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It is sometimes hard to know which pieces will attract wider interest and which won’t. For whatever reason, last week’s article did. And among the many interesting responses to it, there was one by one of my favorite writers: Michael Lind.
In the article, I argued that we are living amidst a strange “Paradox of Infinite Voices and Narrow Minds.” On the one hand, the social media revolution has vastly increased the ease of expressing our opinions, leading to a much more variegated public sphere (in ways both good and bad). On the other hand, those of us who are in some sense members of the professional class are part of a milieu in which the breadth of acceptable opinion is much more narrow than it was in the past. Part of the reason for this paradox, I argued, is a process I called the “Brooklynization of the Bourgeoisie.” The affluent, credentialed class has shifted sharply leftward over the past decades. And since they hold outsized sway over the culture as a whole, this has opened up a cultural representation gap between this milieu and the rest of the country.
Lind’s response, which I am sharing with you today, makes a strong point: that we should, really, be distinguishing between two different segments of the middle class. The first segment includes lawyers, doctors, academics, and others who have advanced to their positions by accruing formal meritocratic credentials; the German term for it is the Bildungsbürgertum (roughly: the bourgeoisie of the educated). The second segment includes business owners and prosperous artisans who have advanced to their positions by competing more directly in the free market; the German term for it is the Besitzbürgertum (roughly: the bourgeoisie of the owners). Without preempting Michael’s fire, I will just note that the way in which I used the term “bourgeoisie” in last week’s essay was primarily meant to refer to the first group, since that—perhaps to the detriment of our collective conceptual clarity—is how that term now tends to be used in the United States.
While I am at it, I should also own up to another synecdoche of which I was rightly found guilty by some thoughtful correspondents last week. When I wrote about the “Brooklynization of the Bourgeoisie,” I of course had in mind the parts of Brooklyn that are home to the Bildungsbürgertum; everything I wrote should be taken to apply to Brooklyn Heights or Park Slope but not to Brighton Beach or Sheepshead Bay; I formally apologize for unduly bringing the latter neighborhoods into disrepute.
One last note: If you have not yet added The Good Fight to your favorite podcast app, now is the time to do so. And if you are (or become!) a paying subscriber, you will have access to full versions of all recent episodes—from my conversation about the war in the Middle East with Francis Fukuyama, to my occasionally contentious interview with Ibram X. Kendi to my abortive attempt at a conversation with Klaus Schwab.
But now, without further ado, here is Michael Lind’s response to last week’s piece.
Thanks, as ever, for reading.
—Yascha
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The Two BourgeoisiesYascha Mounk’s essay “The Bourgeoisie Has Switched Sides” is as insightful as his phrase “the Brooklynization of the bourgeoisie” is memorable. His analysis could be elaborated by acknowledging that there is more than one bourgeoisie in the contemporary West.
In Germany, there has long been a distinction between the “educated middle class,” or Bildungsbürgertum, which includes lawyers, doctors, academics, clerics, and civil servants, on the one hand, and the “propertied” middle class, or Besitzbürgertum, which includes business owners and independent bankers (large and small), and prosperous, self-employed artisans, on the other.
This social division, if not the terminology, is familiar in the United States. The politics of “expert progressivism” has been based in America’s educated bourgeoisie, who since the 1900s have favored variants of would-be enlightened technocratic government as an alternative to the dreaded extremes of mob rule and plutocracy. Meanwhile, for a century, American businessmen and the politicians and pundits they have funded have denounced “meddling bureaucrats” and “long-haired professors” in pseudo-populist campaigns to delegitimize rival non-capitalist elites.
The growth of giant corporations run by managers rather than founders, and the bureaucratization of higher education and philanthropy in the United States and Europe, has greatly expanded the offices that can be filled by professionals educated and credentialed as members of the Bildungsbürgertum. These meritocratic managers can easily circulate among the bureaucracies of business, banking, government, and the nonprofit sector, and they tend to share common values instilled in them by prestigious universities.
Today’s propertied bourgeoisie is made up both of small business owners and of entrepreneurs who found companies that grow to immense size. Big and small owner-operators alike tend to share the view that their firm is their personal property. They feel attacked and insulted by government regulators, tax authorities, and workers who try to organize unions or simply demand higher wages.
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Right-wing populists on both sides of the Atlantic claim to represent “the people” against “the elites,” when in fact they merely represent the propertied bourgeoisie in its century-long battle against the managerial-professional overclass. A model for today’s anti-intellectual, anti-tax, anti-state demagogic populism can be found in postwar poujadism—the revolt of small proprietors in France in the 1950s led by Pierre Poujade. While demagogic populists like Donald Trump and Nigel Farage can win over working-class voters upset with immigration or alienated by cultural progressivism, their core constituents and donors are the petty bourgeoisie as well as super-rich tycoons who answer only to themselves, like oil men and tech-company founders, as opposed to the CEOs and other temporary, professional managers of bureaucratic corporations and megabanks with many stakeholders.
If I am right, the pattern that Mounk has described so well can be described as a clash of the two bourgeoisies. On one side, technocratic professionals in large organizations of all kinds appeal to science and reason as they define them. On the other side, small capitalists and big entrepreneurs hire demagogic politicians to represent them while posing as anti-system populists. Except in the run-up to elections when they need working-class voters, both of the two bourgeoisies tend to ignore working-class majorities in the West.
Michael Lind is a contributor to Unherd and author of “Hell to Pay: How the Suppression of Wages is Destroying America.”
We’re delighted to announce that our online BOOK CLUB is back! You can meet authors and ask questions about their work, as well as meeting other readers. Please join us on Tuesday, April 7 at 6pm ET, when our Head of Podcasts, Leonora Barclay, will interview Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum about their book Ungoverning: The Attack on the Administrative State and the Politics of Chaos. Register your interest here.
Sure you can kick, but can you implement a functioning water system? (Photo by CCTV+ via Getty.)Recently I heard a presentation by an engineer from OpenAI about the incredible transformations that will occur once we get to artificial general intelligence (AGI), or even superintelligence. He said that this will quickly solve many of the world’s problems: GDP growth rates could rise to 10, 15, even 20 percent per year, diseases will be cured, education revolutionized, and cities in the developing world will be transformed with clean drinking water for everyone.
I happen to know something about the latter issue. I’ve been teaching cases over the past decade on why South Asian cities like Hyderabad and Dhaka have struggled with providing municipal water. The reason isn’t that we don’t know what an efficient water system looks like, or lack the technology to build it. Nor is it a simple lack of resources: multilateral development institutions have been willing to fund water projects for years.
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The obstacles are different, and are entirely political, social, and cultural. Residents of these cities have the capacity to pay more for their water, but they don’t trust their governments not to waste resources on corruption or incompetent management. Businesses don’t want the disruption of pervasive infrastructure construction, and many cities host “water mafias” that buy cheap water and resell it at extortionate prices to poor people. These mafias are armed and ready to use violence against anyone challenging their monopolies. The state is too weak to control them, or to enforce the very good laws they already have on their books.
It is hard to see how even the most superintelligent AI is going to help solve these problems. And this points to a central conceit that plagues the whole AI field: a gross overestimation of the value of intelligence by itself to solve problems.
In the teaching I’ve done over the past two decades, and in the Master’s in International Policy program I direct at Stanford, I’ve helped develop a public problem-solving framework that we now teach to all our students. (Credit here also goes to my former colleague Jeremy Weinstein, who is now Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.) The framework is simple, and consists of three circles:
There is a problem that extends way beyond AI, and applies to the way we think about public problem-solving in general. The bulk of effort, and what most academic public policy programs seek to teach, centers on the first two of the three circles: Problem Identification and Solutions Development. Indeed, many programs focus on Solutions Development exclusively: they teach aspiring policy-makers how to gather data and use a battery of powerful econometric tools to analyze it. This yields a set of optimal solutions that a policy analyst can hand to his or her principal as a way forward.
What is missing from this approach is what lies in the third circle: implementation. Our budding policy analyst typically finds that after handing a brilliant options memo to the boss, nothing happens. Nothing happens because there are too many obstacles—political, social, cultural—to carry out that preferred policy, as in the municipal water example.
So let’s go back to how AI will play in this space. AGI will definitely help in the first circle: identifying stakeholders, mapping a causal space, and defining the problem. It will be of most help in the second circle: gathering data and analyzing it to come up with optimal solutions. But intelligence only gets you to the end of the second circle, and is of limited help in the third. An LLM cannot directly interact with stakeholders, message them, or come up with resources. In particular, an LLM will not be able to engage in the kind of iterative back-and-forth between policymakers and citizens that is required for effective policy implementation. It will likely face big challenges in generating the kind of trust that is necessary for policies to be accepted and adopted.
It is not just political and social obstacles that AI has difficulty dealing with; LLMs have limited ability to directly manipulate physical objects. AI interacts with the physical world primarily through robotics, but the latter is a field that has lagged considerably behind the development of LLMs. Robots have proliferated enormously over the past decades and are omnipresent in manufacturing, agriculture, and many other domains. But the vast majority of today’s robots are programmed by human beings to do a limited range of very specific tasks. The world was wowed recently by Chinese humanoid robots doing kung fu moves, but I suspect the robots didn’t teach themselves how to act this way.
Robotically-enabled LLMs do not have the ability to solve even simple physical problems that are novel or outside of their training set. My colleague Alex Stamos, a noted expert in cyber security, puts it this way: “my dog knows more physics than an LLM.” An LLM would be able to state Newton’s laws of motion, but it would not be able to direct a robot to chase a frisbee the way Alex’s dog can because that particular set of moves is not in its training set. It could be programmed to do this, but that is the product of human intelligence and not AI.
Here’s an example of AI’s current limitations. I recently had an HVAC contractor replace the furnace in my house. The contractor photographed and measured the house’s layout; he had to route the new ducts and wiring in ways specific to my house’s design. It turned out that the new furnace would not fit through the existing attic door; he had to cut a larger opening with a reciprocating saw, and then repair the doorframe after the new unit was inside. There is no robot in the world that could do what my contractor did, and it is very hard to imagine a robot acquiring such abilities anytime in the near future, with or without AGI. Robots may get there eventually, but that level of human capacity remains a distant objective.
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Many of the enthusiasts hyping AI’s capabilities think of policy problems as if they were long-standing problems in mathematics that human beings had great difficulties solving, such as the four-color map theorem or the Cap Set problem. But math problems are entirely cognitive in nature and it is not surprising that AI could make advances in that realm. The people building AI systems are themselves very smart mathematically, and tend to overvalue the importance of this kind of pure intelligence.
Policy problems are different. They require connection to the real world, whether that’s physical objects or entrenched stakeholders who don’t necessarily want changes to occur. As the economic historian Joel Mokyr has shown, earlier technological revolutions took years and decades to materialize after the initial scientific and engineering breakthroughs were made, because those abstract ideas had to be implemented on a widespread basis in real world conditions. AI may move faster on a cognitive level, but it may not be able to solve implementation problems more quickly than in previous historical periods.
This is not at all to say that AI will not be hugely transformative. But the kind of explosive, self-reinforcing AI advances that some observers predict are on the way will still have to solve implementation problems for which machines are not well suited. A ten percent annual growth rate will double GDP in seven years. Yet planet Earth will not remotely yield the materials—water, land, minerals, energy, or people—to make this come about, no matter how smart our machines get.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Ibram X. Kendi is Professor of History and the founding director of the Howard University Institute for Advanced Study, an interdisciplinary research enterprise examining global racism. His latest book is Chain of Ideas: The Origins of Our Authoritarian Age.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ibram X. Kendi discuss whether great replacement theory is the common basis for political movements from India to Argentina, the role of racist policy in different outcomes between racial groups, and how to define equity vs equality.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You have a new book out called Chain of Ideas, which covers an incredible amount of terrain, including political movements from around the world and from different time periods. As the title suggests, you argue that they are connected by one unified chain of ideas. What is that chain of ideas?
Ibram X. Kendi: Well, that chain of ideas in its totality is what’s known as great replacement theory. This theory was named in 2010, but it has been around for several decades. It’s a political theory that suggests that “globalist elites” are enabling people of color to displace the lives, livelihoods, and even electoral power of white people. So, when you hear phrases like “people of color are invading the United States or Europe,” that’s an example of great replacement theory. When you hear notions like “multiculturalism is harming the indigenous, white Christian culture,” that’s great replacement theory. When you hear attacks on defenders of abortion, or on women—particularly white women—who decide not to have children or only have a few children, suggesting they are engaging in “white genocide,” that’s also great replacement theory.
Mounk: Great replacement theory is obviously very influential around the world. There is a conspiracy theory about me in Germany because I gave an interview on a major German television channel when my book, The Great Experiment, came out. People were claiming this was proof that I was conspiring with Angela Merkel to replace the German people. I am well acquainted with the feverish imaginations of people who believe in these ideas.
As an intellectual historian, I always struggle to define the contours of ideas; I wonder where a particular set of ideas ends and a different set begins. In this book, you cover a huge range of different political movements. You include the people who actually coined the great replacement theory and who would call themselves advocates of these ideas, people who advocated for Britain to leave the European Union, and people I would describe as right-wing populists who have ideological differences between them. Why do you think it is helpful to connect them all to this particular idea? Do you recognize any significant differences among people within those political strains?
Kendi: There are tremendous differences in the way great replacement theory manifests in different national or regional contexts, because the demographic makeups, political histories, and organizations of every country are different. In Chain of Ideas, I used a definition that sought to classify great replacement theory as a racist idea. It is a political theory that powerful elites are enabling people of color to replace white people who apparently now need authoritarian protection.
I also tried to show how this theory has mutated in different geopolitical and demographic contexts. It is not just the notion that African immigrants are replacing white Germans. In a country like India, authoritarian leaders position Muslims as replacing Hindus. In a nation like Russia, the Putin administration makes the case that queer people are seeking to replace traditional Russian heterosexual Christian culture. This originally racist and anti-Semitic idea has mutated to justify new forms of Islamophobia, xenophobia, homophobia, and transphobia. It links these different ideological movements into the notion that these disadvantaged groups are not only inferior, but are literally dangerous and coming to destroy you.
Mounk: The idea in your book is that this is one unified political theory, and you trace its emergence to Renaud Camus, a particular French thinker who started on the far left before migrating to the far right. A different way of putting this might be that these are distinct political phenomena arising from a unified psychological force inherent in humans. When Hindus in India insist on majority status and try to redefine a secular nation founded by Mahatma Gandhi into a Hindu nation, they are not influenced by a French thinker from the early 2000s. They are acting within their own local political traditions.
Another way of putting this is that human beings are tribal creatures with a tendency to be generous and altruistic toward the in-group, while easily justifying cruelty and discrimination toward the out-group. What we see in these different phenomena is not one political theory that started in the south of France and spread; it is simply different manifestations of human nature. The goal of decent politics is always to manage that aspect of human nature to ensure it does not take over. Why would you disagree with that way of explaining these disparate phenomena, from Narendra Modi in India to Donald Trump in the United States to Marine Le Pen in France?
Kendi: I do not argue that Camus in particular influenced these great replacement theorists around the world. What I show is that he named a theory that was already circulating in different contexts. Indeed, it has been circulating in global political thought since the 19th century, when colonial thinkers were fearful about what would happen if there were a global decolonization movement. They started to imagine that if global white supremacy did not persist, there would be a turning of the table, and formerly colonized people in Latin America, Asia, and Africa would come and colonize Europe. Renaud Camus and others, whether influenced by him or not, have argued that the “great replacement” is what he calls counter-colonization, which directly connects to that old ideological fear.
In the book, I try to show that Camus merely named an idea that was already circulating and connecting around the world. I then show how those different ideological movements started to organize together, particularly by 2016 and 2017. As they organized, their ideas began to converge while maintaining the specificity of their own national contexts. Regarding the notion that this is natural to humans—that we are tribal creatures naturally suspicious of out-groups and protective of in-groups—I would not necessarily challenge that idea, even though I think there is no evidence that it is inherently natural. There is a tremendous amount of evidence showing that it is a sociological phenomenon, meaning we are socialized to believe it.
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I would emphasize how people come to consider what constitutes an in-group and an out-group. For example, we as human beings have been led to believe that there is something meaningful about the color of one’s skin, but not about the color of one’s clothes. How did we come to think that way? How did we come to think that there is something meaningful about particular religious characteristics, but not about the ways people eat? These may seem like ridiculous ideas, but I am trying to show that political thinkers and actors have long caused human beings to place meaning on certain human characteristics while downplaying others. They play up human differences for specific political gains, and we are seeing that in this moment.
Mounk: I agree with that idea strongly. Whether we think the tendency to draw boundaries between in-group and out-group is natural or sociologically rooted, we agree that human beings are quick to latch onto them. History shows that what defines a member of an in-group or out-group has varied over time; at different junctures of history, different markers determined group membership.
What does that mean for the identity we should construct to keep that tendency in check? My sense is that a sense of patriotism can be very healthy because it provides a common identity to people who stem from different regions, have different skin colors, or follow different religions. Emphasizing that we are both American can keep in check the tendency to organize ourselves around identity lines likely to lead to discrimination and exclusion. There is a tension between recognizing the ways different forms of identity structure society and ensuring they do not lead to persistent discrimination. However, teaching people to make that the primary prism for viewing society and the primary source of identity can create divisions between in-groups and out-groups along lines like race or religion, which are susceptible to exploitation by those we politically oppose.
How are you thinking about the implications of the malleability of these lines for whether schools should teach patriotism or how they should talk to young students about questions like race?
Kendi: I am happy you asked this question because I think there have largely been two answers to it, both of which are equally fraught. One, which I would classify in my work as a segregationist answer, is to say that in a nation like the United States, or even globally, there are separate racial groups. These are imagined to be biological, or in the case of Camus, cultural-historical constructs, but they are viewed as fundamentally separate. Therefore, every person is inherently a member of one of those groups. These thinkers typically position a hierarchy among these groups, claiming certain races are superior or inferior to explain racial disparities. They might argue, for instance, that Black people are more likely to be incarcerated because they are naturally more likely to break the law, and that those who reject this racial hierarchy are unwilling to accept common sense. I reject this position.
The second, more liberal position, rightfully rejects the idea of race as a biological construct, which geneticists have now proven. However, it then takes a step further to argue that since race does not exist biologically or scientifically, no one should identify by race. This view suggests that everyone in the United States should identify only as an American. It posits that when Black Americans identify as such, they reinforce the segregationist position that there is a separate Black race, and that if we stop identifying by race, we will undermine racism.
I also reject this second position because it does not account for cultural and historical differences. Furthermore, scholars and historians have long found that race is not the creator of racism; rather, racism is the creator of race. There is almost no way to eliminate the persistence of racism without identifying the mirage of race. From a statistical standpoint, how would we measure the spread of racial disparities or racist violence if no one identified by race? It is possible for us to identify by race while knowing it does not exist biologically, simply so we have a sense of the spread of racism. We also identify that ethnicity exists and that racialized ethnicities have developed particular cultures we should value in a multicultural society.
Great replacement theorists argue that a society of multiplicity and multiculturalism will lead to one race and culture destroying the others. The response to that is often to deny the existence of multiplicity and claim we are all one, but that erases actual multiplicity.
Mounk: I agree with that idea quite strongly. I reject the two poles you outlined, but I would argue there is a huge amount of terrain in between them. Our differences might emerge in which parts of that in-between terrain we occupy.
When you think about questions like education, one approach a teacher could take is to say that racism exists in the United States, that it has historically deeply structured how this society works, and that it continues to have real influence today. Of course, in order to understand the contemporary United States, you need to understand the existence of different racial groups, and there are good reasons to value the cultural traditions that come with different ethnicities. What is really important is that you—as a six-year-old, eight-year-old, or ten-year-old child—recognize that those things are not the most important in this classroom. We need to create a society where those things come to matter less rather than more. Therefore, we are going to instruct you together. We are going to come down very hard when kids exclude each other on the basis of ethnicity in any kind of way. We are modeling very clearly that, while we are deeply aware of those realities in society, we are trying to eliminate them from the classroom insofar as possible.
The way in which particularly the most progressive institutions in the United States have gone over the last 10 years, including some of the most elite ones, is very different. They have started to create affinity groups which are not just self-selecting. It is not just 15- or 16-year-olds deciding that they want to spend time with each other as an after-school club. They are often mandatory. They often start very young, in elementary school, sometimes in kindergarten. They take those kids at the age of six or seven and, for at least part of a week, they teach them separately. The idea here is laudatory in certain ways; it is meant to make people aware of that history of discrimination and the ways in which they can organize together.
If you agree with me that there is this tendency to form in-groups and out-groups—and actually even more so if you believe it is the society that sends that signal rather than a natural tendency—do you not worry about the way in which that actually teaches these kids? It suggests the most important thing about you is the color of your skin and your belonging in these racial groups. You are actually encouraging these school communities to organize and polarize around racial groups much more than they might under the first pedagogical approach I outlined.
Kendi: I think it’s important to emphasize that it is rare that affinity groups are mandatory, whether in colleges or even schools. Certainly many colleges and schools have created affinity groups, but this idea that they’re generally or mostly mandatory is a myth. Indeed—
Mounk: You think they shouldn’t be mandatory? Would you oppose mandatory affinity groups?
Kendi: Do I think they should be mandatory?
Mounk: Yes, would you oppose mandatory affinity groups?
Kendi: I do not think anybody should be mandated to do anything. You have Black students, for instance, who may go to a college or university having been raised in a predominantly white community, and the culture they learned with their upbringing is certainly not Black American culture. If they go to that affinity group, they are not going to feel that is their place, particularly if that affinity group is organized around Black American culture. No, I do not think it should be mandatory, because I recognize that one’s racial identity may not necessarily connect to one’s cultural practices. Many of these affinity groups are connected to cultural practices.
Alternatively, you have affinity groups oriented toward challenging a particular form of bigotry, such as anti-Black racism, and you have Black people who are reinforcing anti-Black racism. I do not think they should be mandated to join the anti-racist Black group. That Black person at that college would probably feel more at home in the white supremacist group.
The other thing I want to emphasize is that I know very few scholars and writers who study racism—who talk about the importance of Black history and of recognizing and supporting African American culture—who would say that the most meaningful aspect of a person’s being is their race. I have never said that. I have rarely come across a thinker or an activist who would say that. I think that has been incredibly overblown, and I am still looking for the people who actually say it. What people are saying, and what I have said in my work, is that as we move through life, other people look upon our racial identity as the most important thing about us and make determinations based on it. People reject that, and anti-racist thinkers push back on it.
Mounk: In some ways, it is a question of emphasis. You spoke about the college context where people have more agency. If you say it is not mandatory, it is perhaps easier for students to decline to engage in these activities. However, I have heard from many people who showed up at an orientation activity on their first day of college and were told that an affinity group is part of the programming. They felt pressure to join, even when they may have parents from different ethnic groups, and felt they must choose between the identities of their parents. While this may not be technically mandatory, if it is part of a broader welcome activity, it may be quite hard to get out of in practice.
At the college level, I agree that for the most part, people have the agency to opt out. But how do you feel about an institution like the Dalton School in New York? It is only one school, but a very influential one where much of the city’s elite goes. It states that one of the prime purposes of a progressive education is to get children to see themselves as “racial beings.” Like other private schools, it starts affinity groups when children are much younger than college age. Some of these schools have these groups for children who are seven or eight years old. Perhaps at some level these are technically voluntary, but if you are seven or eight and your teacher says, “We are now doing this activity; if you are Black, you go to this group, and if you are Latino, you go to that group,” it is very hard to have the agency to get out of it. Do you think it is helpful to have those kinds of groups for seven- or eight-year-olds, or do you think there is a risk that it might backfire?
Kendi: I wrote a book called How to Raise an Anti-Racist, which analyzed about a century’s worth of scholarship and studies on racial attitudes in children. What that book documented, and what scholars have shown, is that the overwhelming number of educators and parents in this country do not talk to five-, six-, seven-, or eight-year-old children about race, racism, or the history of particular racial groups. This is because it is imagined that the subject is one for which people are too young. It is also generally imagined that a seven-year-old child cannot think that people with dark skin are ugly.
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Studies actually show that as early as three years old, in this larger environment where teachers, daycare workers, and parents are generally not protecting children from these racist ideas, kids are connecting skin color to negative and positive characteristics. By the time they are seven or eight years old, according to studies, children have developed the language to start expressing those ideas that connect skin color to negative qualities. Studies consistently show that when kids start articulating those ideas—saying, for example, they do not want to play with a “bad Black kid”—the response from teachers and parents is to say, “Do not talk about that; that is not a subject we talk about.” Those ideas then continue to deepen and spread among our youth with very few people checking them.
When a school decides to take action, it is because we know, according to scholarship and studies, that kids are already making connections between skin color and negative or positive qualities. We need to actively teach them that there is nothing superior or inferior about any racial group. We need to actively teach them that white people do not have more because they are more, and Black people do not have less because they are less. That is making an intervention that responds to the social and cultural environment kids are operating in. Part of that can be affinity group teaching, which studies have shown is particularly effective for white students who are consistently told by their parents that they are colorblind. It can also be helpful for certain Black students who feel more comfortable saying certain things among other Black kids than they do in integrated classrooms. These schools have actually responded to the science as opposed to the politics.
Mounk: I disagree with your reading on the scientific studies and we can go through various ones. There’s a lot of them showing that all manners of diversity training and affinity groups actually aren’t very effective and very often backfire. You can look at the work of Frank Dobbin.
Kendi: Well, those are not the studies that I talked about. The studies that I mentioned are the ones about how as early as three years old, kids are connecting skin color to negative and positive characteristics. Studies have also shown that by six or seven or eight years old, kids are articulating their ideas. Those are the only studies that I’ve cited. And so if you’re saying you disagree with those studies, I’m not stating that diversity trainings, as an example, are incredibly effective. I didn’t make that case. So I just want to just underline that.
Mounk: Well, you were saying that affinity groups are effective, right?
Kendi: I said affinity groups in the context of that form of anti-racist education can be effective, particularly with students like Black students who don’t feel comfortable talking about particularly sensitive topics in front of white kids. There’s all sorts of evidence, particularly anecdotal evidence from Black kids themselves, who say they feel more comfortable talking in the midst of other Black students.
Mounk: You were also saying that they’re effective for white students. I want to make two points. One is that I think you’re running together two quite different things. The first is that there are going to be some racist attitudes that kids imbibe from the environment and may start to have at a relatively early age, and that, of course, teachers should address those, certainly correcting them when they come up. We should also have broader teaching about the effects of race in America, all of which I agree with. I think that’s quite an uncontroversial position, at least in center-left and more centrist spaces. The second thing you’re tying this to is the idea of affinity groups, which I think is a much more controversial idea. So I just want to separate those two things out because on the first one, I agree with you.
Kendi: Affinity groups exist across ethnicity and religion. The idea that Black people, for instance, can’t get together based on a shared culture in history would also presuppose that particular religious groups in which that religion is essentially a culture and a culture derived from a particular history can’t get together either. There’s a way to create a society where we can both acknowledge that there are differences while simultaneously recognizing those differences as equals.
Mounk: Of course, and as a philosophical liberal I believe in freedom of association. Every adult should be free to choose whom they associate with, which obviously includes what we might call affinity groups. The question we are discussing is whether institutions with a lot of authority in society, such as colleges and universities—but also high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools—should be encouraging the formation of these kinds of groups. In particular, should they be encouraging the formation of these kinds of groups when there are children who are too young to have much agency for themselves?
I would distinguish between high schoolers of 16 or 17 years old deciding they want to have some kind of cultural club and teachers coming into classrooms when kids are much younger and doing that. One thing I want to ask you specifically, because you brought up the...
Kendi: So do you think we should abolish religious schools?
Mounk: Well, first of all, I think there is a difference between race and religion in this context. Secondly, again, there’s a question about—
Kendi: Affinity groups are usually based on two ideas: either a shared cultural or historical experience, or they’re typically based on an effort to essentially challenge a particular bigotry that’s affecting that ethnic group or racial group in this context. So in the case of religious schools—
Mounk: Well, I will tell you that I think that—
Kendi: I was sent to a Christian school, a Lutheran school. I didn’t have much agency in choosing that school. I didn’t have much agency in choosing the fact that I had to literally go to service chapel every week. I don’t see any outrage about forcing kids to do that, for instance, and this is not necessarily what affinity groups are doing, but there’s no outrage about that. So that to me doesn’t really make much sense.
Mounk: First, when they are publicly funded schools, I certainly have a strong objection to this. The United Kingdom has publicly funded religious schools, and I think that is a mistake. The state should not be encouraging more separation and division in its pupils. The fact that the state is funding schools for Christians to go to one school, Muslims to go to another, and Jews to go to a third—a policy, by the way, introduced by the New Labour government in the 2000s—is a big mistake. It is a great virtue when students from different walks of life go to school together, are exposed to each other, and learn together. That is much preferable to a system that encourages division on the basis of religion.
I also think the state banning private schools would be a mistake. As I was telling you, when people who are old enough to make those choices for themselves choose to pursue affinity groups, that is a different thing. That is part of freedom of association. What I am talking about specifically is schools where very young kids are divided into those groups.
This is essentially what I experienced growing up Jewish in Germany, where there were confessional religion classes. Those were obviously only for Catholics and Protestants because there were very few people of other religions around, at least at the time. I and the two children of Turkish immigrants simply hung out and did nothing during that time. I think that was deeply alienating. It was not a good system, and I would not want to replicate it in the United States.
My question more specifically concerns the white students and what you think will happen to them. I think the aspiration here is for white students to learn about white privilege and the ways in which society is biased in their favor so they become good anti-racist activists. If you believe that human beings can easily form different kinds of tribes and that they learn from their environment which markers make them part of an in-group, it seems much more likely that the opposite will happen. What you are actually teaching those students is that we live in a school community where the most important dividing line is race. You are showing them that this is how people self-organize.
When people advocate for their interests within this context, they do so on the basis of their racial affinity groups. Consequently, the student learns that the most important thing about them is that they are white. The most important way they will be able to fight for resources or make demands within the school is to organize along those lines. I think we see a lot of evidence of younger white kids, including those in very progressive environments, starting to find the appeal of the alt-right and gravitating toward those ideas. This is partly because they have been raised in an environment that racializes them in that way.
Do you worry at all that these affinity groups might backfire? You either have them hang out and do nothing—as I did because I was not Catholic or Protestant in a German school—or you put them together and say the most important thing about them is that they are white and have white privilege. Do you not worry that it might backfire in those ways?
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Kendi: Well, the first presumption of your question is that those white kids, before they entered into that space, were not racialized as white and did not see themselves as white. The idea that a class exercise suddenly caused them to realize they were white is blatantly false.
All sorts of studies document that the most effective form of whiteness education—in which white people, particularly white children, and even white adults, develop their sense of white identity—is by having no education about race and racism at all. Actually, all a white...
Mounk: I agree with you that that’s wrong and we’ve established that, right? So that’s not where we disagree.
Kendi: I just want to establish the fact that the presumption of your question and even the outcome is that this affinity space among white students or even anti-racist education among white students made the student conscious of her or his whiteness and then led that student to become a part of the white identity movement. I just want to—
Mounk: With respect, I think that you’re really strawmanning my position. You want people to choose between either teachers never mentioning race, pretending it doesn’t exist at all, or we separate kids out at the age of eight into these racially separate groups. Now on this question, you’re trying to divide between either my position is nobody knows the color of their skin, 8-year-olds aren’t at all aware of the existence of race, or—
Kendi: I’m just trying to—
Mounk: —all these racial affinity groups are good. I think the sensible middle position that I have is that, yes, of course, teachers should call attention to racism where it exists—
Kendi: So do you believe before they enter into that classroom that those white students have a consciousness and a conception of the fact that they’re white? I just want to ask that.
Mounk: I think that they’re aware, yes, I think they’re aware of the fact that they’re seen as white in society. They’re also aware of lots of other identity markers they have. I don’t think that they necessarily—
Kendi: I just want to get a sense of what you’re asking me based on your presumptions. Cause you stated that my presumption about what you’re stating is wrong. So now I just wanna ask a few questions to get a sense of what your actual presumptions are. So you stated that you believe that those white kids have a sense of their white identity before entering into those spaces. You’re saying that that’s something you do believe.
Mounk: I think that they’re aware that they’re white. I think if you ask an eight-year-old, according to those different census categories, which of those categories do you fall into? I think most of them will broadly give you the “correct answer” of how they would be classified in those census categories. I don’t think that necessarily means that they think of that as their defining feature. I don’t think that when you ask them, describe yourself, what is important about you, they would foreground the fact of their whiteness. My concern is that these affinity groups and the wider culture in some of these schools will teach them that, actually, the most important thing about them is that they are white. I do not think that is going to be conducive to long-term political development.
Kendi: Thank you for underlining that. I think the first assumption, just so I am clear, is that they had a sense that they were white, but they also had a sense of other identities. They did not perceive their whiteness to be the defining aspect of their identity. You are arguing that when they enter into this education, the educators teach them—you are claiming—that whiteness, or them being white, is the defining feature of their identity. Just so I am clear that is your position, am I correct?
Mounk: That as a result of what they are taught, they come to identify more strongly with their white identity because they come to understand that it is the criterion on which they are being separated from the other kids. At the very least, it is like, why am I in this room with these other people? Well, it clearly is important enough that on Mondays at 3 p.m., that is what governs which room I am sitting in.
Kendi: Okay, and then you’re stating that because they then come to see their white identity as their defining feature, they are pulled toward these white nationalist sort of movements. In your mind, it is actually these affinity groups and this education that are causing white students and even adults to ultimately become great replacement theorists. Am I correct? That is your position.
Mounk: Yes, so let me elaborate on that. A, I think that is right for some subsection of our students—
Kendi: I want to reemphasize that you are radically exaggerating the amount of time students spend in affinity groups. In the vast majority of cases, that almost never happens. Would I say there are instances in which teachers ask different racialized groups to sit in affinity groups? Does that happen? Yes. Does it happen often? No. How much time might they spend? Ten minutes, fifteen minutes, an hour. The notion that asking students to do that completely reshapes their racial identity is a pretty amazing argument you are making. Ultimately, I want to state that the argument you are making has no scholarly or scientific basis; in fact, all the evidence points to the very opposite.
Scholars have documented that it is the students whose parents and teachers do not talk about racism, white privilege, or the benefits white people may have as a result of racist policies who are more likely to believe that white people have more because they are superior. They are more likely to believe that immigrants and Black people are coming to harm and replace them. They are more likely to be seduced by a Nigel Farage or a Donald Trump, according to studies. Anti-racist education is actually protective for white students against racist ideas.
I am also glad you asked about white students, because what often happens in these conversations—particularly around affinity groups—is that the decision of whether to have them is dictated almost entirely by what people think is best for white students. There is almost no conversation about what is helpful for Black students. Most of our conversation and most of your concern has been expressed regarding what you think could help or harm white students. Even though studies show it actually helps white students, we have had no conversation about how affinity groups can help Black students. Is that something you are not interested in?
Mounk: Sure, I am happy to talk about that. To be clear, I am not talking about what helps or harms white students; I am talking about how we can contain some of the ideas that you and I are both worried about. My concern about these affinity groups in the context of white students is not that they might be upset or that they may encounter challenging ideas. I know those are common criticisms, but I think being uncomfortable is actually an important part of an education, so I am not as concerned about that.
What I worry about specifically is that we do not want to incentivize white students to embrace ideas that you and I both agree are very dangerous to our ability to thrive together as a society. You are making it sound as though I am concerned about the well-being of these “poor white students,” but I am concerned about the long-term future of our politics.
I want to touch on a couple of other points as well. Explain, if you will, how you’re framing the difference between equity and equality and what your definition of equity is.
Kendi: To me, equity, particularly as it relates to a policy standpoint, is ensuring that every racial, gender, or class group is not necessarily being undermined by policies that lead to them being less likely to have a particular opportunity. When we have equitable policies, we all truly have equivalent opportunities, equivalent forms of access, and equivalent forms of resources in a democracy.
I would also add that, to think even further, equity is about the groups that have the greatest needs receiving the greatest amounts of resources. Equity to me means that a low-income person is going to pay less in taxes than a billionaire. By contrast, equality from a policy standpoint is that a billionaire is going to pay the same dollar amount in taxes that a low-income person would, which to me is not fair. I think to most people, that would not be fair.
Mounk: I guess I am a little bit confused by this way of framing the issue because there is a long tradition of egalitarian political philosophy, and certainly people who argued for the value of equality in those debates have never been in favor of a flat tax, for example. The idea of higher marginal tax rates for people who earn more money is something that political egalitarians have advocated for for a long time. It is not clear to me that the idea that we should adjust how we treat people based on their circumstances goes in any significant way against the longstanding egalitarian tradition.
The idea, for example, that we are not going to give out wheelchairs to everybody in society, but instead give them to those who have impediments that make it impossible for them to work otherwise, does not really seem to be contradicted by the idea of equality as understood by philosophers like John Rawls or Amartya Sen. But I want to get more specifically at what your measure is of when society—
Kendi: I’m sorry, did I say something that was in contrast to any of that? Because I would agree that we shouldn’t give out wheelchairs to everyone in society, that the people who need accommodations from a society should receive those accommodations. So that’s pretty much what I said. That would be equity.
Mounk: No, of course, I know you agree with that, but the way you are defining it implies that people who believe in equality would not believe in that. What I am saying is that is a kind of strange redefinition of “equality.”
Do you think there are sometimes group differences that arise in societies caused by something other than racist policies? How, for example, do you explain the fact that Asian Americans are hugely overrepresented at top colleges in the United States? Do you think that Asian Americans are beneficiaries of racist policies in ways that white Americans—who are not overrepresented at top American colleges at this point—are not?
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Ibram discuss the difference between equity and equality, why Asian Americans are overrepresented in elite college admissions, and to what extent racial inequality is determined by racist policies. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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(Photo by Athima Tongloom via Getty Images.)The American family is in crisis (again). One quarter of adult children are, or have been, estranged from a parent, while parents in some parts of the United States are more than twice as likely to have a bad relationship with their adult children as parents in other countries. The average age for offspring to choose estrangement is their early-to-mid-twenties—just at the point where, in previous generations, parents could relax and congratulate themselves on a job well done.
The reasons for estrangement can often seem… less than significant. A study by Time found that 1 in 5 people who estranged themselves from a close relative did so because of “political differences,” with those under 35 especially likely to cut off parents for this reason. One Ivy League grad reported cutting off a parent for being “needy,” while others give reasons including vague descriptions of “chronic invalidating dynamics.” It seems that, for some of those who choose to cut off their parents, the decision is not based on abuse or trauma, but on far more trivial things.
What explains this increased willingness to choose estrangement? The trend has coincided with a loneliness epidemic, and a culture that has become more individualistic, deprioritizing familial relationships while also feeling the sharpness of their absence. Advice to cut off your parents has become increasingly trivialized, the stuff of WikiHow guides or TikTok tutorials. Meanwhile, there are reports of therapists encouraging patients to see normal parental mistakes as toxic behaviors that they must sever themselves from.
This makes it tempting to assume that a mixture of cultural factors, peer pressure, and individualism are to blame for the rise in estrangement—and no doubt all of these play their part. But there’s another factor which arguably plays a big role: helicopter parenting.
Helicopter parenting refers to parents being intensely involved in the lives of their children beyond the point where such involvement is healthy (this is related to the phenomenon of “enmeshment,” where boundaries between family members are blurred or non-existent). Helicopter parenting involves parents not wanting their children to go out and do things for themselves, often because of a misplaced fear for their safety. And it is a particularly acute phenomenon in the United States. A recent study of American children aged 8-12 found that most aren’t allowed to be out in public without an adult. Fewer than half of 8- and 9-year-olds have even walked down a grocery store aisle alone.
Furthermore, this pressure is not limited to childhood. Going to college should be a time of self-discovery, learning your own limits, and taking responsibility for your life choices as well as your education. Yet the last few decades have seen an increase in parents checking in with their adult children’s college professors, rather than accepting their offspring as adults responsible for their own education. Helicopter parents are even visible in the workplace, with reports of parents becoming more involved in their grown children’s job hunt—or even attending their adult child’s job interviews.
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All of this is a sharp contrast to the experience of children in the 1970s and 1980s, who remember roaming the streets with their friends without parental supervision. While I, growing up in the 1990s, had less freedom than my parents had, I still cherished daytrips with friends and the joyous thrill of disobedience on the (rare) occasions I lied to my parents about where I was.
Today, the first generation of children who grew up with ever-present parents—and whose locations were supervised by ever-present digital devices—are now entering adulthood, giving insights into the long-term psychological impacts of this parenting approach. And the results aren’t pretty. Overprotective parenting has been linked to increased rates of anxiety and depression, as well as a lack of essential life skills like emotional control. This is unsurprising: To grow up being told you’re not competent enough to handle activities like going to buy candy or heading to the mall with your friends will naturally impact your self-confidence. By always resolving children’s issues and smoothing out potential speed bumps for them, parents are decreasing children’s resilience, making it harder for them to cope when they are finally allowed independence. Lenore Skenazy, founder of the “free-range kids” movement, puts it starkly:
As children’s independence and free play time have gone down over the decades—not just since COVID, not just since phones, but since before that—childhood has become more supervised. And their anxiety and depression have gone up … When we worry about kids being so anxious and depressed, it’s because they have no idea how much they’re capable of doing.
But what’s all this got to do with estrangement?
Quite a lot. Young people need independence—graded according to their age—in order to develop their own identity. Adolescence in particular is a time to explore your own personal values, life goals, and sense of self. While parental support is of course important to teenagers, they also prioritize friendship, and research has shown that they handle stressful situations better when around peers.
The act of rebelling against parents is thus a normal feature of growing up. Teenagers see their rebellion as a way to assert themselves against their parents. Painful as it is to go through for everyone involved, teens are willful and annoying for evolutionary reasons. Pushing away their parents is a vital step for them to develop and see themselves as individuals.
But imagine growing up in an environment with constant parental coddling. You’ll naturally desire boundaries whilst also struggling to complete small tasks and imagine everyday life without an omnipresent adult. These conflicting emotions—of love and anxiousness—short circuit the normal balance of things, in which parental love is combined with a degree of independence that satisfies the child’s need to feel like they are rebelling. The result is that many teenagers feel too anxious or attached to develop a distinctive sense of self.
What then? Although there is a lack of research into this topic, anecdotal evidence—and common sense—suggest that adults who didn’t rebel as teenagers feel the urge to do so later in life. This trend may be enhanced by the fact that adults live like adolescents for longer than they used to. Eventually, the pressure will build to the point that the adult child feels that only a dramatic rejection can create the boundary they crave.
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But of course, the consequences of an adult rebelling against their family are much bigger than for a teen. A teen usually lives in the family home, part of the family’s daily routine, and possibly receiving an allowance. They are directly motivated to quickly reconcile with their parents. An adult, by contrast, has no such motivation. Living away means no longer having daily in-person contact with close family members. The individual isn’t incentivized to put up with their family’s competing perspectives. Living separately also makes it easier to paint family members and their motivations in the worst possible light; living in close proximity, by contrast, often forces reconciliation. While you may hate your parents for a few hours, you also remember you still love them.
Finally, living with roommates or having a circle of friends to go out with means that family has a limited role in an adult’s social life. Having a separate life from your nuclear family is a key part of growing up, but it also means that the factors that push even an extremely rebellious teenager to reconcile with their parents are much weaker—making it easier for adult children to simply walk away.
Of course, some parents do need to be cut off. If a parent has been abusive, going no contact is a necessary step for both healing and building a happy life. It used to be acceptable to inflict physical punishment on children, or to ostracize them for being gay. Thankfully, society has moved on; these behaviors are rightly recognized as abusive, and justified grounds for cutting off parents.
But it is also clear that we have travelled too far in the opposite direction. And one of the reasons may very well be the coddling effects of helicopter parenting. Everyone at some point growing up feels the urge to demand that their autonomy be respected. By postponing autonomy until adulthood, the idea of cutting off parents in your twenties becomes both easier and more appealing.
Hopefully, as the harms of enmeshment and helicopter parenting are increasingly recognized, and movements such as “free range kids” become more mainstream, familial estrangement will decrease. It’s high time to remember that by supporting a child to forge their own independent path, you’re not only empowering your child—you’re also bringing your family closer.
Leonora Barclay is Head of Podcasts at Persuasion.
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Thank you, as always, for reading.
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We’re delighted to announce that our online BOOK CLUB is back! You can meet authors and ask questions about their work, as well as meeting other readers. Please join us on Tuesday, April 7 at 6pm ET, when our Head of Podcasts, Leonora Barclay, will interview Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum about their book Ungoverning: The Attack on the Administrative State and the Politics of Chaos. Register your interest here.
Paul Conyngham with his dog Rosie, March 14, 2026. (Photo via X.)A story about Paul Conyngham, an AI entrepreneur from Sydney who treated his dog Rosie’s cancer with a personalized mRNA vaccine, has been circulating on X this week. What makes the story inspiring is the initiative the owner showed: he used AI to teach himself about how a personalized vaccine could work, designed much of the process himself, and approached top researchers to take it forward.
Whether the treatment itself was curative and how much of an improvement it represents over the current state of the art is not the point here. What interests me instead is the bureaucratic absurdity Conyngham encountered while trying to pursue the treatment. In The Australian he described the long and frustrating process required simply to test the drug in his dog: “The red tape was actually harder than the vaccine creation, and I was trying to get an Australian ethics approval and run a dog trial on Rosie. It took me three months, putting two hours aside every single night, just typing the 100 page document.” Even in a small and urgent case, where the owner was fully willing to fund the treatment himself, the effort was slowed by layers of procedure.
Of course, this kind of red tape is not confined to Australia, nor to veterinary medicine. In fact, in the United States, the red tape is even worse, at least for human trials. GitLab co-founder and billionaire Sid Sijbrandij found himself in a similar position after the relapse of his osteosarcoma. When the ordinary doors of medicine closed, he entered what he called “founder mode on his cancer.” Thinking like an entrepreneur confronted with a difficult problem, he began trying to build his own path forward by self-funding his exploration of experimental therapies.
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Even then, he ran into the familiar maze of regulatory and institutional barriers, which not only delayed him—making it difficult for him even to access his own tissues and to order diagnostics—but also made the price of experimental therapies all but prohibitively expensive. These are obstacles that only someone with extraordinary resources could hope to navigate—in Sijbrandij’s case by assembling an entire “SWAT team” to deal with them and work through the opacity. In the end, Sijbrandij prevailed: he orchestrated an intensive radiotherapy for himself that worked. He has been relapse-free since 2025, long after doctors had told him he was at the end of his options.
Around the same time, writer Jake Seliger faced a similar situation while battling advanced throat cancer. Like Sijbrandij, he was willing to try anything that might help. The difference was that Seliger was not a billionaire. He could not hire a team to navigate the system on his behalf, and he struggled even to enroll in the clinical trials that might have offered him a chance. Seliger died in 2024, commenting “Having my life cut short by cancer is horrible”—and with his wife, a Mayo Clinic physician, livid at a “paternalist” government system limiting access to experimental therapies even for patients who have no other option.
A system originally conceived to safeguard patients has gradually produced a strange and troubling outcome: the mere chance of survival is effectively reserved for the very few who possess the means to assemble an army of experts capable of wending through its labyrinthine procedures.
What makes these stories particularly frustrating is that we already know clinical trials—especially small, early-stage ones like the ones Sijbrandij enrolled in for himself—can be conducted far more cheaply and with far less bureaucracy than is currently required. Ironically, while we started with a story of red tape in Australia, clinical trials for humans there are conducted 2.5–3 times cheaper and faster than in the United States without any increase in adverse safety events over a 30-year span, and American lawmakers have belatedly tried to introduce pilot programs following Australia’s model.
Removing unnecessary barriers has long been important, and the issue has only become more urgent with the rise of AI. One of the central promises of the AI revolution is that it will accelerate medical progress. Organizations such as the OpenAI Foundation list curing disease as a core goal, and figures like Dario Amodei of Anthropic have argued that AI could dramatically speed up biomedical innovation. But, even in the most optimistic scenario, AI will not automatically accelerate a key bottleneck in making these dreams a reality: clinical trials. Conyngham’s observation that navigating the red tape to start a trial for his dog took longer than designing the drug itself only underscores the point.
Drug development is often described as a funnel: many ideas enter at the top, but only a few become approved treatments. Early human studies, known as Phase I trials, sit at the entrance of this process. They involve small numbers of patients and are designed to quickly test whether a new therapy is safe and shows early signs of effectiveness.
If the results look promising, the therapy moves to larger and more complex studies, including Phase III trials that enroll large numbers of patients to confirm whether the treatment truly works. Most people gain access to new therapies only after these large randomized trials are completed.
On average, moving from a promising idea to Phase III results takes around ten years and costs roughly $1.3 billion. Part of this delay is unavoidable. Observing how a drug affects the human body simply takes time. But much of it is not. Layers of unnecessary bureaucracy, regulatory opacity, and rising trial costs add years to the process without clearly improving patient safety.
Allowing a higher volume of early stage trials is a rare “win-win” for both public health and scientific progress. For patients, it transforms a terminal diagnosis from a closed door into a “chance at a cure,” providing legal, supervised access to cutting-edge medicine that currently sits idle in labs. For researchers and society, it unclogs the drug discovery funnel; by lowering the barrier to entry for new ideas, we ensure that the next generation of mRNA, peptide, and AI-driven therapies are tested in humans years sooner.
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From a patient perspective, early stage trials often provide the closest practical equivalent to a right-to-try. In theory, right-to-try laws allow patients with serious illnesses to access treatments that have not yet been confirmed in large randomized Phase III trials. In practice, these pathways rarely function as intended. Pharmaceutical companies are often reluctant to provide experimental drugs outside formal trials, and treatments typically must have already passed Phase I testing. As a result, very few patients gain access through these mechanisms. Early-stage trials offer a more workable alternative. They allow experimental therapies to be tested in structured clinical environments—often in academic settings or academia-industry collaborations—where patients can be monitored and meaningful data can be collected.
Second, early-stage trials are essential for personalized medicine and the treatment of ultra-rare diseases. Many emerging therapies—such as personalized cancer vaccines, gene therapies, and other individualized interventions—do not fit easily into the traditional model of large randomized trials involving thousands of participants. By their nature, these treatments target very small patient populations and often require flexible, adaptive clinical designs.
Lastly, these trials play an important role in maintaining U.S. leadership in biotechnology and, over the long run, in safeguarding biosecurity. In recent years, China has been advancing rapidly in biotechnology, in part because it is easier to run early-stage clinical studies there.
As a result, more U.S. biotech firms are beginning to move parts of their clinical development to China. A Time magazine headline from May 2025 captures what many industry experts have been warning for years: “The US can’t afford to lose the biotech race with China.” This is no longer a hypothetical concern. U.S. early-stage funding is deteriorating, dropping from $2.6 billion in the first quarter of 2025 to just $900 million by the second quarter—the lowest level in five quarters. If this trend continues, it could gradually shift the center of gravity for biomedical innovation abroad. That poses risks not only to U.S. biotech competitiveness but also to biosecurity, much like the earlier offshoring of manufacturing supply chains created strategic vulnerabilities.
In the long run, we may need to rethink the entire sequence of requirements for drug approval, especially as personalized medicine becomes more common. For now, however, it is worth focusing on the unnecessary barriers that limit the expansion of early-stage trials to a larger group of patients.
A critical one is the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), committees responsible for reviewing the ethical aspects of clinical studies. In practice, however, the IRB process significantly delays these efforts. As Sijbrandij, the GitLab co-founder, explained in a Century of Biology article, they can function as “a ‘vetocracy’ where one member of the board can block treatment based on even the smallest concern.”
This situation is difficult to justify: here was someone with advanced cancer who was willing to self-fund the treatment and accept the risks, yet was still prevented from proceeding. It’s as if the system would rather have you dead than risk one imperfect overly long consent form.
Another obstacle is Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) standards, designed for drugs’ large-scale manufacture. Full GMP compliance involves validated facilities, extensive documentation, batch testing, environmental monitoring, and strict process controls. These requirements make sense for large commercial manufacturing, where thousands or millions of patients may ultimately receive the product. However, in the context of very small early-stage trials involving only a handful of patients, the same standards are often applied even though the risks and scale are entirely different.
Experience in Australia shows that a lighter approach to GMP requirements can substantially reduce costs. Clinical manufacturing conducted under Australia’s framework is roughly 2.5x cheaper for this stage of the process alone. Copying Australia’s model and reducing manufacturing costs would likely, however, only be the beginning. If regulatory reforms were combined with modern technologies for final product quality control such as standardized validation platforms, experts I interviewed suggest that manufacturing costs could plausibly fall by 5-10 times overall. Such improvements would not only lower the cost of individual trials but could also significantly expand the number of therapies that make it into clinical testing in the first place.
Lowering costs would effectively expand access to early-stage clinical trials. Today, the high cost of manufacturing and of running these trials means that only a small number of patients can participate. As an academic immuno-oncologist working in cell therapy at a prestigious U.S. academic institution—who asked to remain anonymous—told me, this often leads to heartbreaking choices. Because the size of academic grants allows treatment only for a handful of patients, he is forced to decide which patients receive the therapy and which do not.
We should also give patients greater autonomy in choosing their level of risk. In some cases, a manufacturing method might carry a slightly higher risk—say an additional 0.1% probability of an adverse event—but reduce costs by an order of magnitude. For a patient facing a terminal illness, that tradeoff may be entirely rational. A system that rigidly eliminates even small risks can inadvertently deny patients access to therapies that could meaningfully extend or improve their lives.
All of this may be in the domain of problems that everybody—at some level—knows about but doesn’t have the will to fix. There is, however, a sea change occurring in medical research. AI technology is producing genuine breakthroughs in medical cures—and those can be taken advantage of in societies like China (and, to some extent, Australia) with their smoother pathways to implementation. In the United States, though, the bureaucratic bottleneck makes AI breakthroughs all but moot. Until we fix the regulatory problem, the breakthroughs fade into insignificance.
Ruxandra Teslo is a fellow at Renaissance Philanthropy and co-founder of the Clinical Trial Abundance project. She writes about the intersection of science, culture, and policy at her Substack. She holds a PhD in Genomics from Cambridge University.
A version of this article was originally published in Ruxandra’s Substack.
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Adrian Wooldridge is the global business columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or co-author of 12 books, including Centrists of the World Unite: The Lost Genius of Liberalism.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Adrian Wooldridge discuss how liberalism emerged as a solution to concrete historical problems, why the fundamental challenges liberalism addressed in the 17th and 18th centuries have returned in new forms today, and what lessons the origins of liberalism offer for defending it against contemporary threats.
We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.
That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.
This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: We have both been thinking for a good while about the travails of liberalism. We have both written books that are entrants into the genre of how to understand the roots of its troubles and how to imagine a rejuvenation of liberalism. Tell us about this political moment. What is it teaching us about the nature and the roots of liberalism?
Adrian Wooldridge: I started writing my book, Centrists of the World Unite: The Lost Genius of Liberalism, about four years ago because I was very worried about the state of liberalism. As I wrote it, things got worse; throughout the entire period of writing this book, things got worse. It is appearing just at the moment that the Middle East is in flames.
I also noticed as I was writing the book that quite a lot of other people were writing about liberalism as well—that liberalism had suddenly become a really big intellectual topic. It was not a topic of ratiocination by academics playing games with Rawls’s “original position” and things like that, but a really urgent issue because people are worried that the liberal order is fading and failing to deal with the problems we have at hand.
I think that is exactly what is happening at the moment. That sense of crisis, that sense of urgency, and that need to reconfigure and ask the question—what is liberalism and how can it be revived for the particular set of circumstances we face at the moment?—is more urgent than ever.
Mounk: In a way, what you do in your book is to go back to the origins and say: what is it that liberalism actually had to offer the modern world? How is it that it dealt with previous periods of crises? Liberalism—as I have remarked repeatedly on this podcast—has gone through very serious crises in the past and it was able to adapt to by, in some ways, reinventing itself.
How did it get into the current crisis? What set of factors have led to the weakness of liberalism at the moment?
There is a lot of instinctive anti-liberalism today; I think a lot of people just blame liberalism for everything that is wrong in the world. Going back to the origins of the modern world, how has liberalism helped to create the world we have today? How is it that it helped solve a bunch of deep problems we had?
Wooldridge: Well, there is a fundamental question here: what is liberalism? That is a question which philosophers and academics love to debate. I think what has got lost in a lot of these very abstract debates is the fact that liberalism is a set of solutions to a set of concrete, real-world problems. Those solutions change over time; they vary in time. They do not vary infinitely; there is an essence of liberalism which we have to pay attention to.
Liberalism comes into the world in the, let’s say, 17th and 18th centuries as a set of solutions to the following problems. One is the problem of collective identity. People were supposed to inherit their identity; people in traditional feudal society inherited their identities. The second is the problem of collective beliefs. People in pre-modern, pre-liberal societies were supposed to have a certain set of fixed beliefs. They belonged to confessional states and they were supposed to agree with those confessional states about fundamental things to do with the meaning of life. The third thing was economic growth. People in traditional societies lived in fairly static times. Most of human history has been fairly static. You would have one or two percent growth over a century—not 10% growth over a year as you get in some very fortunate countries today.
What you get in the late 18th century—let us say with the American Revolution or at the time of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations—is the emergence of a world that is mobile. People are moving; they are moving geographically and they are moving socially, up and down the social scale. They are moving so much that people begin to realize that mobility, or motion, is the essence of society.
With individuals no longer anchored in place and in social roles in the way they had been up until then, people began to ask questions. What are the fundamental constituents of society? What should we believe? Where should we get our beliefs from? How should politics be organized? Liberals come along and say society should be based on the rights and abilities of individuals. Belief systems should not be dictated by the powerful; they should not be dictated by churches. Power is something that we need to share. It should not belong to despots; it needs to be shared out. Liberalism comes along as a solution to the problem of collective beliefs, social stability versus social mobility, and the problem ultimately of power—where it comes from and how we should allocate it. That is where liberalism starts.
Mounk: Make the case for that set of things, to begin with, in that time. Why is it that that combination of things proves to have such durable appeal? Why is it that as we are looking at the problems we face today in the 21st century—with the challenge from dictators, with the rise of populism within our societies, with technological changes from the internet and social media to artificial intelligence—why should we be looking back at that particular package of pragmatic inventions and solutions devised to meet the challenges of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries?
Wooldridge: Let us say that these solutions were not without their own problems, not without bloodshed. You had the American Revolution, which is in many ways a successful solution to that problem. You divide power, you allocate rights to individuals, you constrain the power of the state, and you introduce a secular state—a wall of separation between church and state.
In the French Revolution, which was also grappling with similar problems and advancing according to similar premises about the rights of individuals, you have a very bloody solution.
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I start this book by talking about Erasmus as a sort of proto-liberal because he is trying to grapple with this idea of religious certainty and the way that religious certainty leads to persecution. Why are these insights or these arguments relevant today?
Strangely, they are more relevant today than they have been for a long time because we have the return of the notion of collective beliefs—the idea that we can just shout down people who do not agree with us, which we see in universities and on the identitarian left. We see the return of religious intolerance. You obviously have confessional states in Iran and other parts of the Middle East, but we also have communities within the West that are religiously intolerant, where if you question religious beliefs, you should be canceled. We have a teacher in the UK who has been in hiding for years because he tried to teach something about the Quran which the local community took exception to.
Regarding the issue of the division of powers and the constraint of power—which was central to liberalism—we again have the rise of strongmen. We have President Trump in the United States saying the only limit he is willing to admit to what he is going to do is his own conscience, his own set of beliefs; that might be exactly the sort of thing that Louis XVI might say. All of these issues are enormously relevant and important now.
There has been a period when people thought that the debate about liberalism was all about the relative balance of the state and the market. I do not think that is as central to liberalism as Hayekians, libertarians, or neoliberals would argue. The fight for limiting power, ensuring tolerance, ensuring open debate, and doing away with collectivist, identitarian modes of thinking are much more important to the liberal mission.
Mounk: Just a few thoughts on this. One is that in some ways, the historical forces which made this question about how to deal with genuine diversity of religious beliefs and ethnic identities very relevant in the period of the emergence of liberalism were somewhat less relevant for parts of the post-World War II history of liberal states. But now they are much more relevant again.
That is basically because when these states were emerging, they were, on one very important dimension, extremely diverse. Even though they may have all been white or had the same ethnicity, you had Catholics and Protestants, or various kinds of Protestant sects in some places, competing for political power and influence in a framework which originally said that one of these sects has to be primary and everyone else has to submit to that. That made for very high stakes for those differences.
Certainly in Europe, and in some ways in the United States for different reasons, the post-World War II period was actually quite homogeneous. It was homogeneous in Europe as a result of the ethnic cleansing of the first half of the 20th century, which created in many places societies that were much more ethnically and religiously homogeneous than they were before. At the same time, religious distinctions like that between Catholics and Protestants mattered less because the continent had secularized in various ways.
In America, which of course was more ethnically and religiously diverse, there had been a real lull in immigration throughout that period. This led to a much more homogeneous culture than America had either before the 1910s or after the period of mass migration that you got in North America and a little bit later in Western Europe—starting in the 60s and 70s, but really only gathering force in such a way that it became a principal political question a little bit later.
You joked about too much liberalism being the domain of interpretation of Rawls. I agree with you that a lot of the questions we are asking about are in some ways broader and more important than the work of John Rawls, but I think there is also an interesting shift within his work which Joseph Heath, for example, has talked about interestingly in the pages of Persuasion recently.
A Theory of Justice, his most famous work, is really about what the right principle of distribution is. It is all about those economic questions and claiming to have one kind of hegemonic answer: “I have found the right principle of distribution and you should all get on the same page.” Then he realizes that liberal societies and contemporary societies are sufficiently diverse and variegated that you are not going to be able to get agreement about that. Just as the brilliant philosophers of the past were not able to persuade all of their contemporaries of their particular positions, John Rawls was not going to be able to persuade all of his contemporaries of the great wisdom of the “difference principle,” his particular distributive principle.
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He has a real shift in how he talks about things when he writes Political Liberalism, which is all about how we manage the fact of “reasonable pluralism” in society—the fact that reasonable, well-meaning, intelligent people are going to come to very different beliefs about what the most meaningful way of leading a life is. What can we say about building a society that is able to accommodate all of that diversity without opening the gates to the illiberals who want to destroy it?
Wooldridge: Absolutely. I joked a little bit about John Rawls, but I am not really joking about John Rawls so much as the “John Rawls industry.” I remember when I was an undergraduate at Oxford in the late 1970s and lots of my friends were doing PPE—Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. They all read John Rawls; they all read A Theory of Justice; they all endlessly debated it. Liberalism became all about a sort of procedural game—a game about discussing distribution.
Some of the bigger issues of liberal society were ignored, and most of all, the issue that was ignored was the clash of values and fundamental beliefs—the fact that people disagree about very, very fundamental things. This was because society at that point was very, very homogeneous.
You were talking about religion. What happens with religion is two things. One is secularization—people do not believe it that much. The second is privatization—people retreat into the private sphere. Consequently, religion does not really engage in politics that much, and everybody agrees that politics needs to be discussed in secular terms. The sort of religion that survives tends to be—what was it somebody said about Unitarianism? That Unitarians believe in one God, if that. That sort of thing triumphs.
Mounk: The other thing that I love and respect—to cite the culture of your country, Adrian—is in Yes, Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, as is the duty of an office holder, or at least was, has to appoint a bishop. Sir Humphrey, the civil servant, tells him, “You do not want to appoint this bishop, Prime Minister. He is a theological radical.” The Prime Minister asks, “What do you mean? He believes that God created the earth in six days, evolution is false—that kind of thing?” Humphrey says, “No, no, no, nothing as crazy as that. He believes in God.”
Wooldridge: It is very good; I had forgotten that. It is such a wonderful resource. With the dawn of the 21st century, particularly with September 11, religion returns in a very fundamental way. Religion returns as a “hard” religion that people are willing to die for, and it returns because it needs to speak and act in the public sphere.
Now we have a return to these fundamental liberal problems. How do we live together when we disagree about fundamental things? That is particularly important in pluralistic societies because, in the simplest terms, we have had a huge injection of Muslim populations into Europe particularly, but also to some extent in the United States. There is a clash of faiths going on which, in many ways, re-echoes the clash of faiths between Protestants and Catholics in the era when liberalism was first formed.
In my book, I talk about the Salman Rushdie affair. The Salman Rushdie affair is a sort of pre-modern thing; people are burning books because they regard those books as sacrilegious and blasphemous. This is exactly the sort of thing that happened in the 17th century and exactly the sort of thing that upset the great philosophers of liberalism. The liberal solution to this is that you dial politics down, you lower the temperature of politics, and you say that we must agree to disagree about fundamental things. We must put limits on the power of believers to impose their beliefs on other people. We must create, if not an entirely neutral public sphere, a public sphere where we can engage in conversation.
So, that is one fundamental way. What we have argued so far is that liberalism arrives in the world as a solution to some very pressing, urgent problems. Many of these urgent problems have revived and returned. One of the interesting things about liberalism is the way it reconstitutes itself over time. I am emphasizing this because I think we need to engage in another important process of rethinking, rearticulating, and reconfiguring liberalism now.
What you get at the end of the 19th century—we started talking about the 19th century—is the way liberalism has difficulty being born. The American Revolution was largely a successful revolution; the French Revolution was largely a failed revolution. England is a strange case because you preserve an official church, but it is basically a liberal regime that you create. By the end of the 19th century, you have, particularly in Britain, a regime of laissez-faire liberalism in which liberals have agreed to establish a free-market economy. They have agreed to dial down politics so they are no longer burning each other, and they are trying to create a reasonable degree of tolerance.
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Then, at the end of the 19th century, many people came along and said, as they are saying today, that liberalism is a dead philosophy. It is a dead philosophy because it is an individualistic philosophy at a time when the world is being reorganized according to great masses of people and the state is becoming more powerful. It is a dead philosophy because we are discovering that individuals are not rational agents, as they have unconscious minds. It is a dead philosophy because we have huge power blocks emerging in the world, such as conscript armies. There is a whole series of challenges, and many of the cleverest people of the time are admitting that liberalism is dead.
Finally, it is a dead philosophy because capitalism—the wonderful twin of liberalism—is changing from the sole proprietor or the small company to the world of massive giant companies like Carnegie and Rockefeller. These companies are refining votes as well as oil and controlling the political system, leading people to say that liberalism does not really exist in this world or address these problems.
A group of liberals in both the United States and Britain comes along and says, No, we have to reinvent liberalism for this new age. We have to reinvent liberalism so it is more active in dealing with things like pollution, sewage, and the lack of education of the working class. We have to reinvent liberalism so it can deal with big military threats from conscript armies. We need to reinvent liberalism so it can deal with the inheritance of vast fortunes which concentrate enormous amounts of power in the hands of small groups of businessmen. We need to reinvent it in a way that salvages the core principles of liberalism—which are individualism, reason, and open debate—rather than destroying them.
Mounk: Let us go a little bit into this crisis because I think that is really interesting. I have said on this podcast before that it feels to me like there have been three big crises of liberalism. One was around the middle and late 19th century with the emergence of industrial capitalism and the inability of liberalism to really deal with how you govern places like industrial Manchester. The second is the rise of totalitarianism in the form of fascism and communism and the kind of competing claims on political allegiance that those ideologies make, as well as the ways in which they reject bourgeois parliamentary democracy on principle. The third, I think, is the crisis we are going through right now, and we will get back to that.
You presented this a little bit more, I think, as one unified crisis. I do not know whether you would agree that there was really a separate 19th-century crisis and a separate mid-20th-century crisis, or whether you are thinking about them as part of one broader crisis; perhaps that ultimately becomes a semantic question. Tell us a little bit more about these crises and, in particular, how liberalism responds to these charges.
Wooldridge: There is an ongoing crisis from the middle of the 19th century whereby you have mass industrialization, you have the massification of society, and you have obvious huge pools of poverty. Most of the reactions to those crises come from overt left-wing people who say that we need to do something very fundamental about this. Or they come from novelists and writers who say that this is almost a spiritual crisis; we have to do something, we have to grasp what is going on, and we have to do something in terms of reconstituting our whole civilization.
You have Marx writing wonderful stuff about this, but you also have Thomas Carlyle writing wonderful things and Dickens writing wonderful things about all of these problems. Nevertheless, the broad liberal elite—the politicians and the key liberal thinkers—are basically saying we should stick with it. Bagehot would be a classic example of this, saying we should stick with parliamentary democracy, limited government, and laissez-faire economics.
What really happens at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, which fascinates me, is you get a whole bunch of liberal thinkers—self-consciously liberal thinkers—saying actually laissez-faire is not working anymore, and the limited state is not working anymore. You have people like Graham Wallas, who writes a wonderful book called The Great Society, which is later taken up for fascinating reasons in the United States. Or you get somebody like Hobhouse writing books called Liberalism. They are thinking within a liberal framework, and T.H. Green is reading Hegel and beginning to grapple with big questions about how to reconstitute liberalism.
These people are self-conscious liberals who say, “Let us take this philosophy, which has been so good for Britain, and reconstitute it.” They do so through something called “New Liberalism,” which argues for a more active role of the state, particularly in providing welfare and in resisting the rise of Germany, but which also says that we must not sacrifice fundamental liberal principles when we are doing all of these things.
That happens in America too. You get a simultaneous movement in the United States of New Liberals. The foundation of the magazine called The New Republic was an offshoot of this whole movement. You have Teddy Roosevelt saying that we have to save capitalism from itself. Capitalism is being destroyed by gigantism—by gigantic corporations and gigantic wealth—which is turning what should be a democratic republic into an aristocratic business oligarchy. Because business is much bigger in the United States than it is in Britain, his solution is antitrust—break up the big trusts—and inheritance taxes; let us try and dilute these huge fortunes.
In the heart of the Anglo-Saxon world, which is really the laissez-faire world, you get thinkers saying that we must change things. The reason I am emphasizing thinkers so much is that what happens with this new paradigm—developed largely by intellectuals, people at the LSE, at my old college at Oxford, Balliol, and to some extent at Harvard—is that it sends electricity and energy to reinvigorate the political class. Walter Lippmann is one of the communicators of this new philosophy.
Mounk: What most interests me about this moment is actually the ways in which liberals had to sacrifice some of their genuine taboos in order to reinvent themselves. The idea that private property was very important and that you needed to protect it from government overreach was central to liberalism, and for very good reasons. For centuries, it was the crown that tried to appropriate for itself all of the property of its citizens and subjects for its own purposes. Centuries of European politics were about the attempts of first the aristocracy and then the bourgeoisie to create some protections for their properties against arbitrary taxation and arbitrary extraction.
That is not just what created a lot of the space for political liberty; it is what created a lot of the growth of the 18th and 19th centuries, because it took those secure property rights to be able to have a system of large-scale investments and so on. Now you suddenly have new demands of the state saying we should tax people a lot in order to create these new social benefits. For a lot of liberals—for reasons that at that point in history seemed very profound—that seemed like a form of surrender. It seemed like the thin end of the wedge, and that we were going to go back to losing all of that security of tenure of property with terrible consequences, both for the subjection of the individual to the whim of the state and for the inability of people to invest. Who would invest if the moment you do that, you can have your property expropriated?
At the same time, you have this mounting social crisis. You have workers who do not have the benefit of regulation and therefore work incredibly long hours, children being pressed into service, and people having industrial accidents for which they are not appropriately compensated and becoming destitute overnight as a result. You have this incredible need for some of those economic changes. I think that liberalism found a way of incorporating a defense of a welfare state and a defense of a mixed economy within the constraints of liberal theory in a very productive way. This ensures that we still have enough property rights, that we have more giant corporations than we have had before, and an incredible amount of capital that is able to invest, reasonably confident that it will be able to enjoy the returns of that investment. That is a lot of what has created the continued economic growth we have had over the last 100 years.
We also have pretty generous welfare states that make sure that if you have an industrial accident, it will still affect your life negatively, but you are not going to be destitute as a result—even in the United States, where the welfare state is in some ways the least complete out of the advanced economies. But it took a real kind of wrangling with principles. I both want you to take us inside that wrangling with principles and, either now or later, to answer the question: what does that mean for us? What are the sacred cows of liberalism that we might need to slaughter in this moment in order to rejuvenate the tradition?
Wooldridge: Absolutely. I have painted a picture of a decadent liberal elite in the Reform Club and House of Commons sitting on their laurels, followed by a dynamic group like Churchill, Asquith, and Lloyd George coming along and solving problems. You are absolutely right to pick me up on that and ask: Is there not a real debate here, and are real sacrifices not being made?
Many liberals really thought that by opening the door to the welfare state, massed armies, antitrust legislation, and other compromises with a different sort of world, you were sacrificing too much. You were sacrificing the precious things which had made liberalism such a dynamic set of beliefs in the 19th century. There is a book published in 1905 by A.V. Dicey, the great British theorist, who says that liberalism is basically dead and finished because you have destroyed it. He argued that all of these pieces of legislation were destroying this great individualist philosophy.
I think we now would recognize that is not the case. What the liberals managed to do was take certain precious liberal principles, weigh them against other precious liberal principles, and create a new mixture—a new compromise. It is not as though you are moving from a world of perfection into a world of imperfection; you are balancing things against each other to create a new sort of balance.
I would say the interesting example of this is the meaning of freedom. We have Isaiah Berlin’s classic statement distinguishing between “freedom to” and “freedom from,” where he argues that the Hegelians and people in the late 19th century played an intellectual sleight of hand. He believed that freedom really means the old liberal classic sense of not being interfered with by the state. I think that is the “thin end of the wedge” argument gone too far.
When people like T. H. Green—whom Berlin rather mocks—tried to marry Hegelianism with liberalism, the New Liberals were right to say that providing certain goods through the state, such as free education, advances the cause of freedom. That is not an attack on individualism or freedom; it is enabling people to exercise their individual abilities and rights in a way that is commensurate with freedom. In other words, they were actually expanding the world of freedom.
Mounk: But Isaiah Berlin didn’t object to universal primary and secondary schooling, for example, right?
Wooldridge: No, he did not object to that, but he was saying that you should not justify it in the name of freedom. You should justify it in the name of other things. He argued that there is a confusion regarding this word “freedom.” I do not think that is true.
One of the things I argue in this book is that our notion of the individual has been impoverished by pure, Hayekian-style neoliberals who say that individualism is about allowing the individual not to be interfered with by other people. To them, the freedom that comes from that is essentially the freedom to go shopping. I do not think that is really what individualism and individual freedom are about. There are higher ends and lower ends; there is a whole process of self-development and self-improvement which is essential to what the liberal means by individualism.
Isaiah Berlin’s argument is that you are confusing terms. He would be in favor of primary education through the welfare state, but he would not be in favor of using the word “freedom” to justify it. I do not agree with that. Positive freedom can obviously be taken to ridiculous lengths, but I think the freedom to realize your abilities and exercise your talents is a very important form of individual freedom.
Mounk: I think that in different ways, both the identitarian left and the post-liberal right really attack the individualist core of liberalism. I had one leading post-liberal thinker on the podcast who was arguing that the problem with liberalism is that its essence is trying to maximize autonomy above all other considerations, and that is a huge problem. Then on the left you have somebody like Zohran Mamdani who has been ruling in a way that is not particularly liberal, using a phrase like “the joys of collectivism” in his inaugural speech to contrast with the supposed cold, joyless evils of individualism.
Look, I agree with you that this is based in part on the most extreme renderings of that individualism within the liberal tradition by people like Ayn Rand—who I think are not representative of a wider tradition—and in part even on caricatures of what those people think. The beginning of this is: why do you care about individualism? That goes back to the history of liberalism that you lay out in your book and that we laid out at the beginning of this conversation.
When liberals started caring about the ability of the individual to make their own choices about the world and to be true to their conscience, it was not the idea that you should be an egoist who does not care about anyone else and that true meaning consists in buying cheap clothes. It was that each individual has a very different idea of the highest goods and of community. I want to be in community with the people who share my religious beliefs, and you want to be in community with people who share yours. Those religious beliefs are not the same. If we both think that we can only be happy if everyone else follows our tune, we are going to have a giant civil war, as Europe did for over a century.
The way to think about this is that we need to make sure the state does not interfere with our conscience, our worship, or our forms of being in community, precisely so that different kinds of communities can thrive. Each person can then make their own decision about the extent to which they want to be part of this community or that community, or the extent to which they want to have a community-focused life. Some individuals are going to choose lives deeply embedded in the community they grew up in. Others are going to choose lives embedded in different communities they choose later. Others may choose lives that are autonomy-seeking and in search of self-expression. That is their right, too. Liberals do not have a preference between those three options. They do not say a good society is one where everyone abandons the religion of their ancestors. A good society is one where the state and the pressures of society do not impose that decision on you.
It is not clear to me—to go back to Isaiah Berlin, though we do not need to make it a debate about him—that this is not compatible with a broadly negative conception of liberty. I think everything I have said so far is perfectly compatible with a negative conception of liberty. It is also compatible to say that in order for people to grow up to be adults who can exercise those kinds of choices, you need primary and secondary education and a basic welfare state. You need this so people do not grow up in such poverty that intellectual development is stunted. It is good for everyone to educate future citizens so they can defend the political system and earn good incomes that keep society affluent. I think you can derive all of that from negative liberty.
Then you can say other things matter too; it is not just liberty that matters, which is one point Berlin makes. Then it comes to the question of positive liberty. As I recall Berlin’s concern, it is really one about coercion. Once you say you do not just understand liberty as an absence of constraints, but as living life in the “right” ways or fully exercising your autonomy, you enter a danger zone. According to Berlin, it is actually the positive conception of liberty that is autonomy-seeking in that sense. It becomes very easy to say: “I know you think you want to be secular, but that is not how to lead a meaningful life. The way to lead a meaningful life is to be a good Christian, so in your interest, we are going to force you to be a good Christian.” Or you say: “You think all you want is to be a private individual who enjoys playing computer games, but the truly meaningful life is to be a part of the proletariat as a universal class. We are going to force you to partake in the political activities of the proletariat because that is where true freedom lies.”
Isaiah Berlin is precisely responding to the pressures of a totalitarian age—to the sense that the “joys of collectiveness” really define society and you need to partake in them to have a meaningful life. That is where you get into a danger zone where the claim of political elites that they know what true freedom consists in for you creates the fig leaf for the worst forms of state coercion. From the perspective of Berlin, we have just lived through that with fascism and communism.
Wooldridge: Of course, and I can sympathize with that, but it is a sort of “thin end of the wedge” argument in the sense that obviously some terrible state actors have used the notion of positive freedom to coerce people. They say, “Unless you agree with me, you are a terrible person and doing the wrong things.”
However, I think there is a sense in which our freedom to pursue our own preferences is not enough in itself, because there is a question of what those preferences are. Those preferences can be high or low. What liberal education is all about—and I am going to talk about this a little bit—is shaping our preferences so that they are aesthetically and socially good rather than bad.
To revert to your original point about the people you have talked to—post-liberals and left-wing identitarians who are critical of liberalism—if they say that the problem with liberalism is that it is a shallow philosophy that does not address meaning or deal with interesting questions, I sympathize with them. That has been the position of all too many parts of the liberal establishment, particularly the neoliberal and libertarian establishments. They have said that we must maximize autonomy and construct a society which gives primary aim to consumer choice.
If you think about our education policies in the last few years, there has been an enormous emphasis on vouchers, choice, or internal markets, treating the parent or the child as a consumer. I sympathize with the critics, but I think they are attacking something which is not fundamental to liberalism and is based on a misreading of it.
If you go back to John Stuart Mill—a wonderful, brilliant writer—and look at what he says in On Liberty and in his autobiography, he has a much richer notion of what personal autonomy means. He has a radical break with the utilitarians and with Jeremy Bentham in particular. Bentham famously said basically that there is no difference between “pushpin”—which we might call video games today—and poetry. In that view, the individual is a machine seeking satisfaction, and that is all there is to the world. That is a view that re-emerges with modern neoliberalism.
Mill says, “No, poetry is better than pushpin.” He believes there are certain preferences that we should have, and his view is that you need to educate those preferences. You need to make sure that as the child grows up, they are taught that certain things are good and certain aesthetic values are worth pursuing because they make our life more fulfilling.
He is also very influenced by Coleridge, who has this notion of the “clerisy.” These are people who devote their lives to transmitting the higher values of culture, teaching in schools and universities the value of the true, the just, and the beautiful. Liberal education is a movement of taking people with a bunch of basic desires and turning them into fully formed human beings. In order to make them free, you have to educate them, and that education must be sustained by a culture kept alive by intellectual traditions. I think that is what T. H. Green is arguing for.
That is something that really matters in our defense of liberalism against the post-liberals and the identitarian left. If you are concerned about the meaning of life, liberalism has an answer, but the answer does not lie in imposing beliefs from the outside. It does not lie in getting rid of all property, nationalizing things, or forced community. It lies in the cultivated individual who is treated as an individual. This notion of Bildung—self-development—in thinkers like Humboldt is absolutely central to what liberalism is about.
In the rest of this conversation, Adrian and Yascha discuss where liberalism has gone wrong and how to fix it. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
As the backlash to transgender activism went mainstream in the United States, so have postmortems of the movement. A sharp decline in public support now has large majorities of Americans rejecting policies such as trans women in female sports, which a 2025 New York Times/Ipsos survey found 79% of Americans and 67% of Democrats opposed. In 2025, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Skrmetti that states had the right to ban youth gender medicine. And in 2024, President Donald Trump soared to electoral victory on the wings of his “Kamala is for They/Them” ad campaign, which, according to an analysis by the super PAC Future Forward, shifted the race 2.7 points in his favor among voters who saw it. With progressives’ iron grip on the culture loosened, and trans politics definitively revealed as a losing political issue for Democrats, commentators have fallen over themselves to criticize the counterproductive aspects of trans activism, or to suggest alternative policy approaches. But when writers and talking heads assess “what went wrong,” they usually do so through the lens of “what did the trans movement do that caused such a fierce backlash?” The question that often goes unasked is: “How and why did the trans movement become so radical in the first place?”
The answer is layered and multifactorial, but it also boils down to human nature: trans activists tried to bully their way to progress because they believed they could—there was a moment of opportunity where the movement had the wind at its back and there was a tendency (which proved disastrous) to be as ambitious as possible. Any accurate analysis has to start and end there.
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Many observers have grasped at the mainstreamization of queer theory or the LGBT movement’s reorientation of priorities after the 2015 Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court case as the main culprits. (Andrew Sullivan wrote a highly influential op-ed making the latter argument.) But these narratives don’t explain quite as much as they purport to. It’s hardly as if young, otherwise liberal-minded people were suddenly radicalized by narcolepsy-inducing tomes of queer theory written decades before they were born. And it’s not as if the LGBT movement moved money in a different direction and, with that, suddenly changed all of their values. As so often, politics lies downstream from culture. Once we understand the cultural trends of a particular moment in time, the ruinous decisions of a small number of activists—who could have followed the consensus-building, coalition-expanding playbook of the gay rights movement but instead embraced extremism—begin to make sense.
The first thing to recognize is that trans rights was poised to become a major issue almost no matter what happened within a more narrowly political sphere. Trans visibility in popular culture and in online discourse had been steadily increasing throughout the 2000s and early 2010s. In June 2014, a full year before the landmark Obergefell Supreme Court decision ensured constitutional protection for same-sex marriage, Time ran the cover story “The Transgender Tipping Point,” declaring trans “America’s next civil rights frontier.” Recall also that Caitlyn Jenner came out as a trans woman prior to Obergefell. The movement was always going to assume public centrality. Facile theories that pin the blame for the movement’s radicalization on a shift in resource allocation following Obergefell don’t fully explain the illiberal turn—most of the groups in this space had been decidedly liberal up to that point. But at this moment in the 2010s, social media pushed a more radical turn in the discourse all across the society. And dynamics within the trans movement itself broadened the definition of trans in a way that became purely political—and that had a pronounced radicalizing tendency.
What mattered most was a shift from a medicalized conception of what it meant to be trans, which previously had been predominant. Trans, which was short for transsexual, originally referred to people diagnosed with gender dysphoria who transitioned both socially and medically to live and “pass” as the opposite sex. In the early-to-mid-2010s, a sea change occurred within trans circles, abetted by the movement’s newfound popularity and the catalyst of social media. Old-school transsexuals—who came to be known as “transmedicalists”—were quickly outnumbered by a growing cohort of people with a radically different view of trans. For this latter group, medical diagnoses were not only unnecessary; the requirement to obtain them was also dehumanizing. Medical transition, for them, was no determinant of one’s transness. To this emerging generation of trans people and allies, to be trans one merely had to identify as trans, nothing more.
It’s not difficult to see why many found the view of trans as an identity to be affirmed less demeaning and more uplifting than viewing it as a disorder to be treated or a condition to be managed. In practice, however, this rejection of “gatekeeping” opened a Pandora’s box that dramatically expanded the trans community with an influx of people who were, for lack of a better term, politically trans.
In the span of about a decade, trans people went from being 0.3% of U.S. adults in 2011 to 1.6% (and 5.1% among young adults) in 2022. A 2022 survey also found that just 31% of trans-identified adults had used hormone treatments or puberty blockers, and only 16% had surgically transitioned. Transsexualism had been displaced by a new group of people—often identifying as non-binary, and sometimes for overtly political reasons—some of whom may not have changed anything in their lives other than their pronouns. As trans evolved away from a psychological condition and toward a political identity, the nature of the movement’s ideology and activism couldn’t help but change too. (A tragic irony here is that this eschewal of medicalization did not stop activists from making youth gender medicine integral to their policy agenda.)
Those shifts within the trans movement coincided with a broader cultural sea change that exacerbated all possible tendencies towards radicalization. By the mid-2010s, political polarization was on the rise in the United States, with members of both parties displaying steadily greater antipathy to one another. The arrival and chaotic reign of the country’s most polarizing president only kicked this trend into overdrive.
In 2016 and 2017, amid the raging culture wars between MAGA and the #Resistance, negative partisanship became the political north star for finding “the right side of history” on every political issue. For Democrats, or those left of center, one simply needed to observe whatever animated Republicans, and then automatically take the opposite stance. The more vehement one team became, the more vehement the other had to be in response, no thinking required. When Republicans in North Carolina passed the first statewide law barring trans people from using the public restrooms of their choice in 2016, followed by dozens of other states, trans issues were officially sucked into the culture wars and thus the #Resistance. Blue-team America and the institutions they controlled had already been pro-LGBT, to be sure, but it wasn’t until the flood of GOP “bathroom bills” that liberal normies the country over adopted trans rights as one of the central planks of what it meant to oppose Donald Trump. What specifically this entailed, which ideas and policies were being advocated, and who was being empowered—those were insignificant details.
In the span of three years, trans activism became not only the beneficiary of an infusion of cash and support from gay rights groups, but it was also handed a level of cultural and institutional power unprecedented for a movement barely out of its infancy.1 From 2018 to 2023, the trans movement held considerable sway in virtually every avenue of culture and information, from universities to government agencies to nonprofits, entertainment companies, streaming services, social media platforms, publishing houses, media outlets, major corporations, professional associations, and even K-12 schools. In 2014, trans issues were hardly a blip on the public’s radar. By the end of the decade, institutional America marched in lockstep with trans activism while the mainstream press covered its most contested edge cases as though they were settled issues.
Even in deep red states, trans activism flexed its muscle. For example, the controversial policy adopted in many K-12 schools in which faculty were instructed to actively conceal students’ trans identities from their parents was not merely a phenomenon in the urban power centers of coastal progressive cities. These policies were also adopted in schools in states like Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Texas.
It is difficult to overstate just how historically unusual this meteoric ascension was, and how completely it changed the perceptions and incentives of activists.
Nearly every prominent social movement of the past few hundred years, from abolitionism to women’s rights to civil rights, spent generations raising awareness, laying groundwork, planting seeds, organizing, and changing hearts and minds before they gained anything like the power the trans movement was gifted. At every step in their slow climb toward progress, these previous movements were keenly aware of how precarious their gains were and how easily a severe misstep could undo many years of patient labor. The trans movement had no need for such considerations.
Whereas the lesbian, gay, and bi rights movement was a rags-to-riches story of long decades spent toiling to shift attitudes, trans activism had everything handed to it—the movement was the beneficiary of decades of hard work from the LGB struggle and all it had to do, really, was to not snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Instead, flush with newfound cultural power and a sense of invincibility, the trans movement regarded public opinion, persuasion, civility, incrementalism, and even winning elections as irrelevant. Trans activists’ experience was not one of clawing their way into relevance by playing the long game like the gay and bi activists of yesteryear. Rather, it was, as I wrote in 2023, the understanding that they could “bypass politics altogether and simply seize progress and carry it off like an unprosecuted shoplifter in a San Francisco Walgreens.” And so they did, wielding accusations of transphobia like a cudgel and watching the professional classes fold like cheap suits. Why bother trying to convince dissenters when you can circumvent or steamroll them? Why worry about protecting past gains when new ones come so effortlessly?
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Why did so many trans activists behave like authoritarian bullies, or try to force through the most uncompromising and maximalist version of their ideas, including hormone therapy and surgery for minors, against the will of an ever-skeptical public? Because they could. Why did they think it would work? Because, for a solid five years, it did. But it was a mirage.
Given the right conditions, like the sudden popularity of trans causes in the mid-2010s, a minority can forget that they are, in fact, in the minority. But eventually, reality asserts itself. In a free society, policies and ideas that are wildly unpopular are eventually repudiated, however spellbound the majority might be for a time. The rise and fall of trans activism is a cautionary tale about the dangers of too much power suddenly falling into one’s lap. One need only look at the horror stories of far too many lottery winners to see an eerily similar dynamic—being handed winnings without a proper foundation can result in losing everything.
Somewhere in the multiverse, there’s an alternate timeline in which trans activism grew more slowly and steadily, pushed and pulled by the tidal tensions of democratic pressures, forcing it to smooth over the extreme edges, engage skeptics, and hear out the moderate, concerned, or dissenting voices within the community. There’s a world out there in which the trans movement followed in the footsteps of previous campaigns for human rights by building durable liberal progress. Sadly, that’s not how things played out in our timeline. But it’s never too late to, well, do better.
Jamie Paul is a writer based in Greater Philadelphia, founder of American Dreaming, managing editor at Queer Majority, and contributing editor at Bi.org.
1Some trans activists, especially those from older generations, take umbrage at the characterization of the late 2000s or early 2010s as the beginning of the trans movement. They point to activists from generations prior, even going back to the famed German sexologist and LGBT pioneer Magnus Hirschfeld in the early decades of the 20th century. It is certainly true that there were people who advocated for trans rights prior to the modern era, but that does not constitute a proper “movement.”
It is hard to overstate what a complete shambles American foreign policy has become since Donald Trump launched his war against Iran on February 28. Trump clearly believed that the initial decapitation strike would lead to the collapse of the Islamic regime and its replacement by a new leadership willing to work with the United States. He seems to have had Venezuela on his mind as a model, as he referred to it several times during the war’s first week. He and his associates failed to anticipate Iran’s capacity to strike back, as it launched rounds of missiles and drones at U.S. allies and bases in the region, disrupting Gulf economies and raising gasoline prices in the United States.
What is particularly maddening about this is that anyone who has lived through the last quarter century of U.S. Middle East policy should have understood that war would produce multiple unintended and devastating consequences.
After the Twin Tower attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States had good cause to intervene against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, since it had sheltered al-Qaida terrorists who were directly responsible for the deaths of thousands of Americans. The apparent success of this regime change operation emboldened the Bush Administration to intervene in Iraq in March 2003 and topple Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist government.
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The United States then had two collapsed regimes on its hands. The problem was not one of democratic nation-building. Before you can have a democracy, you need to have a state, and the United States was completely at a loss as to how to create a state that, by Max Weber’s famous definition, could exercise a legitimate monopoly of force over a defined territory. Both post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq hosted multiple militias and power centers that challenged the authority of the friendly governments that the United States tried to install. This mistake was then repeated by the Obama administration during the Arab Spring, which used airpower to stop Muammar Gaddafi’s attempt to reassert control over Benghazi.
The Libyan civil war that broke out thereafter is still ongoing; the Taliban is back in power in Afghanistan; and Iraq is ruled by a corrupt and shaky government that has been more closely aligned with Iran than the United States over the years.
The single lesson that should have been drawn from these debacles is that military power itself is not sufficient to bring about the kinds of political change desired by U.S. foreign policy. This was true in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United States was willing to place hundreds of thousands of “boots on the ground.” Airpower by itself has an even lower chance of directing political outcomes.
Let’s be clear. Regime change is often the only solution to the problem of rogue states that oppress their own people and spread instability to wider regions. The disruption they cause can be contained by other means, but containment does not solve the underlying problem. The Iranian Islamic Republic is one such regime, whose nearly 50-year reign has produced brutal oppression inside the country and seeded dangerous Shiite proxies throughout the Middle East.
The problem is thus not the concept of regime change, but what is required to bring it about. Despite its deep unpopularity, the Islamic regime is rooted in parts of Iranian society. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij that sustain it have strong self-interests in not losing power; such a loss would mean not just an end to their economic livelihoods, but an end to their lives as popular forces take revenge. It is hard to judge the strength of the religious ideology that remains today, but it clearly motivates a certain core of regime supporters and is something that did not exist in either Latin America or Eastern Europe after their experience with military dictatorships and communism.
Conversely, the opposition in Iran is highly fragmented. There is no organized leadership, much less a democratic one, comparable to María Corina Machado’s movement in Venezuela. Like Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Iran is ethnically divided with Kurdish, Azeri, Baluch, Turkmen, and other ethnic minorities clustered in different regions. During the Eastern European transitions, the United States was working with a European Union that served as an inspiration to democratic opposition forces; today, it is working with a right-wing Israeli government that is widely distrusted and detested in the region.
Replacing the current regime with a more U.S.-friendly one is thus an enormous task, and one that cannot be accomplished by airpower alone. Indeed, earlier experience indicates that it could not be accomplished even with large numbers of ground forces in the country. As I noted in a previous post, the United States and Israel have by now taken out most of the visible military facilities in Iran, and are moving, for lack of other targets, to attack infrastructure that serves ordinary people. These include oil storage facilities, electrical grids, desalination plants, and other dual-use civilian targets. This shift puts the United States directly at odds with the Iranian people that it claims to want to support.
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The United States has thus far avoided strikes on Iran’s major oil terminal at Kharg Island. Why it has done so is not clear; perhaps some in the Trump administration think that they could have access to Iranian oil under a new regime. But the temptation to go after the economic base of the Iranian regime’s power will only increase over time as the regime fails to capitulate.
The Trump administration is behaving as if it were born yesterday, innocent of any of the accumulated understanding of regional politics or of the sources of earlier American policy failures. Indeed, it has expressed contempt for experts coming out of the establishment—diplomats, intelligence analysts, military officers, and many others—and sidelined them. Instead, it has relied on a small circle of sycophantic Trump loyalists, none of whom are likely to give the president realistic assessments of the way forward.
Consequently, the administration is making it up from day to day. At one moment, Trump says the war is essentially over; the next day Pete Hegseth says it will continue for some time. One day President Trump says the U.S. objective is “unconditional surrender”; another day his press spokesperson Karoline Leavitt says that it is America that will decide when Iran has unconditionally surrendered. I can just imagine the contortions she will resort to at the press conference after such a declaration, when Iran is continuing to lob drones and missiles across the Middle East.
The world has become a very dangerous place because its most powerful country is under the control of a ten-year-old boy. That boy discovered a flamethrower in his parents’ back yard, and is now enjoying the ability to burn things up with it.
His parents need to get him under control.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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About a year ago, Bernard Schweizer and John Tomasi asked me to contribute to a new book about viewpoint diversity. As regular readers of this Substack know, I have long worried about the narrowing of opinion in many professional circles, and am a big advocate of reanimating real debate, especially within elite circles. But it occurred to me that I had not really expressed my ideas on viewpoint diversity and its importance in one accessible essay. So I agreed to contribute to the volume—under the condition of being able to share it directly with you, my most valued audience.
That book is now out. It includes contributions by great writers—and Persuasion regulars—from Jonathan Haidt to Jesse Singal and from Eboo Patel to Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Here is a lightly edited version of my contribution to it; I hope you’ll enjoy reading it.
—Yascha
P.S: I had a rather memorable experience interviewing—or rather, trying to interview—Klaus Schwab, the founder of the World Economic Forum, a few weeks ago. If you have not yet listened to one of the more memorable episodes of The Good Fight, set up the podcast here (or read the transcript)!
(Photo via Getty Images.)The year 2026 is a strange time to worry about viewpoint diversity. In the palm of my hand, I am holding a smart phone which gives me access to a greater diversity of views than has perhaps ever before been available to humans. On social media apps, in podcasts followed by millions of people, and increasingly even in traditional media, I can follow people who argue for communism and for fascism, listen to them making the case for social justice or for Islamic theocracy, or seek out those who will urge me to become a Catholic monk or a Hasidic Jew.
Since the large-scale deployment of artificial intelligence, I can even ask ChatGPT or Claude or DeepSeek to state whatever argument I choose in the tones and the style of any moral tradition that takes my fancy. John Stuart Mill famously argued that it is crucial to hold our beliefs as living truths rather than dead dogmas, something that would only be possible if we were exposed to a genuine diversity of views. “If opponents of all important truths do not exist,” he suggested, “it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skillful devil’s advocate can conjure up.” Today, that devil’s advocate is accessible to any human with an internet connection.
And yet, the unprecedented diversity of viewpoints that is now available to—and to some extent inescapable for—the citizens of modern democracies coexist with a greater homogeneity of thought in key spheres of civil society than has been characteristic of life in the West in any historical epoch since the Victorian period. If you are an artist or an academic or a social worker or a psychologist—or, increasingly, a journalist or doctor or lawyer or civil servant—you likely operate in a social milieu in which the range of respectable opinion is strikingly narrow.
Oddly, that adherence to a narrow band of opinion is largely self-imposed. There are (at least in the United States—the story is sadly rather different in much of Europe) no formal legal constraints on expressing a different point of view. The modes of censorship that leading social media companies, in clandestine cooperation with the state, imposed for the past decade have largely disappeared. There is even a good living in refusing to toe that line: You can accumulate a lot of fame and perhaps ascend to the highest echelons of political power by assailing those respectable nostrums, turning yourself into an angry pundit. But if you happen to be a normie professional who simply wants to enjoy a good career and a peaceful life, the incentive to pay lip service to a list of narrow articles of faith remains overwhelming.
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Homogeneity breeds conformity. Because many of these professions are now so dominated by people with one point of view, the rising generation of professionals tends to share the same outlook. And where the conformity isn’t genuine, coercion can create its appearance. Surveys reveal that an astonishing share of people in a broad range of professions regularly engage in self-censorship.
I have come to think of this strange coexistence between an unprecedented variety of opinions that are strongly represented in the public square and the rigid worldview that constrains the beliefs of the most influential people in our society as the paradox of infinite voices and narrow minds. Never before have so many opinions been at our fingertips—and never before have so many professionals felt unable to voice theirs. What explains this paradox, why does it matter, and what can we do about it?
The Brooklynization of the BourgeoisieIt is impossible to understand the recent politics of the Western world without considering a giant sociological transformation—one that, inevitable though it may seem in retrospect, nearly nobody predicted: The bourgeoisie has switched sides.
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the proletariat was the political stronghold of the left. The bourgeoisie was the stronghold of the right. Indeed, the assumption that affluent professionals would tend to be conservative is reflected in the most famous political treatises and pieces of art that the period produced.
Karl Marx called on the workers, not on the lawyers or freelance illustrators, of the world to unite. The origins of Germany’s Social Democratic Party, of Britain’s Labour Party, and even of the modern-day Democratic Party in the United States lie with factory workers and trade unionists. In Jacques Brel’s song “Les Bourgeois,” three young men mock the conservative pieties of their elders by mooning the notaries of a small French town; when, by song’s end, the protagonists, themselves now middle-aged notaries, respond in anger to being mooned in turn, the obvious implication is that they too have turned into conservatives.
But of late, these realities have started to shift, with huge impacts on contemporary politics. It is astonishing, for example, that according to The Economist, the socio-economic profile of the coalition assembled by Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential candidate in 2024, most closely resembles the socio-economic profile of the coalition assembled by Bob Dole, the Republican presidential candidate, in 1996. (Unsurprisingly, both lost.)
This transformation is even visible in the realm of popular culture. Take, as an example, the most famous American cartoon of the last decades. When The Simpsons first aired, Homer Simpson was likely a Democrat, his pious neighbor Ned Flanders definitely a Republican. But over the three decades that the show has been on air, the nature of America’s partisan divide has shifted so much that any politically astute viewer would now assume these characters to have rather different loyalties. Flanders may be sufficiently alienated by the coarseness of the populist right to vote for the Democrats; Homer would undoubtedly support Donald Trump.
This transformation has been called by a variety of names. Thomas Piketty has described it as the rise of the Brahmin left. David Brooks has written about the rise of the Bobo. Matthew Yglesias has lamented the rise of The Groups. I propose to call it the Brooklynization of the Bourgeoisie: New York’s wealthy used to live on the Upper East Side, to pride themselves on their old family ties, to value markers of high culture like the opera, and to vote conservative; today, they live in Brooklyn, believe that they have earned their place in the upper echelons of society thanks to succeeding in a meritocratic competition, are more likely to care about rock bands or microbrews, and think of themselves as progressive.
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That same transformation also helps to explain the Paradox of Infinite Voices and Narrow Minds. The population of the United States, and of many other Western democracies, is now deeply stratified by educational achievement. The affluent and highly credentialed are mostly on the political left. The working class is increasingly drifting to the political right. And that has deeply transformed the composition, the values, and even the actions of the professional class.
Plumbers are right wing but lawyers are left wing. Cab drivers are right wing but university professors are left wing. Police officers are right wing but civil servants are left wing. And though many professions claim to be apolitical, the plumbers and cab drivers and police officers increasingly suspect that the lawyers and professors and civil servants are letting their political values influence their work. The decline in respect for “experts” is in part owed to the blatant lies spread on social media; but it also has its roots in the real ways in which the consensus within these professions has increasingly come to adhere to a narrowly progressive—and often lamentably erroneous—set of assumptions about the world.
The Brooklynization of the Bourgeoisie also has another side effect. Lawyers, university professors, and civil servants have outsized influence on the rules, norms, and decisions that structure a lot of day-to-day life. And that leaves many less-affluent and less-educated citizens feeling that the democracy they were promised is a sham. “We are the majority,” they complain, “but no one listens to us.”
The resulting state of affairs leaves both sides equally unhappy. Many citizens feel ignored, besieged, and detested by a professional class which believes that it is entitled to rule, and finds the views of many of their compatriots intolerably bigoted. That is of great political significance because, even in highly affluent countries, there are more tradespeople, cab drivers, and police officers than there are lawyers, university professors, and civil servants. Meanwhile, members of the professional class feel bewildered at the lack of respect for their expertise, and fearful that the barbarians at the political gates will soon come for their heads.
What one side perceives as flagrantly unjust domination by the well-credentialed, the other interprets as the perils of revanchist demagoguery.
Barbarians Inside the GateThere is one group of professionals that I have so far omitted to mention: elected officials. These officials differ from other upper middle-class professionals because voters ostensibly select them for their political views. But in sharp contrast to the past, when many of them, especially on the left, had working-class backgrounds, nearly all of them have also undergone an extensive process of socialization as middle-class professionals. With few exceptions, elected officials in the United States, the United Kingdom, and most of continental Europe, have attended universities, spent long periods of time living in big urban centers of economic opportunity, perhaps worked in fields like the law, media, or academia, and now make upper middle-class wages. If it looks like a professional, talks like a professional, and earns like a professional, then it is probably a professional—with all the cultural and ideological accoutrements that nowadays come with that status.
It should, then, come as no surprise that, as a recent paper by Laurenz Günther shows, a significant gap has formed between the views of elected officials and those of the voters they are supposed to represent. In Germany in 2013, at a time when right-wing populists had not yet made it into the national parliament, for example, the average politician was much more likely than the average voter to say that it should be easier to immigrate to the country. In fact, even the average member of the Bundestag for the Christian Democrats, the most right-leaning party to be represented in that body at that time, was well to the left of the median voter on this question.
Similar gaps of political representation, Günther shows, also held in other countries and for other topics. They are evident in questions about how severe the sentences for violent criminals should be; in questions about whether schools should teach students to obey social authorities; and in questions about whether politicians should prioritize the fight against climate change over economic growth.
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There are many partial explanations for the astonishing success of populist parties over the past decade. The rise of the internet and of social media, for example, clearly made it easier for outsiders to storm the political stage and intensified the public’s tendency to see the world in unremittingly negative terms. But as Günther suggests, the big gap in views about cultural topics between most voters and most of their representatives surely played an important role: The most straightforward reason why right-wing populists have gained so much in vote share of late “is that they fill the cultural representation gap.”
The lack of viewpoint diversity in important professions does real harm to their ability to deliver on their mission. A psychologist who prioritizes the abstract demands of social justice over the well-being of the patient sitting in front of him in his office fails to live up to his duty of healing patients. A social scientist who is so afraid of what her colleagues might say about her latest study if its findings happen to run counter to some sacred article of faith fails to live up to her duty of advancing human knowledge. But these kinds of harms only capture the most immediate impact of the Brooklynization of the Bourgeoisie. Its ultimate harm stems from the representation gap that has opened up between ordinary citizens and those calling the shots in society—and the counterproductive rebellion it inspired.
How Not to MAGAPopulists are able to win power in good part because they promise their voters that they will do what they can to close this representation gap. Legislators, they say, will finally start listening to the views of the people. Professions that have been captured by ideologues enforcing a narrow orthodoxy will be forced to become more representative. Institutions which once had disdain for ordinary people will finally feel their wrath.
There are real reasons why these promises have proven so enticing. Anybody who completely dismisses the fact that this anger is based in real failings of the professional elite is refusing to grapple seriously with this political moment. And yet, the record of populists in India and Turkey, in Hungary and Venezuela suggests that these promises are rarely fulfilled—and the first year of Donald Trump’s second administration in the United States only serves to reinforce that suspicion.
When populists rise to power, they tend to assail institutions that have lost the trust of the population. In the United States, for example, Donald Trump has exploited the unpopularity of universities like Harvard and Columbia by subjecting them to an unprecedented assault from the federal government. The ostensible purpose of this assault was to right the ways in which they had become inhospitable to opinions which violated rigid campus orthodoxies. And in certain particulars, those complaints really were well-founded. It is now, for example, well-documented that the mandatory diversity statements which many universities used in their hiring processes over the course of the past decade in practice forced applicants to pay lip service to the mantras of critical race theory (with anybody who refused to comply excluded from serious consideration).
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But it has also quickly become obvious that the White House was never truly interested in broadening the range of views which would be permissible, or even those that would be commonly represented, on the nation’s most prestigious college campuses. Instead, it seems to have two goals, which may stand in slight tension with each other, but are equally inimical to the true cause of viewpoint diversity.
To the extent possible, recent executive orders and other administrative actions by the White House have sought to replace one set of dogmas with another. Instead of pushing back against the forms of ideological coercion which do persist, they have simply created a new set of do’s and don’ts. If it was previously taboo to criticize the nostrums of critical race theory, a raft of new laws, executive orders, and administrative fiats attempt to stifle academics who teach these ideas. And instead of mandating that virtually all research must in some way promote the cause of diversity, public funding bodies have indiscriminately cut grants which commit the faux pas of mentioning such terms in any way—in the most absurd cases, even if they used them in a wholly unpolitical context.
At the same time, the White House also seems to have recognized that no amount of pressure from the federal government will transform the ideological leanings of most faculty at leading universities. And so, its recent activity appears to aim as much at weakening as at transforming these institutions. The point is not to change the culture at institutions which populists rightly recognize as hostile to their worldview; increasingly, it is to weaken the power bastion of their ideological adversary at any cost.
From a purely partisan standpoint, this is probably a shrewd judgment. The cynics in the White House who have concluded that the cause of the MAGA movement is better served by besieging than by reforming universities may be right about how difficult it would be for legislative fiat to undo the long-term effects of a much deeper sociological transformation of the professional class. But anybody who cares about preserving institutions that actually allow a broad range of people to do science, to argue about the world, and to criticize the powerful in honest and intelligent terms should be appalled by what is being sacrificed in the process. To undermine the great contributions that the United States has made in fields from computing to neuroscience in the service of undermining the department of comparative literature is both bad for humanity and for anybody who genuinely aspires to make America great again.
Diversity of Institutions (Within and Between)It is hard to see a quick way out of the Paradox of Infinite Voices and Narrow Minds. This political moment increasingly resembles a Greek tragedy whose protagonists, unable to grasp the larger forces that determine their actions, are quickly gaining ground on the abyss. The professionals whose values are so far out of keeping with those of the rest of the population and the populists who are promising to use all the power they can amass to let the will of the people prevail see each other as mortal enemies; what neither seems to grasp is that they are actually one another’s biggest assets. And whoever ends up winning, it is the goal of viewpoint diversity—and the deeper values, like freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, with which it is intimately intertwined—which is likely to perish as a result.
The technological forces which have allowed such a great variety of viewpoints to enter the public square are unlikely to subside. The sociological transformations which have created a professional class beholden to an ideologically narrow set of nostrums are unlikely to reverse. And the populists who have been empowered by the resulting gap between the actions of key social institutions and the views of ordinary people are, despite their promises, likely to keep limiting true diversity of viewpoints in their own ways. It’s easy to see how things could go from bad to worse.
For the most part, the solution to this narrow problem hinges on the solution to a much broader set of problems. Institutions that want to sustain broad legitimacy must recall that they should be more beholden to their founding missions than to the ideological predilections of their members. This applies to institutions from Harvard to NPR and from the Ford Foundation to Coca-Cola. It also, of course, applies to political parties: If mainstream parties cared deeply about basic constitutional values, and were able to close the cultural representation gap, they would leave much less oxygen for demagogues who blithely reject those commitments.
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There is, however, one more direct change that advocates of viewpoint diversity can try to bring about in the meantime: One of the reasons why a diversity of viewpoints could so quickly have eroded within the professional world has to do with the fact that there has been a concerted attack on the ability to express different opinions in places like Harvard or Columbia. But another big reason is that there is so little true diversity between institutions, with many colleges and law firms and corporations adopting increasingly similar cultures, policies, and operating procedures. And this suggests that one of the partial solutions lies in establishing new institutions that differ radically from the old.
There are over two thousand colleges in the United States. At the lower end of social prestige, there is a great variety of such institutions, from community colleges serving heavily immigrant communities to religious schools preaching the Good News about Jesus. But all the schools at the top range of prestige have over the past decades come to resemble each other to a remarkable degree. However much their respective college tour guides may wax lyrical to visiting high school seniors about their idiosyncratic local traditions, Harvard and Princeton, Yale and Stanford, Duke and Columbia are all examples of what biologists call “convergent evolution.” It is not just in the substance of their prevailing views that they constantly copy and emulate each other; it is also in the design of their curricula, in the way they finance their institutions, and in the criteria they use to select their undergraduate classes.
The same holds true in many other realms. There are tens of thousands of law firms in the United States. But the culture at the most prestigious, from Cravath to Skadden to Wachtell, is much more similar than that variety might suggest to a naive observer. Even the mainstream press suffers from the same malady, especially when it comes to proudly progressive publications. A few decades ago, there were distinctive differences in style and content between Dissent, The Nation, and The New Republic; a well-versed reader could probably have guessed with a high degree of accuracy which article had appeared in which of these publications. Today, these magazines have largely lost their distinctive identities; just about any article which appears in one of these publications could just as easily appear in another.
The situation is, of course, even worse in those areas in which one or two institutions hold outsized sway. Top-level researchers in the natural sciences need to plan their research, more or less, in such a way that it meets with the approval of the National Institutes of Health or the National Science Foundation. Psychologists must abide by the dicta of the American Psychological Association. And researchers in global health better make sure that their proposed work fits the agenda of the biggest private philanthropists in the field, such as the Gates Foundation.
It is this tendency towards convergent evolution which makes it so hard to sustain a genuine variety of thought and opinion within the professional class. If one prestigious university applied different standards for admission and hiring than another, if the culture of one law firm radically diverged from that of another, if the journalistic enforcers of ideological orthodoxies still had genuine debates among themselves, if scientists were not beholden to a tiny number of funding bodies, and if professional associations were less quick to impose their ideological certainties on their members, professionals with dissident—or merely diffident—views would find it much easier to sustain thriving careers and speak their minds.
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Thankfully, there are some incipient signs that those professionals who have grown uncomfortable within mainstream institutions, or been cast out for daring to speak up, are starting to organize. Across the country, new universities and alternative media outlets and rival professional associations are forming. It is too early to know whether they will succeed in establishing genuine alternatives to existing structures, and even whether they will actually stick to their ostensible mission of promoting viewpoint diversity. But they are a small green shoot amidst a devastating drought.
The cause of viewpoint diversity remains much imperiled. One of the best ways to serve this embattled cause is to widen our understanding of what its success will require, both now and when the political constellation shall change: true diversity, both within and between institutions. If we want viewpoint diversity, we must not only protect dissenting voices—but also cultivate dissenting institutions.
This essay originally appeared in “Viewpoint Diversity: What It Is, Why We Need It, and How to Get It,” co-edited by John Tomasi and Bernard Schweizer, and published by Heresy Press.
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