Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • The End of “Legitimacy”
    Tehran on March 1, 2026. (Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    As far back as I can remember, I always assumed that I was on the side of the good guys. The Cold War meant, at core, democracy against authoritarianism. The wars of the ‘90s were sometimes a bit far-fetched but, in a pinch, they could be construed as demonstrating the reach of American benevolence—willing to launch a bombing campaign for the Kosovar Albanians! The Bush wars of the 2000s were obviously pushing things, but the administration did take the trouble of going to the UN to provide a justification for what it was doing—stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and removing a dictator.

    All of that might have been a bit threadbare, but there was an attempt to provide a fig leaf of respectability to the exercise of raw power. With the attack on Iran, that is gone—and likely gone for good. We move from an era of seeing the United States as the “leader of the free world” constraining authoritarianism—and as the broker of a “Pax Americana” protecting the edges of an international order—to seeing the United States simply as a hegemon throwing around the considerable weight it has in competition with other hegemons. A cynic would say that this is always the way it has been—and the cynic would be hard to argue with—but the forms and ceremonies do matter. Once those are gone, it becomes incredibly difficult to legitimate the exercise of power again. The rest of the world will see the future exercise of American power always and only as advancing narrow American geopolitical interests. The moral authority that is needed for coalition-building or for defense of the liberal international order vanishes with unilateral attacks like this one.

    With this conflict, the Trump and Netanyahu administrations are entirely dispensing with the forms and ceremonies. No indulgence has been sought from the UN or NATO or even the U.S. Congress. Yes, there are perfectly valid reasons to wish to enact regime change in Iran. The Islamic Republic has long been a menace to the region and a sponsor of terror worldwide. It does pose an “existential threat” to Israel, as the Israelis are never tired of saying. And, yes, the regime recently engaged in a brutal repression of protestors, killing an estimated 30-40,000 people. But, as extensive reporting has documented, the decision to attack Iran had more to do with a calculation that this would be a geopolitically opportune moment to strike as opposed to believing that imminent threats from Iran warranted the escalated use of force. “The U.S. decision to strike Iran was a victory for Mr. Netanyahu, who had been pushing Mr. Trump for months on the need to hit what he argued was a weakened regime,” wrote The New York Times in a deeply-reported piece. In Trump’s Truth Social video on February 28th, he briefly mentioned “imminent threats from the Iranian regime” before making it clear that the reasons for fighting were more preemptive than that—about removing the regime from power and ensuring that “no one should challenge the strength and might of the United States Armed Forces.” Compared even to Israel’s strike on Iran last summer, there is very little attempt here to legitimate the use of force according to international norms.

    Subscribe now

    So what does that do? Well, it confirms everything that was expected to happen since Trump emerged on the world stage—the United States pulling out of the liberal order and a far more simplistic morality taking its place. It’s already a distant memory—actually from a different epoch—to imagine the kind of coalition that pulled together to support Ukraine, not particularly out of affinity for Ukraine as a nation state, but because the liberal international order was worth defending wherever it was attacked.

    And something like a clear line is drawn here. We’re no longer in the domain of the Pax Americana, where the West’s gains at the end of World War II, and then at the end of the Cold War, are vigorously defended (even if the defense of the North Atlantic sometimes extended all the way to Afghanistan) with the premise that many of those gains are as much about principles—universal human rights, the rule of law—as territory. We’re also no longer in the kind of sovereignty that the Russians sometimes facetiously proposed—and that Trump not so long ago seemed interested in—where national autonomy is paramount regardless of sticky annoyances like human rights; or where, in an alternative version of the same theory, powers have exclusive control over their regional sphere of influence.

    With the strikes on Iran, and to some extent Venezuela, we enter into a fairly clearly different era—we might call it the Warring States Period—where a different political morality prevails. Sovereignty clearly doesn’t matter much if the head of one country can be abducted from his bedroom by the commando team of a major power; and then two months later the head of another country—on the opposite side of the world—can be killed in his residential compound. And the liberal order doesn’t matter if there is no attempt to seek authorization for the strike from the UN or allied partners or even the U.S. Congress.

    Subscribe now

    Other taboos have clearly been violated as well. Out of an instinct for self-preservation, world leaders have had a tendency to let others do the dying and refrained from striking one another. That is clearly going out the window with the attacks on Maduro and Khamenei. The tendency of recent U.S. presidents to shy away from “regime change” is out as well, with Trump insisting on a U.S. role for leadership in both Venezuela and Iran. And the message clearly goes out, as it did after Qaddafi’s fall in Libya, or for that matter Saddam’s in Iraq, that the only effective deterrent is nuclear weapons—everybody else is vulnerable to regime change.

    And if all of that is dispensed with, what remains to preserve any sort of balance of power? Well, power itself. For the moment, this new realpolitik is working out well for the United States and Israel. The two clearly have such an immense advantage in precision weaponry capabilities and especially in intelligence that they have had a string of uninterrupted successes, from America’s efforts to keep Ukraine alive to Israel’s military successes since 2023 to the Venezuela operation to the early stages of the Iran war. Israel in particular has been leading the way with an aggressive geopolitical program that has eliminated Hamas’ strike capabilities, decimated Hezbollah, struck at Iran and Yemen, and done so with strikingly little regard for national boundaries.

    The calculation—insofar as there is a calculation—is simply that this can last forever, that the United States and Israel have such a technological advantage that nobody is likely to catch up; that Russia and China are basically regional hegemons but unable to come to the aid of even a strategically pivotal ally like Iran; and that any small powers that fall out of the order of things will face the same fate as the leaders of Venezuela and Iran. And from Israel’s perspective, all is well so long as U.S. support continues.

    But of course a lot has to go well for this state of affairs to continue. These kinds of showy publicity-driven U.S. missions are, like in Venezuela, often a helicopter rotor away from turning into a Black Hawk Down situation. Israel has forfeited the support of the international community and cements its place on the international scene through a partnership of convenience with, probably, the most mercurial head of state of the modern era—and this against a backdrop of diminishing U.S. popular support for Israel. The United States has made it clear that it will act without any attention to the wishes of European allies and without any pretense of multilaterality. Russia and China know—if they needed any reminders—that they may do what they want without worrying about international law: the only question for them is whether they are able to cut any kind of deal with Trump. And if things start to turn against the new order, there is no principle—no set of treaties, no rallying cry of the “liberal international order,” no system of political values—to fall back on.

    For the last 45 years, a lodestar of American policy has been to treat Iran—the nation of fanaticism and revolution; of the Great Satan and the daily “death to Israel” chants—as the pariah. The irony is that, in getting at Iran—and there is no question that a strategic objective has been achieved in the early days of the war—the pariah may turn out to be us.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • What Regime Change Could Mean for Iran
    Mojtaba Khamenei (R) has been appointed Iran’s new supreme leader. (Photo by Iranian President’s Press Office/Handout /Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    In Washington, Iran policy has become a party reflex. A decision by one administration is rejected by another administration—even when the facts on the ground point in the same direction. The instinct is understandable. The enduring trauma of the 2003 invasion of Iraq looms large in every debate. But Iran is not a talking point, and this moment is not about party loyalty. It is about whether the United States is willing to confront a regime that has treated violence, aggression, and hostage politics as its core identity for nearly five decades.

    Since coming to power in 1979, the Islamic Republic has defined itself as anti-American and anti-Zionist, building an ideology of exporting the Islamic revolution beyond rhetoric. Tehran learned it could undermine the international liberal order without engaging in a direct conventional war by investing in proxy networks, missiles, and drones—using them as tools for negotiation and escalation. At home, Iran developed a secretive nuclear program and used repression as a means of governance.

    Iran’s history demonstrates why the weakening of the regime’s coercive center matters so much in this moment. With Ayatollah Ali Khamenei dead, and his son Mojtaba Khamenei elevated to the role of supreme leader, the Islamic Republic enters a moment that could quickly become a legitimacy crisis. A regime built on coercion is most vulnerable when its chain of command is disrupted, rival power centers stop coordinating, and the aura of inevitability that kept elites loyal begins to fade.

    Today, there are humanitarian, security, and economic cases for pursuing regime change in Iran. The Islamic Republic has become increasingly repressive since it overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979. Its use of repression is not accidental or sporadic; it is systematic and entrenched. For years, Iranians have endured cycles of mass arrests, torture, executions, and deadly crackdowns on protests. Between January 8 and 9, the regime killed thousands of its own citizens for taking to the streets and demanding change. This is not an authoritarian state that sometimes oversteps, but a modern security autocracy that uses fear as a core tool of governance. And a regime that normalizes mass violence should not be treated as a legitimate political authority.

    For years, Iranians have endured cycles of mass arrests, torture, executions, and deadly crackdowns on protests.

    Throughout the years, Iran has remained a persistent challenge to U.S. national security—regardless of which party occupied the White House. Washington’s inability to manage the country is not a partisan assessment, but a reflection of the Islamic Republic’s strategic posture and methods of building power. For decades, the Islamic Republic has established a regional model that depends on ongoing tension and crises. It does not aim for a final resolution; instead, it seeks leverage. This leverage is derived from multiple fronts, proxies, and calibrated escalation, which keeps the region on the brink of wider conflict while forcing the United States and its allies into a constant cycle of crisis response.

    The regime has worked to weaken U.S. influence in the Middle East not only with rhetoric but through policy. It has armed and funded proxy groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, supported attacks on U.S. military bases, and used missiles and drones in an attempt to expel the United States from the region. It has engaged in hostage-taking and coercive diplomacy to extract concessions and deter external pressure, and undermined U.S. credibility among allies by casting the United States as an unreliable security partner. All of this has been done to eliminate U.S. influence in the Middle East. The regime’s intent has never been to simply resist U.S. policies, but to reshape the regional order—constraining U.S. power, weakening U.S. partners, and making Iran’s influence the prevailing reality.

    Subscribe now

    Since the United States and Israel launched their coordinated attack on Iran, the Islamic Republic has attacked more than seven Arab countries in the region, including Oman and Qatar—longstanding allies of Iran’s ayatollahs that regularly tried to shield Iran from the United States’ rage. While a different Iranian regime would not solve every regional problem, it would remove the central engine of organized destabilization. A post-Islamic Republic government led in the interests of the Iranian people would focus on solving domestic problems instead of pursuing revolutionary expansion, and the region could move toward agreements that are unrealistic under the current leadership. Iran could join a new security architecture—rather than sabotage it—by normalizing relations with its neighbors, including Israel, and joining frameworks like the Abraham Accords.

    Economically, Iran is a major country with significant market potential across sectors, including energy, infrastructure, aviation, technology, and consumer goods. Under the current regime, these opportunities have remained largely unrealized due to sanctions, mismanagement, corruption, and political unpredictability. Even after the 2015 nuclear deal, American companies were kept out of the country. A different Iran could reintegrate into global markets, which would open new trade and investment opportunities, reduce volatility in the Persian Gulf, and promote more predictable shipping with less disruption from proxy warfare.

    While the humanitarian, security, and economic cases for military intervention have been frequently raised, there is a fourth reason that many analysts have understated: the geopolitical chain reaction. The Islamic Republic is part of an informal axis of authoritarian cooperation. Tehran’s networks connect to Moscow’s revisionism, Beijing’s anti-liberal worldview, Pyongyang’s proliferation model, and a broader coalition of nations that learn from each other’s coercive tactics. As such, a successful democratic transition in Iran would not only impact coordination between authoritarian regimes but also potentially strengthen global democracy by challenging the narrative that authoritarian repression is a viable long-term strategy.

    Of course, none of this means the United States should act recklessly. Regime change should not and cannot be a slogan. The objectives of military action must be clear and limited, the risk of escalation must be planned for, and civilian harm must be minimized. Most importantly, any path toward regime change must prioritize Iranian agency. The United States can help in this process by creating conditions that make the regime’s coercive system less effective while expanding the opposition’s space for organization.

    The fundamental question today is not whether Iran is a threat but whether American decision-makers will remain constrained by partisan perspectives in the face of a regime that is harming its citizens, destabilizing its neighbors, and challenging international norms. Washington’s Iran policy should be grounded in human rights, liberalism, democracy, regional stability, national security, and economic opportunity—and treated as both a strategic and a moral issue.

    Saeid Golkar is a senior nonresident fellow on Iran Policy at the Council and the UC Foundation associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Previously, he held research and teaching positions at Stanford University and Northwestern University.

    This article was originally published by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • A Very Brief Interview with Klaus Schwab

    In January, I received an email from Klaus Schwab, the German professor who in 1971 founded a meeting of European business leaders in a small Swiss village town that quickly became the premier meeting place of global elites. As the founder and longtime head of the World Economic Forum, Schwab held enormous convening power; and with a series of books and contributions, advocating first for the concept of “stakeholder capitalism” and then for a “great reset,” he also aspired to set the agenda for the statesmen, business leaders, and dignitaries who converged on Davos every January.

    Schwab wrote to me about a new book he had just published, called Restoring Truth and Trust. It was, he told me, “part of my broader series aimed at helping a global audience understand and respond to the profound changes shaping our societies, economies, and institutions.” Its aspiration was to “contribute to essential global discussions—particularly among thought leaders like yourself—on how we can collectively rebuild a foundation of truth and trust that is so urgently needed across public, private, and civil society institutions.” He wondered whether I might have any comments or reflections on the book, or even, “if you feel inspired, a short endorsement or blurb.”

    Instead of offering a blurb, I decided to invite Schwab onto my podcast. In his role at Davos, he had helped to shape, or at least to midwife, the global order which is now suffering an unprecedented crisis. Given the themes of his book, he seemed open to a genuinely searching conversation about which elements of this order were worth preserving, which others in need of jettisoning—and what responsibility the elites he knew so well might have for our current travails. I was greatly looking forward to the conversation, and approached it the way I do most of my podcasts: I was determined both to give Schwab an opportunity to present his ideas in the most compelling possible way, and to interrogate them critically.

    A few questions in, it became clear that the conversation was not going well. Whenever I mildly pushed back at some point he was making, Schwab looked visibly annoyed. After about twenty minutes, he suddenly broke off the conversation, saying that he had a migraine. After giving Schwab time to recover, a member of his team stepped in and requested that we reschedule the conversation, which we were happy to do in the circumstances.

    Naturally, we gave Schwab’s team many opportunities to resume the conversation. We offered numerous options for when we could record the rest of the conversation, and invited them to suggest a time that would work for him. But after a few back-and-forth exchanges, it became clear that his team had no real interest in doing so. Eventually, they openly admitted as much, writing that “Professor Schwab has decided that he does not wish to continue with the podcast.” They also asked us multiple times not to release the part of the conversation we did record.

    Some podcasters consider it a kind of trophy when a public figure like Schwab walks out of an interview because he does not like the line of questioning. I don’t. The point of my podcast is to facilitate genuine conversations across ideological differences. In the 437 episodes I have recorded so far, I have sometimes experienced moments of genuine tension, and perhaps occasional flashes of hostility; but not a single guest has ever walked out of a previous recording.

    Given the nature of my questions, I must admit to being even more bewildered by this turn of events. Schwab has for decades been in one of the most influential positions in the international firmament of power and influence. None of the questions I asked were posed in the spirit of a gotcha question. Are some of the most powerful people in the world really that allergic to basic intellectual scrutiny?

    But don’t take my word for it. Instead, read (or better: listen) for yourself.

    —Yascha

    Klaus Schwab is the founder and former Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum. His latest book is Restoring Truth and Trust.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Klaus Schwab discuss whether the principles underlying global cooperation can survive today’s political upheaval, how democratic institutions can respond to rising populist movements without appearing tone-deaf to voters’ legitimate grievances, and what stakeholder capitalism means in practical terms for corporate decision-making.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You founded one of the most important organizations in the world, the World Economic Forum, that is really a meeting ground of influential people in the world. We live in a strange time in which the political assumptions we’ve had about the world seem to be crumbling around us. There was a lot of talk about that at the last meeting in Davos. How do you see this moment? Do you think that the broader set of ideas and assumptions on which the World Economic Forum was founded are going to prevail through this moment? Or do you think that it’s the end of a political era and many of the ideas that you’ve advocated for over the course of your career?

    Klaus Schwab: We are certainly going through a very dramatic period of change. When I look back and I look at the values on which the forum was created, it was particularly the stakeholder capitalism concept, which means that business also has a responsibility for society, and the concept of global cooperation.

    I think those two values and those two principles are more important than ever before, even in the new context of today, which I call the Intelligent Age. If we look at current technological trends, we have a more globalizing world, not a deglobalizing world. We just need to adapt our standards, our patterns and so on to the new forms of globalization. Some people call this “re-globalization,” but I say “neo-globalization” or “intelligent globalization.”

    Mounk: What is the role of democracy in this? You’ve spoken about a trilemma that underlies how we deal with changes in the world, in which you argue that globalization is in some core ways irreconcilable with democracy and the nation state. What do you mean by that trilemma—and which part of a trilemma should we choose if we have to give up one of the three important values that constitute the trilemma?

    Schwab: I think there is a dilemma particularly between the need to act fast and the need to be very flexible and adaptive. The new speed of change requires this adaptability. On the other hand, we have our much-loved democratic systems which have a tendency to function in rather a slow way. So we have to find a balance here. I do not have a solution, but my home country of Switzerland is a very important example. We have to make sure that citizens feel that they are part of the process of determining policies and how to confront the change we are facing.

    Mounk: That sounds very good, but I do think that there’s a fundamental question in this moment, where we’re trying to understand why it is that these populist forces are rising around the world, in the United States, in Brazil, in India, but also of course in Europe, with Reform ahead in Britain and the Rassemblement National leading in polls in France and the AfD leading in some polls in Germany.

    Subscribe now

    In Switzerland, of course, the SVP is very strong. One of the key drivers of this is the feeling that the preferences that ordinary citizens have have been ignored by decision makers for a long time, that the demands of globalization and other things have in some way taken precedence over their preferences and priorities in the local context. So how do we deal with the evident displeasure that a lot of citizens have with the current systems in a way that preempts what seems to be the natural tendency at the moment, which is that they say, if you don’t listen to us, then we will vote for these people, and they’re willing to blow up this order in a much more radical way than the new countenance?

    Schwab: I think the key, which I described in my latest book, Restoring Truth and Trust, is that people feel they’ve lost control over what’s happening in the economic, social, political, technological and environmental fields. There are so many factors which have to be digested at the same time. If you ask the question why, I think there is now this lack of common understanding of what is the truth. We have, particularly with digital media, different interpretations of truth, so there is no common objective evaluation of developments anymore.

    This leads, of course, to what I describe in my book as erosion of trust. If you want to attack this issue, I think the first question should be, how do we make sure that we establish again a common basis of truth? I come back again to Switzerland. With the referendums and with the process which we have around the vote about each of the referendums, I think that although people are exposed to different ways to look for the truth, in the end they find at least some common ground. This means that the political erosion of trust in this country at least has not progressed as fast as it did in other countries.

    Mounk: That’s really interesting. I think it shows a particular kind of vision of what the problem is. You’re saying that there’s a lack of trust in our institutions and that the reason for that is that there’s not a common basis of truth. So in a way that implies that people are wrong to mistrust institutions, right? That it’s a misperception of the world. Now I think that one response from a lot of the voters for these movements and parties would be to say, hang on a second. I look at the last 25 years and what do we see? We see the Great Recession brought on by bad economic management. The euro crisis brought on by a flawed infrastructure, and a flawed structure of a single currency. I see 2015 and the refugee crisis, and politicians making decisions that ignored what most people wanted. I see a global pandemic in which institutions like the Centers for Disease Control in the United States, which were founded on the promise that they’re going to be able to contain and respond to those kinds of pandemics in an efficient way, are flailing and making poor decisions.

    In fact, that mistrust isn’t downstream from misinformation or downstream from the inability of the media to control the narrative, it’s downstream from the fact that these institutions just aren’t living up to the role and that they’re actually making mistakes.

    Schwab: It’s easy to criticize. Let’s take the pandemic. We were certainly unprepared despite, let’s say, many warnings. So we had to find our way, and certainly mistakes were made in this respect. No government system is perfect, I think. Even if you look back on your own life, and if I look back on my own life, I certainly can enumerate a certain number of mistakes I have made. So, making mistakes is common in decision making.

    The problem is now that everybody has a choice of what truth he wants to adapt for himself. That of course leads to a vicious circle. You choose your truth, you want to have a reconfirmation of your truth, and so you dig a hole into which you fall more and more. This creates this tremendous polarization of society.

    How you describe the situation sounds very pessimistic. Of course we had all those setbacks, but finally if you look, for example, at the global crisis at the end of the 2010s. We suffered, but we overcame it. In my opinion—and of course, that’s the mantra which I have followed for 55 years in my life—what is needed are two things. It is to think more in strategic terms, which allows us to foresee such crises much more. Second, nobody alone can solve those crises. We are living inside a system which is interdependent. So dialogue among the leaders of the different nodes in the system is absolutely essential. That’s what I have devoted my life to.

    Mounk: Let me stay with this for just one more moment, and then I want to make sure that we talk about stakeholder capitalism and other contributions that you know you’ve made. I guess the question is how do more moderate political parties, and political movements, among which I certainly count myself, try to respond to this political moment? My concern about the frame of misinformation or disinformation, about telling people that they simply haven’t really understood reality, that they’ve been misled, is that it just feels like a strategy in which you try with increasing irritation to tell voters the same thing you’ve told them before.

    Joe Biden’s administration in the United States insisted that the economy was great when voters felt that it wasn’t great. That’s what led to Donald Trump getting re-elected. I worry that if the message that people take from this conversation, from your work is that, yes, there have been some mistakes, but really in the end, everything is fine. In order to stem the populist rise around the world, we simply have to somehow change the media ecosystem and make sure that there’s not that much misinformation and get people to see that we were right all along—that just feels tone deaf at this moment. It feels like it is likely to exacerbate the populist revolt that we’re seeing rather than to stem it.

    Subscribe now

    Do you really think that if the next candidate for chancellor in Germany, whether it’s from the Christian Democrats, or the Social Democrats, or the next Labour leader, whoever comes after Keir Starmer, who’s likely on his way out, runs in the next election and says, the problem is just that we don’t have a right basis of truth. If you’re all upset, you’re just being overly pessimistic about the state of our institution—as you just told me—and just content yourself with the things that are going well. Do you think that has any chance of actually averting the people who intend on destroying this order and any limits on responsible capitalism, destroying the important national institutions from NATO to the EU, which I agree with you are worth preserving? Are we going to be able to stop them from winning?

    Schwab: Yes, I would come back to one of the principal issues which we have, because the world has been becoming much more determined by short-term thinking in how we react to crises. For me, the question is, what is the ideology or the philosophy which is behind it? What are the frameworks of values with which we should approach the tremendous challenges which we have in front of us? I have been very much committed and formulated probably as the first person to develop this concept of stakeholder capitalism. I’m using it as just one example of taking a much more principled approach to the issues and not just to react to specific crises. Stakeholder capitalism means that a business has to serve not only shareholders—of course at the core is always the entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurship which creates wealth. But at the same time, a company is part of society and has to take care of societal partners. Currently there’s a conflict between those two concepts—shareholder capitalism and stakeholder capitalism. I think this is the wrong approach in the long term. We need, of course, stakeholder responsibility.

    At the moment, for example, people lose confidence and trust in companies because they see that companies serve only the shareholders and come back to a pure shareholder-dominated policy instead of embracing the stakeholder concept.

    Mounk: Let’s talk about stakeholder capitalism for a moment. The idea that companies should be responsible for something other than maximizing the profits over the short run is very appealing. It’s appealing because companies might have a broader social responsibility to the environment around them. It’s appealing because, in fact, there’s some reason to think that that’s going to serve the company’s own long-term interests better than trying to maximize quarterly earnings for the next call with Wall Street analysts.

    However, the problem with the concept of stakeholder capitalism is that it is very open to interpretation of what exactly it is that companies should then be pursuing. Which stakeholder is being consulted? What considerations take priority? Who’s making decisions about that? When you have shareholder values, it’s very clear what that means—the metrics are clear. With stakeholder value, the metrics are rather less clear. What do you think companies should prioritize when they are making those decisions? Who should they consult with? What are the criteria? Help us understand in slightly more concrete terms what it means for companies to actually pursue stakeholder value.

    Schwab: I’m very sorry that I have to stop. I have such a migraine. I have difficulties understanding you and also the connection is not good. I think we have to rearrange. I’m sorry. Give me five minutes to relax so we can see whether we can continue.

    If you have not yet signed up for our podcast, please do so now by following this link on your phone.

    Email: [email protected]

    Podcast production by Mickey Freeland and Leonora Barclay.

    Connect with us!

    Spotify | Apple | Google

    X: @Yascha_Mounk & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Yascha Mounk, Persuasion

    LinkedIn: Persuasion Community

    22 min
  • North Korea Was Right About Nuclear Weapons
    Kim Jong Un inspecting a shooting competition to mark the Korean People’s Army’s “Snipers’ Day” at a training base in Pyongyang. (Photo by KCNA VIA KNS / AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi agreed to dismantle his nascent nuclear weapons program in exchange for the West’s promises of sanctions relief and integration into the international community. Less than a decade later, in 2011, he found himself hiding in a drainage pipe with his golden pistol after NATO forces bombed his convoy. Gaddafi was dragged out of that tunnel by NATO-backed Libyan rebels, beaten, and executed for the world to see.

    In Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un was taking notes. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the West treated Kim Jong Un’s father, Kim Jong Il, as a comic book villain: a cognac sipping madman who reportedly claimed to have invented the hamburger and shot 38 under par on his first ever round of golf. The madman narrative about the safari suit-wearing cult leader was comfortable for the West: it allowed them to dismiss him as a relic of the past, a man stuck in time with a starving population destined to depose him.

    That comfort is now gone when it comes to North Korea, and with it comes an indictment of the entire rules-based international order. The Kim dynasty has been vindicated—not morally, not ethically, but strategically. As the global security architecture of the post-Cold War era fractures under the weight of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s expansionist ambitions, and America’s reckless and illegal international military interventions, the Kims’ absolute refusal to denuclearize looks more and more sensible by the day.

    Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein attempted to follow the nuclear approach, but his nascent program was systematically dismantled by foreign strikes and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He was left exposed when America invaded in 2003 and was killed in 2006. Gaddafi surrendered his weapons in 2003 and was killed in 2011. In 1994, Kyiv signed the Budapest Memorandum, surrendering the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. In 2014, it lost Crimea when Russia illegally annexed the region. Since 2022, it has been fighting a war for its existence—one that continues today without any signs of ending.

    Iran, too, agreed to stall its nuclear program in 2015, then three years later the United States pulled out from the agreement, later bombed Iran’s nuclear sites, and is now brazenly conducting a regime change war. Nicolás Maduro never had nuclear weapons; he is likely wondering, from his jail cell in New York, how things would have gone if he did. Perhaps his successors in Caracas are thinking about whether they could get them now. Cuba knows they must be next—what will they do to ensure their own sovereignty?

    This is not to oversimplify things; North Korea is the outlier here. Most nuclear aspirants never make it past the window of vulnerability—the period where nuclear capabilities are advanced enough to provoke intervention, but insufficient as a credible deterrent. The two main pathways to a nuclear weapon—thousands of centrifuges spinning at supersonic speeds or spent nuclear fuel reprocessing—provide little concealment. The large industrial footprint is nearly impossible to hide from modern thermal and satellite surveillance. And once the bomb is complete, aspirants face a second immense technical challenge: miniaturizing it and mastering the delivery vehicle.

    Great powers are strongly incentivized to preemptively strike these nascent programs politically, economically, and kinetically. The great tragedy of the 21st century is that Pyongyang’s success has shown that, while the cost of trying to acquire a nuclear weapon is high, the cost of failure, as seen in Baghdad, Tripoli, and Kyiv, is existential.

    Kim Jong Un is living proof, untouched despite a raft of sanctions, a starving population, and increased U.S.-Japan-South Korea unity against his country’s aggression.

    The Kim dynasty understands something that eluded the architects of the liberal rules-based order and their autocratic enemies alike: In a world of laws and norms, there is no better security guarantee than a nuclear weapon. Conventional strength is a “might makes right” game, but nuclear weapons are the great equalizer. Pyongyang understood this before the rest of the world, and paid an unbearable cost to prove it.

    The Kim dynasty, short on cash and with few options to acquire more, chose to pay in human lives. Hundreds of thousands have died in the kwan-li-so death camps, where guards rape and murder prisoners for sport. Millions more have suffered from stunted growth due to malnutrition and starvation. The Kims used the North Korean people as fodder to maintain their own cannon, hollowing out the core of their country to reinforce the walls. They turned 26 million people into a sacrificial offering, and the 21st century rewarded them for it.

    The tragedy is not that the Kims are monsters; those are everywhere. The tragedy is that the international order, ostensibly designed to make nuclear weapons unnecessary, failed so spectacularly that the monsters ended up being right. The Ukraines of the world that trusted the system now find themselves begging for aid to defend themselves, while the Russians can take territory without ever fearing a B2 bomber over Moscow.

    Don’t forget, you can also sign up to receive content from Persuasion and Yascha Mounk! Just click below and toggle the buttons for the content you want!

    Email preferences

    If the lesson of the Kim dynasty is that the only guaranteed security is a nuclear weapon, then every rational state can and should acquire one, provided they can survive the inevitable attempts by the status quo powers to crush them before they reach criticality. Already, a majority of South Koreans believe their country should obtain a nuclear weapon, citing fears of North Korean aggression and doubts about America’s nuclear umbrella. Saudi Arabia has promised to pursue nuclear weapons if their rival Iran gets them.

    For the autocrats that can’t afford to get nuclear weapons, Kim has a solution for that, too: starve the people to feed the bomb. This is nothing short of a catastrophic outcome, yet it is the future the world built through our failures.

    In the 1990s, Kim Jong Il was a laughingstock to the world. In 2026, his son looks right at home. Not because he has turned over a new leaf, but because the world has. The leaders of the United States, China, and Russia all subscribe to his worldview; Europe is too divided to speak with one voice.

    This is a cause for mourning and deep reflection. Not because the Kims deserve sympathy; they deserve none. But because a world in which the Kims are vindicated is a world in which things like sovereignty, diplomacy, and the idea that nations can resolve disputes without the threat of annihilation are revealed as fictions.

    The Kim family bet against civilization. And as of today, civilization is losing.

    Shahn Louis is the founder of Anansi Strategic Intelligence LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk firm. A former senior intelligence analyst with experience across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, he specializes in China analysis and East Asian regional dynamics.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Expecting Iran to Unconditionally Surrender Is a Fool’s Errand
    A U.S. Air Force Boeing B-52 on March 9, 2026. (Photo by Henry Nicholls / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Of the many questionable decisions Donald Trump has made with regard to Iran, one of the strangest was his declaration last Friday that the United States would demand “unconditional surrender” from Tehran. When Trump launched the attack with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel, he was obviously hoping for a quick victory, something like the outcome he achieved when he snatched Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela in January. But the war expanded across the Middle East, with Iran shooting missiles and drones at American allies and bases all over the Persian Gulf. It was clear that what remained of the Iranian leadership was not about to capitulate, and that the conflict could drag on—as Trump himself admitted—for weeks.

    Normally, a smart leader in such a situation would try to lower expectations and declare an achievable objective in the war, such as degrading the better part of Iran’s ability to strike targets with ballistic missiles and drones. This would offer an opportunity for Trump to declare victory and disengage. Instead, Trump did the opposite.

    The new objective of unconditional surrender suddenly raised the goalposts to an unachievable height. There are any number of reasons for Iran not to capitulate. In the first place, unconditional surrender assumes that there is a coherent government that can instruct the nation’s military to stand down, as the Japanese Emperor did in 1945. But Iran’s forces—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Basij, and regular military—are highly decentralized. Indeed, with the U.S.-Israeli targeting of military leadership, it is not evident that there is a single coherent command-and-control hierarchy remaining.

    A second reason for thinking that surrender won’t happen is that it would expose the regime to internal disintegration. Iran is today being ruled by force; a large part of the population hates the regime of the clerics that killed tens of thousands of protesters in January. The IRGC and Basij will not give up their weapons, because they themselves would not survive.

    A final reason for not expecting unconditional surrender is that a good part of the regime can survive and continue fighting for some time to come. The air campaign has been extremely effective in going after Iran’s visible military assets—air defenses, ballistic missiles, drones, launch facilities, ammunition storage, military bases, and the like. But the tens of thousands of individual fighters are still there, and will retain some residual capacity to fight back.

    We have recently seen an example of what this looks like. The nearly two and a half year-long war between Israel and Hamas has destroyed a huge amount of infrastructure in Gaza, and deprived Hamas of the ability to launch major attacks. But they are still there, commanding some degree of popular support in their remaining tunnels and shelters. They have not surrendered, and will be a big obstacle to any attempt to rebuild Gaza and restore a post-conflict government. Gaza is a much smaller territory, and Israel has been willing to enter it with ground forces.

    Subscribe now

    Iran by contrast is a very big country, and has a lot of places for the surviving regime to hide. It will not be possible to eliminate every missile and drone under their control, so we can expect continuing attacks on U.S.-aligned Gulf states and American facilities into the foreseeable future. The threat of a random drone striking the big airline hubs in the Gulf will be economically very damaging.

    The basic problem that the United States and Israel face has to do with the limitations of airpower. We have a lot of experience with attempts to use airpower to achieve political objectives, and it is not encouraging. The U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command flattened many German cities during World War II, hoping to break the will of the Nazi regime. But as the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey noted after the war, this terrible campaign did not bring the regime down; it collapsed only after the Russians and Western allies physically occupied Germany.

    I can think of only two cases where strategic bombing by itself achieved a clear political objective. The first was Japan’s “unconditional surrender” on the deck of the USS Missouri, after the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As in Germany, the United States was willing to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians by firebombing Japanese cities, and demonstrated in August 1945 a terrible new capability that convinced the Emperor and leadership that it made no sense to fight on.

    The second case was Kosovo, where Serbia was attacked by NATO airpower in 1999 and eventually agreed to relax its grip on Kosovo. This result succeeded because the attack triggered a popular revolt against the government of Slobodan Milošević. Even so, NATO had to assemble a peacekeeping force, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which is still on the ground in the region today.

    If, as I expect, the Iranian regime does not capitulate, Trump will face three choices. He can in effect back down, declare victory, and end U.S. operations, leaving a weakened but still dangerous Islamic regime in power. Second, he could decide to send ground forces into the country, a move fraught with obvious dangers both in Iran and politically in the United States. (It is interesting that he has not entirely ruled this option out.) The final choice would be to expand the air campaign to a broader and broader range of targets, hitting civilian infrastructure facilities like desalination plants, the electrical grid, and transportation infrastructure. This would create a huge amount of misery for the Iranian people that Trump claims to want to support. Having neutralized most military targets, further bombing will inevitably hurt ordinary civilians, just as the Israelis have done in Gaza. The United States will, in effect, be bombing the rubble.

    Subscribe now

    Given these unappealing choices, demanding unconditional surrender was a very foolish thing for the president to do. I’m tempted to believe that Trump just liked the sound of the words, without thinking through the ways in which they could come back to haunt him. But this was only one poor decision among many. The most serious was the decision to go to war in the first place without a clear rationale for doing so.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Episode 182: Christopher Clark on A Scandal in Königsberg

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    This week, Richard Aldous talks to Christopher Clark, author of A Scandal in Königsberg (Penguin).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, Instagram, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below. Bookstack listeners can take advantage of a 20% offer for paid Persuasion membership, with access to special columns and bonus Good Fight with Yascha Mounk podcast content.

    20% off for Bookstack listeners!

    27 min
  • Dean Ball on Who Should Control AI

    Dean Ball served as Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, where he was the primary staff drafter of America’s AI Action Plan. He writes the AI-focused newsletter Hyperdimensional.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Dean Ball discuss the clash between Anthropic and the Department of War over AI usage restrictions, why mass domestic surveillance capabilities make AI governance so challenging, and how to regulate transformative technologies under conditions of radical uncertainty.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: So we recorded a really interesting in-depth conversation about the broader philosophical issues on how governments should or shouldn’t regulate AI. And then, you know, this amazing news story broke over the course of the last week with this head-on clash between Anthropic and the Department of War. For listeners who are not in on the details of this, give us a brief summary of what happened. What are the stakes of this fight?

    Dean Ball: So the brief summary is that in June 2024, during the Biden administration, Anthropic and the Department of Defense signed a contract for the use of Claude in classified settings—in intelligence gathering and analysis, active combat operations, things like that. That contract had usage restrictions that applied to a number of different things, but the two that are now the subject of discussion have to do with mass domestic surveillance and autonomous lethal weapons. Autonomous lethal weapons are weapons that can autonomously close the kill chain, which is to say they can autonomously identify, track, and kill human targets, with no human intervention whatsoever. That contract was expanded by the Trump Department of Defense in July 2025.

    When I worked for the administration—though I will say I had no role in negotiating that deal—it had basically the same restrictions. The terms changed very slightly, but those restrictions did not change. Then in fall 2025, Emil Michael, the Undersecretary of War for Research Engineering, looked at these contracts for frontier AI. As far as I understand it, he determined that these contracts had usage restrictions that were too onerous. This is not what the previous political officials in the Trump DoD before him had thought; it’s also not what the many lawyers who I’m sure signed off on this agreement—or what Biden and Trump—thought. But he decided that these terms were overly onerous and so he sought to renegotiate them. This started several months ago. He began to try to renegotiate them, and Anthropic, I think, did renege on some of its red lines, but not particularly on the red lines related to mass domestic surveillance or autonomous legal weapons.

    So rather than just canceling the contract, they have canceled Anthropic as a contractor. They have now designated Claude a supply chain risk. What this means is that no DoD contractor can use Claude—but we don’t know the exact details of what that means. Does it mean they can’t use Claude at all? Does it mean just when they’re doing DoD business, or only particular subsets of DoD business? We don’t exactly know. Those details will probably be available in the relatively near future, but they’re not at this exact moment that I speak to you. That’s kind of where we are.

    Mounk: Just to jump in with a few points here—that is a really extraordinary step, right? To say, look, we don’t agree over these user restrictions, we’re going to go search for a different commercial partner, this is something that may be wise or unwise, but that would be, you know, a very normal step. To designate Anthropic, a U.S. company, as a supply chain risk—which is a designation usually reserved for companies like Huawei that are effectively controlled by the Chinese state—is really quite extraordinary. It matters a lot whether that just relates to dealings with the Department of War or whether it’s in general, as there would be an even broader escalation. I suspect that we can certainly expect Anthropic to sue against this designation, and quite possibly to prevail, given how unprecedented the use of this designation is in this context.

    Ball: Yes.

    Mounk: I kind of want to get to a couple of the broad implications here. The first is to talk about the nature of these use restrictions. We talked a little bit about autonomous weapons and the complete kill cycle. What about the fears about domestic political surveillance? Why is that one of the major sticking points here? It’s one that’s been talked about less in the debate over this. How is it that these new AI models facilitate domestic political surveillance and why is that such a concern?

    Ball: Well, there’s two things that are worth mentioning here. The first is that it is illegal for the government to directly collect private data about American citizens. So the government can’t, without a warrant, without some extraordinary circumstances, wiretap my phone. It can’t put cameras in my house and record what’s going on inside my house. But it can often acquire data from commercial vendors who might have private sensitive information about Americans, or might have data sets from which private facts can be inferred using analysis. And it can also conduct that analysis.

    In other words, doing the analysis on the data is different from actually directly collecting it yourself as the government, and doing the analysis doesn’t count as surveillance for purposes of the relevant national security laws here. So this is something that’s existed for a while—privacy advocates and civil libertarians have talked about these issues for a long time. How does AI change this dynamic? Well, frontier AI means that all of a sudden, you don’t need some expert. I don’t need to pay some data scientist or some intelligence analyst.

    Let’s say the government wants to track my movements. Well, in the past, it might’ve been awfully expensive to do that because why would you pay a human to specifically track the movements of me and my family? It would be quite expensive relative to the intelligence value of my life. But all of a sudden, you get to a world where the government, instead of having a few thousand intelligence analysts, has a few million or tens of millions because they’re autonomous agents. Well, then all of a sudden the cost is effectively zero. Nothing changed about existing law. Nothing really even particularly changed about existing intelligence practices. All that changed is that AI essentially made the value of expert attention much cheaper than it used to be. That in and of itself enables quite significant potential for surveillance.

    Mounk: One way of putting this is that the laws haven’t changed. The laws were put in place for a reason, which is to make it impossible for the government to survey innocent Americans at scale unless there’s probable cause of some very serious crime, some kind of judicial sign-off, and so on. Now, suddenly, technology just means that the laws, even though they haven’t changed, are really no longer effective for the purpose that they were trying to secure. Obviously that is a very large concern.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    Now, that gets to a larger set of things I’ve worried about for the last week. So in this particular fight, I think it’s very easy to be sympathetic to Anthropic. You’ve written quite strikingly about your disquiet—that’s really probably a too soft a word—wiith how the administration has acted. You yourself served in the Trump administration, helped to formulate the administration’s AI policy. And you have said and written that you find the way in which we’re treating Anthropic to be very counterproductive, irresponsible, and dangerous to our republican institutions. But we also need to go beyond this current situation and the particular way in which this fight has shaped out to this broader question of: Who do we actually want to control those technologies?

    My fear is that this is a dilemma that really doesn’t have a very good answer. As we’re seeing at the moment, you don’t want the government to have control over technologies that would, for example, allow it to engage in mass surveillance of ordinary citizens. But of course, contrary-wise, you also don’t want a bunch of private individuals to have control over governments that have huge national security implications—technologies that could, for example, potentially hack into nuclear weapons programs or in other ways impede how we compete with competitor nations and keep our country safe. And another element of this, it seems to me, is that our analogies don’t really work very well. The president of the United States has a nuclear football and he can wipe out a big part of the world at his whim within 20 minutes. That is a very, very scary and dangerous fact.

    But even though the president is able to lead to the destruction of much of the world in that way, nuclear weapons actually aren’t terribly useful in engaging in political manipulation domestically, in mass surveillance, in manipulation of public opinion. These new AI tools are both potentially very dangerous in perhaps inspiring a war if they fire on the wrong target or a rocket launch is misinterpreted as an incoming nuclear weapon or other kinds of problems. But they’re also really powerful in these domestic ways that these previous technologies were not. So the sort of dilemma of AI control is really sharpened in this context.

    Ball: Absolutely. And I would go even further and say that, when I think of my current uses of AI chatbots, for lack of a better term, and the coding agents as well—and I think my current use is probably scratching a very small amount of the surface of what my uses of this technology will be in the fullness of time—but even when I think about just what I use them for today, already, I feel that these technologies are a profound part of how I express myself, thus how I use my first amendment rights. A big part of that has to do with the ways in which the models are aligned. So the idea that the government is going to decide how to align the models and it’s going to be able to monitor my usage of these things directly just seems crazy to me—that such a thing could ever be possible.

    It’s also worth noting that this administration doesn’t even believe in that version of AI capabilities improvement. This administration has said, no, we think AI is like normal technology. We don’t think it’s gonna rapidly progress in these ways and become so profoundly important that it’s a huge nuclear weapon-like event. They dispute that characterization of AI and in some ways I actually agreed with them. It’s funny because this decision by them is kind of even more confusing and erratic given that it doesn’t even fit into the broader administration strategy.

    Mounk: If you thought that we are on the precipice of super intelligence and it’s a completely unprecedented technology, then being absolutely unwilling to have any private control of it would make a lot more sense. But if you’re saying, look, this is an important technology with important implications, but it is actually kind of analogous to previous inventions and is not completely abnormal in those ways.

    Ball: I think that we are pretty close to something like Superintelligence, but it is always very complicated. It means a lot of different things to different people, but whatever we mean, we’re on the verge of extremely powerful world-changing systems. I think we kind of already have them and I think they should remain in private hands, though of course with the government providing regulation of various kinds. But ultimately I hope it’s pretty light touch regulation. I think many people will come around to my view if they really think about what this technology will mean and what government ownership of it would mean. Imagine if the government owned your bank, every bank, and you could only ever spend money in ways that the government had complete and total visibility over, and could bill into and control. I think many Americans think you would not practically have liberty in that scenario. And I think that something similar is true here.

    Mounk: You write what I think is one of the most interesting newsletters about the intersection of artificial intelligence and public policy. One of the problems of trying to grapple with AI, whether that is from a perspective of political science, public policy, or economics, is how you govern something. How do you think about influencing the development of something whose effects are still so radically uncertain?

    That is true both because it is still so hard to figure out, for example, whether AI is currently leading to huge job loss among entry-level professionals or whether it is actually a bust and not really having an impact on the economy. It is all the harder to know ten years from now whether AI is going to look roughly like what it looks like today or whether it is going to be some form of superintelligence that is incredibly able to do things of its own accord, whether good or bad.

    Before we get into some of these questions about how to actually govern AI, how do you think about trying to answer some of those questions under these conditions of radical uncertainty?

    Ball: One of the things I really like about AI is that it is maybe the most general-purpose technology that has ever been conceived. I think its competition is electricity. It has a very uncertain capabilities trajectory. It is very hard to know exactly what the world with it will look like.

    A world with AI diffused in it is very hard to know. The “positive vision” is very hard to articulate. It presents such a wide variety of things that implicate the public interest and public policy that you end up going to political-theoretic first principles much more than you do when we are debating the details of telecoms policy or health care subsidies. There the works of Edmund Burke, Friedrich Hayek, of philosophers and political theorists, do not come up in the same way that they do with AI. AI is almost, in some sense, a literary device for thinking about the future, in addition to being a very real technology. What should the disposition of government overall be?

    My view on this is that, first of all, there are high-level incentives, very deep incentives, in our society. One of them is the market system and the price system. That structures the incentives of everyone in various ways. Another that is really important, on the more protective side, is liability. We have this system of common law liability that has existed for centuries and that allows people harmed by the actions of someone else to seek redress in court, decided by a jury of their peers, if they so choose.

    Those two things in and of themselves structure the incentives of every actor in our society in ways that are quite deep and useful. I like to look at those things first and think about what they are going to get me and what they are not going to get me. The price system and capitalism get you aggressive development of the technology. The liability system gets you some harm reduction. It causes big companies to incorporate the idea that if this hurts someone, they will get sued, and so they have to build in safeguards.

    We have those two big things. What are the gaps that come in between? There definitely are going to be gaps. How do we identify what those gaps will be? We can try to sit around a table in Washington or in Brussels or, for that matter, in Beijing and speculate about what the harms will be that we need laws to address. We will do that with varying degrees of success. My personal disposition is that most of the time we will not be very successful at that.

    Or we can have a fundamentally reactive public policy that looks at harms as they emerge and decides ways to deal with them after they have happened and passes narrowly tailored laws to avert specific kinds of harms that, for whatever reason, are not adequately addressed by existing law or the liability system.

    Subscribe now

    That is my very broad impression. AI is already regulated in many ways. We should rely on the huge base of existing laws that we have before passing a bunch of new, speculative rules. We are usually wrong in our speculations, even the smartest of us. Maybe especially the smartest of us have a tendency to be quite wrong about things. The EU AI Act does not talk about a lot of the things that people are actually worried about with AI today, like in the American electorate. None of the regulations from a year or two ago addressed those things at all.

    I think it is all very much a combination of a Burkean view and a classical liberal view. A traditional conservative view, but also a classical liberal view about being very open to change, which maybe Burke is not.

    Mounk: There are a lot of things that are interesting in there, and I want to drill down on some of them in a moment, but let’s stay for a moment at this philosophical level because there is something surprising about invoking, whether it is the classical liberal thinkers or particularly someone like Edmund Burke, in a discussion of this twenty-first-century, cutting-edge technology that is going to transform the world. You have written in a number of ways about how conservative thinkers, whether it is Burke or Oakeshott and others, can help give us the right kind of orientation toward this.

    The point that you have just made that is obviously right is that your general conception of politics and of the good governance of society is going to give you instincts about how to react to artificial intelligence. There are going to be some people in a more European statist tradition who think there is a new thing happening. It has lots of potential benefits, perhaps, but also lots of potential risks. Let’s pass a bunch of regulations that go heavy on reining in the risks. The role of the state is to protect its citizens from harm. It is to govern the economy and to make sure that there is a kind of primacy of our collective will over the private economy. So let’s lean toward trying to figure out the ways that we are going to minimize the potential harm and master this.

    There is a very different set of attitudes that listeners to this podcast will also instinctively understand, whether they agree with it or not, that is more libertarian. People should have the freedom to do whatever they want unless or until there is very clear proof of harm. Until we actually see AI doing really terrible things, we should be on the light side of regulation.

    It seems to me that conservative thinkers have more of an attitude toward continuity and change. They think that there are lots of elements of our society that work for reasons we do not fully understand, and we want to make sure that we do not impose a huge rational design on the world in a way that might stop those things from working. That includes forms of regulation that something like the EU might be tempted to pass.

    At the same time, we also want to ensure that change does not engulf everything. We do not want a libertarian instinct that says, let’s just see what happens if there is a potential risk of AI completely transforming society in such a rapid way that we cannot keep track of it. Perhaps there is a reason to slow that down a little bit.

    So tell us, when you invoke Burke and Oakeshott, what kind of sensibility do you think that should give us about how to respond to this potentially revolutionary technology that is spreading at incredible speed throughout society and has the potential of leading to a degree of change and upheaval not experienced since the first large-scale factories in Manchester in the early nineteenth century, and perhaps not even then?

    Ball: I think this is the fundamental tension. It is a tension that exists in my own writing because it is a tension in how I think. There is one part of me that is intrinsically skeptical of change. I like things about my life the way they are. I have what Michael Oakeshott would have called a disposition to be conservative, particularly with respect to what government does. The reason I am conservative about what government does is because, ultimately, conservatism is this kind of beautiful and ultimately tragic philosophy. I say tragic in the sense that conservatism, done right, is not about resisting change. It is about a disposition toward change and a way of reconciling yourself to the dynamism of reality.

    Of course, there is a more libertarian or classical liberal impulse that says dynamism is often good, which is also true, though it is not always true. One thing that I think I ultimately come down on is this: what is worse than creative destruction? Creative destruction has its problems. The word is destruction. It is not fun to be destructive, even if it is creative. Stagnation is worse. Stagnation is much closer to death. At least from creative destruction, new things can be born. Birth is the thing that we should want. We should want things to be born, and we should want growth. Those things are healthier and better from all dispositions. They are morally better, I would say. Stagnation is the worst possible thing, and an inevitable outcome of stagnation is gradual death.

    Subscribe now

    What regulation does is it can freeze things in place. It can create red tape. Inside every law that is written about AI is a complex of implicit and explicit assumptions about what AI is, what kind of thing it is, what kind of role it will play in our society, and what is even technologically possible. There are all these assumptions, stated and unstated, that I think AI itself will combust. What concerns me very much is that we will pass laws that freeze in place a status quo with which, if we are honest with ourselves, many of us are already dissatisfied.

    Everyone is of the opinion that something has to change, and we have different intuitions about what. To use a specific example, five years ago, in 2020 during the pandemic, a lot of Americans, especially conservatives, got outraged when their kids came home and were on Zoom class and they heard what schools were teaching. They said we urgently need reform in the education system. This is horrible.

    A couple of years later, a technology comes around that has obvious, profound implications for the institution of the schoolhouse and the institution of education, and I think creates huge new opportunities in education. All of a sudden, the mentality, especially among conservatives but also others, is that this technology is such an imposition. Why do we have to accommodate all this change just for this technology? I thought change was what you wanted.

    There is this tension all the time in a lot of popular discourse about AI, where AI puts us in a posture of defending institutions that, if we are honest with ourselves, have been showing their age for most of my lifetime, and I am 33.

    Mounk: There is a broader issue that I think is confusing a lot of politics at the moment, which is that it probably never was true that progressives wanted history to speed up and conservatives wanted to stand at the top of history and yell stop. But there was something to that. Today, in many respects, the roles have reversed.

    A big part of the Republican coalition today is accelerationist and wants to go all out on innovation and change. I know that is not the dominant faction, but it is a significant faction. A significant faction of the left today is people who instinctively are against any form of change. I am really struck by the fact that one of the most viral essays about AI on the left was this piece by Jia Tolentino in The New Yorker, which I mentioned in a piece I wrote about this.

    To my ears, it sounds like a nineteenth-century priest denouncing the evils of trains, before going on to say, “I have never used AI. Trains are evil, but of course I would never ride on one.” I know that is not the dominant faction of the left, but there is this deeply entrenched, small, conservative instinct on the left that if it is change, then it must be bad, and we should somehow stop it, even as the left often criticizes the status quo as being very negative.

    Let’s make this a little bit more concrete, because I still struggle to get my head around the different options for how to regulate things and what the actual proposals are on the table. You know this in quite a lot of detail. It sounds like you are quite critical of what the European Union laws and regulations about this are going to be. My understanding is that some of these laws have been suspended for at least a year, but they are going to be implemented at some point, at least supposedly. What assumptions about AI and about the right way to govern it do you think are implicit in the set of rules that the EU has passed? What actual rules are at stake here, and why do you think they are a mistake?

    Ball: The AI Act has two halves. Conceptually, you can divide it into two parts. One is regulations put upon developers of AI systems. Another is regulations placed principally upon deployers of AI systems in “high-risk contexts,” which would be governments, banks, financial institutions, health care, education, and things like this, some of the most vital sectors in our society, and maybe some of the ones most in need of institutional dynamism.

    The AI Act perfectly exemplifies the assumptions problem, because most of the text of the AI Act was written in the early 2020s, prior to ChatGPT. The assumption of what AI was at that time was that the AI systems that predominated were principally narrow, machine-learning-based systems. For example, computer vision used for facial recognition, but that is all it can do. I am going to have a camera on the bottom of my tractor that looks at images of crops for defects in the crops, but that is all it can do. It cannot do anything else.

    Most famously, there were algorithms where you might take a loan application and process it through a machine-learning system, basically a statistical model based upon the previous loan data that the financial institution had, and then make a prediction about whether this person is going to pay back their loan based on the historical data, and then decide whether or not to issue the loan based on that, often with human review.

    The interest was in regulating systems like this. There are a couple of things about that. First, it is mostly regulated institutions that are doing that kind of thing. In that world, where that is what AI is, I as a consumer am not going to use AI. AI is going to be used on me. It is an already regulated institution that is working with contractors, assembling data sets, and that sounds like it probably costs a lot of money and takes time. So maybe the marginal increase in paperwork is not that significant compared to what they were already going to do anyway in terms of cost. That is debatable, but you could at least have that intuition.

    Finally, it may also be the case that the bank’s historical loan data has real biases in it. There may have been a period in the U.S. context where it was de facto or de jure illegal for certain demographic groups to even get a loan, and that might bias the data. If you purely take the historical data and put it into a machine-learning system, that system may well be unjustly biased against certain demographic groups. There is a fair argument to be made there.

    You can also get into disparate impact arguments where it turns into race Bolshevism, where everyone has to be treated equally about everything, and that is also a problem. But there is a core of legitimate critique there.

    Then, right at the end of the AI Act, in the final months of the legislative process, comes generalist language models: ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and so on. These are totally different. Is bias an issue in these things? Yes. Anyone can use them. They are adoptable extremely quickly by both enterprises and consumers.

    There is also the issue that one of the fundamental constructs in the AI Act is the notion of the consequential decision. When you make a consequential decision, that is a highly regulated moment. With a language model, which structures your information environment in subtle ways, does research for you, and writes software and code, this is general intelligence.

    Mounk: The idea of a consequential decision is that you are an insurer and you are deciding whether to accept this person for insurance. That moment is the consequential decision. If you want to outsource this so that human beings do not review the files, you have an automated system that you have programmed specifically for this, then it is very clear what the consequential decision is.

    If, instead, you incorporate ChatGPT or whichever AI model into all kinds of business processes, where does the consequential decision start and stop? If this regulation suddenly applies to all of those business practices, then you are basically making it impossible to use AI.

    Ball: To a first approximation, the insurance company has one use of that narrow system, which is to review the application and provide a recommended decision. In the case of a language model, an insurance company might have ten thousand uses of the same neural network. This is exactly what I am referring to, where there is this complex of assumptions that just ended up being wrong, and now we have to live with that. We have to live with the consequences of that.

    That is a great example of what I worry about. We have witnessed that play out in well under half a decade. It took three years for us to go from the framework that the Europeans had to the generalist models completely obviating it. I bet you a lot of the laws we think of today will be obviated by something that comes down the road for which we do not yet have a word.

    Mounk: When you say that we have to live with those consequences, I have a question, somewhat narrowly, about the European Union. I have been in a number of debates about this in Europe and would love your view on it.

    Europe now really believes in the idea of a Brussels effect, that because Europe is a very significant market, when they pass certain rules and regulations, for example on the fuel efficiency of cars, that ends up constraining even what Ford does in the United States because they cannot afford not to produce for the European market. It is not really worth producing two completely different sets of cars for the U.S. and Europe. Therefore, a rule passed in Brussels can transform the car industry even outside of Europe.

    They have now applied this idea to AI and really think that Brussels is able to steer the development of these frontier AI models, which, to a close approximation, do not happen in Europe at all. They happen mostly in Silicon Valley and to some extent in China, and perhaps a few other places. There are not many significant AI players in Europe at the moment. But because companies are going to want to sell their products in the EU, perhaps that somehow really constrains OpenAI and how it produces those frontier AI models.

    I have a few things to say about this. As somebody who has both a U.S. and a German passport, the first is that it just seems to me like an incredibly low level of ambition for Europe to say, fine, we are not going to be players in the development of the most consequential technology of the twenty-first century, but we are going to be able to regulate it. It seems like a somewhat sad ambition.

    The second question is that when I think about what the real risks of AI are, terrorists being able to design a biological weapon that kills tens of millions or hundreds of millions of people, a complete change in military technology where autonomous drones transform modern warfare and perhaps change the balance between offense and defense in such a way that it becomes much more enticing to start wars, a huge percentage of the middle class losing their jobs because AI becomes better able than most human beings at doing white-collar jobs and perhaps eventually blue-collar jobs, or even the existential risk of some misaligned AI model becoming so superintelligent that it runs over humanity, none of these things are going to stop at the border of Europe.

    It seems absolutely naive to think that any of those developments will somehow not happen in Europe because, at the European border, the European AI Act comes into play.

    On the other hand, it sounded from what you were saying that we now have to live with the consequences of the European Union AI Act from an American perspective. How relevant or irrelevant are those EU rules to the CEOs you talk to in Silicon Valley? Are they a headache that might make it harder to monetize some products in the short run, or does the EU actually have some power to influence the trajectory of that technology?

    Ball: I think we are at an interesting turning point right now because the Europeans have really backed down from the posture they had toward regulation even just two or three years ago. As I speak to you right now, I am at the office of the delegation of German Industry and Commerce in DC. I was speaking at an event with a bunch of US–German business interests.

    I think the posture really has changed, and the Europeans have realized that they need to soften some things. In particular, with respect to the AI Act, there are rules on AI development. Most of those rules actually gave themselves enough leeway in the text of the AI Act that the implementation has been considerably softer than I might have predicted two or three years ago when the law was first drafted.

    That being said, it is a real concern for industry because we do not know where those rules are going to develop. It is also a concern for both Europe and America that most of the rules I mentioned were rules on deployers. Those are regulations of any company with operations in Europe, any European company, but also any multinational company.

    That mostly is bad for their economy. If there is some multinational American firm that has a big research presence in Europe and also a big research presence in the United States, and that is being coupled with tariffs and build-in-America incentives, and then the Europeans also have laws that make a lot of fundamental work harder and make the adoption of AI much harder in Europe, then on the margin you start relocating facilities and people.

    In the short term, that is great for America. In the long term, it is not so great for either Europe or America, because I think America will be weaker without a strong Europe.

    To your point about catastrophic risk, that is one thing I did not mention when it comes to my disposition toward how we govern AI. Government is a big risk-management enterprise. Tail risks, catastrophic tail events, unlikely events with very high cost, are the kinds of things that market-based systems tend to handle poorly.

    From a technocratic perspective, this is an area where proactive regulation, or at least proactive steps taken by government, can make sense. That is why I have been supportive of things like SB 53 in California, which is light-touch. It requires frontier AI companies only to disclose how they measure, evaluate, and mitigate catastrophic risks posed by their models, cyber, autonomy, bio, things like that.

    I support that. If there is a federal standard, I hope it includes something like that. It is worth noting that the EU code of practice includes some of this as well. That seems like a good thing to do and a potential area of U.S.–EU collaboration.

    Most of what we should be doing is non-regulatory, proactive, defensive, and focused on resiliency. But transparency regulation in this case allows us to get a glimpse of what catastrophic risks are emerging at the frontier and what resources and steps we should be taking, often far afield of AI itself, to mitigate those risks. That is quite prudent.

    Mounk: That is promising, that the U.S. might still be able to collaborate on this or anything else. Let me push you a little bit on how we should think about regulating AI in a better way.

    You are saying that the problem with a lot of the approach to regulation is that we see what the technology is right now and make a set of rigid rules around this technology in order to minimize risks and reassert our control over it. That is really going to start being unhelpful very quickly if, two or three years from now, the nature of the technology has changed so much that those rules end up being far too specific to a particular state of the technology. They either end up being overly constraining or underly constraining, or they mistail what the state of the world is a few years later. Since it takes a lot of effort and time to change and reform legislation, you are then stuck with a regulatory regime that really does not make sense.

    I have two questions. The first is, what is the alternative? What kind of spirit or approach to regulating AI makes more sense? Inherently trying to regulate how AI works when we do not know what this technology is going to look like in three years is going to be really hard. So what is the alternative? In keeping with that, when we think about some of those bigger risks, is any alternative going to work to actually constrain that? Unless we are saying that a certain kind of capacity is not allowed to be developed, or needs to be developed under very strong security regulations, how can we avoid something like a superintelligent AI that we cannot control? Is a set of dispositions ever going to be enough to facilitate that?

    Ball: I think you need to have a system that, first of all, begins with transparency. Having information about these things matters. A lot of things about the world are going to change in ten years. But one of the things that probably will not change is that we will not want AI-engineered pandemics.

    We will probably still want to avoid those in ten years, even if many other things are quite different. Jeff Bezos always says the best way to predict the future is to think about what will not change. That is also the best way to write a law, to try to write for the evergreen thing.

    Mounk: I assume that in ten years, in one hundred years, in a thousand years, we are not going to want to put technologies in the hands of everybody that make it very easy to cause a pandemic. The obvious follow-up question is what we have to do in order to make sure that the ability of AI to teach people to do things in general, and to give them knowledge about biology in particular, and even more specifically to figure out new DNA sequences or other things that would allow someone with basic skills in laboratory technology to create a really potent bioweapon, cannot be used for that purpose. That truly depends so much on the state of the technology that knowing we share the goal of avoiding people being able to engineer these bioweapons is great, but knowing what kind of regulation is necessary to carry out that task is much harder.

    Imagine that AI were so good at inventing really simple lab techniques, so good at inventing technologies that allow someone to sequence DNA and create a virus, and so good at inventing incredibly deadly viruses, that anybody with access to an all-purpose AI-powered chatbot would be able to do that. Imagine that we are not very good at even basic alignment, so that reliably programming these chatbots to stop people from giving that advice is not possible.

    In that kind of world, we would have to make sure these models basically do not exist, because the moment they exist, somebody is going to be able to exploit them in a way that causes hundreds of millions of deaths. I do not think that is likely to be the state of the technology, but the policy approach we should take, including whether it should be permissive or incredibly restrictive, fully depends in part on what the state of the technology is. So how can we pass regulation that is completely agnostic to predicting the future in that way?

    Ball: It is not entirely agnostic. Something like SB 53 does specifically talk about bio risk. This is a risk that the state is acknowledging. We are saying that if you are developing a model of this size, you have to measure it and you have to tell us how you are mitigating it.

    Of course, how a company does that, given that it is now public, and how a company does that compared to how other companies do it, will factor in if there is ever liability or a legal situation involving something like that. How well they mitigated those risks, what they did, how they measured them, and the thoroughness with which they did so will be compared to their peers. That is how we will assess a duty of care. The common law allows that to be dynamic.

    It is also very possible that the things you need to do to mitigate this kind of risk at the AI model developer level will change. In fact, I think it is likely that they will change quite a bit over time. You want companies to be incentivized to do a good job mitigating these risks while not being super prescriptive, because your prescriptions might become outdated quickly.

    For example, there are safeguards you can put on models to prevent jailbreaking and to monitor usage. You can have specific features of a model that, when activated, immediately trigger human review to decide whether this is a virologist at a university doing legitimate scientific work or a potential bioterrorist. Those are the kinds of things you would want to do.

    You could also imagine a world where there are technical standards for how reliable those safeguards need to be. Various organizations could be involved in creating those standards, private organizations, government organizations, or the Center for AI Standards and Innovation. It could be a hybrid of all of those things.

    Eventually, if the risks become severe enough, we might want supervision or auditing so it is not just AI companies grading their own homework, but some government entity or government-blessed private actor independently testing safeguards against a pre-existing specification not created by the model developers. That is one direction you could go if downside risks become much higher.

    The other important thing to say is that a lot of other things have to happen downstream for this to go well. One example is something I worked on in the Trump administration called the Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening Framework on biosecurity. This is a mandatory regulation on companies that provide nucleic acid synthesis services.

    If I want to make a virus, I might have its genome and send it to a company. This is not exactly how it works today, but bear with me. I would send a protein sequence or a genome, and they would synthesize it. You can require those companies to screen sequences for pathogenicity and toxicity. We already have an early version of these regulations in place.

    You can also require know-your-customer checks to ensure that the requester is a legitimate lab doing legitimate work. In parallel, you might have biosurveillance programs that constantly measure wastewater and other environmental indicators for novel threats.

    In the longer term, in AI terms anything beyond five years, if models are that good at synthesis, they are probably also that good at synthesizing treatments. You could imagine a future where people have devices on their bodies connected to the internet, and when a new pathogen emerges, those devices automatically administer a treatment developed by AI and delivered immediately. That is the kind of future you can imagine.

    Mounk: Given how universal the acceptance of mRNA vaccines was, I am sure nobody would object to a machine like that. That is beside the point. I want to ask you about one element of this, because you have touched on liability a little bit. I think liability is actually something really important that we do not talk about that much in the broader discourse.

    I can see how a liability framework can often be more useful than straight-up regulation. But I think it depends on a few boundary constraints. When you have a car company, the risk is that some design flaw in a car they produced is going to kill some number of people. It is not going to be millions of people, but it is what we consider an unacceptable number of people who die as a direct result of this kind of design flaw.

    When that happens, we have liability rules in place, which mean that those customers are going to be able to sue the car companies. Most likely, together with bad publicity and other factors, the incentives make it such that the car company would rather spend more money on research and development and safety tests than pay out those financial fines or take that kind of publicity hit.

    Part of this is that there is no catastrophic risk involved here. There is obviously catastrophic risk to individual customers, but not at scale. That makes it kind of work. The problem comes when the likelihood of a bad impact for any one company is very low. It is very unlikely that any one particular AI lab is going to create the frontier model that causes the big global pandemic of 2030 or creates a superintelligent AI that kills all of humanity.

    Each company might think the risk of doing this is relatively low, well below one percent. They might not worry about it too much because it is unlikely to impact the long-term future of their company. If it happens, perhaps liability means that the company goes bankrupt. But the pandemic has already happened, or the superintelligent machine has already killed all humans. The fact that one company ends up going bankrupt does not matter in that grand scheme.

    It may be that if you have three hundred companies building AI models, the risk of any one of them bringing about this really bad outcome is so low that liability is not front of mind for any single company. Cumulatively, though, the risk from those three hundred companies is actually very high, or at least significant. In that kind of world, the liability framework does not protect us in the ways we need. Is the liability framework just not well suited to this kind of problem, or do we need to complement it with other kinds of things?

    Ball: Yes, it is. In fact, I alluded earlier to the notion that liability is traditionally not good at catastrophic tail risk. That is an area where liability fails. For that reason, that is why I specifically concentrate my efforts to develop public policy on those things, because that is where I have less trust in liability.

    A couple of things I would say. First, I want to complicate it slightly and say that the liability system does incentivize companies to have a wide variety of safeguards and jailbreak-protection methods for normal consumer harms that would be dealt with well by the liability system. That work is probably general-purpose work that also has benefits for catastrophic risk. But it is generally true that this is why you need public policy to step in. That is why I am supportive of things like SB 53 in California. It is why I am supportive of downstream work on biosecurity policy in the biotech industry. Mostly, those are regulations.

    SB 53 is a law passed by the California government that was signed by Governor Newsom in September of this year. It is a brand-new law. Basically, it says that if you are a very large AI model developer, essentially the top five or six companies as designed, you have to publish what is called a safety and security framework. Every major company already does this. They go by different names. Anthropic’s is called Responsible Scaling Policy. They all have different names. But for the most part, they already do this. This is really codifying an existing industry practice.

    That document must contain details about how you measure certain areas of catastrophic risk, including bio risk, what the results of those measurements were, and what you do to mitigate those risks. That is the idea. There is also the notion that, as we move up levels of capability, as we go from models that are not much more useful than a Google search in terms of bio risk to models where, if you know the right questions to ask, experts can get useful uplift, and eventually to models that could help a complete novice design a bioweapon, we are probably somewhere between the first and second stages right now. They provide uplift to experts, but it is not like I could design a bioweapon right now. It is not clear when or if we will get to that point.

    As we go up these different scales of capability, those capabilities are also very useful, because the same intelligence allows you to design novel treatments and drugs. They are hugely useful, and you do not just want to say you cannot do it. That probably does not work. Saying that a model may not pose bio risk is not going to be an effective law for many reasons.

    The notion contemplated in SB 53 is that as you reach qualitative levels of capability, different qualitative levels of safeguards are required, which seems reasonable to me. You do have to take this seriously. My view is that these are tractable issues on which we can make a lot of progress. It is not that they are not threats at all.

    I also think that early on in AI safety, shortly after ChatGPT, some advocates exaggerated how overwhelming these problems are. My view, especially having sat in government, is that a new catastrophic tail risk comes across your desk every day. There are no 100 percent solutions. There are compounding 95 percent solutions. As I described with layered mitigations, AI model safeguards, biosecurity measures, wastewater monitoring, biosurveillance, and rapid development of cures, doing all of those together is how we deal with these issues.

    I think these are tractable problems. We do not have a 100 percent solution, and it was never realistic to expect one. That does not mean we should relax or do nothing. There is quite a bit of work to be done, and a lot of it needs to be done with urgency.

    Mounk: I feel like you have given us a sense of how you want to think about regulating AI. Perhaps you can now pull those threads together for listeners. If you had to answer in about sixty seconds, what forms of regulation can help mitigate some of those very serious risks without slowing down innovation in AI that could have very positive impacts for the world? Very briefly, give us a list of some of the things we should do and some of the things we should not do.

    Ball: I think that transparency and facilitating insight about these problems is step number one. We are kind of in the process of taking that step right now. Another step is to think about, for threat models that we believe are real, examining the downstream. What would we need to do? The way I would put this is, what is the victory condition here?

    If we are worried about autonomous cyberattacks, we know that autonomous cyberdefense is also possible. So what does the world look like? What is the set of policies, institutions, and technologies that we need in order to feel that not only are we not just treading water, not only are we mitigating this risk, but we are actually going to get better at cyberdefense than we were before?

    Bio is a very similar thing. We know that biosecurity is a problem. We just lived through a multi-year pandemic. You think about what the victory condition looks like. Then you build, in parallel, different societal actors. You channel philanthropic resources, government resources, and corporate resources toward building that institution.

    What I view as my role is helping to channel those resources and trying to articulate what that institutional arrangement looks like. What is the win condition? Or at least trying to amplify the voices of those who have already articulated such things.

    The last thing I will say, and the reason regulation is a double-edged sword, is that all of the things I have mentioned, bio, cyber, and even the challenge of AI governance itself, involve AI as a general-purpose technology. It is useful for the defensive side and the resiliency side of all of those things. We will not govern AI without AI.

    That is a strange fact, but it is also obvious if you think about other general-purpose technologies. Imagine trying to govern computers without computers. Governing computers with pen and paper would not work very well. It is a similar thing. If you regulate AI too much, you not only stifle capabilities, growth, and innovation, but you also stifle the ability of people in critical infrastructure to adopt AI in defensive ways that we want them to. We regulate critical infrastructure a lot, but if we regulate AI use in critical infrastructure because we are worried about AI risks, we might accidentally regulate away the ability of those systems to become more resilient. That is the challenge. That is the balance you have to strike. I do not have a way to summarize all of this in one or two sentences, but that is basically how I think.

    Mounk: This starts to get into another point you have made that I find interesting, which is about how AI is going to transform our institutions. So far, I think this conversation has been quite focused on what regulation is helpful or harmful and what kind of framework to use for regulation. But there is a more fundamental question. Our institutions were built in the eighteenth century, and already there are all kinds of technologies, including the internet, that lead to a felt mismatch between our democratic institutions and how people are now used to having an impact on the world. Some of the basic assumptions that we cannot all come together and deliberate together are not really true with Web 1.0 or 2.0 technologies.

    There are other constraints. One of the reasons you do not want direct democracy is that most people are not that interested in politics, and that would end up with the people most obsessed with politics, who are often the most ideological, having the biggest voices, along with all kinds of other problems. But there is a fundamental question about whether, if we are really serious about the project of self-government, we should be governing ourselves with eighteenth-century technology rather than using late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century technology. You could imagine ways in which artificial intelligence poses the question of how we should radically transform our institutions in quite fundamental ways as well. Part of that may be about the institutions of self-government. How is it that we can use AI to translate popular views into public policy, which I think is one of the core points of democracy? But also, how can we radically change our idea of what the DMV looks like?

    Beyond government, how are universities going to look different, how are research labs going to look different, and how are corporations going to produce goods in a different way? There are obviously no firm answers to any of those questions, but how should we think about keeping what is valid in our institutions, not becoming a weird kind of AI utopian who thinks all these institutions no longer have value because they are going to be replaced by something like Gemini 3.0, and yet remaining open to intelligent and smart ways to rethink our institutions such that they can seize upon these technologies?

    Ball: This is, in some sense, the fundamental question to me. I wrote a piece a couple of months ago. It was called “The Building Company,” and it was a speculative short story about a company that has developed the capability to robotically construct buildings, warehouses, and similar structures. You can think about a world where that technology exists and is widely diffused.

    In that world, there are building codes in local government that are enforced by departments of buildings. They send inspectors out periodically to look at sites, and it is often a very cumbersome and expensive process. When you have end-to-end autonomy in the construction of a building, the robots collect telemetry data, visual data, and other information about what they are doing. That information can be streamed in real time to a regulator who can monitor constantly, using their own AI systems, for potential risks, bad practices, or violations of the code.

    You can imagine that this would change how banks and insurers think about writing policies for buildings if they knew every step that was taken in construction. You can imagine many downstream changes, and you can imagine most of them being better. You can also imagine the same idea being used to constantly surveil everyone and send everything to surveillance systems, which gets you into something like Skynet.

    So we need a set of principles by which we decide when we want heavily AI-enabled governance and when we do not. Those principles probably need to be much more sophisticated than current ideas about data or privacy. I think the answer will often involve binary decisions where we say no, we do not want AI-enabled governance here, and others where we say yes, we want to aggressively adopt it.

    You mentioned democracy. The institution of democracy itself is an example. The notion of going to a polling place and casting a vote on a specific day is a nice notion, but it is also technologically contingent. There may be better ways, more profound than simply voting online, to use digital technologies to bring public perspectives to bear on public policy and ensure that the public retains sovereignty over decisions of public interest. That is possible, but you have to be extremely careful.

    You need very firm principles. This is another area where AI becomes deeply political and philosophical. You need a robust set of principles to decide when we do this kind of thing and when we do not, and what we want to preserve. Governments will be able to do much more than they currently can. They will be able to surveil and incorporate much more information. In some ways that will be good, and in some ways it will be very bad. If we go into this with weak principles, we will end up with poor outcomes. That is why I think classical liberalism is so important, and I hope it has a serious resurgence, not just in America but across the world, because it offers an individual-liberty-preserving and privacy-respecting way of thinking about these issues.

    Mounk: I feel really torn on the subject because the first thought I have is, of course we should try and figure out ways to do this. It is kind of strange to run our institutions along a model that was available in the eighteenth century and that sidesteps all of these technologies that we can use now. It is not like we are doing very well at delivering on the basic promise of our political system.

    One of the key premises of the system is that it is government by the people, that we are translating popular views into public policy. Most citizens do not feel like that is happening. That is something that citizens on the left, the right, and the center probably have in common. Most of them feel like those people in Washington are not really listening to me. So, of course, we should be open to this.

    The second point is that any actual set of ideas about how to do this is very easy to pick holes in, because they usually do have holes. I used to teach a class on democracy in the digital age at Harvard ten years ago now. Even then, there were utopian ideas about liquid democracy and different ways to have smart setups. They were kind of cool and fun to talk about. They were a good teaching tool in that class. But it was obvious that none of them would work.

    The third point is that, as you are pointing out, one of the reasons why they do not work has quite fundamental causes that apply at any stage of technology. One beautiful text from a very different political tradition than yours, but I think relevant, was written in the 1960s, when there was a huge fashion for basic participatory democracy in a somewhat socialist vein, by Michael Walzer in Dissent magazine. He called it “A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen.”

    The idea of the piece was that if we manage to achieve socialism through basic participatory democracy, what would the day of the socialist citizen actually look like? The joke of the piece was that where Marx promised that people would be fishing in the morning, hunting in the afternoon, and being critics in the evening, the day of a socialist citizen under participatory democracy would be sitting on the fishing license committee in the morning, debating laws about hunting in the afternoon, and sitting on a literary prize committee in the evening. It would completely alienate you from the things that this utopian system is supposed to deliver.

    The debate today is very different and has different contours. But the basic question remains. Yes, we have the technology to involve everybody in the design of the details of regulation about AI. We could have public comment in a much more fluid way. We could have every US citizen voting on this stuff if we wanted. This is something we could have done before AI. We could have done it ten years ago.

    But most Americans do not have the interest or the expertise to participate in this process. If we open it to everybody, the only people who would really participate would be special interests, people with extreme ideological views, and weirdos. It would not make the system more representative of ordinary citizens. Some of the constraints on why our political system is not responsive to popular views look technological, but are ultimately rooted in basic facts about human psychology and politics that are unlikely to change.

    Ball: I completely agree. By the way, when it comes to things as fundamental as democracy, any kind of institutional evolution in these areas, my inner Burkean comes out very strongly. I am quite skeptical. I would like to see the technology diffuse and develop in many more areas before we even begin to think about things like that.

    One of the other things here is that I really have a biological conception of institutions. I often use the language of biology in analogical ways to think about institutional evolution. I think it is true that institutions that are insufficiently supple will, in the long run, struggle. We are probably already living through that right now. The insufficient suppleness of Western governance institutions is probably a big part of why many citizens of Western societies do not feel as though their government represents their interests.

    So what are the institutions that are more capable of evolving and that are functioning competently in our society today? I would argue that big technology companies are a fairly good example. What went right during COVID? We did produce mRNA vaccines that worked. That was controversial, but we did in fact do that. We were all able to go to remote work almost overnight, massively increasing our usage of cloud computing, and that largely worked. We owe AWS, Microsoft, Google, and other companies thanks for allowing us to keep our economy afloat during a very fraught time.

    What I am saying is that the risk you run of being highly Burkean with respect to everything involving government adoption of AI is that those institutions simply do not evolve, while other institutions do. There are things about current big tech companies that are already quasi-governmental in nature. This has long been a feature of America. Financial institutions have quasi-governance aspects. Banks do. Many private organizations have quasi-governmental functions. That is not inherently bad.

    But you can imagine a world in which AI fulfills some of its promises. One of the questions I think about all the time is what kind of institution the frontier AI lab is. What kind of a thing is OpenAI or Anthropic or Google DeepMind? To what extent and in what ways will it be governmental in nature? How will that challenge the existing structures of the nation-state?

    To put an exclamation point on it, I do not think the nation-state is necessarily the end of history. The evolution of something beyond it, even if AI moves very quickly, would still take decades if not centuries. But I think we need to be prepared for the possibility that the tectonic plates are moving beneath our feet in a way that challenges the nation-state over time. I do not have high confidence in that, but I think it is a plausible possibility.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Dean discuss policy solutions to the risks posed by AI, what technology shows us about ethics, and whether superintelligence will kill us all. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    1 hr 24 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    Disappointingly, this is an inflatable moon and not the real moon. (Photo by Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images.)
    • We’re delighted to announce that our online Book Club is back, during which you can ask authors questions about their recent books! Please join us on Tuesday, April 7 at 6pm ET, when our Head of Podcasts, Leonora Barclay, will interview Russell Muir…

    Read more

    0 min
  • Fracking Killed Khamenei
    The Strait of Hormuz on February 25, 2026. (Photo by Fadel Senna / AFP via Getty Images.)

    American military planners in the Pentagon have been wargaming scenarios for attacking Iran more or less non-stop since 1979. One major reason president after president stopped short of launching an attack was the frightening realization that the Islamic Republic could always choose to shut down the Strait of Hormuz—that narrow waterway through which roughly a quarter of the world’s oil and a fifth of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows every day. Iran could also hit the oil platforms and gas liquefaction facilities of the neighboring Gulf states. It could, in other words, turn off a frightening proportion of the global energy spigot, setting off an energy shock with implications nobody could quite predict.

    American strategists cared a lot about the way Iran destabilizes the Middle East. But they cared about energy security, too. Which is one reason why every president from Jimmy Carter on took one look at the war option presented by the Pentagon and said, “yeah, no.”

    So what changed? It’s tempting to think the answer is “the man at the top,” and, sure, that’s clearly an important part of the story. But it’s not just about personalities. The strategic weight of Hormuz in the American calculus changed too, because a bunch of geology nerds working for a handful of U.S. energy firms figured out a way to inject water into shale formations at high enough pressure to dislodge the hydrocarbons embedded in the rock.

    Persuasion is on Instagram! Click here to follow us and help us grow our page. And while you’re at it, check out our X and YouTube pages.

    In a shockingly short period, between 2003 and 2015, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing—fracking, to you and me—came to dominate American energy production.

    The shale revolution had geopolitical implications that have become dramatically visible this week. Little by little, fracking loosened the grip the Strait of Hormuz had on American strategy.

    Shale gas, in particular, changed what energy means to the American economy. In 2024, natural gas reached an all-time high of 36% of U.S. primary energy consumption, nearly matching petroleum at 38%. It’s a dramatic shift from a decade earlier, when gas accounted for about a quarter of primary energy and oil for 40%. Fracking turned natural gas, which used to be an afterthought, into an energy source as important as oil.

    Natural gas doesn’t trade globally the way oil does. It’s regional, locked into pipeline networks and long-term LNG contracts, which means price shocks from foreign wars don’t pass through to American pocketbooks with anything like the speed of oil prices. When oil prices spike, you feel it at the pump immediately and acutely, all around the world. When prices for gas spike in the Middle East, American prices barely budge.

    When the United States and Israel began their strikes on February 28, killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and dozens of senior military officials, they were acting on the understanding that the resulting energy shock would be asymmetric. Americans would take a hit, yes. But the rest of the world would take a beating.

    China alone accounts for 37.7% of total energy flows through the Hormuz Strait, more than any other country by a wide margin. India is the second-largest destination at 14.7%, followed by South Korea at 12% and Japan at 10.9%. The United States accounts for just 2.5% of those flows.

    Looking at LNG specifically, China, India, and South Korea were the top destinations for LNG moving through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024.

    Subscribe now

    All of these countries (and many more who import from the Gulf states, like Bangladesh and Thailand) will watch their energy costs soar. Their currencies will come under pressure. Their central banks will have to make ugly choices about whether to defend the currency or maintain foreign reserves. Voters will not like it. Governments will have to weigh taking on more debt to handle the disruption.

    The United States? Not so much. America produces enough natural gas of its own, and is now the world’s largest LNG exporter. Prices will still rise—drivers will grumble when they go to fill up—but on a macro level the more expensive energy gets, the better for America.

    This, I suspect, is one reason why the Trump administration was willing to go to war. A more normal administration would’ve counted a global energy shock as a bad thing because it destabilizes its allies and even its enemies. The United States’ whole role was supposed to be looking after global stability.

    As far as the current bunch sees it, that’s globalist nonsense. The logic is brutally simple: if everyone takes a hit, but America takes a smaller hit than its competitors, America wins. For Trump, weakening competitors is the whole game.

    Of course, the competitor the United States is worried about isn’t Bangladesh or Thailand, it’s China. So is this war going to cripple China? Not as much as you may think, because they saw this coming years ago.

    For decades, Chinese planners have been obsessed with the kind of scenario we’re seeing play out. The Strait of Hormuz looks just as narrow on their maps as it does on America’s. But unlike the United States, they weren’t going to be able to frack their way to energy independence.

    Instead, China went for the resource it’s not short on: coal. As of July 2025, there were 1,195 coal-fired power plants operating in China, as many as in the whole rest of the world combined. China is building new ones at an accelerating pace. Joe Biden’s Climate Envoy, John Kerry, drove himself to distraction trying to explain to Chinese state planners that this made a mockery out of their CO₂ reduction plans. They didn’t listen.

    Instead, China built hundreds of coal-fired power plants: a sprawling backup system for a day when the oil and gas couldn’t be counted on. Just before the start of the war, they were running only around 50% of the time. In competition with cheap solar and wind, a large share of coal plants were operating at a loss.

    But this was intentional: think of those hundreds of often-idle plants as a strategic energy reserve. They were preparing for the day when Qatar can’t deliver LNG because of a war, and Russia can’t be trusted because of geopolitics, and the Americans are too far away to care.

    Well, that day has come.

    As LNG prices skyrocket and availability collapses, China will activate its insurance policy. It will turn on those coal plants.

    But coal is much dirtier than LNG. An additional billion tonnes of coal consumption translates to something on the order of two gigatonnes of additional CO₂ for the year. To give you a sense of magnitude, the United States now emits in the order of 4.7 gigatonnes each year. It’s a lot.

    Which is why the war in Iran is, among many other things, a disaster for the climate.

    It’s funny how things work out. As the shale revolution took shape, we heard a lot about how it would enable America to shift from highly polluting coal to less polluting natural gas for electricity generation. We heard nothing about how that progress might be entirely undone if shale also made America more willing to confront Iran, and in doing so, pushed China to restart its coal plants en masse.

    Subscribe now

    This war became possible—it became thinkable—because the United States no longer has to live with the consequences of energy disruption the way the rest of the world does. The Strait of Hormuz was always Iran’s biggest deterrent, but deterrence requires that the other side cares about the damage you can inflict. Once the United States became energy independent, it started caring a lot less.

    The first-order effects of war are easy to see: they go boom on your screen. It’s the second- and third-order effects that get you. If the Iran war ends up accelerating climate change and entrenching China’s coal strategy, we may end up remembering it for reasons that are on nobody’s radar this week.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • MAGA Misunderstands the Family
    (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images.)

    In recent years, National Conservatives have grown increasingly fixated on the American family. They view themselves as participants in an ongoing war over the role of family and family life in the modern world. As JD Vance recently put it: “I’m going to take aim at the left, specifically the childless left. Because I think the rejection of the American family is perhaps the most pernicious and most evil thing that the left has done in this country.”

    For social conservatives, the Western family has fallen prey to the monstrosities of leftist ideology. They argue that a combination of welfare, the sexual revolution, and no-fault divorce has led the family to the brink of collapse—and with it, Western civilization.

    This view is echoed in a recent report by the Heritage Foundation, a MAGA think tank, which seeks to diagnose and remedy the problems that plague the family. The report declares:

    Today, fewer than 50 percent of Americans believe that society is better off when people prioritize marriage. These new norms mean that many children today will have no concept of the traditional family name, family home, or family vacation, because their definition of family doesn’t include marriage and, often, either fathers or siblings.

    The report’s authors go on to offer a wide-ranging, broadly nationalist agenda to address what it sees as the total collapse of modern society’s moral fabric. They argue that the only real solution to America’s family crisis is a renewed commitment to marriage, which they understand as the stable commitment of one man and one woman. The report proposes the elimination of marriage penalties embedded in welfare programs and providing targeted financial support for those couples who meet their definition of the family.

    Subscribe now

    But despite their laudable aims, the scholars of the Heritage Foundation fundamentally misunderstand the nature of family. While it is undeniable that families (and children in particular) are the foundation of any flourishing civilization, it is not the case that the decline in family is the result of attacks from the political left. What the right sees as a full-frontal assault is, in many cases, simply an attempt to expand the family beyond the tight strictures of 1950s social norms. What’s more, the decline in birthrates is a worldwide phenomenon, and is especially prevalent in Asia. This should cast doubt on the idea that the American left is uniquely to blame for the crisis of the family.

    Before diving into exactly where National Conservatism loses the plot with regards to the family, it is worth acknowledging what they get right. Though most leftists have at least a modicum of respect for the family, some, such as the writer Sophie Lewis, openly despise the family, arguing in books such as Abolish the Family that it is high time for us to rethink the central role we allow families to play in our lives.

    What’s more, it’s certainly true that a healthy family dynamic is one of the greatest guarantees of human happiness. As the 1966 Coleman Report showed, educational resources and economic success pale in comparison to family dynamics in shaping the prospects of the next generation. All of this the authors of the Heritage Report understand well.

    Social conservatives are also right to point out that the family is not as healthy or vibrant as it once was. Since Daniel Patrick Moynihan first sounded the alarm about the collapse of the two-parent household in a landmark report in 1965, the situation has only worsened. An increasingly large number of children are raised by single parents, with a litany of studies showing that this drastically undermines their health and well-being. Likewise, a mounting number of young people have chosen to forgo having families altogether.

    To put it plainly, the family is in trouble.

    However, the most important thing is not just identifying a problem; it is correctly diagnosing the problem’s origin and finding a workable solution. It is here that National Conservatives go seriously wrong.

    For one, they completely misunderstand what a family is. Their idea, borrowed from a unique and fairly rigid time in American history—the 1950s—is that a family should, most of the time, only ever consist of a father, a mother, and their biological children. This means that while many National Conservatives are in favor of straight parents adopting children, they are generally against surrogacy.

    In addition, many thinkers on the right imply that even among monogamous couples, sexual intercourse and romance exist solely for human reproduction. As the (comparatively moderate) conservative political theorist Robert George writes: “Embracing a concept of marriage as a form of sexual-romantic companionship or domestic partnership … was, I believe, a tragic mistake.” He goes on to plug an organization whose entire purpose is to try and abolish same-sex marriage and encourage young people to connect romantically only if they wish to reproduce.

    This nationalist account of the family excludes same-sex couples and any children they may choose to have. Glaringly, it also offers a conception of human romance that would be unrecognizable to, say, Shakespeare or Jane Austen. While child-rearing is arguably the most important thing any human can ever do, it is not necessarily the source of the innate attraction two souls feel for one another. Nor is there any ethical reason to believe that romantic life ought to only ever be coupled with having children.

    As a result of this faulty premise, the Heritage report consistently implies that adoption by gay couples and romance without children are the product of human selfishness—placing the wishes of the couple above all else. The authors of the report state:

    Policies should favor natural marriage over same-sex and polyamorous relationships, cohabitation, or intentional single parenthood. Fathers and mothers are not generic and interchangeable “parents.” It is not discrimination to acknowledge the differences between them. Each brings unique and complementary assets to the vocation of parenthood.

    It goes on to imply that children without two biological parents are doomed to live sadder, less fulfilled lives.

    But this is simply not true. Adoption by gay or straight couples is, as often as not, the product of the same strong nurturing instincts one finds in biological parents. Numerous studies demonstrate that the adopted children of gay parents are just as likely, if not more likely, to succeed in life.

    In other words, National Conservatives consistently fail to comprehend the manifold avenues through which a life may be well led. As they make openly clear, they believe there is only one form of a healthy family—a male and female couple who come together for the purpose of having children and reproducing.

    Nor does the decline in families choosing to have children necessarily indicate a rise in selfishness or some hatred of the family. By and large, nationalist fears that the “traditional” family is openly despised by the youth of today is simply false. The truth is that many young people are getting married and choosing not to have children due to forces largely outside of their control. The current economic climate makes it immensely hard for young people to take the necessary financial steps to start a family. The cost of housing, childcare, and living in general have reached astronomical levels. The average young career professional simply cannot keep up.

    Of course, it’s true that the West has been captured by a strong individualism. National Conservatives’ attack on individualism remains one of the strongest aspects of their thought, and is no doubt one of the reasons for their recent political success. While an emphasis on the innate dignity of each individual human soul will always serve as a philosophic pre-requisite to a just society, too great an emphasis on the individual creates significant social problems. Humans are not made to live alone. At our best, we dedicate much of our existence to serving others. Conservatives are right to point out that this simple moral truth has been supplanted in recent decades by a near total adulation of the self-interested whims of individuals. Yet here, conservatives should view modern people—including the left—as victims of this trend rather than selfish propagators of it. Many young people today are lonely and unhappy, often for reasons they do not understand. They would never willingly choose this state of affairs.

    At bottom, the National Conservatives do not understand the varied and powerful forces of human desire and longing. As a result, they lack the necessary empathy to actually tackle the problem, and instead treat young people as culprits rather than victims. It is hardly surprising, then, that their policy solutions are often illiberal and top-down—designed to force changes in a society they have come to believe is entirely contemptible. It no doubt would be easier if social ills could be easily solved through the brute force of the state. But history has proven time and time again that such avenues to social reform are doomed to failure.

    Subscribe now

    In truth, the crisis of the family is best solved neither through illiberal statism nor by excluding some people from the benefits of family life. Instead, we should promote policies that uplift the family in all its varieties by providing individuals with the economic and philosophic tools to be able to choose family instead of isolated individualism. Some of this is relatively easy: protecting same-sex marriage, alleviating economic hardship through family-planning incentives, and making adoption more accessible. The Heritage report already recommends a child tax credit: if implemented, this should also be offered to those who do not fit within the narrow definition of family given by National Conservatives. Other important steps towards reviving the family are far more complicated—discouraging extreme individualism will take decades of work by writers, artists, and communities pushing to remake our culture from the bottom up.

    There is little doubt that the family is in crisis. But the beauty of the family lies in its naturalness—the fact that parental love transcends social convention to form a basic building block of human happiness. As such, we should not only preserve the family as it currently exists; we should expand its warm glow to all people, and resist the narrow-minded gatekeeping of National Conservatives.

    Jeffery Tyler Syck is an assistant professor of political science and the director of the Center for Public Service at the University of Pikeville in his native Kentucky.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.