Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • The European Court of Human Rights Is Betraying Its Purported Values
    (Picture: Gwengoat via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Irakli Miladze, a food courier in Tbilisi, spent long shifts dodging not only the weather, but also fines for using bus lanes. They were the same bus lanes that government officials sped down in their fancy vehicles with impunity.

    In late 2022, Miladze did what citizens in a modern democracy are supposed to be able to do: he took to social media and vented his frustrations. His central complaint was not merely that Tbilisi’s public transportation service is badly designed; it was that it is enforced with naked class bias. City hall employees, ministry officials, and State Security Service personnel were, he alleged in a TikTok video, “flying down the bus lane with tinted windows like they own the road,” while delivery drivers working twelve-hour shifts in the rain are fined for using the same lane to do their jobs. “You are acting like a bunch of motherfuckers who think you are better than everyone else,” Miladze said. “How exactly are you better than us? You are not better than us at all.”

    The language throughout the video was, to put it mildly, unparliamentary. But despite warning viewers of offensive content, the video was shared 600 times and reached 100,000 viewers, evidently resonating among Georgians navigating the same chaotic traffic.

    This did not amuse the impugned officials. Police were dispatched to Miladze’s house (he directed abusive language at the officers, which probably didn’t help his case) and Georgian courts ultimately fined him the equivalent of €180. Miladze took his case all the way to the European Court of Human Rights, hoping to benefit from its long-held view that freedom of expression protects ideas that “offend, shock or disturb.” Unfortunately for Miladze, the seven judges unanimously upheld the fine.

    The ECHR’s reasoning deserves serious scrutiny. The judges found that while the video contained criticism of public policy, “a substantial portion of the recording consisted of extremely crude and sexually explicit verbal attacks … personally directed at the mayor and at unnamed police and security officers.” These segments “contained no argument or criticism but rather sustained verbal aggression devoid of informational value,” and “assume[d] the character of targeted and degrading attacks on identifiable individuals.” Such “wanton denigration” solely intended to insult, the court argued, falls outside the protection of freedom of expression.

    The ECHR also suggested that public officials may enjoy special protection against verbal abuse: “civil servants must enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks. It may therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive and abusive verbal attacks in the course of their duties.”

    Subscribe now

    That was not all. The court accepted the Georgian authorities’ assertion that the comments amounted to “an attack on the personal dignity of the individuals concerned and constituted violent verbal aggression rather than political criticism.” (Emphasis mine)

    In other words, the ECHR conflated an expletive-laden social media rant with violence even though the comments—however offensive—included no threats, no intimidation, and no encouragement or incitement to actual violence.

    Finally, the judges devoted critical attention to online speech and repeated previous case law to the effect that:

    The internet’s capacity for instantaneous and wide dissemination may justify a stricter regulatory approach, including liability for defamatory or otherwise unlawful speech, because online content poses heightened risks to the enjoyment of human rights.

    With regard to TikTok specifically, the ECHR emphasized the platform’s “rapid algorithmic amplification and particularly high youth engagement”—treating the platform’s design and reach as aggravating factors that weighed against the speaker.

    The implication is stark: online speech, precisely because it travels further and faster, warrants more restriction, not less. That gets the logic of democratic accountability exactly backwards. A food courier raging at the mayor of Tbilisi in 1995 would have been heard by twenty people. That his 2022 equivalent reached thousands is not an argument for punishing him more severely—it is an argument for why robust protection of such speech matters more than ever.

    Miladze may not be the most sympathetic free speech hero. He gave voice to legitimate grievances against the authorities with foul and offensive language. Defenders of the ECHR will point out that the court emphasized that the sanction was administrative rather than criminal, that the fine was modest, and that therefore the restriction on Miladze’s speech complied with the requirement of proportionality.

    But these mitigating factors cannot compensate for the fact that the ECHR has seriously eroded the principled protection of free speech. The arguments the court gave are the same ones that 19th century European governments long used to silence radicals demanding universal suffrage, freedom of religion, equality before the law, and justice reforms—values that were hard won and that the ECHR is supposed to uphold.

    The difference between living in a country where fierce criticism of the government is protected versus one in which it’s prohibited is striking. Anyone who has spent five minutes on social media knows that thousands of Americans express their views on their elected officials—including the president—in language that would make Miladze’s TikTok seem genteel. Under the standard the ECHR just blessed, all of them would be subject to legal action.

    To understand why a free internet is vital for a free society, just look at Hungary. Earlier this year, Péter Magyar’s Tisza party won a two-thirds supermajority in the Hungarian parliament, sweeping away sixteen years of Viktor Orbán’s illiberal democracy. In theory, this should not have been possible. Orbán controlled eighty percent of Hungarian media and had restrictive laws against public protests, minorities, universities and NGOs. But there was one thing Orbán did not control: the internet. It was small, fearless online outlets that broke the corruption story that forced his president, Katalin Novak, to resign in 2024. It was a viral YouTube interview that launched Magyar’s political career. It was social media that allowed Tisza’s organic messaging to outcompete Fidesz’s well-funded propaganda machine. The very tools that the ECHR insists warrant more government control are the tools that just delivered the most important democratic victory in Europe this decade.

    Subscribe now

    The court’s logic is even more disturbing given the current reality in Georgia, where a Putin-aligned government is cracking down on protest, civil society, and the media, and where social media is the only avenue left to the pro-democratic opposition. In response to the ECHR decision, the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, which represented Miladze, warned of a “severe human rights crisis” in the country. It highlighted that “administrative offense proceedings against individuals on grounds of insult” are now “routine for the Interior Ministry.”

    Must Georgians fighting for democracy really show respect and polite deference to the government officials turning their country into a client state of Putin? That would seem to be the direction of travel. Europe is sleepwalking ever deeper into a free speech recession, guided by the very institutions supposed to sound the alarm.

    Jacob Mchangama, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is the Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech, a research professor at Vanderbilt University, and a Senior Fellow at The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression. His latest book, co-authored with Jeff Kosseff, is The Future of Free Speech.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Why Trump Seems Confused By His Own War

    Will you be in Washington, D.C. on Friday, July 17? Join the Persuasion team and friends for drinks from 9:30pm at Hive Rooftop. If you’re planning to join us, please RSVP here. Hope to see you there!

    Donald Trump, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller. (Photo by Molly Riley/The White House via Getty Images.)

    With all the bravado that tends to accompany Donald Trump, something else has been striking me recently—when faced with major decisions, there’s a way in which he carries himself like a wise fool in a Shakespeare play, bemused by all the tumult that’s going on around him. In a revealing moment, on March 17, when asked to explain why the United States was at war with Iran, Trump said, “You could say we did it out of habit”—as if the war was just a bit of noise going on in the background and had nothing really to do with him.

    Just this morning, after the fragile ceasefire appeared to shatter with a fresh exchange of fire from Iran, followed by retaliation from Israel, Trump took to social media to limply declare: “Israel and Iran must immediately stop ‘shooting.’ President DONALD J. TRUMP.”

    Even more pivotally, in the decisive meeting between Netanyahu and Trump in the White House on February 11, Netanyahu delivered his “hard sell” on the need for engagement, according to reporting by The New York Times, arguing that there was a window for regime change. Trump’s reply, according to the reporting, was notably cheerful and notably passive. “Sounds good to me,” he apparently told Netanyahu.

    So what is this storm that sweeps Trump along, this force that he can only bemusedly watch? I would argue that it’s political realism—the doctrine that’s taken over the second Trump administration, maybe not entirely with Trump willing it, but which marks a fundamentally different era in international relations.

    That tone surfaced also in the exchange between Stephen Miller, one of Trump’s leading advisors, and Jake Tapper on CNN on January 6 when Miller, discussing the state of play in Venezuela, swerved into a bit of unsolicited political theory. “But we live in a world, in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.”

    That remark deservedly attracted a great deal of attention—in large part because no one expects a politician to say anything so interesting on cable television and also because it seemed like the declaration of a new Thucydidean direction for American foreign policy. But I think what got me most was Miller’s shrugging tone—this is just the way it is, Jake, and you can pretend differently all you want.

    Political realism is a perfectly respectable discipline of political theory. As media commentators discovered when, in the wake of Miller’s comments, they had to hurriedly dust off their Plato, it traces itself back to Thrasymachus’ comment in The Republic that “justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger,” and to the corollary, articulated by an Athenian general in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Realism, which per Miller may in fact stretch back to the beginning of time, wends its way through Machiavelli and Hobbes, and has its fullest modern exposition in Hans Morgenthau, a pioneer of international relations.

    Writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II, Morgenthau was faced with the question of why citizens within a state tend to refrain from using violence to get what they want while international politics so often appears to follow the law of the jungle. The idealists of the time were preoccupied with constructing international entities to prevent the horrors of World War II from recurring. Morgenthau, fully conscious of the failures of the liberal democracies to head Hitler off in time in the 1930s, argued that the international entities had no chance of succeeding, that in the absence of a world army a world state could not survive, and that, as Campbell Craig, an interpreter of Morgenthau, put it, “a weak global entity would be worse, much worse, than nothing at all.”

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    The premise of liberal cooperation would tend, just as had occurred with the League of Nations and the various inter-war treaties, for the rational actors to let their guard down and the irrational, malevolent actors to steal a march on them. This was what Morgenthau called “the tragedy of scientific man.” As Craig paraphrased Morgenthau, “A modern nation can do two things: seize power or eschew that power in favor of a rationalistic plan to change the world. Choosing the latter always means defeat, no matter the intentions, political system, or moral stature of the nation in question.”

    With Morgenthau what you get is an upside-down world where conventional morality is weakness and where the only viable, one could even say moral, action is to maximize one’s own power position. “Moral behavior is to engage in power politics, of apparently any sort,” writes Craig.

    What’s difficult with Morgenthau is that you sense, reading him, that he’s basically right—a tougher power politics was certainly called for in the ‘30s to contend with Hitler; and the more idealistic political approaches of the mid-‘40s seemed to prove inadequate to contending with the Soviet Union. Morgenthau-esque “containment,” on the other hand, did generate a balance of powers that provided a measure of security in an extraordinarily difficult international situation.

    If the last 80 years have also had their share of liberal internationalist politics, the suspicion is that those are always a fig leaf—a means for great powers to cloak their actions in legitimacy, just as Morgenthau analyzed it, while, when push comes to shove, always acting in ways that benefit their own self-interest. Until quite recently, even fairly direct imperialist acts, like the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, tended to be lathered in multilateralism. What’s striking with an exchange like that between Miller and Tapper is the forgoing of any sort of liberal justifications, of Miller, on national television, removing the fig leaf and… well… sorry for the image.

    In policy documents the Trump administration has more or less explicitly confirmed that realism is now the law of the land. In its 2026 National Defense Strategy, released days after the intervention in Venezuela, the Department of War was slightly less than clear-cut in declaring that “President Trump’s foreign policy is pragmatic without being ‘pragmatist,’ realistic without being ‘realist,’” etc, but the NDS was also evidently a realist document. “Out with utopian idealism; in with hard-nosed realism,” it stated. It reiterated the “flexible realism” of the 2025 National Security Strategy claiming that the turn to naked self-interest will “entail a sharp shift in approach, focus, and tone.”

    A favorable—one could say fawning—article in The National Interest by Ludovic Hood lauds Miller in particular for “channeling Hans Morgenthau.” Hood writes, “Miller’s approach is a return to this historical truth … The lightning strike in Caracas to apprehend Maduro was not a crusade for global ‘democracy promotion,’ rather a cold, Westphalian calculation of national interest within our own hemisphere.”

    Subscribe now

    Not so surprisingly, The New York Times wasn’t so quick to wrap the mantle of Hans Morgenthau around Trump or the un-fig-leafed Miller. “Scholars generally view realism as a theory for describing the world as it is; Trump and his team are using the term in an effort to redraw the world map,” wrote Linda Kinstler for The Times. She cited political science professor Patrick Porter, who differentiated true realism from Machtpolitik, its “corrupt cousin,” which is defined by a “sort of violent exhilaration of destruction, nihilism and vengeance.”

    But let’s not be so quick—just because it’s Trump—to assume that there can’t be some intellectual bedrock to his foreign policy. In Morgenthau’s conception, there’s no particular distinction between “describing the world as it is” and “redraw[ing] the world map.” Actually, at least in Morgenthau’s early work, there is almost a moral obligation to be proactive, without even stopping to think about whether one is more “morally right” than one’s adversaries.

    What does the imposition of realism in international politics actually look like?

    The past four years have given us a glimpse. Almost certainly, the decisive turn in the realist direction in international affairs occurred on February 24, 2022, when 150,000 Russian troops surged into Ukraine. If Putin tended in his justifications for the invasion to emphasize the “historical unity” of Russia and Ukraine, the International Relations scholar John Mearsheimer offered a more directly realist view, that “this is great-power politics,” as Mearsheimer put it in an interview with The New Yorker, and that by trying to “peel Ukraine away from Russia,” the United States and NATO had violated the implicit contracts of great-power politics and invited Putin’s response.

    Putin’s expansionism was soon followed by a turn in Israel’s foreign policy. As far back as 1996, in the “Clean Break” memo prepared for him when he was prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu evinced an interest in a more directly realist approach. Foreign policy directives advised a “clean break from the slogan, ‘comprehensive peace’ to a traditional concept of strategy based on balance of power.” Throughout his longer period as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, Netanyahu emphasized “peace through strength” as the way to handle foreign relations in the Middle East.

    But in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, Netanyahu took a turn. Since then, in addition to the Gaza War, Netanyahu has initiated a ground invasion of Lebanon, strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, and the joint Israeli-American attacks against Iran. “When we become a regional power, and in certain fields even a global power, we have the ability to push dangers away from us and secure our future,” Netanyahu said in March.

    It’s a little hard, at this point, to remember what a deviation this kind of “hardnosed realism” is from the political era that preceded it. As recently as 2020, a “concert of nations” seemed to prevail in the response to the pandemic. By 2022, Putin had decisively pulled himself out of any such international confederation with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in the process getting Russia sanctioned by 49 countries and excluded from the SWIFT banking system. Netanyahu’s post-2023 program clearly attempted to redraw the balance of power across the Middle East by striking at enemies from Iran to Yemen to Lebanon to Gaza, although at the cost of the ICC issuing an arrest warrant for Netanyahu over alleged war crimes in Gaza, of 12 states issuing sanctions against Israel, and of several G7 nations for the first time recognizing Palestinian statehood.

    Hood’s article in The National Interest is paradigmatic of how the realist doctrine has taken root in the United States as well. Hood argues, “While many … proponents of a rules-based international order spent the last two decades heralding the end of history, Russia and China were busy proving that the Nietzschean ‘will to power’ remains the primary engine of global politics.” Hood, doing his own channeling of Morgenthau, claims that “if Morgenthau were alive today, he would recognize Vladimir Putin’s Russia not as an anomaly, but as an exemplar of the realist state.” In other words, he is saying, Russia and China have shrewdly led the exodus from the rules-based liberal international order. It’s high time for the United States to do the same.

    And Hood and his ilk are of course more than pleased that the United States has now started to dance the Death Star dos-à-dos, engaging in regime change in Venezuela in January, attempting the same in Iran in February, and then deploying military resources around Cuba with enough saber-rattling to indicate that an attack might be imminent. That seems to be the “flexible realism” that the NSS and NDS are talking about—going after America’s enemies and leaving it to the likes of Jake Tapper to worry about what Miller calls “the niceties of international law.”

    It’s worth asking, of course, what unbridled realism actually gets you. Russia has been bogged down for four years in a war of choice. As many as 500,000 Russians have died. Ukraine, which has proved itself capable of launching drones at Moscow, has become a stronger and more implacable foe of Russia certainly than it was prior to 2022. Putin actually had nothing to worry about domestically at the time of the invasion, and it’s far from clear what he’s gained in his turn as “an exemplar of the realist state.”

    Israel, meanwhile, has lost allies around the world, and has to rely for its arms and external support on the most mercurial president in American history. Within weeks of the attack on Iran, Israel found itself demoted from “co-pilot” to “mere passenger” in the operation and thoroughly cut out of the truce talks, according to The New York Times. And the United States, currently facing the vicissitudes of war in the struggle with Iran—with the strikes of the past twenty-four hours proving that Trump has much less control over events than he thought—may be discovering that they have badly misunderstood Morgenthau.

    We’re expanding our events offerings! Please check out our events page to join Book Club, Ask the Author, and Intellectual Bootcamp—and to watch recordings of recent events.

    Persuasion events

    Morgenthau wasn’t actually arguing for a Lord of the Flies approach to international politics. He made the case for an “international morality,” which is different from everyday morality but calls for a balance of power between nations. There is a distinction to be made between “satisfied” and “less-satisfied” nations, with the satisfied nations having a moral burden, according to the peculiar logic of “international morality,” to, out of their own strategic interest, curb the ambitions of the “less-satisfied” nations and to adopt a predominantly status quo policy.

    In the passivity of Trump towards the launching of his own war, and in the gleeful amorality of Stephen Miller—doing his best impression of a teenager who has just read Thus Spoke Zarathustra for the very first time—there is the sense of a wave, of a doctrine of “realism” passing like a baton from Putin to Netanyahu to Trump. The shrug is that that’s just the way it is.

    But Miller and Trump and Hood aren’t reading their Morgenthau all that deeply. Realism isn’t just the strong pummeling the weak. Realism is about being very clear-eyed about one’s strategic position, and that takes place over multiple dimensions, in diplomacy and in the struggle to justify oneself ideologically—a step that the contemporary proponents of so-called realism are almost entirely forgoing.

    Subscribe now

    So, yes, Morgenthau’s critique of idealistic views of international relations is compelling—international entities, certainly at present, don’t have anything like the power to contend with the realpolitik of nation states. And it is possible, in one’s darker moods, to argue that liberal internationalism is just a fig leaf for brute power relations.

    But that’s only half of what Morgenthau is saying and half of what liberal internationalism can offer—which is alliances, shared purposes, legitimacy, a balance of power, and (in the current status quo) American hegemony. So, yes Stephen, it’s a fig leaf, but it’s an important fig leaf. Honestly, you look better with it on.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Inside the Anti-Tech Rebellion In Schools
    (Photo by Britta Pedersen/picture alliance via Getty Images.)

    When Mallory received her first “school supplies” email, she was thrilled. As a kid, she loved the trip to the store for pencils, crayons, and notepads. Her daughter was about to enter a public pre-kindergarten class for 4-year-olds. This was a big moment. She felt a surge of love and excitement for her daughter. She enjoyed that feeling of connection to her own childhood that is one of the many rewards of parenting.

    Then she clicked the email, and saw that after a water bottle and lunch box the next item on the list was:

    1. WIRED HEADPHONES FOR IPADS—LABELED with your child’s name (NOT EARBUDS, NOT WIRELESS).

    Mallory is not the only tech-skeptical parent who is currently trying to figure out what could possibly have happened to K-12 education in this country. I interviewed 30 parents around the United States. The overall picture is deeply troubling and may even be an existential threat to the public school system as we know it.

    The average parent of a young American child is now a Millennial. They remember growing up with technology, with computer class, with laptops in high school. They have cellphones, use the internet, and may even work in tech or communications. They have concerns about technology but are happy to incorporate it into their family life when it makes sense.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    However, they are often deeply shocked when they find out that their 4 year-old is about to be given a Chromebook or an iPad upon entry to kindergarten. They think: isn’t that a little young?

    They discover that this is now common practice. According to 2022 data, 73% of K-2 classrooms have a 1-to-1 device policy. They ask: Who made this decision?

    They discover that COVID-era tech policies, which may have been necessary during the pandemic, have not just been continued, but mysteriously ramped up. They start to ask more questions. They quickly learn that their school boards, technology directors, and superintendents have enthusiastically overseen all of this with virtually no opposition.

    Maybe they send an email. Maybe they go to a school board meeting. Maybe they get someone on the phone.

    It is at this point that things start to go off the rails.

    Ed Tech as “Equity”

    First, parents are often told that a 1-to-1 device policy is necessary to ensure equal access. It wouldn’t be equitable for kids from wealthier families to have fancy laptops while kids from families without those resources go without. And certain kids sometimes need targeted, computer-based interventions if they are also learning English or have certain disabilities. How could someone be so heartless as to deny these disadvantaged children what they need?

    Every parent I spoke to cares deeply about equity. They want society to take care of its most disadvantaged members. But they are often shocked by the brazen and unintelligent ways in which the value of equity is deployed against them.

    It is obvious that necessary devices could simply be loaned to poorer students, and that spaces could be devoted to computer-based assistance for the small proportion of students who really need it. None of this requires that literally every student from K-12 be forced to complete schoolwork and homework on their own personal digital distraction device, which they must carry around at all times. None of this requires that school systems must spend fantastic amounts of money purchasing and maintaining these devices.

    It’s worth asking whether all this really is about caring for the vulnerable. ADHD is now one of the most commonly diagnosed disorders amongst children. 11.4% of American kids have it. Other kids have ADD, are on the autism spectrum, or have other special needs. And as many parents told me, Ed Tech is dangerous for many of these children, particularly when students can take the laptops out of the classroom to other classes or to their homes. It can make symptoms worse, delay executive functioning, and reduce attention spans amongst the children who need them the most.

    Now, in principle there are supposed to be protections here. An Individualized Education Program (IEP) can require schools to reduce or eliminate screen time. But many parents told me that Ed Tech is so thoroughly integrated into schools that such protections are useless. They are routinely violated, sometimes out of negligence, other times because teachers simply don’t have the ability to monitor every child’s usage, and sometimes because the school has abandoned paper-and-pencil instruction in some areas.

    Parent testimonials here are eye-opening. Lisa Sunbury is a professor of early childhood education in Santa Cruz, California, and she had a child at Mission Hill Middle School. Her 7th grade daughter has a set of serious issues that require an IEP. Lisa did her part at home, enforcing the low-screen policy. One element of this plan was supposed to be minimal access to school devices and a clear requirement that the device be inaccessible outside of certain classes. This was all on doctor’s orders.

    Subscribe now

    Yet, Sunbury would regularly find her daughter awake at 3am, playing video games on the school Chromebook that she wasn’t supposed to have. She discovered a prohibited TikTok account, made on the school device, with dance videos posted from gym class using that same device. She had further meetings with school officials. Sadly, things seemed to get worse for her daughter, who began to engage in devastating acts of self-harm. Lisa had no choice: she pulled her daughter out of the public school system.

    I heard a variation on this story many times. Because of their disabilities, millions of children are highly predisposed to develop addictive, unhealthy relationships with screens. These are disabled children whose lives and relationships are disproportionately damaged in our public schools.

    The Rise of Book-Free Education

    Jonathan, a dad in Connecticut, raised his son to be very literate. He read to him every day and kept screens and TV to a minimum. Sure enough, his son was reading the entire Harry Potter series in 3rd grade. He was a parent who did everything the school system asks parents to do: to be co-educators, to support learning, to prepare children for school.

    Jonathan’s son is now in 9th grade, and he no longer reads books.

    The deterioration started in 2nd grade, when his son’s homework was suddenly on a set of heavily gamified apps. By middle school, says Jonathan, “my son was rushing through all the app work so that he could play video games and watch YouTube shorts at school.” His behavior worsened, and eventually an ADHD test was administered. The results were inconclusive, but Jonathan is convinced that most of the symptoms were the product of screen time. When he enforced a screen-free summer in 6th grade, his son had “the best summer of his life,” socializing, playing sports, and going out into nature.

    Now, this young man is assigned novels and literature by his teacher, but the books are all e-books, and Jonathan’s son simply asks ChatGPT for summaries before quickly pasting or typing answers into an app. Then, it’s back to watching YouTube and gaming on the school device. Jonathan is powerless to stop this from happening; all requests for more restrictive screen time have been rejected.

    This story is playing out all over the nation. Literacy isn’t just the ability to read; it’s the desire to read. School computers aren’t just impeding book-based literacy; they are ending it. Of course, students have always cheated on their assignments. But now, schools are actively handing out the cheating devices.

    Fake Expertise

    Many parents I spoke to chafe under the weaponization of fake expertise. This is a familiar and depressing feature of the modern world. Officials are tasked with managing some system, and are trained in normal techniques and procedures. But when strange new situations arise, they must somehow justify their right to make this novel kind of decision. They will deploy some shiny new technique, metric, or rubric designed to give the appearance of expertise, which is not grounded in any rigorous science or long-term experience. They are typically not experts. But they tell you that they are in order to end conversations.

    Michelle is a parent in a massive school district in Fairfax County, Virginia. She is also a researcher with the American Academy of Addiction. She reached out to her school board’s multiple “reading specialists” to ask for evidence that supports the deployment of Lexia, a popular gamified reading app. They sent her a few studies, which they described as “independent.” When Michelle looked, she discovered that some of the studies were authored by employees of Lexia. Several weren’t even published in journals.

    She came to a stark realization: a district that oversees 180,000 students does not know how to run basic tests on research quality.

    Other times, this “expertise” amounts to nothing more than some theoretical model, usually one illustrated by a splashy, colorful graphic, to justify the incorporation of even more tech into the classroom.

    One such model is the Triple E framework, developed by Liz Kolb in 2011, which asks school systems to score apps on the basis of their ability to “Engage, Enhance, and Extend” student learning. The model has individual teachers and schools rate their own apps, using only their subjective impressions of effectiveness. (Imagine if medicine worked this way. “Doc, why should I take this new drug?” “Well, because I’ve used it on a few of my patients and it seems to work fine.”)

    Kylie King, a parent in the district of Plattsburgh, New York, saw what happened when the Triple E model was applied. Like Michelle in Virginia, Kylie has advanced training in statistical analysis, which most of the school “experts” she was talking to completely lacked. Yet after a brief exchange, the school board simply refused to continue any discussion about the Triple E model. In their final response to her on the subject, they wrote:

    The information has been shared with both the Technology Committee and the Technology Advisors. They continue to believe they have shared all relevant information regarding how they apply the rubric in the district and are comfortable with the process.

    This is the voice of weaponized fake expertise: no details, no extended conversation, no response to particulars. We have a committee, they rate the apps themselves with no external input, and they have determined that things are fine. End of discussion.

    Opting Out?

    In response to these difficulties, many parents have started to request an opt-out. That is, they have been asking teachers and principals for alternative, non-digital modes of instruction, usually paper-and-pencil or textbook-based learning.

    While many might think this impractical, the state of Vermont is now considering codifying a right to opt out, and Iowa’s legislature just passed a screen time limit for K-5. I spoke to multiple parents who have managed to fight for it, and it seems to be working quite well. One parent reported that the kids in her daughter’s class were jealous that she didn’t have to sit and navigate endless apps, videos, and textboxes to finish her work. Another parent reported that one 5th grade teacher used the occasion to simply drop the Ed Tech altogether and return to traditional teaching modes.

    We’re expanding our events offerings! Please check out our events page to join Book Club, Ask the Author, and Intellectual Bootcamp—and to watch recordings of recent events.

    Persuasion events

    But these stories are the exception. As a rule, when parents ask for this kind of exemption, they don’t get it. School officials often treat the suggestion itself as ridiculous or silly. Sometimes, the responses are even worse.

    Beverly Hyde, a parent in Concord, North Carolina, was explicitly told that if her son wasn’t going to use his Chromebook, “he will just sit alone and spend the day doing nothing.” Her son was entering an awkward, pre-adolescent stage, and the thought of this terrified both the young boy and his mother. They were cowed into silence by this open threat, and eventually pulled him out of public schools, moving him to a low-tech Catholic school.

    And this was no empty threat. Linda in Texas discovered that while her doctor-ordered opt-out request for her 2nd grader was technically being honored, the school wasn’t providing any alternative instruction. They were just “having her sit and draw while the other kids were online.”

    But Why?

    These parents are a diverse bunch with different stories. But what unites them all is puzzlement. None of it makes sense, but it is happening everywhere.

    In 2025, 73 percent of Americans reported feeling dissatisfied with public education—the highest number ever recorded. When things don’t make sense, people start to lose trust in their institutions. They start to promote alternative theories that make those institutions look really bad. Sometimes, those theories turn out to have more than a grain of truth to them. I myself was in a meeting with a New York State education regent who told parents, point blank, that reversing course on Ed Tech is going to be extremely difficult because of “the amount of corporate money in the system.”

    Subscribe now

    It is time for education systems to regain public trust by respecting a parent’s right to a human, book-based education for their children. If they don’t, parents will begin to force the issue, and schools aren’t going to like what happens next. After her principal refused to honor a pediatrician’s request to keep the device at school, Kaitlin and Rich in Chicago told their school: “If you send that device home one more time, it’s not coming back.”

    The Chromebook is currently gathering dust in their garage, and they bear no legal responsibility for something they neither asked for nor agreed to take. Should such acts become common practice, school administrators will loudly complain about the resulting costs and headaches.

    They will have only themselves to blame.

    Nicholas Smyth is a professor of ethics and technology at Fordham University.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The West’s Greatest Innovation—An Independent Judiciary
    Charles I in the House of Commons, not making friends. (Photo by Art Images via Getty Images.)

    Now it’s very unfair, and Republicans, judges and justices, they always want to show that they’re independent… “I don’t care if Trump appointed me. I don’t care if he doesn’t make any difference to me. I’m voting against him.” Because they want to show their independence. You know, stupid people.

    —Donald J. Trump, April 1, 2026

    President Trump was disgruntled after attending, in person, the Supreme Court hearings on his executive order seeking to abolish birthright citizenship. Many of the Justices expressed skepticism over the arguments made by Trump’s solicitor general, John Sauer, as to the constitutionality of the order. Trump not only mocked the idea of birthright citizenship, but also the very idea that judges were supposed to be independent from the president who appointed them. Over the past week, federal lower court judges have blocked a number of his moves, including renaming the Kennedy Center, the $1.8 billion slush fund to reward January 6 rioters, and the Justice Department’s vindictive prosecution of Kilmar Abrego Garcia. This has led to a chorus of attacks by Trump backers against “radical” activist judges allegedly acting out of partisan rancor.

    In light of these events, it may be useful to review the history of the idea of judicial independence. It is one of the foundational institutions of Western, and particularly Anglo-American, political development, and indeed one of the ideas upon which the greatness of Western civilization itself rests.

    Judicial independence can be traced back to a series of events known as the Investiture Controversy that took place in the second half of the 11th century. This crisis pitted Pope Gregory VII against Henry IV, the Holy Roman Emperor, over the issue of whether the Pope or the Emperor should have the right to appoint priests and bishops within the Church. As is the case today, appointment power over senior officials was the source of control of the Catholic Church itself, which was the dominant institution apart from political authority.

    In this period, the Catholic Church was also the guardian of the law. Church officials had discovered a long lost copy of the Justinian Code, the authoritative compilation of Roman Law that had been assembled by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian in the 6th century. This code was the ancestor of contemporary civil law used today in Europe and Asia, and the Church began to teach it in the law schools that had been established in cities like Oxford, Paris, and Copenhagen.

    The Investiture Controversy led to a prolonged struggle in which Henry IV was excommunicated and had to seek absolution from the Pope “barefoot in the snow” at Canossa. The matter was settled only in 1122 in the Concordat of Worms, which allowed the Church to keep control over the appointment of its own cadres. Thus, control over ecclesiastical law remained in the hands of an institution, the Church, that was independent of dominant political authority.

    Over time, law evolved, both on the continent and in a separate common law tradition in England, into a body of rules that was not directly controlled by executive authorities. This was not for lack of trying: ambitious monarchs over the centuries continued to try to wrest legal authority from the Church.

    In England, King Henry VIII ultimately created a separate Church of England because the papal authorities in Rome would not grant him a divorce from his first wife. The later Stuart king, Charles I, sought to evade existing legal authorities by exploiting the King’s Court of the Star Chamber, a separate judicial body he controlled that would allow him to go after his political enemies (sound familiar?), instead of working with Parliament. Charles’ repeated efforts to go around the law and evade parliament eventually led to his beheading and the English Civil War. The conflict between King and Parliament festered and was only settled in 1688-9 by the Glorious Revolution, which deposed the Stuart dynasty and established the principle of parliamentary supremacy. Hereafter, English monarchs were not above the law, but below it, and had to submit to laws made by parliament.

    Paying Persuasion subscribers are invited to join our Intellectual Bootcamp, where we read classic articles and books that help make sense of the modern world. So far it’s been an enormous success! If you would like to join, please take advantage of a 20% discount on paid membership today. Check out our events page to learn what we’re reading next.

    20% off Persuasion

    There is a bigger picture to observe here. The fact that law came to be controlled by an independent judiciary was one of the sources of the rise and dominance of Western civilization in succeeding centuries. China, Persia, and Byzantium all practiced a form of what is labeled “Caesaropapism,” in which state authority was fused with ecclesiastical power, giving emperors and kings ultimate control over the law. In England and other parts of Western Europe from the 18th century onwards, by contrast, the law was controlled by independent judicial authorities. This counterbalanced executive power, and made possible the modern economic world. As any economist will tell you, a rule of law (by which they mean property rights and contract enforcement) is critical to modern economic growth. And a rule of law (as opposed to authoritarian rule by law) is made possible only by the existence of an independent judiciary. If kings and presidents can interfere arbitrarily in economic transactions and take property at will, no one will invest or innovate.

    An independent judiciary is also what made America great. The United States never had a powerful European- or Chinese-style state, but it did inherit from Britain a strong common law tradition in which a decentralized network of judges could create stable general laws under the principle of stare decisis (that is, judicial decisions made in one jurisdiction would set precedents for all the others). To this was added statute law passed by legislatures at state and later federal levels, which created a platform for economic growth in the 19th century and beyond.

    Donald Trump, of course, knows nothing of this history, and operates under the belief that since he was elected president, he has the right to control the judiciary. For his entire career, he has seen the legal system not as a neutral adjudicator of disputes, but rather as a weapon he can use to increase his personal wealth and power. Especially since the beginning of his second term, his attacks on the rule of law have accelerated, and culminated in Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche’s effort to create a slush fund that would put nearly $2 billion taxpayer dollars in the pockets of his cronies and absolve his family from any legal accountability for fraud or abuse.

    It is only political pressure, this time coming from some Republicans, that has forced him to pull back on this issue. But Trump will never concede to the principle that he must act according to law, or that the justice system is anything other than a tool that he will bend to his own purposes.

    In doing so, Donald Trump is not only rejecting an important source of American greatness, but one of the foundational principles of Western civilization. He thus joins the world’s other Caesaropapists in seeking to fuse law and executive authority.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Steve Stewart-Williams on Sex Differences and Human Nature

    Steve Stewart-Williams is a professor of Psychology at the University of Nottingham’s Malaysia campus and runs The Nature-Nurture-Nietzsche Newsletter. His latest book is A Billion Years of Sex Differences.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Steve Stewart-Williams discuss why women and men are more similar than is often thought and what the real sex differences between men and women are, from casual sex to career choices.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Last time we spoke, you gave a really great introduction to how to think about the influence of evolution on human nature and human psychology. You are now out with a book that speaks more specifically about sex differences and how those are rooted in biology. Let’s go through some of the sex differences that the literature establishes relatively decisively.

    One way you break this down is to say some sex differences are just completely dimorphic—women give birth, men do not—while others are more statistical variances. Tell us a little bit about how to think about the kinds of sex differences and what some of the most common ones are.

    Steve Stewart-Williams: The new book is called A Billion Years of Sex Differences. I start by listing what I call the standard issue sex differences: a list of very well-established sex differences in our species. As you say, they range from the very large and strictly dimorphic and categorical, to the not-so-large—at the other end, just statistical differences, relatively modest discrepancies in the average scores of massively overlapping distributions.

    At the larger end of the spectrum, we generally just have physical differences between the sexes: reproductive differences, the reproductive organs, the capacity to nurse versus not, the capacity to give birth versus not—those are all very large differences. The difference in upper body strength is quite large—actually very large, with very little overlap. There is very little overlap either in voice pitch, so voice pitch is another quite large sex difference.

    Moving down the scale, when we are talking about psychological sex differences, the only one that is even remotely in the ballpark of those physical differences is the sex difference in the primary target of sexual attraction. Most men are primarily attracted to women, most women are primarily attracted to men—there are exceptions, of course—but nonetheless, that is a very large psychological difference. It shows, I think, that natural selection can create large levels of dimorphism.

    Mounk: That is interesting, because in the first category—and we are certainly not going to get into the whole trans debate for purposes of this conversation, we are talking about biological sex—men can produce sperm, women can produce eggs. Those are just completely different biological processes: strictly dimorphic. Here, we are talking about how most men are attracted to women and most women are attracted to men, but then there are these subcategories of men who are strongly attracted to men and women who are strongly attracted to women. So that is a very different kind of distribution.

    Stewart-Williams: It is a different kind of sex difference. Even though people attracted to the same sex are exceptions and a minority, they are not a trivial minority—there is a non-trivial number of exceptions. Whereas that is not the case for the first sex differences I named.

    Mounk: Not to go down a rabbit hole, but a lot of people are going to have in their mind this idea of a Kinsey scale—that actually most people fall somewhere on a long spectrum between complete heterosexuality and complete homosexuality. So it’s not that most men are attracted to women and then some significant percentage of men happens to be very attracted to men, but rather that we all fall somewhere along that spectrum.

    Is that compatible with modern science? Is that something that scientists today believe? How does what you are saying fit onto that kind of model of the Kinsey scale?

    Stewart-Williams: I was thinking of the Kinsey scale when I framed the exact wording. My exact wording was that most men are primarily attracted to women, most women are primarily attracted to men—so that accepts the fact that it is not uncommon at all for there to be some degree of attraction to the same sex among people who are primarily attracted to the other sex.

    There are differences in the degree of attraction to each sex that individuals have. One thing is that people often understand it to mean that there is a spectrum and that people are distributed fairly evenly across it, whereas you do actually have clustering toward the two extremes of the continuum—that is, primarily attracted to the other sex versus the same sex. That is especially true with men. With men you get quite strong clustering, either primarily attracted to the other sex or the same sex. With women, the distribution is a bit more even across that scale.

    Mounk: So if you are picturing the scale from left to right, there is one big mountain on the left—attraction to the opposite sex—and then a smaller mountain on the other end of the scale, primarily attracted to the same sex, and then in between are all kinds of people who fall at all kinds of points, but those are not going to be big local maxima?

    Stewart-Williams: That is exactly right, with just the one proviso that there are fewer men in the in-between category than there are women in the in-between category.

    Mounk: So the peaks are going to look higher for men than for women for the same reason. Interesting. That was the second kind of category. The third category is where most of the interesting debates lie. The first category—the biological differences—is relatively straightforward and uncontested. The second category is super interesting and important, but perhaps applies to slightly fewer characteristics. A lot of the things that we really have big social debates about fall into the third category: is it true that men have an innate attraction to certain kinds of professions, to certain kinds of socializing, to certain kinds of ways of thinking about the world? All of that contested stuff lies in the third category—minor statistical differences that might nonetheless make a really significant impact on the world. So tell us about those.

    Stewart-Williams: That is exactly right. The vast majority of psychological sex differences in our species are in that third category—statistical sex differences, or what I call fuzzy sex differences—where you have differences in the average of highly overlapping distributions. A big part of the reason there are so many debates about it is because they fall awkwardly into a middle ground where a lot of them are small enough that you can question whether they actually exist, but large enough that they trouble us. So they sit in that awkward middle ground where you can deny them, but they also have real-world effects to some degree.

    They span a range of different magnitudes as well. Among the larger ones, you mentioned career-related interests—that is actually one of the larger sex differences in this category. There is usually about a standard deviation difference between the mean for men and the mean for women in career-related interests.

    Mounk: Can you explain for lay listeners what that means—both in terms of how strongly a different professional preference drives professional choice, and roughly how big an effect a standard deviation is?

    Stewart-Williams: On average, men tend to be more interested than women in things—how machines work, mathematical and formalized systems, impersonal subject matter—and more interested in careers involving those things. Whereas women on average tend to have a greater interest in people, how people work, and in people-related professions: professions that involve helping and interacting with people.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    The difference is about a standard deviation between the means for the two scores, which is considered to be quite a large effect size. There is still a great deal of overlap. What it would mean in practice: if you were to choose two people at random, one man and one woman, for interest in things—where men score higher—there would be about a 70% chance that the man would score higher than the woman, and about a 30% chance it would go the other way. The converse holds for interest in people: in about 70% of randomly chosen pairs, the woman would score higher than the man, but there would still be a very non-trivial minority of cases where the man scored higher than the woman.

    Mounk: That is, I think, a little bit of what makes this awkward. Let’s cash this out with this relatively uncontroversial example, and then we can think about how it applies to more controversial ones.

    What you are saying is that in the literal sense, stereotypes about this are right. There is a stereotype that men love their machines and their tools—they go into the man cave and potter around in the workshop—and that women gravitate toward more social professions, or, pejoratively, gossip, or whatever. You can make a negative caricature of each, or a positive one. The positive version: the man likes to build things and get things done, and the woman loves to be a connector in the neighborhood, making sure people are doing well and cared for. Or you can put a negative spin on each: the man locking himself away in his workshop, or the woman engaging in mean-girl gossip behavior. The point is that this is a stereotype we hold in society, and what you are saying is that there is some real empirical grounding for it.

    And yet, of course, if you apply that to everybody—if you were hiring at an engineering firm and said, well, this is a female applicant, surely she does not actually like machines—you would not only be perpetrating an injustice towards that woman, but you would very often be wrong. A good number of women are interested in these kinds of things, and among women who are actually applying for such a position, probably most of them are.

    Stewart-Williams: That is exactly right. A lot of stereotypes are on the right track—at the very least they are a response to something real. The danger is in exaggerating the magnitude of them, which is what you are doing if you say: this is a woman applying for a male-typical job involving machines, it is just impossible that she could be interested in them or good at working with them, and vice versa for men applying for people-related jobs. You would be exaggerating the strength of the sex difference.

    I think that is a big reason why people are nervous about talking about sex differences: they worry that people are going to do exactly that. They worry that if there is any acknowledgement that there is some truth in these sex differences, people are going to misunderstand it, blow it out of proportion, and that it will become a justification for—or a cause of—discriminating against one sex or the other. I do take that concern seriously, and in the book I discuss it as something we genuinely need to concern ourselves about.

    Nonetheless, I think it is really worth exploring this topic for two reasons. One is that whether we like it or not, there are average differences between the sexes in many different areas, and we cannot simply lie about that. The second reason is that even though there are dangers in talking about sex differences—dangers associated with exaggerating them and moralizing them—there are also dangers in the converse: in minimizing them, ignoring them, and moralizing the absence of sex differences instead. The only responsible solution to that conundrum is to look at what the data say, try to convey it accurately, and talk about sex differences carefully.

    Mounk: Motivate where the dangers lie. The danger of the first kind of error is relatively straightforward: I am a hiring manager at an engineering firm, an excellent female candidate applies, and I say, well, she is a woman, she is not really going to want to be doing this kind of job, and I do not hire her even though she is an excellent, well-qualified candidate. That is a very straightforward danger. Where does the danger lie in not talking about these sex differences?

    Stewart-Williams: There are quite a few, and there are actually other dangers with exaggerating sex differences as well—for instance, if we develop a mental image of what men and boys are supposed to do and what girls and women are supposed to do, we might pressure people to fall into stereotypical definitions of the sexes, which is bad for people who do not fit the norm.

    Mounk: That is obviously related, but slightly different. In the first case, I am a hiring manager at an engineering firm—I may have no belief that it is wrong for women to want to be engineers. It would be great if women were super into engineering, but sadly not all of them are, so I am not going to take this candidate seriously. Now we have moved to a slightly different thing: because there are some statistical sex differences in the world, that is in fact what men and women should be like. So now let’s say I am a dad and my daughter is interested in engineering—well, that is not for you, you should really study psychology. Here we have moved to the danger of ignoring the is-ought distinction.

    Stewart-Williams: There are dangers with exaggerating and moralizing sex differences, as I just mentioned. But there are converse dangers with minimizing sex differences and moralizing the absence of sex differences. One of these is directly symmetrical with the problem of trying to force men and women into traditional gender roles: there is a danger of trying to force them out of those roles—of not accepting the fact that, although there will always be exceptions, some people are simply going to fit with gender-typical norms, roles, and preferences. People sometimes have a tendency to think that that is a bad thing, a product purely of sexism, or—if it is their own kids—to feel guilty that they have done something wrong in parenting because their child falls into typical patterns: boys engaged in rough-and-tumble play, girls loving pink and dolls. That is one danger.

    Subscribe now

    Another is that if we ignore sex differences in career-related preferences, then when we find discrepancies in the sex ratios of different professions, we will assume it is one hundred percent due to discrimination and sexist socialization. While it is very probably partly due to those factors, it is not necessarily—and not even likely to be—the case that they are the only causes. Given that men and women do have, on average, these different preferences, it seems very likely that part of the reason we have different sex ratios in some professions is a result of those statistical differences in preferences. In fact, given that those different preferences exist, it seems very unlikely that they would not be one of the causes of the differences.

    Mounk: There seems to be some preliminary evidence that men are not just more interested in tools generally, but also more interested in a specific tool: artificial intelligence. If that turns out to be the case, at a moment when it seems very likely that AI is going to fundamentally reshape our society, is that going to be to the detriment of women? Are we entering a technological age in which professions that many women occupy—like human resources—become relatively less lucrative, while professions involved in creating these new AI systems, in which men continue to be overrepresented, come to dominate?

    Stewart-Williams: That is a very interesting question, and I think it is possible. One reason it is not necessarily going to turn out that way, though, is that the interface between people and AIs is quite a social activity—it does not feel like tool use in a traditional sense. You are interacting with something verbally; it can feel quite social.

    I was recently at the How the Light Gets In festival at Hay-on-Wye, and I met a few people who work in AI. One was looking at how AI can be used in the medical sphere—that is Charlotte Blease, who is very interested in applying it there to help people. In that area, you might actually find a predominance of women over men being interested in the question. Someone else I met was very interested in the use of AI for psychotherapy—again, a field where women currently predominate over men. It is possible that if AI moves into that area in a big way, there will likewise be a predominance of women over men in AI applications of psychotherapy.

    Mounk: Let’s make a simple prediction. If you think that professional choice is really down to socialization and social pressure—informal prohibitions on men becoming hairdressers or women becoming engineers—then you would expect that the more gender-egalitarian a country is, the less pronounced those gender differences in professional choice would be. So you would expect that in a more traditional society like Egypt, there would be a large difference, with very few women becoming engineers and very few men becoming hairdressers. And in Sweden, or whichever country is relatively gender-egalitarian, you would expect those differences to be relatively more minor. My understanding is that that is not in fact what the evidence shows.

    Stewart-Williams: Your understanding is correct. I would have made that same prediction before I saw the data. Even accepting that there is an innate contribution to preferences, I would have thought that in cultures where people are treated more differently and gender roles are stricter, sex differences would be even bigger—so if there is an innate contribution, it would be amplified—and then smaller in more gender-egalitarian, more individualistic, and wealthier societies where people are freer to pursue their own interests.

    But as you say, there is this phenomenon called the gender equality paradox, which reflects the fact that for many traits, including career-related preferences and job choices, it is the exact opposite: the more gender-equal, wealthy, and individualistic a nation is, the larger those sex differences become rather than smaller. Very counterintuitive.

    Mounk: Really interesting finding. I had an interesting episode that touched on that with Alice Evans on the global gender paradox, among other things.

    One of the things that makes these conversations often unproductive—and I think this is true not just of this conversation but of many conversations—is that different people have different audiences in mind, and that drives them to talk about things in slightly different ways. Let me give a totally different example.

    A lot of social science disciplines, like sociology, love to make the move of saying: this thing actually turns out to be socially constructed. I find that useful for an introductory undergraduate class, in the sense that a lot of 18-year-olds come in thinking that something like the United States Constitution is a God-given thing that is objectively correct and beyond question. To say: these are particular people who built this at a particular moment—brilliant people doing something important, but with their own shortcomings and blind spots—is a helpful corrective. I am not sure how many 18-year-olds still arrive at college with that kind of naive view, but I can see where it comes from. There is a danger, though, in over-inflating what it means for something to be socially constructed, which is a general pet peeve of mine, and also in making your whole academic career invested in pointing out that this or that thing is not natural or God-given—speaking to an audience that already agrees with you.

    I think something similar happens when people talk about gender differences. A lot of people, for understandable reasons, think: there are stereotypes and prejudices in society that coerce men and women into gender roles and obstruct women from advancing in certain professions—that is really what we need to be on the lookout against. From that perspective, writing a book about sex differences seems actively unhelpful. Then there are others who say: the mainstream has become so concerned about that real danger that it has overshot the mark and gone in the other direction, producing all kinds of other confusions—and that is what we should be setting ourselves against. We can call these alpha bias and beta bias. Talk us through that.

    Stewart-Williams: Those are not my terms, but they are very useful ones. The alpha bias is the tendency to exaggerate the magnitude of sex differences, and the beta bias is the opposite—the tendency to minimize, downplay, and perhaps deny them. There is quite a strong tendency toward the beta bias in media and academia, in the mainstream and among the chattering classes. The alpha bias is perhaps the historical starting point, and it does exist in some small areas of academia and probably journalism as well. I would have to say the tendency to exaggerate sex differences sometimes exists in my own field of evolutionary psychology—perhaps because we are responding to the beta bias we find elsewhere in academia, and it may have swung to the opposite extreme to some extent.

    What I am trying to do with the book is respond to both, critique both, and walk a happy medium between the two. I would love to think that people on both sides will agree and perhaps come to a truce—but of course another possibility is that I will simply annoy people on both sides of the debate. That is nonetheless what I am trying to do: strike a balance.

    Mounk: Let me pose the question so we can address this directly. To make things more complicated, you then add two further biases—the gamma and the delta bias. What are those?

    Stewart-Williams: The gamma bias is the tendency to highlight sex differences that put women in a better light than men, while downplaying those that put men in a better light than women. I think it is a response to historical anti-female sexism—basically an attempt to set right the reverse tendency, where differences were highlighted in ways that cast men as superior and women as deficient. It is a kind of overcorrection that aims to be protective of women.

    Subscribe now

    The delta bias, on the other hand, is a tendency to highlight and favor sex differences that go in the opposite direction to traditional sex differences. For instance, devoting everything to your career and placing family lower down the list might be frowned upon if a man does it, but celebrated if a woman does it. Sleeping around is sometimes considered a bad thing if men do it, but a good thing if women do it. I think that is a response to traditional social norms.

    Mounk: That reminds me of one of the very early viral internet controversies—the Duke “Fuck List,” if you remember that. A senior at Duke University had made a joking PowerPoint, styled like a senior thesis, about all the men she had slept with in college. In a way you can see how it was a fun, charming idea, though the slides themselves were quite demeaning and objectifying—ranking all of these men in various ways. Some people thought it was a mean way to interact with and write about other people. But Jezebel and the early internet feminists defended it as a great act of female empowerment. It was obvious that the same people, had it been a man ranking and grading the genitals of women he had slept with in similar ways, would have found it to be terrible. But because this was typically something men did and not women, when a woman did it, it was considered empowering.

    Stewart-Williams: That is a good example of the delta bias, and also a good example of where I think it comes from—different standards are applied because of the history, because it is turning the tables. Those are the four biases that I think make the discussion harder and make it trickier to research and talk about sex differences without it getting heated. There are these biases and preferences that people have for what kind of sex differences they want to see or not see.

    Mounk: We have done a lot of the preparatory ground for thinking about how to approach these questions. Let’s go a little deeper into how we should think about particular sex differences in light of all this. Why don’t you tell me the three most juicy ones we should talk about for the next twenty or so minutes?

    Stewart-Williams: How about the sex difference in interest in casual sex, in choosiness about sexual partners, and in aggression?

    Mounk: Let’s start with casual sex.

    Stewart-Williams: The difference here—and you will be very surprised to hear this—is that on average men are more interested in casual sex, no-strings-attached sex, and sexual variety than women are. That is a pretty big difference as human sex differences go. Depending on exactly what you ask about, the difference is about 0.8 of a standard deviation between the means for men and women, with men scoring higher. To use the analogy of plucking two people at random, one man and one woman, for that sex difference you would find about two thirds of the time that the man would be more interested in casual sex than the woman. Again, there is a significant minority where it would be the other way around. So it is a real sex difference and it is pretty substantial as human sex differences go, but it is not quite as big as people sometimes make it out to be.

    This raises an interesting point about sex differences in general: even when you have a sex difference that is fairly modest at the mean, when you go out to the extreme of the distribution, the difference will typically get a lot bigger. If you go out to the extreme of the distribution for interest in casual sex, you will find that even though it is about 0.8 or one standard deviation at the mean, out at the extreme there are many more men than women. I think a lot of our stereotypes come from thinking about those extremes rather than about people closer to the mean.

    Source: (2026) A Billion Years of Sex Differences by Steve Stewart-Williams.

    Mounk: It is just a function of how normal distributions work. If you have a relatively small difference at the median—where the top of the distribution is—that relatively small difference can mean that once you are three or four standard deviations out, where you are talking about people at the extremes—the most or least intelligent, the most or least interested in casual sex, the most or least violent—that small difference in the mean can translate into a four, five, or tenfold difference at those extremes. Now that we have established those statistical properties, how does that shape social behavior—and things like casual sex in particular?

    Stewart-Williams: It is often going to be the case that men are pursuing casual sex to a greater extent than women are. One mistake people often make when they hear about that sex difference is thinking that the claim is that men are more interested in casual sex whereas women are more interested in long-term relationships. But actually men and women have similar levels of interest in long-term committed relationships—it is really only within the domain of casual sex that we find this sex difference.

    There are actually two differences here. One is that men are more interested in casual sex on average. The second is that when it comes to casual sex and low-commitment relationships—and also early courtship—women tend to be choosier about their mates: choosier about who they are willing to have a short-term thing with.

    Mounk: On the first topic, before we get to mate choosiness—what do lesbian and gay relationships tell us here? Obviously there may be ways in which lesbian women’s sexual behavior differs from heterosexual women’s, and gay men’s sexual behavior differs from heterosexual men’s—not just in terms of the object of attraction, but presumably this is at least a suggestive field of study: what happens if you take two people with male sexual preferences and put them in a relationship together, versus two people with more female sexual preferences in a relationship together? Obviously there is going to be a huge range, from very monogamous gay couples to very open ones. But do we see systemic differences between lesbian and gay couples, and what does that tell us?

    Stewart-Williams: We do see differences, and they stem from the fact that in same-sex relationships, people are not having to negotiate with the preferences of the other sex. They can typically express their own preferences to a greater degree, with less compromise. Looking at the sexual behavior of gay men and lesbians can therefore provide a clearer window into the sexual preferences of men and women in general.

    What you find is that gay men typically engage in a lot more casual sex than straight men, because they are interacting with other men who typically have similar preferences. Lesbians, on the other hand, typically have less casual sex than straight women—again, because they are not having to accommodate the average preferences of the other sex. It fits very nicely with the idea that there are these average differences between the sexes when it comes to interest in casual sex, and it is a good piece of evidence for that idea.

    Mounk: You were saying that men do not necessarily have less interest in long-term committed relationships, but they do have a much greater interest in casual sex. If you just know those two things, you would predict that you would end up with a lot of couples that are open to each partner having casual sex—which is certainly not the universal norm among gay couples, but is true of many of them.

    Stewart-Williams: It is true of more gay couples than straight couples. In straight couples, some men do want that, but sexual jealousy often gets in the way—a man might think: it would be great if I could sleep with other people, but I do not want my partner sleeping with other people, so I will content myself with monogamy. That seems to be less often the case with gay men. I am sure many do fit that description, but there do seem to be more gay couples where jealousy is not quite such a big issue as it is in straight couples—that is the impression I have, anyway.

    Mounk: Just to up the level of intrigue here—I have read, though I am not sure if this is true, that there are significantly higher rates of divorce among lesbian couples than among gay couples. Why is that?

    Stewart-Williams: I have read the same thing—there are good data on that. Why that is, I am really not too sure. It could be a selection effect, or it could be related to the fact that among straight couples, around two thirds of divorces are initiated by the woman rather than the man. Maybe it is an offshoot of women’s greater choosiness about their mates—our next juicy topic. But I am not a hundred percent sure about that.

    Mounk: Let’s go to choosiness about mates. Two things here are striking. The first is that evolutionary theory would suggest that women are choosier about mates than men because they invest more in offspring—if only through pregnancy, and often well beyond that. That is true throughout the animal kingdom and is true for humans as well. The other thing that is often forgotten—and you will have to remind us of the Greek designation for it—is that actually the difference between the two sexes in humans is relatively smaller than it is in most other animals in this regard.

    Stewart-Williams: At least for long-term relationships it is smaller. When we think of women being choosy and men being not choosy, that has some truth in the short-term context.

    Mounk: So at 2 a.m. in a club, the man is happy to go home with whatever woman, but the woman says: even though I might enjoy casual sex, I am still going to be quite picky. But when it comes to long-term relationships, suddenly the men become picky too.

    Stewart-Williams: Both sexes tend to be pretty picky in long-term relationships—and maybe similarly picky. So you get the alpha bias, the exaggeration of sex differences, when it comes to the long-term context. It is a general truth, actually, that sex differences in sexual psychology are a lot smaller when it comes to long-term committed relationships than to short-term relationships, casual sex, and early courtship. It is in early courtship and low-commitment relationships that the sex differences are a lot bigger.

    Mounk: Is this a challenge for evolutionary theory? Or is it simply downstream from the fact that humans procreate in very different ways from most other animals, because they invest in offspring for so much longer?

    Stewart-Williams: It is not a challenge to an evolutionary perspective—I think it fits very nicely with one. According to the evolutionary perspective, the greater female choosiness we see right across the animal kingdom follows directly from the fact that female animals in general invest more in each offspring they produce than male animals do. Because they invest more, they can have fewer offspring in their lifetimes. Males, on the other hand, typically invest less in each offspring, and therefore in principle could have many more offspring than any female could. That creates different selection pressures on both sexes, and produces a range of traits in males that increase their chances of being one of the few males that has many offspring, rather than one of the many males that has none or just a handful. That is where most sex differences come from: the difference in the maximum offspring number each sex can produce.

    We have some of the same thing in our species, but because of the great dependence of our young, we have evolved a reproductive system where we fall in love, form pair bonds, and engage in high levels of biparental care—much higher than you see in most mammals. When males are investing heavily in their young as well as females, that reduces the sex difference in the maximum offspring number each sex can produce. It brings down the ceiling number of offspring that men can produce—a few exceptional historical examples notwithstanding—and as it brings it down, it has led to the evolution of reduced sexual dimorphism in our species. One area where that is evident is in the sex difference in choosiness.

    The sex difference in choosiness is a result of females investing more, but in a long-term context both sexes are typically going to be investing quite heavily—in the relationship and in any offspring that result from it. For exactly the same reason that females evolved to be choosy when they can only have a relatively small number of offspring, men likewise evolve to be choosy in a context where they are only going to have a relatively circumscribed number of offspring.

    Mounk: I once leafed through a book arguing that when we compare humans to other animal species, we fall somewhere towards the middle of the range on the extent to which we are wired to be monogamous—that some species are strongly monogamous, and many species, perhaps most, are not monogamous at all.

    When you look at a whole set of physical characteristics of humans, they tend to fall somewhere in the middle between those extremes. The book was arguing that we are semi-monogamous, and that this is how to think about us and how to explain a lot of conflict in social life—the fact that we have both a tendency towards pair-bonded long-term committed relationships and a tendency beyond that. Do you find that a helpful way of thinking about this topic?

    Stewart-Williams: We have a strong tendency toward pair bonding and biparental care, but it is not like gibbons or some birds. We also have an interest in sexual partners other than our main partner, which is not uncommon, and that nudges us toward arrangements other than strictly monogamous pair bonding. Men have a desire for sexual variety—some members of both sexes do, but men typically have a stronger desire for it—and that sometimes translates into polygyny, where one man has more than one partner. Pair bonding is the most common relationship type found in basically all human societies, including polygynous ones. Even in societies where men can take more than one wife, it is a minority activity. It is not like gorillas, where a male either has a harem of females or is a bachelor—with humans, most men who have more than zero mates have only one. There are a small number who have multiple mates. Pair bonding is our main reproductive approach, but we are very flexible and do all sorts of other things as well.

    On to the third topic: aggression. At least when it comes to direct or face-to-face aggression, men on average do more of it. That includes verbal aggression, where the effect size is medium—about half a standard deviation between the means for men and women, so not a massive sex difference. But as you go up the scale toward more intense forms of aggression—physical violence, pushing and shoving, more extreme forms of physical violence—the gap gets bigger and men come to predominate more. At the extreme of one-on-one violence, which would be homicide, men predominate massively: around ninety percent of homicides worldwide are perpetrated by men. Only a minority of men commit homicide, but among those who do, it is massively skewed toward men.

    When it comes to indirect aggression—the mean girls phenomenon, gossip, spreading rumors, where you are trying to harm someone but not to their face—we find either no sex difference, with both sexes doing it about evenly, or we find it is slightly more common among women than men. But for most forms of aggression, men predominate.

    Mounk: There is another area where stereotypes seem to hold up to some degree. When you talk about the extreme forms of violence, that difference is very obvious in the statistics and easy to understand—men are more likely to murder, more likely to be soldiers, more likely to be in criminal gangs, and prisons are much more full of men than women. But when you are not talking about the extremes, when you are talking about people towards the middle of the distribution, how big is that difference in standard operating procedure? Is it that the average man is not particularly violent, but perhaps once or twice in his life has gotten into a small scuffle at a bar? The average woman is not particularly violent, but when she engages in social aggression, it takes the form of rounding up a few people to ostracize somebody in the friend group they have a grievance with?

    To what extent are those stereotypes about the middle of the distribution true? Is that a helpful lens for understanding society? As an evolutionary biologist and psychologist, do you feel like you can watch Cruel Intentions or whatever high school movie and check off the behaviors—that your training helps you understand what is going on in ways it would not for someone without it? Or do you think it does not in fact illuminate social reality in that kind of way? Is the alpha bias or the beta bias more tempting here?

    Stewart-Williams: That is a good question. I think with low-level aggression the alpha bias comes in more, and people exaggerate. People are maybe a little surprised when they hear that the difference is not larger for verbal aggression and the like. The way you describe it is pretty accurate for modern Western societies: most men are not especially aggressive—they may get into an occasional scuffle over the course of their lifetimes, or more commonly the odd verbal altercation—and likewise women are not especially aggressive either.

    Women may have as many verbal aggressive interactions, but with less of a sense that there is a physical threat and that it could turn into actual violence. I think that is accurate in the West. We have successfully tamed our aggressive impulses to quite a high level in the West, and in other and more traditional cultures there were higher levels of violence—especially among men. Culture brings it out more in some contexts, while simultaneously suppressing it somewhat in modern Western populations, which I personally think is a good thing. I imagine most people would agree. It is an example of a case where we have a natural tendency that society pushes against—but it is a tendency that is generally a bad thing, so it is a good thing that we are able to engineer unnaturally low levels of aggression.

    Mounk: One benefit of thinking about the world in evolutionary terms is that it helps us see where the dangers lie for society. One very fundamental insight from evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology is the human tendency to split into in-groups and out-groups. You could fall into the naturalistic fallacy and say: therefore we should encourage people to stick to their tribe and hate the other. But we have learned from history that that is a disaster. The whole point of civilization, the whole point of building positive institutions, is to mitigate the impact of the in-group and out-group tendency. The way to do that is to channel it—not to deprive people of any outlet for it, but to redirect it.

    That is why you have sports rivalries in high schools. That is why, if you think of Harry Potter, you split a boarding school into different houses so that they can compete with each other. There are dangers with that—sometimes they come to blows—but the main point is to make people within each house aspire to work hard and take pride in it. The city of Siena is split into around twenty contrade—parts of the city that compete against each other in a huge horse race—as a way of instilling solidarity within each neighborhood. They hate each other and compete fiercely, but it has historically strengthened Siena’s ability to work together as a whole, because it instills a strong civic identity. In terms of aggression, you might think sports work similarly: when you are playing American football, rugby, or even a less violent sport like basketball, that is a way of channeling aggression into something socially non-harmful.

    Stewart-Williams: A way of, as Freud would have said, sublimating those potentially destructive desires. I think that is true and interesting. When you study the fact that we are so prone to in-group and out-group biases, evolutionary biology and psychology, rather than saying it is natural and therefore good, can equally well puncture it. You might genuinely think your in-group really is great and that the out-group really is terrible. But if you realize that we have this built-in tendency in human nature to divide the world into in-groups and out-groups, it can make you challenge that. It can make you think: maybe I am just falling prey to this evolved illusion, and it is not actually true that we are superior and angelic and they are genuinely terrible and demonic.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Steve discuss how society should respond to sex differences, why there are more female double threats than male ones, and to what extent certain disciplines being dominated by men are due to sex differences versus discrimination. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    58 min
  • This Week at Persuasion
    I’m so grateful that I’m too old for anyone to force me to play sports. (Photo by Tomohiro Ohsumi/Getty Images.)
    • Our weekly Intellectual Bootcamp for paying subscribers is on Fridays at 12pm noon Eastern. For more details, check out our events page!

    Read more

    0 min
  • Goodbye To All That
    Party for the Creators Project, a partnership with Intel and Vice, London, 2010. (Photo by Dave M. Benett/Getty Images.)

    I don’t know if anyone but me noticed, but digital media died last month.

    In mid-May, a media mogul named Byron Allen bought a majority stake in BuzzFeed, which has been culturally invisible and financially struggling since shutting down its news division in 2023 and pivoting to AI content. Just weeks later, Vox Media, a collection of brands including New York Magazine, sold its more valuable properties to Lupa Systems CEO James Murdoch, the younger son of Rupert Murdoch. Companies like Vice and Vox were hailed as the future of media in the 2010s, standard-bearers of a new generation of youth-focused, internet-savvy publications that would take over from the New York Times and CNN. At the height of their valuations, around a decade ago, Vice, Vox, and BuzzFeed (the “big three” of the digital media industry) were estimated to be worth a combined $8.4 billion, with Vice accounting for $5.7 billion by itself. Supposedly smart investors were betting on these companies, and venture capital enabled them to build shiny New York headquarters with hundreds of mostly millennial staffers, including me.

    Subscribe now

    I joined Vice in 2010, just on the cusp of this era. I thought I was going to work at a magazine, and for a while I did—we had fashion shoots, photo spreads, fiction, a comic on the back page. For a while, we gave Bob Odenkirk his own page where he could do anything he liked; once, he wanted to do a Highlights-style “can you find the dildos in this picture?” game, which meant I had to go out and buy a half-dozen fake penises.

    As Vice grew—and investors bought in—our focus shifted more toward the internet, and toward social media in particular. Weird magazine shit was out. The game was to capture attention, in the form of clicks and shares and interactions. We were ostensibly competing with BuzzFeed and Vox and other smaller sites like Upworthy, but all of these outlets were fellow-travelers in the same ideological project.

    Digital media companies were all built around a single idea, which was that the internet and its attendant platforms—social media sites, Google, YouTube—had created an opportunity to build massive audiences. These companies used technical and editorial strategies that were totally foreign to their print forebears. The Huffington Post pioneered SEO practices, Gawker perfected the format of the can’t-look-away personal essay, Vice was an early adopter of online video, BuzzFeed practically invented a half-dozen viral post formats. All of this was in service of building those precious audience metrics, but the actual customers of these businesses weren’t the readers or viewers but the advertisers who coveted access to that audience; all of the major digital media companies also had teams that produced ads, including ads that looked like editorial content, aka “native advertising” or “branded content.”

    There were sometimes controversies over whether some companies were inflating the size of their audiences (short answer: they were), but the underlying assumption that attracting traffic would lead to profits was rarely, if ever, questioned. None of the digital media companies used paywalls in the 2010s. Executives and investors wanted to see those traffic numbers increase, and locking out non-subscribers would mean the numbers would go down—number go up, good; number go down, bad. If these new media brands could attract huge numbers of people, particularly young people, they were bound to become financially successful at some point, right?

    I had extremely self-interested reasons to want this to come to pass. I jumped aboard the Vice train early enough that I got stock appreciation rights that would have been worth something had the company been sold or gone public near the peak of its value. Sometimes I would do some back-of-the-envelope math to try to figure out how much I would make in an IPO, but the numbers were too complicated and vague—certainly something in the five figures, which to a journalist in his mid-twenties is kind of a lot.

    The early 2010s were a time of techno-optimism more generally. The internet would connect us and lead to the formation of new communities. Social media could fuel and spark pro-democracy movements in autocratic countries. Citizen journalists could livestream newsworthy events in real time. The media world would have fewer gatekeepers. A connected world, it seemed to many, would be more populist, smarter, idealistic, more progressive, just plain nicer. And incidentally, we would all get rich. Sounds like a pretty good deal.

    The flood of VC money that accompanied these sunny feelings was certainly real enough (a trickle went into my bank account). The jobs were real, and the equipment, and the stories the journalists produced, and the awards that some of those stories won—I remember the collective feeling of pride digital media journalists had when Official Journalism Bodies began handing out awards to online outlets. But it was all based on sand.

    Digital media companies were attracting their audiences in large part through social media apps and search engines—that audience wasn’t “ours” in any meaningful sense. These platforms gradually realized they wanted to keep people on Instagram or Facebook or Google results rather than sending the traffic to publishers. The tech giants began capturing a bigger and bigger slice of online ad revenue.

    At the same time, competition for eyeballs was increasing. It soon became clear to everyone that social media networks were not places people would congregate to celebrate their common interests but the most vicious attention markets ever invented. As entrepreneurial actors attempted to game these market dynamics, you saw a blossoming of influencers, streamers, and conspiracy theorists, all competing for eyeballs with some combination of sex appeal, controversy, and sensationalism. Say what you will about Vice or BuzzFeed, we generally tried to tell stories that were true. We never had a chance.

    The players of the digital media age are mostly still around, at least in name. Vice was bought in bankruptcy and has resumed publishing and making films. Vox never stopped publishing and will likely continue after its sale. Even The Huffington Post, now owned by BuzzFeed, is still kicking. A group of former Gawker Media employees launched the site Defector as a kind of successor in 2020; more recently, a collection of former Eater staffers launched the new food site Ravenous. But all these outlets have retreated from the old ad-driven model, and are instead asking readers to actually pay for journalism. The dominant idea kicking around the industry is that a small but devoted following of readers who will pay you for your work is far more valuable than a much larger readership that merely clicks on your links. Everyone working in media wants to cultivate an intimate community that will follow them from one platform to another. Increasingly, the things we are creating are being put behind paywalls, in private Discord channels, on subscriber-only podcasts.

    Subscribe now

    A lot of the individual journalists who got their start during this era are still bouncing around as well. A few of my colleagues and competitors washed up at The New York Times or The Atlantic, old-school publications that weathered the social media age better than the upstarts that were supposed to replace them. Others pivoted toward advertising or “comms.” I remember one editor I worked with at Vice quitting to go work on a flower farm and all of us congratulating him for getting out. I stayed online: I landed a job at Eater after getting laid off from Vice, then got laid off again, then began devoting more time to my Substack (many such cases).

    But our collective dream is gone. We were supposed to build… what? I’m still not sure what the end goal of the digital media era was. A more populist vision of journalism, where reporters and editors were accountable to their audiences? A shared cultural and political vocabulary that would cross borders and define a generation? A forum for frustrations with the “establishment,” whatever that might mean? Just a platform for a lot of young media talents?

    Whatever we were trying to do, it failed. The money is gone. The jobs are gone. The websites we made are atrophying into junk floating around in cyberspace. I don’t know if anyone will believe me, but man, it was fun while it lasted.

    Harry Cheadle is a freelance writer and editor living in Seattle.

    A version of this article was originally published in Notebook Dump.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • A Precarious Balance
    An elderly protester is taken away by police officers at a "Lift The Ban" demonstration in support of the proscribed group Palestine Action, calling for the recently imposed ban to be lifted, in Parliament Square, central London, on September 6, 2025. (Photo by Justin Tallis/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Canceling an election. Banning political parties. Blocking access to foreign media. Arresting demonstrators simply for holding signs.

    These sound like the tools of dictatorships. But over the past five years, European governments have engaged in all these actions.

    In each case, governments have defended these measures as essential to maintain democracy, national security, or the rule of law. Their explanations echo Karl Loewenstein’s concept of “militant democracy”—the argument that the defense of democracy sometimes requires undemocratic acts. Loewenstein published his theory of militant democracy in 1937 amid the rise of European fascism. Winston Churchill expressed a similar idea in 1948, writing, “The letter of the law must not in supreme emergency obstruct those who are charged with its protection and enforcement.”

    And yet, these actions give ammunition to authoritarian powers that claim Western democracy is a sham. When Britain banned Kremlin media outlets RT and Sputnik after Russia invaded Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s spokesman accused the UK of “another step to grossly restrict freedom of speech.”

    How did European governments get to the point where far more repressive regimes like Russia can purport to give them lectures on political rights? More pertinently, are there ways European states can defend democracy and national security without using tactics that turn into political and reputational liabilities?

    European governments have taken several actions in recent years that go beyond normal democratic practice.

    In 2025, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency labeled the most popular party in the country, the Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD), “right-wing extremist.” The classification created a legal basis for wiretapping the AfD and infiltration by undercover agents. German officials said they took action against the AfD because its “xenophobic, anti-minority, Islamophobic” statements threatened the constitutional rights of citizens.

    Last December, British police arrested hundreds of demonstrators just for holding up signs containing the words Palestine Action—the name of a group banned under UK terrorism laws after it carried out attacks on British military facilities, defense contractors, financial firms and universities. “This is not even ‘draconian,’ it is vile,” huffed a commentary published by Russia’s RT. (Russian police, meanwhile, have arrested demonstrators simply for holding up blank pieces of paper.)

    Romania canceled the first round of its presidential elections in 2024 after the surprise victory of Călin Georgescu, a Russia-friendly new age Christian who appealed to conspiracy theories and superstition, while Moldova banned pro-Russian political parties in 2023 and 2025. Romania attributed the cancellation of its 2024 election to an intense, Russian-backed TikTok campaign supporting Georgescu that violated campaign financing and labeling laws.

    There is no mystery as to why some governments have taken dramatic actions to protect liberal democracy from foreign and domestic threats. European society is under extreme stress. The Great Recession in the late 2000s, COVID lockdowns, the hollowing out of Europe’s industrial base, and the arrival of large numbers of immigrants have fed radical, populist movements on the left and right.

    Right-wing parties believe national governments and the supranational EU have been far too liberal in economic and social policy, while leftists favor even more social diversity and public spending.

    Meanwhile, many governments perceive a foreign policy emergency born of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Trump administration’s ambiguity about defending Europe. They are spending heavily on their own militaries and aid to Ukraine. Leftists and rightists have been able to find common ground in opposing this spending, arguing it could provoke Russia further and that the money is better spent at home. Russian propaganda has sought to intensify the conflicts inside each European nation, amplifying grievances from any quarter against governments that stand up to the Kremlin.

    Governments have been at pains to justify their coercive actions as individual special cases. For example, the EU’s ban on Russian media outlets recalled efforts by Putin’s Russia and the Soviet Union to block out Western broadcasts and news sources. But the EU bypassed questions of media freedom, saying its action was essential because Russia’s disinformation was “an operational tool in its assault on Ukraine.”

    Subscribe now

    Still, as the saying goes: when you’re explaining, you’re losing. Despite constant justifications—many of them well reasoned—the succession of such incidents has a bad look overall for nations that see themselves as beacons of democracy.

    The best guarantor of national security is a sense of national unity and confidence. Traumatized by the national chauvinism that unleashed World War II, European elites bet heavily on the EU to develop a “new European man” with a continent-wide, rather than a national, frame of reference. This boomeranged into extreme nationalism by some citizens and disaffection toward their nations by others. In 2023, for example, just 32 percent of EU citizens said they would be willing to fight for their country.

    Reversing this trend requires inculcating national pride, spreading knowledge of how democratic societies work, and an understanding of what life is truly like in lands ruled by authoritarian governments and terror groups. Such education is also the best firewall against undemocratic domestic political movements. Making populations less vulnerable to messaging from the extremes is far better than banning parties or prosecuting their leaders once they have built large followings.

    Governments need to be alert to threats in the shadows. For example, the massive TikTok campaign to support Georgescu, with its obvious violation of election regulations, was directed mainly to the social feeds of young, rural, and politically radical people. It was almost invisible to state authorities and the pro-democracy community before he emerged with an election win. If the machinations in Georgescu’s favor had been detected earlier, they could have been publicly exposed well before election day.

    This is what Moldova’s government did when it disqualified pro-Moscow parties from running. It broadly publicized evidence of vote-buying and other irregularities, dampening claims the parties were banned solely for political reasons.

    When the actions of anti-liberal actors are less egregious, strong actions are harder to publicly justify. When French right-wing politician Marine Le Pen was preparing to run for president last year, a court banned her from holding elective office for five years. It found her guilty of diverting millions of euros, provided to pay for aides when she served in the European Parliament from 2004-2016, to pay employees of her own party in France.

    Such a crime was not the kind likely to incense citizens, meaning in practice that the verdict played easily into claims authorities were using technicalities to suppress her popular Rassemblement National party. Prosecutors are now investigating Jordan Bardella, who is expected to run in Le Pen’s place if her appeal is unsuccessful, for alleged fraud. A poll in May showed he could win the 2027 race for president.

    Subscribe now

    Governments should also dare use their most coercive powers only when they are likely to prevail. The British ban of Palestine Action was overturned by the High Court in February; a government appeal is pending. A German court issued a temporary injunction against the state’s designation of the AfD as “confirmed right-wing extremist.” Such developments undermine governments’ claims they deploy extreme measures only in cases of unquestionable certainty and gravity.

    Authorities have also looked rather hapless in their bans on RT and Sputnik. The bans sharply cut audiences on the outlets’ main channels, but the networks have gloated over their cat-and-mouse strategy to spread content through dozens of new information brands. “We spit on your sanctions,” RT Chief Editor Margarita Simonyan said.

    Given present dangers, democratic governments may have no choice but to take highly undemocratic actions again to fend off authoritarianism and terror. But such measures should always be a last resort—and only after the exhaustion of the less draconian remedies of education, vigilance, and public exposure of malign actors.

    Thomas Kent teaches at Columbia University. He was formerly president and CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and standards editor of The Associated Press.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • In Britain, A Tragic Murder Was Followed By Mass Confusion
    Floral tributes for Henry Nowak on June 3, 2026. (Photo by Ben Stansall / AFP via Getty Images.)

    The tragic death of 18-year-old Briton Henry Nowak in Southampton last December, the gruesome details of which have finally been revealed after his killer was convicted of murder last week, has become a lightning rod for a racial controversy on both sides of the Atlantic.

    The outrage has focused on the behavior of the police officers who arrived in response to the killer’s false report of a racist attack. (Nowak’s murderer, 23-year-old Vickrum Digwa, is Sikh.) Nowak, barely conscious and near death, was at first treated as the presumptive perpetrator and put in handcuffs despite his attempts to tell the officers he had been stabbed. In the United Kingdom, the backlash has already caused an anti-police riot. Even in the United States, it is starting to reverberate via social media and a growing number of articles covering the tragedy.

    The anger is understandable: It is undeniable, and appalling, that the officers on the scene failed to treat the victim of a violent crime with the dignity he deserved or to offer him assistance. The case also raises serious questions about when the contemporary form of identity-conscious “antiracism,” which has been explicitly embraced by British police in recent years, itself turns into a form of racial prejudice.

    Yet Nowak’s tragic death has also generated a tsunami of irresponsible demagoguery. Nigel Farage, the leader of Britain’s populist right, has called for “pure cold rage” in response to the case. Stateside, Elon Musk has declared that being “racist against Whites” is now “official police policy” in the United Kingdom.

    So what exactly happened on that tragic night in Southampton—and what does that tell us about the state of Britain, as well as the global influence of a racial reckoning that began in the United States in the summer of 2020?

    When Nowak was fatally stabbed around 11:15pm on December 3, 2025, he was on his way home from an evening out with friends celebrating the end of his first year of college. At some point he encountered Digwa, and noticed a sheathed blade on his belt, exempt from the UK’s strict knife possession laws for religious reasons.1 Nowak, who had earlier been filming himself singing songs, asked, “Are you a bad man?” and began filming him. Digwa, apparently perceiving this as a taunt, replied, “I am a bad man” and moved to grab the phone.

    Moments later, Digwa stabbed Nowak four times, in the chest and in the legs; he also cut his face. The wounded young man attempted to flee, climbing over some trash bins and a fence before collapsing in the yard of a house. Digwa’s brother Gurpreet, who arrived shortly afterward from the family’s nearby home, called the police to report a racial attack by a drunk white male. (Tests later showed that Nowak was only mildly intoxicated at the time of his death, with a blood alcohol content below the drinking and driving limit.) As the family waited for the police to arrive, Digwa’s mother took the blade and the sheath home at his request.

    The police arrived at 11.37pm. As bodycam footage released on Tuesday shows, Digwa claimed that Nowak had hit him and knocked his turban off, pointing to a supposedly swollen eye. When Nowak told one of the officers, twice, “I’ve been stabbed,” the policeman reacted dismissively: “Whereabouts? I don’t think you have, mate.” The policeman proceeded to put Nowak in handcuffs, ignoring his repeated pleas that “I can’t breathe.” He did tell a female officer that Nowak should be checked out and that “he says he’s been stabbed”; but the check was quick and perfunctory. At this point, a man, presumably either Digwa or his brother, can be heard saying: “He hasn’t been stabbed,” and the policewoman replies: “I know, but we have to check, don’t we?”

    As Nowak lay on his side, motionless, the male officer told him he was under arrest for assault and read him his rights; the female officer called an ambulance. The video ends with her checking Nowak’s eyes, and then saying: “His pupils aren’t even reacting.” Moments later, one of the officers tried to give Nowak CPR and was shocked to discover that he really had been stabbed.

    At 11:55, Digwa was arrested. About 40 minutes later, Henry Nowak was officially pronounced dead.

    Many actions by the police officers that night raise serious questions. Why did they decide to handcuff Nowak, who was clearly in a weakened state and posed no threat—yet apparently, according to Nowak’s father, did not put Digwa in handcuffs after his arrest?

    Why was an ambulance not dispatched straight away after the call to emergency services? Even in Gurpreet Digwa’s false account of events, he had told the operator that his brother’s supposed assailant might need medical attention after a fall from a fence. When the police got there, Digwa’s father, who was trying to help Nowak stand up, told the officers that “he keeps dropping down” and “he has a mouthful of blood.” After this, and after Nowak’s repeated assertions that he had been stabbed, the failure to thoroughly check him for injuries was inexcusable.

    It is difficult to disagree with the statement by Nowak’s father, Mark, that Henry was treated in an “inhumane and degrading” way while he struggled for breath in his final moments of consciousness, terrified and desperate. These are shocking facts, and they certainly warrant an investigation, which—thankfully—is now being conducted by the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

    However, these facts do not justify the inaccurate, hyperbolic, and plainly dishonest claims that have been circulated in recent days—not only by random social media posters, but by politicians and journalists. That includes outright lies: For instance, that Nowak was in police custody for an hour while he was dying and was “denied first aid” (in fact, the ambulance was called within three minutes of the police arriving), or that the murderer had his sentence reduced because, as a Sikh, he had a “good legal reason” to carry a weapon as a ceremonial religious item. In fact, it was the opposite: the judge explicitly said that Digwa’s abuse of “the privilege extended to Sikhs to have a knife in a public place for religious reasons” was a factor in increasing the sentence. Digwa was sentenced to life with a minimum of 21 years before he is eligible to be considered for release.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal values wherever they are threatened, please become a paying subscriber today!

    There have also been numerous assertions that Nowak was accused merely of “racism” or “saying racist things” when, in fact, he was arrested on charges of assault. In the initial call to emergency services, Digwa said (falsely, the court found)2 that he had been punched, pushed “till my turban came off,” and grabbed by the head.

    Also widely repeated: The claim that Nowak “bled out” during his disastrous encounter with the police. Writing in The Free Press, the British right-wing commentator Konstantin Kisin asserts that Nowak was “bleeding from five stab wounds [in front of] officers who had decided that the man who put those wounds in him was the real victim.” These accounts imply that Nowak was visibly bleeding, and that the officers’ glib dismissal could only be due to them prioritizing alleged racism as the greater crime. Rupert Lowe, a member of parliament for the far-right Restore party, even describes Nowak as dying “in a pool of [his] own blood.”

    But that’s false. Trial testimony made it clear that Nowak was bleeding internally—a particularly lethal situation when it comes to injuries. No blood can be seen on his body in the police footage. He apparently had a visible cut on his face: The footage shows the female officer who went to check Nowak for stab wounds asking where he may have been stabbed and then repeating twice, “In the face?” But that minor injury could have been easily attributed to his going over the fence and falling down. The lethal knife wounds to the chest were outwardly small and invisible, especially in poor lighting. The police clearly assumed, based on the earlier call from Gurpreet Digwa, that Nowak’s weakened and half-conscious state was due to intoxication. The calm and composed demeanor of four other people—Vickrum Digwa and his family—undoubtedly boosted their credibility.

    Should Nowak’s statements that he had been stabbed have been taken far more seriously? Yes, of course. But did the officers ignore clear and visible evidence of the stabbing? No.

    Was the officers’ dismissive attitude toward Henry Nowak, as many are claiming, a result and an example of “two-tier policing” that holds white people to a higher standard than minorities—or even of “anti-white racism”?

    There is certainly substance to reports of “woke” pressures on British law enforcement. The fallout from the 2020 George Floyd “reckoning”—which had a strong impact in the UK, despite the very different history of race and policing there—led to a push for proactive “anti-racism” in police departments, such as a national “Police Race Action Plan” to address racial disparities in policing.

    The 2024-2026 action plan for the Hampshire & Isle of Wight Constabulary, of which Southampton is a part, mentions a commitment to—among other things—“understanding the impact, trauma and history of policing ethnic minority communities.” How did this play out in practice?

    According to a Times of London report, a recent survey of the officers and staff of the constabulary found that 15 percent “felt ‘controlled and pressured to feel certain ways’ by mandatory diversity training” which stressed “unconscious bias,” “privilege” and “the importance of being an ally.”

    Did these trainings influence the police response to Henry Nowak? Would the officers have reacted differently if the emergency call had come from a white family reporting an alleged assault by an intoxicated black, Arab, or Indian man—and if that man was found in the yard in the same condition as Nowak? Would they have been more careful to make sure that the minority man wasn’t the real victim here, if only to shield themselves from accusations of racism? Such hypotheticals are impossible to answer (just as, in a different context, it is impossible to know whether the police would have treated George Floyd differently if he had been white). But the possibility itself is troubling.

    The same questions are raised by the National Police Chiefs’ Council March 2025 guidance on anti-racism, which said that officers should:

    Respond to individuals and communities according to their specific needs, circumstances and experiences, with understanding that these will be racialised and with the aim of reducing harm. It does not mean treating everyone ‘the same’ or being ‘colour blind’ (racial equality).

    While it’s an obvious truth that people’s individual circumstances should be taken into account, this should not lead to a retreat from the principle of equal treatment. Abandoning that vital principle creates a clear potential for injustice and racial favoritism, and it undermines trust in the justice system. Policing minister Sarah Jones has insisted that the guidance was not part of formal training—but has also conceded that “this document is wrong.”

    Subscribe now

    Many factors may have contributed to the policing failure in the Henry Nowak case: the killer’s brazen, sociopathic lies; the presence of his family; the “first reporter” bias; and the circumstances that created a plausible alternative explanation for Nowak’s condition. But given the broader climate in British policing, it seems entirely possible that the fact that his killer was a minority man claiming to have been the victim of a racist attack added a thumb on the scale. That in itself is unacceptable.

    Many people, however, are making a much more serious accusation: that only racial dynamics and favoritism toward minorities can explain Nowak’s treatment. These claims simply do not hold up. It is also worth noting that Mark Nowak, who was scathingly critical of the initial police response in his first public comments, stressed that the subsequent police investigation and prosecution were handled with full professionalism and empathy toward the family.3

    The reality is that policing is messy: officers often have to make split-second decisions, including assessments of who is the victim and who the perpetrator in a given situation. Police work also tends to lead to what some call “empathy fatigue”—or, to put it plainly, callousness—since officers so frequently come into contact with distressed or disturbed people who may be difficult to control and may pose a potential danger.

    Ironically, claims that only racial prejudice was responsible for Nowak’s treatment resemble nothing so much as the claims, commonly made in 2020, that only racism and the white supremacy “baked into” American policing could explain the murder of George Floyd or the deaths and shootings of other black Americans at the hands of white police officers.

    When these narratives were widely hegemonic in the United States, I pushed back against them. Now, I think it’s equally important to push back against today’s forms of hyperbole and hysteria. The assertion, by a right-wing American X account with nearly 130,000 followers, that Henry Nowak died because “the police thought [he] was a racist and that meant that they did not feel obligated to extend to him any form of human decency” is fact-free ragebait—just like the claim that George Floyd died because American society is systematically designed to “destroy black bodies” was in 2020.

    The upcoming inquiry by the Independent Office for Policy Conduct, which will look at additional bodycam footage and documents, should answer many remaining questions about Henry Nowak’s death and the failures of the police response. It should certainly include an objective review of the role antiracism trainings may have played in priming the police to trust one side over the other.

    In the meantime, it is worth paying heed to a recent intervention by the leader of the opposition Conservative Party. On Tuesday, Kemi Badenoch, who was highly critical of the “overcorrection” in response to the Black Lives Matter movement, also warned against a backlash in the form of “White Lives Matter.” The focus, as Badenoch says, should be on “common sense”: equality before the law, and treating people on the basis of their individual actions rather than their collective identities. It is high time for the British police, and everyone else, to return to that time-tested principle of equality.

    Cathy Young, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is a writer at The Bulwark, a columnist for Newsday, and a contributing editor to Reason.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    1

    Sikhs are required to carry a small knife, called a kirpan, on their person at all times. This is usually small and worn under clothing. As a member of an order of Sikhs called the Nihang, who traditionally have a second, larger blade (though this is not required), Digwa carried two knives. It is this larger knife, also exempt from knife possession laws, that was the murder weapon.

    2

    In a secretly recorded conversation with his brother in Punjabi after his arrest, in which Digwa admitted to the stabbing, he said that he would not be able to successfully claim self-defense if there were any surveillance cameras that had recorded the encounter.

    3

    The uncorroborated claim by a far-right anti-immigration activist that “the police took Henry’s phone and his dad’s and read all the messages looking for racist comments or jokes,” amplified by some larger conservative accounts, appears to have no basis in fact. Henry’s phone, found in Digwa’s pocket, was appropriately taken as material evidence, since it contained video related to the murder.

    0 min
  • Russia’s Oil Is Getting Hammered
    Oil storage tanks on fire at the Tuapse oil refinery. (Photo: Satellite image (c) 2026 Vantor via Getty Images.)

    The apocalyptic scenes coming from Tuapse in the Russian Federation, with oil raining from the skies and burning through the streets, are just the latest illustrations of the measures Ukraine is taking against the Russian oil industry. Ukraine has taken a hammer to Russian oil processing and exports, calling this their long-range sanctions in lieu of European and U.S. sanctions that do not work.

    From afar, it might seem that Ukraine is hitting anything within the oil industry it can reach. In fact, Ukrainian attacks are three-pronged, directed at Russian export capacity, budget revenue, and future oil production.

    The Way We Were

    Although hardly anybody remembers it now, the first Ukrainian attack on Russian oil infrastructure came very early in the war. Two Ukrainian Mi-24 helicopters crossed the Russian border at low altitude in the early hours of April 1, 2022. The target was a Rosneft-owned fuel depot in the city of Belgorod, approximately 35km from the Ukrainian border. Eight fuel tanks caught fire. Two depot workers were injured. Nearly 200 firefighters were deployed.

    At the time the rationale for the attack, in addition to a much-needed morale boost for Ukraine, was that it would complicate Russian troop movements by depriving them of fuel.

    In 2023, as Ukraine increased the range of its attack drones, it started attacking oil refineries in Russia—initially only within a 500km radius, as the current 2,000km range was still years away. Ukraine targeted specialized equipment—catalytic crackers, hydrotreaters, vacuum distillation units, and primary processing columns. These are technologically complex and depend on Western specialty manufacturers, and Russian sanction avoidance was still in its infancy, so spare parts were difficult to come by.

    In fact, Ukrainian attacks contributed to the first fuel export ban in September 2023. A combination of a spike in military demand, holiday traffic, the autumn harvest, and refinery repair delays under sanctions had created real shortages within the country. The state often described as a “fuel station” had no fuel. And since it did not have any storage, it did not have reserves.

    Subscribe now

    The Other Side of the Refinery

    At the start of 2024, Ukrainian drones turned to oil and gas depots, terminals, pumping stations, and port facilities. The burning storage tanks produced the most spectacular results—they burned for days and were filmed extensively by locals. However, the overall consensus was that they were merely a sideline for Ukrainian attacks, and that processing equipment and port infrastructure constituted more valuable targets.

    These and further attacks caused Russia some difficulties, but the losses were not considerable—until the war in Iran started. Russia should have finally been able to cash in by selling oil at a higher price. But, in late March 2026, Ukraine hit its most valuable ports in the Baltic Sea, so Russia could not get its oil out of the country.

    Then, in April 2026, the Tuapse refinery and marine terminal were hit four times in two weeks, destroying 24 storage tanks as well as the marine terminal that loaded the tankers. Days later, Ukraine struck Perm, over 1,500km from the border, hitting both the Transneft pumping station and the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez refinery within 24 hours, with most of the storage tanks at the pumping station reportedly burning. That is when Ukraine’s strategy became clear.

    Ode to Storage

    Most countries have strategic oil reserves intended for a rainy day. The United States has massive salt caverns that can hold up to 700 million barrels of oil. Their structural integrity requires a certain amount of oil to be kept there at all times, so the oil available for release is usually less. China’s strategic oil reserves are well over one billion barrels, although the exact number is not publicized, and a large part of this storage was created within the last ten years.

    Russia, on the other hand, has no strategic oil reserves. They never built them.

    The main reason is that most Russian infrastructure was built in the Soviet era, when labor was cheap and the working population had no choice. Corruption existed, but it took different forms. Elites had better access to goods, schools, and housing rather than money. Money could not buy everything. There was no private property in the USSR, and no private businesses. So, all the large infrastructure projects were built to last centuries and withstand a nuclear strike.

    However, Soviet officials determined that they did not need any strategic reserves because their oil was in the ground. Consequently, no storage facilities were built. What they did build, though, was a vast network of oil refineries with substantial operational storage. This processing buffer was the closest thing Russia had to a reserve, and this is what it inherited after the fall of the Soviet Union.

    While the attacks on oil refineries and the storage tanks were disregarded almost as publicity stunts, they turned out to be very important in combination with the attacks on Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk, and Tuapse ports. When ports are damaged and cannot move oil or fuel out of the country, that oil or fuel has to stay put, so needs to be stored somewhere. Further, attacks on ports usually involve attacks on storage tanks as well, meaning the remaining tanks are insufficient to store all the leftover oil. Again, it would not be an issue if the refineries had all their oil tanks intact and ready for storage. Refineries, however, have been fixing or replacing their storage tanks almost non-stop for the past couple of years. Building a large 50,000 cubic meter storage tank can take up to two years, smaller ones up to a year—and that’s assuming the imported parts are available.

    In summary, Russian producers end up with oil they cannot store. Existing storage is full, so they have no room for newly extracted oil. Oil wells, however, cannot be turned on or off with a flick of a switch—at least not in Russia. Oil wells in Russia are mostly old, drilled decades ago and worked hard ever since. They depend on continuous water injection to maintain reservoir pressure, and they produce oil with very high water content. When such a well is closed, paraffin solidifies inside it, pressure drops, and the reservoir itself suffers permanent damage. Once production has been stopped, it can be restarted only with significant investment, and that investment exceeds the future profits from the well. Which means that once an oil well is closed in Russia, that should be the end of it.

    When the Wells Bottom Out

    This is already happening. According to Reuters reporting in late April, Russian oil output has fallen by up to 600,000 barrels per day compared to late 2025 levels—roughly 7 percent of total production, and the sharpest monthly drop since the COVID pandemic. Industry analyst Mikhail Krutikhin has cited more recent reports suggesting the figure may already be approaching 800,000 barrels per day. Either way, this is not the total. Production has been falling steadily as long as ports and refineries remain under attack.

    That production will not come back. Russia can drill new wells, yes—but with what money? Foreign investment has dried up, almost all oil companies are under direct Kremlin rule, and around 40 percent of the Russian federal budget is committed to defense and security. There is simply no money for new wells.

    If the irreversible decrease in oil production were not enough, the current shutting of wells also reduces budget revenues. Oil in Russia is taxed at the point of extraction. As long as oil is being extracted, the revenue stream is maintained and taxes are paid into the budget, even if it never leaves Russia. When oil can no longer be extracted because there is nowhere to store it, even if there is demand domestically, current tax revenues drop. And future ones are affected too—there will always be less oil to tax from that moment onwards.

    Subscribe now

    Sanctions Are as Sanctions Do

    Most of the recent commentary has framed Ukraine’s spring 2026 strikes on oil infrastructure as an effort to prevent Russia from cashing in on high oil prices during the Iran war. And that is correct, although only on the tactical level. Denying Russia additional revenue is only the immediate result of these attacks. The strategic objective is to reduce Russia’s oil production capacity altogether—not to lower earnings per barrel, but to ensure that fewer barrels exist to be earned from. The Iran war provided a tactical opportunity to accelerate the campaign and to magnify its visible effects. But the campaign was already a long time in the making.

    Western sanctions, such as they were, sought—in theory—to restrict Russia’s oil revenues. In reality, they never worked. Russia routed around the G7 price cap from the start, and the West lacked either the will or the means to close the loopholes. Under Trump, sanctions multiplied while enforcement disappeared entirely.

    In the meantime, Ukraine, having relied on the Western world to do what it claims to do best—namely, enforce the international order—in the end had to work out how to decrease Russian oil revenues on its own. Unlike Trump’s sanctions, which can be turned on and off without rhyme or reason, and unlike European sanctions, which can be reversed the moment the EU’s financial position weakens, Ukrainian strikes cannot be walked back once a certain result has been achieved. By hitting the entire oil chain, including depots, pumping stations, marine terminals, and storage facilities, Ukraine has removed close to 10 percent of Russian oil production from the equation. Unless Russia makes considerable investments in new oil wells, this 10 percent will not be recovered.

    And under current circumstances, with a large fiscal deficit, an economy in catastrophic condition, and almost half of the budget committed to the war, that investment is not coming.

    Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK. Born in the Baltics, with a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter, she writes and gives live commentary on European security and Russia.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.