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Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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  • An Actually Popular British Politician
    Andy Burnham speaks to supporters on June 19, 2026. (Photo by Darren Staples / AFP via Getty Images.)

    British politicos have feverishly spent the last week with their eyes on the parliamentary by-election that took place in the northern constituency of Makerfield yesterday. With the future of Britain’s government in the balance, Makerfield—a few miles west of Manchester—was the setting for a dramatic showdown between the governing Labour Party and right-wing challengers Reform. Most crucially, it was the first step in Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham’s campaign to replace his boss, Keir Starmer, as prime minister of the country.

    Starmer’s growing unpopularity (he is now tied with Liz Truss for least popular prime minister ever) invited a series of challenges over the last few months, especially following a disastrous result for Labour in May’s local elections. But none of his opponents, including the ambitious health secretary Wes Streeting, managed to get sufficient backing from other Labour MPs to launch a challenge. The amateurish plotters resigned from the cabinet without drawing blood.

    But all along, the real threat to Starmer was far from Westminster. Andy Burnham, the Mayor of Manchester since 2017, has long been gunning for the top job. Britain’s parliamentary system only allows MPs (or, more eccentrically, members of the House of Lords) to become prime minister, so Burnham has been on the hunt for a good seat for months. Last January, Starmer barred him from running in one by-election. But he was no longer in a position to replicate that power move when Labour’s Makerfield MP Josh Simons stood down from Parliament to pave Burnham’s road to Westminster.

    Until last night’s results came in, Burnham’s bid seemed to face considerably more jeopardy than Makerfield’s history might suggest. The constituency is a historically safe seat for Labour, even staying true to its colours in the 2019 general election when Boris Johnson plucked most of Labour’s famed “red wall” seats in the north for the Conservatives. And yet with Nigel Farage’s nationalist Reform Party surging across the country, over half of Makerfield’s electorate backed Farage’s outfit in last month’s local election. Polls gave Burnham a single-digit lead over Reform’s Robert Kenyon.

    But Burnham trounced Kenyon with a surprise 20-point win last night. It was a potent demonstration of the man’s political talents. Burnham will return to Westminster with the honorary title of “Britain’s most popular politician.” Thirty-five percent of the country has a positive opinion of the 56-year-old northerner, twice Starmer’s approval rating. Burnham is almost certain to launch a leadership bid against Starmer in the coming weeks—and he will probably win.

    But who is Andy Burnham? What does he stand for?

    A former member of Gordon Brown’s cabinet until 2010, and of Jeremy Corbyn’s shadow cabinet during one of Labour’s most left-wing periods following the 2015 election, Burnham was elected Mayor of Greater Manchester in 2017. Nine years later, his legacy in the city is largely positive. Manchester has been labelled the “star performer of the UK economy since 2008,” with private investment pouring in and employment growth in the top five of European cities over that period. His investment in the very popular (and very visible) bright yellow “Bee Network” of public buses and trams has been popular. Burnham was also instrumental in campaigning for a deal that granted Greater Manchester more devolved power in 2023.

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    Burnham plans to make this record key to his pitch to the country: an approach he has labelled “Manchesterism.” At its heart is regional devolution, an appealing prospect in one of the most financially centralized countries in the world, in which London holds most levers over infrastructure spending and taxation. Economically, Burnham claims that Manchesterism represents the “end of neoliberalism, the end of trickle-down economics.” He is also a vocal advocate of reindustrialising the UK’s economy.

    But there’s a problem: the Manchesterism that Burnham has defended publicly contrasts starkly with the Manchesterism actually in effect in the city. Burnham is a regular advocate for nationalisation, having indeed brought much of Manchester’s transportation into public ownership. But in practice, Manchester’s success predates Burnham’s election, and was boosted by a surge in foreign direct investment encouraged by consistently pro-business political elites over the years. Regarding industrialisation, Manchester’s success has been decisively post-industrial, with an emphasis on the service economy. It’s unclear which vision of Manchesterism—the one in Burnham’s rhetoric, or the one that actually exists—he would seek to implement nationwide as prime minister.

    On top of these ideological teething issues, Burnham would also inherit an incredibly tight fiscal situation. The British government spent around £110 billion (8.1% of public spending) on debt interest in the past year—one of the highest levels in 50 years, and a figure that continues to rise. Starmer has already attempted to juggle these impossible constraints. Burnham, likewise, would also face difficult arbitrage decisions. Will he commit to increase defense spending towards the 3% of GDP target? Could he do so without touching the £333 billion the UK is spending on welfare (up from £262 billion only three years ago)?

    True, some key metrics are trending in the right direction. Illegal migrant crossings over the English Channel are down, waiting lists for the National Health Service are down, inflation is down. But Britain’s structural economic reality remains dire, something that will hurt Burnham just like it has hurt Starmer. As the churn of Conservative prime ministers over the past decade demonstrated, the polling bump enjoyed by fresh faces is only temporary.

    Starmer’s fate will be decided in the next few weeks. But the prime minister has not yet signalled he will leave, and is obstinately clinging on. This could force Burnham to ask Cabinet ministers to heap pressure on Starmer to set out a timeline for resignation. Worse still, he might launch a protracted leadership bid that would take most of the summer.

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    The one potential lifeline for whoever becomes Britain’s next prime minister is the fragmentation of the political right. Yesterday’s by-election was a blow for Reform—the scale of the defeat in a constituency that is 95% white and that only a month ago elected a clean sweep of Reform local councillors will hurt.

    Even further to the right, Restore Britain, a breakaway party created just this year, scored almost 7%. Replicated across the country, these results could very well cost Reform up to 70 seats in a general election. And while the Conservatives were a distant fourth in Makerfield with 2% of the vote, they gained almost 50% in the Aberdeen South by-election taking place the same night. For leader Kemi Badenoch, this will be much needed ammunition to prove that the Conservatives are still a threat to Reform.

    But this won’t be enough to save Labour. The party has to deal with its own challengers, such as the rising popularity of the left-populist Greens. Most importantly, it will need to develop a clear narrative of how to fix the country and start lining up tangible results. It is unclear whether Andy Burnham is the solution to these problems—but right now, he might be the best Labour has to offer.

    François Valentin is a senior consultant at London Politica.

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  • This Week at Persuasion
    The world’s first Museum of AI Arts, Dataland. Its inaugural exhibition “Machine Dreams: Rainforest,” inspired by visits to the Amazon rainforest, displays 360-degree multi-sensory evolving art experiences. If only there were another way to get a multi-sensory experience of a rainforest, eh? (Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images.)
    • Our weekly Intellectual Boo…

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  • The Myth of Authoritarian Efficiency
    Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 28, 2025 in Beijing, China. (Photo: Ken Ishii/Pool via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    A specter haunts debates about governance: the idea of benevolent and efficient dictatorship. Where democratic leaders haggle, delay, and pander, the authoritarian ruler simply acts. Where elected governments bend to lobbyists and electoral cycles, a dictator is in for the long haul. This vision—or autocratic temptation, if you will—has been popular as far back as we have documented political theory, and it still has plenty of champions today. Beijing officials invoke it to explain the rise of China; climate activists to argue that the planetary emergency demands that we put democracy on pause; populists to suggest that current institutions are broken and that a fresh start and setting the popular will free requires a firm and unchecked hand.

    The academic literature has supplied these critics with plentiful ammunition. Books with ominous titles like Against Democracy, Democracy: The God that Failed, and Democracy Kills have found audiences well beyond university campuses. The charges echo those we find all the way back to Plato: democracies are short-sighted, paralyzed by special interests, prone to electing demagogues, and incapable of making the sacrifices that the challenges of the day require.

    However, a large body of studies of how democracies and autocracies actually perform across regions, over centuries, and in domains ranging from economic growth to military effectiveness to environmental protection have questioned this story. They do not show autocracies to be superior—on the contrary, the autocratic temptation is, in most domains, a mirage, or even a trap. Not only are democracies morally preferable because they recognize the political equity and dignity of citizens; they also tend to work better.

    Countries that successfully consolidate free and fair elections face substantially lower risks of civil war and domestic political violence than authoritarian states. Democracy, by design, offers losers something: the prospect of future victory at the polls, legal channels for dissent, protection from persecution. Citizens who can kick out the opposition at elections are less inclined to take to the streets with weapons.

    The military dimension is also revealing. At least since the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who admired oligarchic Sparta’s discipline over democratic Athens, democracies have been accused of weakness in warfare. This charge resurfaced in the 1930s, when authoritarian Germany and Japan ran roughshod over unprepared democracies, and again during the first three decades of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union seemed to outmaneuver its wealthier Western rivals. Yet the long-term record is unambiguous: since 1815, democracies have won more than 80 percent of the wars they have fought. They win not in spite of their openness but because of it. Elected governments have more legitimacy; they are better placed to ask citizens to make hard sacrifices. Democratic alliances, rooted in shared values, are more durable and credible than autocratic alliances. And no two modern democracies have ever gone to war with each other—a remarkable empirical regularity, an iron law, that has held for two centuries.

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    Vladimir Putin’s catastrophic miscalculation in Ukraine illustrates this. Putin appears to have made a bet that a divided, energy-dependent West would fracture under pressure; that Ukrainian society, lacking the coercive power and will of a dictatorship headed by a strongman, would collapse quickly; and that his own military was far stronger than it proved to be when put to the test. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s citizen-soldiers have fought with a tenacity and creativity that has confounded nearly every prior assessment, and support from other democracies has helped them make their brave stand against the aggressor. An autocrat’s epistemic isolation, it turns out, is not a strategic asset—it is a liability.

    An even more seductive version of autocratic temptation is economical. Authoritarian leaders, the argument goes, are unencumbered by electoral cycles, and thus can make investments that democracies are unable to but which are necessary for development. They can suppress wage demands, override property rights when needed, and redirect capital toward the sectors that create growth. Democratic politicians, by contrast, must constantly placate voters and campaign donors, skewing policy toward immediate gratification.

    There is something to this argument—but much less than its proponents claim, and the authoritarian alternative is hardly perfect in its economic results. Democratic accountability, for all the short-termism it supposedly encourages, creates powerful incentives to invest in public health, education, and physical infrastructure. Citizens who benefit from these things tend to reward the governments that provide them. Democratic institutions protect property rights in a way that encourages the private investment that drives productivity. And the open circulation of ideas across universities, a free press, and competitive markets is not a distraction from growth but one of its primary engines. Studies show that, on average, democracies enjoy a modest but robust long-run growth advantage over autocracies, and that this advantage strengthens with the quality and longevity of democratic institutions.

    More telling than average growth rates, however, is the frequency with which disasters strike. Unchecked political authority not merely fails to deliver growth; rather, it periodically produces catastrophes. Mao’s Great Leap Forward between 1958 and 1962 killed tens of millions through an entirely man-made famine, a consequence of ideological fantasy insulated from the real world. The Soviet collectivization campaign produced similar horrors two decades earlier. Comparable disasters in democratic states are virtually unknown—not necessarily because democratic leaders are wiser or more virtuous, but because they face institutional constraints and public scrutiny that make disastrous policies impossible to sustain.

    The most advanced economies in the world are democracies. The handful of countries that have joined the ranks of wealthy, high-technology societies over the past century, including South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and Ireland, made at least the final leap under democratic governance. Singapore is the sole exception to this rule. Autocratic regimes can mobilize resources to achieve middle-income status, as China has done. But the transition to a knowledge-based economy requires the rule of law, the protection of intellectual property, and the freedom to challenge received wisdom—all of which are systematically undermined under dictatorship.

    Climate change has given the autocratic temptation a new lease on life. The argument is compelling: effective climate policy requires incurring costs now for the benefit of future generations who cannot vote, overriding vested interests that are well-organized and politically powerful, and maintaining consistent policy over periods that exceed any electoral cycle. Addressing climate change might therefore require setting democracy aside. Others, meanwhile, have proposed nurturing a class of enlightened eco-authoritarian technocrats.

    However, this appeal to authoritarian governance relies on a fundamental confusion between the capacity to decide on policies and the likelihood of adopting and implementing good ones. Authoritarian regimes can certainly move fast when they decide to. But choosing to address climate change rather than subsidizing fossil fuels is precisely what they frequently fail to do. They also regularly lie about emissions.

    Freedom of expression is not in fact an obstacle to climate action; it is what makes it possible. Green movements need to organize, publicize, and campaign. Independent scientists must have the freedom to publish findings that inconvenience powerful interests. International environmental agreements require governments that can credibly commit. Overall, democracies, especially high-quality ones with a capable state apparatus, outperform their authoritarian counterparts, whether on greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, water pollution, or soil erosion.

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    The eco-authoritarian chimera also sidesteps the tough but unavoidable question of how the virtuous technocrats are to be selected and constrained—the classical problem of who will guard the guardians, which no eco-authoritarian has satisfactorily answered. Concentrated power that happens to be used wisely for climate issues can easily be turned toward repression, ethnic persecution, or foreign-policy adventurism. Absent democratic accountability, there is no mechanism for ensuring it remains focused on the planet’s welfare without neglecting or undermining other things we cherish.

    China is the principal exhibit in every contemporary case for autocratic governance. China’s growth over the past four decades has been spectacular. It has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, building infrastructure at a pace democratic countries are unable to match. To many observers, China is decisive proof that the authoritarian model outperforms.

    Look at the record more carefully, however, and a different picture emerges. To begin with, China’s official growth figures are among the most manipulated of any major economy. Satellite-based measures of night-time light emissions, which correlate closely with actual economic activity, indicate that Beijing’s statistics overstate both the pace and the scale of growth.

    Context also matters. In 1949, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and North Korea were all equally poor. Today, South Korea and Taiwan are consolidated democracies with per capita incomes substantially higher than China’s. North Korea, on the other hand, offers the unvarnished control case. Communist one-party rule without economic reform has produced one of the most disastrous economic and humanitarian records of the modern era. China’s own pre-reform decades under Mao were characterized not by rapid development but by stagnation punctuated by ideologically driven disasters.

    China’s environmental record, meanwhile, questions the case that autocracy handles long-term challenges better. Decades of growth have left cities choked with smog, rivers contaminated across large regions, and groundwater depleted in ways that will come back to haunt future generations. China’s domestic security spending now exceeds what the country spends on its military—a striking indicator of the regime’s lack of trust in its own population.

    The handling of Covid-19 is also instructive. China’s initial containment, characterized by rapid hospital construction, mass testing, and strict lockdowns, impressed many Western observers. What is less often noted is that China’s initial response also included the active suppression of early warnings and the punishment of those who tried to alert the public, delays that cost not only China but the whole world dearly. And when Beijing eventually abandoned its zero-Covid policies in early 2023, almost a year after other countries had lifted most of their measures, it did so abruptly and without preparation, exposing a population with minimal acquired immunity to a wave of mass infection. The government had optimized for control rather than for public health, and when control became untenable, it had no alternative to letting the virus spread unchecked. South Korea and Taiwan, facing similar epidemiological conditions as democracies, managed to handle the crisis without the brutality or the catastrophic crescendo.

    Taken together, China’s rise not only reflects a historically specific combination of starting conditions, reform choices, and global economic integration that is not easily replicable; it has also generated huge costs, in inequality, in environmental damage, and in political repression, that official accounts systematically obscure.

    Democracies have real and well-documented failings. They are often slow. They are susceptible to capture by organized interests. They sometimes elect leaders who undermine the very institutions that gave them power. None of this should be ignored. But the relevant comparison is not between actually existing democracies and some imagined model of virtuous authoritarian efficiency. It is between actually existing democracies and actually existing autocracies. By that yardstick, the democratic record is substantially better.

    Niccolò Machiavelli is not the first thinker who comes to mind when defending democratic governance. But the Florentine cynic recognized something like this five centuries ago. Contrasting republics with principalities, Machiavelli concluded that “fewer errors will be seen in the people than in the prince—and those lesser and having greater remedies.” The mechanism he identified was not virtue but accountability—the capacity of a political system to detect its mistakes and correct them.

    That capacity is precisely what democratic institutions are designed to provide. At a time when open societies face serious pressure from within and without, the temptation to admire their alternatives is understandable. But admiration is not a sound foundation for political judgment, especially not when it is based on a selective reading of the evidence. The autocratic temptation promises fortitude and efficiency—but too often, it only produces chaos and mismanagement; and, occasionally, it delivers disaster.

    Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning are both professors of political science at Aarhus University.

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  • Brits May Soon Say Goodbye to an Anonymous Internet
    Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosts social media industry leaders to discuss child safety. (Photo by Leon Neal/Getty Images.)

    Last week, the United Kingdom unveiled a new policy it claims will protect children on social media platforms like TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and X. The exact rules governing the ban will be announced before its implementation next year, but we know it will mandate age verification to restrict access to social media platforms for children under the age of 16. The policy will also affect older teens—16- and 17-year-olds will face a curfew preventing them from accessing social media overnight, while younger teens will be unable to access live streaming.

    The proposed law is part of a wider trend. Last year, Australia passed a landmark social media ban for under 16s, which was lauded for setting the tone globally for other countries to follow. The campaign to keep kids off social media has also hit Europe, Asia, and the United States.

    Supporters of such bans argue that they are necessary to protect children from the harms of social media. Governments often claim noble reasons when putting limits on citizens’ ability to speak freely and anonymously, and nothing sounds more noble than “protect the children.” “This is a choice about whose side we’re on: families across the country, or a status quo that isn’t working,” Prime Minister Keir Starmer said of the new policy.

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    But there are many reasons to oppose social media bans. First, supporters assume these bans do what they’re supposed to. But Australia’s ban emphatically isn’t doing what it promised. The government’s own research found that among parents with kids on social media before last December, about 7 in 10 said their child still had a Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, or TikTok account. Starmer admits the Australian model hasn’t delivered. He has stated that the UK will “learn the lessons from Australia’s experience” and “make it far harder for children to bypass safeguards.” That’s why Starmer is calling his version “Australia-plus.” Soon, the UK government will release “different options for effective forms of age assurance for proving whether someone is over 16.”

    But there’s a problem: these “under-16” policies will blunt all UK citizens’ ability to speak freely and anonymously online. All users, whether they’re 15 years old or 55, will need to prove their age in order to post on social media. This raises significant privacy concerns, not just for users’ ages, but for their identities. The process of age verification will cut away vital firewalls around users’ anonymity. As the rush to ban children from social media hits a global fever pitch, it’s well past time we abandon the faulty claim that only children will feel its effects.

    In passing a ban, the UK will join a wave of countries pushing against anonymity. Earlier this year, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he wants “to see real names on the internet.” The Turkish government meanwhile announced its plan to end online anonymity. If you’re reading this piece in a nation without age-gating proposals or an associated threat to anonymity, be warned: It’s only a matter of time.

    One problem facing advocates of internet restrictions is the availability of virtual private networks (VPNs), which reroute traffic and allow users to access banned content or sites from behind firewalls or blocks. The UK government is well aware of the challenge VPNs may pose to its under-16 ban, and Technology Secretary Liz Kendall announced this week that the government “will make further statements in July about VPNs.” Children’s Minister Josh MacAlister has said there are “options there about whether we could age-gate VPN use, which would be really welcome.”

    But attacking VPN use is a hallmark of authoritarian internet censorship. In deeply censored societies, VPNs are often the only way people can access vital information about current events, history, and information about their health and safety. Speech and privacy advocates should watch closely the lengths to which UK officials are willing to go in enforcing their under-16 ban, especially if it involves restricting access to VPNs.

    Parents and policymakers around the world have raised reasonable concerns about the role social media use plays in young peoples’ lives and development. The internet is a revolutionary technology that is always evolving, and we are still in the process of understanding its implications for kids and broader society.

    But the answer is not blanket censorship. Parents across the board may have different ideas about how they want to manage their own children’s internet use and their exposure to online speech. And it’s deeply troubling that few policy makers have discussed how their “child safety” rules burden adults. Put simply, many unsettled questions and serious objections to social media bans have been cast aside in the rush to enforce a near-uniform policy approach on a mass scale.

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    It’s not particularly surprising that the UK is once again treading censorial ground. In recent years, Britain has banned controversial speakers from entering the country, targeted blasphemy, investigated and arrested people for peaceful protest, and rolled out messy regulations targeting so-called “harmful” online content. It has been shockingly comfortable with targeting social media users, with thousands annually facing police action for posts perceived as offensive or harmful. And that’s just a sample of the growing power the UK is asserting to define what its citizens can see or say—and the tools the government has at its disposal to enforce that power.

    The truth is that we don’t need to pit our speech rights against youth safety. We can work to help parents individually make the right choices for their families. There are ways to empower parents to navigate their kids’ use of the internet while respecting that children have their own ability to speak and seek information, and protecting the rights of the entire population against burdensome and invasive limitations on their expressive rights.

    If Britain doesn’t learn this lesson fast, it will find itself sleepwalking into an unfree internet.

    Sarah Mclaughlin is Senior Scholar of Global Expression at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression and author of Authoritarians in the Academy: How the Internationalization of Higher Education and Borderless Censorship Threaten Free Speech.

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  • The University As We Know It Is Finished
    Clark Kerr (center), president of the University of California, at Occidental graduation, 1958. (Photo by Los Angeles Examiner/USC Libraries/Corbis.)

    When University of California President Clark Kerr delivered the Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1963, published shortly thereafter as The Uses of the University, he was doing something unusual for an academic administrator: he was offering a sophisticated social theory, and doing so with wit. In these lectures, Kerr coined the term “multiversity” to describe what the postwar American research university had become. In Kerr’s account, the modern university was no longer to be understood as a community of scholars united by a shared ideal of learning, but rather as a sprawling institutional conglomerate serving at once as a research engine, a job-training facility, a credentialing mechanism, a coming-of-age experience, and an incubator of the national technical elite. The University of California, which Kerr had just finished steering through a near-decade of explosive growth, was his exemplar.

    Kerr was a droll man. He once observed that the three great problems facing any university president were “parking for the faculty, athletics for the alumni, and sex for the students.” He described the university faculty (and I can confirm from personal experience that this remains accurate) as “a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking.” And when Ronald Reagan made good on his 1966 gubernatorial campaign promise to fire him for being too lenient with the Free Speech Movement protesters, Kerr offered one of the great farewell lines in American academic history: “I leave the University of California as I arrived: fired with enthusiasm!”

    Despite the jokes, Kerr was a serious man. The argument underneath The Uses of the University was that the multiversity, precisely because of its sprawl and apparent incoherence, was the institutional master key of mid-century American civilization. It was the nexus at which basic scientific knowledge was produced, technical and professional talent was credentialed, democratic citizenship was cultivated, and the national project of technological supremacy was advanced. The multiversity didn’t need to be coherent in order to be functionally useful as a platform for what Kerr called “administering the present.” He wrote with the high modernist confidence of someone who believed that hierarchical technocratic institutions, if competently managed, could keep these various volatile elements in balance.

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    Kerr’s dismissal by Reagan in 1967 was, in a sense, the first indicator and warning of the crisis of the high modernist technocratic model that he championed and sought to institutionalize through the multiversity.

    It is time to acknowledge that Kerr’s model of higher education is finished: long on its last legs, the arrival of AI announces its death-knell. What comes next is disaggregation: the multiversity as we know it being disassembled into its component parts. This need not, however, be a catastrophe for higher education. Actually, in many ways, it represents an opportunity to return to roots, in a classical model of education and in attentive pedagogical instruction. But higher education can only weather this period of disruption if it is clear-eyed about what is happening and moves confidently toward a new model.

    The Crisis of the University Is Not New

    The present crisis of the American university began building already sixty years ago as the postwar bargain that Kerr’s vision embodied started to fray. What followed was a slow-motion privatization of university finances, producing a slow-motion tuition hyperinflation that has burdened a generation of students with debt while hollowing out the public mission of the university. The shift from grants to loans, from tenured faculty to mass adjunctification, and from a broad education in the liberal arts to vocational credentialism all occurred under the banner of making universities more “responsive to market demands.” In practice, this has meant transferring cost from the public to the individual “student consumer,” while defunding the parts of the institution that didn’t produce monetizable outputs. The net result has been the ever-upward-spiraling costs of undergraduate education, without a corresponding increase in the value of educational training or credentialling, and a loss of political support for the mission of universities. These financial and political travails have heightened the contradictions between the disparate missions and functions of the multiversity.

    Into this increasingly unstable compound, add AI.

    The arrival of large language models is acting as a catalytic solvent, titrating out the incoherence that was always there. When a student can produce a plausible term paper in twenty minutes using Claude Opus or Google Gemini, what is the point of assigning term papers? When an AI tutor can explain any concept at any level of sophistication with infinite patience, what is the value of a lecturer reading from notes? When AI can ace most standardized professional examinations, what is a credential certifying? These are old problems that AI has made it impossible to ignore.

    Beyond the pedagogic challenges posed by the arrival of LLMs, AI is also exposing that the Kerrian bundle held together for as long as it did because its components shared a common and venerable set of technologies of knowledge transmission: the book, the lecture, the problem set, the written examination. In a pre-LLM world, these formats made cognitive demands of students that were difficult to simulate or shortcut. That is no longer true. AI doesn’t just automate some of the tasks associated with these formats; it renders the formats themselves obsolete as instruments of either intellectual discipline or assessment. And when the shared technological substrate dissolves, the contradictions built into the multiversity from the beginning become impossible to paper over. The world-class research mission and the undergraduate teaching mission have always been in tension. The prestige economy that rewards publications over pedagogy always distorted faculty incentives. The credentialing function was always only loosely connected to the educational one. These were the open secrets of the American research university. In a post-AI world, these divergences are being rendered untenable.

    It is striking, then, that the most widely discussed recent attempt at university self-examination, the April 2026 Report of the Yale Committee on Trust in Higher Education, barely registered any of this reality. The report was in some ways an admirable document. It was clear-eyed about costs, scathing about admissions opacity, and candid about the political monoculture that has eroded public trust across partisan lines. Yet its treatment of AI was cursory to the point of negligence: a few sentences in the section on the classroom, expressing uncertainty about AI’s effects and noting that faculty are “scrambling to redesign syllabi.” It is remarkable that a report tasked with understanding why public trust in higher education is collapsing would fail to reckon with the technology that is restructuring the economics and logic of knowledge work. It suggests that even the most self-aware corners of the academy are still treating AI as a pedagogical inconvenience (or literal cheat-code) rather than what it actually is: the force that is making the entire inherited architecture of the multiversity impossible to sustain.

    The Co-curricular Dodge

    So how should the university respond to this crisis of purpose, identity, and even faith? The most popular present answer in certain administrative circles to this question is an emphasis on the “co-curricular,” that is, on residential life and human connection as the university’s irreducible value in an age of AI tutors. Perhaps the most cited proposal is Molly Worthen’s New York Times piece from three years ago, “Why Universities Should Be More Like Monasteries,” which argued that universities should offer radically low-tech, high-presence educational environments.

    This argument isn’t meritless: there is evidence that learning works differently when embedded in community, that chance hallway encounters with faculty members, late-night bull sessions in the dormitory common room, and heated dining hall debates are often the most generative moments of learning. Students’ own accounts of what matters most in college consistently center on relationships, belonging, and dialogue. The argument for residential education, for the ancient model of the Platonic Academy as gymnasium and garden as much as classroom, is stronger now than it has been in decades.

    This is continuous with a long-standing function of universities as sites for passage from childhood to adulthood, for coming to a new understanding of oneself. In the 1960s more than four fifths of college freshmen reported that a major goal of college was to help themselves “develop a meaningful philosophy of life,” a number which collapsed by half in the 1970s and 1980s. A reemphasis on the co-curricular could help revivify this ideal, which would in turn help prepare students for the AI-forward world they are entering. As Anthropic cofounder Jack Clark recently argued, the people who will most benefit from AI are those who have first built deep, idiosyncratic human capacities through “repetitive practice and creation.” The machines will work best when helping you to amplify what you’ve already made of yourself.

    But by itself, the co-curricular is an evasion. It leaves untouched the question that determines what students and families are paying for: what happens in the curriculum, in the classroom, in the formal educational encounter. That is where reform needs to be most radical, and where the response of universities so far has been most quavering. If the primary response of universities to the most dramatic new knowledge technology in decades, one that employers everywhere are expecting employees everywhere to use, is to demand that students stick cotton in their ears and keep rowing, it will only hasten their decline into institutional redundancy, if not irrelevance.

    Cognitive Requirements in the Age of AI

    Any reimagining of the university in the age of AI must begin with an honest reckoning with what AI cannot do—and what therefore becomes relatively valuable precisely because AI can do everything else. The key distinction is between work that AI does well (such as synthesis of known patterns, argument elaboration, template instantiation, and generating local coherence) and work it structurally cannot do because of the architecture of the technology as such. AI cannot build the trust on which institutional cooperation depends, because trust is not a conclusion reached by processing information about another agent but instead is a relationship constituted over time between persons who have staked something on each other, and who can be betrayed. AI cannot give a person good taste or style, because taste and style are about personal distinctiveness within a community which shares an aesthetic. AI cannot constitute goals, because that act requires a valuing subject. These are not gaps that more compute will close. They are absences that follow from the ontology of the technology itself.

    A curriculum designed around AI’s limitations should be seen neither as an exercise in nostalgia nor as a denial of the burgeoning power of these systems. In fact, given the trajectory of AI capabilities, it is the only curriculum with any hope of finding a stable foundation.

    What does this mean in practice? Start with the most obvious casualty: the term paper, as an assessment instrument, is dead. Written homework assignments were meant to push (and test) a student’s ability to produce a well-structured, coherently argued text. But this is exactly what LLMs do effortlessly and without demanding of the user any of the underlying cognitive work for which the traditional term paper was supposed to be a proxy. This included sustained argumentative reason: the ability to construct and maintain a complex argument across an extended piece of discourse, distinguishing claims from evidence, handling counterarguments, and reaching a defensible conclusion. Written assignments also demanded epistemic self-regulation, that is, the metacognitive capacity to monitor one’s own understanding, recognize gaps in evidence, revise positions in response to what the evidence shows rather than what one hoped to find. This pedagogically valuable work always operated below the waterline of the actual output of a term paper; what LLMs do is deliver results that simulate these actions without putting the students through their cognitive paces.

    The replacement, as many education researchers are arguing, is live assessment and demonstration: real-time diagnosis of novel situations, design critique, structured adversarial debate, and Socratic examination. These formats test the ability to sense-make under pressure, defend a frame against live challenge, revise a model when evidence contradicts rather than confirms it, and recognize when uncertainty is too high to proceed. In practical terms: collaborative student projects will require documented decision logs tracing reasoning behind commitments, the canonical deliverable shifts from polished artifact to demonstrated live reasoning, and oral examinations and hand-written exams will become the primary assessment instruments. But despite this emerging consensus among education researchers, institutional practice has barely moved.

    If the post-AI university’s pedagogic value proposition is the formation of cognitive capacity in conditions that cannot be replicated on a screen, then the function and responsibilities of faculty members must also be reconceived. It clearly no longer makes sense for professors to stand in front of a hall full (or, too often, only half full) of students delivering lectures. As a mechanism of information conveyance, AI can now provide the same at near-zero cost, tailor-made to the specific knowledge gaps of individual students. Instead, professors must reconceive of themselves as interlocutors, serving as performative models of how to calibrate uncertainty and revise frames in real time. The classroom experience should focus on helping students to understand how to constitute a goal rather than generate a text in response to a prompt provided by the professor.

    This is something closer to the Oxbridge tutorial system, the clinical ward round, or the seminars of many small liberal arts colleges in the United States. These pedagogies were once defended on grounds of tradition or prestige. The post-AI argument is structural: they are the delivery mechanisms for exactly the cognitive capacities that the architecture of AI cannot replicate, because those capacities are developed only by being exercised, not described. Interestingly, this means that the coming of AI is going to mean there will be demand for more professors, rather than fewer.

    None of this implies that faculty should pretend AI does not exist, or that the tutorial and seminar should be conducted in proud ignorance of a tool students will be spending the rest of their professional lives using. The opposite is true. Faculty should integrate LLMs directly and deliberately into their instruction as tools that need to be used correctly in order to not be harmful. (The analogy of a blowtorch or a chainsaw comes to mind: these are useful tools, but you need to learn how to use them safely.) Teaching a student to prompt effectively is teaching them to think precisely about what they want to know and why; it is, in this sense, an exercise in goal constitution. Teaching students to evaluate an LLM’s output critically by scrutinizing the machine’s often over-confident syntheses against evidentiary standards defined by the phenomenological reality of the external and material world is teaching them epistemic provenance tracking and calibrated self-assessment. LLMs can also become objects of critical study in their own right: students should be asked to assess why the model did not produce exactly what they had a priori in mind when they initiated the interaction. Handled this way, LLMs can serve as clarifying instruments in the pursuit of the classical objectives of enlightened education: the inculcation of critical thinking and logical reasoning, rhetorical and communicative competence, aesthetic appreciation and the cultivation of taste, moral and ethical reasoning, and ultimately the ideal of self-knowledge and Bildung.

    This brings us to the content of the curriculum itself. As I recently argued in Noema, if the goal of a college curriculum is (as it should be) to inculcate oral reasoning and persuasion, ethical analysis and moral judgment, historical and comparative thinking, and the cultivation of taste and discrimination, then we are precisely in the domain of the classical curriculum of the liberal arts. Skills such as goal constitution, situated judgment, and value alignment are exactly the capacities that a serious engagement with history, philosophy, literature, and political theory develops. History trains temporal imagination and frame revision; philosophy trains epistemic precision and the discipline of distinguishing solid argument from vapid sophistry; literature sharpens an appreciation for style and a feeling for hidden meaning; political theory trains the recognition of suppressed goal contestation and the conditions for legitimate alignment. Together they enable students to imagine lives unlike their own, a hugely valuable experience in a world changing as fast as ours.

    How to convey the content of these disciplines to students is going to have to change dramatically from the homogenous one-to-many mass-delivery model of the postwar multiversity, but the content is perfectly classical. The university’s present crisis of purpose is, in this light, at least in part a crisis of having abandoned its own best tradition in pursuit of vocational or technical training that AI is now rendering obsolete.

    But Does It Scale?

    The central challenge for universities will be how to move toward this model at scale. The tutorial and seminar model is labor-intensive by design: a professor working as interlocutor rather than lecturer can engage only a fraction of the students she could previously reach from a podium. The skills required of faculty will also need to change substantially. Under the old model, a brilliant researcher delivered expected value simply by speaking one-to-many; the new model requires someone with the pedagogic sensitivity to calibrate each student’s specific confusions and capacities—qualities that research prowess neither produces nor rewards. Elite universities in particular have built their faculties almost entirely around research achievement, with teaching treated as a secondary obligation. Reconceiving the professoriate will mean altering tenure criteria and promotion incentives, and it will face fierce resistance from scholars whose professional identities are bound up in the research function. None of this is impossible, but none of it will be easy. No doubt some tenured faculty will pour boulders and boiling oil down the side of their ivory towers to prevent these changes from taking place.

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    Longer term, however, we should expect the disruption caused by AI to be not just pedagogical but to the structure of the university as such. Kerr’s great insight was that the multiversity’s incoherence was not a bug but a feature—that a loosely bundled institution mirrored a loosely bundled society by providing something for everyone, from the Nobel laureate to the newbie grad student, from the NIH grant-seeker to the remedial English student. What held those disparate functions together was a social infrastructure of knowledge transmission: the laboratory, the lecture hall, the examination, the credential. Once AI can provide information delivery at near-zero cost there is no longer a compelling reason why research, teaching, and credentialing need be co-located in the same institution. What will replace the multiversity is likely to be not one thing but several: research centers that focus exclusively on the new-knowledge-production business; independent communal residence facilities that know they are in the coming-of-age business; and teaching systems that are honest about what skills they are inculcating. Even credentials from the most exclusive universities may not retain much social signaling value.

    Clark Kerr would have recognized this moment. He was no naïf about the multiversity’s contradictions; but he also believed that competent management could hold them in productive tension. What he did not foresee was that the tension would be dissolved not by political upheaval—as it nearly was in 1964, when the student movement that eventually got him fired also signaled the coming fracture of the postwar liberal-technocratic consensus—but by technological rupture. The irony is that the research university, which Kerr celebrated as the engine of American technopolitical supremacy, incubated the very instrument that is now rendering untenable the research university’s inherited form.

    What the students who booed the mention of AI at recent commencement ceremonies this spring were registering, in the way that students have always registered institutional failures, is that they were not getting what they came for. But as with more than one student movement before them, just because they rightly identified a structural problem doesn’t mean that they have particularly good ideas about what a better institution would look like. Just as Kerr recast the University of California to match the liberal-technocratic imperatives of the postwar period, so do visionary college leaders today have an opportunity to remake the university to match the requirements of an economy that will be redefined by AI. Achieving this will be a generational project.

    Nils Gilman is Senior Advisor to the Berggruen Institute and former Associate Chancellor of UC Berkeley.

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  • It’s Time For a Flexible EU
    President of The European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen with President of Moldova, Maia Sandu in Chisinau, on October 10, 2024. (Photo by Elena Covalenco/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    There are serious countries and unserious ones. Where the United States belongs these days I leave for others to judge. But about one country I have no doubt, having recently returned from it. It may be tiny and poor, but Moldova is a serious country—and its leaders know exactly what they want.

    I visited Chișinău last year, several months before Moldova’s parliamentary election, when its outcome—and with it the country’s European trajectory—hung in the balance. This time, however, the mood was different. While meeting President Maia Sandu, the prime minister, the foreign minister, members of parliament, and journalists, my American Enterprise Institute colleagues and I were struck by how uniformly serious they all were about Moldova and its place in Europe.

    Anne Applebaum recently called the September result—the victory of Sandu’s party despite a deluge of Russian money, vote-buying, cyberattacks, and bomb threats—“the Moldovan surprise.” And yet, while the absolute parliamentary majority that her faction enjoys in Parliament was unexpected, I remember a number of well-placed Moldovan officials who assured me a year ago that they had a good handle on Russia’s interference in the fall election.

    When she met with us, Sandu wore white trainers and a smart glenplaid suit that would have looked less conspicuous at the World Bank—where she once worked—than at the fairly monstrous Soviet-era presidential palace. But Sandu is no technocrat. She is a skilled politician who built a party from scratch, without oligarchs or networks of patronage, and stayed the course with steely determination through numerous setbacks.

    Mihai Popșoi, the foreign minister, who wrote policy reports for AEI a decade ago, has yet to turn 40. His command of his brief is impressive, as is his ability to think on his feet—especially when my colleagues and I asked difficult questions about Moldova’s relationship with the United States. In a way, it mirrors the deftness with which Moldova’s ambassador to Washington avoids the traps that the Trump era presents for him—neither antagonizing Donald Trump nor cozying up to him, always working scrupulously across party lines. In an era when so many European governments lurch between sycophancy and tantrum, Chișinău’s poise is a quiet masterclass.

    The prime minister, a former financier with a Columbia degree and a U.S. passport, speaks the same language. One can also see Moldova’s seriousness clearly in the unglamorous business of energy policy, which the PM is visibly passionate about. For years, Moldova was hostage to a power plant running on subsidized Russian gas in the breakaway region of Transnistria—a lever that Moscow could pull at will. That has now changed. Moldova has stopped buying Russian natural gas completely. A new 157-kilometer high-voltage line from Vulcănești to Chișinău—aptly nicknamed the “Independence Line”—connects the country directly to Romania and the European grid and will cover more than half of peak demand.

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    Moldova has EU candidate status, its accession negotiations are underway, and it is aiming—ambitiously—to conclude them in 2028. While not a completely unrealistic timeline, some European diplomats whom we saw were squeamish about the prospect of bringing Moldova in so rapidly. “It is not just a question of meeting the criteria, but also a political one,” we heard several times—both from one European ambassador (sincerely) and from several Moldovans (with a hint of sarcasm).

    A related lesson that Brussels is slowly absorbing is that EU accession should not be an all-or-nothing prize handed over only at the very end of a decades-long marathon. The smarter approach is to frontload the benefits of membership: phased access to the single market, structural funds, and a seat—even a non-voting one—at the institutional table, so that citizens see the dividends of integration well before the final treaty is signed. For Moldova’s pro-European elites this is a no brainer. The country’s political life is fractious, and progress made today could be reversed. In order to anchor the country in the West for good, tangible benefits to ordinary people must first be delivered before any formal process is completed.

    Yet, on the front of European integration, Moldova has both benefited from—and now risks being a victim of—the imperative of bringing Ukraine into the West’s fold. Kyiv’s case for EU membership is morally overwhelming and necessary in geopolitical terms. But it is also a difficult one. Ukraine is enormous, not to mention busy fighting a war against an intimidating adversary. Its entry would reshape the EU’s budget, its agricultural policy, and the balance of votes around the table in ways no previous enlargement has come close to. While it has leapfrogged the West in some ways (not least in defense technology), many of its post-Soviet pathologies seem to linger.

    It was against this backdrop that Friedrich Merz floated, in a late-May letter to EU leaders, the idea of an interim “associate membership” for Ukraine—participation in the Union’s institutions without a vote during the long negotiations—while accelerating Moldova and the Western Balkans toward full membership. The clumsy label aside, the idea is sound: deliver what you can now, and don’t let the hardest case set the pace for everyone else.

    It was unfortunate that Kyiv’s reaction was a faintly indignant refusal. President Zelenskyy insisted that Ukraine’s place in the EU must be “complete, with full rights,” and that there can be no genuine European project without it. Meanwhile, Ukrainian commentators denounced the proposed decoupling from Moldova as a red flag.

    I yield to no one in my admiration for Ukraine. But treating any interim arrangement as a demotion—and full EU membership as a debt the West owes for Ukrainian blood—is unbecoming and self-defeating. An associate status, if firmly tied to eventual accession and packed with real benefits, is not a consolation prize. It is a head start that earlier candidates never enjoyed. Reflexively spurning it hands ammunition to those in Europe who would be perfectly content to leave Ukraine parked in the waiting room indefinitely.

    It would be a disaster if Kyiv’s all-or-nothing insistence, colliding with the genuine complexity of its situation, froze the entire enlargement machine on political grounds—and if little Moldova got dragged down as collateral damage.

    Decoupling Moldova’s accession from Ukraine is not a betrayal of Kyiv but common sense. A third of Moldovans, or 850,000 of them, hold Romanian, and therefore EU, passports. A large share of the country is already, in effect, made up of European citizens. Integrating a country the size of a mid-sized European region would not strain the EU, but would instead be an accelerator, bringing Ukraine even closer to the fold.

    Yes, there is Transnistria, a seemingly intractable problem. But the true size of the Russian garrison, excluding locals with Russian passports, is tiny: some 300 officers. Since the border with Ukraine is sealed, the region is boxed into a position from which Moscow can neither reinforce nor resupply it. Moreover, the territory’s real master is not an ideologue but a businessman: Viktor Gushan of the Sheriff conglomerate, whose exports flow overwhelmingly to the EU. It must be possible to resolve this issue through negotiation.

    Serious countries deserve to be treated seriously. Moldova has done the work—which is more than can be said for many of its larger, richer, and longer-established neighbors, whether or not they seek (or already enjoy) EU membership. The least Brussels can do is to reward that clarity of purpose, rather than punish them for the headaches involved in some of the harder cases.

    Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, an advisor at GLOBSEC, and a columnist with American Purpose.

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  • Samuel Moyn on Why Old People Are Ruining America

    Samuel Moyn is the Kent Professor of Law and History at Yale University. His books include Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War, The Last Utopia, and Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Cohost of the Digging a Hole podcast, he is a frequent contributor to The New York Times and many other publications.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Sam Moyn discuss whether a truly fair democracy might weigh different citizens’ votes differently, whether the emphasis on human rights have got us into the mess we’re in today, and to what extent our democracy is in danger from populism.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: So why are the old people the problem, Sam?

    Samuel Moyn: I don’t think old people are a problem. I think gerontocracy is—in the same way that whites may not be a problem, but white supremacy is real.

    My goal is to show how older people actually sometimes suffer too under a regime of gerontocracy, and to look at how that regime came about and what its current form is—not just for the sake of younger folks, but also for the mass of older people themselves.

    Mounk: All right, I’ll refrain from being flippant for the rest of the conversation. Walk us through some of the ways in which America is ruled by gerontocracy today.

    Moyn: In the book I look at the first coinage of the term. It’s not Greek, but it’s based on Greek words. It’s supposed to add a dimension to our classification of forms of government like monarchy or oligarchy. The person who coined it made it very clear that it was taking a different form in modern times, having to do with the organization of the electoral system—how people have elections in a democratic society—and then a lot to do with how wealth is allocated and transmitted. I definitely talk about the politicians of our day, who in America are old men and women, but I’m mainly interested in showing that gerontocracy is systemic and that it affects what it means to go to the polls, the outcomes, how elections are financed, and how our economy is organized. I have this sense that we should think about power in the broadest sense—rather than just looking at who’s in office, as the Greeks did—and look more at who has power, meaning effective control of the lives of most people.

    Mounk: Let’s go through some of these areas. As you’re saying, politics is the most straightforward, and then there are ones you think are perhaps more important or deeper. But just at a purely descriptive level, what’s the evidence that old people are ruling us in Congress, in the White House, and so on, in a way that hasn’t been the case in past eras?

    Moyn: The most graphic evidence, if we’re talking about the United States, is the two most recent presidents. There had really only been one very old man in the presidency before Ronald Reagan, and that was William Henry Harrison, who died in short order of a cold in the nineteenth century. With Reagan we began to see older and older men in office, capped by the last two presidents, Joe Biden and Donald Trump. Now, in fairness, more than half of humanity is ruled by an old man over 70 at this point, largely because of the aging of Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and so forth. The American syndrome is specific.

    What I try to do—and this I think is tolerably well known—is go beyond the focus on Biden and cognitive decline to ask just how unrepresentative the political class generally is in the United States, looking in particular at Congress and the federal judiciary. What I’ve tried to do in the book across all these topics is provide the receipts, mainly generated by other people, and gather them in one place. Congress is aging; the Supreme Court is aging in the sense that even when appointed young, the justices stay for a long time.

    Aside from cognitive decline, the risk of death is a very serious aspect of the problem. Donald Trump’s one big beautiful bill was facilitated in its passage by the death in droves of Democrats in the House in the six months before that bill. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, notorious for other reasons, died setting up the end of federal abortion rights. All of that pales in the end, if we’re talking about the political class, beside representational fairness, because cognitive decline or death are just the flagrant symptoms of a broader political class that’s old. Very few people in their thirties and forties hold any position of significance in the federal government. That’s the story when it comes to politicians.

    Mounk: What do you think is the explanation here? Obviously, when it comes to the presidency, you said that’s been the trend since Ronald Reagan. Reagan was quite old when he assumed the presidency, but the three presidents afterwards were relatively young. He was followed by Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, all of whom were reasonably young men at the time they took office. Some of the dynamics in the Senate, and perhaps in the House of Representatives, have to do with very specific American institutions—though I think that’s harder as an explanation for the presidency. What I mean is that if you’re an incumbent senator, particularly in a safe state, of which there are now very many on both sides, it’s very hard to displace you. If you’re 70 or 80 years old and running for reelection, you probably wouldn’t win a primary contest when you’re first being elected, but with 25 years of service and all the favors owed to you and all the fundraising muscle at your disposal, you may be able to hold off a primary challenge—and then you’re going to sail to reelection in Texas or Massachusetts, if you’re in the right political party.

    The presidency is harder to explain. In 2020, Joe Biden faced a lot of younger rivals for the Democratic nomination, and yet voters in the primaries freely chose him. In 2024, Donald Trump faced a number of opponents who were quite a bit younger than him, but he was clearly able to retain the loyalty of the Republican primary electorate to such an extent as to gain reelection. I haven’t seen analyses showing a very obvious age gradient in which primary voters voted for those candidates. In 2024, for example, it’s not clear to me that the people who voted for Trump in Republican primaries were systematically older than the people who voted for his rivals. Even in the general election itself, there was less of an age difference than we might have expected, and most of that is produced by partisanship rather than a preference for a particular age. So what do you think produces this? If this is the free choice of American voters, I’m free to disagree with that choice—and I think there’s good reason to disagree in both of those cases—but it’s somewhat unclear that we shouldn’t just leave it to American voters to make their own decisions.

    Moyn: One reason I’m interested in pushing beyond politicians in general, and not just the president, is that I agree there’s a lot of contingency and idiosyncrasy in the political story—and yet it’s the one that, to the extent Americans care about this politics, they care about. So I’m using it as a door.

    I agree with you, and I’d even add that if Donald Trump were to fulfill the fondest hopes of those who’ve resisted him and depart or die within a year, we’d immediately have the youngest president in U.S. history, because J.D. Vance would enter the office at an age younger than Theodore Roosevelt, who currently holds the record for youngest president.

    Mounk: When you look at some of the leading Democratic contenders for the nomination in ’28, they go from middle-aged men—like Gavin Newsom—to very young contenders like AOC.

    Moyn: Absolutely. The foundations of what I’m thinking of as the structure of gerontocracy—as a structural phenomenon that goes beyond these contingencies and therefore leads us beyond the level of politicians—the main driver is going to be the aging of humanity, and certainly of Americans. I would push back a bit on the moral you seem to hypothesize when it turns out that there’s a lot of contingency in accounting for the age of politicians.

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    Voters only select and express their preferences within a system, and we have to critically inquire into that system. Let’s continue to take my analogy of white supremacy as something many people would acknowledge exists and may be systemic in the way I’m saying gerontocracy is. If you said that, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Callais, no Black politicians are being elected in the Deep South anymore—is that the will of the people, or is it because of the way the will of the people has been organized in an electoral system?

    As far as I see it, it really matters that there are advantages of incumbency—which you mentioned—which means that especially when politicians in America are starting their careers later, you’re just going to have an older set of politicians than the electorate and certainly more than the population. Then we’d have to get into campaign finance, where the facts are glaring about just how old the median campaign donor is: over 60, sometimes higher. I devote a whole portion of the book to thinking about gerontocracy at the political level, not just in terms of the politicians, but in terms of the institutions. We do literally have a branch of government named after old men. We do have age minima in the Constitution for federal political office, with no age maxima. Those are also features of the way we’ve organized political choice. We can’t say “the will of the people” as if that’s pre-existing, because it utterly depends for its expression on the institutions we’ve devised and the rules we’re following to figure out what it is.

    Mounk: Perhaps we’ll get into a little bit later what we should do about those institutions, what kinds of ways to reform them. Certainly when it comes to something like abolishing age minima, I think there’s a very strong democratic and liberal reason to abolish them. Some of the suggestions you make in the book are rather more ambitious, and we may have different views about them, but we can get into that.

    Let’s get beyond politics. As somebody who is an immigrant to the United States having grown up in Europe, I’ve always been struck by how open American society is to the talents and contributions of young people. I feel that a little bit less now that people in my age group in Germany and France and so on are coming to have genuine roles of importance and responsibility in society. But I was struck when I was 30 years old that I had many friends and acquaintances in the United States who already had positions teaching at major universities, positions editing publications or at least important sections of publications, and very significant roles in law firms and investment banks. Obviously, when you look today at Silicon Valley, you have an enormous number of people in their thirties who have about as much power and influence as any human being has had in the history of humanity by certain standards.

    This stood in contrast to a lot of 30-year-olds in Germany still being interns, to somebody getting to be the editor of a newspaper section of a major publication at the age of 30 being an incredibly exceptional achievement. When I worked in theater after college for a year, my first task as assistant director was to hire an intern—I was 21 years old, and the intern we ended up hiring was 29. So to what extent is it true, when you look at American society more broadly, that there is this kind of gerontocracy? Isn’t America still in many ways the country of the young, where people have enormous opportunities if they have the right kind of education and perhaps the right kind of background and the various advantages that play into that in a system that is not always as meritocratic as it claims to be? Isn’t it actually striking how much influence and power and money a lot of young people have in the United States compared to anywhere else in the world?

    Moyn: Oscar Wilde famously said that the youth of America is its only tradition. I don’t think that’s true—I see the U.S. Constitution as a gerontocratic document in the ways we’ve already addressed, and that’s a big tradition—but I agree with you. It’s one reason I’m interested in thinking about the American case, that at times America has stood for launching youth and providing careers open to talent. I think you might overstate the transatlantic gulf, insofar as I think the whole point of modernity was to topple elder rule and put in place opportunities for young people. The whole modern novel and its roots in the so-called Bildungsroman is about the opportunities that young men could enjoy after the revolution, on the model of Napoleon.

    The question is what’s happening now. The demography, I think, is unsuitable for the picture of America you’re saying still prevails. I’m not denying it: I became an Ivy League professor at twenty-nine and got tenure shortly after, so I have had enormous opportunities as a youth. Many of my students have not. Some have been the editors of those publications you mentioned, but in part because they were blocked from becoming professors in a way I wasn’t. The general story has to be that our demography is changing, with fewer young people and an overwhelming number—absolutely and relatively—of aging people who are not suffering decline and are not forced out of their power. The baseline is changing, and that’s the very modest claim I’m making.

    Mounk: I wonder whether we need to distinguish between areas of American life and the American economy where you’re not just distributing a fixed number of positions of influence and opportunity, and ones in which you are. For a variety of reasons, I think universities—and particularly humanities departments within universities, and particularly humanities departments studying the sorts of things that you and I studied when we were applying for faculty jobs—are just at the extreme end of that distribution. Universities have not increased their numbers in part because it is an oligopoly that is trying to protect its prestige. The faculty of Columbia University recently voted by something like 80 or 90 percent against admitting more students to the opportunities that university may give to people. The number of students studying the humanities has crashed over the last 20 or 30 years for a whole set of reasons within the humanities. Political theory and European intellectual history—your discipline—are very much out of fashion. In those very specific areas of American life, there is indeed a highly limited number of positions and opportunities, and if professors no longer have to retire and some of them choose to stay in post until they’re 75 or 80 or 85, that means young doctoral students don’t have an opportunity to take up those faculty jobs.

    I wonder whether the lesson of that is that universities should actually expand opportunity, that the humanities need to reform themselves to attract undergrads, that the institutional priorities of who’s getting hired are sometimes wrong, that we should hire more professors rather than more administrators—lessons which are more specific to this particular case rather than the broader thesis. When it comes to the broader economy, it doesn’t strike me that most talented, driven 25- or 30-year-olds don’t have enough opportunities to go and join banking or artificial intelligence, or that there’s not enough capital for them to do a startup, or that they can’t become pharmacists or teachers and so on. To what extent are we overgeneralizing from the world that you and I know?

    Moyn: That’s a fair question, and I don’t mean to stake my case on academic gerontocracy—in the few pages I address it, it’s really treated as its own distinctive, idiosyncratic phenomenon. However, aspects of it turn out to be more familiar than your binary presentation suggests. I agree that we are a bit illusioned about the general picture because of certain vanguard sectors of the economy that do indeed provide youthful opportunity—Silicon Valley would be the classic example—but most of the analysis I give of the job situation is making the point not about the academic scene but about American business more generally, which has features that resemble universities to the extent that there are apex positions and a pyramid of authority. The higher you go, the older you are, in the last thirty years. In part, the reason is that across these sectors, mandatory retirement—which was once a familiar element of the American employment landscape—was abolished in the later nineteen-eighties through the early nineteen-nineties. More generally, all of these sectors involve aging Americans who are being not just kept alive but in at least a high enough functioning state to indulge the illusion that they’ve still got their mojo, and they stay. We’re really talking about most sectors where American innovation is at stake, and Silicon Valley would emerge as a kind of outlier.

    Mounk: There is a distinction between areas where the argument seems immediately compelling—which is politics and academia—united by having a stagnant number of positions to be meted out. There’s only one president, there are only 100 senators, and the faculty of major universities hasn’t expanded in the way it might have. When it comes to CEOs of S&P 500 companies, by definition there are 500 of them. Opportunity in the economy as a whole does seem to be a different story.

    Moyn: The S&P 500 takes up a gargantuan percentage of the economy as a whole. Those who own their own businesses are even less constrained and more likely to stay.

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    That may be permissible, and now we’re really talking about employment, not the economy in general. I am very modest in this regard. I agree with you that we need to analyze sector by sector, industry by industry, where there is a supply of younger people who are objectively blocked because of a bottleneck failure to organize succession. Until recently, big law—another elite profession—was a kind of outlier in requiring mandatory departure of its senior partners, and that’s eroding now. It was actually a sector that preserved a sense of the importance of arranging intergenerational succession of counsel for those who have legal problems, and it could be legally structured in such a way as to sidestep ordinary prohibitions in federal law on mandatory retirement.

    That would be a different sector, although it’s increasingly looking like the dominant form. The difference between us may be whether to resolve all the complications in the direction of saying there’s a dominant situation—which I think is the case—or whether we really see a few pockets of gerontocracy and it’s more a minor problem to deal with in those few sectors where it’s significant. That can’t be right, because it’s too general even if we shouldn’t overgeneralize.

    Mounk: I don’t have a strong stake in this fight, I have to say. I think there’s something clearly intuitive and appealing about the thesis of a gerontocracy in America, and there are certain elements—particularly in the political system and perhaps in academia—where that strikes me as being right. I perhaps have a comparative instinct where this problem seems so much more pronounced in every other society I know: whether that is China, looking at the composition of the central committee of the Communist Party and all of the top political officials; whether it’s the fact that a lot of young people who are graduates of the most prestigious universities feel they’re never going to be able to afford an apartment in Shanghai or Beijing if they don’t stand to inherit one; whether that is extreme rent protection laws that mean that if you came to Beijing or Shanghai from the countryside in the seventies or eighties, you’d probably live in a big apartment in the center, but as a result everybody else has that problem.

    Or obviously looking at Europe—there you have additional problems, which in part China now has as well. If you find employment, you have an extremely generous pension system, as in France, where pensioners now on average have more income every month than working people. In the United Kingdom there is the triple lock, which basically ensures that pensions will always outgrow the salaries of working people by definition, as long as the policy stays in place. All of that is purchased at such strong levies on work that you have a huge problem of youth unemployment that by and large you don’t have in the United States. You can see that as a glass half empty or glass half full: either gerontocracy is actually a problem beyond America and perhaps America is in danger of ending up with the same depth of problems, which makes the problem even more urgent, or Americans are a little bit spoiled and should look at the ways in which other countries have this problem so much worse and appreciate what they have.

    Moyn: In the end I’m always going to want to transcend comparison to other places that are worse, in the name of comparison to what society ought to look like and how it ought to be organized. The comparisons are complex because Western Europe is indeed suffering in terms of its capitalist growth compared to the United States right now, and so it’s producing fewer jobs for young people—even though in the American case those may be what David Graeber called bullshit jobs. At the same time, Western Europe has a much more widespread culture of retirement and a welfare state that comparatively enables retirement and allows Western Europeans to avoid fear of decline, in a way that Americans—not just because of their work ethic, but because of their extreme fear of what their long-term situations will be—can’t afford to do. It’s not surprising, then, that not just professors at the pinnacle UK institutions but all professors across Western Europe are subject to mandatory retirement rules, and that’s true in many industries. I see a lot of bright spots in Western Europe and a lot of resources for the anti-gerontocratic campaign.

    Mounk: What is it worth if people have to retire at 65 but young people have a problem of mass unemployment? Wouldn’t you rather have people not having to retire and there’s actually opportunity for young people?

    Moyn: Absolutely, but there may be sectors in which there’s actually a choice. I’ve made the argument that academia in America is like much of organized business, especially in large firms, where there are a lot of people in the firm who have the same experience of serving endlessly under old men and women. The market wants them to leave, and the stock price of companies actually increases when an old leader finally gives up power, whereas it goes down when a younger CEO falls ill or dies unexpectedly. In the name of growth, you might really want to take seriously how widespread the pipeline issues are, and argue that in the cases where that’s true, we should combine growth with mandatory retirement.

    Mounk: Comparing those places, the United States seems to me to have both a lot more opportunity for young people and a lot fewer rules about all people having to retire. It seems superior on both of those metrics in terms of the opportunities it gives to people than Germany or France.

    Moyn: Most millennials have a generational experience of living after the 2008–09 financial crisis and feeling an immense sense of blockage since, and that may not be shared universally. It doesn’t mean that jobs aren’t available to them—they may not be the jobs they wanted. I take your points, but I worry about vast generalizations when we should really look sector by sector and figure out whether it’s true that America is already this neoliberal utopia where, because of the lack of rules, it’s the land of opportunity for all comers. Not really.

    Mounk: That’s not exactly what I said, but what do you think we should do about this? What is the set of responses we should have, including in the political realm, where you make some really quite provocative proposals?

    Moyn: What’s helpful about your questions is that we’ve really isolated jobs—both political and nonpolitical—from the overall analysis. Whereas I said I’m as focused, and maybe more focused, on the political system, gerontocratic institutions, and the organization of elections—not just jobs in the economy, but the economy more generally. However, if we’re going to talk about jobs, I believe in age limits as well as youth quotas, for which we can look to Western Europe principally for inspiration. The trouble with term limits—which are very popular among Americans when polled, as are age limits—is that Americans are entering their political careers later in life. Term limits merely give them a time limit. Age limits have the virtue of guarding against the risk of cognitive decline or death to a much greater extent. Youth quotas are really exciting because, no matter where you set a limit on service, you’re basically going to have many or most politicians closer to that limit than we would like. What we really see as the problem, I think, is not cognitive decline or death, as I said earlier, but a lack of representation for most age cohorts. Youth quotas allow us to correct that to some extent.

    Mounk: Age limits is a slightly broad term. What do you think is an appropriate age limit for a senator, a professor, or a CEO?

    Moyn: I’d go for seventy right now, but I don’t feel strongly about the number. I’m more committed to the philosophical idea, especially as our life expectancy goes up—and it may go up in leaps and bounds. I don’t think it will, but we have to leave open the possibility that it will happen. The number has to be flexible and open to change. As of today, I’m for 70-ish.

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    Mounk: You’re the Kent Professor of Law and History at Yale University and the head of Grace Hopper College. I believe if you introduced age limits of 70 for the professoriate, that would give you about 16 more years of service. Are you willing to pledge to retire when you turn 70?

    Moyn: I’ve done it—in the Chronicle of Higher Education. I spun off the few pages in the book about gerontocracy and I did commit to that there. It’s not a problem because I would love to retire now and I really think of myself as semi-retired to begin with.

    Mounk: Retirement for academics is kind of fake, right? I was speaking to a very prominent academic the other day who was saying they were really thinking about whether to retire next year or the year after. I asked how come, and they said, because it would allow them to write more books. Why should they, if they no longer need the money? Obviously they love teaching. But at some point you think you want to focus on your writing. That’s not really retirement in the way that it is for most people. A lot of people love their jobs, but they have jobs where when they retire they no longer get to do their jobs. That’s kind of different for us, where at least a lot of our work involves things that we get to do more of if we retire from our faculty positions.

    Moyn: That’s true, and I discuss this in the book. My own view is that we should think of retirement, at least as a default, as a last chance to reinvent yourself. It’s just true that some people will have an experience of their vocations that makes it impossible for them to give it up—existentially. I think that’s a mistake for them existentially when that’s the case, but I’m not going to mandate that they go fishing. Is fishing really an acceptable way to spend your retirement?

    Mounk: Tell us about some of the political proposals. One of the proposals you float is that perhaps—I forget the exact details—you get one vote if you’re 80 or over, two votes if you’re 70 or over, and three votes if you’re 60 or over, all the way down, not quite to toddlers. How seriously do you mean that? What about the straightforward objection that the point of democracy is meant to be one person, one vote, and that perhaps some of our constitutional realities—like the ban on running for president before you’re 35—should go out the window, that we should approach the principle of one person, one vote more rather than less? Saying that simply on the arbitrary basis of which year you were born you’re supposed to have five times more votes than the other person casting their ballot next to you seems like a pretty fundamental violation of that foundational democratic principle.

    Moyn: There’s a general discussion to have about just how bad electoral gerontocracy is. Even when you and others are rightly on a campaign for #ourdemocracy, we really have to reckon with the truth about what we’re defending, which is an electoral gerontocracy. There’s a long list of remedies, many of which—actually all of which—are less radical than the one you’re speaking of now. Let’s talk about it philosophically. First, it’s just not true that we should think of democracy as involving one person, one vote. It certainly doesn’t in the United States right now, because of the Electoral College and the Senate, which basically overweights the votes of those from less populous states by constitutional design. More generally, the idea of one person, one vote became an article of faith in the United States largely as a result of Supreme Court decree in the context of the civil rights era. If you go back to the origins of democracy and mass suffrage in the nineteenth century, there were very widespread proposals for plural voting and organizing voting generally very differently than we do, and there was an argument for it. The argument I would make is: what does it mean to be equal in a democracy? Right now we basically say that if you have one body, no matter its age, you should get one vote. What if we had a principle of equality that said your vote should be correlated with how much time you have left, so that we don’t overweight—which we do now—the vote of those who are closer to death and therefore less likely to see and live under the policies they’re choosing.

    Mounk: So if you’re diagnosed with a very serious disease that foreseeably leads to your demise within the next five years, you should get your vote discounted.

    Moyn: The policy of so-called one person, one vote is a policy of systematically overweighting the votes of those who are older—on one conception of equality.

    Mounk: So why is it over-weighting them? It’s weighting them equally.

    Moyn: The question is what are we equalizing: bodies or life expectancy?

    Mounk: The basic problem of society is that I have a bunch of boneheaded ideas about how we should be governed, and you have a bunch of boneheaded ideas about how we should be governed, and there isn’t a God or some kind of objective authority that’s going to tell us whether you’re right or whether I am right. We’re trying to design a set of institutions that we can all somehow live with, because we realize that not having political organization at all, or taking up arms in order to clobber the other’s boneheaded ideas out of their mind, is not worth it. The cost of that is too high. The whole point of democracy from that point of view is to say there isn’t one person who is in some way superior to the other—we should all have the same amount of voice. The idea of one person, one vote is not some kind of epiphenomenal invention; it flows relatively logically from that principle. Now, that doesn’t mean that this is perfectly respected in the United States or in any other democracy, and we can certainly discuss reforms—whether that’s campaign finance or reforms to the Electoral College that would allow us to more fully live up to this. To claim that there isn’t some fundamental set of reasons why one person, one vote really speaks to the basic aspirations of a democratic system is, I think, to ignore something quite important.

    Moyn: The history just doesn’t back you up. It wasn’t obvious until it was, and that’s among other reasons why everyone—all liberals—believed for a long time that what mattered was not that you had a body that was alive, but that you had an adequate stake in the election and the capacity to exercise the relevant judgment, and then there was one person, one vote among those people. That was hegemonic for a very long time.

    Maybe there were some folks who said there were exclusions, in the same way that I could say children and prisoners are kept from voting in the United States even though they have bodies that are alive. My actual point is somewhat different, which is that we could imagine historical circumstances in which it becomes equally intuitive to say that the equality that matters is the equality of your stake in the election. That actually was the rule, as I suggested, for much of the history of democracy, because it was a natural thought to those early democrats that you couldn’t have a stake in the election without education and, more importantly, property—because that’s what made politics matter, how property was going to be protected or not.

    Mounk: Here I think we’ve come to our fundamental difference: you’re an intellectual historian, I’m a political theorist, so we have different approaches to this. I wasn’t making a historical claim; I was making a conceptual claim about the nature of democracy.

    Moyn: I’m talking about the histories of political theorists who believed the opposite of what you do. I agree it’s totally intuitive now—you’re right that it’s totally intuitive. I guess I’m looking at the situation and saying: if that is really an ideological smokescreen for gerontocracy, then we might have to revisit it in creative ways.

    Mounk: If we’re going to revisit this, if we’re going to open up the black box of one person, one vote and say that for various reasons various groups of voters should have a vote that counts for more than those of others, why is age the one that matters over others?

    Moyn: It’s not. I think Black people should have more votes than I do. John Stuart Mill believed—something I don’t believe—that those of us with doctorates should have more votes.

    Mounk: So who else? Should Latinos have more votes?

    Moyn: We could give women a modest increase.

    Mounk: So women should have more votes. What about disabled people?

    Moyn: That would be subject to debate. If you’re someone who cares most of all about the fate of minorities who are unlikely themselves to enjoy political power unless they enter into compromising coalitions, then we could proceed that way.

    Mounk: What about trans people?

    Moyn: My own view is that we should have an ongoing debate about how to organize our elections. We do in some sense, but we’re locked into a constitution that basically forbids us from experimenting with our electoral system. If you’re asking what I would vote for: first of all, we need more descriptive representation—that’s to say, elected representatives need to be produced by the system who are understood by relevant sectors of the electorate to represent them. That’s why the Calais decision—I don’t know if you supported that one—is so noxious: it forbade arrangements that allowed Black people to have Black representatives in this country. More generally, now we’re talking about actually sculpting the electorate itself and who gets what powers, and there I would be open to experimentation. The age case is to me the clearest one.

    Mounk: Your point is that if you’re young, you should have more votes. I challenged you by asking about ethnic minorities, trans people, disabled people, and as I take it your answer was broadly yes, they should all get more votes as well.

    The problem with this is precisely that it undermines the point of democracy in adjudicating between our fundamentally different visions of government. Democracy is the technique that, perhaps not in a unique way but better than any of the alternatives in human history, has been able to say: we take this huge, diverse country with people with a vast multiplicity of views and preferences and interests, and the way that we keep social peace, the way that we avoid civil war, the way that we avoid a complete falling apart of this polity is to say everybody gets one vote. There is also a certain set of fundamental rights that protects you against, for example, the government locking you up for worshipping in a way that others don’t agree with. What you’re suggesting is completely exploding this. What we would then have to do is arrive at some Habermasian consensus about exactly how many votes Black persons should have, how many Latino persons should have, how many somebody with one Black parent and one Latino parent should have, and whether trans people should also have multiples. What it would actually encourage in any real-world sense is naked interest group politics along racial, ethnic, and other lines, in a way where there’s never any consensus and the only way to contribute to policy discussions is to band together explicitly as members of monolithic groups to protect the interests and vote of your group against those of the others. This isn’t about whether in the 1850s Mill had a different view and thought that more educated people should have multiple votes. It really is about whether this would be a deviation from a democratic principle that actually undermines the historic achievement of this political system.

    Moyn: I really appreciate those arguments, but I’m not sure I agree with them, for a couple of reasons. One is that your alternative is the nightmare scenario. Your case there at the end was really the familiar case against affirmative action, familiar to us from the neoconservative movement’s theories about the Balkanization of America—Arthur Schlesinger and so forth. I don’t think that’s all that’s going on, and it’s certainly not how we avoid fascism or tyranny, which has a lot to do with material factors and not mainly how we organize elections. The big response I have is that there’s no non-neutral technique, and the idea that one person, one vote is it, I think, is not persuasive.

    Mounk: Don’t you think there’s something less politically fraught, and less subject to the influence of changing electoral majorities and insiders and outsiders, about saying the moment you are a citizen you get one vote—versus having a multiplier where, depending on the particular intersection of identities at which you stand, that multiplier is three times or five times or seven times or 0.2 times?

    Moyn: You’re certainly right that in the real world a lot depends on what people empirically think, and you’re probably right that as of today a lot of folks would say that one person, one vote is just the only credible way of organizing elections, because it’s the only neutral principle.

    Someone could write a book, and there could be whole movements, basically saying that’s false and there’s a more just way to do this. I’m not saying there’s going to be some big conversion. I agree with you that what people think out there really matters. Even if affirmative action was just, it really matters that the majority thought it wasn’t—certainly the majority of white people. You’re completely right about that. I thought we were talking about the matter of principle: can we argue credibly for an alternative to one person, one vote if it turns out that’s itself a partisan, non-neutral view? More generally, if you went out into the street and said, okay, you say you’re for one person, one vote, but how can you defend the Senate?—no one would understand it. We can’t be hostage to public opinion in that way if we’re trying to think about our principles and whether they’re credible and consistent. I concede a lot to you. This is a very important point you’re making.

    Mounk: On the Senate—virtually every democracy has ways to ensure that different territories have influence in different kinds of ways. In the European Union, Luxembourg has as much vote on certain kinds of votes as Germany or France does. That’s just the cost of large-scale political unions between entities that have, to some extent, a different identity that persists. The second thing to say is that I think there’s a lot of enthusiasm in America for either abolishing the Senate or diminishing the extent to which it is geographically unfair. That’s precisely because I think there is a compelling logic to one person, one vote that is perhaps cushioned by the need to have some kind of political representation for smaller states with their own identity. The reason people have trouble explaining the Senate is precisely that one of the fundamental principles to which they intuitively hold is that a voter in New York or Texas should have the same influence as a voter in Montana—and that’s currently not the case, and that seems unfair. The logic of that seems to suggest we should go closer toward one person, one vote, not that because we tolerate, for complicated historical reasons as well as for the need for geographical representation, some deviations from it, we should give up on the principle altogether and think it doesn’t constrain us when it comes to fundamental things like whether a 70-year-old should have the same vote as a 30-year-old, or a white person the same vote as a Black person.

    Moyn: I love that and I’m sure it’s right up to a point. The question is whether concluding that we’re overweighting the wrong people’s votes—namely those in small states—means, logically or otherwise, that we shouldn’t overweight somebody else’s vote. I know a lot of people who hate the Senate but believe in majority-minority districts. What’s that about? It’s about saying we should organize the districts so that within them, Black people who are a minority in the state generally can get someone of their race elected. You may not agree with majority-minority districts, but it’s certainly the case that most liberals think both that the Senate is problematic and that Callais was bad.

    Mounk: The most cynical reading of that—irrespective of the merits of each of those institutional arrangements, and one that I think you, as a certain kind of materialist intellectual historian, should actually be quite sympathetic to—is that most of the people you’re talking about prefer the Democratic Party, for all of the misgivings we may have about it, over the Republican Party, and the over-representation of small states harms the Democratic Party while majority-minority districts help the Democratic Party.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Sam discuss whether we should be skeptical of human rights, why Trump seems to be a spent force, and how the Democrats can present a credible alternative to populism. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 1 min
  • The Art of the Non-Deal
    U.S. President Donald Trump on June 9, 2026. (Photo: Saul Loeb via Getty Images.)

    So Donald Trump, on his 80th birthday, announced a deal in which there would be a 60-day ceasefire. Precise details have not yet been officially published. But, according to reports, they apparently include a cessation of attacks in Lebanon, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—according to Trump, “permanently toll-free”—and lifting the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports. He touted this as a key win, in the process praising China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin for helping secure it.

    This “deal” was nothing of the sort. If the reports are accurate, it instead represented a total U.S. capitulation to Iran. It basically set the clock back to February, when the Strait was open and the United States and Israel had not yet started bombing the Islamic Republic. It merely solved a problem that Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had themselves created by launching the war in the first place.

    Still left up to future negotiations are all of the objectives that the Trump administration has set forth over the past three months in trying to justify the war:

    • There was no regime change or “unconditional surrender”; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains even more firmly in control of the country than previously;

    • There was no commitment by Iran to turn over its stockpiles of enriched uranium;

    • There was no commitment to stop enriching uranium, either immediately or on some specified date in the future;

    • There were no commitments on ending Iranian support for allied groups like the Houthis or Hezbollah in the region;

    • There was no agreement by Iran to let up on the violent suppression of protesters.

    The reported “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) kicks all of the contentious issues down the road into negotiations that are to take place during the 60-day ceasefire. Trump treated all of these issues as having been conceded already, but if that were the case, why weren’t they in the MOU? It is very unlikely that Iran will budge over the next two months, since it is precisely these issues that speak to the regime’s core identity.

    Trump stated that if Iran didn’t agree to these outstanding terms, he would re-commence the war and possibly make the United States “the guardian of the Middle East” in return for 20 percent of the region’s revenues. It is hard to know whether such an initiative is more ludicrous from the standpoint of countries in the Middle East, including U.S. friends like Saudi Arabia or the UAE who would now be paying explicitly for U.S. protection, or from domestic opinion in the United States, where everyone would like to be done with the region as soon as possible.

    The MOU that Trump celebrated is a worse agreement than Obama’s 2015 deal, which Trump endlessly castigated in the past. Obama’s deal forbade Iran from enriching uranium beyond 3.67 percent for 15 years (far below the 90 percent enrichment necessary for bomb-grade purposes), and provided specific measures for removing enriched uranium from Iran. All of these provisions were to be overseen by outside inspectors, and Iran complied with its terms until Trump withdrew from the agreement. The major criticism of the deal, which U.S. hardliners stressed, was that it said nothing about Iranian support for regional proxies and that it provided sanctions relief at the start of the agreement.

    Trump’s reported MOU, meanwhile, places no limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and makes no commitments about regional proxies. It does not provide for sanctions if Iran doesn’t concede by the end of the 60 days, though the Iranians have said that they will not proceed with final negotiations unless such relief occurs first. So Trump’s purported deal achieves considerably less than the agreement that Obama made.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    It is clear that Trump is being driven to reopen the Strait of Hormuz at virtually any cost by the domestic pressure from rising oil prices and inflation. Being unwilling to send ground forces to Iran, he has had few cards to play over the past six weeks to get further Iranian concessions. So he has chosen to back down and accept a return to the status quo ante from before he began the war on February 28.

    The world will indeed be better off if the Strait is re-opened. Perhaps Trump’s hardcore MAGA supporters can be persuaded that he has negotiated a consummate deal and achieved a great victory. But everyone else will understand that the world’s most powerful country is being run by a feckless and ignorant president who will impose immense costs on both other countries and his own people if he thinks it will benefit himself.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • Protests Are Not Emotional Support Groups
    Protesters hold a “No Kings” flag as they gather in Southeast Area and take part in rally and march on March 28, 2026 in Washington, D.C. (Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images.)

    The No Kings rallies in March 2026 were perhaps the largest single-day protest in the United States since the first Earth Day in 1970. Millions showed up at over 3,000 locations in a display of resistance against the second Trump administration.

    But days later, the protests had already faded from the public mind. The White House seemed unbothered. Trump continued to embrace authoritarian tactics, targeting his enemies in the courts and waging a war in the Middle East without the consent of the legislative branch.

    That hasn’t stopped No Kings from trying again. Today, the movement is co-hosting a “Rise Up, Sing Out” concert in New York (with watch parties across the country) to coincide with Donald Trump’s 80th birthday celebrations. According to the No Kings website, the event is an opportunity to “sing along, make art, share food, connect with neighbors, and take meaningful action together.”

    If Americans want to actually enact change, they seriously need to re-think their strategy. Take it from us: we both grew up in Putin’s Russia and saw well-intentioned protests fail to stop an aspiring despot. We know that authoritarians are typically unwilling to respond to the kind of protest No Kings exemplifies: loud, raucous, and ultimately harmless. These “festival protests,” as we call them, are convenient for their participants. They are fun and usually do not require much sacrifice or risk. They also look good on TV and TikTok feeds. But they often achieve next to nothing.

    Why are so many people convinced they work?

    The festival approach to protesting has its roots in the end of the Cold War. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe was accompanied by largely peaceful popular mobilization, which created a perception that revolutions are something fun and frictionless. The Czechoslovak anti-communist protests in 1989 even got the Slovak moniker of nežná—the “gentle” revolution.

    These protests were subsequently written up as a key reason for communist collapse. The perception that a successful revolution can be a fun affair was so omnipresent it seeped into theories of change and scholarly work. Theoreticians like the late Gene Sharp wrote protest manuals which popularized the idea that even a hardline dictator will bend to popular will if that will is manifested in a suitable rousing manner.

    The ensuing “color revolutions” of the early 2000s—a series of protests that sought to peacefully enact democratic transformations in post-socialist countries—seemed to vindicate this approach. The meek strongmen Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia and Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine melted away under the creative slogans and color-coordinated marching columns of bright-eyed youth.

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    But the real story of those successes is much more complicated. The regimes fell in places where their foundations were already weak. Shevardnadze, famously, couldn’t even pay police officers. It’s no wonder they did not want to protect the regime once protesters came. Similarly, in Ukraine’s protests of 2005 and 2013-2014, a large sector of the elite—oligarchs, high-level officials, politicians, and members of the security apparatus—were willing to defect to the side of pro-democracy protesters.

    We are not seeing massive defections among American elites. Republicans in Congress support the vast majority of the administration’s initiatives, while business leaders rarely stand up against the president, even when his actions (such as tariffs) hurt them directly. Establishment media such as The Washington Post and CBS News already show signs of self-censorship. Courts and some Democratic states are the only traditional institutions that display systematic resistance.

    Then there’s the fact that protests in general are becoming less effective. In the 1990s, around 65% of non-violent movements succeeded in overthrowing a dictator. In the late 2010s, that figure was down to 34%. Violent movements are even less effective—their success rate is currently around 8%, down from a peak of more than 40% in the 1970s.

    This is partly because authoritarian rulers have learned from their mistakes since the color revolutions and the Arab Spring. When one leader gets in trouble, others come to help. Russia, for example, sent troops to Venezuela and Belarus during recent protests. The regime also invested massively in preventing protests at home. The pro-democracy “Snow Revolution” of 2012 flopped because the Kremlin was able to maintain elite cohesion and police loyalty. Moscow was an odd city during the snow protests: While several squares in downtown were occupied, ordinary life more or less went on as usual.

    Making life comfortable enough that most people can disengage from politics and ignore protests is Putin’s greatest accomplishment. The well-educated urban elites do not call for civil disobedience or direct action—they know that most Russians are not ready for such sacrifices.

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    So what lessons are there for the resistance in the United States? Let’s look at Minneapolis. During ICE’s raids earlier this year, protesters made sure to warn the local community by blowing whistles, shouting, and banging drums. They organized solidarity networks and boycotts. The tactics were extremely demanding: protesters had to engage in constant surveillance of law enforcement and skip work to participate in non-violent direct action. Two lost their lives.

    These disruptive tactics deeply angered officials, and eventually made them retreat. It slowed the repressive machine of the state. The faces of the anti-migrant campaign—Border Patrol Commander-at-Large Greg Bovino and Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem—were quickly fired.

    Minneapolis proved that resistance movements should not be evaluated by the number of people they bring to the streets. Resistance to authoritarianism is not an emotional support group.

    In Russian, there is a joke about good-hearted but ineffective pro-democracy protesters: “They are for everything good and against everything bad.” A successful anti-authoritarian movement in America will be a movement of people who are ready to make sacrifices. It will not come from a place of comfort.

    Maria Kuznetsova was part of Russia’s protest movement from the 2010s up until her exile. She is the co-author of How to Survive Authoritarianism: A Russian’s Phrasebook for Everyday Life in America.

    Dan Storyev has covered protests on the ground as a photographer and reporter. He is the co-author of How to Survive Authoritarianism: A Russian’s Phrasebook for Everyday Life in America.

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  • Why Our Flag Brings Americans Together
    (Picture: Prasit photo via Getty Images.)

    June 14 is an important halfway point in America’s summer civic holidays, connecting Memorial Day with Independence Day—and in more ways than one. June 14 is the anniversary of the birth of the U.S. Army in 1775—and is today celebrated as Flag Day.

    “A yearly contemplation of our flag strengthens and purifies the national conscience,” declared President Calvin Coolidge. Echoing sentiments Woodrow Wilson expressed in his 1916 proclamation recommending the annual observance of “Flag Day,” Coolidge succinctly summed up the point for such a national holiday: “We see in [the flag] the great multitude of blessings, of rights and privileges that make up our country. But … we must remember that it is equally a symbol of our duties. Every glory that we associate with it is the result of duty done.”

    Like Achilles’ famous shield depicting both war and peace, the American flag symbolizes the blessings and the duties of a self-governing nation dedicated to freedom and equality. The blessings are frequently invoked, while flag-draped coffins of fallen soldiers show viscerally both the glory and the cost of “duty done.” But, as successive presidents from Wilson onward have noted in relation to Flag Day, the stars combined with the red and white stripes remind us of the ongoing and current duties we carry as citizens, chief of which is respect for the rule of law.

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    “In whatever direction we may go we are always confronted with the inescapable conclusion that unless we observe the law we cannot be free,” noted Coolidge. Or, as that philosophical grandfather of America John Locke put it, “the end of law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge freedom.” In the American tradition, this observance of the law as a supreme principle is two-pronged: it means that laws when made must not designate winners and losers, applying unequally to different persons or groups of society; it also means that all alike, from those in elected office, enjoying positions of economic power, to the those struggling to make ends meet, must follow the law—and can enjoy the shared peace this brings.

    But, as the stories in our newspapers seem frequently to remind us, the rule of law is much easier to invoke than to practice, particularly as it relies upon the goodwill of human agents. Like the flag itself, it is fragile without both.

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    Flag Day is not an official holiday. Rather, mandated by a 1949 act of Congress, the president is “requested to issue each year a proclamation, calling on United States Government officials to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings on Flag Day; and urging the people of the United States to observe Flag Day as the anniversary of the adoption on June 14, 1777.”

    America’s flag, and indeed all flags in general, originally had a predominantly military purpose. It emerged out of the Revolutionary War (although not sewn by Betsy Ross) and its martial image became fixed for many Americans through the “gave proof through the night / that our flag was still there” lines in “The Star-Spangled Banner,” an 1814 poem that over a century later would be adopted as the national anthem. Marking the 200th anniversary of “The Star-Spangled Banner” in 2014, American composer extraordinaire John Williams celebrated the link between the nation’s flag and its national anthem, when on the steps of the U.S. Capitol he debuted a new arrangement of the Star-Spangled Banner. During this 250th anniversary year of our American nation, we are reminded that our flag is still here. Remember its glories; remember, too, its requests.

    Rebecca Burgess is a senior fellow with the Yorktown Institute and at Independent Women. She serves as an advisory board member at the Thomas Jefferson Foundation at Monticello.

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