Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Ivan Krastev on Why Even Dictators Can’t Escape Democracy

    Ivan Krastev is the chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, and Albert Hirschman Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, IWM Vienna.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ivan Krastev discuss how Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule in Hungary came to an end, why democratic institutions proved more resilient than many expected, and what lessons this holds for understanding the limits of competitive authoritarianism.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Well, Ivan, it’s always a special pleasure to have you on the podcast, but today is also a joyous occasion, because of the defeat of Viktor Orbán after 16 years of leading Hungary. It’s striking that he had such total control of Hungarian politics for a long time and now clearly lost control in the last months, and was defeated very roundly. The opposition Tisza party is going to have a two-thirds majority in parliament.

    He conceded the election, something that not everybody expected. How are we to understand this moment in Hungarian politics, and what’s its relevance beyond Hungary?

    Ivan Krastev: This is interesting because this is an irony of history. If you’re looking at people on the streets of Budapest, it was really very much like 1989. If you see the profile of the constituencies voting for Mr. Orbán, they very much look like the constituency of the old Communist Party. He was in power for too long, and this is also one of the reasons that he lost. In democratic politics, there is a certain type of limit. Democracy cannot tolerate governments staying for too long.

    This is going to be more and more of a problem for leaders who believe they can live long and remain in good health. You remember the old dictator game, where you have a hundred dollars and you should offer the other side some money, but if they don’t accept, both sides get nothing. Scholars have discovered that if you offer the other person less than $20, they’re never going to agree.

    Mounk: The idea here is this: I get $1,000 and my task is to distribute it between the two of us. You can then accept or decline. Rationally, if I give you 10 cents, you should accept—because 10 cents is better than nothing. But it turns out that people have pride and they don’t want to feel cheated. So below a certain threshold, they say, “Screw you,” even if it means they themselves lose money.

    Krastev: In my view, there is something like this in democratic politics. There are certain limits beyond which people start to feel it’s too much—the idea of change, of rotation, becomes very important. What is most interesting from Magyar’s point of view is that one of the things he is going to propose as a constitutional change is that nobody can be prime minister for more than two terms, which is normally what you do with presidents. That is rotation of power, and the dynamics, in my eyes, are quite interesting.

    There is a circle and an irony here that is quite striking, because everything came back to your earlier point. Revolutionaries rarely age well in power. Orbán is a case in point. As you know, he started his political career in 1989 at the reburial of Imre Nagy, the leader of the 1956 revolution. Before the reburial, all the leaders of the opposition met and decided not to raise the issue of Soviet troops in Hungary, afraid that doing so might provoke reactionary forces on the Soviet side and make the transition more difficult. Then a 25-year-old Viktor Orbán broke the taboo and said, “Russians, go home.” I mention this because in these elections last weekend, it was the 45-year-old Péter Magyar who, in the wake of leaks about elite Russian interference in the Hungarian elections, used the same phrase: “Russians, go home.” So you have this kind of cycle in which 1989 comes back.

    But there is also an element here that may surprise many. When the communists left power in 1989, many of them—in places like Hungary—adopted much more liberal economic policies. In the same way, Magyar is not so different from Orbán in many of his policies. In a certain sense, Orbán may leave, but that does not mean you are going to have a wholly new foreign policy consensus or wholly new economic policies. It is very much about cleaning the system, dismantling the model, and changing the personnel. This is interesting to watch, because unlike in Poland, Magyar has a constitutional majority, so he can undertake measures that are much more radical than anything post-populist governments have done elsewhere.

    Mounk: I have a couple of questions. One is about something I remember you explaining before—the evolution of Hungarian politics and politics in a number of Central European states. You argued that we sort of misunderstood the 1989 revolutions. One easy narrative about someone like Viktor Orbán is that he became a traitor to the 1989 revolution—that he ultimately turned his back on everything he stood for in 1989, and that’s why he is bent on undermining democracy, why he is against Brussels, against internationalism, and all of those things. But the way to understand 1989, you argued, is as having three different strands: a liberal, universalist, democratic strand; a nationalist, anti-imperial strand; and a religious conservative strand. We should therefore understand Central European politics not as people betraying the revolution, but as a civil war between its different strands. Orbán, as it turned out, really belonged more to the religious conservative or anti-imperialist tendency.

    But how do we square that with his strange embrace of Russia in recent years? Is this simply a convenience of power? Because it is striking—as you’re saying, his entry into politics was defined by telling the Russian troops to go home. Yet by the end of his rule, he is aligning Hungary in many ways more closely with the Kremlin than with Brussels. That really does seem like a betrayal of the central promise of his entry into politics.

    Krastev: You are totally right that there were all these trends in 1989, and what is interesting about Orbán is that he was dancing with all the different wings of that revolution. He entered as a liberal, but a liberal from the countryside—not a Budapest liberal. He is somebody who does not come from a political family, who does not come from a strong dissident tradition.

    The major answer to your question is how he redefined what it means to be sovereign. Sovereignty for him in 1989 essentially meant getting out of the Soviet bloc, joining NATO, joining the European Union—and he was firmly in that camp. The problem came with what sovereignty meant for him within the European Union. He came to conclude, step by step—particularly after 2010, and especially after the migration crisis—that it was Brussels that was the major threat to Hungarian sovereignty. He then redefined sovereignty to mean having geopolitical options, and began investing in relations with Russia and China—China, to be honest, even more than Russia.

    He started doing something quite remarkable: selling his veto in the European Union—to the Chinese, to the Russians. His importance to them derived precisely from the fact that he was a member of the European Union. He could veto sanctions against Russia. He could veto economic policies against China. Suddenly, a small country that has no geographical or other reason to be so central to European politics became pivotal.

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    But his model rested on three things that were in fundamental contradiction with each other. To be successful, Orbán had to be anti-Brussels and anti-EU. At the same time, he needed European Union money, which amounted to as much as 4% of Hungarian GDP. And he needed to remain important within European politics in order to be able to sell his influence to the Chinese and the Russians. In the beginning he managed this—he himself called it a “peacock dance,” making a step in one direction, then another. But with the passing of time he radicalized and radicalized. He lost access to European money, and economic issues proved very important in his losing the elections. He also moved closer and closer to the Russians, to the extent that some of the leaked memos that emerged were genuinely humiliating for somebody who had cast himself as a rebel speaking truth to power.

    And yet, here was this same Orbán trying to present himself to his voters—and to the world—as a rebel, even as Putin was reportedly telling him, “You are the lion and Trump is the mouse who wants to help you.” That destroyed the rebel image. The relationship with Trump didn’t help either.

    The paradox of the elections is this: Orbán had run as the sovereign fighting globalism—that was his central platform. But he turned out to be a globalist. At his own campaign rallies, the Vice President of the United States was showing up, foreign countries like Russia were trying to help him win, and against him stood one of his former supporters who largely refused to give interviews to the Western media, who did not want to talk about big international issues, who simply said to Hungarians: “I care about you, I care about your salaries, I care about what is important in your life.” By the end of his career, Orbán had ended up embodying everything he had spent his life fighting—first authoritarianism, and at the end, globalism itself.

    Mounk: To add to the irony: he changed the electoral system to benefit himself, by giving a large bonus of parliamentary seats to the party that gets the most votes under normal circumstances. He assumed the opposition would always be divided—that while he might not win outright majorities, he would always have the single biggest party. Of course, it is precisely because of that electoral system that the opposition is now going to have a two-thirds majority in parliament, and will be able to unravel some of the safeguards he put in place to keep himself in a position of influence even after losing the election. So there is one more irony there.

    Krastev: What you’re saying is extremely important institutionally. All of these populist leaders hated liberal democracy because in liberal democracy, when you’re winning, you’re not winning enough. So they tried to radicalize—they came up with majoritarian systems, but as a result, every election starts to look like a regime change. That is attractive when you’re in the opposition. But suddenly you understand that you have created a system in which when you’re losing, you’re losing a lot.

    It was very important that Orbán conceded so early. The margin was simply too large, and Orbán is a strong enough politician that the fact of losing the election does not change my view of him—he understood that he simply could not contest the results. Add to that the fact that two-thirds of opposition voters were people younger than 30. He could not rely on street protests on his side.

    This is very important, and I say it having met both Orbán and Magyar. I had the feeling that Orbán, to some extent, was expecting what happened. But what was interesting is that many colleagues and pollsters who knew the data—who knew the opposition was doing much better—were afraid to predict the results, because they were no longer sure that Hungary was a democracy. Only in a democracy can a government lose an election, and those who lose power relinquish it peacefully. So you had this incredible schizophrenia in which people were predicting a 15 to 20 point advantage for the opposition, and yet when asked who was going to win the election, they said, “I cannot be sure.”

    Mounk: What do you think the lessons of this election are beyond Hungary? One set of questions is about what this tells us about the resilience of democratic institutions. Hungary was in many ways the key example of why an older consensus in political science seemed shaky. There was an idea in the 1990s and early 2000s that once a country reaches a standard of living of about $15,000 to $16,000 of GDP per capita in today’s terms, and once it had changed government through free and fair elections a couple of times, it would basically be safe. Hungary seemed to disprove that, because it fulfilled those conditions and yet Viktor Orbán clearly made it an “illiberal democracy”—his own term, which he embraced—really undermining freedom of the press and marginalizing the opposition through all kinds of institutional tricks, pushing out institutions like Central European University from Budapest.

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    And yet, with the benefit of hindsight, we must now say that it wasn’t an authoritarian regime. It was a kind of competitive authoritarianism, or semi-democracy, or flawed democracy, or dirty democracy—the terms proliferate—but somewhere in which the playing field may have been uneven, yet the opposition retained an ability to win elections, to displace the government at the ballot box. Which is what they did.

    So should that make us more optimistic about the United States and other countries where we see strong forms of democratic backsliding? Does it turn out that truly capturing a system so thoroughly that elections become meaningless is a very hard thing to do in an affluent place with a long democratic history? Or do you think Hungary is too sui generis to jump to those kinds of conclusions?

    Krastev: We cannot draw conclusions based on Hungary alone, but there are certain things we can observe. One is that if you allow people to vote, you cannot ignore the possibility that—however much you control the media, however much you control economic power, if you’re not going for outright political repression—people can decide to speak. From this point of view, the agency of the voters was very much reconfirmed.

    Being in the European Union also puts certain constraints on Hungary, not least because it is a small country. I would not, for example, draw a direct comparison between the United States and Hungary when people say Trump is trying to adopt the Hungarian model. Yes, you can borrow policies, but the countries are so different institutionally—in size, in culture. Hungary, for example, is an extremely ethnically homogeneous place.

    A second point: we like to talk about ideas and programs, but political leadership matters. Orbán could probably have lost in 2022 as well, had there been a strong political leader who managed to do what Péter Magyar did. In political science, we tend to favor institutional explanations and ignore the talent and the risk-taking of individual politicians. If you look at Magyar’s biography, you would never have predicted this. He was a cadre of Fidesz—there was nothing dramatic about him. The most heroic thing he had done was divorcing his wife, who was a minister under Orbán, and making public recordings about government corruption. And yet he resonated with people—precisely because he had been part of the Orbán system. A classical liberal candidate could not have done this.

    On the other hand, I don’t think it would be entirely wrong to conclude from what we saw in Hungary that European right-wing populism faces a fundamental problem: it cannot win elections once it becomes the establishment. Populism in Europe was rooted in a very strong anti-establishment sentiment, and it was that anti-establishment sentiment that ultimately destroyed Orbán. Most far-right parties in Europe are not currently in power, so they are not the establishment in the way Orbán was—and that distinction matters.

    The symbolism and psychological impact of this election were considerable. Orbán was also the intellectual, financial, and institutional hub of the European far right, so his fall will have very practical implications for how these parties cooperate. One impact, in my view, is that far-right parties in Europe will increasingly go their own way. This type of far-right solidarity can backfire. That is also true of the Trumpian effect.

    One of the most interesting questions here is not why Orbán lost, but why JD Vance, Vice President of the United States, in the middle of a war in which he is going to be a negotiator, decided to come to Hungary and spend three days at a rally—knowing what the opinion polls were saying. In my view, there are two explanations. One is that they were treating Orbán not as an ally of the state, but as an ally of the Trumpian revolution. Magyar is not anti-Trump, he is not anti-American—so why does it matter so much? But if you see yourself and your government as a revolutionary government, you support Orbán the same way the Soviets supported revolutionary leaders in other parts of the world. The second explanation is that they believed Orbán was important for their European policy—that they wanted an East European leader who was not merely pro-Trump, but also pro-Putin. Such an explicitly pro-Putin leader is not easy to find.

    Mounk: I agree that they see Hungary as a revolutionary ally. I would add the wrinkle that for the most part, the Soviet Union was the first nation with a communist revolution, and so it cared about the revolution in Vietnam, it cared about the revolution in Albania—but those were children of the revolution. When you have many children, you can split your attention and each one matters a little bit less. For the people who are trying to give some intellectual coherence to Trump—which is an impossible task—Orbán was the father. It’s not just that he was a revolutionary relative. He is an antecedent, with all of the reverence that that deserves.

    Mounk: And I don’t think that Trump cares. I have no insight into his psyche, but I don’t think that Trump was sad when he heard that Orbán is out, whereas I think that JD Vance and a lot of the MAGA intellectuals probably did care, because Trump is fundamentally not an intellectual, unlike many people around him.

    Krastev: What you’re saying is very important because, of all these leaders, Orbán was the only real intellectual among them. Meloni is a very good politician, but she is not going to spend her time talking to influencers and conservative professors. Orbán was still very much coming from the culture of the 1980s, when ideas mattered and when you needed certain constituencies. If you’re thinking in tweets, consistency doesn’t matter—what matters is intensity, everything in capital letters. Orbán, by contrast, wanted a classical ideology, and that probably alienated some of these people.

    This raises one of the big questions for me: what is going to be the impact of these elections on the choices that new right parties in Europe are going to make? They had genuinely admired him—he was the model. And for Orbán himself, in my view, the model was Bibi Netanyahu. It was never Putin. Putin cannot be your model if you don’t have the oil and the nuclear arsenal. But for nationalists in Eastern Europe, Israel was in many ways the most successful East European country. It was ethnically defined, but it was a democracy—an ethnic democracy. It was economically very successful, with very high technology and nuclear capability of its own, and influence totally beyond its size. Most of its people were, two or three generations ago, former East Europeans. Orbán was even using Netanyahu’s consultants—not in these elections, but in previous ones.

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    This is the story of small countries with big dreams about their history and their role in the world, and in this Orbán occupies a league of his own in Europe—for the French far-right and others, it is different, they are a big country. But Orbán was never just interested in running Hungary. He wanted to run Europe. Paradoxically, that did not help him in the elections.

    Mounk: What lessons do you think we should draw from Hungary for electoral politics? You already said that you don’t think this means right-wing populism is on its last legs, because what drives it is anti-establishment sentiment. When you’re in Hungary, after 16 years of rule by Viktor Orbán, anti-establishment sentiment means you want Orbán out. When you’re in France, anti-establishment sentiment may well mean you want to vote for Jordan Bardella or Marine Le Pen, if she is allowed to run.

    What about people who are running against populist incumbents? Do you think that, as some have argued, the lesson of Hungary is that you need to distinguish yourself on rule of law, on corruption, on actually delivering for people—but that you also need to embrace some of their political stances? Because what is striking about Magyar is not that he is the liberal, progressive alternative to Orbán. It is that he is able to eat into Orbán’s electorate by saying: “I am a conservative, I disagree with Brussels on many things, I am going to protect Hungary from immigration more than Orbán did—and by the way, I am not corrupt and I don’t have all these scandals to my name.”

    Krastev: The most important thing Magyar did was the most simple thing a politician of 50 years ago would have done: he went to the people, physically. When you have been in power for a long time, even when you go to see people, you’re not really seeing them anymore. What Magyar did was simply go to villages that opposition politicians normally never visit, because they assume these villages are controlled by Orbán. He went there and he listened.

    On corruption, too, he did something interesting. Normally when politicians talk about corruption, they talk about big companies, they talk about billions. But ordinary voters outside the big cities don’t think in terms of billions—billions do not exist for them. Magyar focused on corruption in the health system, corruption in things that people can actually understand. On that level, he was a very traditional politician, going to people and saying, “I am doing what you asked me to do.” But he also knew very well where the consensus lay.

    The clearest example: Orbán kept trying to cast Magyar as a traditional liberal candidate, because he knows how to defeat liberal candidates. So the government came up with extremely outrageous anti-LGBT legislation, expecting Magyar to jump up and protest the way opposition candidates before him always had. He could have done so—500,000 Hungarians protested the legislation—but Magyar said nothing. He said, “This is not my priority.” That is precisely why Orbán found him so difficult to deal with: Magyar stayed focused on the core issues.

    There is another dimension that matters for anyone running against a populist incumbent: it is not easy to tell voters who have been supporting that incumbent for years that they share the blame for the system. Magyar managed to make victims of them—just as he made a victim of himself. He said, “I was one of you. He cheated us. We believed we were doing something good.” He was the honest insider who said, “He cheated all of us—we didn’t sign up for this.” Suddenly people felt innocent. Suddenly they were victims of the regime rather than participants in it. As a result, 500,000 fewer people voted for Orbán in these elections—he bled his core voters. It wasn’t simply that Magyar mobilized more opposition votes; he also collapsed Orbán’s base.

    Then there is the generational dimension. Almost two thirds of voters under 30 voted for Magyar, because he knows how to speak to that generation. There is something generational about the charisma of political leaders—it is very difficult to remain charismatic across different generations over a long period of time. Orbán’s charisma simply did not work on younger people. He is a good speaker, he had worked well with crowds, but a new generation came that did not find his jokes funny, did not find his references mobilizing. That generational dimension, I think, is also very important.

    Mounk: A lot of the time, previous political moments prized different things. In the 90s and early 2000s, the medium prized the sound bite. There were news cycles, you needed to dominate each one, and the way do that was to have the right 15-second clip on the evening news. People like Bill Clinton and Tony Blair were masters of that. This moment prizes authenticity. It matters much less than it used to whether you say what people agree with, as long as they feel that you are honest, that you are being yourself. That means a lot of young people who have grown up in this environment find it easier to adapt, while older people who were raised in the age of the sound bite and who have been in office for a very long time find it harder. Though, of course, there are some older people who play very well in this age of authenticity—Bernie Sanders is an obvious example.

    Viktor Orbán is an interesting case in this regard. Say what you will about him—he clearly was willing to be honest about his beliefs in many ways, to go against the mainstream and challenge people. All of that could have given him an appeal to young people. But I wonder whether in the end the hypocrisy got too much. The opposite of authenticity is hypocrisy. When you’re claiming to stand up for the Hungarian nation threatened from outside, but you’re cutting deals with Putin, at some point—even if you’re a good speaker—the tension between what you claim to be doing and what you’re actually doing gets too big to preserve authenticity. People start to think you’re talking out of both sides of your mouth, and charisma doesn’t save you. Trump says whatever he thinks, he’s deeply corrupt, but he never talks out of both sides of his mouth. That is not the right description of what he does.

    Krastev: You’re right, and this is very important. The problem with Orbán is that he stayed in power for so long that he really became a king. He moved the government to the old palace, and you can see that he became the symbol of power itself, such that people stopped seeing the person. He put on extra weight—everything that comes with aging—and to some extent that added to his troubles. Suddenly they could not see the person anymore.

    His rebel story worked when he was seen as one man against everybody. But when Trump came along, Orbán became the ally of the strongest player in the game, and pretending to be a victim all the time—young people didn’t buy it. There is also something about his brand of conservatism that worked against him. He is conservative in the way an old man is conservative, and old men who are conservative rarely have much tolerance for the next generation—how they look, what they believe. He became a kind of disapproving old uncle, and that cost him with younger voters.

    What he is going to do now is, for me, a very interesting question. If the law limiting a prime minister to two terms in their career passes, Orbán cannot become prime minister again. That law will have strong popular support—Magyar is young and will clearly embrace the constraint himself, and that will appeal to people. So how does Orbán position himself? Does he simply become a bitter figure, somebody like Berisha in Albania, spending whatever remains of his political life fighting the people who drove him from power? Or does he try to carve out a role as the intellectual leader of the European new right?

    Then there is the question of his relations with Trump and Vance. Are they going to see what they did as a mistake? Are they going to forgive him for losing? Because Trump is not famous for his tolerance of losers—and unfortunately, that is how Orbán looks right now.

    Mounk: Perhaps Orbán can become a senior fellow at the Claremont Institute on the West Coast and enjoy some Californian sun. But I want to make sure that we talk about the broader world. We are recording this on Monday, April 13, as the American blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is beginning. It is too early for us to know how that blockade is going to play out in military terms. Help us think through this extraordinary war that has now been going on for months. What sense can we make of how America got into this war and whether it is going to be able to get out of it? How is this changing the world?

    Krastev: I am not a specialist on the Middle East, and I do believe that modesty is quite important—these days we try to pretend that we understand everything. But there are three or four things that, precisely as a non-expert, make a strong impression on me.

    One is that part of the problem with this war was the previous special operation in Venezuela. It worked too easily, too well. In the same way that nobody is going to fully understand what was in Putin’s mind in 2022 without knowing how he experienced the annexation of Crimea—how easy it was, how glorious it felt—something slightly similar happened with Trump. There were of course other factors: the Israeli factor, and his personal history with Iran. If you go back to Trump’s biography, his politicization very much coincided with the hostage crisis in 1980, and so Iran has always been important to him. There is also his obsession with nuclear weapons—he wanted to be the one who solved that. But then you have a war in which it was never very clear what success or failure would look like.

    This is where something important for political scientists comes in. Trump does not have an understanding of a regime as an institution. For him, a regime is simply the leader and his friends—because that is also how he understands the American system. So when Israeli intelligence told him that in one day they could kill the Ayatollah and some key commanders, he believed that was regime change.

    There are two things about this that will stay with me and that are not discussed enough. The first is how the decision by the Americans and the Israelis to kill a leader—and particularly a religious leader—is going to affect the behavior of others. What I follow in discussions on the Russian side is many people are now saying: why are we not doing this, why are we not targeting key Ukrainian commanders? We are creating a wholly different understanding of what constitutes permissible conduct in war.

    The second is what you do when you don’t know what to do. Here I think Trump is doing something that was beautifully described to me by Stephen Holmes, drawing on the ideas of Niklas Luhmann—the great German sociologist—who asked what it means to be powerful. Power, in his conception, is the capacity to offload your problems onto others. What is the blockade? You don’t want to risk a military operation, you’re not prepared to lose people. So you make the problem much bigger. Your problem becomes a Chinese problem, an Indian problem, a European problem, because the oil is not going to move. Oil prices will rise so sharply that others are forced to solve your problem for you. That is a wholly different understanding of what power is—the power to make a problem bigger, to make your problem everyone else’s problem. The blockade is really going to hurt others much more than it is going to hurt the United States.

    Mounk: The blockade is a fascinating piece of tactical thinking. Trump is often capable of tactical brilliance, and sadly he often completely lacks strategic vision. We went into this war assuming, first, that the real goal—toppling the regime—would be relatively easy to achieve. That obviously turned out to be wrong. We assumed, second, that there was an easy exit plan: we start this war, we can stop this war, we throw a bunch of bombs, we destroy a lot of Iranian military capacity, we degrade the nuclear program, and hopefully the regime topples. That would have been an incredible outcome. If not, we stop the bombardment, come to some kind of ceasefire, and get out when we choose.

    Neither assumption held. Iran was able to impose costs on its neighbors through sustained bombardments—not just of Israel, but of the UAE, the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia—and mostly by blocking the Strait of Hormuz. The administration found itself in a very serious bind. The logic of the blockade is: you think you have leverage because you’re blocking our ships from getting through the Strait of Hormuz—we’re going to get leverage over you by blocking all ships from going through the Strait of Hormuz.

    Part of what makes this work is that you need to be ruthless enough, and perhaps crazy enough, not to care too much about the consequences. This is where the schoolyard bully dynamic comes in—Trump is many things, including a schoolyard bully, something he has been since he was a very small child. Part of what gives a schoolyard bully his power is that he is impervious to consequences. If you know that the boy threatening you at recess cares about being reprimanded by teachers, or cares about being thrown out of school, you have a kind of protection—you can think, “I’m not going to give you my lunch, because if you beat me up, you might get expelled.” A lot of the power of a schoolyard bully comes from the credible signal that he is crazy enough not to care what the consequences are.

    Trump can project that he doesn’t care much about the consequences of this blockade—in part because the U.S. is now basically energy independent, so the real impact on America is much more limited than on other countries. But also in part because he doesn’t care about American alliances with Europe, East Asia, and other places where the blockade is going to have the biggest economic impact. That is a consequence previous American presidents would have worried about. Trump is a lot less worried about it, and that gives him a lot more power.

    Krastev: There are three other elements here that are very important. One is that Trump believes that to be powerful means that you can do what you want. We normally know that this is not the case—that power is very much based on the constraints you operate within.

    The second is the timeframe in which he works. People like to compare Putin and Trump, but when it comes to timeframes, these are two of the most different people you can imagine. Putin thinks in centuries—consulting the dead Russian tsars on what to do in Crimea, reading 19th-century books and manuscripts to decide his next move.

    Mounk: There’s a famous Tucker Carlson interview where Carlson asks him one question and Putin starts in the 12th century and goes for 45 minutes.

    Krastev: For Putin, the 12th century is as relevant to the conversation as what happened yesterday. Trump, on the other hand, cannot imagine anything longer than four weeks. Every time he uses timeframes, it is either something he is going to do in one day, two weeks, or four weeks—he thinks in weeks. He is never going to say, “In two years we are going to do this,” particularly when it comes to conflicts. As a result, he cannot imagine something going on for a long time. That kind of time-framing—how you manage time—is critically important.

    The third element is that he also became a victim of not understanding the power of words. He was so good with words, and he managed to mobilize this idea of civilizational destruction. The Iranian regime is genuinely unpopular—it is really awful, and many Iranians wanted to get out of it. But the moment somebody starts talking about destroying your civilization, there is no longer any language available to defend what the Americans are doing, if you are Iranian. This is very different from the Cold War. During the Cold War, American governments tried to claim the cultural tradition of the other side as their own ally—you talked about the Soviets and claimed that Pushkin was your ally, that Tolstoy was your ally, that you were on the side of their culture against their regime. For Trump, that does not exist.

    This creates a very strange situation that helps explain why Europeans are not joining. Technically, of course, it is not easy for them to do so. But beyond that, they understand that everyone facing Trump is also facing a question of identity—who are we? The British, who are very much hurt by what is happening, the French—everyone is now using Trump simply to tell others who they are. There is no real relationship with Trump anymore, only a theatrical one. That theatrical nature of power on the Trumpian side is going to create a very serious problem for any future American president, Republican or Democrat—the problem of how to restore meaning to the words that carry weight in politics.

    Mounk: This relates to a broader question I’ve been asking myself. When Trump won re-election and was moving very fast in the first couple of months of his administration, it felt as though the old order had collapsed and any hope of restoring it seemed deeply naive. Trump is clearly making big changes in the world, including this reckless war in the Middle East. But his ability to impose his vision on the United States—and in many ways on the world—is being revealed as very limited.

    He has not transformed American culture. He has degraded it in various ways, but he doesn’t enjoy nearly the dominance over American culture that Viktor Orbán enjoyed in Hungary for a good number of years. A lot of his institutional initiatives are running aground. They wanted to either transform or destroy higher education in the United States. I know from conversations with university leaders that life is certainly not easy for the top American universities at the moment, and there is some genuine damage being done, but I don’t feel the difference day to day at Johns Hopkins, where I teach. For all of the protestations, I don’t think professors at Columbia or Harvard do either—if you are a faculty member at one of these universities, you are not worried about criticizing Donald Trump. On the contrary.

    So what does that do to the old order? There are clearly parts of it that are going to be impossible to reestablish. There may be others that return relatively to how they were before. Or perhaps we have to wait for the truly world-historical figure who is able to leave the old order behind and put something new in place—and we are still in what Gramsci would call the interregnum, that strange long moment where the old has died and the new cannot yet be born.

    Anyone who thinks we can simply turn back the clock and return to the Obama years is completely wrong. But the birth pangs of a new order—the impossibility of actually putting something different in place, rooted partly in the incompetence and anti-intellectualism of Trump, and partly in the strength the old order still retains in certain ways, even as it is clearly on its last legs—that is also an important factor. So how does this movie play out?

    Krastev: One year after Trump came to power, the European Council on Foreign Relations conducted opinion polls in 11 European states and a number of major countries beyond—Brazil, the U.S., Turkey, India, South Korea. The view of Trump had of course changed—he had lost support here and there. But the biggest change was not about Trump at all. Suddenly, after one year of Trump, in every single country, a majority or plurality of people declared that they expected Chinese influence to increase over the next decade. What is even more important, China had stopped being perceived as threatening.

    I believe one of the things Trump did was to dismantle a crucial distinction that the old order was based on—not a distinction of power, but of legitimacy. We knew that China was powerful, economically impressive and admirable in certain ways, but we maintained the distinction that there was something wrong with their political system, that we didn’t want to live there. What Trump managed to do was to create a world in which power is the only currency of identity.

    If there is something you can call a Trump doctrine—not about any particular place, but about the world as a whole—it is not that he sees it as a clash of great powers. He sees the world more like Greek mythology: there is one supreme figure, Agamemnon, and then there are other powerful figures—the Chinese, the Russians—and then everyone else who basically doesn’t matter. This is a hierarchy without order. He constantly expects others simply to demonstrate that they know how powerful he is. In doing so, he has deprived America of everything that is not an identity based on raw power.

    He is not even a conservative leader, if we’re being honest. In his world, migration is the most important issue—and yet his major allies are the Gulf countries, where migrants make up 80% of the population? This lack of any real political conviction, where everything reduces to “I am powerful and you should treat me accordingly,” creates a very real vulnerability. Everyone else is trying to do only one thing: tell him that he is not as powerful as he believes. That is what the Iranians did. He was right that the destruction of Iran has been incredible—but they said, “You destroyed us, but you cannot change us. You are not as powerful as you believe.” Europeans are telling him the same thing.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Ivan discuss whether Trump has a future, and the European identity crisis. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    0 min
  • How Péter Magyar Won
    Viktor Orbán. (Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The elections in Hungary have concluded, and the opposition with Péter Magyar at the helm has achieved a historic win. Voters seized the chance to steer Hungary back towards the rest of Europe.

    However, even before the elections, it was evident Magyar’s Tisza Party could not simply run with a liberal and pro-European message. Magyar was working with exactly the same society that Viktor Orbán was. And the eggshells Magyar had to walk on indicate that Hungarian foreign policy, which is what concerns Europe most, might be less an extension of Fidesz and Orbán than an extension of the society itself.

    While the internal conflicts, slippage of the rule of law, and corruption were used to entice disillusioned voters, the four cornerstones of Hungarian foreign policy—the Hungarian diaspora, as well as relations with Ukraine, Russia, and the EU—were handled with conspicuous caution by the opposition, though with one notable exception—relations with Russia. If anything, the treatment of each of these subjects by Tisza in this election tells us a lot about the electorate they have inherited from Orbán, and how foreign policy in Hungary might change or not change now that Orbán has finally been dethroned.

    Why, exactly, were these matters so important to Orbán and Magyar? Or rather, why are they so important to the Hungarian electorate?

    The Gold Mine of Diaspora

    In 2010, at the start of his second term as the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán devised a way of increasing his voter base—by amending the Citizenship Act so that Hungarian citizenship was given to ethnic Hungarians who lived outside of Hungary. In doing so, he created an entirely new electoral class.

    A brief historical detour is in order. In 1920, after the end of WWI and as part of the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian borders of what was once the Austro-Hungarian Empire were rearranged. Although the lands Hungary lost were majority non-Hungarian, the borders cut through ethnically mixed territories, leaving approximately a third of ethnic Hungarians on the wrong side. At the same time, the lands passed to neighboring and newly-created states dominated by the region’s other main ethnic groups. By once again siding with Germany, this time in WWII, Hungary regained some of its former lands, and then promptly lost them, finding itself once again on the wrong side of history.

    Through the Citizenship Act, which was adopted in 2011, the descendants of these ethnic Hungarians were offered and granted Hungarian citizenship in countries where dual citizenship was permitted, and then a year later acquired voting rights. These were people who had never lived in Hungary, had owed no allegiance to Hungary for decades, and who often had different cultures and customs through their integration into different societies. What they did have, however, was a feeling of gratitude to Viktor Orbán for giving them a sense of belonging.

    This proved to be a master stroke for Orbán—he acquired his own private electorate. And Péter Magyar attempted to turn it. In May 2025, he made a pilgrimage to the Romanian town of Oradea, walking 310 kilometers in 11 days, ostensibly in response to Orbán’s endorsement of George Simion in the Romanian presidential election, which ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania read as a betrayal.

    In late December 2025, Slovakia passed a law making it a criminal offence to publicly question the Beneš Decrees—the post-WWII measures that imposed collective guilt on ethnic Hungarians and Germans, stripping them of property and citizenship. Orbán stayed largely silent, his alliance with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico making confrontation inconvenient—and besides, ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia cannot acquire Hungarian citizenship without surrendering their Slovak one, leaving Orbán with no electorate there to protect.

    Magyar seized the opportunity, participating in various protests and capitalizing on Orbán’s conspicuous silence on the plight of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia.

    What is telling is that by framing Orbán as insufficiently committed to the diaspora, Magyar was actually addressing Hungarians inside Hungary—since there were no votes to acquire in Slovakia. He referred to Slovakia by its historical Hungarian name, Felvidék, signaling a nationalist view of Slovakia that his electorate would recognize. It was an appeal, in other words, to the common resentment of a lost empire.

    Even if Magyar managed to flip any of the diaspora vote, they will continue to support the same message as before—indeed, the only message that links them to Hungary: a connection to a time and place long gone.

    A Country in Want of an Enemy

    Viktor Orbán framed his electoral campaign as though his actual opponent was not Magyar but Volodymyr Zelenskyy. His name and likeness appeared on many posters, and there was even a dedicated Twitter account counting the number of times Orbán had complained about Zelenskyy that day.

    Orbán’s obsession with Zelenskyy and Ukraine is overblown. However, judging by Magyar’s response to Zelenskyy’s sardonic attacks—claiming, with Orbán, that “no foreign leader can threaten any Hungarian,” the subject is a sore one. While Magyar may not have the same antipathy to Ukraine as his opponent did, that might be immaterial, since the Hungarian electorate shares the anti-Ukrainian sentiment. According to a 2025 Policy Solutions poll, half of Hungary’s electorate considers Ukraine dangerous, 64% oppose EU accession for Ukraine, and Zelenskyy ranks as one of the most disliked foreign leaders in the country, level with Putin.

    Unlike the fraught shared history with Poland, where centuries of oppression and reprisals left wounds on both sides, Hungary has no comparable grievance to explain its hostility toward Ukraine.

    What exactly has Ukraine done to Hungary to warrant such animosity?

    All roads in this case lead to Trianon. As a result of the post-WWI land transfers, Hungary in 1920 lost what is now Zakarpattia to Czechoslovakia. It briefly recovered Zakarpattia at the start of WWII and then lost it again to the Soviets, who annexed it by assigning it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1945. Ukraine had no say over the transfer—they were themselves under Soviet occupation at the time.

    Yet this piece of land, which before the full-scale war was home to some 150,000 ethnic Hungarians alongside roughly one million Ukrainians, still seems to be the bone of contention, at least on the Hungarian side. While all other countries in Eastern Europe seized the opportunity to move away from Russian influence and to face the future, Hungary turned to face the past.

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    When Orbán discovered the additional stash of voters in other countries, he approached ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine as well. As with Slovakia, Ukraine did not allow acquired dual citizenship. The Hungarian government offered Hungarian passports to Ukrainian citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin and encouraged them not to declare the passport to the Ukrainian authorities. Ukraine was not happy. A consul was expelled. And Hungary, naturally, blamed Ukraine.

    Then came 2014: the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. Ukraine was at war and needed to think of its security. Since ubiquitous “Russian speakers” were quite literally the raison d’état of the invasion, the proportion of Russian speakers had to be reduced to discourage any further attempts to “save them” from being Ukrainian. Ukraine did in 2017 what the Baltic states did only after the start of the full-scale war—they banned state education in Russian after grade five across Ukraine.

    Russians were not an indigenous national minority—they were settled across Ukraine throughout the Soviet period as part of a deliberate russification policy, as occurred with other countries under Soviet occupation. Many Ukrainians were russified in the process, but that did not make them Russian. In Crimea, the Soviets deported almost the entire indigenous Crimean Tatar population in 1944 and took over their homes and lands.

    However, the ban—intended to restrict the spread of the Russian language and its associated ideology under wartime conditions—unfortunately affected real national minorities. Ethnic Poles, Slovaks, and Hungarians were all affected.

    Poland and Slovakia attempted to address the issue through diplomacy. Ukraine had its hands full, and the Russian language was a serious cause for concern when it came to national security. And Poland and Slovakia remembered who the real enemy was.

    Hungary, however, did not. Instead of taking the high road, they decided to hassle Ukraine as much as possible, knowing full well that it would not change the overall national policy. But Hungary’s campaign fueled the sense of collective resentment, much to Orbán’s political benefit.

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    When the full-scale war started in 2022, Hungary accepted Ukrainian refugees, but very soon started pitching for the other side—they vetoed EU decisions on weapons supply and financial help; blocked Ukraine accession talks and all but represented Russian interests in the EU; and, as recent revelations have revealed, essentially spied for Russia in the EU.

    Resentment towards other neighboring countries, like Romania and Slovakia, had to be managed in the interest of accessing EU funds. After all, they had to work together on a daily basis. Ukraine, however, was an outsider—a country worse off, looking in through a window from the cold. In other words, a perfect target.

    When Grudges Extract Tolls

    The third defining element of Hungarian foreign policy has been Russia. While most other Eastern European countries with an experience of Russian occupation have moved as far away from Russian influence as possible, Hungary took a different path. And this choice was one of the weakest elements of Fidesz policy.

    They had to reconcile the memory of abuse at Russian hands and the Soviet role in sealing their territorial losses after WWII—conveniently blamed on Ukraine—with the corrupting influence of Putin’s Russia on their own leadership. While Hungary clung to Russian energy resources, the rise of kleptocracy within its own state was too obvious to ignore.

    The diverging logic of alignment with Russia has therefore been the one policy element that the opposition was able to latch onto. Following a series of leaked phone calls between Orbán’s team and Russian officials (and yes, the timing of their disclosure cannot be incidental, although the source has not been disclosed), Magyar openly declared treason and called for an investigation.

    Despite Orbán’s attempts to force collective amnesia on his people, historic memory once again proved to be stronger. The Hungarian electorate has no love left for Russia. While a significant minority, polling at around 29%, remains amenable to Russia as a counterweight to Brussels, the overall picture is one of historic resentment rather than affinity. It just so happens that they have an equally negative view of Ukraine.

    The Due That Is Not Due

    Hungary’s interactions with the other EU countries have been anything but positive. While outwardly parroting the value of democratic governance, Hungary has tried to replace the principle of majority rule with the rule of minority—after all, a whole bloc of countries being held hostage by one country is anything but democratic.

    It is therefore curious why a country that has so much objection to everything its European neighbors do is not interested in leaving the EU and going it alone or within other alliances. And the answer is simple—financial interests.

    The EU provides the biggest potential source of prosperity available to Hungary as a landlocked state in modern Europe. It is not quite clear how they intend to access this prosperity while simultaneously destabilizing the whole EU structure. But overall, the European Union and its funds are treated as their due. Perhaps they consider it compensation for the suffering inflicted by the post-WWI settlement.

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    This is very different from the rest of Eastern Europe, which also sees European funds as their due, albeit for a different reason—Eastern Europe has never quite gotten over the sense of betrayal at being handed to the Soviet sphere at Yalta in 1945. However, the other former Warsaw Pact countries decided to transform this sense of betrayal into a drive to achieve a better life for themselves and others. Hungary, on the other hand, seems to want to extract rents without offering much in return, or at least, that is the signal its political class consistently sends to its partners.

    It is therefore unsurprising that Tisza’s angle was pro-European in rhetoric, transactional in substance, and aligned with Fidesz on migration and sovereignty. Even the 2035 energy timeline suggests a government adjusting its EU commitments to what its electorate will accept—the funds, but not the obligations.

    Reading the Meter

    Magyar has won. What he has inherited is another matter.

    In his election campaign, Péter Magyar found genuine opposition to Fidesz only where the electorate allowed him to—on the question of Russia. All other elements—the power of diaspora, dislike of Ukraine, and the transactional approach to the EU, are broadly the same as under Orbán.

    It is evident that Magyar did not believe the electorate would be responsive to any meaningful change on these subjects. Since a large portion of the electorate he needed to win the elections would not respond to a different message, he positioned himself accordingly.

    Perhaps as younger urban voters, currently the engine of Tisza’s support, become a larger share of the electorate, more open policies will find their way into Hungarian society. But at the moment, the opposition’s message indicates that Hungary is still driven by past grievances caused by the loss of imperial power.

    For those in Europe hoping that April 12 marks a turning point, the message from the campaign trail is sobering: you may have got a different government in Hungary, but you will still have to work with the same Hungarian society.

    Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK.

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  • Why, Exactly, Orbán Lost

    Our next ASK THE AUTHOR on Substack Live will take place in JUST OVER AN HOUR at 12:30pm ET. We’re delighted that John B. Judis will join us to discuss his recent article “What Hegel Knew About Trump,” and to answer your questions. Please click here to join!

    Peter Magyar on election night, April 12, 2026. (Photo by Ferenc ISZA / AFP via Getty Images.)

    After 16 years in power, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has suffered a decisive election defeat, one so overwhelming and undeniable that the self-styled tribune of “illiberal” politics conceded to his opponents—the Tisza party led by 45-year-old Péter Magyar—with no effort to resist or overturn the results.

    Orbán’s defeat is also a setback for the two foreign leaders who had backed him: President Trump had made support for right-wing populists in Europe a key element of his national security strategy and dispatched Vice President Vance to campaign for Orbán days before the election. Russian President Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, had depended on Orbán to defend his interests within the European Union, most notably by vetoing a pending 90 billion euro aid package for Ukraine. Now Putin’s lost his lawyer in Brussels.

    It is a watershed moment that opens new possibilities for a more united European front against both Trump and Putin—as well as a fresh start for Hungarians themselves after 16 years of increasingly corrupt and overbearing Orbán rule.

    Opponents of right-wing populism on both sides of the Atlantic are celebrating the downfall of Orbán, as well they should. Yet they need to learn the right lessons from Magyar’s victory. And the crucial one is that this defeat for illiberalism is not a victory for liberalism—at least not of the progressive variety now increasingly ascendant within, say, Europe’s Green parties or the Democratic Party in the United States.

    Magyar was a moderate conservative defector from Orbán’s own Fidesz party, which he loyally served—including in a senior official position—until just two years ago. At that point, he quit in protest of one of the government’s myriad scandals. As a candidate, corruption was his signature issue, along with bread-and-butter concerns like the stagnant economy and Hungary’s decrepit health and education systems.

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    Meanwhile, he downplayed cultural liberalism—steering clear, for example, of a controversy over a Budapest gay pride parade Orbán tried to suppress. And he co-opted the more popular parts of Orbán’s agenda, such as his tough approach to public safety and the closure of Hungary to asylum seekers. On the campaign trail, Magyar promised to maintain the heavily patrolled border fence Orbán erected to keep out Middle Eastern and South Asian migrants; he even attacked Orbán from the right on migration, proposing to end a program that lets a handful of people from Armenia, Georgia, and the Philippines into the country for short-term work contracts.

    Hungary’s liberal and progressive parties all but died out during the last two decades. The only party other than Fidesz and Tisza to win seats Sunday was the tiny Our Homeland Movement, which is even more right-wing and nationalist than Fidesz. To be sure, the country’s rightward shift reflected Orbán’s determined efforts to stack the political system in his favor, but that is not the only cause. Many Hungarians were genuinely disenchanted by their left-leaning politicians; many, too, were repelled by the EU’s inability to stem the surge of migration and concerned by unrealistic green energy mandates emanating from Brussels. The potential spillover of war in neighboring Ukraine created additional worry.

    There is a rough analogy between Hungary in the Orbán era and Israel during the last 15 years of political domination by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The latter country’s political center of gravity shifted to the right; the only successful or potentially successful challenges to Netanyahu now come from politicians—some formerly affiliated with his party—who style themselves “right-wing.”

    Magyar and his campaign team dealt skillfully with the country’s changed political landscape, understanding that they could depend on the votes of more cosmopolitan, reflexively anti-Orbán, city dwellers, and that the campaign would be won or lost in the traditionally pro-Orbán countryside. Magyar set up “Tisza Islands” across the countryside, a network of over 20,000 volunteers distributed among more than 200 localities—and spent the bulk of his campaign time outside of Budapest and the major cities trying to win over culturally conservative swing voters.

    So even though the new Hungarian prime minister will enjoy a two-thirds majority in parliament, giving him maximum latitude to govern, he might not shift policy as dramatically as some of those celebrating his win hope.

    He will keep his promise to move Hungary into closer alignment with the European Union, likely by ending Orbán’s veto of Ukraine aid. It’s in his own interest to reverse Orbán’s stacking of the judiciary with Fidesz loyalists, which could help restore 18 billion euros in aid that the EU froze as a punishment to Orbán. Magyar could nevertheless remain relatively cool toward Ukraine and more resistant to migration than the EU would like.

    For Brussels, though, the main thing now is to consolidate Hungary as a member of the overall European mainstream. If that means ending the million-euro-per-day fine the EU imposed on Orbán’s government in 2024 for refusing to allow in asylum seekers, so be it. Most EU member states are themselves getting stricter on migration.

    In the end, Orbán was a better democratic citizen than Trump, conceding defeat and promising to wage a loyal opposition. There will be no Hungarian January 6.

    Still, after 16 years, Orbán simply wore out his welcome. Too much corruption, too much heavy-handed propaganda, and too much emphasis on his own grandiose role in international affairs alienated the electorate. The soon-to-be former prime minister focused on ideological abstractions such as Christian nationalism and increasingly fanciful conspiracy theories about Ukraine and a “pro-war” Brussels. Like most democratic publics, Hungarians mainly want good government: a robust economy, effective public services, and as little drama as possible in international affairs. Orbán failed to deliver on all fronts.

    If that reminds you of how Trump is losing the plot politically as the United States mid-term elections approach—well, it should. Ironically, one of the distractions upon which Trump has expended valuable presidential attention and prestige was Orbán’s re-election, though he ultimately delegated the actual campaigning in Budapest to Vice President JD Vance. This intrusion into another country’s internal affairs accomplished nothing except to damage Vance’s standing as a potential Trump successor in 2028.

    The outcome in Hungary shows that even a deeply entrenched right-wing populist leader can overplay his hand, and alienate the public, by failing to deliver on issues that most affect daily life. Such a leader is most vulnerable to an opposition that understands the factors that motivated ordinary people to support him in the first place—including the excesses of the liberal left itself.

    It’s doubtful that Trump will learn very much from this experience. Can the Democrats?

    Charles Lane is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for The Free Press.

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  • The Post-Populist Dilemma

    Our next ASK THE AUTHOR on Substack Live will take place at lunchtime TODAY at 12:30pm ET. We’re delighted that John B. Judis will join us to discuss his recent article “What Hegel Knew About Trump,” and to answer your questions. Please click here to add it to your calendar!

    Supporters of Peter Magyar celebrate on the banks of the Danube, the Hungarian Parliament in the background. (Photo by Ferenc ISZA / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Viktor Orbán, who has governed Hungary for the past 16 years, turning the small Central European country into an international model for (as he himself proudly put it) “illiberal democracy,” just suffered a crushing defeat at the polls. According to preliminary results, the main opposition party, Tisza, will win over two thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. The victory by Péter Magyar is so unequivocal that Orbán conceded his defeat within hours of the polls closing, congratulating his likely successor on his victory.

    This victory is such a big achievement in good part because Orbán has for the past decades proven extraordinarily effective at dominating Hungarian public life. He has built up a huge network of clients whose wealth depended on his goodwill. He has anointed himself an effective spokesperson for the conservative values shared by a large part of the country’s voters. And he has proven extremely adept at portraying himself as the only politician who can protect Hungary against its enemies.

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    These enemies kept changing according to the needs of the moment. They variably included George Soros, who was raised in Hungary and paid for Orbán to attend Oxford University; the European Union, which grew vocal about Orbán’s blatant abuses of power after initially tolerating them for a shamefully long period; and Ukraine, which according to the most extreme claims in the latest election campaign had plans to invade Hungary. What never changed was Orbán’s insistence that the threat was existential, and that he alone was able to protect the Hungarian nation.

    But after many years in office, leaders tend to be judged on their record rather than their rhetoric. And Orbán’s record increasingly looked abysmal.

    Once one of the most affluent countries in Central Europe, Hungary is now the poorest in the European Union; over the last years, the standard of living of a typical Hungarian has fallen behind that of countries that had historically been much poorer, such as Romania and Bulgaria. Corruption runs so deep in Hungary that it started to affect the lives of ordinary citizens; the evident impunity enjoyed by Orbán allies who broke serious laws was a big part of the reason why erstwhile allies distanced themselves from him in droves over the last months. And on the international stage, a country that suffered brutal domination by the Soviet Union for half a century—most notably in 1956, when a reforming government was violently quashed by tanks sent by the Kremlin—found itself more aligned with Moscow than with Brussels, a development many Hungarians came to resent.

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    The man who was able to seize upon these failings has himself for most of his adult life been an Orbán loyalist. Magyar rose to prominent political positions, running a public student loan program and sitting on the board of state-owned corporations, thanks to his close ties to the government. His break with Orbán did not come until 2024. When a presidential pardon for an accomplice in a child sex abuse scandal drew widespread outrage, Magyar broke with his political allies by giving an interview to a independent YouTube channel that went hugely viral. Within weeks of the interview, he was leading mass rallies; within months, the new party he put together had won 30 percent of the vote in elections for the European Parliament. Magyar has since positioned himself on the center-right, allying his newly founded party with Christian Democratic parties like Friedrich Merz’s CDU.

    The victory of the opposition gives Hungarians a crucial opportunity to heal their ailing democracy and return their country to economic growth. It will make it much easier for the European Union to act with a united voice, especially regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine. And it is a humiliating defeat for the many American conservatives who have over the last years chosen Hungary as the projection screen for their political fantasies. (Evidently, it was so important to JD Vance to boost Orbán’s chances at reelection that he made a remarkable stopover in Budapest amid his negotiations with Iran.)

    All of these are reasons for genuine joy. But to this expression of joy, I want to add a few more sober observations from the perspective of a political scientist.

    Hungary has such outsized importance in part because it has long been seen as a test case for the stability of democratic institutions. Political scientists once believed that countries which are as affluent and have as long a democratic tradition as Hungary should not be vulnerable to sliding into dictatorship. Orbán’s ability to undermine key democratic institutions like a free press thus seemed to suggest that even countries in the traditional heartlands of democracy might be vulnerable to serious “democratic backsliding.” This makes it remarkable that the opposition was able to oust Orbán at the ballot box, and that he conceded defeat rather than trying to rig the elections. The outcome of Sunday’s vote should thus make us a little more optimistic about the prospects for democratic resilience in other countries in which demagogues are daily attempting to circumvent constitutional limits on their power, including the United States.

    The stakes of politics have risen sufficiently high that, from Hungary to the United States, it is widely said about every major election that it is “the most important of our lives.” But the opposition’s success at ousting Orbán on its fourth try reminds us that the process of demagogues trying to win office and consolidating their power is very lengthy. A single election rarely allows them to concentrate power in their own hands. Despite all of his attempts at entrenching his rule, Orbán evidently failed to do so over the last 16 years.

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    Conversely, a single defeat rarely banishes the danger such movements pose. In the United States, a demagogue who had been widely written off after his first electoral defeat succeeded in returning to power. In Brazil, a demagogue who had been widely written off—and even put in jail—after an electoral defeat could soon help his son ascend to the presidency. The fight for democracy is a marathon, not a sprint.

    For similar reasons, it would be premature to conclude that the threat to Hungarian democracy has now been banished. Magyar has won a commanding victory, and the fact that he enjoys a two-thirds majority will make things much easier for him. But the impressive coalition he put together is so diverse that it will struggle to agree on how to govern, and he himself remains in many ways an ideological cipher.

    Even if Magyar proves to be sincere in his commitment to govern in a way that is more respectful of the rule of law, he will face what I’ve come to call the “post-populist dilemma.” Orbán has put so many of his own people in so many positions of power that, even with his party reduced to a small rump in parliament, he will retain the ability to torpedo the work of the government in a million ways. This means that Magyar faces two equally unappetizing choices. He can choose to play completely by existing rules; but if he does, he is leaving many of Orbán’s corrupt appointees in key positions in the administration and the state media, making his work all but impossible. Or he can fire anybody who appears more loyal to Orbán than to the constitution; but if he does, he will effectively normalize the idea that each new prime minister simply fires anybody appointed by their predecessor. The difficulty of navigating the post-populist dilemma is one reason why even a big setback for demagogues doesn’t always spell the end of their political career.

    Finally, there is a delicious irony to how lop-sided Magyar’s victory is. During his 16 years in power, Orbán repeatedly changed the electoral system to tip the balance in his party’s favor. Because the opposition was divided and he counted on always retaining the most votes of any single party, he adopted an electoral system which strongly boosts parliamentary representation for the numerical victor. Now that Hungarian voters have finally turned on Orbán, he is a victim of his own machinations. Despite winning about 40 percent of the vote, his party will hold less than a third of seats in parliament.

    Demagogues always try to manipulate political institutions in their own favor. But as Orbán’s crushing defeat illustrates, doing so successfully is very hard. Again and again, tomorrow’s electoral arithmetic turns out to be vastly different from today’s. And so the frequency with which attempts at manipulating the electoral system backfire is one of the small ways in which democratic institutions have proven to be more resilient than we might have expected a few years ago.

    Over a decade into a political era defined in large part by the threat that demagogues pose to democratic institutions, it is time to recognize that some of the simplest narratives conceal more than they reveal. Most countries are neither perfect democracies nor outright dictatorships; they fall on some point along the messy continuum between the two.

    For that reason, the most likely threat for most countries is not that they are about to slide into outright dictatorship. It is that incumbents severely tilt the playing field without quite being able to banish the opposition.

    This implies an important lesson for those of us worried about the state of democratic institutions in our own country. The real risk for the United States today is not that the country will soon resemble the world’s most extreme dictatorships. It is that America turns into a “dirty democracy,” in which those in power are able to rewrite the rules of the game in their own favor without ever quite rendering democratic elections meaningless.

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    Whether in Hungary or in the United States, a clear view of the situation requires us to adopt a more messy model of how democracies rise and fall. The fate of longstanding democracies is unlikely to consist either in a full victory or in a full defeat for the forces of freedom; and it is determined by choices made over the course of decades, not days.

    But such a refined understanding of the complexities of this political era should not impede our ability to celebrate when there is a rare piece of genuinely good news. And anybody who cares about basic values like the rule of law should welcome Orbán’s defeat as a big step in the right direction. Sunday’s election was a good day for Hungary and a good day for democracy.

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  • Andrés Velasco on Oil Shocks and Financial Crises

    Andrés Velasco is the Dean of the School of Public Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the co-editor, alongside Tim Besley and Irene Bucelli, of The London Consensus: Economic Principles for the 21st Century.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Andrés Velasco discuss whether the Middle East war will trigger a 1970s-style economic crisis, why AI valuations could spark the next financial meltdown, and what signs to watch for in predicting future market crashes.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I really look forward to talking about the big questions of principle about what we should be trying to achieve with economic policy. But it’s hard not to start by talking about the current economic situation. The war in the Middle East has led to the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, and to the destruction of a lot of oil and gas infrastructure in the Middle East. Energy prices are up, and some people are starting to say that the shock that this will cause will turn out to be equivalent to the oil price shock of the 1970s. How permanent and how bad do you think the impacts of this war are likely to be at this stage?

    Andrés Velasco: Clearly the picture is not pretty and we need to worry for several reasons. The first one is that the economy hates uncertainty, and today we’re facing uncertainty on so many fronts—tariff policy, the war, pretty much everything that the United States does today. So the headline is terrible.

    Secondly, I think the war has revealed something we should have known all along, but we hadn’t really, which is that Iran can impose a massive cost on the world by simply controlling that one point. Many people, as I’m sure you know, worry that this may be a playbook, of course, for China and Taiwan. That is not a pretty picture.

    The good news, I think, is that per unit of GDP, we depend less on oil than we used to. Oil remains very important, of course, and it’s politically very important because people hate to go to the gas station and find that prices are up, but to produce the stuff that we need to produce, oil is less necessary. The other reason why I don’t think that we’re quite back in the 70s yet is that back then you had really bad monetary policies. You didn’t have autonomous central banks. You didn’t have a track record of low inflation. Central banks are easy to hate, but they’ve done a pretty good job. I think they will be a stabilizing force going forward, even if the price of oil remains high.

    Mounk: In a lot of the debate, there’s a question of whether the obvious temporary spike in oil prices is going to prove very long lasting. The assumption in the background seems to be: if the spike in oil prices proves long lasting, then we’re back in the 1970s. What you’re saying is that we’re not going to be back in the 1970s because oil was just much more important to an economy that still was in very large parts industrial.

    The other thing to note here is that the United States in particular, which is a huge share of the global economy, has just become virtually independent and autonomous on oil and gas. The fracking revolution really means that most of the energy consumed in the United States today does not come from the Middle East, and therefore the American economy is less exposed to those effects.

    Velasco: I think that’s right, but let me add two caveats. One caveat is that we need to be precise about what it is that we mean by being back in the 70s. In the 70s, the crucial word was stagflation—that is, stagnation and inflation. Stagnation could be an issue. The world economy outside the United States hasn’t been growing a lot. China grows a lot less than it used to. India does pretty well, but of course Europe doesn’t grow very much, Latin America doesn’t grow very much, much of Africa doesn’t grow very much. So slow growth is a danger.

    The other component of stagflation, of course, is inflation. There I think we are on safer ground. You can have a one-time spike in prices, and that means higher inflation over a month or two or three. But a return to high inflation, I think, is pretty unlikely. The reason is that we have these institutions called central banks, and they showed us—for instance, in the inflationary episode after COVID—that you can have a spike in inflation. We had a year of very high inflation: the United States, the UK, other countries at 10, 11%. But without a big cost, inflation went down. It’s not guaranteed they can pull it off again and again and again, but I think monetary policy is much better run and we have many more monetary policy tools than we did a generation ago. So on that account, I think we are in reasonably good shape.

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    The other thing I was going to say is that the real danger is not so much inflation. The real danger is that this moment of craziness, from the point of view of American policymaking, could trigger other things that today are under the rug, but which can blow up in a big way. That is finance. Ultimately these crises become crises not if you have a little bit more inflation, and not if you have half a point less of growth—it’s when the financial sector implodes. I don’t think we’re quite there yet, but there is a list of things that people worry about.

    One of them, of course, is AI. Nobody doubts that AI will be good for productivity, but it’s not clear that the current valuations of AI stocks and technology stocks are reasonable. It’s also not clear that the investment boom in data centers is justified. It’s also not clear that other areas of the financial picture—particularly what Wall Street calls the private credit market, which are not banks, but other people providing private credit—are on solid footing. One can tell a story in which a lot of those institutions are vulnerable and they could take a hit. So I think the real danger—and again, we’re not quite there yet, but we should be thinking about it—is a financial multiplier. When finance gets out of whack, as it did in 2008/9/10, then we really have to worry.

    Mounk: We’re trying to read tea leaves, and I think you’ve set out really nicely what the factors of stability are—why perhaps the oil price shock is not going to be as bad as the 1970s—but also what the tail end risks are. What the kinds of things are that could get us into a recession that could, in theory, spiral out of control. Of course, the old joke is that economists have successfully predicted 17 out of the last three recessions, and also that sometimes they fail to predict the recession that’s around the corner.

    Velasco: I should point out that I’m recording this from the London School of Economics, where the late Queen Elizabeth came to cut the ribbon on a building in the middle of a financial crisis and asked one of my colleagues here—who was two doors down from me—how come you didn’t see it coming? The Queen wondered in 2008, how was it that so many economists had missed the big financial crisis? The answer is: ex post, we can tell you what went on, but ex ante, we’re not so good at predicting these things.

    So could it be that around the corner we are going to face another financial blow up? Yes. As an academic, I specialize in financial crises. One thing I can tell you is that somewhere in the world there is one every five years. We haven’t really had one for about 15 now, so maybe it’s time for one.

    Mounk: That’s very interesting. Since it is your academic specialty, what are the signs to look for in advance of a financial crisis and why is it so hard to predict them?

    Velasco: The great Stanley Fischer, who was the vice chair of the Federal Reserve and the governor of the Bank of Israel and a professor at MIT, used to say: all my students are writing papers on the last crisis, nobody’s writing papers on the future crisis. The reason for that, of course, is that we don’t know what it will look like. Finance is a many-headed monster.

    Nobody would have predicted that the crisis of 2007 and 2008 would begin in the mortgage market. Mortgages were supposed to be boring, were supposed to be safe. But there was an innovation in mortgage markets, and mortgage markets became something called asset-backed securities. Suddenly that very safe asset became unsafe. The first large institution to go under in 2008 was AIG—an insurance company—and people thought insurance companies were big and boring, that they cannot go under. But AIG came very close to the edge.

    So where will the thing blow up next time around? If I knew, I’d be rich, but I’m not. The obvious two candidates are everything connected to technology, and particularly people who have made bets on these massive valuations of technology companies. Let me put it this way. If in fact the stock price of every major technology company—including Nvidia and Apple and Alphabet and everybody else—is right, the increase in GDP in the United States and the increase in exports by the United States is humongous. So ten years from now, the question will not be about the U.S. trade deficit, it will be about the U.S. trade surplus. That is if these valuations are right. But the truth is we have no idea if they’re right.

    Mounk: The idea is that the valuations of these companies are so enormous. Valuations, of course, are based in large part on the expectations of future returns. So effectively, when you look at how much Nvidia is worth, how much some of these other tech companies are worth today, these are bets that they’re going to be selling enormous amounts of chips—in the case of Nvidia, for example. That can’t just be domestically in the United States, given the size of those bets; they have to be selling to countries around the world. The United States for a long time has had this huge trade deficit. Either the valuation of Nvidia just crashes down to levels that are much lower than they are today, or it basically implies arithmetically that the United States is suddenly going to have a trade surplus. Which of those two things do you think is going to happen?

    Velasco: Again, it’s very, very hard to say, but let me spell it out in a bit more detail because the point you’re making is very important here. The price of a stock today, as you pointed out, is dependent on our guesses about how much the company will make—what the return on that company will be next year and the following year into the indefinite future. So if I look at the price of the stock of any large tech company today—and this includes not just the AI companies, Amazon for instance and others—they are suggesting humongous profits.

    So one of two things must be right. If the people pricing these stocks today are correct in what they’re doing, the boom in productivity and in output and in U.S. exports is going to be gigantic. The issue of the 2030s will be how the world accommodates that. How can the rest of the world pay for these massive American AI-led services? But there’s an alternative scenario: that the calculations are wrong—I shouldn’t say calculations, these are educated guesses. One day we will wake up and realize that this stock is not worth 100, it’s only worth 50. At that point, a lot of things could go wrong, because people have borrowed against these stocks, they’ve used them as collateral, they’ve made investments based on these guesses. At that point, the stress on the financial system would be huge. Which one of the two will it be? I have no idea. As usual, something in between—but I couldn’t tell you exactly where in between.

    Mounk: What about fears of an AI bubble more broadly? One company whose valuation is now very high is OpenAI. They have gigantic expenditures to keep training new models, and some people think their revenues so far are relatively modest. So in order for OpenAI to keep going, they need to either keep raising unprecedented sums from private investors over and over again, or they eventually need to vastly increase revenue beyond levels anything close to what they have at the moment. I take it that there is actually a reasonable possibility that OpenAI will prove to be unsustainable.

    I’ve heard different arguments about this. Some people say that if that happens, it could be a systemic shock to the economy—that the bursting of the AI bubble could really be the beginning of the next financial meltdown. Other people say no, that’s a problem for OpenAI, it’s a problem for some of the people who’ve invested in OpenAI—some of the sovereign wealth funds, some of the VC firms—but most likely the valuable remains of this company would be taken over by Microsoft or Google or one of the other tech giants, and it’s not going to be a systemic shock to the economy. Do you have any way of helping us think more intelligently through what the consequences of a bursting of the AI bubble might be?

    Velasco: Two thoughts on that. The first one is that I wouldn’t focus on a particular company because if in fact AI is not as productive as some people are claiming it will be, that will not affect one company. It’ll affect all of them. So, my first point is that if you look at the seven big tech companies, they account for a humongous share of the valuation of the American stock market.

    Mounk: And since the U.S. stock market is a majority of the valuation of all of the world’s stock markets, it means that they’re a humongous share of the world economy.

    Velasco: What’s happened in the last three or four years—it’s changed slightly in the last month or two, but let’s take the trend over the last five years—is that two things have changed. First, tech is a much larger share of the U.S. stock market, and second, the U.S. stock market is a much larger share of the world. So we’re all more exposed to American risk.

    Now, that’s the financial picture, but let’s go to the core question, which is a very hard one: how large will the productivity increase linked to AI be? I don’t know the answer to that, but we can look at history. When big revolutions in technology happened—think of the arrival of electricity and the electrification of factories a century ago, or think about the arrival of the personal computer and the internet 30, 35 years ago—the gains eventually arrived, but we know two things. It took companies a long time to figure out how to use these technologies, and as a result of that, the productivity numbers took a decade sometimes to reflect the technological innovations.

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    I’m sure you’ve heard the quip by a famous American economist who said computers are everywhere, but not in the productivity statistics. When the personal computer arrived, we all had it, we all used it, we were all thrilled—but it wasn’t showing up in the numbers. So my guess is that AI will show up in the numbers, but it’s not going to be tomorrow. We don’t quite know which companies will use it in which way, and where the productivity gains will pop up. So anything that we do today is based on the belief—but at this point it is no more than a belief—that it’s going to be big. Big when, big where, how soon? The honest answer is nobody can be sure.

    Mounk: Help me think more broadly about how much of a turning point in economic history this juncture is. There has started to be a consensus—we’ll see whether that turns out to be right—that we are at a turning point in the political order. The actions of Donald Trump as president, along with a number of other developments that have been happening over the last years, really mark the end of what we want to call the international liberal order, or whatever it was. The world is much less predictable. A lot of the rules that seemed to govern the international sphere no longer hold. We can no longer be sure that NATO is an effective organization that can provide deterrence to enemies of Western Europe and North America. The survival of the transatlantic relationship is in many ways in doubt.

    On the economic front, you could make a parallel argument. The United States—one of the architects of the World Trade Organization and of the growth of free trade over the last decades—has now put up enormous tariffs, at least until a recent Supreme Court ruling, which is complicating that question. Somehow the country that is the wealthiest large country in the world, whose companies represented something like 60% of the world stock market valuation, seems to have decided that all of this order is not in its interest and is tearing key parts of it down. You could proclaim the end of globalization, as some people have. At the same time, we see that other countries are rallying to sustain free trade as best they can. Global trade has not declined significantly over the last years, and parts of the economic order are clearly proving resilient to the attacks that Donald Trump is making on them.

    It’s an impossible question to answer, of course, but when people write the economic history of the 20th and 21st centuries, is what we’re living through going to be an interesting little chapter, a sort of fascinating side note, or is it going to be a major turning point?

    Velasco: First, on globalization: globalization is not going away, and I think it is not going to go away for one very simple reason—because in much of the world, working-class people can walk into a supermarket and get themselves a pair of sneakers, or trainers, call them what you wish depending on your side of the Atlantic, for $10, when a generation ago the same pair of sneakers cost $30 or $40. The benefits to the average consumer in any country—whether in Asia, Latin America, or Europe—are tremendous. I don’t think any politician is going to drive us away from that. You pointed this out in passing, but I want to underscore it: in spite of all the crazy stuff being done by the United States, and in spite of the fact that China doesn’t always play a constructive role either, world trade has not shrunk. There’s a recent report by McKinsey that shows that American exports are up, Chinese exports are up, and trade among countries in the rest of the world without China and the United States is also up. So globalization is not going away—globalization is morphing and changing. You’re getting more trade among countries that are politically similar and less trade among countries that are political rivals, like China and the United States. Is this good or bad? I think in many dimensions it is bad, but globalization is not ending.

    Now, what is changing? Every period of history and every international economic arrangement needs an anchor country. Shopping malls have an anchor store, an anchor department store. The post-1945 world economic order has had the United States as the anchor country—not only because the United States was large and rich, but because the United States stood for a set of rules and helped enforce those rules, and also because the United States provided something very important: a financial system and the U.S. dollar. What I think is true, even if globalization is not ending, is that the set of rules has been rubbished and is not going to come back anytime soon, and that those financial arrangements are not disappearing, but are clearly under attack.

    I’ll give you one example. In every crisis that I have ever seen in my lifetime as an economist, whenever people got scared, the dollar rose. The old joke is that an emerging country currency is one from which you cannot emerge in an emergency—and when you try to emerge in an emergency, what do you do? You buy U.S. dollars. The one moment when this rule was broken was Liberation Day, almost exactly a year ago, when the United States said we’re going to increase tariffs. The standard textbook says an increase in U.S. tariffs should cause the dollar to strengthen, and instead the dollar weakened. Why is that? Because people in Beijing and in Johannesburg and in Brasilia said the Americans have gone crazy, and therefore the United States is no longer an anchor of stability.

    The dollar is not going to be dethroned as the world’s reigning currency simply because there are not that many alternatives. China is a much bigger country, but I don’t think you are about to put all of your life savings into Chinese RMB. China does not have a liquid capital market, and more importantly, China does not have a trustworthy judicial system—if you ever end up in a fight, you’re not going to go to a Chinese judge to settle it. As a result, China does not provide an alternative, but increasingly other currencies—like the Canadian dollar, the Australian dollar, the Swiss franc—are stepping into the breach. The big question is whether the euro will really step into the breach. I live in the UK, not in continental Europe, but I keep thinking this is a moment for the euro to really leave adolescence and come into adulthood. But this requires the European Union to really want that. There are a number of reforms that you need—you need to make the euro more readily tradeable, you need to have a very liquid market in European bonds, not in German bonds or Italian bonds or French bonds, but European bonds. That can be done. It’s not that difficult to imagine a world in which the euro rivals the dollar—not tomorrow, but in five or ten years’ time. But this will require political will.

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    Last but not least, there’s the security issue. NATO was mentioned earlier. Kyiv is what—two hours away by plane from Berlin? So this is not an imaginary threat. It’s a very real threat that is very close. From a security point of view, for people living in Europe, the world is very, very different. A massive question is whether Europe will get its act together when it comes to defense and really become autonomous from a security point of view. Europe is not autonomous from a security point of view today, but it needs to be.

    Mounk: Let me dig a little bit deeper into this question of a reserve currency. The first general question to ask is: what are the advantages and disadvantages of effectively being the world’s reserve currency? I think that’s part of a political debate in the United States. Obviously, one of the advantages is that it makes it much easier to issue debt and it means that you can borrow at much lower cost—those are significant advantages. Is there a disadvantage, especially when you’re talking about smaller countries like Canada or Switzerland partially stepping into the role of reserve currency? Are they appreciating the local currency in ways that can have negative consequences for citizens of those countries? Or am I making a wrong economic assumption here?

    Velasco: Let’s start with the United States, because today in the United States there are many people—mostly linked to the Trump administration—who claim, erroneously in my view, that the United States pays for being the world’s reserve currency. That makes absolutely no sense. Money is a bunch of pieces of paper that cost nothing to produce. There’s an amazing fact that the world wants to hold these little pieces of paper that cost nothing to produce. So the United States collects a tax on the rest of the world. It’s not an explicit tax—it’s not legislated or mandated anywhere—but every time I take a green piece of paper in exchange for a good that I made, I am giving the United States a break. That’s one big advantage.

    The second big advantage is that the United States borrows massively internationally in its own currency, and whenever things get tougher in the United States, the dollar depreciates and therefore the real value of the outstanding debt goes down and Americans get a benefit. That happened, for instance, after World War II, and it happened during the Vietnam War. At points of stress when the U.S. economy is in trouble, the dollar depreciates, and therefore if I’m holding American debt, I—as a resident of Europe or as a resident of Asia—lose.

    So this is really a pretty win-win situation for the United States. Some people say this means that the dollar is too strong. First of all, it’s not clear what it means for the dollar to be too strong. And if that is a problem, there are ways of dealing with it. One reason why the dollar has been strong is maybe that the United States has a fiscal policy that doesn’t make a lot of sense, and the United States could correct that. But bottom line, the idea that the world is ripping off America because we all hold dollars makes absolutely no sense. That’s simply MAGA nonsense.

    Mounk: What about smaller countries? Part of this is that the United States is such a big country and such a big economy that people from around the world wanting to hold U.S. dollars may not have as big a distorting impact on the currency. If the whole world suddenly flooded into Canadian dollars, presumably that would make a much bigger difference to the valuation of that currency. Could that distort things in ways that would actually be a problem for the Canadian economy, or is that not a serious concern either?

    Velasco: Yes, maybe, but let me qualify it in ways that are important. Most countries, in fact, worry about the opposite problem—most countries worry that they issue currency and nobody wants to hold it. So having the rest of the world want to hold your own currency is 99% of the time a great thing. Why does a country like Argentina often get into trouble? Because nobody wants to hold the Argentine currency, not even Argentines. So when people say they want to hold Swiss francs or Canadian dollars, the first line of argument must be: what a great thing.

    Now, there is a danger in what economists call sudden surges of capital inflow. It could well happen that interest rates in the United States are suddenly low and people are looking for some other place to park their money. A lot of money comes into your country and all of a sudden your currency appreciates. You can find episodes in history—not only in Canada or in Switzerland, but even in emerging markets—where people are getting out of the United States because interest rates are too low and they come to your country and appreciate the currency. That can be a problem. But it’s a nice problem to have. It means that people trust your currency and trust your country. There are also tools for dealing with it—you can cut your own interest rates, or you can impose some disincentives to capital inflows. Countries have done that; countries have taxed capital inflows. So if that is a problem, you can deal with it. But believe me, 99% of the time, it’s a problem you really want to have.

    The more serious problem is the opposite: people dump your currency, people don’t want your currency. That’s bad for your currency, for inflation, for domestic residents. That’s not the problem of Canada today, Australia today, or Switzerland today.

    Mounk: Let’s get to the book that you’ve just published, which is really interesting. It’s called The London Consensus. That, of course, is a play on The Washington Consensus. What was the Washington Consensus? What’s wrong with it and why do we need to supplant it?

    Velasco: The Washington Consensus was a set of ideas that emerged—predictably—out of Washington around 1989, 1990. There was a conference at a place called the Institute for International Economics, which is still around under a slightly different name. A big fat book came out edited by a man called John Williamson, a British economist living in Washington. It became a bit of a blueprint for a certain kind of economics. Some people like to call it neoliberal. I don’t particularly like that label, because neoliberal has become really a bit of an insult.

    Mounk: It’s not just that it’s an evaluative term—there are many evaluative terms that are fine. I think “fascist” is in my mind an evaluative term. I think that anything that is rightly called fascist is bad; it does, even though it’s often overused, have a core meaning that actually makes sense. The problem to me with how people use “neoliberal” is that it’s just a way of saying, it’s something I don’t like, and beyond that, I don’t think there’s a clear meaning.

    Velasco: When you say “fascism,” you’re thinking of concentration camps. But when you say “neoliberal,” it’s not clear what you’re talking about. So let us go back in history. The conference was held in Washington. The book was presumably about the world, not about Washington, but it was mostly in response to the Latin American debt and financial crisis, which mattered to the United States at the time because the people holding that debt were American banks. People around Washington were wondering: what’s wrong, why did this happen, and what do we do to make sure it doesn’t happen again? So predictably, at a time when the problems were high debt, weak banks, high inflation, and big government deficits, the medicine was: stabilize the public finances, increase interest rates, bring down inflation, maybe shrink the government a little bit, liberalize prices.

    At the same time, this happened more or less coincidentally with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the liberalization and reform of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. There, obviously, the problem was too many controls, a state that was too large, and in some countries like Poland, high inflation and high debt. So the solution was the obvious one. People like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, of course, took these ideas and applied them, and the World Bank and the IMF also took these ideas and applied them around the world. In some places, they made sense—clearly in Latin America in the 1980s, government deficits were too large, public debt was too high, and something had to be done about it. The problem was that this set of commandments—and Williamson really came up with a list of ten things to do, and it looked like the Ten Commandments—were not universally applicable. So all the criticisms about one-size-fits-all economics really were relevant. Secondly, the problems of 35 years ago are not necessarily the problems of today.

    So what did we do? An LSE colleague, Tim Besley—a very influential British economist—and I and another colleague, Irene Bucelli, asked ourselves: what is it that we have learned in the last 35 years, we as in the world at large and we as in the economics profession? We invited a number of colleagues, most of whom are LSE-based or studied here or have taught here, and said: tell us, in your subfield—whether it’s international trade or finance or fiscal policy or whatever—what do we know today that we didn’t know 35 years ago, and what is it that we should do differently? Which bits of the Washington Consensus merit keeping, and which bits were completely wrong and need to be thrown out the window? Tim and I wrote an introduction which doesn’t try to summarize the book—the book is huge, it has 670 pages—but tries to extract some themes.

    Let me give you two ideas broadly, and then we can dig deeper. One idea is that certain things in the Washington Consensus remain true. You want to be careful when it comes to fiscal deficits and debt, because you don’t want to end up like Argentina—you don’t want to be a country that is always teetering on the verge of collapse. It is also true, and a lot of research has shown, that international trade does bring benefits. The gains from trade—to use the phrase by David Ricardo—remain large. So overall, it is a good idea to trade. The idea that you’re going to become Cuba or North Korea, close your economy, and become prosperous makes absolutely no sense. But the gains from trade are unequally distributed, and those gains also mean that some people lose. One big mistake that we made back in the 80s and 90s is that many countries—especially the United States—did nothing, or close to nothing, to address the plight of people who lost.

    Let me mention another idea. Some people say that economic growth is a bad thing, that we should embrace degrowth. We don’t think that. Certainly, if you come from a developing country, you want to grow—economic growth is important. You only hear degrowth ideas from citizens of rich countries; you don’t hear that in India or in Africa or in Brazil. People want to grow. But what we have learned is that growth is a lot more complicated than the Washington Consensus suggested. The cliché from the 1980s—the Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher line—was: get the government out of my way and private businesses will get the economy to grow. We know today that many countries followed the Washington Consensus, liberalized, opened up, and didn’t grow very much.

    Colleagues like Philippe Aghion—the French economist who won the Nobel Prize last year, a colleague here at the London School of Economics—have explained why. Growth is all about productivity, and productivity is all about innovation. To innovate, you need to invest, and in order to invest, you need a very delicate ecosystem in which the private sector has to do its bit, universities and researchers have to do their bit, and the government has to provide some key inputs for that research to be fruitful—because the bets are risky. Not every country has this ecosystem. The United States has one. Europe, remarkably, even though it is a rich region, doesn’t have much of one. Mexico is an example: Mexico followed the Washington Consensus to the letter and has low inflation today, but doesn’t grow very much. So we need to be less ideological about growth and think about what forms of collaboration between the government and the private sector get innovation going. That’s a very relevant debate—not just for the Mexicos of the world, but for Germany and much of Europe today.

    Mounk: What I think is really interesting about this project is that you’re clearly trying to replace an old framework with a new framework—that’s implicitly, and I guess explicitly, the goal of this project. But you’re not trying to throw the baby out with the bathwater. You’re not saying that everything about that old project was wrong or that we didn’t get anything right in the last 30 years. You’re replacing a framework in a way that’s still building on some of the enduring wisdom in it.

    I’d love to get an overview of where this new framework would differ, and then to dig into some of the specific points. A very simplistic summary of the Washington Consensus is that it has ten points. It wants you to have fiscal discipline; to reorder your priorities in public spending, shifting away from subsidies towards more broadly beneficial investments like education and healthcare; to reform the tax system to broaden the tax base; to liberalize interest rates; to pursue competitive exchange rates rather than protecting your currency; to liberalize trade; to make it easier for foreigners to invest in your country; to privatize state-owned enterprises that aren’t very efficient; to deregulate sectors like telecommunications that used to be highly regulated in many countries; and finally, to secure property rights, making sure that there are better legal protections for them.

    I imagine that a number of these you still agree with—securing property rights, fiscal discipline, and probably some of the tax reforms—still make sense. Some of this has become a victim of its own success. It probably was right in the late 80s and early 90s for many countries to deregulate. But just as I’m skeptical of the idea of ever closer union in the context of the European Union—because it has no logical endpoint, and surely there’s a right level of closeness—the same is true about deregulation. Some deregulation was good, but perhaps in some ways we went too far, and clearly we don’t want to always keep deregulating. Some things need to be regulated.

    So where do your disagreements lie? Where was this perhaps wrong all along, now that we know a little bit more? Where have we done enough of the right steps that emphasizing them today just isn’t helpful? Where do you think we really need a new departure—a completely different set of principles to guide our actions?

    Velasco: This is not black and white—it’s not Washington all bad, London all good. Pessimism is fashionable, but we have to recognize that the world did certain things reasonably well over the last 30 years. I’m old enough to remember the 70s and 80s, when inflation was high pretty much everywhere. Today—leave Venezuela and a couple of other countries aside—inflation is mostly low everywhere. That’s a big achievement. There are things about the Washington Consensus that of course have to be right.

    Mounk: One thing I remember is that when I was in college, the big debates about the World Trade Organization were that this is going to screw poor countries—that the World Trade Organization was just a way to exploit India and China and make sure that they stay poor forever. Today, when you hear criticisms about the World Trade Organization—including from the progressive left—it’s that they screwed over steelworkers in Michigan. That is a very real concern, as we were talking about the inability to compensate some of the losers. We had David Autor on the podcast recently, who spoke about this—and that’s a serious topic. But it’s very different from what people were saying back when I was in college, which was that this is going to screw over those countries that have actually grown enormously over the last 25 years, significantly reducing poverty in them.

    Velasco: The paper that we have in the volume makes exactly that point—that the benefits from free trade today, we know how to measure them better than we did before, and they’re humongous. You’re making a very interesting political point, which I agree with and not many people make, so I want to underscore it here. Because free trade has become controversial in the American Midwest or in the north of England, many people jump to the conclusion that free trade today is controversial everywhere. That is not true. The people calling for a more closed economy are not in India, not in South Africa, not in Nigeria, not in Turkey, not in Brazil—not in the emerging or developing world. They’re mostly in the United States and the UK and bits of Europe. So the idea that free trade is bad for the poor is one idea that simply did not resist the test of time.

    Of course, when you liberalize—I said it already, but I want to repeat it—there are winners and losers and you need to address that. But a more open economy, Ricardo could have told you this a couple of centuries ago, is going to be good for the people making products that you can export. If you’re a farmer in Africa or a farmer in Latin America who couldn’t export that product before and now can, you are going to be better off. We’ve seen a lot of that. The last 35 years brought hundreds of millions out of poverty in India and China, and that’s a massive increase in human well-being.

    So that’s the past. Let’s now move to the present. Where do we think that the Washington Consensus got it wrong? Let me mention two or three areas. One is that precisely in having that set of ten commandments, it oversimplified reality and sometimes provided the wrong medicine. Yes, privatization is justified much of the time, but it is not justified all the time. For instance, we learned during the world financial crisis that having state banks can be a stabilizing force, because state banks can do the things that private banks don’t do in the middle of a panic. Yes, deregulation of many over-regulated industries was probably called for in the 1970s, but having a well-regulated financial sector is absolutely crucial—and if you don’t have a well-regulated financial sector, you’re going to have crises like the one the world had 15, 20 years ago. The Ten Commandment approach—do this regardless of who you are, where you are in the world, what your level of development is—that’s bad economics, period.

    The second thing where I think the Washington Consensus got it wrong is that it misunderstood the sources of human well-being and human frustration, because it said what really matters is financial payoffs. If there are no jobs in your town or in your province or in your part of the world, just move elsewhere. What we have learned in the last 35 years is that when people leave places like the American Midwest or the North of England or bits of Spain or bits of India, what is left behind are regions that go into a tailspin of decay—crime sets in, deaths of despair set in. Politically, these are the people who end up voting for Trump or voting for Brexit. We know today something we should have known all along: that people care about their paycheck, but people also care about belonging to a community that feels respected, and about identifying with a group that is felt to be respected. We care about belonging and we care about the wellbeing of the people around us. In our rush to decentralize and open up and deregulate, we forgot that. We paid a price economically, and we paid a huge price politically—because this is one of the sources, not the only source, of populism and rising authoritarianism around the world.

    The Washington Consensus also got growth wrong. Growth is not simply about getting the government out of the way. Yes, government can sometimes overdo it, but government needs to provide many very crucial inputs. I’ll give you a concrete example from my own experience. I was the finance minister of Chile when Chile signed a trade deal with the European Union, which is still in force today. Part of Chile is in Patagonia, and Patagonia has a lot of sheep, so people were very happy because they could export mutton to the European Union. What did Chilean farmers who produce mutton learn very quickly? That their mutton was very high quality, but before you could export to the European Union, you needed slaughterhouses that were up to European Union standards. You had to guarantee that the animals had not been given medicines outside European codes, and that the transport was safe so that the meat would arrive in Europe without spoiling. Who provides those guarantees? Who certifies the quality of the vaccines that the animals are given? Who certifies that the slaughterhouse is up to a certain standard? Who provides the roads and the ports and the airports through which that product gets exported? That’s the government. So if you don’t have a state that is working with the private sector to identify those needs and those regulatory structures, you’re not going to export anything.

    Countries that really had an exporting revolution—think of Ireland in the last generation, think of Singapore, think of Uruguay—these are countries with able states. Which takes me to my last point. Because the Washington Consensus felt that the state really has to be gotten out of the way, it forgot that a capable state is at the root of everything. You don’t have a thriving financial sector like the City of London—four blocks away from where I am—unless you have the best regulation in the world. You don’t invest in a market that is not well regulated; you’re going to lose your shirt. You don’t invest in a country where the judicial system is not up to par, because they’re going to steal your money and you can’t get it back.

    Let me give you an example from the pandemic. Many countries spent a lot of money on vaccines and people died—there were hundreds of thousands of deaths because they didn’t have the state capacity to reach the last town in their territory and vaccinate the last person who needed it. This is not rich versus poor. In Latin America, some countries vaccinated everybody very quickly because they had the state capacity to do so—because they have been vaccinating people for the last 50 years. The country next door, perhaps a richer country, didn’t have that state capacity, and people died as a result. So it is not that we want to go back to the 1950s and argue big state against small state—this is not Thatcher against Marx. The question is: how do we get states to be able to do the things that states need to do? Guarantee private property, regulate finance, build good infrastructure, get people vaccinated before a pandemic. That requires a certain kind of policy and a certain kind of attention that the Washington Consensus entirely missed.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Andrés discuss the policy implications of the London Consensus and what artificial intelligence will mean for the economy. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    56 min
  • Ban Politicians From Swearing

    Our next ASK THE AUTHOR on Substack Live will take place at lunchtime on Monday April 13, at 12:30pm ET. We’re delighted that John B. Judis will join us to discuss his recent article “What Hegel Knew About Trump,” and to answer your questions. Please click here to add it to your calendar!

    Protestors, 2005. (Photo by Scott Olson.)

    It will come as no surprise to anyone masochistic enough to follow the news these days that the rampant use of profanity is on the rise.

    Elected officials, party leaders, media pundits—they’re swearing like goddamned sailors. “Open the Fuckin’ Strait,” President Trump said to Iran on Easter morning. Of Maduro he had said, “he doesn’t want to fuck around with the United States.” Of Iran and Israel he opined last year that they “don’t know what the fuck they’re doing.”

    But Trump’s not the only one dropping f-bombs these days.

    James Carville posted a video in which he called Trump “a fat fuck.” A Republican senator called the war a “fucking clusterfuck.” Don Lemon called Kristi Noem a “motherfucking liar.” Gavin Newsom’s communications director told a reporter to “fuck off.” Hakeem Jeffries declared, “Fuck Donald Trump,” and Wisconsin Representative Mark Pocan, not wanting to be outdone by Jeffries, said, “Fuck Donald Trump and Elon Musk.”

    And that’s just “fuck.”

    “Shit” is fast rising up the Obscenity Leaderboard, too.

    Of the current not-war with Iran, Trump declared, “We’re obliterating the shit out of them.” David Urban called Chuck Schumer a “chickenshit” live on CNN. Jim McGovern said of Republicans, “These guys don’t give a shit about everyday people.” And Melat Kiros, a progressive challenger in Denver, posted that establishment Democrats “fellate Israel” and “suck shit”—presumably (and hopefully) not at the same time.

    All this cursing is pissing me off.

    I am no prude. I’ve dropped many an f-bomb in my time. But something about this particular trend has been grating on me, and I have been trying to figure out why. Was it that I expect something more from them, our leaders and pundits?

    I didn’t think so.

    Sure, I would like our officials to maintain a modicum of decency, even if they are by both nature and occupation fundamentally indecent. And after the past few years, I’m sure I’m not alone in feeling it would be nice to have a good old-fashioned “statesman” or two to admire. But I know that politics has always been foul, and politicians always foul-mouthed.

    Was it the transparent attempt at getting attention and (please, God!) being retweeted, the only true goal in this day of social media? After all, according to a recent study analyzing 2.2 million public statements from members of Congress, those who use obscenities get nine times the media coverage of those who don’t:

    A legislator who devotes 5% of their communication to personal attacks receives a similar amount of media attention as a legislator who dedicates 45% of their communication to critical policy debate. For context, the 25 most conflictual members of Congress receive more cable news attention than the 75 least conflictual members combined.

    I didn’t think so.

    Political attention whoredom—from throwing out the first pitch on Opening Day to playing the sax on Arsenio Hall—is nothing new. Getting clicks has always been more important than writing actual policy.

    Was it the phony “I’m just like you folks” subtext, the Devil’s mask they wear to convince us they are just regular ol’ folks?

    I didn’t think so.

    From pretending to clear brush at their Texas mansions, to ordering Mexican food they never eat in order to persuade Latino voters that they are on their side, to wearing yarmulkas when they visit the Wailing Wall so Jews will vote for them, this shameful and shameless performative nonsense has always been a part of the scam.

    Was it that some things such as politics, policy, and peace should be conducted in a manner that reflects their import?

    Partially, yes.

    After all, maybe some things should be dull. Political discourse these days reminds me of the “wacky” airline safety videos that have become common of late: we’re talking about a plane crash, you idiots. Save your creativity for when you have to pull us from the burning wreckage.

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    And then, last week, I finally figured it out.

    It happened after I read about another public figure dropping the f-bomb, and I suddenly realized why it so annoys me. The obscenity that broke my back?

    Katie Couric.

    “The Republicans,” she said, “are trying to fuck with our elections.”

    My blood boiled.

    Katie Couric?

    Are you shitting me?

    Katie fucking Couric is now dropping the f-bomb? No fucking way. Because if Katie fucking Couric is dropping the f-bomb, what does the f-bomb even mean anymore? And that, for me, is the crux of the whole issue.

    As a writer, I value the power of words. To help, to hurt, to lift up, to knock down. And obscenities are our words. We the fucking people. We need those words, in large part to describe the very leaders and pundits who are now using them.

    Look around: War. Violence. Organized pedophilia. Rampant corruption. Unchecked greed. A politicized judiciary. A spineless Congress. Historic income disparity. For over-50s, no end to work in sight, for under-30s, no jobs at all in sight.

    I know that Persuasion is a high-brow outlet full of trenchant insight for an intellectual audience, but I think I speak for many people these days when I say, “Fuck this shit.” Because in large part, that’s all we can do.

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    We are increasingly powerless. Oligarchs control the media and governments. Our votes may or may not matter. Even if they’re counted, the results may not be accepted. If we take to the streets, we’ll either be shot, tear-gassed, or accused of being paid for, or the media won’t even report on it because Bryon Noem wears fake breasts.

    We need fuck.

    Obscenity is all we have. And so to hear the powerful use the words of the powerless drives me fucking insane.

    Are they just posturing? Of course.

    Is it performative? Yes.

    Is it meant to convince us they care? No doubt.

    But more than anything, to me, it’s a violation. If the government can’t come and take our guns, then they shouldn’t be able to come and take our obscenities. Perhaps we need a Constitutional Amendment, right after the Second one. Amendment 2a:

    The f-word, being necessary by the populace to describe the leaders of State, shall not be used by said members, nor by TV News hosts nor by political pundits, who are all total f-wads.

    It will never pass, of course. Those asshats in Congress can’t agree on anything. On the plus side, the same study mentioned earlier found that the use of such language didn’t actually help with fundraising or with getting votes:

    Lawmakers who hurled insults raised neither more nor less money than their civil counterparts, whether the donations came from inside or outside their home states. At first glance, lawmakers who frequently used personal attacks appeared to win elections by wider margins, but that difference was explained by district partisanship. Meanwhile, lawmakers who engaged in policy-focused debate were significantly more likely to cosponsor legislation. Substance, not spectacle, correlated with actual lawmaking.

    Perhaps someone should send them all this study.

    Perhaps then they’ll stop using our words.

    Perhaps then, if we’re lucky, those assholes will go do their fucking jobs with an ounce of goddamned integrity.

    We can only hope.

    Shalom Auslander is a novelist, short story writer, essayist and scriptwriter. He writes The Fetal Position on Substack, and his memoir, FEH, is available here.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    Corgis and their owners take part in the Corgi Derby at Musselburgh Race Coursee on April 4, 2026 in Musselburgh, Scotland. (Photo by Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images.)
    • Our next ASK THE AUTHOR on Substack Live will take place at lunchtime on Monday April 13, at 12:30pm ET. We’re delighted that John B. Judis will join us to discuss his recent article “What He…

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    0 min
  • Orbán’s On the Ropes. But Don’t Pray for a Miracle Just Yet

    Our next ASK THE AUTHOR on Substack Live will take place at lunchtime on Monday April 13, at 12:30pm ET. We’re delighted that John B. Judis will join us to discuss his recent article “What Hegel Knew About Trump,” and to answer your questions. Please click here to add it to your calendar!

    Orbán at a campaign rally on April 7, 2026. (Photo by David Balogh/Xinhua via Getty Images.)

    Some thirty years ago, Slovakia’s aspiring authoritarian prime minister, Vladimír Mečiar, hired several international celebrities—Claudia Schiffer, Gérard Depardieu, and Ornella Mutti, among others—to join him on the campaign trail. The photo-ops were invariably “cringe,” as today’s younger generation would say, and the deflated Mečiar was ousted in September 1998.

    Today, Viktor Orbán’s overwrought re-election campaign in neighboring Hungary brings back some of those memories. For one, I doubt that U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s recent visit to Budapest—including a rally where he made an impromptu on-stage phone call to Donald Trump, and insinuated that Ukrainian intelligence and Brussels bureaucrats are trying to interfere in the election—will turn the tide in Orbán’s favor.

    It is not simply that Vance’s appearance was similarly cringe. Rather, it is about political fundamentals. The opposition Tisza Party, led by Orbán’s main challenger, Péter Magyar, has maintained a healthy lead over Fidesz, averaging a 10-point lead on Politico’s poll of polls. It’s the most formidable electoral challenge Orbán has ever faced, and the best chance yet for Hungarians to arrest their country’s descent into authoritarian rule.

    You may not know that Dalibor also writes a regular column for American Purpose! To receive all of his content in your inbox, click “Email preferences” below and slide on the toggle for American Purpose. Thanks for supporting our mission!

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    Booed at his own rallies, Orbán is doubling down on his anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, blaming Kyiv for everything from high energy prices to supposed threats against his family. Yet it is going to be hard for Orbán to run away from his record in government. What was once a highly successful economy in transition is now the most corrupt country in the EU. Hungarian voters are not blind, and optics like Orbán’s sprawling estate neighboring a safari park owned by his childhood friend, the billionaire Lőrinc Mészáros, have not been lost on them.

    Hungary now also appears to be the poorest state in the EU, behind Bulgaria and Romania. Since 2010, Hungary has lost almost half a million people, both to aging and to emigration. Far from being a bulwark against mass immigration and a lab of exciting pro-family policies, as imagined by its ideological allies in the West, Fidesz’s policies have served as a catalyst of stagnation and decline.

    There are powerful players who have an interest in keeping Orbán in power. As The Washington Post recently reported, Russia’s intelligence services drew up plans for a false-flag assassination attempt against Orbán, designed to generate a wave of sympathy and rally his base. The Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency—already under U.S. sanctions—has been flooding Hungarian social media with pro-Orbán content while portraying Magyar as a puppet of Brussels. And according to VSquare, a Central European investigative outlet, Russia’s military intelligence is present in Budapest under diplomatic cover to help coordinate Orbán’s re-election effort.

    There are many unknowns—including last-minute campaign surprises, and the question of whether Orbán will relinquish power peacefully. In 2011, his government changed Hungary’s already complex electoral system with the aim of entrenching Fidesz in power, generating sizable parliamentary majorities from narrow wins in the popular vote. As a result, Tisza may need to beat Fidesz by 3 to 5 percentage points nationally just to secure a parliamentary majority. A small lead by the opposition could hand Fidesz a majority of seats.

    Yet even if the opposition overcomes these obstacles, and the handover of power goes smoothly, we cannot write Orbán off entirely. Nor can we necessarily look forward to Hungary’s return to the family of well-governed, reliable European nations.

    For one, if it loses the election, the Fidesz government would be leaving behind a spectacular economic and fiscal mess for its successors to clean up, only amplified by the recent shocks to the global energy supply propagating from the Strait of Hormuz.

    In August last year, the International Monetary Fund warned that the Hungarian economy found itself at a challenging juncture with a combination of high inflation and stagnant output. Policy remedies to these two problems are in tension with each other. Short-term stimulus can easily make the inflation problem worse, while a consistent effort to reduce inflation comes at a price of lost output. Meanwhile, the European Commission has projected that Hungary’s fiscal deficit will rise in 2026, with the debt-to-GDP ratio climbing toward 75 percent.

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    But something will need to be done. It may, in fact, not be completely irrational for Orbán to leave power peacefully after Sunday and allow the opposition to step in with difficult, unpopular measures to consolidate public finances and bring stability. Letting the opposition deal with the economic fallout of the last 16 years might well facilitate Orbán’s return to power in the future—perhaps even before Magyar completes his first term.

    But even in opposition, Orbán is unlikely to sit still. Tisza is a catch-all party that includes many former Fidesz officials. Magyar himself is a former Fidesz member and an ex-husband of the now-disgraced justice minister Judit Varga, who resigned in 2024 after countersigning the pardon of a man convicted of covering up sex crimes against children. The scandal, which also triggered the resignation of Hungary’s then-president, was what brought Magyar into politics in the first place.

    Given the improvisational nature of Tisza, it is perfectly thinkable that in a year or two from now Orbán will be able to find wedge issues—immigration, gay rights, EU law, Chinese investment, Ukraine—that will split a Magyar government.

    There’s another obstacle to a post-Orbán Hungary: Fidesz’s influence across all levels of society. An oligarchic network dominates Hungary’s business landscape. The media ecosystem has been reshaped so thoroughly—through the massive KESMA conglomerate, state broadcasters, and the withdrawal of advertising from independent outlets—that reversing it will take years even under the most favorable political conditions.

    The courts have been packed, the public administration stacked with Fidesz appointees, and the country’s universities placed under the control of Fidesz-friendly foundations through legislative maneuvers that will be exceedingly difficult to undo. Attempting a “deep clean,” beyond just changing top government echelons, would certainly be a risky move by Magyar. It would open the new government to charges of illiberalism from Fidesz’s still-formidable media machine.

    Yet leaving the existing power structures in place will leave many voters dissatisfied—and will also be a source of vulnerability for the new government.

    One study of nearby Poland notes that “there is no easy or obvious course of action for a reforming government to take” after a long period of illiberalism. It goes on to warn that: “Such governments are structurally impeded in their capacity to respond to the consequences of illiberalism, and perhaps also susceptible to the temptations of exploiting illiberal precedents or pretexts for their own benefit.”

    Hungary’s friends in the West should wish the country well. A Budapest that is no longer leaking confidential European Council conversations straight to Moscow, as the current foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, likes to do, will be a massive improvement over the status quo. Yet no one should be under any illusion that even a decisive defeat for Orbán will bring about quick, decisive change for the better.

    Democracies seldom emerge healthier from periods of heavy abuse—and Hungary is unlikely to be an exception.

    Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. and a contributing editor with American Purpose at Persuasion.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Lionel Jospin: French Prime Minister, Secret Trotskyist
    Lionel Jospin preparing for a television debate with Jacques Chirac in 1995. (Photo by Jacques Langevin/Sygma/Sygma via Getty Images.)

    The death of Lionel Jospin on March 22, aged 88, has reopened familiar debates about the French left. Some hail the Socialist who, as France’s prime minister, brought Communists and Greens into a pragmatic governing coalition between 1997 and 2002, and see it as a template for the future. Others argue that the rift between radicals and moderates is now deeper than ever, making any such alliance a mirage. Jospin has been given credit for his stewardship of the economy and his signature social policy, the 35-hour week. For critics, the dream of France working less and maintaining its rank among nations has been conclusively crushed. These are legitimate arguments. But this article sets them aside to examine something on which there is near-universal agreement: Jospin’s moral character, or rather, the legend of it.

    When he was alive, Jospin was widely regarded as the most honest president France never had. Words like “probity,” “sincerity,” and “honor” tripped off the keyboards of journalists who wrote about him. Much was made of his Protestant background (why Catholics, Jews, or Muslims should inspire less trust was never explained). After his greatest setback—his elimination in the first round of the 2002 presidential election, eventually won by Jacques Chirac—he was praised for withdrawing from politics. “Jospin is a man of principles who does not deceive himself and acts on his convictions, even at his own expense,” the veteran analyst Alain Duhamel wrote in a recent series of political sketches.

    In death, he has been virtually canonized. “Jospinism was above all the ethics of a man,” declared Le Nouvel Observateur. He “refused to separate ethics from politics,” wrote Le Monde. The right-wing channel CNews faithfully compiled the tributes heaped on him by political friends and foes alike: “rectitude,” “a model of integrity,” “an exemplar of hard work and exacting standards.” Lost in the encomia, or discreetly relegated to a footnote, is the fact that Jospin led a political double life for decades on his way to the top—and lied about it repeatedly once it was exposed.

    “We live at the mercy of certain silences,” Henry de Montherlant wrote. For Jospin, the silence was broken in June 2001, four years into his prime ministership. An elderly revolutionary Marxist, Boris Fraenkel, revealed that in 1964 he had recruited Jospin into the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI), a cloak-and-dagger Trotskyist group dedicated to infiltrating key institutions. Jospin, then a student at ENA, an elite school for bureaucrats, was quite a catch. “We didn’t have any énarques in the movement then,” Fraenkel told Le Nouvel Observateur. “It was a unique chance to penetrate the upper reaches of the civil service.”

    In 1970, after five years as a diplomat, Jospin became a university professor. More interestingly for his revolutionary handlers, Jospin—codenamed “Michel”—decided to join the Socialist Party (PS) the following year. OCI leader Pierre Lambert, an imperious guru who kept a personal grip on every tactical move, gave his blessing. The PS had just been relaunched by François Mitterrand with a programme of “rupture with capitalism,” and having a mole on the inside was an opportunity not to be missed. Jospin, Lambert later acknowledged, “went into the Socialist Party with my consent” and “had a particular job to do.”

    The operation was a ringing success. “Michel” rose through the ranks of the PS. By 1979, he was Mitterrand’s second-in-command, running the party by day and discussing the revolution in cell meetings by night. He hid his clandestine activities even from his wife. By the turn of the 1980s, he was easily recognizable by his owlish glasses and frizzy hair, and rumors about his Trotskyist connection began to circulate. His response: people must be confusing him with his brother, an avowed OCI member. Although Jospin became PS leader in 1981, and a cabinet minister in 1988, the press looked away. In 1995, when he seemed well-placed in the presidential race, Le Monde mustered the curiosity to ask him if he had ever been a Trotskyist. He flatly denied it, once again sheltering behind his younger brother.

    Six years later, now prime minister, Jospin was finally cornered. Both Fraenkel and Lambert had gone public and the game was up. In June 2001, he rose in the National Assembly to deliver what passed for a confession: “It is true that in the 1960s I took an interest in Trotskyist ideas and established relations with one of the groups of this movement. This was a personal, intellectual and political journey of which I have no reason to be ashamed, if that is the right word.”

    This masterclass in evasion warrants close scrutiny, as every word is carefully chosen to blur facts without lying outright:

    • In the 1960s: This conveniently ignores credible reports that he remained an OCI operative well into the 1980s, and more than a decade of entryism within the PS is airbrushed out;

    • I took an interest in Trotskyist ideas: This sounds like a case of youthful intellectual exploration rather than a structured clandestine activity, complete with a codename and deliberate double membership;

    • I established relations with one of the groups: The indefinite article deepens the fog. The OCI is not named—as though he had vaguely frequented one club among many others;

    • A personal, intellectual and political journey: The three-word formula dilutes a political commitment into something resembling a voyage of self-discovery;

    • Of which I have no reason to be ashamed, if that is the right word: The final rhetorical caveat allows him to both distance himself from his own formulation and reinforce it. He does not merely deny shame—he questions whether shame is even a relevant category.

    In France, Trotskyism—an anti-Stalinist strand of Marxism dedicated to permanent revolution—is not the quaint ideological relic it might seem elsewhere. Among baby boomers, former devotees rose to prominent positions in politics, the media, and the civil service. Many have worn their past affiliation with pride. The late Socialist senator Henri Weber was a notable exception: “Permanent revolution, what a load of balls!” he once thundered. Jospin, who had belonged to a particularly conspiratorial branch of the brotherhood and traded on an upright public image, was not capable of such plain-speaking.

    In 2010, Jospin had a chance to come clean. After an inconclusive flirtation with the presidential race three years earlier, he was well and truly out of politics. Two journalists approached him to take stock of his career. In the resulting TV documentary and book—both entitled Lionel raconte Jospin—Lionel may have told Jospin’s story, but he dodged all questions about “Michel.”

    “I was first a Trotskyist and a Socialist, then the Trotskyist faded before the Socialist,” he said, not mentioning that he was a Trotskyist long before joining the PS and neglecting to specify when he left the OCI. Most analysts place the final break in 1988, when he became education minister.

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    No one is accusing Jospin of corruption or attempted subversion. By the standards of French leaders, his record is honorable. At first, his secret revolutionary identity was a way of managing an inner tension: in the late 1960s, the budding diplomat felt out of place climbing the career ladder in de Gaulle’s France while the country’s idealistic youth was rebelling in the streets. In the 2010 interview, Jospin described his OCI membership as an “antidote” to the risk of “conformity.”

    But the dynamic of the double life gradually reversed itself. He continued to play the undercover agent without believing in the cause; it was his open life—a life in which he made a real difference—that became his true self. His first wife put it plainly in 2002: What had begun as a conviction had become a constraint, and eventually a prison. Jospin was a decent man whose past had caught up with him.

    But to then make him out to be a paragon of probity—that is a step taken with remarkable ease in the only Western country where at least two rival Trotskyist candidates stand in every presidential election. One of his eulogists (ironically, one of the journalists who had first unmasked him) went so far as to write: “Jospin was never more sincere than in his double life, never more honest than in his secrecy. Never more free than in his contradictions.”

    Mendacity elevated to the highest form of sincerity! To understand that, to quote the late Madeleine Albright in a rather different context, “you have to be either a genius or French.”

    Henri Astier is a London-based journalist who writes for French- and English-language publications. He writes the Substack Out of France.

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  • Ceasefire Is a Big Word for Backing Down
    Pete Hegseth and Donald Trump on April 6, 2026, in Washington, DC. (Photo by Saul Loeb / AFP via Getty Images.)

    It’s difficult to think of a day with quite the same anxiety as April 7, 2026. Doing his best Darth Vader imitation, Donald Trump announced via Truth Social that “a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again,” sparking what the Wall Street Journal called a “frantic global guessing game over his real intentions.” Even if the presumption was that this was a version of “mad dog” diplomacy, with the unusual twist that Trump seemed to be the one just barely holding himself back on the leash, the day had the uneasy quiet of the lead-up to the Iraq War—the whole world just waiting for something really terrible and irrevocable to happen.

    So, needless to say, the sudden and unexpected announcement of a ceasefire is an immense relief to everyone involved. Trump has apparently found his “offramp with Iran,” as The New York Times put it, and the fatal collision course between two powers—with the world’s energy markets held hostage in the exchange—has, for the time being, been averted.

    All good news, then, until you start to read what’s involved in the ceasefire proposal. Iran’s ten-point plan, which Trump called “a workable basis on which to negotiate,” includes the following stipulations: lifting of all sanctions against Iran, reparations for damage done to Iran during the conflict, acceptance by the United States of Iran’s right to enrich nuclear materials, and continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

    Trump, not so surprisingly, had a different interpretation of what was on the table. The administration assured Israel, as The Times of Israel reported, that America will in coming negotiations resist demands for reparations or the removal of heavy sanctions, and will demand that Iran remove all nuclear material from the country, halt uranium enrichment, and remove the ballistic missile threat.

    So, in other words, there’s no agreement on anything at all.

    The truth may be closer to what Trump articulated in his social media post announcing the ceasefire—that the United States and Israel’s bombing would stop on the condition that Iran agreed to the “complete, immediate, and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz.” Or to put it a different way, the United States would allow everything to return to where it was before the start of hostilities—when the Strait of Hormuz was fully open and functional—except now with Iran having the opportunity to make its own demands. As a negotiation goes, it’s really closer to a hostage standoff than anything else—Iran puts a gun to the head of its most valuable hostage and Trump declares victory the moment the hostage is released.

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    A bit more of the truth of the situation may have been revealed in the positively statesmanlike approach that the Trump administration suddenly adopted in the wake of the ceasefire announcement. “The success of our military created … an opening for a diplomatic solution and long-term peace,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said in a statement, adding, “Additionally, President Trump got the Strait of Hormuz reopened.” So—the Trump administration pretty much finds itself right back where Obama and decades of U.S. presidents have been, drawn to a difficult negotiating table, with Iran having established its deterrent capacity and with the nuclear program as the most significant bargaining chip of all. (Whether we will even get to that is somewhat questionable. Iran welcomed the announcement of the ceasefire by launching ballistic missiles towards Jerusalem and five Gulf states, while Israel has specifically excluded ongoing operations in Lebanon from the ceasefire.)

    To the Iranians, the possibility of talks represented “a significant diplomatic victory for the Iranian nation,” as the Supreme National Security Council said in a statement. To take Trump at his word—that the ten-point proposal represents even a “basis” for talks—is, as The Times of Israel put it, “an extraordinary step down by the U.S. after 47 years of hostilities with Iran.”

    Trump, of course, was quick to dispel that nasty rumor. “We won, ok?” he said in a press conference on April 6. And lest there be any doubt of that, he added in a telephone interview that it was “a total and complete victory, 100%, no question about it.” This stage of the conflict ends, then, as so many conflicts have before—with both sides declaring victory.

    The massive confusion may trace itself back to the impromptu way the war was launched on the U.S. side, without any clear sense—beyond a bit of wishful thinking—of what the actual objectives were. That becomes evident in a deeply reported piece yesterday from The New York Times, which demonstrates the extent to which the war truly was Benjamin Netanyahu’s brainchild—with Netanyahu delivering a critical briefing in the Situation Room on February 11 arguing that quick strikes could destroy Iran’s senior leadership and ballistic missile program and that the conditions were in place for a popular uprising to topple the Islamic Republic.

    That presentation seemed to persuade Trump, even as U.S. intelligence estimates presented a very different view. John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, called Israel’s regime change scenario “farcical,” while Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized it as “bullshit.” Other elements of Netanyahu’s pitch—for instance, that Iran would be so weakened from air strikes that it would lose the ability to choke off the Strait of Hormuz—proved, in subsequent events, to be just as “detached from reality,” in The New York Times’ phrasing, as the visions of civil war and regime change.

    Yes, the United States and Israel have had significant tactical successes. Around 40 senior Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have been killed in airstrikes. Over 5,000 members of Iran’s military have been killed. Iran’s military infrastructure—and particularly its ability to launch offensive operations—appears to be significantly degraded. The United States and Israel have thoroughly demonstrated their ability to dominate Iran’s skies and to strike, with startling precision, virtually anywhere they wish. The most defensible part of Netanyahu’s proposal—that inaction would allow Iran to increase its missile production, while immediate action would curb the country’s ability to project force in the region—is still an arguable proposition. But the conduct of the war has only gone to show that regime change was a far-fetched possibility and that Trump was never all that serious about it.

    Yesterday’s ceasefire—while it may not speak to any of the actual areas of disputation—does at least reveal something of the true intentions of both sides. Trump has indicated that he remains more showman than warlord. He would like to continue with hype-ready adventures in different parts of the world—and in the spinning of the war, he will be able to point to the killing of the ayatollah, as well as the ready-for-primetime story of the rescuing of the downed American pilots, as achievements.

    The Iranians, meanwhile, are able to prove the durability of their regime. They had a great deal thrown at them. They did not falter when they lost their supreme leader and much of their senior leadership. They continued to fire missiles and drones all around the region. They were able to demonstrate the strength of their trump card, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. There was no popular uprising and no Kurdish invasion. In peace talks, they may well be able to achieve a lifting of some sanctions and maybe even an imposition of tolls in the Strait of Hormuz—which would be an astonishing diplomatic success for a regime that was presumed to be on its last legs. And, presumably, the cat-and-mouse game with the nuclear program will continue indefinitely.

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    Maybe most significant of all, Iran demonstrated that it is a different kind of regime from what is often thought. Vertically-oriented autocracies are assumed to be inherently weak—topple the leader, the thinking goes, and the rest of the structure crumbles. But reporting reveals that the recently-appointed Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has been incapacitated for weeks. Nobody actually knows who is running Iran or who has been leading the military response. The presumption is that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps holds de facto control, and that the state has moved to a more horizontal style of leadership—an adaptation also seen in groups like Hamas and Hezbollah as they responded to Israel’s policy of decapitation.

    The question of who actually is on the other side of the table may be most significant for Trump in his effort to spin the war. It will be important for him to argue, if the ceasefire is to hold, that this new iteration of the Islamic Republic is somehow different. His claim is that he has already achieved a kind of soft regime change—that Iran is now led by new, “much more reasonable leaders.” That’s the same playbook as in Venezuela, where Delcy Rodríguez, the vice president and longtime regime loyalist, is suddenly presented as the face of change. Meet the new boss; same as the old boss.

    On a day when an ancient civilization is not actually being obliterated, it may seem churlish to be anything other than grateful that an offramp has been found, whatever that offramp may be. But having experienced myriad false hopes of ceasefires in the Gaza war, we would do well to be aware of how fragile ceasefires can be and how much rests on the genuine intentions of the participants. Trump is very far from having achieved the strategic objectives of the war, and if he faces intractable opposition at the negotiating table, there will be a hard question of whether he resumes the fighting or just tries to spin. For the sake of Iran’s citizens, let’s root for spin.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

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