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Our next London pub meet will be TOMORROW, Friday, February 27, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
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Last night, Vice Admiral Fred Kacher was removed as Director of the Joint Staff. The move comes while the United States is actively debating military strikes against Iran—a time when stability and expertise are paramount. For over a year, the American national security apparatus has been systematically decapitated: generals have been fired, intelligence directors have been removed, and top uniformed lawyers have been dismissed.
It all sounds like a story we’ve heard before.
A few weeks ago, Beijing confirmed that Zhang Youxia, the highest-ranking military official in China and a long-time confidant of Xi Jinping, had been purged from the Communist Party. The news sparked the predictable, feverish rash of Western analysis: Is Xi losing his grip? Is the People’s Liberation Army in a death spiral of corruption? And, most urgently, does a decapitated military command make a Taiwan invasion more or less likely?
The first two were the correct questions to ask of an adversary. But it is past time America had the courage to ask them of itself.
For the last year, mirror-image purges have unfolded within the United States and Chinese military and intelligence communities. While the justifications differ—Beijing cites “discipline and corruption,” while Washington cites “loyalty and bureaucracy”—the structural result is identical. Of course, the stakes for those affected remain vastly different: in the United States, a purge usually means an early retirement with full pension, healthcare, and a potential board seat; in China, it often entails trumped-up charges, the seizure of all personal assets, and a disappearance into the black hole of the prison system.
Yet while the individual outcomes vary, the institutional damage is the same. Donald Trump’s purge of the American national security apparatus has been as far-reaching and strategically destructive as Xi Jinping’s. While Xi’s actions are hollowing out the PLA’s readiness, the United States is delusional if it thinks its own house remains in order.
A score check, courtesy of the tracking done by Jordan Schneider and various other outlets, reveals the scale of these purges. Both superpowers have now removed their highest-ranking military leaders. In China, it’s Zhang Youxia; in the United States, it was the unceremonious firing of General CQ Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, barely weeks into the new administration.
The decapitation has not stopped at the top. It has extended to the service chiefs and the theater commanders who actually manage the mechanics of war. Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Chief of Naval Operations, was relieved of duty in a move that stunned the Pentagon. In a chillingly similar move, Xi Jinping purged PLA Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao, the man responsible for China’s nuclear and conventional missile deterrent.
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Further down the organization chart, the scale becomes even more alarming. In April, the U.S. Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) was ousted after a whisper campaign from political activists. In August, the Trump administration purged the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) following a disagreement over the agency’s assessments of the strikes on Iran. Even the legal guardrails have been dismantled: last February, all three service JAGs, the top uniformed lawyers responsible for ensuring military orders comply with the Constitution and international law, were replaced in a single afternoon. Meanwhile, Xi has purged two consecutive defense ministers and five out of the seven members of the Central Military Commission.
Both leaders are effectively telling their respective forces the same thing: professional expertise is a liability, and dissent is a firing offense.
The cognitive dissonance in the current discourse is staggering. If the expert consensus is correct that these purges are catastrophic for Chinese decision-making and have decimated the PLA’s readiness, what should be made of the American mirror image?
The public is told that the PLA is a “paper tiger” because its commanders are chosen for their fealty to the Party rather than their tactical brilliance. Yet, somehow, the expectation remains that the U.S. military will remain the world’s most lethal fighting force even as seasoned combatant commanders, like Admiral Alvin Holsey at United States Southern Command, are forced into early retirement for daring to question the legality of specific kinetic operations. American intellectuals and military leaders mock the yes men in Xi’s inner circle, while their own Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, explicitly clears the decks of any officer who might offer a roadblock to the commander-in-chief’s impulses.
The dissonance is irreconcilable. A military that prioritizes political purity over professional competence is a military that has already begun to lose the next war. While Trump was able to conduct a targeted raid against Nicolás Maduro, the United States lost seven Reaper drones, two fighter jets, and burned through one billion dollars to achieve a stalemate against the Houthis in Yemen.
In China, the purge of Zhang Youxia points to a president who no longer trusts his own generals to tell him the truth about Taiwan’s defenses. In the United States, the purge of the intelligence community points to a president who views objective reality as a personal insult. Both leaders have created a feedback loop where the only information reaching the top is the information they want to hear.
The result is a dangerous new reality. Trump’s purges have made him more erratic, more willing to use force as a political performance, and less considerate of long-term strategic outcomes. When a leader removes principled skeptics from the Situation Room, America doesn’t get a more efficient military; it gets a more reckless one.
The United States spent decades arguing that the strength of the American system was its apolitical military and its robust, independent intelligence. This was framed as the primary advantage over the CCP. That advantage is currently being set on fire in the name of domestic political vendettas.
If the PLA is indeed a mess because of Xi’s paranoia, America should not be celebrating. It should be terrified. When two nuclear-armed powers simultaneously purge their best thinkers and replace them with loyalist ideologues, the world is in for a rough ride. The United States is no longer just competing with China for regional dominance; it is competing to see which country can destroy its own military institutional stability first.
The score is currently tied. And in this game, nobody wins.
Shahn Louis is the founder of Anansi Strategic Intelligence LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk firm. A former senior intelligence analyst with experience across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, he specializes in China analysis and East Asian regional dynamics.
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Perú’s congress voted last week to remove the country’s president—again. If you missed it, it’s because this barely counts as news anymore: it’s the ninth head of state they shed in a decade. This time, they shuffled the president less than two months before a presidential election that will pick its tenth.
The ousted president, José Jerí, had been in office for four months. His offense: attending a clandestine late-night meeting with a Chinese businessman wearing a hoodie to avoid recognition, then claiming the whole thing was preliminary planning for a Chinese-Peruvian friendship festival. Congress wasn’t buying it. It voted 75-24 to remove him, replacing him with José María Balcázar, an 83-year-old former judge currently under investigation for bribery, previously expelled from a regional bar association for suspected embezzlement, accused of plagiarizing a book his own son wrote, and on the record as the only Peruvian legislator to have voted in favor of child marriage. Balcázar will serve as caretaker until July. Congress chose this man specifically because he’s too weak to cause trouble; in any case, he won’t be around long enough to try.
To those of us who studied political science, Perú presents a bit of a taxonomic conundrum. We’re all taught at school that systems where the executive needs to keep parliament on side to stay in power are called “parliamentary,” and systems where the executive is separately elected and serves a fixed term independent of legislative majorities are called “presidential.”
These are the two flavors democracy comes in. Everyone knows this.
Perú didn’t get the memo.
Peruvian legislators have figured out one weird trick that magically turns a presidential system parliamentary. Buried in the 1993 constitution is Article 113, which allows Congress to remove the president on grounds of “permanent moral incapacity.” Who determines moral incapacity? Congress does. What does it mean? Whatever Congress decides it means.
The standard is, as legal scholar Francisco Guerrero put it, “completely elusive, viscous, fluid.”
In nine years, Perú has cycled through eight presidents. Three consecutive heads of state have been impeached by the current Congress, which has been sitting since 2021: Pedro Castillo—who was elected, then governed execrably—then Dina Boluarte, then Jerí. When Boluarte fell in October, Congress voted 122-0 to remove her. The coalition that had protected her for three years simply decided it was politically inconvenient to keep protecting her six months before elections, and that was that.
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Commentators usually have some pat line about Peruvian political chaos, but at some point this isn’t chaos anymore: it’s a system. Not a good system. Not one anyone designed. But a system nonetheless.
What Peruvian legislators have done is reinvent Westminster parliamentarism from the ground up. They did it without anyone formally proposing the reform, without a constituent assembly, without any sort of consensus that this is what happened. In Perú, the president now serves at the pleasure of Congress. Nobody calls him a prime minister, but that’s what he is.
The normalization of this new way of governing hasn’t taken that long. The first impeachment was traumatic. The second was alarming. By the third and fourth, it was just procedure. Congress has also started setting explicit terms for what kind of president it will tolerate: when Jerí took over from Boluarte, congressional leaders demanded that his cabinet members be barred from running in the April elections. You’ll scour Perú’s constitution in vain for anything authorizing Congress to impose this kind of restriction on an incoming president, but that doesn’t matter anymore: the executive serves at Congress’s pleasure.
Peruvians, for their part, despise this state of affairs. Not because they love the presidents Congress keeps removing—they don’t. Boluarte’s approval rating bottomed out at 2 percent before she was ousted, a number so low it’s basically a measurement error. Congress’s approval rating spiked all the way to 19 percent after it ousted her, which is considered high in a country where hating all politicians is part of the national identity. One poll found that 48 percent of Peruvians don’t know who to vote for, will cancel their ballot, or have no favorite candidate at all.
To be sure, everyone everywhere loathes their political class. But in Perú, this sentiment is turned up to eleven.
The strangest fact about Perú is that none of this has stopped the economy from humming along. GDP grew around 3.4 percent through 2025. Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P all rate Perú investment grade, with stable outlooks. Inflation sits at 2 percent, among the lowest in Latin America. The share of the population living on less than $8.30 a day has halved since 2001.
The explanation lies in where actual power resides. Perú’s macro framework—the central bank, the fiscal rules, the investment protections—is run by technocrats whose positions don’t change when presidents fall. If anything, markets have come to view congressional dominance as a perversely stabilizing force: weak presidents don’t have the muscle to mess with technocrats. Investors have, grotesquely, learned to read an impeachment as a bullish signal. Political weirdness turns out to be perfectly compatible with fiscal orthodoxy, and foreign capital has noticed.
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This is not a ringing endorsement of the system. The gap between macroeconomic stability and institutional legitimacy is not stable in the long run. Organized crime has filled much of the space that functional governance would normally occupy. Extortion cases rose sixfold between 2019 and 2024. A machine-gun attack on a cumbia band in Lima was the proximate trigger for Boluarte’s removal—which tells you something about how far things have deteriorated.
Yet, somehow, Perú’s political class has mastered the art of managing economic continuity while failing entirely at governing in any other meaningful sense.
Amidst this wreckage, 37 presidential candidates have filed to run in the first round to be held on April 12. The field includes a comedian, a former soccer goalkeeper, and a man whose brother was impeached, booted from the presidency, and is currently in prison for corruption.
The two frontrunners—polling in the low double digits, which counts as commanding in a field this fragmented—are Rafael López Aliaga and Keiko Fujimori. Together, they illustrate just how surreal Peruvian political life has become.
López Aliaga, a conservative former mayor of Lima universally known as “Porky” for his resemblance to a famous cartoon pig, is a Trump-admiring Opus Dei member who resigned as mayor to run for president and positioned his congressional bloc to support Jerí’s removal. His campaign platform is mano dura on crime, liberalization of markets, and the general proposition that what Perú needs is someone with the will to govern firmly.
Fujimori, running for the fourth time, is the daughter of Perú’s most effective modern economic reformer—who was also a convicted authoritarian who received a 25-year prison sentence for human rights abuses. Her party, Fuerza Popular, controls a significant bloc in Congress—the same Congress that has impeached three presidents.
Her lawmakers voted to keep Jerí in power. López Aliaga’s voted to remove him. Given Perú’s new habit of treating presidents like prime ministers, this disagreement is now, meaningfully, an electoral issue.
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And yet the candidates have remained silent on the underlying constitutional problem. Nobody in the serious running is proposing to reform or constrain the moral incapacity clause—the mechanism that has made the presidency a temporary appointment. The platforms center on crime, corruption, and economic management, as if the relevant question is what a future president might do rather than whether they’ll stay in office long enough to do anything at all.
In other words, nobody is seriously questioning the strange system that Perú has blundered into: presidential in theory, parliamentary in its executive accountability, technocratic in its actual governance, and ungoverned on the street. The president is the most powerful person in the country in theory and among the most precarious in practice. Congress is Perú’s most despised institution while being its most functionally dominant. The economy works despite all of this, or perhaps because macroeconomic policy has been insulated from it.
Political scientists will have to invent a name for whatever this is. They may find that amusing. Peruvians surely won’t.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.
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Let me tell you the tale of the ungrateful creatures who crawled out of Eden.
They murdered their own mothers. They slaughtered their own siblings. And they reproduced with such wild abandon that their success drove nearly all other life on Earth extinct.
I’m talking, of course, about certain nematode worms, sand tiger sharks, and cyanobacteria, respectively.1
“Wait a minute,” you say, “I thought this was about us!”
I’m not surprised. Such stories now dominate the zeitgeist, painting our species as a unique blight in an otherwise perfect paradise, Mother Nature’s one bad seed. The Guardian, The Harvard Gazette, and The Institute of Art and Ideas have all recently published pieces blaming the ongoing ecological crisis on human exceptionalism—the belief that humanity is superior to other life forms in an ethically meaningful way. Christine Webb’s book, The Arrogant Ape: The Myth of Human Exceptionalism and Why it Matters, was a New York Times Notable Book of 2025. And as I write, viewers are still flocking to theaters to watch the third installment in James Cameron’s Avatar—a series about a large corporation’s attempts to exploit the natural resources of a distant moon, likely representing humanity’s most expensive critique of its own superiority complex.
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This bleak outlook may be gaining steam, but it couldn’t be more wrong. Humans are indeed exceptional, and embracing that fact is not the cause of, but is rather the solution to, the ongoing ecological crisis.
In evaluating the bleak narrative, it’s worth distinguishing between two claims: first, that other creatures are capable of suffering and deserve our empathy; and second, that human exceptionalism is a moral failure that’s driving the destruction of the planet.
The first claim is unobjectionable. We don’t know where on the tree of life consciousness first flowered, so some questions are currently unanswerable. (Does a cockroach suffer when it’s squished underfoot? Does a bacterium upon first contact with penicillin?) But we should all be able to agree that many organisms—other mammals, for example—definitely seem to experience both joy and pain, to feel both love and fear. And we also know that mammalian brains include many of the same structures that power our own emotional processing. Absent a compelling explanation for why consciousness requires the specific features these animals lack, denying their subjectivity is irrational.
If other creatures are conscious—if they subjectively experience the world and are capable of suffering—then they deserve our empathy. On this point, critics of our behavior are absolutely right: the ongoing destruction of the environment and practices like factory farming, which inflict extreme suffering upon billions of animals a year, are indeed moral atrocities.
But recognizing this does not require us to deny humanity’s exceptional nature. On the contrary, appreciating our unique place in the cosmos is a prerequisite to building a better world, not only for us and our descendants, but for all of Mother Nature’s other children as well.
The more passionate critics of “speciesism” (the prioritization of humanity’s needs over all others) often make their case by way of an analogy to racism. But racism isn’t evil because it posits a difference in the moral worth of two groups. It’s evil because it wrongly posits such a difference. Racists mistakenly assume superficial differences—such as skin color or eye shape—should impact moral value. The central question for us, then, is whether the qualities that make us human are essential to determining moral value.
The anti-exceptionalists are clear where they stand. “Any idea that humans are better or at the top or superior in any way is just wrong,” they say. The mind of a human is comparable to the bioluminescence of a lantern fish or the music of a songbird, they say: each adaptation unique in its own way, but none more ethically meaningful than the others. And failing to recognize this is the cause of the ecological crisis, they say.
I say they’re wrong. Humanity is exceptional.
Our needs and wants matter more—not because we’re more powerful, but because our capacity to suffer and flourish exceeds that of any other creature on Earth. Philosophers of mind can’t even agree on whether certain configurations of matter produce conscious minds, or whether conscious minds conjure our physical world. But they do generally agree that there exists some important relationship between the two. A person experiences a broader range of emotions than any other creature, and is much more capable of breathing meaning into the cosmos.
This is why none of us feels any particular guilt about our immune system’s unending war against the microbes that invade our bodies every day and night. It’s why letting a human child suffer to spare a pet would be morally wrong. And it’s why equating speciesism with racism is ludicrous: it equates the superficial difference between a Caucasian and a racial minority with the essential difference between people and other species.
The more profound justification for human exceptionalism—and the reason its denial is so dangerous—is that our unique capacity for rational knowledge creation can make us an unparalleled force for good. Species egalitarians often dispute this by citing Charles Darwin himself, who famously said, “The difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind.” But on this point, the legendary scientist was wrong: sometimes a sufficient difference in degree can produce a difference in kind.
In his 2012 book The Beginning of Infinity, David Deutsch, the father of quantum computing, shows how gradual improvements can sometimes evolve a system past a certain critical threshold after which it becomes infinitely more potent—a process he describes as a jump to universality. An example is the difference between a pictographic writing system, in which each character represents a word, and an alphabet, in which each character represents a sound. The former can be used to write only a finite set of words, but the latter is universal: it can be used to write any word that could ever be imagined using the sounds of that language.
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The human brain, Deutsch argues, represents a similar jump to universality. Though it evolved gradually, at some point it cleared that critical threshold, transforming into a qualitatively different thing: a physical structure with a computational repertoire on par with a universal Turing machine. This means a healthy human brain—armed with the right memory and speed augmenting devices, like a pencil or a computer—is capable of representing almost any idea that is logically possible and of understanding fundamental truths about the physical world. Equating this to a lantern fish’s ability to glow in the dark is absurd.
We, alone among Mother Nature’s creations, can iteratively improve our collective understanding of reality by subjecting our conjectures to rational criticism. And, importantly, this can produce not just scientific knowledge, but moral knowledge as well. Our capacity for moral reasoning is why Martin Luther King, Jr. had that dream. It’s why Rosa Parks took that seat and why Malala Yousafzai took that stand. And it’s why their actions can change the minds of millions as they reverberate through time.
It’s easy to look at what we’ve done to the planet and say “the world would be better off without us.” But this view is too shortsighted. Though we are responsible for the current ecological crisis, the climate change deniers are right about one thing: the planet’s climate has changed many times in the past, and it will change many times in the future, whether or not humans are around to see it. There is only one force in the universe potent enough to preserve the biosphere in the face of these cataclysms: our ability to create and use knowledge.
To deliver change at the scale we require, we need to better align the interests of individual people with the environment. It’s not enough to recognize that factory farming is cruel or that burning fossil fuels harms the biosphere. Expecting the billions of people who struggle to make ends meet to prioritize the environment over their own immediate needs is unrealistic. Telling them their suffering is on par with a frog’s is insulting. We need new knowledge that will enable us to meet the needs of all of humanity, without sacrificing the environment in the process.
This knowledge may take the form of new technology, such as lab-grown meats, nuclear fusion, or carbon sequestration. Or it may take the form of new international treaties, new legislation, or even entirely new modes of organizing economic and political activity. But one thing is certain: that knowledge will only be discovered by the people who search for it.
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This is why the denial of human exceptionalism is so dangerous. It’s a fundamentally disempowering perspective that rejects our only viable path forward. The ecological crisis is the result of us treating the planet as nothing more than a resource to exploit—in other words, behaving like every other creature on Earth. The solution is not to accept our animal nature, but to reject it and rise above.
The hottest place in the solar system is not the surface of the Sun but the inside of our experimental fusion reactors. The coldest place in the universe is not found in the deep space between stars, but within the confines of our own absolute zero experiments. These things, as well as our greatest moral victories—from the abolition of slavery to the emancipation of women—were made possible only by unleashing our unique capacity for knowledge creation. If we want to stop the damage we’re doing to the planet and reverse the damage we’ve done; if we want to become the protectors the biosphere so badly needs; and if we want to carry the torch to ensure the light of consciousness burns brightly for billions of years to come; we must continue to embrace what sets us apart.
Bharath Krishnamoorthy is a Columbia Law graduate and the founder and former CEO of Denim.
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1The flatworm Mesorhabditis belari hatches inside its mother’s body then eats its way out. The sand tiger shark embryo that matures first will eat its siblings inside the uterus. And cyanobacteria flooded the atmosphere with oxygen 2.4 billion years ago, causing somewhere between 70-99% of species on Earth to go extinct.
To truly feel the force of America’s cultural attraction you have to be born outside of it. The natives see the cracks up close and learn to take the whole thing for granted. Growing up in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, none of my friends had to be convinced of America’s appeal. Its jeans-clad, Ray-Ban-wearing, moon-dancing cultural exports were the opposite of propaganda. They were the natural overflow of a society so confident in its own desirability that it never had to make a case for itself.
That dominance is what the Civilization video games once called a “cultural victory.” I’m not talking about soft power, a much-abused concept that, in seeking to be policy-relevant, folded in American political values and U.S. foreign policy as part of its definition. The dominance I’m talking about is not built on government-funded exchanges or diplomatic initiatives, but on the organic triumph of a society’s language, art, music, media, consumer brands and, on a deeper level, its norms and aesthetics.
For decades, this was America’s most formidable and least appreciated strategic asset. Except for the occasional CIA-sponsored literary magazine, American culture never had a budget line in the federal government because it was produced by society itself. Yet it accomplished a great deal invisibly. Hollywood normalized American values; American universities trained foreign elites who came home with American contacts; Silicon Valley’s platforms became the infrastructure of global public life.
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This inculcation is in some sense pre-political: it shapes the moral imagination which then invisibly structures political choices. And it’s that invisibility that makes it so powerful, because it made American leadership feel less like domination and more like the natural order of things.
The slow erosion of that dominance over the past decade is therefore not just a commercial setback for studio execs but a change in how American power operates. In movies, music, even in higher education, the United States is experiencing something it hasn’t faced for a while: actual competition. The country is still on top of most global rankings of cultural influence, but it’s descending from a peak that was probably unsustainable. The 2026 Soft Power Index, for example, saw the United States declining more steeply than any other country. (To be fair, this is an index built on little more than clickbait and vibes. But when it comes to cultural power, vibes are what counts.)
It’s not just due to Trump. Global opinion polls have dipped before, most dramatically during Bush’s invasion of Iraq, and then rebounded. But in 2003 the American cultural infrastructure remained mostly intact. Hollywood kept producing globally dominant films, U.S. tech platforms were ascending, and the country’s universities remained the undisputed global pinnacle of higher ed. Today, audiences and consumers are increasingly turning away from American cultural products—not even due to anti-American sentiment, although that plays a part, but chiefly because alternatives are now finally available.
The cinematic multiverseHollywood has been the architect of global aesthetics for almost a century, exporting an American worldview that served as the country’s most visible form of cultural power. In Lenin’s Tomb, his reportage of late Soviet life, David Remnick recalls attending a pre-collapse screening of Wall Street during which young Communist apparatchiks whooped unironically as Michael Douglas’ character praised the virtues of capitalist greed. American movies didn’t just entertain but provided the ideological vocabulary through which the world understood concepts like individualism and democracy. This unipolar movie order is slowly giving way to a cinematic multiverse.
Hollywood’s share of the global box office has dropped from roughly 92 percent to about 66 percent over the past two decades. China was once Hollywood’s most reliable overseas piggy bank, but has now basically turned away. Hollywood’s market share in China fell to 21% in 2024, down from 35-40% in the pre-pandemic era. Local films accounted for nearly 90% of ticket sales in China last year, and all ten top-earning films were domestic productions, with the animated juggernaut Ne Zha 2 generating over $2 billion at the box office. Meanwhile, over the past decade, China’s global share of the movie market has almost tripled from 6 to 17 percent.
Streaming has accelerated this fragmentation by eliminating distribution bottlenecks that sidelined foreign content. Netflix data from last year shows that one-third of all viewing now comes from non-English titles, with Korean content leading the way. Streaming of non-English content on Netflix rose 71% since 2019 among Americans themselves, suggesting that even domestic viewers are developing global tastes.
Hollywood, meanwhile, has aided in its own marginalization by reducing its output. Between 1995 and 2009, major U.S. studios averaged around 112 releases a year; by 2025 that number was 78. The industry has retreated into a defensive posture, relying on a dwindling number of tentpoles, and the resulting product is often culturally odorless. Hollywood’s creative conservatism is probably accelerating its cultural decline as viewers around the world find novelty and local specificity in new-wave cinema that aging superhero franchises cannot provide.
The global jukeboxGlobal music is a similar story of cultural fragmentation, with the clearest evidence coming from billboard charts. In 2021, English-language music accounted for 67% of the top 10,000 most-streamed songs globally. By 2024, that share had fallen to 55%. “While English may still dominate the streaming charts for now,” concluded one analysis, “that dominance is beginning to wane.”
The rise of K-pop is the most visible challenger. In 2024, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry noted that seventeen of the top twenty albums came from Korean artists, with Taylor Swift the only Western entry in the top ten.
Latin music, meanwhile, has been the fastest-growing segment of global music for more than a decade. Bad Bunny, the Puerto Rican reggaeton artist, was Spotify’s most-streamed artist globally from 2020 to 2022 and again in 2025. While an American by citizenship, his cultural center of gravity is firmly Latin American. His rise has not been a crossover success in the conventional sense, where foreign artists molded themselves to American tastes, but victory on his own linguistic and cultural terms, with American audiences, including at this year’s Super Bowl, doing the adapting.
The shrinking campusThe ivory tower is undergoing the same structural decline. It’s tempting to blame this on Trump’s crackdown on foreign students, which has accelerated the trend. New international student enrollment at U.S. colleges declined by 17% last academic year, the first decline after four years of growth. To use an anecdote from my own experience, applications for Toronto’s political science PhD program, where I teach, rose from 201 two years ago to 385 this year. In the past, many of those students would have focused on American schools, but not anymore.
But even here, Trump-induced declines are part of a longer and more structural trend. In the Times Higher Education’s 2026 World University Rankings, the United States fielded just 102 institutions in the top 500. That was the lowest total on record, down from 125 in 2018. Twenty-five American universities fell to their lowest-ever positions, including historical heavyweights like Chicago, Columbia, and Duke.
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The global market for higher ed is expanding even while fewer international students choose the United States, which means the country is actively hemorrhaging market share. The United States is losing international enrollments to universities in Europe and Asia, which are aggressively stepping in to absorb the demand. China has been leading the charge with a transformative higher education initiative that, over the past twenty years, has seen university enrollment increase nearly tenfold while 18 of its universities achieved their highest score ever in the most recent World University Rankings. Times Higher Education’s chief global affairs officer called the shift of higher education’s center of gravity from the United States to Asia “a dramatic and accelerating trend.”
From the U.S. perspective, the enrollment decline of international students translates into over a billion dollars in lost revenue and nearly 23,000 fewer jobs. As one analysis warned, the combination of visa restrictions, enrollment declines, and growing competition represents “a potential inflection point for American scientific leadership.” The students who once would have come to America are going elsewhere, absorbing different values, and building different lifelong networks.
The Tower of BabelAmerican cultural prestige isn’t going to collapse overnight. A country can coast on accumulated cultural capital for a long time before the consequences become acute. And the world is not converging on a new cultural hegemon; no other country is surging to replace American dominance. China’s cultural exports remain modest relative to its economic weight. Ne Zha 2 earned almost nothing outside China. Unless you’re from the country, have you even heard of it? The index of soft power mentioned above, despite recording a steep American decline, still placed the United States first. This is not a cultural hegemonic transition but a gradual climbdown from a very high peak. But it’s still a climbdown.
American culture has historically functioned as a flattering self-portrait, projecting back to Americans an image of their own society that reinforced its best aspirations. The society that produced jazz, Hollywood, and the Ivy League had good reasons to believe in its own project. When cultural hegemony fades, so does this source of national self-confidence. It might be replaced by a more brittle kind of superiority that needs to be asserted not assumed.
The Soviet kids listening to bootleg Metallica tapes in the 1980s and the Chinese students watching Titanic in the 1990s were both being drawn into a common cultural orbit that made the world, in some diffuse but real sense, more universally legible to itself. That orbit is weakening.
Some people might welcome this change as another element in the demise of American hegemony, but I’m not sure a world without a cultural center of gravity will be a more open one. It may simply be more fragmented, where the shared reference points that invisibly facilitated international cooperation slowly dissolve. America’s cultural Tower of Babel is slowly crumbling and no new structure is rising to replace it. What follows is not pluralism but mutual unintelligibility.
Seva Gunitsky is the George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto. He writes at hegemon.substack.com.
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January 2026 will be remembered as the month the Islamic Republic tried to break Iranian society’s political spine through mass violence and fear. More than one million people poured onto the streets across the country, demanding the regime’s downfall. The state responded with overwhelming force. Rights groups and international reporting describe killings on a scale that reached into the thousands during the peak days of the crackdown, alongside mass injuries and arrests. The regime treated public assembly as an existential threat and acted as if it were at war with its own population.
Among those targeted were university students. Student networks say at least 130 students were killed in connection with the January uprising. The youth were not on the margins of Iran’s street politics. They were again at its center.
On campuses, repression was not limited to bullets, arrests, and prison vans. It also moved through paperwork. Authorities forced universities into silence by closing dormitories, shifting exams online, and dispersing students across cities and provinces. The goal was not only to punish but also to interrupt the protest movement’s most persistent engine: organized youth living, studying, and mobilizing in dense social spaces.
Faced with unrest, the state returned to a familiar tactic: mass arrests of students and emptying campuses. Multiple universities in different cities announced online classes, online final exams, or dorm evacuations. Some outlets inside Iran framed these steps as routine “management” during an exceptional period. But the operational purpose was dispersal. Reporting in higher education media also described campus shutdowns and dorm evacuations as protests spread.
This is a distinct phase of repression. After killing, injuring, and arresting students, the next move is repression by memo and circular. It does not replace the rifle but aims to reduce reliance on it by hindering concentration and coordination. The regime understands that the university is not simply a physical space, but a social infrastructure built on networks, trust, and shared political language. A dorm isn’t just a building; it’s a vibrant community where information circulates rapidly, enabling collective action. Closing dormitories alters this pattern of dense living.
Yet January also revealed the limits of this strategy. Students continued to organize even as campuses were hollowed out. Pro-opposition outlets reported joint student calls for coordinated action in mid-February, including a nationwide strike on February 17 and 18 to commemorate those killed and to express solidarity with families seeking justice. Although the specifics of these calls may not be externally verifiable, their importance lies in what they indicate: connectivity remains intact, and student politics continue to exist.
The most revealing feature is the form of struggle that is emerging. The university is being pushed online, yet student contention is adapting to an online and semi-clandestine environment. The regime wants remote exams and empty dorms to produce isolation. Students are using the same conditions to build safer channels: encrypted groups, decentralized coordination, and dispersed actions that are harder to decapitate. When open protest becomes too costly, political life does not disappear. It shifts into low-visibility spaces. In authoritarian systems, that shift is often a bridge to the next wave, not the end of the previous one.
To understand why this keeps happening, January 2026 must be placed in the context of Iran’s post-1979 history.
The Islamic Republic emerged from a revolution in which universities had already become centers of opposition. From the earliest days of the new state, the regime treated campuses as both a resource and a danger. Universities produce skilled labor and future administrators, but they also concentrate young people with time, grievances, and the capacity to organize. The state wants modern education without political autonomy. This is the classic authoritarian dilemma: modernizing the country while preventing the university from becoming an opposition headquarters.
The Islamic Republic tried to manage this dilemma through repeated cycles of control. It shut down universities during what it called the “Cultural Revolution,” purged faculty, redesigned curricula, and built loyalist structures inside campuses to police student life. Over time, it combined direct repression with quieter methods: disciplinary committees, ideological screening, control over appointments, and selective rewards for loyalty. It also dramatically expanded higher education, producing millions of students while seeking to neutralize the political consequences through surveillance, co-optation, and ideological management.
These measures produced periods of containment, but they never solved the problems. Student politics reemerged across decades, from the late 1990s through the 2009 Green Movement and later protest cycles. By 2026, the tone hardened further. For many students, the horizon is no longer reform within the system but dismantling the regime itself. Students openly called for regime change, including support for restoring the Pahlavi monarchy. Whether one agrees with that direction or not, it signals a deeper point: A growing segment of the young no longer sees the regime as negotiable. They see it as irredeemable.
This demand is not romantic, nor is it simply nostalgic. It has social roots. Iran is a young society living under heavy political repression amid collapsing life prospects. Degrees do not translate into stable futures for many graduates. Mobility is blocked by corruption, patronage, and an economy shaped by security institutions and politically connected networks. For millions, education has become a promise that ends in unemployment, exclusion, and humiliation. When the university stops functioning as a social and political ladder, it becomes a staging ground. Students become politically dangerous not because they are inherently heroic, but because they are trapped.
That is why the move to close campuses and shift exams online is so telling. It reveals fear of student concentration. It reflects awareness that universities remain among the few places where collective identity can still form despite censorship. The state can shut gates, empty dorms, and move exams to screens. But it cannot remove the university from society, because the university is embedded in it.
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For nearly five decades, the Islamic Republic has tried to domesticate the university through purges, ideological policing, and now digital dispersal. January 2026 shows that it still cannot. A regime can force quiet for a season, arrest thousands, and kill on a massive scale, but it cannot permanently solve the contradiction it created: mass higher education inside a political order that offers young people domination without a future.
The conclusion is not that repression is ineffective, but that repression cannot address the underlying conditions that continuously generate dissent. The university is still breathing in Iran because the forces that politicize it are still alive. Since 1979, the regime has treated campuses as a danger to be contained. January 2026 suggests that containment is no longer enough, and that dispersal is the new language of fear. Students, in turn, are learning how to turn dispersal into a new kind of collective life.
Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management and Founding Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Janice Stein discuss whether rational choice theory has led us astray in understanding political behavior, why voters have lost interest in nuclear deterrence, and why cooperation, not rationality, is important in global politics.
This transcript has been condensed and slightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I’ve been thinking about a strange way in which my perception of the world has shifted over the last 10 or 15 years. I don’t think my values have changed much, but my perception of how rational the world is has shifted. Ten or fifteen years ago, I had some sense that the people in charge were adults who made rational decisions and were responsive to incentives, and there was comfort in that. One reason to doubt that now is that increasingly erratic and extreme political leaders govern some of the most important nations in the world.
There’s also a subplot about how political science thinks about these things, which I know has grounded much of your work. The assumption is that we can identify what is in the rational self-interest of actors, whether politicians within a state or states within the international system, and that this allows us to predict what they will do. Have we been wrong to assume a baseline of rationality all along?
Janice Stein: You’ve raised one of the most fundamental questions in post-Enlightenment philosophy, economics, psychology, and political science. In the 20th century, for a variety of complex intellectual and sociological reasons, we came to believe that we were rational. That belief served many purposes. It was comforting, and it also served institutional and individual purposes.
Foundational work began in economics and psychology, most notably by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Kahneman won the Nobel Prize, and Tversky would have if he had not died. Their message was: Wait a moment. In lab experiments, we are finding systematic departures from rationality. They are not random; they are systematic.
One concrete example is that when people are deeply in the domain of loss, they take big risks. You would not expect that. They are least conservative when their back is against the wall. A second foundational point is that we are not net asset calculators. If I ask you what your house is worth today, you probably will not compare it to what you paid for it. You will compare it to the peak of the market, which you have normalized for. You move yourself from a world of gains into a world of losses. That shift matters.
Microeconomics did not account for that. Political philosophy did not account for that. Much of international relations, focused on strategy and decision-making, did not account for that either. When this stream of thinking entered the field, and Bob Jervis was instrumental in bringing it into international relations, it was explosive.
It was explosive because it attacked the foundations of rationality. Are we never rational? Are we rational under some conditions and not others, which I think is closer to the truth? What do we give up when we abandon the built-in assumption that human beings are rational? From there, we can extend the debate to every area of politics and even to AI. In many ways, it all flows from this debate about rationality.
Mounk: That’s super interesting. There is an injury to human amour propre in saying that we are not super-rational beings. In international relations, the stakes were particularly high in a way that even readers of Kahneman and Tversky may not have had immediately in mind. This was the era of the Cold War. The logic of rational choice was reassuring in the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The reason why the proliferation of nuclear weapons on both sides was not supposed to lead to nuclear war and the annihilation of much of the world was the presence of mutually assured destruction. If I bomb you, you bomb me. I might be able to wipe out your cities, but you have nukes hiding in submarines around the world. You have a second-strike capability. So I have nothing to gain from a first strike.
The idea that every American president and every Soviet leader was a rational agent capable of understanding those incentives was, at the time, the assurance that the world was not going to end in a nuclear blast.
Stein: Let me take that example because it is so interesting and that will let us talk a little bit about different understandings of rationality. In the field of nuclear strategy, most people working in the field do not accept that argument, which is the nuclear revolution, MAD, mutual assured destruction, because they were looking for marginal advantage all the time.
What happens if the Soviet Union put multiple missiles, multiple warheads on one missile? Well, then there might be a calculation that they might have enough to overrun the survivable second strike of the United States. You have gone into these finely grained calculations, which we are still involved in to this day. This is what is shaping the debate as all the arms agreements have fallen apart and we have three big nuclear powers. It is called the Three Body Problem. It is all these fine-grained calculations.
But what do we know from looking at the documents in the archives and from the way leaders actually thought? Khrushchev and Kennedy never thought about who had the marginal advantage at that time. They were both terrified of what using even one nuclear weapon would mean. Probably the phrase that has stayed in my mind the longest is by Nikita Khrushchev who said, don’t pull on the thread of war too tightly because it will break.
If you have an evocative, powerful narrative, which is that nuclear weapons are unpredictable, despite all the climate scientists and everybody else, we cannot actually predict the damage with any precision because we have only used them twice. So do not go near them. If you believe that story, then it is irrational to use them. As soon as you move away from the story and you start to calculate marginal advantages, which is what economists do and what political scientists who were rational choice theorists did, we started to see that huge buildup of nuclear weapons to retain that marginal advantage. We are going back to that world again.
Mounk: The concern is not that world leaders might not act in a rational way. It is that this methodological approach to rational choice instructs people how to act. It might instruct people to act in ways that actually lead to much worse outcomes. There is a small story of this, which I think is slightly oversimplified, but it is directionally correct. The basic idea of Prisoner’s Dilemma is that two people have been arrested. If both of them confess, they are going to go to jail for a couple of years. If neither of them confesses, they go free because there is no proof that they did the crime. But the worst world is if you do not rat your friend out, but your friend rats you out. Then you go to jail for a long time and they won’t go at all; they had some kind of deal.
Stein: Let’s stop over that story for one second because we need to think about the implications of it. They are huge. The implication is that individual rationality will defeat collective rationality. You are still within the family of understandings of rationality, but they operate very differently. The incentive structure that operates for individuals will trump and will overcome what is a collective good and the collective benefit. That is a powerful insight for the way we structure a lot of institutions. We have to design protections for the collectively rational outcome that can defeat what is in the individual rational self-interest of leaders.
Mounk: That is a really helpful way of framing what the normative upshot of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is. The basic point is that there are many situations in which some action is individually rational. It is, under any circumstance, better for you to rat out your friend than not to rat out your friend. That is why that is always a Pareto optimal course of action. Collectively, it is a suboptimal outcome for both. It would be better for both of you not to rat each other out; institutions and norms can get us out of this world where we are always doing what is individually rational but collectively irrational.
I was getting at a different point, which is that in studies around the world, what is interesting is that there are actually background social norms which allow people to reach the collectively rational decision more often than you might expect. Most people do not rat out their friend in Prisoner’s Dilemma games, except one group that always rats them out, or that is among the most likely to rat them out, and that is economics grad students. If you ask economics grad students in a lab, perhaps not in real life, it shows an indication of a thesis you were putting earlier at a much more important scale of actual behavior of world leaders. The practice of rational choice itself can teach people to act in ways that are individually rational, but then perhaps collectively irrational.
Stein: Let us go back for a second and link that to a lot of evolutionary theory. It has always struck me that evolutionary explanations—and psychology is deeply into evolutionary psychology and that moves into politics—have always focused on survival. That has been translated into acting in your own self-interest to survive, which has emphasized being the first or moving first to keep the advantage.
What we have ignored in that whole story of evolutionary psychology is the huge advantage of cooperation that societies have when clans, for example, work together. There was another clan. There is a mixed story in the incentives to collaborate that you call those background social norms. If we want the economists in the room for this discussion, they will say incentives, but it does not really matter. There are huge advantages, evolutionary advantages to collaboration, which got buried in the literature.
Mounk: There is a great chapter on this among many other places in The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt—I believe chapter nine—in which he defends the idea that group selection actually was a real part of evolution, which is something that evolutionary biologists for a number of decades really doubted, and connects it to a number of important political phenomena. Let me try and make the devil’s advocate argument for the ways in which rational choice is useful and helpful.
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I am not sure that you disagree with them, but it will be helpful for you to tell us when to call on this tool and when not to call on this tool. The way that I try to explain to students what that method is—and it is not a method I use in my own work, but there are some partitions of it that I find to be insightful about the world—is to ask: what should a map do? I can say that I look at Google Maps and this is a terrible map. There are lots of things about the world that it does not show. It really simplifies the world. There are ways in which it distorts what is actually in the world. It hides some of the most interesting things about the world. I can stand in the Campo in Siena and it will give me the shape of the Campo, but it will completely miss how beautiful the square is.
Maps are terrible, but the answer to that is no. Maps have a particular kind of purpose. If a map always had to be one-to-one, if the map was exactly at scale, it would be completely useless for the kind of purpose that it is actually serving. It would not help to orient you about the broad outline of a terrain that makes it easier to say, should I take this highway or that highway in order to get from Ottawa to Toronto?
The loss of detail is in fact part of the point. A good rational choice model is one that takes very simple assumptions and reveals a lot of how people act. It is never going to reveal 100 percent, just as a map does not reveal 100 percent of the reality. But it is directionally correct. It says that you make these few little assumptions and something really interesting follows from that. It is not 100 percent correct; it does not give you everything. But it gives you something about the logic of things that you might otherwise miss. That is my attempt to represent what the tradition is up to. To what extent do you agree with that? To what extent do you disagree with that? When should we call upon this?
Stein: Your argument is in fact an argument for the value of abstraction and models because the world is so complex. If we just mirrored the complexity of the world, we would be overwhelmed. We do not have the capacity even to process that kind of information. But when you were describing it, you used a set of phrases, Yascha.
You may want to take this back because you made it easy for me. You said it is directionally correct because it tells us more or less most of the time the way people will behave. But what if the models are not directionally correct? How do we know? One of the ways to know is to use history as a living laboratory and to go look at the way people actually behaved under a set of conditions. Now, that is not scientifically satisfying. So how do you get out of that trap? Well, you do a lot of cases from history and work. Again and again, if the assumptions violate the empirical patterns, you should, in my view, either limit the assumptions to a set of conditions or revise the assumptions.
But that is not what the rational choice theorists in politics did. The argument came back, well, they are just “as if” assumptions. So it does not matter if they are empirically correct or not; it is an “as if” exercise.
Why do I find that a very, very difficult argument to accept? For two important reasons. Models are simplified assumptions. They are also stories, and they have narrative power. If we tell stories over and over where we know the assumptions are not sustained by empirical evidence, then I think as academics we have a responsibility to go back and look at the assumptions and say, where do we think these assumptions are most likely to hold and where are they not? That is much, much better.
The world helped because we have evidence in front of us now that we have leaders who barely meet the minimum of rationality, and so it becomes a more plausible argument to make. But until that happened, there was a resistance. There was the Milton Friedman “as if” argument: I do not really care how people behave. Whereas for Keynes, that was not his argument. Keynes talked about “animal spirits” that operated; he could not quantify them, he could not measure them. Often in his argument, it was hard to know exactly when the animal spirits would be unleashed, but he knew they were there. We had to tell a story about the animal spirits just as much as we had to tell a story about disciplined, rational calculators who were always able, through some method which they never specified, to make the most optimizing decision.
I have spent my life asking people, how do you make the decisions in your life? Who do you want to partner with? Did you calculate relative cost and benefit?
No, not really.
Which graduate school did you want to go to?
Well, I had a kind of a list.
I said, well, how did you measure across the dimensions? How do you compare?
Well, I don’t know, but I got to an answer.
When you think about what the risks are here, rational choice models are stories where the assumptions are sometimes upheld but often not, and they rely on a method that almost nobody uses other than in formal studies. That is a very dangerous model to take into the world of practical politics. The one that is most striking is nuclear politics, but you and I can think of many others.
Mounk: I would love to hear more examples where you think a rational choice approach goes wrong. I am sure there are many, and I am sure I will argue on many of them. Let me share one where I was dismissive of a kind of rational choice approach, and I think that it was somewhat vindicated.
When Donald Trump won the first presidential election in 2016, the Republican Party was still full of people who really did not share his ideology and who I think were quite depressed. The easiest task for any decent political journalist in Washington, D.C., was to corner some senator or some representatives in one of the bars around Capitol Hill and get them to tell you anonymously, of course, how much they hated Donald Trump and how miserable their life was. It seemed to me at the time that if they were being honorable, they would quit or criticize the president. They probably would even have gotten a lot of good things out of it. They could have gone and been fellows at the Munk School at the University of Toronto, which you lead, or perhaps at SAIS in Washington, D.C., where I teach. They might have gotten a nice gig as an on-air commentator at CNN or MSNBC.
But they did not. The very simple model that students of Congress had applied for a long time best predicted their behavior, which is that they did whatever they thought was needed in order to get reelected. They prioritized the reelection over everything else. That is a specific conception of rationality. One of the things that puzzles me is why it is that those members of Congress so preferred this particular set of incentives—what it took to get reelected—over these other incentives, like perhaps cashing out in some smart way and having social prestige and having a lot of followers. They clearly care about power as a particular kind of goal, rather than a different basket of goals they might have, and that is interesting in itself.
This simple model that I would have laughed at in 2014 or 2015—that a legislator is just going to do whatever it takes to get them reelected—explains, to a first approximation, 99.5 percent of behavior. I feel like that particular model in that particular moment held up better than my prediction, which was to go criticize him and take the job at CNN and be a fellow at a fancy place and join some corporate board.
Stein: I agree with you. I think the model is vindicated. There is still a very large and interesting literature on whistleblowers and the huge costs that whistleblowers pay, even when they are exposing behavior that is morally reprehensible. People know that they pay these costs. There is going to be isolation; they are going to lose their job; they are going to lose their friends. There are powerful inhibitors against actually blowing the whistle even when they see things.
Part of this speaks to the power of rationality. You calculate the costs, and sometimes they are emotional. It does not matter; they are costs, and you do exactly what rational choice theorists will tell you they are going to do. Another area where I see this is the unwillingness of students to come forward sometimes when there is egregious behavior, either by their peers or by a faculty member. They will not come forward because they are well aware that there are going to be social costs afterwards for doing it.
When we started our conversation, I said to you that the recognition for me—which was like a kind of blinding light—is that for some of the biggest questions of international security, rational choice was not going to get us there. It raised more questions than it answered because it raises this question that we are talking about right now: when are people rational? There is a fertile ground for a conversation that crosses almost all our fields, including political philosophy and theory.
Is it when the costs are so blindingly obvious to them that they are rational? Or is it when the costs for engaging in it are so painful as they understand it that they therefore do not take that action? There is a whole set of categories where people are rational.
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Where I think the really critical work has to come is in distinguishing those and separating out the conditions that are likely to promote optimizing behavior where the measurement is easy. It is pretty easy to figure out the cost. That is what Khrushchev was telling us: Boy, do not pull this war. It is very easy for me. I do not care how many more nuclear weapons you have than I do, JFK; it is going to be really bad for you and it is going to be even worse for me, so let us not do this. I come back to narrative and story; certain kinds of stories will enable rationality, and certain kinds of stories will actually move us away from it.
Mounk: One of the problems with a rational choice approach is just about how broadly you define the incentives and the rational choice that comes in. There is a very straightforward, famous puzzle in political science, which is: why does anybody go to vote? The chance of being run over by a car on the way to the polling station is higher than the chance that your vote is going to swing the election, at least in large-scale elections at the national scale. So, why would you do it?
One way to say it is that clearly voters are not making a rational choice; they are doing it for other kinds of reasons. Rational choice scholars come back and say that it is a rational choice; it is just that one of the things they consider is the kind of nice civic glow they get from voting. But then you might say we are smuggling in this much broader conception of rationality. It is one way of thinking about this simply: human beings are deeply responsive to incentives, but the nature of incentives is much more complicated than a rational choice approach usually explains.
To go back to the puzzle about why it is that rank-and-file members of the Republican Party acted the way they did after 2016, the key thing to understand might be what Arthur Brooks argued. He argued that each human being is driven by one of four different fundamental drivers: money, power, pleasure, and status. Different people are going to maximize on different dimensions.
That is a soft rational choice approach in a way, but the key thing you have to understand is: is this person driven by power or by something else? The reason why these representatives were not willing to give up being reelected is that they like money and they like status, but what they really like is power, and so they are going to maximize political power over those other things. Is that a more helpful way of thinking about it, or do you worry that that is going to have some of the same flaws?
Stein: Let me tell you why I started with that, because I am playing a sophisticated trick on you in this answer: you can rationalize any outcome by reasoning backwards and constructing a set of incentives that will explain the outcome. That, to me, is a trap. It is an intellectual trap, and it actually becomes, at some level, a normative trap too.
That is why I pushed back. You just said they are really motivated by power. But are you going to tell me that being one of 435 members of the House gives you a lot of power? That is a really difficult argument to make. Then, well, but they did not break ranks. You end up with a kind of regressive reasoning back, and you can explain almost any outcome. If you cannot tell me in advance what incentives people are responding to, then what is the value of the whole thing? Let us just go find better, more complex models that are not so satisfying but build in at least an additional level of assumptions so that we get a more accurate understanding.
I will tell you how I explain voters. There are powerful norms that motivate people to vote because they value being a citizen in a democracy. It is paradoxical if you are using microeconomic reasoning, but it is not paradoxical if you have a larger conception of society that is, in part, norm-driven on certain key issues that matter to people. That is why I come back and say: the story you tell has long-term consequences for our self-understanding in our society.
Mounk: I was playing devil’s advocate, but as you know, I agree with 90 percent of what you have said. How do we apply this to this moment? We are in a situation in which we have the political leaders we do: Donald Trump in the United States, Vladimir Putin in Russia, and Xi Jinping in China. We have a lot of people losing trust in the idea that their leaders and the institutions are acting in very rational ways. We are at a moment in which many of the norms that have actually governed and constrained the behavior of political leaders seem to be on the way out as well. What kind of intellectual toolkit should we grasp for understanding and analyzing this political moment?
Stein: I think that is the question of our times, and that should be our vocation. For us in the social sciences and in political philosophy, it is the most fundamental question because getting the answers more or less right will explain where we are a decade from now. Again, I think a story about norms that supersede incentives is a fundamental part of what we have to reckon with. That is an empirical question; it is not a philosophical question only. It is an important empirical one. When do people respond to norms and give priority to norms rather than self-interest? If that is not part of the research agenda, people are not going to hear that discussion.
I have had conversations with many of my liberal friends—let me put the hot-button issue on the table. I have had many conversations with my liberal friends who have nothing but scorn for people who vote for people who are norm-breakers and for the exclusionary language that they use about these people. I cannot use some of the words because I would offend the sensibilities of some of our listeners, but there is no recognition, Yascha, that part of the way the liberals behaved beforehand is in part a contributor to the distrust that people have of institutions. There was a self-righteous superiority where liberals condescended to those they considered the “great unwashed,” who were ignorant and uneducated and drove trucks and only had high school degrees and worked in the industrial economy and really did not understand these niceties of politics. The attitude was: just leave those to us because we know better.
Now, if you engage in those kinds of conversations—and that is not to claim in any way that that is the sole experience, but it is one of the streams that feeds into the river—that is not an incentive question. That kind of behavior is a norm-driven question. For any candidate to say that all the voters for my opponent, or 50 percent of the voters for my opponent, are “deplorables,” that is norm-breaking behavior for a leader of a democratic society. People who are labeled “deplorables” hear it and are unforgiving and are angry and resentful, and then they recalibrate what democracy means to them. It is not about who defends their interests, because I think we would have a very difficult case arguing that Trump in any way has advanced the interests of the voters who are his base. That is not the right question. It is a different question, and that is why I say we need to move beyond rationality. It is not that it is not important, but it is never the whole story. The question becomes: who speaks for me? Who represents me? Who hears me?
Mounk: The way I think about this is that in American politics, there is sometimes the idea of a “beer test,” which goes back to 2004 when there was a poll which showed that more people would like to have a beer with George W. Bush than with John Kerry. I always found that to be a kind of cop-out. I do not think people care about whether they would enjoy having a beer with the president.
I think there is a kind of inverse beer test that makes a lot more sense to me, which is: if a president showed up in my home today, and I did not have time to change the paintings on my wall, and I talked to the president the way that I talk to my neighbors, would they like me? Would they think this is a decent person whose interests I share, whose concerns I take seriously? Or would they say—as Gordon Brown said in a hot mic moment during his reelection campaign—“What a bigoted woman?”
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I think it is when they feel like this person would be nice to my face, but then go back to the people of their ideological persuasion or their social class and say, what a terrible person, that they say, why should I trust this politician? Why should I trust the institutions run by these politicians?
Stein: That is not a calculation of interest. You just told a profoundly important social and normative story about trust. Trust, as we all know, is the glue of all social interaction. Without trust, there is no society, and no institution survives when members lose trust in it and how it works.
That is a normative story. It is much more, for me, to come back to what we are talking about: the limits of rationality. It is not that we are not at times all of us very busy calculating our own self-interest, but it is not what we do all the time. It is not what we do on some of the most important issues in society.
Mounk: We share a fundamental intellectual sensibility and diagnosis of this moment, which can feel lonely at this time. It is both to recognize that there are, in fact, many institutions which are important that we should defend, and that universities, especially in the United States, are deeply flawed places at the moment. Some of the most important institutions in our society—to recognize that the CDC has acted in some really quite disastrous ways during the pandemic—really failed to live up to their mission. For example, the catastrophic failure to roll out accurate and widely available tests for COVID early on because of bureaucratic obstacles.
Stein: When COVID started, the Chief Medical Officer of Health came out to do a press conference, as every government does, and she said, do not wear masks. They asked why, and she said, well, there is no evidence that masks will help against this sort of virus. Except, of course, if you went to the ERs where COVID patients were swamping the wards, there was not a single health professional who did not have a mask on. Afterwards, there were two hypotheses about why she said that, and both of them raise profound difficulties.
The less benign hypothesis is that we did not have enough masks in the country and the priority was to make sure that the frontline workers had them, and so you do not tell the truth to the public. Boy, if that is accurate, we are in deep, deep trouble for the future. I do not think that was her motive because she could have said to everybody, we do not have enough masks. Go home, cut up a pillowcase. Make masks for yourselves and your kids until we can get enough masks into the country.
The second argument is even more troubling to me: there was no evidence that masks worked. Why was there no evidence that masks worked? Because nobody had ever done an RCT on masks. But there is common sense—for years in operating rooms and infectious environments, healthcare professionals wore masks.
That piece of advice did more to undermine confidence and public trust. There is another way that could have been handled, and it comes again to how we think about public discourse and public language. She could have said, we do not know much about this virus. It is not for no reason it is called a novel virus. I am telling you, I do not know. I am going to give you advice today, but I will be back in two weeks because we have an army of people studying this, and I hope my advice changes because that means we will be learning something. I want you to stay in step with me as we learn more over time, and I will share whatever we learn with you. To me, that is a deep flaw: officials who are fearful that they will be pilloried by the public for making a mistake and fail to talk to citizens.
Mounk: Elites wonder why people do not trust them, but actually we should also wonder why elites do not trust the people. Of course, there is a very similar debate about Anthony Fauci and his advice that masks were not effective at the same stage of the pandemic early on in the United States. I think this discussion will be familiar to listeners here. The dilemma that you pointed out is true on either assumption. If the point was that they thought, we do not have the best, most rigorous scientific study to prove that masks are effective, and therefore we are going to tell them that they are not effective, there is a mistake of scientific reasoning going on there.
More importantly, it is this inability to communicate in the right way—to trust people and say, look, this is a fast-moving situation. We are going to try and give you the most accurate information we can at every point, but really, we do not yet fully know. We have the best scientists working on this, and we will update you as soon as we can, but we trust you with uncertainty. It is not having the trust that the public can understand that complexity. It is saying, no, we have to have a simple message; we have a media trainer over here and a PR consultant. It is not that the motivations are nefarious, but it is the lack of trust in people’s ability to understand.
The same thing is true in the other assumption, if you think that what was going on was a “noble lie.” Again, I think I understand the underlying motivation. If you feel that the doctors and nurses in the ICU desperately need this personal protective equipment and they do not have access to it, and if we tell people masks are really effective against the virus, everybody is going to try and go out and get masks—so perhaps we should fudge the issue a little bit because I am speaking to the head of this hospital and they are saying we do not have masks. I get it; I do not think the public health officials are corrupt in the sense of wanting to make money or that they do not care about people dying. I get it is a hard position to be in.
But two things: number one, it is really short-sighted about the effect of that. As you are saying, it delayed all of the entrepreneurial spirit that people then developed, of saying, I will just cut up my pillowcase and turn that into a mask, or factories that are producing other things saying, perhaps we can start producing masks instead. It is not thinking of all the broader effects on society.
Most importantly, it is not trusting people to be public-spirited. What a different appeal it would have been to say, hey, look, masks are helpful—or at least we think they are helpful. The evidence is not yet completely clear. If you have some way of getting a mask at home, produce your own cloth mask. We are going to try and do everything to produce more masks so we have the best masks to give out very soon. But in the meanwhile, please do not buy them up. The doctors and the nurses who are keeping your friends and relatives safe if they have a serious case of COVID—they are the ones that need them. That would be trusting the public. On either of the assumptions—either that they do not trust the public to understand the complexity of evidence available at the time, or they do not trust the public to act in a public-spirited way—it is actually a lack of trust in the public that led to that misstep.
Stein: That is right. We agree entirely. But that itself, I think, is a deep flaw. It is an elite problem: I know more, I am more sophisticated, I understand the complexity, so I am not going to trust you, the citizen. Once you, as leaders, lose trust in the community that you lead—it does not mean you share every complexity, but you are truthful. You have the capacity to acknowledge, I do not know.
I find with students that is the most trust-building statement I can make in the classroom. They ask me something and I say, you know what? I do not know. I have to go read, and I will be back to you. That creates a kind of shared trust. I believe it is the loss of trust in the public that has gotten us to where we are. If I had a voice in who we select as the next group of leaders in 2028, my highest criterion would be: who trusts the public? Who does not condescend to voters? Who does not believe voters are ignorant?
Let me switch gears and tell you why I think this matters so much—because you and I both agree that we are in the middle of a disintegrating international order. Whether you think the next one has not yet been born or not, clearly we are at a moment where linear thinking is not very helpful. If you love history, we can have a lot of fun identifying what these nonlinear breakpoints in history were in which things changed.
Just think about what this means: all our linear probabilistic models will not work. Let me take two sentences to tell you why I feel so strongly about this. It is an entirely different way of thinking about rationality, because rationality has probability built deeply into it. It is subjective, expected utility. “Expected” is just a nice word for “probability”: what is the likelihood? Linear means the future is going to look a lot like the past.
Well, you and I do not think that right now. You do not think that about AI. I do not think that about the way our international institutions and practices are going to represent themselves. So, linear thinking is not a good way to go forward.
There is a second thing: probability is going to be a very poor guide. What do we need to really be intellectually honest about probability? We need to have a large number of trials and understand the probability distribution. Otherwise, we really should not do it if we are being intellectually honest. We do not have that for AI; it is too new. We do not have it about this world that we are leaving behind, and we do not know yet what we are moving toward. So, what do you do? How do you use your analytic tools?
Mounk: That is not only a question about rational choice. Rational choice is one way of trying to predict the future. We know roughly what the incentives are, and so we can build the model and predict it forward. A very different way that political scientists try to understand the world, which in some ways is more dominant today than rational choice, is high-end statistical reasoning. You construct databases which show statistical regularities.
Then you use them to make predictions about the future. To go back to 2016, one of those was to show The Party Decides, a very well-regarded book in American politics, which said that activists seem to play a role and there is often a crowd favorite who is quite high in the polls early on. But in the end, the thing that really matters is the decisions of donors and party insiders and elected officials. They are the ones who actually decide; the party decides who is going to be the nominee.
For 2016, all these political scientists were saying, Donald Trump, it is not going to happen. In the end, he is not going to get the Republican nomination. This is one prominent example of a broader problem where if you are at a moment of paradigm shift, looking back at the statistics of the last 10 years or the last 50 years to predict what is going to happen in the next five or 10 years is not going to help.
Stein: I just asked somebody who is a very experienced political operative who is going to be the nominee in 2028. He said, whoever is most closely connected to the big donors, that is who it will be. I am not sure that is the right answer.
I have been thinking hard about uncertainty for the last couple of years. First of all, people hate it. It is similar to rational choice in only one minor but important way. Rational choice was as powerful as it was because it gave you control; it made a world predictable. Large datasets are as attractive as they are because they give you control; they allow you to structure things and you can generate these predictions. That is psychologically very satisfying because you do not feel you are tumbling in a universe which you cannot structure in any way.
But those methods are not appropriate to the world that we are moving into because we just do not know. That is where I start from. We do not know. So what do we do? We tell stories. You could call them scenarios. They are structured, disciplined stories. You tell them and you ask yourself: what are plausible ways of thinking where we will be in the next 10 years? What makes sense to you, Yascha? What are three possible worlds?
The next question might be: tell me how you get from your first possible world back to today. If you cannot imagine a single possible path to get there, it is probably not very possible if you cannot reverse engineer your way back. That is also narrative power. As you reverse engineer your way back, there are key decisions along that path, or key landmarks. When you get there, it is like the Turing test in AI. Here is a test, and if we pass this test, we are going one way rather than another way. Identifying those markers will tell us: are we moving more directionally here rather than there? If so, then we adjust our strategies and the things we do to mitigate the risks. But that is fundamentally based on human capacity to imagine. Right now, we have a monopoly on a capacity for structured imagination.
Mounk: The question I was going to ask earlier, and it is a mark of a great conversation where there are always four branches and you have to prioritize between branches. I am sad to let that other branch go, but I do want to return to this branch: I think we share the sensibility that there are many things in the old order that we want to rescue in various ways.
We don’t think we shouldn’t have a CDC. We don’t think that we shouldn’t have NATO. At the same time, it is clear that the order is crumbling and that the people who are simply saying the order is fine and we need to make some cosmetic changes—that eventually Trump will leave office and leave the political scene, and then we can go back to normal—are deluded.
The fundamental challenge is: how do we balance those things? How do we recognize that there is fundamental change that is needed without throwing the baby out with the bathwater? Should we think through scenarios? Tell me how to think about this. What are some of the scenarios, good and bad, for how this is going to go?
Stein: Let’s say that if we were thinking about this and we had a blackboard and we could draw the stories that we were telling. We could think about a world with three or two and a half big powers that are more or less led by thugs. Let me put it bluntly. But what is the underneath layer? How does that underneath layer self-organize? Do we put all our eggs in strengthening international institutions that I think are less than effective? Long past their best-before dates.
Or do we think differently about standing up a set of institutions just underneath that are smaller, that are nimbler, that don’t build in vetoes? Mark Carney spoke about this at Davos to some degree. It is in many ways a very misunderstood speech because it has so many dimensions. But one of the things he talked about was a world just beneath that level that was what we would call variable geometry. You and I are both interested in narrative and stories. I am going to come and start a project with you to stand up a big research project on how disciplined narrative can help us think through our future. We could probably think about 10 other colleagues that we would invite from different parts of the world. We get that project going; we wouldn’t worry too much about the ones who tell someone, this is all going to blow over, don’t do anything.
That is one vision of the world: that we invest all our effort toward these next 10 years in propping up the UN, propping up NATO, and other institutions. Some of these are the holy grail. That is one. The second one is no, we don’t do that. There is another world out there. There are still thugs at the top, but right underneath them, there is a plethora of small or nimble international institutions. Climate gets thought about that way and nuclear weapons get thought about that way, and they are not the same members in every group. There is a kind of test of effectiveness that we use for each of those. That is number two. Number three is the thugs self-immolating, or two of the thugs self-immolating, or one of the thugs has self-immolated. What difference would that make to what we do in level two?
Then we start thinking about the paths backward. What would it take? What would we have to do today to get to stage number one, number two, or number three? That is hard work. That is where it is really disciplined thinking, and it requires a knowledge of political institutions: how they work, how you build coalitions, what is doable, how you keep a coalition together. That is the essence of democratic politics, isn’t it? And what norms really matter?
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Janice discuss the role of mid-sized powers in global politics, whether the European Union can be saved, and how to stay intellectually curious in cynical times. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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Firefighters watch flames from the Palisades Fire in Los Angeles, California on January 7, 2025. (Photo by Apu Gomes/Getty Images.)This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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When wildfires tore through Los Angeles County last year, millions of people reached not for a government alert, but for a nonprofit app called Watch Duty. Emergency managers had it open in their operations centers. Tanker pilots and dozer operators checked it between runs. Families at their kitchen tables watched its maps to judge whether they had hours, minutes, or seconds to leave. Official channels existed, of course, but the information they offered was too old and fragmented to be helpful in the moment of encroaching danger. In practice, one of the most basic public-safety functions in fire country—timely, intelligible information about where the fire is and where it’s headed—is now being performed by a civil-society organization that didn’t exist a few years ago.
If that feels jarring, I get it. Real-time warning in the face of an advancing fire sounds like an obvious thing the government should do: high stakes, large scale, life and death. Yet when the smoke rolls in, the provider people actually trust to get the job done is a volunteer-driven nonprofit that listens to radios, watches public cameras, and pushes out clear, verified, usable information. One could interpret this as a solution born of bureaucratic failure, and in one sense it is. More importantly, though, it’s an object lesson. In a liberal society, even in a moment of crisis, government is not the only arena in which important public challenges can be overcome.
In my own research on post-disaster recovery, this lesson asserted itself repeatedly. Businesses, neighborhood associations, congregations, and ad hoc volunteer networks routinely solve problems that governments struggle to handle: housing people in the days after a disaster, restoring livelihoods, rebuilding not only physical spaces but the texture of neighborhood life. The point is not that government is useless. It is that different forms of social coordination—government, markets, and civil society—have different strengths. When we treat government as the default solver of every problem, we miss opportunities to get important things done better and faster.
That lesson matters, not only for disaster response, but for liberal democracy.
It’s no secret that public trust in our governing institutions is plummeting. In 1964, 77 percent of Americans said they trust the federal government to do the right thing “almost always” or “most of the time.” In September 2025, that number was 17 percent. That trust gap is more than a messaging problem. Many Americans feel that “the system” just isn’t working for them. Even amid long-run growth, the cost and complexity of the basics—housing, healthcare, education, energy—has made everyday life feel like a rigged obstacle course. Rules intended to make the world cleaner, safer, and fairer have accumulated into compliance thickets where delays and regulatory roadblocks become the default and nobody is clearly accountable for results. And when everyday experience teaches broad swaths of citizens that “the system” can’t deliver, we shouldn’t be surprised that strongman populism becomes the dominant political force.
This line of critique is now firmly established in our public discourse. In housing, Matt Yglesias and the broader YIMBY movement argue that housing crises aren’t inevitable. They are the predictable result of rules that treat population density as a social ill and make homebuilding more complicated, time-consuming, and expensive. In their book Abundance, Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson widen the lens. Layer enough mandates, reviews, and process checks, and the public interest turns into a recipe for permanent shortage of housing, energy, infrastructure, even basic scientific and commercial innovation. In Recoding America, Jennifer Pahlka shows the same pattern from inside government. Hierarchy, cumbersome procurement processes, and risk-aversion reward cautiousness, punish delivery, and freeze government in a perpetual state of technological backwardness. In Why Nothing Works, Marc Dunkelman describes the political end-state as a “vetocracy,” where everyone has a say, no one owns the outcome, and the easiest move is “no.”
Out of this discourse, a rough consensus has emerged around both the diagnosis and the needed course correction. Our governing systems, built to prevent mistakes, have also learned to prevent progress. And this creates a vacuum into which strongman and authoritarian politics rushes in. If we want to restore public trust in liberal democratic institutions, we must make them worthy of that trust.
That means at least two things. First, the government must stop getting in its own way, and in ours, when problems need solving—by pruning back needless veto points, modernizing procedures, and clearing the thicket of rules that make it easier to block than to build.
Second, where government does have a proper role, it must have the capacity to do that work well. It must have the talent, information, and institutional agility to deliver critical services in ways that citizens perceive as clear, fair, and humane.
As someone trained in the public choice tradition of political economy, there’s a lot I admire about this turn in our discourse. Public choice scholars have long warned that when government gets in the way of solutions, or fails to provide clear, general, and transparent rules of the game, it will not be trusted for long. The new emphasis on unblocking “yes” in critical areas like housing, healthcare, and clean energy is a welcome shift, as is the insistence that citizens should expect government to perform well the things it promises to do. If citizens are to buy into the liberal democratic project, they need a sense of certainty about what government services they can in fact rely upon.
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That said, what tends to drop out of view in this conversation is a systematic account of which things government should take on as its responsibility, and which are better left principally to markets and civil society. As a classical liberal, I have a general concern about the size of government. But, in this context, my concerns are less about size and more about scope. Of all the important things that need to be done, what should we be asking government to do? If we don’t have a way to properly define the scope of government action, the emerging emphasis on abundance and state capacity risks becoming an agenda that expects too much from government. Worse, it risks devolving into a campaign designed to overpromise and underdeliver. When disappointment returns, as it will, the crisis of confidence will be even deeper, not shallower.
We need a mental framework that helps us sort what we should and shouldn’t be asking government to do. Before we say “there ought to be a public program for this,” this image should flash in our minds:
We should ask four basic questions. Is the project under consideration essential? Is it big? Is it simple? And is government, in the world as it actually is, comparatively capable of taking on the tasks we assign to it?
In what I call the EBSACC filter—Essential, Big, Simple, and Comparatively Capable—it’s worth noting how much work that little word “and” is doing. Unless the answer to all four of these questions is “yes,” we should default away from expecting government to take primary responsibility for its provision and instead look first to the coordinating capacities within markets and civil society.
Is it essential?Identifying the “essential features of a functioning society” could be the focus of a rich philosophical seminar. But its purpose here is not philosophical; it’s basic housekeeping. It forces us to ask, before anything else, whether a given project is anywhere near the front of the line. One need only consider lavish subsidies for professional sports arenas and bespoke tax breaks crafted for a single corporate headquarters to recognize that this question doesn’t get asked often enough.
Of course, doing so will not sweep away the forces of cronyism from our politics. But nor should we be resigned to those forces. Among the most important roles policy advisors and citizens can play is to remind the government to refrain from doing the unimportant. Every non-essential project the government takes on consumes fiscal and administrative capacity that cannot be used to deliver truly essential public services.
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In addition to calling out obvious boondoggles, the “essential” filter disciplines against the impulse that says, “If it truly matters, surely the government must provide it.” Look around. Food, clothing, shelter, medical services, childcare, eldercare, mentoring, and the mutual support that holds communities together are all, arguably, essential. But most of these essential things, most of the time, are provided privately, through a combination of markets and civil society. That pattern of non-governmental provision is so familiar that, often, we just don’t see it.
None of this means that the government has no role where essentials are concerned. But it does mean that “This is essential,” is not, by itself, an argument for public provision.
Is it big?Among the projects we consider essential, which are of a scope that individuals, households, and local communities cannot manage on their own? Maintaining a highway system that moves goods and people across a continent, building flood defenses for an entire river basin, coordinating a public-health response to a fast-moving pandemic—these are all obvious candidates. But again, not all projects that are both essential and big require government provision. In fact, most do not. Insurance risk pools, large-scale manufacturing, and transcontinental shipping are just a few of the big things that markets provide.
Here we must acknowledge the critical role that government plays in all this: enforcing a rules-based order that has businesses fulfilling their promises to their clients, employers honoring their commitments to employees, and drivers respecting the rights of their fellow travelers along the highway, and so on. That acknowledgement is itself a lesson for liberal democracy. When we’re narrowing the set of things that the government must do, we should focus on those big and essential things that create the conditions in which people are well positioned to exercise their agency, collaborate, and solve the problems that are within their capacity to solve.
Is it simple?“Simple” is likely the most counterintuitive filter. Our impulse is to say, “When it comes to our most complex challenges, wouldn’t we want the most powerful institution to take them on?”
Not necessarily.
Development economist William Easterly offers a helpful way of thinking about this. He asks why, given many good intentions and decades of international development aid, the West had failed to end global poverty. Foreign aid, he observed, is like a cow. Cows can do many useful things. They can provide a poor family with milk, butter, cheese, and more cows. But we shouldn’t expect the cow to win the Kentucky Derby. If we ask foreign assistance to put cash in the hands of expectant and new mothers, it can do that. Premature births and infant mortality will fall. But as soon as we ask foreign aid to do something as complex as ending global poverty, we’re asking it to do the wrong thing.
Generalizing Easterly’s point, the more elaborate, the more complex, the more complicated the project, the less likely it will be that government is well-situated to achieve success. We saw this in the Covid-19 pandemic. When the first vaccines were made available, the impulse was to ensure that the rationing scheme was optimally designed to get the vaccine into the arms of those at greatest risk, based on criteria like health history, comorbidities, and socio-economic status. This approach tracked with the best advice coming from the public health community at the time.
But it proved far more complicated in practice, which left valuable vaccines on the shelves unused for weeks at the height of the pandemic. In hindsight, it would have been much more effective to ration according to a single simple criterion, such as age, which could have been easily verified with a driver’s license. A key lesson here is that when asking government to do something, you should ask it to do the simplest possible version of that thing.
None of this is to suggest that complex problems can’t be solved, nor that government has no role in solving them. On the contrary, as the abundance and state capacity discourse suggests, government has a critical role to play in ending wicked problems like homelessness and climate change, by removing compliance barriers that stand in the way of solutions emerging within markets, civil society, and government itself. The removal of such barriers has the doubly beneficial impact of tapping capacity within households, businesses, and communities and freeing up government capacity to take on the pieces of the challenge it is best positioned to take on.
Is government comparatively capable?In the face of our most complex challenges, fully-formed solutions rarely present themselves from a single source. Pieces of a solution emerge over time, from different, often unexpected quarters. In a pluralistic society, with multiple arenas of social coordination, that’s an advantage. It means that we can break a challenge down into its constituent parts. And when we do, we should only be asking government to supply those elements for which it is comparatively capable.
Disaster settings are instructive on this point. In the wake of catastrophic flooding, for example, the government is well-positioned to pump flood waters out from low-lying areas, clear mountains of debris from roadways, and protect evacuated neighborhoods from would-be looters. These are important but simple tasks that individuals cannot do on their own, and for which government has the resources, equipment, and authority to perform well. When it does those things quickly, it unlocks the capacity of everyone else. Residents can re-enter and begin repairing their homes. Businesses can reopen. Employees can return to work. And voluntary groups can move supplies where they are most needed.
Comparative capability, in other words, is not a veto on government action. It is a design principle. It tells us to look for the critical but simple enabling pieces that the government is best positioned to provide, and to provide them in ways that tap—rather than replace—the agency and capacity of individuals, businesses, and civil society organizations.
Bringing it back to trustThe Watch Duty story is one small example of this principle at work. Wildfire safety in the American West is an essential, big, complicated challenge. Within that challenge, there are crucial tasks that public agencies are, arguably, better positioned to perform: forest management on public lands, funding and training fire crews, maintaining a network of detection cameras on which others rely.
But when it comes to the complicated task of turning raw information into clear, verified, real-time alerts that reflect local conditions, a lean, private non-profit has proven itself to be the more effective provider. Rather than resisting this fact, as they did early on, official firefighting authorities should be welcoming the capacity Watch Duty is freeing up.
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That is the pattern a liberal democracy should want to reproduce. Even if we succeed in making government more technically capable, we will not rebuild trust by asking it to do more. We will rebuild trust by becoming more candid about what work properly belongs to government at all—and by designing institutions that concentrate public effort on the essential, big, simple tasks they can do well, leaving space for solutions to emerge from other domains.
An EBSACC-shaped government would still be busy. It would maintain order, uphold rights, provide core infrastructure, prepare for pandemics and disasters, establish and enforce easy-to-follow rules that keep people safe, and clear the way for solutions—in housing, healthcare, energy, and so on—to be discovered and built. But it would also be recognizable for its restraint, frank about the many essential aspects of a good life that are better provided elsewhere, and focused on doing its own part in ways that empower rather than displace the agency of self-governing citizens.
If we want people to trust liberal democracy again, we must create the conditions by which our governing institutions make fewer promises and keep the promises that they do make, leaving room for the other dimensions of a liberal society to do their work.
Emily Chamlee-Wright is the president and CEO of the Institute for Humane Studies.
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(Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images.)Much of the commentary about the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Donald Trump’s use of tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) has focused on its macro consequences: things like inflation or the government’s repayment of tariff revenues to companies. Trump immediately replaced the “Liberation Day” tariff regime with a uniform 10 percent duty (subsequently raised to 15 percent) under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, and will doubtless come up with other creative interpretations of existing statutes to re-institute as many new tariffs as possible. But his use of tariffs as a political weapon has been fatally undercut.
One of the worst aspects of Trump’s original tariff regime was his belief that he as president had unlimited discretion to set tariff rates on individual countries. Trump saw tariffs not just as economic tools but as all-purpose political weapons that he could turn against any country he didn’t like, as well as a source of personal enrichment.
There were many examples of this. After a conversation with the Swiss president that rubbed him the wrong way, he imposed a 39 percent duty on the country’s goods. After receiving a fancy Rolex desk clock and a gold bar inscribed with the numbers of his two presidencies, Trump reduced Switzerland’s rate to 15 percent. We don’t know what happened to the gifts that were in effect bribes. Another example was Greenland: as part of his effort to take over Greenland, the president threatened countries that had sent troops there in solidarity with Denmark with high tariffs if they did not accommodate his bid for sovereignty over the island. This was again the use of an economic instrument for strategic purposes.
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This kind of bespoke tariff policy is bad for any number of reasons. Even if one accepts the premise that tariffs are useful in encouraging domestic manufacturing—a questionable proposition—tariffs should be imposed in a uniform, transparent, and consistent manner. Importers and manufacturers need clear rules that apply to categories of goods if they are to plan and invest properly. There should not be different tariff rates on the same goods produced in different countries. And as almost every business owner affected by tariffs has said, it is impossible to plan in an environment where rates are set by the whim of the president.
The discretionary ability to set individual tariff rates is an open invitation to corruption. Following the “Liberation Day” announcement of high global tariffs last year, virtually every U.S. trading partner came to Washington to try to strike a deal with the Trump administration. We know about the Swiss payoff and the golf courses offered by Vietnam, but when the history of this period is written, we will doubtless learn about many, many other side payments that were made to Trump or one of his associates in order to get a deal done.
Trump is said to be transactional. He does not think in terms of institutions or broad policies. An institution is a rule that is not dependent on particular individuals and persists past the moment when the maker of the rule passes from the scene. If a president wants to leave a lasting legacy, he needs to do that by getting Congress to pass legislation.
Trump has left virtually no institutional legacy. The 119th Congress that came to power with Trump’s second term and is controlled by the Republicans has been one of the least productive in recent history. What we have instead is a whole series of executive orders and one-off deals. This means that Trump’s legacy will be potentially very evanescent: what can be done through an executive order or a one-off deal can be undone by a subsequent executive order or a new deal.
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The Supreme Court has done the country a service by invalidating Trump’s use of IEEPA tariffs. The Section 122 authority he subsequently turned to mandates a uniform tariff, and not one that can be targeted against disfavored countries. Moreover, that authority expires after 150 days, undercutting its utility as a political weapon. Future tariffs under other authorities may be possible, but almost all of them reduce the president’s discretion in imposing them, requiring formal procedures to justify the imposition of the levy.
So, Trump has not just lost the foundation of his economic policy; he has also been stripped of a political weapon that he was particularly fond of deploying against friendly countries. Overall, this is a win for the United States and for the rest of the world.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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As a constitutional matter, the issue before the Supreme Court in the case of President Trump’s tariffs was a relatively easy one. If the Constitution was designed to prevent anything, it was economic rule by one-man decree. Declaring a national emergency due to foreign disputes and making the American people pay stiff import taxes as a consequence, without clear legislative authority—as Trump did last year—was never part of the Founders’ plan.
But actually acting on this truth was not so simple, especially for a conservative court majority that faced overt pressure from a president who had appointed three of them. Tariffs are the president’s signature policy and personal obsession. Before the justices listened to oral arguments last November, he had warned them that a contrary ruling “would literally destroy the United States of America.”
For the justices, then, this case posed a test of legal reasoning. But it also posed a test of personal integrity and institutional duty.
Chief Justice John Roberts passed the test. So did Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Neil Gorsuch, two Trump appointees, who, along with the Court’s three liberal Democratic appointees, struck down the tariffs.
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In a 21-page opinion, Roberts wisely kept rhetorical flourishes to a minimum and let obvious constitutional truths do the work. He noted that the law Trump used last year to impose the tariffs—the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977—nowhere granted the president authority to do so. To sign off on the president’s policy “would replace the longstanding executive-legislative collaboration over trade policy with unchecked presidential policymaking.” And in America, we don’t do “unchecked presidential policymaking.”
To be sure, the case wasn’t a total no-brainer. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brett Kavanaugh—joined by Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito—showed how a smart lawyer could have interpreted the law and Constitution creatively, and permissively, enough to enable Trump’s tariffs. The reward for going along with this would have been a presidential press conference at which Trump said he was “proud” of Roberts, Barrett and Gorsuch, too, and not just the dissenters. But they resisted that temptation.
After the ruling, there was a lot of commentary about what this means for the midterm elections, for the economy, even for Trump’s possible behavior toward the justices as they sit before him while he delivers the State of the Union Address on Tuesday. It’s all interesting; and it’s all beside the point. The only thing that really matters is whether the U.S. constitutional system is going to survive the Trump years intact—and the Roberts Court’s ruling is a strong signal that it will.
Not only did the Court rein in Trump; it followed a pattern established during and after the pandemic, when it checked President Biden’s efforts to forgive student loans, bar evictions, and impose vaccine mandates, which were also rooted in strained interpretation of emergency authority. Ruling consistently between presidents of different parties enhanced the court’s legitimacy and that of the judiciary as a whole.
The progressive left has been inclined to disparage Roberts and blame him for doing Trump’s bidding in a series of recent cases that let the president freeze foreign aid, fire federal employees, and base some immigration enforcement tactics on race and language—pending resolution of the underlying lawsuits against those policies.
Unlike those interlocutory rulings, however, the tariffs ruling was “on the merits,” as lawyers say, meaning that the justices were responsible for the final, substantive outcome. When the stakes were highest, and the choices binary, the chief justice stayed true to principle. It would be nice—and, in political terms, smart—if the left changes its tune about Roberts in the wake of his courageous stand.
For his part, Trump ranted and raved at Roberts and the other two conservatives who voted with him, labeling them “very unpatriotic and disloyal to our Constitution.” This was shameful.
The main thing about Trump’s rage, though, is that it’s impotent. He did not call for the impeachment of the justices; he did not threaten to defy or ignore the ruling. Rather, he accepted the Court’s ruling and claimed—not incorrectly—that it still left him plenty of other ways to pursue tariffs.
You would have thought that the president might have taken the ruling as an off-ramp from a tariff policy that has achieved little except to raise costs in the United States and alienate allies abroad. In 2025, America’s merchandise trade deficit actually rose to an all-time high; though the gap with China shrank significantly, trade just shifted elsewhere. Meanwhile, American factories lost 108,000 jobs.
Trump’s tariffs are also unpopular, as shown by polls and the fact that a majority of the GOP-controlled House recently voted to end the national emergency Trump invoked to justify a 25 percent levy on Canadian goods. (This was short of the two-thirds necessary to override a presidential veto, but it was symbolically important.)
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And yet the president insists on continuing his tariffs under other authorities than the international emergency statute he cited, unsuccessfully, at the Supreme Court. Yesterday he announced a 10 percent global tariff under section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act; today he raised it to 15 percent. It will expire after 150 days unless Congress extends it.
In continuing to impose tariffs, Trump’s acting on personal pique, not any clear policy rationale. His political thinking is unclear as well, since voting on extension would force members of his own party to take a controversial stand in the middle of a midterm campaign that already looks difficult for them. Trump’s response to the court looks like a losing proposition for the economy, for him, and for the Republican Party.
But at least, for now, Trump has been forced to act within the law. From the standpoint of what really counts—the institutional integrity of the United States—that’s a win.
Charles Lane is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for The Free Press.
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