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By Yascha Mounk
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  • Welcome to the Postmodern Presidency

    We’re thrilled that Damon recently became a contributing writer at Persuasion. To celebrate, he will be joining us on Substack Live to discuss this article on Wednesday June 10 at 1pm ET. Click here to join!

    Jean Baudrillard, 2001. (Photo by Eric Feferberg / AFP via Getty Images.)

    We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our ongoing series on “Liberal Virtues and Values.”

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    In striving to make sense of the mind-warping incoherence, corruption, and self-destructiveness of the second Trump administration, my mind often wanders back to my time in college and graduate school during the 1990s. Back then, perhaps the most pressing intellectual question we pondered about the present was whether we were on the cusp of entering a “postmodern era.”

    That famously slippery phrase had many meanings and implications, but this was its core: The time of grand, unifying, “hegemonic” narratives was over. A so-called “hermeneutics of suspicion” and impulse toward “deconstructing” received theories had revealed all attempts to reach a universal, permanent truth as power-grabs attempting to conceal fundamentally political motives. Broad swathes of the left latched onto the work of French theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, and Jean Baudrillard as a contribution to the liberation of individuals and groups from the white, male, heterosexual writers of the West—and from the grand narratives that justified their domination.

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    At the time, the most cogent critics of these prophets of postmodernism could be found on the center right. The philosopher Allan Bloom’s surprise 1987 bestseller The Closing of the American Mind, for example, suggested that what he called the “Nietzscheanization of the left” was bound to end badly. That’s because, Bloom insisted, a world no longer oriented toward universal truth would be one in which raw political will would dominate unimpeded by higher aspirations.

    I don’t want to suggest that Trump or his advisors are taking their cues from Derrida or Foucault—or that we’re living in a world these and other French theorists somehow conjured into existence with their books. But I do think the political events of the past decade have vindicated the critics of postmodernism. Whatever its sources, the world of the present is permeated with deep skepticism about the grand narratives and universalistic hopes that often prevailed in the past. And amidst the wreckage of these narratives and hopes, a new right is taking advantage of the resulting confusion to wield power in a ruthless and deranging way.

    A Postmodern Resurgence of Nationalism

    It seems undeniable that the return of nationalism as a major force across the democratic world is downstream of a collapse in confidence about universal truths. Yes, some of its ideological boosters, like the Israeli-American philosopher Yoram Hazony, are committed to national solidarity as a positive and even necessary foundation for properly conservative politics. But it’s more common for contemporary nationalists to treat the constriction of solidarity to the nation as a response to a collapse of faith in higher and broader ideals of universalism.

    The countries of the West once believed other countries and cultures would be better off adopting our political and economic arrangements, creating a world in which differences among peoples would be outweighed by an underlying similarity that united them. Our multiculturalism would be counterbalanced by a commitment to cosmopolitanism. Live where you want and how you want. Love who you want in the way you want. Worship the deity you want and in the way that seems best to you, or don’t worship any deity at all. Such a world could afford to permit, and feel like it was thriving by permitting, the easy movement of people and products. Come and go as you please. Move about the planet, and make purchases from across the planet, at will.

    This internationalist liberalism—most common in the 1980s and ’90s—is what inspired deep suspicion and skepticism among postmodern thinkers. The moral content of universalism came from liberalism, an ideology rooted in the West. This meant that the higher aspirations toward a sort of worldwide tolerance wasn’t really tolerant at all. It was a parochial cultural export, imposed as a form of ideological imperialism—a cultural currency the other peoples of the world would be forced to adopt, with refusal to do so, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, issuing in the punishment of forced exclusion from international markets, the financial system, and the loans and aid provided to those willing to play by the rules established by the United States and its allies. At least so postmodernist thinkers argued.

    Today’s nationalists, including Trump, agree entirely with this zero-sum outlook on international affairs, though they usually reverse the moral valance: the West’s systematic imposition of its will on the world, they believe, has been a burden and a net loss for the West. Others gained while we got screwed. If we had benefitted from the arrangement, it would have been self-evidently worth continuing. But it didn’t benefit us, and the way to rectify the unfairness is for us to go our own way, acting unilaterally in aggressive pursuit of our interests without any pretense about others thriving by following our example or obeying American-authored international rules.

    The Turn to Internal Tribalism

    The abandonment of universal aspirations in the international arena has been accompanied, in domestic politics, by a collapse of trust in the ability of public institutions to devise and administer norms and rules in a competent and fair-minded way. Which means that nationalism abroad has been matched by partisan tribalism at home. Either Democrats run the government or Republicans do. Either civil servants seek to advance liberal-progressive ideology or they seek to advance a conservative-populist one. Neutrality is a sham. There is no third alternative, let alone one that rises dispassionately above the fray of partisanship.

    Politics permeates everything, just as the postmodern critics insisted it did. The right thinks it gains an advantage by accepting this reality and acting on it without shame or apology. In doing so, it believes it will finally acquire the capacity to challenge the left’s relentless advance in the culture, move for move. The point, at every moment, is to win, and the only alternative to winning is losing, just as the only alternative to being a friend is being an enemy. That makes those from both parties who continue to focus on even-minded fairness, the rule of law, and neutral procedures little more than saps, suckers, and chumps—just like those who defend international laws, norms, and institutions.

    That’s where the strange affinity between the postmodern theorists of old and Trump’s mode of governance becomes most apparent and uncanny.

    If it was anything, postmodernism was an expression of skepticism about the capacity of reason to forge genuine consensus, let alone for it to achieve objective truth or knowledge. What other thinkers call “objective truth” and “objective knowledge” are merely expressions of the interest of one person or group. There is no such thing as disinterested reason, just various forms of self-interested rationalization. The claim that one possesses truth or knowledge is nothing but a power move.

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    There is no better distillation of this view than Donald Trump. All the way back to The Art of the Deal, he has spoken of truth as a tool for manipulation. Rather than determining what is true and then deciding what to do on that basis, Trump takes the reverse approach, first determining what he wants to do, and then adjusting what he claims to be true in order to help him accomplish it. This is why he is the first truly postmodern president.

    How to Wage a Postmodern War

    There are a multitude of examples of this from the first and second Trump administrations, but none is more powerful than the way the Iran War has been conducted.

    When Trump ran for the presidency in 2024, he promised to end America’s “forever wars” and vowed not to start new ones. Yet he has kept the military quite active since returning to the White House, and nowhere more so than against Iran. When he opted to leap to the side of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in seeking to topple the Iranian government and eliminate its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, Trump offered no coherent explanation. He made no effort to build support in public opinion or Congress. He merely acted, as if reasoning about going to war was irrelevant and persuasion both futile and unnecessary.

    He then articulated no clear or consistent goals after it became apparent that the country hadn’t undergone regime change, and the constantly shifting rationales he trotted out on his Truth Social account, together with those expressed by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, made it impossible to judge the progress, success, or failure of the operation. That sense of arbitrariness and chaos has only deepened as it’s become clearer that Trump is eager to bring the war to any kind of conclusion (it doesn’t matter what) and to move on while declaring victory.

    Just after the conclusion in 1991 of the Persian Gulf War, the postmodern theorist Jean Baudrillard famously published a short book that was provocatively titled The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. I’ve always considered his argument transparently ridiculous. Of course the war took place, just as the Iran War is taking place right now, despite a fragile ceasefire.

    Yet what Baudrillard was pointing to back in 1991—the transformation of war into a media event broadcast to the world in eye-catching snippets that turn it into a carefully curated spectacle—really was something new at the time. But now it no longer is. We have entered the age of fully postmodern propaganda in which the powers that be don’t even bother to construct a coherent narrative to generate support for what they do. They merely act and then bombard us with shards of multiple competing and contradictory rationales, assuming we’ll be so entertained by explosions and infliction of pain that we’ll be indifferent to what’s actually transpiring—and, above all, to the fact that the White House has embraced a mode of governance that’s completely indistinguishable from tribalistic partisan spin.

    I don’t know about you, but I’d be hard-pressed to come up with a more perfect example of postmodern politics than that.

    Bringing Universalism Back In

    That brings us back to what the original postmodernists hoped to accomplish by dethroning universal narratives. Their hope, I think, was to achieve greater liberation of individuals and groups from externally imposed oppressive constraints. But what we ended up liberated from, instead, is any notion of higher aspiration. It may be that the only way to keep liberation from collapsing into cognitive chaos that leaves us sailing on a choppy sea of endlessly churning spin is to affirm some notion of universalism.

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    If nature, reason, or historical progress—the traditional justifications for liberal universalism—seem too freighted with contestable assumptions, we can choose to view it in more modest terms. One option is to conceive of it as a cognitive heuristic, or what Immanuel Kant called a “regulative” principle—namely, a presumption we must make in order to orient our thinking and guide our action in the world. Think of it as a flashlight emanating from the human mind that can illuminate the darkness of the surrounding world, showing us a way to move forward that blends an appreciation for particularism with an awareness of the need to affirm what all of us share as human beings.

    Regardless of whether that would catch on, we can at least acknowledge that the original critics of postmodernism, like Allan Bloom, had a point: a world in which universal truths and goods is widely denied will also be a world in which politics has been reduced to raw and ruthless assertions of power. If we want to do better than that—and we should—we need to find a way to back out of the intellectual dead end we find ourselves stuck in.

    Damon Linker, a contributing writer at Persuasion, writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

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  • The Islamic Republic Is More Dug in Than Ever
    Veiled pro-government supporters walk beneath portraits of civilian and military personnel, Tehran, May 24, 2026. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto.)

    The war with Iran is now in limbo, somewhere between ceasefire negotiations and the next explosion.

    After weeks of joint U.S. and Israeli strikes, the elimination of its top leaders, and President Trump’s repeated threats, the Islamic Republic appears not weaker but something else… exposed. The war pulled back the curtain. What was standing behind the regime was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), now more powerful than before and more visible than ever. At the same time ordinary Iranians have lost more freedom and access to basic rights. With the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the regime displayed how far it could flex its muscles and hold global markets hostage, while the United States appeared far less decisive than initially expected. Both sides have declared victory, and neither can explain what was won.

    The most underreported story of this war is the information war, and in many ways, the Islamic Republic has proved far more adept at it. The side that controls the flow of information gains more than the side that inflicts the most damage. The true legacy of this war may not be the destruction of the Islamic Republic; it may be who gets to narrate what happened.

    Every time I talk to people in Iran, the first question they ask me is: “What do they say over there? What’s happening?” There is something deeply unsettling about people living inside a war asking those of us outside to tell them what’s happening.

    During the last 90 days of the internet shutdown, there have been only a few ways to connect with those inside: a phone call that costs a fortune, or an IRGC-backed app called Bale, both heavily monitored by the military. Unless you are among the small group granted privileged SIM cards by the regime, real communication has become nearly impossible. I have not been able to have a candid conversation with those inside. Not for weeks. They’re afraid. Phones are tapped. Silence has become the only safe language. This is what the information war looks like from the inside: a vacuum the regime fills, unopposed, with its own version of events.

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    I spoke to a family friend who left me a voice memo explaining the mood inside Iran:

    It’s like they spread death dust over the city. Everyone is depressed. People are sad and checked out. Especially seeing how emboldened the Islamic Republic supporters have become.

    The fear is no longer just of the government. Regime supporters have become more impassioned. They are out in the streets every night guarding neighborhoods, gathering publicly to show support—some holding guns, others appearing on state television celebrating marriages with rifles in their hands.

    My friend continued: “This is what they wanted all along—to die for their cause. And now the war is giving them exactly that.”

    For almost five decades, the Islamic Republic has maintained itself through a narrative of confrontation with the West, particularly the United States and Israel. In schools, after Friday prayers, during national ceremonies and state broadcasts, there were chants, slogans, and stories centered around hatred of Israel and the United States. The regime framed its identity not just as a government, but as part of a cosmic struggle between good and evil, connected to the next return of the Mahdi—an apocalyptic vision of justice and redemption. To many of the Islamic Republic’s committed followers, conflict with the West is not just political. It is existential, even sacred. And when that conflict finally arrived in the form of airstrikes a few months ago, it did not shatter the narrative—it confirmed it.

    The regime exploited this information vacuum. With independent journalists absent from the ground and social media flooded with competing narratives and AI-generated content, the line between truth and fabrication became impossible to discern. In that confusion, what was happening to ordinary Iranians became ever-harder to verify.

    Among those captured by this shift are people I never expected to succumb to the regime’s propaganda. Family members who lost loved ones to its prisons. Friends who had been arrested. Acquaintances who spent years in exile because of the Islamic Republic. Under foreign bombs, something in them shifted. Nationalism filled the space where opposition had been. I have watched some of them, in recent weeks, post on social media defending the Islamic Republic—not out of belief, but out of something older and harder to argue with: the patriotic defense of their country. The regime didn’t have to do anything to persuade them. It only needed someone to drop bombs on their loved ones.

    The Islamic Republic is not misunderstood in one direction; it is misunderstood in every direction. The American right views the regime as irrational, incompetent, and easy to defeat from the air, hence the recent war. The left often frames it as an underdog, a product of Western intervention, shaped more by outside pressure than by its own intentions.

    Recently, at a gathering, I found myself surrounded by progressive liberals mourning Islamic Republic figures such as Ali Larijani and Ali Shamkhani, senior regime insiders killed in airstrikes, as Iran’s “moderate voices who could have potentially led Iran to democracy.” These—it seems too easy to forget—are the same men who spent decades holding Iranians hostage to an ideology, overseeing the repression and killing of thousands.

    This is another Western misunderstanding that strips the regime of something essential: agency, capability, and intelligence. The Islamic Republic is a system built with a purpose and is deeply invested in its own survival. It learns to adjust quickly, and under pressure does not dissolve but consolidates.

    The Islamic Republic is a revolutionary ideological system rooted in political Islam. Its foundations were built not on delivering prosperity, but on preserving an ideological project. That project is rooted in resistance, in the belief that pressure from outside is not a threat to the regime’s existence but a validation of its purpose.

    The war that the United States and Israel waged was not a surprise to the regime. It was something the regime had structurally prepared for and, in some ways, leveraged. The attack has not only empowered hardliners but has also allowed the regime to reframe survival as victory. If the war was fought on two fronts—physical and informational—the Islamic Republic proved far more prepared for the latter.

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    Now everyone is waiting for a deal. But a deal requires something neither side has shown it can do: admit the other side is here to stay. For the Islamic Republic, that means negotiating with the country it has spent 47 years denouncing. For Donald Trump, it means accepting an outcome that looks less like victory than a compromise with a heavy price tag. Neither side wants to be humiliated. And the fear of humiliation, more than questions of uranium enrichment or sanctions, may be the greatest obstacle to peace.

    But there is a third party to these negotiations with no seat at the table: the Iranian people. Any deal struck now will be made in the dark without their voice, without their knowledge, possibly against their interests. The information war did not just shape the military outcome. It is now shaping the peace.

    The internet is slowly returning. A deal may be somewhere on the horizon. But I keep thinking about my friend’s voice memo:

    I will delete this voice message, but you can keep it. Listen… if this war ends with no real result, we’re in deeper trouble than before. God help us.

    Mitra Vand is an Iranian-American writer from Tehran. Her work examines authoritarianism, exile, and the emotional consequences of political violence. She writes under a pseudonym.

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  • Jeremiah Johnson on Why Gen Z Isn’t Actually Doomed

    Jeremiah Johnson is the co-founder of the Center for New Liberalism. He hosts the New Liberal Podcast and writes at Infinite Scroll.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Jeremiah Johnson discuss why young Americans think the economy is worse than it actually is, whether social media has made us permanently pessimistic about institutions, and how elite failures are now exposed in real time.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: There’s been an interesting debate over the last few days on social media over why Zoomers are having trouble buying homes—why they’re doing so badly in material terms. One faction was saying, it’s all because they’re spoiled: they go out to lunch too often, they order on DoorDash all the time, and they just have terrible financial habits. The other half of the debate said, no, it’s because of neoliberalism—the economy is in a terrible state, and why are you blaming these poor kids? It’s not at all their fault; it’s our evil economic system. What do you think is actually going on?

    Jeremiah Johnson: To set the stage for people who are blessedly offline and not poisoned in the same way that maybe you and I are: Kevin O’Leary—the guy who calls himself Mr. Wonderful and is on TV—gave an interview where he said something along the lines of, it makes me sick when I see some young kid who’s making $70,000 a year spending $28 on lunch. This went viral in the way that these things do, because it’s intergenerational conflict—people yelling at each other about their personal budgets. One group was saying, yeah, that’s ridiculous, $28 for lunch—kind of redoing the whole avocado toast thing that everybody’s aware of. Bizarrely, certain left-leaning commentators jumped in to defend the Zoomers. Sometimes this took on the bizarre quality of: well, lunch just costs $28 now—have you looked at a menu recently? Or: people need to use DoorDash because they’re disabled and they can’t make lunch for themselves—and in this case “disabled” usually means having an anxiety disorder and being unable to talk to people.

    Mounk: I’m sure there are some people who are disabled and generally can’t make lunch for themselves, but that is not the average person.

    Johnson: That is very much not the average person. On a very basic level, you can join one side or the other: you can say it’s ridiculous to pay $28 for lunch and that you can easily pack a lunch, or you can join the people who say this is not the reason Gen Z can’t buy a home—that saving $5 on lunch is not going to allow you to buy an $800,000 home in a nice metro area. But there’s an implicit assumption in both of these arguments that things are indeed really bad for Gen Z, that Zoomers are suffering, that they’re never going to be able to afford a home, that it’s really bleak out there. People have this sense of doom about the economy.

    What I find interesting is that’s just not true, at all, if you look at the data. Gen Z is actually buying homes at an increased rate compared to where millennials were at the same age. Gen Z homeownership is tracking significantly higher than millennial homeownership, and Gen Z is earning more money than any previous generation—not literally at this moment, because they’re all young and early in their careers.

    Mounk: The average 25-year-old today makes more money than the average 25-year-old 10, 30, or 50 years ago—and presumably not just in nominal dollar terms. Even adjusting for inflation, that is true.

    Johnson: Even in real terms, it is true. This entire narrative around Zoomers being screwed—I just don’t think it’s true. The general economic picture certainly has some downsides. The entry-level job market right now does look a little grim, inflation is higher than we’d like it to be, and there are some things you can point to. But unemployment has been lower than 5% for five straight years now, job growth is good, and GDP growth is good. This is, relatively speaking, a pretty good economy. If you are waiting for some other economy to show up that’s going to blow this one out of the water, I’m sorry to report you’re going to be waiting for a while.

    To me, the interesting part of this is not who’s right about the question of the $28 lunch. What’s interesting is: why do we all think that society is doomed, that this generation is doomed, when the numbers and the reality on the ground just don’t bear that out?

    Mounk: I’ve been thinking about this in a slightly broader context, and then in the narrow context of liberalism. Perhaps let’s start with the broader context. People now have much less trust in institutions, and they have, generally speaking, a more negative view of the world—at least in North America and Western Europe. The question is: why is that? Is it that institutions have gotten worse? Is it that institutions have always been bad in all kinds of ways, but social media allows us to see those failures much more easily? Even a politician’s most embarrassing moment in the past probably wasn’t caught on camera—or if it was, it would have been played once on the evening news for five seconds. Now, every time a politician posts something on social media, the first comment is going to be a five-second clip of them choking on a pretzel or whatever. We are just much more aware of the weakest moments of people in institutions. Or is it that institutions were pretty good 15 or 30 years ago and are pretty good today, but we now have an unduly negative view of them?

    Johnson: There’s some nuance here. Our institutions have absolutely gotten worse, and specifically in the last year under Donald Trump 2.0, we’ve seen a rate of institutional decay that we have not seen in decades, in generations. Our institutions are absolutely being hammered. But I really do think that, broadly speaking, that is for the most part a last year or two kind of phenomenon.

    Mounk: But in an interesting way, that is sort of downstream from the previous stuff—which is to say, it’s because people soured so much on the institutions and became so mistrustful of them that Trump was elected for a second time. Now, in fact, in office, he is degrading institutions at a very alarming rate. But in a way, that comes downstream from people having lost faith in those institutions, which is what allowed him to win power again in the first place.

    Johnson: What I was going to say is that the things we’re talking about predate the election of Donald Trump for the second time. Consumer sentiment is at the lowest it’s ever been right now, unemployment is something like four and a half percent, and job numbers remain pretty decent. Yet if you ask people, they report lower consumer sentiment than they did during the 70s stagflation, than they did during the Great Recession, than they did during the COVID recession. You can extend this to all sorts of things that are not just the economy. People think that race relations are worse than they were 30 years ago, that gender equality is worse than it was 30 years ago.

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    You can look up all the Gallup polling—Gallup does a lot of very good polling over time where they ask the same question for decades, so you can really see how people are answering the same question over time. People think that race relations and gender relations are significantly worse than they were in the 90s, which I feel like would come as news to Rodney King. Certainly race relations have hit some rough spots in the last few years. But the idea that we’re not making progress strikes me as incorrect.

    To keep going: when they ask whether people think crime has gotten better or worse in the last year—they’ve asked this for 30 or 40 years straight—in something like 29 out of the last 32 years, people think crime got worse. People think crime is getting worse every single year. The 90s were absolutely a high point for crime, and yet people continually believe it’s worsening, despite the fact that crime has been on a very large decline from the mid-90s until now. It’s not even a comparison.

    So in every way—economically, socially, with crime, with everything—people think things are getting worse. I do think that is a function of our media ecosystem and the ways that has changed, and I think social media plays a lot into this. There’s an interesting question of how differently social media shapes our expectations as opposed to the forms of media we used to have—the nightly news, newspapers.

    Mounk: To play devil’s advocate: if people have said for 29 out of the last 30 years that crime has gotten worse, that predates social media. So perhaps there is just a general tendency for people on particular topics like crime to see the world very negatively. One interesting thing is that, in the same way people absolutely hate Congress but often like their own congressman, people sometimes think crime is terrible in the world but their own neighborhood is kind of fine. Part of this is that the places people know very well they can often judge relatively accurately, whereas the places that are far away from them they end up having very negative stereotypes about.

    But insofar as it’s true that on all these other metrics overall sentiment has gotten worse—and I think the evidence of that is pretty clear—why is that? Is it social media? Is it that our media environment has changed? Or is it that our institutions deliver less for people than they once did?

    What’s certainly true is that you had a very rapid improvement in living standards that was really anomalous in human history, and that completely shaped our implicit baseline. When we think about what a normal developed economy or a normal consolidated democracy looks like, we tend to think about the 1960s and 1970s, which were a period of just extraordinary economic growth. The living standards of the average American doubled from 1935 to 1960, and doubled again from 1960 to 1985. At some point it becomes harder to grow at that pace.

    Even though, as you’re pointing out, the story is actually much less dire than it’s often believed—I have an article showing that the economic doomerism of the 2010s, where a number of economists argued that inequality was only growing, that global economic growth only benefited the richest, and that wages were stagnating for the middle class in America, was significantly challenged or revised—we tend to think Zoomers are doing worse, when actually they’re doing better than millennials were at the same juncture. So the story is not that negative. But it is true that I don’t feel like my living standard is vastly better than my mom’s was, and I don’t think my kids are likely to have a vastly better living standard than I do. Fifty years ago, people probably did feel that way.

    Johnson: There are a couple of books I would point to here. There’s a great book by Robert Gordon, where he examines the nature of economic growth called The Rise and Fall of American Growth. He argues that we had this really anomalous period of wild growth that was more than just the headline GDP number—that it was really impactful stuff. We were electrifying the country, we were inventing new forms of household appliances that eliminated a significant amount of manual labor, we were really revolutionizing a bunch of things. And that the computer revolution, while significant, has not actually changed daily life in quite the same way that plumbing, electricity, appliances, and antibiotics did.

    Mounk: Life expectancy shot up in the middle of the 20th century because of inventions like antibiotics and because, for the first time, most people had access to medical care—and it’s hard to replicate that a second time.

    Johnson: There’s some argument that our current level of growth is just not as emotionally or viscerally impactful as previous growth was. But I would also point to a second book called Revolt of the Public by Martin Gurri. The thesis of Revolt of the Public is that everyone is mad all of the time about everything, and this will basically be the state of things forever.

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    Gurri is a really interesting figure. He wrote this book essentially before Trump, before Brexit—when he wrote it, he was talking about things like the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and different protests in Spain and Israel about the general state of society and cost of living. He was looking at this from a roughly 2012, 2013 perspective. His thesis is basically that elites and institutions have always failed to deliver on their promises—that is the human condition, as far back as you can possibly go. But it used to not matter that much, because we had media systems that either protected the elites, covered for them, or made it very hard to organize around those failures. What social media has done is made those failures—which have always been happening—very obvious in real time, and made it very easy to organize around them.

    He gives the example of JFK’s invasion of the Bay of Pigs: early in his presidency, JFK tried to invade Cuba using a group of Cuban émigrés, and it turned out to be a complete disaster. A bunch of people got killed, it was hugely embarrassing—and the reaction from the press was basically, that’s too bad, he’s a young president, he’s learning, he’s growing into the role. They were just fully covering for him. Can you imagine the United States trying and failing to invade a country in 2026 and the press simply saying, oops, we’ll get them next time? You can also think about FDR—there was a kind of gentleman’s agreement that nobody was going to talk about the fact that he had polio and could barely stand up. That kind of informal agreement simply doesn’t exist today. Social media makes it impossible.

    The result is that people are constantly being bombarded with the failures of elites and institutions, constantly angry about it, and don’t have much of an idea what to do with all that anger. This is kind of the defining feature of a lot of these movements—Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring—that they know what they are against but don’t really know what they are for. The Arab Spring was not for anything in particular: some people wanted liberal democracy, some wanted Islamism, some wanted an entirely separate set of things. Occupy Wall Street was united by anger but had no real policy agenda. You can see the same thing when you look at Brexit or Trumpism—these are movements primarily against something, not really unified in what they are for. They just know they’re very angry and that they need to toss out the people who were in charge. I think the media environment has a lot to do with why people are so dissatisfied all the time about everything.

    Mounk: Revolt of the Public is a really interesting book—I’ve had Martin on the podcast for a couple of conversations, so if people are interested, they should go and look at those episodes. The thing that is quite persuasive in Martin’s book is the somewhat nihilistic impact this might have. What he calls the periphery—these self-organizing publics, people who come together for some cause very quickly and might also very quickly dissipate—has a really strong ability to take on power and challenge hierarchies, but a really weak ability to actually organize, impose a structure of their own, or coherently put forward an alternative program. What you get is this lurching from one thing to another. There’s a kind of nihilistic, restless element to it. I find that quite persuasive.

    In terms of the movements you talked about, I would quibble a little and say there are distinctions between them. Occupy Wall Street was a set of people who had somewhat unified politics for all their differences, but no concrete vision—they wanted to occupy Wall Street and make Wall Street go away, and it’s just not really clear what that means or what they wanted to put in its place. A bunch of them were influenced by a kind of utopian socialist thinking which, compared to where a lot of progressive spaces are today, seems somewhat charmingly quaint. The thinking was that it’s impossible to really make an alternative to the current system within the system, and so it would take a democratic revolutionary process to figure that out—and so somewhat deliberately, they didn’t want to offer that alternative upfront. That really was an example of a movement that just didn’t have a clear alternative in mind.

    The Arab Spring was different, because a lot of the people who took part did have very clear visions of what they wanted—just different visions. What they were united around was getting rid of these old, corrupt, moribund dictators who had been dominating their countries for so long. They could build a coalition around that shared goal, but what to put in its place divided them entirely: some genuinely wanted a liberal democracy, others wanted a Muslim Brotherhood-style soft Islamic government, others wanted an even more fundamentalist Islamist government. So it’s not that nobody had an idea of what they wanted—it’s that they all had different ideas, which is a slightly different problem.

    I want to connect all of this to the question of liberalism. In a way, these are two separate questions—we’ve been thinking about the legitimacy of institutions, and our institutions are in certain respects liberal but in other respects not perfectly so. But I do think liberalism faces a similar set of problems, because people associate liberalism with the status quo, and because part of our political order has been built by liberalism. A lot of what’s good in our world exists insofar as it actually lives up to liberal principles and precepts. The trouble that liberals have in defending their ideas is, I think, a little bit related to the trouble that institutions have in sustaining respect and approval. Because on social media, whether you’re clobbering liberalism from the left or from the right, it’s very easy to say everything is terrible. The person pointing out that, actually, Zoomers are buying homes at higher rates than previous generations, or that there are some pretty good things in our world compared to any other epoch in human history, just doesn’t have standing in that debate.

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    Is that an inherent feature of liberalism as a political ideology, or just of our political order being somewhat liberal and therefore representing the status quo and being mistrusted? Or is it the fault of liberals for not knowing how to argue for their positions on social media? You’re obviously well placed to speak to that question as somebody who has really thought about how to argue for liberal points of view in the daily battle of social media.

    Johnson: I don’t think it’s an inherent feature of liberalism that it’s just destined to lose arguments on social media. But I do think there’s an inherent feature of social media that benefits extremist ideologies—that extremism in virtually all of its forms is inherently more viral and more algorithmically beneficial than moderation. Liberalism has not always been the moderate option. There were points in history where to be a liberal was to be at one of the extreme ends of the political spectrum—liberalism was a very revolutionary form of politics. But that’s no longer the case. For all intents and purposes in the West, philosophical liberalism has built virtually all of our institutions, and liberals were the great victors of the 20th century—winning World War II, winning the Cold War. So, they are the ones poised to lose in a new system that basically ensures whatever’s currently in power is likely to be tossed out.

    One of the ways I like to think about extremism on the internet is through a non-political example. Say you’re on YouTube, bored, just surfing, and you see something about someone who baked a four-pound cake. Would you click on that? Maybe not—it’s not that interesting. What about a 40-pound cake? What about the world’s largest cake, a Guinness World Record 400-pound cake? You’re much more likely to click on that. This holds true for basically any form of content.

    The world’s most popular social media influencer is a guy named Mr. Beast, a YouTuber whose whole thing is that he just does really, really big things. His first viral video came when he got $10,000 from his first big brand deal and said, I’m just going to give this to a random homeless person on the street. It went insanely viral. So in the next video he gave $20,000, then $50,000, and then he just bought a house and gave it to someone on the street. He just kept going bigger, and he became the world’s biggest influencer—he has something like half a billion followers on YouTube and is about to hit 500 million. His entire ethos is: never go small when you could go big.

    The internet has done this in a lot of ways. If you’re a spicy food enthusiast before the internet, you might know one or two restaurants with really spicy food, or subscribe to some niche magazine, or order a really spicy sauce by mail. These days you can go online and see people breeding the Carolina Reaper crossed with something that registers 10 trillion Scoville units. You can literally chart the spiciness of the hottest pepper over time, and it’s gone off the charts. This is just what the internet does—it pushes everything to its extremes. It’s doing that to our politics too.

    Which political message do you think goes more viral? One that says the world is burning and we’re all going to die in the next 30 years from climate change, and the oligarchs have screwed us, and the reason you can’t get ahead is all these greedy people looting the world while it burns to the ground? Or one that says climate change is a serious problem and some people are certainly going to be harmed by it, but if we have the right policies we can mitigate that harm, and society will probably be fine in the end, and economic growth will probably continue? The first one goes incredibly viral. The other one gets maybe seven total likes. This is just a feature of how algorithms work—things that inspire a response inherently go more viral.

    Mounk: How do you think about pushing that reasonable message in a way that is more exciting? You started a bunch of accounts called Neoliberalism and other things—and I don’t want to presume your opinion about climate change, but I’m guessing that the boring message is a message you in fact believe in. So are we just doomed? Is that message just never going to cut through? You don’t seem to think it’s doomed, because you seem to think it is in fact worth engaging on Twitter, on Reddit, on all kinds of other platforms, trying to push out that more middle-ground message if you believe it to be true. Is it a question of repackaging it? Is it engaging in the fight knowing you’re always going to be at a disadvantage and will probably lose, but it’s worth at least trying? What’s your rationale, and how do you go about doing that?

    Johnson: I think we’re always going to be at a structural disadvantage—and by “we” I don’t necessarily even mean liberals, but just anyone who tries to offer nuance and depth and reasonableness, who wants to provide a message that plays towards factual reality rather than emotional reality. There’s always going to be a structural disadvantage. It doesn’t mean that you can’t win, but it does mean that you’re starting at a disadvantage. So you have to take certain steps.

    The reason this all exists is because social media rewards the opposite of nuance—it rewards really quick reactions and thoughts. Sometimes I like to think back to what the media was like in a previous era. I think back to the Lincoln-Douglas debates, to go all the way back to pre-Civil War. This was the hottest thing happening in 1858—these debates were national news, the front page of every single newspaper. You know how they were structured: one man would give an hour-long speech uninterrupted, the second would give a 90-minute rebuttal, and then the first would come back for a 30-minute closing. This was to packed venues—people’s attention spans were such that they were riveted by it. Today, our political discourse has devolved from that to the Buckley-Chomsky debates, to CNN Crossfire, to just 10-second out-of-context clips on social media. The age of nuance is dead, to some extent.

    But there are some things you can do. You can create these little islands of quality. The fact that social media is structurally against nuance doesn’t mean that nuance will never survive anywhere—there are still going to be people who care about it. You can create communities of people that actually want to understand the world in a realistic way, and I think those communities are what allows you to get your message out. You have to build a group of people that cares about something, whether that’s in a subreddit, a Discord server, a Substack newsletter, or a podcast like this—people who actually care about the world as it really exists and about nuanced, complicated, complex questions that can’t be answered in 10 seconds. If you can get those people, keep them, and convince them that they’re not just individuals but part of a group, that this is part of their identity, that’s really powerful. That’s part of what we’re trying to do at the Center for New Liberalism—build an identity around that kind of politics. Because identity is really powerful.

    Mounk: There are a few slightly different questions here that feel identical but are important to keep distinct. One question is: are the extremes—the people who are angry, the loudest, the least subtle—always going to dominate certain social media platforms, particularly the ones that are especially political? That seems likely. It seems likely to me that Twitter, by its nature, is always going to be dominated by the most extreme people.

    The question is also what “winning” and “having an advantage” actually mean. The most viral tweet is often going to be pretty extreme—but that’s different from whether the tweet actually persuades and convinces people. Part of it is that the people who are on Twitter exposed to political content are already quite a small percentage of the population. Most people seek out social media, but not primarily for political content—they might encounter political content every now and again, but the people whose Twitter feed is dominated by political tweets rather than sports or gossip are a very self-selected minority. That’s an important thing to bear in mind.

    The other thing I was wondering about is whether there might not at some point be a kind of course correction in norms and expectations. There was a time when it was enough for three or four people to claim they were terribly offended by some exhibit, play, movie, or speech for that to go super viral, for The New York Times to write up the controversy in very neutral terms, and for the thing to get canceled. There was a time when you could post a 10-second video of somebody seeming to misbehave without any context and everybody would credulously jump on the bandwagon and say, that must be a terrible human being. Eventually people kind of got the message—they realized that this was just inviting conflict entrepreneurs to gin up completely spurious cancellation attempts, where a lot of the time the 10-second video came from a five-minute context in which somebody was being antagonized for four minutes and 50 seconds, and all that gets captured is the 10 seconds where they can’t take it anymore. Nowadays, quite often when people post that kind of content, the median response is not credulous outrage but: why is it only 10 seconds? What about the rest of it? People have become a little bit smarter about it, and the appetite for that kind of social media drama has somewhat abated. I don’t want to overstate the point—there’s still a lot of social media nonsense—but it does feel like people have gained some kind of literacy.

    So I wonder whether at some point something similar is going to happen with extreme political views and statements—whether at some point people are going to say, here’s another person breathlessly making this exaggerated claim, and just roll their eyes or push back. Whether we might over time learn to adapt in ways that lessen that advantage. Is that overly optimistic?

    Johnson: I think it might be, to be honest. Unless we change the way that algorithmic feeds are constructed—the way TikTok operates, Instagram Reels, Twitter, and Facebook, which is still very influential among older generations—unless we literally change the nature of algorithms, the saying holds: a lie can get halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes. We know scientifically that negative information is more viral than positive information. So in terms of just the way our information systems are set up, we’re always going to be operating at a disadvantage. We might still win certain battles, but we’re going to be the underdogs a lot.

    Where I am a little more optimistic is that I think we can’t spend the entire time thinking about this problem just in terms of messaging, because the other thing that actually influences how people feel is reality on the ground. When you do enough good for a long enough time, people do notice. I’ve been talking about how things are good but people believe they’re bad—but even in that context, if you do enough, people start to notice that their lives are improving. The stimulus checks during the pandemic were very, very popular. Now, did they help Joe Biden get reelected? No, because they went out three and a half years before the reelection campaign. But I don’t want to make the case so strong that material reality just doesn’t matter anymore, because it still does matter when you don’t deliver for people.

    Trump was reelected largely on the back of cost of living, and he is making the cost of living crisis worse. He started a war with Iran, so gas prices are spiking. He’s implementing tariffs all over the place, so consumer products are more expensive. People notice, and he’s less popular than he’s ever been. The hope, obviously, is that if we can elect someone with better, liberal principles to succeed him and reverse some of the damage, people will actually notice that we’ve started fixing problems—and that leads to a virtuous cycle rather than the damaging cycle that we’re in now.

    Mounk: In terms of actually being present on social media and making the case—give us some examples of how you thought about making the case for philosophically liberal principles on social media. What was the goal? It sounds like the goal wasn’t necessarily to have the most viral tweets, but to have enough presence to create a tribe of people. And I don’t know that I’d recommend to any podcast listeners to engage actively on social media, but if they want to engage and be active, how should we think about what they can do to put forward reasonable, moderate points of view—without getting into a polarization spiral, without getting slowly incentivized to make more and more extreme statements? What should the goal be, and what are the means?

    Johnson: One of the ways I like to think about this is that social media breeds extremism and conflict. Conflict drives engagement, engagement metrics get noticed by the algorithm, and the algorithm sends more people to the conflict. Social media is just built structurally to encourage conflict. You can think about it as roving groups of tribally aligned people who yell at each other all the time—and that’s not necessarily a bad model of social media, whether it’s political, whether it’s pop stan armies like the Sabrina Carpenter people yelling at the Taylor Swift people, or how sports fandoms work online.

    But there’s another way to think about it. You’ve got all these tribal identities roaming around—K-pop stans, Oklahoma City Thunder fans, liberals versus socialists versus MAGAs—and one thing you can do is just make your tribe an attractive place to be. You can cultivate your garden, so to speak, rather than sending people out to fight all the time. Create spaces that are informative, friendly, welcoming, and fun—and fun is an important part of it. People have to want to be there. If you can do that, you’ll see those spaces grow, because people want to spend time talking about the things they care about in a place where they’re not going to get yelled at, with people who might agree with them, teach them something, or just give them a good time. Inside jokes and iconography are an important part of this.

    Weirdly, a lot of this is the same way that religions form—and I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad analogy, because people believe in their current political ideologies with a very religious fervor. But if you want to build a community, it needs to have visuals, it needs to have iconography, it should have its patron saints. If you are a socialist, that’s probably Marx, Lenin and Mao. If you are a liberal, maybe that’s Adam Smith and Milton Friedman and Ben Bernanke. The early days of the neoliberal movement were punctuated by doing lots of memes with Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen with lasers coming out of their eyes defeating the populists. It was just a bunch of silly fun—but that’s the kind of thing that makes people happy, makes them come back, and makes them start to identify not just as someone who agrees with a set of ideas, but as one of these people. This is who I am, rather than just this is a thing I kind of believe. That’s a very powerful thing to create.

    So the model of building a garden, tending your garden, expanding your garden—building a community that actually reflects the values you want to see in the world—is a very powerful thing. You can see this in movements like Effective Altruism, the New Liberals that I’ve been a part of, and in the way the left built power through the 90s and 2000s before the Bernie Sanders explosion. Getting beyond just fighting all the time and building something internally is one of the ways we can short-circuit the cycle we’ve been talking about.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Jeremiah discuss the new liberal ecosystem and how to build a lasting online community. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    47 min
  • It’s Ideology, Stupid
    Trump and Xi in Beijing last month. (Photo by Brendan Smialowski via Getty Images.)

    The end of the Cold War came as a shock to many in the liberal democratic world. While U.S. intelligence agencies recognized that the Soviet system was in a state of decline in the 1980s, it would have been impossible to predict the speed and scale of the USSR’s collapse. Many American policymakers and analysts regarded the bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as a permanent feature of the geopolitical landscape. And when that confrontation came to an end, it was difficult to predict the shape of the world to come.

    But there were those who boldly attempted to do so. The Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington argued in 1993 that “fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed.” This was Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis, which predicted that global anarchy would emerge as a result of tension between eight different civilizations: “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African.” He argued that insuperable cultural, religious, and political differences between these civilizations would inevitably lead to conflict.

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    Several assumptions underpinned Huntington’s argument, one of which was the idea that certain “civilizations” are fundamentally less capable of adopting liberal democratic principles and institutions than others. Huntington was partly responding to Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that the world was witnessing the “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” after the Cold War. Fukuyama acknowledged that the process of democratization was by no means smooth or inevitable—there are, of course, cultural and institutional impediments to liberal democracy in many countries. But he did not share Huntington’s view that these impediments are insurmountable, nor did he believe the world is destined to descend into a state of perpetual civilizational conflict.

    This disagreement resonates today more than ever. To what do people hold more allegiance: civilization or ideology? There’s a lot riding on the answer to this question. The rise of China and its confrontation with the United States, the return of Russian imperialism, and many other global developments—not least the war in Iran—seem to support the idea of permanent civilizational conflict.

    But if we take a deeper look at the past few decades, a different picture emerges. The major conflict today isn’t between rival “ethnic identities and animosities”—it’s between liberal democracy and its enemies, two camps that do not map neatly onto culturally-defined “civilizations.”

    Take Taiwan. Huntington argued that “with the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan [are moving] closer together.” He thought a similar convergence would happen with Hong Kong. But Taiwan has jealously guarded its autonomy since the 1990s and aligned with the democratic West instead of Beijing. Hong Kong remains a special administrative region of China after gaining its independence from Great Britain in 1997, and Beijing has been forced to use increasingly draconian tactics to enforce its “one country, two systems” policy and limit the city’s de jure autonomy. If Huntington were right, Sino solidarity would trump the democratic ambitions of Taiwan and Hong Kong. But that has not happened.

    The same is true in Europe. Huntington argued that the “Velvet Curtain of culture” had “replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line.” This line separated the Orthodox world from Western Christianity, which meant Ukraine would side with Russia against liberal democratic Europe. “In 1991 and 1992,” Huntington wrote, “many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine … If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low.”

    It would be difficult to imagine a more direct refutation of a thesis than Huntington’s mistaken assumption that Ukraine and Russia wouldn’t go to war because they share cultural, religious, and historical ties. In 2014, Ukrainians revolted against their pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, who abandoned an association agreement with the EU in favor of closer ties with Moscow. Yanukovych was removed from office after Ukrainian security forces fired on protesters, and Russia annexed Crimea shortly thereafter. Ukraine’s rejection of Russia also precipitated the proxy war in Donbas—a prelude to the full invasion in February 2022.

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    Part of the reason Huntington considered war between Ukraine and Russia unlikely is that he believed “Western ideas” such as “individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] the separation of church and state” have “little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.” But Ukrainians have an Orthodox culture, and they’re fighting the largest conflict on European soil since World War II to assert their right to liberty and democracy. Japanese culture hasn’t proved to be an impediment to democratization, the rule of law, free markets, or any of the “Western ideas” Huntington listed, either. And earlier this year, millions of Iranians took to the streets to demand their rights and a return to a Western facing form of government.

    Huntington was wrong: the world didn’t enter a post-ideological age after the Cold War. Instead, the “political and ideological boundaries” shifted. The central conflict today is between liberal democracy and authoritarianism, both abroad and, crucially, within the borders of democratic countries.

    The forces of authoritarianism are strong. China has proven that a partially market-based authoritarian system is capable of securing dramatic economic growth. American voters, meanwhile, elected Trump twice, and his primary political project is the destruction of democratic norms and institutions that served as checks on his power. All those liberal democratic qualities that Huntington said have “little resonance” in other civilizations—individual rights, the rule of law, liberalism, and so forth—turned out to have little resonance for millions of Americans when they reelected Trump.

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    The American administration is also working tirelessly to destroy the liberal democratic global order that was established after World War II. Trump recently declared that ongoing American military support to Taiwan is a bargaining chip in future negotiations with Beijing and said he was “not looking to have somebody go independent” with the assumption of American protection. Nor is Trump interested in challenging Putin’s bid for hegemony in Eastern Europe. After cutting off the vast majority of U.S. military support to Ukraine, Trump has repeatedly tried to force Kyiv to accept settlements that are extremely favorable to Moscow.

    Ideology, it seems, matters more than “civilization.” We must challenge Huntington’s thesis and accept that the great clash of today is between liberal democracy and the forces working tirelessly to destroy it—wherever they are found.

    Matt Johnson is an essayist and the author of How Hitchens Can Save the Left: Rediscovering Fearless Liberalism in an Age of Counter-Enlightenment.

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    0 min
  • Episode 188: Liaquat Ahamed on 1873

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    This week, Richard talks to Liaquat Ahamed, author of 1873: The Rothschilds, the First Great Depression, and the Making of the Modern World (Penguin Press).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

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    26 min
  • Kathryn Paige Harden on How Genetics Shapes Human Behavior

    Kathryn Paige Harden is a professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Texas at Austin, where she leads the Developmental Behavior Genetics lab and serves as Director of Clinical Training. Her latest book is Original Sin: On the Genetics of Vice, the Problem of Blame, and the Future of Forgiveness.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Paige Harden discuss why twin studies reveal the substantial influence of genetics on human behavior, how genetic effects actually increase rather than decrease over a person’s lifetime, and why acknowledging genetic influences shouldn’t be seen as incompatible with progressive politics.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Thinking about genetics, and particularly the genetic influence on human behavior, is, for lack of a better word, often right-coded. People assume that it’s people on the political right who want to emphasize the genetic determinants of human behavior, and it’s often people on the left who are very allergic to this, who say that genetics doesn’t really explain anything—it’s social forces. Somehow, if we accept that genetics influences human behavior a lot, then that would lead us down all kinds of dark alleyways.

    You see yourself, and think of yourself, as a woman of the left. You also think that we have, in many areas of our life, underestimated the role that genetics plays in explaining human behavior. Let’s start with the latter part of this: why should we think that genetics is such a big determinant of human behavior?

    Kathryn Paige Harden: We should think about the importance of genetics because we have a lot of scientific evidence that genes matter in shaping our lives. We can see that in twin studies, which were the workhorse of genetic science in the 20th century: how similar are genetic relatives, even if they haven’t been raised together, for certain aspects of their behavior? We see it now with more modern technology, where we can actually look at specific segments of DNA, how they differ between family members, and are beginning to discover how they help shape behavior.

    It’s very rare that genes are determining behavior, but my PhD advisor from graduate school is very famous for a paper called “The Three Laws of Behavior Genetics.” The third law of behavior genetics is: everything is heritable—which means that everything that differs between people, when you look at it scientifically, tends to show some influence of the genes that you were born with. I’m a scientist; I’ve been working in this field since I was 18. It’s important to me because I think it’s a scientific fact that is incontrovertible at this point: genes influence behavior.

    Mounk: Let’s walk people through these arguments step by step, because I think a lot of people have heard about twin studies and they know that nowadays there’s probably more modern techniques that are slightly different. What exactly do the twin studies show and establish?

    Harden: Twin studies typically compare identical twins—who were conceived from one egg and one sperm, and then there was an error in early cell duplication so that now there are two people—to fraternal twins, who are the sort of twins who look like ordinary siblings: two sperm, two eggs, who just happen to share a pregnancy. That logic can be expanded to compare full siblings to half siblings, or adoptive parents and children to biological parents and children.

    What all these designs have in common is that they take people who share a social relationship. Both fraternal twins and identical twins have the same social relationship as siblings being raised in the same home with the same parents, but have different genetic relationships.

    Mounk: The idea here is to try to hold as many things constant as possible, other than genetics. You’re going to assume that perhaps there are differences between siblings—perhaps the family became a lot richer over the course of three or four years, and so if one sibling is three years younger, you might say it’s because of that. But if you’re comparing identical twins to fraternal twins, there’s no three years in between for the family to become richer.

    Harden: Yes, and it’s the same pregnancy—the same maternal smoking, the same neighborhood they happen to live in, the same prenatal supplements that the mother was taking. The only difference between them, in theory—and we can get into whether this assumption holds—is the difference in their genetic relationship. You’re then trying to see: does the similarity in their behavior track the similarity in their genetic relationship, or does it track the similarity in their social relationship?

    One of my favorite studies looks at twins where the mother is wrong about whether the twins are identical or fraternal. The mother thinks they’re fraternal because they look different to her—she knows them so well. But when you look at their DNA, it’s clear that they’re identical. The question is: do they look as similar in their behavior as identical twins typically do, or as fraternal twins typically do?

    Harden: The study shows that behavior tracks the actual genetic relationship, not what the mother thinks the twins are. It’s not explainable by being raised in the same home, and it’s not explainable by parental expectations of how similar they would be. The best predictor of their similarity is how many genes they share.

    I want to go back to what you said at the beginning: is that result right-coded or left-coded? It really depends on what you’re talking about. Some of the earliest twin studies were done around schizophrenia, showing that the best predictor of having schizophrenia is having an identical twin who also has schizophrenia. Subsequent twin studies have shown that you also see this higher similarity in identical twins for addiction, for sexual orientation, for depression, for all sorts of mental health problems.

    Mounk: That might be left-coded because it implies that it’s not your fault.

    Harden: If we look at whether people with more right-wing political ideologies versus left-wing are more likely to believe twin studies, or more likely to believe that genetics influences behavior, it very much depends on what behavior you’re talking about. Liberals are much more likely to say yes, identical twins are more similar for addiction; yes, sexual orientation is partly shaped by the genes that you inherit. It is the application of this to specifically cognitive ability and achievement that tends to be more right-coded in the United States.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about the magnitude of these findings. When you compare identical twins to fraternal twins, give us some statistic or concrete measure that allows people to get a sense of how much variation there is between identical twins—obviously there’s still some variation. How much more variation is there once you get to fraternal twins? How does that compare to a half sibling, for example?

    Harden: There was a really big meta-analysis where they pooled data from 50 years of twin studies—something like 15,000 studies, millions of pairs of twins. The punchline was that on average, across behavior but also medical traits, about half of the variation in outcomes was due to genetic differences between people. One way to think about that is: if people were all genetically the same, how much could you make outcomes the same? You could shrink people’s differences by a substantial degree if they were all genetically identical.

    It varies by trait. For things like schizophrenia or height, in modern populations almost all of the variation between people is due to their genetics. For things like personality or depression, it’s about half. When you start talking about education, it’s a fifth to a third. It depends on the phenotype you’re looking at. It also depends on the population you’re studying. If you’re looking at a nutritionally deprived sample—people who didn’t get enough to eat in childhood—you’re going to see less of a role for genes than if you’re looking at people who all had ample access to food, where most of the differences between them are necessarily about their genetics because there isn’t that much environmental variation.

    Mounk: The average height in China has shot up over the last 30 years. There’s a really nice example of that in a writer who was in Sichuan teaching in the 1990s. He’s a little shorter than me—like five-seven or something—and he was the tallest person in the classroom. He went back a few years ago and suddenly he was one of the shorter people in the classroom, and he was really struck by that. Obviously it’s not that the genetics of people in China has completely transformed over the course of 30 years—it’s that they’ve overcome the nutritional disadvantage they had as recently as the 1990s.

    If you’re in a place where a family doesn’t have enough money to buy enough food for all children, and one child for one reason or another is favored by the parents, or is better at elbowing their siblings out of the way to get to the food, they might end up being much taller—so it’s not genetically determined, it’s determined by social factors. But once you look at a context where everybody gets enough to eat, genetics is the thing that really drives it.

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    The other interesting finding here is that you might think genetics plays the biggest role early in life, and that later on its influence fades as people’s paths diverge, as they make different choices. If I’m understanding it right, the actual finding is the other way around?

    Harden: What you see is that twins get more similar over time, and people who don’t share genes get more different over time, such that heritability estimates tend to go up with age rather than down. If you’re looking at the similarity between adopted children and their parents, or adopted children and their siblings, they are most similar to these non-genetic relatives in childhood. Then, as they leave the family home and have more control over their environment, the evidence of the genotype tends to emerge over time.

    One way to think about that is that, especially in modern contexts, people have increasing amounts of control over their environments—both conscious and unconscious—as they go through life. They pick their peers, they pick their partners, they pick their daily routines, they pick what city they want to live in. Each of those choices reflects, even in small part, their own personality and temperament, and so there’s going to be a feedback loop where the environment is reinforcing those initial genetic differences. That sense of becoming more like your identical twin, and less like people who are genetically different from you, increases over age rather than decreases.

    Mounk : What are the main responses from people who are skeptical of the genetic explanation? Perhaps let’s start with popular objections and then go through some of the most sophisticated scientific objections. I should say that my wonderful podcast producer, Leo, is messaging me in all caps over WhatsApp because she has an identical twin and keeps saying there’s no way they’re going to get more similar as they get older. I think for a lot of people, a lot of their sense of self is bound up in many of these questions.

    Harden: There are a couple of objections. One is, I think, just a distaste for even doing the research—and this may be piggybacking on the comment you just made, that people’s identities are bound up with their behavior. It can feel inherently reductionistic, or inherently threatening to human agency, to make really valued parts of people’s identity—or very problematic or darker parts of people’s behavior—the object of scientific study, and especially scientific study at the level of genetic analysis. It collapses across our sense of ourselves as embodied animals and our sense of ourselves as choosing, agentic wills or reasoners. One objection is simply: it gives me the ick to think about genes influencing my sexual identity, my religious activity—that can just be uncomfortable.

    Another objection is that regardless of the results, and regardless of how the results are presented, there’s the fear that it is necessarily giving ammunition to the most reactionary, eugenic, or racist elements within a society. There’s a history of people using genetics to justify really horrible things. The objection is: even if you’re scientifically correct, there’s no way to do this work responsibly in our current political climate.

    Then there’s the scientific objection, part of which is very correct: twin studies make a ton of assumptions. You’re taking a really complicated developmental process and flattening it into one bucket for genes and another bucket for environments—but genes and environments don’t work like that. They’re always combining over the course of development. So what does it mean to have a statistical model that tries to disentangle them? Often people’s objections can float between these. They’re animated by fear, and that makes them perseverate on some of the assumptions of twin studies. These are not mutually exclusive—they’re fluid objections.

    Mounk: It is strange that this is an area in which people have very strong moral convictions, and it’s not always clear what drives them. There are a lot of people who feel a kind of sense of threat from recognizing some of this genetic influence. I’m thinking of one very dear friend of mine—an avid listener to this podcast, so she’ll recognize herself being mentioned here—who for a very long time believed strongly that the most important determinant of behavior is cultural: that the way to understand behavior is to study sociology and anthropology and the cultural determinants of how people behave. Obviously, if you spend time in Italy and you spend time in England, those places shape people in deep ways, and that’s not a genetic difference between Italians and English people by and large—it is a difference in culture, norms, and what personality traits those cultures encourage. There’s a real pull to that view.

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    She now has two children, and when I was visiting her, she looked at me and at her kids and said: “Yascha, I was totally wrong. The difference between these kids—it’s just clearly like they come to the world with their own personalities and attitudes.”

    I wonder whether there’s a slightly mistaken assumption in the background about what it would take to be responsible for our personalities—as if, on the one hand, if my personality is determined by my genes then I have no responsibility for it and it’s out of my hands, and on the other hand, there’s some idea of having totally chosen my own personality, and only then can I be responsible for it and be my own person. That background assumption may simply be wrong. We may just have to accept that if I like somebody as a friend, it’s because of the traits they have, and it’s perfectly appropriate to be grateful to them for their generosity, or to decide that I don’t want someone in my life because they’re mean and not a very good person. Whether or not behavior is in part genetically determined is, in that respect, kind of irrelevant. I have a friendship, a social relationship with the person in my life, and the question of how they came to be that person is not nearly as directly relevant to my gratitude, my anger, or my relationship with the people in my life as many people seem to assume.

    Harden: What you’re getting at is just really core to the dilemma of being a person—and I write about this a lot in my new book. We go through our lives and we experience ourselves in relationship with other people. We feel certain things. We have resentments, gratitudes, affections. We’re drawn to certain things and repulsed by others. At the same time, we have this peculiarly human gift and burden of being able to reflect on all of that—and to reflect in this really peculiar way we call scientific, which is to measure it, to put numbers on it, to try to develop theories about what predicts it: in terms of culture, genetics, parental socialization, life events. Behavior genetics sits right at the intersection of our experience of ourselves as loving, behaving, feeling people, and our existence as self-conscious minds that turn ourselves into objects of scientific study.

    I don’t think it’s really about someone having assumptions that are wrong versus right. Of course you’re going to come to learning about the science with priors, because you’ve been a human. You’ve had a sense of yourself, and you’ve necessarily had to develop a story about why you are the way you are. Science, on the one hand—and this is fading—has carried a kind of cultural authority. So people so often experience scientists saying “here’s one lens on behavior” as if it were “this is the only lens” or “this is the right lens.” If that conflicts with the narrative you’ve developed about your life, of course that’s going to bring up feelings.

    I talk about this with my undergraduates all the time. I teach intro psych here at UT, and I say at the beginning: psychology is not going to be like your calculus class. A professor going into calculus can assume you have no prior knowledge of calculus. Whereas I’m going to be talking about attachment and personality and parental relationships—and you already have thoughts and feelings about all of that, because you’ve been a person. I’m not trying to say that your theory is necessarily wrong. I’m trying to add a layer of information on top of that to refine some of those priors. It’s necessarily a topic that people have feelings about, because the question of why you are the way you are is one you can’t get through life without having constructed a story about, one way or the other.

    Mounk: How should we think about a few key questions? I had Emily Oster on the podcast perhaps about a year ago. One way in which she reads the influence of genetics—but also the influence of some basic socioeconomic facts about you that are not really under your control—is to say that parents hugely overestimate the impact of little decisions they make. Do I take the kid to this ballet class or not? Do I take them to this slightly marginally better school, even if one school is much further away? If I allow them to have 20 minutes more screen time, is that going to deplete their ability to pay attention forever? By and large, you would also say: you’re overthinking it. As long as you make sure they have enough food to eat, and they feel loved and safe, and they don’t experience some horrible form of trauma as a child, some mixture of genetics and the very basic facts about their environment is going to determine the vast majority of a life outcome. Torturing yourself over all of these marginal decisions is just a mistake. Would you broadly agree with that? Do you think that’s one of the upshots of this kind of research?

    Harden: I broadly agree with that. A lot of things that especially middle-to-upper-middle-class mothers—these are the moms in my cohort—obsess about are just not going to make that much of a difference in terms of measurable child outcomes. They’re not going to meaningfully change your child’s IQ score, or likelihood of becoming depressed, or likelihood of graduating from college, based on whether they go to a Montessori preschool versus a Waldorf preschool.

    I would refine that conclusion in two ways. One is that parenting is a relationship, and you do things in relationships not because they’re going to change the other person, but because they seem to be the best thing for how you’re relating to that person in the moment. It would be really strange if someone said it doesn’t matter how you treat your husband because you’re not going to change his IQ. That’s not the point of behaving toward your husband in a certain way—it’s to live out your values and to treat him in a way that he deserves and wants to be treated. A lot of parenting is about that.

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    I switched my oldest kid’s school this year from public school to private school, and I didn’t do that because I think going to private school is going to change his cognitive ability at 30. It was because he was unhappy at his public school and he’s happier at his new school. The reduction of parenting into can we optimize on these measurable variables—rather than asking what relationship you’re in with your kid, and what makes them happy this year, even if it doesn’t have a long-term effect—I think that can be missing from some of these conversations.

    Mounk: You’re presenting that partially as a refinement—or perhaps a small objection—to Oster’s outlook. I would put it the other way around: if you’re obsessed with how every little thing you do is going to impact the IQ score at age 30, or the likelihood of becoming a successful trader at Goldman, or a world-class pianist, you’re not in fact focusing on the relationship in the moment. If you’re freed from that anxiety, and recognize that these choices you’re making are not going to make or break the kid or determine all of those things, it actually frees you up to think more about what your child needs, how to create a family culture where everybody’s thriving. You can actually focus more on that really important question.

    Harden: I would agree with that reframing. I talk about this a lot in my second book: genetics can be both liberating and horrifying in equal measure. Thinking about how much your child’s life might be shaped by the role of the genetic dice does confront you with the limits of maternal control. I do not think of my kids as lumps of clay that I have unlimited control to mold, and that frees me a lot from the burden of feeling responsible for everything about them. But it also means confronting the fact that bad things might happen to them, that they might do bad things, and that I have limited control over how much I can prevent or shape that outcome.

    Going back to our earlier point, I think that can be part of the implicit negative reaction to genetics: we love control, and thinking about this factor that’s not fully within our control can be, again, both liberating and horrifying in equal measure.

    Mounk: Control is a burden, but it is also reassuring. In a very different context, I’ve made this point a few times about conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are scary because these evil people hold all the strings and are making the world go wrong in all kinds of ways—but it’s also comforting, because there’s a group of people who have control over the world, and if only we uncover them and replace them, everything is going to be fine. In a strange way, the idea that there is a locus of control somewhere always has this double-edged nature. As a parent, if you have control—well, that’s horrible, because everything depends on you. But it’s also very flattering; it’s a form of ego extension.

    Harden: Yes. With the conspiracy theory, one factor has all of the control, and there is something comforting about the cognitive closure of being able to say: it’s this. Not that the world is a messy, complex place where everything is interacting in ways we don’t fully understand, and our ability to steer the ship is always half guesswork—but rather, if we can just get rid of the deep state, everything is going to be better. When you get into “it’s all genetics” or “it’s all culture” or “it’s all capitalism,” that can be comforting because one problem offers the possibility of one solution. Whereas what we’re saying here is that it’s nature and nurture and culture and economies in combination—and knowing where to pull on that sweater is hard. That’s a lot less comforting.

    Mounk: Let’s go a little bit further down on this point of education. What do you think drives educational outcomes and success? How do you think that an unwillingness to take the genetic component in educational outcomes seriously has shaped and perhaps misshaped educational policy?

    Harden: If we look at the United States in the last 120 years, education has gone up—more people are educated, more people can read, more people can do advanced math. That is not because genetics have changed. It is because we have invested in mass public education and continue to make it a cultural priority to educate every successive cohort of students. The most important thing about education level is that it’s a cultural practice that requires the commitment of adults to educate the next generation. I’m always amazed when I’m helping my kids with their math—my 13-year-old is learning algebra, something that took humanity tens of thousands of years to develop, and now we teach it in a year. That’s an amazing cultural accomplishment.

    Within that system, within any cohort of kids moving through an educational system, it’s obvious that kids raised by high-income, more educated parents go further in school. Also, kids who happen to inherit a combination of genes that makes going through school easier for them also get further in school. Those associations—whether we’re looking at a correlation with a genetic indicator or a correlation with socioeconomic status—are of comparable magnitude.

    This is not surprising to the average American. If you ask the average American to estimate how important genetics is for education, their estimate is roughly what the meta-analytic twin study estimate is. People have been in classrooms, they’ve been around kids, they’ve noticed their own kids. It is not saying anything revolutionary to observe that some kids have an easier time paying attention, remembering things, manipulating information, and learning new vocabulary words, and that our education system is cumulative and stratified such that those initial advantages compound over the course of education. Who is most likely to graduate from college? Who is most likely to take calculus in high school? Who is most likely to be in the advanced math class in seventh grade? It’s not just the richest kids—it’s also the kids who have a certain combination of genetic variants.

    It’s not radical in that sense, but it is radical from the perspective of research on education, because almost none of it considers genetic differences between people.

    Mounk: How would this change the consensus in that field among researchers who don’t look at genetics? I can come up with a couple of hypotheses. One is that it may imply the system is somewhat less unjust than it appears. Presumably there’s some genetic correlation between a parent’s academic achievement and a child’s academic achievement, if there’s a genetic component—not a perfect correlation, but some correlation. If you’re only looking at the extent to which socioeconomic or educational background shapes outcomes, you say: the children of college graduates go to college at much higher rates, because if you don’t have parents who went to college, you just never have a chance—you don’t know how to apply, you didn’t go to the right high school, you didn’t read books when you were six years old.

    Presumably socioeconomic status does play some causal role. But once you put some kind of genetic factor into the analysis, and it turns out that some percentage of that difference is predicted by genes, that implies that a six-year-old who doesn’t come from a household with those socioeconomic achievements or that educational status actually has a much better chance of making their way than we expected. So interventions designed to make up for socioeconomic disadvantage may not make as much of a difference as we thought.

    Harden: A couple of things there. Empirically, it’s kind of worked out the opposite: the research that has controlled for genetics has actually given us some of the strongest evidence of continuing socioeconomic disparities in education. I was just reading a new preprint yesterday where researchers were looking at children at the very top of the distribution of a polygenic score—and we can get into how this is constructed, but it’s a genetic marker indicating whether you have genetic variants statistically associated with going further in school. They were looking at the top end of this genetic distribution for kids from lower-income and higher-income families, and showing that even at the very top of this genetic distribution, there were still big differences in educational outcomes by family income that accrued over the course of education.

    I mention that study because it’s a really common fear that if we start to take genetics into account, it’s going to make our evidence for disparities disappear—disparities that need to be addressed with social policy. But in actuality, the studies that have taken genetics into account have made a really strong case for the fact that there are still family economic disparities in educational opportunity in the United States. So empirically, that’s not what we’re seeing.

    Mounk: To be clear, empirically, what you’re saying is that the impact of socioeconomic status doesn’t disappear. But it does become smaller when you take into account the genetics.

    Harden: It doesn’t disappear. I don’t want to misrepresent the study off the top of my head, so I don’t know exactly how that coefficient changes. But without accounting for genetics, you’re always open to the objection: well, this looks like a socioeconomic effect, but it’s really just differences in kids’ ability.

    Mounk: What really frustrates me in these discussions is this: what we actually want to do is give people opportunity. There’s an ideological point of view that says, I care about the outcome, I want everybody to have good opportunity—and then, in service of that, denies the scientific evidence, or feels uncomfortable even engaging with the academic evidence, because engaging with it might undermine the mechanism to which one is committed. But the point of this information is that it might show that the mechanism isn’t in fact going to work. If what is driving disparities were not socioeconomic status at all, then all of the interventions meant to compensate for socioeconomic status are not going to produce more opportunity.

    As you’re pointing out, it seems unrealistic that socioeconomic status doesn’t play some independent causal role—and the study seems to confirm that it does. But there is this strange dynamic where people oversimplify their causal model because they care about the outcome, and in doing so actually obstruct their ability to influence that outcome in the way they hope.

    Harden: One thing I sometimes say when talking to education researchers is: imagine that someone has snuck into every data set you have and deleted all the information about student socioeconomic status. You don’t know which kids come from poor families and you don’t know which kids come from rich families. You’re still tasked with figuring out which schools are doing the best job of improving student learning. How much harder would your job be?

    Your job would be harder because the classic problem in education research is how to disentangle selection—what’s being driven by the student—from what schools and teachers are actually doing. One way to get at that problem is not simply comparing a kid from a rich family to a kid from a poor family without taking that difference into account. And that is the current situation that most education research is in with regards to genetics. If you’re not collecting that information, if you’re not considering it, you’re still trying to disentangle which schools are working, which curricula are working, which teacher practices are working, which policies make a difference. You still have to grapple with the problem of what schools are doing versus what students are selected into those schools—and you have a whole piece of information that’s just not there.

    It would be unimaginable to conduct this research without family income, and yet we consider it a matter of course to conduct it without genetics. Going back to your point—do you want to know how the world works or not? If we think that information about what causes what in the actual world is helpful for designing policy, then why would you leave data on the table that could help you understand student developmental outcomes? That doesn’t make sense if you’re truly invested in the ends you claim to care about.

    Mounk: There are areas where this dynamic plays out that have nothing to do with genetics. One example is the female wage gap, which is often presented as women earning less money for doing the exact same roles. That is not what the evidence shows—they might earn around 2% less for doing the actual same roles at the same level of seniority. The female wage gap is much larger than that in most countries, actually larger in continental Europe than in the United States. The reason has to do with other factors. If you become a lawyer, the key period in which it’s decided whether you make partner—and make enormous amounts of money—is in your 30s. In academia, it’s decided whether you make tenure, often also in your 30s. If you have children during those years, that reduces your likelihood of making partner or getting tenure, and puts you on a completely different earnings trajectory. The reason female lawyers make less money is not that female partners at the most prestigious law firms make less than male partners—it’s that fewer capable women end up as partners at those firms because of those circumstances.

    That doesn’t make it just or fair, but it does mean that if you’re trying to address this problem with anti-discrimination laws, negotiation training, or cultural messaging, you’re not going to get to the root of it. The problem actually requires a more fundamental intervention—perhaps in academia, for instance, there shouldn’t be an up-or-out tenure track where if you make it there’s very little advancement further down the line, and if you don’t, you can never really break in. A more radical intervention may be required, but you can only understand the nature of the intervention once you understand the nature of the mechanism. Yet some people find it somehow counterproductive to complicate the picture, fearing it will make people less committed to addressing the problem. In the process, they obscure the problem in such a way that the measures taken to address it simply can’t work.

    Harden: This dynamic you’re picking up on—where a mechanism, a causal story, or a proposed policy is offered as a solution to something people see as genuinely unjust—can become a stand-in for care about the problem, or the perceived injustice, in and of itself. When you say the causal model is different, or the mediating pathway is different, or that the policy didn’t work, it can be perceived as saying there’s no problem to be solved, or no injustice to be addressed. How to avoid our means being conflated with our ends is a really difficult science communication problem, and one where people end up talking past each other.

    My friend Jennifer Doleac has done work on ban-the-box—the policy of banning employers from asking whether applicants have an incarceration history—which was a very popular measure. It turns out that it tends to increase job discrimination against the formerly incarcerated, and also against Black men generally, because in the absence of information people simply rely on stereotypes.

    Mounk: If you have a racist employer who stereotypes Black men as likely to have been to jail, but you can tell them whether or not an applicant has a criminal record, they can at least reason: this applicant doesn’t have a criminal record, so I’m safe hiring them. If you remove that information—and I’m not approving of that reasoning, but it’s what you would expect given those incentives and background beliefs—then they’re much more likely to think: who knows whether this person has a criminal record, better hire someone else.

    Harden: The pushback Jennifer Doleac has gotten is telling—she’s been accused of not caring about second chances for people with an incarceration history. Her response is: she does care, and that’s precisely why she wants to know what actually works to get them employed, not what we think works. I feel similarly about education. If we think a certain math curriculum is going to help people get to Algebra 2, and we care about that as a society, but then you look and see that one school is only performing better than another because it has a higher concentration of kids who’ve inherited genes that make them slightly better at manipulating nonverbal information—I want to know that.

    Part of this is being attuned to opportunity costs: anything we do that doesn’t work, and anything that makes it slower to identify what doesn’t work, is not free. That’s time and opportunity that could be used more effectively. There’s a real pragmatic case to be made for incorporating genetics—not because it’s a silver bullet, but because it’s another variable. You wouldn’t leave a variable of comparable statistical power off the table if it weren’t genetics. So why not use this one too?

    Mounk: We’ve covered a lot of ground, much of it terrain from your last book. In your new book—in case the last one wasn’t controversial enough—you go for the maximally difficult part of this discussion: how do we think about the problem of evil? How do we think about people who do really bad things, the genetic determinants of that, and how should it influence our social response? Perhaps again, let’s start with the empirical evidence. Is there empirical evidence to suggest that the propensity to engage in serious crime has powerful genetic determinants?

    Harden: Again, I would say genetic influence rather than genetic determinants. Going back to the laws of behavior genetics—everything is heritable, which is the third law. The second law, I believe, is that siblings raised in the same family are not usually all that similar—that being raised in the same family doesn’t make you alike, and that most of our environmental influences are much more idiosyncratic and not structured by the family.

    Mounk: Is the first law simply the counterpoint—that there is some variation in behavior that is not influenced by genetics, that genetics is not 100%?

    Harden: Yes. What we see is that there are very few extremely rare genetic disorders—less than 0.1% of the population, usually running in a few families—where we see what we would call monogenic, single-gene disorders that cause people with them to be seriously antisocial, aggressive, and impulsive. I talk in the book about one study of a Dutch family where the men inherited an X-linked gene that affects an enzyme in the brain, and they were all seriously antisocial. They had committed arson, homicide, and rape; multiple members of the family were in prison. So from the monogenic side, we see evidence that rare genetic variants can really warp your ability to restrain aggressive and impulsive impulses.

    Most people who are aggressive do not have a monogenic disorder, but we are increasingly identifying genes that—and again, these are not deterministic, they work in combination with the environment—do increase your risk of becoming addicted to alcohol or drugs, of struggling with serious impulsivity problems from childhood, of behaving in more aggressive ways. This middle ground, where there’s not a single gene but many genes that raise your probability, produces correlations roughly as strong as those we see with a childhood maltreatment history, and that raises real questions. My book is me grappling with that question: how do we make sense of the fact that we didn’t choose to have this body and brain, and yet when we’re adults and we hurt each other, we hold each other responsible for our behavior?

    The other theme in the book is that I was raised as an evangelical Christian when I was a young woman, and I’m really interested in how older narratives from Christianity around the inheritance of evil or the inheritance of sin continue to shape our debates about the science. Genetics is a very young science, and I think we are interpreting much of it through the lens of these much older, more Christian stories.

    Mounk: You can see again why there might be so much resistance to thinking about genetics as a determinant here. I had a great podcast episode with Abigail Marsh on psychopaths. The fact that you can often diagnose a psychopath very early—at seven or eight years old, you can relatively reliably tell that a child has psychopathic traits—means that for obvious reasons, particularly if you have a child who exhibits those behaviors, there’s a reason why you might not want to accept that your child has a very strong tendency toward that. Abigail Marsh argues that with the right interventions, you can at least moderate the adverse impact it’s likely to have on the life of the child and on the lives of the people around them. But it is very scary to contemplate.

    There’s an important distinction we need to make, and perhaps should have addressed earlier. One thing people sometimes mix up is that genes can be hugely influential on our behavior, while at the same time there is going to be significant variation within families. Siblings only share 50% of their genetics, and especially when it comes to particular constellations of genes or recessive genes, it’s very possible that some members of a family have certain traits that others don’t. I wonder whether that’s part of what makes people so instinctively skeptical—whether we’re inclined to say: you’re telling me it’s all genetics, but I’m different from my parents, so it can’t be genetics.

    Harden: We tend to think of genetics and heredity through much older ideas of inheritance. If you had a hereditary title, you passed it down to your oldest child intact, in full. If you inherited your parents’ estate, you got all their money. But you don’t get all your parents’ genes—you get a random 50% draw from your mother’s and your father’s. One way to think about it is: your mother has a pantry of ingredients that she’s used to make a recipe, and your father has a pantry of ingredients he’s used to make a recipe. You get 50% of the ingredients from each pantry. What recipe can you now make? It might be very different from either one.

    That’s also why parents are always surprised by how different their second child is. They think: this is what happens when you combine my genes with my partner’s—and then they have their second child and it’s a completely different person. It’s a different combination. Getting out of the habit of thinking of genes as a source of continuity, and thinking of them also as a source of discontinuity, shuffling, and change from parent to child, is a really important shift in thinking. You are not your parents, and part of the reason you’re not your parents is that your genes are different from theirs. You’re not your parents’ clones.

    After my first book came out—and I write about this a little in the new one—I had so many people reach out to me. Someone who was the oldest of eleven and felt so different from their siblings, the only one who went to college. Someone who was adopted and didn’t find out until young adulthood, and said it suddenly made so much more sense because they had always felt like an outlier. Someone whose brother was an addict who had never been able to stay clean, who had always worried about having children because of what they might carry. People have this intuitive sense that family history matters, but that it can also surprise you. I appreciate being able to describe how that’s actually happening scientifically—this reshuffling that occurs whenever we create a child.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Paige discuss how society should respond to these questions, to what extent we have free will, and what genetic influence on our behavior tells us about humanity. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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  • This Week at Persuasion
    It’s SO HOT! This is how I’ll be spending my weekend. (Photo by Jeff Pachoud/AFP via Getty Images.)
    • Don’t miss our Intellectual Bootcamp, which will be TODAY, Friday May 29 at 12pm ET! This week, we’ll be discussing Revolt of the Public (Chapter 3) by Martin Gurri. To join the session, click here (passcode: 129264). If you have any issues joining, please…

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  • What the Pope Is Telling Us

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    (Photo by Alberto Pizzoli / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Pope Leo XIV’s new encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas, is not about artificial intelligence. As its name makes clear, it is about the human being. It examines an ancient question that has suddenly become urgent: namely, are humans more than very smart machines?

    This is Pope Leo’s first encyclical, but it follows his namesake Pope Leo XIII’s famous Rerum Novarum encyclical from 1891. Rerum Novarum was the Church’s response to the industrial revolution, the transformation of labor by machines and capital, and the creation of a huge class of poor workers. Magnifica Humanitas, similarly, is a response to the rise of artificial agents that are, in certain respects, much more capable than humans.

    The issue at stake is not only economic or technological, but anthropological. Today, as in the 1890s, there are those whose position acknowledges no inherent worth to the human person. From materialists in ancient times, through radical 18th century Enlightenment philosophes, to many of today’s atheists, the vision of the human person as merely animated matter captured the imagination of those who wished to shake off the yoke of institutional religion—and indeed, at times, of humanist morality.

    By this view, humans are no more than centers of intelligence, function, and performance, which means there is no reason not to treat AI as an improved human and no problem with wanting to “upgrade” humans by attaching them, or uploading them, to machines. The human subject becomes an object for modification, while objects are bestowed with human value and pertinence.

    The Pope’s words deal directly with this. He underlines two visions of humanity. One, inherited from Genesis and developed through the Jewish and Christian traditions, sees the person as created in the image of God, thus bearing irreducible significance and dignity. Unconditioned, inalienable, and unearned, this dignity and worth is not a function of intelligence, usefulness, productivity, or eloquence. It is a direct implication of humans being created in the divine image, having subjective depth and self-awareness. It is expressed, as the Pope mentions, in “the movement toward the identification and proclamation of human rights.”

    The rival vision, advanced by AI and transhumanist thinking, sees human beings as entities to be optimized. Here the human person is to be measured, upgraded, enhanced, and eventually surpassed. According to this understanding, humanity is no more than another rung on the evolutionary ladder, to be treated as raw material for reconstruction. This view was demonstrated by Larry Page who, at one of Elon Musk’s birthday parties, allegedly accused Musk of being a “speciesist”—used by Page as a derogatory term for someone who prefers a future in which humans survive and are not exterminated in the evolutionary struggle by AI.

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    What the Pope is warning against, therefore, is not AI per se, but the anthropology that often lurks behind it. He implores us not to ask only whether AI is used well or badly, but to examine what vision of the human person is embedded in our assumptions about AI and its use. “[T]he pervasive technocratic paradigm in which we are immersed, and that is amplified by the digital revolution and AI,” he writes, “threatens to normalize an anti-human vision … human beings are tempted to see themselves as a project to be optimized rather than as persons called to relationship and communion.”

    It is that vision, rather than AI girlfriends or machine-generated student essays, which defines our current crisis. What we must fear isn’t “evil robots” or “machines replacing humans,” but human beings learning to adopt a machine’s image of humanity: measurable, optimizable, predictable, and replaceable.

    This dangerous worldview is shared not only by transhumanists and posthumanists, but in a different way by some secular humanists. For if secular humanism grounds dignity in a certain capacity of the human mind (intelligence, rationality, reason), a more intelligent system has the stronger claim to it. That’s why “speciesist” isn’t an insult but an argument, one that only works if we’ve conceded that value and moral worth are derived from a scale on which both humans and machines can be ranked. In this way the transhumanist isn’t departing from secular humanism but drawing out its premise.

    The Pope describes transhumanism and posthumanism as imagining an “enhanced human being” or a “human-machine hybrid,” thus raising what he calls a new Tower of Babel. While the concept of “tzelem Elohim” or “imago Dei” (the image of God) dignifies the finite human, transhumanism rejects finitude, and indeed humanity, as it attempts to construct a deified cyborg.

    But humanity’s finitude is part of its essence. It is our limitations that inevitably open us to others, to being in relationships, to sharing commitments, feelings, and consciousness with other humans. “Humanity,” writes the Pope, “flourishes not despite limitations, but often through them.” To deny this is to deny our humanity, to close us off to others and to twist life into a mechanized race for cold precision.

    Moreover, in a society that measures human beings by efficiency, it would not be long before someone raises the question of what is to be done with human beings who are inefficient.

    From its inception in the book of Genesis, the idea of the creation of human beings in the image of God infused everyone, regardless of race, gender, status, or talent, with dignity, equality, singularity, and immeasurable significance. One of the greatest engines of Western moral history, it helped form the grammar of universal humanism, abolition, human rights discourse, and the liberal international order.

    The origins of these ideals and institutions are often forgotten, if not actively denied. But the AI debate seems to be forcing us to rediscover the theological genealogy of human dignity. The image of God is summoned again, not against empires, aristocracies, or racial hierarchies, but against the reduction of the human being to computation and performance.

    What is striking is not that the Pope cites Genesis. It is that Genesis still describes the problem better than much of our technological vocabulary is capable of doing.

    Tomer Persico is a Senior Fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute. His book, In God’s Image: How Western Civilization was Shaped by a Revolutionary Idea, was published this year by NYU Press.

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  • Be Excellent, Not Efficient
    Sydney making the omelet. (Screenshot: FX/Hulu.)

    This essay is based on a commencement address given at Denison University on May 16, 2026.

    Let’s travel through time.

    Put on your bell bottoms, stare dreamily at that lava lamp, turn up the volume on Paul Simon’s “Mrs. Robinson,” and imagine you are graduating from college in the mid-1960s. It is a revolutionary era that had different contours but presented similar questions to the ones you face today: how might you make your way, your mark, and your fortune in a time of global conflict, political upheaval, and technological transformation?

    In Mike Nichols’ film The Graduate, the main character, Ben, is cornered by middle-aged men in suits at cocktail parties and told “there’s a great future in plastics.”

    They could just as easily have lectured him about processed foods. This was the era of TV Dinners, instant mashed potatoes, and frozen fish sticks. The future of American cuisine seemed destined to come out of a package. Ambitious college graduates were no doubt told to think up new products that could be prepared more quickly than Spaghetti-O’s, or find new preservatives that would make those items last longer, or devise new marketing campaigns that would sell more cans to more people. The wave was cresting right in front of you; all you had to do was ride it.

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    Alice Waters loved to eat. She had come of age in the 1960s eating meals out of the freezer, all the while nurturing a vague notion that there had to be a better way to engage in one of life’s most fundamental activities: sharing food with family and friends.

    Alice was a student of the liberal arts. In fact, she majored in French cultural studies. It might not be the most direct route to Wall Street, but it did mean she studied abroad in Paris.

    France transformed Alice Waters, particularly the difference in how people approached meals. Processed foods were not the norm in Paris. People went to the market to find the freshest produce available, sometimes multiple times a day. They were happy to pay extra for the good bread. Most importantly, they savored their meals slowly, lingering for hours at a time with family and friends.

    One day, Alice went to a restaurant in Brittany and ordered fish for lunch. Her waiter took the order, and showed Alice a trout that had been freshly caught in the stream that ran alongside the restaurant. Then he cooked it with vegetables that had been picked from the garden.

    The experience opened Alice’s eyes to new possibilities. At that time in the United States there were virtually no grocery stores, no markets, no restaurants that supported a slow food way of life. So Alice Waters built them. She opened a restaurant called Chez Panisse, which served fresh food in a comfortable environment that encouraged conversation.

    Chez Panisse was the nation’s first farm-to-table restaurant. It has a claim to be the most influential American eating establishment of the past 60 years. A whole galaxy of famous chefs got their start in its kitchen. When you see terms like “organic” or “wholesome” or “fresh” associated with your food, rather than “quick” or “convenient”; when you read the name of the farm your meat or vegetables come from—that’s the universe that Alice Waters and Chez Panisse built.

    Let me point out three things we can learn from that story.

    First, you are not obligated to ride the wave that presents itself as inevitable. This is not a comment against Instagram, or instant mashed potatoes, or artificial intelligence. It is a comment about embracing human judgment. Your judgment. The judgment that gets cultivated by a liberal arts education of constant reading, thinking, discussing, opining, revising. It’s the judgment that can look at a rising tide—whether it’s processed food or gambling apps—and say “I think that wave is more likely to destroy cities than lift boats.” Or simply, “No thanks, I don’t want to live that way.”

    You may decide that it is just fine for a robot to drive you from point A to point B. Or to do your taxes. But you want a sentient being to share your meals with, and to lay their head on the pillow next to you at night. It’s the judgment that recognizes you don’t want to spend the second half of your life apologizing for what you did during the first half. Just remember: you get to decide what matters, and you get to decide how to organize your life around it. Thich Nhat Hanh tells the story of a rider on a horse galloping madly across a field. When someone says, “Hey, where are you going so fast?” the rider responds, “I don’t know: ask the horse.”

    You don’t want to be that guy.

    Second, connect the social change you want to see with the life you want to live. Alice Waters wasn’t motivated by her anger at a system. She was inspired by her love for a form of life: namely, how we eat and talk together. The great Jesuit philosopher John Courtney Murray had a word for that: civilization. Turns out the simple things can be quite profound. David Brooks calls this the “Some people find a better way to live, and other people follow,” approach to social change. It has been the north star of my own life. The reason that I started an interfaith organization was because I think religion is principally about being a better person, and I need to be a better person. So being around religion is good for me.

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    Third, focus on the excellence that is the fruit of hard work. Be skeptical of people who help you make excuses or encourage a sense of entitlement. Whenever you are faced with the choice between doing more things in a mediocre way, and doing fewer things in an excellent way, choose excellence. When Alice Waters returned from France, her instinct was not to convince fast food places to put better pickles in their burgers. It was to start a single restaurant that mastered a particular cuisine. There is no substitute for being good at what you do.

    In Islam, there is a word for this: ihsan, or sacred excellence. It’s the highest spiritual state that one can achieve. If you achieve excellence, if you are good at what you do, impact will follow. Brian Eno once said about the Velvet Underground that they weren’t influential because they sold millions of albums. They were influential because the handful of people who bought their albums were so inspired that they all started their own bands.

    Excellence finds its ultimate destiny in the service of others. My favorite example of this is, well, about food. In the penultimate episode of season two of “The Bear,” Sydney, the sous chef of a fine-dining restaurant, notices that her friend Natalie is near collapse from exhaustion. She offers to make her breakfast. The camera does a closeup on every exquisite detail of the process: the way the eggs are cracked and whisked, the way the pan is buttered, the manner in which the cheese is spread evenly right down the middle, the chopping of the chives, the mixing of juice, the smile when the food is delivered to an exhausted and grateful recipient. And then the eyes lighting up as the first bite is taken.

    “That was the best part of my day,” Syd tells the chef-owner of the restaurant, Carmy. Carmy nods knowingly. They have aspirations that their restaurant will win a Michelin star. But the original motivation was never about the honors or the recognition. It was about a commitment to the craft of cooking, and the joy of taking care of others. It was about the profound sense of satisfaction you feel when making a perfect omelet, and an honest living from your craft, and a gift that brings joy to others.

    I don’t tell you stories about Alice Waters or the Velvet Underground or “The Bear” because I’m a cook or a musician. In fact, I’m the last person you want making you an omelet or singing you a song.

    I tell you these stories because when I watch chefs or musicians or any human being do their work with ihsan—sacred excellence—and direct it towards the elevation of other human beings, it inspires me to improve at my craft, to do my work with ihsan, to be as useful as I can to the people around me.

    Humans inspiring other humans to elevate. Maybe the robots can do that, but I don’t think so. And even if they could, I’m not sure I’d want them to. There is something very human about making our own food, and our own music, and our own inspiration. This is the essence of our condition. It is what we were made for. It is what makes us precious to one another.

    It makes me think of the wisdom of the Roman philosopher Seneca. I will leave you with his words: “While we live, while we are among human beings, let us cultivate our humanity.”

    Eboo Patel, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.

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  • What Tunisia Teaches the United States About Democracy
    An election poster for Kais Saied is pasted on a wall along a street in Ariana, Tunisia, on September 29, 2024, during the presidential election campaign. (Photo by Chedly Ben Ibrahim/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    In July 2021, Tunisia’s president, Kais Saied, dismissed his prime minister, suspended parliament, and began ruling by decree. The country that had been the lone democratic success of the Arab Spring—the same country that had produced a Nobel Peace Prize-winning national dialogue, ratified a celebrated constitution, and held competitive elections—folded with little public resistance. Polls in the following months showed majority support for the consolidation. The institutions that Western democracy theorists had spent a decade praising did not so much fail as become irrelevant.

    This is an intriguing puzzle. Tunisia had nearly everything a democracy requires, according to traditional political science. It had a civil society—particularly the powerful Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT)—that had supported the country through the 2013 crisis. It had a written constitution drafted through compromise. It had elections, peaceful transfers of power, and an active press. By 2014, observers could plausibly point to Tunisia as evidence that Arab democracy was not an oxymoron. But seven years later, Tunisians traded that democracy for a strongman, and they did so without much regret.

    The standard postmortems emphasize institutional weakness, factionalism, or constitutional design. While these factors had an impact, they miss the deeper story. Tunisia’s democratic collapse was not, at its core, a crisis of institutions. It was a crisis of economic performance that institutions could not absorb, which hollowed out trust, and finally made authoritarian populism look like the rational choice. This provides both a parallel and a warning for America.

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    The Economic Roots of Tunisia’s Trust Collapse

    The 2011 revolution did not start with a vote or a manifesto; it started with an unemployed fruit vendor setting himself on fire in protest against police harassment. The original grievance was economic precariousness, and the democratic transition that followed inherited economic obligations it could not meet. Between 2011 and 2021, Tunisia’s youth unemployment hovered above 30 percent, with university graduate unemployment higher still. Real GDP growth lagged behind the demographic wave. Foreign direct investment never recovered to pre-revolution levels. The informal economy expanded as the formal sector failed to absorb new entrants.

    Why couldn’t the new democracy deliver? Part of the answer is structural. Tunisia inherited a French-derived labor code that made hiring and firing costly, discouraging investment in jobs for young workers. These rules might suit a wealthy European economy with deep social insurance and high productivity. But in a middle-income country with 30 percent youth unemployment, they functioned as a ceiling on opportunity.

    The deeper problem was political. The UGTT—without which the revolutionary coalition could not have held together—had veto power over the very reforms most likely to produce employment. IMF-backed structural packages stalled. Subsidies remained. Stagnation eroded trust.

    This is the missing link between Ben Ali’s ouster and Saied’s coup: a decade in which democracy delivered freedom but not work, and in which young Tunisians, who had supplied the bodies for the revolution, found themselves with the same economic prospects under democracy as under autocracy—and concluded, not unreasonably, that the political form was a secondary concern.

    The Civil Society Paradox

    The role of the UGTT illuminates a paradox at the heart of democratic theory. Civil society is supposed to be a bulwark of democracy. In Tunisia, it was—yet it was also one of the obstacles to democratic survival.

    The United States has no analog to the UGTT, and the decline of American labor unions is a real loss for workers’ voices. But the underlying pattern is familiar. Organized interests across both parties block productivity-enhancing reform—in housing, occupational licensing, infrastructure permitting, healthcare, and education—and citizens experience the resulting stagnation as a generalized institutional failure. The lesson is not that more unions would save American democracy, but that democracy requires coalitions willing to deliver material improvement, and that organized interest groups can obstruct this delivery. This is already apparent in many areas of American life, with democratic processes such as citizen participation or interest groups holding back infrastructure development.

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    How Economic Failure Becomes Institutional Failure

    This economic story gives context to the decline of trust in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Citizens do not lose faith in judiciaries, legislatures, political parties, and police in the abstract—they lose faith when those institutions fail to resolve economic tensions. And once trust bottoms out, institutions stop functioning as shields and instead start functioning as targets.

    Tunisia’s party system collapsed because no party could deliver on economic promises, and the public concluded—reasonably—that the parties were a cartel of bickering elites who differed in every way except their inability to provide meaningful work. Saied’s ascent was a populist verdict on that cartel. The American parallel is unmistakable: decades of wage stagnation, regional decline, and elite indifference have produced populist movements on both the left (Bernie Sanders, Zohran Mamdani) and the right (Donald Trump, JD Vance) with a shared diagnosis of failure despite disagreement on solutions.

    This is echoed in the undermining of the judiciary. Saied dismantled Tunisia’s judiciary by leveraging widespread perceptions of corruption—perceptions rooted in decades of Ben Ali-era capture that the 2011 transition could never fully repair. Low trust made the institution disposable. American politicized judicial appointments have similarly eroded perceptions of neutrality, creating a permission structure for narrowing judicial authority that would have been unthinkable even a generation ago.

    Most striking is the trust differential between security services. Tunisia in 2019 had roughly 62 percent trust in the police compared with 96 percent trust in the armed forces—a pattern that recent research identifies as a leading indicator of backsliding. Low local-security trust drives protest; high military trust legitimizes consolidation. The United States is seeing declining confidence in federal and local policing alongside persistent high trust in the armed forces. While economic grievance is what puts citizens in the streets, the trust differential is what determines how the state responds when they get there.

    The final warning is in the legislature. Saied sidelined parliament by ruling through decree once trust in the legislature had collapsed. The American legislative branch is drifting in the same direction, with executive orders rising as congressional productivity falls. A legislature that cannot deliver on economic policy becomes a legislature whose bypass the public will tolerate, and, eventually, ratify.

    The American Ledge

    The United States is not Tunisia, and the differences matter. America’s GDP per capita is more than fifteen times Tunisia’s. Its institutions are older, and its constitutional system has survived crises that would have ended most democracies.

    But none of this is grounds for complacency.

    The American trust collapse has its own economic roots. Median wage growth has lagged behind productivity for four decades. Housing and healthcare costs have outpaced wages on nearly every metric. Regional economic divergence has stranded entire communities—manufacturing towns in Ohio and Pennsylvania, agricultural regions across the Plains, former resource-extraction economies in the West—in conditions of long-term decline. The cohort of Americans now entering middle age is the first in modern history that does not expect to do better than its parents.

    These conditions do not produce 30 percent youth unemployment. They produce something subtler and arguably more dangerous: the persistent political signal, sent through every available channel, that the system is no longer delivering. When that signal reaches every institution simultaneously—Congress, the courts, local police, federal agencies, the parties—the result is the sort of low-trust landscape that Saied exploited, transposed into a larger and more consequential democracy.

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    Restoring the Economic Foundation of Democratic Trust

    Tunisia’s tragedy was not simply that its citizens lost faith in institutions. It was that its institutions, constrained by a revolutionary coalition that could not reform itself, could no longer earn that faith. This triggered the descent into authoritarianism.

    The American lesson is therefore not to redouble institutional defense alone, but to build coalitions willing to deliver the housing, the jobs, the wages, and the opportunity that make trust rational. Democratic reformers focused only on procedural integrity are merely treating symptoms. Without economic renewal—and without the political courage to confront the organized interests that block it on every side—the institutional defenses will not hold.

    Dania Arayssi is a Program Head and Senior Analyst at New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, where she works on policy research and analysis at the Central Asia Center.

    Henry Rogers is a student fellow at the New Lines Institute, a contributor to the Middle East Policy Council, and a public affairs consultant with the Washington AI Network.

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