Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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  • Belarus Steps Back From Russia
    Alexander Lukashenko. (Photo by Natalia Kolesnikova/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    As the Ukrainian military continues destroying refineries across Russia, and Moscow responds by targeting random gas stations in eastern Ukraine, the war threatens to spill over into neighboring Belarus—the Kremlin’s only ally in Europe. Whether the conflict will eventually escalate depends on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko—an autocratic leader who has so far managed to keep his country out of direct involvement in the war in Ukraine.

    When Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy issued an ultimatum to Lukashenko demanding that Minsk remove Russian signal relay equipment installed on communications towers in the regions bordering Ukraine, it was a clear indication that Kyiv—emboldened by the recent successful strikes on Russia’s key energy infrastructure—was ready to raise the stakes. On June 19, he gave the Belarusian president one week to comply.

    “If he doesn’t remove the equipment, we will,” Zelenskyy stressed.

    As an experienced politician, Lukashenko undoubtedly took Kyiv’s threats seriously. On June 24, Zelenskyy announced that Russian drone signal boosters in Belarus had been switched off, and that communications equipment that Ukraine said was helping support Russian drone strikes from Belarusian territory had stopped operating. The Belarusian leader seems to have backed down.

    Previously, just days before Zelenskyy’s ultimatum, amid growing tensions between Ukraine and Belarus, Lukashenko publicly apologized to the Ukrainian leader for his harsh comments in the past. Zelenskyy, however, bluntly rejected the apology, stating “He can keep his ‘apology’ to himself.”

    Instead, the Ukrainian president expected Minsk not only to remove Russian relay equipment from southern Belarus but also to stop supplying Russia with fuel. As a result of Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on Russian oil refineries, fuel shortages in the country have become the norm. Russia now relies on fuel supplies from two oil refineries in Belarus: the Naftan Oil Refinery in the north and the Mozyr Oil Refinery close to the Ukrainian border.

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    The Ukrainian military has already shown that it has the capacity to significantly damage major refineries, if not completely destroy them. To avoid such an outcome in Belarus, Lukashenko did not seem to have much choice but to make a concession to Ukraine and switch off Russian signal relay devices.

    The problem for him is that, in the eyes of Russian hardliners, he has demonstrated serious weakness. On the other hand, by complying with Zelenskyy’s ultimatum, he avoided—at least for now—being directly involved in the war in Ukraine, something he has managed to stay out of since 2022.

    Weeks before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Lukashenko said that, in the event of war, the Belarusian military would act “in the same way as the Russian army.” But that did not happen. Instead, he allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory to attack Kyiv, but refused to directly participate in any military operations against the neighboring state.

    When it became clear that the Russian military lacked manpower to seize the Ukrainian capital, Moscow made a “goodwill gesture” and withdrew its forces not only from the suburbs of Kyiv, but also from the whole of northern Ukraine, as well as from Belarus. Although Russia maintains military bases there, it does not have nearly enough troops to launch a new offensive on Kyiv.

    Under the current circumstances, it is Ukraine, with almost one million soldiers, that would be unlikely to face serious resistance from the Belarusian Armed Forces—estimated at around 60,000 personnel—if it decided to capture parts of Belarus. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Zelenskyy is willing to make such a move, even though the Ukrainian military undoubtedly has the capacity to do so.

    In the eyes of parts of Belarusian society—namely those who support Lukashenko—a potential invasion would be interpreted as an act of aggression. It also remains unclear whether Kyiv’s Western allies would support such an operation, especially given that the Trump administration is reportedly seeking to improve relations with “Europe’s last dictator.”

    On the other hand, Lukashenko, despite his history of threatening Ukraine and NATO with nuclear weapons, showed that he does not seem interested in supporting Moscow at any cost. On June 25, he openly told the Russian ambassador to Belarus that Minsk “has no intention of joining the hostilities against Ukraine.”

    Lukashenko’s logic is simple: if Russia, after four and a half years of war, is unable to protect itself from Ukrainian drone and missile strikes, then where is the guarantee that it would protect Belarus in the event of conflict spillover? If Putin openly admitted that he wasted hypersonic Oreshnik missiles by firing on sheds in Ukraine in response to Kyiv’s strikes on Russia’s key energy infrastructure, what assurance is there that he would not use the same approach by “helping” Belarus?

    Fully aware of the Kremlin’s unreliability, this time Lukashenko decided not to escalate. Although, at least for the time being, he might continue supplying fuel to Moscow, the Kremlin cannot count on Belarus’ military assistance in its war on Ukraine. This raises a key question: does Russia have any real allies?

    According to Article 4 of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered as a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO.” Belarus is a member of the CSTO. But so are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Yet none of them has ever supported Moscow following Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

    The Kremlin is, therefore, on its own. It may count on North Korea’s limited assistance, but that is unlikely to have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war. At this stage of the conflict, it is Ukraine that has the initiative, even though Russia continues making small tactical gains in the Donbas at extremely high cost. Kyiv, on the other hand, seems focused on isolating Crimea and other occupied regions in southeastern Ukraine from Russian territory, potentially preparing for a large-scale offensive in the foreseeable future.

    One thing is for sure: Zelenskyy’s ultimatum to Lukashenko was a clear demonstration of Kyiv’s military and political might. Just as the Ukrainian military is cutting off Crimea from Russia, Zelenskyy seems to have managed to isolate Belarus from Russia. Now that the Belarusian strongman has effectively backed down—aiming to save his own country—Kyiv is likely to increase strikes on Russia. Indeed, hard days lie ahead for Moscow.

    Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher, and analyst based in Serbia.

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  • Right and Left Are Seeing Two Different Worlds
    Graffiti memorializing Henry Nowak in Belfast, Northern Ireland, June 2026. (Photo by Henry NICHOLLS / AFP.)

    In recent years, there has been considerable scholarly and political attention to the worry that citizens of many democracies increasingly inhabit different “worlds.” This fear is acute in the U.S., where sharp polarization between Democrats and Republicans is intense and seemingly ever-increasing, but it surfaces in many other Western countries as well.

    Concretely, the worry is that on topics as diverse as election integrity, immigration, crime, vaccines, and the Epstein files, many citizens do not just hold different values and interests but operate with fundamentally different factual understandings of what is going on.

    This creates an obvious problem. Democracies can function if citizens have different experiences, interests, values, and ideologies, but if they can’t even agree on what is happening in the world, we are in trouble.

    As Barack Obama said, “We want diversity of opinion; we don’t want diversity of facts.”

    However, a prior question is whether this assessment of substantial “factual polarization” is accurate to begin with. How widespread is this phenomenon, really? How worried should we be?

    The good news is that there seems to be less bare factual disagreement than many have feared. The bad news is that bare factual disagreement was never where the deepest divisions lay.

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    Sources of Skepticism

    There are three reasons to doubt the conventional factual-polarization story.

    The first is a now-familiar body of research contending that post-2016 worries about fake news and misinformation are overblown. According to this work, clear-cut falsehoods and fabrications are less prevalent in the information environment than many have assumed.

    The second is a persuasive line of work suggesting that estimates of factual misbelief and polarization have been systematically overstated due to flawed survey designs. When you pay respondents to give accurate answers (to guard against insincere partisan “cheerleading”), include “don’t know” options, and screen for inattention and trolling, the amount of outright factual errors and disagreements in public opinion tends to drop quite substantially.

    Finally, five or ten years ago, it was all the rage among social scientists and public intellectuals to argue that people are so irrationally tribal that they are often immune to facts and sometimes even “backfire” when confronted with corrections. But such ideas have shared the fate of countless other sexy social-psychological findings: they generally haven’t replicated. The more robust, boring finding from recent research is that when people are presented with factual evidence and rational arguments, they tend to update their beliefs, even when that means moving away from their tribe’s orthodoxies.

    All of this suggests that the “different worlds” panic is unfounded—that most citizens are more closely tethered to a shared reality than was assumed.

    This overly optimistic reading, however, would be premature. Citizens can agree on verifiable facts and still inhabit different worlds, because facts do not interpret themselves. To see why, we need to look beyond narrow factual disagreements to the competing systems of interpretation through which people select, categorize, frame, connect, explain, and narrate facts.

    The best account of this phenomenon comes from one of my intellectual heroes, Walter Lippmann, in his analysis of what he called the “pseudo-environment”: the highly selective, low-resolution compressions of reality that most citizens confuse for reality itself. This analysis of the pseudo-environment spotlights a form of political division that tends to be overlooked in the scholarship. We can call it “interpretive polarization,” though the insight is not new.

    To understand how this works, it will be helpful to start with one of the biggest stories in recent British politics: the murder of 18-year-old student Henry Nowak, and the processes through which the facts of his death were refracted through the rival systems of interpretation that organize political attention and conflict in the UK and broader Western world.

    “I Can’t Breathe”

    Many of the facts concerning what happened to Henry Nowak are not in dispute, in part because the final moments of his life were captured on horrific body-cam footage.

    Last December, Nowak, a white eighteen-year-old university student, was stabbed multiple times by a Sikh individual named Vickrum Digwa. As Nowak lay dying, Digwa’s brother phoned the police and claimed that Nowak had racially assaulted his brother. When the police arrived, Digwa and members of his family reinforced this story as Nowak lay on the ground, barely able to speak or move.

    He told the police officers he had been stabbed. One responded, “I don’t think you have, mate.”

    He was then placed in handcuffs and was initially ignored and dismissed as he said, multiple times, “I can’t breathe.” The officers told him he was being arrested for assault and read him his rights as he lay dying. “Please, brother, I can’t breathe” were some of his final words.

    Eight minutes after arriving on the scene—according to a recently-released transcript of the incident—the police officers discovered that Nowak had in fact been stabbed, and Digwa was subsequently charged with murder. In May, Digwa was found guilty of this charge, after which the body-cam footage from the police officers who arrived on the scene was released to the public, fueling a vast amount of media attention and political discussion of the incident.

    Observing this charged discussion, it would be reasonable to conclude that many citizens inhabit different worlds. And yet, this manifested much less through disagreement on the verifiable facts of the case than in how they were interpreted.

    Among the populist and far-right, the events were imbued with maximal political salience—not as an isolated or unrepresentative occurrence, but as a national emergency, a cause for a political reckoning.

    It was categorized as both an instance and proof of how the UK operates with a “two-tier” culture and justice system, in which establishment institutions apply different standards to white (increasingly capitalized “White”) citizens than to racial minorities.

    The police’s response was explained not just in terms of incompetence but in terms of the insidious influence of anti-racist/DEI/woke ideology throughout our institutions, which led the police officers arriving on the scene to treat an accusation of racism “more seriously than an act of murder,” as Nigel Farage, the leader of Reform UK, put it.

    In this way, the events were also filtered through counterfactual assumptions about how such an event could never have occurred had a white man stabbed a Sikh teenager and then falsely claimed to have been racially assaulted.

    Most fundamentally, the events were located in a clear narrative of villains, victims, and heroes. The direct victim, Nowak, was a synecdoche for the broader population of ordinary white Britons victimized by liberal elites and racial minorities. To fight back, these victims must rely on brave, truth-telling individuals—politicians, pundits, activists, ordinary men and women—unafraid of being called racist.

    This interpretation clashed with the mainstream liberal and progressive reading. Here, the events of Nowak’s murder and the police response were largely treated as an isolated tragedy, unrepresentative of, and so uninformative about, anything broader. Hence, they should not be “politicized,” as one Labour MP phrased it—a far cry from Farage’s prescription to respond to the event with “pure, cold rage.” The right’s impassioned reaction to Nowak’s death was assimilated to a broader, more familiar template: far-right demagogues and deplorables exploiting unrepresentative tragedies to whip up hatred and division. In this narrative, the true victims became the racial minorities targeted by such racist hatred, as well as the establishment institutions that serve to protect them.

    Importantly, one reason the events ignited such a political and media storm is a specific phrase Nowak uttered: “I can’t breathe.”

    Back in 2020, these words were uttered by George Floyd as he was killed by Derek Chauvin, events captured in horrendous video footage.

    In that case, the systems of interpretation that I have described were neatly inverted. Among liberals and progressives, not just in the U.S. but across the broader Western world, Floyd’s death was imbued with maximal political salience. It was not an isolated or unrepresentative murder and tragedy but the cause for a national reckoning—in fact, an international reckoning.

    The core narrative frame here was racism—not just Chauvin’s racism, but also the deeper, even more insidious forms of racism (structural, systemic, implicit) that had long poisoned Western cultures and institutions, which Floyd’s death was an awful symptom of. Of course, this causal interpretation implied a counterfactual assumption: that had Floyd been white, this would never have happened.

    Conservatives and right-wing populists tended to view the events through a very different interpretive framework. They emphasized the specific facts of the case, including Floyd’s criminal record and behavior. They expressed agnosticism or outright skepticism about the relevance of racism to the events, and often made efforts to publicize similar cases in which white victims were killed by police without receiving comparable media or political attention.

    This is what interpretive polarization looks like: the filtering of agreed-upon facts through rival systems of salience, explanation, and narrative.

    Lippmann’s View

    In his 1922 masterpiece Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann argued the following. In contrast to the relatively small-scale social worlds our species engaged with for most of its history, the modern world is far too big, complex, changing, and inaccessible for any individual to engage with directly or completely. Most events, trends, regularities, and public affairs are remote. They happen in places we have never been, involve people we have never met, are affected by complex systems and institutions we cannot fully understand, and turn on countless facts we cannot personally verify.

    This has two interacting implications.

    First, we rely on others (journalists, pundits, politicians, activists, intellectuals, etc) to mediate reality for us, all of whom are in exactly the same situation.

    Second, this mediation cannot involve any simple transmission of “the facts.” There are too many facts and too many ways to interpret, connect, and explain them. So, we must reduce reality to extremely selective, low-resolution mental models.

    This thesis underlies Lippmann’s distinction between what he calls the “real environment”—the vast, complex, independent reality in which our actions have consequences—and the “pseudo-environment”: our simplified, selective pictures of reality (“the pictures in our head”) that we instinctively confuse for reality itself.

    For Lippmann, we cannot understand democratic politics and its defining pathologies without attending to the distinctive characteristics and failure modes of these pseudo-environments. We also cannot understand political divisions and the ways in which different citizens “live… in different worlds.”

    These ideas lie behind perhaps the most famous line from Public Opinion: “For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see.”

    Public opinion is, hence, not a matter of evaluating a pre-existing, self-interpreting set of facts. It involves applying a pre-existing system of interpretation to the task of selecting, omitting, categorizing, and framing facts.

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    Pseudo-Environments

    All of this cuts much deeper than questions about simple factual polarization. Radically different systems of interpretation can co-exist with a shared recognition of narrow matters of fact. In fact, just as the most effective propaganda rarely involves outright falsehoods, the most resilient systems of “stereotypes” are precisely those that are difficult to falsify.

    For example, the increasingly popular conviction that white (“White”) Britons are victims of an oppressive two-tier justice system is not easily subject to traditional “fact-checking.” Of course, one can point to many facts that seem to contradict it (e.g., the dominance of white people among the higher strata of British society), but one can also point to facts that seem to confirm it (e.g., laws and policies that often involve de facto positive discrimination in favor of non-white groups). At bottom, however, it is not a simple, verifiable claim about reality. It is a highly charged interpretation of reality capable of gobbling up confirming information and screening out disconfirming information.

    For most of those who live in this pseudo-environment, it doesn’t even exist as a fully articulated set of propositions. It involves inchoate feelings of identity, status, and grievance coupled with a high-level narrative, the precise details of which are then fleshed out, connected to ongoing events, and defended by a professional class of politicians, pundits, and activists who work to construct and update the details of the pseudo-environment in real time.

    Lippmann’s point was that although not all pseudo-environments are equally wrong, they are all, in a sense, wrong. Not only are they selective and simplifying pictures of complex realities drawn in profoundly unscientific ways, but they are also never neutral nor disinterested. Our pseudo-environment, writes Lippmann, is “the guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world of our own value, our own positions and our own rights.”

    We gravitate toward interpretations that flatter our allies, demonize our rivals, vindicate our grievances, and assign the right people to simplistic roles of villain, victim, hero, coward, dupe, hypocrite, and enemy.

    What Can Be Done?

    When writing in 1922, Lippmann favored a broadly technocratic solution. If the problem is that public opinion is pre-scientific, the solution must rest with “organized intelligence”: institutions that apply rigorous scientific and statistical methodologies to classify, analyze, and explain the social world.

    However, the Nowak and Floyd cases help to show why this solution is so fragile.

    The ostensibly neutral knowledge-producing institutions can themselves become captured by popular pseudo-environments. And that highlights a second issue: even if such institutions were perfectly objective, they could shape public opinion only if people trust them. If citizens inhabit a pseudo-environment in which such institutions are viewed as captured, corrupt, or biased, they cannot perform the role that Lippmann hoped for.

    We are left with gesturing at some things that might help.

    We must make our epistemic institutions more reliable and more impartial. Too often, they are politicized and advocacy-driven. Perfect objectivity may be unattainable, but it is not, therefore, a cover story for hidden interests either. The left’s growing institutional dominance in recent decades, together with a strand of progressive thought that seeks to replace ideals of objectivity with social justice activism, has done real damage to the trust these institutions depend on to play a valuable role in society.

    Representatives of these institutions also need to be better at adapting to the constraints and incentives of the new media age. The days of relying on establishment gatekeeping and elite control of the public narrative are long gone. We now live in a more fragmented, more competitive attention economy, one which favors more direct, authentic modes of communication.

    Ultimately, however, it’s easier to diagnose the disease than to prescribe the cure. Freed from the constraining influence of reliable, expert knowledge that only systematic inquiry can provide, democratic citizens will construct rival realities, each a grossly simplified and distorted map of a complex environment that they will confuse for the environment itself.

    Dan Williams is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He works on issues at the intersection of science, politics, and technology. He blogs at www.conspicuouscognition.com and is a contributing writer to Persuasion.

    A version of this essay originally appeared in Conspicuous Cognition.

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  • Trump Lost Both the War and the Negotiation
    Secretary of State Marco Rubio in the Middle East to discuss the U.S.-Iran deal. (Photo by Eric Lee / POOL / AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    For years, Donald Trump and his supporters often said that Iran never wins wars, but never loses negotiations either. This critique was often made about U.S. administrations, particularly the Obama administration and the 2015 nuclear deal, which Trump called one of the worst agreements in American history. However, under Trump’s leadership, recent events suggest a different, even ironic, outcome. It seems Trump has lost both the military confrontation with Iran and the negotiations that followed.

    The contrast between the June 2025 Israeli-Iran war and the February 2026 U.S.-Iran confrontation is quite striking. In the June conflict, Iran faced a major setback; its military was weakened, its deterrence diminished, and its leaders endured a level of humiliation that hadn’t been seen in decades. The war, which revealed cracks in Iran’s military infrastructure and showed the limits of Tehran’s regional plans, ended with Iran making no gains.

    The February 2026 U.S. intervention and the negotiations that followed produced a very different result. Although Washington entered the confrontation with overwhelming military superiority and ambitious objectives, it ultimately failed to achieve its central political goals—largely due to incompetence in political leadership and a lack of true understanding of the Islamic Republic. The United States was unable to compel the Islamic Republic to fundamentally change its ideological identity, regional posture, or strategic orientation. Instead, Tehran leveraged one of its few remaining sources of influence—its ability to disrupt the global economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz. By disrupting maritime traffic and amplifying fears of a prolonged energy shock, Iran demonstrated the economic costs of ongoing escalation. As oil and gas markets responded, pressure grew on Washington to find a quick resolution to the crisis, as even President Trump noted.

    The outcome seems to be a memorandum of understanding giving Tehran many concessions at the expense of some limited structural changes. The reports about easing sanctions, economic opportunities, and exemption periods show a degree of flexibility that would not have been politically possible in previous periods of Trump’s Iran policy. For instance, Iranian sources claim that the negotiation team arrived at an agreement in Switzerland regarding the release of $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets. If these reports turn out to be true, the administration that called any negotiations with Iran appeasement would have entered into an agreement in which Iran receives considerable economic gains without making any behavioral or ideological changes to the regime. So far, the main thing that Tehran has agreed to do is open the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before Trump started attacking Iran.

    Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance are both touting the deal as a diplomatic victory, although the long-term ramifications may be quite the opposite. Sanctions relief and renewed access to foreign investment would give the Islamic Republic resources at a time when its military credibility and regional influence have been severely hurt. But there is little evidence that the regime has abandoned its core objectives. Rather, Tehran appears to be pursuing what late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has long described as “heroic flexibility”—a tactical adjustment designed to preserve the regime, reduce immediate pressure, and create favorable conditions for future recovery.

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    The reason is not just Iranian strength but the realities of power and economics. While military force can erode capabilities, devastate facilities, and impose costs, it cannot easily force ideological transformation in a regime such as the Islamic Republic. For years, the Islamic Republic has survived war, sanctions, domestic unrest, and international isolation because its leadership has seen regime survival as its overriding objective. As long as the regime’s core institutions remain intact, Tehran can absorb considerable punishment and simply wait for geopolitical conditions to change.

    At the same time, the United States faced constraints of its own, since escalation threatened energy markets, regional stability, and the broader global economy. Rising economic costs increased pressure on Washington to seek a negotiated exit from the crisis; it did so. As the risks of prolonged conflict mounted, the administration’s bargaining position weakened. The result was a familiar paradox: the stronger military power found itself making concessions to stabilize the very situation it had sought to control.

    This outcome of the U.S.-Iran conflict will carry a broader lesson about coercive diplomacy; most critically, that the assumption that military pressure automatically produces political surrender is flawed. This is especially true when it is done by an incompetent administration, which alienated its allies and was not able to create a global alliance. It is even more true when dealing with revolutionary regimes. The Islamic Republic’s leadership has consistently demonstrated a willingness to absorb extraordinary costs in pursuit of regime survival. Military action can influence Tehran’s calculations, but it cannot by itself resolve the underlying political conflict between Washington and Tehran.

    For Trump, the political implications are especially significant. His critique of the Obama administration rested on the argument that American negotiators traded sanctions relief for inadequate concessions. Yet the emerging agreement may expose him to the very same criticism. If Tehran retains its essential political and strategic characteristics while receiving substantial economic benefits, critics will rightly argue that the administration accepted a deal even less favorable than the one it spent years condemning.

    The ultimate irony is difficult to ignore. Trump once argued that Iran never lost negotiations, yet under his presidency, the United States may have achieved something even more remarkable: after failing to translate military pressure into political transformation and clearly signaling the weakness of the U.S. military force on the global stage, it accepted a negotiated settlement that left the Islamic Republic politically intact and economically relieved. If that assessment proves correct, the administration will have lost both the war and the peace that followed. And, interestingly, nobody is surprised!

    Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.

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  • We Need an International Treaty to Ban Superintelligence

    Want to join a Zoom call with Francis Fukuyama to discuss “The End of History”? Of course you do! Frank is joining our Intellectual Bootcamp this week, Friday June 26 at 12 noon. You must be a paying subscriber to participate in the bootcamp—so click here to take out a paid subscription today! Once you have subscribed, please email [email protected] to be added to the mailing list and receive the Zoom link.

    Anthropic CEO Anthropic Dario Amodei at the G7 Summit on June 17, 2026. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images.)

    As today’s AI companies race to create artificial intelligence that is smarter than humans, governments around the world are failing to meet the moment.

    Just this April, Anthropic withheld its Mythos model from wide release due to its unprecedented cyberattack capabilities. General Joshua Rudd, head of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, confirmed that Mythos “broke into almost all of our classified systems, not in weeks, but in hours.” This led the Trump Administration to issue an executive order setting up voluntary pre-deployment reviews of AIs. When Anthropic deployed a scaled-back version of Mythos called Fable 5 to the public, the Trump administration used export controls to bar foreign nationals from using the models, forcing Anthropic to disable both Fable 5 and Mythos.

    It’s clear that the U.S. government is starting to take the national security implications of powerful AI seriously. But it is still missing the bigger picture. Pre-deployment evaluations and export controls fall far short of addressing the threats from increasingly capable AIs, because the threats we’re facing aren’t just shockingly capable cyberweapons. It’s much worse than that. The leading AI companies are explicitly trying to build superintelligent AI, or “superintelligence.” Such AIs would be vastly more capable than humans, fully autonomous, and able to overpower countries’ national security institutions.

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    The entire international security architecture is built around the assumption that the most dangerous weapons are controlled by humans, and that the decision to take lives ultimately rests with humans. Superintelligence would upend this. Unlike nuclear weapons—the most lethal weapons we have today—superintelligent systems would not be tools humans can leverage, but rather agents able to pursue their own objectives with no human control over their actions. The leading AI companies are actively worsening the problem by making AIs as autonomous as possible and cutting humans out of the process of AI development.

    Superintelligence thus represents the ultimate principal-agent problem, and it’s nowhere near being solved. Most alarming of all, Nobel Prize winners, leading AI scientists, and even the CEOs of the top AI companies warn that superintelligence poses an extinction risk to humanity. OpenAI’s CEO Sam Altman has repeatedly said that superhuman machine intelligence is the greatest threat to humanity’s continued existence, yet he affirms that OpenAI is “before anything else … a superintelligence research company.”

    As a handful of companies accelerate toward superintelligence, is it already too late to step back from the brink? No. But the window to act is narrow, and it is closing.

    The only solution is an international prohibition on the development of superintelligent AI. Governments should pursue this prohibition urgently, because there is no technical solution in sight that would allow humanity to remain in control over AIs vastly smarter and more capable than us.

    Some argue we can solve this through “alignment” research that would let us create AIs that do what humanity wants. But the astonishing growth in AI capabilities is drastically outpacing research into understanding and controlling AIs. To see why that gap matters, consider how the systems are built.

    Right now, engineers essentially grow AI systems out of enormous piles of data, instead of coding the systems line by line like traditional software. They use intense amounts of computational power in large data centers to train these systems. What emerges on the other end of training are AI systems whose internal workings are opaque even to their developers.

    While engineers can test what AI is good at and try to slap some guardrails around it, they do not know how the systems actually work. Dario Amodei, the CEO of AI company Anthropic, has said we understand maybe three percent of what is happening inside AI models.

    The inherent unpredictability and uncontrollability of these systems presents massive risks as we get closer to superintelligent systems. And even if one brilliant scientist found a solution, without any government intervention there is no one to stop a different company, or country, from rushing ahead with superintelligent AI that can kill everyone.

    Fortunately, it would be possible to both monitor and enforce an international agreement prohibiting superintelligence, because there is a large industrial process behind advanced AI systems. This is akin to the extensive, largely traceable process required to create nuclear weapons. The supply chain is unusually narrow and controlled by Western countries and like-minded democracies. The world’s most advanced AI chips are fabricated almost exclusively by TSMC in Taiwan. The lithography machines required to make those chips are built by a single company, ASML, in the Netherlands. And cutting-edge chip designs come overwhelmingly from one American firm, NVIDIA.

    Additionally, the data centers training and continuously running powerful AIs use power on the scale of small cities. Their footprints are easily tracked using satellite imagery. The Federation of American Scientists recently demonstrated this by mapping the buildout of a large-scale AI data center in the United Arab Emirates from 2024 to 2025, using freely available imagery. The size of the industrial process is precisely what makes monitoring, and potential intervention, possible.

    But the window to act is closing. In the coming decade, we can expect algorithms for AI to improve, while hardware like advanced chips could get smaller and more efficient. It’s possible that within a few years, the resources required to build superintelligence could become small enough that monitoring is rendered impossible. This could also eventually make smaller actors, including terrorists and other non-state groups, capable of building such systems.

    We need to act before that happens.

    The United States should domestically prohibit superintelligence and set a policy to prevent its development globally. It should work with other countries to establish an international agreement prohibiting the development of superintelligence using a “trust but verify” regime, similar to how we have handled nuclear deterrence. While such an agreement is a tall order amid today’s tumultuous geopolitics, it is well within the reach of existing tools of statecraft.

    Countries party to the agreement would ensure that superintelligence is not domestically developed. If anyone outside the group tries to develop it, countries in the group could respond to deter that development. They could use export controls, sanctions, or intelligence cooperation. No country has an interest in any actor, including itself, developing a technology that could overpower the security forces of any government and threaten humanity with extinction.

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    None of this will be easy. The ongoing great power competition with China is tense, and there is minimal appetite in Washington for international cooperation. But the same was said about nuclear nonproliferation, and there has been no nuclear detonation in conflict since 1945.

    The political coalition for prohibition is already broader than many realize. In the fall of 2025, leading AI scientists and political figures across the spectrum, like former U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice, President Trump’s former adviser Steve Bannon, and former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, called for a prohibition on the development of superintelligence. Meanwhile, a coalition of more than 150 lawmakers across the UK and Canada are warning about the extinction-level threat from superintelligence and calling for binding limits, up to a ban on developing such technology.

    Yet most policymakers still aren’t taking the danger seriously. They’ve only heard the nice stories of sky-high profitability sold to them by AI executives. What’s missing is both the widespread recognition that superintelligence is an unprecedented national security threat, and the political will to act. The right solution is a doctrine of superintelligence prevention that protects the United States and the rest of the world.

    With it, we can still avert the catastrophe we’re racing toward.

    Andrea Miotti is founder and CEO of ControlAI, a non-profit organization working to keep humanity in control of advanced AI.

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  • The Kennedy Center Could Have Transformed American Culture
    Jacqueline Kennedy, composer Leonard Bernstein, and his wife, Felicia Bernstein. (Photo: Bettman via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    With the fate of the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts—for the moment, no longer the Trump Kennedy Center—unknowable, it’s tantalizing to inquire what it might become. A related question is whether it became all it could have been in the first place.

    When Jackie Kennedy urged Leonard Bernstein to become the first artistic director of the Kennedy Center, what was on her mind? Did she phone him because he was a famous and dynamic American musician with whom she happened to be well acquainted? Or because he was a famous and dynamic American musician dedicated to curating the American musical past and charting its musical future? All we know (from Jamie Bernstein’s memoir) is that he answered the call, said yes—and then changed his mind because he could not see himself dedicating time to the job.

    What became the Kennedy Center was envisioned as a showcase for both American and “global” performing arts when President Eisenhower signed the National Cultural Center Act in 1958. The specific form this might take was secondary to a prolonged fundraising effort that surged after the Kennedy assassination. The eventual result both is and is not a “national cultural center.” Its National Symphony has never aspired to be a national symphony—it is the Washington, D.C. Symphony, which is a perfectly legitimate thing to be. That said: We really do need a national symphony, because our native musical inheritance, in the concert hall, remains largely unattended. For that matter, American cultural memory is notoriously short, and never more so than today. Imagine a national cultural center with national music, theater, and dance companies. It’s a pipedream, but it’s an informative one.

    Bernstein is a wild card in this narrative. He enjoyed a dynamic rapport with JFK and the First Lady. The day of the assassination, the first edition of the New York Times announced the impending appointment of Richard Goodwin, a Kennedy insider, as the president’s advisor on the arts. The impending Bernstein/Kennedy partnership might have taken many forms. Very possibly it could have included a bona fide national symphony at the planned “national cultural center” that was being planned and promoted with Bernstein’s help.

    Something like a national symphony was in fact created four years after the Kennedy Center opened in 1971. This was the American Composers Orchestra, which during its initial decades commanded the resources to regularly perform at Carnegie Hall. But it was crippled by a programming formula (often attributed to the composer Francis Thorne) that created eclectic concerts, sampling American works from different periods.

    When I was invited by the Pacific Symphony to help create a West Coast equivalent to the ACO, we instead programmed thematically—and surveyed a lot of important American music that remains neglected. But in Orange County, California, we had no national impact. D.C.’s PostClassical Ensemble, during the years I helped to run it, was dedicated to curating an American repertoire. Our concerts, CDs, DVDs, and broadcasts championed Louis Moreau Gottschalk, William Levi Dawson, Harry Burleigh, Arthur Farwell, Lou Harrison, Silvestre Revueltas, Virgil Thomson (his film scores), Aaron Copland (the music not heard: The City with film; the Piano Fantasy), Zhou Long, Charles Ives, and more.

    But the closest thing to a national symphony was Bernstein’s New York Philharmonic, especially in its earliest phase. Correction: It was a national symphony. His first subscription program, on October 2, 1958, proclaimed a template—William Schuman: American Festival Overture/Charles Ives: Symphony No. 2/Beethoven: Symphony No. 7. Bernstein’s repertoire explorations were systematic. They included Gustav Mahler and subsequent twentieth-century symphonists little played or otherwise marginalized. They included programs dedicated to specific periods and styles of American composition.

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    In the realm of symphonic music, Charles Ives is our supreme creative genius. Bernstein’s Ives advocacy, with the Philharmonic, figured crucially in the belated discovery that Ives was a composer who singularly enriched American cultural memory. As a matter of course, Bernstein prominently participated in the Ives Centenary in 1974. But the recent Ives Sesquicentenary was wholly unmarked by our most prominent orchestras. It also passed unnoticed at the Kennedy Center. What form of arts leadership might Bernstein have furnished in D.C.? His tenaciously American odyssey, embracing both Broadway and the concert hall, testifies that he would have pursued a mandate passionately weighted toward New World achievement.

    An informative footnote to this tale is the candidacy of Nicolas Nabokov. He lobbied hard for the Kennedy Center job and was supported by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., once Kennedy’s intellectual aide de camp. As secretary general of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (covertly funded by the CIA), Nabokov was a crucial figure in the cultural Cold War. His output included high-profile arts festivals abroad. The biggest and most ambitious, in Paris in 1952, showcased orchestras and opera companies from London and Vienna, and orchestras from Boston, Paris, Geneva, Berlin, and Rome. Nabokov was not especially knowledgeable about the American arts. He was a Russo-European intellectual based in France. His Rolodex was famous—he could have conceivably turned the Kennedy Center into something like an American Edinburgh Festival.

    Nabokov visited the Kennedy White House in 1962 for a dinner (which he helped to plan) honoring Igor Stravinsky. His impressions of the First Lady were not especially flattering. Perhaps this disaffection was returned. In any event, it was the American baritone George London who served as the Kennedy Center’s first executive director, overseeing artistic planning. The center never attained the international prestige Nabokov would have craved—and never attained the New World focus Bernstein would have pursued.

    What might the Kennedy Center have hypothetically become? We could also use a national theater with a gifted dramaturg. Right now, it might pertinently curate the important political theater works of the thirties. A play like Clifford Odets’ Waiting for Lefty (1935) might be a poor bet in a commercial theater today. But it once electrified America, and we should have an opportunity to remember why and how. In the world of ballet, we actually possess a national company once linked to the Kennedy Center. Thanks to George Balanchine and Lincoln Kirstein, the New York City Ballet Americanized classical ballet and more bravely explored the American repertoire than any present-day orchestra. The Suzanne Farrell Ballet, an offshoot of City Ballet, was once the Kennedy Center’s resident ballet company.

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    In New York City, the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts hosts an orchestra, an opera company, a ballet company, and a theater company. The artistic synergies once vaguely envisioned, binding the constituents, never materialized, but they could do so at a bona fide national cultural center stocked with scholars, dedicated to preserving and applying American cultural memory. Imagine an alternative world, in which Bernstein and the Kennedys—John and Jackie both—bequeathed a proactive White House arts component prioritizing American achievement, past and present. It almost happened.

    Joseph Horowitz is most recently the author of a novel, The Disciple—A Wagnerian Tale of the Gilded Age. His book on the cultural cold war is The Propaganda of Freedom.

    A version of this piece was originally published on Arts Fuse.

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  • Mark Leonard on Whether Europe is Doomed

    Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the first pan-European think–tank. His latest book is Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Mark Leonard discuss why Europe is behind, the global impact of China’s rise, and whether Europe can learn to defend itself without the United States.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I really look forward to this conversation. I look forward to talking about your new book. We just spent a few days together in Vienna at the annual meeting of the European Council on Foreign Relations. How is Europe’s situation in the world looking right now?

    Mark Leonard: It’s looking pretty bleak. There is a real sense of jeopardy. You’ve had for a few years now the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has brought physical military conflict back to the continent. On top of that, there has been a big shift in relations with China. People have gone from an age of optimism about their economic relations with China to a fear of deindustrialization as Chinese excess capacity floods European markets, and Germans are worried that Baden-Württemberg is going to turn into Detroit.

    On top of that, you have the United States, the protector of first resort for the last few decades, that has become at best disengaged from European security and at worst a predatory power. We’re also seeing a big divergence between the ways that Europeans look at the world—whether it’s on Ukraine and Russia, whether it’s on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz—from American priorities. Europeans are feeling both very uncertain and very alone. That is leading to quite profound changes in European politics and European identity. We’ve been going from Europe as a peace project to Europe as more of a war project for the last few years, and that’s only becoming more and more pronounced.

    In many countries, this is leading to a big fear of the far right, which is looming over the domestic politics of many of the biggest countries. Whether it’s the danger of Rassemblement in France, the Alternative for Germany in Germany, or Reform in London, that kind of adds to a sense of insecurity. It’s both a symptom and a product and a kind of accelerator of insecurity.

    Mounk: One way of thinking about this is that Europe—and perhaps particularly certain nations within Europe, like Germany—had built the entire post-war model on a certain set of assumptions that have proven to be wrong. One formulation of this around Germany is by Constanze Stelzenmüller, who said something like: Germany used to outsource its security to the United States, its energy needs to Russia, and its demand for goods to China—and each part of that model has now collapsed.

    You could obviously talk in this context about the fracture in the transatlantic relationship, about how far Europe is behind on some of the technologies of the future, including things like electric cars, but also things like artificial intelligence. My hunch is that around 2016, Europe was really in denial about the ways in which its model was running out. They thought they could somehow continue to deal with Putin without that much disruption. He was a nuisance, but a nuisance they could contain. They thought that Trump would somehow be impeached or go away and America would go back more or less to how it was—that it was just a matter of getting through those four years, or perhaps getting lucky and only waiting two years, until America went back to normal.

    This time around, with Trump’s reelection, the second China shock playing out in Europe, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, I feel like Europeans have started to realize that that was a piece of wishful thinking. I’m a little bit skeptical about how deep that insight goes, though. Everybody says it, everybody sort of knows it, but it’s not clear to me that there’s a real recognition that there’s going to have to be fundamental change in how Europeans govern their own societies and engage with the world if they want to be safe, prosperous, and competitive in this new world. Am I being too skeptical here, Mark?

    Leonard: No, I think you’re absolutely right. In a way, that’s what my book is trying to do, because I think we’re in a situation now where rhetorically people talk about a rupture, but then the next thing they do is behave as if we could preserve the status quo—maybe without the United States. In a sense, that’s what Mark Carney was doing when he made that speech in Davos: talking about this rupture and then putting forward the illusion that middle powers could come together and preserve the rules-based order, as if that were remotely an option—the idea that Europeans are going to be able to work with the Canadians and South Koreans and the Japanese to keep the World Trade Organization alive, to open the Strait of Hormuz, to stop the war in Ukraine. It’s obviously a chimera.

    What we’re having to very slowly come to terms with is that the entire edifice around which our economic policy, our security policy, and our ideas of how relationships should work with different countries have now been overtaken by events. We need to start from ground zero and work out how to survive in a world where there is very little exogenous order—and the only order we’ll have is the order that we can create for ourselves. That won’t be a global order, because we don’t have the power to determine what happens on the global stage. It doesn’t mean that you necessarily have to give up on all of your values and your goals and the big advances which have been made within Europe. Europeans are still very prosperous, with a lot of capacity. But it does mean behaving and acting in a totally different way, and that is something that almost nobody has really managed to tackle in its entirety.

    You see different things happening: Germany spending much more on defence, Finland and Sweden joining NATO. But that sort of comprehensive rethinking of who we are, how we work together, and what the world around us is going to look like—that is very, very painful. For Germany, I think it’s the most painful, because the whole constitution of post-war German identity was bound up in this global order, bound up with an idea of returning to the West. The fact that America has changed creates a massive crisis—not just for German security, but also for German identity.

    Mounk: In the German case, my sense is that Germany created—stumbled into, was forced to adopt—some mixture of those things: a model that worked quite astonishingly well in the post-war period. Germany was in many ways the most successful European country from 1950 until a decade or so ago. It had its moments of crisis and challenge, including the very difficult process of reunification. By and large, though, it was the European Musterkind—the example of how things go right in Europe. Many of its institutions ended up being quite influential; the European Central Bank is based on the German Central Bank, and all of those kinds of things.

    What the German political and intellectual elites learned is that the only responsible thing to do is to support and mildly reform and sometimes renovate—but not fundamentally challenge or rethink—the model inherited in the 1945 to 1955 moment. By and large, that served the country very well for 65 to 70 years. The problem now is that we are at a moment in which we really have to radically rethink the model. It’s not just that it’s genuinely hard to think about what that model might be—that’s a real intellectual challenge with lots of constraints—but nothing in Germany’s political or intellectual culture has predisposed its leaders to actually dealing with that, because everything learned over the last 70 years is precisely not to rethink the model. There are versions of that challenge in other European countries as well.

    The way you frame it in the book for Europe as a whole: is there a distinction between architects and artisans? What do you mean by that distinction? How can it help us think through this moment?

    Leonard: The backdrop in my mind is that we’re going through a period of what I call “unorder,” which is different from disorder. If you have disorder, there’s broad agreement on what order looks like. Order basically has two components: a balance of power that can uphold certain relationships, and a series of rules that people are willing to be bound by—a common framework for discussing things.

    What I think we’re in now is a different state, not where people are breaking the rules, but where the rules have become quite irrelevant to a lot of the big actors in the world. If you were sitting in the Pentagon before the war against Iran, the idea of legality or its absence was just not part of the calculus in the way that it was during the Iraq War. When it came to the Iranian response, it was similarly absent. They were as happy attacking countries that were attacking them, like Israel, as countries that had nothing to do with the war at all, like Oman and Qatar—simply because those countries were within range of their missiles and drones. There is a sense that we have basically overtaken the rules around which a lot of our international politics was centered.

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    When it comes to thinking about the future, you have two tendencies—and I think this is the biggest dividing line. The architects are basically people who start to imagine how the world should be organized from first principles. They develop blueprints and grand plans which can then be anchored in institutions, laws, and norms. The model for that is the creation of the post-war world: the Bretton Woods system, Dean Acheson’s memoir, Present at the Creation—which is a very architectural way of formulating things.

    Mounk: It’s even more theological than architectural, isn’t it? “Creation” is nearly biblical.

    Leonard: It is biblical, but I think the way they thought about it was quite architectural. You have a set of institutions and structures, and they all make sense—all created from scratch.

    Mounk: Part of that was a kind of assumption of permanence, right? If you build a building, you know it might come down eventually, but you’re ideally building for centuries. Especially if you’re doing the blueprint for a new city, you’re really thinking that you’re shaping it for a very long period of time. That certainly was a lot of the idea behind the post-war order: putting in place institutions that should be able to endure for the indefinite future.

    Leonard: Absolutely. It was underpinned by a balance of power in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States that controlled the vast amount of global economic and military power. Then, at the end of the Cold War, you have a moment of rebuilding in which Europeans get more involved, and a whole wave of new institutions is built: the World Trade Organization, Kyoto climate measures, the International Criminal Court. It’s the same basic idea—you try to imagine what the perfect world looks like and then build a set of institutions from scratch to govern it.

    Another way of thinking about how you conduct yourself in global affairs is what I call the artisan. The artisan doesn’t try to build things from scratch but adapts to what is going on in the world anyway. You don’t start with an ideal blueprint; you try to work out how you can reuse old objects, repair things, reinvent things, try things out—and if they don’t work, you get rid of them. It’s a much more improvisational approach, more like DIY or bricolage than grand planning.

    The model for that, I think, is China, which came back to global prominence in a system it didn’t create, and is very happy to use existing institutions to its own ends. It gets involved in the World Trade Organization and the IMF, but doesn’t necessarily use them in the way their original architects intended—it doesn’t buy into the original purpose, but is happy to repurpose them and work out how they can serve China.

    At the same time, China tries out new things. It creates arrangements like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the BRICS, tries them out, changes the membership, and experiments. It also builds its own arrangements, like the Belt and Road Initiative, and develops relationships with different parts of the world. What it’s not trying to do is create a new global architecture in which it delivers security and global public goods the way the United States did at the end of the Second World War, or the way Europeans imagined reordering the world at the end of the Cold War. It’s much more flexible—trying to work out how China can benefit from where the world is going, rather than modeling a perfect world and coercing people into it.

    If you look at American-Chinese policy over the last couple of decades, it’s basically been trying to position itself to deal with the disorder and chaos created by others, to benefit from that rather than create order. They tried to work out how they could benefit from America’s wars in the Middle East. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, they don’t really try to resolve it—they work out how they can have a better relationship with Russia, get cheaper oil and gas, get Russia more dependent on China, while simultaneously talking to the Global South about Western hypocrisy. It’s a very different sort of approach.

    You can see it in other areas of policy too. When it comes to Chinese economic policy, the Americans talked about decoupling and de-risking, but actually it was Xi Jinping, with his idea of dual circulation, who really thought about how you develop an autonomous economic system—one where you are not subject to pressure from elsewhere and where you build up other people’s dependence on you. The idea of dual circulation separates the internal economy, called internal circulation, which is meant to be more self-sufficient, from external circulation, which governs your relationships with the rest of the world: how you get access to raw materials and the things you want, but also how you make others more dependent on you. You see that in China’s technology policy as well, with Made in China 2025.

    Mounk: We’ll go into some more of the details. I want to get to the broader themes and understand the extent to which this is challenging a kind of universalism and so on. But before we get there, there is a kind of bearish case on China as well. You could look at China and say it doesn’t have a lot of friends in the world. The one major power on its borders that it is more or less friendly with is Russia, but the Russian-Chinese relationship has always been complex historically. There have always been moments of cooperation, but also deep moments of tension, and it’s not clear to me that Putin fully trusts Xi Jinping. We will see how long that relationship can endure. The other uneasy alliance that China has with a country on its borders is with North Korea.

    I don’t know whether, if you wake Xi Jinping up at 3 a.m., he really thinks that Kim Jong-un is a wonderful, reliable ally. I think that even the government in Beijing has certain concerns about the nature of the regime in Pyongyang. Other than that, China has deep conflicts and skirmishes with just about every country on its borders or on its periphery, from Japan to India and beyond.

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    In the world, the relative standing of China has recently improved in public opinion, in part because the United States under Donald Trump is so toxically unpopular globally. There is also quite deep skepticism about China, and that is only going to grow as China rises in prominence and becomes more of a global player.

    A number of countries in Africa and elsewhere are now quite economically dependent on China, but that is also leading to a lot of anti-Chinese sentiment in those countries, in part because some of the Belt and Road initiatives—which were really meant to portray China as a very friendly investor nation—ended up with terms that were often quite difficult for those countries. As the infrastructure projects aren’t always reaping the benefits that were promised and the repayment terms are coming due, there is a lot of anger about China in those countries.

    Even internally, China, along with genuine and big strengths—it is a very impressive place in its development over the last decades—also has quite deep challenges: from the fact that housing is very difficult to afford even for elite university graduates in Shanghai and Beijing, to the fact that there is a vast army of underemployed gig workers who continue to have very poor standards of living and who are often excluded from local welfare states. There is a way of making this kind of Chinese bricolage appear very attractive, but there is also a bear case to be made about it.

    Is there a danger that some of the advantages Europe has historically had—being perceived as very principled, rule-bound partners, perhaps a little stodgy, perhaps unable to act very fast, but on whom you can actually rely and with whom you can have long-term partnerships—which helped explain why, despite the colonial history, or in the case of Germany despite its Nazi history, a lot of European countries are actually quite popular around the world—is there a risk that emulating the Chinese bricolage approach might undermine what have historically been Europe’s strengths in the world?

    Leonard: On the point about China, that’s absolutely well taken. My purpose here is not to romanticize China. I’ve been going back and forth to China dozens of times over the last 25 years, and you could fill an entire year’s worth of episodes of your podcast with Chinese problems—whether economic problems, social problems, or mistakes in Chinese foreign policy.

    My feeling, though, is that people often, when they look at Chinese success, think it has a lot to do with the Chinese regime type—the fact that you have this authoritarian power that can do whatever it wants. People often talk about how the Chinese are like engineers and the Americans are like lawyers, and make those sorts of distinctions.

    Mounk: We had an episode of this podcast with the author of a book that argues this a few months ago.

    Leonard: Exactly. It’s a very good book. I have a slightly different take on China from Dan Wang, in that I think actually the essence of Chinese success has less to do with regime type and more to do with this experimental mindset. In many ways, Xi Jinping has gone against it. There is a lot that is much more repressive about internal society than it was beforehand. When I first started going to China, you had very lively public debates between intellectuals, which are much less part of the Chinese public sphere now than they were before. But there is still—and some of it has to do with China’s size, but some of it has to do with the way they think about things—a much more improvisational way of governing, where there is a lot of internal competition between different parts of the Chinese system. You have this complicated relationship with different layers of government and the party playing a kind of unusual role. There is actually something very interestingly adaptive about the way they are working.

    We sometimes miss that, particularly as Westerners, because their language is often very architectural. There is a big fuss about their five-year plans every now and again, and we think these five-year plans are like Soviet five-year plans—with tractor production targets and very detailed blueprints. Whereas in fact they are much more poetic. It is often a kind of metaphor: the party will set a broad direction and then lots of different things get tried out. There is a lot of waste, and it is not a detailed plan in the way that would be developed by the Pentagon or by a Western civil service or by Soviet planners.

    Mounk: There was a very interesting article recently trying to undermine the Western perception of how electric cars became such a dominant industry in China. The simplistic version is that this is top-down industrial policy decided in Beijing—tremendous public subsidies, the precise scale of which is unclear—and that this is simply what created the incredible capacity to build electric cars more effectively, more efficiently, more cheaply, and often at higher quality than American cars and certainly than most European cars. The actual story that the authors of that article seem to be arguing is that there is a lot more local competition and improvisation—that there is a broad direction set by Beijing, but that it is actually the competition between particular cities, which try to attract industry and experiment with local ecosystems and local subsidies, that has created this explosion in electric-car manufacturing capacity. I think that is one concrete instance of this.

    Leonard: On your point about Europe: you were saying there’s a danger of losing the things which people value us for. My feeling, actually, is that in a way we’ve slightly lost our way as Europeans, because we have—obviously since the French Revolution and the Enlightenment—these universalist ideas. At the same time, our universalism wasn’t something that was developed as a result of universal consent or discussion with people around the world. We basically came up with a bunch of ideas that were hard-won within our own countries and social systems, and then we universalized them—often because of empire, because of the reach of Western capital—and were able to spread them to different places.

    This universalism was often quite unilateral. We then held people up to standards that we had developed ourselves and judged their level of civilization in terms of how far they were able to meet those standards. Some of these standards are very recent. A very interesting example for me is what happened during the World Cup in Qatar, where Qatar was behaving toward gay and lesbian people in exactly the same way that most European countries did until ten or fifteen years ago. All of a sudden we decided it was an evil country, and we were lecturing them and saying people should boycott the World Cup—rather than having the humility to see how rapidly many of these rights and norms have been developed within our own societies, and to consider that there might be political processes in other countries too.

    That is part of the challenge with our universalism: it is something we assert. It sometimes maps onto indigenous desires that people have, but in other societies, people might not necessarily go for exactly the same balance of rights and responsibilities that we have developed through our politics. Our ideas might also change—they might not be valid for all time. There are ongoing debates within our own societies, and we are having to coexist with lots of people in countries that have their own desire to decide what their fate is and what the balance between different norms in their societies should be. That is a kind of big shock to the European self-image.

    The fact that China faces a backlash in different countries where it is becoming the dominant power is definitely true, and China is much less popular with its neighbors than with places further afield. But part of China’s advantage in the world is that it is entering a world defined by the West, where America and Europe carry a lot of baggage and have often been telling people how to lead their lives and imposing norms. The fact that China is emerging—even if it is not as attractive as the United States or Europe—gives other countries a choice and an alternative. It is that alternative which gives them a kind of sovereignty.

    That is also what is very interesting about the Chinese approach. China has realized it would never have as many allies as the United States of America, and so has tried to turn that weakness into a strength by saying: alliances are very old-school, that is Cold War thinking. They want to be in a world where people are not forced to choose between different blocs but can determine their own future. They try to make themselves the champions of sovereignty—which is more convincing if you are not a direct neighbor of China, where China is trying to claim some of your territory, as with the Philippines or Vietnam. But it is an interesting sign of this kind of adaptability they have.

    Mounk: I’m torn here, because there are things you’re saying that I agree with and others that I think I disagree with. I certainly think there is a European tendency to want to lecture the world. Part of that tendency comes from the fact that we can’t really do much else in the world. There is a particular form of this in a certain kind of anti-Americanism that has been quite traditional in Europe for a long time—the idea that you Americans are so militaristic, with your guns and cowboy hats, while we are wonderfully pacifistic Europeans. Of course, the condition of possibility of that pacifist Europe was that we very happily subsisted under the American security guarantee and nuclear umbrella and relied on the U.S. Army to create that peace. Now that we suddenly realize we may not be able to rely on a security guarantor in Washington, D.C., we are rightly investing a lot more in the military in Europe and perhaps trying to become a little bit less pacifist.

    With all kinds of hypocrisies and injustices in European societies, we should certainly be a little more skeptical about sitting in easy judgment of everywhere else in the world. There is an interesting German dimension to this: Germans are the least patriotic Europeans and among the least patriotic people in the world—or at least that was true until relatively recently. If you ask whether someone is proud to be German, Germans are much less likely to say yes than citizens of most other nations. But if you ask whether the world would be better if everybody lived as people do in Germany, Germans overwhelmingly say yes. The patriotism and chauvinism take a slightly different form.

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    At the same time, it is important not to go too far. Qatar has a penal code that in principle criminalizes sex outside of marriage, with penalties up to the death penalty—and that includes all homosexual sex, since gay marriage is obviously not recognized in Qatar. That is rarely applied, but there are genuine prison sentences. There is a relatively recent law passed in 2004 criminalizing leading, instigating, or seducing a man to commit sodomy, with up to three years in prison. That is not where Europe was ten years ago—that is closer to where some English laws were, going back to Oscar Wilde, well over a hundred years ago. There is a genuine gap between those two things.

    The thing I actually want to ask you about is how to formulate this critique of universalism in a way that captures both the moral problems with Europe trying to lecture others, and also just the absurdity of Europe lecturing others when it has no power to impose anything—when going around telling India or China how they should do things is going to be ineffective regardless of whether we would want to do it if it could be effective. We really should pull back on that front.

    But that doesn’t mean to me that we need to abandon universalism or liberalism as a way of thinking about which societies are just, which treat their citizens in the right ways, and what the model for our own societies should be. How far should we take this critique of universal liberalism? Is this just a matter of not going around thinking we should be architects of the world—ensuring that people in Afghanistan separate their trash in the good universalist ways that Germans in Heidelberg have done for the last 30 years? I sign up to that recognition. Or is it a deeper questioning of political liberalism, or a certain kind of universalist outlook, in terms of helping us understand who we are, how we want to govern our societies, and how to think morally about the world?

    Leonard: I think we’re in a very similar place, actually. I’m not questioning the validity of a lot of the freedoms and the ideas and the moral codes that have been developed in European societies. We are both Jews; my family were German Jews.

    What happened within Europe and the creation of the freedoms that we have is a kind of miracle, and gives us a set of perspectives in our lives which are unthinkable for our ancestors. I think they’re very fragile, and I think we have to fight for these rights and make sure that we don’t go backwards in a lot of these different dimensions. At the same time, I think we need to move from seeing the world as a kind of unitary system which was going to be melded around European ideals, toward seeing what we’ve managed to do in Europe as quite exceptional and fragile, and put a lot of our energy into preserving that.

    There is a huge debate and discussion going on about the future of our politics in different places. We’re much more conscious both of the positive aspects of liberalism and the negative aspects, and that is leading to the rise of the new right in lots of different places. There are very powerful critiques of some of the side effects of liberalism—not least the economic side effects, which you’ve done lots of podcasts on. I think we need to take those discussions very, very seriously.

    Increasingly, we’re moving toward a world where power is much more widely spread, where this desire to control one’s destiny is very, very strong everywhere, and where Europeans might have views about how people should lead their lives everywhere in the world. We shouldn’t run away from them and pretend that we’re wrong to be against the death penalty or against stoning people for marital infidelity or whatever other things which offend us as human beings. But we don’t necessarily have the standing in those countries to tell them what to do. It doesn’t mean we shouldn’t say these things, but I think we need to conduct ourselves in a way where we have to be clear that we’re going to have to coexist with other ways of organizing societies—that the main people who are going to be fighting for particular rights in different places will be those citizens themselves rather than outsiders telling them how to do things.

    A lot of the freedoms that we’ve enjoyed over the last few decades in our own societies are under threat, and we should put a lot of our energy into winning the battles around them. But also, increasingly, I think we do have to be less blind to the problems of liberalism within our own societies. What we’re seeing now is a much greater awareness of the dark side of liberalism and of globalization. Part of the challenge for our kind of politics—if you want to have a politics which isn’t just about building walls and going back to ethno-nationalism—is to find ways of bringing everyone in our societies along with the idea of cooperation, and to find ways of speaking to the losers and others like that. That does mean a different kind of politics.

    Mounk: A few points on this. One is that domestically, a lot of the time the problem is not actually with liberalism; it’s with people who claim to be liberal in some kind of way but actually impose their values on the rest of society. There is a set of people who are very influential because they’re hugely overrepresented in the most educated classes and so on, who are actually quite illiberal, who have real disdain for people who are religious in their societies, who have more traditional communities in certain ways, who don’t go to university and move to a big city but who stay rooted in more local communities. There is a lot of looking down on them, and that is not actually a liberal attitude, even if it sometimes masquerades as that.

    In terms of our general outlook on the world, I think we agree. To put it more starkly: if I could flip a button and make sure that Afghanistan is ruled more or less the way that France or Germany is, and that women there have a right to go to school and to university and to make their own decisions in life—of course I would. I wouldn’t hesitate one moment. The last 20 to 30 years have demonstrated amply, though, that trying to impose that from outside is incredibly difficult, often counterproductive, and can involve a lot of suffering along the way. That button just doesn’t exist.

    People have trouble distinguishing between: either you think we should do it in principle and therefore we should do it in practice, or if you think it’s a bad idea to do it in practice, you should claim that Afghan culture is just as fair to people living there as cultures elsewhere—and that Afghan women have somehow chosen to live in the way they did, even if all indications are that they haven’t. I think we need to be able to live with the discomfort of some amount of impotence. Of course, if we could easily do something without enormous wars and suffering to allow people in Afghanistan to lead self-determined lives, recognize the freedoms of individuals there, and give equal rights to women and so on, we absolutely should. It’s just that that is not the world we live in, and we have to be clear-eyed about that.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Mark discuss whether Europe is living up to its values, what the Trump administration means for the continent, and why the transatlantic relationship is still important. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    43 min
  • Israel Is the Big Loser of the Iran Deal

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    Netanyahu with Trump, December 29, 2025. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP.)

    Who are the biggest losers of Trump’s Memorandum of Understanding, signed last week with Iran? Well, it’s a long list. First and foremost is, almost certainly, the Iranian people. Less than four months after being told that the “hour of your freedom is at hand,” Iranians must contend with a deeply-entrenched hardline regime, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in greater control than ever and U.S. forces retrograding post-haste out of the “proximity” of Iran. Then there’s Trump, who signed the “Retreaty of Versailles” as a diminished version of Obama’s 2015 deal and agreed to pump $300 billion into Iran’s economy. Then there’s the Republican Party having to somehow spin a chaotic foreign policy, if not a signal defeat, in the November midterms. Then there are the Gulf states who may suddenly find themselves without the umbrella of protection they were counting on if the United States really steps back in the region just when the Islamic Republic finds itself emboldened. Then there’s America’s global reputation. And there’s the enhanced possibility of Iran-sponsored state terror on a frighteningly wide front.

    But the absolute unquestioned loser of the agreement is Israel and the entire shape of Israel’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Iran war was his war—it was supposed to be his masterstroke for generating regime change in Iran and removing the greatest threat to Israel’s existence. The absolute failure of that plan should be a wakeup call to Israelis—if nothing else is—of how ruinous Netanyahu’s foreign policy has been and the extent to which a policy of isolation can’t be anything else but dangerous to a nation as small as Israel is.

    In the Israeli press there was surprisingly little effort to spin the MOU. In an impassioned editorial, The Times of Israel—a reasonable bellwether of mainstream Israeli opinion—called Trump’s deal “a catastrophic capitulation to Iran’s aggressors, leav[ing] Israel vulnerable and constrained.” Netanyahu for his part tried to claim that “the war did not go wrong at all,” and that Israel’s primary goals had been achieved, but that was far from the consensus view. “The deal manifestly empowers and finances a mass-murdering regime. It elevates the Islamic Republic to a regional powerhouse,” The Times of Israel wrote. Bezazel Smotrich, the far-right finance minister who is a key piece of Netanyahu’s governing coalition, was even more direct, writing on social media, “The agreement with Iran is bad for Israel and the entire free world. Period.”

    And Netanyahu got another negative review from an unlikely source. “He has no fucking judgment,” Donald Trump said in response to an Israeli attack on Beirut that threatened to scuttle the Iran deal. A U.S. official told Axios that Trump went even further in a profanity-laced phone call with Netanyahu. “What the fuck are you doing? You’re fucking crazy. You’d be in prison if it weren’t for me. I’m saving your ass. Everyone hates you now. Everybody hates Israel because of this,” Trump said to Netanyahu in the official’s retelling.

    Usually, when Donald Trump of all people tells you to get a grip… that’s when it’s time to wonder if you actually do need to get a grip.

    Of course, this is not the first time that people have reacted this way to Netanyahu. You may notice a pattern in remarks U.S. statesmen have directed towards him going back decades. “Who the fuck does he think he is?” Bill Clinton asked aides after his first meeting with Netanyahu in 1996. “Who’s the fucking superpower here?”

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    “That son of a bitch, Bibi Netanyahu, he’s a bad guy,” Joe Biden said in 2023 to the journalist Bob Woodward. “He’s a bad fucking guy!” Woodward reported that the next time Biden spoke to Netanyahu he erupted at him, “Bibi, what the fuck? You know the perception of Israel around the world increasingly is that you’re a rogue state, a rogue actor.”

    And Jeffrey Goldberg, then a reporter for The Atlantic, started keeping a list of descriptions White House staffers in the Obama administration had for Netanyahu. The list included “recalcitrant,” “myopic,” “reactionary,” “obtuse,” “blustering,” “pompous,” “Aspergery,” and “chickenshit.” Obama and French president Nicolas Sarkozy seemed to find common ground in 2011 when Sarkozy was overheard calling Netanyahu a “liar” and Obama replied “you may be sick of him, but me, I have to deal with him every day.”

    If Netanyahu lacked congeniality, that tended to be excused by Israeli voters because of his singleminded focus on Israel’s security, but now, two-and-a-half years after October 7, and with Netanyahu pushing his security vision to the maximum, we can finally see what that approach has gotten Israel. 156 countries now recognize the state of Palestine, with 19 choosing to do so in reaction to Israel’s war in Gaza. The International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Netanyahu’s arrest—the first time it has done so for the leader of a democratic country—with the result, among other things, that Netanyahu was unable to plead Israel’s case in negotiations at the G7 in France. The estimated 50-60,000 civilian deaths in the Gaza war produced an international outcry that, for the first time, led to the American public, and younger Americans in particular, evincing greater sympathy for Palestine than for Israel.

    The argument has been that that loss of international support is the price to pay for a muscular assertion of Israel’s strength around the region—breaking the striking power of Hamas, dismantling Hezbollah, hitting the Houthis, and launching two waves of attacks against Iran. And it is impossible to argue that Israel, with its allies, has not had battlefield successes—killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, Hezbollah leader’s Nasrallah, Hamas’ military leadership and (more treacherously) political leadership.

    But Israel’s plan of action hinged entirely on support from the Trump administration. That seemed to work fine when Trump joined in at the end of the 12-day Israel-Iran war in 2025 and when Trump struck at the Houthis in Yemen and when Trump proved a surprisingly easy sell in the plans for a more vigorous attack on Iran in late February of this year. “Mr. Netanyahu delivered his presentation in a confident monotone. It seemed to land well with the most important person in the room, the American president,” The New York Times reported in its description of the critical meeting that led to the joint U.S.-Israeli assaults later that month.

    But, in retrospect, that may very well have been Netanyahu’s high-water mark. By late May, The New York Times would report that Netanyahu, “once Trump’s co-pilot against Iran,” was now “a mere passenger,” cut entirely out of the loop on truce talks between the United States and Iran. By June, Israel’s left-leaning Haaretz would report that “Israel has been frozen out of the negotiations while being forced by [Trump] to sit on command.” The entire premise of Netanyahu’s foreign policy seemed to be to generally manipulate and annoy their babyminders in the Biden administration, and to run out the clock until Trump was elected, at which point Netanyahu could really do what he wanted. But if Trump was a kindred spirit in certain ways, his limited attention span obviated the ability to place any long-term trust in him. “The strategic mistake that Netanyahu made was failing to understand that just as Trump is with you, he could also flip on you,” Yaakov Katz of the Middle East-America Dialogue said of the fairly obvious shortcoming of Netanyahu’s grand strategy.

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    The result is a debacle. On October 8, 2023, Israel had the sympathies of the international community in a way that hadn’t been the case for years, if not decades. The grand strategy of Netanyahu—“Mr. Security”—seemed to be to burn through that goodwill as rapidly as possible, trading it in ultimately for an alliance of force, and a united spirit of bravado, with Trump. That worked until it didn’t, when the grand strategy revealed itself to be encouraging the Kurds to rise against the Islamic Republic, installing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s leader notwithstanding his history of Holocaust denial and advocacy for the destruction of Israel, and selling Trump on wildly optimistic regime change scenarios that U.S. intelligence regarded as “farcical.”

    Israel has an election scheduled for October, and that may be the moment for Israel to finally get moderate and rational leadership and some sort of reset in its relations with the international community. But first, it is important that Israel takes a hard look at what it has gotten with its force-first approach. “What’s your strategy, man?” Joe Biden asked Netanyahu in 2023, as reported by Woodward. Well, now we know. It was to cut out all of Israel’s possible allies until Trump was the only one left, and now Trump—or his aides—are calling Netanyahu “fucking crazy” in public. It really is time to get a grip.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

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    0 min
  • Colombia Just Elected A Maverick Lawyer As President
    Abelardo de la Espriella on June 21, 2026. (Photo by Cristian Acosta/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    On Sunday, Abelardo de la Espriella won the second round of Colombia’s presidential election. A lawyer and businessman who founded his political party—Defenders of the Homeland—two years ago, he defeated the incumbent left-wing president Gustavo Petro’s handpicked candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda, by a razor-thin margin: just under one percent of the vote. It’s clear from the results that the left was defeated. What’s less clear is what ideology won.

    As the vote coincided with the start of the World Cup, de la Espriella regularly wore the country’s yellow jersey to rallies, a move that mirrored a similar campaign by former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. President Petro angrily demanded that de la Espriella stop using national symbols while campaigning, and a court briefly ordered him to do so—an absurd request amid global football fever. De la Espriella leaned into the controversy, encouraging all his followers to wear the yellow jersey.

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    The twist: it turns out Colombia’s president-elect doesn’t even like soccer. De la Espriella told the author of his 2012 biography that he detested soccer, had never gone to a stadium for a game, and did not care about the World Cup.

    The cynical use of soccer for political purposes fits a larger pattern of behavior, and is symbolic of everything Colombia must now deal with as de la Espriella becomes president. He wears the Colombian jersey while holding U.S. and Italian passports and owning a Miami mansion paid for by decades of representing unsavory clients. He is a self-described atheist turned Catholic who courted and won the evangelical vote. He promises to wipe out the cocaine traffickers he once defended as a lawyer for paramilitary groups. He vows to keep Colombia from sliding into a Venezuela-like mess despite having worked for Alex Saab, a fixer who helped former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro evade sanctions and remain in power for over a decade.

    So while many Colombians fear that the country has elected a far-right populist, they should perhaps be more afraid of the fact that they elected a lawyer without ideology or ethics. In a country with the world’s largest cocaine economy, a candidate known for accepting any job from the highest bidder is a worrying occupant of the presidential palace.

    Colombian voters did not have a great choice in this second round. De la Espriella’s narrow victory was, above all, a rejection of the outgoing President Petro—a former left-wing guerrilla—and the four years of fiscal deterioration and failed security policy that he oversaw.

    Iván Cepeda, the candidate Petro chose to run as his successor, struggled to differentiate himself from his predecessor in any meaningful way. He pledged to double down on Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy of negotiating with armed groups. His campaign focused on criticizing Colombia’s traditional right-wing parties even after it became clear that de la Espriella, an outsider very much not of the traditional right, was his main opponent.

    In other words, this was a rejection election—and de la Espriella should have won it more easily. Petro’s approval sits near 45 percent, and presidents that unpopular rarely drag their successors across the line. That de la Espriella won by a single point in an environment built for anti-incumbency tells you how thin his coalition is. This could cause problems down the line: Petro is already posting conspiracy theories about voting machines being rigged, sowing the seeds for challenges to de la Espriella’s legitimacy.

    De la Espriella, for his part, will not read a narrow victory as a reason for caution or moderation. That is not who he is. His party lacks a congressional majority, having only won a few seats in the March legislative elections, so he plans to govern by decree. He has promised to push through his agenda “by reason or by force.” He has said that the Congress will be considered treasonous if they block or stall his agenda. He has preemptively threatened to crack down on any street protests organized against his presidency. As a lawyer, he had a history of suing journalists, and now he’ll have state resources at his disposal. He’s also promised to push for Colombia’s exit from the UN, the Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, institutions which he claims hold Colombia back.

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    Like many presidents who win narrow mandates, de la Espriella will be looking for an early win, and will likely turn to a security-populist agenda to achieve it. He has planned a military campaign to retake all of the country’s territory from the gangs in 90 days, and while that timeframe is unrealistic, it signals that a major military surge is coming. He has also promised to build ten mega prisons in the style of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, threatening to detain a large number of citizens in his effort to drive down the crime rate.

    But that security agenda will be expensive, which is why de la Espriella is almost certain to break his big campaign promises on the economy. He ran as an austerity hawk in the mold of Argentina’s libertarian president, Javier Milei. But whatever else one thinks of Milei, he is genuinely committed to austerity—a man even more in favor of cutting budgets than the IMF. De la Espriella is not. He has promises to keep and a congressional coalition to buy. So he will govern as a right-wing spender in the Bolsonaro-Trump tradition, the kind who praises austerity and then opens the taps. His expensive security agenda is his top priority, and the promised budget cuts will never be more than a symbolic way to target the programs that he views as helping his political opponents.

    That matters, because Colombia’s fiscal hole is real. The deficit is the worst it has been since the COVID pandemic, public debt has pushed past 60 percent of GDP, and Moody’s and S&P have downgraded the country deep below investment grade. Petro’s government shifted around debt payments so that the bills will come due during the next presidential term. Facing an expensive security agenda and a need to cut the budget, de la Espriella will struggle to fulfill the promises he made to voters if he remains constrained by democratic institutions. Whether you call it right-wing populism or an illiberal power grab, expect his authoritarian instincts to come to the fore.

    The good news is that Colombia has been here before, and its institutions held. In 2010, the Constitutional Court blocked Álvaro Uribe, the incredibly popular strongman president who had already rewritten the constitution to run for a second term, from holding a referendum to seek a third term in office. Uribe, to his credit, respected that decision. The same court constrained Petro from the left, striking down the economic emergency he declared when Congress wouldn’t fund his proposed budget. Colombia has its political caudillos who dominate their ideological coalitions, but courts, Congress, and an independent central bank are the reason no strongman, of the right or the left, has yet been able to remake the country in their image.

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    But institutions move slowly, and the opposition is divided in defeat. That means de la Espriella has an opening. The courts can rein him in, but the process takes time. A president who spends his first hundred days issuing decrees can outrun the judiciary for a season.

    De la Espriella knows the honeymoon period is short. Across Latin America, recently elected presidents in Chile and Bolivia have watched their early goodwill collapse as approval sank and their congresses balked. De la Espriella sees the sand running low, and he will press hard before the reality that he cannot deliver everything he has promised catches up with him. The institutions held against Uribe and Petro, the ideologues of right and left. But now they face a different challenge: a wily lawyer who cares less about ideology than about the power and influence the office of president confers.

    James Bosworth (Boz) is the author of the Latin America Risk Report and a non-resident fellow at the Stimson Center’s Latin America Program.

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    0 min
  • What Obama Meant
    The Grand Opening Ceremony of the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago, Illinois, on Thursday, June 18, 2026. (Photo by Jacek Boczarski/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    I recently got the chance to walk through the exhibits of the Barack Obama Presidential Center before its opening on Thursday. Looking at photos of the young Obama as a community organizer in Chicago, watching video clips of those iconic speeches that marked his dream-like rise from a nobody to leader of the free world, I was reminded of a time when our politics was more hopeful, our social sector was more constructive, and the two were aligned in the service of the nation.

    I first met Obama in 2004 at a campaign event when he was running a distant third for the Democratic nomination for U.S. Senate in Illinois. There were maybe 25 people milling about a modest condo belonging to early Obama fundraisers Alan and Andrea Solow. I told Obama about the various programs my nonprofit organization, Interfaith America, was running to bring people of diverse faiths together to solve social problems.

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    The early 2000s was a golden era for the social sector. It was a time when talented college graduates were just as likely to start nonprofit organizations as they were to head to Wall Street. Civic institutions like Ashoka, Teach for America, the KIPP network of charter schools, Public Allies, Partners in Health, the Harlem Children’s Zone and City Year were broadly known and widely admired. These organizations shared a common ethos: to recognize that talent exists everywhere, to build excellent institutions to nurture people’s potential, and to cooperate across differences to lift people up.

    Obama was a product of the nonprofit world. His formative years were spent as a community organizer, a profession that relies on storytelling to bring people together and whose cardinal rule is “never do for others what they can do for themselves.” He served on the board of the Chicago-based philanthropic foundation the Woods Fund, which made grants to community-based organizations. He had been the youngest participant in the political scientist Robert Putnam’s 1997 Saguaro Seminar, a workshop for leaders committed to strengthening social capital. And his wife, Michelle, had been the Chicago director for Public Allies, an organization that trained young people to be civic leaders, and then found them a one-year placement in a nonprofit organization.

    In that post-9/11 era, my friends and I in the social sector were thrilled by Obama’s rise. Here was a black man with a Muslim name, raised by a single mother, shaped by his work in Chicago communities, staking his claim to the nation’s story, and showcasing his talents to lead us into the next chapter.

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    In the Obama narrative, America is a nation defined by people who fought for freedom and defeated repression. The 1776 generation won a victory over the British Empire and established the foundational promise of the nation: that all people are created equal and have the God-given right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Black people fought against slavery and segregation, and women fought against misogyny and patriarchy, so that promise could be extended to everyone. Veterans fought repression around the world. Immigrants fled economic, religious, and political persecution in their home countries, and came here to build a better life, and through that process America became a better country.

    There is a genius to this narrative. It recognizes the ugly parts of American history without getting mired in them. It hands the victory not to the slave drivers but to the freedom fighters. It identifies a common, heroic thread that connects a wide range of communities. And it provides clear direction and forward momentum for the future.

    From his very first appearance on the national stage, at the Democratic National Convention in 2004, Obama was explicit about what that future should look like: teach the black child on the South Side of Chicago to read, ensure the senior citizen can get access to her prescriptions, protect the Arab-American family who is suffering discrimination, create job training programs for the laid off white factory worker.

    In the heady days of that first presidential campaign, the nonprofit leaders I knew were fully aware that Obama was casting us as a central character in the American drama. Obama-ism was the belief that the talent development, character formation, and civic bridgebuilding of the social sector could be elevated into a governing philosophy. We embraced the challenge. Our work was concrete evidence of his famous “hope and change.”

    As president, Obama turned that governing philosophy into concrete policy. He established two White House offices to work with the nonprofit sector, the Office of Social Innovation and the Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships. He increased funding for charter schools. He created “Promise Neighborhoods” across the country, based on the model of the Harlem Children’s Zone. He launched a major White House initiative called My Brother’s Keeper that partnered with nonprofit organizations to invest in black men. Even his signature government initiative, the Affordable Care Act, relied heavily on nonprofit organizations to be “navigators,” helping enroll people in Obamacare. He even partnered with my organization to launch a program called the President’s Interfaith Campus and Community Service Challenge.

    Increasing social investment in communities that had experienced marginalization was one part of the Obama philosophy. The other part was calling for more personal responsibility. Obama addressed minority youth in blunt terms: Yes, you will experience racism, he would tell them, but you cannot let it prevent you from trying your best. Your ancestors overcame far greater obstacles than you. Focus on the things you can control, not the things that are holding you back. View your identity as a source of pride, not of victimization. Remember that you owe something to your forefathers and foremothers. Never make excuses.

    Every narrative is a script for forward action. If you are moved by Obama’s “Yes, we can” interpretation of American history, then it inspires you to do a set of things: Yes, we can help children achieve academically, no matter their circumstances. Yes, we can bridge the divide between urban America and rural America. Yes, we can transition industrial-era workers to knowledge economy employees. We are all agents of constructive change in this story.

    But this talk of personal responsibility angered a set of progressive intellectuals, who accused Obama of emphasizing respectability politics over addressing structural racism. In 2014, Ta-Nehisi Coates published a blockbuster article in The Atlantic called “The Case For Reparations.” It became the cornerstone of a worldview that presented a stark contrast to the Obama story: America was not defined by the expansion of freedom, but by the legacy of slavery.

    What Coates wrote was true—systemic racism is very, very real. And he was right that Obama rarely talked about that dimension of American life. But Coates was also not telling the whole truth. He ignored the part that Obama emphasized—slavery and segregation really were abolished, and the progress of minority communities in the United States since then has been stunning, if uneven and incomplete. Coates’ own rise to intellectual stardom is a signal case.

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    In the Coates narrative, you are either a victim of America’s continuing legacy of slavery, or you are a villain. Thinking of yourself as a victim is terrible for your mental health, and ensures failure before you begin. In fact, it sets up a perverse incentive structure: to prove that America holds minorities back, you have to present yourself as a victim or a failure.

    Moreover, the white men cast as villains in the Coates story just so happened to be the group who experienced the most dramatic increase in mortality rates during the 2000s, a spike dubbed “deaths of despair” because so many of them had to do with suicide, alcoholism, and opioid addiction. A handful of white men in woke circles might have embraced the term “privileged oppressor,” but the laid-off factory workers dying from fentanyl overdoses in Macomb County, Michigan were not having it.

    In 2016, a Black Lives Matter activist from Chicago publicly spurned President Obama’s invitation to visit the White House and discuss civil rights issues with the great John Lewis. Progressive activists were embracing the “America is a continuation of slavery” narrative. I viewed this as par for the course for activists. What surprised me was how that narrative started to shape the worldview of mainstream social sector organizations. Seemingly overnight, the conversation went from having a “Yes, we can” orientation to being obsessed with dismantling systems of oppression and challenging white supremacy. Nonprofit organizations adopted the Coates worldview, not as a critique of Obama-ism, but as an alternative to it. The clenched fist replaced the extended hand as the symbol of social change.

    Charter school networks that once told families that their children could achieve academically whatever their circumstances changed their tune entirely and started to claim that black and brown kids were too oppressed to learn. Minorities were now valued for talking about their trauma, not their talents. Cooperation across difference was viewed as doing harm to BIPOC communities. The laid-off small town factory worker did not deserve a job training program—he needed to be reminded of his white male privilege and scolded for not stating his gender pronoun. Canceling coworkers over microaggression became standard practice in nonprofit organizations.

    If your governing philosophy is to elevate the social sector to write the next chapter in the story of America’s continuous expansion of freedom, and significant parts of the social sector decide that their real job is actually to protest America’s legacy of slavery and criticize you for not doing enough about structural racism, then your governing philosophy collapses. That is effectively what happened to Obama-ism.

    The alternative to Obama-ism did not turn out to be a glorious antiracist revolution followed by a socialist paradise. It turned out to be Donald Trump. A black president with a Muslim name was always going to face racist opposition from right-wing elements in America. But I don’t think those right-wing elements would have had the opportunity to build a political movement that won two presidential elections had the social sector not cannibalized itself.

    Still, I am happy to report that things are changing in the nonprofit world. It turns out that when you embrace a “disrupt the system” worldview, the first system that your junior staff will try to disrupt is the institution that employs them. A decade of organizational turmoil was enough. Executives in the social sector are putting a stop to the crazy practice of cancellations within their own shops. Moreover, responsible leaders in the nonprofit world were sobered by the fact that many minorities voted for Donald Trump in 2024, preferring a candidate who called Mexicans rapists to a candidate who used the term “Latinx.” Maybe the nonprofit world didn’t understand BIPOC communities quite as well as they thought.

    Whatever the reason, I am hearing a lot more talk about investing in potential and building civic trust than I am about dismantling patriarchy and white supremacy in social sector spaces. Which means it is a perfect moment for the opening of the Obama Center. The goal should not be a nostalgia trip; it should be a revitalization of the central role the social sector can play in the next chapter of America’s glorious story of expanding freedom.

    Eboo Patel, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.

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