Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • David Bromwich on Why Americans Have Lost Faith in Universities

    David Bromwich has taught literature at Yale University since 1988. His books include Hazlitt: the Mind of a Critic, The Intellectual Life of Edmund Burke, How Words Make Things Happen, and Politics by Other Means: Higher Education and Group Thinking.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and David Bromwich discuss why Americans have lost faith in universities, how grade inflation and political conformity undermine academic credibility, and whether the opacity of elite admissions processes can be reformed.

    Note: David Bromwich asked us to be clear that the views he expresses are his own and not those of any institution or group within an institution.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I’ve been hoping to have you on the podcast for a long time, and we have a good occasion now because you were on the faculty committee at Yale University that was tasked with trying to figure out why people have lost faith in higher education in significant numbers in the United States, and what universities—and particularly Yale—can do to regain the trust of the public.

    What do the findings of the committee suggest lies at the heart of this loss of faith in universities in the United States?

    David Bromwich: Several things. You use the word “faith.” The official name of the committee was Trust in Higher Education. But trust, as anyone who has studied moral philosophy or just speaks English knows, is mutual. It depends on a shared understanding of what the purpose is of this or that institution, this or that custom or ritual.

    The understanding that was lost is how public higher education—and specifically liberal arts education—prepares you for life in a way that will serve students well in getting jobs, but also make them thoughtful citizens. There is some effect from the education that they wouldn’t get just from reading a lot of books or even watching a lot of television.

    Some of the causes of waning trust that we looked at were the process of admissions. Yale is an elite school, so this is particularly dealing with the loss of trust in schools that have that sort of prestige. The price of the school is very high, although most people don’t pay the sticker price. That relates to a lack of transparency in things like how you pay, what tuition costs are, how it may be deferred, what loans are available, and how much tuition can be covered for people who aren’t rich.

    Recently—and this overlaps with the work of the committee—an announcement came out about a month or two before our report was put into its final draft. The president of Yale, Maurie McInnis, announced that families making $200,000 a year or less, per household, would not have to pay any tuition. If you know how low on the scale of disposable income $200,000 for a whole household actually is, that’s not surprising. It’s not extraordinarily generous, but it is more generous than most people imagine the Ivy League schools are.

    Mounk: For probably most of the households that send kids to Yale, that threshold is above their income. The median household income in the United States is something like $70,000 a year, so for the median American family that is able to get their child into Yale, they are going to have a free ride.

    Bromwich: There is what we should call opacity rather than transparency. I like the 18th century word for it: publicity—making public, in a neutral sense, the criteria that are used by a university like Yale to accept or not accept students. This is all the more important because we’ve acquired an excess of bogus prestige from rejecting a lot of students. There are more and more applicants, more and more people think they might make it, but admissions are now lower than 5% at Yale and at places like Yale.

    So how to account for the distrust? There seems to be a kind of false advertising in which the institution has been unconsciously indulging.

    Mounk: The report is also quite explicit about the problem of grade inflation. In Yale, the median grade is now an A or an A minus, I believe. How is that contributing to the loss of trust in universities?

    Bromwich: A student reporter writing for the campus newspaper, the Yale Daily News, found in an article published about a year and a half ago that the average grade given at Yale was in the A family—meaning As or A minuses—something like 70% of grades. As a teacher in the humanities (and we are usually charged with being the great culprits on grade inflation) I was shocked to discover that even in the natural sciences, grade inflation of this sort prevails. In order to distinguish among students—non-invidiously, but to discriminate—some much greater separation of degrees of distinction would seem desired.

    That is one of the suggestions made in the final section of our report, which is called “Recommendations.” There are 20 recommendations, and one involves making it easier to calibrate how well students are doing against the cohort of people in that class. If a class is 80% A’s, your A in that class is going to count less than an A in a class where there are 30% A’s. That can seem like a small recommendation, but it may mean that students demand classes where distinction can show up. If they demand classes like that, they may gravitate more towards courses that have some real rigor and be a little less shameless about attending big lecture semi-gut courses in the social sciences or even the humanities that assure them of a good grade, thereby mingling with the respectable crowd of Ivy graduates.

    Mounk: One topic that has been broadly discussed in the media, but also felt by many professors—including left-leaning professors at universities—is a sense of political conformity and a fear that one may, in some explicit or implicit way, be punished for expressing unpopular views. The report mentions that the number of students and faculty members at Yale who fear sharing a political view is quite substantial. How has the problem of political conformity contributed to a loss of trust in universities?

    Bromwich: It is a reductive way of framing this, but not without its own revelations, that 90% or more of faculty at universities like this tend to be registered Democrats and to have, let’s just say, left-liberal politics. Why is that? That’s a long story. I have my own speculative explanations. But there’s no doubt about the enormous, sharp divide in the political culture of the United States right now. It’s a 51-49 politics, counting it simply as Democrat versus Republican, and it keeps going back and forth. So it’s about even, and what these two parties stand for is not quite clear very often, even to themselves. To have it all leaning with great imbalance on one side doesn’t seem an adequate representation, or an adequate preparation for society, among the students who go to college.

    That’s not to say that there’s a great deal of political indoctrination that is just part of the ethic of campus life. I don’t think that’s true at Yale. I think it’s been overplayed as a problem about universities in general. But there’s no doubt that the actual disproportion of political tendencies among faculty members was a factor in creating more distrust.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    Then there’s the question of free inquiry and free speech—related to politics, but related to cultural and social issues too. Are there questions that could be important moral topics for discussion in a university that are pretty much off limits, or where it’s understood—with nobody having to say so—that there’s one right answer, one right response, one right side to take, so that students are, imperceptibly but nevertheless, discouraged from getting into animated discussions about these things in class or outside of class?

    Mounk: Part of what makes students afraid to speak up in class is the threat of social media. If a student says something that a classmate finds offensive, that classmate may go on TikTok or some other social media platform, perhaps misrepresent what was said, and call it out—leaving that student with no friends, with nowhere to sit in the dining hall, and so on.

    Broomwich: Students are wary of saying something controversial because it might be reported in such a way as to harm their reputations early on, and how that affects people’s willingness to speak is pretty easy to guess. One of the recommendations—and it is one I’m most proud of on behalf of this committee—is a no-gizmo classroom: no laptops, no iPhones, no recording. It was suggested that we propose Chatham House rules for all classes, which means you can report things that were said, but you must never report who said it. I don’t think we went that far, and I don’t think it’s necessary to go that far. But you want to stop well short of permissiveness towards creating gossip around comments made in class, either by a teacher or a student.

    Mounk: I want to double-click on a few of these because there are a lot of interesting things in there. I’m struck by your first observation that there is a lot of opacity. I don’t think that opacity is by design exactly—in some areas perhaps more than others—but it has been created over time.

    It’s true that a lot of the things that universities do, that supposedly are meant to serve worthy goals like equity, in fact have the result of favoring the people who know how to play the game. Personal statements are meant to give admissions officers a richer view of a personality and allow students to share when they’ve dealt with some kind of genuine hardship. In reality, it is often the most privileged students, from the most privileged backgrounds, who have the cultural knowledge to understand what you do and don’t say in a personal statement, and who have had the money to go volunteering on some wonderful project somewhere.

    With the financial aid system, there are some really strong reasons why universities have embraced the models they have. The logic is that students who come from very rich households pay a lot, and students who don’t come from rich households are not charged any tuition, or are perhaps even given full living expenses. The top universities with big endowments are now very generous in that regard. But the result is that if you come from a genuinely underprivileged background, you may not know that. You may only have heard in general conversation that going to Yale now costs about $100,000 a year all in. So you may not even apply.

    Not to mention that there are surely some parents who are smart about how they plan their finances and income—if you’re self-employed, you might frontload some losses to your business in the year your kid goes off to one of these schools, and because you really know the system, you’re able to come in under $200,000 that year, even if in the years before and after your kid attends college you’re way over $200,000 a year.

    These are all examples in which a system—often designed quite earnestly, for example to make college accessible, which it now factually is for most people who are not very affluent—remains so opaque that people may not know it. If your kid gets into Yale, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and so on, you do actually get tremendous aid. But the system is so opaque that people may not know it. How did that come about, and is it fixable?

    Bromwich: I don’t know how it came about. As the scholarship process became more intricate, with more kids from public schools being admitted to elite schools—the Ivies, Chicago, and so on—I suppose they found it difficult to explain the intricacies. There is also the gradual advent of what came to be called the holistic approach. This is what Harvard got hit very hard for in the fairness in admissions case before the Supreme Court, because the holistic approach could be shown to disfavor Asian students on personality criteria that are very obscure. They kept receiving low grades on those criteria to compensate for their high SATs, so that the university wouldn’t have to admit too many.

    Mounk: To expand on this for a moment, there is a dark history here. Those personality scores were explicitly introduced to keep down the number of Jews at these schools some 50 years ago, and now they are being used to keep down the number of Asian students. The figures were just remarkable. I believe it was on a five-point scale, and the personality of the average Asian applicant was determined to be more than a standard deviation lower than that of any other racial group. Basically, Harvard University’s institutional judgment is that, on average, Asian students have remarkably terrible personalities—and all of this is just part of this opaque system.

    Bromwich: It’s all a cultural and racist cliché, but it fits all the old models. Black people are just more interesting, more animated, more lively than everyone else—they have personality. Asian people, on the other hand, are harder to read; they all seem to have, somehow, not enough personality. White people are somewhere in between. It was absurd what came out of that.

    All these schools have been practicing some version of holistic admissions. That system depends on the spontaneous judgment and tact of the people working in admissions when reading an application. They should presumably be people who have been taught some basic rules: what are the good schools, what are the hard schools, what are the districts where, if a student has really done something exceptional, it means a lot—and so on. Nevertheless, that system, because it is so personal and so subjective, is liable to particular abuses. No doubt about it.

    Subscribe now

    A well-meaning democratic desire to present a welcoming face to students of all kinds is also largely responsible for some of the obscurity of the process. One recommendation from our report is that schools not advertise sticker price alone, but actually go into some of the intricacies, showing just what kind of chance an applicant has. But a subjective element remains. There will be students who feel prompted to try their chance at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, or elsewhere, but who, on objective measures such as the SAT, aren’t quite up there with the best students—students who do come from more privileged backgrounds but are more academically prepared for a difficult university.

    Mounk: One of the interesting things that the report suggests is that over time the mission of the university has broadened explicitly, and with it the criteria for the kind of students you want to admit. The report suggests that the university should refocus its mission much more narrowly on the creation, preservation, and transmission of knowledge, rather than those vague goals of educating future leaders and all kinds of other things. Going with that, it suggests that academic merit should be the core criterion for admissions, in a way that evidently it is not always now.

    How far should we go with that? Why shouldn’t we do what other top universities in most other countries do? The report acknowledges that in most other countries, universities like Yale and Harvard—as we have recognized in the last year during the Trump administration’s attacks on these universities—are private universities with large endowments, but they do actually receive a lot of public funding. One obvious way to preserve trust in them is to have a very transparent, clear academic metric for who should get in, whether that is a national entrance examination or a university-specific entrance exam—something where people are graded without knowledge of their identities. The people who come out on top are admitted. That is broadly speaking the system that most other democratic countries in the world use. Why not go the whole way and get rid of holistic admissions altogether?

    Bromwich: I am probably closer to that view than some of my colleagues on this committee, but we went a distance towards it. As you mentioned, what these mission statements import is a hard thing to say. They started becoming inspirational—part of the brochures sent out to prospective applicants—about 30 years ago or so. For example, all of these elite universities will speak of their virtues as being a “second home.” The word “home” is used, I would say, even half as often as the word “community”—as if the university is a whole separate community. That leads to some fallacies about the sort of concord or comity that ought to exist among everybody, fallacies that are very hard to erase but should be erased. If you want what John Stuart Mill called the clash of ideas to happen in a university, that clash means friction, some abrasiveness—not necessarily wounded feelings, but surprise, startlement, shock, the feeling of being rubbed the wrong way in an argument, hearing for the first time an argument made well that you didn’t think you had to take seriously. You want that to be part of what goes on in universities.

    As a University of Chicago philosophy professor once told me, we respect you here if you can defend your ideas. That’s a nice way of putting it—maybe a little less forbidding than “clash of ideas.” Students, by the time they are some way into university life, should be interested in defending their ideas. If they are going to, for example, a lecture or a political speech by a person whom they dislike, distrust, and are opposed to, they should have some pride in their ability to ask a hard question instead of shouting the person down. Why? Because it’s a university.

    That seems to me to move towards wanting people who are qualified. Are the people who are qualified the people who score the highest on these merit tests? On the whole, I think that should be a guiding line. I believe it is one of the recommendations in our report: that a baseline be set explicitly—which is not there yet in Yale’s advertisements for potential applicants—that if your SAT score is below a certain threshold, and it’s going to be a pretty high one, you are not encouraged to apply because you’re probably only in for disappointment. They don’t do that yet. In fact, in previous outreach to potential applicants, they say don’t worry too much about SATs.

    As you know, schools like Stanford, Berkeley, Yale, Columbia, and Harvard, around the time of the George Floyd protests and COVID in 2020-2021, abandoned the SAT for a while and then gradually took it back because it was so impractical not to have it be a factor at all. There shouldn’t be a hangdog attitude about using this test—it’s merely objective. It should be a good test, one that tells you something about the student.

    Mounk: One of the interesting things about the SAT test is that it went test-optional in most of those universities, which of course meant that if you had a very good score, you would include it. But if you had a bad score—yet otherwise had a great experience volunteering in Ecuador, or teachers who were really pushing you—you would omit it. The effect of that in the incoming class was, in many universities, very negative: there was a serious drop-off in intellectual quality.

    The other thing this speaks to is exactly the nexus of admissions and opacity, and perhaps—I don’t like the term too much—a form of mollycoddling that has just become the background hum of the American elite class. There is a very odd mix of a highly meritocratic culture, with outsized returns for getting into Yale or into the investment bank you want to work for, and a culture that is very reluctant to be explicit about criteria. You see that in admissions and you see that in grading.

    Part of the advantage of not having minimum SAT cutoffs, let’s be clear, is that you can do all kinds of social engineering. That’s one reason why universities are reluctant to adopt them. But part of it is simply that it feels mean to tell people that if your SAT is below 1300, you probably don’t stand a chance of getting into Yale. So let’s not say that explicitly—even though in reality, I’m sure these admissions offices that claim to read every file holistically probably discard every application below certain criteria without looking at it for more than two seconds. By not writing it on the website, you are actually inviting lots of students to spend a great deal of time on these applications, to get their hopes up, to think that perhaps they are such a unique student that their wonderfully neglected talents will be recognized—only to be disappointed six months later. It’s a kind of fake niceness.

    Subscribe now

    That is related to grade inflation. I am a relatively soft teacher in the sense that I don’t want my students to be punished for taking my class rather than the class of some colleague of mine. Because grade inflation has become the practice, my grades are about as inflated. I try not to make them more inflated than those of my colleagues, but I don’t think they’re less inflated either. There is just no individual incentive to hold firm. But I think that’s also fake niceness. My students deserve to know whether the piece of writing they have handed in is poor, decent, good, or exceptional. At the moment we don’t have the signals to send them for them to know that about themselves. At the moment that feels nice, but it isn’t actually nice if we take intellectual development seriously. Universities should have a stronger sense of mission and be able to stand up against this better than they have. But it’s a downstream effect, I think, from a broader set of cultural attitudes that have become very widespread in the American professional-managerial class.

    Bromwich: There is a well-meaning and rather innocent democratic idealism reflected here: we want all kinds of people, we don’t want to feel that we discriminate, we don’t want to feel we’re an aristocratic country. As the Ivy League—which was an aristocracy if anything was—began to become more democratic, at least in its surface presentation, holistic considerations began to take hold: find a student who has overcome an obstacle, a student who is a fascinating, strong personality and intellectually good enough. That kind of exception started to be made, and it is one form of diversity.

    The word “diversity,” before Trump—who uses it to cover everything having to do with civil rights, gender, and whatever else—really meant devoting special attention to race, gender, ethnic background, immigration status, and cultural and ethnic issues. But diversity is also just wanting different types of people, and that impulse goes far back.

    This is touched on briefly in the preface to our report. Anti-intellectualism—or, to put it more politely, non-intellectualism—has been a major strand of American life. It seems wrong for the academy to present itself as participating in this unprejudiced non-intellectualism, but there is a little bit of that too. It leads to unfortunate effects when you try to have a popular face while not really being a popular institution.

    Mounk: I find the idea that you need to put together a diverse class very strange. I was an undergraduate in England at Cambridge, and the admissions system is so fragmented that there’s no chance of putting together a unified class for the whole university, because colleges do their own admissions per subject. There’s no real way of doing that. Yet the university orchestra somehow always had a second violinist. The idea in America is that you need to make sure that you have this kind of student and that kind of student. But there is a law of large numbers in statistics: if you admit the smartest students, you’re going to end up having one student who happens to be interested in music and one student who happens to be interested in sports. I just don’t buy the premise that active curation is necessary to create a diverse class. My class at Cambridge was every bit as diverse in terms of interests, talents, and the way students spent their free time as a class in America—without any constituency being able to say, we need to make sure we have somebody who can do this sport or that.

    The report rightly calls out all kinds of special categories that continue to be given preferential treatment. These include athletes, the children of alumni, and—this is a minor point numerically, but one I find very striking—the children of faculty and staff, who explicitly get a leg up. That is really quite remarkable.

    The one thing the report does not include is a treatment of race. That is partially because officially we no longer have affirmative action at Ivy League universities in the wake of recent Supreme Court judgments. But that is where the opacity comes back in. When you look at some of the amicus briefs that various universities wrote in the Supreme Court litigation about affirmative action, they said that the number of black students would decline radically if they were not able to practice affirmative action. In the case of Harvard, one of the calculations presented by Harvard’s side said that without affirmative action, the number of black students at the university would go down from about 14% to something like 2%. Yet after the Supreme Court outlawed affirmative action, the number didn’t budge—or it budged only a tiny bit. At Yale, it went from 14% before the Supreme Court judgment to 14% a couple of years later, and I think it has since fallen a little to 12%.

    Bromwich: The desire to have the percentage of students in an entering class reflect the percentage in the population goes with, I think, a fallacy that Michael Oakeshott talks about in some of his essays on education, which he calls the reflection theory of culture. That is to say, the idea that higher education and universities should, in all possible respects, reflect the society they are meant to serve. But institutions are good at functioning for different purposes. If you’re thinking about an activity—call it an institution—such as classical music, or engineering at a high level of specialization, or the armed forces, the kind of abilities needed for one thing or another aren’t necessarily going to reflect the distribution in the population. Universities are a large institution and you should perhaps strive to make them as representative as possible. But the reflection theory also carries the trouble that it makes the university think it should reflect attitudes in society as well as populations. Again, I think that’s wrong.

    Mounk: That brings us to the question of intellectual diversity. You alluded to this briefly earlier: the vast majority of faculty at the leading schools lean left, many of them registered Democrats. That in itself need not be a problem. But I do think it’s indicative of a deeper problem—that the debate at these universities lies, as I see it, between the identitarian left and the liberal left. There is probably a slight preponderance of the liberal left on most campuses, not necessarily in every department or every field. But everything that falls outside of that range is hard to formulate at those universities without experiencing significant pushback.

    Some of the solutions to this problem I view somewhat critically. In an ideal world, we wouldn’t hire colleagues at our universities in order for them to be intellectually diverse. First, it’s very hard for one person to be intellectually diverse in themselves unless they hold a very incoherent view of the world. Second, it’s rather odd to have a colleague who is just there to have a different opinion. But the truth is that political criteria are currently a very large part of the selection process, especially in the social sciences and the humanities, where the quality of work certainly matters, but where people whose views fall too far outside the consensus in a particular department often aren’t even considered in the first place. There is an effective application of ideological criteria that is covert and sometimes not even self-conscious—it’s simply that this person falls outside a reasonable fold, and so they are not considered. That is a very effective implicit political filter.

    Unless you are able to upend that, perhaps the only alternative is to sometimes hire people who fall outside that consensus. It’s very hard to know how to fix this. As in the case of a broader reluctance to state criteria explicitly, this too is downstream from a larger transformation of the professional-managerial class. A lot of the problem today is that the Democrats have simply become the party of the professional-managerial class. As professors, university administrators, and (to a significant extent) students are recruited from the ranks of the professional-managerial class and its offspring, there is always going to be some lean in that direction, as long as that is the nature of our political cleavage.

    So how can universities improve on intellectual diversity and foster genuine debates on campus, in a way that doesn’t itself run counter to the principles of free inquiry and that avoids political litmus tests for faculty hiring?

    Bromwich: It’s very hard. What you’re describing is a standoff between two desirable goods. On the one hand, the intellectual autonomy of departments: departments should be able to choose to hire, and then possibly to tenure, the scholars they consider the best in a given field. On the other hand, if you have very little variety of opinion in a field such as politics—where there is in fact great variety outside the academy—there is something lacking in the education students are going to get.

    This is called, by people who do the kind of study this report was working at, the pipeline problem. The pipeline problem of having so few black people represented in the academy was addressed by affirmative action, but affirmative action is no longer constitutional and may have run its course in any case.

    Where the left-liberal side got its strongest foothold was in certain departments in the humanities and social sciences, but also in the studies programs—black studies, ethnic studies of various kinds, immigration studies, gender studies, and so on.

    Mounk: Is that where the left-liberal or the identitarian left got its foothold? My sense—and I know Harvard much better than Yale—is that at Harvard, the government department and the main faculties have a left-liberal predominance.

    Bromwich: Correction taken. I meant consciously political and consciously left, but you’re right—that would better be described as identitarian.

    In any case, if you want a pipeline going the other way, you can’t do it by political affirmative action. That is, as you said, a litmus test. But universities—Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Berkeley, Stanford, and so on—have created what they call centers or institutes, which aren’t quite academic programs, let alone full departments, but where people can have a permanent presence on campus and teach credit-bearing classes. It is imaginable that, at some places, if done with imagination and scruple, these centers could provide more room for people with academic training to hold views that inform their teaching without becoming dogma—or to hold views that are libertarian in ways that fall outside the usual range. That is one solution, but it is a standoff. It is a hell of a problem, how to change the composition of faculties without somehow compromising intellectual and departmental autonomy.

    Mounk: What about the student side of this? The report refers, at surprising length I thought, to the famous Halloween incident, in which there was an email from the office of intercultural affairs urging people to be very sensitive in the Halloween costumes they chose. There was then a response to that by Erika Christakis, who was—as it was then called—the master, along with her husband Nicholas Christakis, the associate master, of one of the residential houses at Yale. Her response suggested that students should be able to think for themselves about these kinds of things. There was a huge eruption of anger that did look rather like some form of cultural revolution—an effigy of Nicholas in the courtyard and so on. A subsection of students, but an influential subsection, saw it as their calling to impose a certain identitarian orthodoxy on campus. That included intimidating senior faculty members, as in this instance, and sometimes intimidating their fellow students. There is some discussion in the report about the norms that should be established so that people feel free to share their opinions in class without the fear of being canceled afterwards on social media or in other ways.

    I have personally found that that moment has somewhat passed. For the last few years of teaching, I’ve been struck by the fact that for many students, these ideas are now the received wisdom of what they’ve been told in high school, middle school, and sometimes elementary school. It depends a little on where they grew up—if they grew up, for example, in the suburbs of a major metropolitan area like New York, Los Angeles, or Boston, these are largely just the ideas their teachers have always taught them. As a result, they tend to take them for granted. It’s the world they’ve grown up in. But they no longer think of themselves as bearers of a flame whose goal is to impose it on others. It’s more that this is what their teachers told them and, like most things their teachers told them, they assume it’s true—until somebody has a different opinion, which surprises them, and they find they want to talk about it. It feels somewhat less fraught.

    What is your impression of campus culture at Yale—has it somewhat improved? And more broadly, how big is the challenge today and what are some possible solutions? One of the recommendations in the report is to remove electronics from the classroom. The report also entertains but ultimately dismisses the idea of a Chatham House rule prohibiting attribution of remarks made in class. Where do things stand and what can be done?

    Bromwich: I agree with your impression that the pressure zone, so to speak, has lifted somewhat in the last two or three years. A person I’m very close to in this household, who is a psychologist, speculated that in the year 2020 this country had a nervous breakdown—the whole country had a nervous breakdown. COVID was an element of it, but so were the George Floyd protests and the disorders in cities. The Halloween event you mentioned came in 2015-16, so that is an earlier BLM moment, and it had been going on for a long time—really from Obama’s second term into recent days.

    But I do agree that there is more tolerance and interest in the exchange of ideas, and more animated talk and susceptibility to humor in the classroom, as far as I am able to discern. That is a good thing. It means that younger teachers, who tend to be cautious because they worry about student evaluations, will not constantly develop twenty different tones of voice for saying that’s interesting—and may instead learn how to say, I don’t really think that’s true and here’s why, or that’s absolutely true but let’s go further with it. That kind of give and take in a classroom is very important.

    One of the things you could hear from conservative students in the worse recent years—here at Yale, which is not as badly off as other places because it has a conservative political union and a conservative presence in the background, so those students don’t feel entirely isolated—is that sometimes in class, when they made a remark that showed their traditionalist sympathies, they would not get denounced or shamed by anyone in the class or by the teacher, but the teacher would be silent for thirty seconds and then move on to something else. That’s not good. A greater openness that reflects a community with divergent, somewhat disharmonizing points of view is a good thing, to the extent that it really is coming back. I think it may be.

    Mounk: Is one challenge not explicitly mentioned in the report that there is a minority of faculty who really do abuse their power in the classroom to impose their ideological views? My impression is that most faculty members do not do that, and I certainly think most of my colleagues do not. But I am struck, speaking to students, that they very consistently bring up experiences of this.

    I go out of my way, when I explain what I think a good essay is for my class, to make clear that I don’t care whether students agree with me or not. The last thing I want is for somebody to badly parrot my views back to me—that’s not going to earn a great grade. If you write something I agree with, I want to feel that it is a really strong, interesting representation of that view. If you write something I disagree with, the question is not whether I am going to come to agree with you—that is unlikely. What I want to feel is whether the pull of that argument in my mind is a little bit stronger after reading your essay than it was at the beginning. Have you made a case for a point of view I may happen to disagree with, where I find myself thinking: I still probably disagree, but I see the force of that—I see why somebody might believe that.

    Because I am very explicit about this, students sometimes say that they feel they can say what they think in my class, because it is not always the case elsewhere. I always listen up at that. When is it not the case? I remember one recent instance in particular where a student said that in high school, a teacher had a set of views—actually a rather woke set of views, views the student largely shared—but the student chafed at the fact that any disagreement was clearly going to be punished.

    Are there ways that universities need to reckon with that, even just in terms of training teachers and setting clear expectations? You don’t want to be too intrusive, and you certainly don’t want auditing of every grade, which would be open to abuse in all kinds of other ways. But even if it is one in twenty faculty members, that is an experience most undergraduates are going to have once or perhaps twice during their college career. Is that one of the things that damages trust in higher education, and something we need to deal with?

    Bromwich: I don’t know if it is one in twenty teachers, but I agree that it goes against the ethic of teaching. If you have anything resembling a Hippocratic oath as a teacher of the liberal arts and sciences, it should be that a view that is well defended gets the respect of the teacher, and a view that is earnestly and genuinely meant but not well defended receives a response that is not crushing or personally harsh, but reasonable—an example of how to point out the fallacies or the loopholes in a rival argument. Teachers should be exemplary in that way and it should be part of their training. But what is involved in acquiring a PhD is so specialized in other ways that that element of pedagogy is often neglected.

    Some of it is intuitive. Some of it is, as I’m sure you have experienced, getting to know what your classroom presence is like and what it’s like to teach different kinds of classes. I remember in my early days teaching at Princeton—I was in my 20s—being morbidly worried about what I thought of as dead time, what disc jockeys call dead air: nothing being said. If I asked a question and there was no answer for ten seconds, I got very anxious. But as a teacher you learn that if a question was well asked, you simply wait.

    Mounk: The best piece of teaching advice I’ve ever gotten was in graduate school. The department put on a little meeting for people who were going to be teaching assistants for the first time, and the best piece of advice—which I follow very often—is this: if you ask a question and you look anxious that people might not answer it, and you look like you’re going to jump in yourself, students think they can just sit back and let the teacher do their thing. What you should do instead is lean back, look comfortable, and let an awkward silence arise. Some student always can’t bear the awkwardness and jumps in, and suddenly you have a real discussion. I don’t generally have trouble getting my students to talk in the classroom, but on the occasions when that happens, I do that. Sometimes I even call it out explicitly: I’m happy to sit here in awkward silence for as long as you like. When you do that, somebody always jumps in.

    Bromwich: Sometimes you haven’t asked the question well, and that shouldn’t lead to too much self-consciousness either. You learn to listen to yourself and say, a few seconds later, you know what? I posed that badly. Let me try again. There was a philosophy professor at Princeton—modal logic and philosophy of language and other such things—David Lewis, who spoke perfect paragraphs and was an excellent lecturer. When he would walk back and forth on the stage and, in the middle of a sentence, realize he was about to talk nonsense, he would stop and say so, then go back and say the whole thing again. Teachers, in a quieter way, should be able to do that.

    Let me read a passage from a British education master of the 19th century that is quoted by Oakeshott, because I think it speaks to exactly what we’re talking about—the kinds of habits and manners that go with thinking in the context of higher education:

    A certain amount of knowledge you can indeed with average faculties acquire so as to retain, nor need you regret the hours you spend on much that is forgotten, for the shadow of lost knowledge at least protects you from many illusions. But you go to a great school not so much for knowledge as for arts and habits, for the habit of attention, for the art of expression, for the art of assuming at a moment’s notice a new intellectual position, for the art of entering quickly into another person’s thoughts, for the habit of submitting to censure and refutation, for the art of indicating assent or dissent in graduated terms.

    That last part is obviously what has become most challenging for students in the last generation or so.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and David discuss why the number of students choosing humanities subjects is declining and how colleges and universities can regain public trust. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    59 min
  • They Went Hard Against Woke. And Then… Went Even Harder Against Trump

    Cathy will be interviewed about this article by our senior editor Luke Hallam for our latest Ask the Author livestream on Substack Live, Tuesday May 5 at 6pm ET. Stay tuned! And click here to watch recordings of our recent livestreams.

    FIRE’s Greg Lukianoff speaking at the Global Free Speech Summit in Nashville, 2025.

    As Donald Trump tries to strong-arm the media into compliance using federal agencies as his weapon, and to purge undesirable content everywhere from museums to universities, freedom of speech in America under the second Trump administration faces real and urgent dangers. Amid these dangers, charges of hypocrisy and opportunism are frequently leveled at those who advocated for free speech and intellectual tolerance during the era when censorious “woke” progressivism was at its height (roughly 2013-2021). The title of an episode of the progressive podcast “Cancel Me, Daddy” sums it up: “They Screamed ‘Cancel Culture’—Then Went Silent While Trump Gutted Free Speech.”

    Others, such as writer David Klion in The Nation last June and, most recently, attorney and blogger Ken White in The UnPopulist, make a charge that goes beyond hypocrisy or silence: they argue that critics of “wokeness”—such as the signatories of the July 2020 “Letter on Justice and Open Debate” in Harper’s Magazine—bear at least some blame for the Trump administration’s war on speech.1 Such critics, it is argued, partly enabled Trump’s current actions with their hyperbolic claims of speech suppression by the left.

    We are expanding our events offerings! Please check out our events page to see what we have lined up—and to watch recordings of recent events.

    Persuasion events

    Likewise, former Yale philosophy professor Jason Stanley, now at the University of Toronto, has accused the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), the premier free-speech group that challenged speech suppression by the illiberal left at the height of “woke,” of fostering a “moral panic about leftism [in] universities” that supposedly cleared the way for the Trump administration’s assaults on the academy.

    Is there any substance to these arguments?

    First, the hypocrisy claim. It is very true that some vocal opponents of “woke” left-wing illiberalism have not acquitted themselves well under Trump. Political hacks like anti-woke activist Christopher Rufo have gleefully embraced right-wing “cancel culture,” and have been quite upfront about having double standards on the issue.

    Before the 2024 election, I wrote about other anti-woke culture warriors who had gotten on the Trump train in the hope that a new Trump presidency would effectively combat far-left progressivism. Some have stayed on that train. Colin Wright, an evolutionary biologist who claims he was denied a position at Cornell University because of discrimination favoring racial minorities, has not only defended Trump’s widely criticized deportation policies, but has insisted that “for wokeness to go away—to salt the Earth of it—Republicans must win again in 2028.”

    When you start talking about “salting the earth” to exterminate a viewpoint you dislike, maybe it’s time to consider the “are we the baddies?” meme.

    A far more prominent—though more complicated—case is Bari Weiss, whose magazine, The Free Press, was recently acquired by Paramount under the new leadership of Trump-friendly tycoon David Ellison. Weiss herself was elevated to editor-in-chief at CBS News last October.

    Despite Weiss’s stated commitment to fairness, independence, and truth-seeking, both Weiss and The Free Press have taken a largely accommodating stance toward the Trump administration. A lot of Free Press content still focuses on the absurdities and abuses of the “woke left,” including articles that revisit “cancel culture” episodes from a few years ago.

    Much of its coverage of the Trump presidency, meanwhile, qualifies as out-and-out cheerleading or even attempts to push the administration further. Last year, the site published a manifesto by Rufo (co-signed by a few dozen mostly pro-Trump pundits) calling for a de facto White House takeover of American universities—with no reply or counterpoint from any Rufo (or Trump) critics, many of whom are also critics of the academic left. Rufo’s proposed “contract with the universities” would strip schools not only of public funds but of accreditation for failing to comply with the right’s nebulous ideological demands.

    Perhaps more disturbingly, The Free Press has trodden softly on an issue indirectly related to Weiss’s position at CBS: the Trump administration’s use of the FCC’s powers to strong-arm broadcast media. (Its article on the subject focused on the agency’s excessive powers in general, only briefly mentioning the specific, and unique, Trump-era abuses.)

    Meanwhile, the site’s criticism of the government—including immigration enforcement tactics that trample due process, and blatant abuse of federal prosecutorial powers to punish Trump’s enemies—tends to be tempered with soft-pedaling and “Democrats do it too” both-sidesing.

    Subscribe now

    I happen to agree that it’s important not to forget the real harms of left-wing illiberalism (more on that in a moment). But to act as if left-wing illiberalism is still the main threat to freedom of speech in America during the second Trump administration is an egregious failure to keep things in perspective. Weiss has been wrongly caricatured as a pro-Trump or right-wing propagandist, but it’s fair to say that she has failed to live up to her stated principle of holding both left and right accountable without fear or favor.

    But does this reflect a more general trend among anti-woke “free speech warriors”?

    Of the still-living signatories of the Harper’s Letter, I could find one, the writer Sarah Haider, who has emerged as cautiously pro-Trump. She hailed Trump’s victory in November 2024 and suggested that concerns about the harmful effects of his presidency were overblown. (There is no evidence that she has come around to a more critical view since; her recent posts on X are still in a “Democrats bad” vein.) Three or four others, including Weiss, can be counted in the “anti-anti” or “both sides” column, or punch predominantly left.

    But such people are vastly outnumbered by those signatories who have been scathingly critical of the administration: Anne Applebaum, Garry Kasparov, Thomas Chatterton Williams, Jonathan Rauch, Nadine Strossen, Caitlin Flanagan, David Frum, Matt Yglesias, Damon Linker, Judith Shulevitz, Jesse Singal, Steven Pinker, and Persuasion’s own Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama—and that’s far from a complete list. The “where are they now?” critique is manifestly wrong.

    It is also worth noting that FIRE, the vanguard of opposition to “woke” speech-policing, has emerged as one of the strongest free speech advocates opposing Trump’s attempts to bully and muzzle critics. It filed a legal challenge to the administration’s move to deport noncitizen students who have expressed pro-Palestinian views, and backed Harvard’s lawsuit challenging the Trump administration’s cuts in research funds. It also represented, pro bono, Iowa pollster J. Ann Selzer, who had been sued for “fraud” by a Trump supporter claiming that she had misrepresented poll results to help Kamala Harris. And it has stood up against Trump’s own lawsuits against media organizations.

    So, for the most part, the “free speech warriors” have acquitted themselves quite well.

    That brings us to the second charge. Klion concedes that many signers of the Harper’s Letter have criticized Trump’s abuses—but he thinks they’re evading their own partial responsibility for our current predicament. What they did, according to Klion, was “build a broad elite consensus that has functioned mainly to legitimize Trump’s actions.”

    White’s piece in The UnPopulist makes a more fundamental case against “the ‘free speech culture’ ethos” espoused by FIRE and the Harper’s Letter—an ethos that he believes absurdly inflates the threat from the progressive left and allows bad-faith actors on the right, including authoritarians like Trump and Elon Musk, to pose as free speech warriors challenging a “totalitarian” order.

    Few people would deny that pro-free-speech arguments criticizing the left can be, and are, disingenuously misused by bad-faith actors on the right. White’s point, however, is that these were bad-faith arguments in the first place: in his view, “free speech culture” champions have relentlessly hyped a supposed left-wing threat from “relatively powerless people like students,” whose worst offenses are to respond too rudely or obnoxiously to speech they consider harmful. The result, he says, is to blur the lines between rudeness and repression, and to elevate a phantom menace that serves both to distract from and to excuse repressive measures by “antiwoke” government officials.

    But this account fundamentally misunderstands, or misrepresents, what happened in American culture during the “Great Awokening.”

    To begin with, one may quibble with the depiction of students as “powerless” when they have the institutional backing of schools. During the protests that followed the murder of George Floyd in the summer of 2020, Leslie Neal-Boylan, Dean of the University of Massachusetts-Lowell School of Nursing, was fired after a student’s Twitter “call-out” of her email which said, “BLACK LIVES MATTER, but also, EVERYONE’S LIFE MATTERS.” Several years earlier, Northwestern professor Laura Kipnis was put through two formal Title IX investigations for criticizing what she saw as overreactions by colleges to allegations of sexual misconduct.

    What’s more, plenty of “cancel culture” episodes happened in non-academic settings, and involved people being fired, or forced out of their jobs, over very tame “problematic” opinions or trivial offenses against progressive racial etiquette.

    Neal-Boylan was one of several people, including a school principal and a sports broadcast host, who lost their jobs in the wake of the 2020 protests for social media posts dissenting from the Black Lives Matter movement over its coercive tactics or its racial focus. Around the same time, the Journal of the American Medical Association fired a deputy editor over a podcast questioning the existence of “structural racism” in medicine. Philadelphia Inquirer editor Stan Wischnowski was pressured into resigning over an article on the damage from property destruction during riots, headlined “Buildings Matter Too.”

    Subscribe now

    Meanwhile, a senior curator at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art stepped down under fire for “white supremacist beliefs” because he said that refusing to acquire works by white artists is “reverse discrimination.” A Denver yoga studio chain was driven out of business by a social media backlash after “callouts” from a few employees who felt that the management’s statement of solidarity with Black Lives Matter was “too little, too late,” and who dredged up other vague grievances.

    The list goes on and on—and, contrary to White’s assertion that the backlash against “cancel culture” has protected primarily powerful people such as pundits or politicians, many of the casualties were working-class employees. A truck driver lost his job after being accused of making a “white supremacist” gesture at another driver. (Around that time, there was a trollish effort by the far right to popularize the idea that the “okay” symbol—an “O” formed with two fingers—is a badge of white-power loyalty.) In Portland, Oregon, two bakery employees were fired after a black activist made a video claiming a racist slight because the shop refused to serve her several minutes after closing time.

    Even children got caught in the net: Two teenage boys in California were expelled from school after a goofy photo they had shared of themselves wearing dark green acne masks was mistaken for blackface.

    It’s also worth noting that critiques of left-wing illiberalism did not come solely from conservatives or liberal centrists prone to “both-sidesing.” In 2023, PEN America, a veteran free-expression advocacy group that strongly supports racial and gender diversity, issued a report documenting the chilly climate in publishing created by speech-policing in the name of social justice—including books canceled by publishers or withdrawn by authors because of an online backlash against writers of the “wrong” identity depicting “marginalized” characters and cultures.

    Of course, none of the cases described above were assaults on the First Amendment, since the government was not involved in censoring speech. But are “free speech culture” advocates either unable to make that distinction, or unwilling to admit that state repression is worse than non-state “cancel culture,” as their detractors suggest?

    At the “Global Free Speech Summit” held at the University of Vanderbilt in Nashville, Tennessee last October, most speakers did agree that while it’s important to continue opposing cultural repression of unpopular speech, it is also important to acknowledge that repression by the government is worse. As Jonathan Rauch put it in one of the panels, “We do have to walk and chew gum.”

    True, in some ways, the existence of left-wing illiberalism does complicate opposition to right-wing authoritarianism. Trump’s moves to yank funds from universities and browbeat them into bending to his ideological agenda may look a little less outrageous if one acknowledges (as does FIRE) that many of these universities have a not-so-great record on intellectual freedom themselves—and that some of the steps schools have pledged to take as a sign of compliance, such as more support for diverse ideas and civil discourse, are positive.

    Likewise, the Trump administration’s war on “diversity, equity and inclusion” initiatives at schools and in workplaces may not seem so straightforwardly authoritarian or bigoted if one admits that many DEI programs have had strong elements of enforced ideological conformity and even compelled speech, sometimes of a creepy and intrusive kind. (One program developed by the Seattle Office of Civil Rights, for example, required white city employees to share “a time in the past two to three months when [they] caused harm to a person of color.”)

    But should liberals avoid talking about these issues simply because it might give ammunition to the right? That doesn’t seem like a winning strategy. White thinks that free speech advocates who oppose left-wing cancel culture spout such blatantly hypocritical “bullshit” that they turn multitudes of people off the free speech cause. But surely it’s much more off-putting to evade or sanitize the truth—evasions plenty of people are savvy enough to notice. Given today’s free-for-all media ecosystem, liberal and centrist silence about the abuses of the illiberal left is not going to sweep those problems under the rug (even if that were desirable); it will only boost right-wing media that will happily report these problems—and, sometimes, misreport them in the service of their own agenda.

    Subscribe now

    There is no question that the populist right, including Trump, has exploited the issue of free speech and “cancel culture” for its own authoritarian power grab. (And no, it didn’t need any assistance from the Harper’s Letter, whose outlook was explicitly anti-Trumpian, or from FIRE, which has opposed speech suppression regardless of ideology since its inception in 1999.) It is equally true that plenty of anti-woke “free speech warriors” turned out to be unprincipled or opportunistic, cheering on the government when it attempted to impose ideological conformity on colleges or bully the media.

    But plenty of others have been at the forefront of standing up to the Trump administration’s assaults on civil liberties. Seeking to pillory them for imaginary sins of complicity with the right is not just intolerant—it’s remarkably self-defeating.

    Cathy Young is a writer at The Bulwark, a columnist for Newsday, and a contributing editor to Reason.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    1

    Full disclosure: I was among the signers of the Harper’s Letter; I have also been a regular contributor to The UnPopulist, a fine magazine despite my disagreements with some of its articles.

    0 min
  • Luis Garicano on the Economics of Artificial Intelligence

    Luis Garicano is Professor of Public Policy at the London School of Economics.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Luis Garicano discuss the economic magnitude of AI’s transformative potential, whether artificial intelligence complements or replaces human workers, and why Silicon Valley predictions about automation consistently miss the mark.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: There are many things I would love to talk to you about, but the topic I have been thinking about a lot is artificial intelligence. I have had conversations on this podcast about the technology itself with people like Geoffrey Hinton. I have discussed the dimension of existential risk with people like one of the co-authors of If Anybody Builds It, Everyone Dies. I have also thought about some of the broader public policy angles.

    However, I have not yet had a conversation specifically about the economics of artificial intelligence. It would be really interesting to try to get a handle on those questions. We will focus particularly on the labor market, but before we get there: what, in general, do you expect the impact of AI to be? Is it going to be major, middling, or minor? Is it going to lead to the vast economic growth some are predicting, or is it going to really decimate the number of jobs out there for humans? Is this going to be an economically revolutionary time, or is it just one of many developments that are interesting but ultimately not that consequential?

    Luis Garicano: I don’t have a crystal ball—anticipating things is always hard. But let me give you my best take based on what we see. It is clear that a lot of knowledge work, even if the technology stopped tomorrow, could be automated—a lot of knowledge tasks. It is already very clear that tasks which are routine, tasks that have to do with diagnosis, writing, crafting documents, doing research—the AI is already doing these perfectly. Coding work is really spectacular. In terms of whether it is going to be big, I think it is going to be huge. It is probably as big a revolution as the industrial revolution—that is a very likely thing—except that instead of automating physical work, it is for cognitive work. Everything points to a large impact, and also an accelerating one.

    There were people who were doubting, people who were wondering if AI would be a big deal or not. I don’t think any of those people could still be doubting, given what we have observed in the last six or eight weeks. The explosion of new models, the way they work—Claude Code is really taking the world by storm. Everybody has noticed that software firms’ valuations are plummeting in the stock market, showing that people believe many functions, many verticals, and many software products that were accommodating one particular use case can be replaced by AI.

    So yes, a big deal, and in many segments. On the question of growth: yes, if this is as big a deal as it appears, we will see big productivity growth and an acceleration—though not the kind of growth that many people in Silicon Valley predict, because most economists think in terms of O-rings and bottlenecks and weak links. Meaning: you can invent as many compounds to solve cancers as you want, but if you need to go through years of clinical trials and regulatory approvals, that is not going to suddenly accelerate massively. Those weak links will constrain growth everywhere.

    On the question of labor: the evidence so far is that AI is more complementing than replacing. In the three areas where we expect the largest impacts, translators haven’t dropped—everybody thought translators were going to be decimated, translation seems like a solved problem, and yet the amount of translation work hasn’t dropped according to world labor statistics. Customer service agents: some people get let go, some get rehired to do different jobs; again, the BLS doesn’t see much. Even computer programmers—we are not seeing big drops. There were a couple of papers earlier in the year. Erik Brynjolfsson has a paper with co-authors called Canaries in a Coal Mine which was starting to see drops in more exposed segments for more junior employees, and we do see a bit of that. But there is a lot of discussion on whether that has to do with COVID and so on. For employment at the moment, it looks like AI assists more than it replaces.

    It is clear that AI can do many tasks. My main quarrel with the Silicon Valley interpretation of things is the belief that if a computer can replace the tasks most easily done by a machine, then the job is gone. Jobs are more than their most automatable tasks—a radiologist, for instance, spends only 30% of his time looking at scans. The job of a radiologist is much more than just diagnosing scans.

    Mounk: I was in a meeting with Sam Altman in, I believe, 2018—I barely knew who he was at that time. I remember him pointing outside the window of a hotel in Silicon Valley, saying that in three or five years there were going to be robots building homes there. None of that has materialized. There is a very real tendency of people in Silicon Valley not just to overpromise on the technology, but to underestimate the obstacles to real-world adoption of technology. Those obstacles are particularly evident, as you recently pointed out, in something like house construction, where the constraints are not actually the inability to build homes—we know how to build homes. It is regulatory approval, zoning laws, concerns about whether the nature of a neighborhood is going to change, and all of those kinds of things.

    Garicano: Two points about the comments you made. One is about the Silicon Valley position. I am very surprised that they are not just hyping the technology—which I understand, because you want to sell enterprise subscriptions—but they are also hyping the risks of the technology, and all the time threatening people with extinction, saying AI will take all their jobs. I don’t see the point of this tactic. I can see that if you want to justify the valuations, they need to say that all these things are incredibly transformative—and they are transformative.

    The other day, Mustafa Suleyman—the ex-DeepMind co-founder and Microsoft AI head—was saying to the FT that they are going to automate all white-collar work in 18 months. I was joking: does anyone really believe that Microsoft will actually get Outlook or Word to work properly in 18 months? I don’t think they can fix their two pieces of terrible software in 18 months. We all hate Outlook—we’ve hated it for 15 years, and I’d bet we’ll hate it in 18 months. So they’re talking about automating complete, complex jobs, and they cannot fix their own software. That’s just completely ridiculous.

    Mounk: Before we dive into the substance of this, I would love for you to help us establish the premise you’re operating on. A lot of my listeners are tech-forward, and a lot are not. I still find many people in conversation who experimented with ChatGPT when it came out three or so years ago and have gone back to use it every now and again—perhaps using it instead of Google to search for certain things, or for a translation need, or for very specific tasks. They are still convinced that it hallucinates a lot, and they feel the limitations of what it can do are very strong.

    Part of that, I think, is that the most commercially used ChatGPT products are not very good compared to some of the competitors now—in part because they route your requests sometimes to a really powerful model and sometimes to a not very powerful model at all. Part of it is that a lot of people use free versions of these AI tools, which are much less powerful than the ones for which you need to pay at least $20 a month. Part of it is that probably only a fraction of people who listen to this podcast have used tools like Claude Code.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    So, just to motivate what we’re talking about: when you say there has been tremendous progress over the last few months, and more broadly over the last few years, what are these tools able to do today? How are people using them in ways that are so different from what you might expect if you’re just using the free tier of ChatGPT?

    Garicano: Let me give you a Claude Code example and a deep research example.

    The Claude Code example is the following. What is interesting is that the machine can talk to you and it can deploy tools—it can put Python tools to work. Let me explain this in a very clear way. I did a paper: I was a member of the European Parliament, and after returning to academia, I wanted to do some research on how narratives work in the European Parliament—I wanted to show there are no trade-offs in the narratives. What I did was collect 46,000 speeches, all the speeches, downloaded them, put them in a spreadsheet. Each speech goes to ChatGPT through an API—which means it goes through a special pipe—gets processed, comes back into a spreadsheet, gets classified in certain ways, and then we analyze that classification with statistical tools. That took six months. It is a lot of work: getting each speech, sending it, bringing it back, and so on. I had done this for climate.

    I then decided to use Claude Code to do all of that work—six months of work—for the topic of AI. How is the discourse in the Parliament evolving on AI? I told Claude Code—in text, no programming—here is my directory, where I had all these files, and I told it to write the entire same pipeline: get the speech, send it, classify it, analyze it, but instead of for climate, as in the original files, do it for AI. There are many Python programs involved, multiple programs I had to run. Six months of work. Six to ten hours later, there was a complete analysis by Claude Code—all the directories, all the tables, every single figure, from start to end. The difference is that you talk to it, but it can deploy all these tools, do all these things, go over the web, run code.

    The second thing I would tell your listeners about, which they would very much enjoy using if they are not already, is the deep research tools. On the highest-end research frontier of these models, you ask it to research a question—for example, you might say: populism has been growing, and there are two explanations, cultural and economic. I want an in-depth literature review of all the evidence comparing those theories. I want you to spend a lot of time collecting hundreds of papers, classifying them, telling me the prevalence of the evidence, and writing a thorough research report. This is now better than what a research assistant could do over several months.

    Those are two examples of what is possible at the higher end. Why are they useful for the world? Think of a lawyer. A transactions lawyer is essentially comparing a situation to existing precedents and existing case law—drafting, for example, an intellectual property agreement or a contract to buy a house. They go and find similar contracts, upload the relevant knowledge, and convert it into a new contract. If a law firm incorporates all its contracts into Claude Code and asks the system to use that knowledge to automate contract drafting, compliance, and verification, it is definitely able, right now and without any question, to handle that complete task.

    Mounk: I started to use Claude Code about a month and a half ago. I have basically no coding background—I had a couple of group lessons of C++ in middle school, did a little bit of programming in statistical software in graduate school, but very limited. I was mostly a political theorist. I then took a few weeks of CS50, the famous online computer science course on edX—a very good course, and that was ten years ago. If you had set me an entry-level coding task, like programming a number guessing game, I would not have been able to do it. Now, with this tool, I have been able to program five different things that are of concrete use to me. It is just astonishing what it can do.

    More broadly, some of the pitfalls that AI used to have until a few years ago are not really there anymore. When ChatGPT 3.5 launched, it didn’t have an extended thinking modality. It’s as though I ask you a challenging question and it’s part of a game show where if you don’t start answering within one second, or if you hesitate more than one second between any two words, you lose—that answer is not going to be very coherent. Now the systems, at the higher tier, talk to themselves and walk you through the process by which they attempt an answer. They try one answer, check whether it makes sense, and then say, no, actually I made a mistake, I should do this. By the time they give you output, they have thought through it in a much, much bigger way.

    On the problem of hallucinations: I wrote a post on Substack about asking Claude to write a publishable paper of political theory. A number of senior colleagues in the field wrote to me after I published it saying it would absolutely have been published in a top journal if it had been submitted. I looked through some of the references—not every single one—and it was not hallucinating. It now knows, by and large, how to ensure that something actually exists, and it flags when it is uncertain. It told me: I have put in the page numbers for the canonical translations of Tocqueville—I’m not sure about those, please go and double-check them, I don’t have access to that full text. If I upload the PDF of that book, it will do it for me. So it knows what it knows and it knows what it doesn’t know. A lot of those problems have been fixed.

    Now we go into the realm of economics. I don’t know whether we have reached superintelligence as defined by Dario Amodei—where we suddenly have the equivalent of a whole country of geniuses. But we certainly have the equivalent of a whole country of middle-class professionals. Suddenly the number of people who can competently draft a legal contract, and do so in ten seconds for very little money, is vastly larger than it used to be. So what does that do—first for growth? If economic growth was in some ways constrained by human capital, constrained by the number of well-trained people with access to a lot of knowledge able to carry out that work, that should mean we are going to see a real increase in economic growth. Or is it more complicated than that?

    Garicano: The first-order approximation is that you have an increase in productivity and an increase in growth—that is a reasonable place to start. There are two or three caveats that I think are important in trying to figure out how big that increase is.

    The first is organizations. The organization of work is intensely human. As you were hinting from my recent post on London housing: the reason 23 out of 25 boroughs of London are building zero housing this year—in 2025, there were zero housing starts—has nothing to do with technology. Giving them better technology is not going to solve the problems with the neighbors, with the NIMBYs, with the Greens, with the land regulation, the lawyers, and all the other things that stop construction that we already know about. So the first caveat is organizations and all-too-human obstacles, which mean that even when the technology is there, many other factors have to collaborate.

    Subscribe now

    There are entire sectors which have Baumol characteristics. Baumol had an observation in the 1960s—and maybe you have discussed this with your listeners—that a string quartet would still take one hour to play a Mozart piece, the same exact hour as it would have taken 200 years ago: four people, one hour, no productivity gain.

    Mounk: This is a very old point because nowadays, no economist would talk about string quartets.

    Garicano: This observation holds for a very large share of the economy. For hairdressers, cooks—technology doesn’t play any role. It’s not just that there are bottlenecks, but that productivity growth is very small because there is really no actual technology and no actual AI involved.

    What is interesting is that in the sector of the economy that enjoys technological change, as prices drop, it is perfectly possible—and we will talk about demand elasticity in a moment—that people reach satiation and that sector becomes smaller. Think of agriculture: it became technologically fantastic, but it became smaller and smaller as it grew more productive, because people’s stomachs didn’t grow. The amount of workers employed went down. What that means is that the sector with the technological expansion reduces its size, and the other sector—the one with the violinists—expands its. As a result, the weighted average of growth depends not just on how much the productive sector is growing, but on the fact that the sector that is growing may itself be getting smaller.

    Mounk: One way of thinking about this is that everything that can be automated suddenly becomes plentiful. To that extent, it might not fully show up in GDP figures, but it does fundamentally remake the world. When I think about the agriculture case: as a result of the successful mechanization of agriculture, that has become a much smaller part of the economy and we are paying vastly less for food than we used to. You will understand the technical details better than I do, but that sort of underplays the degree of that change in the way we track GDP.

    What it does mean is that whereas for most of human history, even people in affluent countries—if you weren’t at the very top of the hierarchy—were deeply constrained in how much food they could consume, were malnourished as a result, and died earlier as a result, nowadays, if you are anywhere outside the bottom 20% of a medium-to-affluent country, food is not your primary expense. It is a significant expense if you like nice food and shop for nice things, but if all you want is to feed yourself on ramen and a few supplements in such a way that you avoid malnutrition, that is going to be a tiny part of your budget. That is a fundamental positive transformation of human life, even if it doesn’t fully show up in GDP figures.

    Garicano: Economists like to talk about welfare as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In this case, the consumer is enjoying the biggest gain. A lot of what happens with AI is that the gains are going to consumers and not showing up in GDP figures.

    Let me give you an example. We have a dishwasher that is broken. We take a picture, upload it to ChatGPT and ask what is going on. It says this part is stuck and you should just remove it. We remove it. Our welfare has gone up—we are happier, we solved the problem. Now, there is a transaction that would have taken place—some person coming to our house to fix the dishwasher—that didn’t happen. The GDP would have been higher if that person had come and we had paid him. But our welfare increased. If we can diagnose our own illnesses, if we can assess whether our diet is good or bad without going to a dietitian, if we can do our own contracts—all of those things increase our welfare but do not show up in GDP. In fact, some of them could reduce GDP.

    I was talking to a CEO from China who told me he thought a lot of the gains were being “smoked in the corridor.” I asked what he meant. He said he observed all his IT people becoming more productive—solving problems faster—but that it wasn’t showing up in better numbers at the end of the month. Each person in IT was more productive, but they were going home earlier or playing video games. Those are real gains that need not increase GDP.

    The other thing I would mention is the difference between the short and the long run. Imagine there are two sectors, and sector A gets fully automated—let’s say lawyers, even if that example is imperfect because lawyers have a lot of regulatory protection and there are many contexts where you are required to use one. Imagine we no longer need any lawyers and we solve our legal problems ourselves. All the people in sector A that gets automated need to move to sector B. All the demand that is now consumer surplus—money we no longer need to spend on legal problems—can go and be spent on the other sector. But that reallocation doesn’t happen instantly. The capital has to be moved, the labor has to be relocated, the demand has to be redirected. There is a moment when GDP could be dropping, because we are not consuming legal services or dishwasher repairs, and the transition to new consumption patterns hasn’t yet occurred. In the meantime, capital is being written down, labor is being relocated, and there may not be sufficient demand either. All of that transition could definitely look nothing like smooth, continuous growth.

    Mounk: I’m trying to figure out what the aggregate effect of these changes might be. On one hand, agriculture—historically a huge part of human activity—mostly gets automated, the number of people working in agriculture is now astonishingly low, output goes up a lot, and as a result prices go down a lot. Most of the consumer surplus is captured by consumers, and so it is a very good thing.

    What I don’t fully understand is what actually provides the basis of ordinary people’s bargaining power. In the agricultural world, the answer is that the production of agricultural goods becomes very cheap, but it turns out that humans are necessary for running all kinds of other elements of the economy. There is a strong demand for human labor, and that is what allows people to continue to consume.

    Now, if we get to a world—and this still sounds a little like science fiction, but I am trying to imagine the scenario—where AI can fully run agriculture without any humans, and can fully run the systems needed to manage agriculture, and can fully run the law firms needed to efficiently allocate capital to agriculture and ensure the most efficient firms are tilling the most land, it may be that there are still elements of a human economy where human work is needed. It may be that humans still prefer human teachers, or that humans continue to be required in medical decisions—perhaps because we don’t trust AI systems to make them, or perhaps because of regulatory obstacles to fully automating those decisions.

    Subscribe now

    But if all of the underlying productive processes that actually generate material wealth no longer require humans, is there a kind of perpetual motion in the circular economy of humans that is enough to sustain affluence on its own? Or does there need to be some relation back to material production for the whole construct to sustain itself? If all of the demand for human labor is produced by the fact that it is extremely expensive to look after old people, by regulations that prevent us from building houses, by the willingness of capital owners to pay a lot for housing because they need somewhere to live, and by some people continuing to be employed in human-facing roles because of regulation—is that actually enough to sustain affluence for human workers if all of the genuinely productive processes can be done by non-human workers?

    Garicano: Let me break this down into a few parts. First, the satiation case we are discussing—where the sector gets smaller as it becomes more efficient—doesn’t necessarily have to be the case. In fact, in many sectors, as technology gets better and things become more efficient, the sector actually grows in size. This is called the Jevons effect, after William Stanley Jevons, an English economist who observed that machines using coal were getting more and more efficient and yet were consuming more coal rather than less. Why? Because as they got better, they were being used for so many more things that total coal consumption was going up. In many sectors—think about health, think about energy—as things get more and more efficient, it is unlikely that the sector as a whole will shrink. In fact, it is more likely that it could grow in size and demand more humans. The sectors most likely to grow when prices go down—those with the most elastic demand—would be things like health and energy, just to give two simple examples.

    The second important point is the idea of complements, which you were clearly hinting at in your question. There are many situations where a human is needed at a bottleneck. Even if the first 99 tasks can be automated, if the 100th task requires a human, the 99 automated tasks are abundant but the scarcity is still the human—and the human is going to capture the rent and the labor income.

    Mounk: That depends on the human being scarce. If that task requires a very high level of qualification and you need millions of humans to do it because they are so productive, then a lot of people are going to be in relatively decent employment. But if you only need seven people to do it and they have to be excellent, then those seven people are going to capture huge rents—some of that economic gain is going to go to them, but only to them.

    Consider that something like 5% of the male workforce globally is employed as drivers. The rent from the need for human drivers is very broadly distributed—each of those drivers is probably not very affluent, but the rent for that activity is widely shared. Now say that ten people have to supervise all of the self-driving cars, and they have to be incredibly qualified with very few people able to do it. Perhaps they capture a lot of that rent, but that is only going to be ten people who get that money. Or say it needs a thousand people, but a million people are able to do that job—in that case, the wage for those thousand people is going to be really low, because any one of them can be fired and there are 999,000 waiting outside the door willing to take their position. So it depends a lot on those kinds of details.

    Garicano: I am writing a book on this point—it is called Messy Jobs. The argument of Messy Jobs is that there is a big difference between a task and a job.

    Geoffrey Hinton, whom you have had on your podcast, is famous for having said in 2016 that nobody should study radiology because radiology was just an expert system that could scan photos—and of course any expert system was going to be better, trained on hundreds of millions of breast cancer scans and perfect at detecting those cancers. The truth of the matter is that demand for radiologists has never been higher. Their salaries are growing, their numbers are growing, and it is the third highest-paying medical profession in the United States. Why? Because the task is very different from the job. The technologist imagines a radiologist just looking at scans. But only 30% of a radiologist’s time is spent looking at scans—they have to develop the diagnosis plan, talk to colleagues, talk to patients, and do many other things.

    The first crucial obstacle to your dystopia is that automating parts of jobs—tasks—is not automating the job. I invite all your listeners to think of what they did today and consider which of those things could be replaced by a machine. I went to a workshop, had a job market seminar, had a meeting with colleagues, had students walking in, worked on a paper—and if you think through how many of those tasks you could replace with a machine, you will discover that many of them can’t be. The task we are doing right now—having a human conversation about something—can’t be. A job and a task are really very different things. Many aspects of a job can change without the whole bundle disappearing. It will get re-bundled, it will look different, but it will not go away.

    There are specific reasons for that. One is the need to direct the AI. You cannot just let it do its thing. The AI is sycophantic—it tends to agree with what you say. If you want to direct it to the left, it says yes, left is great. If you want to direct it to the right, it says yes, right is the best, you’re the smartest. What you tell it is going to matter, and that means somebody is going to have to exercise judgment. Crucially, this is not a problem that is solved by AI getting smarter and smarter. Think of managing a family—everything you do in the morning with the kids, moving around, deciding. A lot of that is not automatable because a lot of the knowledge of what is going on is tacit. It is in your head. No machine can tell you whether the kid has to wear these boots or whether today is the day they need this or that particular thing. Authority is inherently human. Making difficult decisions is inherently human.

    Being the consultant who does PowerPoint presentations—yes, that can be automated. But does the consultant only do PowerPoints, or does he or she go to the company, listen to the workers, figure out where the problems are, and determine how to improve things? A lot of that is tacit. So I would push back against the idea that entire jobs are going to be done autonomously.

    You are right that self-driving cars passed the autonomy threshold—the cars can essentially drive themselves, which means the supply of drivers suddenly becomes infinite and the wage floor collapses. That is a good example, but it is an example where the task is very clearly defined and very repetitive. Is that the majority of jobs? The claim of Messy Jobs is that if you think about demand elasticity, many sectors will grow; if you think about complementarities, there are going to be crucial scarcities that humans can exploit—and there will be many such scarcities. This is without even getting to the question of demand for human services, about which I am actually not sure. I am not sure that people, when they are old, will necessarily want a person bossing them around asking “are we well today?”—I might prefer a robot taking care of me. So it is not obvious that human-ness in itself is always the preferred option.

    Mounk: Including a lot of the more intimate tasks involved in elder care—would you rather have another human wipe your ass, or would you rather have a machine do it? You certainly want some human company. Once your ass is wiped, you would love to have a conversation with a human.

    I have a middle position in these debates, and I want to push back on a couple of the things you said—though I am not coming from a maximalist position. I agree that a lot of the predictions that all jobs are going to be gone in two years are testimony to people who haven’t thought carefully about politics or the real world. But some of the examples you gave leave me a little less convinced.

    To give one example: can AI outsource the management of a family? Part of family life is that you are negotiating between human beings, trying to come up with a plan together. Even if the AI can make a plan that is Pareto superior to whatever plan you would have arrived at, part of what it is to be a family is to make those plans together—to decide what you are doing today, and so on. On an emotional level, you might not be able to outsource those things. On a purely planning level, though, I think AI absolutely could handle the tasks you described—and in fact, many feminists would say that is precisely what they have been arguing for for a very long time, because it is often women who do the emotional labor and the second shift: keeping track of the fact that Timmy has to go to the dentist tomorrow and Tammy has to go to ballet the day after, and whether the dress she needs for ballet has already been washed. It would require an invasion of privacy—an AI that is party to all of these conversations and immediately notes down when Tammy says, don’t forget I need X or Y for my ballet practice next week. But can AI do all of those things? Absolutely. Could it, in fact, save some marriages in the process? Probably yes.

    Garicano: Here is why I disagree. There are information processing tasks—and you are right that a lot of information processing tasks can be automated. We synthesize information, put it in a form that can be processed, and make a decision. But there are other tasks that have nothing to do with information processing. Your wife or your kid is upset—someone needs to talk to the kid, someone needs to understand why he is upset, and someone needs to decide: yes, the optimal plan from the perspective of the family was that you couldn’t stay home, but I listened to you and I decided that you are staying.

    A lot of it is not information processing. You understand your kids. You understand what a look means—from your wife, from somebody else. When a look means yes, I will do it. When they say yes but in fact they mean no. There is a lot of tacit, local knowledge that goes into management, into family life, and into business. We are not just talking about politics or emotions—we are talking about interpersonal knowledge. You have known your wife for many years and you know when you can push and when she knows she can push. You might say the machine could know those things—I honestly don’t think it could.

    Take the contractor: you know which electrician is reliable and which one played tricks on you last time. Can the AI know whether you can use some piece of leverage to get that electrician to show up on time? We are talking about a level of interpersonal and tacit knowledge that is extraordinary—and also, think about this: a lot of the tacit knowledge within jobs is knowledge that employees have that gives them power. They are not going to be happily sharing it with AI. You should know that my colleague so-and-so has this problem with the boss and never wants to work with him—that kind of thing is going to remain in the heads of humans.

    So yes, information processing tasks can and will be automated. But a lot of what remains has to do not just with emotional and social skills, but with tacit knowledge and personal knowledge that the machine will probably never fully gain, because it cannot capture it.

    Mounk: I have two different lines of questioning about this. The first is: if we move away from the extreme predictions, and if we recognize that advanced AI tools are clearly capable of doing a lot of the tasks involved in knowledge production, that presumably means some jobs are going to go away. The idea that AI is incompetent, that it can’t do any of those things, that it’s all hype and a bubble—we agree that is wrong. But I think we also agree, at the other end, that real-world frictions are very real. Jobs are messy because the world is messy, and therefore the idea that the moment Claude beats doctors on a bunch of stylized medical questions—which it more or less does now—we should expect there to be no doctors tomorrow, is naive and doesn’t understand the real world.

    But what happens in the middle space? What happens if the demand for white-collar work is suddenly reduced by 25% or perhaps 30%? It doesn’t have to happen between today and tomorrow—it happens over the course of 10 or 20 years. You just see a continuing, gradual reduction in the demand for that kind of high-skilled work: as existing firms automate work away, as firms that are too stubborn or unable to do that are outcompeted by new entrants that are AI-native—in the same way that in many areas of the economy, it took internet-native companies to outcompete old ones before you really saw productivity gains come online.

    That is going to be a significant process, and it is not going to happen all at once. In a way, that raises an equally troubling possibility: that the job market is going to slowly slump for an extended period, and that we face the famous, somewhat apocryphal, boiling frog scenario. If everybody lost their job over the course of two months, perhaps we would all organize and demand some way of being made whole. But if this shows up as decades in which the bargaining power of ordinary people diminishes gradually—because the demand for human labor just continues to fall in a messy, haphazard way—that could still be an incredibly painful period ahead for ordinary people.

    Garicano: You are more or less describing my scenario of the transition between sector A and sector B. We know that during the Industrial Revolution, what was called the Engels’ Pause—roughly between 1790 and 1840—this was happening: wages were stagnating or dropping and workers were in trouble. Then GDP roughly doubled over the following decades to 1900. So yes, it could happen that over a period of time the transition is hard.

    I would think instead about the combination of factors working in the other direction. First, there are sectors where nothing is going to happen because they are outside the reach of this technology entirely. Second, in the sectors with elastic demand, there will be enormous growth—think of medical scanning. If AI handles all the routine scans, perhaps we would all be getting whole-body scans every year or every six months. The demand is extremely elastic and the sector could grow much, much larger, with radiologists needed to oversee far more machines. I think this is true for many sectors. Third, within the sectors that are getting automated, there are still messy jobs—humans directing, judging, making decisions, setting direction. If you count all of this together, you don’t have a catastrophe. You have a transition that is more significant in some subsectors and less significant in others.

    We will also discover entirely new sectors—who would have predicted TikTokers and Instagramers? If you add up the sectors where nothing is happening—from public sector jobs to arts, music, barbers, hairdressers, cooks, and pet care, which alone accounts for roughly 1% of the U.S. population and is of course entirely unaffected by AI—and then add the sectors with very elastic demand that are going to grow, like health and energy, and then add the messy jobs where even though some tasks are being automated the jobs continue—from managers to entrepreneurs—and then add the complementarities, there is also David Autor’s idea of the new middle class: think of a nurse who is empowered with a genius in a box, who can now diagnose really complicated illnesses, hold the patient’s hand, do all the other parts of the job, and solve more problems than ever before. Of course, as you said, then maybe everybody wants to be a nurse, and we have to think about the supply of nursing and other skilled trades. But when you add all of this up, you move away from the feeling that there is a cataclysmic change ahead, and more toward the view that yes, this is automation, yes, it is going to be a bigger revolution than what we have seen in the last 50 or 60 years, perhaps more similar to the Industrial Revolution—but no, it is not going to cause widespread, long-term unemployment. We are going to see new jobs we wouldn’t even think of today, from TikTokers and Instagramers to dog walkers. Who would have told you that you were going to be a podcaster?

    Mounk: I don’t know if the vision of the future is that humans are going to be fine because we’re still going to be TikTokers and Instagrammers and dog walkers.

    Garicano: No, I was not saying that. I was saying that the pet care sector is 1% of the population. It’s nurses and people who take care of the pets and all these other things.

    Mounk: Let me ask you about the dog walkers. One interesting thing that has happened over the last ten years—which just shows how epistemically modest we should be about all of this—is that I remember all of the conversations about drivers losing their jobs, and how that was somehow linked in the conversation about populism to why the Midwest went for Trump. The proposed solution was that they should all learn to code. Now it turns out that AI is really good at coding. Meanwhile, because of a set of technical issues that ended up being harder to solve for a while—though mostly solved now—Waymo is very efficient and much safer than human drivers, yet there are still significant regulatory obstacles. The number of rides Waymo is offering is going up exponentially, but it is still a very small share of the market and most human drivers are still fine. This is going to take longer to play out than many people think.

    But we are now in a world in which coders appear to be losing their jobs—though I understand the economic data on that is mixed—and in which knowledge workers are seemingly about to lose their jobs, while all of the manual trades are assumed to be safe. The plumbers are going to be fine. The dog walkers are going to be fine. Well, I watched, as many others did, the quite remarkable display by Chinese robots at the annual Chinese state television gala. The progress in their dexterity from a year ago to today is just astonishing. The ability to combine the manual dexterity of these machines with visual processing and understanding of the world is advancing very quickly as well.

    I am personally waiting for the ChatGPT 3.5 moment in robotics. I don’t think it will take very long for there to be some consumer product that is actually usable—we are getting close to that. The applications in the industrial sector are likely to increase as well. Again, I don’t think that is going to happen tomorrow, and it will take time to be fully implemented in the economy.

    But when we are talking about a timescale of decades—when you say that in 20 or 30 years, more and more knowledge work tasks are going to be automated because those skills can already be performed by AI, and perhaps it will take a long time for firms to reorganize and for new entrants to come in, but that is okay because perhaps we will all be in the pet care sector—well, that assumes that in 20 or 30 years we will still not have figured out household assistance robots. That if you are out at the office or doing whatever you do during the day, you cannot have a little robot walking your dog in your stead. Given the rate of progress of this technology, that seems to me like a pretty significant background assumption to be making.

    Garicano: Physical AI—robotics, let’s say—is not that far off. What we have seen in the past is that capital is in what we call elastic supply: you can always invest more in capital, which means the rents on capital eventually get competed away and the robot gets sold at a competitive price. That means people can use robots for care. Remember, we have significant fertility problems and population growth problems when it comes to paying our pensions, and having robots could be a solution to all of that—it is like having more population growth.

    In a world where those returns are competed away, we are back to consumer gains. The capital doesn’t earn extraordinary returns because there is an infinitely elastic supply of capital—more people can invest in making more robots. What is the scarce resource? It is going to be land, it is going to be energy, and it is going to be whatever human labor is still needed. That human labor could mean we work fewer hours, that we are able to enjoy more leisure, or that human labor is employed in a whole range of jobs which, as you rightly say, we cannot anticipate.

    What we should not imagine is an economy that works without humans, because all value is generated for humans. What does the economy generate value for if nobody is buying the products? Value, by definition, is something that is worth more to humans than it costs to make. If there is no human who can buy things because they are all poor, there is no value. The way the economy works is that the return to capital gets pushed back down to the competitive return, and the rents get captured by the scarce resources—in this case, the complementary human labor that is still needed.

    Nobody can anticipate what happens in 30 years. Both physical robotics and cognitive AI are going to represent a major revolution. I don’t think we should be thinking of this as an apocalypse. There are a lot of complementarities, a lot of scarcities that still favor human labor, and a lot of areas where this doesn’t really bind at all.

    Mounk: Tell me a little bit about the state of the empirical literature. I understand that there is a real distinction between micro and macro studies—a real distinction between studies that look at the extent to which particular tasks can be automated and studies that look at how the overall job picture has changed.

    When I look at the fields I know a little bit, I worry that the absence of change so far is an indication of what is yet to come, rather than an indication that AI won’t have a big impact. You mentioned translation earlier. Another thing I have been thinking about is index-making in the publishing industry. In all of those fields, there has been basically no change in the economic flows—so far as I can tell, my next book is going to be translated by human translators. Well, perhaps they don’t actually do it and privately send it to Claude and capture the consumer surplus by going on a nice vacation while they pretend to be working on the book. But in terms of the actual economic flows, nothing has really changed, and I don’t know how long that is going to continue to be the case.

    It is very sticky and very complicated to change those processes. Somebody needs to be willing to fire all the translators and deal with the backlash—the agent saying the author doesn’t like the idea of AI doing the work, the risk of a newspaper story, the possibility that customers will be upset. There are all kinds of reasons to be risk-averse about being the first mover to make that change.

    What I will tell you is that one of the things I have built for myself with Claude Code is a personalized translation tool, because I publish my articles—including some podcast transcripts—not just in English but also in German and French. It is not just better than the off-the-shelf tools; at this point it is better than all but the very best translators I have worked with. The very best translators—particularly in France, for whom I am deeply grateful—I think are still better. But 90-plus percent of the professional translators I have dealt with, people who have translated famous books by famous authors, are now significantly outperformed by it.

    For now, if economists tell me that translators haven’t lost their jobs and none of this has changed that much, I believe it—I can see that. But given that AI has existed in its current form for only about three years, and that for two of those three years it really wasn’t yet at the level it is reaching now, and that people have not yet integrated these tools sufficiently into their processes—I would say: come back to me in 15 years and let’s see whether those translators still have jobs in the way they do today.

    Garicano: Nobody is predicting that translators will still exist in their current form indefinitely. I said “so far, so good”—but perhaps like the person falling past the window. Jobs do go away. Newspapers went digital, and there were lots of people working in printing presses, paper, and all the associated industries, and all of that was automated away.

    Mounk: Including my grandfather, whose job it was to, as a young man, to lay the newspaper letter by letter. He helped to manage the printing side.

    Garicano: This is human history all the time. On the question of empirical evidence: the evidence up to now is positive. When randomized controlled trials have been conducted—giving AI to workers in a controlled setting—the results are consistent. In customer support, the most junior agents achieved performance similar to more senior ones. In writing tasks, the worst writers achieved performance similar to the better writers. When it was given to software programmers across three different tasks, the less skilled programmers were brought closer to the level of the better ones. Micro studies seem to be finding complementarities rather than substitution, consistently.

    At the aggregate level, there is much more confusion and much less clarity. We don’t see big drops in demand. There are some canaries—as I mentioned from that paper, Canaries in the Coal Mine—some preliminary evidence that there may be drops in junior roles. When we think about the research task, the PowerPoint task, the Excel task—those are the obvious things to automate—we have to imagine that junior lawyers, junior consultants, and junior investment bankers will not be recruited as much, because you can do a research task without a junior person. Yet it turns out the McKinsey class this year is bigger than before. They keep hiring. So far, so good.

    I agree with you that this is not a forecast of the future—I don’t mean to say that because we haven’t seen much yet, we won’t. That is not the point. The point is that there are indications that complementarities are important, that people who use AI produce better work, and that substitution is still limited. It is hard not to think that tasks involving basic PowerPoint work and research are going to be fully automated at some point. But I agree—we should not try to make this a 15-year forecast.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Luis share advice for young people at the start of their careers, why AI won’t kill off bullshit jobs, and whether companies run by AI would be more successful than those run by messy, emotional humans. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    1 hr 6 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    Do you want to look stylish whilst also wowing everyone around you with your commitment to liberal values? Support us by checking out the Persuasion merch shop at the below link!
    • We’re so excited to announce that, in an event exclusively for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion, Yascha Mounk will be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and …

    Read more

    0 min
  • Yes, The Right Has an Omnicause
    President Donald Trump receives a DoorDash delivery of McDonald’s from Sharon Simmons. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images.)

    Last week, President Trump accepted a DoorDash delivery from an Arkansas-dwelling grandmother of ten, who quickly became known as DoorDash Grandma. The stunt was intended to celebrate the “no tax on tips” policy. Since DoorDash Grandma, real name Sharon Simmons, is a tipped worker, she has saved some money from not having her tips taxed. Questions erupted as to how much she could actually have saved, whether she’s a plant given her other involvements with Republican advocacy, and so on. Whatever! That’s not my focus.

    What I’m interested in is a moment when Simmons is standing next to the president as he answers questions from the press. At one point, Trump argues that the Democrats have to resort to nefarious means to win. “They cheat,” he alleges. “They can’t get elected with their policies … They want to have open borders. They want to have men playing in women’s sports.” He turns to Simmons: “Do you think that men should play in women’s sports?” She replies: “I really don’t have an opinion on that.” Trump presses her, saying he bets she has an opinion, and she reaffirms: “I’m here about no tax on tips.”

    That struck me as an extraordinary moment, not because of my opinions on trans women in women’s sports, but because what had seemed like an obvious bet for Trump turned out not to be so obvious. One might assume that a woman who’ll appear on TV with Trump, who likely votes red, and who happily promotes a signature Trump policy, would give Trump an enthusiastic “Amen” on this unrelated topic of trans inclusivity. In that moment, Trump—and probably many viewers—took the right-wing omnicause for granted. Surprisingly, it didn’t hold.

    Subscribe now

    I first encountered the term “omnicause” in a 2024 article by Hadley Freeman. As Freeman puts it, “The Omnicause is, simply, every cause you must care about if you’re A Good Progressive rolled into one, because everything in the world is connected.” Thus, “trans rights are connected to Palestinian rights are connected to environmental concerns, and any self-respecting progressive who cares about one has to care about the other two … According to The Omnicause, they’re all magically connected. It’s the fatberg of causes, and the fat gluing them all together is Western narcissism.”

    Freeman defines the omnicause as specifically a progressive thing. I disagree. The right—and I have my own personal experience to back this up—is more than capable of having an omnicause, and what we saw from President Trump’s awkward interaction with DoorDash Grandma was an assumption that the MAGA fatberg would hold strong. If you support Trump’s tax policies, surely you don’t want trans women in women’s sports, right? In reality the two have nothing to do with one another other than falling under the MAGA umbrella. If the assumption is that the omnicause is fairly weak on the right, it might be strengthening, especially under MAGA and growing conspiracy theories that try to unite various right-wing concerns under one umbrella.

    I first noticed a right-wing omnicause when I was on the far right myself. In the early to mid-2010s, I was part of a loosely knit right-wing movement called the “alt-lite.” As opposed to the alt-right, which was typically classified as white nationalist and was focused heavily on race, the alt-lite was not racially focused or overtly white supremacist even as it loathed what would become known as “woke” racial politics. In many ways the alt-lite foreshadowed the now played-out “anti-woke” media sphere. It had an unusual degree of sexual and gender diversity, with women and LGBT (yes, even T) people forming large parts of its vanguard. Nowadays, I think alt-lite vibes are too mainstream to bear rehashing. The move of the right away from moral policing to amoral transgression and an edgy sense of humor strikes me as having been driven by the irreverent alt-lite alongside, to some extent, the grimmer and less palatable alt-right.

    When I was regrettably on the alt-lite, here are a few things most of us screeched against all the time:

    • Ideas of a gender spectrum + neopronouns.

    • What seemed like excuses for riots.

    • Feminists (even I was annoyed at the ones I considered cringe).

    • Anti-police sentiment.

    • Pro-fat activists.

    • “Fake” mental illness.

    • Policing of right-wing speech.

    • Social justice warriors.

    Those seem like humdrum targets of complaint for the normie right or even center to some extent but the alt-lite went a lot farther to the right than the average conservative would. It had its points, but the alt-lite was radical and vicious. One might notice ties between a few of these things, while some might seem kind of random if they weren’t vaguely linked by the emergent fatberg. The alt-lite seemed like a 4channy counter to the mainstreaming of progressive cultural ideas mostly associated with Tumblr. It was a counter-fatberg.

    For me, a big reason I was drawn to the alt-lite to begin with was its anti-fat-activism content. I was struggling with a burgeoning eating disorder or two and alt-lite media gave me content that reinforced the idea that it was disgusting to be fat—quite handy fuel for my eating disorder. A frequent talking point was that “fat shaming works.” What does that have to do with the critiques of “antiracism” that I was also engaged in at the same time? Not much, but, by bundling them together, it was easy to create a counter-fatberg against them.

    While the left has the academic idea of intersectionality to glue together the ideologies of its omnicause, the right may be using conspiracy theories for the same purpose, in the absence of academically approved options for making sense of why its fatberg’s elements are stuck together. Various conspiracy theories that incorporate a broad range of issues, such as the great replacement theory, can perform this sense-making task by taking disparate phenomena of which the right is critical and finding connections where there are—or appear to be—none. Just as intersectionality gives the left a reason to connect Palestine to trans rights, sweeping conspiracy theories may give the right the glue they need for their own fatberg rather than let it be formed only in relation to the opposing fatberg.

    I regret having been on the far right. I said rude and inaccurate things and cheerled a movement that exploded into the mainstream in a way I now recognize as damaging. It was eventually the cruelty and oppositional stance that yanked me out of the right. I realized that politics was a sick game for many on the alt-lite, including me, and I could no longer be a cheerleader for it. I realized as well that being part of what I’d now dub a counter-fatberg didn’t provide me with any positive beliefs about the world; it just made me a rhetorical gladiator against something. Fortunately, aside from regrettable in-real-life conversations in private, my engagement in politics was online and anonymous. I could simply delete and log off.

    Today I get a sick feeling every time I see a fatberg or a counter-fatberg start to form. I would encourage those on the contemporary right not to make the alt-lite’s mistake (and not to be as extreme as we were). The right, if it has to have any decency, must try to incorporate a range of positive, rather than reactive, visions that strive together to make the world a better place, rather than clinging to a counter-fatberg given to them by pressure from the left.

    Virginia Karnstein is a PhD candidate in literature, writing about culture and faith on Susbstack at Overlong Memories and podcasting at Wailing & Gnashing.

    A version of this article was originally published in Overlong Memories.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Lessons in Combating Polarization
    Cyril Ramaphosa’s election was a sign of hope against authoritarian state capture. (Photo by Moeletsi Mabe/Sunday Times/Gallo Images/Getty Images.)

    Trapped in an accelerating downward spiral of us/them polarization, it can feel as if there is no way out. In democracies, when things go badly, the prospect of an upcoming election ordinarily can be a source of hope. However, as we learn from country after country, when those who fuel polarization also control the levers of state power, the next election can become empty, trumped by an emerging competitive authoritarian reality.

    But experience elsewhere shows that the descent into authoritarianism can be reversed—as in the example of South Africa. In 1948, many centuries of white minority rule culminated in the accession to power of an explicitly ethno-nationalist political party. By the mid-1980s, the country seemed to be hurtling towards a devastating race war. Yet, within a few years, the world witnessed its “miracle” transition to constitutional democracy. A quarter century later, the country became entwined in a very different doom loop—a predatory president increasingly was wielding an ethno-populist political discourse as a weapon for subverting checks and balances, and accelerating state capture. But, again, the country was able to step back from the brink.

    While on the surface the two episodes are very different from each other, they share some similar underlying patterns. Leadership mattered in both—indeed South Africa’s transition from apartheid often is depicted as a near-unique leadership-driven miracle. But in both episodes, the ground for change was prepared less by leadership than by the interplay between civic activism on the one hand and, on the other, the willingness of a subset of social and economic elites to look unflinchingly at the abyss opening up ahead. Exploring this interplay offers useful insights into the urgent question of how to break the spell of polarization in the United States.

    American Purpose at Persuasion is a registered nonprofit and relies on reader support to pay the bills. Please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    Resistance to apartheid set the first South African episode in motion. As of the late 1960s, the country’s black majority had been cowed into subservience. Nelson Mandela and others who had campaigned against apartheid in the 1950s and early 1960s were in jail. The African National Congress had been forced into a seemingly ineffectual exile. But a 1976 uprising in the township of Soweto, led by high school students in defiance of their parents’ caution, marked the beginning of a new phase.

    By the early 1980s, civil society, trade unions, and religious organizations had coalesced around a mass movement, the United Democratic Front (UDF)—and international clamor against apartheid had evolved from scattered activist initiatives into a broad-based global campaign for corporate divestment from South Africa. Even so, it was not resistance alone but the way in which elites engaged in response that led to apartheid’s demise.

    In polarizing environments, elites can respond in radically different ways. One response deepens polarization, hardens lines of opposition, and accelerates the downward spiral. The demise of Weimar Germany is a notorious example of the consequences of elite miscalculation. There, the center did not hold. In the wake of the 1929 economic crisis, street violence between the Communist Party of Germany on the left and Nazi brownshirts intensified. Many right-wing (non-Nazi) political and business leaders—among them Alfred Hugenberg, media and manufacturing magnate and leader of the German National People’s Party (DNVP)—rejected participation in centrist political coalitions. In January 1933, Germany’s conservative political leadership made the fateful decision to appoint Adolf Hitler as Chancellor (even though in November 1932 the Nazi Party had won just 33% of the vote). “I have the confidence of Hindenburg! In two months, we’ll have pushed Hitler so far into the corner that he’ll squeal,” said power-broker Franz von Papen. That is not what happened.

    A very different elite response is to look for ways to break the spell of us/them polarization. In both episodes explored here, key segments of South Africa’s elites took this latter course. Rather than avert their eyes, they looked squarely at the unfolding reality, reset their calculus as to the benefits and costs of inaction, and acted boldly to head off disaster.

    Polite elite opposition to apartheid had long been part of South Africa’s political landscape, but subsequent to the 1976 Soweto uprising elite opposition increasingly moved beyond the bounds of white politics within which it had been contained. Influential actors within the corporate establishment came out in support of the legalization of trade unions for black workers and the easing of restrictions on urbanization for “undocumented” South Africans. In 1985, a few leaders from the commanding heights of business broke the prohibition on contact with the exiled African National Congress. Some leaders within the influential white Afrikaner Broederbond (an organization that, dating back at least to the 1930s, had played a key role in laying the groundwork for white ethno-nationalism) began questioning the status quo. Subsequently, an increasing stream of Afrikaner intellectuals, technocrats, and independent-minded politicians initiated dialogue with ANC leaders, not only with the still-jailed Nelson Mandela, but also with senior exiled leaders. While each of these was an incremental re-positioning not a decisive break, cumulatively they widened the political space, and made a negotiated transition possible.

    A sequence of indelible moments followed: The February 1990 announcement by South African prime minister F.W. de Klerk that all political parties would be unbanned and Nelson Mandela released. Mandela’s 1993 television address to the nation that helped keep the transition to democracy on track in the face of the assassination of a major ANC leader. The joyful scenes that accompanied the country’s first democratic election in 1994. Mandela’s swearing in as president. Each of these offer a vivid display of heroic leadership. But that leadership did not happen in isolation—the interplay between civic mobilization and elite response prepared the ground.

    In 2009, a quarter century after South Africa’s inspiring transition from apartheid to democracy, Jacob Zuma became the country’s president. Over the next few years, under the guise of a populist anti-elite agenda, he systematically began dismantling checks on the capricious, personalized use of political authority. He placed loyalists at the heads of the country’s prosecutorial apparatus, tax authorities, and other state-owned entities, used them to manipulate procurement and other decisions—and framed all of this as part of a broader mission to weaken the stranglehold of “white monopoly capital” on the (still massively unequal) economy. Things looked increasingly dire.

    But Zuma was stopped in his tracks. What again made the decisive difference was the willingness of a strategically-positioned subset of elites to confront the mounting risks and, at considerable personal and political cost, mobilize to change course.

    Senior leaders within the African National Congress, appalled by the direction in which Zuma was taking the country, overrode lifetimes of loyal struggle and party solidarity, spoke out publicly against Zuma, and organized to oppose his attempt to install his preferred candidate as successor. In November 2017, Cyril Ramaphosa, a central protagonist in the crafting of the constitution in the 1990s, won an intra-party electoral contest by a hairs-breadth, and became party leader—and then decisively won the 2019 national elections. Though things haven’t been easy since then, the state capture project was brought to a halt.

    In both South African episodes, the spell of us/them polarization was broken via a sequence that began with resistance, and was followed by a reset by a strategically important set of elites—neither early resisters nor unshakably loyal to the incumbents—who saw where things were heading and became increasingly willing to try and move things in a different direction. Then came a hinge moment where the combined efforts of civic mobilization and semi-insider elites unleashed a far-reaching cascade of positive change.

    Where is the United States along this trajectory? Civic activism has taken hold—in the courts, in the streets of Minneapolis, in thousands of “No Kings” protests across the country. But the impersonal, rule-based economic and political institutions that have long underpinned America’s thriving economy and free, open, and (mostly) stable society continue to erode—and so far the elite response has fallen short.

    Subscribe now

    America’s elites are, of course, not uniform. At one end of the spectrum, a subset has embraced culture wars as a way of shifting the focus of American political discourse away from questions of economic fairness, with the influence of this group recently being buttressed by tech sector elites chafing at the prospect of greater regulation. At the other end are liberal elites who have long supported progressive economic and social policies, with culture wars of their own. In between is an ambivalent-but-acquiescent middle group of corporate elites, wealthy individuals, and right-of-center political insiders who have chosen to interpret what is unfolding as politics as usual. They risk sleepwalking their way into disaster.

    Key to what comes next is the interplay between civic mobilization and the response of ambivalent-but-acquiescent elites. An approach to mobilization that fights fire with fire would almost surely accelerate polarization, further weaken the center, and nudge elites towards acquiescing to so-called “strongmen” promising stability. By contrast (as in the two South African episodes), an approach to civic mobilization that builds alliances and articulates a vision of a thriving inclusive society is more likely to encourage ambivalent elites to resist the lure of us/them polarization. And their speaking out could in turn help set in motion an “ideational cascade” that draws in a critical mass of disengaged voters who had been inclined to dismiss accelerating polarization as political theater.

    How far down does the United States’s downward spiral have to go before a turnaround? In South Africa’s struggle against apartheid, it took determined mass mobilization and an imminent threat of implosion for semi-insider elites to recalibrate the costs and benefits of going with the flow. By contrast, South Africa’s 2010 elites had already been primed by their struggle against apartheid to look into the abyss and take action—and could do so by leveraging the authorizing environment provided by the constitutional order they had helped create.

    At least for now, the United States’s constitutional rules of the game still hold open the possibility of a rapid turnaround. However, their resilience will imminently be tested by the upcoming midterms—not so much by the results themselves as by the surrounding dynamics. Worryingly, it is easy to envisage an accelerating downward spiral of efforts to subvert access to the polls, disputed results, and street violence, culminating perhaps in the siren song of a call for decisive state action as the way to restore order. But if a critical mass of hitherto ambivalent-but-acquiescent elites put their weight behind free and fair midterm electoral processes—and if voters decisively repudiate us/them politics—then an immediate electoral escape route may still be possible. A presidential election two years later could then provide a platform for a necessary far-reaching conversation about renewal.

    The United States’s current crisis did not arise from nowhere—any durable reset will require grappling with the far-reaching imbalances and frontier challenges that have accumulated over decades. These include: rising economic inequality; a widening cultural and social divide between big cities and smaller towns and rural areas; new technologies; transformed geopolitics; and climate change. Added to this is the massive cross-cutting task of reforming the public sector so that it works again.

    But before any of the deep-seated structural issues can be addressed, first things must come first. We must break the spell of polarization—and this calls for an inclusive approach to activism, one that skillfully balances urgency and hope. We can pay the price of letting go of comfortable illusions now—or pay a far greater price later. Which is it to be?

    Brian Levy teaches at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Exclusive Free Tickets!

    We’re so excited you’re interested in a Persuasion event! Please find the exclusive code for paying subscribers below—simply add it in the discount code box at checkout and you should be comped a ticket.

    If you have any questions, please contact [email protected]

    Alternatively, become a paying member today for free access to all our events!

    Subscribe now

    Read more

    0 min
  • How to Save the Planet Without Screwing Over Poor People
    Shandong Province, China, on April 10, 2026. (Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    I’m a climate activist, but I don’t think climate is the most important thing. Not really.

    I care about climate because I care about human flourishing, and an out-of-control climate makes human flourishing very hard. A stable climate is a really important means, but it’s not in itself an end.

    That seems like a pretty milquetoast position, but it’s weirdly divisive in climate circles. Much of the climate left seems to want to prioritize climate stability even at the cost of human flourishing. The recently departed Paul Ehrlich (who infamously predicted that the world was facing a “population bomb”) was probably the paradigmatic example of this brand of anti-humanist environmentalism. Anytime you hear people worry about the climate impacts of having children, you’re face to face with this strand of thinking.

    That makes no sense to me. I’m for people first, climate stability second.

    If your first concern is for human flourishing, the thing to worry about is poverty. I grew up rich in a poor country. I didn’t live through poverty, but I saw it up close, day after day. If you have a gut level sense of what material deprivation looks like in the developing world, you know it blights human potential in a way nothing else short of war will. I’m interested in the climate mostly because I fear runaway climate change would make it very difficult for the poorest countries to bring people out of poverty. The reason to worry about climate change isn’t that it’ll make some properties on the Florida coastline hard to insure—it’s that millions of people across Africa and South Asia will struggle to survive in a world that is 3 degrees warmer than pre-industrial levels. Climate studies, to me, is a sort of branch of development studies. I realize this is not a mainstream position, but it’s the one that makes sense to me.

    Subscribe now

    That’s my starting point, and it’s different from the starting point of a lot of people in the climate movement.

    When I talk to climate people in rich countries, I find a lot of concern about capitalism, about our alienation from nature and the way capitalist consumption unbalances our relationship with the natural world. Which figures: when you talk to first-world people, you hear a lot about first-world problems.

    Most climate activists don’t seem very worked up about poverty in the developing world, probably because they just haven’t spent a lot of time with poor people in poor countries, and they just don’t think about them very often.

    The results are unsurprising. First-world climate activists tend to favor policies that risk making poverty in the developing world worse, and they don’t seem much troubled by this.

    You could cite many examples. The degrowth movement is the most obvious one: as development economists know (or used to know), economic growth is far and away the best way to fight poverty in the poorest countries. Nothing else comes close. To advocate degrowth is to prioritize a stable climate over human flourishing. To me, that’s morally abhorrent.

    Of course, degrowthers will push back. They’ll tell you they want degrowth in the rich countries, where people already consume too much, not in the poor countries. But emissions are falling in rich countries—it’s just that they’re rising in the developing world five times faster. Even deep, society-disrupting cuts in developed country emissions (which would not be politically sustainable) could leave emissions still rising for years to come if poverty abatement continues on the path it’s been on.

    Climate movement people hate this chart, and I can see why. It shows their basic program won’t work. Degrowth in rich countries will not, by itself, bring a stable climate. And degrowth in poor countries implies more poverty.

    The inconvenient truth is that poverty abatement and middle class formation in the developing world is really carbon intensive. The data is pretty clear about this.

    Take a look at some of the countries that have made the biggest strides in fighting extreme poverty. Places like India, where the proportion of the population living on less than $2.15 a day fell from 48% in 1993 to 5% in 2022. And Vietnam, which cut its extreme poverty rate from 58% to under 2% over the same period. And Bangladesh, which went from 51% in 1991 to 6% in 2022. And Tanzania, where extreme poverty fell from 87% in 2000 to 51% in 2018. And Ethiopia, which managed to halve its extreme poverty rate from 74% in 1995 to 33% in 2015.

    Let’s look at these development stars and ask how their carbon emissions have evolved since 1970:

    In all these places, emissions have been rising fast. Tanzania now emits 12 times as much CO2 as it did in 1970. Bangladesh emits 37 times as much. It figures: as people get richer, they can suddenly afford the kind of consumption that generates CO2 emissions.

    The pattern is roughly similar, though not as marked, when you look at countries that have performed best at getting people above the poverty line. Here, the range is from Brazil, which now generates 4.4 times as much CO2 as it used to, to Indonesia, which now generates 21 times as much as it used to:

    Of course, not all developing countries have seen rising emissions. Some countries have seen them stay stable for two generations, even fall a bit. It’s just that those countries are, without exception, development basketcases—places where people are as poor or poorer now than they were one or two generations ago:

    In a way, the point I’m belaboring is headslappingly obvious: poor people in poor countries pollute very little because they consume very little—that’s what it means to be poor. Where economies grow and poverty abates, people consume more. Not just more energy: more water, more steel, more concrete, more transportation services, more medical care, more meat. All of that emits greenhouse gases, and while solar and wind can address some of those emissions, they can’t address all or even most of them.

    In the real world, where emissions don’t rise it’s because living standards aren’t rising either.

    This has troubling implications.

    In positive terms, it means curbing emissions from the developing world is unlikely, because developing country governments are under intense pressure to bring their people out of poverty. But I also don’t think it’s desirable, because given the technology we have today, curbing emissions would imply slowing poverty reduction.

    Of all the things the climate movement is in denial about, this is the most consequential.

    Trust me, I know how problematic this conclusion is, and how far out of consensus. I realize it puts me in a small minority among people who consider themselves climate activists—though, arguably, Bill Gates does now agree with something not too far from this position.

    We are expanding our events offerings! Please check out our events page to see what we have lined up—and to watch recordings of recent events.

    Persuasion events

    If you agree that climate goals are a means to the end of human flourishing, and if you agree that poverty is the thing most injurious to human flourishing, then I don’t see how you avoid this conclusion.

    A world where we “Just Stop Oil” is a world that cuts off the legitimate aspirations of billions of people. It’s a world of galling absurdities, like the growing European unwillingness to countenance the kinds of energy investments that would allow Sub-Saharan Africa to thrive. It’s the mindset that WePlanet brilliantly sends up in their biting, profound Just Stop Cooking spoof campaign.

    Telling poor people in poor countries to just put up with their deprivation for the sake of climate stability is monstrous, a wholly misguided putting of the cart before the horse. If that’s what climate activism means, I want exactly nothing to do with it.

    And yet. And yet and yet.

    The climate is changing, we are flirting with a terrifying array of potential tipping points that we can only sort of measure and only sort of understand. To say that curbing carbon emissions is not a defensible climate goal is not to say that we have nothing to worry about. We have a lot to worry about, and it’s not fine. We’re creating risks future generations may not be able to handle at all, as well as putting today’s most climate-vulnerable people in an ecologically untenable bind.

    The challenge, as I see it, is to find climate solutions that enable rather than impede human flourishing.

    This is the Hard Problem of climate change, the genuinely flummoxing bit. The climate movement prefers to just elide these sorts of moral dilemmas altogether.

    But the dilemmas are there. They don’t go away just because you refuse to acknowledge them.

    The role of intellectuals in society is to try to resolve precisely this sort of dilemma.

    Let’s do that.

    If you really believe both that rising greenhouse gas concentrations are a world-historical problem and that curbing carbon emissions carries unacceptable development costs, your options for action are limited.

    Really, you get to pick between two flavors of response:

    1. You can try to lower the temperature directly by managing how much solar radiation reaches us; or,

    2. You can try to suck carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere faster than we’re putting it in.

    Both of these approaches are fairly niche in the climate world, though they’re getting less niche every day.

    Of the two, the more widely discussed one is solar radiation management (SMR). This is what people call “solar geoengineering” (though that’s a label I don’t think we should use.) The idea is to make the planet cooler by making it more reflective, thus reducing the amount of the sun’s radiation that reaches us. There are a number of ways you could do this—from the truly fanciful, to ideas that seem more realistic, like releasing reflective particles into the stratosphere and brightening marine clouds.

    Subscribe now

    There’s plenty of discussion out there about these techniques. Mainstream climate movement people are mostly appalled by them. They see it as a “get out of jail free” card—a way of giving licence to polluters to keep polluting.

    I think that’s a fairly weak objection, because it rests on a mickey mouse political economy model of why pollution happens in the first place. If you imagine the reason there’s a lot of emissions is that some greedy oil industry fat cat wants a second yacht, it’s easy to see calls to sidestep emissions curbs as just carrying water for those fat cats.

    But that’s a child’s mental model of why emissions keep rising. The reality is that emissions keep rising because billions of people in poor countries who used to consume next to nothing now consume a little bit more.

    And that’s a good thing.

    People who have a more sophisticated understanding of these dynamics tend to find solar radiation management really enticing, and to some extent I do sympathize with their view. It would almost certainly work, and quickly, and cheaply. We should definitely be researching it more, and we should definitely lift the outdated taboo on talking about it.

    But I don’t think it should be our main approach to mitigating climate change, for reasons people in the field have discussed pretty extensively: because it tackles symptoms rather than causes, and because it carries genuinely hard-to-abate risks of unintended consequences, not just in terms of the climate but in terms of geopolitics.

    The geopolitical question is the one that really gives me pause. Solar Radiation Management will almost certainly produce losers as well as winners. If some of those losers happen to control a well-resourced military, you can just about imagine a solar radiation management program becoming a new flashpoint, maybe even a reason for war.

    Imagine a scenario in which some of the losers from solar radiation management are nuclear armed countries—whether it’s Russia, which doesn’t want colder winters, or India, Pakistan and China, all of which could see rain patterns shift in ways that counter their interests. Creating new possible reasons for nuclear powers to fight each other is not the reason I got into this gig. I got into this whole field because I’m concerned about human flourishing, and if there’s one thing that’s worse for human flourishing than extreme poverty, it’s war.

    I’m not quite ready to say these geopolitical risks mean SRM should be abandoned, but I do think it’s a reason to look much more closely at the alternative.

    The alternative is Carbon Dioxide Removal—CDR to people in the field. As climate responses go, CDR is a niche within a niche, the usually-overlooked little brother in the heterodox-climate-solutions space, which is itself usually overlooked. Which is unfortunate, because CDR is obviously the superior solution: it addresses causes, not symptoms. It gets at the root of the problem. If we could just make it cheaper to implement, it could solve the Hard Problem of climate change.

    The problem, of course, is cost. For the most part, existing techniques to suck carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere are far, far too expensive—in the order of hundreds to thousands of dollars per ton. The cheaper techniques that do exist have other drawbacks: they keep carbon dioxide out of the air for just a few decades, say, or they need far too much energy, or they use up too much land, or they require you to physically move billions of tons of physical stuff around.

    The holy grail would be a low-cost, ecologically sound way to capture carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. This ought to be the focus. It’s all any of us ought to be thinking about.

    About a year ago, the folks at the Anthropocene Institute think tank, who’d been reading my writing on this subject, challenged me to put up or shut up. They hired me to really investigate this field, to actually understand who is doing good work on an avenue that looks like it might really work. Talking to people in this space is what I’ve been doing ever since. What I found is, I think, alternatively infuriating and heartening.

    It’s infuriating because the CDR field is small, and a lot of it seems to me to be pursuing avenues that obviously won’t scale. With all respect to the folk working on Direct Air Capture—machines that filter air to capture CO2—unless energy becomes ten times cheaper, their methods will remain very expensive, on the order of many hundreds of dollars per ton of CO2 captured.

    A lot of engineering ingenuity has gone into CDR approaches that appear to be dead ends. There’s just not enough energy, or land, or money to bring most of these projects to anything like climate-relevant scale. Too many smart, idealistic people are spending too much energy developing ideas with no credible path to moving the needle. For a field as small as CDR, any funding and any human talent wasted on a dead-end solution is a small tragedy. I’ve seen too many of these tragedies, and wish they would stop.

    But I’ve also been heartened because some research avenues are genuinely exciting and look to me to have a very credible chance of solving the Hard Problem of climate change.

    They have a few things in common: they work backwards from where we need to be in terms of scale (at least 10 billion tons of CO2 captured by 2035) to the things we would need to do to get there, rather than working forward from the technologies we have today through incremental improvements. They’re smart about targeting free sources of energy and piggybacking on existing natural processes, rather than trying to reinvent them from scratch. And although they’re a niche within a niche within a niche, there are some smart people working on them.

    The most promising approaches, to my mind, build on two key insights.

    The first key insight is about photosynthesis. We’ve known since the 19th century that plants use the energy from sunlight to absorb carbon dioxide from the air so they can use that carbon to build their own bodies. Human beings are very unlikely to come up with a way of absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere that’s better than the one evolution came up with over a few billion years.

    Photosynthesis runs on solar power, which means the main thing that makes so many CDR approaches uneconomic—the cost of energy—just isn’t an issue. And it’s nature-based in the way that matters most: it’s not about replacing nature with something better we thought up in a lab, but about helping nature do what it’s always done—turn sunlight into life—quicker.

    Subscribe now

    The second key insight is about the ocean. Photosynthesis on land is fundamentally limited by the availability of said land. There aren’t that many good places to grow trees able to suck in a lot of carbon dioxide, and those places tend to be in or around farms. Try to scale forest-based approaches to a point where they really start to make a dent on carbon dioxide concentrations, and you just run out of space to grow food.

    Displacing a poor farmer in a poor country off of his land defeats the entire point of climate activism. (Shockingly, it happens more than most people realize.) So tree-planting is fundamentally limited in its potential as a CDR technique.

    But there’s no good reason to rely on photosynthesis on scarce land when 70% of the planet is covered in oceans that can do the same thing.

    Which is how I became obsessed with the field of marine Carbon Dioxide Removal, and the sub-field some of the smartest people in climate are now calling Phytoplankton Carbon Solutions. Because the only mechanism that will allow us to capture carbon dioxide at scale is photosynthesis, and the only place where the planet can host enough photosynthesis to move the needle is… the ocean.

    The microscopic marine plants known as phytoplankton are the Earth’s oldest and most reliable carbon dioxide capturers. After they take up carbon dioxide at the surface, they die, and a proportion of them sink, where they can lock away that carbon not for dozens, but for hundreds if not thousands of years. In the vast area of the oceans where nutrients are scarce, a startlingly small amount of essential nutrients could lead to large new areas of plankton growth and large scale carbon dioxide removal at the same time.

    In the nutrient-deficient parts of the ocean—the so-called “marine deserts” that cover around half the surface of the Earth—a gentle intervention may turn out to be enough to capture a significant percentage of the carbon emissions humans make each year. And because phytoplankton double as the bottom rung of all marine food webs, growing phytoplankton may help many other marine organisms as well, from krill to fish to whales.

    A lot of scientific research remains to be done on how to make this mechanism work. Some of that work is happening as we speak. It may turn out not to work, or not to scale. But it may also turn out that, over the coming four to six years, we develop an ecologically sound, affordable, high-quality means of capturing carbon dioxide at genuinely climate-relevant scale.

    Phytoplankton would be an actual solution to the Hard Problem of climate change—the problem of how to find climate solutions that enable rather than impede human flourishing, and that restore the natural world in the process.

    It’s a unique opportunity; we’d be mad not to seize it.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • My Vision For A Post-Trump America
    We need to rebuild state capacity. (Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images.)

    Now that Donald Trump is visibly weakening, it’s important to start thinking seriously about what comes after him. It’s no secret that I’ve been a big fan of the Abundance movement, which was popularized by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson last year in a book by that name. The core of Abundance is to rebuild American state capacity and create a government that can build things once again. At the top of the list are housing and infrastructure—public goods that will make significant dents in the affordability crisis for ordinary Americans.

    Over the past several decades, the United States has lost state capacity, a void that has been most apparent in its failure to build things. There is a huge deficit today in maintenance of our existing roads, bridges, and public utility systems, not to mention new things that we would like to have, like high-speed rail.

    Subscribe now

    Declining state capacity has a number of causes. Chief among them are the number of restrictions we have put upon ourselves, something the legal scholar Nick Bagley calls the “procedure fetish.” We have moved since the 1960s, according to Marc Dunkelman, to a Jeffersonian mindset in which the government is seen as a threat to our liberties; he argues that we need to recapture a “Hamiltonian” perspective in which we see the government as a force for progressive change. Young people with skills and the ability to use technology effectively don’t want to go into government these days, and we have outsourced public goods and activities to private contractors who have their own agendas. Our government often lacks the ability to properly monitor those we have hired to do its work.

    Having a positive agenda will be critical if we are to overcome the current crisis of American democracy. Donald Trump is well on his way to being the worst president in our history, scorning basic democratic values and lacking the basic dignity and empathy required of a president. We will not be able to overcome his legacy simply by criticizing him. We need to recognize that Trump’s authoritarianism arose in part from a perception that our government couldn’t do anything well, and needed a strong leader like him to produce outcomes. You can’t beat a would-be authoritarian by criticism alone; if the Democrats are ever to return to power they need to explain what positive things they will do and how the country will be a better place in five or ten years.

    The Abundance agenda is not about catering to corporate greed or filling the pockets of oligarchs. Rather, it seeks progressive goals like making housing affordable or dealing with challenges like climate change. I was proud as an American to witness recently the crew of Artemis 2 orbiting the moon. Hopefully it will be the beginning of a series of new explorations. But we should want this to be a collective achievement for the country as a whole, and not the vanity project of a single rich individual. The recovery of state capacity is something that all of us should own.

    The ongoing series by American Purpose at Persuasion, “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents,” has already dealt with many of the issues standing in the way of Abundance. It is my hope to continue along these lines, offering concrete suggestions on how the American state can recover its ability to build things and get things done.

    Stay tuned.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Want To Save the Humanities? Start Reading

    Want to keep up-to-date with our growing events offerings? Want to watch recordings of our recent Substack Lives? Check out our new events page!

    Harvard seminar, 1977. (Photo by Lee Lockwood/Getty Images.)

    Consider the following:

    • Syracuse University shuts down 93 of its academic programs, including Classics and Classical Civilization. It’s hard to fault the university itself for the move—no students were majoring in 55 of the shuttered programs.

    • Innovative Hampshire College, at one time among the most selective undergraduate programs in the United States, closes its doors, with the president citing “public discussion in this country about the value of a liberal arts education.”

    • Humanities majors at Harvard plummet from 30% of the student body in the 1970s to 20% in the 2010s to less than 10% and sinking—with professors describing themselves as feeling as if they are “on the Titanic,” and assessing their students as having trouble identifying the subject and verb in their course reading.

    • Students at Columbia report never having read a book cover to cover in high school, and students at NYU admit that they use AI for all of their assignments—with the professors usually either oblivious to or ignoring what’s going on. These are of course among the most prestigious universities in the country, with the most selective admissions.

    The humanities crisis has gotten so intense, and has accelerated so quickly, that it is hard for us to wrap our minds around it. The usual fixes—either trying to modernize curricula to better integrate digital materials, which was the default of the 2010s, or else to go the other way and do all graded assignments as in-class tests with blue books—are so obviously evading the main issues that it’s difficult even to engage with them.

    The point is that there has been a cognitive shift among young people. They are raised in a world in which tech is ascendant, in which their social and financial lives will be routed through tech and through digital spaces, in which longform reading is no longer of any clear utility. Asking professors to save the humanities by making classes more fun, or more rigorous, is like asking riding instructors to offer better lessons in order to save horseback riding from the advent of the automobile.

    The future is here—and it’s not pointing in a good direction for people who care about the humanities.

    So what to do? Well, the first thing is to try to understand the value of the humanities and to clear the discourse of a few convenient myths that have from time to time been introduced into the pedagogical discussion. The value of the humanities is not actually in “learning how to think”—that can be done in plenty of other pursuits, and in pursuits that have a more direct connection to students’ employability. It is not having a base of knowledge, and refined expression, that can ease one’s way into elite circles—the elites have changed and are pretty much only interested in how much money you make. Nor is it that the humanities will improve your life outcomes—just tell that to the writers who have died on skid row, or the adjunct professors wandering paycheck to paycheck as charter members of the “precariat.”

    The value of the humanities is just that they are interesting, that they are worth pursuing entirely for their own sake. They are, in the end, wasted on people who aren’t interested in them. What has to happen, in other words, is that the humanities have to be rescued from the schools.

    Within the domain of being inherently interesting and worthwhile, the humanities have a great deal to offer. They are a path to creativity and artistic excellence—it is very difficult to be good at any kind of art without being steeped in the culture that has come before. They are a means, among the sole means we have, for getting outside of oneself—a book is a kind of hard limit to the ego and the self, it requires parking one’s socially structured being at the perimeter of a book and leaping entirely into the consciousness of someone entirely different, often at a remove of continents or centuries. They offer a vehicle for thinking about ideas in the most distilled possible way—with the ideas sometimes serving as a hidden key to understanding events as they occur on the phenomenal level. And they represent continuity with the past—whatever else the digital era and AI may provide, they seem extremely unlikely to help us genuinely access minds that existed in a pre-digital world.

    If we want to help the humanities survive the bleak period that is besetting them (and will continue to beset them), it’s worth grappling with those intrinsic values and being clear-eyed about them.

    We are making a modest contribution to this vast problem by offering humanities-driven discussion groups through the Persuasion Institute.

    Starting next Friday, May 1, I’ll lead a group called “Intellectual Bootcamp.”

    We’ll meet on Zoom every other week at 12 noon EST.

    For the first meeting, we’ll discuss Jonathan Haidt’s essay “Why the Past 10 Years of American Life Have Been Uniquely Stupid.”

    “Intellectual bootcamp” is a chance to read, in a collaborative setting, the kinds of “big-picture” writers and thinkers who shape our discourse. Writers discussed will include, but certainly not be limited to, Marshall McLuhan, Neil Postman, Gilles Deleuze, Christopher Lasch, Byung-Chul Han, Simone Weil, René Girard, Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, James Burnham, Walter Ong, Benedict Anderson, Joseph Henrich. The list may evolve with time but it will be drawn from work that I personally find meaningful and thought-provoking. The program is split between reading articles and reading full books so as not to make the reading volume overwhelming.

    The group will provide motivation to read serious thinkers who are wrestling with deep problems of the individual and society, and to discuss them in what will hopefully be a fun and freeing atmosphere.

    The reading group will only be available to paying subscribers of Persuasion, and a link will be sent a few days in advance. So if you would like to join, please take advantage of this offer to get 20% off your Persuasion subscription:

    20% off Persuasion

    The reading group is of course a drop in the ocean in the overwhelming problem of the humanities’ decline within civic life, but it does seem important to place it in that context. The schools—the whole complicated beautiful structure of degree-conferring and pedagogical molding and shaping—will continue on in their own way, but they don’t really own the humanities, nor should they. They are, after all, businesses—or keepers of the public trust. They are answerable to the wishes of their student-clients, and if the students wish to do something more practical with their lives that might earn them back the extravagant cost of their school tuition, then the schools will have a tendency to meet the students where they are.

    But the humanities are bigger than that. The internet opens up extraordinary new opportunities for learning and for intellectual collaboration—and it is my contention that those resources have barely been tapped. In theory, the internet allows people who care about this kind of material to not cease their studies at 22 or 25—which is sort of what the job market and the educational system quietly insist that they do—and to take the humanities seriously for the entirety of their lives. With the isolation that just about everybody feels, the sense that the endless scrolling and swiping don’t quite fill the void in your soul, it’s a bit of a shock that more online communities haven’t emerged by now to try to achieve in a digital setting a bit of the magic that is sometimes achievable in the liberal arts colleges.

    If that system is breaking down, we owe it to ourselves to try to move what we can into the new online archipelagoes and into a more lifelong structure of intellectual exchange.

    Anyway. The crisis of the humanities is an immense problem—it’s a breakdown of a carefully-constructed centuries-long project of thinking through the values and shared knowledge base of a society. As a problem, it’s likely greater than any of us can really comprehend and greater, certainly, than any one initiative. But we do what we can. I am very much looking forward to the “Bootcamp,” and look forward to seeing some of you when we start meeting on May 1.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.