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(Photo by Ying Tang/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)Last month, UN scientists announced publicly what climate researchers have known for years: the most extreme climate change pathway is now so implausible, it really shouldn’t be part of our climate debate. The culprit—known as the Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5, or RCP8.5 to habitués—suffered a peculiarly nasty case of context collapse: a tool developed by a bunch of nerds was set loose on the world only to be wildly misinterpreted, generating mass confusion and buckets of activist dollars on the way to thoroughly disfiguring our climate debate.
Now the UN is mothballing it. Good riddance.
The “8.5” in RCP8.5 refers to the amount of added solar energy the atmosphere will trap by 2100—specifically, 8.5 watts per square meter. That’s very high—likely to bring about a shocking 5 degrees of global warming above pre-industrial levels.
RCP8.5 was the kind of climate scenario lurking behind Greta Thunberg’s accusation, in her September 2019 speech at the UN Climate Action Summit, that “we are in the beginning of a mass extinction.” It’s the kind of pathway young people in England were thinking about when they decided they needed to launch “Extinction Rebellion.” It’s been a fundraising bonanza for climate activist groups from Adelaide to Zurich, the main player in every single alarmist climate critique you’ve read in the last 15 years.
And it’s been the default setting for literally thousands of climate science papers—Google Scholar lists more than 30,000 published since 2018 alone. It was from this kind of research that we got lurid papers like “Future of the human climate niche,” where respectable Dutch climate scientists claimed that one in three human beings live in regions that will become unlivable in the next 50 years. It was this kind of research that gave rise to countless breathless headlines about how outdoor labor was about to become impossible across much of the tropical world, and alarmist documentaries claiming the ocean was about to end up without any fish. It was RCP8.5 that turned David Wallace-Wells’s “The Uninhabitable Earth” into the most read story in the history of New York Magazine, and later propelled the book version to the top of the New York Times best-seller list.
The story of RCP8.5 is ultimately the story of what goes wrong when people convinced they are defending “The Science” catastrophically misunderstand how science works, and when politicized activists glom onto legitimate scientific tools and insist on ramming the round peg of probabilistic forecasting into the square hole of fundraising emails. It’s one of those stories that’s at once illustrative, hopelessly wonky, and exceedingly easy to get wrong—so strap in, because we’re going for a ride.
Imagine you’re an engineer tasked with designing a highway bridge. You need to figure out where your structure’s weak points are—and what it would take to cause it to break.
To figure that out, you’re going to want to simulate what would happen to your structure in really extreme circumstances. Maybe you’d want to whip up a computer simulation and ask what would happen if 250 fully loaded M1 Abrams battle tanks drove onto your bridge at the same time. Not, you see, because there’s any conceivable scenario in which 250 army tanks really are going to drive onto your bridge, but because modeling that possibility allows you to gain valuable knowledge about the bridge, about its structure and its failure points, about the way the bridge would fail if it did fail.
This, basically, was the original intent of RCP8.5. The UN scientists who initially proposed it characterized it as exactly what it was: a very high-emissions scenario that would allow modelers to puzzle through how the Earth System would behave under what’s known as extreme radiative forcing.
It’s important to understand that this is fully legitimate science: Earth’s atmosphere and oceans are chaotic systems, and there is a lot of noise and not a lot of signal. Run a simulation under realistic atmospheric scenarios and it’s very hard to pick out the signal from the noise. To really understand the underlying relationships, to see clearly what causes what, it’s useful to turn the forcing dial up to 11: that’s when relationships that look fuzzy in the real world start to come into theoretical focus. To scientists, the usefulness of RCP8.5 has never been in question.
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The problem is downstream from the science. What happens when people who aren’t trained in Earth Systems science start to read the outputs of these modelling studies? They freak out. Of course they do! RCP8.5 was designed specifically to tease out worst-case scenarios, so naturally the models you run on it are full of hideous possibilities.
Which, obviously, doubles as a fundraising goldmine: nothing gets donors to whip out those checkbooks like a good scare story. Pretty soon, every climate advocacy organization was putting out sensationalist stories on the basis of research showing what would happen if you piled 250 tanks onto the damn bridge. Activists were haranguing shareholders about how the IPCC was predicting that “business as usual” would mean tanks were going to get piled onto that bridge and the bridge was definitely going to collapse and we were all going to die. Mental health professionals all around the world started treating people for the toll that RCP8.5-mediated climate anxiety was causing. And if you tried to explain that this was all a massive misinterpretation of what the IPCC was doing, you got slammed as a climate denialist.
Lost in the melee was the reality that RCP8.5 was never a plausible pathway for human emissions. This was well understood in the scientific community right from the start. The original 2011 paper laying it out was titled, with deliberate care, “RCP 8.5—A scenario of comparatively high greenhouse gas emissions.”
The modelers characterized it as what would happen if you combined very high population growth with virtually no technological change towards cleaner power. In practice, it was a world where the population grew to 12 billion by the year 2100, the economy grew very fast, and the majority of the global energy needs of these 12 billion people were met by burning coal. Back in 2011, researchers reckoned that RCP8.5 sat near the 90th percentile of the no-policy baseline scenarios—meaning that roughly nine out of ten futures with no climate policy at all would still produce less warming than RCP8.5.
Since 2011, it’s become clear that this 90th percentile risk is not where the world is headed. Populations are growing considerably less quickly than RCP8.5 implied—the UN’s 2024 World Population Prospects now projects the global population to peak at 10.3 billion in the mid-2080s and decline to 10.2 billion by 2100, well below the 12 billion baked into RCP8.5. And the energy story is even more striking: in 2023, solar and wind made up almost 91% of net new global power capacity additions, while fossil fuels contributed just 6%—the lowest level on record.
If we lived in a more rational world, RCP8.5-alarmism would’ve ended in 2017. That was the year when the energy economists Justin Ritchie and Hadi Dowlatabadi published research showing that RCP8.5 wasn’t just implausible; it was straight-up impossible as a pathway for human carbon emissions (this last part, “for human carbon emissions,” is important—more on that later). The paper showed that to reach the anthropogenic levels implied by RCP8.5 would require burning more coal than there is estimated to be in the world’s recoverable coal reserves. There’s just not enough mineable coal in the world to bring us to this level of emissions, even if we were satisfying all of our new energy needs with coal—which is definitely not what we’re doing.
It’s as though engineers had shown conclusively that 250 M1 Abrams tanks wouldn’t even fit on the highway bridge we want to build.
That should’ve been the end of the story. But it wasn’t, because by the time Ritchie and Dowlatabadi’s paper came out, too many activist groups had built business plans around scaring the bejeezus out of people on the basis of highly emotive, RCP8.5-inspired catastrophist research. By then, everyone from the Bloomberg Philanthropies to the Union of Concerned Scientists was referring to RCP8.5-style scenarios as “the business-as-usual” or the “no action” scenario—something it was emphatically never intended to be.
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Scientists, for their part, quickly realized that research based on RCP8.5 would give rise to flashier findings, which would have a better chance of being accepted by prestigious journals. RCP8.5 amplified their results and turned journal editors’ heads; and besides, everyone else was doing it. Those inflated findings then got recycled into activist discourse and fundraising pitches, creating a hermetically sealed system where the science and the activism fed back on one another in an unbreakable loop of messed-up incentives.
RCP8.5, which had started life as a useful climate modeling tool, had subtly morphed into an engine for disinformation. The ideology it spawned—climate catastrophism—captured the Democratic Party, murdered The Liberal Patriot, and locked center-left elites in a disinformation chamber of their own making. A calamity, any way you slice it.
Perhaps belatedly recognizing how badly off the rails the discourse has gone, the scientists preparing the IPCC’s next assessment report have decided to pull the plug on RCP8.5. The new “high emissions” scenario to be used in climate modeling going forward is considerably less pessimistic than RCP8.5, less pessimistic even than RCP6, the second-worst case scenario in the old IPCC reports.
It’s a significant step towards a saner climate debate. Thank God for that.
But if you’ve read this far and found yourself thinking: “oh, so it turns out climate alarmism was so much activist bullshit, finally we can relax!” I’m afraid I have bad news for you.
I’m not even a little bit relaxed about climate change. Here’s why.
In reality, we’re likely to come in at below 6 watts per square meter in added trapped energy, which likely puts us on track for 2.5 to 3 degrees of global warming.
But there’s an old saying among Earth System scientists: “nobody lives at the global mean temperature.” Nobody actually cares about cumulative global averages. People care about the weather in the places where they live: the floods and the droughts, the storms and the sea levels and the fires. And while Earth Science has made pretty good progress in connecting the pollution we emit to likely global radiative balances and temperatures, it’s on much shakier ground when it comes to relating those averages to the actual, on-the-ground conditions people care about.
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The emissions path we’re on is clearly less hazardous than it would’ve been under RCP8.5. Activist groups plainly shot themselves in the foot by latching onto an unrealistic standard that couldn’t really be defended scientifically. But that categorically does not mean the path we’re on is safe. The reality—less useful for fundraisers, but much more honest—is that science has only the haziest idea of what the path we’re on means for the kinds of outcomes people care about.
And there’s another, subtler, reason to hold off on those victory laps. It’s now clear that anthropogenic carbon emissions are not likely to bring us to the kinds of catastrophic scenarios RCP8.5 implies. But talk to Earth System scientists and you’ll find plenty of other ways we could end up in other catastrophic scenarios. The Earth System has many poorly-understood, hard-to-measure, hard-to-model feedback loops that could drop us right back in RCP8.5-type scenarios.
The one you hear about most often is Siberian permafrost: it could be that it thaws quickly enough to emit masses of new methane, which is a much more powerful greenhouse gas than CO2. But that’s just one; there are plenty of others. Seabeds contain huge amounts of methane that could be stirred as ocean temperatures rise. Or the ocean nitrogen cycle could shift to expand nitrous oxide emissions, which traps heat even more effectively than methane. There are small groups of scientists working on quantifying each of these risks, and I’m sorry to report that the error bars around their estimates are often very wide.
Those are the known-unknowns. But what about the unknown-unknowns? The Earth System is hugely complex, and there’s no guarantee that we’re even aware of all the most relevant processes, or how they interact with each other. Could there be an Earth-changing feedback loop out there nobody’s identified yet? We… just don’t know.
So it may be that we were only ever going to pile 100 M1 tanks onto that bridge, not 250. But maybe we’re also creating conditions for a herd of elephants to pile onto the bridge at the same time. Maybe the bridge is being built on an unidentified seismic zone. The fact that our original stress scenario with the 250 tanks was never realistic shouldn’t lure us into complacency. There’s more than one way for a bridge to collapse.
The fever dream that was RCP8.5 research sent the climate community down a series of idiotic rabbit holes and badly distorted our climate conversation. But treating the demise of RCP8.5 as reason to let down our guard could be an even more damaging mistake. The maddening reality about climate change is that Earth System science is not really up to the task of quantifying the risks for the worst outcomes.
We’re forced, just now, to face them “naked”—in the terrifying awareness that our best guesses about the hazards we face probably aren’t very good.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
Imagine the following exercise. You are asked to write down the values you wish both your neighbors and your elected officials possessed. You have as much time as you need, but there is a catch: you cannot use AI or any digital crutch. It is just you and a blank page. What do you scribble?
The difficulty of the task reveals a deeper tension in American civic life. Values are not easy to ponder or discuss, in part because the term has been hollowed out by the clichés of stump speeches. Phrases like “middle-class values” or “family values” have become placeholders that can mean almost anything to anyone. Yet the challenge runs deeper. We lack a shared vocabulary for the virtues we expect from one another and from those who govern us.
What, then, do we mean by “values?” Are personal characteristics such as industriousness or integrity values? They are—but they are often treated as private traits rather than civic expectations. One could easily imagine listing honesty, decency, kindness, and courage. There are also values we cherish collectively—liberty, freedom, individual responsibility, privacy—yet these are often invoked as national ideals rather than the qualities we hope to see embodied in individual leaders. They belong on the list as well.
Call it a moral deficit or a societal ethical breach, but candidates who speak meaningfully about civic virtue, and who integrate those virtues into their public commitments, are likely to resonate with a public that yearns for something steadier and more principled. When one looks at our collective lists, I suspect that—once rephrased and refined—what emerges is a shared blueprint for civic virtue.
Wisdom. Decency. Character. Public-spiritedness—the internal drive to seek the good of others. Moderation in temperament. The ability to reason, knowing that others do not share your view. Courage, including the willingness to articulate ideas that are not always popular. These are not small aspirations. It is not easy to be courageous, wise, or unselfish. Civic virtue is both something we occasionally grasp and something we continually strive to attain. It is both discernible and aspirational.
The purpose here is not to catalog every virtue but to raise a broader point. As the Democratic Party looks toward the 2026 congressional elections and the 2028 presidential race, commentators across the ideological spectrum note that it must address a wide range of concrete issues—national security, health care, housing, technology, climate, immigration, inflation, and deficits—and yes, even social issues such as trans rights. But alongside these policy debates lies a deeper need: a conversation about civic virtue and the values we hold, and wish to hold, as a nation.
Can one speak simultaneously to liberals and progressives who will reliably vote Blue, to 2024 Trump voters, and to disengaged non-voters? The answer is yes, but only if the message is grounded in conviction and purpose. Yet the current roster of potential candidates has not articulated a coherent civic-virtue agenda.
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Some political figures have embraced a performative, profane vernacular as a way to attract attention and signal authenticity. A recent New York Times headline noted this trend: “Online and on the Stump, Democrats Embrace a Four-Letter Word.” How myopic and unvirtuous. What about appealing to what Abraham Lincoln called “the better angels of our nature?” Being glib or profane—whether in private or on the campaign trail—speaks to one’s character. In an age when clicks and likes are treated as political currency, it is tempting to seek the popular rather than the greater good. Profanity can be funny, even cathartic, but it does little to advance civic virtue.
Candidates of all party affiliations would benefit from revisiting Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s landmark 1963 study The Civic Culture. The authors remind us that a democracy survives not only through the strength of its institutions but through the habits, expectations, and values of its citizens. Our political culture is not created in a vacuum. We the people shape it, as do our leaders. We determine what we discuss, how we sound, and which virtues we elevate or ignore.
Across age, race, and party affiliation, Americans consistently express a desire to be respectful, strong, free, and courageous. Candidates who speak to the better angels of our nature—who appeal to civic virtue rather than to cynicism or spectacle—may find themselves inspiring something larger than a single election cycle. They may help renew our political culture for years to come.
And in doing so, they will remind us why we treasure our Bill of Rights, why we cherish liberty, and why the American experiment continues to serve as a beacon of hope for people around the world.
Robert M. Eisinger is a political scientist. He is the author of several works, including The Evolution of Presidential Polling.
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On a scorching hot afternoon in Havana, the line outside the state bakery stretches down the block. Inside, the shelves are almost bare. A man in a faded baseball cap tells me he’s been waiting for two hours for bread that might not arrive.
Across the street, a gleaming black SUV with tinted windows idles outside a hotel mostly reserved for foreigners. Its lobby is stocked with imported whiskey; the air-conditioning is turned up to Arctic levels.
This is not an unusual juxtaposition in today’s Cuba.
I walk through Central Havana with Antonio Rodríguez, a 60-year-old university history teacher who supplements his income by working as a tour guide. His state salary amounts to around 9,000 Cuban pesos a month—worth little in an economy increasingly geared toward dollars.
“I work two jobs and eat one meal a day,” Antonio tells me matter-of-factly. We pass shuttered shops and darkened apartment blocks (this is during one of the regular blackouts) before turning onto San Rafael Boulevard. “There are a lot of prostitutes here,” he says, gesturing down the street. The lights are out in parts of Havana, but here the informal economy is still very much open.
In the past, apologists for the Cuban government, wanting to show that the people have enough to live on, would point to the monthly ration book—the libreta—through which Cubans received a basic food basket. But since Raúl Castro succeeded Fidel in 2008, the ration book has been steadily pared back. Today it supplies, on average, enough to subsist on for perhaps 10 days at most, and only with careful rationing. Everyday items such as toothpaste and shampoo have disappeared from it altogether.
In their place is the unforgiving market: a tube of toothpaste can now cost as much as 600 pesos, around 15 percent of a typical monthly salary. That is the equivalent of spending something like $800 on a single tube.
A few days earlier, I walked through Havana with a friend, who stopped me whenever we passed the window of one of the big department stores, pointing incredulously at the goods on display. He works as a bartender, and on a good night he earns around 200 Cuban pesos—less than fifty cents at the informal exchange rate. If he wants to buy something as basic as a pound of rice, it will cost him between 250 and 350 pesos: the better part of a day and a half’s wages.
When I first visited Cuba in the 2010s, one dollar would get you around 24 Cuban pesos. This year, the informal exchange rate has climbed to as high as 545. There’s no guarantee you will have access to your money. Many ATMs in Havana don’t work, and those that do often run out of cash extremely quickly. The goods, meanwhile, are there, behind glass. But most people can’t access them.
For decades, Cuba has presented itself—both to its citizens and to the world—as a socialist alternative to the inequalities of global capitalism. That story still has its defenders abroad. But spend any time on the island today and it becomes clear that something else has taken its place: not socialism in any meaningful sense, but a post-ideological system run by a military-commercial elite that continues to speak the language of revolution long after the revolution itself has faded.
Socialism has already fallen in Havana, even if some of the country’s intransigent foreign admirers remain staunchly ignorant of the fact. That the implacable state continues to wave a red flag is neither here nor there.
The scale of the island’s economic deterioration helps explain why the old ideological framing feels so hollow. Cuba’s GDP has contracted by an estimated 23 percent since 2019—a collapse that has filtered down into daily life in the form of shortages, blackouts, and a steady exodus of working-age people. Antonio’s two jobs—one in the official economy, one tied to tourism—are increasingly the norm.
The most powerful economic actor in Cuba today is not a workers’ cooperative or a state ministry accountable to the public. It’s a sprawling military-linked conglomerate known as Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA). Through a web of subsidiaries, GAESA controls much of the island’s tourism sector as well as significant parts of retail, real estate, and hard-currency trade. If you stay in a hotel, rent a car, or buy imported goods in Cuba, there is a good chance your money is flowing, directly or indirectly, into its accounts.
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What makes GAESA unusual—even by the standards of opaque state capitalism—is not just its size but the degree to which it appears insulated from the state itself. It operates largely outside the formal budget, pays no meaningful taxes, and—based on leaked financial data—does not transfer dividends into public coffers. Its revenues are estimated to exceed those of the Cuban state by a factor of more than three. Yet there is little sign that these resources are being channeled into the country’s collapsing infrastructure or depleted public services.
More striking still is how those revenues are generated and where they end up. Between 2024 and 2025, according to analysis by the Real Instituto Elcano, roughly 60 percent of the oil shipped from Venezuela to Cuba did not stay on the island at all. Instead, it was re-exported to Asian markets by Cuba Metales, a GAESA-linked entity. The proceeds, rather than being channeled into Cuba’s failing electricity grid or its crumbling infrastructure, reportedly accumulated in offshore accounts linked to the same military-commercial network.
Why maintain such a system? Fidel Castro himself conceded in 2010 that Cuba’s economic model was not working. Yet meaningful reform has remained elusive. One explanation is that the institutions that now dominate the economy are controlled by a narrow elite with a direct stake in preserving them. To loosen their grip would not simply require an economic adjustment but a loss of elite privilege.
Cuba today endures rolling blackouts, fuel shortages, and a transport system that barely functions. The recent decision by the Trump administration to restrict oil shipments to the island has intensified the crisis, bringing parts of daily life to a halt and disrupting even the distribution of humanitarian aid. The UN Resident Coordinator in Cuba, Francisco Pichón, has warned that 170 containers of essential supplies already in the country are not reaching people because of the fuel shortage.
Walking with Antonio through darkened streets, it is hard to reconcile the official narrative about scarcity with a system that appears, at least in part, to be synonymous with it.
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The same logic is visible in the state’s spending priorities. Healthcare—long touted as one of the revolution’s defining achievements—now receives a strikingly small share of public investment. At the same time, more than 30 percent of spending has been directed toward tourism infrastructure even as visitors increasingly stay away. The result is an island dotted with new or half-empty hotels while hospitals lack basic supplies and patients are often forced to rely on family members to source medicines.
What you see, in effect, is a bifurcated economy. On one side, the dollarized enclaves—hotels, resorts, and well-stocked shops—cater to tourists and a narrow slice of Cubans with access to foreign currency. On the other, the peso economy continues its long decline, marked by scarcity, inflation, and a steady erosion of living standards.
Talk to ordinary Cubans and what emerges is less a sense of embattled revolutionary purpose than of exhaustion. Many are trying to leave; those who remain navigate a landscape of shortages and informal workarounds. The language of socialism still appears on billboards and in official speeches, but it feels entirely detached from the reality it purports to describe.
Recently, a series of humanitarian missions and “solidarity” flotillas by Western leftists arrived in Cuba to deliver aid. Some of their participants, ensconced in generator-powered hotels, blame the island’s economic crisis entirely on American imperialism. This is possible only if you ignore the many ways in which Cubans are not just impoverished but oppressed by their own state.
Speak to people in Havana—away from official minders—and a more complicated picture emerges. One 33-year-old resident told me, only half-jokingly, that if Donald Trump sent in the American army “everybody would be out in the streets” (he quickly conceded that Trump is “loco”). Others are more wary of foreign intervention, and probably with good reason. But the fact that such sentiments are expressed at all is revealing. The level of frustration is such that some are willing to entertain almost anything that brings about the possibility of change. As the Cuban dissident writer Guillermo Cabrera Infante once joked about the prospect of a McDonald’s in Havana, plastic food is better than no food at all.
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What struck me most about Cuba was not a single viewpoint but the range of them. People often begin by insisting they are “not political,” only to speak at length once they feel it is safe to do so. These conversations tend to start in hushed tones and grow more candid in private. The official narrative remains loud; dissent, by contrast, is uttered sotto voce.
American hostility has, over time, furnished the Cuban state with a ready-made alibi—an explanation for failure that is not entirely false, but which is far from complete. Many Cubans, even with limited access to information, grasp this dual reality. They will tell you how things really are if given the chance. It is striking, then, how often Westerners with far greater freedom to read, speak, and organize choose not to listen.
It is tempting, particularly for observers outside Cuba, to interpret the island through the lens of the Cold War: socialism versus capitalism, resistance versus imperialism. But that framing obscures more than it reveals. The system that exists in Cuba today is not meaningfully egalitarian, nor is it moving toward greater democratic control over economic life.
In that sense, the Cuban Revolution has long since ended. What remains is a self-serving military elite that invokes the revolutionary tradition while clinging steadfastly to its own privileges. “Socialism or death” was once the official slogan. Today, it has curdled into something closer to “privilege or hunger.”
James Bloodworth is a journalist and the author of Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain and Lost Boys: Undercover in the Manosphere. He writes the Substack “For the Desk Drawer.”
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(Photo by Paolo Martinez Photography via Getty Images.)Like it or not, generative AI is becoming increasingly embedded in the process of seeking information, sharing ideas, and producing images. Want to know where to find pizza near you? Consult Gemini. Agonizing over the closing line of an email? Claude has 14 suggestions that strike just the right tone. Need a photorealistic image of a malnourished child building a boat out of popsicle sticks? ChatGPT thought you’d never ask—but will gladly oblige!
With tools this multipurpose, it’s no surprise our workplaces expect us to at least put up a convincing facade that we’re embracing them and making massive productivity gains. Or that our social media feeds are flooded with low-quality AI content generated by people desperate for clicks and views.
But I’m not sold on the narrative that generative AI marks the democratization of communication, a new creative renaissance, or even a particularly good thing for productivity properly defined. As Neil Postman put it almost thirty years ago: “The question, ‘What will a new technology do?’ is no more important than the question, ‘What will a new technology undo?’” And given that AI is frequently pitched as a replacement for any human speech mediated through a screen, it stands to undo quite a lot. What’s at stake is nothing less than authenticity itself.
Authentic expression helps us understand truth. Not objective, capital-“T” truth, but subjective truth—the kind that reflects a person’s interiority. Generated by systems lacking consciousness or lived experience, AI content, by definition, cannot be authentic.
Why should we care? Because authenticity is foundational to trust, the thread that ties human relationships together and allows us to work toward shared goals. Without the assumption of authenticity in communication, the small amount of trust that remains in our institutions is at risk of unraveling further, making everyday experience more clinical, cynical, and fake.
Let’s say you work a 9 to 5 job. After successfully guiding a project to completion, your team receives a congratulatory email from your supervisor. If it weren’t for the stilted tone and excessive use of the word “delve” (a common AI tell), you’d still clock the message as AI-generated by the sloppy cut-and-paste job, which leaves a slime trail of font style inconsistencies.
But regardless of the content, knowing that your supervisor did not engage in the deliberative process of writing makes the message ring hollow: No matter how well-intentioned the messenger, it is not ultimately their message. It’s the seed of a thought filtered through an algorithm developed by a tech company. And you wouldn’t be wrong to feel demoralized about that.
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More concerning, however, is the race to the bottom this could create. You might become suspicious of your coworkers, assuming they’re also outsourcing their expression to the bot. Maybe you’ll even decide to use AI for your own communicative tasks. After all, if no one else can be bothered to speak from the heart, you might as well save 10 minutes on emails and squeeze in one more YouTube video between projects. Before you know it, one message at a time, your workplace becomes less connected, less trusting, and less humane.
“If it seems to us that other people are playing fair and doing their share, we do, too. If not, not,” wrote social scientist Robert Putnam in Bowling Alone. Trust does not simply materialize out of thin air, he argued. It requires trustworthiness. Building on Putnam’s point, we might say that in a high-trust space, a well-adjusted person would presume authenticity unless given good reason not to. Unfortunately, knowing AI use is widespread, rarely disclosed, and often occurs without regard to context, it’s much harder to assume authenticity in online communication.
Creative fields shed light on what creeping inauthenticity looks like in the real world. In a testimonial for journalist Brian Merchant’s newsletter “Blood in the Machine,” costume construction artist Rachel E. Pollock shares how AI amped up the surreality of her job, leaving her to contend with wildly unrealistic projects. “Someone will share the AI generated costume ‘designs’ and they will be literally impossible to construct for an actual human with materials available in the actual world,” she said, giving the example of “gravity-defying materials on pornographically cartoon bodies.”
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An anonymous copy writer, meanwhile, described what it feels like to be on the other side of the equation, pressured to use AI for processes that once felt gratifying. “Writing like this doesn’t feel like it used to,” they said. “I don’t do the hard work that makes me feel alive afterwards. It’s different, more clinical, and much less rewarding.”
Of course, inauthenticity existed long before generative AI came on the scene. Spaces from offices to church groups have always been susceptible to social posturing that hinders the formation of deep relationships, and technological changes have arguably amped up the incentives for inauthenticity. AI may simply be the logical conclusion of this trend. In an episode of the podcast “Your Undivided Attention,” political scientist Sonja Amadae discusses the idea of “gamification,” arguing that the embrace of AI-generated content is a predictable outcome in a society that uses language tactically instead of expressively. When people use words not to convey their authentic thoughts and feelings, but as “tokens” for achieving strategic ends, it makes sense that they will gravitate towards outsourcing communication entirely to a bot.
I recently finished watching “Mad Men.” The show is set in the 1960s, before communication was regularly mediated through computers, but its main character, Don Draper, is the perfect example of how corrosive inauthenticity is to the soul.
Through his role at an ad agency, Draper attempts to escape his troubled past by spinning impressive campaigns from threads of truth from his own life. Throughout the show, however, he is haunted by his failure to integrate the various aspects of his identity. Using his pain as raw material for his work is not constructive when that pain is decontextualized, sanitized, and generalized through the language of advertising. Not only does failing to resolve this tension make him a restless, unsettled person, but it also impacts the way he sees other people: not as fully realized human beings but as static symbols of sexuality, domesticity, or authority. This is often exposed in his romantic relationships, which tend to fall apart right around the time the other party starts showing signs of human complexity.
To be sure, there’s a place for less-than-complete authenticity, for strategy in communication, for self-editing or tailoring a message to an audience to accomplish practical rather than expressive ends. The line between artistry and artifice has always been a blurry one, and most interactions contain an inseparable mixture of both.
However, just because authenticity is difficult to quantify, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t value it at all. The more our tactical objectives come at the expense of lowercase-“t” truth, the more disconnected we become from ourselves and the world around us.
Continuity between thoughts and words, words and actions, matters immensely, because language not only describes reality: It creates it. Whether you can get behind that claim because you appreciate humanity’s constructive capacities or because “in the beginning there was the word,” we all have reason to recognize the miraculous power of language—that essential human technology that allows us to reveal a bit of our inner world to others and get a glimpse of theirs in return.
Maybe those marveling at AI’s ascendant role in communication are missing the forest for the trees, praising algorithms capable of turning expression into content and ignoring the expression itself that makes such reduction possible. After all, human expression is worth marveling at. The seed of a thought, once planted, flowers into an idea, which feeds a conversation, which nourishes an action, until possibilities once inconceivable are playing out in the world, cultivating fertile ground for further discovery.
Forgetting this process means forgetting who we are.
Talia Barnes is a visual artist and communications professional interested in media, culture, and the creative process. You can find more of her work on Substack at Art Life Balance.
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Alvin E. Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012. His latest book is Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Al Roth discuss the impact of moral disgust on solving economic problems, whether we should allow financial payments for organ donation, and what the rise of OnlyFans tells us about changing attitudes towards the self and economic transactions.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Economists have a lot of influence on our lives, but a lot of the time that influence is less direct. As we’re recording this, there was a decision by the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates constant—and that’s going to influence the lives of people listening to this podcast in all kinds of complicated ways. But you have had influence on the world in a much more direct way. If some of the people listening to this are doctors in the United States, where they went to residency was probably decided by a procedure that you helped to put in place. If you have children who go to public school, there’s a good chance that which public school your children ended up in was decided by a mechanism that you helped to put in place. Tell us about the class of problems that you started to tackle in your academic work, and that then had this huge influence on the world—how to allocate scarce goods to people under particular kinds of circumstances.
Al Roth: Economists study marketplaces, broadly defined, and game theory gave us a way to study the rules by which marketplaces are organized. That opened up the possibility that economists could start studying the design of markets—and I’m using the word “design” there as a noun. Markets have designs, and you can study them. After I’d studied some market designs, I started to get asked to help design and redesign some markets. Now “design” is a verb. That’s part of a pretty new movement in economics called market design.
Of course, market design itself is an ancient human activity. People have been creating markets of various sorts, with or without money, for a long time. Stone tools distributed in the archaeological record, far from where they were quarried, tell us that our prehistoric ancestors knew something about trade. They knew something about markets. They could move goods far across the world. Markets are a little bit like languages—they’re tools that human beings build to cooperate and coordinate and communicate and compete with each other. Often we treat markets as if we just received them, but of course markets are built, and they can be fixed when they’re broken.
Mounk: Tell us about some of these examples. How should we think about what good or bad design looks like? Even when we’re not thinking about designing markets, you’re saying that laws, rules, cultural expectations and habits effectively design a market. But when you’re going about trying to design them in a more conscious, more explicit way, what kind of criteria should we apply? How should we assess whether they are doing a good job or a bad job?
Roth: Sometimes markets are broken in a very obvious way. That is, the people trying to transact with each other are having trouble making connections. That’s often where market designers get called in.
Mounk: Give me an example of that.
Roth: A lot of labor markets—like the market for new doctors—once had all sorts of problems with the timing of offers. People would get offers that they had to answer very quickly, exploding offers, before they knew what other opportunities they had. That market, in the first half of the last century, had unraveled to the point where doctors were getting offers of their post-graduation jobs very early in their education—too early for them to really know what kind of jobs they wanted, and too early for the institutions hiring them to be able to tell who was going to be a good doctor and who was not. That was a problem that the medical establishment tried to solve in various ways.
Today, there’s a centralized clearinghouse for how new doctors get their first jobs. I was involved in redesigning that when it ran into some problems. Sometimes there are operational difficulties in a market that make it clear it needs some help and redesign. Also—and this is part of the subject of my current book—markets need social support to work well. When you design a marketplace to operate in some big economic environment, people have other options. They could make their transactions outside the marketplace. So you have to attract people to participate and come to the marketplace. That starts to involve questions of equity and transparency—making the market work well so that people want to support it and participate in it.
Mounk: This speaks to a broader confusion about the relationship between economics and ethics, economics and morality. Since its inception, economics has sometimes been known as the dismal science—the science that is amoral, perhaps even immoral. There was a time in which economists claimed that the principles they followed were in some sense free of moral choices. I don’t think that is how most sophisticated economists think about these questions today. But your disciplinary hat is that of an economist, not that of a political theorist or a moral philosopher. To what extent are you making normative choices? Where do those normative choices come in? How explicit are they?
Perhaps you can tell us about a concrete system you were involved in designing or advising on, in which there was a moral fork in the road—where you had to explicitly choose one kind of market design that would serve one set of moral goods, or another kind that might serve a different set of moral goods, and it wasn’t obvious which was preferable on purely economic grounds.
Roth: One way to answer that is to say that this book on moral economics that’s just about to come out is my second book aimed at a general audience. The first one was called Who Gets What and Why?—a somewhat cheerful book about designing marketplaces where the questions were relatively straightforward, where they were technical, where it was about helping people make transactions that they wanted to make. This book is about markets that are also broken, but that are harder to fix because we can’t agree on what we want. These are morally contested markets where people have very different visions of how the market should work.
One thread that connects them is my work on kidney transplantation. Right now there are about 130,000 cases of kidney failure a year in the United States, but we only do fewer than 30,000 transplants a year. Transplantation is the treatment of choice for kidney failure. So most people who could benefit from a transplant—whose lives could be saved and whose healthy lives could be made much longer—are going to die without getting one. One of the questions was how to help people get more transplants.
A topic I talk about a lot in the current book, Moral Economics, is the widespread feeling around the world—codified in many laws—that it is illegal to pay a living donor to donate a kidney. Kidneys are a little bit special because healthy people have two and can remain healthy with one. So it’s possible, if you love someone who has kidney failure, that you might be able to save their life by donating a kidney to them. That happens about 7,000 times a year in the United States. But if someone wanted to pay you for a kidney, the two of you would be involved in a felony. It’s against the law to be paid for a kidney, although you’re allowed to give one.
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What I’ve done with my economist colleagues—and how we’ve helped our surgical colleagues—is make more efficient the idea of kidney exchange. Perhaps you want to give a kidney to someone you love and you’re healthy enough to do so, but you can’t give it to the person you love because kidneys have to be well matched and yours is incompatible with your intended recipient. Perhaps I’m in the same situation. It used to be that the two of us, as potential donors, would be sent home—sorry, but no thank you—and that would deprive our loved ones of living donor transplants. But now it might be that I can give a kidney to your patient and you can give a kidney to my patient. That’s a way in which each patient can get a compatible kidney from another patient’s intended donor. That’s called kidney exchange, and it has blossomed in many ways. A lot of transplants are now done that way that couldn’t be done before. An essential part of this, when you’re talking about morally contested markets, is that the donors are not paid. That avoids the repugnance that much of the world feels towards the idea of paying for kidneys.
Mounk: This is obviously an amazing win-win solution. It means that a lot more kidney transplants are facilitated every year through this process. By and large, people who have moral objections about the buying and selling of kidneys are perfectly fine with it because it still operates as part of a kind of gift economy—people saying they want to donate a kidney without a financial reward. There’s just a more complicated chain of transactions, which means that a donor can thereby assure that their loved one survives even if they are not directly giving them the kidney.
What about the underlying question? Should we in fact allow the buying and selling of kidneys? This mechanism that you were involved with is saving thousands of lives in the United States every year—a fantastic thing. I don’t often have a distinguished podcast guest of whom I can say with some confidence that they helped save thousands of lives in the United States and around the world every year. But as you’re saying, a lot of people still die from kidney disease without having received a transplant. Many of these people would be able to pay for a kidney. Perhaps if we collectively decided that buying and selling kidneys should be allowed, and health insurance covered that, even people without significant means who now die would be able to survive. How should we think about that moral question?
Roth: That’s a question I have a chapter devoted to in my current book, because although we’ve had some good achievements in increasing the number of kidney transplants, these are victories in a war that we’re losing. There are more people who need kidney transplants today, and the gap between how many transplants we can produce and how many people need them is growing.
A natural thing to think about is whether we can increase the supply of kidneys so that there won’t be almost 100,000 people on the waiting list for a deceased donor kidney, as there are today. When economists see a long queue of people waiting for a scarce resource, they wonder if prices could increase the supply so it wouldn’t be so scarce anymore. Kidney exchange increased the supply, but not enough to solve the problem. We still have this terrible shortage.
One of the things that people worry about is that we might not want, or be able to get support for, a market in which only rich people could get transplants by buying kidneys from poor people. A lot of the designs that have been proposed get around that by, for instance, proposing that only the federal government could pay for kidneys, and that we’d continue to allocate kidneys based on need—the way we now allocate deceased donor kidneys, not that that’s a perfect process either.
There is legislation being proposed in Congress that would allow at least a small experiment in that direction. The particular legislation currently seeking a hearing is called the End Kidney Deaths Act. It proposes simply to give a tax credit, over a period of time, to non-directed donors—people who donate a kidney anonymously to someone they don’t know, rather than having a particular patient in mind. Those donors help facilitate a lot of kidney exchange transplants because, as you alluded to, they allow long chains of transplants to be effectuated. There are about 500 such donors a year in the United States at the moment.
Mounk: To be clear, the much more common case is that a parent, child, or spouse needs a kidney, and a loved one happens to be a match—or, as part of a kidney exchange, is willing to give somebody else a kidney if it causally results in their loved one receiving one. The rarer case is that of a healthy person with two functioning kidneys who decides to save the life of a stranger by going to the hospital and having one removed. That is obviously a very altruistic act, and the number of people willing to do that is about 500 a year.
Roth: There is a proposal to experiment with whether that number might be increased if we were more generous to those donors through the tax system—a more grateful nation, so to speak. It’s an incremental proposal. On the other hand, if it substantially increased the number of non-directed donors, it would not only increase transplants, but would serve as an indicator that we might start to think more generally about being more generous to donors than we are now.
Mounk: Should we do that? I think this kind of proposal is interesting, but it’s quite limited. The broader question remains very urgent. Even if this proposal means that 700 rather than 500 people a year give a non-directed kidney, that doesn’t seem to actually grapple with the most fundamental problem—the tens of thousands of people who don’t get a kidney every year. Should we abolish any limit? Obviously it needs to be regulated, but should we in principle allow the buying and selling of kidneys?
Roth: If an experiment like the one proposed by the current legislation works well, then we’ll be able to garner support for broader programs of generosity to donors. As a practical matter, even small legislative steps like this have failed in the past. So I think it’s probably necessary, as a matter of practical public policy, to start small—with these very generous non-directed donors—to see if we can express our gratitude to them for all they do. Opponents of paying for kidneys worry that it will lead to the exploitation of poor people in ways that we would regret. But if that doesn’t happen, then I would certainly be in favor of pursuing a much broader program.
Mounk: Let me go through some of the obvious objections to this scheme. One you just mentioned is the exploitation of the poor. Presumably you could also imagine terrible cases of exploitation in a system where you can’t buy and sell kidneys. One of the things a free market often does is alleviate scarcity. At the moment we have an artificial scarcity in kidneys because it is impossible to pay people for them. Presumably, if we had a liquid market in kidneys, it would also be much less dangerous to donate one. One concern is: what if I donate a kidney and my remaining kidney later becomes diseased? In a world where buying and selling kidneys is allowed—and where, if you’re poor, the state steps in to ensure you can get access to a kidney—that danger would be much lower, because I could in that circumstance receive a kidney myself. You could also imagine cases of exploitation arising precisely because of the current scarcity. If you have a loved one who says they will die unless you donate your kidney, there can be enormous pressure exerted on people—in a life-or-death situation—over whom they might have some power or influence. That danger too would be mitigated if you had a liquid market in those organs.
Roth: The whole point of making kidney transplants more available is to make kidney disease less deadly and therefore reduce the danger of this life-or-death decision. Given that paying a donor for a kidney is illegal almost everywhere in the world—with the single exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran—there are black markets. Because it’s illegal to be paid for a kidney, these black markets often operate outside of the traditional medical establishment, with surgeries being done outside of hospitals. That means very low quality medicine and very serious dangers both to donors and recipients.
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One of the ways to fight black markets is with legal markets. One of the examples I use in Moral Economics is prohibition. When we had prohibition of selling alcohol in the United States, there were lots of black markets and organized crime grew up to mediate them. When we ended prohibition in the early 1930s, alcohol remained problematic—there’s still alcoholism and drunk driving—but you can no longer buy moonshine whiskey from gangsters. We eliminated the organized crime component that prohibition had produced.
If we want to fight black markets and make kidneys more available, those two goals go together. Many opponents mistakenly, I think, believe otherwise. They look at the black markets and say these markets are very bad because donors are being paid for their kidneys. But really they are very bad because they deliver very low quality medicine in very inequitable ways. If we could design an acceptable market in which we could pay donors for kidneys, kidney disease would be much less a cause of death and criminality.
Mounk: What about another objection that people might make, which comes downstream from a book that I think is fun, interesting, and insightful, but that has perhaps overly influenced people’s understanding of economics—Freakonomics? A Freakonomics-style argument that you could make about this, and I’ve heard moral philosophers make similar arguments, is that sometimes when you pay people for something, they stop giving it for free. If there are 500 people who think of themselves as moral actors and want to give a kidney to save somebody’s life out of altruism, giving them minor tax incentives—or perhaps even paying them a significant amount—might cause some of them to say: I’m not the kind of person who sells a part of my own body for money. That seems like a very different kind of moral act than donating a part of my body so that somebody else may live. How sure can we be that compensation would actually help alleviate this shortage?
Roth: That’s an empirical question. There is vast evidence from the world’s economies over centuries that while paying for things might stop people giving them away for free, that effect is more than compensated for by the fact that if you pay enough, people are willing to be paid providers. There’s a famous passage in Adam Smith that says it’s not through the generosity of the butcher and the baker that you get your food—that’s how they earn their living. They sell food. By and large, we are not short of food.
Blood plasma is a good example. I was an early adopter of COVID, and when I recovered I went to Stanford Blood Center, where you can donate blood plasma without being paid, because there was a demand for convalescent plasma. Once my antibody levels fell below a certain threshold, they let me go. I still give whole blood, because we do that for free in the United States and that’s how we get whole blood. But I no longer donate plasma, because there’s plenty of plasma in the United States—we pay plasma donors, and there’s no shortage. In fact, the United States exports about 70% of the world’s plasma, because it’s in short supply in the many countries that consider it immoral to pay plasma donors. Those countries can always buy plasma from the United States. So yes, I’ve been crowded out of the plasma market. It’s awkward and not particularly enjoyable to donate plasma, and I don’t need the $70. I also don’t want to take that option away from people who are supplementing their income by donating plasma, which is plentiful here.
Mounk: There is another kind of argument that a number of moral philosophers have made: that there is a way we should value our bodies and our organs, and that making them the kinds of things that can be bought and sold is to dishonor what our bodies are. It is simply valuing them in the wrong kind of way. My doctoral advisor made this argument, among others. How would you respond to that?
Roth: Millions of people are dying of kidney disease. I would want to at least weigh that idea against the cost of all these deaths. You would have to be very sure that this aesthetic judgment was more important than millions of deaths a year around the world. In most places, kidney disease is among the top ten causes of death, and it’s growing—as we beat back infectious disease as a cause of death, kidney disease becomes relatively more prominent. You have to be very sure that you find the idea of people selling their kidneys objectionable before you condemn so many people to death.
Mounk: To show my hand: I want to make sure I run through the devil’s advocate arguments in a fair way, and I think those are some of the main ones people make against these kinds of transactions. I agree that there is something queasy about the buying and selling of organs, and I absolutely understand why a lot of people—probably many listeners—have a deeper objection to it. But one of the fundamental things in politics is that you always have to think in trade-offs and understand what’s on the other side. In cases like this, the trade-off—not in some theoretical or distant way, but in a very immediate, everyday sense—is people needlessly dying. You need to be really sure that the moral arguments you make against a practice that could alleviate untold suffering are sufficiently weighty to justify persisting in that position.
To make a meta-ethical point, which I try to refrain from on this podcast: I think this is actually an instructive way of thinking about utilitarianism. In the broader debate in moral philosophy between consequentialist outlooks—which evaluate actions and rules by their consequences, of which utilitarianism is the most prominent, measuring policy in terms of whether it increases the balance of happiness over pain—and more deontological notions, which hold that certain things are in themselves wrong and that rights obtain irrespective of consequences, I am not a straightforward consequentialist. I don’t think it is obviously true that in every realm of our lives we should simply look at what increases the balance of happiness over pain. But I do think that when the consequences of a rule or an action are very obviously very bad—as they obviously are in the case of prohibiting the buying and selling of organs, leading to tens of thousands of people needlessly dying in the United States and many more around the world—you had better have really weighty arguments on the other side. Consequentialism is not necessarily the right philosophy in every context, but it makes a sensible default in policy situations when the consequences of a rule are as disastrous as I believe the consequences of not allowing the buying and selling of kidneys to be.
Roth: I agree. The market design question also requires us to be very careful to make sure that bad things don’t happen to paid donors. That is a matter of high importance in the design of any eventual market that might relieve the shortage of kidneys.
Mounk: That leads to my next question. Let’s imagine that Congress finally changes its mind and decides to allow the buying and selling of kidneys—and asks you to come in and help design this market. How would you go about doing that?
Roth: Any market you design would have to be constantly monitored, and if bad things were happening you would want to change the rules to try to avoid them. A good way to start would be to say: we’re not going to have a laissez-faire market for kidneys. Rather, we’re simply going to amend the law so that the federal government can pay for kidneys. The kidneys obtained in this way would be regarded as the same kind of national resource that we now regard deceased donor kidneys, and would be allocated according to need. Medicare would pay for the costs so that the rich and the poor alike would be able to get the suddenly more abundant kidneys.
Some of the payment to donors might involve coming back for annual checkups for the next ten years, because we would want to be really sure that donors are doing well, and if there’s something that can be fixed about the way we’re dealing with them, we should fix it. One of the problems now is that it’s a little bit hard to keep track of donors because they’re healthy—they’re off skiing somewhere. The goal would be to incentivize donors not just as an expression of gratitude for providing a kidney, but to make sure that they continue to allow their health to be monitored, so that donating a kidney becomes a very well-understood and desirable thing to do.
Mounk: Kidneys are a fascinating case that has allowed us to make concrete a lot of these broader questions. Let me ask a different one. What should we do about kidneys today, while they remain scarce? And setting kidneys aside, even if we solved that problem, there will still likely be a scarcity of livers, hearts, and other organs that might be transplanted. How should we think about the best algorithms and decision-making procedures for determining which patients get those organs and in which order? Obviously, we likely don’t want the richest person to get priority, or for allocation to be based on discriminatory criteria such as race. But how should we think, beyond those baseline assumptions, about designing systems to distribute these very scarce goods?
Roth: That gets squarely into the area of technical difficulties in allocating deceased donor organs, because you can’t do living donation of hearts. Livers are different—you can donate a lobe of a liver—but hearts will always involve deceased donation.
With deceased donation, you first have to decide when the donor is dead. That’s a little controversial because we have two criteria that in ancient times were the same: brain death and circulatory death. The reason those used to coincide is that once your heart stops beating, your brain very quickly dies. The special thing about transplantation is that death isn’t exactly binary. A donor can be dead while some of their organs are still viable enough to be transplanted—but you have to work very quickly, and an organ doesn’t stay viable for long outside the body. So organs have to be allocated quite quickly.
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There are many more people who need a heart transplant than there are hearts, and similarly for other organs. Some of the questions involve efficiency and how it relates to equity. Consider a waiting list for hearts that depends either on how long you’ve been waiting or on how sick you are—those are different ways to prioritize patients. In the United States, the idea is that a deceased donor organ should be offered first to the highest priority person on the list, then to the next highest, and so forth, with priorities depending on many things including location. But the problem is that it takes a little while for an offer to be considered and accepted or rejected. If it’s rejected, the heart has a little less chance of reaching someone who will accept it while it’s still transplantable.
Sometimes you have to reckon with the fact that a particular organ is hard to place. It’s a marginal organ—it will save somebody’s life, but many high-priority patients may choose to wait for a better one. Can you skip over people with higher priority and offer it to someone you think will accept it now? Some organs are offered too many times, rejected repeatedly, and then are no longer usable. Among the things we have to think about is how to balance efficiency and equity: how strictly must you follow a predetermined priority list, or can you expedite an organ through a different process? That is a matter of current debate.
Mounk: There is obviously a black market for organs, and it is significant. But transporting an organ requires a lot of attention—many people involved, a great deal of infrastructure. The prohibition on buying and selling organs has not been perfectly enforced, but it has had a very real effect in suppressing those transactions.
There are other areas where the state’s ability to suppress transactions is much more in doubt. Drugs and other illegal substances are probably the prime example. There must be many, many transactions every year involving the buying and selling of methamphetamine, cocaine, or heroin in the United States—many more than there are of people buying and selling organs. The harms from drug prohibition are straightforward and obvious: people going to jail, enormous resources spent on enforcement, users being criminalized and potentially unable to access help. But the dangers of completely opening up those markets—of potentially having very sophisticated corporations advertise and sell drugs in ways that could have hugely damaging consequences for individuals—are also very real.
From my philosophical perspective as a philosophical liberal, this case pushes harder against my usual framework than organs do. With organs, you can invoke the harm principle and argue that nobody is clearly harmed by allowing buying and selling, as long as certain side conditions are met—that people can’t be coerced, and that no one is so destitute that selling an organ is their only alternative to starvation. In the case of drugs, a strict harm principle reading might say: if an adult chooses to use heroin, the person being harmed is themselves—why should we intervene? But drug use can lead to significant rises in crime in neighborhoods and imposes real costs on society at large.
Yesterday, walking back from dinner with conference participants here in Boston, we came past a gentleman who was crying for help and appeared to be in the grip of addiction. We stayed and called 911. When the EMTs arrived, they recognized him immediately by his first name—he was clearly a frequent user of that service. I’m very glad he got help, and he seemed to be a decent person in a very desperate situation. But it is also obvious that that imposes costs on the broader community. You can try to argue that even on the harm principle, drug prohibition is justified. But it’s not clear to me how clean that argument is, because the primary harm is to the individual. This is a topic on which I am genuinely torn. How do we puzzle through it with more clarity?
Roth: One thing I say in the conclusion to my book is that when we think about the things we are morally obligated to do, they have to be things that we can actually do. Even if we feel morally obligated to prevent heroin use, we have to recognize that there is still a great deal of heroin, fentanyl, and crystal meth in circulation. Our prisons are full of drug offenders, and yet the drugs remain. One of the thought experiments I discuss in the book is why it is so easy to buy drugs and so hard to hire a hitman. I think it has to do with the social attitude towards drugs on the one hand, and towards killing for hire on the other.
Mounk: A more obvious explanation may be this: every time someone uses a drug, they may be breaking the law, but there is no immediate external victim—which is the point I was making about the harm principle—and the state has no immediate way of knowing it has happened. Every time a hitman kills somebody, they are harming another person, and it is likely that someone will notice the victim is missing and the state will begin an investigation. Part of why drug crime is so prevalent is that it is quite easy to get away with, at least at a low level or as a user. You can violate a drug law and the state has little way of knowing. It is quite difficult to violate the prohibition on murder without the perpetrator eventually going to jail.
Roth: That is largely true. But there have been years in which there were more than 100,000 opioid overdose deaths, which vastly exceeds the number of homicides from any cause in the United States—I believe fewer than 20,000. Drugs kill far more people than murder does. And yet murder for hire is so rare in the United States that it doesn’t even appear in the national crime statistics.
Mounk: If you think that you’ve successfully hired a hitman, 99 out of a 100 times, it’s an FBI agent who’s about to arrest you.
Roth: If someone told me they wanted to hire a hitman, I might call the police, and they would say, why don’t you go back to Professor Roth and tell him there’s a bar where he can find one—and that’s where I’d end up trying to hire an FBI agent. Whereas if someone called the police and said Professor Roth is thinking about trying heroin and wants advice on where to get it, the response would be: why are you calling us? We’re a busy police department.
Part of the conclusion I draw in the book is that not only do markets need social support to work well, but so do bans on markets. The ban on drugs doesn’t have enough social support to work well—we have a great deal of drugs even though they’re against the law. We are losing the war on drugs. But it also turns out it’s not so easy to accept our surrender. In places like Portland, where they’ve tried decriminalizing use, the result has been open-air drug use that is also very distressing and makes cities difficult to live in. That is a real cost to citizens, and Portland has walked that back.
Drugs are the market about which I have the least ability to make helpful suggestions, except that we should continue to experiment. In many places we allow clean needle exchange, and at least we’re not seeing as much HIV transmission alongside drug use as we used to. That seems to help a little. We may find that incarceration remains among the options available for dealing with addiction, but it will certainly have to be combined with more medical approaches to help people deal with it. We don’t know the answer yet, but that calls for more experimentation and more search for solutions, not less.
Mounk: What does success actually look like in this case? Laws against jaywalking, which I think are largely silly, presumably succeed if fewer pedestrians die in car accidents—that’s the actual ultimate goal. You wouldn’t say the goal of the prohibition on jaywalking is that nobody ever jaywalks. Perhaps the prohibition actually does lead to fewer pedestrian deaths, in which case it’s a sensible law. I suspect that it doesn’t, though I haven’t seen empirical studies on it, and if it doesn’t, I think we should abolish it.
When you think about the success of a prohibition on theft, part of that is allowing a thriving economy with economic exchange and sparing the costs of extremely elaborate safety procedures. Part of it is reducing the number of thefts, because it is upsetting to have something stolen from you. We can consider the law against theft in the United States broadly successful even though things are obviously stolen every day. We don’t need perfect compliance for a law to be successful.
When we think about the prohibition on heroin or methamphetamine, what is the criterion of success, and how are the laws doing relative to that criterion?
Roth: Jaywalking isn’t a bad example, because I believe that in New York City, jaywalking has been decriminalized. One reason it was decriminalized is that it gave too much discretion on enforcement and was enforced inequitably against people of lower socioeconomic status. Part of having laws is asking whether we support the way they are enforced.
To come back to drugs: part of the reason it’s hard to move forward is that we have deep disagreement about what our goals are. There are people who think it is simply wrong to allow sales of drugs like heroin or fentanyl for private use—though fentanyl, of course, is an essential drug in medicine. I’ve been given fentanyl during surgeries. It’s a quick-acting anesthetic.
Mounk: I was astonished when I had a wisdom tooth out—which turned out to involve relatively minor pain, perhaps I was lucky—and my dentist prescribed me an opioid without telling me it was one. When she handed me the prescription, I Googled it and asked whether it was an opioid. She said yes. I asked if I needed it, and she said I could just try some Advil instead. So I never filled the opioid prescription, partly out of caution. If I had been in terrible pain, I would have. But the ease with which opioids were being prescribed in those circumstances—and this was only a couple of years ago—is astonishing.
Roth: Consider alcohol. We ended prohibition because it turned the United States into a nation of lawbreakers—whenever you had a drink, you were aiding and abetting whoever sold it to you. Prohibition didn’t have a big effect on alcohol consumption, but it did have a big effect on creating organized crime. Ending prohibition didn’t solve the problem of alcohol, though. There are still alcoholics, organizations like Alcoholics Anonymous that try to help people with addiction, and people who drive drunk and kill others. The problems that caused people to support prohibition didn’t go away—prohibition just didn’t solve them.
That’s essentially where we are with drugs. The problem of addictive, lethal drugs is very large. It’s not even entirely clear, from the libertarian point of view, that people are choosing to take these addictive drugs freely—you may choose to take one initially and then find yourself enslaved by it. So there’s also a distinction worth drawing between what I call repugnance and what’s called paternalism. Sometimes we’re trying to protect people from mistakes that will harm themselves. We have many laws that do that, like prescription drug laws. Before you got that opioid prescription, it would have been more difficult to obtain opioids without one, but your dentist judged that you might need them, and on that advice you were legally allowed to buy them. We require prescriptions for a vast array of drugs because we believe you need expert advice before consuming them safely. Going forward on drug use, we may move in the direction of treating addicts more like patients than like criminals—but it’s not simple, because addiction is complicated and enslaving.
Nicotine is a useful drug to think about in this context, because tobacco causes a lot more deaths than opioids do, and even more than legal alcohol does—though some of those deaths are delayed. Cirrhosis of the liver is not quite as dramatic as someone collapsing on the sidewalk. Tobacco is legal, but heavily and increasingly regulated. Americans smoke much less than they used to. There were large advertising campaigns—you mentioned not wanting heroin advertised by some corporate equivalent, but Big Tobacco ran extensive ads. The Virginia Slims campaign told women “you’ve come a long way, baby,” and tried to convince more women to smoke. It was, I think, largely successful at the time, at least among those women who didn’t mind being referred to as “baby.”
Mounk: We tend to think in terms of fully open markets or fully prohibited markets, but there are many regulatory arrangements in between. One strange irony is that in many contexts now, smoking a cigarette is very poorly viewed—at the very least a breach of a taboo, and often against the rules. Meanwhile, in many places, smoking a joint has become far more morally acceptable. In Brooklyn, you probably see more people smoking joints on the street than smoking cigarettes, which is rather astonishing. There is very little open advertising of cigarettes because of extensive regulation, but in my neighborhood there are three or four shops very aggressively advertising marijuana.
Marijuana is an important case. It is the drug where the war on drugs clearly went too far and was most damaging, because it is less immediately dangerous and deadly than many other drugs, and yet many people went to prison for selling it—and sometimes for consuming it, though that was rarer. The case for overturning prohibition on marijuana was very strong.
At the same time, we are seeing some of the damaging mechanisms you might have feared. Marijuana is much stronger now than it was even twenty years ago—the nature of the drug has actually changed. There are some suggestive findings that heavy use is very bad for users and may be bad for those around them. One recent study suggests that if you are a significant user of marijuana in the months before a pregnancy—even as a man—the likelihood that your offspring has autism or another serious developmental challenge is significantly increased. The mechanism by which organized commercial interests are now spreading this product, marketing it, perfecting it, and making it more powerful—in ways that also make it more addictive and more dangerous—is fully in motion. We are in the middle of an experiment whose results aren’t yet clear. How do you feel about how marijuana legalization has gone? What are the positive elements, and where are you concerned?
Roth: Marijuana is becoming more like tobacco—legal, with companies perhaps perfecting its addictive qualities, as tobacco companies apparently did quite consciously. They understood the addictive properties of nicotine. But the laws against consuming marijuana were not effective. If the point of those laws was to make marijuana unavailable, they failed. They also had the consequence of sending people to jail, forcing them to deal with criminals, and turning them into criminals themselves—producing widespread law breaking. Recent surveys suggest that the number of Americans who use marijuana every day now exceeds the number who have a drink of an alcoholic beverage every day. What you’re observing in New York is easy to verify with your nose when you’re near a cannabis user.
Cannabis is now much more potent. There was an organization called the California Growers Association—and California has many organizations with similar names, though normally they have a vegetable in the title, like the California Artichoke Growers Association. The California Growers Association was ambivalent about legalizing marijuana. People who grew marijuana illegally talked about how many plants they had—hundreds or thousands of plants. But farmers talk about yield per acre. The artisanal growers who were hiding their crops in national forests to avoid raids by the Drug Enforcement Agency have been largely put out of business.
We haven’t reached equilibrium yet. It’s not a crime to smoke marijuana or consume edibles, but we don’t yet know how cannabis will compare to alcohol, tobacco, sugar, or other things we consume. It remains to be seen. We shouldn’t regret that marijuana is now more available, because it was also available when it was a crime. The question is how to manage it—and leaving the management of these difficult questions in the hands of criminals is not the best way to do so.
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Democratic debate on artificial intelligence is increasingly taking place not in Washington but in village council chambers. Here, small communities who never imagined their voices were relevant to the dialogue on AI are demanding answers to why local governments are signing away land and energy infrastructure to hyperscale data centers.
In packed council meetings like those in Perry Village and other small towns across Ohio, the dividing line hasn’t been party affiliation, but instead who profits and who pays. While these debates focus on the benefits and pitfalls of Big Tech, they tell us even more about how—and if—local democracy still functions.
Hyperscale data centers are the physical infrastructure of today’s AI. These are data centers that occupy over ten thousand square feet and house 5,000 or more servers. As of writing, 613 of the 4,000 data centers in the United States are hyperscale, with a combined 18,289 megawatts of capacity. But “hyperscale” is rapidly scaling up: an additional 916 hyperscale data centers currently planned and under construction will raise total capacity by more than an order of magnitude to 300,000 megawatts of capacity.
In the process of generating the computing power (known as “compute”) essential to AI leadership, these hyperscale data centers consume staggering energy and water resources with profound impacts on communities. The new data centers may provide no benefits to the citizens in these communities, yet in town after town, deals are being quietly struck between Big Tech, developers, and local officials before residents hear about them.Perry Village is an egregious case. In July 2024, Mayor James Gessic and the Village Council entered a purchase agreement with Province Group, a California-based developer, to buy 163 acres of village-owned land at $8.4 million. The scale of the data center has since expanded to 230 acres, one-sixth the size of Perry Village itself. The data center, which borders local homes, farms, and the school baseball field, would include six buildings of about 250,000 square feet each and consume 200,000 gallons of water daily.
Few of the village’s 1,600 residents heard even a whisper of the plan in the year after the deal was signed. Mayor Gessic and key council members had signed NDAs with Province Group before negotiations began. Binding elected officials to silence through NDAs has become a standard feature of data center development across Ohio, and their proliferation points to a deliberate strategy. It wasn’t until June 12 of last year, when the Council voted to approve the new zoning ordinances for the data center, that the village began to talk.
What followed is a demonstration of the local democratic process reasserting itself. Within two weeks of the council’s June 12 vote, residents gathered enough signatures to force a referendum, and the council rescinded the ordinances so they could do further research. Then, at a quiet evening meeting in September, the Council reinstated the ordinances, a move that sparked outrage not just among Perry residents but among county officials and community leaders from surrounding towns.
Morris Beverage III, a Republican commissioner for Lake County, was among those shocked by the move: “They scheduled a special meeting, presented it, then had a council meeting at 7PM to vote and approve it under emergency provisions so that it could not be referendumed. That’s actively trying to deceive your constituents.”
As the local movement to stop the data center gained steam, details of Perry Village’s finances and the data center contract shed light on why the Council may have felt pressure to push forward approvals. The Village’s finances were under stress, and the signed contract could bankrupt the Village if the deal didn’t go through.
“The contract they signed says they have to deliver a clean deed free of any referendum, or any deed restrictions with proper zoning in place for their intended purpose,” says Commissioner Beverage. “Either a data center was being built or they were going to financially ruin the village.”
Carl Setzer, a Democratic congressional candidate for the 14th District, where Perry Village is located, has made the data center debate a core pillar of his campaign, attending protests and council meetings while regularly sharing updates on his social channels.
“They want to slam these through, get a bunch of underprepared solicitors and village councils to agree to notorious terms, and get these things built ahead of the realization that these should be metered,” says Setzer. “They want to get as much free infrastructure into these communities as possible before governments realize there’s a tax structure being left on the table.”
An already troubling local story became something larger in January 2026, when Meta and Vistra announced a 20-year power purchase agreement covering three Ohio nuclear plants, including the Perry Nuclear Plant visible from the backyards of the Perry residents mobilizing against the data center.
Meta’s power purchase agreement for the Perry Nuclear Plant poured fuel on an already charged debate, and in January, citizens began organizing and seeking legal support to ensure they had a voice in the process.
Erin Derzon, an army veteran and owner of a nearby farm, helped form ConserveOhio, which is gathering signatures for a state-wide ban on new data centers that consume more than 25 megawatts.
“With this deal, Meta gets to take the power from that nuclear facility, and then our nuclear facility is no longer generating public power,” says Derzon. “Out here, if the wind blows wrong, the power’s out. We have rolling blackouts and brownouts year-round. Some people are without power for weeks on end.”
Derzon, who also works professionally in habitat restoration and wetland management, argues that the environmental costs extend well beyond the data center’s noise and heat: “They hyperfilter the groundwater and add PFAS-PFOS lubricant so the water can move through the small server coils. They don’t have to filter it back out. By default, my beef and maple syrup will be contaminated with PFAS, and I will never be able to get an organic certification.” (While data center cooling, manufacturing, and fire suppression systems are known to contribute to PFAS in water, Perry Technological Park states on its website that “The facility will not contribute to PFAS or other contaminants of concern.”)
John Nicely, a retired executive who moved back to Perry to care for his aging mother and now drives the town school bus, is concerned about more immediate dangers: “The community’s fire department is in the red. Its newest engine is 20 years old. There are no ladder trucks in Perry or the neighboring community of Madison. If fire breaks containment and becomes a structure fire, we have no way in this community to even comprehend how to battle it.”
Across Ohio, a similar pattern has played out with financially pressured local governments, well-resourced developers, NDAs, and contracts inked before residents discovered what had been signed in their names.
In Hilliard, a recent change to state law is allowing a proposal by Amazon Web Services for a fuel cell system to power a new hyperscale data center to bypass local zoning review entirely. In an October 2025 press release, the acting Hilliard mayor stated: “It’s regrettable that state lawmakers have overridden local oversight, particularly since this technology is unfamiliar and new not just to our City, but also the entire State.”
This development should concern anyone who cares about democratic governance. The response to community resistance, at corporate and often state legislative levels, has not been to improve transparency or democratic debate, but to eliminate it. Ohio legislators are reportedly advancing legislation that would bar counties, municipalities, and townships from passing laws that restrict data center development.
None of this makes sense to Setzer: “A data center is a manufacturing facility. It takes raw material—data—processes it, creates refined products, and sells them. If you’re making chicken tenders, you pay for the chickens going in and there’s a tax on what comes out. But with data centers, we’re not having that conversation. We’re leaving billions on the table.”
Setzer’s proposed response is to create a state-funded bipartisan legal defense fund that would send experienced lawyers to any village, township, or city that finds itself outgunned by a developer.
“It would cost Ohio two and a half million dollars a year and save billions in poorly negotiated tax abatements,” says Setzer.
It’s these kinds of practical, non-ideological proposals that too often get lost in the noise of our political conflicts, which is perhaps why unfettered and unmetered data centers are meeting such resistance across party lines.
“There’s only so much people can take,” says Derzon. “They will start voting people out because their government is not acting in their best interests.”
That is of course how democracy should work, if Ohio’s legislature will let it.
Perry Village is far from the first American community to discover that its land, water, and future were spoken for before anyone thought to ask. What is new is the industry, the scale, and the speed.
What is not new are the democratic principles residents of Perry are insisting upon with increasing force: transparency, fair compensation, and a democratic process that treats citizens as participants rather than obstacles.
Blake Stone-Banks is a writer and strategist who spent two decades working in technology, data, and marketing in China. Now based in the New York City area, he writes on artificial intelligence, democratic governance, and the political economy of Big Tech.
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Will you be in London on Sunday, September 6? Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought to mark the publication of his memoir In the Realm of the Last Man at the Sekforde at 5pm. Find out more and book tickets here. (Paying subscribers can access a code for free tickets here.)
(Photo by Morten Falch Sortland via Getty Images.)Last weekend, I had the pleasure of giving an address in Aarhus, Denmark. Using “Getting to Denmark” as a shorthand for building a high-trust society, I took the opportunity to explore how Donald Trump is undermining trust at home and abroad—and why Americans should be inspired by Denmark’s example.
– Frank.
I’m happy to have been invited back to another Matchpoints conference here in Aarhus. I have very fond memories of the time I was a visiting professor here, and am glad to have the opportunity to catch up with some old friends.
As you may know, I was responsible for popularizing the idea of “Getting to Denmark.” This phrase was used originally by a friend of mine at the World Bank, who complained that many development programs funded by rich countries unrealistically sought to turn poor countries like Somalia or Afghanistan into effective states like Denmark overnight.
My admiration for Denmark is somewhat different from that of Senator Bernie Sanders. He likes Denmark’s social democracy. I instead marvel at the quality of government in this country, its efficiency and relative lack of corruption. We scarcely understand how the Denmark of the Vikings got to be modern Denmark, much less how to transform a contemporary underdeveloped country in a similar fashion.
I knew that I had to return to Denmark last February when my president, Donald Trump, began threatening your country and talked once again about taking over Greenland. World order cannot exist without a minimal degree of trust, and today the United States has become a giant source of distrust.
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There are two critical types of trust. The first is trust in formal institutions like the rule of law and the existing constitutional order. People must have a shared understanding of the law, and confidence that the state will enforce it. The second form of trust is what has been labeled “social capital,” that is, informal norms that allow people to work together. Both types of trust rest on a foundation of moral virtue. People come to trust government if the institutions that comprise it are stable and predictable, and they trust one another if they are individually honest, reliable, and keep commitments.
Trust builds over time: if citizens interact with one another, they will gravitate to working with those who show themselves to be honest and reliable. It is only through a process of repeated interaction that trust develops.
Both social capital and trust in formal institutions are necessary for the proper functioning of both a modern economy and a healthy democracy. Economic prosperity is built on the belief that the government will enforce property rights and fairly adjudicate business disputes. Social capital for its part acts like a lubricant for formal institutions and makes business transactions function smoothly. In politics, social capital is what allows citizens to work together in the groups and associations that we call civil society. A healthy democracy depends on a vigorous civil society: under such conditions, citizens are not isolated individuals but are able to act together in groups united by common passions and interests.
Not all societies are blessed with high levels of institutional trust, or generalized trust between citizens. Many decades ago, the social scientist Edward Banfield described a town in Southern Italy that he said was characterized by what he labeled “amoral familism.” In such a society, people trusted only members of their immediate nuclear family; strangers were regarded as potential threats and kept at arm’s length. As a result, Southern Italy was largely devoid of the sorts of voluntary associations that were plentiful in the north: football clubs, newspapers, self-help societies, labor unions, and other organizations that gave texture to civic life.
The two organizations that flourished in the south were the Catholic Church and the Mafia. The latter was the direct outcome of distrust: because of a weak rule of law and distrust of government, business partners could not rely on the state to enforce contracts or protect their property rights. They had to use mafiosi—otherwise known as “men of honor”—to threaten violence on their behalf. This type of private enforcement naturally leads to greater violence overall as protectors turn into extortionists. This pathology is evident not just in Southern Italy, but in many parts of Latin America and Asia.
By contrast, Denmark and the rest of Scandinavia are properly understood to be “high-trust” societies. That trust extends both horizontally between citizens, as well as vertically in citizens’ relationship to the state. Anyone living in this region knows that crime, corruption, fraud, betrayal, and dishonesty exist here as in any other society, but the aggregate level of these dysfunctions is much lower than in, let’s say, Southern Europe.
In my 1996 book Trust, I characterized the United States as a “high-trust” society as well. This was not an idiosyncratic judgment on my part; there has been a long history of outside observers noting that the United States experienced high levels of trust. The great French writer Alexis de Tocqueville, after traveling through the United States in the 1830s, noted that American democracy was supported by what he called a strong “art of association,” in which ordinary citizens had an easy time coming together in a wide range of clubs, neighborhood associations, religious organizations, and the like. This, he noted, stood in sharp contrast with his native France, where, he said, you couldn’t find ten Frenchmen who could come together spontaneously for a common purpose.
I would no longer characterize the United States as a “high-trust” society. Beginning in the 1990s, we have seen an increasing polarization of American society. This polarization was initially political, based on the differing policy preferences of Democrats and Republicans. Willingness to cooperate across party lines fell. The polarization deepened steadily, particularly in the 2010s, and evolved into what social scientists label “affective polarization,” meaning that partisans no longer simply disagreed on policy issues, but believed that their opponents were deeply malevolent and dishonest. With the rise of Donald Trump, we had a political leader who made no effort to unify the country or to be a president for all Americans; rather, he trafficked in distrust and demonized anyone who disagreed with him as “Marxists, maniacs, and lunatics.”
This loss of social trust has not occurred only in the United States, but has affected many other countries as well. It manifests itself in conspiracy theories: the belief that society is being manipulated behind the scenes by a shadowy elite, whose secret dealings need to be exposed.
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This kind of populism is driven by a number of social and technological factors. In many societies there has been a sorting between inhabitants of large, diverse urban areas, and those who live in the countryside. This mirrors a sharp division based on levels of education. Educated urbanites tend to vote for liberal parties, while populist movements usually rely on rural and small-town voters.
Technology has also contributed to this polarization. The spread of the internet and social media has changed the nature of social interaction. Citizens who used to rely on a small number of elite-controlled media channels can now get information from anywhere in the world. The kinds of filters that used to control the quality of information have been undermined, which has led to the appearance of parallel information universes in which there is no common understanding of empirical reality.
Trust is also critical in international relations. There is no such thing as an international rule of law, because there is no global sovereign to enforce rules. International law is more normative than legal in nature, articulating rules and behavior that states believe other states are likely to follow. This makes trust very important: global order depends on states making their future behavior predictable by following a host of informal norms. Since 1945, global stability has been based on deterrence. Early on, there was a realization that countries could defend themselves from nuclear weapons only with great difficulty. It was only the credible threat of nuclear retaliation that kept the peace. Deterrence extended further to conventional warfare as well, and was embodied in NATO’s Article 5 commitment that an attack on one member of the alliance would be regarded as an attack on all. One’s international competitors and enemies did not have to believe in your values, but they did have to believe that you would reliably use force in response to aggression.
Perhaps the most important international norm that has been in place since 1945 is the norm against using force to acquire the territory and resources of another sovereign state. This norm has been much more powerful than the norm against the use of military force per se, and it was followed by the United States up until recently, even as America fought numerous wars and launched multiple military interventions around the world. The United States justified its actions in defensive terms, or in terms of preventing adverse political change. The Korean War and the 1991 Gulf War were both fought explicitly to uphold the principle of no territorial conquest. The Vietnam War was fought to prevent the takeover of South Vietnam by the North; the invasion of Afghanistan was fought to eliminate the threat from al-Qaida, which had just attacked the Twin Towers in New York, while the 2003 Iraq War was launched to stop postulated Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In the end, many of these fears proved to be vastly exaggerated, but the problem was faulty judgment, and not the pursuit of self-interest.
This brings us to the events of earlier this year, and Donald Trump’s demand to take over Greenland. What was particularly shocking about this move was that it was not justified by any principle of self-defense or the defense of political values. Rather, it was a naked and self-interested grab for the territory and resources of a sovereign country that was a loyal treaty ally of the United States. This was in line with Donald Trump’s belief that the United States should have seized control of Iraq’s oil after liberating the country from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. This mindset predominated in the 19th century world of clashing imperial powers, but was banished following the tragic history of the early 20th century when territorial ambitions provoked two world wars.
Today, Donald Trump’s foreign policy has joined hands with his domestic policy. Since returning to office in January, the president has sought to rule the country by executive order, bypassing the many checks and balances established by the U.S. Constitution to limit his powers. He is, in other words, a would-be authoritarian. Similarly, he has ignored the legal and normative constraints on American international behavior. He has imposed tariffs, now determined by the Supreme Court to be illegal, on virtually every country in the world (whether they were inhabited by human beings or not).
President Trump has used force unilaterally on nine occasions, culminating in the joint attack with Israel on Iran on February 28. In doing so, he has bypassed the United Nations Security Council, as well as the U.S. Congress, which is given responsibility for authorizing wars under the Constitution. When Trump was asked by a journalist what would constrain him from acting unilaterally on the global stage in the future, he said “my own morality.” Given that his morality often seems to be akin to that of a Mafia boss, this is not very reassuring.
By his threats against Greenland, Donald Trump has destroyed all remaining trust in the North Atlantic relationship. Europeans have been rightly asking themselves whether the United States can ever be trusted again. And at this point, I would say that the answer is no.
There are several reasons for this. The most important is that the Republican Party has been changed beyond recognition. Before 2016, it was a party committed to free trade, limited government, openness to immigration, the strong defense of allies, and a democratic world order. Since the rise of Donald Trump, it has coalesced around an “America First” agenda that wants to close off the United States to the outside world. Trump has openly favored dictatorships like Putin’s Russia, Kim Jong Un’s North Korea, and Xi Jinping’s China over democratic countries in Europe and Asia. He has visibly eroded trust within the United States, attacking domestic opponents as enemies and traitors, and degraded the quality of discourse through vicious personal attacks on perceived enemies. I noted earlier that trust depends on the moral virtues of honesty and reliability, something that is foreign to a leader who lies shamelessly, virtually with every sentence he utters.
I think that Europeans would be foolish to believe that America can be trusted in the future to meet its treaty obligations to NATO. This is not a legal matter but a moral one: if the U.S. president is uninterested in supporting allies, then Article 5 is a dead letter whatever its legal status. Europe has no choice but to take full responsibility for its own security, and to reshape both NATO and the European Union to permit much stronger collective action. Europeans hoped in 2020 that the United States would return to its old self with the election of Joe Biden, and yet American voters managed to re-elect Donald Trump in 2024, despite the fact that he sought to overturn the earlier election.
I want, however, to end on a more optimistic note. Despite the damage to institutions that has occurred over the past decade, I believe that the checks and balances built into the American system continue to operate. The most important of these checks are elections. There is a great deal of evidence that Donald Trump will be strongly repudiated in the midterms this coming November, and that the Democrats may retake not just the House of Representatives, but the Senate as well. The recent Hungarian election showed that voters can make clear choices and reject authoritarian leaders like Viktor Orbán. I do not believe that the fears that many people had last year about a rising populist tide sweeping Europe will come to pass. Donald Trump has not proven to be the unifying glue that holds the European far right together. No party will want to bind itself closely to an aging, mentally deteriorating 80-year-old man who seems to be losing control of events both at home and abroad.
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International trust radiates outward from high levels of trust at home. This is where Denmark can play an important leadership role. The strength of Denmark’s domestic institutions is ultimately what guarantees its position in Europe as a bulwark of democracy and effective government that is a model for many other countries to follow. And I hope that “getting to Denmark” will be an inspiration for Americans as well as they seek to recover from the current assault on their institutions.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Thank you to everyone who joined our inaugural Intellectual Bootcamp the other week. The turnout and quality of discussion were fantastic!
The next Bootcamp will meet this Friday, May 15 at 12pm EST.
We will be discussing Gilles Deleuze’s article “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” Click here to read it.
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Russians have learned to live with a lot: a devastating war next door, sanctions, inflation, mobilization, repression, and the full disappearance of independent politics. But the recent wave of internet restrictions—mobile internet blackouts across major cities, disruptions to Telegram and WhatsApp, and pressure on VPNs—has touched a nerve that the Kremlin may have underestimated.
Since 2025, Russia has seen repeated mobile internet shutdowns, officially justified as protection against Ukrainian drone attacks. By spring 2026, the problem had reached Moscow: mobile internet outages disrupted banking, ATMs, coffeeshops, taxi apps, and even officially approved “white-list” websites.
The response has been unusually visible. In April 2026, approval of Putin’s performance dropped below 80 percent for the first time since the fall of 2022, declining by 8 percentage points since September 2025. Influencers who normally stay far from oppositional politics have started complaining publicly. Victoria Bonya, the television personality and Instagram celebrity, posted a viral appeal to Vladimir Putin criticizing internet shutdowns, economic stress, and the growing distance between the authorities and ordinary people. The episode quickly became a meme: people joked that Bonya had “saved Telegram” after reports that authorities might soften some restrictions. More seriously, even Putin seemed concerned enough to urge officials to explain internet restrictions better to citizens, and then advised lawmakers “not to get stuck” on prohibitions too much.
It is not that Russians have suddenly discovered censorship—they have lived with expanding digital restrictions for years. In March 2022, a Russian court banned Facebook and Instagram after designating Meta an “extremist” organization. YouTube has been slowed, foreign media have been blocked. Yet ordinary users adapted: VPNs have become part of everyday life. Illegal Instagram remains widely used by citizens, influencers, businesses, and even elites. CEPA cited a survey showing that 48 percent of Russian influencers kept earning money there after the ban. For ordinary Russians, this created a bargain: you may use the internet as long as it’s for personal purposes rather than political ones. What is different now is that the state is no longer only blocking “political” content, but breaking the infrastructure of everyday life.
Russia is not a digitally backward country. At the start of 2025, it had about 133 million internet users, internet penetration above 92 percent, and roughly 106 million social media user identities. Telegram alone reached 61 million daily users in Russia in 2024. Digital technologies are the foundation of everyday comfort for the majority of Russians. Russians are so accustomed to the convenience of digitalization that Russian migrants living in wealthy European capitals often complain that Europe feels digitally backward by comparison.
Reportedly, a three-week disruption in Moscow produced backlash not only among ordinary users but also among parts of the political and business elite. In Moscow alone, business losses during a five-day outage were estimated at 3–5 billion rubles. Nationally, internet shutdowns and throttling cost Russia close to $12 billion in economic output in 2025.
But Russia’s digital economy is also about millions of people making small amounts of money in semi-formal and informal ways. Hairdressers, tutors, nail technicians, and repair workers all depend on visibility and communication online. Avito, Russia’s dominant online marketplace for privately buying and selling goods and services, had a monthly audience exceeding 72 million users and 230 million active listings in 2024, and had even overtaken the U.S.-based global powerhouse Craigslist years earlier. When the internet is broken by the government, people lose clients and income.
Russians are not particularly happy about losing money in this economy. By the end of 2025, inflation, rising utility bills, and tax hikes were hitting many Russians hard. Alena Ledeneva’s work shows that informal networks have long been central to how people navigate scarcity, uncertainty, and just everyday life in times of crisis in Russia. Internet restrictions now interfere with the updated digital version of that survival economy.
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The internet is also where many Russians find coping mechanisms. Online life offers distraction, self-expression, and psychological escape. A huge virtual industry of coaches, fashion bloggers, psychologists, self-improvement gurus, and esoteric practitioners exists partly because people are looking for ways to manage the daily anxieties of life in today’s Russia. In 2024, online schools on the Russian platform GetCourse earned over 168 billion rubles, including more than 16 billion rubles in the “psychology” category. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russians’ interest in magic and esotericism increased, with people spending about 6.6 billion rubles on such virtual courses in 2022. Seventy-seven percent of active Russian internet users regularly play online video games, and market estimates put Russian gaming spending in 2024 at roughly 170–200 billion rubles. As described by Alexei Yurchak, late Soviet citizens often created spaces of vnenakhodimost—being inside the system but mentally elsewhere. Today, for many Russians, the internet performs a similar function. When the state breaks these spaces, it invades the fragile private zones where people have learned to hide from politics.
The aggressive promotion of MAX, the state-backed Russian messenger, makes the situation even more difficult. In 2025, Russia ordered the app to be pre-installed on phones and tablets sold in the country, positioning it as a domestic alternative to WhatsApp and Telegram. Reuters reported that MAX is integrated with government services and that critics fear it could be used for surveillance. During shutdowns, authorities have also discussed allowing access only to approved domestic services (so called “white list” websites) while restricting the broader internet. To Russians, it means that the internet becomes a completely state-curated space.
The Kremlin’s logic is not irrational. Authoritarian governments have learned from Iran, China, and other countries that control over connectivity can be crucial in moments of crisis. The internet helps people document violence, coordinate protests, receive uncensored information, and maintain horizontal ties outside state control. From the regime’s perspective, the internet is political infrastructure.
But the Kremlin seems to deeply misunderstand the society it governs. It has spent years building a political order in which citizens are encouraged to be private, consumerist, and demobilized: do not interfere in politics, and the state will preserve stability and everyday convenience. Internet blackouts attack the second half of that bargain by punishing not only activists, journalists, or opposition-minded citizens, but also loyalists, apolitical consumers, and even pensioners trying to reach relatives.
There is also a symbolic problem. Russians know that Putin is not an internet user. He has repeatedly displayed suspicion toward the digital world, famously describing the internet in 2014 as a “CIA project.” Internet restrictions make the generational and experiential distance between ruler and ruled especially visible. There is the collision between two Russias: a digitally integrated society and an analog authoritarian state. For years, the Kremlin managed to combine political repression with technological convenience. But as the war pushes the regime toward deeper isolation, that compromise is becoming harder to maintain. The paradox is that many Russians may tolerate war more easily than they tolerate a broken internet, because it is more immediate in revealing the limits of authoritarian adaptation.
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In an autocracy, it is difficult to predict how public anger will play out because there are no meaningful democratic channels through which frustration can be expressed. Some Russians will likely respond as they have before: by looking for an exit from the situation, adding to the steady flow of people who have left since the invasion. But Russian society may also change once again while its rulers are “sleeping,” until a seemingly stable system suddenly discovers that society has no need for it.
Ivetta Sergeeva is a Senior Research Associate at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University and a Research Affiliate at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. She is a co-principal investigator and co-founder of OutRush, a longitudinal survey of Russian migrants who left the country following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
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