valued physical strength a lot more than we do now. But that argument, of course, cuts both ways, because it is now quite hard to make your living from just having physical strength, and the people who do command much lower salaries. When we look at past transformations, like the transformation after the Industrial Revolution, a lot of people were screwed over by them, and this happened over decades and over centuries.

    But the thing they had—the thing they resorted to—is what I sometimes call a sort of mental reservoir. There’s a reservoir of demand for human skill, which is to carry out mental jobs, mental tasks, cognitive tasks. So if you were 45 years old and you lost your job in a factory, or weaving cotton, or cultivating a field, your life might be screwed—it might be too late for you to have a good income. But your kids were probably fine, because they acquired those cognitive skills, and that’s what kept them in demand and ultimately gave them a much better standard of living than you likely had. But if we’re now tapping the mental reservoir, is it clear that there is some higher-order skill humans can go to in order to compensate for that? Saying, well, we’ll just go back to the things we’ve always done, like taking care of kids and old people—it’s unclear to me if that’s going to cut it.

    Narayanan: Again, I think you’re right to worry. I think there’s a lot that we will lose. I guess if there’s one point of disagreement, it’s that I don’t think that in the future we will distinguish ourselves by our skill. We will distinguish ourselves just definitionally by the fact that human time is scarce, and AI’s biggest weakness is that anything one AI can do is something a billion copies of AI can do.

    Subscribe now

    Scarcity always commands value. That’s how it’s always been. We can create value out of even completely artificial types of scarcity, like wedding rings and diamonds, even when there’s actually no intrinsic value. In one sense that’s very depressing, but again, I think from an economic perspective, we’ll be okay. There’s going to be a lot of demand for human time, for us to have various forms of companionship. We’re going to call it various things—coaching, therapy, care. A lot of professors’ jobs, I think, in the future will just be about managing students’ emotional journey as they undertake their path through the education system. The content, we don’t have to provide—that’s going to become very commoditized.

    Mounk: So a good thing that there’s already more administrators than professors at most universities, because really what we need is not professors, it’s these administrators.

    Narayanan: Maybe. Look, if this all sounds incredibly depressing, I’m not here to say we should embrace this future. I’m saying a few things. It’s not a catastrophe if everyone being out of a job will have jobs simply because human time is scarce, and we’ll just find artificial ways to turn that scarcity of human time into jobs and call it various things, whether it’s professor or therapist or caregiver.

    Lots of wealth will be created. Maybe we’re going to have a problem with a few companies trying to capture most of that wealth, but that is something we can and should change with policy. All of this is going to unfold over a period of decades, not one or two years. So we have time to prepare, both in terms of new things we’ll need to do, but also just getting mentally ready for this future, whether you find it empowering or depressing or anything in between. Those are my core points.

    Mounk: I’m pushing back on them, but I think they’re very interesting points. Clearly, one of the things you’ve implied a few times in the conversation, and that you’ve written about more explicitly, is that there are real dangers to thinking of artificial intelligence as an abnormal technology. If we assume everything is going to change in the next two years, and we assume that we have to throw out our usual toolbox of policymaking, you think that has really bad consequences for our ability to govern this technology and for the world. Why? How would we be pushed in the wrong direction if we don’t recognize that AI is actually a normal technology, in the sense you outline?

    Narayanan: It’s very simple. There’s this narrative coming out of the AI safety community—and they’re doing great research. I respect all the work they’re doing, where I disagree is on the policy implications and this overarching narrative. That narrative is that AI is getting more and more capable, and it’s going to increasingly be able to do things like hacking into critical infrastructure or creating biological weapons.

    So if this technology diffuses throughout society, it’s extremely dangerous in two ways. One, AI systems themselves might turn against their creators, or bad actors might get hold of them and do dangerous things. The way to prevent this is to stop really powerful AI systems from being released to the public without guardrails. There are, I think, a lot of problems with this.

    The first is the idea that increasing AI capabilities are automatically dangerous. That’s not what we’ve seen historically. When it comes to cybersecurity, for instance, superhuman ability to find and exploit vulnerabilities in software started a couple of decades ago, and it’s been going up since then, even before modern AI systems. Actually, that’s made software more safe, not less safe. The reason is that defenders, the companies that create software, can use those same capabilities to fix those bugs before they even put the software out there. So generally speaking, these powerful technologies have actually helped us improve resilience rather than worsen it. That should be our default presumption. Maybe there are exceptions in some cases, but we should insist on evidence that increasing capability is actually making the world more dangerous.

    That’s the first big area of disagreement: one, capabilities increasing doesn’t mean the world is getting more dangerous. Two, in order to prevent AI capabilities from diffusing widely, you basically have to have authoritarian governments. And three, even if you manage to do that, that’s going to be a temporary relief. Eventually the dam is going to break, and what you’ve done by trying to control AI has not built up the kind of immune system you need in order to live in a world with these powerful systems.

    Mounk: Presumably, one of the things you might conclude on the most dire version of this claim you’re arguing against is: we’re about to have these incredible cyber warfare capabilities, rogue actors are going to be able to break into your bank account, and probably break into the database of the U.S. military, and possibly commandeer nuclear weapons. And if that happens, then we need to sideline any kind of historical protections we’ve had for private businesses, but also for individuals, in order to make absolutely sure that doesn’t happen. Perhaps we need to empower our governments with all kinds of capabilities they don’t currently have in order to avoid that kind of worst-case scenario. Is that one of the kinds of fears you have?

    Narayanan: Yeah, that’s one of the claims that’s often being made, and we have a different position. I do think the government has to be nimble, adaptable. Some of the things that have happened in the U.S. policy context recently, like having voluntary agreements to have governments test the capabilities of new technology and maybe hold off for a month or so before releasing them, those are pretty low on the ladder of extraordinary interventions. If we do them carefully, I think that can be okay.

    But where the problem comes is saying that the way to prevent rogue actors from getting access to this technology is to control it so tightly that we make sure they never get their hands on it. Our view is that the only way you’re going to do this is by having authoritarian governments, and not just one authoritarian government—a kind of world authoritarian government, if you will—because it’s getting so much cheaper each year to build these incredibly powerful capabilities. When you look at those exponential charts, they’re amazing. It’s just Moore’s Law all over again. At most, you’re buying a couple of years, and eventually this technology is going to diffuse into the hands of everybody.

    Mounk: One side point here, by the way, which I’m sure you know more about technologically than I do, so I’d love to hear your thoughts on it: our frame of reference is often nuclear weapons. That is an incredibly dangerous, powerful technology that can destroy the world, and we’ve been able, to some extent, to prevent its diffusion through international treaties and regimes of inspection and control under certain circumstances, etcetera. My understanding is that there are principled differences between nuclear technology and the capability to build cutting-edge AI models.

    One of them is that nuclear technology requires much bigger physical machinery. The United States is quite good at figuring out, through satellite images and other things, whether the centrifuges in Isfahan, or wherever they are in Iran, are spinning or not. It would be much harder to do that for data centers.

    The other point is that there’s always some dual-use issue in nuclear power in terms of civilian use, but broadly speaking, you know what it’s being used for. So much of our civilization already depends on chips and data centers. Literally, some of the most powerful chips used to develop artificial intelligence were originally designed to power graphics for video games. Then actually controlling whether, say, the United States and China had a big treaty agreeing not to develop cutting-edge AI models—controlling, from the American point of view, that China is sticking to this, or from the Chinese point of view that America is sticking to this—would be incredibly hard because of this challenge of dual use.

    Narayanan: You’ve exactly captured it. There’s dual use, there’s a powerful economic logic of diffusion of AI capabilities and chips, there’s the observability, and there’s the physical bottleneck. Let me add one more point: there’s no particular threshold at which AI becomes dangerous. Every level of AI capability we’ve had has always brought some dangers with it. You can go back to very recent history, and there are striking moments of panic around GPT-2, for instance. OpenAI didn’t initially release the model because they thought it was so dangerous. It’s a model that today my grad students build over a weekend on a single GPU in order to teach themselves how to build these AI systems. That’s how rapidly the technology has diffused, and we’re so much more powerful than GPT-2 now with our recent models. If you stood up today and said GPT-2 is too dangerous, that would sound so ludicrous. My prediction is that whatever we’re saying with Mythos or whatever is going to look exactly like that a decade from now.

    The last point I’ll make is that the good thing about the fact that we have been releasing these systems is that it’s also forced us to improve our defenses, because if some of these models can be used for hacking, it’s forced companies to work with various kinds of software makers to give them better access to these models, so that they can find and fix these bugs before the software even ships out there. If we instead follow a policy approach of nobody having access to the technology in the first place for these dual-use purposes, then we will lose the opportunity to build that immune system, and the dam will break eventually. When the dam breaks, it’s going to enter a world that doesn’t have those defenses in place.

    Mounk: I’m very worried about giving the government powers over individuals, and to some extent over corporations, as well. I’m a philosophical liberal, I give great importance to individual freedom, and I think we’re going to face certain kinds of dilemmas in this context that are quite dissimilar to those posed by previous technologies. Going back to nuclear weapons, for example, we obviously need to govern how states use nuclear weapons. One of the scary things is that, from Kim Jong-un—not to compare them entirely—to Donald Trump, some rather irresponsible people currently have their finger on the button, and that’s deeply discomforting.

    One thing about nuclear weapons, though, is that while they can destroy and blow up the world, they aren’t very useful for domestic political control. You can’t really threaten to win the next election by nuking some city you don’t like. The scary thing about some of the most cutting-edge AI models, from a political point of view, is that they can be used for domestic forms of repression. That means that if you want to avoid the government having all of its powers, you might say it’s better for OpenAI and Anthropic and so on to keep control over those cutting-edge models. But of course, if those companies have control of those cutting-edge models, and they can potentially break into nuclear weapons, or they can potentially have military applications that are absolutely central to the government’s ability to keep its citizens safe, then we can’t really do that either. So how are you thinking about how to solve these real trade-offs, and perhaps these genuine dilemmas, without allowing the government to have powers that could very quickly become tyrannical.

    Narayanan: Simply that it’s not all or nothing. I think we can give the government limited power. So, for instance, pre-release access to these models—the government has access before the general public, in order to, again, find and fix vulnerabilities in critical systems. But that’s very different from giving the government the power to try to carry out a mass persuasion campaign. We’ve written about this, and in our view, the critical bottleneck to the government being able to do that is not the capability to generate text or images or whatever, but rather the distribution channels. In other words, if the government were to control, for instance, social media, that’s a much more dangerous thing than governments controlling AI systems when it comes to the ability for persuasion and propaganda.

    When you go back to media theory, naively, back in the ’50s, people used to have this “hypodermic syringe” model—the idea that there can be messages coming from companies or governments, or any other adversarial actor, that are so powerful that if people come into contact with those messages, even subliminally, they will change their view. Now we know that’s not true. Yet in the AI conversation, a lot of the discourse proceeds as if that is the case. That’s not how people get persuaded. People get persuaded because they’re embedded in a social community where those beliefs take root for various kinds of tribal reasons. When we look at how AI is being used for disinformation, for instance, it’s being used by those in power, including politicians, to persuade or trick their own supporters, as opposed to their adversaries, because it’s in that context that it becomes very powerful.

    So, really, the problem of controlling AI disinformation and propaganda reduces to the existing problems we’ve had with the quality of our epistemic channels and discourse—what do we do about the level of polarization and tribalism, and those types of things. Those are hard problems. They’re not easy. On the margins, AI is going to amplify them. I don’t think AI is creating those problems, though.

    In the rest of this conversation, Arvind and Yascha discuss how artificial intelligence is changing warfare, and how governments, companies, and individuals should prepare for AI’s impact. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    59 min
  • Progressive Asceticism Will Never Win Elections
    Die-in in front of Tate Modern, London, 2019. (Photo by Claire Doherty/In Pictures)

    Alicia Kennedy, one of the most celebrated food writers of her generation, sometimes seems to approach food as a series of moral dilemmas waiting to be untangled. In her new memoir, On Eating—a useful starting point to consider progressive culture as a whole—she writes that alcohol “is one of the most wasteful things one can consume, producing twelve times the wastewater for the amount of spirit created.” Climate change may make wheat scarce, she worries. Sugar, meanwhile, conjures up a litany of horrors—it was originally harvested by slaves, and the present-day sugar industry is often accused of mistreating workers. “Most of us only know the sweetness of it because of the brutality of colonialism and slavery,” Kennedy writes. “There’s no way to have its specific sweetness without exploitation, is there?”

    Kennedy is both a champion and a product of the long-running movement to push consumers to pay attention to what they are eating—where it comes from, what damage it might do to the earth, and who might suffer as a result of its production. These days, conscious, progressive-minded foodies tend to seek out local produce and meat (if they still eat meat) at a farmer’s market; they are aware of the carbon costs of transporting exotic delicacies long distances and the environmental consequences of factory farms. Consumption, in this worldview, is an unavoidably political act. “We can change our desires, reconsider our luxuries,” Kennedy writes. And many have been doing just that.

    What this movement is gesturing toward is a conception that the lifestyles enjoyed by citizens of wealthy nations are, if not outright unsustainable, then at least deeply unfair. For at least a decade, left-of-center, educated, middle-class-and-above Westerners have become inflamed with guilt for the way we live. In a roundabout way, the left has reinvented the idea of sin.

    Electorally speaking, this couldn’t come at a worse time. The Christian conception of sin at least contains a pathway to redemption, through some combination of prayer and faith and good works. Progressivism is less concerned with forgiveness; contemporary left-of-center discourse has instead mired itself in negativity, and in particular on notions of collective guilt for colonialism, racism, and exploitation. Political candidates subscribing to this worldview can win elections in left-leaning enclaves, but it is hard to imagine that tendency as being anything other than profoundly alienating for consumerist-minded mainstream America.

    This negativity manifested, for instance, in the since-deleted tweets of Darializa Avila Chevalier, who recently won a primary for a New York City congressional seat even though she wrote in 2020 that “this country [the U.S.] is a fucking disgrace” and in 2019 that “I forgot to get napkins so I just wiped my hand on the American flag behind me.” What Chevalier was expressing is not a political critique, but a view of the country as being irredeemably fallen—and that’s of course catnip to conservatives who attempt to paint all liberals and progressives with the same brush.

    Subscribe now

    It’s not easy to say why exactly progressivism became so wrapped up in personal consumer choices—it’s a hard turn away from traditional leftist thought, which largely focuses on transforming systems on a broad level. The simplest explanation is that it’s a consequence of political gerrymandering. Progressives who live in blue cities in blue states have little ability to influence our polarized national politics, since all of the viable candidates in those places are progressive Democrats. Thanks to a gridlocked political system and a divided country, actual large-scale change seems borderline impossible. So maybe it’s no wonder so many frustrated progressives have turned to small-scale, personal change, spurred on by a social media environment where negativity and extremism spreads like wildfire, and where there’s a tendency to tell people that everything they do, no matter what it is, is wrong.

    If you buy organic foods because you’ve been told that that’s better for the planet, you’ll find plenty of sources that tell you this is not good enough. If you buy carbon offsets to lessen your emissions impact, you’ll quickly be informed this is a scam. A few years ago, there was a push among some on the left to explain why philanthropy was bad, actually. Progressive thought can be so focused on what we are doing “wrong”—personally and collectively—that it lends itself to a kind of nihilism. On a much-lampooned New York Times podcast episode from earlier this year, the New Yorker writer Jia Tolentino said that “getting iced coffee in a plastic cup” is “a profoundly selfish, immoral, collectively destructive action” that she nevertheless partakes in regularly. On the same podcast, she endorsed shoplifting from Whole Foods, stealing from the Louvre, and (jokingly?) blowing up pipelines. If everything you do is suffused with sin, why have moral standards at all? If you truly believe there is no ethical consumption under capitalism, but find yourself living under capitalism, maybe you should just give in to your most selfish impulses.

    This is the danger of focusing so much on the idea that our consumption is immoral and that our pleasures originate from some nexus of colonialism and misery. If absolution from sin is impossible, what’s the point of taking any of this stuff seriously?

    In the late 2010s peak woke era, “antiracist” gurus advocated sometimes bizarre methods of fighting prejudice—all of it with the hint of the hairshirt and almost medieval prescriptions for wallowing in sin. Robin DiAngelo’s website advises white people to undergo a process of “continual education” that involves forming “affinity groups” with other whites and befriending black or indigenous people to “talk through issues and challenges.” These relationships should be “authentic,” DiAngelo warns, but we should also pay the BIPOC people we talk about race with. In the same spirit, a couple of women of color had, for a while, a good business going charging liberal white women $2,500 to be berated for being racist. This is the parodic endpoint of much of 21st-century progressivism—instead of working toward a more just world for everyone, flagellate yourself endlessly for making the world worse.

    Some well-meaning people, faced with these problems of guilt and culpability, have created a version of moral accounting that is basically just accounting. In Strangers Drowning, a 2015 book by Larissa MacFarquhar that profiles individuals whose sense of ethics leads them to extremes, she writes about Julia Wise and Jeff Kaufman, early adopters of what would become known as the Effective Altruism movement. For more than a decade, they gave away more than 50 percent of their combined income to nonprofits that worked in the developing world, in their personal attempt to address global inequality. This is an extreme version of tithing that the couple settled on thanks to Julia’s rigid, quantitative moral code. MacFarquhar writes that early in their relationship, Wise asks Kaufman to buy her a candy apple at an event, then immediately regrets it:

    With her selfish, ridiculous desire for a candy apple, she might have deprived a family of an anti-malarial bed net or deworming medicine that might have saved the life of one of its children. The more she thought about this, the more horrific and unbearable it seemed to her, and she started to cry.

    Few would be willing to donate the majority of their earnings to charity in order to absolve their guilt; few, for that matter, feel guilt as intensely as Kaufman. But at least Effective Altruism considers how one might go about fixing the world, rather than dwelling on its brokenness.

    Much of progressivism, though, seems to go further. Joy was the missing ingredient from so much of progressive discourse in the late 2010s and early 2020s. Left-leaning media figures told the public that our way of life was destroying the earth, that we were racist, that our favorite shows and books and works of art were “problematic” and should be discarded. And nothing really was offered in its place—just atonement and penitence and the self-lacerations of collective guilt.

    Subscribe now

    For an example of what progressive joy can look like, look to the left’s current champion, Zohran Mamdani. For all of the controversy stirred up by the New York City mayor (for instance, he endorsed Chevalier), he won election in large part because it was fun to support him. His smiling, sunny social media presence was a far cry from the dour stereotypes of socialists—and for that matter, a far cry from his more centrist opponent Andrew Cuomo, who did not seem fun at all. In one of Mamdani’s more famous campaign videos, he decries the high cost of operating a food cart while interviewing cart operators and eating their food. Was their lettuce and rice organic? Are their styrofoam boxes clogging up some horrific landfill? Maybe—but the point was that these people had problems, and Mamdani was talking to them in hopes of solving them. The progressivism that can endure doesn’t tell people what they’re doing wrong, but instead asks what help they need.

    That seems to be what’s missing in the current discourse. The last decade has convinced a lot of people that progressives are nothing but humorless scolds. Who wants to join a club like that? Until the left can convince everyone that it’s fun to be a member of the movement, that movement will struggle. But first, maybe some leftists need to convince themselves it’s okay to have fun.

    Harry Cheadle is a freelance writer and editor living in Seattle.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Ivan Krastev on Why America Has Lost Faith in Itself

    Will you be in Washington, D.C. on Wednesday July 15? I will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about how liberalism should respond to the postliberal threat. Find out more and get your free ticket here! —Yascha

    Ivan Krastev is Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies and the Albert Hirschman Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) in Vienna. He is a founding board member of the European Council on Foreign Relations and serves on the advisory and governing boards of several international organizations, including the European Investment Bank, the International Crisis Group, and GLOBSEC.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ivan Krastev discuss what the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the United States reveals about America’s crisis of self-confidence, whether America and Europe are converging rather than diverging, and how competition with China will reshape American identity in the decades ahead.

    We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.

    That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.

    This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Well, it’s a real pleasure to speak to you every time, Ivan, and today I thought we’d do something slightly unusual, which is that whatever I am, I’m a U.S. citizen at least, but a born European and a Bulgarian citizen are going to do the July 4th episode, the special July 4th episode for the 250th anniversary of the United States. But you’re such a thoughtful thinker about every part of the world, and you obviously know the United States well, that I think it is not asking you too much to play a kind of latter day Alexis de Tocqueville. On this 250th anniversary of the United States, what strikes you most about the state of the country?

    Ivan Krastev: We Europeans believe that we know the United States. At the end of the day, we don’t. We understand it immediately when you get out of some of the big cities to which we normally go. But when I look at the United States today, I had the feeling that the country is really trying to reinvent itself and to refound itself, and to decide basically who they are. Now when I’m looking back, my view is that there was a different United States, and it can be seen much easier from outside than from inside. There was an America that came and basically was very much being born of the place which it left, and this was Europe, and this was America as a new world, and is basically all the time comparing itself with Europe and struggling against this European legacy. But this America was very much populated by Europeans, people coming from Europe, immigrants from these countries, being satisfied from the place from which they go. And there was another America, and this was very much the America of the Cold War, where it was not about Europe anymore, where America was mirroring itself with the Soviet Union. It was a much more different ideological America. America as leader of the free world, which it was competing with the Soviets to whom the future belongs.

    My feeling is that we are now going to a kind of a third America. America is much more trying to make sense of itself looking at China, trying to understand who we are. From this point of view, what President Trump is doing, for me, paradoxically, is really kind of trying to change American identity on several dimensions. One is that he is dreaming, probably he will not do it, but he’s dreaming to change the territory of the United States. I take it much more seriously, his talk about Greenland or Canada or even Venezuela becoming part of the United States, because he had the feeling that in order to refound and to reinvent the country, first of all, you should change its territory. Secondly, of course, he’s trying to reinvent America very differently from the America of the Cold War that he has inherited, and he does not see America anymore as the champion of liberal causes in the world. He’s seeing a totally different America. But thirdly, and for me this is most striking, unlike any previous Americas, I’m not sure to what extent the American president is self-confident about the America that he sees. So this is what I found particularly interesting. I’m not sure while he talks about America being great again, that he really believes in the greatness of America.

    Mounk: So it’s perhaps a sign of his lack of self-confidence, right? It’s often the case psychologically that teenagers who are particularly insecure are also the ones who try to bully their classmates in order to get the external proof that in fact they are somebody and they’re worth something, and they’ve proven their status in this very straightforward and brutal way. We’ve talked enough about the psychology of Donald Trump over the last years, but do you think that at this point this is true of the psychology of the United States more broadly? Is there a kind of quarter millennium crisis of self-confidence that the country suffers from?

    Krastev: You had the period around the Civil War, and of course you had the 1970s, which was a very tough period in which America was questioning itself very much. But this idea of America that should reinvent itself, it didn’t start with Trump. Honestly speaking, from a very different ideological perspective, even if you look at the 1619 Project, you’re going to see that suddenly America decided to tell a new story about itself. The idea was that all these cliches that we outside of America have always been thinking about America were not true anymore. But this America, regardless of whether it is the America that wants to face basically slavery and all the other bad things that it has done, or this America that Trump is talking about, is an America which, in my view, has lost this self-confidence of a kind of exceptionalism that does not come simply from the fact that America is powerful, but from the fact that America has a special purpose. Because this was true for all these previous Americas. The America that was running away from Europe in order to create a new world was very much believing in its exceptional nature, and the Cold War America was very much believing in its exceptional nature. In my view, this America which we see now, the America that is facing China, the America that is “America first,” I’m not sure anymore that it is very much believing in its exceptional nature.

    Many of the things that we think about America also start to look different. For example, normally for us, for Europeans, America was an immigrant nation. This was a place where people go and basically become Americans. Now, if you look at the statistics, you’re going to be surprised to learn that Austrian citizens not born in Austria, as a percent of the population, is a higher percent than American citizens not born in the United States. So in a certain way, you have the feeling that countries and identities are changing places.

    From this point of view, President Trump is interesting not simply because of his insecurity, but because he has, in my view, a very special idea of historical time. If you go closer, you’re going to see that he’s not very much interested in those who have been before him, and also I don’t believe that he’s very much interested in who’s going to come after him. He does not think in terms of legacy. If you think in terms of legacy, you want somebody else to build your Arc de Triomphe. No, in my view, he basically managed to reduce time to his individual lifetime. So the world starts with the moment he was born, and in a certain way ends for him politically with the moment when he’s not going to be president anymore. For me, this kind of collapse of time is something that probably partially explains this lack of self-confidence. Because now when America looks at China, first they see a country which is much bigger than any type of challenger or adversary that America has been seeing before. But secondly, it’s a country that is economically producing, having scale. You have the feeling that now America is envying China in the way that Soviets had been envying America in the last decades of the Cold War.

    Mounk: I want to get back to China in a few moments, but to start with America’s relationship to Europe, which is obviously fundamental to the country’s identity, certainly when you think about the period of the founding. There’s an argument at the moment, which I think is widely believed in Europe without people having thought about it very much, that Europe and the United States are diverging, that they’re becoming much more dissimilar from each other. When you just compare Donald Trump as the president of the United States to Emmanuel Macron as the president of France, and Friedrich Merz as the chancellor of Germany, it is fair to say that the differences between them are much bigger than the differences between Barack Obama and Angela Merkel, for they certainly had very different biographies, right?

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    But I think in other ways, you’re implying an argument that’s quite interesting, on which America and Europe are actually becoming more similar. Part of this is that Europe is Americanizing, and certainly the fact that European societies are now societies of immigrants, have very quickly speed run become extremely diverse societies, but not necessarily with the historical knowledge about how to actually succeed in integrating newcomers and making them feel like Americans historically have managed to, that they truly are just part of the American experiment, for example, does make those countries somewhat more similar to the United States.

    Conversely, of course, one way to think about Trump and the broader transformation of the American right over the last 10 or 15 years is that it has Europeanized. The American right has historically been quite striking, at least since the kind of fusionist right from the 1960s, by being a right that accepts the idea of liberal democracy, which was part of the founding creed of the country. Whereas certainly the hard right in Europe was always tempted by fascism, by anti-democratic currents, by a rejection of the idea of liberalism, certainly. So perhaps Europe is Americanizing and America is Europeanizing, and in some ways the two continents are now more similar than they were 50 or 200 years ago.

    Krastev: I first of all agree, because I really believe that Europe has been Americanized, and the paradox of Trump’s position is that he starts to dislike Europe exactly because Europe starts to look like America. Paradoxically, for all these years, Americans were kind of telling Europeans, “You do not have this diversity thing that we have. You’re very much closed in your own nationalistic dreams.” And now, when this much more diverse Europe has arrived, basically, at least President Trump was shocked and discovered how much he dislikes it.

    But also, in a strange way, I do believe you are right, because on one level, the American left, in economic terms, is more and more fascinated by the European social model. You remember Bernie Sanders dreaming about America becoming like Denmark. Not that many Americans know exactly where Denmark is. On the other side, of course, now the European right is fascinated with Trump. Even some of the leaders who are going to distance themselves as political leaders from Trump, they basically see him as somebody who speaks to their fears and basically speaks to their hopes.

    On the other side, what has changed, in my view, is that people of European origin are now a minority in the United States. This type of connection that existed on the level of the individual, of the family, if you go to the American universities, you’re going to see that European studies or European departments are kind of a disappearing species. At the same time, when you look at how the American right and, to a certain extent, even the American left look, they remind me very much of what I see in Latin America. This is why I’m not surprised that President Trump and his agenda are very successful in Latin America, in a way that Trump-supported candidates are winning in Latin America the way they are winning in the red states in the United States. In great respect, this is a right which is less related to this kind of libertarian ethos that was much more typical for the American right. It is less kind of, at the same time, having these very strong liberal credentials, which was typical for the Republican Party. You have something much more difficult, and the American left is also much more about identity politics, different minority groups, and a coalition in a certain way of minorities, which was not the case for the American left before.

    So we’re coming together in a certain way, and going apart. But the major story is that both Europe and America, in my view, go through this identity crisis. We were not what we used to be before, and we don’t know exactly how to define ourselves even in the relations between ourselves. Because in my view, one thing that has happened, and I could be very wrong on this, is that we see the end of the long 20th century. In the 20th century, America was defined by, as you said, “it never happened here.” Neither communism nor fascism. This was part of American exceptionalism, and there were many explanations for this. One of them also had a lot to do with the problem of race and kind of very much racially based politics, which prevented any type of worker solidarity, which was so important for the early socialist movements and others.

    But on the other hand, “it never happened here,” even Americans don’t believe it anymore. Suddenly, I do believe we’re living in a moment in which Americans believe both that their country can go fascist, and this is what half of Americans believe, and also the other half believes that America can go socialist or even communist. Nevertheless, both are not very clear about the meaning of these words anymore.

    Mounk: So earlier you were saying that the second phase of American identity was really defined by the competition with the Soviet Union. Perhaps that helped that period of American history revolve in a very explicit way around the American creed, because of course the United States and Soviet Union had one key similarity, which is that they were both universalist political projects, that they both thought the world would be better off if everybody was ruled like they are. I wonder what that tells us about how this third phase, which is significantly going to be defined by competition with China, is going to transform and transmute American identity.

    China obviously has roots in very much the same political system that drove the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was informed by Marxism-Leninism for a long time, but has since become a quite notably different thing. One of the things that it does seem to lack historically, though perhaps the stronger it gets, the more that will come to the fore, is that universalist ambition. China, for now, claims that the party has figured out the right way to rule the country. It certainly is somewhat friendly with a few of the regimes that have similar post-Marxist-Leninist political parties in charge. But broadly speaking, it is perfectly happy to make alliances with anybody who is on its side in the broader geopolitical competition with the United States. So what element of American identity is going to be pushed to the fore over the next decades, at least as defined by this competition with China?

    Krastev: Great question, because if you look at the end of the Cold War, more and more we’re trying to see how exceptional this period was. You have two superpowers, both of them very much ideological states. They were standing for a certain type of political idea and political philosophy, and both of them were very much obsessed with the idea of the future, of how the future was going to look. They were universalist, exactly what you are saying. All of them believed that the whole world was going to look either like them or like their enemy. There is this character in Updike’s novel who said, “What is the point of being an American if there is no Cold War?” So in a certain way, the Cold War created a very strong identity for the United States, but this identity, America as the free world, was very much connected in opposition to the Soviet Union. For example, the Soviet Union had censorship and tried basically to repress freedom of expression. As a result, the United States decided to make out of freedom of expression, and for example jazz or abstract art, symbols of itself. We can question to what extent a quite culturally conservative America would have made jazz or abstract painting the symbol of its culture if it was not for the Soviet Union. In a certain way, America was doing many things because Americans knew that in the eyes of many other parts of the world, they were compared all the time with the Soviets. This is why all this focus on freedoms, individual freedoms, but also collective freedoms, was so important.

    Subscribe now

    Also, before going to China, for me it’s important that the fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States, I mean their elites, were sure that the future was on their side, explains also why the Cold War did not become hot. Because if you believe that the future is on your side, if we’re going to clash, better to clash tomorrow, because tomorrow I’m going to be in a stronger position. If you’re reading Marxism, you’re going to see that capitalism is going to collapse out of its contradictions. But if you’re going to read George Kennan, you know that containment simply said we should outweigh them. Communism is going to collapse out of its contradictions. So there was this possibility that this fight did not need to become a military clash immediately. It was not simply the nuclear weapon, it was this strong belief that the future belongs to us that made it possible for both sides not to have this clash.

    The story with China is, and I believe this is really interesting, the Chinese obviously try to increase their global influence. We can say that they want to dominate the world, but they’re not interested, like the Soviets, in exporting their own model, probably because they believe that their model is too good and others cannot adopt it. But also what is very important is they’re competing with the United States on the field which Americans always believe they’re strongest at, and this is economy. Suddenly, basically, the Chinese are doing fine, particularly when it comes to industrial production. They’re producing much more than America is producing these days, and this puts America in a very difficult position, because not simply the free market, but industrial economic power was so important for America, by the way, so important for America during the Cold War. Now this is the moment in which the United States is not anymore, in my view, convinced of its own economic power.

    While there is a lot of talk about innovation, and rightly so, fascination with what Silicon Valley is doing, you can see some statistics, and you’re also going to see the story of this clash. For example, the famous book about America and China describes a clash between a society run by lawyers and a society run by engineers. You can see that suddenly many people in America start to fear that if we’re in a new Cold War, America starts to look like the Soviet Union when it comes to economic development. In my view, this is very new. Americans were always very optimistic about themselves. They were very optimistic about the direction in which the world was going, and this was lost. Paradoxically, Trump, who talks about “America first” and “we’re going to be great again,” became the symbol of this kind of crisis of self-confidence. Because while he talks so much about “America first,” you can see the extent to which he, in a way, envies China. He envies the absolute power of the Chinese leader. He envies the industrialization of China. So the idea of reindustrialization is to make America look more like China than it is looking now. So in my view, this is the new moment, and this is why the competition with China, like the competition with the Soviet Union, really became a question for American self-confidence.

    Mounk: One of the things that I sometimes say as a quip, but I think really does say something about the current situation in China, is that the country works reasonably well in practice, but is a mess in theory. What I mean by that is that there were historically many political regime types that didn’t necessarily work very well in practice, but certainly were much less good than the Chinese system at delivering wealth and affluence for its people and so on, but in which it was quite clear what the system was, and you could go and impose that system on another country if you were able to influence it. In China, the country is based on a very long tradition of a meritocratic civil service, selected through public examinations. It has such deep state capacity because it is a country that in very complicated permutations and variations has existed for many thousands of years. But if you tried to actually take the model and impose it on Nigeria or on Zimbabwe, it’s just really unclear what that would actually mean and entail. I think this creates a weird situation where at some theoretical level, the aspirations of a Communist Party are always universalist. But in practice, I don’t think that people in Beijing are particularly interested in universalizing the rule, because they recognize something about the fact that the system is not easily exportable.

    But I actually want to take the conversation in a different direction, which is that the deepest reasons for the crisis of confidence in the United States, I think, are not the competition with China or anything like that. It’s a kind of crisis of conviction about America’s own self-perception. You said earlier that there were historically three kinds of ways that Americans thought about themselves. The first we might associate with its most impressive contemporary articulator, Barack Obama: a nation that was flawed from its inception because of slavery and other injustices, but in which nothing that’s wrong about the country might not be fixed, and what is right about the country, the guiding ideals of its founding, is what allowed us to overcome many, though not all, of these injustices, and that should spur us on to do even better in the future.

    Then there is a kind of right-wing rejection of that idea, which says, no, this was never a universalist nation. It was a nation of white Anglo-Saxons, and it was a nation of Christians, and if we lose that part of our nature, then what is special about the United States is going to be lost. And then, of course, there’s the left’s rejection of this narrative, which is to say that the country was not defined by 1776, the holiday we’re celebrating today. It was defined by 1619. It was defined not by the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence. It was defined by the first day that slaves arrived on American shores. Are you an Obamaist in this juxtaposition, or do you think that way of contrasting the three different options is somehow too simple, or do you embrace one or the other two?

    Krastev: I do believe that you are right, but all three in a certain way are talking about different types of exceptionalism. One is America being exceptionally bad, and by the way, this was always part of Americans’ discourse about America. Being critical about America was one of the important things in how American democracy was functioning, and you can see it very much on the left. And you also have the exceptionalism of America as a country with a purpose, as a city on the hill, and it can have all these different types of incarnation. What was interesting about Obama’s view is that in a certain way, he believes that America is exceptional but also very normal. He tries to integrate it into a world which is not so America-centered. It was not simply about American power, but in a certain way he believes, probably rightly, that we’re going to see much more divergence, that all the different nations are going to try to find their own way.

    I’m saying this because going back to what you said about China, in my view, in a certain way, it rhymes with what we are talking about now. In the 1970s, the Chinese were exporting ideology more than the Soviets. Mao and Maoism was so powerful in the Third World because basically his idea of peasants being the major driving force of the revolution was fitting much more easily to the reality of Third World countries outside of the West, than the communist idea of the working class, the classical Marxism. And then it failed, and I do believe that this was the moment in which suddenly the Chinese decided that dominating the world and exporting your model are not necessarily the same thing.

    Here is the point which for me is critical: America and China know the world in two different ways. America was the melting pot. America knows the world to the extent that for over 250 years, people from all over the world were coming to the United States, and they were becoming Americans. The melting pot was about this: you know the world because you know how to transform others. America was always perceiving itself not simply as an exceptional, but as a transformative power. China was not thinking in terms of a melting pot, but in terms of the Chinatown. Chinese go to the world, and they are not trying to transform the places that they go, but they try to keep their identity and also try economically to benefit and to dominate the place where they are. Chinatowns also are not trying to spread, but they are trying, of course, to prosper and to become much more powerful, particularly in economic terms.

    Now, when this is happening, I have the feeling that the Chinese are happy with the power, and of course their regime can collapse like any political regime. But then the Americans are saying, if we don’t have this special purpose, if, like President Trump, who believes that America is the victim of the fact that it tried to be exceptional and particularly exceptional in its liberalism, then comes the story of what it means to be an American. You’re right about Obama, but one of the interesting things that happened after the end of the Cold War, and this is when the idea of the future became problematic in the American story, was that suddenly, at the end of history, you have the feeling that the future has arrived and America was the future. Everybody started trying to copy the United States in one way or another: to speak American, to play golf, to read the Founding Fathers. The moment when you have been the future for others, you in a certain way lose the perspective of the future for yourself and start asking yourself tough questions.

    Subscribe now

    If you’re, for example, going to read Huntington’s Who Are We?, one of the interesting stories, and his particular resentment towards many of the new migrants coming from Mexico and other places, was that before, coming to America was a one-way ticket. You go across the ocean and you cannot go back. You either become American or you’re doomed. Now it was so easy to cross the borders in all directions, so suddenly this decision to come to America is not a decision anymore to become American forever. I do believe that this is the paradox. In the age of migration, suddenly the particularity of America as a migrant nation was put into question.

    Mounk: That is very interesting, and it does go to the challenge that the right perhaps has always historically had with the American story, and that has come to the fore with Donald Trump: whether America is defined by its values, by the ideas in the Constitution, or whether it has actually historically only worked because it was in some ways a cultural and religious product. It’s a question that in America is posed as whether or not the United States is a Christian nation, just as Narendra Modi is trying to relitigate in India the question of whether or not India is a Hindu nation. Of course, these religions in both of these contexts go beyond faith. I mean, they are markers for an ethno-religious identity that is setting itself up against another, against the significant Muslim minority in India, and against a kind of broader set of people who are coming to the country in the United States.

    Now, of course, part of what that story gets slightly wrong is who it is who’s actually challenging the Americanness of a country and some of the ideas and values that we could take for granted. I’m a great admirer of Samuel Huntington. I think he’s made astonishing contributions to political science, from Soldier and the State to Clash of Civilizations, even though I’ve often disagreed with him. I think the one book that it’s hard to take seriously is exactly the one that you’ve criticized, Who Are We?, because I think the idea that Latinos are somehow undermining the true nature of America was probably silly at the time and seems much more silly today. That’s because I think most Latinos who’ve been in the United States for a little while are quite clearly very American. In an ironic turn, it is often the liberal arts, college-educated scions of the Mayflower that seem to be rejecting many aspects of what America is.

    I would guess that most Latino families in the United States are enjoying some form of celebration or barbecue about July 4th today, and even if many of them have all kinds of misgivings about the current state of our country, I think most of them are actually quite patriotic. I think there are a lot more people who both can take advantage of some of the things that the United States offers its citizens, including still the most remarkable middle-class economy in the world, and who may actually have many more historical ties to the generation of the founders, than the people who may be sitting around rolling their eyes and saying, really, we shouldn’t be celebrating any of this.

    Krastev: The American dream is something that was really important for the way at least those of us outside of America were seeing America. You go there, and you can succeed in one generation. You can succeed in two generations. There was this incredible social mobility that was so important in the way, for example, Europeans were trying to compare America with themselves. We are also forgetting that particularly after the end of World War II, America was so powerful but also so prosperous and so rich. When you read basically anything, the diaries or memoirs of the Europeans talking about American soldiers or any type of American that they were going to see in Europe in the late 1940s, 1950s, you have this totally devastated continent, and then you have all these people who are coming, and they were rich, and they’re prosperous, but also they were self-confident. They were really representing this new world.

    I’m saying this because suddenly the American dream is becoming a challenge within the United States. On one level, this is a challenge because of the thing that everybody is seeing: ` this fear that the next generation is not going to be able to live better than their parents. I do believe this was really important for the United States, because America depended on social mobility much more than traditional European societies. But secondly, it is something that you said: if we are going to a world of civilizations, if the Chinese are going to become a civilization which tries to dominate but doesn’t want to export its model, if Indians are going to define themselves as a civilizational state, if Russians are struggling to do the same, not particularly successfully, then which is the American civilization? Is Europe part of it?

    For example, in Europe in the 19th century, words like race and nation were synonymous. This kind of a ratio, the idea of whiteness, was very much an American invention. The interesting story about the current type of talk about this is that America was changing demographically not simply because new people were coming, but because people were being redefined. For example, Bulgarians or Jews in the late 19th century were not defined as white, but there was a moment in which they became white, and we know from sociology how the Irish became white. I do believe this is what is going to happen with Latinos and others. But then how are we going to define this civilization to which Europe belongs, America belongs? If it is on racial terms, who is going to be white and how is it going to be white?

    In my view, this is one of the biggest problems that is coming from some of the right-wing attempts to redefine basically European American civilization simply on racial terms. Because the moment you’re going to do it, you’re starting to realize how historically constructed and how differently constructed race was in different periods. In a certain way, paradoxically, whiteness came as the result of trying to reconcile the differences between people coming from different European countries, Germans and Brits, people coming from different religious traditions, because religious divisions were so important in Europe in the beginning. So strangely enough, whiteness was the way to try to reconcile all this diversity of American society, and after that, it basically became one of the sources of confrontation. I’m saying this because as a result of it, 250 years after its founding, America is kind of forced to reread and reinterpret all of its traditions, because the world in which it is living is not allowing it to coexist easily with the previous identities that it was telling itself.

    Mounk: There is a strange set of paradoxes about the role that the idea of race plays in the American imagination at the moment. Of course, the history of the country has, because of slavery and other things, been deeply defined by some imagination of race all along. But one of the fights of this moment, I think, is whether you will get a further broadening of the idea of who’s white. Some sociologists claim that this is already happening, that there’s going to be a kind of mainstream society that sees itself in the broadest sense as white, and it is going to include a lot of Latinos and probably a lot of Asian Americans, and it may even in some ways include middle and upper-middle-class Black Americans. So whiteness becomes a kind of strange multiracial category, with some kind of a racialized remainder that is based on some mix of ethnic origin and socioeconomic status.

    Or whether you actually do the opposite, and the idea is that you get the kind of overarching category of “person of color,” the term that was used incredibly often over the last five or six years, but is now, I think, slightly declining in salience, and you’re pitting them against this kind of remainder category of whites. Of course, ironically, whereas for the vast majority of American history you would enjoy a higher status and you would want to be counted in the category of whites rather than the category of people excluded from whites, which is why, according to the sociological accounts, which I don’t always fully agree with, Jews and Irish Americans and so on fought to be included in the category of white, today, in some senses, you might wish for the opposite. In many contexts, to be white is supposed to be a negative thing, and there may actually be negative consequences for college admissions or for your ability to garner some kind of contract from your local government if you are counted within that category.

    Remarkably, this is not even an ethnic example. The state of California has now included a mandate for the boards of companies in California to have some representation from the LGBT community, and if you falsely claim to be gay, then the state may prosecute you, not for being gay as it might have done 100 or 200 years ago in many countries in the West, but for falsely claiming to be gay, which is a kind of remarkable thing. So what do you think is going to be the way that people think about their identity in a little bit of time? To raise the stakes here, Ivan, let’s imagine that we’re talking on the 500th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. How do you think Americans will think about the role of these kinds of forms of identity and of race 250 years from now?

    Krastev: If we’re going to talk on the 500th anniversary, which means that we are going to embrace the idea of individual immortality, then probably everything is going to be different for everybody. But you are making a very important point, and the important point is that suddenly being part of a majority means that you do not have an identity. Identity comes only from being part of different minorities, and you can try to be one type or another type of minority, but there was something wrong about the idea of the majority as a whole. I do believe this is a very new idea. Normally, minorities try to be integrated into certain political majorities, and this was why, for example, political parties, ideologies, and elections were so important, because by being part of the majority, you have the feeling that you are integrated into the country. Now the story is that suddenly being a majority means being oppressive. Being a minority becomes a privilege, and this is the paradox. By the way, this is one of the paradoxes that is very much used by the right, who say, how did this happen? Is it not that in a democracy the privilege is to be part of a bigger group? Does it mean that basically everything depends on us?

    I’m saying this because I do believe in a democracy there are two different ideas of a majority. One is the idea of the historical majority that created the state, and in a certain way, in the case of America, this was the Europeans who basically came to the continent and wrote the Constitution and put in their rules and basically their tradition. Then there is the majority which is born on the night of the elections, and this majority does not have a particular color. It has much more of a political identity than any type of ethnic or religious identity. But the idea was that this second majority should not contest the first one, and this is happening because of the demographic changes. Suddenly, you can see that either we’re going to redefine what it means to be white, or you’re going to end up with all the fears that have been captured by Huntington, with his idea that WASP America is disappearing and it is not going to be the same anymore. These identities are not going to work well if they’re not going to be redefined.

    I do believe we’re living in this interesting moment in which everything is too fluid, and too much is possible, and this is why nobody has the feeling that he lives at home. This is not true only about America. I do believe we see the same in Europe, because home is the place that you feel you understand and where you feel understood, where there is this intuitive understanding that you know how the system works, you know basically how institutions work. In this case, America was always very different than Europe, because this sense of home as a much more ethnically and culturally homogeneous place was much more typical for Europe, and for Europeans, home was like speaking a native language, a language that you speak before knowing the grammar, a language that naturally comes to you. In America, even if you come from England, you should learn a new language, because American was this new language that everybody, even English speakers, should learn, because America, from this point of view, was always different from the classical European nation-states.

    But now, if there is no American dream, and if there is not a dream that we should all become much more similar, that we are not going to be so much defined by our ethnic or racial identity, I do believe that suddenly the country starts to have this feeling of tension and civil political polarization, of a civil war. Paradoxically, I do believe that there is one conflict, and I could be wrong, that probably if you’re going to look from the future, probably not so distant, like the next 20 to 150 years, you’re going to see that in current America, the generational conflict can turn out to be politically more important than some of the class conflicts that we know from before, or even the type of identity conflicts that we are talking about. Because paradoxically, for the first time in modern history, young people in the world, but particularly now in the United States, are a minority. This is a minority which does not feel represented enough in politics, and as a result of it, starts to contest democracy, and because they start to contest democracy, they start to contest the basic American values.

    In my view, this is an interesting story, because the gap of wealth between the population, the fact that we are living much longer, and for the first time you’re going to have not three but probably five generations living next to each other, the fact that we don’t have many kids, and suddenly the generational pyramid is turning on its head, all of this, in my view, is going to restructure American politics to the extent that the identities that we talk about now, which are very much race-based and ethnically based, may turn out to be less important than they look today.

    In the rest of this conversation, Ivan and Yascha discuss their personal perceptions of how the United States has changed, and how Donald Trump will be remembered. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    51 min
  • A Pluralist Manifesto

    Will you be in Washington, D.C. on Wednesday July 15? I will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about how liberalism should respond to the postliberal threat. Find out more and get your free ticket here! —Yascha

    An American flag is waved on July 1, 2026 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Finn Gomez/Getty Images.)

    The rise of Civic Thought programs and the demise of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs are two of the main hallmarks of this moment in higher education, and they are viewed as closely related.

    The conventional wisdom will tell you that this is mostly about ideological rebalancing: DEI is the den of progressives who are obsessed with identity; Civic Thought is the lair of conservatives who want to return America to a more homogenous heritage.

    But I think there is a different way of looking at things. The distinguishing feature of schools of Civic Thought is a focus on American foundations, and when you focus on American foundations, you find that America is, inescapably, a diversity project—an experiment in diverse identities coming together to build a greater whole.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    Consider Roger Williams, who, in 1635, was banished from John Winthrop’s Puritan theocracy for his diverse opinions and built the state of Rhode Island on the foundation that people of “other worships” could be “peacable and quiet Subjects, loving and helpful neighbours, faire and just dealers, true and loyall to the civill government.”

    Or the group of mostly Calvinist men in the hamlet of Flushing who in 1657 felt a duty to oppose Director General Peter Stuyvesant’s order forbidding Quaker practice. In a document that came to be called the “Flushing Remonstrance,” they wrote:

    The law of love, peace and liberty in the states extends to Jews, Turks and Egyptians, as they are considered sons of Adam … our desire is not to offend one of his little ones, in whatsoever form, name or title hee appears in, whether Presbyterian, Independent, Baptist or Quaker, but shall be glad to see anything of God in any of them, desiring to doe unto all men as we desire all men should doe unto us.

    Or the time in August 1790 when President George Washington was received in Newport, Rhode Island by the Warden of the Touro Synagogue, Moses Seixas. Seixas had high hopes for the new nation, but sought assurances that Jews and other religious minorities would be protected. Washington responded in a document that became known as the “Letter to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island”:

    The government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction and persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves good citizens … May the children of the stock of Abraham sit in safety under their own vine and fig and let there be none to make them afraid.

    Or July 1858 when Abraham Lincoln came to Chicago to celebrate Independence Day. From the balcony of the Tremont House Hotel, in a time of national turmoil over slavery and immigration, Abraham Lincoln told the gathered crowd that they should be proud to be direct descendants of the Founding Fathers. “They were iron men,” Lincoln said. “They fought for the principles that they were contending for.”

    And then Lincoln pointed out that there were many present who could not trace their ancestry back to the Founders by blood. How should the nation view these immigrants? He continued:

    When they look through that old Declaration of Independence they find that those old men say that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal” and that they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration, and so they are. That is the electric cord in that Declaration that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world.

    These examples should be standard teaching in a Civic Thought program. And you could add hundreds more—Thomas Jefferson reverently owning a Qur’an, Benjamin Franklin making donations to multiple religious communities in Philadelphia, James Madison defending Baptists in Virginia, our 1782 national motto being E Pluribus Unum.

    America is inescapably a diversity project.

    Subscribe now

    Because the United States of America is the world’s first attempt at diverse democracy, many of our greatest minds and most renowned leaders have devoted themselves to these principles. That tradition of thought and practice has a name: pluralism. There are three pillars of pluralism.

    1. Welcoming diversity in a three-dimensional manner, by which I mean the recognition that not only do people have a right to their identities, but that identities give meaning to people’s lives and vitality to our democracy, and therefore we have a stake in protecting people’s ability to practice their identity.

    1. Recognizing that, in a diverse democracy, deep disagreement is inevitable, and the goal should be to build both a political architecture and a civil society strong enough to hold together people of diverse identities and divergent ideologies. As John Rawls said, “How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”

    1. Cultivating an ethos whereby people of diverse identities and divergent ideologies can disagree on some fundamental things and work together on other fundamental things—in Yuval Levin’s phrase, an ethos where people who do not think alike can still act together.

    These three pillars of pluralism can be found in the writings of some of America’s greatest leaders and most renowned philosophers. James Madison ensured that it was integrated into the political architecture of the nation, most importantly through the Constitution. In the early 20th century, the philosophers Horace Kallen and Alain Locke developed the intellectual tradition of cultural pluralism, which described the nation as a harmonious gathering of different cultures, in the same way that an orchestra is a harmonious gathering of different instruments. Alexis de Tocqueville and Jane Addams emphasized how American civic institutions gathered people of diverse identities and divergent ideologies to solve problems and achieve shared goals that require cooperation across difference.

    In the tradition of pluralism, distinct identities (black, gay, Catholic, female, southerner, etc.)—and the communities that emerge to celebrate and sustain those identities—are viewed as valuable pieces of the broader whole, rather than as elements tearing the fabric apart. These identity groups are what Edmund Burke called the “little platoons” of society, where people find an intimate community that connects them to the larger society. The political scientist Robert Putnam highlighted that it is in these groups that people learn the building blocks of democracy—how to inspire volunteers, run meetings, and organize activities.

    If the American foundations are taught rigorously, pluralism will be at the heart of any Civic Thought program. In that sense, schools of Civic Thought would be engaged in a form of diversity work. I think they should embrace that. In fact, I think schools of Civic Thought should be viewed as champions of diversity efforts on campus.

    I recognize that this might seem, at first glance, like a counter-intuitive idea. Diversity work has in recent years been viewed as the province of DEI programs, and as DEI programs were discredited, diversity work has been thrown out like the proverbial baby with the bathwater.

    But, as you can see from the American foundations I sketched above, diversity work is not just embedded in the American project as a matter of historical fact; it is one of the nation’s defining strengths and something we ought to take pride in. Because universities bring together young people from a diversity of identities, traditions, and beliefs, campuses need intentional ways to navigate difference and cultivate a healthy common life. The problem with DEI programs is not that they champion diversity efforts; it’s that they run entire campus regimes in a diversity framework that demonizes so-called majority groups, asks minorities to constantly demean themselves through victim narratives, and divides everybody into the camps of oppressor and oppressed.

    Civic Thought programs should champion diversity efforts in the framework of pluralism, where people are taught the importance of respect for diverse identities and for cooperation for the common good based on the key documents and events of America’s founding.

    An ambitious Civic Thought program might even consider doing this not just in the classroom, but also through the kinds of co-curricular activities that make residential colleges so special. Such a program would not only teach how the Founders proactively welcomed Jews and Muslims into the new nation—it would also have spaces where Jews and Muslims on campus can express their identities. Jews might celebrate shabbat, Muslims might break their fast during the month of Ramadan.

    A Civic Thought program that championed pluralism would also seek to foster cooperative activities between these distinct groups. Perhaps this would take the form of an interfaith tutoring program that drew on the fact that knowledge and service are sacred in both Judaism and Islam. Pluralism is not afraid of the deep differences between identity communities, and so there would be programs where Jews and Muslims could have civil discourse on topics where they likely disagree, such as the war in the Middle East.

    We’re expanding our events offerings! Please check out our events page to join Book Club, Ask the Author, and Intellectual Bootcamp—and to watch recordings of recent events.

    Persuasion events

    Moreover, an ambitious Civic Thought program would make room for perspectives long associated with DEI efforts on campus, including sharp critiques of America’s failures to live up to its ideals and theories like antiracism and intersectionality. These too have a connection to America’s founding, in the form of speeches like Frederick Douglass’s “What To The Slave Is The Fourth of July” and Sojourner Truth’s Ain’t I a Woman. The problem with the DEI era was not that these perspectives were present; it’s that they were largely viewed as the only acceptable perspectives to hold, and that they effectively became policy through things like required DEI statements and bias response training. It is no wonder the public trust in the university declined significantly.

    The great Catholic philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argued that the university exists not simply to transfer knowledge, but to initiate students into the conflicts inherent in a diverse democracy and prepare them to articulate and navigate those disagreements in a reasonable way. This means that alongside academic excellence, higher education has the responsibility to form active citizens capable of cooperating across deep difference—the key challenge of our day.

    If schools of Civic Thought on college campuses are to help universities reclaim this vital civic role, they cannot treat diversity work as a failed project to abandon simply because previous DEI programs were ineffective and lost the trust of the public. Instead, they must recover its deeper purpose and do it better by embracing America as a pluralism project.

    Eboo Patel, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.

    This article is adapted from a keynote speech delivered at the Civics in Higher Education National Summit at Tufts University on April 10, 2026.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    Celebrating the Soccer [sic] World Cup the traditional way. (Photo by Finn Gomez/Getty Images.)
    • There will be NO Intellectual Bootcamp this week! The next Intellectual Bootcamp will be on Friday, July 10 at 12pm noon Eastern. For more details, check out our events page!

    Read more

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.