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Timothy Garton Ash is the author of Homelands: A Personal History of Europe and writes the newsletter History of the Present. His upcoming book, Europe in 7½ Chapters, will be published in October 2026.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Timothy Garton Ash discuss the crisis of Labour and rise of Reform, why Europeans are struggling to adapt to a new political, cultural, and technological age, and the future of the war in Ukraine.
Will you be in London on Sunday, September 6? I’ll be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought to mark the publication of his memoir In the Realm of the Last Man at the Sekforde at 5pm. Find out more and book tickets here. Paying subscribers can access a code for free tickets here. —Yascha
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I thought we would do a little European tour with you. I didn’t tell you that we had hired you as a tour guide, but you are our historically and politically informed tour guide. We are going to do a little trip from the northwest of the continent to the southeast in rough geographical order. We will start with local elections in Britain. That does not sound particularly exciting.
The results are coming in as we speak, and they seem to herald a very significant political shift in British politics. What is your read on what is happening?
Timothy Garton Ash: The motto for my intellectual tour company is, of course, “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.” That goes on the brochure. These elections, which are both local but also Scottish and Welsh national elections, are absolutely fascinating. What they show you is that this country, which voted to leave Europe just about 10 years ago on the 23rd of June 2016, is now becoming ever more European in its politics.
Number one, by far the biggest winner in England is Reform UK, which is a classic hard-right populist nationalist party of the kind we basically did not have in British politics for decades, if not centuries. It is very like Fratelli d’Italia, or Rassemblement National in France, or Alternative for Deutschland. I sometimes like to call it Fratelli d’Ingleterra, the Brothers of England. They are sweeping the board, taking votes both from Labour and the Conservatives.
Finding number two, it is also becoming very European: tremendous fragmentation. This used to be the country of the two-party system: Labour and Conservatives, His or Her Majesty’s Government, and His or Her Majesty’s Opposition. Now we have a five-party system in England; and if you take in the nationalists in Scotland and Wales, both of whom are doing very well, you have a seven-party system.
Thirdly, as in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the discontents that flow into a populist vote also flow into votes for separatists, nationalists, or regional parties. The Scottish National Party does spectacularly well in Scotland and, for the first time ever, Plaid Cymru seems to be doing pretty well in Wales. Welcome to Britain, a very typically European country.
Mounk: We are in this strange situation where the Conservatives have been discredited by a long and very chaotic stretch in government. A whole bunch of different prime ministers struggled to deliver on Brexit in the way they promised. They now have a rather impressive new leader in the form of Kemi Badenoch, who has been improving in the polls a little bit in the last months. However, that last decade-plus of chaotic government is really hanging around her neck like a millstone.
We have a Labour Party, the other big traditional party in that two-party system you invoked, that was elected on a huge parliamentary landslide in the general elections about two years ago, but not with a huge share of the vote. Already at that point, part of the reason for its landslide victory was the fragmentation of the political system, but they managed to concentrate enough of that vote on themselves to have this huge parliamentary majority.
They came in with a leader, Keir Starmer, who is a little bit of a chameleon. He was a loyal adjutant to Jeremy Corbyn when the Labour Party was extremely far left. He managed to win the leadership of the Labour Party by being somewhat acceptable to different wings of the party. Then he became very moderate as the leader of the Labour Party and clearly expelled the Corbyn wing from the party, but he never really seemed to have a positive program. The British public has soured on him very quickly once he got into office.
So perhaps the first question is, why is it that Labour has fallen from grace quite so quickly? And why is it that the Conservatives have not been able to pick up the slack of an unpopular incumbent political party, as might be expected in a top two-party system that still has a hold over the country?
Garton Ash: Remember that Labour’s “landslide” victory was, to a significant degree, because the right was split between the Conservatives and Reform UK. Actually, the Labour share of the vote was slightly down from the previous election, so it was not a landslide in that sense.
Secondly, it turns out that Keir Starmer is not a very good politician. He has made a series of often foolish mistakes and an endless series of u-turns. These involve apparently trivial matters, like appointing Peter Mandelson as UK ambassador to Washington. Then, more material from the Epstein files is released, and it turns out that Mandelson was deeply compromised and even sharing inside information from the Cabinet table. That in itself seems trivial, but there has been a whole series of those incidents.
Above all, what are they doing with power? What are they doing with this enormous parliamentary majority? It is totally unclear to everyone where they are going. That is partly because it is difficult to work out where a post-Brexit Britain goes when it is being abandoned by its “best friend,” the United States, and has very little money left in the kitty. With soaring public debt, deficits, and an overburdened welfare state, it is difficult to work out what you would do in those circumstances; but whatever it is you might do, they are not doing it.
Mounk: What about the Conservatives? Why is it that they have not been able to pick up the slack? Is it just the fact that they have been in government for ten-plus years and people are sick of them, and not enough time has passed for them to be able to represent themselves? Is it that Kemi Badenoch is not effective as a leader, or that she has not figured out a way forward for a center-right party?
Is it part of a broader trend? We used to talk about the slow death of social democracy in the 2000s and early 2010s, but it turned out that the slow death of social democracy was just a precursor to the slow death of the old catch-all parties. Christian Democrats and Conservatives across Europe and other countries are now declining in the way that social democrats were, and the Tories are just one instance of that.
Garton Ash: I incline toward the second explanation because that is what we are seeing across Europe. One could even go more broadly than Europe. What was peculiar, not just to Britain but to Europe post-1945, was liberal conservatism, called Christian Democracy on the continent. Now, as we see everywhere, the barrier between that and hard-right nationalist populism is breaking down. If anything, the voters are going off to the hard-right populists, so I would favor that structural explanation.
On top of that comes 14 years of Tory misrule. People have not forgotten that from 2010 to 2024, we had a Conservative government which implemented stark austerity. For many people, even Conservative remain voters, they took the country out of the EU, and everyone can now see that was a terrible mistake.
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Then there is a slightly sensitive issue, which is that on the right, and particularly for populists, immigration is the key issue. Immigration is not just immigration; it is about deeper cultural changes in the country. People feel they do not recognize their country anymore. If you have voters like that who are, say, elderly, white, and middle class, you have a leader who is extremely impressive in her own way, Kemi Badenoch, but who actually grew up in Nigeria and did not know she was a British citizen until the age of 14. She is up against Nigel Farage, the bluff, pint-of-beer-quaffing man from the 19th hole in the golf club. That is an uncomfortable subject to point to, but I do think that for an elderly electorate—and the Tories have an elderly electorate—that is a significant part of the explanation.
Mounk: If I am remembering correctly, Kemi Badenoch was born in the United Kingdom, then grew up mostly in Nigeria until she was a teenager and came to Britain. Unlike Kamala Harris, who claimed to have worked in McDonald’s, but I think there was never any very strong evidence that she had, she did indeed work in McDonald’s and work her way up in a very impressive way. I met her once when I was giving a presentation in Parliament when she was a backbench MP and I had never heard of her. She came and asked a number of somewhat aggressive but very perceptive questions. I remember being very impressed with her at the time and have been following her rise with interest since. There are many things I disagree with her on, but from that first meeting, I thought that she was a very impressive person.
I am a little skeptical about the role that race plays in this for the following reason. I had a debate with a good friend who knows British politics well when there was the leadership election for the Conservative Party. The way it works is that the Members of Parliament narrow the field down to two candidates, and then there is a choice among the membership of the Conservative Party. The membership of the Conservative Party skews old, very conservative, and somewhat away from London. I thought that Kemi Badenoch would win that election quite clearly. My friend was making the same argument that you just made, which is to say, those old Tory Party members are very conservative and quite wedded to an old vision of England. Are they really going to pick somebody like Kemi Badenoch over Robert Jenrick, a white guy who went to university at the same time as me in Cambridge?
Kemi Badenoch won that election very clearly. In that case, it seems we have quite strong evidence that this was not so strong an obstacle to her. It seems to me more broadly that when you look at even right-wing populist movements, people are very open to voting for ethnic minority candidates that they feel represent their views and that actually reassure them that immigrants to the country are able to stand up for the values of their homeland as they see them. Kemi Badenoch, of course, is not averse to a little bit of culture warring. She does very loudly represent what people on the right of politics would think of as traditional English values.
To me, it is not obvious. Surely there are going to be some people who are not going to vote for her because she is Black, because they are out-and-out racist. There are also going to be a lot of people who actually find that very appealing, who say that she is able to make a very full-throated, persuasive case for those values precisely because she is not the stereotype of the person who might make those claims. Why do you think that she was able to win the membership vote in the Conservative Party so strongly? Is that a very different electorate? What is the difference?
Garton Ash: First of all, I really do not want to put too much weight on this particular factor. I think the other two factors are significantly more important. Secondly, I was very impressed when they went for Kemi Badenoch. A party which had the first Jewish prime minister in British history, Benjamin Disraeli, the first female prime minister in Margaret Thatcher, and now they go for a woman of color. Very impressive.
The fact is that an awful lot of Conservative voters have gone to Reform UK. The man you mentioned, Robert Jenrick, who was effectively the runner-up and a leading figure in the Conservative Party, is now a leading figure in Reform UK, along with several other former Conservative ministers.
Let us put to one side the question of race, which in Britain means something slightly different than in the United States and for Kemi Badenoch. The fact is that at the drop of a hat, not just voters but also ministers and senior politicians from the Conservative Party are going off to Reform UK.
Mounk: As a side note, Robert Jenrick was at university with me studying history as well and nobody can remember him, which is a very strange thing.
Garton Ash: It is said—although I am not sure if this is a reliable authority, but according to the columnist Matthew Parris—that he is the only person to have lost an election in which he was the only candidate.
Mounk: I can disconfirm that because the same thing happened when I was an undergraduate in my college. There was a women’s officer for the Students Union for which the electorate was exclusively women. The candidate who ran had electoral posters which were slightly ill-conceived in general, and perhaps particularly ill-conceived given that the electorate was exclusively female, which read: “Vote for me because I’m gorgeous.”
She lost to the option RON, which is short for Reopen Nominations. There is at least one other election I can remember in which that happened.
Garton Ash : Robert Generic is his nickname, and the point is that he is so transparently opportunistic and chameleon-like that it helps explain why he lost to Kemi Badenoch. That is by the by. I think these are secondary issues.
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Now, just one further word on England specifically: let us remember that the Conservative Party is the most successful party in modern political history bar none. I would still not want to write it off. When the memory of 14 years of Tory misrule is a bit more remote and Reform UK starts getting some scandals, which it is bound to do, it may be a different story by the time of the general election, which has to happen before 2029.
Mounk: Speaking of Reform UK, tell us a little bit more about Nigel Farage and Reform UK. Earlier, you compared the party to Fratelli d’Italia, to the Rassemblement National, and to the Alternative for Deutschland. I increasingly think that we may need to make finer distinctions between different right-populist movements. I certainly think that Reform UK is a right-populist movement.
I see the resemblance in certain respects to Fratelli d’Italia, though Italy and Britain are very different countries. I also see the resemblance to someone like Marine Le Pen or even Jordan Bardella, who are clearly in the right-populist camp but have also distanced themselves from the post-fascist roots of what used to be the Front National and the figure of Marine’s father, Jean-Marie.
It does also seem to me as though there is a different wing of European right-wing populism which retains a deeper flirtation with the past and which is more deeply uncomfortable with any form of ethnic and religious diversity. I want to see to what extent you stand by the idea that Reform and the AfD in Germany are comparable, or to what extent it is helpful to think of those as really part of the same families of political parties.
Garton Ash: I think it is. It is certainly more like those classic continental populist hard-right parties than anything we have seen in mainstream British politics for a very long time. Such parties have been absolutely marginal in British politics. In that sense, it is more like them. Its major themes, like immigration, are very much the same, as is the mix of cultural conservatism and nationalism with more left-wing social and economic policy ideas, such as generous provision for welfare state pensions.
In its basic morphology, you are right that it is a more moderate or civilized version of some on that spectrum. It is very much more to the Meloni end of the spectrum than the Orbán or the East German AfD. That is undoubtedly the case.
An important point is that the effect of all this is not necessarily that we see a Nigel Farage Prime Minister, but that either we have a coalition of Conservatives and Reform UK—which is exactly what we are seeing all over Europe, the temptation for the center-right to go with the hard-right because there is no alternative—or we get a reform of our electoral system. If the only party that is doing well out of the electoral system seems to be Reform UK, and the former big parties—Labour and Conservatives, along with Lib Dems, Greens, and others—all go down to under 20%, then suddenly there might actually be a majority for the reform of the electoral system.
Mounk: That would be remarkable. Historically, in the United Kingdom, we had a two-party system between Liberals and Conservatives. The Liberals were supplanted by Labour. When Labour was weakened and far to the left in the late 1970s and 1980s, there was a rejuvenation of the liberal movement through the Liberal Democrats. The Labour Party and the Conservatives, as the two major political parties, were traditionally against electoral reform because “first-past-the-post” was most likely to give them periods of consolidated rule, as it continued to do until recently. It was the lone voice of the Liberal Democrats, along with scattered smaller parties, that wanted electoral reform.
It would be quite a turnabout for Labour, and possibly the Conservatives, to now vote for electoral reform. In the British system, which has very few checks and balances, Labour could just decide to do it; they have a parliamentary majority to put it in place. But it would be an extraordinary anticipatory capitulation, would it not? It would be a recognition that we have no chance of being re-elected or even of having a period in opposition for five or ten years before roaring back to be the governing party. We are giving up on the historic place that we had in the electoral system. Whether you can get the strategic initiative within the party and the willingness to bear that public humiliation is a very interesting question.
I want to cover the other part of the electoral transformation. We have talked about the weakness of Labour, the struggles of the Conservatives, and the rise of Reform. We are also seeing in many opinion polls, including those for the next general election, Labour running more or less head-to-head with the Green Party, which is led by Zack Polanski. In these local elections, another political force has gained significantly: Muslim independent candidates. These are basically sectarian candidates in largely Muslim parts of the United Kingdom running, in part, on issues regarding the Middle East and Israel, but also on deeply conservative social policies.
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You have two trends. The first is a form of sectarianism of which we have started to see inklings in different European countries. In the Netherlands, which has a system of proportional representation and a low electoral threshold, you had the rise of the Denk Party, which is a kind of Erdoğan-esque, mostly Turkish-Dutch party. Secondly, the Greens look very similar to the La France Insoumise of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France. What the French sometimes call islamo-gauchisme is a strange mixture between a bourgeois, highly educated, urban environmentalist left and a deeply conservative, if not reactionary, Muslim identitarian movement under the flag of one political party.
How do you assess the threat that the Green Party poses to the Labour Party, its prospects of establishing itself as one of the major forces on the left, and what do you think about these Muslim independent candidates?
Garton Ash: I do not think the comparison with La France Insoumise really holds up. I would say that Zack Polanski’s Greens are what the French call bobo, or bourgeois-bohemian. His appeal is that he is radical—significantly to the left of Labour on many issues—and, of course, very strong on Gaza.
The classic green issues are also a factor. I am talking to you from Oxford, where the Greens have just had a tremendous success in the local elections, and those are not the kinds of voters you are talking about.
What I would say is that Gaza, and then Trump’s war—or the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran—are not only making us in Europe, including Britain, seem utterly hypocritical through the question of double standards—Ukraine versus Gaza and the Iran war, respect for international law, and so on—but are really damaging what have been relatively good inter-community relations.
In a country where the figure for London is well over 40% foreign-born and nationwide is over 20% foreign-born, with large Muslim communities but also significant Jewish communities, we have had horrifying, repeated antisemitic incidents and stories of antisemitic violence. The Middle Eastern element is a very important part of the story; that is what is helping to tease our politics apart. But that said, Yascha, I think the situation here is nowhere near as bad in that respect as it is in France.
Mounk: You know both countries well, and I have spent a significant amount of time in both as well. I am more pessimistic than you are. When I look at what Zack Polanski has said as leader of the Green Party and how he has positioned himself—he is himself Jewish, but there are members of La France Insoumise who are Jewish as well.
After the terrible terrorist attack in Golders Green recently, in which someone stabbed two visibly Jewish men in a very Jewish neighborhood of London, deliberately targeting Jews, the response of the leader of the Green Party was remarkable, even after other attacks on British Jews in the preceding weeks and months. He had doubted whether a feeling of unsafety among British Jews was rooted in reality or merely perception. His first response after this terrorist attack was to retweet somebody criticizing the police response for subduing the attacker too harshly. Again, we’re talking here about somebody who is in the process of stabbing people, grievously injuring them in a heavily Jewish neighborhood in a terrorist attack and Polanski’s first response was to criticize the police for doing too much to stop this attack.
This is, to me, a level of denial of a very clear and present threat to Jewish life in Britain which is every bit as bad as what Jean-Luc Mélenchon has done in France.
Garton Ash: It is indefensible what he said; I could not agree more. For me, it is utterly shocking that ordinary British Jewish families are talking about needing to emigrate because they do not feel safe in this country.
Where I want to push back a little bit is that La France Insoumise is a major electoral and political force in France. Indeed, there are scenarios in which the second-round runoff might be between someone from La France Insoumise and the Rassemblement National. The Greens are nowhere near that, so I think their larger political significance is much less. However, we are absolutely in danger of attracting the kind of politics in this country from which we have been relatively free.
Mounk: In Oxford, the appeal of the Green Party is to students and left-leaning academics. It is a bobo party—the party of the bourgeoisie bohémien, a term David Brooks invented. I have an episode with him on the podcast about that. In other parts of Britain, the appeal of the Green Party is very different. You see a political coalition in the mix of candidates for local elections: socially progressive students in Oxford and socially conservative Muslim candidates who care about the Middle East. The Green Party is trying to keep this together, but it is not clear how long it can last.
Perhaps that is the natural transition to France. In polls for the next general election—though there are questions about sustainability in a first-past-the-post system—the Greens in Britain currently get between 15% and 20% of the vote. That puts them on par with Labour in some polls. In France, Jean-Luc Mélenchon is around 10% in preferences for the first round of the presidential election. It is not obvious that the Greens are that much weaker than La France Insoumise is in France.
Regarding France, we have important presidential elections coming up in the spring of 2027. Emmanuel Macron cannot run again. Interestingly, there is no lifetime limit on presidential ambitions in France, so Macron can run again in the future, but he cannot run this year. It is not clear there is an obvious centrist candidate to stand in for his movement. The likely candidate for the center is Édouard Philippe, or perhaps the young former prime minister.
The frontrunner is on the right: either Marine Le Pen, if she is allowed to run—which will be determined in a court appeal this summer—or her 30-year-old stand-in, Jordan Bardella. Bardella is an interesting figure who grew up in the suburbs of Paris. Then there is a chaotic left with candidates ranging from the “red-green” Jean-Luc Mélenchon to more moderate candidates like Raphaël Glucksmann in the center-left. How would you describe the political situation in France today?
Garton Ash: As it looks at the moment, the likely next president of France is either Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. If Marine Le Pen is not allowed to stand, the chances may be even better for Jordan Bardella for the simple reason that his name is not Le Pen. In the last quarter century, the French have voted three times in the second round of a presidential election to keep out a candidate called Le Pen: twice to keep out Marine Le Pen, and once before that to keep out her father. There is something about that name which raises a certain allergy. Bardella is presenting himself as the very model of a modern populist.
As every presidential candidate must do in France, he has published a book. There was reporting of business leaders meeting discreetly with him for a nice dinner. I think that is what it is looking like, unless a candidate like Édouard Philippe or another unites everything from Macron’s liberal center to the center-left. It does not look likely at the moment.
The question becomes: how does a Europe with a President Bardella look? Is he more like Meloni or Orbán? If he were really Viktor Orbán, trying to put a spanner in the works at every step in Brussels and simply pursuing the French national interest coûte que coûte, that would be disastrous for the EU. This comes at a moment when it faces an unprecedented triple challenge: under attack militarily from Russia, politically from the United States, and economically from China.
If it seems more likely that it is a Meloni option, maybe that could work. We might actually work out some way of strengthening European defense rather rapidly, because we know we can no longer rely on Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin might have a go at Europe in the next two to three years. We will then have a rather consolidated transition of the European right. The European right will be something different from what we thought it was 15 years ago, when it was center-right, Christian Democrat, and liberal conservative.
Mounk: That is very interesting. I absolutely agree with you about the electoral prospects of Jordan Bardella. Interestingly, nobody I talked to in France agrees with that. In the Macronist camp, they all think they can beat Marine Le Pen because they have done it before. For some of the reasons you mentioned, they are convinced that Bardella is too young and unproven, and that he would fall apart in an electoral campaign. They think it is all hype and TikTok, and that he would fall apart in the debate between the two remaining candidates between the first and the second round. I have heard from quite senior people that they are reassured about the prospects of Bardella running. To me, that gives me echoes of what a lot of Democrats were saying in 2016: “Give us Donald Trump; this is going to be great, and we are going to beat him easily.” It did not turn out to be that way.
Tell me more broadly about how you see the shape of France and perhaps Germany at this point. These remain—despite the enlargement of the European Union and the fact that this Franco-German couple is much less at the center of the EU in political and economic terms—the two most important countries in the European Union, even more so now that Britain has left the bloc. They both seem to be in a deep malaise in different ways.
Germany, it seems to me, had a postwar model that worked very well for decades. In certain respects, it has squandered that model; in others, it has failed to update it in a world where it no longer applies. France, in certain respects, has never quite had a model that worked, at least in a number of decades, and is struggling to find one now. It feels as though there is just this significant weakness at the heart of Europe in economic terms and in terms of a self-understanding of what role the countries of the continent can play in the world.
Perhaps we should raise our eyes a bit above the political battle and think about why it is that, from Germany to France to the United Kingdom, citizens have this deep feeling of economic stagnation, of fear of the future, of growing irrelevance, and of a social contract no longer really holding up.
Garton Ash: Germany is a different matter from France. France is a matter of slowly accumulating problems over a long period of time—an ancien régime which Emmanuel Macron attempted to change and failed to change. There is massive social spending, and the French Revolution is repeated because they want to raise the retirement age to 63 or 64, whereas in other countries people are working to 68 or 69.
Mounk: The striking fact according to the Financial Times is that the average pensioner in France has a higher income than the average working person.
Garton Ash: Yes, and by the way, it creates a beautiful, wonderful way of life which many Brexit-voting Brits love to enjoy in their retirement.
The German case, as you know very well, is one of an incredibly successful national business model which has been blown out of the water by the triple challenge I just mentioned: the famous triad of cheap energy from Russia, cheap security from the United States, and easy exports to China. Crash, crash, crash. All three have gone. Actually, China is doing to Germany what Germany did for much of the world—the mercantilist model of export, export, export—and now it is turning the other way around. China is actually catalyzing a rapid deindustrialization of Germany. Tens of thousands of jobs are being lost in the car industry. The situation is dramatic in the German case.
Unlike France and Britain, what Germany has is money in the public purse. Friedrich Merz has roughly a trillion euros to spend over the next few years on defense and infrastructure. The question becomes: why is Merz not doing so well? I do not think it is so much about the individual. It is true that he does not have much government experience, so he does not always know exactly what levers to press, and sometimes he “shoots his mouth off,” but I do not think it is primarily that.
I think it is what Jarosław Kaczyński, the Polish populist leader, used to call “impossibilism”—the impossibility of making things happen. It seems to me that there is a real structural problem in Germany. This system, which was designed to prevent the emergence of another Adolf Hitler—a federal country, decentralized, with lots of checks and balances—has in the meantime acquired so many more bureaucratic and party-political checks and balances, including a complicated coalition, that it is actually very difficult to change things in a big way. Even a Maggie Thatcher, arguably, would be frustrated in the German system.
The answers are to hand. The big European problem is quite simply the gulf between our huge potential and our actual. Mario Draghi in his report and Enrico Letta in his report have told us what to do: make it a proper single market; have a unified capital market; have a single digital space; have a Europeanized defense industry. There are ways in which we could get much more dynamism back into Europe economically as well as politically, but at the moment the politics, which are still national, are simply preventing us from doing so.
Mounk: I have a few thoughts on this. First, it strikes me that if you talk to any leading French politician or civil servant, they are very impressive people. They are often somewhat provincial—many of them do not have much experience outside of France and do not necessarily speak good English—though that is changing in the younger generation. But they are intellectually brilliant, highly educated, erudite, and hardworking; they are elites in a self-conscious way, with the education to show for it. Yet, France has, by and large, been quite badly governed for the last 60 years.
You speak to German elites and, while there are exceptions, they are mostly provincials. Of the three candidates Germans could choose from for Chancellor in 2021, Olaf Scholz, who became Chancellor, had what I think Churchill said about Baldwin: a “municipal mind.” He had been a somewhat successful mayor of Hamburg, but was far from an impressive visionary or leader, with no charisma. Armin Laschet, whom I spent an evening with at a conference recently, is a very pleasant guy—he drinks five shots of schnapps, smokes three cigarettes, and is very jovial—but he really does not have a great understanding of world politics. He simply does not know or understand basic things about the United States, for example. Annalena Baerbock was pushed as an exciting figure—she is now the Secretary-General of the UN General Assembly—but I think she has very deep political and other weaknesses as well.
It is striking that you have a country like Germany, an impressive place with so many smart, hardworking people, and yet the top political personnel is just far less impressive than that of most peer countries. There are structural reasons for that, such as the federal system, but it is striking because Germany has been quite well-governed for most of the postwar period. However, I think that is because they stumbled upon a model that worked. As long as that model did not need changing, things were okay.
The German political intellectual class has learned the slogan with which Konrad Adenauer won a number of elections in the 1950s and 1960s: Keine Experimente—no experiments. Let us just stick with what we have because the alternative is “who knows what.” Now, they have in part demolished that model. Angela Merkel’s decision to switch off nuclear reactors and instead import coal from Poland—which is effectively what happened—has led to very high energy costs that are strangling German industry.
In part, the model just does not work anymore. As Constanze Stelzenmüller has said, Germany used to outsource its energy needs to Russia, its market to China, and its military needs to the United States. None of those three parts of the model work anymore. There seems to be a lack of serious conversation about this in Germany. People are talking about it, but not in a serious way, and there is a lack of imagination for what the new role of Germany in the world could be. There is a complete failure to recognize that these changes need to happen.
That is where the second point comes in: the coalitional math. Because the populists are now strong on the right and, to some extent, on the left, you never have an ideologically coherent government anymore. It is always some form of “grand coalition.” At the moment, it is technically a Große Koalition—a coalition between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, the two traditionally dominant Volksparteien in Germany. Before that, it was an effective cross-ideological coalition between the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Free Democrats. You always have someone blocking change in any direction. In the current government, a big part of the reason for Merz’s failure is the complete immobility of the Social Democrats, who have just not understood anything about this moment and are blocking any attempted reform.
Garton Ash: I have to say, I think you’re slightly over-egging the pudding in your description of the German versus the French elites and political elites. I’ve met some very impressive people in Germany; traditionally post-1945, the most impressive people have been in business or science. That was traditionally the way it worked.
Actually, Berlin—I was just there a couple of weeks ago—is a very interesting, lively place with a very interesting think tank landscape. If you look at the rethinking on Russia and on security and defense policy, I would say it’s more impressive than that in London and Paris, partly because more rethinking needed to be done. But above all, what I want to say is this: I don’t think the perennial slogan of the politics of the Federal Republic of Germany was “no experiments.” Schröder’s labor market reforms in the early 2000s were quite expensive. I think the slogan or the motto was “change through consensus.” That was the key to the success of the German system—not just consensus within Parliament or consensus between the federal government and the Länder, but also, of course, between capital and labor.
It’s a phrase that I owe to my good friend Michael Mattis: “change through consensus.” The problem is, as you rightly point out and as I was saying a moment ago, that the system has become so complicated with the fragmentation of the party landscape—which is absolutely characteristic of Europe in our time—plus this accretion, sort of barnacles on a ship’s hull, of not just constitutional checks and balances, which are already very large, but regulatory and bureaucratic and procedural checks and balances. “Change through consensus” is just proving extremely difficult to achieve, even if you have a trillion euros to spend.
The larger point I just want to make—I think I’ve made this to you before, but I want to make it because it’s so important to understand: in most European languages, there is no separate word for “policy.” The key structural problem of Europe—I mean the European Union—is that the policies we need are European, but the politics are still national. We need European-scale defense industry, defense policy, capital markets, etc. But the politics keep holding us back because they’re always national. For me, the future of Europe hangs to a large degree on how we manage that tension. Obviously, the logical answer would be to say, well, let’s make the politics European. Let’s have European political parties and direct elections to European Parliament. Been there, tried that; it hasn’t got us very far. So my view is just get on with it and try and make it work.
Mounk: That is a huge structural challenge where a lot of important decisions are now taken at the European level, but it is very hard to muster the will for some kind of coherent change at any of the national levels, and even harder to then bundle that at the European level.
Garton Ash: One consequence of that is that you only need a single veto player in Brussels in the decision-making of the European Union. This brings us on our little tour to Hungary because the prime minister of one small European country, because it was a member state of the EU, could hold up packages of sanctions that everyone else wanted against Russia. He could hold up 90 billion euros, which are crucial to the future of Ukraine for the next two years, until he exacted his price.
The unique structural nature of this voluntary empire, which is the European Union—this empire by consent which empowers small and medium-sized countries—enables them to block larger countries because of the requirement for unanimity. It is a beautiful thing and something new in history, but it does mean that national politics can put an enormous spanner in the works of a very big machine.
Mounk: I see on American lists of “great German words” many phrases that would not be instantly recognizable to most Germans. They might understand them in the sense that they can scan the components and grasp the meaning, but they are not existing idioms. However, there is a lovely German phrase that really does exist: Besitzstandswahrung.
It is the idea that people are motivated by preserving what they have—the protection of vested rights or acquired status. It applies to the German political scene and society, and it is one reason for the current lack of imagination. It applies in France as well. I took part in an exercise called France 2050, which was forward-planning by the French government. An interesting poll found that most French people think things will be a little worse in the future than today; they are pessimistic, but they think things will not change that much.
It strikes me that this is the attitude of many Europeans today outside of France as well. I do not think it is realistic. Either Europe reforms itself properly—in which case things might be better in 20 or 50 years—or it fails to reform, and things could really get a lot worse.
To what extent is Besitzstandswahrung the real condition of Europe? We see it in Britain with the triple lock on the pension system. We see it in France with the rage at Macron for attempting reforms. In Germany, perhaps some think-tank people in Berlin are starting to understand the need for change, but certainly it is not translating into policy, and it is not really translating into a demand for real change from voters either, other than perhaps relative to immigration with people migrating over to the Alternative for Germany. To what extent is Besitzstandswahrung the real condition of Europe, and can the continent overcome it?
Garton Ash: I think that is the question of questions. Because we are still, in spite of all the multiple crises, on the whole—in most, certainly, Western European countries—too comfortable. And look, the largest war in Europe since 1945 has been going on just next door for more than four years, longer than the Great Patriotic War, Russia in the Second World War. I think as of June 11th, it will be longer than the First World War. And most of life just goes on as normal in Western and Central Europe.
What I have just written is a new book, a very short introduction to Europe. One of the points of the book is precisely to say to Europeans: wake up; learn from history. If you do not change, then things can collapse quite suddenly. Tancredi in Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s The Leopard said, “Things must change so they can remain the same”—the famous, oft-repeated line. I think that is exactly where we are.
I think there is an intellectual understanding of that among a lot of the European elites. If you go to a policy intellectual conference, people will absolutely understand that. But does it translate into our politics, which are all about defending our pensions, defending the welfare state, and defending this and that? I think not. And therefore, the quite possible, perhaps even probable scenario is that Europeans in their majority, particularly Western and Central Europeans, will choose gentle decline and suddenly one day find out that, like the old joke about going bankrupt, it is not gentle; it is quite sudden.
Mounk: That is my fear as well: that there is this option of gradual, genteel decline in the minds of a lot of Europeans that may turn out not to exist.
We briefly alluded to Hungary. I feel like a good conversation makes people depressed and gives them some hope, so let us try and give people some hope about Hungary and perhaps about Ukraine for the rest of this conversation. Viktor Orbán ruled for 16 years. He clearly undermined democratic institutions in a very serious way. There were huge amounts of personal corruption with a great enriching of the entire environment of Viktor Orbán, including old friends and relatives. You had a genuinely unfree media landscape. I remember when I was doing some reporting in Hungary, seeing every newspaper reporting on a speech by Orbán with the same flattering photograph and the same positive write-ups—something quite striking to see. A lot of people thought that it would no longer be possible to displace Orbán from elected office at the ballot box.
He finally overstayed his welcome, in part because of some straight-up scandals of governance—pardons for people who were running institutions in which child abuse had taken place and things like that. There was, ironically in part because of electoral rules that Orbán introduced to boost his majority, a particularly strong majority against him in the new parliament.
I have two questions about this. First, is democracy more resilient than we thought? Is the fact that the opposition was able to displace Orbán at the ballot box—that he did not call out the military or somehow try and sustain himself in power, and that the opposition now has a two-thirds majority—a sign that democracy is more resilient than we have given it credit for in the last 10 or so years?
Secondly, what are the dilemmas of post-populist rule? The new government will have a choice: either tolerate a lot of Orbán loyalists who are not committed to democratic rules and norms and who often are not qualified for their positions—keeping them in place, which has obvious downsides—or try to throw them out of office. But that, of course, just normalizes the rule that every new government comes in and throws out the old guys. It could even, at the extreme, lead to an over-consolidation of power in the hands of a new prime minister.
In general, should we be more optimistic about the resilience of democracy? And can the new government deal with this post-populist dilemma?
Garton Ash: I booked my ticket to Budapest many months ago because I have known Viktor Orbán since 1988. I first met him when he was a seemingly idealistic student leader, just three months after they had founded this wonderful new party called the Young Democrats, Fidesz. I still actually have the notes in my notebook where they were telling me about the rule of law, multi-party democracy, and all these wonderful things that he proceeded to destroy. I wanted to be there to see his fall.
The day and the evening in Budapest were magical; they even exceeded my wildest dreams because it was not a level playing field. For all the reasons you have given—gerrymandering, media control, abuse of the state administration, and abuse of state funds—it was an uphill battle. But there was such a massive outpouring of popular will and a sense that it was time for a change that it just swept all those obstacles away.
What you had was this overwhelming sentiment, mainly about social and economic conditions, meeting a seemingly credible change. Péter Magyar had a very clever campaign. He only gave one interview to the international media. He did virtually nothing in Budapest. He did not touch the classic urban liberal themes; he just went from small town to small town and village to village talking about social and economic issues and corruption. The “time for a change” sentiment met what looked like a credible change, and it was a fantastic moment.
Now, to the question you posed: you and I have for some time been saying—or I, at least, have certainly been saying—that Hungary is no longer a democracy. We have a member of the European Union which is no longer a democracy; it is a competitive authoritarian or electoral authoritarian system. So how come he could win an election? I think there is an answer to that. Elections are dangerous moments, even for competitive authoritarian regimes, even with all those advantages. Remember Slobodan Milošević was toppled by an election in 2000. Remember the spark for the Orange Revolution in 2004 was an election.
Elections in competitive authoritarian systems are unpredictable. On the day, it was relatively clean—it wasn’t massively rigged like an election in North Korea. They thought they had the system under control, as they had for many years. The difference from other cases is that those often involved an element of violence. To our astonishment, at about 9:20 p.m. on election night, a message flashed on Péter Magyar’s Facebook page: “Viktor Orbán has just rung me and congratulated me on my victory.”
I think you have to say that being inside the EU was a constraint. Were you really going to send in the thugs and use the Russians to try and falsify what was clearly a landslide result through force and fraud? It remains true that it was a competitive authoritarian system, but it was overcome by the combination of a “time for a change” sentiment, a credible alternative, and the external constraint of the EU.
To your second question: it is absolutely fascinating because, as you know, in Poland, we had another wonderful electoral moment when Donald Tusk was re-elected in autumn 2023, and this has gone completely pear-shaped. We have what is now famously called the “post-populist trilemma.” There are three things you want to be: rapid, effective, and legal. The trilemma says you can only be any two of them at once. Poland is now completely stuck in a situation of legal chaos, something almost like what Trotsky called “dual power” between Donald Tusk’s government and the Law and Justice president.
Fortunately, there is very good news about Hungary. Because the incoming TISZA government has a constitutional majority, and because of the way Orbán built his system—wanting formally to comply with EU rules while violating the norms—it is in a much better position. It can, with a bit of luck, restore the legal order and a neutral civil service, and legally replace the people Orbán put in place. It will not be easy. There will be local power holders in place and massive issues with corruption. But for me, if you can undo such far-reaching state capture by essentially legal and constitutional means, that will be a very positive sign for the rest of Europe and perhaps even for the United States.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Timothy discuss the Russia-Ukraine war and the future of the relationship between Europe and the United States. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
We’re so excited to announce that, in an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought at 5pm on Sunday, September 6 at the Sekforde in London. Find out more and get t…
Who could have seen it coming? The historic center-left party of government triumphantly elected to replace their discredited center-right rivals—who were in office for over a decade—ends up combusting once in charge of the levers of power. Weakened by the rise of an insurgent left and a nationalist right, the center-left party under the helm of a weak leader ends up bleeding voters election after election, only to stare down the barrel of political extinction.
You’d be forgiven if you thought I was describing Labour’s first two years in office under Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Last night, the country went to the polls in elections to choose local councillors in England and representatives for regional parliaments in Wales and Scotland. And the results for Labour were apocalyptic. The party is set to lose the Senedd, Wales’ parliament, for the first time since it was established in 1999. It is also on track to lose well over 1,000 councillors in England—around half the seats it was defending.
And yet, in painting the portrait of an embattled left-of-center government, I had in mind the demise of the once-dominant Socialist Party of France under President François Hollande. Elected in 2012 to replace the very unpopular Nicolas Sarkozy, Hollande came into office with a strong mandate. But his even more unpopular tenure ushered in the rise of La France Insoumise on the far left, the National Rally on the far right, and Emmanuel Macron in the center. Ultimately, Hollande’s presidency led the Socialists into complete political marginalization in a mere five years. To this day, the party remains a shadow of its former self.
Like so many of their continental brethren, the French Socialists discovered that, despite their glorious history, they too are mortals. The British center left, no longer coddled by the electoral comfort of being in opposition, are now brutally coming to grips with that same reality. Labour won a triumphant victory in parliamentary elections in 2024. But Britain’s entrenched structural problems, the difficult tradeoffs the country faces, and Starmer’s hapless leadership sunk Labour to Conservative levels of unpopularity in a mere three months. Last night, the electorate sanctioned them for it.
As the Romans used to say: there is but one step from the Capitol to the Tarpeian rock.
What explains Labour’s spectacular fall? Focus groups highlight the party’s poor leadership, resentment about Britain’s flailing economy, and Starmer’s timid legislative agenda. The prime minister’s decision to appoint the Epstein-tainted Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States—the center of a major scandal in recent weeks—has been damning. Raising taxes by £26 billion in the last budget, despite manifesto promises not to do so, further hurt Starmer’s credibility.
Then there’s immigration. The flow of illegal immigrants crossing the channel in small boats continues, with 2025 having the second highest annual figure on record. The British electorate, more than any other electorate in the world, considers immigration the most important issue the country faces. And even when some metrics trend in the right direction (net migration has decreased substantially over recent years), the damage done by the surge of refugees arriving under Boris Johnson’s premiership in 2021 and 2022—since dubbed the “Boriswave”—continues to inform Britons’ voting habits.
As a result, Labour is bleeding seats in all directions. But so are the Conservatives, leading to a fragmented political landscape much more in line with continental standards.
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The so-called “Red Wall” towns—historic working-class Labour heartlands that voted for Brexit in 2016 and swung for Johnson’s Conservatives in 2019—are now turning to Nigel Farage’s right-populist Reform party. Every single council seat up for grabs in the northern city of Hartlepool, for example, has now backed Farage. Across England, around one in three seats up for grabs has been plucked by Reform.
The rise of hard left alternatives has also hurt Labour. Both the Green Party, led by controversial eco-populist Zack Polanski, and so-called “Muslim independents” (or “Gaza independents”) are making serious inroads in left-wing bastions. For these voters, Starmer is resented for not pushing hard enough against Israel’s military interventions in Gaza and Lebanon.
Finally, voters are flocking to the Liberal Democrats as a centrist alternative—and the party is competing with Labour to win the most seats in England after Reform.
The full extent of the gains these alternatives make will crystallize throughout the rest of today. But it’s clear that the results represent a threshold in British politics, pulling it firmly in line with the fragmented political systems in the rest of Europe.
Labour’s 2024 victory, winning a historic 411 seats in Parliament, seems far removed now. But even back then it was clear the party was in danger.
The median majority in each constituency during that election was the lowest since the 1950s—despite the population growing massively since then. In other words, it would only have taken some 100,000 to 200,000 Labour voters deciding not to turn up in key constituencies for the party to have missed out on a majority.
Given that yesterday’s local elections suggest millions of voters are turning their backs on Labour, we can expect the party’s performance in the next general election to be dire.
Across the channel it was the French Socialists’ strong, albeit dwindling, local presence that allowed the party to remain relevant to millions of their countrymen even as they held only a handful of parliamentary seats. Labour has no such comfort. Britain’s electorate was clearly motivated more by national than local issues in this election, which could seriously hamper the ability of the center left to rebuild.
Hollande, meanwhile, benefitted from the power of the French constitution that allowed him to limp through five years as president. Starmer, as prime minister, does not have that luxury. He’s been dodging coups left and right over the last couple of months, and has been aided so far by the amateurishness of Labour’s aspiring Brutuses. But last night’s grueling defeat could lead to his replacement within weeks.
It’s going to take exceptional leadership to turn things around. Otherwise, like so many of its sister parties on the continent, Labour might well become a backbencher of British politics.
François Valentin is a senior consultant at London Politica.
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Dara Massicot is a military analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who previously worked for the Department of Defense and the Rand Corporation. Learn more about Ukraine’s defense tech sector in this recent piece in American Purpose.
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We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.
That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.
This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we’ll feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.
It’s no coincidence, it seems to me, that the decline of liberal democracy, as a fact and value, has succeeded the decline of liberal education as a fact and value. If we are ever to revive the first, an essential step will be to resurrect the second. The two “liberals,” after all, are the same. They refer to political liberty, as understood by ancient Athens, republican Rome, the American Founders: not libertarian freedom from individual constraint but collective self-government by civic equals. Its opposite is tyranny, arbitrary rule by a single will, a dispensation we’re becoming more familiar with than we had ever thought we’d be.
Liberal education is that form of education that prepares individuals for the exercise of political liberty—in other words, for citizenship. (Its opposite, in Aristotle’s account, is servile education, that which aims at mere utility, the performance of an economic function.) For generations, its importance was a governing idea in American higher education. In 1945, to pick a single milestone, Harvard published what became a widely influential volume, General Education in a Free Society (known from its color as the Redbook)—a pedagogical program, as the war neared its end, for the emerging era of mass political participation. “A republic, if you can keep it,” said Benjamin Franklin, and liberal education, which the Founders also championed, is part of how you keep it.
But citizenship, too, is a concept in long-term decline (along with republic, for that matter). On campus, as a goal of education, it has given way to mere utility, salaried servility, veiled, at selective schools, beneath the drapery of “social justice,” the language of changing the world, which bids young people be not citizens but activists.
Yet to imagine oneself as an activist is, in important respects, the reverse of regarding oneself as a citizen. The two entail divergent aims, virtues, attitudes about this country that we share. An activist is a soldier in a social or cultural war. A citizen is a member of a political community, a group of individuals who recognize that they have responsibilities to one another. Activism divides: us versus them, the good guys and the bad guys. Citizenship unites: we speak of “fellow citizens” or “fellow Americans.” Activists see those who oppose them as enemies to be defeated and, ideally, eliminated, if only through reeducation (though also, more and more, through violence). Citizenship demands toleration, the acknowledgment that even those you hate the most possess an equal share with you in the political collective: an equal right to speak, vote, advocate, educate, organize, assemble, and, if elected, govern. Activists say, go away; citizens say, we’re all in this together, dammit.
What would it look like to restore the idea of citizenship to the center of undergraduate education? What does liberal education entail? Two things: what to teach and how.
The what is named in Harvard’s title: “general education.” In other words, that which every student needs to know, regardless of what they major—that is, specialize—in. It seems obvious to me that that which every student needs to know as a citizen (and, a fortiori, at elite schools, a future leader) of this country is American, Western, and, to a lesser extent, global literature, philosophy, and (something often overlooked in core curricula) history. These compose the basic grammar of our common thought and culture, including, or especially, our lazy hot-take half-thought and our derivative-schlock popular culture. How much can’t you understand, of our collective imagination, if you do not know the story of the Exodus; of our political contentions, if you haven’t studied the development of the concept of equality in Western thought; of international affairs, if you aren’t familiar on at least a basic level with the history of European nationalism?
It’s incredible, to start with, that one can graduate from college in this country (that one can graduate from high school) without having taken a class in the documents and ideas of the American founding. To a mandatory course on those I’d add a second term on American political thought in the 19th and 20th centuries, full years each on American literature, American history, Western literature, Western philosophy, European history, and global history, plus two terms (from a menu of options) on non-Western civilizations.
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Yes, it’s a lot—16 semesters in the curriculum I just sketched—and that seems right, if we are going to graduate individuals who actually know a damn thing beyond their specialty, who can effectively evaluate whatever nonsense shows up in their feeds. One third to one half of an undergraduate career, to speak a little less prescriptively, should be devoted to general education. If that prevents students from double-majoring, so be it. There’s too much of that already anyway (largely since the withering of general education has left specialization as the only part of college students understand). If it means that engineering departments can no longer mandate 20 courses in their majors, good. They need to play better with others. As for the objection that students won’t or can’t read even single books, let alone a dozen courses-worth or more of weighty tomes, I call bullshit. If we can demand that students study chemistry and physics, French or Spanish, algebra, geometry, and trigonometry, let alone calculus, before they even get to college, we can insist that they read. And if they cannot get through college without reading a lot, or even be admitted if they haven’t read a lot already, then high schools will insist on it, as well.
A larger point here is that liberals need to reclaim the great books, and the humanities more broadly, from both the right and left: from the know-nothing populists who think that “Western civilization” means “I’m better than you” and the tenured avengers who use “dead white male” as a term of abuse. It’s been many years since liberals have even had a theory of culture, have engaged with culture as an object of thought or recognized its relevance to the political (many years since the heyday of Partisan Review). I remember hearing Al Franken, then an Air America host, insisting that the only poems he was interested in had five lines and started “There once was a.” That’s about the level of seriousness with respect to culture that liberals have been operating on since, I’d say, the 1970s.
A second point is that the university must recognize that the fields proper to general education do not exist for the same purposes, and should not be conducted in the same manner, as the natural and social sciences. The latter, at least in their mature form, are native to the modern research university, that factory of facts, with its positivist conception of knowledge, its quantitative methods, the kinds of questions that it asks. But philosophy and literary inquiry predate the research university by many centuries. They arose to ask a different set of questions, ones about the nature and meaning of existence, which cannot be answered empirically (or, in any final way, at all). It was only once they migrated into the modern university that those traditions became “the humanities,” a set of academic disciplines, and they’ve become denatured from needing to conform to scientific standards—the reason that, whether produced by non-academics or by academics writing in non-academic modes, a great deal of the best philosophy (often in the guise of “thought”) and certainly of the best literary criticism (and music, art, and theater criticism) has continued to take place outside the university.
But the purpose of general education is precisely to equip students to address those fundamental human questions—questions of value, not fact—which are perforce the fundamental political ones. That is why the study of literature (to turn to something dear to me as a former professor of English) is integral to liberal education. Even individuals and institutions committed to civic education and core texts (and there is a growing movement toward both, especially at public universities in states like Florida and North Carolina) do not appear to grasp this. Beyond Homer, Greek tragedy, and Shakespeare, curricula lean largely to political philosophy—that is, to texts that seem more relevant to public questions.
That literature is equally relevant, if less obviously so, begins for me with a remark that a professor made in graduate school, a kind of gnomic aside, and that I’ve been pondering ever since. He said that stories are a form of knowledge. What form, exactly, is what I’ve been pondering, but this much is clear: it is a form that’s recognized by every culture we’re aware of. Every culture tells stories, and not just for entertainment. In every culture, stories are central to the transmission of collective understandings. They are a culture’s way of expressing its sense of how the world goes, and of how we should conduct ourselves within it.
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Yet that expression is rarely transparent. In the Old Testament, for example, replete though it is with commandments and precepts, the meanings of stories are far from obvious—think of the binding of Isaac—which is why they’ve given rise to a vast and ongoing interpretive discourse. Indeed, one of the books of the Old Testament, the most morally and existentially challenging of all, is itself concerned with its own interpretation. Job spends most of his story largely in the company of friends who prove exquisitely unhelpful, precisely since they keep proposing simple answers, trying to understand the meaning of what has happened to him. Then God shows up and tells him the answer, which is that there is no answer—not one, at least, that humans can grasp.
When we turn to the New Testament, we find that Jesus himself told stories, the kind of stories we call parables, which are likewise frequently distinguished by their open, enigmatic quality, their endless interpretability. And so it is with all the great teachers: with Socrates and the Buddha, with the Zen masters and the Hasidic masters. They do not offer extractable morals or lessons. They offer riddles and puzzles, enigmas and dilemmas, because that is what life does itself. And the same is true of great works of literature, texts so central to our own culture that we denote them by a term that once referred exclusively to Scripture: the canon. The Iliad does not offer readily statable meanings, and neither does Antigone or Hamlet or Moby-Dick or To the Lighthouse.
Literature offers us not answers, but vivid ways of posing questions. Unlike philosophy, with which it shares an interest in foundational perplexities, it deals not in abstractions but particulars. Unlike the social sciences, with which it shares a focus on psychology and sociology, it puts us in the midst of life. Unlike both, it gives us a plurality of points of view. When you read a work of exposition, not just philosophy or social science but commercial nonfiction, opinion writing, even personal essay, you know what its author believes, because it is the purpose of the thing to tell you. But the better a work of literature is, the harder to say what its author believes—famously, most difficult of all with Shakespeare. Great works of literature present divergent perspectives without choosing between them. They show us the validity of all: Antigone and Creon, Lear and Cordelia, Elizabeth and Darcy. This is an essential political idea, a liberal idea. The world isn’t heroes and villains, good guys and bad guys. It is people, who are always flawed and always have their claims.
We can say more. One of the limitations of the way we think about both public and private life today, I’ve come to feel, is that we invariably talk in terms of problems and solutions. Not that there aren’t problems, or that they don’t need solutions. But some things—again, the fundamental things—do not have solutions, which means it doesn’t help to think of them as problems. Call them, rather, tensions: the tension between equality and liberty, or prosperity and the environment, or a woman’s bodily autonomy and the interests of her unborn child. Or, in private life, between desire and fidelity, or between our love for our parents and our need to separate from them. These aren’t problems to be solved, or resolved. They are tensions to be endured. They are tragedies, in Hegel’s sense of tragedy: a conflict between two rights, two values.
And that is what literature shows us: these tensions, those tragedies. The point of studying Antigone is not to decide whether Antigone is right or Creon is right. It is to see that they both are. That sometimes there are not only not simple answers, but any answers at all. That this, at its most acute, is what life is. That we all exist within these tensions, those tragedies—as individuals and as political communities.
Students may not read, but they are soaking in stories: superhero movies, action movies, rom-coms, detective shows, shows about teens with special powers. Video games. Porn, which tells a kind of story, too (though the ending is always the same). As well as, in the realm of supposed nonfiction, conspiracy theories, partisan narratives, propaganda. In other words, bad stories: stories that offer easy answers, stories with good guys and bad guys, stories where the hero gets their every wish fulfilled, stories where it all works out in the end. All of which has political implications, because it shapes one’s expectations of the world. Another reason students need great stories is to guard themselves against the bad ones.
If all great literature is, as Harold Bloom insisted, wisdom literature, then what its study helps you to develop is, precisely, wisdom. And wisdom is different from skills or expertise or subject knowledge, as valuable as all of those are. It is such understanding as pertains to the conduct of life. And not only the individual life—the collective life, as well. That is why Plato spoke of the need for wise leaders and we speak of the wisdom of the American Founders, their grasp of human nature. Wisdom is a political virtue. It is the highest political virtue.
So much for the what of liberal education. Now for the how. When people talk about the college classroom as a training ground for citizenship, they mean the inculcation of a certain set of virtues and habits. You sit around the table wrestling with Locke or Dostoevsky, and you learn to have a civil conversation: to disagree respectfully, to listen, to consider arguments, to change your mind. As David Bromwich puts it, you learn how to be wrong. You develop humility, patience, tolerance, courage (the courage to speak up, to make waves, to risk looking foolish)—perhaps above all, a thirst for truth, even at the cost of self-regard.1
Though—to digress for a moment—it is a lot easier to teach students how to disagree if they actually do. I’m speaking not just of the ideological conformity, real or performed, that dominates selective institutions, but also of the social homogeneity that lies behind it. I love that schools like Harvard claim they want their student bodies to “look like America”; I only wish they meant it. Looking like America would entail enrolling 40% of their students from the white working class (as opposed, at elite schools, to virtually none). Imagine how quickly campus culture would change if institutions did that—and, before long, how the culture of the professional-managerial class would, and then how our politics would. We are polarized because we’re siloed. The domains we occupy are not just different; they are separate, non-communicating. We need to reconstruct a shared world, in Hannah Arendt’s sense: a sphere of mutual intelligibility, an arena of discourse not in which we all agree, but in which it’s possible to disagree. At present, we cannot even disagree, because to disagree you need to understand each other. A genuine commitment to civic education at elite schools would begin by gathering students together across relevant forms of difference—social, cultural, political.
In any case, it’s easy to talk about teaching for citizenship; it’s a lot more difficult to do it. Teaching well is hard. The kind of seminar-style teaching that general education involves—orchestrating conversations that are substantive and rigorous, that keep the focus on the text, that stay on point, that require students to respond to one another, not just wait until the other person stops so you can say your thing, that don’t degenerate into speechifying or (in lit class) group therapy—is much, much harder. It takes a lot of time to learn, and it continues to take a lot of time even after you’ve learned, since each new text you teach necessitates reverse-engineering a fresh set of questions, and a lot of the art involves asking questions: ones both specific and challenging, not ambiguous or vague or obvious, not “so what did you guys think?” or guess-what’s-in-my-head, questions that you don’t have settled answers to yourself. The guiding principle is this: whoever is doing the talking is doing the thinking. In a seminar, 90% of what comes out of the instructor’s mouth should be questions, and 90% of everything should come from the students.
Most faculty do not know how to do this. Most college teaching is mediocre at best and often far worse. This is not a guess or an impression (though I’ve seen enough of it myself). In The Amateur Hour, a history of college teaching in America, Jonathan Zimmerman lays out the gory details. We’ve had the same problems, for the same reasons, with the same failed solutions, since the emergence of the research university: professors neglecting instruction; enormous lecture courses (and tedious discussion sections); contingent and underqualified faculty; students feeling bored and cheated; resistance from faculty to supervision, evaluation, or change; innovations, often based on new technology, rolled out with large claims; and no improvement ever. The reason for this last is clear. Under the research model, faculty are incentivized to do a single thing only: create knowledge. Publish or perish. When good teaching happens, it happens by accident, and often at a cost to one’s career.
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Which means that if general education is going to be resuscitated—and undergraduate education in general improved, and academia despised a little less—colleges and universities need to start seeing themselves, to an extent they never have before, as teaching institutions. “Our scholarship is a professional enterprise,” Zimmerman writes. “But when it comes to teaching … [w]e are flying by the seat of our pants.” No more. Instead of being flung into the classroom with minimal preparation and expected to figure it out on their own, graduate students need to learn to teach in a concerted, informed, and organized way: with extensive training, repeated observation, regular feedback, iterated improvement, and continual support. Just like in K-12. And they need to continue to learn and improve once they get a position, just like in K-12.
Faculty should meet to talk about teaching on a regular basis: troubleshooting, sharing insights, discussing best practices. Master teachers ought to serve as mentors for less experienced ones, including through team-teaching. Some of the former should act, at least part of the time, as instructional coaches, going into classrooms and working with colleagues on specific areas of weakness. Doors should stay open, and observers should be free to enter class at any time. Professors must get used to being less defensive and territorial about their teaching. Faculties should see themselves as communities of mindful practitioners, striving together toward excellence.
But how are academics ever going to find the time for this, with all of the research they do? Well, that’s just the thing. I hate to say this now, when the government seems intent on killing scholarship and science altogether, but there is far more research done than anybody needs. Truckloads of articles, monographs, studies, much of it trivial, most of it essentially ignored. The research model was never meant to apply to more than a relatively small number of institutions, but given academia’s incentive structure, especially since the postwar funding boom, it has spread to nearly every corner of the enterprise. The lion’s share of significant work continues to be done at a few dozen schools, the ones with the money and prestige to attract the best people. Yet according to the latest count, there are 543 Carnegie-classified research institutions in the United States, including 187 R1s alone (in 1994, the latter numbered 59). And that is not to mention the 2670 other colleges and universities, which also maintain expectations, albeit at a lower level, for scholarly production. No wonder there is so much fraud in science, a replication crisis in the social sciences, and mountains of meaningless bullshit in the humanities. Most research should simply stop. Most if not all of a professor’s time, at the vast majority of schools, should be devoted to teaching.
Believe me, I know what I’m saying sounds crazy, including the part about turning over much of the curriculum to general education. My suggestions would necessitate enormous changes: structural, cultural, and, above all, psychological. Academics would have to learn to see themselves, and value themselves, in radically different terms, as members of a helping profession. It isn’t clear how we could even do these things with the existing professoriate, given the way they’ve been socialized and trained. A new faculty, somehow, would have to be raised, gradually and in part, perhaps, from outside the academy.
But now is the time to think big. With the recent Yale report and other scattered indications, it seems that academia is starting to acknowledge its disasters and its culpability for them. Incremental changes, though, will not suffice. More than once in our past, at moments when the sector recognized that it had ceased to serve the nation’s needs, higher education overhauled itself in fundamental ways: in the late 19th century, when Ivy League and other colleges transformed themselves into research universities and the fixed curriculum of Greek and Latin, in place since time immemorial, was discarded for the system of majors and electives; in the 1960s, when the old-boy, private-school arrangements in elite admissions were torn down in favor of meritocratic criteria, which remade the American leadership class. This is the kind of juncture where we find ourselves. This is the scale at which we need to act.
William Deresiewicz is an author, essayist, and critic. He is working on a historically situated memoir about being Jewish in modernity.
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1For a great account of what this looks like in practice, see this conversation with Jennifer Frey on The Honest Broker podcast.
Jordan Bardella is often described as France’s answer to Donald Trump. Like the U.S. president, the leader of the hard-right National Rally (RN) has ridden a wave of anti-immigration sentiment, anger at globalized elites, and mistrust of multilateral institutions. He’s France’s most popular politician and looks the favorite to win the presidency next year. And he’s only 30 years old.
Born in 1995, Bardella was raised by a single mother in Saint-Denis, a bleak northern suburb of Paris. He is almost entirely of Italian stock, with an Algerian great-grandfather on his father’s side. He is also, like his party, firmly anti-immigration. But to those who cite his ancestry against him, Bardella has a pointed answer: his European forebears fully assimilated; when the cultural distance is greater, the journey is harder.
He became politically active at age 16, drawn to far-right leader Marine Le Pen, whom he felt spoke to people like him living in France’s gang-ridden banlieues and other areas the establishment had forgotten. Le Pen was then engaged in turning the rabble-rousing National Front—founded by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen—into a true governing force by expelling its openly racist and antisemitic elements, and eventually Jean-Marie himself.
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After dropping out of Paris-Sorbonne University to focus on politics, Bardella rose rapidly through the ranks and caught Marine’s eye. A smooth talker, he became party spokesman. His big break came in 2019, when she picked the 23-year-old to lead the National Front—now rebranded the National Rally—into the European Parliament election. The gamble paid off: Bardella’s list narrowly beat the centrist bloc supporting President Emmanuel Macron. The RN was not just the main opposition: it was France’s largest party.
2022 was another pivotal year. After a second consecutive defeat to Macron in the presidential run-off, Le Pen decided to prepare more rigorously for the 2027 election by stepping back from day-to-day party business. She needed a loyalist to take over as RN president. No prizes for guessing who got the job. The division of labor suited both: he had the title and the platform, while she retained her position as head of the parliamentary group and overall strategic leader.
A series of twists over the past two years have turned Bardella into clear presidential material. In European elections in 2024, Bardella’s list achieved double the vote of Macron’s centrists. A humiliated Macron immediately called a snap general election and paid dearly for it. The RN and its allies made historic gains, placing it in a position to help topple governments in a hung parliament—which it has since done, twice.
Then came the legal shock. In March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted of embezzling EU funds, and judges declared her ineligible to run for president for five years. Although an appeal verdict is expected in July, the party has been preparing an alternative candidate. “Plan B for Bardella” became the inevitable shorthand.
Bardella rejects the phrase, insisting that “plan A has not yet run its course.” But his evident electoral appeal has already placed him on a presidential trajectory. In 2024, his autobiography became the political best-seller of the year. Book signings in towns up and down France drew long lines, confirming his star status. By the end of the year, his approval ratings had overtaken Le Pen’s.
Bardella’s politics can best be described as populism with French characteristics. In this sense, the comparison with Trump is appealing but misleading. They took opposite routes to the top: while Trump radicalized a mainstream party, Bardella helped moderate a once-pariah movement. Last year he withdrew from an American conservative event after Steve Bannon appeared to make a Nazi salute. Since then, Bardella has been at pains to condemn Trump’s trade offensive against Europe (“blackmail”) and Middle East policy (“totally erratic”).
This speaks to Bardella’s main asset—his ability to expand the RN’s reach into territory where it has historically been weak, starting with younger voters from working-class backgrounds with little prior engagement with politics. His social media presence—2.3 million followers on TikTok—reinforces the image of a man who grew up in the same suburban France as his audience. In behind-the-scenes footage, he is shown relaxed, sipping pastis, nervously preparing for a rally, or compulsively snacking on candy. It may be manufactured authenticity, but it hits home. As one young voter told Le Monde: “The others are a different world, they don’t speak the same language.”
More broadly, a recent IFOP survey suggests that among lower-income voters, Le Pen and Bardella perform equally well. But in richer categories, where the RN has struggled, he pulls markedly ahead of her. IFOP also asked respondents whether they would like various politicians to run in the next presidential election—a different question from voting intention, but still a measure of how they feel toward various figures. Among centrist and center-right voters, approval for a Bardella candidacy significantly outstrips that for Le Pen.
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The lesson is clear: where Marine Le Pen consolidated the RN’s electorate, Bardella is expanding it upward—toward wealthier voters and what remains of the mainstream right. That, in essence, is the Bardella effect.
Another key part of Bardellism has been wooing corporate France, which has long shunned the RN. The party’s 2024 program included lower taxes for companies and a bonfire of regulations. But the finances were far from sufficiently broken down, and the plan piled on new spending by scrapping a planned pension reform.
Against this backdrop, Bardella worked hard to arrange meetings with France’s main employers’ federation. The bosses, on their side, were eager to inject some fiscal reality into a program that, as it stands, would alarm the bond markets. After a private lunch, a besuited Bardella struck a reassuring note: “I believe in freedom of enterprise; we need to give back freedom to those who create and innovate.”
This charm offensive towards big business sits uneasily with Marine Le Pen’s more traditionalist line. Catering to RN voters who peeled away from the left, notably in France’s northern rust belt, she is not afraid of striking redistributive poses. Her party’s program still contains a “tax on financial fortune.” More recently, her deputies in France’s assembly backed a levy on “unproductive” assets—an attempt to revive an old wealth tax—and an equally controversial tax on multinationals’ profits in France. Neither was retained in the final budget, but both confirmed where Le Pen’s instincts lie when it comes to big business.
The tension with Bardellism extends to the taxation of oil company windfall profits during supply shocks such as the current conflict in the Gulf, a measure also championed by the left. Le Pen embraces it as “a matter of social justice.” Bardella, characteristically, cultivates strategic ambiguity: when pressed on the question, he simply said, “Why not?” The two-word answer sums up the studied vagueness he has developed into an art form.
None of this is easy to read. Are the two playing a double act to maximize their electoral reach? Both Bardella and Le Pen insist there is no daylight between them. But even if genuine divergence exists, the question remains: does Bardella have the weight, or the will, to reshape a party the Le Pen family has spent half a century building?
Whatever happens, the RN’s core principles remain. And they still put the party on a collision course not only with France’s need for fiscal stability, but with European realities. The RN’s flagship policy of “préférence nationale”—reserving jobs, housing and welfare for French nationals—runs against the EU’s foundational principle of equal treatment for all citizens of member states. Its suspicion of free trade and Bardella’s talk of “intelligent protectionism” jar with France’s deep integration into global supply chains. And the RN’s vision of a “Europe of nations” rests on the illusion that French companies can enjoy the benefits of the European single market while Paris picks and chooses which rules to follow.
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Bardella is no Trump. But neither is he Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, who set out to make a pragmatic peace with EU rules and multilateral institutions. Populism with French characteristics represents something new and untested: a burst of utopian nationalism in the place that invented the European project. In a country traditionally run by high-flying graduates, a university drop-out with no government experience in the Elysée would be just as disruptive as a Trump White House has been in the United States.
It is sure to send shock waves well beyond France’s borders.
Henri Astier is a London-based journalist who writes for French- and English-language publications. He writes the Substack Out of France.
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This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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The end this week of the longest ever shutdown of U.S. government offices marks a new normal in polarized Washington. Closing federal doors is now a routine power play for Republicans and Democrats alike. Last year, a bitter fight over healthcare funding forced some 900,000 civil servants to stop work for 43 days. This year, the same impasse hit about 100,000 employees in the Department of Homeland Security for almost twice as long. Returning to work with no resolution of the underlying dispute promises more future shutdowns.
Thirty years ago, American voters viewed the stoppage of government as unacceptable. When the Republican Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, refused to pass funding bills unless President Bill Clinton agreed to steep budget cuts, the backlash helped propel Clinton to reelection in 1996. A chastened GOP did not pull the trigger on federal funding until 2013, when closing government down failed to stop the rollout of the Affordable Care Act.
Now, however, the public seems ready to go along with missing the full range of government services as long as a few important red lines are not crossed. These include delays in federal benefits and tax refunds, the closure of national parks, and prolonged disruption of airport security. The other big things done by the government in public health, regulation, scientific research, and a host of other fields don’t figure as punishable.
While Congress and the White House focus on shutdowns as a maneuver, the deeper damage of holding government hostage goes unnoticed.
First, shutdowns over the past decade have pulled attention away from exploding U.S. budget deficits. The clash between President Clinton and House Speaker Gingrich in 1996 over the nation’s financial future had a positive outcome. Both sides agreed that U.S. budget deficits were unsustainable—they just differed on the pace and distribution of cuts. The compromise that ended the shutdown put the country on a path to pay down the national debt and resulted in one year of actual surplus.
The national debt has grown from $5.7 trillion to $39 trillion since 2000. Budget confrontations, however, have nothing to do with bringing deficits under control. Instead, government shutdowns stem from a bitter divide over America’s racial, ethnic, and cultural identity. The funding of President Trump’s border wall brought the government to a standstill during his first term, while no-holds-barred immigration enforcement has done so during his second. The divide over national identity has marginalized voices of fiscal restraint on both sides of the aisle. Neither Democrats nor Republicans are ready to hit the brakes.
Second, the normalization of shutdowns has weakened Congress. Every decision not to fund the government marks a failure on Capitol Hill of give-and-take political bargaining. Surveys record steep drops in public approval of Congress from the mid-30s to the mid-teens after every shutdown, followed by partial recovery when government reopens. Nevertheless, hardliners feel empowered by voters to stick to their guns.
The electoral costs of refusing to find common ground may be low, but the price that Congress pays as an institution is high. Legislation with input across party lines creates institutional leverage. However, the Republican-led Senate and House have given unequivocal backing to a them-versus-us agenda set by the White House. As a result, President Trump exercises a degree of control over Congress that used to be unthinkable, undermining its classic role as a check on executive power.
The third way in which shutdowns do damage is that they devalue federal workers. Having to stop work highlights their facelessness and political vulnerability rather than their specialized skills and commitment to public service. Since more than two million civil servants are spread over 15 cabinet departments and 50 independent agencies, most Americans lack an overall picture of what they do, why they do it, or what the true impact of stopping their work is. Lack of knowledge feeds a stereotype of careerists as overpaid, overprotected, and able to withstand shutdowns because they eventually get their paychecks.
The president has deliberately devalued the federal workforce by making its reduction a priority domestic goal. Some 350,000 career employees have left government through retirement, resignation, and layoffs since January 2025. The White House has taken credit for this downsizing despite the loss of experience and expertise and the need to backtrack on hasty, mission-threatening personnel cuts in disaster relief, tobacco oversight, and other federal programs.
A singular focus on reducing the size of government leaves out America’s stake in attracting and retaining top-tier personnel in dozens of specialized fields. As I have learned firsthand from high-performing federal workers, talent means as much in government as it does in the private sector. Devaluing federal careers reduces their appeal to the very men and women who are needed to improve federal performance.
Holding non-partisan civil servants hostage is an act of self-destruction. The damage won’t stop unless Americans get serious about rejecting extremism and making democracy work.
John Yochelson, the former president of the Council on Competitiveness, is assembling and editing a collection of personal stories of high-performing federal workers to make them more relatable to the public.
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(Photo by Al Drago/Getty Images.)Call me naive, but I think I had given up on hypocrisy as a defining feature of American politics—I thought we had gone all the way past that to open avarice and the unapologetic exercise of force—but I guess if there’s one constant in life, it’s that there will be a place in politics for hypocrisy. So there was something refreshingly quaint about Tucker Carlson’s recent break with Trump right at the moment when a wedge issue formed in the MAGA coalition and Carlson could start to position himself for a 2028 presidential run. The news cycle was duly roiled with Tucker’s discovery of principles, even as it was evident on slightly closer inspection that the principles all benefited Tucker in the long-term.
The ostensible reason for the break is legible enough. Carlson has been an advocate for America First policies for a long time. He criticized Trump’s killing of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 and reportedly advised Trump against an Iran strike at that time. He campaigned—avidly—for Trump in 2024 on the premise that Trump would keep America out of foreign wars, and the attacks on Venezuela and then on Iran seem to have registered for Carlson as a genuine shock, and then led to the kind of falling out with Trump that, short as the memories of these two are, will be hard to patch up again.
On April 6, responding to Trump’s “Open the fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards” posts on Truth Social, Carlson said on his show, “How dare you speak that way on Easter morning to the country? Who do you think you are? You’re tweeting out the f-word on Easter morning?”
On April 7, Trump, skipping over the theological bits, countered by saying “Tucker’s a low IQ person that has absolutely no idea what’s going on.”
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On April 20, Carlson hosted his brother, a longtime Republican operative, on the Tucker Carlson Show, and, in anguished and deeply religious terms, talked about his reasons for the break. “You and I and everyone else who supported him, we’re implicated in this for sure,” he said.
“We’ll be tormented by this for a long time, I mean I will be. And I want to say I’m sorry for misleading people. It was not intentional.”
It’s a little hard to believe that there were no warning signs of what sort of person Trump might prove to be—not calling a beauty pageant contestant “Miss Piggy,” not boasting that he likes to grab women by the pussy, not going out to see a movie on the day of his brother’s death, not exploiting his father’s dementia to bilk his relatives out of their inheritance, and not encouraging a mob to storm the U.S. Capitol. But Pastor Tucker was in a very Christian frame of mind. Yes, Trump had his character failings, but “there are tons of people of low character who outperform their character,” he declared.
And what a compelling, nay, biblical picture that makes—prodigal Tucker misled by his overly compassionate nature and his desire to avoid foreign wars having his Road to Pennsylvania Avenue (er, Damascus) moment over Trump’s “or you’ll be living in hell” post. By now fully ascending the pulpit, Tucker had it in him to offer a remarkably ecumenical message to all faiths. “No decent person mocks other people’s religions,” he said. “To mock other people’s faith is to mock the idea of faith itself.” Never mind that he has discussed the “Islamic cult” and the “Islamic problem” and in 2019 a guest on his show called Islam “the most hateful, intolerant religion in the world.” Tucker, even in the depths of his torment, was in a forgiving mood, forgiving even for such a sinner as himself, and in his grace and willingness to look beyond past trifles he appeared, yes, positively presidential.
I really mean this. The betting odds site Polymarket has JD Vance leading the Republican GOP field with 39%, followed distantly by Secretary of State Marco Rubio at 22%, and then Carlson all the way behind them at 6%. I would never ever give betting advice to any Persuasion reader, but if I did, I might well counsel laying some sweet cheddar on Carlson. Vance is giving major Jeb Bush vibes at the moment—linked to an America First point of view that he seems to at one point have felt deeply but knowing that if he breaks with Trump over Iran or anything else he loses virtually the entirety of his support. Rubio was never exactly in his element as a presidential candidate and seems to have found his ceiling as more of a backroom boy.
But Carlson is a survivor, and comes with a built-in audience, and knows how to work the media in a way that resembles Trump himself. He also speaks to what may be the single most stable voting bloc in American politics—Christian nationalism.
So Tucker really is one to watch—for her part, Marjorie Taylor Greene was virtually the first to hop on the bandwagon and declare on March 5, “I SUPPORT Tucker … Tucker would beat Trump if he ran for president”—and this break with Trump may well be the start of the Making of the President 2028, when he would be the first modern candidate to run on a Christian nationalist platform as well as the first-ever Dancing With the Stars contestant to reach the White House.
So, a pretty arresting narrative of repentance and redemption. But before you are too taken in by it, do consider this: Tucker could have broken with Trump a long time ago, and the timing of his break, when it finally happened, could not be more serendipitous to getting organized for 2028. As far back as 1999, he called Trump “the single most repulsive person on the planet.” In documents that emerged through discovery in 2023, he wrote privately of Trump, “I hate him passionately.” This was of course around the time that Tucker pushed the narrative that the voting systems had been hacked by Communists to perpetrate widespread fraud and that the January 6 Capitol attack was an FBI “false flag” operation, and, while campaigning for Trump in 2024, declared that he “always agreed with Trump’s policies” and called Trump’s survival in the Butler, PA assassination attempt “divine intervention.” So, yes, while Tucker is in torment mode, he does have some “splainin’” to do.
But, as is often the case in politics, hypocrisy is a superpower. Tucker has, as so often happens, changed his stance on every single major issue. Foreign interventions? He supported the Iraq War up until 2004. Protectionism? He was an economic libertarian until 2018. Strong borders? It wasn’t an issue for him until the Trump era. His biographer Jason Zengerle argues that Carlson’s slipperiness, and ability to always put himself first, encapsulates the “larger story of conservative media and conservative politics over the last thirty years.” When he has about-faced, it hasn’t always necessarily been for the best of reasons. His principled opposition to the Iraq War in 2004 was based above all on the observation that “Iraq is a crappy place filled with a bunch of, you know, semi-literate primitive monkeys” as well as concerns that it’s not worth invading a place where people “don’t use toilet paper or forks.”
And Carlson has an ability to not only reverse his positions but to actually voice two completely contradictory positions at the same time. In 2021, he strongly pushed Trump lawyer Sidney Powell’s allegation that Dominion Voting Machines had been hacked at the same time that he was (unfortunately, as it later turned out) writing internally that “Sidney Powell is lying by the way. I caught her. It’s insane.” That little fib—well, more the honest admission on the back end—is one reason why Fox ended up paying Dominion Voting Systems $787 million for defamation and Tucker lost his job. But Tucker, as he has so many times before, bounced back, hosting his own show without oversight from Fox.
Faith and patriotism are, in the end, the last refuge of a scoundrel—and they are formidable sanctuaries. You may have noticed that Tucker has been sometimes less than Christian-like in his behavior in the past, as for instance when on the show Bubba the Love Sponge he referred to individual women as “pigs” and “cunts,” assessed women in general as “extremely primitive,” and volunteered to give Martha Stewart’s daughter “the spanking she so clearly needs.” But that’s the beauty of cloaking oneself in faith. Repentance is the ultimate get-out-of-jail free card, and there is no reason why Carlson’s path to repentance can’t coincide with a White House run.
That really is the only meaningful fissure that can break the MAGA coalition. Epstein won’t do it; and a foreign policy excursion like Iran isn’t enough. But religion could do the trick. Evangelical voters, through a bit of deft theology and a vituperative hatred of Hillary Clinton, managed to support Donald Trump, but it was always an uneasy and sometimes comical alliance. Tucker speaks that language far better than anybody in the more Trump-y core of MAGA.
We had a glimpse of what the future of the Republican Party, if not the 2028 campaign, might look like in a contentious interview between Carlson and Mike Huckabee—formerly the preferred candidate of evangelicals and now ensconced in MAGA-dom as the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. This was before the decisive break with Trump, and Carlson frequently came across like a seventh grader on the border between a B and B+ in civics class when he, for instance, asked about public disapproval of the war in Iran: “We care deeply about [poll numbers] in what sense? If we’re ignoring it then in what sense do we care deeply about it?” Watching that had a rivetingly Shakespearean aspect to it, like viewing Macbeth wander into his sleeping king’s chamber and consider that the poll numbers gave him all the legitimacy needed to do the bloody deed.
But the conversation also took a turn. And I suppose that we all knew American politics would one day come to this, with both Carlson and Huckabee carefully parsing Genesis 15, and Huckabee articulating an interest in a Greater Israel—like, a much Greater Israel (“It would be fine if they took it all,” he said, redrawing the hypothetical map of Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates). Carlson, in the opposite vein, took a much more, er, New Testament view speculating on whether Jews “have dual loyalty” and claiming that Huckabee’s “priorities are very clear” in reference to being overly sympathetic to the Jewish state.
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What Huckabee likely had in mind was “dispensational premillennialism,” the story of the rapture, with all Jews moving to Israel to initiate the “end times” button on the console. And what Carlson had in mind was revealed at Charlie Kirk’s funeral in 2025, when he compared Kirk to Jesus Christ and envisioned the conspiracy leading to Jesus’ death: “Picture the scene in a lamp-lit room with a bunch of guys sitting around eating hummus thinking about, ‘What do we do about this guy telling the truth about us? We must make him stop talking!’”
Having given the Elders of Zion their appetizer course, Carlson continued that vein of thought into this year. No sooner had he washed his hands of Trump than he was wondering aloud who the shadowy cabal was behind world events. “What was Butler? What was Ryan Routh?” his brother asked in their conversation on Tucker’s show. Tucker did not miss a beat. “I know that those investigations have been stymied. Fact,” he said. At which point his brother upped the ante by segueing to Israeli-American businesswoman Miriam Adelson’s (alleged) campaign contribution to Trump and asking, “Why would someone who has obvious and demonstrated allegiance to a foreign power give Donald Trump $250 million dollars while he’s running for president?”
The premise here is that both the assassination attempts in Butler, PA and in Mar-a-Lago were orchestrated by the Adelson family over a delicious hummus course as a way to show that they could get Trump anytime they wanted, and it’s that plot (this is also the plot of the Don DeLillo novel Libra, by the way) that accounts for Trump’s sudden turn towards warmongering in his second term—a scenario, to Tucker’s mind, that fully exculpates him for having ever been hoodwinked by Trump.
In a wide-ranging interview with The New York Times this week, Carlson—in “just asking questions” mode—took that notion well past the point of absurdity. “One thing that has bothered me for many years is the fact that a lot of people in Trump’s immediate orbit have been hurt—and really hurt. Gone to prison, become unemployable, publicly shamed, have gotten cancer,” Carlson said. Based on the unenthusiastic tone in Trump’s voice when Trump told him about the plans for the Iran War, Carlson could conclude nothing else except that “Trump was more a hostage than a sovereign decision-maker in this.” As a conspiracy theory, it’s a neat reversal of QAnon—with Trump held hostage by a shadowy cabal and needing to be rescued by a white knight, and a white knight with a mega-popular TV show.
If I am a little less than impressed by Tucker’s turn towards Christian righteousness and not exactly thrilled by the advent of of anti-Semitic blood libels into American politics, that is not to say that I find him any less formidable for it. He is extremely dangerous and he could well win. He is adaptable and resilient. He speaks fluently to the Christian Nationalist wing of the Republican Party, but for all his faith-mongering, he will not get bogged down in pieties like previous religion-oriented candidates have been.
He is as chameleonic as they come, and, in this era, with the kind of politics we have, what else can his gift for hypocrisy and shape-shifting be but a superpower?
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.
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Laurenz Guenther is a political economist at the Toulouse School of Economics and a Fellow at the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University. His research and Substack focus on representation, populism, and immigration in Western democracies.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Laurenz Guenther discuss why there’s a massive representation gap between political elites and voters on cultural issues, how this explains the rise of populist parties like the AfD in Germany, and whether new parties can successfully occupy the economically left but socially conservative political space.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You managed to write one of these papers that goes viral quite quickly because it really shows something interesting. Often in the social sciences, the best kind of papers show what we all already kind of knew, but actually demonstrate it in a thorough and methodological way. What you show is that there is a significant gap in representation, particularly of representation on cultural issues, between political elites and ordinary people. To me, the most striking graph in this paper came from Germany, and it looked at attitudes about immigration among members of the Bundestag, among elected politicians, and ordinary voters—I believe in 2013. Tell us a little bit about that specific data and what it shows us.
Laurenz Guenther: What we have is answers to surveys of representative samples of citizens and also of parliamentarians. These two groups answer the exact same question, which enables comparability. The example that you mentioned is about immigration—to what extent immigration should be facilitated or restricted. What one can see in this graph is that Germans, of course, have heterogeneous preferences, but most Germans want to restrict immigration to Germany. What I show is the average response of the members of all the parties that were relevant at this point in time in Germany, and all of these parties—measured by the average position of the member—wanted to facilitate immigration. There was a huge mismatch, even in the direction, in the sense that most people wanted to go to the right on immigration, but all the parties wanted to go to the left.
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Mounk: One of the striking things about this is that this is before the rise of the Alternative for Germany, which I think was founded right about then, but was not yet represented in the Bundestag. The most right-leaning political party in the Bundestag was the Christian Democratic Union, which was led at the time by Angela Merkel. The view of the average parliamentarian—not just in the Bundestag, but in the Christian Democratic Party—was way to the left of where the average view in the population was. Is that right?
Guenther: Yes, this is right. All of these people who are right-leaning on immigration—from their perspective, it must have looked like everyone, even the supposed right-wing politicians, were much more left-wing. They had absolutely no representation on this topic. This is one of the ideas of this paper: this provided fertile ground for the AfD, which then subsequently also rose.
Mounk: Over half of the population didn’t really have their views represented in the Bundestag. What happens? The AfD was founded as a political party by these slightly stodgy economics professors who were really worried about the euro and opposed the single currency. But the longer the party existed, the more it focused on issues like immigration. By the time it managed to get elected to the Bundestag in 2017, its main focus really was on restricting immigration. What this paper strikingly shows is that there was all of this fertile ground in which it could fish for voters, because so many voters weren’t represented by the pre-existing political parties.
How general is this? That is a really striking data point about Germany. To what extent do you have similar data about other countries? To what extent can we generalize from the existence of this kind of cultural representation gap in the German case to the existence of similar cultural representation gaps in other countries in Europe or beyond?
Guenther: The aim of this paper is to do that more systematically—to look at other countries and other issues. This can be generalized across European countries, and across cultural issues. Looking at 27 European countries, I find the same patterns on cultural issues for all of them. By cultural issues, I mean immigration, but also issues like gender relations, punishment for criminals, assimilation, and multiculturalism. On all of these, voters are much more right-wing than the parliamentarians of their countries. On economic issues it is much more mixed and the gaps are smaller. Notably, there is a great article in the Financial Times where this analysis was also extended to the United States, and there you find a similar pattern.
Mounk: Tell us a little bit more about each side of this. On the cultural representation gap, what other metrics do you look at where the views of ordinary citizens tend to be quite far apart from the views of parliamentarians?
Guenther: Immigration is certainly one of the issues where you have one of the largest differences. Another issue where the difference is similarly large is punishment for criminals—should sentences for criminals become harsher? Here again, majorities in basically all European countries say that this should be done, but parliamentarians disagree. This is a directional disagreement: majorities of parliamentarians disagree with that position, while around 70% of the population say that it should be done. There are also big differences on gender relations and European unification. European unification, however, is not so directional. Parliamentarians seem to be very strongly in favor, and voters are also somewhat in favor, but apparently want a much slower unification.
Mounk: There is an interesting contrast here. On some issues, political elites feel really strongly about something, but they are actually going in the same direction as ordinary voters. But when talking about things like immigration in particular, and to some extent assimilation and how strong criminal sentences should be, they are not just far apart—they are going in opposite directions. The average view of a parliamentarian is that immigration is a good thing for the country. The average view of a voter is that immigration is a bad thing for the country. That feels like a more significant gap. Even if on a 1 to 10 scale the gap is three points on each of them—and I don’t know exactly what the gap is on your scale, I’m making these numbers up—if that three means that overall preferences go in different directions, that seems to matter more than if three means one set of people is very enthusiastic and the other is somewhat enthusiastic.
Guenther: In the public discourse, people sometimes don’t use that term, but this idea often comes up that there may be differences between parliamentarians and voters. It is always framed in the sense that parliamentarians are somewhat ahead and voters want everything to go a little bit more slowly—which, of course, adds a normative dimension, and that is a whole different issue. But it also does not really address these findings. Because, as you say, this is not just a matter of everyone in principle wanting the same thing, with some wanting it a bit more quickly and others a bit more slowly. It is really that parliamentarians and the average voter disagree on the goal—on where we should be heading as a society. That is indeed a very different thing.
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Mounk: Tell me a little bit about those economic metrics, because I think that especially on the left, a lot of people want to think the real disjuncture between voters and the people is on economic issues. People want redistribution, they want a robust welfare state, and then there are the evil political elites—probably from a much more affluent milieu, who have to find donations for political parties, especially in the United States, but also in Europe—who are moving in fancy circles and don’t want any redistribution. That is really where the gap lies. Your data seems to suggest that the story is much more complicated. There are obviously some gaps on various issues of economic policy as well, but they seem to be much smaller on average than on cultural issues. Tell us about the extent to which the views of ordinary people and of political elites match up on economic issues.
Guenther: On economics it depends a bit. On redistribution, there is an item that asks people about redistribution, and qualitatively this is indeed what people on the left would think: ordinary people are a bit more in favor of redistribution than parliamentarians. Notably, wealthier ordinary people—those above median income—have similar preferences to the average parliamentarian of their country, and the gap is driven by the poorer half of the population, who really want much more redistribution. That makes a lot of sense.
But this gap—and I would have to look up the exact numbers—is much smaller than on cultural issues, by a factor of roughly five. The gap on immigration is really about five times as large as the gap on redistribution. On other economic issues it depends a bit more. Generally speaking, it looks like people want a bit more redistribution than parliamentarians, and they want less state intervention.
One thing that is missing here is trade. In the dataset that I use, there are no questions on trade, so there may be a representation gap there—we don’t really know.
Mounk: We would expect political elites to be probably more pro-free trade and ordinary people probably less so. There is another way of thinking about this, which is a two-dimensional graph where you look on one dimension at where people are on social and cultural issues and on the other dimension where they are on economic issues. What tends to be well represented, particularly in two-party systems but to some extent even in systems of proportional representation, is the things that go on the axis from the bottom left to the top right. On the one hand, there are right-leaning political parties that want less redistribution and are reasonably restrictive on migration. On the other hand, there are left-leaning political parties that are quite open to immigration, or even want more immigration, and are also pro-redistribution.
On one side, there are libertarians who are very socially liberal but want less economic redistribution. Those tend to be overrepresented in elite political discourse, but they are actually a relatively small part of the population. There is a much larger part of the population that occupies what is often called the populist quadrant—people who actually want a reasonably high level of redistribution, who do not oppose the welfare state and are not libertarians on economic policy, but who are quite conservative on social issues.
How does your research intersect with that line of thinking? Do you think it is basically right that it is that last quadrant—the people who are socially quite conservative but economically and fiscally reasonably progressive—that are most underrepresented?
Guenther: If you think about these four quadrants, this is the group that is least represented. In this two-dimensional space, the parties in most countries fall along a diagonal. The more you condition on political knowledge or participation in politics, the more you get a strong correlation to that line.
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Mounk: People who are very engaged in politics, if they are economically liberal, are also likely to be socially liberal. But people who are not very interested in politics are going to have views that are more all over the place, which doesn’t necessarily mean they are less coherent. They are just not bundled in the way that our political system conditions us to bundle our views.
Guenther: For the general population, views are more dispersed—it looks more like a circle, like a two-dimensional normal distribution. What my paper shows is that this line of the politically active has actually shifted downward. If you think about that, you can see that the people who are socially conservative and economically left-wing are particularly far away from the closest party in many countries. There is no major party that bundles their views, which I would predict would be an opportunity for new parties.
The populists that are very successful in many countries usually supply this policy position for the upper-right quadrant—that is, for people who are socially conservative and also economically right-wing, even though they are often quite flexible on economics. If you plot them over time in this space, you can see how they move around somewhat to attract more voters from the left.
Mounk: The one thing that defines right-wing populism today in most contexts—perhaps excluding Argentina or certain other countries—is not economics. It is those social and cultural issues. The AfD is interesting in that sense because it was founded on an economically populist issue, but over time it really became defined by those social and cultural issues much more than economic ones.
The economic views of populist parties are a little bit all over the place in different countries. A party like the AfD, in part because of its roots, is probably mostly right-leaning on economic issues, though it certainly isn’t a radical libertarian party and doesn’t want to abolish the welfare state. But a party like the Rassemblement National in France is much more left-leaning on economic issues. They have promised in many ways to preserve the welfare state and opposed Emmanuel Macron’s pension reform, wanting to preserve those entitlements for people. Even Donald Trump plays a strange role in this. On the one hand, a lot of the economic policies he has passed have been quite right-leaning economically—huge tax benefits for the rich, much less for ordinary people. But when you look at how he distinguished himself from his Republican competitors in the 2016 primaries, it was in part by saying things like, perhaps the state does have a responsibility to make sure that everybody has access to healthcare, which was something that the other fifteen Republican candidates did not say.
Why is it so hard for populist parties, particularly in systems of proportional representation, to really appeal to that quadrant? There is something surprising about the fact that you don’t see more political movements move squarely into the space that is economically relatively left-wing and socially right-wing. We have seen an attempt at something like that in the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht in Germany—a party that for all kinds of reasons I personally don’t particularly like. They nearly got into the Bundestag in the last elections but fell just short by a few thousand votes and now seem to be falling apart. It seems to be hard for political parties to move into that space, even though that clearly is where a significant portion of the electorate is. Tell us a little bit about who Sahra Wagenknecht is and what this party is.
Guenther: Let me answer this in two steps, looking at two parties that may have moved into that space: the AfD and the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht.
The AfD was founded as an economically right-leaning party, largely driven by economics professors opposed to the European Union, and then became very anti-immigration during the refugee crisis. At that point it was probably already positioned, just because of its members, as an economically right-wing party, and it is difficult to move from there. This plays a big role: it is difficult to completely change your position over time, which I think is also one of the reasons why established parties don’t do that. To really capture this quadrant, a party would have to move so much that it risks a split. It would have to make much bigger moves than, for instance, Merkel did during the refugee crisis, which was already a big stress test for the party.
One thing worth mentioning briefly is that in Germany, the quadrant of economically right-wing and socially right-wing people is quite a bit larger than the quadrant of socially right-wing and economically left-wing people. The latter—the quadrant we are interested in—is still a big quadrant, larger than the libertarian quadrant. But if you want to be the socially conservative party and you are simply thinking about maximizing votes, it makes sense to first go after the people who are right-wing across the board, then perhaps move to the center, and then take the second quadrant. The AfD does seem to be trying to do something like that.
Now, turning to Sahra Wagenknecht. She was for a very long time one of the most prominent members of Die Linke—the left-wing party that is basically a descendant of the former Communist Party of East Germany. It is a minor party, polling around five to ten percent, that is very economically left-wing but also very socially progressive and liberal. Wagenknecht distanced herself from this party, largely driven by her views on cultural issues, in particular immigration, on which she was more conservative than much of the rest of her party. This ultimately led to a split in which she left the party together with a few other members of parliament and founded her own party, Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht—Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht.
This party initially did very well in the polls and was seen as considerably more successful than the original left-wing party. In the election, however, they nearly failed to clear the 5% threshold required for parliamentary representation, while Die Linke did make it into parliament. In some sense, it was a respectable performance—it is very rare for new parties in Germany to clear that threshold, and it was the party’s first election. Now they seem to be falling apart.
My sense is that on cultural issues they were not right-wing enough to capture the quadrant of socially conservative, economically left-wing voters. I think in the beginning people expected Wagenknecht to be more conservative on social issues, and that position appeared to be significantly watered down over time, which I think was a problem for the party.
Mounk: That is interesting. She is also a very charismatic but polarizing figure, and there is always a tension between a political party really just being a personal vehicle for its leader. The party’s name, BSW, literally consists of her initials—Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, or Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht. She has now distanced herself a little from the party, and that probably means it is not going to survive. But it was an interesting attempt at trying to capture that quadrant of the electorate.
Let me present to you a reading of your paper which I know you deliberately don’t put in the paper, but which I think is how a lot of people have read it. Tell me to what extent, speaking as a private citizen rather than a scholar of social science, you agree with that interpretation.
Here is the first part. Here is the real explanation of populism. We have been having this debate for ten or fifteen years about why populism is rising around the world, and people point to this explanation and that one. The one thing nobody has really been talking about is whether the problem is simply that the established political parties aren’t listening to what voters want. You might agree with the views of the established parties, or you might agree with the views of voters. On many things, I’m probably closer to the views of members of a political elite, because having a PhD in political science, I’m virtually by definition a member of the political elite. But when we collectively become so distanced from what ordinary people think, they are going to get upset. What happened here is that over time, this cultural representation gap increased. People no longer listened to voters. Election after election, people said they wanted more controls on immigration. Elite political parties did not deliver on those preferences. Finally, voters rebelled by voting for the one party willing to give them what they want.
The second part is a more provocative statement. Perhaps one of the things that established political parties need to do in order to deal with the rise of populism is to actually listen to what people want and adopt some of those policy positions. Not every single established party needs to do this. In the German context, it probably makes sense for the Green Party to continue to be very pro-immigration, because its electorate is very pro-immigration—and that is the virtue of a system of proportional representation. But if the Christian Democrats or even the Social Democrats want to compete with the AfD for the many voters who have shifted towards it over the last few years—a party that now polls roughly equal with the Christian Democrats in first place, having grown from less than 5% of the vote in 2013, around the time of your paper, to around 23 to 25% in polls today—the straightforward thing to do is to get closer to what a lot of ordinary people want. Is that a plausible interpretation of your paper?
Guenther: I think that is a plausible interpretation. The first part stays relatively true to the paper. The previous literature has done a lot of very valuable work, and what I do is not a substitute for that—I’m not saying everyone else was wrong. I have the impression that the previous literature just didn’t really look at this specific part of the puzzle. It looked more at how the financial crisis contributed to making people vote for populist parties, what the loss of manufacturing jobs did, and so on. But there was less focus on the choices of mainstream parties and in particular how they would respond. That ties into the second question, which I also think is a fair interpretation.
This paper is also interesting because it looks at a variable that can be easily influenced. We have all of these variables in mind when it comes to populism—lack of trust, slow economic growth, certain cultural characteristics, and so on. But these things are more or less given and very difficult to change. If you take the estimates seriously, winning back voters by increasing economic growth would require growth rates that are just completely unrealistic. What this paper—and several related papers—does is look at the positioning of parties, which is a variable that can be adjusted relatively easily. In that sense, I do agree that if mainstream parties want to win back voters and weaken populist parties, they have to move their political positions.
Importantly—and this is often a point of confusion—they need to deliver on policy outputs, not just rhetoric. There are some papers that show it backfires if parties merely shift their rhetoric. There was a famous speech by Starmer—“island of strangers” and so on—and the analysis of that suggests it probably backfired.
Mounk: The idea here being that if politicians say they have heard the voters and are going to do something about immigration, and then there is no action to follow up on it, voters conclude that the politicians are simply being hypocritical and cannot be trusted.
Guenther: The facts on the ground must change. In some sense, this is a chance—and maybe the last chance—for the mainstream parties, because populists are often not that good at delivering real results or delivering on their promises, at least in their first attempt. During the first Trump administration, for instance, there was no major deportation effort. The second time, Trump is delivering on that: immigration has fallen dramatically and deportations are proceeding at scale. He learned from the first term and delivered on those promises in the second.
Something similar may be happening in Europe. Often, in their first time in power, right-wing populists don’t really deliver. We have seen this with right-wing populists in Austria, with Meloni, and others. Mainstream parties therefore have a chance to deliver now, or even if populists come to power, to use that period to develop a new strategy and new policy positions. If mainstream parties then win the election after the populists leave power, they have another chance. But I do think it is an increasingly difficult situation for mainstream parties across Europe. They have one or two election cycles to deliver. If they don’t, populist parties could, in the medium term, simply outperform them and come to dominate European policymaking.
Mounk: What do you say to people who claim that when mainstream parties try to emulate populists, it actually only reinforces the populists? This is a strand of research that I have seen repeatedly, and more than anything else it seems to be conventional wisdom among a lot of political scientists—that there are these studies, sometimes somewhat dubious studies I think, that demonstrate that when mainstream political parties start to use the verbal register of populists or emulate some of their policy positions, voters are simply going to vote for the original. This is an argument you hear a lot. How convincing do you find it, and why does it sound like you don’t agree with it?
Guenther: This depends a lot on whether you deliver results or whether you do something else—which is why I made the rhetoric versus results distinction. There are a lot of studies on this and they show mixed results. Some find that people vote for the original populist party if a mainstream party moves toward the populists. An example is the analysis of the Starmer “island of strangers” speech that I alluded to before. Other papers show the opposite: that if a party moves to the right on immigration, voters shift toward that party and away from the populists. There is a study in Denmark that shows this, and we also have a study done in Germany just before the most recent election that finds that if the CDU moves to the right and fills the representation gap, the AfD loses voters and the CDU gains voters.
I do think it depends, and it depends most strongly on whether actual policy positions change. If the policy positions really change and the output is delivered, people do not simply vote for the original.
One thing that is often forgotten in this context is that right-wing populism in Germany is only in some sense a third wave. There were early right-wing populists just after the foundation of the German republic who were strong in the 1950s. Then there were the Republikaner—the Republicans—in Germany in the 1980s, who were in some sense similar to the AfD. In both cases, the CDU—the centre-right party—accommodated them, moved toward their positions, and in the 1950s under Adenauer even gave them ministerial posts. Later, in the context of the asylum wave from Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, immigration had become a major issue and people wanted less of it, and the constitution was actually changed to limit asylum immigration significantly.
Mounk: Your point is that it worked at the time—the Republikaner really were a kind of insurgent populist force in the 1980s and 1990s. They had some significant successes, ended up being represented in a number of state parliaments, but never quite made it into the Bundestag. What you are saying, I take it, is that the Christian Democrats moved to the right in order to limit the oxygen for that political party. Rather than people saying that this somehow reinforced their impression that the Republikaner were onto something and they should vote for them, they said that some of their concerns were being taken care of by the political party they traditionally voted for and moved back toward voting for the Christian Democrats.
On this telling, it was Angela Merkel’s very deliberate strategy of capturing the political center—and no longer covering the right of politics—that allowed this insurgent movement to establish itself as a permanent political force. There are two ways of thinking about this. Strauss, a very influential Bavarian prime minister, always used to say that between the Christian Democrats and the right, nothing should be able to fit—meaning that he always wanted to make sure that the Christian Democrats, as a democratic political party, would cover the flank on the right far enough to prevent any party to their right from establishing itself. Merkel’s approach was very different: she would make the Christian Democrats into the party of the political center. But of course, that raises the question of who deeply conservative people—those who don’t think of themselves as being in the political center—should be voting for.
One way I have sometimes put this about German politics—and I am obviously a German citizen—is the following. I have been politically socialized on the left and continue to think of myself as being on the left, even though I have significant criticisms of the shape that the left is taking in many countries today. If I look at Angela Merkel and find that I share a lot of her basic value coordinates—even if I think she made a lot of bad decisions—we have a problem, because there are a lot of people in Germany who are considerably more conservative than I am. If the leader of the most conservative democratic political party in Germany holds views that someone on the left feels broadly comfortable with, that may be fine as long as that person is in charge. But it leaves a huge segment of the German electorate without political representation. What happens? They go and vote for the AfD.
There is another line of argument, which is that left-wing political parties in particular have not made sufficiently large redistributive demands. There was a period in which the left and the right had very similar positions on economic policy. If you look at Germany today—the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats—or at Britain—Labour and the Conservatives—they are not that far apart on a lot of economic policy issues. People therefore no longer invest significance in economic policy, and that is why cultural issues become so salient. Why are we debating immigration? Because if there are no deep ideological differences in economic policy, that is the only thing left to debate. On this argument, what is really explaining the rise of right-wing political parties is the convergence on economic policy, and one way to fight that—particularly for left-wing political parties—is to move to the left on economics, making that a more charged political issue and shifting the public debate away from issues like immigration. This is an argument that has been made by a number of political scientists and that I often hear in the debate. I imagine that you are skeptical about that line of argument as well.
Guenther: I am indeed skeptical about that line of argument. It leads to an interesting deeper question, which I will address first. I do believe that in principle the theoretical argument is correct. All else being equal, if left-wing parties moved further to the left, we would probably talk more about economic topics and, because people’s attention is limited, they would probably think a bit less about cultural issues. However, I would guess—and I don’t think we have particularly strong studies on the relative importance of this effect—that it is a relatively minor thing. That is my main criticism. I’m sure the effect probably exists; all kinds of effects exist. But how big is it?
I don’t think people will stop caring about immigration because talk shows discuss economics more, or because the policy options on offer are somewhat more distinct from each other. This belief is driven by two things. The first is simply talking to Germans. I am German, most of my friends are German, and I do a lot of interviews and survey work where people tell their stories. Immigration and issues related to it is such a huge issue, and touches on such fundamental fears about identity and belonging, that I think it will always be salient for these people as long as immigration is high or looks like it could increase further.
The second thing is that if you look at the immigration that people say they care about—specifically immigration from the Middle East and Africa—the actual numbers of arrivals from these groups are extremely highly correlated with how much people care about the issue. During the refugee crisis, for instance, people were asked how important immigration was to them, and that line tracks extremely closely with the actual number of asylum applications in Germany. This suggests that concern about immigration is tied to things that really happen on the ground.
Notably—and this is an argument that is often made, but I think it is close to a straw man—how much people care about immigration is not really predicted by overall immigration numbers, that is, by how many people come to Germany in total. Most people don’t really care about, say, a French student coming to Germany to study. It is about very specific groups, and the correlation with real-world arrivals of those groups is clearly there.
Mounk: You said a little while ago that perhaps the last chance for established political parties to win the race against the populists is not just to shift their rhetoric, but to actually show results. The problem is that especially in systems of proportional representation, this becomes more and more difficult the higher the share of parliamentary seats populists hold. In Germany now, it is barely imaginable that there will be a right-wing governing majority in the Bundestag that excludes left-wing political parties while also maintaining the Cordon Sanitaire—the Brandmauer—the separation between the traditional democratic parties and the new right-wing populists.
The last German government was a left-leaning coalition in which the Social Democrats and the Greens governed alongside the right-of-center Liberal Party, the FDP. Now there is a conservative chancellor in power who is in various ways more conservative than Angela Merkel, but his coalition partner is the Social Democrats, the left-of-center political party. Even though Merz was talking a great deal about the need to curb immigration during the election campaign, it is actually very difficult for him to deliver on those policies because his coalition partners in the Social Democrats are opposed to many of them.
Do you think realistically that traditional political parties are going to be able to rein in immigration to a sufficient extent to make voters feel that their preferences are being represented? Or do you think we are now in a structural situation in which the inability of mainstream political parties to deal with that issue is simply going to lead to their continued decline in vote share and to parties like the AfD continuing to grow?
Guenther: This depends a lot on the country. In Germany, also for historical reasons, the resistance to accommodation is particularly high, even though as we discussed, it did happen in past episodes. I would guess—and this has to be taken with a grain of salt—that the current coalition has the last real opportunity to deliver the legislation needed to genuinely reduce asylum immigration and pursue deportation efforts.
After that, I would guess the AfD will be stronger in the next election than in this one, and it will then be very difficult to find a coalition that addresses immigration effectively while leaving the AfD aside. If efforts don’t increase significantly—and I would guess they won’t—the next government will probably also fail to deliver, the AfD will be even stronger, and it will probably eventually become part of the governing coalition. That is my guess. We can check in perhaps nine or ten years.
For other countries, the picture is a bit different. Populists are participating in or supporting governments in several countries. In Sweden, for instance, with the support of the Sweden Democrats, immigration policy has changed quite significantly—net asylum immigration is now reportedly negative. It is possible. Germany tends to look mostly at itself, but in other countries, such as Denmark, these things have happened.
Mounk: Let me ask you about how this theory applies in some other contexts. We haven’t talked much about the United States. America actually, on a lot of the generic questions about immigration that are asked cross-nationally, continues to have more pro-immigrant attitudes than most European countries, which is interesting. The failure of the Biden administration to deal with the southern border with Mexico is clearly one of the big reasons why Donald Trump won reelection in 2024. It was even one of the reasons why new voting groups like Latinos shifted to the Republican Party. At the same time, as you said earlier, the current administration is in some sense very successful in its policies—it has reduced the number of immigrants coming to the United States very significantly. But it has done that using cruel and indiscriminate tactics that turn out to be very unpopular. The immigration enforcement agency is very unpopular, and Donald Trump’s approval ratings on immigration are quite low.
Is that an American specificity, where American attitudes about immigration are simply somewhat more permissive than European ones? Or do you think that if, say, Marine Le Pen—or if she is not allowed to run, Jordan Bardella—became the next president of France and effectively cracked down on immigration, deporting large numbers of undocumented people, they might face a backlash as well? Not just from people with more progressive attitudes who become activated by those policies, but perhaps from some of the swing voters who helped them get into power in the first place—as, according to polls, seems to be happening in the United States.
Guenther: You can always overdo it. The vast majority of Europeans want lower immigration levels, but you can also have levels that are too low. The amount of cruelty—for lack of a better word—that voters are willing to tolerate is certainly limited. I do think that voters will support severe actions to reduce immigration, but there is some limit. The threshold in Europe might be a bit higher than in the United States, so Europeans might be willing to accept more severe measures than Americans, but even there some limit exists. It is possible that populists, when they come to power, overdo it to some extent—one could argue that Trump somewhat overdid it.
Relatedly—and this is a slightly different point—it also depends on how efficiently these policies are carried out. Some degree of severity may be necessary to achieve a goal, but there is also cruelty that is arguably indiscriminate and serves no purpose in achieving the desired outcome. I would guess that because populists are considerably less experienced, they will tend to be less efficient. There will be problems when they come to power and pursue immigration policies. This is something that mainstream parties can exploit by shifting their positions but then arguing that they are the professional alternative—that they will pursue these goals in a more targeted and discriminate way, and that they won’t overdo it. I think that is one way that mainstream parties can make their case.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Laurenz discuss whether journalists and politicians have as much impact on public thought as they think they do, to what extent self-censorship has increased in recent years, and the impact AI will have on the media. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
In his recent interview with the Financial Times, Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, startled many by predicting that Russia might soon test NATO’s resolve to defend its allies. Yet what has ruffled feathers even more was his question about the “loyalty” of the United States as an ally.
Given Poland’s steadfastness over the past thirty years, it is easy to sympathize with Tusk. Regardless of who holds power in Warsaw, Poland has always taken its defense seriously. It has bought U.S.-made military equipment and welcomed U.S. investment—including in nuclear energy.
There is very little that the current administration has done in return for highly reliable allies such as Poland—notwithstanding the recent U.S.-brokered release of a Polish journalist held by Belarus. Polish exports to the United States face arbitrary tariffs. Washington has stopped almost all of its aid to Ukraine, whose victory remains an existential question for Poles. More recently, the U.S. president has picked NATO as a scapegoat for the failures of his ill-conceived war against Iran.
Yet Tusk is not a public intellectual, free to air musings about his country’s relationship with the United States. His task as prime minister is different. First, it is to ensure that Poland is ready for less-than-ideal scenarios in the U.S.-European relationship. Second, it is to help prevent the worst-case scenarios from materializing.
As a result, leaders like Tusk must resist the magnetic pull of the grotesque show that Donald Trump is putting on in the United States. It is easy to score political points at home by confronting Trump. Yet the further east one goes, the higher are the stakes of making the U.S.-Europe relationship a part of everyday political life. That does not imply rolling over in the face of the U.S. president’s antics. Quite the contrary: Europeans must be ready to push back whenever their interests are threatened, as they did when the Trump administration readied to take over Greenland.
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It is also conceivable that voicing questions about the U.S. commitment to Europe, as Tusk did, will help mobilize the European (or Polish) public to do more to prepare for scenarios in which Europe cannot rely on the United States. Yet it can also act as a self-fulfilling prophecy, as any unforced fights with Trump risk accelerating America’s drift away from the continent.
To be sure, the odds that the current presidency is just a fleeting episode in U.S. history, to be followed by a swing back to the post-war norm, are slim. Hope, moreover, is never a substitute for strategy. Nor should one believe in the mistaken trope of “transactionalism” as a way of placating Trump. As Ukrainians have learned from their critical minerals deal, mutually beneficial business relations are no guarantee of staying in the good graces of the U.S. administration. Similarly, billions spent by European militaries on future deliveries of F-35 fighters may or may not be justified on defense grounds. However, one should not live under the illusion that such purchases would prompt Trump’s United States to rush to the defense of Europe.
Rather, the reason for restraint in rhetorical and other confrontation with the United States is that adaptation to America’s reduced reliability and wild swings in its politics is a long-term project, requiring not just unprecedented investment in defense but also the building of new institutions and new political projects. That takes time, intellectual leadership, and a willingness to look dispassionately beyond the immediate horizon, instead of just reacting to the latest outrage or international crisis provoked by Trump.
Why make institutions a part of the equation? Well, if the current moment teaches anything of value to international relations theorists, it is that institutions—understood both as organizations and as rules of the game—matter. Personalist alignments, flattery, bribes—or “transactionalism”—are no foundation for a stable international system. Never mind the one-sided deals meant to mollify Trump or outright bribes offered by the likes of Qatar and UAE; the U.S. president has only one loyalty—and it is to himself.
And no matter how skillful the likes of Alexander Stubb, Giorgia Meloni, or Mark Rutte have been, their sweet talk has not fundamentally altered the course that the U.S. administration is on. It is only a matter of time until the glamour of King Charles’ recent visit to Washington will be superseded by yet another episode of the administration’s lashing out against the UK and its government.
As Europeans look ahead, seeking to put the relationship with the United States on a more durable footing, they will have no choice but to think about institutions and institution-building. That means building structures of political, defense, and economic cooperation that can deliver in the absence of U.S. leadership and that could perhaps even provide a deterrent against America’s predatory behavior in the future. It also means building institutions that America would want to be a part of, allowing them to constrain and moderate its behavior in future political cycles.
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The reason is simple. Institutions are sticky and they often survive under mercurial and unpredictable leaders. One tends to think, for example, of the post-war ecosystem of international organizations and treaties as hopelessly outdated—just waiting to be shattered by a Trump-like figure. Yet it should give one pause that ten years into Trump’s full-frontal assault, many of the relevant institutions still persist, weakened though they are.
Few in the Republican Party harbor any love of multilateral institutions; yet the United States has (for the most part) remained a part of the UN system, a member of NATO, and a party to countless international treaties and conventions.
In Washington, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are humming along, with a staff who may be a little confused about the new realities but who certainly do not feel under any existential threat. Sometimes, even Trump and his team seem to recognize the usefulness of the existing institutional architecture. More importantly perhaps, even for the Trump administration, it may not always be an appealing proposition to just smash things while being patently unable to come up with alternatives.
The Five Eyes alliance continues to function despite intelligence-sharing tensions. Meanwhile, the dollar-denominated international financial architecture appears resilient. And even if the United States withdrew from NATO tomorrow—reducing its own ability to project power globally through its European bases—the alliance would still be extremely useful to Europeans as a platform for ensuring interoperability, joint planning, and socializing allied militaries into fighting together.
Yet fundamental realities about the world have changed relative to the post-war era in which such international institutions, treaties, and alliances were being created. And unless those institutions adapt effectively, they will eventually be hollowed out and replaced by new ones. For all of the U.S. administration’s ham-fistedness, there is thus a grain of wisdom in the quest to build a “NATO 3.0,” or to create new structures of cooperation around critical supply chains.
It is an open question how effective the United States can be at institution building anytime soon, considering the magnitude of its domestic political crisis. But that provides an opening for others—perhaps for Mark Carney’s middle powers, perhaps for the EU, perhaps for China—to think about how the international arena could be structured by new rules and new political projects, sometimes working around an unreliable United States, rather than with it or under its leadership. Europeans must be at the forefront of that exercise, both at home (especially in updating and strengthening the EU) and in their engagement with the wider world.
Concrete moves underway include the expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); the EU-Mercosur trade deal with Latin America; strengthening of the Canada–EU strategic partnership; and, in the context of European security, the Coalition of the Willing to support Ukraine and the Joint Expeditionary Force of Northern European nations.
“We have all the institutions we need,” one European diplomat claimed during a panel I moderated. “We just have to make the existing ones work.” But that betrays a deeply ahistorical view of our situation. States, governance structures, alliances, and institutions have changed constantly through human history—sometimes through war and chaos and sometimes through ordered, democratic change. The Holy Roman Empire, the dual monarchy of Austria and Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union all seemed like basic, immutable artefacts—until they weren’t.
Tusk asked whether the United States is still a loyal ally. It’s a valid question, but not one for Poland’s prime minister to ask aloud. The right question—quieter, harder, and answerable only over years—is what institutions Europe could build that would make American loyalty matter less. In a few years, Donald Trump will be a memory. The institutional solutions that Europe and its partners come up with—or fail to come up with—in response to the change in America’s role in the world will shape the continent’s geopolitical future for generations.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. and a contributing editor at American Purpose.
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