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Parliament Square is heaving. All around me, thousands press towards a stage on which a black gospel choir is performing. There’s a sea of flags, lots of people are drinking beer.
I’m on the outskirts of the crowd, in the shadow of Big Ben, and I’ve struck up a conversation with a group of strangers who hadn’t met before today.
There’s an Iranian couple who’ve lived in the UK for several years. There’s an Indian student on a temporary visa. There’s a business owner who grew up Hindu in Germany but whose parents hail from Afghanistan. Suffice it to say, these are not the kinds of people I thought I’d end up meeting at the “Unite the Kingdom” march organized by the far-right activist Tommy Robinson.
The Iranian man is blunt. “I think what all these people have in common is a dislike of Islam,” he says, gesturing at the crowd. He’s been talking about his hatred of Sharia law, about his belief that it is being imposed in Britain, just like in his native Iran.
Beside him, a woman holds up a sign bearing the image of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah of Iran. She speaks fluently about the oppression of the Islamic Republic and her sympathy with the protesters in her home country. She believes that the same danger—radical Islam—is taking root in the UK.
Sneha, the Indian student, agrees. She tells me that she doesn’t plan to remain in the UK once her studies are over, but she does plan to return as a tourist. And when she does, “I don’t want Islam to be so prevalent. I don’t want Sharia here.”
The demographic diversity in this group is unusual. The rally is overwhelmingly white and working class—for the most part, it’s exactly the sort of crowd you’d expect. But almost without fail, everyone I speak to over the course of the day converges on this same view of Islam. I can tell that most people here are torn between wariness of voicing their views in public and feeling that things have gotten so bad that they just have to speak out.
All of this is taking place a week after the British public handed the Labour government a devastating loss in local elections. The right-populist Reform led by Nigel Farage emerged as the largest party, gaining well over a thousand council seats. Labour and the Conservative Party both flounder with abysmal poll numbers. The fallout from the election is almost certain to topple Keir Starmer’s premiership.
Which poses a question: Will these marchers be satisfied with protesting in the streets? Will the movement fizzle out, like so many far-right movements before it? Or do they represent something more permanent—a growing constituency of the British electorate that won’t rest until it sees itself represented in the halls of power?
Sceptered Isle“The country’s in such an absolute mess. With this oppressive Labour government at the moment, if people don’t get out on the streets, nothing will change. I genuinely believe that.”
I’m talking to Daniel, a soft-spoken man from the East London suburbs. The march is just getting started, and we’re walking down the Strand towards Whitehall in central London.
The scene is lively. I see members of the public stand in bemusement as their path into town is interrupted by a sea of Union Jacks and Saint George’s crosses. Several kids have climbed up the scaffolding on a tall building and are throwing flares down onto the roofs of other buildings. Below, a speaker system blares Tracy Chapman’s “Talkin’ Bout a Revolution.”
“For the last thirty years,” Daniel tells me, “the British people have decisively voted for the party that promises to restrict immigration the most, and we’ve just been ignored. It’s not a question of being racist, it’s a question of numbers. We don’t have the infrastructure for it. Our public services are crumbling.”
It’s a sentiment I hear a lot over the coming hours: Britain is broken, nobody is fixing it. Again and again, people tell me they’re worried that immigrants don’t integrate, that they are a drain on public services. They reference various events from recent years to support their case. The Conservative Party promised that Britain’s exit from the European Union would bring down net migration, but net migration increased. Following a surge in refugee numbers after COVID, asylum seekers were put up in hotels around the country. And there have been scandals like the “grooming gangs”—the fact that, over several decades, police in multiple regions were slow to investigate the abuse of young girls by groups of mainly Asian men in England for fear of appearing racist.
One young man from Kent spoke for many when he told me, “When you’re allowing unvetted men in, creating vast problems in our country, then things need to change.”
Britain, of course, has real problems. Following the 2008 financial crisis, its economy simply did not grow as fast as the United States or much of the rest of Europe. Outside of London, many towns and cities suffer from decline. Successive governments have struggled to deal with a huge surge of refugees in recent years, including 200,000 crossing the English Channel on small boats since 2018.
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There are also problems with integration on the edges of some of the UK’s Muslim communities. While it’s false to say that “sharia law” has been imposed on a wide scale in British cities, religious intimidation, flare-ups over blasphemy in schools, and instances of hardline imams on “sharia councils” arbitrating things like divorce are all real phenomena. Extremism and violence by some Palestinian activists—and violent attacks against British Jews—are also real.
None of these concerns can be dismissed out of hand. But in this crowd, they have been inflated to fit a vast narrative of terminal decline and elite betrayal. Issues like the grooming gangs and the migrant hotels are not failures to be learned from within a status quo that basically works; they are symptoms of civilizational collapse at the hands of one religion.
Kyle, a young man wrapped in an Israel flag (though he tells me he’s a Christian) says that World War III is coming “from Islam.” Tony, a construction worker from Birmingham, says of the Muslim month of Ramadan: “They don’t fast, they feast. When the sun’s up, they don’t eat and they tell everyone ‘we’re fasting, we’re fasting.’ But when the sun goes down they gorge again. They feast on everything.”
And a man who identifies himself as Stan Laurel because of his resemblance to the English comedian points up at the tall Victorian buildings all around. “We built all this. Our fucking peasants fucking built the fucking lot, mate. And now we’re fucking retaliating.”
Retaliating against who?
“Muslims.”
Oh, Tommy Tommy!Today’s march has been organized by Tommy Robinson, the country’s most notorious far-right activist. Born Stephen Yaxley (he adopted his current name to conceal his criminal conviction for assaulting an off-duty police officer), Robinson first gained prominence in Luton as co-founder of the English Defense League in 2009.
Luton is a town that can easily stand in for various problems facing the UK. One of the country’s most densely-populated urban areas, it suffers from widespread relative poverty and social unrest. A decade or two ago, the town was a hub for several extremist Muslim groups. After one of these groups heckled a homecoming ceremony for soldiers returning from the war in Afghanistan, dozens of young white men and football hooligans mobilized and formed the EDL: a street movement protesting both jihadist extremists and regular Muslims.
The EDL’s tactics were antagonistic, regularly racist, and often violent. In the early 2010s, it was common to switch on the news and see them rioting, shouting slurs, and attacking police officers.
While the EDL eventually declined amidst infighting, other movements took its place. Far-right groups like “Britain First” made headlines for protesting against what they claimed was the “Islamification” of the country. Then, the Brexit vote in 2016 drew attention to the economic and cultural grievances of working class voters, putting immigration squarely on the national agenda.
Through it all, Robinson was never far from the headlines. Boyish, pugilistic, and a passionate orator, he’s the closest thing the British right has to a working-class hero. Unlike Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson—the upper-class faces of British populism—he looks and sounds the part.
It’s obvious from the way he MCs proceedings at Unite the Kingdom that he knows how to work a crowd. The second most common chant I hear (behind “Keir Starmer’s a wanker!”) is “Tommy Tommy Tommy Tommy Rob-in-son. Ohhhh, Tommy Tommy!”
Robinson has always been clever enough to distance himself from the more overt displays of violence and racism spawned by his movement. But he’s also authentic enough to retain the allegiance—even adoration—of broad swathes of the far right. He’s received a number of criminal convictions over the years, including for assault, fraud, and contempt of court—but in the eyes of his supporters these only reinforce his status as a martyr unjustly targeted by the elite.
A watershed moment came with the summer 2024 riots. After three young girls were stabbed to death and many others injured in the seaside town of Southport, it was rumored that the perpetrator was a Muslim asylum seeker. The claim was amplified by Robinson, and by the time it emerged that the real attacker was born in Wales to a Rwandan Christian family,1 27 towns and cities had been plunged into a week of unrest. Protesters were heard chanting Robinson’s name. Angry mobs firebombed migrant hotels. Hundreds were arrested, including Peter Lynch, a grandfather of three who later committed suicide in prison.
One of the first things I see at the Unite the Kingdom rally is Lynch’s face plastered across a banner:
I suspect the Southport riots, more than anything else, explain how Robinson’s movement grew so big, so fast. It was proof that ordinary people all across the country, not just violent young men from deprived towns like Luton, can mobilize against immigrants. While during the height of the EDL in 2011 only a thousand people would show up to demonstrate, by September 2025 the first “Unite the Kingdom” rally was drawing an estimated 150,000 attendees.
Soldiers of ChristWe arrive at Parliament Square, where the sky is overcast. Up on the stage, a parade of speakers and musicians keeps the crowd alternately enraptured, enraged, and entertained.
I’m struck by the proliferation of Christian imagery here. Dozens of marchers are carrying crucifixes and wooden crosses. Others hold signs reading “Christ is King.” At times, the tone is apocalyptic—a large banner reading “REPENT, TODAY WE ARE IN THE LAST DAYS” flutters against the clouded sky.
“I’m here to unite the Kingdom for Jesus,” says Topaz, a young woman who works as an online tutor. Like everyone else, she’s watching the speeches on huge screens above the stage. “I’m hoping that everyone starts to turn back to Jesus. I think that when we do we will be blessed again, like we once were as a nation.”
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It’s strange to hear this sentiment expressed in the UK where, until quite recently, the intermingling of religion and politics was viewed with suspicion. Faith is a private thing, and few will actively invoke the Bible to push a political agenda.
That’s starting to change. Many of those attending Unite the Kingdom are convinced of the need for an assertive Christianity in public life. I speak to Richard, one of several people wearing high-vis jackets on which are written lines from the New Testament. Richard says he is part of a group invited by Robinson to hand out the Gospel of Saint John. He tells me that Robinson is a good Christian, despite his criminal convictions.
“When he was jailed, the prison chaplain met with him every day and taught him about the Bible and about Jesus Christ,” Richard explains. “I would say he’s very close to putting his full trust in Jesus as his Savior.”
Christians are just one part of the coalition Robinson has assembled here. Unite the Kingdom has folded into its ranks working-class Brexit voters, Iranian monarchists, and British admirers of Donald Trump. (Up on stage, Robinson plays a videoclip of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He also vociferously praises Charlie Kirk.) Perhaps surprisingly, ethnic minorities are frequently among those giving speeches or leading the music. Back in September, during the first Unite the Kingdom rally, I’d been startled to see a group of Māori performing a haka.
That’s what stands out most: the (for want of a better word) intersectionality of it all. It’s a far cry from young men smashing up police vans in Luton because they want England to remain white. In fact, many people at Unite the Kingdom actively express solidarity with other countries that take a hard line on immigration. “In North Korea you get shot. In Russia you get five years in jail for entering illegally,” says the man who looks like Stan Laurel.
The prevailing view is that every civilization has a right to defend itself—and that includes Britain.
“Are You Ready?”You can’t reconcile the view of immigrants displayed here with my own experience of London.
Some people go out of their way to tell me that they don’t object to most Muslims, just the minority of radical Islamists. But plenty of people either don’t supply that caveat, or actively claim that the problem is most Muslims. They tell me that Islam is an exception among all religions in the world: the one faith that simply cannot integrate.
I live in the North London borough of Haringey, which is 57% white. It contains a diverse mix of Turks, Greeks, Muslims, and is adjacent to the Stamford Hill ultra-Orthodox Jewish community. Costas, my Greek landlord, collects the rent. Mohamed, a Muslim Uber driver, takes me into town the day after the rally. Yogita, the Indian shopkeeper, sells me beer on the weekend.
Many of the marchers here are convinced that such diversity is neither desirable nor possible—or, at the very least, that all the non-Muslim groups live in constant fear of Muslims and refugees.
It’s nearly 5pm. I can already tell that this Unite the Kingdom march isn’t as big as the one held in September. I can see it in the vast empty spaces that have opened up in front of the TV screens spaced out along Whitehall. Later that night, police will estimate that roughly 60,000 people showed up, compared to more than 150,000 the first time round.
It’s tempting to chalk up this decline in attendance to a lack of momentum. Some in the media are already claiming that the movement is fading, that the far right remains fringe.
I’m not convinced. Unite the Kingdom was years in the making, fed by a drip of news stories and narratives that are slowly coalescing into a coherent—if apocalyptic—worldview in Britain. It’s not just Brexit. It’s not just the rise of right-populist media like GB News (by some metrics the most-watched news channel in the country), which has long pushed the conspiratorial narratives I heard at the rally. It’s not just the refugee crisis of the 2010s or the small boats crisis of the 2020s. It’s not just the Southport riots or Islamophobia. It’s not even the failures of successive governments to fix what feels like a terminally stagnant economy.
It’s a combination of it all, along with an intractable sense of powerlessness that just isn’t going away, no matter what the establishment does.
Which is why I don’t think these marchers will be satisfied until they attain real power. They feel betrayed by a Conservative Party that delivered Brexit but then oversaw a surge of migration. They feel even more betrayed by a Labour Party that promised radical change but has managed to please exactly nobody.
So now, in the words of Tracy Chapman, they’re talkin’ bout a revolution. Most are willing to give their vote to Nigel Farage and Reform—but only, as a couple of people tell me, because he is the most viable candidate to the right of the Conservatives. If they could, they’d vote for parties to the right of Reform.
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Things are starting to wind down, and Robinson once again takes to the stage. “Are you ready for the Battle of Britain?” he shouts. “If you don’t send a message in the next election—if you don’t register to vote, if you don’t get involved, if you don’t become activists—we are going to lose our country forever!”
Britain’s far right is eyeing power. The question many of us are asking is how far they’ll be willing to go if they get it.
Luke Hallam is senior editor at Persuasion.
Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
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1Much has been made of the fact that Axel Rudakubana, the 17-year-old perpetrator of the attack, downloaded an Al-Qaeda training manual onto his computer. But as detailed in a lengthy report last month, there’s no evidence that he was motivated by Islamic fundamentalism, and the manual was part of a pattern of downloading extreme and violent material. His computer also contained “grossly offensive and graphic” anti-Islamic material.
In an hour we will host a book club with Freya India discussing her book GIRLS: Gen Z and the Commodification of Everything. Please join us on Substack Live!
Trump and Xi in Beijing on May 15, 2026. (Photo by Yan Yan/Xinhua via Getty Images.)It was both painful and humiliating to watch media coverage of Donald Trump’s recent visit to Beijing, because it amply demonstrated America’s decline as a great power relative to China. Prior to the summit, expectations were very low: Trump was in a weakened position, beset by inflation and declining popularity, while seeking Chinese help in getting out of the Iran trap he has created for himself. Xi, on the other hand, had forced Trump to back down in his trade war the year before, with China showing strong export growth in the face of Washington’s weak response.
And so it was. Trump returned to Washington with little to show for his visit: only two agreements on opening Chinese markets to U.S. products, and no political help in the Middle East. China did agree to buy 200 Boeing aircraft (fewer than expected), but it has failed to follow through on similar announcements in the past. The White House also claimed that China has agreed to purchase $17 billion of agricultural products, but China has not confirmed this. It did not prevent Trump from claiming that they “did great trade deals” and that the meeting was “a great success.”
It was the optics of the meeting that demonstrated how far Trump has fallen in Chinese eyes. Trump was not met at the airport by Xi. He was seated on the podium in a chair that made him look smaller than Xi, a slight that could have been avoided had Trump’s State Department not sidelined the protocol officials whose job it is to look after these things. The worst part of the visit was Trump’s constant sycophancy, exclaiming that Xi was a “great leader,” “really a friend,” someone “from central casting”; he effused time and again about how beautiful and impressive China is. As in previous interactions with various dictators, Trump seems to have thought that they would be impressed by the same kind of praise and flattery that he himself revels in. Xi, for his part, failed to reciprocate any of these assertions of friendship, saying merely that the United States and China “should be partners and not rivals.”
The most significant issue arising out of the summit was Taiwan. Trump had held up a $14 billion arms package voted by Congress in advance of the summit, and there is no indication delivery will resume anytime soon. Xi told Trump that future relations with Washington would be conditioned on the level of U.S. support for the island. A light went on in Trump’s head that Taiwan would be a “very good negotiating chip” in trade negotiations with Beijing. Trump made other dismissive remarks about the island, noting that “we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war,” and repeating his assertion that Taiwan has stolen semiconductor chip technology from the United States.
His failure to say anything about Taiwan’s security stood in sharp contrast to Joe Biden’s clear assertion that the United States would act in its defense.
Donald Trump is a politician who is unable to see the world in anything but personal and self-interested terms. He was furious after his return at the suggestion that Obama was treated with more respect than he was, using the occasion to assert that “nobody respects Obama,” who was in any case “a divider.” The Chinese media has been talking for some time about the United States as a “declining power”; Xi brought it up with Trump by expressing hope that their countries could avoid the “Thucydides trap” if a declining America ceded power gracefully to a rising China. Trump immediately interpreted this as Xi agreeing with him that America was in decline under Joe Biden, but that it was great again now that he was president. As usual, Trump reserves his greatest anger and hostility for his domestic opponents, and not the leaders of the world’s great dictatorships.
The truth of the matter, which the Chinese understand very well, is the opposite: American decline is a direct product of Trump’s rise since 2016. It is as if Trump has decided to do everything in his power to weaken the United States vis-à-vis China. He has polarized an already polarized country like no previous president; he has cut funding for basic scientific research and attacked American universities which were the best in the world; he has gotten the United States involved in an unnecessary war in the Middle East that has depleted stocks of advanced American weapons; he and his colleagues have openly stated that their domestic opponents, the Democrats, pose a far bigger challenge to the future of the United States than either China or Russia.
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Trump has also systematically sought to undermine the U.S. alliance system, disparaging allies while heaping tariffs on even the closest traditional friends, and threatening to grab territory from Denmark, a loyal NATO ally. He claims that the United States under his leadership is now respected as never before, when something close to the opposite is true: both friends and rivals agree that the United States has become something of a rogue state that is contributing to global instability and disorder, as well as something of a laughing stock.
Trump has made Xi Jinping’s life enormously easy in a way that was reflected in his behavior during the summit. America under Trump is engaged in such a determined process of self-harm that China does not really have to do much but sit back and watch it unfold. Trump predicted that China would not attack Taiwan while he was president. He may be right about this: Xi does not want to get in the way of a declining United States. But he may be forced to act quickly if America finally gets a president who wants to reverse that trajectory.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
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Marc Lipsitch is the Berberian Professor at Stanford University, with appointments in Infectious Diseases, Biology, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Marc Lipsitch discuss the good, the bad, and the ugly of gain-of-function research, how scientific incentives may be encouraging risky experimentation—and the recent outbreaks of Hantavirus and Ebola.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: There are many topics I’m excited to talk to you about, and we’ll talk a little more broadly about the landscape of public health in the United States at the moment, which is interesting. But I asked you to be on the podcast because I’ve been trying to think through a subject that I find fascinating but don’t have much expertise on, which is gain-of-function research. To start off with, what is gain-of-function research?
Marc Lipsitch: “Gain of function” is a general term that means a biological experiment that gives an organism a new function—a new ability to do something, usually by a genetic change. The type of gain-of-function research that has been controversial and raised concerns among many people, including me, is what’s sometimes called enhancement of pandemic pathogens, or dangerous gain of function, or risky gain of function—there are various other names. It is a small category, but a particularly concerning one, in which the function that an organism gains is the ability to spread more easily or cause more disease in organisms we care about: people, crops, or other organisms.
The most notorious example of it was when researchers took a strain of influenza—a flu virus that had been causing sporadic disease in people and killing a large fraction of those it was infecting—and achieved the ability of that virus, through genetic and evolutionary manipulations, to transmit readily in the air. That strain was so-called bird flu, or H5N1 flu. The reason why that’s concerning is that if you do that to a strain of flu, there’s a risk that it actually becomes capable of causing a pandemic in people—a new outbreak. We’ve all experienced a pandemic recently, of coronavirus, and a flu pandemic would be equally, if not more, damaging. The idea of these studies is that the investigators are trying to understand what makes it possible for a virus like flu to become pandemic.
Mounk: At first, that just seems like a crazy thing to do. You’re taking a virus that’s somewhat dangerous and deliberately making it more dangerous by making it more easily transmitted or by making its properties worse. That sounds like a Bond villain, crazy scientist kind of thing to do. But the purported logic is that understanding these viruses better—understanding what kind of pathogens we might face—might allow us to prepare better for pandemics, to prepare vaccines. Talk me through in detail what it is that scientists are hoping to achieve with this research, which in their mind is very well-intentioned.
Lipsitch: The goal of the research, as described by the investigators, is to find ways to characterize viruses and determine which ones are dangerous, which ones might cause a pandemic if found in nature, and which ones probably aren’t capable of that. The idea is that by doing dry runs in the lab, researchers are able to compile a list of the characteristics or genetic properties of a virus that allow it to do that.
The critique from those of us who are skeptical of that is really about both the risks and the purported benefits. On the risk side, there’s good reason to be worried about the possibility that a strain of virus created that way could infect one of the lab workers and eventually transmit beyond the lab, that it could be stolen and used for deliberate mischief, or that it could enable people to figure out how to make a dangerous virus themselves. So safety, security, and the potential for misuse are all of concern.
In terms of the purported benefits, one of the arguments that I and others have made is that you learn potentially what’s true about that particular strain of flu. But there’s good reason to believe—and even experimental evidence to show—that if you do the same thing to a different strain of flu, you might not get the same result. You might even get the opposite result: it becomes less transmissible or less able to cause widespread harm. The generalizability of the information is very limited, and that has been at the heart of the debate.
Mounk: The way to think about this seems to be as a trade-off. There’s potentially information we can get out of doing this research—which is scientifically interesting in itself, but more importantly could be helpful in trying to prevent or treat a pandemic. That’s one side of the ledger. On the other side are all the risks: the risk that somebody gets infected and the virus we’ve created ends up infecting a lot of people, the risk that somebody might steal it, the risk that the knowledge we gain in the process could reach somebody trying to create a virus for purposes of bioterrorism or something else.
Let’s go through each side of this in a little more detail. You’ve started to talk about how understanding the particular ways in which the behavior of a virus might change may not generalize. What are the other purported benefits that people claim for this? What is the strongest case that defenders of this practice would make for why we absolutely need to be engaging in this work in order to gain scientifically valuable research that might actually prevent bad pandemics in the future?
Lipsitch: The case is that if we can do it in the lab, then we understand what nature will do. Nature is constantly trying things out with mutations happening and viruses spreading in animals. If we can somehow predict what will happen, then we can prevent it.
Mounk: Perhaps you can explain to laypeople why you are skeptical about whether doing experiments on one kind of virus tells us much about different kinds of viruses. But there are also a lot of other steps in this argument that you need to assume. If we figure out that the most dangerous potential viruses have a certain shape or set of characteristics, then our whole machinery of pandemic prevention needs to be able to take precautionary steps to prepare for that kind of pandemic—to pre-produce the relevant vaccines, or to plan for certain kinds of social interventions that would stop the spread.
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The part where I’m quite skeptical is that part. When you look at the experience of COVID, there was certainly a pandemic that roughly speaking was in line with what we might have expected. We’d gone through H1N1 and other kinds of viruses that behaved in roughly similar ways. It’s not like we were totally surprised by the characteristics of this virus, but all of that prior knowledge doesn’t seem to have helped us respond to that pandemic in a very rational way. Even if we know that the most dangerous kinds of pandemics are going to be roughly of a certain form and shape—and perhaps we have some degree of knowledge about that which we wouldn’t have without gain-of-function research—is that realistically going to put us in a position to prevent that pandemic, or to lessen its impact, in a way that goes way beyond what we might have been able to do without that specific knowledge?
Lipsitch: I largely agree with your skepticism, though I’ll push back on one piece of it at the end. Recently, with an undergraduate student from Harvard, where I was working until this year, we published a paper looking at the claim that finding viruses in nature is an important way to create vaccines as countermeasures. What we found was that over and over again, viruses have been found in nature and little has been done about it. Then, when there is a large-scale human outbreak—usually among people in the West, and especially among wealthy people in the West, and occasionally in other settings—vaccine development begins in earnest. Or when there’s concern about a virus as a bioterrorist agent, vaccine development begins in earnest. Simply finding a virus in nature, even with signs that it could be very dangerous, has not been enough to prompt significant development of countermeasures.
Mounk: Even if gain-of-function research shows that a certain kind of pathogen could be super dangerous—that it could be a huge problem for the world—and even if that prompts calls to develop a vaccine, that development is unlikely to actually happen. So the purported benefits from the scientific practice aren’t going to arrive.
Lipsitch: That’s an important distinction—what we studied was when people find new viruses in wild animals rather than in the lab. But the broader point is that we are pretty good at mobilizing resources when there are significant numbers of people at risk, especially in the developed world, and historically we are not very good at mobilizing resources otherwise.
Mounk: Vaccine development is an incredibly expensive, complicated, and under usual circumstances, slow process, so we can only develop vaccines against a relatively limited number of diseases. There are new technologies coming online—perhaps most importantly, mRNA vaccines, but also other kinds of approaches—that have the potential, if the regulatory environment is reformed in the right ways, to speed up vaccine development hugely.
Which way does that cut in this debate? On one hand, if we are becoming much faster at developing vaccines, then we need to know less about potential pathogens in advance, because what we should do is simply wait for them to emerge and produce actual human outbreaks. Rather than needing a five-year head start to have a chance of responding with a vaccine, we can develop those vaccines very quickly—and what we should be investing in is just the capacity to adapt and roll out vaccines at scale when that happens. On the other hand, perhaps if vaccine development has become much easier, it is becoming more feasible to pre-produce defensive vaccines against a whole range of pathogens that haven’t yet emerged in real-world outbreaks. So perhaps having knowledge about what kinds of pathogens could be more dangerous is now becoming more valuable than it was in the past, because we’re going to be able to do more about it. Which way do you think our progress in rapidly producing and adapting vaccines cuts in this debate?
Lipsitch: One of the other things we found in our study of existing vaccines and virus prospecting in nature was that there are numerous whole viral families—large groups of viruses that infect and cause widespread disease in humans—for which we have no existing vaccines. So on the broad scale, if we go beyond pandemics and look at anything that infects humans and spreads, there is a whole menu of things we could be doing to develop vaccines with the knowledge we already have.
That is not to say there’s no point in getting new knowledge. The question, to me, is whether the best way to get that new knowledge is by doing very risky experiments that tell us something narrow about a particular group of viruses, or whether there are alternative approaches to studying these viruses that would tell us something about which viruses to be concerned about, but without creating viruses that are themselves dangerous.
Mounk: The claim by people who defend gain-of-function research is that we need to understand all the potential kinds of pathogens there might be in order to develop vaccines against them. What you’re saying is that we already know there are a huge number of existing pathogens that could potentially cause pandemics, and we haven’t even developed vaccines against them. So how about we start developing vaccines against these known dangers before engaging in a really risky practice to discover other kinds of candidate pathogens against which we could pre-develop vaccines in a speculative manner?
Lipsitch: That’s right. Beyond that, there are many ways to study which viruses are potentially dangerous without creating new ones. If you want to understand what makes a flu virus dangerous, we already understand many of the components of that. We know what the major determinants of transmissibility in people are in a flu virus. So we can study individual proteins of the flu virus, ask how they work, how well different variants of those proteins work, and then look for those variants in viruses that we find in nature. It is not the same experiment and it doesn’t produce exactly the same result. But if you think about getting some large proportion of the information with none of the risk, it’s a pretty good trade-off.
One of the important points in thinking about which research to do is not to frame it as should we do experiment X or not, because there are hundreds of thousands of experiments that never get done in science. Every scientist is deciding to spend their money and time on this project and not that one, on this approach and not that one. Most experiments that would be interesting never get done. It’s just a question of where you allocate your resources.
If you think about allocating the resources that would otherwise be used for a gain of function experiment to the next most useful experiment—one that would give you similar information or a similar ability to develop countermeasures—it becomes very hard to say that the marginal benefit from the gain of function study is really enough to make it worth putting the world at risk. Not everyone agrees with that view, obviously.
Mounk: We’ve given a pretty fair hearing to some of the potential benefits from gain-of-function research, and I at least am convinced that those benefits are much smaller than some of the defenders of the practice claim. Talk us through in a little more detail some of the risks of this kind of research. The claim that defenders would make is presumably that this tends to happen in labs with high levels of security, and that therefore, even though the pathogens they create may be dangerous, the risk of them getting out into the world is quite low. Starting with that claim—how confident can we be that these pathogens really would remain contained in safe research environments?
Lipsitch: Many of the studies done in the West, at least, have been done in very carefully designed, highly skilled labs. There is a lot of global variability in laboratory safety standards—and that’s setting aside the whole issue of malicious use entirely.
On the safety aspects, much of the controversy that followed the discussion of Wuhan and the origin of the COVID virus highlighted—whatever you think of that controversy—that there have been much lower levels of containment for the same experiments in China than would be expected in the United States. In particular, viruses where you really don’t know the pandemic potential are not very well regulated.
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There is also the fact that gain of function studies, which tend to appear in the most prestigious journals because they’re flashy, creates an incentive for researchers around the world to do these studies in order to advance their careers and get into the top journals—which is what all scientists try to do, and appropriately so. But we really don’t want a dynamic in which the more dangerous your experiment, the more prestigious the publication. The amount of biology we learned from those gain of function studies that appeared in Science and Nature—the top journals in the field—was comparable to many other papers that appear in much less prestigious places. I would argue they appeared in those places because of how shocking what had been done was.
Mounk: Give us a little historical context on lab leaks. We can come back to the question about the origins of COVID and the research undertaken in Wuhan. My understanding is that there’s actually a long history of significant accidental lab leaks. In the 1970s, H1N1 escaped, probably from a lab in the Soviet Union. There was an outbreak of smallpox in the United Kingdom. More recently, there were escapes of SARS in a number of labs across East Asia—in Singapore, Taiwan, Beijing, and other places. There were also serious biosafety failures at the CDC in the United States involving anthrax and other pathogens.
Historically, have we been really good at avoiding these kinds of lab leaks? Or is there a pattern of lab leaks repeatedly happening—not just in one country, not just in one culture, not just in one political system? The examples just reeled off span from the United States to the Soviet Union, from North America to East Asia.
Lipsitch: The list of prominent ones you’ve given is accurate, and there have been some bacterial pathogen leaks as well—there has been a bacterial pathogen leak in China in more recent years, and one of the foot and mouth epidemics in animals in the UK resulted from a lab leak from their highest security lab.
Humans are imperfect, and almost all of these leaks are not the result of a physical system failing. Very often the issue is that a person fails to inactivate a vial of pathogen but thinks they have, or switches the inactivated vial for one that is still live. It’s just human error, and that’s the hardest kind of thing to prevent. The skill of the lab is, of course, important. But the record is, as you say, one of repeated failures—and underreporting is acknowledged even by the people who run these labs. The incentives to report an incident or accident are very low. The Netherlands, for example, has published a paper assessing the risk of underreporting and finding it to be quite high.
Fortunately, setting aside COVID and the controversy over that, most of these incidents have not gone very far—the 1977 release of H1N1 flu being the most clear exception. But they do illustrate that infections happen and transmission can occur, as it did with SARS in one of the accidental releases in the mid-2000s. It is a real risk. Because the consequences are so high, we are just not good at thinking about that risk. Biosafety is a field mostly dedicated to protecting individual lab workers and the people immediately in the area. Biosafety on the population scale is a relatively new phenomenon, as we deal with more dangerous pathogens.
Mounk: From a philosophical perspective, that seems to make a real difference. We want to protect all scientists who work in labs and make sure they are not exposed to serious danger. But at the limit, you can say that scientists agree to work in an environment with highly infectious pathogens and, even though we should obviously do what we can to protect them, they understand there is some risk involved. They can make that decision for themselves. Here, however, we are talking not about exposing individuals to a risk they have knowingly taken on, but about thousands, or tens or hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of people dying as a downstream consequence of choices they didn’t make and had no say in. That seems very different.
When you look at this trade-off—and that’s one of the hard things to do, one of the things that political scientists and commentators often fail to do—the potential dangers are very serious and very clear, while the potential benefits are minor and questionable. So we probably should be discouraging, or perhaps banning, this practice. Why is it that this practice is continuing despite how stark this trade-off is? Why haven’t there been serious efforts to discourage or ban gain-of-function research?
Lipsitch: That’s not entirely a fair characterization. Toward the end of the Biden administration, there was a large effort led by the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, or the NSABB, which became an executive order from the Biden administration in May of 2024 that laid out a framework for very careful review of this kind of research. It was comprehensive and very much applauded by people like me and colleagues who thought it was a major step forward. It was not perfect—one of the major issues is that it’s very hard for the federal government to regulate work that it does not fund. It’s not impossible and it should be done, but it’s much easier to put guardrails around work that the federal government is itself funding.
It was a very good policy. Then, under the Trump administration, some of the same people were involved in developing an executive order that came out in May of 2025 that, had it come from any other administration—Democratic or Republican—I would have given a grade of around 95%. It put quite strong restrictions on what it calls dangerous gain of function and attempted to extend some of that regulation beyond federally funded work.
The reason I add an asterisk about which administration it came from is that even at the time, it was clear that regulation and discussions of research funding were much more complicated and destructive in many ways under this administration. When the actual implementation of that executive order happened, a number of studies were stopped that were being funded by the federal government but posed no reasonable risk—no reasonable person would say these were at risk of causing a pandemic. Some of them were types of studies that have been done for decades and were simply not what any of us have been concerned about. Some that were stopped might raise legitimate concerns, but I think it would be very hard at the moment to get funding to do dangerous gain-of-function research. The pendulum has now swung in the direction of collateral damage to other kinds of research that have no plausible risk. The Washington Post reported that the administration simply wanted more things banned because they hadn’t banned enough.
Mounk: There is obviously a much broader attack on research funding from this administration that raises serious concerns. But give me a sense of the kind of risk we are currently running from gain-of-function research worldwide. You’re saying it has become much harder to get funding for that in the United States—is there still some dangerous gain-of-function research going on in labs in the United States? Has there been an international understanding to scale back this kind of research, or is it ongoing in labs in China, Russia, Europe, and other parts of the world? To what extent have we actually been able to build a consensus that we should abstain from the most dangerous forms of this research?
Lipsitch: It’s really hard to say what’s going on because there’s no central tracking and because the definitions are different in different places. There was a very good article by Tony Mills at the American Enterprise Institute, about a year or two ago, called “How the Virologists Lost the Gain-of-Function Debate,” which made the point that the leave us alone and let us do our science attitude that some virologists were taking was really self-defeating and not sustainable, particularly after people had experienced a pandemic in their own lives and seen what it really meant.
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There has been some significant shift of opinion and more attention paid to the concerns about it, at least in this country. China has a relatively new biosecurity law that may represent some move in that direction, but there are a lot of things on people’s minds and this is probably not at the top of most people’s list. The sentiment is shifting to some degree towards seeing dangerous gain of function as a problem and something not to be done, but I don’t think we’ve quite reached the point of everyone agreeing to that.
Mounk: One of the elephants in the room is COVID. Early on in the pandemic, there was a pretty concerted attempt by public health officials and parts of the scientific community to rule out the hypothesis that it could have been caused by an accidental lab leak—which would likely be related to gain-of-function research going on in particular at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Later, it seemed as though the consensus was shifting towards thinking that it had indeed been a lab leak. A number of assessments by American and European intelligence agencies strongly suggested this was the most likely cause of the pandemic. My understanding is that perhaps the consensus has shifted back somewhat, and some people are now more skeptical of the lab leak hypothesis than they were a few years ago.
What is your assessment of how likely it is that the most consequential pandemic in 100 years stemmed from an accidental lab leak? How should people who are not scientists think through this question?
Lipsitch: The best way to understand this discussion is that there is no definitive evidence either way. People who hold strong prior beliefs really have nothing more than that, because the evidence is so lacking in both directions. There is some circumstantial evidence in each direction. I am totally happy to have an honest discussion with somebody who thinks it’s 99% either way. It’s the 100% that is the problem—and opinion is roughly split between the lab leak hypothesis and zoonotic or animal origin. Certainty in either direction is just an implausible reading of the evidence. People can interpret the available signals in whatever way their priors allow, and that’s understandable. But anybody who is certain is simply dismissing all the flaws in their own evidence.
Mounk: Stepping back to a broader question: what should someone think about public health in the United States at this juncture? Going back to the pandemic, there was an obvious failure of public health. There are important things that public health did during the pandemic to keep the situation manageable, but on the whole, the Centers for Disease Control were built to prevent pandemics and coordinate a rational response to them. They had an enormous budget devoted to exactly this. In the first major pandemic in 100 years, there was all kinds of malfunction—from the difficulty of developing a reliable diagnostic test for COVID early in the pandemic, to the refusal to allow private labs to step into the breach during a crucial period, to often conflicting guidance about masks that changed rapidly from one moment to the next and then changed back.
Something seems to have gone wrong, and there is probably a serious need for reform. On the other side, the way in which the Trump administration is trying to blow up public health—changing guidance around vaccines for diseases like measles in ways that have already led to serious outbreaks of this highly infectious disease, and mistrusting all of science—seems to be sometimes aiming at the right problems but doing it in a way that is only likely to make those problems much worse.
How should somebody who sees the failings of some of our institutions, who takes the criticisms of them seriously, but who doesn’t want to throw the baby out with the bathwater, approach this debate? What kind of reform do these institutions need? Why are the reforms currently being imposed on them by the Trump administration going, by and large, in the wrong direction?
Lipsitch: As a first cut, there are significant problems with how we did public health during the pandemic, and almost everything that’s been done by the Trump administration would make it worse the next time. The biggest threat to our biosecurity right now is undermining trust in vaccines, which most Americans very strongly approve of. If you wanted to make it easier for an adversary to cause trouble in our country with biology, one of the best ways to do it is to undermine trust in the most beneficial public health innovation of the 20th century, which is vaccines. There are real problems, but shooting holes in the best parts of public health is a catastrophic way to address them.
In my darker moments, my sense is that this is simply about shrinking government down to the point where we can drown it in the bathtub, as Grover Norquist once said, and that it has nothing to do with reforming public health. I don’t think that’s the motivation of everybody involved, and I think there are some things that genuinely need to be done. The diagnosis that we made major mistakes in the pandemic is correct. Many of those early mistakes were under the first Trump administration and were partly due to denying that this was going to be a problem when all the experts were saying very loudly that it was and that we needed to prepare. We had a warning in December of 2019 that this could be a problem, and certainly by January it was a three-alarm fire. We didn’t get into gear nationally fast enough because there was too much denial going on.
Mounk: The story of who was taking it seriously and when was a little more complicated. There was a period in January and February where a portion of the Republican party was taking it quite seriously—Tom Cotton or some other senator was really warning about it. Meanwhile, Nancy Pelosi was giving press conferences in Chinatown in San Francisco saying that anybody who was concerned about this was essentially being racist against Chinese people, and that people should continue going out to restaurants. That was in part a response to some genuine craziness where Asian Americans were being discriminated against in a totally abhorrent way. But in January and February of 2020, the partisan politics of this were somewhat unclear, and large parts of the Democratic party were really downplaying it. It was around March and April that the very dangerous dynamic got set into place—where Trump wanted to keep the economy going and downplay the danger of the virus, and Democrats became more in favor of social distancing measures and closing things down.
Lipsitch: The details of what everyone said are hard to remember. There was a current of anti-Asian racism at that time, and I attended an event in Boston’s Chinatown in January or February that made some of the same points. But saying that this is not an occasion to express racism is a different claim from saying this is not a threat to public health that we need to be taking seriously. Some of us were able to make that distinction, and if certain politicians couldn’t, that’s a failing on their part.
Mounk: In general, we would all profit from politicians who are better able to make those kinds of obvious distinctions, which somehow they don’t seem to be.
Lipsitch: The CDC is an institution that can benefit from reform. I was working there part-time from 2021 until 2025 and saw a lot of great things, but also saw that the ability to explain ambiguity to the public has been lost to some degree. I remember from the 2009 flu pandemic there were really excellent examples of that from some of the top officials. There’s now a sense that conveying ambiguity is too hard and that overstating certainty is preferable. On the communication side, there is a lot to be done.
The same kind of conservatism is part of why the CDC didn’t allow other labs to do testing for COVID for a period. It’s an understandable impulse in public health—to try to discourage people from drawing their own conclusions—but not a good one. There is a lot that could change at the CDC. But undermining vaccination, which is really the one thing that doesn’t need to change except to become even more widely used, is a sign of bad faith and destructive impulses rather than reconstructive ones.
Mounk: The point about communication is really interesting. I never had the impression that there was bad faith involved in any of these failings. I don’t think that at any point important public health officials were lying or misleading the public out of commercial interest or because they were in the pocket of Pfizer or anything like that. I did often feel that they treated the public like children—that they thought, for the good of the country, we need to induce certain behaviors, like staying at home or not buying up all the masks that might otherwise be used by medical personnel when personal protective equipment was incredibly scarce in the early stages of the pandemic. The impulse was to communicate in such a way that better outcomes for everybody were more likely to come about. But there was neither a reckoning with the fact that people can smell dishonesty and that this approach was not necessarily likely to induce the behavior they were hoping for, nor a reckoning with the second-order effects—that if people feel misled about one thing, they are going to be much less likely to listen on the next thing, and trust erodes over time.
One of the things in the debate about masks and the early guidance that masks were not useful—that I think public health officials didn’t think through—was other disciplines of social science, like economics. The earlier the market gets the signal that there is going to be large and ongoing demand for masks, the faster factories producing other kinds of things could retrofit to produce more masks. Sitting in Atlanta, somebody at the CDC probably wasn’t thinking about that.
Is that a fair account of some of those communication failures? How can these institutions do better? How can they warn citizens about real dangers and exhort them to engage in the behaviors most likely to save the largest number of lives, but do so in a way that takes citizens seriously as reasoning adults who can make decisions for themselves?
Lipsitch: That’s exactly right, and I agree fully that this was not about financial corruption or anything like that. I would add to the list of concerns that it is fundamentally undemocratic—or anti-democratic—to deceive the citizenry, and that’s a problem in itself.
We actually need more research on how to effectively communicate in public health. If there is good research on this, it’s not being used, because we continue to see the failures. My hypothesis for such research would be that in any given moment, you are operating in an environment shaped by your previous actions. If you have been communicating with the public under normal circumstances in a way that suggests you always know exactly what’s going on, that you won’t revise your views, that the science is all settled—then people will be genuinely surprised when you say you don’t know. In fact, on many scientific and public health topics, there is real uncertainty. Very few things change as fast as a pandemic, to be fair. But there is uncertainty about what the best diet is, uncertainty about the timing of flu in a given year, uncertainty about a whole range of public health topics.
People deal with uncertainty in their lives all the time and don’t think that the person who acknowledges uncertainty is an idiot or doing their job badly. Even when a doctor says a treatment has a risk of helping and a risk of not helping, people can deal with that. The key is to accustom people to expect that public health, like all human endeavors, involves some science and some uncertainty—and that especially in fast-moving situations, guidance is going to change. Not because anyone was lying, but because the best understanding changes and there will be disagreement. All of that is something people could get used to, but it would be very hard to absorb in the middle of a crisis, because people don’t react well to crises. It’s a long-term project.
Mounk: The slogan that most galled me during the pandemic was “believe the science,” because I do believe in science and put great trust in it. But precisely what distinguishes science from systems of blind faith is that in science, no point of view is sacrosanct. There is genuine debate about most propositions, and when somebody comes in with a paper that challenges a long-held assumption in the field, the right way to respond is neither to dismiss it nor to blindly believe it, but to probe how strong the evidence is and then come to a conclusion about whether to revise our views. The slogan “believe the science” was so often invoked in a way that was actually against the spirit of falsifiability and rational inquiry—which is the very reason we should provisionally trust a scientific consensus in the first place.
The second thought comes from my own teaching practice. There are many insecure teachers who hate to be asked challenging questions by students because they fear embarrassment or loss of authority if they can’t answer. I love it when a student asks me a question to which I don’t have the answer, because when I can genuinely and authentically say, “I don’t know—do you want to look it up? Or I’ll look it up and come back next week”—I can feel the trust in everything else I say go up. I’ve just signaled that when I give an answer, it’s because I’m pretty sure I know it, and when I don’t know, I’ll say so. That actually increases the trust people have in a professor, at least in the classroom.
Lipsitch: Some of the smartest journalists about infectious disease have the same instinct. Helen Branswell, who is perhaps the smartest one that I know well and writes about infectious disease, once said that she doesn’t trust anyone who never says “I don’t know.” That’s exactly right.
Going back to the “believe the science” point—the phrase I heard more often was “follow the science,” and I think that’s even more problematic, in the sense that science tells you what is, not what you should do. There are consequences for what you should do that follow from what is, but the science doesn’t say you should stay home. The science says that if you don’t stay home and other people don’t stay home, there might be significant consequences for disease spread.
My wife and I and a colleague wrote an article in the New England Journal of Medicine in July of 2020 calling for primary schools to be reopened. My wife is an educational ethicist, this colleague is an infectious disease pediatrician, and I am an epidemiologist. That call was based on science—on an emerging and imperfect understanding that children were not major transmitters—and on the view that education is an important good not worth sacrificing on that scale for some benefit in reducing disease transmission, particularly given the other choices we were making at the time. People could debate that, and in fact they did. Most schools did not reopen in the fall of 2020. It’s not that the science says you must do that. The science says here are the consequences as best we understand them—and that understanding was changing rapidly.
Mounk: I went through a version of this myself. I wrote a viral article early in the pandemic encouraging the cancellation of large-scale events—this was, I think, March 6, 2020. At that point, we were still having mass concerts and mass political rallies. The debate wasn’t yet about whether there should be government restrictions on movement; it was just about whether we should be cancelling a lot of these privately held events. I got a very angry email from an old friend who had also been a boss of mine for a while, saying I wasn’t an epidemiologist and should stay out of it. My answer was that I’m a political theorist, and I was basing the factual assertions I was making on the best statements by people with expertise in virology. I wasn’t pretending to understand something about the properties of the virus that they didn’t understand. But the question of what consequences to draw from that is an ethical question and a political question, and as a citizen I should be able to speak to that—and as somebody trained in reflecting about normative issues, I actually have some professional expertise in doing so.
Later on, I was among the earlier people to say that now that a lot of people were vaccinated and we knew more about the properties of this virus, we should start reopening a bunch of social institutions. The people who liked me the first time disliked me the second time around. That is one of the hazards of writing.
There’s a lot of ethical reflection in the field of public health, and it often comes from one particular disciplinary angle. A lot of attention, for example, is given to the precautionary principle—ideas that I think would be very controversial in philosophy departments, where many moral philosophers would be far less convinced this is a black and white issue than the consensus in public health seems to imply. These ideas then guide public policy in ways that can backfire.
One example is that we might have been able to get a vaccine even earlier than we did—and it is an achievement how quickly we did get it—through human challenge trials. Those were ruled out as unethical. Yet if some people had been willing to expose themselves to a pathogen that was dangerous but unlikely to kill any one individual, we might have been able to save hundreds of thousands of lives. It is not at all obvious to me that that would have been unethical, but there seemed to be a relatively broad consensus within public health that it was.
More broadly, there was a very interesting story about somebody designing a custom-made vaccine for their dog’s tumor in Australia with the help of a number of AI systems. They said that over 50% of the work they put into this effort was filling out the enormous amounts of paperwork required to get permission to inject a novel drug into a dog that already had a likely lethal form of cancer. Do you think that in the field of public health, while in some areas like gain-of-function research we are continuing with really dangerous practices, in other areas—like human challenge trials, or the bureaucratic burdens for getting drugs to patients who are very high risk of harm in any case—the rules are too strong to actually maximize the potential benefits of medicine?
Lipsitch: It’s interesting you bring up human challenge trials, because with a moral philosopher, Nir Eyal, and another epidemiologist, Peter Smith, the three of us wrote one of the first articles advocating for human challenge trials early in COVID for exactly the reasons you describe. In retrospect, the benefit would have been pretty small, because the United States, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK—where vaccine trials turned out to be run—provided the world with a massive global public good, which was a large enough epidemic to test vaccines in. We would rather have not provided that good, but we did.
Mounk: Because in this particular case so many people were infected in the first place, there was less need for the human challenge trial. One can imagine lots of other circumstances where human challenge trials could save a great many lives.
Lipsitch: There was some movement on human challenge trials—at least one member of the U.S. Congress was quite interested, and the UK did establish a human challenge model, though somewhat later. It’s a complicated example. But the field of research ethics as a whole is very precautionary and much more concerned about avoiding harm than about doing good. Some people have begun to push back against that. Alex London wrote a book about two or three years ago that pushes back in the right direction. It has been recognized as a problem, but the level of reflection about basic principles of ethics is not that high in an applied field—it’s more about how to apply what has been taught, and what has been taught is largely non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. Those principles are interpreted, in the standard way, to mean it is better to miss the opportunity to do something great than to cause harm. The conservatism is a real thing.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Marc discuss the recent outbreaks of Hantavirus and Ebola—how concerned we should be, how the general public may respond to pandemics in future, and when it’s time to worry about the current outbreaks. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
In Iran, ambulances are no longer always trusted, especially in times of crisis. During protests, people have watched emergency vehicles move through streets not to rescue the injured, but allegedly to transport security forces, arrest demonstrators, or move detainees. This image says something larger about the Islamic Republic. The regime does not only repress society from outside, but enters civilian life, uses its institutions, borrows its vehicles, hides behind its buildings—and then presents itself as the victim when those same spaces are caught in the consequences of conflict.
This has long been part of the Islamic Republic’s evolution, not an accident or a temporary wartime improvisation. Over the last three decades, the regime has gradually blurred the line between civilian and security (or military) institutions. Universities, hospitals, schools, banks, municipalities, and even private companies have been penetrated by the security apparatus, including the Basij and Herasat offices. For the regime, civilian institutions are more than pure autonomous spaces; they are resources that can be used for surveillance, ideological control, repression, military movement, and propaganda. Unlike other authoritarian states, the regime doesn’t just control society; it securitizes it.
Herasat offices operate inside universities, ministries, banks, municipalities, and public organizations. Their job is to protect buildings and sensitive information, but also to monitor employees, supervise behavior, enforce ideological discipline, and shape hiring and promotion decisions. The civil Basij organization also performs a similar role inside schools, universities, workplaces, and neighborhoods. It is a multifaceted organization. The Basij is an armed militia, as well as a social-security network that extends the state’s eyes and arms into everyday life.
But the blurring of civilian and security spheres has also become operational, meaning that during moments of crisis, the regime uses civilian tools for coercive and security purposes. For example, ambulances, buses, ordinary cars, commercial trucks, hospitals, schools, universities, and mosques can all become part of the security system. The regime benefits from the civilian appearance of these spaces and vehicles. They are familiar, less suspicious, and often protected by social trust. That trust becomes a weapon.
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The use of ambulances is one of the clearest examples. Iran’s military and security agencies used ambulances as military vehicles to arrest and transport protesters and political rivals, and to move them to detention centers, for example during the Women, Life, Freedom movement.
This is important because an ambulance normally carries a special moral and legal status. Representing medical neutrality, it has access to restricted areas and people are expected to move aside for it. When the state uses it to carry security forces or detainees, it destroys public trust not only in the regime but also in emergency medicine. The victim is not only the arrested protester. The victim is also the next injured person who may not receive help because people now fear the ambulances.
Similarly, hospitals have also been treated as extensions of the securitization of civil institutions. According to Reuters, Iranian security forces removed protesters from hospitals and detained them—with the support of the Basij and Herast offices at the hospitals. The Revolutionary Guards took wounded patients while police and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members searched hospital records to identify discharged protesters. The same pattern holds for other civilian vehicles, such as ordinary cars, vans, buses, and commercial trucks, which were used to transport security personnel or detainees. Claims about specific private companies, including Mihan ice cream trucks, have circulated widely; in one case, security forces used one such truck to transport a 17-year-old girl to a detention center, then raped and killed her.
According to Amnesty International, Iran’s highest military body instructed commanders across the country—including the Basij and plainclothes security agents—to “severely confront” protesters. This matters because repression in Iran is carried out through overlapping institutions, some formal and some informal, some uniformed and some hidden inside society.
Since the June 2025 Iran-Israel war, this blurring of security and civilian domains has become even more stark, showing that the regime’s use of civilian space is not limited to domestic repression but is in fact part of its wartime defense. During the U.S.-Israeli airstrikes, Iranian security and military forces moved personnel, weapons, and equipment into civilian sites, including schools, hospitals, stadiums, universities, mosques, parks, and government offices across the country. This is not simply about hiding. It is about transferring risk onto society. In some cases, the Islamic Republic even used civilian trucks for transportation and for the launch of missiles and drones during the war.
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International humanitarian law is clear that civilian objects are protected from attack unless and for such time as they become military objectives. Even when a civilian site is misused by military or security forces, any attack must still obey the laws of war. The Iranian regime is creating ambiguity and turning schools, hospitals, ambulances, and commercial vehicles into contested spaces by using them for coercive or military purposes.
This is the regime’s double game: it militarizes civilian life and then, when those spaces are damaged or threatened, it plays the victim card by presenting them as purely civilian, and uses those images for propaganda. This victimhood narrative is powerful because it contains a partial truth: that civilians are suffering. When civilian buildings and equipment are damaged, ordinary people are the ones who pay the price. But the regime hides its own role in creating that danger, denying that it placed security forces inside civilian areas or used medical institutions as instruments of control or transformed schools, universities, hospitals, and commercial infrastructure into parts of the security system.
This strategy undermines Iranian society from within and erodes political and social trust. Iranians distrust ambulances, fear hospitals, and avoid treatment, especially during protests. They understand that universities, schools, and mosques are not safe, as they are used for military purposes. The regime’s survival strategy creates insecurity everywhere.
This is why the concept of a modern security state is a useful framework. The Islamic Republic is more than a theocratic regime—it is also a military dictatorship. It is a system in which ideology and security reinforce each other inside everyday institutions. The mosque, school, university, hospital, workplace, and neighborhood are all connected to the survival of the regime. The result is the transformation of the civilian sphere into a security field.
Many analysts still look for a clean division between civilian and military life in Iran. They ask whether an institution is educational or security-related (like Minab School, which was struck earlier this year), and whether a vehicle is medical or used by military commanders. But in the Islamic Republic, the answer is often both: the form may be civilian, while the function is security. For example, the university may produce engineers, but it may also serve the defense establishment and work on military equipment.
This does not mean that every civilian institution in Iran is a legitimate military target. That approach would be legally and morally wrong. But it does mean that we must understand how the regime itself has polluted the civilian sphere and made civilian life vulnerable by inserting security apparatus into it.
The Islamic Republic has endangered Iranians by placing security and military equipment and personnel inside the spaces where ordinary people live. Iranians are trapped inside this system, which exposes them to risk and then turns them into propaganda images. In fact, the regime, despite claiming to defend the people, constantly sacrifices the safety of the people for its own survival. By removing the boundary between civilian life and the military, the regime has turned Iranian society into part of its battlefield.
Jason Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran.
Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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Inuit hunter with sled, Greenland, 2024. (Photo by Olivier Morin/AFP.)In 1981, a young Steve Jobs—bearded, bespectacled, brown corduroy blazer over an open-collared shirt—sat in front of an Apple II and explained what he thought a personal computer was for. He’d read an article in Scientific American that compared the efficiency of locomotion across species. The condor, he said, came out on top. Humans ranked about a third of the way down, “not too proud a showing for the crown of creation.” But then someone had the insight to test a human on a bicycle, and the cyclist blew the condor away.
“What it really illustrated,” Jobs said, “was man’s ability as a tool maker to fashion a tool that can amplify an inherent ability that he has. And that’s exactly what we think we’re doing.” The computer, he said, was “a 21st century bicycle” for the mind.
Curiously, the original 1973 article on locomotive efficiency makes no mention of a condor, but Jobs’ point is noted. (Scientific American, retrieved here.)In the age of AI, Jobs’ quaint bicycle has received an update from Silicon Valley. With the launch of ChatGPT, gushed Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella in early 2023, “We went from the bicycle to the steam engine.” Reid Hoffman, LinkedIn’s CEO, routinely calls AI a “steam engine of the mind” that will usher in a “cognitive industrial revolution.” In a Time magazine article modestly entitled “A Roadmap to AI Utopia,” venture capitalist Vinod Khosla writes that “AI amplifies and multiplies the human brain, much like steam engines once amplified muscle power.”
I find the shift from bicycle to steam engine instructive for the current AI moment. In invoking the steam engine, there’s something about the bicycle that Jobs’ heirs seem to have forgotten. Like the steam locomotive, the bicycle was a technological revolution. But a train traveler sat back and enjoyed the ride, while a cyclist still had to put in effort. With a bicycle, “you are traveling,” wrote a cycling enthusiast in 1878, “not being traveled.”
I think about this distinction a lot: between traveling and being traveled. Bicycles and trains are both technologies that move us from place to place. In that sense, in the sense of their outward function, it’s fine to lump them together. But the comparison falls apart when you consider their effects on the traveler. In terms of effort, a steam engine doesn’t really “amplify an inherent ability.” It replaces it. You sit back and the coal does the work. You arrive, but you’ve been traveled. So one way to look at a technology is how powerful it is, what it can enable humans to do. But an equally important question is what happens to humans when they use the technology.
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I’ve started calling this the mythology of amplification—the assumption, buried so deep in Silicon Valley’s rhetoric that it goes unexamined, that its tools merely add capability without subtracting anything meaningful. Some tools really do work this way, or close enough to it. Perhaps the personal computer, in its early days, was one such tool. A true, literal “computer”—a machine that computes. But general-purpose AI, at least as the tech titans envision it, is not like that. And the difference has nothing to do with how powerful the tool is or how impressive its outputs are. It has to do with what the tool asks of you. Whether you travel with it or are being traveled by it.
The Rifle and the GPSI was recently reading an ethnographic study by Claudio Aporta and Eric Higgs about GPS adoption among Inuit hunters in Igloolik, a small community in the Canadian Arctic. The Inuit had been navigating that landscape for millennia using methods that took years to learn: reading wind-shaped snowdrifts, tracking animal movements, interpreting tidal patterns, memorizing thousands of place-names passed down through generations. Elders would wake children early and send them outside to report on wind and sky conditions, a practice called anijaaq.
When GPS units arrived in the mid-1990s, the Inuit did what they’d done with other new technology: they assessed it, experimented with it, and adapted. This was a culture that had already adopted rifles and snowmobiles. These technologies weren’t neutral: Rifles made hunting more solitary, more distant; snowmobiles were loud and fast, replacing the slow dog-sled travel that had been an ideal context for teaching younger hunters to read the land. With rifles and snowmobiles, the texture of Inuit culture changed. But neither struck at something that the elders felt was fundamental to cultural knowledge and identity.
GPS was different. The ethnographers put it bluntly: “For the first time in history the navigator can completely rely on technology and travel successfully knowing nothing about navigation and very little about the environment.” The device didn’t amplify the Inuit’s famous wayfinding skills but bypassed them entirely. This skill erosion had consequences: During a search for an overdue traveler in a blizzard, an elder realized the GPS was leading the party directly toward pressure ridges and dangerous ice. He took over and guided the party using traditional knowledge of the wind and snowdrifts. The GPS had given the correct answer to “where is my destination?” while removing any need to understand the journey.
Most of us will never navigate a blizzard in the Canadian Arctic. But you’ve probably experienced a milder version of this when navigating a new city. If you unfold a paper map, you study the streets, trace a route, convert the bird’s-eye abstraction into the first-person POV of actually walking—and by the time you arrived, you’d have a nascent mental model of how the city fits together. Or you could fire up Google Maps: A blue dot, an optimal line from A to B, a reassuring robotic voice telling you when to turn. You follow, you arrive, you have no idea, really, where you are. A paper map demands something from you, and that demand leaves you with knowledge. GPS requires nothing, and leaves you with nothing.
With GPS, the stakes are relatively low for most people. But AI tools are now mediating the same trade-off across far more consequential domains: reasoning, analysis, writing, clinical judgment, scientific thinking. I thought about this after Anthropic recently released a small study that reveals how offloading affects skill formation. Researchers had software developers complete coding tasks using a new Python library—some with AI assistance, some without. The AI group finished slightly faster. But when tested afterward on their understanding of the library, they scored 17 percent lower than the control group. The gap was largest on debugging questions: the very skill required to catch AI errors.
Psychologists Elizabeth and Robert Bjork explain why. They distinguish retrieval strength (how easily you access something now) from storage strength (how durably it’s encoded in the brain). Struggling to generate an answer builds storage strength. Being handed the answer builds nothing. As the Bjorks write: “Any time that you, as a learner, look up an answer or have somebody tell or show you something that you could, drawing on current cues and your past knowledge, generate instead, you rob yourself of a powerful learning opportunity.” Just as the Bjorks would have predicted, the AI group in the Anthropic study bypassed the struggle and thus bypassed the learning that came with it.
What Silicon Valley Is Blind ToThe Inuit elders and the Silicon Valley executives are looking at the same phenomenon and seeing different things because they’re asking different questions that come from different sets of values. The executives seem to be asking: what kind of output does this human produce? The elders seem to be asking: what kind of person does using this tool produce?
If output is your only metric, then the steam engine really is just a better bicycle. Both get you from A to B. One gets you there faster with less effort. Case closed. The fact that you arrive having done nothing, learned nothing, built nothing—that’s not a bug, that’s the point. Effort is a cost to be minimized, not a value to be preserved.
But embedded in that worldview is that the journey is merely instrumental. The only thing that matters is arrival. That it doesn’t matter if you travel or are traveled. The Inuit elders seemed to operate on a different premise. Arrival, of course, mattered. These were hunters who needed to find caribou and get home alive. But only through the journey could you acquire deep knowledge of the terrain. You couldn’t separate arriving at the destination from what you learned on the way there.
So when Nadella is rhapsodizing away about steam engines, he’s telling you what he values. He values arrival. The faster and more effortless, the better. The passenger who shows up rested and refreshed is, in his framework, strictly better off than the cyclist who shows up tired and sweaty. What he doesn’t seem to care about—what the output-only frame makes invisible—is what happens to the cyclist along the way. The increase in muscle strength, in cardiovascular fitness. The knowledge of the landscape. And, crucially, the capacity to do it again tomorrow, alone, if necessary.
“To choose Inuit wayfinding,” the ethnographers conclude, “becomes increasingly heroic in the face of wayfinding that depends on an advanced technological system.”
It may be a losing battle to demand that basic acts of competence require heroism. But I still think it’s worth noticing what assumptions that Silicon Valley steam engine metaphor is trying to force us to accept. When bicycles and steam engines get talked about as though they’re the same kind of thing, a concession has already been made: output is all that matters. The cyclist’s legs and lungs and mind are incidental, and the only interesting question is how fast you can get from A to B.
Tim Requarth is director of graduate science writing and research assistant professor of neuroscience at the NYU Grossman School of Medicine. He writes “The Third Hemisphere.”
A version of this article originally appeared at The Third Hemisphere.
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This week, Richard talks to Ian Shapiro, author of After the Fall: From the End of History to the Crisis of Democracy, How Politicians Broke Our World (Basic Books).
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In this week’s episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk, Amanda Ripley, Jesse Singal, and Thomas Chatterton Williams explore whether Trump has succeeded in remaking American culture in his image, the rise of white identity politics and its psychological drivers, and how America might break free from cycles of political revenge and backlash.
Amanda Ripley is the founder of Good Conflict. Her latest book is High Conflict: Why We Get Trapped and How We Get Out.
Jesse Singal is the co-host of Blocked and Reported and the author of The Quick Fix: Why Fad Psychology Can’t Cure Our Social Ills.
Thomas Chatterton Williams is a staff writer at The Atlantic. His latest book is Summer of Our Discontent.
Will you be in London on Sunday, September 6? I’ll be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought to mark the publication of his memoir In the Realm of the Last Man at the Sekforde at 5pm. Find out more and book tickets here. Paying subscribers can access a code for free tickets here. —Yascha
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
NEW: You can now watch the episode below! All episodes of The Good Fight are now on the Persuasion YouTube channel.
Yascha Mounk: It strikes me that we’re in a strange, frenetic moment in American culture that also is a kind of weird interlude. Around 2024 and 2025, there was the much-discussed vibe shift, which is part of what got Donald Trump elected. When I look at other countries in which figures who resemble Trump in certain ways came to office, some of them were really able to enjoy a kind of cultural victory—imposing their values on a large swath of the public and becoming the default mainstream way of thinking about the country. I would argue—and I’ll see whether you disagree with me—that in the second year of his presidency, it is already quite clear that Trump has failed at doing that. Whatever the vibe shift felt like 14 or 15 months ago, with a lot of young people, a lot of Latinos, et cetera, voting for Trump, it does not feel like Trump is remaking all of America in his own image. Obviously his administration is using executive orders and his power very aggressively to change institutions and do all kinds of things, but it doesn’t feel like Trump is managing to remake the country in his image. So where is American culture going? Thomas, how should we think through this?
Thomas Chatterton Williams: Politically, I agree with you, but on a cultural level, I think one of the lasting impacts of this new Trump era—Trump 2.0—is that white Americans have gone all in on claiming a standpoint position for themselves. They are getting involved in the kind of battle royale of identity and declaring that they’re not neutral, that white culture and white identity is not the atmosphere that everybody moves in. White identity is racialized, and they want to advocate for themselves as such. Jeremy Carl’s testimony before the Senate, when he was asked by Senator Murphy of Connecticut what he meant by white culture and white identity, is instructive here. He said he was advocating for heritage Americans and that they had been really harmed by immigration. I think this is going to be a lasting change: white Americans—a diminishing majority, but still a large numerical part of the population—are now going to be participating in the game of anti-racism that was really installed in the past 10 to 15 years during the Great Awokening. I think that is going to be, lastingly, to the detriment of society.
Mounk: That’s really interesting. Eric Kaufmann has this point in Whiteshift where he talks about asymmetrical multiculturalism. The idea is that there’s this kind of encouragement of taking pride in your group for all of the minority groups, and Kaufman’s point was that that’s unsustainable—eventually, the white majority group is going to say that’s the way the game is played, and they’re also going to take pride of place. I think Eric felt that was a kind of natural downstream effect and we should just embrace that. I was always much more worried about it. But perhaps it turns out that he’s right about the natural tendency of society. That’s kind of what we’ve been saying, Thomas—that we’ve now gotten to the point where multiculturalism is no longer asymmetrical, and whites as an identity group are playing the same game. Amanda, that would be bad for a modern society, would it not?
Amanda Ripley: What we’re saying is that in some ways Trump has imposed potentially lasting cultural shifts on the country, and in other ways he has not. I think one of the biggest challenges of dealing with someone like Trump is that in trying to oppose him, you can end up playing the very same game and thereby perpetuate it. It’s very tricky not to do that.
More than anything else this cycle, the thing that I’m frustrated by in the way that we’re covering culture and politics is that we’re not talking about the psychology of it. The psychology of Trump is about the addiction to revenge-seeking. It’s not just Trump. This is why Fox News is successful. It’s why many media outlets are successful. It’s less about outrage and more about revenge. Revenge operates in a really interesting way in the brain, and we’re just starting to understand this. It is addictive. There is a way in which you can see everything as a grievance and then, feeling aggrieved, seek revenge. A lot of our media outlets and politicians on both the right and the left are now not just giving us grievances—which they’ve done for a very long time—but also serving up a revenge fantasy.
That’s what you see with the gerrymandering race to the bottom. That’s what you see with the coarsening of the rhetoric: if you did it, then I’m going to do it—this tit-for-tat cycle that leads to endless revenge. The research is also very clear that to get out of that, you have to play a very different game. You can’t just do the same thing, or you perpetuate it. The ways in which Trumpism is likely to endure have to do with that psychological piece as much as the bigger, more obvious changes he’s imposing on our norms and institutions.
Jesse Singal: On this whitelash question, I may be skeptical of the extent of it. Persuadable voters who voted for Trump voted for him for a lot of reasons, and I think a lot of those reasons are a little bit obscured to people like us. This won’t be news to the panel or to anyone listening, but voters just make these decisions in a very different way from the way we do. It’s less ideological and more vibes-driven. Looking at the graph of Trump’s disapproval rate on Nate Silver’s website, he’s having an extremely bad presidency from a public opinion standpoint. So I think if there were any real appetite for asserting a white identity—maybe I’m just skeptical—I think there are some bad actors in and around his administration who want that, and there are certainly some online influencers who want that, not least the vice president. The memes alone posted by DHS and others are very creepy and white nationalist-coded, and I say that as someone who is often skeptical of claims of racism. They’re bizarre and they harken back to an America that never really existed. But I think there’s this problem that a lot of politicians have between telling the difference between what the people want and what their creepiest online fans want. I don’t think there’s a huge market for this stuff among the general public.
What we’re seeing is what feels like an exhausted democracy that’s going to keep barely electing people, then quickly getting mad at them, then moving on to the next person. It’s all pretty dark, but I think it’s maybe more complex than white identity reasserting itself.
Mounk: Let’s separate out two different things. One point is that the vibe shift, when it was happening, was remarkable in part because it went beyond white voters. The number of black voters who voted for Trump in 2024 was double the number who had voted for him in 2016. The number of Asian-American voters who voted for him was going up a lot. Numerically, the most important group that increased the vote for him was Latino voters. There was a feeling that the whole society was sufficiently disappointed in the Biden presidency and perhaps saw something in the second promise of Trump that made them willing to make that jump.
The second point is that perhaps we have to distinguish between the kind of white nationalist, creepy DHS images and so on—which I think is a very real theme of this administration—and a broader kind of social logic. I’d agree with Jesse that that’s certainly not the driving force of most of the people who voted for Trump. It’s just become such a part of American life—this natural reference to identity all the time—that perhaps it becomes natural for white people to identify themselves in that way. It doesn’t have to be as creepy as the DHS memes. The form that white self-identification takes doesn’t need to be as extreme as that. But I would still be quite worried if that becomes the default form of expression in the country in general, and particularly for the white majority group, even if it doesn’t take the form of the craziest meme on the DHS Twitter feed.
Williams: That’s right. I think that’s what JD Vance is trying to slip into the common parlance when he talks about heritage Americans—this desire to be able to speak as a heritage American and make claims to grievance that then get you special privileges or consideration in the zero-sum competition for status and prestige in the society. I think it operates along the lines of the logic of mimetic desire that René Girard talks about. After all of this time that groups have been advocating for themselves as a group, a lot of white Americans want that too now. That desire has become mimetically replicated among a lot of whites. I think Trump really did act as a kind of tribune for these people, even as he excited some working-class and downwardly mobile minorities and less educated minorities as well.
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Whiteness is really much more complicated in the 21st century than it was in previous eras of American history. One of the most prominent spokesmen for white nationalism is Nick Fuentes, who admits to his followers that he’s not only part Mexican but may very well have African ancestry. This stuff is complex.
Mounk: Jordan Bardella, who may well be the next president of France, is mostly an Italian immigrant to France. It’s already interesting that the leader of the far right is an immigrant from a neighboring European country. A little known fact in the United States is that he’s also partially of North African ancestry.
Williams: This stuff is going to get weirder and weirder. I think that Trump—and some of the voices of white identity would agree with Ta-Nehisi Coates on this—is the first white president.
Singal: What concerns me, in terms of trying to figure out how this happened again, is that some of this talk may distract from one of the biggest drivers of Trump’s second election, which was the border crisis. There was a genuine border crisis, and wanting a secure border is not just a white point of view. Most Americans want a secure border and are perhaps comfortable with some deportations, but are not comfortable with what Trump is doing. There is a lot of talk about the connection between Trump and white nationalism, and I get that, especially in this second and creepier term. But perhaps one of the lessons is that we simply need a normal, moderate immigration policy—which people in Biden’s orbit, by the end of his presidency, realized they had gotten catastrophically wrong. That framing brings the conversation down to something more tractable: what can Democrats do, and how should they message? The white identity framing, which I agree is menacing and weird, is perhaps a little tricky to pin onto specific political outcomes.
Ripley: What Thomas said earlier—about zero-sum thinking and the search for status—is important. That can take a lot of different forms. In our country, it is often about race; in other countries, it’s more about religion, class, or other things.
To bring us back to reality: Jesse, I think you’re right. Lee Drutman, a political scientist whose Substack I really love—he wrote Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop a couple of years ago—was recently arguing that the biggest mistake Democrats are about to make is thinking that a backlash against Trump and the GOP means endorsement of the Democratic Party. This is what we keep seeing over and over: this nauseating swing back and forth. Public opinion always moves against the party in power. Every president since FDR who has had control of Congress has also lost seats in the midterms.
So then what? What does anyone who cares about this country and wants to get out of this never-ending cycle do? We know a couple of things. We know that about 80% of Americans believe we’re in a political crisis. Almost half the country now identifies as independent. Americans don’t just dislike both parties—they want more of them. This is what Lee has been arguing for a very long time: that one way to exit this roller coaster is to promise—whether you’re a Republican or a Democrat—that if elected, you will give Americans more parties and move toward proportional representation, which is actually achievable. It doesn’t require a constitutional amendment.
Mounk: Lee is an old friend and we were colleagues at New America for many years. I think the idea of proportional representation in America is deeply foolish for two reasons. The first is that the causes of political fragmentation are much deeper than the electoral system. You see it just as strongly in Germany, in Spain, obviously in Israel, obviously in Italy—countries that have systems of proportional representation, or, in the case of Italy, ran away from a system of proportional representation because of the chaos it was causing. More fundamentally, it is a complete pipe dream to think you can have proportional representation in the United States, because the only chamber in which you could have it is the House of Representatives. To have proportional representation in one chamber—the least powerful chamber—would probably mean five, six, or ten different political parties in the House, while the Senate would still be controlled by two parties, since by definition you’re electing one senator per state per election. The presidency would have a very bimodal outcome. I think that would make America far less governable than it already is.
The more profound question is this. I agree on the thermostatic voting—which is the political science term for this, though I think it’s a dumb term; I’m not sure what a thermostat has to do with it. The idea is that public opinion always moves against the president. Because of gerrymandering, the primary system, social media, and the donor class, each party always goes way overboard, putting in place what the activists want rather than what average voters want. Voters say they hate the people in power, give the other side a try, the other side goes too extreme, and then voters say they hate that even more and put the original people back. That is a huge problem and a huge danger for Democrats in 2028. At this point, I think Democrats will likely win the midterms and may well win 2028. I’m very worried about what is going to happen in 2032 if they get it wrong once again.
I have a more fundamental question: has the basis for any kind of social cohesion just gone away? In my optimistic moments, I look at the opinion polls on immigration, on America’s relationship to its history, on what should be taught in schools, on trans rights, and on all of these issues, and the average American has a very reasonable opinion. The average American is pretty tolerant and pretty sensible. Perhaps we can finally find somebody who actually governs in the name of that majority and escape this spiral of polarization. In my less optimistic moments, I think our society is now so fragmented—with so many different ideological tribes, so many people getting information from such different sources—that the basic mechanisms of our public discourse are driving people toward polarization to an extent that we’re never going to have a mainstream big enough to keep our parties together again. What do you think?
Ripley: I totally agree, Yascha, that our problems run way deeper than a winner-take-all system. In many countries that have proportional representation, you still see very serious polarization. On average, countries that have multiple parties and proportional representation are less polarized than countries that don’t—but there are so many factors there, to your point. It’s not the solution. It’s one of many things we need to do to get outside of the game we’re in. We can’t keep doing this. We have to do something very different that Americans can see is very different, because average Americans are not represented in Congress. That’s not how primaries work. One of the reasons primaries are the way they are is because of gerrymandered districts.
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The phrase gerrymandering comes from a Massachusetts Democrat whose last name was actually Gerry, who carved up the districts into something that a political cartoonist thought looked like a salamander—combining those words to make “gerrymandering.” This has been going on for a long time. But there are three big differences now. One is the sophistication of the mapping and the tools used to carve up districts. The second is our profound contempt for one another—these revenge cycles that make us very vulnerable to thinking the only option is scorched earth and extreme measures like gerrymandering. The third is the Supreme Court, which has abdicated any role in keeping campaign fundraising and gerrymandering under control. A lot of these things need to get fixed. One way to prevent the splitting we are doing—dividing the world cleanly into good and evil—is to mix it up and have more than two choices.
Mounk: Jesse, Thomas—you can choose to speak to this more narrow institutional debate or to the broader point. Is there still a kind of American mainstream, a reasonable voter that some political force could successfully speak to and mobilize? Does the center still hold in American society more broadly?
Williams: Whether the center holds is really dependent on having the right kind of politician who can articulate ideas in a way that reaches that broad and sensible center. There is a center-left and center-right that’s not entirely comfortable with the extreme rhetoric and constant warfare of contemporary political culture. But it would require somebody who has a lot more talent than what we’ve been seeing.
Barack Obama was clearly able to reach Americans on a rhetorical level that inspired a certain amount of hatred and animosity, but also really inspired a lot of Americans to exercise their better tendencies, especially in the first term. He’s still quite popular. That’s asking a lot of a candidate, and I don’t see that kind of talent on the Democratic side at all. A lot of Americans could also be relieved to vote for somebody with the sensibility of Mitt Romney, if that were on offer from the right. I think a lot of people would like to turn the temperature down. What do you think, Jesse?
Singal: It’s interesting that a lot of the most charismatic politicians—and I’d put folks like AOC and Mamdani in that camp—have a lot of baggage from having said radical things, and they don’t really do the Obama style. They’re probably capable of that sort of rhetoric, and I think we’re going to see them shift toward it as their ambitions get higher. Obama is a generational political figure, but to answer the question: we’re not so broken that we couldn’t see another Obama type who talks in sweeping, unifying terms from a center-left perspective. In other ways, though, we’re experiencing runaway fragmentation that is not going to get better. The idea of a truly shared culture—beyond the Super Bowl and Bad Bunny—seems increasingly remote. There will be a few super-culture attractors that most people know, but I don’t think we’re going back to any sort of shared culture in terms of people’s day-to-day consumption of music, art, political figures, and so on. To the extent there are superstar political streamers, they tend to be hyper-partisan, which is a problem. So mostly I’m pessimistic about this whole America thing.
Mounk: There are surveys which show that in the 1980s, when you asked people who the most famous actor was, the answer was someone in their 20s. The same was true in the 1990s. Then the age started going up. The reason is that when Matt Damon, George Clooney, and those figures were first in the big movies, everybody was talking about those movies—they were central to American culture, and so those actors reached a degree of celebrity that goes beyond what Timothée Chalamet now enjoys. The common basis for that shared culture has eroded over the last few years because of technological developments.
I want to segue into the second topic I loosely thought we would talk about today, which is how the Democrats are reacting to all of this. We have the failed vibe shift of a few years ago and the recognition—which I think is valid—that Trump is actually starting to fade. He’s perhaps managing to remake a part of Americanism, but he’s not winning an all-out victory where it feels like everybody is now on board with Trump. There were a few months when it felt like that might happen. I think that danger is now quite clearly banished.
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How have the Democrats reacted? During the first Trump administration, part of the reaction was to fully embrace a new identity ideology on the left that felt very new and exciting and was able to sweep through institutions quite quickly. This time around, it doesn’t feel like Democrats have explicitly gone back to fully fighting for woke. In some ways they’ve superficially surrendered on some of those issues. It’s surprising that not many Democrats are going around saying the first thing they will do is nominate Supreme Court justices who are going to put affirmative action back in place. Perhaps that is in fact what they would do, but it’s not a prominent calling card.
At the same time, it feels like they’ve inverted Michelle Obama’s line—”when they go low, we go high.” One of the lessons the Democrats seem to have taken from the Trump era is that he won because he went low, and this time they’re going to go low as well. We see them campaigning with people like Hasan Piker, who is, in the old-fashioned description of the left, someone who actually defends the dictators of tanks rolling over other countries. We see Democrats making excuses and getting very angry at people who criticize them, like Graham Platner, who had a Totenkopf tattoo on his chest for over ten years before it became a campaign issue. You even see it in some of the institutional fights—on gerrymandering, the attitude seems to be: if the Republicans are gerrymandering as hard as they can, we’re going to gerrymander as hard as we can as well.
How should we think about the evolution of the Democrats? Is it fair to say that’s the lesson they’ve taken, and how do we feel about that?
Williams: It certainly is the lesson that Gavin Newsom has taken, at least stylistically, and I find that extraordinarily off-putting. The strength would be to model the kind of political behavior that many of us would recognize from the past and miss, as opposed to mimetically replicating Trump’s online behavior—the trolling and the extraordinary vulgarity. I find that deeply depressing.
I’m a little more agnostic about whether you have to accept that people are flawed and find ways to reconcile with previously flawed candidates if they have a chance of winning and have rejected the previous behavior you find problematic. Someone like Graham Plattner doesn’t stand by the Totenkopf. He says—whether we believe it or not—that it was a mistake, that he got rid of it, and that it’s not what he stands for now. Realistically, there has to be a path towards reconciliation, especially when somebody has momentum, because the alternative is that you don’t support him and you empower Donald Trump to have one more advocate in the Senate. There’s not one response to that question—it depends on the situation. Gerrymandering also presents another set of calculations.
Ripley: It’s hard to generalize about Republicans or Democrats, but if you look at some of the loudest voices—House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries keeps referring to maximum warfare everywhere all the time when it comes to gerrymandering—this is literally, as Thomas said, mimicking the behavior of your opponents. It doesn’t get you out of the trap you’re in.
Plattner is a really interesting example. We know from the research on human behavior in these revenge addiction cycles that one way out—and I know this is going to sound incredibly squishy, and it sounds squishy to me too, but it is backed up by the research—is that you have to start forgiving people. That is the only way out. You have to do it even internally. Even if you never say it out loud, it actually has an effect on that kind of addiction cycle. Plattner has spoken enough to the whole issue of the tattoo. We just can’t keep doing this.
Mounk: Has he, though? When Barack Obama had the most serious crisis of his primary campaign in early 2008, tapes of Reverend Wright were released in which he was saying “God damn the USA,” et cetera. Obama gave a major speech in which he laid out his relationship to race. It wasn’t Obama who was on tape saying these things—it was the pastor of the church he attended. He said: let me take this really seriously. I understand why a lot of people are going to be upset about that, and they will be right to be upset. Even so, he laid out what the pastor’s perspective was and where he came from. He threaded the needle in both a beautiful speech—which I often assign to my students—and in a serious way: not hiding who he is, not debasing himself, but explaining it and recognizing why it was so upsetting to people.
I have seen nothing like that from Graham Plattner. All I’ve seen from him is the claim that this is trolls on the right weaponizing something he didn’t know about. His story does not add up. His chief of staff has said that he referred to it as “my Totenkopf” years ago, and yet he later claims he never knew what it was. He hasn’t explained that in a satisfactory way.
I’ve said many times that I’m against cancel culture. But being concerned about a candidate who literally had a tattoo of a symbol associated with the SS on his chest for ten years, covered it up once it became a national political issue, and never addressed it seriously—that’s a different matter. Ninety percent of what he has said about it is that this is just right-wingers trying to exploit it against him. I’m open to him perhaps one day being a great senator, and I’m open to forgiveness. But has he actually, in a serious way, explained what it is, where it comes from, why it’s upsetting to people, and what it means for the Democratic Party? Aren’t we being deeply hypocritical? If somebody on the right had a Totenkopf tattoo for ten years, would we really be saying it’s perfectly natural to forgive that?
Singal: It does seem disingenuous. David French complained about the slide in decency and standards, writing that “the slide begins when you tell yourself that the stakes are just too high for normal politics”—that of course you wouldn’t support this candidate in better times, but now American democracy is at stake. He’s saying: don’t go down that road. I understand the argument given how tight the Senate is and what one seat means. But I find it demoralizing that people act like it’s a crazy cancel culture campaign to be concerned about a Nazi tattoo. In many cases, it’s the same people who, before the vibe shift, were calling for people’s careers to be ruined over much lighter offenses. There’s a degree of disingenuousness on display that I just don’t like.
Mounk: The same thing applies to Hasan Piker, where people completely mix up two different things. When somebody has a big media platform, should you go and make your case in front of that platform? Sure. Should Democrats go on Fox News? Should they go on Joe Rogan? Should they go on those shows and be authentically themselves and try to reach those audiences? Yes. If somebody wants to go on Hasan Piker’s stream and argue for their political views, I don’t have a problem with that—even though I am deeply concerned about Piker’s views and have some strategic questions about whether that is actually going to be very useful, given that his audience is very different from the mostly apolitical audience of Joe Rogan. But let the consultants make that call. That’s different from campaigning with him. That’s different from saying he’s the future of the Democratic Party.
Ripley: Litigating the tattoo back and forth at this point is not super helpful. What I find revealing about Plattner is that while he has apologized for that—and I think in a more believable way apologized for some of the things he said about sexual assault in the military—he still uses the tool of revenge-seeking. It’s just different subjects, different scapegoats, different targets of blame, but it’s still the same mindset of splitting the world into good and evil, with the conviction that you are on the side of good and that anything is justified because the other side is so evil. That’s the piece of his behavior today that gives me pause. I know people who have gotten idiotic tattoos in their 20s that they didn’t know the meaning of. We perhaps can’t expect an Obama-level reflection from this guy, but we could expect people to start thinking a little more critically about this constant cycle of oversimplifying and blame.
Williams: I understand the arguments that Yascha and Jesse just made and the point Amanda is making. But at the end of the day, if you are actually concerned about things like anti-Semitism—and if you have any familiarity with German culture—look at the memes coming out under the banner of the White House and the Department of Homeland Security. These are not things being rejected or covered over. They are deliberate emulations of actual Nazi propaganda and rhetoric. If anti-Semitism is your concern, Graham Plattner is not where you should be channeling all of your outrage. Unfortunately, in some situations, we do have a binary choice.
Mounk: That’s where Amanda is saying: why do we debase our standards in that way? Why can’t we both be outraged at the DHS Twitter feed and the symbolism of Trump and all of that, and also say—excuse me—the party that was, as Jesse was saying, canceling people, is now telling us how dare we be upset about a man who had a Totenkopf tattoo for ten years? I wrote about an electrician in San Diego who was actually of Latino heritage, who had his hand dangling out of a truck and somebody thought it looked like the OK sign, which they took to be a white supremacist gesture. He lost the best job he ever had. Those same people are now telling me I have no right to be upset about Plattner. Excuse me if I find that a little galling.
Williams: There’s hypocrisy to go all the way around and excuse me if I got Amanda’s point wrong. I just solely disagree with Jesse.
Ripley: People will justify anything because they want to feel right and because the other side feels threatening. It never ends. I do it too. When I think about one of the things that has most made me ashamed of this country—a country I was born in, am a citizen of, and love—it was the way we withdrew from Afghanistan. At the time, I was angry at the Biden administration about that, but I didn’t necessarily blame Biden personally in the way I now very quickly catch myself blaming Trump for most things personally. You can catch yourself doing this, and the trick is to at least notice it and try—as Yascha is pleading with us to do—to reflect on the ways in which we are debasing ourselves, extending a huge benefit of the doubt to our own side while denying it to the other.
Mounk: Two more thoughts on Maine, and it’s not about the tattoo. The first is that it shows the really terrible field in so many of these Democratic races. On the one hand, you have a candidate who doesn’t have any very clear achievements, has a history of erratic political opinions, and looks like the image that people drinking coffee in Brooklyn have of what appeals to the country—in a way that I’m not sure it actually does. On the other hand, you have a governor who by all accounts is perfectly competent and decent, but who is 78 years old and has no charisma and no real ability to articulate what the campaign is about. Given those two choices, I understand where some primary voters ended up going for Plattner. I felt something similar on the day of the midterms when a couple of pretty reasonable governors were elected in New Jersey and Virginia. I tried to watch the victory speeches and they were really quite boring. Meanwhile, Zohran Mamdani has a bunch of policies I disagree with, but he’s clearly a talented and charismatic politician. That’s a real concern for where the Democratic Party is.
The other question I want to raise is whether “when they go low, we go low” is actually a sensible electoral calculus. It relies on the idea that what drives Trump’s appeal is that he goes low, and it’s not clear to me that that’s what people like about him. Perhaps it is, but it deserves thinking through. If you embrace the same style without the same charisma, the same political cause, or the same political coalition, it’s not obvious that’s going to benefit you. Gavin Newsom going around signaling his social media dominance clearly appeals to the base, but is that going to win over independents in the way that Trump, for whatever reason, was able to in 2016 and particularly in 2024? I have my doubts.
Williams: For the people that style does appeal to, they can get it from Trump, and he does it better than anybody who’s trying to mimic that behavior—he certainly does it better than Gavin Newsom. So if that’s your thing, replicating it will not convert anybody to your side. What it can do is repel a lot of people who don’t like that quality in Trump but put up with it because they like certain other things he’s delivering.
Ripley: Is the lowness what people are actually attracted to? Some people are genuinely attracted to it. It feels authentic. It feels like this is a fearless person, because people feel—and they are not wrong—that the whole system is rigged. They’re finding the wrong solution, in my view, but they’re not wrong that there’s something deeply wrong, that there’s distortion and corruption and dishonesty in the dealings between the political class and the American people. So Trump’s lowness functions as a proxy for honesty and courage. It’s a false idol, and a dangerous one, but it looks courageous even when it’s deeply cowardly.
All sides can play that game and have tried, but as Thomas said, Trump is much better at it for a number of reasons, including his addiction to vengeance. This is not a healthy person, and it’s easy to forget that. Most of us were not involved in 4,000 lawsuits before 2016. Before he even ran for president, Trump was using the justice system as a tool of revenge. If you talk to any seasoned lawyer, they know people like this. In modern history, we do not have another example of a president routinely suing news organizations he doesn’t like while in office. He has sued Trevor Noah, the BBC, the Washington Post, and on and on. This is not normal behavior, but it is what Trump has always done, and his behavior is not going to change. He is a very fragile person, and lawsuits function like self-medication—a way to temporarily feel better.
That is the behavior we need to be looking for. The party affiliation matters less to me than the pattern itself: this conflict entrepreneurship behavior, and our collective failure to recognize it and become less vulnerable to it.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Amanda, Thomas, and Jesse discuss the state of free speech in the United States, whether Trumpism will continue beyond the presidency of Donald Trump, and what America will look like in 2030. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Will you be in London on Sunday, September 6? Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought to mark the publication of his memoir In the Realm of the Last Man at the Sekforde at 5pm. Find out more and book tickets here. (Paying subscribers can access a code for free tickets here.)
William III and Mary II, King and Queen of England, Scotland, and Ireland, c1689.(Photo by Historica Graphica Collection/Heritage Images/Getty Images.)Today, it was my pleasure to speak at William & Mary’s 2026 Commencement ceremony. The namesakes of this college played an underappreciated role in the birth of liberalism, so I’m delighted to share my remarks and their story with you now.
—Frank.
Chancellor Gates, Rector Poston and members of the Board, President Rowe—thank you for the beautiful video and introduction and for the honor from this distinguished university.
To the students, faculty, parents, relatives, and friends of the graduating class of 2026, I am very honored to be able to speak to you on this day. This year is part of William and Mary’s “Year of Civic Leadership,” as well as the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. I’m grateful for the introduction, and want to add one small biographical note.
Back in 1989, I published an article entitled “The End of History?” with a question mark at the end. I don’t want to spend any time today explaining the meaning of that phrase, which was not mine but that of the German philosopher Hegel. Suffice it to say the article set off a firestorm of discussion about democracy and world politics. It eventually led to my getting my first academic appointment at George Mason University. I was told by my sponsors that I had received a huge number of references in the citation index that is used to evaluate the work of scholars.
What they didn’t say was that probably 99 percent of those citations said I was completely wrong.
With your permission, I would like to talk to you a little about history and the role that your college’s namesakes played in it.
William of Orange was a Dutch prince, married to Mary Stuart, the young daughter of King James II of England. William was invited by a group of English nobles to help overthrow Mary’s father. This was the culmination of a series of events starting in 1688 known as the Glorious Revolution.
At the heart of the Glorious Revolution was a crisis over constitutional authority. The Stuart kings Charles I and James II had insisted on their right to unilaterally impose taxes and make laws without the consent of Parliament. This led to an English Civil War, the beheading of Charles, an interregnum under Oliver Cromwell, and finally the restoration of the Stuart dynasty.
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But the principle of parliamentary supremacy had not been fully established by the late 1680s. The Catholic King James refused to consult with Parliament on a host of policy issues, and he appointed Catholic officers to key posts in the army. Fear that he would return England to Catholicism led to an uprising, James’s abdication, and his replacement by William and Mary.
The Parliamentary side in the Glorious Revolution rallied under the banners of two principles: “no taxation without representation,” and, more broadly, legitimate government coming from the “consent of the governed.” William and Mary ascended to the throne with the understanding that hereafter, English monarchs could no longer operate with absolute authority, but needed to get the consent of Parliament first. The philosopher John Locke had accompanied Mary Stuart back to England from the Netherlands, and wrote his Second Treatise of Government that set these principles in a universal context.
The American Founding Fathers read John Locke. Thomas Jefferson studied John Locke while a student at William and Mary College, and incorporated the principles of “consent of the governed” and “no taxation without representation” into the Declaration of Independence. This, of course, is the document whose 250th anniversary we are celebrating this year. The College of William and Mary played a role in this Founding; John Locke himself wrote a letter in 1699 to James Blair, the college’s first president, inquiring into the progress it had made.
The Glorious Revolution established the principle that the King’s authority is not absolute, and is limited by the need to get approval from a representative body. Neither England in 1689 nor the American colonies in 1776 were democratic in the sense of universal citizenship, but they accepted the idea that government authority needed to be limited by a rule of law, and the idea of constitutional checks and balances. This is the meaning of “liberal democracy”—a government that gets its authority from the consent of the governed, but also limits that authority with a rule of law.
We are today living in an historical period in which liberal democracy has been in retreat around the world. Liberal democracy went through a huge expansion beginning in the 1970s and reached a peak in the years after the collapse of communism. But according to Freedom House, the aggregate level of democracy leveled off around 2008, and has been falling ever since.
This new world has been characterized by the rise of authoritarian great powers like Russia and China. But the regression from democracy has occurred as well in existing democracies, including several that were long established. What we call “democratic backsliding” has centered in the first instance on a deterioration in respect for the rule of law, rather than attacks on the principle of democratic representation per se. We have seen this taking place in many countries, including Hungary, Turkey, India, El Salvador, and, unfortunately, the United States.
Take the example of Hungary, a small country in Central Europe that nonetheless became a model for democratic regression. With the rise of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party in 2010, the government progressively packed the courts with Fidesz supporters, put the media under the control of Orbán’s friends and cronies, changed the electoral laws and constitution to make it ever harder to unseat the ruling party, and assumed control of large parts of the Hungarian economy. Hungary shifted sides in the great global struggle between democracy and authoritarian government by supporting Russia in its aggressive war against Ukraine and blocking efforts by the rest of the European Union to help the latter country.
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Orbán explained that he was creating what he labeled an “illiberal democracy,” that is, a country that would continue to hold democratic elections, but would burst the limits of existing laws and use state authority arbitrarily. His party and country served as an inspiration to many other would-be “illiberal democrats” around the world.
The good news in 2026 is that Hungary voted in April by huge margins to eject Viktor Orbán and Fidesz from power. Hungary had fallen from one of the richest Eastern European post-communist countries in the 1990s to one of its poorest as a result of the gross corruption of the Orbán regime. Voters saw this and overwhelmingly rejected Fidesz. As in Poland three years earlier, Hungary proved that elections remain one of the most important checks on arbitrary power, and that citizens can still exercise agency by withholding consent from those who seek to govern them.
At the College of William and Mary, the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence has been declared the “Year of Civic Leadership.” It is critical for you who are graduating today to understand the great opportunity that you have to exercise that leadership in future years.
You are living, as Abraham Lincoln explained, in a democracy “of the people, for the people, and by the people,” that by the end of the Civil War received a “new birth of freedom.” Citizenship in such a country does not mean that you should passively enjoy the benefits of life in a free society; it is not enough to simply follow the law and pay your taxes. Civic leadership requires active participation in the democratic process. You need to pay attention to public affairs, and to understand that you personally have a responsibility to improve the common life of our country. You need to honor the legacy of King William and Queen Mary by playing your part in supporting a constitutional order built around John Locke’s contention that legitimate government arises out of “consent of the governed,” and the Declaration of Independence’s assertion that “all men are created equal.”
Thank you very much for your attention.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
The victory of the opposition in the Hungarian elections of April 12, 2026 was nothing short of spectacular. Péter Magyar and the Tisza party won 53% of the vote and 141 out of 199 parliamentary seats, ending 16 years of governance by the illiberal populist Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party. Fidesz rewrote the constitution, including changing the electoral rules, suborned the judiciary, clamped down on independent media, nationalized significant sectors of the economy, and engaged in massive corruption. Yet the party continued to hold elections. This time, the pendulum decisively swung away from Fidesz.
Hungarians cheered, and analysts celebrated. But what does this victory mean?
First, it does not imply that Hungary was a full-fledged democracy under Orbán. Some observers claimed that the Hungarian case shows that “competitive authoritarianism” is a contradiction in terms. Yet autocrats hold elections, often to forestall change—and they often misjudge their own popularity and the likely outcome. This was the case in the Philippines in 1986, in Poland in 1989, and in Chile in 1990. In Hungary, Orbán won successive elections in 2014, 2018, and 2022, and apparently thought his message of regime stability, oil supplies from Russia, and protecting Hungary from a Ukrainian invasion would continue to sway voters.
Second, this is not the end of illiberal populism, either in Europe or elsewhere. An autocrat suffered a blow in Hungary. But international demonstration effects are limited, and most voters care more about economic performance than democratic freedoms per se. Indeed, voters are often willing to trade democracy for other goods—and view the parties they support as appropriately democratic. These partisan evaluations of democratic performance mean that most voters see their parties as democratic, whether they support President Trump, PiS in Poland, or Modi in India. (In the United States, the share of voters who prioritize democratic values in their voting choices is less than 10%.)
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Yet even if voters don’t care that much about democracy, they do care about their pocketbooks. And here, Tisza’s victory carries another important lesson: Fidesz used its stranglehold on power to engage in unprecedented corruption—and the very real costs of that corruption are what brought them down. People care about corruption, not as an affront to democratic rules, but as an insult to their dignity and their wallets. And that was Magyar’s unrelenting message: corruption is everywhere, it has cost us EU funding, and it costs us untold damage in our standard of living, our health care and education, and the future of our children. Fidesz got rich, while everyone else became impoverished.
There are three other important implications for would-be democratizers. First, the ground game was everything in Tisza’s case. Magyar visited tiny villages and hamlets, usually the bastions of Fidesz support, and consistently delivered his message that everyday Hungarians were bearing the costs of corruption. He emphasized patriotic themes, surrounding himself with Hungarian flags and recitations of Hungarian national poetry and songs. Even the party’s slogan, “Now or Never,” echoed the 1848 uprising against Habsburg rule. Finally, he did not shame Fidesz supporters, but instead invited them to join a broad coalition to reclaim Hungary, winning them over with a combination of patriotism, multiple visits to key areas, and a consistent and credible message.
Second, autocrats live by gerrymandering—and die by it. Among other changes, Fidesz had reduced the number of parliamentary districts and concentrated opposition support (even if it resulted in districts of wildly varying sizes), and increased the compensation votes given to the largest parties. All of this was layered on top of an already disproportional electoral system, one that saw Fidesz win in 2010 with 53% of the vote and well over two-thirds of the seats. However, this institutional engineering meant that, when the swing occurred, it was even more decisive: Tisza now controls nearly 71% of the seats.
Third, the real work has just begun. Undoing the damage done by Fidesz to the judiciary, the public welfare system, the economy, and all the other sectors of the polity and the economy is going to be both a monumental and painstaking task. Yet even here, as every East European optimist will tell you, things could be worse. Fidesz politicized agencies to punish its rivals and competitors: media boards went after recalcitrant media, while tax audits and laws punished civil society organizations and disloyal politicians alike. All of this required retaining state capacity in some form.
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Here, the contrast with the Trump administration could not be starker: while Fidesz suborned institutions, the Trump administration is destroying them. Ironically, that limits some of the damage: it is difficult to pursue rivals with tax investigations when the IRS has fired 38% of its workers devoted to pursuing tax fraud among the very wealthy. Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has abolished USAID and other agencies, effectively hobbling American foreign policy and, worse yet, its soft power abroad. The task in the United States will be enormously more challenging. Some agencies will not be rebuilt. The reputation of the United States has been permanently diminished. Neither one of these challenges applies to Hungary, where the EU is already in the process of releasing funding.
There are other complications: Magyar continues to be committed to several aspects of the Fidesz program: oil imports from Russia, minimal immigration to Hungary, and a focus on Hungarian sovereignty. As a defector from Fidesz in 2024, his democratic bona fides are not impeccable.
Nonetheless, Magyar and Tisza have brought down an autocratic regime that had been in power for 16 years, and that had systematically flouted democratic norms, international cooperation, and basic decency. Illiberal populism is not dead, and most voters care more about their pocketbooks than about lofty democratic ideals. But we owe several existence proofs to the opposition victory in Hungary, where the difference was a credible candidate, consistent focus on corruption, and campaigning where it matters the most—not just where it was convenient.
Anna Grzymala-Busse is the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science and the director of the Europe Center at Stanford University.
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