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We recently published a piece by our associate editor Sam Kahn on why he’s continuing to boycott AI. In true Persuasion spirit, we decided to make him debate it. So tomorrow lunchtime, at 12:30pm Eastern, Sam will debate our contributing editor, Quico Toro, on all things AI—Sam from the perspective of an avid AI boycotter, Quico as an avid AI user. The debate will happen on Substack Live, so you’ll all get notified when it starts. Please tune in!
The Artemis II Space Launch System on March 31, 2026. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images.)For as long as I can remember, I’ve been mildly obsessed with space. It really took off when, around the age of seven, my parents bought me several science books and encyclopedias containing stunning photos of galaxies and nebulae and planets. Those books inculcated in me a deep love of all the weird, cool, and mind-blowing things there are to learn about the cosmos. The history of Saturn’s rings. Theories of the Big Bang and the Big Crunch. Dark Matter and Dark Energy. What the universe was like when it was half a second old. The (then yet to be launched) James Webb Space Telescope. The “golden record” aboard the Voyager 1 probe which, if they ever discover it, will allow aliens to listen to humanity’s most iconic musical recordings, from Chuck Berry’s “Johnny B. Goode” to Mozart’s “Magic Flute,” as well as samples of the various languages of Earth.
Reading about all of this, there was so much I didn’t understand—what do you mean we don’t actually know what 85% of the universe is made of?—but I couldn’t escape the feeling that attempting to solve the mysteries of the cosmos was pretty much the most important thing anyone could ever do.
I never seriously considered pursuing science as a career. But something about space and space travel continued to fascinate me. I read about the Apollo missions, the decline of the Space Shuttle program, the Challenger and Columbia disasters, the lack of any serious attempt to send humans back to the moon after Apollo 17 in 1972. Francis Fukuyama has given the lowdown in these pages about the various bureaucratic impediments that stymied ambitious space travel in the 21st century. It always seemed a shame to me that mankind had lost the skill and ambition it once possessed that would allow us to step foot on distant worlds.
Recently, however, something changed. In 2022, five years after Trump signed Space Policy Directive 1 during his first term, NASA flew the first mission of the new Artemis program: an unmanned craft that shot into space, flew past the moon twice, then plunged back into the Pacific Ocean.
Artemis I was the first of five missions. According to the current plan, Artemis IV will land humans on the moon in late 2028. There were plans to build a permanent base in orbit, but those were recently scrapped by NASA’s ambitious new administrator, Jared Isaacman, to prioritize a base on the moon itself.
But before all of that—today, in fact, at around 6:20pm Eastern Time if all goes well—Artemis II will send the astronauts Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover, Christina Koch, and Jeremy Hansen into orbit around the moon—a precursor to the eventual manned landing. This will be the first time in a half-century that anyone has gone that far into space. In fact, their route is such that those astronauts will travel further than any human being has traveled. Ever.
The weird thing is that so few people seem to have been aware this was coming. Space travel simply isn’t on the public’s radar—certainly not to the extent it was back in the 1960s when the space race peaked. Even the international stakes don’t feel as pressing as they used to. Despite the best efforts of people like Ted Cruz to spin Artemis as part of a new space race, with China taking the place of the Soviet Union, most people just don’t care. They aren’t motivated enough by geopolitical competition or sticking it to the commies. It doesn’t matter to them whether the United States or China becomes the one to finally overcome humanity’s collective failure over half a century to do anything more ambitious than blast Katy Perry into orbit for 11 minutes.
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I also suspect that the general indifference has something to do with who is leading space travel efforts. It was Donald Trump who signed the executive order that, to a large degree, laid the groundwork for the Artemis program. It’s billionaires like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos whose companies—SpaceX and Blue Origin, respectively—are scrambling to build the capsules that NASA needs in time for the 2028 manned landing. Tech optimism in general, and interplanetary exploration in particular, have over the years become coded as right-wing: a “promethean irreverence” (as Alan Turing quipped in a different context) on the part of the rich and powerful who just want to play with their giant toys and exploit the resources of other celestial bodies in much the same way that they ravaged Earth’s natural resources.
In fact, as The New York Times bluntly put it this week, “Polling has consistently found that most people would prefer NASA spend money on things like monitoring climate change and averting asteroid collisions rather than human spaceflight.”
I’m not convinced. When, in 1961, John F. Kennedy announced America’s intention to put a man on the moon “by the end of the decade,” the United States—and the world—were in important ways in a much worse state than they are today. Much of the United States was effectively suffering under apartheid with the injustice of Jim Crow. The world faced the real possibility of nuclear armageddon, a prospect vividly underscored by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. At the start of that decade, a full 55 percent of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty.
Plenty of reason to ditch space travel and focus on other things, then. But we know now that that’s not how it works. Far from letting our space ambitions become a distraction, the reality turned out not to be so zero-sum. The Civil Rights Movement happened and segregation in the United States was outlawed. The Cold War ended. Extreme poverty began sinking, eventually falling to below 10 percent. On top of which… we went to the moon.
What about the feeling of moral ickiness about the fact that it’s people like Trump and Musk driving this new age of space travel? Honestly, I don’t think it matters. Yes, our red-pilled billionaire class have emerged as the prime movers of space travel—but the increase in human knowledge and wonder that comes from exploring space lasts generations, long after the contributions of the politicians are all but forgotten. I’m willing to bet that most Americans know that Neil Armstrong was the first person to walk on the moon—and that far fewer know that it was Kennedy who set that process in motion eight years earlier. Likewise, in 50 or 100 years, most people will have forgotten Trump and Musk’s contributions to space travel. All they’ll remember is that, despite everything wrong with the world in our time, humanity dared to do it at all.
I want to make a case that you should care about space travel, a case that comes from a place of personal wonderment. Sometimes you are struck by an image that seems to capture everything truly mystifying about the universe. That could be the famous “pale blue dot” photographed by Voyager 1 in 1990. It could be the first ever image of a black hole, captured in 2019.
For me, it’s a photo taken a few years ago by the James Webb telescope:
(ESA/Webb, NASA & CSA, G. Gozaliasl, A. Koekemoer, M. Franco, and the COSMOS-Web team.)The more you think about it, the more amazing the photo seems. The bright white lights are stars in our own galaxy—our immediate cosmic neighbors. Everything else is a distant galaxy. Each galaxy can contain up to 100 billion stars. Because they are so far away, we are actually seeing many of those stars as they looked six billion years ago, because that’s how long it has taken the light to reach us. The older galaxies are red because, as the universe expands, light itself stretches into the red end of the spectrum. The very oldest splodges are likely galaxies that formed only around 300 million years after the Big Bang itself. To put that into perspective, various types of scorpion have inhabited the Earth for longer than 300 million years. From the perspective of cosmic time, it’s nothing. It’s not even the first baby steps—it’s the universe opening its eyes for the very first time. And we built the tools that allow us to see it.
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I’m not saying that everyone has to find space cool and interesting. Plenty of people don’t. But it’s surely a shame that the culture as a whole finds itself unable, most of the time, to be awed and inspired by those parts of the universe that exist beyond the thin shell of our atmosphere. Exploration requires curiosity, and curiosity is deeply human. Unlike other animals, we aren’t driven to new environments simply because of resource scarcity or the threat of predators. We have a surplus of wonder that causes us to pursue knowledge and beauty wherever we find it, without quite knowing why.
Artemis II is just one small example of that spirit in action. But it’s worth celebrating nonetheless. If we lose the will to explore space, we lose the thing that makes us most human.
Luke Hallam is senior editor at Persuasion.
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Today at 6pm Eastern, I am giving a webinar on the impact that artificial intelligence will have on democracy and public life at Johns Hopkins University. It is mostly meant for alumni of the university, but I was able to secure an invitation for readers of Persuasion. If you want to tune in, please follow this link: https://events.jhu.edu/form/snfagora-ai-impact.
Ruy Teixeira is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and was co-founder and politics editor of the Substack newsletter, The Liberal Patriot. His latest book, with John B. Judis, is Where Have All the Democrats Gone?
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ruy Teixeira discuss why The Liberal Patriot is shutting down after five years, how the Great Awokening is still driving the Democratic Party, and whether the Democrats have learned the right lessons from Trump’s 2024 victory.
Persuasion is a registered non-profit and relies on paying subscribers to pay the bills. If you would like to make a donation, please click here. We’re so grateful for your support!
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I have to say that I would like to talk to you under more pleasant circumstances. You are one of the co-founders of The Liberal Patriot, which I have been reading religiously for the last five years. I am sure that many of my listeners are well-acquainted with The Liberal Patriot. I, like many of your readers, was shocked to learn a few days ago that you are closing down the shop. Tell listeners a little bit about the publication and why you saddened our weekends with this news.
Ruy Teixeira: Well, it started about five years ago. It was started by a group of people who either left or were in the process of leaving the Center for American Progress. They were worried about the state of the Democratic Party and that they did not seem to be absorbing the lessons they should from the rise of Trump and right-wing populism, and some of the other ways politics had evolved in the country. It was weakening the support sustained among working-class voters and moving to the left, quite severely, on cultural issues and a lot of other things.
We were just disquieted about that. We thought we would start a Substack where we put forward a different philosophy and a different approach, and had a no-holds-barred attitude toward the problems of the Democratic Party. Sometimes we summed it up as “pro-worker, pro-family, pro-America.” Sometimes we looked at it as a combination of social-democratic economics and cultural moderation. But it was certainly different from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and where it was going.
Given that we started this five years ago, as you can figure out from the math, this was right as Biden was coming into office and right on the heels of the “Great Awokening.” Well, the crest of the “Great Awokening” in 2020—the George Floyd summer and all that. As a longtime observer of Democratic politics and someone who was actually hanging out at the Center for American Progress at the time, it was like, “What the hell is going on?” I could not believe the things people were saying, the causes they were taking up, and the intolerance and “cancel culture” type attitude toward anyone with a different point of view.
Mounk: Take us back to that moment. We do not need to go through all of the summer of 2020, but the Center for American Progress was founded by the center left, right? It was founded, I believe, by the Clintonite faction within the Democratic Party. It was a very center-left establishment think tank and was dominant in the 2010s. How did CAP evolve in the years before your departure?
Teixeira: Well, when it started out it really was a more conventional center-left think tank. They were pretty focused on—just because it started in 2003—getting rid of the Bushies and managing to move the Democratic Party back into power and not really pushing the envelope on cultural issues necessarily. But that really changed over time. The two things the center did that were most well-known to begin with were that they laid some of the basis for Obamacare and they basically did a lot of stuff around the Iraq War and how we needed to get out of it. It was pretty unradical kind of stuff, really.
As time went on, and as the Obama administration came into office and went through its second term, you could see that the nature of the party was starting to change, and CAP fully reflected that. People really were moving to the left on a lot of cultural and other issues. They really were becoming more intolerant of the other side. Black Lives Matter started in 2013. It may have crested in 2020, but those kinds of ideas were already out there, and they really were infecting the minds of people in the Democratic Party infrastructure—the think tanks, foundations, the arts world, legacy media, you name it. You could already see the hints of it evolving.
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As people who have a more small-c conservative attitude toward cultural issues in the sense of being for equality, anti-discrimination, and tolerance, we are not really on board with a lot of this more radical stuff. That is just going to scare off a lot of voters. Besides, what is progressive about racial preferences, for example? But that became a harder and harder thing to sustain at a place like CAP, and indeed within the center left in general. I think things really had a phase change after 2016 because Trump won, as we all remember.
People could not process it on the center left, in my opinion. That was very true at CAP. All they could think of was that this was a result of racism, xenophobia, and all the other things that “deplorables” of our nation believe in and that Trump managed to mobilize. That was really all there was to it, and we must resist, resist, resist. As someone who followed American electoral politics for a long time, I just did not think that was an adequate understanding of why the Democrats did lose, and why working-class voters deserted them so severely, particularly in the Midwest.
It was, in a sense, at least partly a revolt against neoliberal economics in trade, in manufacturing, and a lot of other things in many left-behind communities. People were not too happy with the way the country was going. All the Democrats could think of was how awful these people were—just beyond the pale. Of course, things just got worse over the course of the first Trump administration.
Like I say, it’s a phase change. By the time you get to the lead-up to the 2020 election and the George Floyd summer, that’s when things really got out of control. You saw this incredible group-think on a lot of these cultural issues.
Mounk: For those four years, you are trying to stay a loyal soldier of the center left. You stay within CAP. You are trying to push the Democratic Party to address some of these issues, both because you disagree with some of the policy positions they are embracing, but more broadly because you think that this kind of stuff is going to lose them elections, that it is not what is needed in order to defeat people like Donald Trump.
What finally pushed you and some of your co-conspirators to say, in order to actually push the Democratic Party to reform in these kinds of ways, we have to leave CAP, we have to start this new publication? What were your hopes for what this publication would accomplish in 2020?
Teixeira: Well, it is true what you say, Yascha, that for years I was more in the loyal soldier position. I was always tugging at people’s sleeves at CAP. Well, don’t forget about the white working class. Don’t forget that we are really doing pretty badly among this demographic. They are still pretty big. They do not really think the Democrats are their party, and this could really hurt us.
Mounk: For people who do not know the backstory and who have not listened to the excellent earlier episodes with you on The Good Fight or read the work you published in, I believe, 2002, you had some authority on this. You are one of the people who coined the concept of the “emerging Democratic majority,” which emphasized that Democrats could build on the diversification of the United States. They were doing very well among knowledge workers and people who have gone to college, but also among racial minorities that are growing as a share of the population.
When you say, Democrats can build on all of that, but if they fall below a minimum level of support among the white working class, the electoral math is not going to work out, that carries weight. It comes from somebody whose strategy all along was not just that Democrats need to build in the white working class. You were saying Democrats can win thanks to these new voters, assuming that they retain significant support among their historic constituency, which was the white working class.
When you go to people saying, our policies are so alienating us from rural voters and the white working class that we are not going to be able to win, that carries more authority than it would coming from some random policy analyst.
Teixeira: In my book with John Judis, The Emerging Democratic Majority, we framed things in terms of a progressive centrism that would be consistent with the way the country was changing, but would not be obviously too far to the left. They would have to retain a core of white working-class support that could not afford to shrink much.
The reason 2016 is a phase change in all this, Yascha, is because I had been reminding people of this over and over in my role as a loyal soldier. Nobody was paying any attention. Then, after 2016, they are taking this event that I more or less predicted and, instead of trying to remedy the weakness, they are making it worse. They are paying no attention. They are consigning all these voters to the eighth circle of hell. How are you going to win people over on that basis?
When you fast-forward to 2020 and the peak of the “Great Awokening,” obviously this stuff was not going to go well with many of these voters. This was not the way they were going to win any of them back, even if Biden did manage to win the election. In the process, I noticed a very important thing, which a lot of other people did as well: non-white working-class voters were starting to weaken their support for the Democrats. That was what really led us to think this is ridiculous. If they do not realize they have a problem when they are losing support not only from white working-class voters, but from non-white working-class voters as well, what can we do?
As you know, Yascha, from the way the Biden administration went down, he ran as a moderate, but he did not govern in a particularly moderate way. It was symptomatic of the way the center of gravity of the Democratic Party had changed dramatically, both in cultural and other ways. The kind of people who are staffing his administration, and their supporters outside of the administration—what John Judis and I called in our other book the “Shadow Party”—were pushing the party very strongly to the left. The Biden administration was responsive, and it did not seem like that would go very well, either.
That is the kind of stuff we started to write in 2021 and onward to warn that the way the Democratic Party is going at this point is like being on a train bound to hell and not realizing it. This is not going to end well; bad things will happen. We wrote a lot and made some cogent arguments, but people did not really want to believe that the problem was as deep as we said.
Then, in the 2022 election, the Democrats did better than they thought they would. They now clean up in special elections where their turnout advantage among higher-education, more engaged voters is typically operationalized. You have a formula for the “Great Forgetting”—the great refusal to engage. I think we are seeing it again. That is really what my latest piece is about.
All Democrats should consider it a cataclysmic defeat. This guy who they anathematized and thought would never come back won the popular vote. He won all the swing states. What is it you do not understand about the danger you are running? How quickly they forget. For a few months, there was some moderately serious effort to engage in it, but now people have completely forgotten about it. They just want to oppose Trump. They are doing great in the special elections and did well in 2025. Unless something drastically changes, they will do quite well in 2026, I think. It is just like: why change? Why bother? We have them on the run. Trump is so terrible that the masses of honest workers and peasants have finally woken up and rejected right-populism forever. I think that is not true.
Mounk: The steel-man argument on the other side is that some of the most toxic practices of the period around 2020 have subsided—that not just the Democratic Party, but more broadly progressive institutions, have walked back some of the most absurd outrages of that time. People are no longer getting fired for referencing a Chinese filler word that has a passing resemblance to an American swear word. Electricians in San Diego are not getting fired because they have a hand dangling out of the truck and somebody thinks they made the “OK” symbol, which they somehow associate with white supremacy.
I was at a dinner with people who have broadly heterodox views yesterday and someone said, “I just don’t feel afraid that somebody is going to try and cancel me in the way that I did five or six years ago.” It does not feel like when I voice my perfectly tolerant and reasonable opinion out loud in a cafe or restaurant, I have to take my voice down a notch.
Of course, the unpopularity of Donald Trump is real. Trump has come in and governed in such an extreme and irresponsible way that perhaps the Democrats do not need to change all that much in order to win the midterm elections. They are likely to win the House; they may even win the Senate, which would be a remarkable feat given the map. Why shouldn’t Democrats just keep going the way they are? As you know, I do not fully agree with the steel-man version, but I am trying to give you that version here.
Teixeira: I do not think Democrats need to change anything to do well in 2026. You could argue that if they change a few things they might do even better than they are likely to do, but given the nature of this upcoming election—the way the out-party tends to do well in these midterm elections anyway—and how unpopular Trump is, I do not see how they do not take back the House. I do think they have an outside shot of taking back the Senate. Broadly speaking, it will be a very good election for them.
The longer-range issue is how the Democrats change their pretty toxic image among tons of working-class and rural voters around the country, where they are still viewed as being pretty out of the mainstream in terms of these other culturally freighted issues. As I pointed out at the end of my piece, Democrats’ economic program is nothing to write home about, either. They will do well in 2026, but I think their brand is still pretty terrible, particularly among working-class voters. You need to change that if you are going to succeed on the presidential level, and more generally in terms of forming a more stable majority coalition.
Mounk: There was an amazing poll recently, which mostly was paid attention to because of what it found about artificial intelligence. But it revealed something interesting about the Democratic Party: artificial intelligence is now very unpopular in the United States. The two things that are less popular than artificial intelligence are the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic Party.
Teixeira: Nothing has been unsolved in terms of those underlying problems. The problem is that Democrats do not want to solve their underlying problem and feel they can get away without doing much about it at the current time. In terms of the specific stuff you were mentioning about race and cancel culture, I do think that at the elite level, it is harder to cancel people and they are less interested in doing it than they once were. You are a bit safer in terms of saying particular things in particular contexts.
The fact remains that people who are very culturally liberal—the radicals—still have control of the commanding heights of cultural production. They are still ensconced in universities, newspapers, foundations, the infrastructure of the Democratic Party, and NGOs. I think they are all still there; they have just sanded off a few of the rough edges. The question becomes: if you really want to change people’s perception of the party, its image, and its fundamental commitments, do you not actually have to change some of your positions instead of just not talking about them?
As I pointed out in that article, and as Lauren Egan mentioned in an article in The Bulwark, the typical approach of the Democrats now is to “shut up and pivot.” Do not talk about what your positions are on unpopular issues. Just immediately attack the billionaire class and say this is a diversion from the rich fat cats picking your pockets. I think that is the party line now, and it is not a very promising way to change your image in a fundamental way. It is a way to win the next election by deflecting.
Where are the Democrats who are willing to say forthrightly, actually, I think DEI programs are a terrible idea. I think race-based affirmative action is a bad idea and I do not support it? With a lot of these issues—trans rights is another one—you find that they are either not talking about it, or they might mutter something about how some of this stuff may have gone a bit too far, but it is basically noble stuff.
Mounk: I want to go into some of those positions in detail and really think through what the reasonable positions would be. I guess my position on this is that we are in a two-party system. That means that if one party is really unpopular, it allows the other party to be pretty damn screwed up and do relatively better. That always goes to the benefit of the opposition party.
The Biden administration was sufficiently dysfunctional and Joe Biden, of course, was sufficiently mentally unsound. People looked at that and said, I don’t want that. They went back to Donald Trump despite everything we knew from his first term about how irresponsible he was. Now that Trump has come in, he had a great opportunity to actually turn the Republican Party into a multiracial party of the working class. He has completely squandered that opportunity.
He has been culturally extreme in ways that go well beyond the American mainstream and has made significant blunders, like the current war in Iran. I think he is going to be so unpopular that, in the midterm elections, Democrats are going to do very well. Probably even in 2028—if you asked me for a point estimate right now, if I had to place a bet on one of these betting markets—I would say the Democrats probably retake the White House in 2028. I do not want to be certain about that because Trump is term-limited.
Teixeira: What would your probability estimate be?
Mounk: 60/40. The reason for that is I think Republicans have an ability to rebrand; they have an opportunity to rebrand. Primaries are unpredictable once the person who has been dominating the party for a very long time is out of the way. I do not think it is unimaginable that Marco Rubio, J.D. Vance, and perhaps Donald Trump Jr. compete for the mantle of the MAGA movement and they split the vote. Perhaps someone like Spencer Cox somehow manages to win the nomination, and suddenly the Republicans go into 2028 with a much more palatable face, which would be great.
Teixeira: I think Marco Rubio would be actually a fairly forbiddable candidate. We could argue about that, but that’s what I think.
Mounk: Yeah, I agree. He would have real strengths. Anyway, I do not think the shadow of Trump will remain that strong. I think that if the administration keeps going the way it has for the first year and six weeks of being in office for the next nearly three years, people are going to be so sick of them. The Democrats have a good chance of winning.
But there are two fears that I have. Number one is the Keir Starmer scenario. The Tories were in power in Britain for ten-plus years, and people got deeply sick of them. That was enough for Keir Starmer—who was never charismatic and never had a substantive political vision of his own—to come into office. Because he did not have a coherent governing program and because he did not solve some of the underlying problems of the Labour Party, within a few months he was deeply unpopular. Now it looks like Reform is likely to win at the next election.
A broader way of putting this is that it depends on what you are solving for. If you are solving for getting Donald Trump and his chosen successor out of the White House in 2028, perhaps Democrats do not have to do that much. It is a risky strategy. It would be much more likely to succeed in that crucial undertaking if they changed more, but perhaps it is not necessary.
But that is not the problem for me. The actual challenge for me is that we are at a moment when people who are very dangerous to basic democratic norms and institutions have the commanding heights of the Republican Party. We need to lastingly and convincingly beat them to force the Republican Party back to the negotiating table—to make sure that they have to expel those extremists from the commanding heights of the Republican Party in order to win elections. That has to happen not just in 2026 and 2028, but for long enough for the Republican Party to make those reforms to themselves because of the wilderness they are in. That, I think, would take much, much more than being, in the eyes of many voters, the lesser evil in 2028.
Teixeira: Well, just to clarify what I was going to say about “necessary”: are you satisfied with a 51–49 or 52–48 chance of winning, or do you want to maximize your probability of victory? If the situation is as dire as you say it is, then Democrats should view it as a necessity to maximize their ability to win that election. You do not just want 60–40; you want something like 75–25.
May I recommend the report I wrote with Yuval Levin, Politics Without Winners? It is all about the idea that we are now in a very peculiar political space where we basically toggle between the two parties. They do not get to hang around very long before they are tossed out because people get sick of what they are doing, and there is no stable, dominant majority coalition.
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What you want to do is get to that point. You do not want to just alternate with right-populists for another 20 years; you want to have a stable coalition that can govern effectively, make the country prosper, and gain the default allegiance of the American voter. Conversely, if you were the Republicans, you should want the same thing.
As you are pointing out, there was a brief moment where, if Trump had played his cards right and the Republicans had governed in a different way, they really could have grown their coalition. They could have been much more moderate on cultural issues and avoided a weird, tariff-heavy economic regime.
Mounk: Well, if they had secured the border with Mexico and even done some deportations, but not gone after people who’ve been here for a long time…
Teixeira: They did not need to do that. It was a way of manufacturing bad publicity for the party and not doing anything very effective. Everything they did, they overdid. If they had played their cards right, they had a chance to sustain a fairly high level of popularity, consistent with Politics Without Winners.
As you say, let us say the Democrats do get back in in 2028. What is the guarantee that they are not going to have a light version of what Biden tried to do that would wind up being very unpopular? It is very unclear what they would do on the border, on the economy, on DEI, or on trans issues. I think the fundamental radicalism of some of the left agenda that the Democrats have adopted in the last 15 years would actually come out because they have not changed. Their underlying positions are roughly the same.
If they want to maximize the probability of not only winning in 2028, but sticking around for a while, they would be well advised to change some of these underlying positions.
Mounk: The only smart way to think about the future is in terms of scenarios, and I am going to defy that and give you a point estimate. I think it is less than 50% that this exact scenario will play out—it is probably less than 5%—but I think the Democrats are going to win the midterms: definitely the House and possibly the Senate. I think they will eke out a victory in 2028 unless they really self-sabotage.
Then you are going to have the Keir Starmer problem. Very quickly, they will become unpopular because they will overreach and because they have not actually developed a substantive vision for how they want to govern. In 2032, we will see the Republicans romp back into power. Whether the leader at that point is J.D. Vance, Tucker Carlson, or Donald Trump Jr., it will be potentially even worse than the current Trump term.
I am conscious of the fact that in this conversation we have presumed both a substantive case that Democrats are in the wrong place on a bunch of these issues, and that people are going to agree with that. I want you to lay out really clearly, in a few of those areas, how concretely Democrats are actually in the wrong place. We can go through the valedictory piece you published with the lovely title, No Learning, Please, We’re Democrats. You say they have a cultural problem. What concretely is that problem? What are some cultural positions the Democrats have that they need to move away from, and what should the position on those issues be?
Teixeira: There is a long list of issues with cultural content where Democrats are much farther to the left than they used to be. We recently discussed DEI and racial issues; clearly, the Democrats are too far to the left on these. People do not really believe in DEI, except in the sense that everyone should have an opportunity. Equal opportunity is popular; equal outcomes are not.
The fact that there is not a completely proportional representation of different racial or other groups in a professional setting or for a given set of rewards is not prima facie evidence of racism. However, that became a widely-accepted position within the Democratic Party and remains so today. The solution should not be racial preferences. People should be judged on the basis of merit—how good they are at a task, how well they did on a test, and how competent they are. This is a fundamental principle of fairness that Americans deeply believe in.
By soft-pedaling or outright opposing the idea of merit-based rewards, Democrats have gone far out of the mainstream. Where are the Democrats today who are willing to say that DEI is not written into the Constitution, as Hakeem Jeffries suggested? Where are those for merit-based rewards and jobs who do not believe in racial preferences, but want everyone to compete on an equal playing field while remaining against discrimination? I do not see them.
The immigration situation is also extraordinary. In the late 20th century, Democrats had a very different attitude toward immigration. They were unafraid to say the border should be enforced or that people here illegally should be deported. They were willing to entertain the notion that there might be negative aspects to open immigration, such as pressure on the low-wage labor market and unions. This changed drastically in the 21st century, culminating in the spectacle of quasi-open borders under President Biden, where every lever was pulled to make it easy to enter the United States and stay indefinitely. This resulted in the biggest wave of immigration since the early 1900s. This was not what people in the United States wanted; quasi-open borders were not popular.
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Tied to that was the culturally radical position that anyone objecting to this surge or the gaming of the asylum system must be a racist or a xenophobe who dislikes immigrants. This was the hegemonic point of view in huge sectors of the Democratic Party, and it was divorced from how most people look at the world. People believe borders count and that if you come here, you should do so the right way. They did not hate immigrants, but they did not like a wave of illegal immigration.
Another example is the trans issue, which hurtled to the top of the Democrats’ litmus tests within about ten years. It became de rigueur to say trans rights are the preeminent civil rights issue, despite the fact that it was not historically controversial to say there should be no discrimination in housing, employment, or marriage. Instead, there was a push for everything from personal pronouns to gender-affirming care for minors and biological boys in girls’ sports. Underneath it all is the concept of gender identity—the idea that everyone has an innate identity that should frequently trump biological sex.
The idea that biological sex is real and that there are two sexes became a marker of transphobia. Anyone who believed that was labeled a transphobe. Look at what happened to Representative Seth Moulton, who said he was unsure about having biological boys on girls’ sports teams. He was hammered; his staff quit, and he was denounced as a Nazi.
That is an example of something far to the left culturally that became the dominant tendency in the party. It remains hard to dissent from the trans rights agenda, including gender-affirming care for minors, even as much of the world moves against the idea of medicalizing children with gender-nonconforming behavior. In the 2024 election, Trump’s most successful ad was “Harris is for they/them; President Trump is for you.” This is a loser in public opinion and does not make sense as policy or science, yet the party tenaciously holds onto it. To the extent anyone raises a question, the approach is to “shut up and pivot.” If someone mentions trans issues, the consultant-approved reply is that the billionaire class is trying to divert you.
Mounk: That is the line taken by the moderates in the party. The progressives are very loud on these issues and double down on them, while the moderates—like Abigail Spanberger in her race for governor in Virginia—might say that an issue like people who have gone through male puberty playing on women’s sports teams is something local school districts should regulate on their own. It is a way of bowing out of the discussion and having a talking point you can repeat over and over—I think she repeated it three times in a single minute of a debate—to avoid taking a substantive stance.
People like her feel completely boxed in. On one side is the realization that this is an 80-20 issue where a huge majority of independents, and actually most Democrats, are on the other side of the official party line. On the other hand, if you take a position that deviates from what highly engaged activists want, you make yourself so toxic that you are attacked aggressively. It takes a lot of courage to go against that.
When I speak to Democratic electeds, this is the issue on which I most often hear, I would love to vote for a particular bill that a more moderate Republican has introduced, but if I do, I will be primaried tomorrow. I just can’t. I have heard that from many electeds, as I am sure you have. Is there any way of changing those incentives, or are they so baked in that there is no moving them? What would it take for someone like Abigail Spanberger or the 2028 Democratic presidential nominee to speak in a more forthright manner on these issues?
Teixeira: Someone has to break the mold on this. I have used the term myself to describe what is really needed: a “Sister Souljah moment” where the hegemony of the Democratic Party’s professional-class activists is challenged on some of these key issues in an unapologetic way. Rahm Emanuel probably comes closest to that at this point.
Underneath what you have to contend with in the Democratic Party is the unavoidable fact that the professional class, which now votes heavily Democratic, holds a very radical point of view on many of the cultural issues we have discussed—and on climate issues as well. That makes it very difficult for someone to break the mold. It is not clear to me that it is impossible, however. If it happens, it will likely occur around the 2028 presidential cycle.
Mounk: Is this the sort of thing where, actually, if you are any candidate below the presidential level, the heat you take for taking a position like that is so big that you cannot afford it? You have to be the presidential candidate in order to make that break?
Teixeira: I think it is pretty common for parties to change their image in and around a presidential election cycle, where the person is going to define the image of the party. The presidential candidate takes a different position. Everything from “compassionate conservatism” back to Clinton and his approach. I think it is not out of the question that someone could do that in and around the 2028 cycle.
My fear, actually, is that everyone will be herded toward the same positions—maximum resistance to Trump and defending all the basic Democratic positions on these cultural issues. Otherwise, they will get hammered in the primary context because people to their left will attack them. Maybe there is an opening there for someone who is willing to do and say something different and see if there is a lane within the Democratic primary electorate for that.
The problem is that doing what you and I might recommend—if I may take the liberty of assuming we are similar in some of this stuff—would be great in the general election. The problem is getting through the primary electorate, the kinds of voters who show up in primary elections, and the political dynamics that are peculiar to them. To navigate that would be difficult. Right now, you are going to have Gavin Newsom and people like him.
Mounk: That might be easier for a presidential candidate than a lower-level candidate because, if you run for state representative, such a huge share of your electorate consists of people mobilized by local teachers’ unions and other Democratic interest groups. If they give the directive that you are “bad,” there is really no way of winning against it. If you are running at the presidential level, there is so much public attention on you and you have so much free media to put forward your ideas that, if they are compelling to a lot of people in the country, you can build your own kind of coalition.
In some of those issues where Democratic voters are split 50/50, or even less, you might be able to move. Even if a majority of the people who vote for a local state representative in the midterm elections agree, for example, with the recent ruling by the International Olympic Committee that transgender women are excluded from the female category in the Olympics, it is going to be really hard to get the nomination in a primary if you take that position very proactively. Because the share of people who participate in that election is so low, it is difficult to make your argument, since people are not paying a lot of attention. At a presidential level, that might be easier.
Teixeira: I think you’re right. There are two big factors there. One is just that it’s a wider primary electorate, even though it is still a primary electorate. The other is what you said: an enormous amount of free publicity is available for an aggressive candidate for the presidential nomination, which could be leveraged to try to move the conversation in their direction. There is a possibility there.
But where is the profile in courage? Where is the Democrat who is willing to do that and who is also a viable candidate? I like Rahm Emanuel; he has come closest to really raising serious questions about the Democratic approach. Can he get the traction necessary to do that? Maybe. One thing he may do is force the other candidates to reckon with some of these things. There will be debates, and if he is aggressive about raising these issues, maybe someone more viable will move toward his position. Perhaps it will create a lane for “normie” Democrats.
Mounk: Why is he not viable?
Teixeira: Well, I think he is viewed as too much of an operative. There is not a lot of money behind him. He is actually not close to the center of gravity of the Democratic Party today, particularly its more activist segment, but maybe he will be by the time things really develop in terms of the cycle. I do not want to completely disparage his chances; I would love it if he had better chances than he does. I am just trying to be realistic about who he is now and where the debate currently is. I do not know what his betting market rate is at this point, but I bet it is pretty low. I know where it is good—it was a very cheap buy. Gavin Newsom is probably too expensive now. Maybe everyone out there should buy Rahm Emanuel in the betting markets; that is my advice.
Mounk: I want to ask you a strategic question. One of the most striking stats I saw about the 2024 election—and I therefore talked about it repeatedly, including on this podcast—is that when you look at the socioeconomic coalition put together by Kamala Harris and compare it to the socioeconomic coalitions put together by Donald Trump, George W. Bush, and also by Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and Bill Clinton, the one it most resembles is not her Democratic predecessors. It is the coalition put together by Bob Dole in 1996, the Republican candidate, which is to say that the Democrats are now the party of the highly-educated and the relatively affluent.
There is a way of thinking about two demographic problems the Democratic Party has. The first is that they have become hopeless among rural voters. They have gone from getting a majority of the white working-class vote in the past, to getting a significant minority of it for many years, to just bleeding votes in that demographic in an extremely rapid way. That is one of the demographic problems.
The other demographic problem is that, as you predicted back in the 2000s, the diversification of America was meant to buoy the prospects of the Democratic Party. States like Florida, which was the decisive state in 2000 with the hanging chads and all of that, were meant to become solidly Democratic as they became more diverse and majority-minority. What has happened is that Florida is now solidly Republican, and even Texas has not moved strongly toward the Democratic Party. There is a Hispanic, to some extent Asian American, and even black working-class problem that the Democratic Party has—bleeding rather than building its electoral base among those voting groups.
To what extent does the Democratic Party need a distinct strategy for each of these demographic groups? To what extent is this downstream from the same problem? Is there one set of fixes that would actually buoy the prospects of the Democratic Party among both of those demographic groups, or does it take different approaches to strengthen its positioning with each?
Teixeira: The good news for the Democrats is that they have the votes of these influential professional-class voters; the bad news is that this very fact makes it hard for the party to strike a different tone. The solution is to recognize how toxic your image has become in many areas of the country. You need to break from priorities that people see as out of whack with their worldview and culture. That will be tough and will invite blowback, but it is the only way through. If you want to stop the ongoing bleeding among working-class voters, including non-white working-class voters, that is what you have to do. It will take time and you will get flack, but otherwise, you are stuck with a professional-class-driven coalition.
Occasionally, you will pick up working-class voters when they are dissatisfied with the incumbent party, but they will not stick around. We see this in the polls as Trump’s popularity has declined. As I mentioned in my article, voters who are disaffected with Trump and are not necessarily voting Republican in 2028 do not like the Democrats either. The fact that they are no longer down with Trump does not mean they see the Democrats as their party.
You must make a conscious effort to reach voters outside the professional-class mainstream; if you do not, they will never come back. You have to be willing to take some flack and have “Sister Souljah moments” that accept the reality of contemporary class divisions. I wish I could be more optimistic that they will do this soon, but there is evidence they think they can manage the problem just by talking about affordability and kitchen-table issues. They think that by saying the billionaire class is picking your pocket, they can fix problems that have developed over twenty years. I think that is delusional, but it is what people believe.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Ruy discuss whether a third party presidential bid could be viable, what happened to The Liberal Patriot, and what this means for the Democrats. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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Gen Z United activists hold a demonstration in Kathmandu, Nepal, on September 8 and 9, 2025. (Photo by Safal Prakash Shrestha/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)The last half century has seen the greatest reversal in the prospects for democracy in the world since the modern experiment in democracy was initiated 250 years ago by the American Revolution.
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, democracy expanded more than ever before, with the number of democracies in the world more than doubling from under 30 percent of all countries to over 60 percent. Samuel P. Huntington famously called this the “Third Wave of Democratization,” succeeding two earlier waves triggered by the American Revolution and the Second World War. Huntington saw five drivers of the third wave—a legitimacy crisis in many authoritarian countries; rapid economic development that raised education levels and the size of the middle class; the liberalization of Catholic doctrine following the Second Vatican Council, which made the Church a pivotal defender of democratic rights throughout most of Latin America, as well as in Poland, the Philippines, and other Catholic-majority countries; a greater role by external actors in promoting democracy, above all the United States and the then-European Community; and the contagious effect of democratic breakthroughs that Huntington called “snowballing.”
Huntington’s wave theory of democratization included the understanding that the consolidation of a democratic system after a period of dictatorship is a difficult process, and that some of the newly democratic countries might revert to autocratic rule in what he called a likely “reverse wave.” He noted that each of the preceding democratic waves had been followed by such a reversal, the first in the 1920s and 30s with the rise of fascist and communist totalitarianism, and the second from the late 1950s to mid-1970s when many newly independent or democratic nations fell to military or executive coups.
Although he couldn’t discern the nature and scope of another democratic reversal, he saw many possible reasons it could happen, among them governance and economic failures, a process of “reverse snowballing” if a number of new democracies shifted back to dictatorship, the weakening of democracy in many countries if a major nondemocratic state greatly increased its power (he mentioned China in this context), and the rise of various forms of authoritarianism in response to changing political and social conditions, from militant nationalism to religious fundamentalism to virulent populism.
A third reverse wave did, in fact, begin at the start of this century, spurred by the 9/11 attack on the United States and the growing threat of terrorism that led many governments to take security measures curtailing individual liberties. Other developments that fueled the crisis and steady decline of democracy included the backlash against the U.S. intervention in Iraq; the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 that led the Putin government in Russia—followed by many other governments—to pass laws tightening controls on NGOs and international democracy funding; the global financial crisis in 2008 that shook the confidence of U.S. and other Western leaders; the geopolitical resurgence of authoritarianism led by Russia and China; the backsliding of many new democracies; and the rise of illiberal democracy and populism in many established democracies, including the United States. Freedom House has charted 20 consecutive years of declining political and civil liberties in the world as a result of these developments, and the Swedish democracy-monitoring group V-Dem says that this reversal has “wiped out” all the advances in global levels of democracy that were made over the last 35 years.
This third reverse wave is especially worrying for three reasons. First, it’s more protracted than the earlier reverse waves, with V-Dem noting that the current “wave of autocratization has been going on for at least 25 years and shows no signs of cresting.” It has also raised doubts for the first time about the durability of long-established liberal democracies in the West, including the United States, where illiberal populism has made significant gains. Finally, while the United States has been the leader of efforts to defend and advance democracy globally since President Ronald Reagan gave his Westminster Address to the British Parliament in 1982—in which he called for the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—it has now abandoned democracy promotion and is dismantling, or trying to dismantle, all the soft-power institutions that have been the bedrock of American assistance to people abroad striving to build democratic societies. It is therefore reasonable to ask if the fight to advance democracy in the world is doomed, or whether there’s a way for this effort to continue in the absence of support from the U.S. government.
The fight is certainly more difficult than it’s ever been since the end of the Cold War, and there has already been a pronounced democratic regression, as we have seen. But it’s crucial to stress that the battle for democracy has by no means ended, even if the U.S. government no longer supports it.
During the past year, for example, Gen Z youth-led protests erupted against corruption, economic distress, and ineffective government in Nepal, Peru, and Madagascar where the governments fell, as well as in Indonesia, Morocco, Kenya, and the Philippines. The protests followed upon earlier youth-led uprisings that toppled corrupt and abusive governments in Sri Lanka in 2022 and Bangladesh in 2024. Different issues sparked the outrage that led to these uprisings—a social media ban in Nepal, intense anger in Indonesia when MPs were given a housing allowance ten times the minimum wage, crime and corruption in Peru, poverty and police brutality in Kenya, water and electricity failures in Madagascar, and the embezzlement of $17.6 billion in the Philippines that was designated for flood relief projects. In Morocco crowds took to the streets chanting “No World Cup, health comes first,” having been galvanized by the deaths of eight women in an abysmal maternity ward in the city of Agadir at a time when the government was spending over $5 billion in preparation to co-host the World Cup in 2030.
Already, these movements have strengthened citizens’ rights and government accountability. The Atlantic Council has reported that because of such citizen pressure, six of the seven countries where these protests occurred score well above their respective regional averages in an index that measures the protection of civil and political rights. Erica Chenoweth has argued that the Gen Z protests, which are mostly leaderless and decentralized, could be an antidote to global democratic backsliding if they develop the capacity to channel their momentum and influence into formal institutional politics.
A different arena of contestation pits Russia, Iran, and China—the world’s three leading autocracies—against three smaller countries whose existence they threaten: respectively, Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. Jaroslav Kuisz and Karolina Wigura have written that the preservation of the sovereignty of each of these smaller countries is “a matter of global significance.” If that sovereignty collapses or is significantly eroded in any of these three countries, they note, it would have profound implications, not just for international law, alliance credibility, and what is left of the post-1945 liberal international order, but for the security of Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific—and therefore for the United States as well.
For obvious reasons, democracy is not the paramount issue for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan—sovereignty is. Still, it is important to note the extraordinary political impact that the wars being fought by Israel and Ukraine have already had. Israel did not retaliate against the October 7 attack by Hamas and go to war against Hezbollah and Iran for the purpose of creating conditions for political change in neighboring countries. But a by-product of the fighting, Robert Lerman has argued, has been the creation of “the space necessary for the transformation of the region.” Its severe weakening of both Hezbollah and Iran contributed significantly to the fall of the murderous Assad regime in Syria following a devastating civil war in which 580,000 people were killed. The long process of recovery in Syria has now begun under a new government that has been able to unlock over $28 billion of investment and international reconstruction aid, in addition to encouraging the return of millions of refugees, beginning the difficult process of building a stable and ethnically integrated country, and becoming part of a new coalition to stabilize the region.
In Lebanon, Israel’s degradation of Hezbollah’s leadership and military capability ended a political deadlock that made possible the election of a new government committed to restoring state authority, disarming Hezbollah (which retains significant influence), and making reforms needed to attract aid and investment to rebuild the country. Not least, the dramatic blows that Israel delivered against Iran starting in October 2024 weakened the Islamic Republic’s military capability and political legitimacy, setting the stage for the current joint attack by Israel and the United States. While the outcome still remains uncertain, Saudi pressure on Trump to stay the course against the Islamic Republic could lead to the epochal fall of an odious regime that murdered tens of thousands of protesters in January and poses a grave threat to regional stability.
Putin’s rule in Russia has also become more precarious as a result of his disastrous aggression in Ukraine. Stephen Kotkin has argued that the survival of authoritarian regimes is always uncertain because they suffer from a “debilitating incapacity” stemming from overreach and corruption. Putin has emphatically demonstrated that incapacity. The so-called special military operation that was supposed to have conquered Ukraine in weeks if not days has now entered its fifth year due to the entirely unanticipated Ukrainian resistance. As documented in a new report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains” in Ukraine, and popular support for the war has significantly declined. Russia’s economy is suffering from unsustainable war spending, major labor shortages, growing inflation, and a shrinking sovereign wealth fund that has been cut by more than half to cover budget deficits and war costs. Alexandra Prokopenko writes in The Economist that “Russia’s economy has entered the death zone.” It’s also extraordinary that 325,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in the four years of war, a number that exceeds by nearly 22 times the losses suffered by the Soviet Union in its decade of war in Afghanistan. As Putin well knows, it was Moscow’s debilitating failure in Afghanistan that precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union, which he called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the last century. The consequences of Russia’s even more costly failure in Ukraine will inevitably affect the stability and legitimacy of Putin’s regime.
The Xi regime in China has not yet acted on its threat to attack Taiwan, but it, too, has grave vulnerabilities. Its core weakness is economic stagnation, which constitutes a serious threat to the stability of the regime. This danger was foreseen by the late Communist Party general secretary Hu Yaobang, who was removed from power in 1987 for warning that unless the country’s economic modernization was accompanied by reform and democracy, it would lead to political convulsions. Ironically, it was the outpouring of public mourning for Hu following his death in 1989 that morphed into the freedom protests that erupted in Beijing and 400 other cities across China. Those protests were crushed, but the aspiration in China for a more open society endures, along with the regime’s resistance to reform and opening.
Conditions in China today are far more volatile than they appear, and another political convulsion like Tiananmen Square is not unthinkable. The current economic slowdown has been accompanied by a surge of strikes by workers protesting against unpaid wages, excessive and uncompensated overtime, and poor working conditions. The underground house church movement has also surged to over 100 million Christian believers who are resisting the communist dictatorship’s interference in their worship. In addition, political resistance erupted in 2022 against the draconian zero-COVID lockdown in the form of the White Paper Protests, the most significant revolt since Tiananmen Square. The uprising occurred just a month after a dissident named Peng Lifa, later called the “Bridge Man,” hung banners from a busy overpass in Beijing with slogans reading “We don’t want lockdowns, we want freedom,” “We don’t want lies, we want dignity,” and “We don’t want to be slaves, we want to be citizens.” He was immediately arrested, but his demonstration set off solidarity rallies in 31 Chinese cities and at over 350 universities around the world, and the subsequent White Paper Protests broke out in over 50 cities across China, forcing the regime to call off its zero-COVID policy.
That wasn’t all. When people trying to break the regime’s tight censorship sent videos of the demonstrations to an overseas Twitter account named “Teacher Li Is Not Your Teacher,” the account’s manager, a Chinese art student in Italy named Li Yeng, posted the videos for the whole world to see, including tech savvy people in China using VPNs. The number of his followers quickly jumped to 1.6 million, and he became what Yaqiu Wang of Freedom House called “the aggregator” of independent and often politically sensitive information, something that is “very scary to the authorities … he has a kind of power that nobody else has had in the past.” According to the organization Human Rights in China, initiatives linked to Li now advance public-interest projects on worker exploitation, youth unemployment, and freedom of expression. It believes that digital activism in China is now capable of “challenging the #CCP’s Panopticon.”
This brief survey of some of the battles that are taking place today to expand rights, fight corrupt and unaccountable governments, and resist the aggression and arbitrary power of the world’s leading autocracies, shows that there are significant opportunities to make democratic gains despite the sustained reverse wave. In addition to promoting such openings, pro-democracy governments and nongovernmental groups need to respond to the increased strategic collaboration of the world’s leading autocracies.
Carl Gershman retired in 2021 after 37 years as the founding president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), where he oversaw the NED’s grants programs in Russia, China and some 100 other countries.
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The Transportation Security Administration has one job. It is right there in the name: transportation security. Its purpose is not merely to screen bags and check IDs. It is to make a sprawling system of strangers, machines, procedures, and handoffs trustworthy enough that millions of people board planes without thinking twice.
For years, that trust has been thin. You do not need to follow GAO reports—which have raised serious concerns about the efficacy of some TSA protocols, equipment, and behavioral monitoring—to sense the problem. Travelers feel it at the checkpoint: inconsistent instructions, rituals whose connection to actual safety is far from obvious, irritated TSA agents projecting more contempt than concern for the traveling public. Airport satire works because it seems all too familiar. And it’s that experience that makes it harder for the public to see the TSA as a trust-generating institution devoted to the job of transportation security.
That is what made border czar Tom Homan’s recent comments about ICE’s deployment to American airports so revealing. “I don’t see an ICE agent looking at an X-ray machine, because we’re not trained in that,” he said. The problem was not merely that officials contradicted one another about what ICE would do. In a space where trust was already thin, confusion about who is trained for the core job is itself corrosive. It tells travelers that the government is improvising around a role that ought to be clear, disciplined, and fit for purpose.
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The scramble to send ICE to America’s airports began on February 14, when members of Congress clashed over funding for immigration enforcement in the wake of Operation Metro Surge in Minneapolis. That deadlock led to a partial shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security, including the TSA. Because TSA screening is considered essential, TSA officers have had to stay on the job without pay, even as the shutdown drags on.
Across the country, more than 450 TSA officers have quit, while daily callout rates have risen from about 4% before the shutdown to 11%. And as spring break travel surged, passengers waited in hours-long lines, missed flights, and saw firsthand a system visibly struggling to maintain basic levels of service.
Within a few days of deploying ICE agents at airports, the division of labor had been clarified. ICE would handle checkpoint support—guarding exits, helping manage lines, checking some IDs—not the specialized screening work of TSA officers. But the political uncertainty only escalated. Last Friday, the Senate approved a bill to restore funding for TSA and most of the DHS. Later the same day, House Republicans angrily rejected the measure because it withheld funding for ICE and immigration operations.
An executive order signed by the president may provide TSA workers relief as early as today, but uncertainty remains, bringing an even larger question to the fore: Will ICE’s airport presence fade when the TSA’s funding is restored, or has an improvised substitute already become a normalized presence at the checkpoint? That is the pattern to watch. Just yesterday, Homan suggested that ICE agents could remain at airports even after TSA workers get paid.
Crises like this invite an expedient workaround. But what happens when that workaround becomes the new normal?
Free societies depend on institutions that reduce the trust burden of dealing with strangers. The work of political economist Elinor Ostrom reminds us that institutions earn legitimacy not by projecting authority, but by aligning rules, roles, and incentives with the problem they are meant to solve. When an institution is fit for purpose, people can see it. They may not love every inconvenience it imposes, but they can tell that it is organized around solving a real shared problem. That legibility is part of what makes trust possible.
Among Ostrom’s keener insights is that many of the good things that free societies offer are co-produced. She argued, for example, that effective policing depends not only on what police do, but on whether the public perceives them as legitimate enough to cooperate, comply, and share responsibility for public order. So too with transportation security. Safe passage is not delivered to travelers by force from above. It is co-produced through a relationship in which travelers submit to security procedures because they trust that the rules, the agents, and the institution itself are oriented toward a shared end. Once that trust begins to break down, the system does not simply become more irritating. It becomes harder to sustain as a cooperative enterprise.
That is the standard by which the ICE substitution should be judged. The question is not simply whether ICE can fill a few operational gaps. It is whether an agency identified with immigration enforcement can sustain the kind of voluntary confidence and cooperation on which transportation security depends.
And the answer is: probably not. ICE is a poor substitute not only because its mission is immigration enforcement rather than transportation security, but because it carries a trust deficit of its own. In Minneapolis, it became clear that ICE’s professional posture is optimized around demonstrating state power and demanding submission, not earning the public’s trust. We remember the killings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti. We remember seeing people arrested while going to church, picking up kids at school, and showing up at appointed court hearings.
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Even if its airport role is officially limited to support functions, ICE’s presence tells travelers that the government is patching over a failure, not restoring the integrity of transportation safety. In a space where trust was already thin, that kind of improvisation erodes even further the trust upon which a successful co-production dynamic rests.
That is the deeper cost of institutional improvisation. Free societies work because people can move through complex systems without having to inspect every handoff for themselves. Regulation earns its keep when—and only when—it inspires that kind of confidence in people. When government answers a failure of transportation security with a poorly-suited substitute, it does more than create confusion at the checkpoint. It teaches the public that the institution is no longer secure in its own purpose. And once that confidence starts to erode, the freedom to move about the world feels less and less secure.
Emily Chamlee-Wright is the president and CEO of the Institute for Humane Studies.
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Tomorrow, Tuesday, at 6pm Eastern, I am giving a webinar on the impact that artificial intelligence will have on democracy and public life at Johns Hopkins University. It is mostly meant for alumni of the university, but I was able to secure an invitation for readers of Persuasion. If you want to tune in, please register at this link.
(Photo by J. David Ake/Getty Images.)The universe of publications that share an ideological affinity with Persuasion has just become smaller. A few months after I founded this magazine, John Halpin, Ruy Teixeira, Peter Juul, and Brian Katulis started The Liberal Patriot. All four had been prominent staffers of the Center for American Progress, the biggest left-of-center think tank in the United States. All four had come to chafe at the increasingly rigid ideological strictures put upon them by their colleagues. And all four recognized that Democrats would run the danger of losing to Donald Trump—as, disastrously, they did in 2024—if they were not able to moderate their positions and overcome the party’s tendency for groupthink.
There are important differences between Persuasion and The Liberal Patriot. We are advocates of a set of liberal principles, for which we fight without fear or favor: an open society, not a closed one; free speech, not censorship; liberty, not coercion. While the founders of The Liberal Patriot agree with us on all of these points, they viewed themselves more as the loyal opposition within the Democratic Party, their mission explicitly framed as helping the party win elections. We concentrate on big ideas and longer-form essays, often with a philosophical bent; they largely focused on questions of public policy and electoral strategy.
But for all of those differences, there was never any question in my mind that we were kindred spirits, and some of their leading voices made frequent guest appearances in our pages.
This makes it feel a little personal to learn about the struggles The Liberal Patriot has faced in maintaining its financial viability and its intellectual independence. As John Halpin revealed in a note on Substack, some of their donors made explicit ideological demands: “In TLP’s first year as a formal organization, I was given an ultimatum by a donor not to write about climate policy and politics anymore, and not to publish anyone else on the subject as well, b/c they didn’t like our criticisms of Democratic orthodoxy and strategic failures on the issue.” When he refused, his funding was pulled.
An even broader problem was the difficulty of attracting funders in the first place. American foundations spend enormous sums of money on promoting causes like democracy and civil discourse every year. But while they are willing to throw large sums of money at conferences and convenings, at grassroots organizations and voter registration drives, they are reluctant to fund the magazines that can actually get much-needed new ideas into broad circulation. And when they do fund such magazines, they nearly always want them to be firmly aligned with the worldview which prevails in one or another of America’s two major political parties.
At Persuasion, we have been somewhat luckier. I am deeply grateful that our donors have never put similar ideological blinders on us. (If they did, I would of course respond in much the way John did—by telling them to take a hike—even if it might eventually herald the end of this magazine.) We have always budgeted conservatively, and all of the content we bring to you each week is produced by a remarkably small team. So don’t worry: We are in no imminent danger of demise.
But the sorry fate of The Liberal Patriot has nevertheless taught me an important lesson. The only way for a non-profit magazine to stay strong and independent in the long run is to build up a circle of strong supporters who are willing to put their money where their values are. And that is why we will, over the course of the next months, start a campaign to raise a substantial portion of our budget from you, our most loyal readers.
This will involve asking more of you to become paying subscribers; it will also involve an appeal to those of you who can afford to do so to become Patrons of Persuasion, pledging a more significant contribution to help us survive—and thrive—over the long term.
I will write to you with more details about this campaign in the coming months. But today, I am asking those of you who don’t want Persuasion to suffer the same fate as The Liberal Patriot for two favors:
First, if you are interested in becoming a Patron of Persuasion, please register your interest here.
Second, if you are able to make a one-time donation, please follow this link or write to our Director of Operations at [email protected]. (We are a registered 501(c)(3) non-profit, and all donations are tax-deductible.)
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Thank you so much for your loyalty and your support. It means the world.
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P.S: Ruy Teixeira has kindly agreed to come on The Good Fight to discuss why The Liberal Patriot is closing its doors, and what the Democratic Party needs to do to win back the trust of the American people; watch out for the episode tomorrow.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
The most important fact in Iran right now is not what the regime says about Mojtaba Khamenei’s health; it is what the regime has not revealed. After the February 28 attack that killed Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic appointed his second son, Mojtaba, as the third supreme leader on March 8.
However, since the war began, Mojtaba has neither appeared in public nor delivered a televised speech. He has not released even a recorded audio message to the Iranian people. Even his first remarks as supreme leader were read by a television presenter. Although Iranian officials claim that Mojtaba is well and directing the war, many, including President Donald Trump, believe he is injured, and some think he may be in a coma.
That leaves one basic question at the center of Iranian politics today: If Mojtaba is wounded, incapacitated, or even in a coma, who is making the decisions? Who wrote his first message?
The Islamic Republic is not in a normal succession moment. It is in the middle of war, leadership decapitation, and an unprecedented crisis of command. In such a situation, the person with the title does not automatically assume power. Instead, power goes to the people who can communicate, coordinate, survive, and remain hidden. Mojtaba may have been elevated to preserve continuity after his father’s death, but continuity on paper is not the same as control in practice. If the new supreme leader cannot speak to the public, cannot appear before elites, and cannot reassure the system through his physical presence, then his position becomes vulnerable to capture by those operating around him.
Some may say the answer must lie with the visible civilian and semi-civilian leadership, figures such as President Masoud Pezeshkian or Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei, who are still alive. After all, these are the men the public see. Pezeshkian and Ejei appeared recently at a Quds Day rally in Tehran, and have been the public faces of the state since Ali Khamenei’s death.
But that visibility is exactly why they are unlikely to be the real wartime decision-makers. If Israel or the United States can locate targets through public appearances, speeches, and open movement, the men standing before cameras are not the safest to manage sensitive military and security decisions.
Public figures have political value: They can signal continuity, calm internal audiences, and provide a formal face for the state. But in wartime Iran, the people likely making the hardest decisions are those who are not visible.
The real center of gravity is probably elsewhere, inside the hidden security apparatus around Mojtaba and, more importantly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The answer lies in the regime’s structure of power, which Mojtaba helped to build and shape. As the second most important man in his father’s office, the Bayt, he was aware of the underground tunnels, secure networks, and institutions through which the regime exercised power, formally and informally.
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The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, established in 1979 as the clerical regime’s bodyguards, has since the 1990s become the most important organization in the Islamic Republic. Ali Khamenei repeatedly treated the Guard as the central pillar of the regime’s survival. The organization strongly pushed for Mojtaba’s elevation and has tightened its grip over wartime decision-making despite major losses in its command structure. Even if Mojtaba is alive, the structure around him is likely already moving toward direct Guard control.
If that reading is correct, the people who matter most are not the politicians seen in public, but the less-visible security actors who have remained in the shadows since the war began. This includes Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker who has a long Revolutionary Guard background; Ahmad Vahidi, the new Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander; Hossein Nejat, commander of the Guard’s security command; and Majid Khademi, the head of the Guard’s intelligence organization. Not all their roles can be confirmed directly in real time, especially when wartime reporting is incomplete, but the pattern is clear. The men with the guns, secure communications, and underground networks will make decisions in Mojtaba’s name if he cannot.
That would mean the Islamic Republic has moved one step further in its long transformation from clerical authoritarianism to security guardianship. Mojtaba’s succession was a sign that the system no longer cared much about public legitimacy, clerical stature, or even revolutionary symbolism. His possible incapacity would push the same process even further, effectively reducing the supreme leader from a decision-maker to a figurehead. The title would remain clerical, but the rule would become more military- and security-based.
All of this helps to explain why the regime’s behavior has become so rigid and escalatory. A hidden chain of command dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is far less likely to compromise, de-escalate, or test a diplomatic opening. The men around Mojtaba are not pragmatists; they are hardliners shaped by intelligence work, internal repression, missile doctrine, and survivalist thinking. They do not see war as a reason for moderation, but as proof that only coercion, ideological discipline, and regional escalation can save the system.
In authoritarian systems, silence is never neutral. Iran’s silence strongly suggests that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ security commanders are already making the most important decisions and Mojtaba’s rise means something darker than dynastic succession: It means the final masking of military and security rule behind a cleric’s name.
Saeid Golkar is a senior nonresident fellow on Iran Policy at the Council and the UC Foundation associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Previously, he held research and teaching positions at Stanford University and Northwestern University.
This article was originally published by the Middle East Forum.
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David Autor is the Daniel (1972) and Gail Rubinfeld Professor in the MIT Department of Economics, and codirector of the NBER Labor Studies Program and the James M. and Cathleen D. Stone Center on Inequality and Shaping the Future of Work.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and David Autor discuss whether the economic pessimism of the 2010s was justified, what lessons we failed to learn from the China trade shock, and how artificial intelligence will reshape the American job market.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I was thinking in preparation for this talk about how the broader shape of the economic conversation has changed over the course of the last 15 or 20 years. It strikes me that there was a period of deep pessimism in the 2010s. This came from Thomas Piketty’s work on rising inequality, and from Branko Milanovic’s famous “elephant curve,” which suggested that while the global very rich gained the most from globalization, the global middle class did not gain much at all. It also came from your work regarding the “China shock” and the declining middle of the American job market.
Ten or 15 years on—and all of this is before we even get to the subject of AI—it feels like there is a little bit more optimism. Piketty’s work has been critiqued quite widely. Milanovic has updated his chart, and it seems to be much more positive, showing much more broad-based gains from globalization. You also published an interesting paper a few years ago saying that, at least since the COVID-19 pandemic, less affluent American workers have actually done comparatively better than more affluent ones. Was the pessimism of the 2010s a mistake, or does some of it remain?
David Autor: I do not think it was a mistake, but it is good that there is positive news as well. Something we learned from the work I did with Gordon Hanson and David Dorn on the China trade shock was how scarring rapid labor market change can be when it involves the loss of critical sectors or career jobs.
What has been very positive since around 2015, at least in the United States, has been relatively robust wage growth in the bottom half of the wage distribution. This has been pretty pervasive; it started before the pandemic, but then it really took off. In the United States, a lot of what was going on before the pandemic was the rise of minimum wage laws across many states. We did not actually see much wage compression outside of states that did not raise their minimum wages. Starting with the pandemic, however, there was just across-the-board tightening. That has been really dramatic and positive. I think a lot of that has to do with running tight monetary policy and having demographic tightening—real labor scarcity has contributed to that.
Simultaneously, I think many things remain concerning, even before we get to the present era. A lot of the job growth among workers without a college degree is not in stable career jobs; much of it is in hourly service jobs that are comparatively low-paid, not very economically secure, and lack high lifetime returns on specialized skills. Growing income concentration has been with us this entire time.
The China trade shock, in the form that David, Gordon, and I studied, was a very concentrated period that ran its course in its own way. However, the competition from China is now actually much more significant. It is not just about jobs making commodity products, but competition in the core leadership sectors of technology that have both civilian and military applications. This will affect the prosperity of the United States, Western countries, and democracies very broadly.
Mounk: Let us hit a couple of those points. First, we were talking about how scarring the China shock was. There are two elements here. One is that economists say there are gains from free trade and, of course, winners and losers. They argue this is fine because, since there is an aggregate gain, you can redistribute some of those gains from the winners to the losers. In practice, of course, redistributing those gains is very hard and tends not to happen.
The second point is that even if the losers might be made whole in some material sense—even if we found mechanisms where a worker with a union job in a car factory who is now unemployed is given enough money to avoid an income shortfall, which seems unlikely—there is probably a psychic scar. There is a sense of no longer being necessary that remains.
To what extent do you think those were genuine policy mistakes which explained the China shock and made it as bad as it was, with all the political consequences that followed, and to what extent was it inevitable? To what extent was it good and necessary to get China into the global economy? Would forms of automation perhaps have taken some of those jobs if the China shock had not happened? With the benefit of hindsight, were real mistakes made there, or were some of those disruptions inevitable?
Autor: First, let me address your point about the nature of the losses. You are completely right to distinguish between pecuniary losses—lower income—and broader psychic scars about identity, status, and purpose.
Both of those are first-order issues. Many people losing manufacturing jobs were in areas exposed to the China trade shock. Just so your listeners are aware, the China trade shock largely accompanied China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and led to a huge contraction of U.S. manufacturing. About 4 million jobs were lost in the course of seven years. Not all of that was due to the China trade shock, but an important part of it was.
That is not a huge number of jobs on the scale of an economy of 155 or 160 million workers, but it was very geographically concentrated in certain industries and places. The people who lost work could not just go to other manufacturing work; it simply did not exist. Either they hung on, left the labor force, or joined typically much lower-paid service employment. While the pecuniary losses were significant, there is also the issue of identity. These workers usually did not have high levels of education or broadly portable skills. Recent work by my colleague Amy Finkelstein finds that manufacturing job loss during the China trade shock and NAFTA was associated with higher excess mortality among non-elderly men. That was not true for non-manufacturing job loss. These were high-wage jobs for non-college men with steady hours and long-term prospects. They were the anchor of a certain family structure, and nothing comparable was available. I do not mean to sound nostalgic; the data supports this.
Economists like to invoke the “second welfare theorem,” which says you first expand the pie and then divide it. It assumes you can just compensate people with money. I do not think that is true. You cannot give someone back their injured self-esteem by writing them a check. People do not love the notion of being compensated for losses; they would strongly prefer unions, minimum wages, and things that make their jobs pay well—not a consolation prize for what they lost.
Regarding your second question: was this inevitable and was it necessary? Inevitably, U.S. manufacturing employment in labor-intensive sectors would have declined eventually. These were legacy activities that would have faded over a couple of decades. However, they would not have cratered in the time period they did. In labor markets, it is not just how much change you want, but how fast you want to get there. The market has a natural ebb and flow; you can accommodate a 10 percentage point change over 10 years, but if it happens overnight, it is much more challenging.
Even if we accept the idea that we had to do this, we could have done it at a more gradual rate. The merchandise deficit as a share of GDP was enormous at that time, meaning manufacturing had to decline very rapidly. The labor market was simply not geared to change that quickly. We bungled it by not slowing it down or regulating China’s currency manipulation. We could have also had better compensatory policies; Trade Adjustment Assistance was very limited and directed toward training. We now know that wage insurance policies are more effective, but the belief at the time was that there was nothing to worry about.
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Finally, was it necessary? That is a much harder political calculation. It was difficult to foresee how things would turn out. It was reasonable to say that China was a rising power and the world’s most populous country, and we should help it open up. The fact that it became more autocratic and less tolerant of democratic norms was not something we could have easily forecast. If we had prevented China from joining the WTO, we might now be saying, if only we had let them in, they would not have turned into an adversary. While it is hard to blame people for not knowing the future, I believe that—conditional on the decision—we bungled the policy badly.
Mounk: Excellent answer to all four of my explicit and implicit questions. I am going to try and be more disciplined in the questions I ask you going forward. To pick up on one of the strands of our conversation: do you think that we have learned from the mistakes of the China shock in such a way that if we suddenly faced, completely hypothetically, a bunch of jobs disappearing because of a technological shock, we would be much smarter at thinking about how to minimize the social and downstream political costs?
Or do you think that it is just incredibly hard to do that, even with the lessons we might take from that shock? This might be in part because of questions of rational choice, where the people who have just lost their jobs are not necessarily the people who can best advocate for their own interests. It may also be because it requires significant redistribution, which is always hard to do, and because of all kinds of other structural obstacles that stand in the way of implementing even the smart lessons we may have drawn from those bad decisions.
Autor: I can give you a simple answer to the question: have we learned anything? The answer is no. Our political system has learned nothing. In fact, to the degree it has learned anything, it has learned the wrong lessons. Again, I speak of the United States in particular. The United States has eliminated the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program—the only thing we ever had in place to help people displaced by trade. It is no longer funded by Congress. That is a mind-blowing fact.
The only lessons we seem to have taken about trade policy are that we should across the board harm our neighbors and our adversaries simultaneously, and protect sectors that do not need protecting while failing to invest strategically in those that do. It is crazy to think we should be making tube socks or assembling iPhones in the United States; there is never going to be high-paid work in that, and we are just taxing ourselves by doing it.
On the other hand, we should be thinking very strategically about sectors like semiconductors, fusion, artificial intelligence, drones, electric vehicles, power generation, and robotics. Yet the United States is not doing that. Moreover, we are not big enough to contend with China on all those fronts alone. We used to have allies in Canada and in Europe. Collectively, we were an incredibly large economic strategic bloc, and yet we have fractured those relations.
Like so many things in the Trump era, it is exactly the right question followed by a terrible answer. I do not want to say no one has learned anything; I think both our political process and the economics profession have done some rethinking and concluded that we should not be so laissez-faire on trade. I agree that is the “hit me over the head with a sledgehammer” lesson. But in terms of what to do about it, I think our responses have been counterproductive, unwise, short-sighted, and harmful in the long run—both to the United States and to our allies.
Mounk: Obviously, a lot of the economic discussion now is about the effect that artificial intelligence is going to have, and you have written very interestingly about that. I want to get to that in a moment. But before we do, how would you characterize the pre-AI state of the American economy and the American job market more specifically? I do not know whether you want to address that by looking at what it looked like the day ChatGPT-3.5 was released, or what it looks like today.
Autor: I would say that from 2015 through the spring of 2020, the U.S. labor market was actually in great shape. Wage growth was robust, and productivity growth was pretty strong. There was a significant reduction in inequality among “normal mortal” earners—those between the 10th and 90th percentile. At the very top, things were still growing explosively, which one can have mixed feelings about, but in terms of the people I am most deeply concerned about—those without college degrees earning at or below the median—things were looking very good.
The U.S. labor market was in great condition. If you want to put it this way, the Trump labor market was a great labor market, especially for blue-collar workers. This provided a substantial basis of support for Trump. If you ask why so many Hispanic and Black voters supported him in 2020 and even more so in 2024, it is partly because things were going very well for American workers outside the elite.
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I do not think most Americans appreciate that only two countries have had economic miracles over the last 20 years: the United States and China. The notion of “American carnage” is misguided; productivity growth has been robust, unemployment has been low, and wage growth has been relatively strong. I do not mean to imply it was a utopia—there are many things to be unhappy about—but it was overall going very well.
Then, of course, we had the COVID-19 pandemic, which was a huge setback. However, the U.S. economy recovered more rapidly than almost any other country. We did have significant inflation, which was partly due to COVID and partly because the Biden administration overstimulated the economy. But that was coming down even before 2024, and we managed to land it without a recession, which is remarkable. One could call this the “immaculate recovery”—to recover from that type of inflation without a recession is almost without precedent.
We were already coming back into pretty good shape in 2024 and 2025 when Trump took office. Since then, we have been awash in incredible uncertainty regarding tariff policies and shifting energy sectors—whether oil, gas, solar, or coal. We are facing multiple wars of choice and the political persecution of our leading technology companies, universities, and elected officials.
I am not an expert in this specific area, but Nick Bloom has done a lot of work on the cost of uncertainty itself. How do you invest when you do not know what prices or tariffs will be, or whom you will be at war with? The U.S. economy and labor market have been remarkably robust in the face of all that, but job growth has slowed enormously. In fact, the jobs report from last month was quite negative. While those numbers fluctuate, the irony is that the United States did not recognize how good it had it. In responding to that misperception, it implemented policies that arguably made things much worse.
Mounk: It is striking that there was that gap between the data and the perception. One thing I am really struck by is that China, and to a lesser degree India and other populous nations, have had phenomenal economic growth over the last few decades. While that is obviously easier to do when you are coming from behind, it is a phenomenal success story.
Autor: China’s growth over the last four decades is miraculous, and not just for China. It is the creation of a global middle class for the first time. China’s growth has created prosperity, not just in China by bringing hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but also in Central and South America and Sub-Saharan Africa. It has been the best event in world economic history for poverty reduction worldwide. It has created challenges, and I am not saying it is all upside, but the world has never seen anything like it.
Mounk: One of the impacts of that has been a significant reduction in global inequality. If you look at the global Gini coefficient, it has come down significantly because hundreds of millions of people have been lifted into the global middle class.
What is striking is that while the share of global GDP taken up by China—and to a lesser extent by India and other countries—has risen significantly, and Europe’s share has declined rapidly, the United States has actually held on. It has seen some decline in its share of global GDP, but given the background of that incredible economic miracle in China and significant progress in nations like India, it is astonishing how little America’s share has declined.
Yet people still feel very unsettled, negative, and pessimistic. What explains that disjunction? Is it just that once a nation becomes very affluent, it becomes much harder to generate growth that translates into a tangible improvement in life prospects? Is this a “disease of affluence” we will have forever? Does it have to do with political changes or a shifting technological environment? What explains that gap?
Autor: Okay, so I need to be clear: I am now just going to be giving you an uninformed opinion in the sense that I am an economist, not a sociologist or a philosopher. Why are people’s perceptions so negative given that there are so many outward indications that things are so positive?
I would say two things. One is, unfortunately, Americans are very ill-informed about where we stand relative to others. If they are told that America used to be great and is no longer great, that we are being taken advantage of by everyone else, that we are the laughing stock of the world, and that we have given up all our power, they begin to believe that things are very bad.
The other thing, which I think has more foundation, is that there is a ton of economic insecurity in the United States. I do not think this was true in the first three post-war decades—a period of really rapid economic growth combined with very robust, even growth for people at all education levels. That era saw rising living standards for everyone.
Today, the average in the United States is not very informative because very few people are near the average; the outcomes are so dispersed. I think many people—the majority of Americans who do not have four-year college degrees—felt that their horizons were shorter than they were 40 years ago. They do not see a secure pathway into the middle class, and it is not obvious that their children will do better than they did.
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That is real. You could say the United States created a lot of wealth on average but did not distribute it very evenly. Some would argue that is how it got so wealthy—by not “squandering” it on redistribution or the welfare state. I do not personally believe that, though I could not refute it immediately. I think the United States could have used its prosperity differently to create more economic security, which would have resulted in less dissatisfaction.
In terms of the China trade shock, it certainly was not negative for everyone; it lowered many prices and may have been positive in the aggregate for the United States. However, the distributional consequences were so adverse that they made it very scarring. It would have been possible to use some of those resources more effectively; even if you cannot make people entirely whole, you certainly could have made them better off than they were without that assistance.
Mounk: I feel like we’ve been working up to the topic, and now I want to grab the bull by the horns. What kind of technology is artificial intelligence? When we think about artificial intelligence in the context of other historic technologies that have had a major economic impact, what do you think is the right comparator? What level of change and disruption are we talking about?
Autor: Well, let me try to describe what makes artificial intelligence distinct from other technologies. Prior to the computer, we were in eras of mechanization where we had better tools that could do amazing things like facilitate chemical reactions or pull plows. The computer was the first commercial symbolic processing tool—something that could take information, stored symbols, and instructions, and then act upon, process, and analyze that information. We never really had any tools for that other than our own minds, pens, and paper.
That gave us enormous power to take repetitive, complicated, and difficult tasks—everything from calculating space trajectories to playing chess—write them down as code, and have increasingly inexpensive machines do them with perfect accuracy and incredible speed. That was an amazing breakthrough.
From the 1980s to 2020, we were in this era of computerized automation. That was very displacing for people who did work that was often relatively expert but followed well-understood rules and procedures. It was very complementary to professionals who could take time-consuming parts of their work—retrieving information, looking things up, or calculating—and make those tasks incredibly efficient so they could focus on what they were really good at: making expert decisions. It was not especially helpful for blue-collar work, where it wasn’t very applicable.
However, for everything we computerized, we had to understand the rules of how to do it. We had to understand it formally so we could write down the procedure for a non-sentient, non-improvisational machine to follow. That turns out to be a huge limitation because, as the philosopher Michael Polanyi said, “We know more than we can tell.” There are many things we do without knowing exactly how we do them.
We don’t know the “code” to write a funny joke, make a persuasive argument, develop a hypothesis, or ride a bicycle. These are all things people do based on tacit understanding learned inductively. We never write down the rules.
AI overcomes that “Polanyi paradox” because it can learn things without us telling it. It can know more than it can tell us because it learns inductively from examples and data. It can learn from unstructured information and solve problems we don’t know how to solve. It can perform tasks we would think of as creative if done by another person. This moves technology into a whole new domain of cognitive and physical activity that machines simply couldn’t enter before.
It is qualitatively different from traditional computing. To use an analogy: if traditional computing is like an orchestral musician reading notes exactly in sync, AI is much more like a jazz musician who can solo, improvise, and extrapolate. That is incredibly powerful, and we are only beginning to figure out how to use it well.
One thing AI is not, however, is simply a better, cheaper, or faster version of something else. In many ways, AI is not as good at many tasks as traditional computing. You probably saw the story in the New York Times about not using AI to do your taxes; it’s not reliable. No one ever said, I wouldn’t use Excel for that problem, it might hallucinate. That was never a concern with traditional software.
Mounk: That is really fascinating. It makes me wonder about the terms in which we should think about the economic impact artificial intelligence is going to have. For good reasons, social scientists like to look to the past for guidance about what might be around the next historical corner, while being very careful about making projections. When a new technology arises, the natural thing to do is to look at what happened when other major technologies emerged. That may be an imperfect way of reasoning through the problem, but it is the best we have.
In the past, we have typically seen a phenomenon that economists call “job reinstatement.” This is where a machine or some form of automation takes away a bunch of jobs that can now be done more efficiently, but new roles are created in their wake. As we discussed, this can be deeply disruptive to the people directly affected; they may be too old or too set in a particular range of skills—or a way of life, like that of farmers or peasants—to really accommodate these new jobs. This can have deeply disruptive consequences. Yet, the children and the children’s children simply adjust to this new world and learn the skills necessary for new tasks, many of which might not have existed beforehand. Therefore, over time, we have not seen the phenomenon of mass-scale job loss.
One of the background conditions for that was what I call a “mental reservoir”—a reservoir of tasks that machines could not perform. First, this was because there was no way of automating cognitive tasks. Later, even when we could automate some cognitive tasks, we could only automate those that followed the steps of an algorithm in the way a computer can.
Now, for the first time, we have a machine that potentially rivals us in carrying out all of those cognitive tasks—as it does to some extent today, and likely will to a much larger extent in ten, five, or even one year. Is that going to make this metaphor of job reinstatement obsolete? Or do you think that is a timeless mechanism which will persist even as this new machine penetrates deeply into an area of human skill that, until now, only members of our species were able to carry out?
Autor: First, let me say that although we have been through multiple technological eras, not all the transitions are smooth or painless. The first Industrial Revolution was an era where valuable artisanal skills were wiped out. People who did textiles and weaving saw their expertise become valueless; they were replaced by indentured children and unmarried women working in what William Blake called the “dark satanic mills.” It took decades before new work began to appear that actually utilized the numeracy and literacy of the next generation of workers. There is no guarantee that it ever goes smoothly. Usually, even in the best case, there are winners and losers, much like the China trade shock where some expertise is devalued while new expertise is reinstated.
We have seen a lot of this over the last four decades. Computerization has been decidedly non-neutral for the welfare of different skill groups. It has been great for educated adults, but, on average, it has not been good for people without college degrees. It hollowed out the middle of higher-paying jobs in production, clerical work, and administrative support, and moved many people into services: food service, cleaning, security, transportation, and home healthcare. Although those services are socially valuable, that work is relatively inexpert. Most people can do it without much training or certification, meaning it won’t pay well because there is no scarcity of labor.
AI changes the game again, and there are two things we want to think about simultaneously. One is how this changes human comparative advantage. What will the machine make too cheap to meter? You wouldn’t want to do those tasks anymore because you can’t compete with a machine that does them instantly at almost zero cost. The second question is: what will it make more valuable because humans are really needed to do those remaining tasks?
We don’t have a very good answer to that yet. For now, we can say there is plenty of physical, hands-on work that will require labor for decades, even if we make tons of progress in robotics. I am very confident that there will be many people working as doctors in medicine, in education, and in the trades. In many settings, humans will continue to provide an intermediary layer between formal bodies of expertise and other people. We will look to other people to guide us in decision-making in every high-stakes domain.
That may mean there will be fewer people who are more expert, or in other cases, many more people who are less expert. Technology can be very bifurcating. Take ride-hailing services like Uber and Lyft. That really changed the occupation of taxi and chauffeur drivers, not just because it allowed more people to do it, but because being a taxi driver had two components: driving the car and knowing the routes. Ride-hailing meant you no longer needed to know the routes; you could drive in a city you had never visited immediately. That reduced the expertise requirements, simplified the work, and allowed many more people to do it. It simultaneously created new opportunities and unwelcome competition for incumbents.
In other cases, technology eliminates the simple part of the work and leaves the expert components remaining. Many people would say that in their professions, the part they actually have to do is much harder because the grunt work is done for you; you have to focus on diagnostic skills, software architecture, or solving hard problems in contracting.
We have to ask: where will we re-specialize? Which expert tasks will be de-skilled, and where will human expertise become more valuable because it is the central piece remaining to put everything together? That is a very hard question. It is not sufficient to say something is “exposed” to AI, with the implication being that it is at risk of shriveling up and dying. Exposure could mean it gets simpler and more people do it at lower pay, or it could mean it becomes more specialized because the technology does the easy part and the people who remain perform more abstract, increasingly demanding tasks.
We have seen this happen before. Accounting has gone from bookkeeping to planning and forecasting. In the professions, computers have taken away a lot of the simple work and made us focus on the high end. That is very hard to forecast.
There is a second component to this: will there simply be less work for people to do? I don’t want to be a Pollyanna and say that can’t happen. Wassily Leontief famously said that humans are like horses; they will soon be put out to pasture. Why aren’t horses being used anymore? They are just as productive as they ever were, but they cannot compete with an internal combustion engine. They are fundamentally too expensive; you have to maintain them, have a stable, and have land for them to graze on. There are cases where a factor of production simply cannot be competitive. Similarly, there is no wage at which a human could compete with a computer to do a set of calculations.
The amount of calories a human would have to burn just to do those calculations couldn’t support the food consumption required compared to a microprocessor. It is possible to have circumstances where the pure cost of hiring a person would not be justified when you could get a machine to do it. It is not impossible.
One indication that this could be occurring is that the labor share of national income is falling. It has been declining for a couple of decades, dropping from above 60% by about eight percentage points in the United States. While the majority of every dollar used to go to workers and the minority to capital, it is now getting closer to parity.
That is a possibility. I do not think we are going to enter a world where labor has no value or where we have no more labor scarcity. I think that is a long way away and unlikely. On the other hand, if labor’s share of national income falls by even a substantial number—say, 20 more percentage points—that is going to be pretty seismic.
Mounk: I have a few follow-ups on this. The first is about the example of horses, which is really interesting. The primary reason, you are saying, is that keeping and maintaining a horse is just very expensive, which is why the number of horses has gone down radically.
I think there may also be a second reason. I recently visited an Amazon warehouse, which is a fascinating thing to do. One of the things that becomes clear is that there are these very efficient robots which move produce around, install them, and bring them back out to the person who wants to pick them out when they are needed. Sometimes these machines malfunction in some small way because a piece of lint gets attached to their wheels, and a human needs to come and clean that up. That is very costly because, to avoid accidents, they have a special vest which makes all the robots around stop until the human is out of that area and they can resume their operation.
There is a significant cost to that human-robot interaction. An additional reason why it may be bad to have horses in the street is that there are cars around, and horses and cars do not mix very well. The handover cost from machine to human and back may be so high that even in tasks where humans have a small comparative advantage, it may be easier to push them out of the loop for that reason entirely.
The other point I wanted to make is about judgment. You are assuming that in areas like medicine, for example, human judgment will always be required. On many benchmarks, AI bots are now very close to the judgment of humans on those decisions. They do not yet have sufficiently large context windows to take into account all of a patient’s medical history, so we probably still want high-stakes decisions to be made by doctors. Quite plausibly, machines are going to have even more powerful models within a few years, so their acuity and judgment will be even higher. We are going to continue moving toward being able to solve those kinds of external constraints by giving them larger context windows and finding smarter ways for them to understand more about the patient. We already know that humans actually tend to trust AI bots quite highly. Why are we so sure that those most high-stakes medical decisions are not going to be made by machines eventually?
The real question I want to ask you, based on your academic expertise, is that it seems to me there is a world of Silicon Valley technologists who do not really understand the constraints of the real world and who think all the jobs are going to disappear tomorrow. That is deeply naive. On the other hand, I think there is a strain in parts of economics where people are looking at studies of productivity gains from using ChatGPT-3.5 in highly constrained circumstances two years ago and projecting forward from that. I think that tends to give you far too-low estimates.
If we think that for 50 or 100 years, there is a significant decline in the demand for high-skill labor, what happens then? If the world we are entering is perhaps one where there are some jobs that are highly specialized and new, and a good number of jobs that are not very specialized for which we now need people, that is going to be a pretty bad outcome for most. There is a little bit of the lawyer who no longer has to do the grunt work and just makes the decisions, and a little bit of the ride-hail worker who actually has been de-skilled.
If there is a small caste of people who are highly skilled and make these high-stakes decisions, and then there is a big pool of not-very-differentiated labor that can do these relatively low-skilled jobs, that could be enough to radically decrease the wages of a lot of people. It could lead to pretty deep economic disruptions. You are the economist who can model this, and I am just a political scientist who is speculating.
Autor: I do think you certainly raised the point that there may be many domains where we currently think we need humans involved, but ultimately we will not. Medical diagnosis might be one of them, where the costs of error are so high and you have machines that could be trained on millions of cases. Maybe they will just be better. I think in many cases they will work collaboratively. I do not think it will be full automation for quite a while.
However, let me take your question on its premise. It is quite possible there are areas where we have labor now and we just will not want it. For a while, ATMs were complementary to bank tellers; bank teller employment actually grew. Banks began branching because they could do it at a lower cost. They built more branches and hired tellers not just as cashiers, but as salespeople to introduce you to other products like loans and investments. Now, teller employment is declining. People have decided they can just do it all online and do not need a person. Most of the people who still stand in line to see bank tellers are elderly individuals who are used to that way of doing things.
There may be a period where there is collaboration, followed eventually by encroachment. The other side of this is that if all this is happening, we are getting very wealthy all of a sudden. That means we are doing a lot of stuff very cheaply; there is a productivity side implied by this.
Why did this happen to horses so fast, while it has not happened to people so far? There are a few different reasons. One is that people are much more flexible than horses. We have a capacity to educate ourselves and do many different things. As my co-author Anna Salomons likes to say, people are not “one-trick ponies.” Two, of course, people own capital. We own the machines, whereas horses do not, so we get the fruits of those productivity benefits. The third reason is that we vote. Democracy buffers the effect and shapes how these things bear out.
When you say we could all end up jobless yet with high productivity, I am reminded of what the science fiction writer Ted Chiang said. He noted that fears of AI and automation are not really fears of the technology; they are fears of capitalism. We are afraid of what the economic system will do once we have those capabilities. If people do not need to hire workers, then the fruits of that productivity will not be distributed evenly.
That is a very significant concern. The biggest concern I have about the technology, at least from the labor market perspective, is the threat it implies for democratic function. In my view, the labor market is one of our most important social institutions. It works hand-in-glove with democratic institutions because most people are considered both contributors—through their labor and taxes—and claimants, through their retirement, education, and social insurance.
If labor were suddenly devalued, most people would be claimants without being seen as contributors. The political economy of that is a nightmare. To say we will just have a few rich people, tax them, and redistribute the rest has not historically tended to work out.
I do not see this as the most likely scenario, but it is sufficiently plausible that I would not dismiss it. People are very polarized on this. There are many “doomers” and many utopians. I think we should recognize that a range of possibilities is plausible—some quite good, some quite bad. Many of them will co-occur; we will make some terrible mistakes even as we see big gains. We should be adopting policies that help us ensure a better transition if such a transition is needed.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and David discuss what a world without employment would really look like and how we can harness technology to complement jobs for humans rather than destroy them. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Time has a way of compressing history. The Hundred Years’ War was a series of three separate wars that must have felt as distinct to its contemporaries as the World Wars feel to us now. But those three wars were a long time ago, so we lump them together into one conflict. Besides, we are wise. We have seen the direction of History and know they were all fought over the unresolved question of England’s rivalry with France.
I suspect future historians will apply the same compression to the three Gulf Wars of the unipolar era. While 1991, 2003, and 2026 are distinct in many ways, they all revolve around repeated attempts by the hegemon to impose its order on a region that it appears to understand less and less each time.
Together, the three wars trace the arc of America’s unipolar moment, from its triumphant emergence in 1991 to its hubristic peak in 2003 to its current retreat. Each phase of the campaign is defined by deepening contempt for the rest of the world and increasing disconnect from its own national interest. In 1991, the United States had a reason to fight; in 2003 it manufactured one; in 2026 it didn’t bother. Maybe this time the bombing was “out of habit,” Trump explained recently, which, he added, is “not a good thing to do.”
The First Gulf War was the coronation of the new arrangement: a 34-nation coalition, UN authorization, Arab states fighting alongside NATO allies. The USSR stood by meekly, Gorbachev hoping for more loans for his tottering regime. The coalition liberated Kuwait and stopped. A miracle, the hegemon actually working within the rules it claimed to uphold. But Saddam remained in power, and the sanctions regime that followed was corrosive to American credibility. The first war’s restraint preserved the legitimacy of American primacy but also left unfinished business.
The Second Gulf War was unipolarity at its hubristic peak. The 9/11 attacks produced the Bush Doctrine, with unilateral preemption as America’s formal strategy. The hegemon would no longer just react to aggression but reshape regimes by force if necessary. Everything present in 1991 was by now degraded or absent. The coalition was thinner and there was no Security Council authorization. The casus belli of Weapons of Mass Destruction was hotly contested before the invasion and collapsed shortly after. France and Germany broke openly with Washington; Arab states were skeptical or hostile. The war dramatically expanded Iranian influence across the region, eliminating its most powerful rival and creating space for proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Iraqi militias. The second war’s chief beneficiary became the next target.
And so to the Third Gulf War. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes across Iran and killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with members of his family. The strikes came one day after Oman’s foreign minister announced a breakthrough in nuclear talks, with Iran agreeing to forgo enriched uranium stockpiles and accept full IAEA verification. Peace, the mediator said, was “within reach.” Three weeks into the war, the Strait of Hormuz is functionally closed for commercial shipping and a fifth of the world’s oil supply is offline.
Each subsequent war has stripped away another layer of hegemonic restraint, with the legal justifications thinning and the deference to allies vanishing. The role of Israel across the three campaigns traces this arc nicely. In 1991, Israel had to be actively sidelined. Saddam launched missiles at Tel Aviv to provoke an Israeli response that would break the Arab coalition, and the entire American diplomatic effort depended on keeping Israel out of the war. Bush pressured Yitzhak Shamir, Israel’s prime minister, not to retaliate and deployed Patriot batteries as consolation. Israeli involvement was the thing that had to be suppressed for the multilateral framework to hold.
By 2003, Israeli strategic interests had moved into the background of the war. The neoconservative case for remaking the Middle East overlapped heavily with Israeli strategic thinking, even though Ariel Sharon, the prime minister at the time, privately told Bush that Iran was the real threat. Israel’s role was part of the war’s intellectual scaffolding without being visible on the battlefield.
In 2026, there is no hidden scaffolding. The United States and Israel launched the war together as open co-belligerents. The evolution of Israel’s role from suppressed to implicit to explicit mirrors the pattern of increasingly unconstrained American behavior. Geopolitical alliances that were hidden in 1991 to maintain coalitional cohesion are now acknowledged openly with no concern for the impact on the coalition.
Why the erosion of concern for international standards of action? It’s clearly not just Trump, because the crucial break was 2003. Bush invented a casus belli and established the precedent that the hegemon could wage elective war. Trump is doing something even dumber but in some ways less radical by operating in the space Bush opened. So any causal story has to explain the whole arc, not just the endpoint.
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Is there something about unipolarity itself that makes restraint unsustainable over time? Is it domestic, with the political economy of primacy capturing foreign policy? Is it ideological, with the logic of liberal hegemony curdling into something more sinister? These are all interacting explanations, not competing ones. But as any realist will tell you, unipolarity is always permissive. When no peer competitor can check you, restraint becomes voluntary. The 1991 coalition wasn’t held together by American goodness but by the residual habits and institutions of bipolarity. That model reflected a world where the United States felt it needed legitimation. But once unipolarity was unquestioned, why bother?
There’s also a feedback loop specific to the Gulf at work here, with each war creating the conditions for the next. 1991 left Saddam in place and imposed a sanctions regime that created the political space for finishing the job in 2003. That war in turn destroyed Iran’s chief rival and turned the Islamic Republic into the dominant threat to U.S. interests in the region, creating the target for 2026. Each intervention produced the crisis that the next intervention was supposed to solve. It’s a common imperial problem.
The Hundred Years’ War had a winner. France reclaimed its territory and England’s continental ambitions were finished. Who wins the Gulf Wars? Not Iran certainly, but not the United States, either. Each subsequent war has decreased American influence, pushed the Gulf states closer to China, and undermined the institutions America claimed to lead.
The first war was fought to announce the new global order. The second paid tribute to that order while breaking its rules. The third disregarded it completely. Four decades of the same hegemon trying to impose its will on the same region, in a single arc from multilateral restraint to unilateral preemption to something so thoughtless it doesn’t need naming at all. Maybe it’s just habit.
Seva Gunitsky is the George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto. He writes at hegemon.substack.com.
A version of this article was originally published in Hegemon.
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A couple of years ago, when AI had come onto the market and was clearly reshaping the society, I decided that I would have nothing to do with it—I would boycott. This decision was based partly on morals and partly on practicality—I suspected that, underneath the really impressive technological breakthrough, AI was still, essentially, a one-trick pony. And now that AI has evidently gone through another revolution, vastly improving itself in recent models and opening up a whole world of coding to the public at large, it seems like I should have to re-examine my decision to boycott—which, actually, is one of the easiest decisions I’ve ever made. I am more adamant about it than ever.
I might be a lot more interested in developments with AI if I hadn’t already seen this movie. It played out across a great swath of my life in the form of social media. It featured all the same actors making all the same promises early on—and all of them following the same playbook to extract our attention, as if it were a mineable resource, and then selling that for ads, as well as whatever personal data we were unwise enough to leave unguarded on our own devices. I remember showing up on a college campus looking forward to young people connecting with each other; instead—Facebook had just come out—everybody seemed to be sealed up in their rooms carrying out a facsimile of social exchange. All this time later, has anything really improved? Every time I go into my bank account I seem to find some recurring subscription that I signed up for in the flush of tech optimism and long ago stopped using—but which still clings to my wallet like a barnacle to a ship’s hull.
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So what’s different this time around? Well, if in the previous installment of this series, the tech companies targeted social relationships, and hacked at the envy and FOMO and anxiety that animates social relationships as much as the substance itself, now they’ve made their way into a different kind of space—the deep privacy of people’s innermost lives. In the AI regime, people confess their darkest secrets to their LLM therapist, which spits back out what they want to hear—although without the legal confidentiality of actual therapy sessions, with everything forming a digital record, and with the tech companies, on a whim, sometimes posting the raw text of chats onto the open internet. People earnestly ask AI about the existence of God or the meaning of life in the way they might once have sunk down to their knees and searched the silence of their own soul. And people freely turn their most creative projects, sometimes their life’s work, over to AI under the bashful premise that they themselves are not that good at the thing they most love to do and it’s better handled by the bot.
Now that we’re a couple of years into this whole set of developments, the essentials of it—and the battle lines—are a bit more clear. It’s not really about what AI can do or what it can’t do, whether it will take all the jobs or won’t, whether it will destroy the world or not. The question is about agency—do you choose to exert agency in your own life, in the way that humans always have and were doing just fine with until, like, three years ago? Or do you prefer to turn it over to a machine, which really means turning it over to the data miners and the advertising innovators in the world’s largest tech corporations?
Maintaining an AI boycott, it has to be acknowledged, is getting progressively harder to do—and I am not always the strictest Luddite about it. I was hooked into various forms of AI before they started being called AI—Google Translate, Apple’s text predict feature, and so on. If I think I have cancer for some ridiculous reason, I now no longer need to go to all the trouble of clicking on WebMD to be told I don’t have cancer; the AI tools can do it with just a glance at the screen.
But... it’s really not so difficult either. Every so often—in a moment of weakness—I’ll download an AI app onto my phone and the process will begin all over again where I rack my brains to come up with some way in which the technology might actually benefit my life. So far, I haven’t been able to come up with anything. I like structuring and writing my own essays; I have no idea why I would outsource that to AI. The advice it gives always starts out kind of interesting—and there’s always a moment of being awed by the technology—before it reveals itself to just be gleaned from a couple of random pieces of information on the web. The actual zone of my life just seems to be in a place that AI can’t touch or help—unless I proactively turn myself over to the bot.
And meanwhile, in that time, I can feel the whole world around me doing exactly that. It’s very common to have a conversation where someone shares their great idea—only to reveal that it came from AI. Teaching (I teach journalism and public relations at an international university) has largely become a matter of trying to suss out what is AI and what isn’t—and, since AI became prevalent (and all my students use it), they have become distinctly lazier. They clearly feel that the AI is just better than they are and there’s no real point in trying.
The general impression is of the invasion of the bodysnatchers occurring all around me—if I deal with anyone, it tends to feel like they’re becoming a kind of frontman for AI-generated work but without the work itself becoming in any way obviously better.
The lecture I tend to give to my students isn’t moral at all. It’s just very practical. They may fool their teachers sometimes with AI work, but their teachers are starting to catch on—all it takes is running their work through an AI detector, or insisting on giving them paper-and-pen exams, to starkly reveal how much they’ve been relying on the technology. And they certainly won’t be able to fool their employers. If they show up in the workforce using AI for everything, their employers will of course take them at their word and simply replace their jobs with AI. If they use AI for their products, then they will be competing with rivals using exactly the same sets of AI tools and generating the exact same kinds of work—there will be no way to distinguish themselves or to get ahead.
For adults, the question is a little more existential. It isn’t so much how to adapt to the world but what kind of world you really want to build and transmit onwards. The value that AI presupposes is about optimization—about doing things really, really well. AI text is always very clean, there is never a hint of, say, a spelling mistake; it really (and it is obviously a work in progress, but AI is getting better at it all the time) can do just about any task to a high level.
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But whoever said that life is about optimization? If you simply shift your focus and presuppose that life is about enriching human experience, and finding meaning, then the value of AI almost instantly dwindles away. I’ve heard of people using AI to write their diaries—but the whole point of a diary isn’t to produce some sort of masterwork, it’s to record a particular day in the highly subjective, idiosyncratic way that lends meaning to you. A friend who works for a travel writing company told me that the boss had a meeting in which it was announced that they should “welcome in AI”—with the result that, only a few months later, virtually everyone at the company lost their jobs and the ones who stayed were basically there to check over AI-generated posts for hallucinations. But travel isn’t actually just a bundle of information—the whole point of travel is the relationship between you, the traveler, and the place visited—and the result of the travel industry’s turn to AI is that it now wouldn’t even occur to me to read one of their posts.
The assumption at the moment is that AI “is the future”—a phrase like that is the underpinning of just about any conversation on AI. I’m not sure actually. I could sort of imagine this spinning the other way, that the pace of LLM improvement slows down, that more and more of what they’re generating is obviously “slop,” and that the enthusiastic early adopters are the ones who will be caught out—who will be remembered in a few years for having downsized their workforce for the sake of a bot; or for having skipped out on their education, on a crucial period of investing in themselves, in order to generate work that turns out to be indistinguishable from the machine-generated work that everybody is producing.
But the ship really seems to be sailing on that fantasy of mine. AI has already moved into a “too big to fail” category—the economy isn’t producing much, but it is producing AI and that’s the horse that we’re collectively hitching our wagons to; the tech companies haven’t quite been able to figure out a clear use for AI, but they’ve been very good at generating stickiness—at persuading people to download the free samples of AI and to use it for one thing or another so that it already becomes unimaginable to write a student paper or to prepare a recipe without it.
AI may well push through the slight bottleneck it’s been in for the past couple of years and prevail. The dissenting voices are starting to get a little lonelier; when I make this point with people, the glazed look I get back tends to mean that my interlocutor has already turned AI into a habit. But even should AI win out in the culture wars, that actually doesn’t prove the larger point. AI isn’t actually some guaranteed future that we have to succumb to whether we like it or not. The adoption of AI rests on choices—on the individual choices of billions, and there is agency, actually, in deciding whether to use it or not, an agency that may be all the greater since we were fooled once by the tech companies’ marketing gimmicks in the high social media era of the 2010s, and should at least be wiser to the tricks they are pulling with AI in the 2020s.
At the moment, the conversation about AI is basically a lot of noise. Most of it turns on AI’s capabilities. The tendency to hallucinate and to generate confident slop were embarrassing for quite a while. The fact that it seems to be pushing past the worst hallucinatory tendencies is supposed to quiet the doubters. But the conversation about capabilities is, I am convinced, basically a distraction. The technology is already impressive and will continue to improve; that’s not in dispute. But cloning and nuclear technology are also impressive and have strict guardrails around them.
What’s at stake isn’t really technology—it’s about taking a good hard look at what our fundamental values are and questioning whether AI aligns with them. The question isn’t whether AI is a stochastic parrot or not; the question is whether you are.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.
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