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It is clear that we are living through a dramatic revolution in warfare brought about by changes in technology. Classic airpower, manned by human pilots, is increasingly being displaced by pilotless drones and ballistic missiles. This has led to surprising developments, as seemingly weaker powers like Ukraine and Iran have been able to stymie larger ones like Russia and the United States.
Over the last several weeks, the mainstream media has begun picking up on the fact that Ukraine has been doing much better on the battlefield, and that the war with Russia may at long last be turning in its favor. But some of the claims about the underlying technological revolution have been exaggerated, and we need to understand the precise ways in which warfare is changing.
Airpower by itself has always had great difficulties in achieving political objectives, something aptly demonstrated by the ongoing Iran war and Operation Epic Fury. What I want to investigate here is how airpower affects the land battle, which remains the main way that war influences political outcomes. In this realm, there are three main domains in which it has been used historically.
The first is strategic: the destruction of large targets deep in the enemy rear that have important roles sustaining the enemy’s war effort, like factories, railroad junctions, power grids, and the like.
The second use of airpower is operational: hitting military targets closer to the battlefield, perhaps 10 to 100 kilometers behind the front lines, including supply lines, air defenses, troops massing for an attack, communications facilities, command posts, barracks, or fuel storage needed by mobile armored forces. Such attacks are critical in “shaping” the land battle by disrupting communications and resupply.
The third mission is close air support: that is, attacking enemy forces that are actively engaged in battle on the front lines.
The first and the third of these have already been greatly impacted by new technologies, and we are about to witness big changes in the second category. Let’s see what recent wars have demonstrated.
A lot of recent media coverage concerns the Ukrainian campaign of long-range drone strikes that have targeted Russian oil and gas facilities, in some cases thousands of kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Observers have noted the lack of military hardware at this year’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations in Red Square for fear of Ukrainian strikes during the ceremony, and Vladimir Putin’s reported fear of assassination by drone.
Technology has made a huge difference in this realm. During World War II, the British Bomber Command and U.S. Eighth Air Force attempted to hit strategic targets like ball bearing factories in Germany. But Nazi air defenses forced bombers to fly at night, when their accuracy was atrocious. This led to the Allied decision to indiscriminately bomb urban civilian targets, leading to the flattening of cities like Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo, with accompanying civilian casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Despite the armchair strategizing of people like Lindsey Graham, these kinds of civilian attacks are both morally repugnant and have a poor track record in changing the political calculations of targeted countries. The Russians have been hitting Ukrainian civilian targets throughout the war; though they have made life miserable for its citizens, they have not brought about the country’s capitulation.
It is in the realm of close air support that drone technology has had the most revolutionary effects. This mission has historically been very difficult to carry out: until the advent of precision-guided munitions in the late 20th century, like the Maverick missile or guided GBU 10 and 12 bombs, it was hard to hit point targets from the air. Even so, “low and slow” aircraft like AC-130 gunships or the beloved A-10 Warthog were vulnerable to air defenses, and ran the risk of fratricide, where the aircraft would mistakenly hit a friendly target.
Inexpensive FPV drones, which are now being produced by Ukraine in the millions per year, have changed this calculus completely. Classic combined arms maneuver warfare—that is, rapid breakthroughs by armored vehicles that can drive deep into the enemy rear, cut supply lines, and capture territory—has been made virtually impossible. FPV drones have made the battlefield completely visible; they can see everything and strike everything they see, not just tanks and surface-to-air batteries, but individual foot soldiers. FPV drones are not, at least for now, vulnerable to modern air defenses, and are much more precise than earlier munitions.
The one mission that remains the domain of airpower is the operational one, beginning with the establishment of air superiority in the early stages of a campaign. By neutralizing SAM batteries and destroying the enemy’s aircraft, either on the ground or in the air, airplanes remain very useful. Airplanes are also necessary for certain kinds of strategic missions such as delivering heavy “bunker buster” bombs like those the United States used against Iran’s Fordow enrichment plant last summer.
But operational missions are now being transformed as well. Early in the war, the Ukrainians used American HIMARS rockets, with ranges in the tens or low hundreds of kilometers, to great effect. While these have been largely neutralized by Russian countermeasures, the Ukrainians are developing a new generation of drones and rockets that can strike at operational distances.
We see this unfolding as we speak in Russian-occupied Crimea. The Ukrainians have been systematically taking out Russian air defenses with medium-range drones and missiles. The peninsula has very constricted supply lines, with a road and rail connection through the narrow isthmus to the north, and the Kerch Strait bridge connecting it to the Russian mainland. The Ukrainians reportedly now control the isthmus route from the air, and have attacked the bridge repeatedly over the past three years.
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Under these circumstances, it would not be at all surprising if the Russian command decided at some point in the coming year that its position in Crimea was untenable, and began to withdraw its forces there, just as it has already withdrawn the bulk of its navy. Such a withdrawal would, of course, mean an enormous political defeat for Vladimir Putin.
Airpower is not obsolete yet. Success in war still depends on layered defenses and systems that are capable of operating within each of the layers. In judging the future of drones versus legacy airpower, however, the question is not one of pure capabilities, since airpower will remain superior in certain operational and strategic missions. Rather, the issue is one of relative cost.
While a Patriot missile can shoot down a Shahed drone, the Patriot costs north of $4 million, while the Shahed is produced for less than $40,000, and in much larger quantities. In the future, countries like Ukraine will be able to unleash swarms of low-cost drones, controlled autonomously by AI systems. Operation Epic Fury in the Middle East, meanwhile, has demonstrated that the sophisticated air defenses provided to America’s friends in the Gulf have been unable to prevent serious damage to their facilities from Iran’s drones and missiles. This balance of capabilities will persist until someone comes up with a cheap and effective anti-drone system. Many countries and companies are working on that today, but we are not there yet.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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(Photo by Justin Sullivan/Getty Images.)Well, now it’s just embarrassing. The party that lost power to a man last seen shepherding a mob in the direction of his own Congress, that tried to run a vegetable under the campaign promise that he wasn’t a vegetable, that decisively lost a Blue Wall which had held solid for generations, that lost ground with demographic groups it had spent a decade shamelessly courting, that welcomed the new podcast medium by… declining an interview with the most popular podcast of all, has gone well beyond being the gang that couldn’t shoot straight to being the party that can’t even conduct its own autopsy. What should have been an ordinary after-action report on the 2024 election defeat turned into a political hot potato. That spoke, more eloquently than anything in the report itself, to the chronic dysfunction within the Democratic camp.
The story of the report is that Ken Martin, Chair of the Democratic National Committee, ran for his office promising an autopsy on what went wrong in 2024. Martin turned to Paul Rivera, a veteran Democratic consultant and ally, who produced the report on a volunteer and part-time basis. Rivera didn’t present the report to the DNC until nearly a year after the election, at which point Martin twice delayed its release before announcing in December 2025 that the DNC wouldn’t release the report at all.
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That, naturally, led to more questions—what exactly was in the report that the DNC was running away from? The case of the missing report dogged Martin’s tenure, reportedly leading to funders withholding donations from the Democrats. But when CNN got hold of the report, the DNC had no choice but to release it, although annotated and accompanied by the strange disclaimer that “This document reflects the views of the author not the DNC.”
Martin took to Substack to give an even more scathing review of the report. “I am not proud of this product; it does not meet my standards and it won’t meet your standards,” he wrote. “When I received the report late last year, it wasn’t ready for primetime. Not even close.” That verdict is supplemented by the DNC’s truculent annotations to the report, which point out various factual errors, and note on a significant number of sections, “No sourcing or evidence provided for many claims in this section.”
So that becomes the sad denouement to the case of the missing report—no smoking gun revelation about what went wrong in 2024, but the dispiriting spectacle of a party that can’t even figure out how to cast blame properly. The spin by the DNC is about misplaced trust—basically, that Rivera has been out of the game for a long time and slow-walked his investigation and then made unaccountable errors in the presentation.
But the story is actually worse and stranger than that. Because here’s the thing: the report is (mostly) perfectly fine. It was never going to set the world on fire, and it has its shortcomings, but it’s a professional, often technically-minded analysis of flaws within the Democratic Party organization—pretty much exactly what one would expect an after-action report like this to be.
Some of the more fanciful speculation about what it contained had to do with questions about the extent to which it indicted Kamala Harris and her team for running a poor campaign. But, actually, Rivera barely touches on that at all. There is nothing in there about the hiding of Joe Biden’s mental state, only a brief mention of the changing-of-the-candidate in the aftermath of the disastrous June 2024 debate. Joe Rogan’s name is not mentioned. And there is none of the salty inside-the-campaign-trail gossip reporting that tends to characterize journalistic autopsies of elections.
You could argue—as the media is reflexively doing—that it’s those omissions that make the report worthless. “The document, it’s now clear, was kept under wraps not because it was impolitic, but because it’s a disaster,” writes Michelle Goldberg in The New York Times. The commentator Chris Cillizza also uses the “d” word and headlines his segment on the report, “I read the DNC’s 192-page disastrous autopsy report so you don’t have to.”
But the media—falling for a bit of spin from Martin and the DNC—is misunderstanding what the report was intended to be. “There has to be some lessons that we glean on [2024] so we can operationalize it, not just here in DC, but through all of the 57 state parties,” Martin said at the time of commissioning the report. It was always going to be fairly technical and forward-looking, and that clearly is how Rivera interpreted his assignment. “There are many books already written, and many more to come presenting analyses of ‘what happened’ [in 2024] for both sides,” Rivera reasonably writes. The point of the report was to “develop, organize, and implement a 10-year strategic plan to align the infrastructure, partnerships, and people we need to win,” using lessons from 2024 as a starting point.
In that vein, the report is full of riveting material on the performance of a North Carolina attorney general candidate relative to the national ticket; on the glitchiness of the Democrats’ voter database software; on the efficacy of spending campaign funds on a year-round basis as opposed to pouring it into an electoral surge; and on the alignment of Super PAC messaging with that of the campaign. Martin may well have been right that a document like this isn’t exactly “ready for primetime,” but it’s far from clear that “primetime” was ever going to be its destination. It locks into various electoral fundamentals and makes detailed suggestions for areas of improvement.
Beyond this, Rivera often does write trenchantly and contends that Democrats have essentially given away large swathes of the voting populace. Here he is on the electorate gender gap: “Male voters require direct engagement. The gender gap can be narrowed. Deploy male messengers, address economic concerns, and don’t assume identity politics will hold male voters of color.” Here he is on a geographic strategy: “Strong urban + competitive suburbs + limited rural losses. You need all three.” Here he is on a digital strategy: “The fundamentals have changed. It’s no longer enough for campaigns to push information out—they have to pull people in—and digital and social platforms are tools designed for this engagement.”
Not necessarily breathtaking, but in line with a common-sense verdict on what happened in 2024—and, crucially, a sharp critique of the play-to-the-base direction the Harris campaign went in. If we were to draft an executive summary—Rivera and the DNC seem never to have gotten around to writing one for the actual report—it would be something like this:
Democrats have to close some of the gap with male voters and rural voters—and down-ballot races show that inroads are possible with both groups.
Democrats have to fight even in places they know they’ll lose. “Limiting losses matters,” Rivera writes.
Messaging should be constant, as opposed to rushed during an election. Rivera cites the Trump-backing Turning Point USA in particular as having a year-round model that Democrats should imitate. “Early money is like yeast—it helps the dough rise,” Rivera writes.
Handle the adjustment to new media. Rivera contends that Democrats’ digital ads tend to just be shortened versions of TV ads, as opposed to truly working with the form.
Lean into negativity. “When they go low, we go lower” might make a decent subtitle for the report—with Rivera chiding the Democrats for trying to walk a high road in 2024 as opposed to drilling into Trump’s negatives.
If there is a substantive critique of the report, it would be that Rivera focuses less on specific issues than he might. Immigration, for instance, is barely discussed. But Rivera likely felt that that was not his mandate; future Democratic nominees will choose what issues they want to focus on. Rivera noted that identity politics did poorly with voters compared with meat-and-potatoes economic campaigning, and otherwise stays within more technical aspects of electioneering.
It’s also possible to argue that Rivera misses the forest for the trees and fails to discuss the kind of group-think that resulted in the party failing to have genuinely open primaries in 2024 or to question Biden’s mental acuity before it was far too late. Which is fair, but Biden—presumably—isn’t going to be on the ballot in 2028, and it’s understandable that Rivera would try to be forward-looking in his recommendations.
So, all in all, a perfectly serviceable report. Had Martin and the DNC released it when it came in, there might have been some media annoyance at not going more stridently after the Biden or Harris campaigns, but the press would have forgotten about the report by the next day, and there might have been some real lessons to take in for party operatives.
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But that’s not what happened. Faced with a message he didn’t exactly like—or found underwhelming—Martin elected to shoot the messenger, and to do so in a very public, graphic way. Yes, there are some errors in the report. Rivera, for instance, misreports Mark Robinson as winning 45% of the vote in the North Carolina gubernatorial race, when the actual number is closer to 40%. The former New Jersey governor Jon Corzine is incorrectly spelled as “John Corzine,” and former Kentucky governor Matt Bevin as “Matt Brevin.” The writing can be clunky in places.
But the DNC, in its annotations to the report, tries to rip basically all of it apart.
We’re kind of falling into the same trap that Martin and co. did if we make too much of the annotations to the report, but the annotations, pedantic and supercilious—I think the more technical term is “bitchy”—speak with remarkable vividness to what’s gone wrong within the Democratic Party. There’s a suspicion of common sense, of forthright thinking, a demand always for more sourcing, for, presumably, footnotes, as if it’s more footnotes that stand between the Dems and beating Trump.
Let’s take a sample of a few of the DNC’s annotations to the report:
To the line “This was a blatant attempt by the Republican power base to take advantage of name recognition”—a reference to the 2022 Georgia Senate election—the DNC annotator helpfully notes that “In 2022, Joe Biden was president,” as if Rivera didn’t know that, and as if a “Republican power base” couldn’t exist if the Republicans didn’t hold the White House.
To the line “states which had consistently and reliably voted for Democratic candidates, including Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin,” the annotator informs us that “all three of those states voted for Trump in 2016,” as if Rivera weren’t, obviously, talking about the decades-long voting patterns of the Blue Wall.
To a line referencing the “deaths of five people” during the 2021 Capitol attack, the annotator writes, “Claim contradicts public reporting”—even though that’s exactly the number that most sources give.
The DNC’s chief contention is that the report provides inadequate sourcing for many of its claims. That’s largely accounted for by Rivera’s method of operation of “promis[ing] confidentiality” to the “more than 300 organizations and individuals” who were interviewed in the process of researching the report in order to “encourage their participation and candor.” But that perfectly-reasonable approach seems not to have satisfied the DNC. And the annotator jumps all over anything analytic or opinion-based.
For instance, to the perfectly common-sensical line “we failed to meet these voters in the ecosystems where they spend the majority of their time and where narratives are built”—part of a discussion of young and chronically-online voters—the annotator writes “No evidence or sourcing provided for these claims,” as if anyone who was paying attention to U.S. politics in 2024 wouldn’t tell you the exact same thing.
The annotated copy of the report is a breathtaking imitation of the U.S. Army as depicted in Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22, and as run, sub rosa, by ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen, a mail clerk who takes it upon himself to critique the literary style of any generals’ orders that come in and to throw the ones he doesn’t like into the wastepaper basket. “Too prolix” determines ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen—and that’s the last anybody ever hears of one particular battle order. “No evidence or sourcing provided for this claim,” write the ex-P.F.C. Wintergreens working at the DNC—and so much for Rivera’s common-sensical analyses or suggestions.
That kind of spin works, to an extent. The response by the media to the heavily-redlined report is to assume that it must be deeply flawed—with spelling and occasionally math mistakes, with sections missing. But that’s to be taken in by Martin’s blame-shifting game. I have a feeling—although no evidence provided!—that Rivera expected the typos to be corrected before publication, and was intentionally leaving sections like the executive summary blank because he anticipated a productive back-and-forth with the DNC, as opposed to the DNC sitting on the report and then eventually dumping it, unedited, to the public.
But, as ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen would be the first to point out, why proofread or edit when you can just shoot the messenger for their spelling mistakes and typos? And so the DNC hits the button on the console that initiates the spin cycle and in so doing dives into a morass of blame and meta-blame. “It’s… Keystone Kops,” one former DNC official said to CNN.
But that may be overly generous. What it really is is weird and insular—the Democrats somehow not understanding that the essence of electoral politics is extroversion. They could have just released the report, whatever its shortcomings, and moved on from there, trying to attack the next news cycle. The Keystone Kops, at least, have no shortage of energy.
But the Democrats just can’t seem to resist these cycles of self-sabotage. Unless the party manages to focus, even the task of casting blame is going to be too much for them. The Keystone Kops are enviable when the party, really, is being run by ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.
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H. W. Brands holds the Jack S. Blanton Sr. Chair in History at the University of Texas at Austin and is the author of more than a dozen biographies and histories. His latest book is American Patriarch: The Life of George Washington.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and H. W. Brands discuss why Washington’s reputation has endured despite the controversial legacies of other founding fathers, how his frontier upbringing shaped his character, and what Washington’s voluntary relinquishment of power reveals about leadership and ambition.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: George Washington is, I suppose, the most famous figure in American history. Many biographies have been written about him. Looking at him from the vantage point of 2026, as we celebrate the 250th anniversary of America’s founding, what stands out to you about George Washington that may be different from what other historians emphasized when they wrote about him throughout American history?
H W Brands: The principal thing, since you mentioned the vantage of the 250th anniversary, is Washington’s staying power. Upon his death, one of the eulogies described him as “first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen.” It’s hard to say where Washington sits in the hearts of his countrymen today, but he is one figure from that era who has survived most of the revisionism that has eventually come for people like Thomas Jefferson and any number of other figures from that era. This is not an accident of history. The capital city of the United States is named for George Washington, so it would be pretty difficult to de-platform him.
Washington wears well. He has a level of gravity with which he fulfilled his roles as president that has given him a long shelf life. Any complaints that people might make about Washington are easier to make about other figures from the founding. Jefferson is the one who said all men are created equal and owned slaves. Washington owned slaves too, but he didn’t say all men are created equal. So he seems to be a very solid figure.
There is always interest in the first of anything, including the first president and the first victorious general. Washington is more responsible for the creation of the American Republic than any other person. If his Continental Army had lost to the British, American independence wouldn’t have happened—at least it wouldn’t have happened then. He is an important figure and somebody who is easy to come back to again and again.
Mounk: There are many aspects of his life that I want to get into—his childhood and upbringing, which you portray very interestingly, and his responsibility for the American Republic. That responsibility stems in part from his military victory, and in part because he clearly did not have the ambition to become a dictator or monarch. The longer history goes on, the more positive a light that puts him in.
If you look at many of the newly independent republics around the world that threw off colonial shackles, the number of times in which the courageous, charismatic independence leader who leads the rebellion against colonial forces becomes the first president of a country and then stays there for fifty years—making the country corrupt and concentrating power in their own hands—is enormous, especially in the twentieth century. With more knowledge of how easy and how tempting it is for those kinds of figures to declare themselves indispensable, the fact that Washington gives up power after two terms, setting the informal norm that presidents should be limited to two terms, is even more significant than it may have looked at the time.
Brands: Your point is very well taken. When King George III of Britain heard that Washington, upon the end of the Revolutionary War, had resigned his command and returned it to the Continental Congress, George III is said to have remarked that if that report was true, he was the greatest man in the world—for doing exactly what you said: not being beguiled by political ambition.
When we get to that point in the narrative, I’ll explain why it would have been a different thing for Washington to attempt that than for any number of other victorious generals later on. But it certainly serves his reputation well that he did it. In fact, as you suggest, he did it twice: once at the end of the Revolutionary War, when he resigned command of the army, and then after two terms as president, when he retired and returned to Mount Vernon.
Mounk: Let’s go back to the beginning and work our way up to these later stages. Washington is often portrayed as the consummate patrician—as somebody born at the top of a social hierarchy, a revolutionary leader who is, in some ways, to the manner born.
You argue that this is an oversimplification. Even though he is born into a reasonably privileged class of landed gentry, and into a slave-holding family, he is not nearly as elite as some of those portrayals have made him out to be.
Brands: Both parts of that story are crucial. Washington was born into the Virginia gentry—the upper class of Virginia in the early eighteenth century. Compared to the people around him, Washington was privileged. He did not have to worry about where the next meal was coming from.
On the other hand, this was a colonial gentry, a frontier gentry. The serious members of the aristocracy of the British Empire all lived in England. The Fairfax family was one that was transatlantic, and Washington was fortunate enough to have got to know the Fairfaxes—Thomas Fairfax and others—when he was young. That gave him one leg up on climbing the ladder, because even within a gentry, even within an aristocracy, there are always gradations. Washington was not born at the top of that, and so he had to aspire. He had to work to ascend. He wasn’t born particularly wealthy—certainly wealthy by comparison with the yeoman farmers of Virginia, and certainly by comparison with the enslaved population of Virginia—but he couldn’t simply rest on his inheritance. He wanted to make more of it.
A continuous theme in Washington’s life was his desire to acquire more land. Everybody in Virginia essentially made their living by the land. Washington was a landowner, but he wanted more. This is what took him on his first adventures to the West. Although Washington was born and grew up in Virginia—which was the first permanent colony and has a seaboard—he was associated with the western part of the state. The western part of Virginia at that time included what is now West Virginia, Kentucky, and parts of Ohio. He was constantly heading out to the West, and it was as someone who had been to the West that he came to the attention of the government of Colonial Virginia and eventually to the British government in London.
Mounk: What does he do in the West? He’s a surveyor, but what precisely did that mean? When I picture a surveyor today, I picture somebody in a high visibility vest with a strange machine standing around suburban London.
Brands: If you were surveying property in the wilderness, as in Alaska, you would have to go out and do some serious measurement. If you survey in a city today, everything is already measured and you simply find the post that has already been located. Washington went out into western Virginia, which had never been surveyed before, in part because he was looking for the best land in a large grant that had been given to the Fairfax family. He was hired by the Fairfaxes and went out with one of the younger Fairfax men on this surveying trip. It was his first expedition into the wilderness.
At that point, Washington began something that would be his great gift to biographers and historians: he kept a diary, a journal, almost every day of his whole life. It starts here, and so it is possible to find out what he was doing each day and how he was responding to the challenges he faced. One of the things Washington learned about himself on this journey—and that the reader of biographies learns about Washington—is that he was somebody who thrived in the outdoors. This was not a given for a member of the gentry, many of whom were more comfortable in parlors and salons. Washington really liked being outdoors. It was a great adventure. He was camping out, getting rained on and snowed on, falling into rivers, and nearly freezing—and he thought it was the greatest thing in the world. He was good at it and he liked it, and this was going to serve him very well.
He kept his journal, he came back, and the surveying was fine. But he also developed a reputation—and he was a teenager at this point—as somebody who was resourceful, who could find his way in the wilderness, who could get along with the various Indians and frontiersmen who were out there, and accomplish what needed to be accomplished.
When the Virginia governor required somebody to carry a message to the French, who were trying to colonize the Ohio country—claimed by Virginia but also by the French—he said Washington was the man to do it. Washington had developed a reputation as somebody who could take on challenges, figure a way through wherever he had to go, and get the message to where it had to go.
He also discovered that he was a wonderful horseman, and this was a significant distinction in those days—not only for getting around, which was how you got around, but for winning the admiration and even the envy of your fellows. A man who was good on a horse cut a commanding figure. It didn’t hurt that Washington was big for his age: tall, well-built, and imposing on horseback. That is often a metaphor, but in Washington’s case it would become an actuality, because Washington on a horse was a very persuasive military commander.
Mounk: Of course, it’s how he’s often still portrayed when you look at statues. Like many other people of that age, he’s shown on his horse.
Brands: The fact that so many military figures are portrayed on horseback is testament to the impression that a man on a horse made. When you are on a horse—especially if you are a tall man like Washington—you are head and shoulders and torso above everybody else. In those days before radio communications, your soldiers had to be able to see you. The fact that the enemy could see you too, and level their guns at you, and perhaps kill you, made it all the more impressive when you survived. Washington cut an impressive figure on a horse, and that was quite important in his day.
Another thing Washington figured out at an early age was that he had to develop a character. He would ascend by reputation. Reputation was the coin of the realm among the gentry—did you have a reputation as a brave man, a capable man, an honorable man, a generous man? Washington decided that he needed to win that reputation. How do you win a reputation? You do the things that are conducive to it. Washington created this public character, set this model for himself: he was going to become this person. He took the steps and the actions to allow him to live up to the reputation he was aiming for, and he did this his whole life. It shows the degree to which virtue of this kind—civic virtue, public virtue—can be developed. It is not innate. You say, this is the man I am going to become, and then you strive to become that man.
Mounk: Looking at this from 2026, what is striking is that the incentives toward good character—or at least what was at the time regarded as good character—were aligned. An ambitious man like Washington, born to some privilege but very conscious of wanting to rise in the social hierarchy, thought that both appearing to have a good character and cultivating the virtues that actually gave him a good character would be conducive to that goal. It is not clear that the same is true today. If you are born with some social advantages and you are thinking about how to get ahead in life, cultivating the best possible character is probably not where the incentives lie. If what you want is fame, renown, or political power, the incentives go in a different direction.
Tell us a little about the society that produced him. Americans, I think, are a little confused about this. We have a sense that there was a kind of gentry in the eighteenth century, but we also have a strong sense that unlike in Britain, there was not an aristocracy. How should we think about this? It is a world in which virtue is rewarded and certain character traits are highly regarded, but it is also a world in which people are scheming to acquire more land, in which people justify slavery, and in which there is a great deal of partisan contestation—different factions and groups plotting against each other. How should we understand the social background against which Washington’s rise takes place?
Brands: The first thing to keep in mind is that this was a pre-capitalist world—one in which not everything had been monetized. Washington made his living as a planter. He planted crops, harvested them, and sold them. Tobacco was the largest cash crop, but tobacco was hard on the soil, so he shifted to wheat, oats, and other ordinary farm crops. He did not get into cotton, which came later and would change the face and economics of the South. Washington came along before cotton became a viable commercial crop.
Since it was a pre-capitalist society in which things were not particularly monetized, people did not compete on the size of their bank account. They competed in terms of hospitality and the quality of their homes. Washington inherited a home and gradually enlarged it. If you were a member of the gentry—a relatively small class, a few hundred people, somewhat larger when you add in the relatives—you were expected to be a gracious host. In Virginia, where the economy was based largely on slavery, you were a slave owner, or perhaps more precisely a slave manager. Most of the slaves that Washington controlled he did not own, which meant he could not have sold them or emancipated them even if he had wanted to—but we will get to that.
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Because Virginia had no cities and was entirely countryside, travelers could not expect to find a hotel or inn. They stayed in private homes. Washington had open house at Mount Vernon pretty much every day. Anybody traveling from the southern part of Virginia toward Maryland would stop in, expect to be given dinner, and if the weather were poor or they could not continue on, expect a room for the night. This was also the way news traveled and the way Washington kept informed about the world.
A member of the gentry might appear very wealthy while being deeply in debt. The best example of this is Thomas Jefferson, who had his wonderful place at Monticello outside of modern Charlottesville, was constantly rebuilding, and seemed to live the life of a wealthy man—but was always deeply in debt. At the time he died, everything he owned had to be sold off to pay his creditors. Even Washington, at times one of the largest landholders in Virginia, could not come up with the cash to pay a relatively small debt and had to ask for more time. That was a mortifying thing for a man of Washington’s reputation, but that was how it worked.
One of the things that being a planter, being a member of the gentry, gave you was practice in being—the term fits—a commander. You were the commander of your little village. You were literally in command of the enslaved people who worked under you, and the boss of the free people who worked alongside them. You had executive experience in a way that a lawyer in Massachusetts—to take John Adams, the second president—did not. It is not an accident that of the American presidents before the Civil War, a majority had been slaveholders and planters. They had the advantage of managing large operations and making decisions within them.
Mounk: There is a similar point to be made in a totally different context. There is sometimes a line of argument that if artificial intelligence displaces a lot of human work, that will be fine, because we will be in a very affluent society, give people universal basic income, and they will be like latter-day aristocrats, enjoying their leisure and cultivating their skills. That slightly mischaracterizes what the life of the average aristocrat was actually like—not just in the context of the American gentry, but of European aristocracy as well. You could neglect your lands and the people cultivating them, and you would probably end up with a lot less money than you were passed and pass on a lot less to your offspring. You could do that for a generation, but it constituted a deep failure of honor. If you actually wanted to be a good steward of your inheritance and your family’s position, you were running a small to mid-sized business. If you were bad at it, that might be tolerable for a generation, but it was genuinely discrediting and created significant problems.
To return to the eighteenth century: Washington really starts off as a British loyalist. He thinks of himself as part of an extended British aristocracy and part of the project of building the British Empire. How does that change? How does he turn from a British loyalist into an American revolutionary?
Brands: This is one of the principal tasks that a biographer of Washington, or a historian of the period of the American Revolution, has to tackle. It is important to remember that when the United States declared independence in 1776, that did not signify that all people living in America were in favor of independence. There was a large category of people—called Loyalists or Tories at the time—who said that independence was a terrible idea. Many of them took up arms against George Washington and the Continental Army and fought on the side of the British against American independence.
The question is, why would somebody like George Washington come out in favor of independence? Why would he become a rebel, a traitor? This is an important question because typically the people who turn against their regime are people who are not succeeding within it. The successful ones are happy enough and stay around. Washington was quite successful. By the time of the American Revolution, he had risen even farther up the hierarchy of the Virginia gentry. He had married well—a wealthy widow—and acquired a great deal more land, more slaves, and more property. He was well respected and had a reputation as Virginia’s top soldier. Not America’s top soldier, but Virginia’s. That distinction matters, because talking about America in 1770 was like talking about Asia today—a vast collection of different peoples and places. There were Virginians, New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians. People who lived in Virginia thought of themselves as Virginians and as subjects of the British crown, but not as Americans. They felt they had more in common with people living in London than with people living in Boston.
Things were going well for Washington, but there were certain annoyances. Annoyances are one thing, but what turns annoyances into grievances that rise to the level of sedition and treason? Virginians, like other people living in the American colonies, had over a period of roughly one hundred and fifty years grown accustomed to the idea that they would pretty much govern themselves. This was due primarily to inattention and laxity on the part of the British government. When colonists left England and went off to America, they fell out of sight and out of mind, and were allowed to do more or less whatever they wanted.
Mounk: The distances involved were so enormous that it created a kind of principal-agent problem. The principal had great difficulty instructing even the agent of the British Crown sitting in Virginia exactly what the preferences were. Some amount of self-government was inevitable as a result.
Brands: From the standpoint of London, there was very little of interest in North America. Further south, in the West Indies, there were sugar plantations and money to be made. But out of North America, not much at all. Decades would go by and the colonists in America would have very little to do with what was going on in London, or vice versa. They got of a mind that they ran their own affairs, and they interpreted this in ways that served themselves. They thought, for example, that they ought to have the right to raise and spend money as they wanted. If they got dragged into one of Britain’s wars, they did so sometimes with less than perfect grace.
When the government in London went to war with France over something that had nothing to do with America, Americans found themselves drawn in anyway, usually because the French controlled Louisiana and parts of the West Indies. They were dragged into a war they had no part in starting and no benefit from at the end. That got annoying.
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This brings us to what began in America as the French and Indian War—not the French against the Indians, but the British and their Indian allies against the French and France’s Indian allies. It was a war of crucial importance for Washington and for people who lived in Virginia and Pennsylvania, and it was a war that Washington helped start, because it was over control of the Ohio country—roughly where Ohio is today, including western Pennsylvania and West Virginia. This mattered enormously to people like Washington because Virginians and Pennsylvanians had their eye on that western territory, particularly its land. The population of the American colonies was growing rapidly. Benjamin Franklin calculated around this time that the population doubled roughly once a generation, and since nearly all of them were farmers, they needed land to make a living and to bequeath to their children. Land in the West was cheap.
Washington joined Franklin and others in something called the Ohio Company, a speculative venture in which they would acquire title to a large tract of land in Ohio, survey it—which is why Washington got involved—and sell it to others. Over time, this habit of purchasing land and reselling it at an appreciated value would make more fortunes in American history than almost any other means. If the French took control of the Ohio country, those dreams of speculative fortunes would vanish. The Virginians had a real stake in the outcome, and so they were more than happy to join the British in the French and Indian War.
The conflict eventually became what was called the Seven Years War, the later years of which had nothing to do with North America and everything to do with empire and Europe. From the American standpoint, the fighting ended in the late 1750s, but there was no peace treaty until 1763. At the end of it, Americans were rather miffed to receive what amounted to the bill for their part of the war. The British, having run up an enormous debt fighting the French, did what governments do when facing a deficit: they reduced spending and increased revenues. Reducing spending meant, among other things, reducing the number of troops in the western territory just won from France—the very territory that people like Washington had expected to survey, settle, and profit from. Instead, Americans were told they could not settle there, because no troops would be stationed to protect them and because, to avoid trouble with the Indians, the western territory would be closed to settlement. This policy was articulated in the Proclamation of 1763.
Then Parliament passed the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act—a series of taxes. Americans had fought the war and won it, and now they were being told they could not enjoy the benefits of winning, and would moreover face higher taxes as a consequence. This was not what they had signed up for. The idea of being taxed by Parliament would not have surprised anyone living in Britain, but it did surprise the people living in America, because it had not been the case before. The understanding had been that colonists funded their own local taxes, which they voted on themselves, and that the British could levy taxes on imports as a way of regulating trade. But internal taxes were another matter. This is when people in America began thinking that perhaps their connection with Britain was not such a good idea after all.
It was not unthinkable. If you lived in the south of England and said you didn’t want to be governed by London, you simply couldn’t do that. But if you were living in Virginia, three thousand miles away, and the British had shown up only rarely for the previous three generations, going it alone seemed possible. This is what somebody like Washington began thinking. Resistance followed. There were protests against the Stamp Act and a boycott of British imports—economic sanctions, which have been around forever. The thinking was that British merchants would feel the pain and go to Parliament demanding that the colonists be appeased so that trade could resume.
Mounk: At this point, the rebellion is against the fact that the deal has changed—that suddenly the colonists are supposed to pay a great deal more in tax while receiving fewer services in return.
Brands: I wouldn’t use the term rebellion yet. Protest would be a better word.
Mounk: At this point, the people involved are thinking that they need to resist and send a message, but they are not yet thinking of themselves as the founders of a new nation.
Brands: The colonists made a point of saying they were loyal Englishmen, standing on their rights as Englishmen to be free of taxes except those they voted upon themselves. This had roots all the way back to Magna Carta in English history. When it served their purposes, the Americans said they were Englishmen who must be treated as Englishmen and granted the rights of Englishmen.
This did not always sit well with the people back in Britain, who thought of the colonists as provincials—second-class subjects who had gone out to live on the frontier. There was a certain disdain that developed in Parliament and in England generally toward the colonists, and the colonists felt it. That too entered into the consideration.
Mounk: Was there something provincial about American life at this juncture? If you were at Mount Vernon or Monticello, were you ten years behind the fashion in London,? Did it feel like London was a metropole and America the periphery, or had a different culture already begun to grow up even before 1776?
Brands: It really did depend on where you lived. If you lived in or around Boston, you thought of Boston as fairly up to date. Boston had Harvard College, a literary circle, and libraries. It looked like a miniature version of London, and partly as a result, people in Massachusetts were even more annoyed by the disdain shown to them by people in London. But somebody like Washington in Virginia—which, as mentioned, had no cities anything like Boston or New York—tended to deal directly with agents. If you were a planter like Washington, you had an agent in London who handled the sales of your produce, tobacco for example, and who handled the purchase of whatever you wanted. Washington might write to say that his carriage was wearing out and ask for the latest model with his specifications. Jefferson in particular would write to his agent asking him to go to the local booksellers and acquire the fifty most important books published in the last year. They certainly tried to keep up that way.
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There was as yet little in the way of higher education, arts, or sciences in America, though a beginning had been made. Benjamin Franklin helped establish the American Philosophical Society. There was Harvard College, Yale College, and the College of William and Mary in Virginia. But if you were a wealthy family and wanted your son to become a lawyer, you might very well send him to London to study at the Inns of Court. It was clear that London was the cultural capital of the realm that included the North American colonies. Boston was a partial exception. New York was a world of its own, having been founded by the Dutch and being more commercially and bourgeois-minded. But Virginia, in many ways, should have been the most loyal of the colonies.
Mounk: Part of what is involved in this conflict, beyond the dispute over taxation, is a sense of feeling disrespected—of having the rights of Englishmen but not being treated as equals, of being treated as second-class subjects. How does this conflict escalate? In retrospect, was escalation inevitable, or could other choices by London have kept America within the British Empire for decades, centuries, or perhaps indefinitely?
Brands: Taking that last question first: it is very difficult to imagine that in 2026 the United States might remain part of a British Empire—empires have long gone out of fashion. But it is not impossible to imagine a change of government in London in the 1770s, before the American Declaration of Independence, that concluded it was better to keep the Americans as friends than to have them as enemies and chose to compromise. Had London been willing to compromise, there were plenty of people in America willing to meet them halfway. There were very few people before about 1774 who were calling for independence. There was no real groundswell in favor of it until relatively late in the game.
What would become the United States might very well have evolved as Canada evolved. Canada was invited by the American colonies, upon independence, to join their revolt against Britain. The Canadians said they were doing well enough within the British Empire and declined. They gradually received more and more home rule until, by the 1860s, Canada was effectively independent—still recognizing the British crown, but to all intents and purposes self-governing.
America broke with Britain in the 1770s and made it effective as of the 1780s. The two countries were formally at war in what Americans call the War of 1812 and were at odds with each other for some time after that. But since 1900, the United States and Britain have been the closest of allies—in some ways closer to each other than Britain and Canada were to each other. So today, had there been no American Revolution, or had it failed, we would probably be roughly where we are today, arrived at by a different timetable and somewhat different means. If those different means included avoiding a war in which thousands of people died, that would not have been a bad thing. If you can avoid wars, you should try to do so.
Mounk: Counterfactual history is always difficult. A later separation could also have led to a much bloodier war fought with more modern technology, and perhaps one that would have soured relations between Britain and America far more deeply. In a sense, it is healthy for adolescents to separate themselves from their parents, because it becomes easier in early adulthood to come back and develop a strong relationship. If you delay the period at which you create autonomy for yourself, the relationship can get much more complicated and rocky later on.
Brands: There is one other thing to consider. The British Parliament in the 1830s decreed an end to slavery within the British Empire. The United States would not end slavery until 1865, with the passage of the 13th Amendment at the close of the Civil War. If America had remained part of the British Empire in the 1830s, slavery in America might have ended thirty years before it actually did.
This is complicated, because ending slavery within an empire that included the cotton-growing American southern states would have been a far bigger undertaking and might have been more difficult to achieve. But what made it so hard to end slavery in the United States was that the people who owned slaves and benefited from slavery had to vote to end it themselves—they had to absorb the economic hit personally. There were no slaveholders in London when Parliament decreed an end to slavery; the burden fell on planters in the West Indies. Parliament could, in theory, have told South Carolinians to give up their slaves as well. It is useful as an exercise to consider these things.
Mounk: One other possibility is that the war for independence and the war to preserve slavery might have coincided. Rather than having a Revolutionary War and a Civil War as separate events, a number of states might have broken away from Britain over the issue of slavery in the 1830s—and had they prevailed, they might have preserved slavery. The possibilities are many.
Brands: One last point on that: had the slave states broken away in the 1830s, they would not have been opposed merely by the northern states of the United States. They would have been opposed by the northern states and the rest of the British Empire.
Mounk: Or they might have been able to forge a coalition with the northern states, because the conflict would not have been about the nature of the future political settlement within an independent republic. They might have been able to wed the issue of slavery to the issue of self-determination for the colonies and forge a coalition of northern states against Britain. We can play this game forever, but let’s get back to actual history.
Where does the phase shift occur? Where does protest turn into rebellion, turn into revolution?
Brands: When the Americans protest, the British, instead of compromising, double down. Within British politics, the party that favors acting tough on the Americans wins out—it is a popular thing in a campaign to promise strength and the enforcement of the law. When the British escalate, the Americans escalate in turn. The Americans stage violent protests, the British send troops, and there are more protests. When the Americans see that British troops are coming to be used not against the French or the Indians but against them, Britain begins to look like a foreign country with an army of occupation.
The fighting begins when a Massachusetts militia moves to defend one of its armories. Every colony had its own militia—part-time soldiers who farmed during the day and took up arms when trouble arose—and their own stashes of weapons. The British decided to seize one of these armories so that the Massachusetts militia could not use the weapons against British troops. The militia refused, and the battles of Lexington and Concord took place—a firefight between the two groups that marks the start of the American Revolutionary War. At the time, nobody realized it was a war, nobody realized it would last a long time, and nobody quite knew what it was about.
Just two months after this, Washington is appointed commander of a new army. The Continental Congress—an ad hoc, self-appointed body, not authorized by British law—met in Philadelphia, the largest and most centrally located city in the colonies, and decided they needed a unified organization among the different militias. This is 1775, and their stated purpose is to defend their rights as Englishmen—not as Americans, but as Englishmen. Looking around for the most accomplished soldier available, they settled on George Washington.
From his beginnings as a surveyor in western Virginia, Washington had gone on to command the Virginia regiment and won a reputation fighting in the French and Indian War. Crucially, he had served right alongside British officers during that war, and he and his men had performed much better under fire than the British troops and their officers. Until that point, the British had sustained the mystique of having the best army in the world—the best uniforms, the best drilling, the most precise formations. But when they came under attack in conditions that existed in America, they fell apart. It was Washington’s soldiers who saved the day and prevented a complete rout. At that point, Washington realized that British soldiers were not ten feet tall—that he was a better officer than theirs and his men were better soldiers than theirs.
At one point during the French and Indian War, Washington had sought a commission in the British army. He was a colonial officer, and the British soldiers fighting alongside him refused to take orders from a mere provincial. Washington went to the British commander in chief with a recommendation from the governor of Virginia, arguing that a commission would give his orders proper weight. The commander in chief refused, for his own political reasons, though he did tell the British soldiers to listen to Washington. Various people have thought that had the British seen what was coming, they would have been smart to commission Washington as an officer. His loyalties might then have shifted from Virginia to the British crown.
As it was, this episode showed Washington that there was a ceiling on what he could accomplish—on the reputation he could acquire and on how he would be seen—as long as he remained part of the British Empire. He might be the greatest man in Virginia, but he would always be looked down upon precisely because he was a provincial. The idea that people could lord it over him for no good reason made him think he could get along without the British.
Washington is appointed commanding general of the new Continental Army and sent to Boston, where the British are besieged inside the city by the colonial militias. The fighting has developed a momentum of its own. The British don’t want to be surrounded and captured; the Americans don’t want them to get away. Nobody could have told you exactly what they were fighting about—once you are playing a contest, you want to win, whatever the larger purpose may be. For the first more than a year of his command, Washington didn’t know what the war aims were. He was trying to keep from being captured by the British and trying to keep the British from getting away. The British did get away—they sailed away from Boston. Washington then retreated to defend New York, though the question of what exactly he was defending it for, and what the war was ultimately about, remained unresolved.
Mounk: What is the last step? We have a protest that turns into a rebellion, that turns into a war in which you are trying to win. How does that then turn into a revolution? How do the war aims clarify, and how do they clarify in the form of a declaration of independence?
Brands: In the winter of 1775–1776, fighting had largely ceased—in those days, armies generally stopped campaigning in winter because the roads turned to mud and nobody could move. Washington and his men were waiting for the spring fighting season, uncertain what they would do when it came. In the middle of this, Thomas Paine—a recent arrival from England—wrote a pamphlet called Common Sense. Its conclusion was that Americans had been fighting for several months and needed to decide what they were fighting about. The only thing that made any common sense to fight for was independence. Without it, you could win a particular campaign and two years later have to refight the same battle, having never established the principle that Americans make laws for Americans.
The pamphlet was an immediate sensation—one of the fastest-selling pieces of political propaganda in American history. All sorts of Americans suddenly found themselves nodding in agreement. When the Continental Congress met in the spring of 1776, it did not take long for the question of independence to come to the fore. But everybody understood it was a big step. To say they were defending their rights as Englishmen was one thing—something George III could understand even if he disagreed with it. To say they were fighting for independence was to commit treason. The people who signed the Declaration of Independence were putting their lives on the line. If they lost the war, they could lose everything.
From Washington’s standpoint it was a big step, and he was in favor of it. It also clarified things dramatically. He could now tell his soldiers they were fighting for their own country, their own rights, their own destiny—that if they won, they would no longer be subject to the whim of a distant king. They were creating a republic, a political system in which authority emanates from the people, not from above. When news reached Washington’s camp that the Declaration of Independence had been passed by the Continental Congress, there were celebrations. Now they knew what they were fighting for.
It is worth pausing here to note that when the protests against the Stamp Act began in 1765, nobody knew where things would end. It is an example of one thing leading to another. There were plenty of people in America in 1776—the Loyalists—who said this was too big a step, that bad laws were one thing but that breaking up the British Empire over them was an overreaction. There were people in London who said that had they known it would come to this, they would have been more willing to compromise earlier. Just as Americans were not unified behind the Declaration of Independence, people in Britain were not unified behind the campaign to suppress the Americans. Many in Britain said the Americans had legitimate grounds for their complaints.
This is crucial to understanding how the war was handled. It was a war that began in politics and would end in politics. The political question for Americans was where their loyalties lay. The political question for Britain was how much pressure to apply and how important it really was to keep the colonies formally subservient to the British Empire. Washington understood this, and it is one of the keys to his success as a military commander. He realized he did not have to defeat the British army outright. He did not have to win the war in a positive sense. He simply had to avoid losing it, because as long as he kept his army intact, the British would have to keep fighting. At any moment, people in Britain had the option to decide that the war in America was too expensive and too much trouble and simply end it. That is ultimately how the war ended.
To put it plainly: Washington lost almost every battle except the one that mattered—the last battle at Yorktown. He knew this all along. He could lose and lose and lose, but if he won the last battle, he won the war, because it would be that final battle that convinced the British that enough was enough and it was time to go home.
Mounk: Alongside the question of independence, there was a whole parallel set of debates about what the nature of this new country should be—should it be a republic or a monarchy, should it be a very loose federation of states or a United States of America with a stronger federal element? What role does George Washington play in those debates? To what extent is the picture of him as somebody who stays above the partisan and ideological battles—like those between Jefferson and Hamilton—accurate, and to what extent is he really just one more ideological combatant in the fights over what nature this new state should have?
Brands: George Washington was no political theorist, and he was surrounded by political theorists. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and others were writing political treatises about how this new country ought to be structured from first principles, going back to the Roman Republic. Washington was not one of those. He was an example of military and then political leadership, and between the theory and the practice of leadership there is sometimes a large gap. Washington’s example—first as commander in chief of the army and then as president—gave the advocates of republicanism cause for confidence that the American people could actually govern itself.
It was a big step. There was very little historical evidence, certainly in the last 2,000 years, that a republic could work. There had been a Roman Republic, so the idea was not created out of whole cloth, but there were no active republics in the eighteenth century that Americans could use as a model. They were trying something that had never been done before—creating a country by sitting down together in Philadelphia, holding a convention, and writing a constitution.
The government that Americans created for this new republic—the one we know today—was in fact the second try. The first had to deal with thirteen separate countries. Several of the newly independent states called their chief executive a president rather than a governor—South Carolina had a president, Georgia had a president. The states considered themselves fully sovereign and independent, owing nothing to each other except proximity and perhaps neighborliness. The shared incentive of winning the war against Britain elicited enough voluntary cooperation among them to make it work. But in some ways, victory over Britain was the worst thing that could have happened for this nascent republic. With the British threat gone, the separate states went their own way. They began bickering among themselves, imposing tariffs on imports from other states, and treating each other as rivals rather than allies.
Washington in particular became very dismayed at this. He had spent eight years of his life, risking his life, trying to create this newly independent country, and within a few years of the war’s end he saw it beginning to fall apart. He became convinced that a stronger central government was needed. Though he had no political ambitions—he had handed in his commission after winning the Revolutionary War and returned to Mount Vernon intending to spend the rest of his life as a planter—he was talked into joining a convention in Philadelphia to write a new constitution that would strengthen the central government. Washington was immediately elected president of the convention, though that meant only presiding officer. One effect of the role was that it spared him the necessity of speaking on the floor of the Constitutional Convention. This brings out a secret of Washington’s. He understood the power of silence. If you don’t speak, people cannot draw negative conclusions about whatever you’re saying.
Mounk: Is this a brilliant strategy, or is it simply his personality? He was surrounded by political theorists who loved to argue about these things—was he personally just not as interested in them?
Brands: It is both. He was not interested in doing it and he was not good at it. But it also enhanced his reputation. Put yourself among all these lawyers and politicians in a small room in Pennsylvania, all arguing with each other and basically lowering themselves to each other’s level. Washington is sitting there silent at the head of the table. People are imagining what Washington is thinking. He doesn’t say. They can all imagine that he is wiser, that he has the answers.
Mounk: It is always tempting to think that since he is wise, and since I know what is best, he must agree with me—he may not be at liberty to say it, but since we are both wise, he must hold the same opinion.
Brands: There is that. But there is also the very practical matter that whichever side wins a particular aspect of the debate can claim Washington, and Washington doesn’t have to disavow anything he said or didn’t say. His silence serves him well. There is also the crucial fact that he had the reputation of being the victorious general, and no one else in that room did. That alone put him head and shoulders above everybody else.
With the exception of Benjamin Franklin—who was some twenty-five years older than Washington—he was a generation older than almost everybody else in the room. If they were founding fathers, he was a founding grandfather.
There is one last thing, and it really gets at Washington’s attitude toward being president and toward leaving the presidency. Washington recognized that his reputation was as high as it was ever going to get at the end of the Revolutionary War. He was the victorious general, the father of the country. He realized that anything he did after that could only tarnish his reputation, and so he had every incentive to stay out of politics.
When George III called Washington the greatest man in the world for relinquishing command, consider the counterfactual: suppose Washington had said in 1783 that he was not giving up command and intended to take over the government. What would he have taken over? There was no government to take over. America was an alliance—something like, today, a German, British, or French general deciding to take over NATO. You march on Brussels and what do you have? All the power and all the wealth are elsewhere.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha Mounk and H.W. Brands discuss how Washington shaped the presidency and what lessons this period has for the United States 250 years later. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
James Traub is a journalist, author, and scholar. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Institute For The Humanities, and the Society of American Historians.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and James Traub discuss why progressive pedagogy is failing American students, how classical schools are achieving better outcomes through traditional teaching methods, and whether learning facts versus critical thinking represents a false choice in education.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Your latest book is about how to educate citizens in the United States, a relevant topic today. A lot of the debates in this area are about what students should be taught: are they being indoctrinated in woke ideology, or are they being indoctrinated in right-wing thought that downplays the evils of slavery? You think that in some ways, those very ideological debates are a little bit beside the point.
James Traub: These are the sexy things everybody wants to seize on—the whole right-left thing, which is an important part of my book. But if you go to school, which of course the people who are having this fight don’t, I spent a year in classrooms. One thing that struck me is the relatively-less-politicized-than-I-thought character of classrooms. You can go to a red state which has very red state standards written into its laws, and the teachers aren’t thinking about that. They often don’t know what’s in the standards. Teachers have a strong ethos that says, I don’t want to impose my views on the kids. Though that is an important part of my book, the thing that troubled me more was not what they’re taught. It’s how they’re taught. It’s pedagogy as opposed to politics.
American education, as far as I can tell, is ideological in a way that’s not true elsewhere. What I mean by that is not the right-left thing we were just talking about. It’s the notion that there is a progressive way to teach and there’s a conservative way to teach. That makes it very hard to have a sane and sober conversation about what’s an effective way to teach. The classes that I was in—many history, government, social studies, and other classes over the course of a year in many different places—the thing that troubled me was not the politics. It was how vacuous, how empty, how silent many of these classes were. It was how poor the reading comprehension of many students was. It was how little was assigned to them, how few books there were in the schools and in the classrooms.
The thing that I focused on, and I think is terribly important, is a pedagogy—the one called progressive pedagogy—that has this idea, which you could trace back to John Dewey and others, that learning facts, learning information, learning names, dates, places, the things you do in a history class, or for that matter an English class, is coercive, that it’s jamming things down children’s throats. A more effective way of teaching, in this view, is to engage their wish to ask big questions, to engage in critical inquiry and so forth, and, through that, they will come to know things. I don’t think that’s how most educated people got educated. Educated people got educated because they learned, they loved to learn, they found a way of learning. When you learn things well, you are naturally launched into the world of critical inquiry and thinking critically.
Mounk: Let me play devil’s advocate on this, because I’m a little bit torn. Even though I lived in mostly left-leaning parts of Germany and was taught largely by students who were part of a generation of 1960s student radicals, the education I received was, by that definition, quite conservative. History class was an unending parade of years and battles, learning off by heart various kings. The stakes of this were never made clear to me, and I was tremendously bored—it just felt like a rote exercise. I still grew up in an old world Europe where the idea of general knowledge about the world was really prized, and I had intellectual aspirations even relatively young. But it really felt like a rote exercise. Why does it matter that Frederick the Great ascended the throne at a certain point and died at a certain point? Well, part of why it matters is that he had a certain set of views and personality that shaped Prussia, and there’s a debate about whether something like enlightened monarchy actually existed. When you explain those stakes, then it becomes relevant when Frederick the Great ascended the throne. If you’re just learning that he was an influential king, these were his dates, and then a couple of dates of battles, you just don’t start to have a stake in this debate in the first place.
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On the other hand, I know that you need a certain set of facts and figures in order to actually engage intelligently in a conversation. I’ve been trying to learn more about China and I’m learning Chinese. I worked my way through a very good history of China, but I had real trouble retaining a lot of information because I don’t have enough context on the Song dynasty to really be able to place things in a scaffolding, and so I retained less. I certainly understand why you need some facts as well.
To give a third kind of alternative, I was always struck by the way that history is taught in Britain. It’s always taught through debates. Right from day one, it is: here’s one view of what happened in this period; here’s a second view of what happened in that period. That involves learning dates and facts that are contested, or the interpretation of which is contested. But the stakes are immediately made clear because you’re thrown into a debate about how to understand a period of history. Perhaps that’s a third possibility. I have to say that I’m slightly sympathetic to this idea that just throwing names and dates and battles at people is not going to get them interested.
Traub: Two thoughts. First, I’m fascinated that all of your super left-wing ’60s German professors were nevertheless still so unconsciously rooted in the pedagogy in which they had grown up that they repeated it. That’s in itself very interesting. Second, yes, there’s a reason why there was a progressive revolt against traditional forms of pedagogy—it’s because rote learning of facts with no larger purpose in view is boring and pointless.
For the purpose of this book, I read about the first times that American public education became a matter of debate, which was the 1890s or so. In the debate over what should be taught to American students in history, Woodrow Wilson was one of the members of the panel, and the great historian Frederick Jackson Turner was a consultant. You would have thought they would have said students must learn more history. What they said instead is that history must be presented in a way that makes it meaningful to students. For them, that did not mean students must not learn an important body of information. That body of information has to matter because you need teachers who are—and this was the language they would use—fired with enthusiasm for the subject.
The classes that I was in over the course of this year where I felt that learning a lot of material was always directed towards inquiry were the Advanced Placement classes or the International Baccalaureate classes. That made me think: can it really be that only 10% of the kids in the school are able to do the kind of work where real substantive learning leads to thoughtful conversation? The best schools that I was in were schools where I found that to be much more widespread—where it was simply taken for granted that if you’re in 11th grade, you are able to think important thoughts.
I’ll give you one last example. I was in a class the week before last, sitting with ninth graders—14 and 15 year old kids—who were having a deeply thoughtful conversation about the Aeneid. Ninth graders in America do not read the Aeneid. They don’t read whole books. But these kids were having a deeply searching conversation about it. The two are not in necessary tension. That’s what good teaching is.
Mounk: Let’s take a step back. One thing that I was always struck by coming from Germany is just the huge range of quality in American public schools in particular. Europeans often have this image that American schools are all quite bad. I didn’t find that to be true at all. I never went to an American high school, but based on what friends told me about the schooling over the years, I feel like I have a relatively good sense of it. When you look at the most failing schools in the country, you have a vast majority of students graduating barely literate, barely numerate—a complete disaster. Then when I hear about some of the schools that my friends went to in the suburbs of major metropolitan areas, which are public schools but in fancy neighborhoods—one friend of mine was in a rocket club where they had to call up NASA before launching some of the rockets because they were going to go up that high. I’d never heard of anything like that in Germany.
Traub: I went to one of those schools myself—a school full of neurotic, highly literate Jewish kids, a public school. It was great because it was a well-to-do suburb. We had great teachers and there was a huge emphasis on learning.
Mounk: Just to get a level reading here—the schools you’re going to: are you seeking out the worst and the best schools to contrast, or are you trying to look for average schools? What kind of schools should we be imagining when you’re talking about your experience reporting on this?
Traub: The first chapter of my book talks about schools in a suburb of Chicago—a big suburban area, largely middle-class and highly diverse. The first school I was in was the kind of school where almost everybody was going to go to college, probably many of the parents had gone to college, they had great facilities, the school was clean and nice. It was a majority white school, with Asian students as the second largest group—relatively high achieving students. And yet, when I was in a class of 10th and 11th graders reading the Declaration of Independence, it was very hard for a lot of them. I don’t think it was vocabulary in that sense—I suspect what defeated them more was unfamiliar syntax. Their reading ability, broadly understood, not just the ability to say or know the words, was surprisingly poor. What that meant is that those kids could not have had the conversation like the one I heard among the ninth graders about the Aeneid. They were not academically prepared to do it.
When you have this big fight about whether students should be learning a left-wing or a right-wing version of American history, you have to say: before you get there, they have to have the ability to think their way through a difficult text.
Mounk: Why is it that these ninth graders were able to have a certain conversation about the Aeneid, but these older kids at this other school—which is not a failing school, which is a pretty good and probably above-average school—could not? What explains the difference between these two schools?
Traub: The good story in my book involves what are called classical schools—a term I’d never heard before I set out to write this book, and a kind of school that would be unfamiliar to many listeners, in part because they’re seen as conservative. The word “classical” probably doesn’t help. They’re much more common in red states than blue, but it’s one of the most rapidly growing forms of schooling in the country. These are public schools—charter schools, which allows them to do things differently if they want to, but public schools nonetheless.
Mounk: Part of what you mean by private schools in this context is that they’re not fee-paying. So there’s not an extra financial burden for kids to attend these schools.
Traub: These schools are free and they have to take everybody who applies—they’re not selective. That’s very important, because if they were selective, you could say of course they’re taking especially talented kids. They are selective only in the sense that the parents choose to seek to have their kids get in.
These schools are self-consciously traditional in their pedagogy—a belief in vocabulary, learning stories, reading books. You may think that reading books is simply what you do in school, but the book is a rare thing in American public schools. Kids are not asked to read a book because it’s too taxing for their now very short attention spans. These schools assume that a kid can read a book, likes to read a book, wants to read a book. By fifth or sixth grade, kids are reading great novels—The Count of Monte Cristo—and talking about them. They learn Latin from an early age. They read the Iliad and the Odyssey—first in adapted versions, and then in grown-up versions later on.
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These schools tend to have a lot of rules. Kids wear uniforms. They’re schools that a lot of parents probably wouldn’t like—too strict, they would say. One of the things I say in my book is: let’s think about what general principles we can learn from these schools, even if you don’t like them. One of those principles is that kids can do a lot more if from an early age you start them with higher expectations and more rigorous forms of learning. I went to another school like that with only Hispanic kids, many of them from impoverished backgrounds. Their conversations weren’t as searching, but they were reading Crime and Punishment in 10th grade—which is pretty remarkable if it’s your second language and you didn’t grow up in an educated household.
Mounk: Do you think this is something that could be rolled out more broadly, and it’s really just a question of the wrong approach having gained too much ground in a lot of public schools? Or do you think there is a selection effect? You’re saying rightly that these schools have to admit everybody, but one of the big indicators of success in life is how educated your parents are. If you have educated parents and you have to flee your country penniless, come to a new country where your parents don’t have any social capital, don’t speak the language particularly well, don’t have any connections—statistically, the kids of those parents are going to do very well. So the self-selection by the parents may still play a crucial role here. How much do you think the education of our kids would improve if a lot more schools adopted either this classical curriculum or a modern version of it—not necessarily learning Latin and reading the Aeneid, but reading the great novels in the English language and great contemporary novels?
Traub: My little dream is to rename this form of education “liberal education,” which is what it would have been called in the Renaissance. If you took that word away, maybe you could have more of these schools in the blue world—and if you had them in the blue world, they would have different ideas about the way you want to shape a young person, which would be a good thing.
As for your first question, there are no studies of this yet. There is something called Core Knowledge—E.D. Hirsch, a great literary scholar at the University of Virginia, created a pedagogy which assumes that you need to have high familiarity with a lot of words and expressions in order to read your way through a text. It’s a focus in curriculum across almost all the major subjects on learning particular things as a means towards becoming a more thoughtful and critical actor. There are a lot of studies that show that it works. If you were to ask what can be generalized from these schools, that pedagogy is the big thing.
The people who say their daughter is not going to be happy in such a strict school, that she’s a free spirit—they shouldn’t go there. But there is nothing conservative about learning in the Core Knowledge way. There is nothing liberal—speaking as a liberal, a left liberal—about the other thing that calls itself progressive learning, though it has a liberal pedigree. When I talk to people, I get the strong sense that America is full of people whose politics are liberal but whose intuitive pedagogy is traditional, like me.
Mounk: What about the selection of the teachers? I assume that a lot of these classical schools also have teachers who may be more educated, may have a deeper love of learning, who are excited to be part of one of these model experimental schools because perhaps they are disenchanted with how normal schooling works. I imagine that the quality of the teachers in these schools may also be higher than in regular public schools.
More generally, what did you think about the quality of teachers in the schools you were in? I’m really struck by the fact that if you go back to the 1950s and 1960s, a lot of teachers were women who had graduated in the top 10% of their class. There obviously weren’t other job opportunities, or there was an expectation that they would do that job for a number of years and then get married and leave the workforce—so it was for bad reasons, produced by bad background conditions. But it was a great thing for the students of that age, because they were taught by very, very smart people. My understanding is that today the average, or median, teacher graduated in the bottom half of their class. If that’s the case, how can you get teachers who were not among the best and brightest when they were in school to inspire students who, even though they may not be getting a great education at 15 or 16, are in some ways smarter than their teachers? That is a hard setup.
Traub: If I were king, this is what I would do: increase teacher salaries—by a lot. Who knows what number, 50%, I don’t know. Then you not only would have a better pool to select from, but you could make different demands than the ones you make now. The schools that I was so admiring rarely take teachers whose graduate degree is in education. They take teachers whose graduate degree is in a subject matter. The school that I write about the most—a school in a middle-class, working-class suburb outside of Dallas called Louisville—the principal there said to me: I can help a teacher who doesn’t have the pedagogical background be a better teacher. I cannot take a teacher who doesn’t have the love for his or her subject and infuse that. He only hired teachers who had a master’s degree in a subject. Most of the other schools I went to, almost all the teachers—except the best ones—had an education degree and not a subject matter degree.
My book is not about teachers’ colleges, so I don’t hold myself out as an authority on the subject. But the overwhelming impression I got was that if a teacher isn’t fired with enthusiasm—to go back to that 1890s language—for the subject matter, then it’s very hard to fire the students with enthusiasm. The only way to get teachers who are fired with enthusiasm is to get people who are intellectually alive, and those people need to get paid better to go into teaching.
Mounk: Let me play devil’s advocate here, and this is perhaps my least popular position. When you look at the OECD studies of teacher pay, the United States is well above the average of OECD countries. Part of that is that the United States is rather richer than a number of other OECD countries. The way in which the United States stands out is not that teachers make comparatively low pay. Having lived in both the United States and Europe, I think the average American teacher has a better standard of life than most teachers in other countries. The problem is that lawyers and doctors in the United States earn so much more than their peers in other countries that the economic gap is very difficult to bridge. But I don’t know that the way to solve that is to get a teacher to earn 75% or 50% of what a doctor earns, when the doctor’s pay is already so high that it’s basically unsustainable for patients to seek medical care.
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The other thing to note about teacher pay is that when you look at the LA School District, for example, teachers actually make a lot of money. One of the problems is the structure of it—in the first few years you earn very little, but once you get a certain kind of tenure, you actually make a great deal. Part of this is the teachers unions, which structure pay in such a way that senior members of the profession live very well for years, with extreme job protections. But that’s not enticing younger talented people to go into the profession. How do you solve some of those structural issues?
Traub: I think you’re exaggerating the steepness of that curve. Salary structures in the teaching profession tend to follow a steady, stepwise progression, with a bigger step if you’ve gotten another diploma or achieved certain milestones. It’s not as radical as that. I don’t think you have a whole lot of teachers earning $160,000—that’s quite rare. But when your starting salary is $48,000 or something like that, that’s tough.
Interestingly, at these classical charter schools, teachers are paid less, for reasons having to do with how they’re compensated by the state. How do they get decent teachers? The answer, in some of these schools—not all of them, some had fairly normal teachers and nevertheless the kids were still doing well—but at the best one I went to, when I talked to the teachers and asked why they were there, they would say: “Because I get to teach beautiful things. I get to have elevated conversations. I get to talk about great books with the kids.” I admit there’s a limited number of people who will do that—it takes real dedication. But it does tell you that the atmosphere of the school matters a lot in terms of the kinds of teachers it’s going to attract.
Mounk: Let me push back on that a little bit, because I think it’s important to understand the incentives here. The first thing you said is that a lot of the teachers you were disappointed with had gone to teachers colleges. It’s interesting to talk about what teachers colleges teach and how they shape education. From my understanding, these are extremely ideological places, not just in the content they convey but also in what they teach about the right approaches to pedagogy.
We’ve been talking about kids that are older, but for a long time a lot of American school kids weren’t even taught how letters work—how letters correspond to particular sounds and how that allows you to form a word. It took me years of ambient awareness of this debate to understand what was even at issue, because it seemed so incomprehensible that you wouldn’t learn that.
Traub: That’s the most notorious aspect of what I’m calling progressive pedagogy. The premise behind what’s called “whole language” is that children acquire reading ability naturally—that if you place them in an immersive bath of language, they will learn to read. That’s wrong. You don’t acquire reading the same way you acquire talking. But that was based on a kind of ideological predisposition, a Rousseauian view of the child. It’s very hard to break that view. But that view has been broken.
Mounk: Just to go back to this question about teachers, because I think it’s helpful to have a sense of it: a new teacher with a regular credential in Los Angeles has a typical starting salary of about $69,000. That’s not a ton of money, but for a young person—presumably most of these people are in their 20s—that is about average household income in the United States. If you’re a couple and you’re both teachers, you start off at double the typical household income. You live in a high-expense area, and Los Angeles is an expensive place—that’s important to acknowledge. But that is hardly catastrophic. By the time you’ve taught for about 10 years, a typical veteran teacher can expect to make around $110,000. On your own, you’re making about twice US household income. If you were a couple where both people are teachers, you make about four times the average US household income. It’s just not clear to me that the solution is for teachers to be making significantly more than that. That doesn’t seem to me to be the crux of the problem.
Traub: Let’s ask ourselves a question: as a society, do we feel that teachers or lawyers play a more fundamental role in shaping good collective outcomes? These are market-driven things, but if we do feel that we have an educational crisis—and my general view is that most spending in schools doesn’t produce any different outcome at all, whether it’s fancier buildings, swimming pools, or even smaller classes—then the only place where I would be in favor of spending more money is in some agreed transaction between paying more and demanding more. Your point, I believe, is that we’re already paying enough to make bigger demands than we’re currently making. That may be true. All I would say is it isn’t working now, and so I’d be in favor of trying to find some other way of making it work better. That said, it’s not going to happen anyway—these are local decisions.
Mounk: Let me make myself even more unpopular with two other segments of my listeners. If the problem isn’t that, as an individual earning $110,000, you can’t have a decent life in LA, or as a couple earning $220,000 you can’t have a decent life in LA—and I don’t think that is the problem—then a lot of the problem is relative prestige. A young person in Germany who thinks they’d like to become a teacher might worry that classmates choosing to become doctors or lawyers are going to have higher social status and more money. But the gap isn’t that large, so they pursue their love of teaching. Whereas in the United States, that same person at a good college who’s excited about teaching might in the end decide they don’t want to be in such a different earnings category than their friends, don’t want to have such a different level of social status, don’t want their friends always feeling sorry for them or to wonder if they can go out to dinner with them. Perhaps they’ll go and apply for that job in consulting or tech or investment banking instead. I’m sure that happens a lot—I know people like that.
Traub: Except that you can go to Teach for America—that’s one prestigious thing you can do. You can spend two years as an enrollee in one of these programs. But then the question becomes: how do we keep those people? How do we make them feel like this should be a lifetime vocation?
Mounk: Part of the answer is that we can’t have the taxpayer try to compete with the salaries currently paid to doctors and lawyers, because they’re completely disproportionate. The best-paid doctors and lawyers are always going to earn more, and there’s nothing we can do about that in a free society. But there is one thing we can do, which is to bring down the salaries of lawyers and particularly doctors. The way to do that is to recognize that those salaries are kept artificially high by licensing. Particularly in the case of doctors, the American Medical Association refuses to credential new medical schools, which would lead to many more doctors being trained. America has one of the lowest rates of doctors per capita in the developed world, and that is one of the reasons why the salaries of doctors are so high. So rather than taking the politically more left-leaning solution of increasing teacher pay, perhaps what we should do is push against some of those artificial regulations that create that disproportion in the first place.
Traub: The lawyer situation is really driven by their clients. Law firms are always seeking corporate clients because that’s where the money lies, so having more law schools may not have much of an effect. In any case, we are now talking about what I offered as an idle fantasy—I don’t have an overwhelming belief in it.
Mounk: What is the role of teachers unions in all of this? I had Randi Weingarten on the podcast for an interesting and at times somewhat contentious conversation a few months ago. To what extent do these classical schools that you admire have less influence from teachers unions, or perhaps the teachers aren’t generally part of unions?
Traub: Probably not, because these tend to be red states—though I don’t know that for a fact, since municipal teachers unions are pretty widespread and individual schools can choose to have a union or not. I was on the board of a charter school in New York City for many years and the teachers—I think through our own fault—were unhappy. They said they needed the protection of a union, they joined one, and I thought this was going to be the end of the school. It didn’t make that much of a difference.
If you ask me whether the world would be better with or without teachers unions, it’s a hard question because there are positives and negatives on both sides. Teachers unions view charter schools as competition and oppose them—that’s the worst aspect of unionization, the closed-shop mentality where you’re not thinking about what’s good for the kids but about what’s good for you as a professional. That’s bad. On the other hand, raising salaries is good. If you said to me there should not be public sector unions—which is an interesting claim made by some on the right who believe in unionization but not public sector unionization—I might say, perhaps in an ideal world you’re right. There should be more unionization in the private sector and less in the public sector.
Mounk: I want to make sure that we circle back a little bit to the content. What did you see people being taught about America? The cliché is that in progressive schools, students are taught that America is bad and evil, and in conservative schools, they’re taught that slavery never happened. I’m sure the reality is much more subtle on both counts.
I happened to have had a conversation with some of my undergrads about this recently. There was a big range in what they were taught depending on where they were from. Students from blue suburbs of cities in Texas, for example, reported a fairly middle-of-the-road education. Students from somewhat more conservative-leaning parts of Kansas reported much the same. But the students who had gone to schools in the suburbs of New York, LA, and San Francisco reported two things. First, that they had a very identity-focused education, to put it as neutrally as possible. Some of these kids agreed with that education and were shaped by it; some had rebelled against it in various ways. But they agreed that it had really been the prevailing focus of everything in any social science related subject they studied. Second, a good number reported that some of their teachers were highly ideological in a way where it was clear you had to agree with them to get a good grade.
That’s the thing that really troubled me. I think it’s fine for teachers to betray their worldviews in some ways. I try in the classroom to always play devil’s advocate and present the strongest version of different views. But I’m also a public figure—my students can easily figure out what my views are and I don’t hide them in the classroom. What is really important to me is to empower each student to think for themselves. One way I put this is in how I give advice on writing an essay: if I already agree with your thesis, I want to make sure it’s the best version of that thesis. A lot of the time I’m not going to agree with your thesis at the beginning or at the end. What I’m going to judge the essay on is whether it moves me towards your position. Do I think, at the end of reading this essay, that there are arguments here I should grapple with, even if I’m unlikely to change my mind? I’d much rather you put forward a thesis I disagree with, smartly and in a logical, coherent way, than that you echo back something you think I might believe.
The students I spoke with were not particularly exercised by what they had been taught one way or the other. But you could see the seething anger in those who had felt that teachers were highly ideological—where you knew you could write really badly and get an A if you reflected back what the teacher believed, and you knew that no matter how well you wrote, you would be in trouble if you wrote something else. Sometimes these were students who actually agreed with their teacher and didn’t have a problem with the substance of their views, but they still chafed against that dynamic.
How did you experience in the classroom both what students were taught, and whether teachers empowered students to argue, to disagree, to put forward their own point of view—or whether they abused the power of the classroom?
Traub: In general, I found classrooms less ideological than people think they are. I remember a conversation I had with a teacher who said that when he was a college student, he wrote an essay defending the surveillance act that was passed after 9/11 and his teacher gave him a D simply because the teacher was a liberal and thought it was a bad thing. He said that stuck with him, and he would never do that to a student. His goal was to help students arrive at their own views. I found that to be the default position of teachers.
When I read a lot of the conservative critique of schools, I thought I needed to find out whether it was really true that there are whole parts of the country where schools are deeply ideological. So I went to some schools in Minneapolis. As it happened, the high school I went to was in the catchment area of George Floyd’s neighborhood, so it was profoundly affected by what had happened there. The principal—a person I admired in many ways, ambitious, active, and restless—was deeply committed to the anti-racist notion that all white people harbor innumerable unconscious racist impulses and that one of the purposes of education is to bring them out into the open. That was relentlessly part of the educational program. I said to her: do you really want to create a situation where a student who doesn’t hold that view is told that that’s probably a sign that he or she is racist? Her response was: what are you saying, that there’s no such thing as structural racism? So yes, that exists, and I have a whole chapter about it in the book.
One of the most fascinating things I saw was a meeting of this principal with her council of teachers, where she was saying they had to make sure they were not punishing students of color by giving them bad grades—that they should have the same fraction of good and bad grades among white students and students of color.
Mounk: That is a remarkable demand—a demand to not grade people on the basis of their individual work. The fact that a principal of a school is demanding this should be a national scandal. The fact that students on the basis of race are not going to be able to get the same grade in a public school is a national scandal.
Traub: It’s a terrible misfortune. The teachers pushed back and said: the white kids who go to this school come from a middle-class background, while the children of color come from a pretty impoverished background—they don’t have the same academic preparation and they’re not going to do as well. She backed off a little bit. At least it was a matter of debate and discussion. But it is true that she had these strong priors that made her insist on things that I thought were just wrong, and that showed me that the right-wing critique is not totally off base.
Mounk: Interesting. Was your impression that this is a subset of schools that are like that?
Traub: I didn’t go to that many of the kinds of schools you’re describing—well-to-do, very progressive suburban areas. That’s probably true of those. But here’s a counter example. I went to a school in New York City, in Long Island City, that was like the school you’d see in a TV show—kids of every color, race, and ethnicity. I never heard a word about identity. It was called the Academy of American Studies, and the premise of the school was to teach much more about American history, government, and economics than you would get in a normal school. Interestingly, it wasn’t the kind of well-to-do, progressive, largely white school that maybe your students went to—the kids who went there were working-class immigrant kids. Even though they lived in the very progressive culture of New York City, they were perhaps less inclined to think in identitarian terms than left-wing white kids. I didn’t encounter that kind of ideological atmosphere nearly the way I did in Minneapolis.
Mounk: For the record, the students I talked about were mostly non-white themselves. My impression is that they probably went to schools that were predominantly Asian, white, and high-achieving Latino, in quite multi-ethnic and multicultural parts of the country, but probably quite affluent districts. That is an interesting point of context.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and James discuss practical steps to reform education and whether boys and girls have different learning styles. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Donald Trump is attempting to engineer a $1.8 billion taxpayer-funded slush fund to be paid to persons and groups that got in legal trouble promoting his interests. It’s one of the most notable legal stories of this (or almost any) year.
In January, Trump and two of his sons sued the federal government, claiming that his own Internal Revenue Service had failed to prevent a rogue contractor from unlawfully leaking parts of his tax returns to the press in 2019 and 2020. U.S. District Judge Kathleen Williams was skeptical about the suit, since Trump had appointed and could fire the officials charged with defending the U.S. Treasury.
On Monday, it was announced that Trump had dropped the suit, forcing the judge to relinquish her jurisdiction. Within hours, he unveiled a “settlement” with the IRS, which at that point could proceed without judicial supervision. On Tuesday, an “addendum” to the settlement was released, signed by Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche.
Legal journalist Roger Parloff was among the first to dig into the language of the purported settlement. He writes:
The Trump/Blanche “settlement” fund purports to be challengeable only by those who colluded to create it.
To help themselves to nearly $2B of our tax dollars, claimants present evidence to the (wink-wink) “settlement” fund that they were victims of “Lawfare” or “Weaponization,” terms that are nowhere defined.
The fund is administered by 5 people chosen by Acting AG Todd (“I love you, sir”) Blanche, and are removable at will by Trump.
The identities of those given our tax dollars, and how much, will be kept secret from us, and known only to Todd (“I love you, sir”) Blanche.
The procedures for processing these claims can be as secret as Blanche’s appointees choose to make them.
Two other provisions of note: the fund must wrap up operations and liquidate by December 2028, ensuring that later administrations cannot get their hands on it (or more to the point, I suspect, its records).
It has a second, longer section purporting to exclude judicial review: “there shall be no appeal, arbitration, or judicial review of claims, offers, or other determinations” made by the fund.
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The sum transferred is to be $1.776 billion, a number that is cute but reveals the arbitrariness at work. Blanche’s argument that this is the sum expected to be paid had claimants gone through regular legal processes is baldly mendacious. At any rate, no judge had anything to do with that number.
Additionally, under Tuesday’s addendum to the settlement, the IRS is “FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED” (capitals in original) from asserting civil or criminal claims against Trump, his companies, and his family over any tax returns filed up to the present date. At least so Blanche—who is also Trump’s former personal attorney—has agreed.
Nice deal if you can get it! Maybe you can get it if you’re “negotiating” with someone who serves at your pleasure?
The slush fund has not been without its supporters. The most common line of defense is that prior administrations did something similar, setting a precedent for creative use of large-scale settlements by the government. As the Cato Institute’s Tad DeHaven and Molly Nixon note, Blanche cites earlier cases under the Obama and Clinton administrations in which the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) “resolved discrimination claims brought by Native American, Hispanic, and female farmers” who claimed that they had been discriminated against in agricultural loans and other programs.
Blanche stated that those cases were “settled on similar terms” to the new slush fund.
No, they weren’t. The USDA discrimination settlements indeed deserved the vigorous criticism I and others directed at them at the time. And as DeHaven and Nixon write, they “did indeed tap the Judgment Fund”—the permanent fund established by Congress in 1956 to pay out claims against the federal government, which is the same pool that Trump’s slush fund is drawing from.
But those USDA claims were overseen by the courts, and were intended for people who had made claims in the legal system or who were similarly situated to people who had made claims. The underlying issue was USDA discrimination, so the funds were intended for people alleging such discrimination.
This new slush fund, by contrast, is not structured to assist victims of improper tax disclosure, which was the allegation behind Trump’s original lawsuit. Nor has the settlement been overseen by the courts. Instead, the level of generality as to offense committed and injury suffered is set high enough to give the fund broad discretion to reward Trump’s friends and turn away his foes so long as they can claim they were “targets” of lawfare during the Biden administration. There is no neutral third party administration, no appeal, no public accounting, and of course no court supervision from the get-go, the whole thing having been engineered to escape scrutiny by any judge. Not much of a comparison to the Clinton- and Obama-era USDA discrimination settlements, then.
It’s also true, of course, that the persons and groups given money in those settlements had not been prosecuted for crimes meant to prevent the peaceful transfer of power following an election. Blanche, on the other hand, has explicitly refused to rule out that part of the new $1.8 billion fund will be paid out to rioters convicted of storming the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
I’ll close by quoting Nick Catoggio in The Dispatch:
It’s simple theft packaged in the argle-bargle of “weaponization” and “compensation.” … The president behaves with impunity because he believes most of his party will unthinkingly defend anything he does, and he’s correct.
Harvard professor of government Ryan Enos, meanwhile, calls this “the most brazenly corrupt action in U.S. Presidential history.”
I’m not prepared to pronounce either way on that. But it seems fair as applied to the presidents I’ve followed over my lifetime.
Walter Olson is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies.
Versions of this piece first appeared in The UnPopulist and on Walter Olson’s Substack.
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Don’t miss our Intellectual Bootcamp, which will be TODAY, Friday May 22 at 12pm ET! This week, we’ll be discussing David Graeber’s article “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs.” For those interested in…
ICE’s budget has grown dramatically in recent years, now rivaling, and in some cases exceeding, that of entire branches of the U.S. military. It has been given one mission: the deportation of over 10 million people with virtually no constraints.
Legally and ethically, ICE has pushed past acceptability. Due process is ignored, family members are lost to the system, and excessive enforcement methods have caused public outcry.
Demographically, this mission is setting the United States up for failure in the medium- and long-term. Like many Western countries, the U.S. birth rate is slowing; combined with a low-immigration scenario, this would lead to population decline and all the socio-economic complexities that this entails. With Trump’s deportation campaign, we are already seeing immigration and naturalization rates fall faster than at any point in recent history.
Serious immigration reform was never meant to be like this, and Americans know it. The mission and the agency are now being seriously questioned. Defunding and abolishing ICE are no longer fringe positions. In the upcoming midterm elections, Americans will decide whether ICE’s current mission still has a place in this country.
The danger, however, is in treating defunding and abolishing as the solution rather than the starting point. We need to confront harder, more consequential questions: Who enforces immigration law going forward? What would become of the personnel who, until recently, had a mission, carried guns, and have been told they have federal immunity?
Let’s start with the easier question.
How should immigration law be enforced?Any functional immigration system rests on three things: the capacity of the host country to absorb newcomers, the ability of migrants to contribute, and the humanity to recognize that not everyone arrives under the same circumstances.
That last point matters more than it might seem. There is a fundamental difference between an economic migrant in search of opportunity and an asylum seeker in search of safety. The U.S. system stopped distinguishing meaningfully between the two, and that failure is a fundamental part of the current crisis.
Over the past forty years, legal immigration has become progressively harder. The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (the Immigration Reform and Control Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act), as well as the post-September 11 expansion of enforcement through the creation of Homeland Security and the Secure Fence Act, steadily narrowed legal pathways and increased enforcement—whilst doing little to address the millions already here. While the government attempted to manage this contradiction, the underlying problem remained: legal immigration was too slow, too complex, and too opaque for a country that still represented opportunity to the world.
That gap was filled by asylum. Migrants learned that filing a claim triggered a legal process that allowed them to remain and work for years while awaiting a decision—a rational response to a broken system. An administrative system designed to handle tens of thousands of cases a year was suddenly handling close to a million. The backlog became the system.
Fixing this requires three things. First, legal immigration pathways need to be coherent and timely. Canada’s historical points-based system, which matches migrant skills to economic need, offers a useful model. Second, the asylum system needs to be properly staffed and designed to distinguish genuine refugees from economic migrants. The 2024 Border Act, voted down in the Senate under pressure from Trump, came close to addressing this by proposing thousands of additional asylum officers and a faster adjudication process. Third, there needs to be a path to legalization for people who have demonstrated they are contributing members of society. France allows undocumented residents of over three years to apply for legal status if they have worked for at least twelve of the previous twenty-four months, a pragmatic framework worth seriously considering here.
As for those with criminal records, existing agencies—local police, the FBI, and the DEA—are already equipped to handle them. Deportation remains a legitimate tool in those cases.
A humane, coherent immigration system is achievable, but it requires an agency that can differentiate between opportunity migrants, asylum seekers, and criminals. ICE was deliberately designed to blur those lines. It is impossible to turn an agency built for monodimensional paramilitary enforcement into one that makes civil, humane decisions.
What happens to the people shaped by ICE?Many within ICE come from backgrounds marked by economic insecurity, limited opportunity, or social marginalization. ICE offers them something powerful: a uniform, authority, a sanctioned enemy, and a narrative. Over time, this mission becomes their moral framework. Loyalty and betrayal, order and chaos, us and them. As ICE agents become increasingly isolated from the public because of the job they are being asked to do, they must choose to either leave or double down.
Dismantling the agency or removing its authority without taking into account how it has shaped its employees thus creates certain risks.
Diffusion: Former personnel do not vanish. They could reappear in local law enforcement, private security, militias, and online extremist networks. While their location has changed, their self-image will remain the same.
Re-composition: Groups formerly under federal mandate often reorganize, explicitly or implicitly, around the same narratives that once justified their actions. Violence is no longer framed as enforcement, but as “defense,” “patriotism,” or “restoration of order.” Groups may start appearing outside the law, just like the KKK appeared right after the Civil War.
Moral inversion: Individuals who once acted under state sanction may even come to see the state itself as illegitimate. History shows this clearly: post-Reconstruction militias in the American South illustrate how former enforcers, stripped of formal authority, reinterpreted extra-legal violence as defending “order” against a state they no longer recognized. Internationally, the collapse of French Algeria offers an interesting parallel: after withdrawing from the colony in 1962, former counterinsurgency forces, the Organisation Armée Secrète, turned their violence against the French state, assassinating officials and bombing civilian targets in France. When state-sanctioned enforcers lose formal authority, the narratives that justified violence do not disappear. We may see the emergence of militia groups targeting what they believe is an illegitimate government.
In short: dismantling ICE without reintegration and oversight is more dangerous than anyone seems to realize.
The harder questionCalls to defund and abolish ICE remain morally compelling, but incomplete. We need to have a serious conversation about what the enforcers of yesterday will become tomorrow. History offers relevant precedents, the most striking of which is de-Nazification.
When Nazi Germany collapsed, its enforcers did not simply return to civilian life unchanged—dismantling the regime required significant investment in education, accountability, and a deliberate cultural reckoning to establish that the behavior of the prior regime was unacceptable. We may need to ask ourselves similar questions as to how we ensure ICE agents do not revert to violence. That might mean mandatory reintegration programs, psychological support for personnel leaving the agency, and explicit community engagement requirements before former agents can move into other roles.
Ending ICE is not just about cutting a line item. It is about ensuring that what ICE has built—the culture, the identity, the permission to use force—does not simply move somewhere it is even harder to control.
Benjamin Aimlin is a New York-based French-American Managing Director at an international consulting firm who writes about democratic institutions and policy.
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Thank you to everyone who has come to the first two Intellectual Bootcamp sessions.
The next session will be this Friday, May 22 at 12pm EST. (We are experimenting with additional meetings on a weekly basis for highly-motivated participants.)
We will be discussing David Graeber’s “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs.” For those interested in reading more,…
Of all the names that could appear in a Western-backed plan for postwar Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may be the strangest. The former president was once known for Holocaust denial, anti-Israel speeches, claims that gay people don’t exist in Iran, support for his country’s nuclear program, and the violent repression of domestic dissent.
Yet according to a new report in The New York Times, the United States and Israel considered him as a possible political leader after the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the early days of the war. They consulted with Ahmadinejad about the plan, and attempted to free him from house arrest in February on the first day of the war. But he was injured in the strikes, became disillusioned, and has not been heard from since.
The story sounds too crazy to be true. But if it is true, it shows just how little the Trump administration understands the way power works in the Islamic Republic.
Learning from the experience in January of deposing Nicolás Maduro and installing Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela, Trump’s plan appeared to assume that Iran’s regime could be changed by finding an insider with name recognition to become the new leader. Yet the Islamic Republic is not a leader-centered regime like Venezuela, waiting for a simple replacement. It is a theocratic-security state: real power resides in an alliance of theocratic institutions with the extensive security establishment.
Ahmadinejad served as Iran’s president from 2005 to 2013, and before that as the mayor of Tehran. As a regime hardliner and former member of the state-backed Basij paramilitary organization, Ahmadinejad was part of the core of the Islamic Republic. He understood the regime deeply, and had populist appeal among the lower classes because of cash handouts to the poor he oversaw while president.
Yet his relationship with Khamenei was rocky. The Supreme Leader strongly supported Ahmadinejad after a disputed presidential election in 2009, but the next year Ahmadinejad clashed with the Ayatollah’s circle, criticizing Khamenei and accusing officials, including the IRGC, of corruption. That’s why Khamenei rejected Ahmadinejad’s presidential candidacy in 2017, and why Ahmadinejad has been repeatedly blocked from running since then.
To the Trump administration, it may have looked as if Ahmadinejad was an “insider-outsider”—someone who came from the regime but could be used against it. But this missed a crucial point. Even during his presidency, Ahmadinejad never controlled Iran’s powerful security structure. Khamenei and his theocratic network merely used Ahmadinejad when it served their interests. They saw him as a tool for controlling the state bureaucracy when it was not yet completely under the Ayatollah’s control.
Ahmadinejad opened up the state to IRGC and Basij veterans, who entered ministries, governorships, municipalities, and state companies in large numbers. During his first term, many cabinet positions went to figures with IRGC backgrounds, and the Guard expanded its role in the economy, gaining access to state contracts and advancing further into politics. After the disputed 2009 election, the IRGC and Basij violently suppressed the popular Green Movement to keep Ahmadinejad in power.
But the relationship was transactional. The Guard had little personal loyalty to Ahmadinejad. They answered only to Khamenei. This became clear during Ahmadinejad’s second term when the president’s relationship with Khamenei deteriorated. Ahmadinejad and his circle began to criticize the Supreme Leader, but the IRGC did not stand with the man who had empowered it. It stood with Khamenei, targeting Ahmadinejad and arresting many in his network. The regime labeled Ahmadinejad’s loyalists the “deviant current” and placed the former president under house arrest.
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This history shows why Trump’s reported regime change plan was unrealistic. If Ahmadinejad could not command the IRGC when he was president, why would he be able to command it after a foreign-backed war and the killing of Khamenei?
The United States seems to have confused removing a ruler with building authority. It naively assumed that after Khamenei disappeared, the regime could be redirected to install any recognizable face the Americans and Israelis chose. But in reality, the Islamic regime is thicker than that. The IRGC is an ideological armed force that was created in 1979 to defend the Islamic Revolution and clerical rule. It has spent four decades preparing for coups, infiltration, elite defection, uprisings, and foreign attack. Nobody—not even Ahmadinejad—can rule without first controlling the security-theocratic structure.
If the Times report is true, it raises hard questions about the Trump administration’s judgment. It suggests Washington entered the war with too much confidence that the regime would collapse easily and a successor could be found. And if Washington misread the Iranian political structure at the start, it is likely to misread what kind of settlement is possible in the end.
Everything that’s happened since February proves the plan was a fantasy.
Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga.
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We’re excited to announce that, once again, the Persuasion team will be at the annual Liberalism for the 21st Century Conference (LibCon) in Washington, D.C. on July 16-17—and there’s a special discount for subscribers who’d like to join us!
LibCon is organized by the Institute for the Study of Modern Authoritarianism. This year, the theme is the Reconstruction Agenda, featuring a tour through the major branches of government, both assessing the state of their damage and proposing a path toward renewed confidence in institutions and the rule of law. Speakers will include Ezra Klein, Danielle Allen, Anne Applebaum, David French, Bill Kristol, Jonathan Rauch, and many more!
The conference will also feature a live recording of The Good Fight Club with Yascha Mounk, Francis Fukuyama, and other special guests. Persuasion subscribers will be able to attend an exclusive Happy Hour and hang out with the Persuasion team.
Attendees of LibCon will also have free access to the New Liberal Action Summit (NLAS) on July 15 and until mid-afternoon on July 16, organized by the Center for New Liberalism. Francis Fukuyama will be recording a live episode of Frankly Fukuyama at NLAS, so this is not to be missed either!
Subscribers to Persuasion can access an exclusive discount on tickets—find out more by clicking the button below!
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If you have any questions, please contact [email protected]
We hope to see you there!
– Persuasion team
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