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Daniel Diermeier is Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, where he has served since 2020.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Daniel Diermeier discuss why American universities are simultaneously world-leading and losing public trust, whether elite higher education creates dangerous separation between the professional class and ordinary Americans, and how the shift from regional to national universities has reshaped American society.
Polarization is at an all-time high. It can feel daunting—perhaps even misguided—to engage in meaningful dialogue with those holding starkly different views. What does it mean to champion pluralism in such a moment? Persuasion’s new series on the future of pluralism, generously supported by the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations, features essays and podcast interviews that make the case for civic dialogue and highlight inspiring examples of it in practice. You can find past installments here.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You’ve been Chancellor of Vanderbilt University since 2020. I assume it’s been a very calm five and a half years.
Daniel Diermeier: It was quite something. I started on July 1, 2020, right in the middle of COVID. So it has basically been one crisis after the other. I think we had maybe one or one and a half years when we were not constantly dealing with another challenge. But despite all of that, we’ve had a great five and a half years. The university is thriving, but it sure has been an interesting time.
Mounk: One of the striking things about higher education in the United States is that it’s both an incredible story of success and is clearly losing the support and respect of a lot of the American population at the same time.
American universities continue to be world leading. Students still want to come to the United States to study over any other country when they have the opportunity. A huge percentage of Nobel Prize winners come from American institutions. The contribution to cutting-edge research is tremendous. The endowments and the facilities that you enjoy at American universities are more luxurious than what you can find in just about any other country in the world. Undergraduate students are treated to incredible opportunities. At the same time, you look at something like the Gallup poll that asks, do you have a lot of trust or some trust or little trust or no trust at all in the higher education sector? Ten years ago, most Americans had trust in higher education. Today, only a little more than a third do.
What is your diagnosis as to why that is happening? What’s the fundamental reason why so many Americans are losing trust in higher ed?
Diermeier: This is exactly the situation we find ourselves in. On the one hand, we have this tremendous history of accomplishment and success. The American universities, as you correctly point out, are still the greatest in the world, both in terms of their educational achievement, their research achievement, and then also their contribution to the innovation economy. So many of the innovations that have transformed our lives have originated in universities. Our university played an enormously important role in that, all the way down to AI and quantum and all of that. So that’s the success story.
The challenges, as you correctly point out, it’s very important for people to realize that this did not start a year ago when Trump took office. We have had an erosion of trust that goes back years. It’s an erosion of trust in universities both from the left and from the right. So the decline happened across the board. It was more pronounced and the decline was steeper on the conservative side, but both on the left and on the right we have seen significant erosion of trust. The concerns are different from the left and from the right.
If you look at this a little bit deeper, the criticism from the left is really that we are elitist. That’s about inequality to a large extent—that we’re inequality machines, that we’re replicating the elite, that we are unaffordable. That is, I think, really overblown. I think that when you look at particularly America’s leading universities, the commitment to financial aid is tremendous.
Mounk: I want to hear what the conservative concerns are that drive this decline in support. I agree with you that there’s a lot of popular misunderstanding about this. People see the sticker price at American universities, which is now huge, and which is often actually the biggest problem for the upper middle class, because really rich people happily pay that much money for their kids to go there.
People who make less than $150,000 a year, as you said, can now go to Vanderbilt for free. A lot of middle-class and upper-middle-class families may end up struggling to pay for their kids’ education, or at least having to save a great deal of money to do so. But the real problem, I think, is not about opportunity so much as about the recreation of a professional-managerial class that has outsized influence in American institutions and effectively runs the country.
I think the smartest objection, and perhaps not the most commonly voiced one, is not that it’s impossible for anybody to go to Vanderbilt because it’s too expensive. The facts don’t bear that out. The smarter objection is that Vanderbilt, Johns Hopkins, Harvard, and similar institutions scour the country for the most talented people. They often find them in really disadvantaged inner-city neighborhoods or in small, neglected, declining industrial towns in the Midwest.
They give people from those places extraordinary opportunities, which they richly deserve, and then turn them into members of a professional-managerial class who live in New York, Boston, Los Angeles, perhaps Chicago, perhaps Tennessee. They go back home twice a year, once for Thanksgiving and once for Christmas, and they lose touch with the rest of the population.
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Contrast that with the German university system, which we’re both from. It has many deep challenges, and I came to England and other countries for my studies for a reason. But most people attend local universities, stay much more involved in their local communities, live in ordinary neighborhoods rather than on campus, and perhaps as a result universities don’t create this kind of professional-managerial overclass in the same way.
Perhaps the fundamental objection many people have today against experts, elites, science, and universities is not that little Joey is talented and can’t get a good education. It’s that little Joey gets a great education and goes off to become a master of the universe in New York, while the people who don’t are governed by a class produced by the country’s leading universities, a class that has become disconnected from them.
Diermeier: So I think that’s really two points you make here and it’s worth unpacking that a little bit. I think one point is that every country has a means of recruiting and then educating the people that run the country fundamentally. And in the United States, that’s the university and especially a residential university.
So just as you say, the model is you leave home and you go to these places, usually far away from home, it’s residential. You don’t live at home like in the European university, but it has huge advantages. You meet people from all sorts of life. You meet people from different regions. You interact with people that you never would interact with in your home environment. So I think that has a lot going for it.
If you always stay in the milieu that you grew up with, you just don’t have that. That I think is something that’s a loss. The second point I think you’re making is that these universities are basically a pipeline towards these regional centers—New York, LA, and so forth. That is historically true. If you look at Vanderbilt’s history, you can see the entire development there. For the first hundred twenty, hundred twenty-five years, we were basically a great regional university. Our nickname was always “the Harvard of the South.” So this was for people that lived in the South, and wanted to get a great education. But the understanding was they would go there, get a great education, maybe meet their life partner, get married, come back and stay in the community.
There were many universities like that. We were like that. Northwestern was like that. Emory was like that. Rice was like that. And then about 25 years ago, we all decided that we’re going to compete nationally. Not everyone did, but most of us did. We became national universities.
We would recruit from across the country, but people will tend to go back to where they came from. So they may have come from New York and then others that had an opportunity would go to New York, Boston, and Chicago, whatever. But that’s changing now, in the last five years. That is driven by macro forces that are, I think, exemplified by what’s happening in universities, but not necessarily driven by them, which is the move of talent from the traditional centers like the coasts or the Midwest to the South.
Texas is booming, Nashville, Tennessee is booming, Florida is booming. Those places are now magnets for talent and we see this from students as well. Public universities in the South are absolutely busting at the seams. We see more people now that go to Nashville—they still may want to go wherever they want to go, but many of them see opportunities in Dallas, in Nashville, in Florida, in Miami. So the dynamism of the South starting in Texas and ending in Florida, I think is really changing that narrative.
Mounk: I see the appeal of moving to Nashville and having visited Vanderbilt a couple of times, I know it’s a wonderful university. But let me say the point one more time in a different way.
I think part of this is a question about regional versus national universities. You’re right to point to that transformation as a very important factor and one that’s perhaps a double-edged sword. I think part of this is about each system having its own way to select an elite and that’s always going to have its own advantages and disadvantages. But I do think that the mode of selection also shapes the nature of the elite.
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When I look at Germany, I think one of the good things about the German elite is that it’s quite rooted in different parts of the country, that it’s not very abgehoben.
Part of it is about industrial structure. The biggest German media conglomerate is based in Gütersloh, a city which many American listeners perhaps have never heard of. It’s unimaginable for the biggest American media conglomerate to be based in a similarly insignificant town. People often don’t move from their hometown for universities, they stay in those local communities.
Now, don’t get me wrong, I think all of that has tremendous disadvantages. I think the German political, cultural, and other elite is often quite provincial, and is often insufficiently ambitious. And that has gotten the country into a world of trouble across a number of dimensions. But it also has this advantage that when I talk to really the people who are in charge in Germany in a variety of ways, they feel like they live more or less in the same world as their fellow citizens.
In America, it just strikes me that I’ve been living in this country for 20 years and perhaps this just says bad things about me, but I barely know anybody who didn’t go to college. I barely know anybody who didn’t go to a top 25 university. I barely know anybody who doesn’t have a master’s degree. That’s because when I arrived here, I was doing a PhD at Harvard and I was living in a complete bubble of people.
Now, when you look at the social, ethnic, and national backgrounds, it’s a very diverse set of people. When you look at what the educational trajectory was, they were all the best in their high school. They all went off to good colleges. They all got into good grad programs. They all, to varying extents, are very successful today. They all make six figures today, unless they’ve made very deliberate choices that precluded them from doing that.
So it’s just very easy for the American elite, even in a broad sense, to become far removed from the average population. On the plus side, they’re surrounded by the brightest minds from an early age, there’s much more ambition, they end up founding AI companies, getting Nobel Prizes and feeling at the age of 28 that they can go and do something in the world in a way that I think is very rare for people in Europe, sadly. When I look at the level of ambition of students in America, it’s much higher than our students in Europe and there are lots of good things about it. But the bad part about it is that it separates this professional managerial class—and not just the top 10,000 people, the top two million people in the country—from the rest of the population in a much more extreme way than when it’s the case in a place like Germany. Do you think that’s a fair complaint or am I getting something wrong?
Diermeier: I think it’s an interesting perspective and very much worth thinking about. It’s always helpful to contextualize this a little bit historically. This is different from European countries. America is a vast country. It’s an immigration country where people come from all sorts of parts of the world.
There is a really important value in bringing people from different parts of the country together to get to know each other as friends and members of one community. That is a very valuable thing. Especially post-Civil War when really so many of the public universities were founded and many of the great research universities that—not all of them, but many—Stanford, Hopkins were all founded after the Civil War.
Vanderbilt’s mission statement, when Cornelius Vanderbilt founded us, said the goal was to found the great university that brings together all the parts of a divided country. That was the idea. So I think the historical mission of the American university to do just that has been enormously successful.
That’s bringing together different backgrounds, culturally, regionally, and so forth. What you’re pointing out is something very important, where what people now call the college divide or the degree divide is that the cultural differences in this country correlate now largely, or to a much larger extent than before with whether you have a college degree or not. That is both academic, that is both economic opportunity and success, but more importantly, I think, values. So the value divide that you have and the political divide now cuts through that. That is clearly manifesting itself politically, it’s manifesting itself in this backlash against universities in a different way. Now, what do you do about that?
We don’t want to give up the model that this is a place where we bring together these exceptionally talented individuals from across the country, from very different backgrounds. We help them not only to get a great education, but we want to prepare them for a role as citizens in a democratic and free society, where they can interact with people from different backgrounds and so forth. But we cannot lose the connection with people that did not go to these places.
Now I’ll give you something that may sound completely off, but I actually do think this is important. One thing that we do very intentionally is we are very much connected with our community. We were connected with our medical center that provides Medicaid, so there’s community presence as a force for good. That’s number one. One important way in which the community really connects with us is through college athletics. There is a shared communal aspect but the communal aspect of sharing that experience is a powerful thing.
Bottom line, no matter what we do, whether through community engagement, athletics, or the arts, that bond with the community needs to be strengthened. The last thing I should say: we have to be super careful that the values that are more common in rural communities, in communities that are not knowledge centers, are represented and discussed and respected inside the university.
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I think a particularly toxic component of this is contempt for people that have different beliefs than oneself. That’s fueling a lot of the anger and the backlash against universities. But that is a job that we need to do inside the university. It’s not just driven by where we recruit locally or nationally.
Mounk: That brings us naturally to the next topic. We were talking about analyzing why some on the left have been critical of universities and what their fundamental complaint is. As you were saying, there has been a decline in left-wing support for universities, but there’s an even steeper decline among conservatives in the United States. What is the nature of the complaint about American universities from the right?
Diermeier: One simple way to say this: the left thinks we’re inequality machines, the right thinks we’re woke factories. Everybody thinks we are unaffordable and badly run—bureaucratic with too much overhead and all of that. That’s the situation in a nutshell.
Mounk: Having been a member of many institutions in Europe as well as the United States, every institution has too much bureaucracy. American universities are in certain ways inefficient and bureaucratic. My God, are they more efficient and less bureaucratic than any European university I have ever been in touch with.
Diermeier: I think that’s true, but we can do a lot better too. I think we can lean in more. This is an underappreciated component of the whole debate that requires a lot of thought and intentionality and sometimes doesn’t happen. Sometimes people that work in universities feel this is beneath them, to worry about how facilities are operating. But I think that’s a managerial problem that with intent and better management practices can be fixed.
The woke thing is really interesting. After the Trump administration took office, there was talk about an endowment tax, basically an excise tax that would particularly hit wealthy private universities. There was a lot of conversation on that. I spent a huge amount of time in Washington talking to members of Congress, members of the administration. The original proposals were very harsh.
Mounk: Well, one of the striking things about it was that at least in one version of a proposed bill, it would take effect just about if you had about $100 million more than Notre Dame University because they didn’t want Notre Dame to be taxed. So they put it just above Notre Dame.
Diermeier: Yeah, that’s the political process, right? Notre Dame is now subject to the endowment tax, and so are we, but at a lower level. If you are like the most well-endowed universities, it’s pretty material and has a direct impact on what you can do.
The reason I’m mentioning this is that endowments are used for financial aid and to support faculty research. They are basically the accumulated stock of philanthropic support of generations. So you’re basically taxing philanthropy that supports these universities. That’s a pretty extraordinary thing to do, and I think it was a wake-up call for all of us.
But even more striking is what people would say. When you meet with senators or members of Congress more generally, members of the House, their staff, there were astonishing things that people said. People on the right would basically say something like this—and it’s almost a reflection of the conversation we just had: We know you’re educating the leaders of this country and we don’t like what’s coming out the other side.
We’re giving you billions of dollars, hundreds of billions of dollars in research funding and student aid, and you’re creating graduates that hate America. That’s the statement. The second thing is, they said, we will use all tools at our disposal to make sure that that changes.
Mounk: Is there truth to that statement?
Diermeier: Well, the leverage that Congress and the administration have is on taxes, research funding and all that stuff. The post-October 7th drama with Harvard and all of that—that’s all driven by that concern.
Now I think “hate America” is clearly an exaggeration for rhetorical purposes, but that’s what people said. The problem, the way I see it, is this political drift of universities is a reality. It has been happening for years and manifesting itself in multiple ways.
The debate over free speech, which really started in earnest around 2015. That’s when speakers were canceled, and we had speech codes. You remember the Halloween costume controversy at Yale? The Christakises—that was one chapter.
Mounk: I remember it well.
Diermeier: The next big chapter, of course, was October 7th and the debate over institutional neutrality. Then there’s the next chapter, which is DEI. Now the newest thing, which is really the most important one, is what happens in the classroom. The concern now is that there is political bias, ideological capture and lack of viewpoint diversity. These are all different ways to talk about a phenomenon. They have different meanings and they need to be carefully parsed. But that’s what’s happening in the classroom. It’s happening in research publications. It’s happening in professional associations. It’s pervasive.
The root cause of that—at least the way I think it makes the most sense—is the concern that we are subverting scholarly standards, scholarly and educational standards, to a political ideology. That’s the big problem. That manifests itself now in different ways: free speech constraints, institutional neutrality, DEI and so forth.
The problem is that there is a group among students, but also very importantly faculty that have a particular political point of view and that’s pushing a lot of these things. Then, the flip side of that is that presidents and boards have not reacted to that at all, I would say. Or not all of them and not coherently enough. Over the last weeks, there’s been a big debate about faculty recruitment and discrimination in faculty recruitment inspired by an article in Compact Magazine. It’s certainly true when I talk to friends of mine that they have experienced in hiring committees explicitly illegal justifications for how to proceed, justifications by the way that would have been illegal even before the recent Supreme Court ruling about affirmative action.
Mounk: This feels to me like a dog that hasn’t quite barked yet in the broader public debate about universities, in part because so many people who probably could sue are worried that they would be completely blackballed from academia and therefore have not done so.
It seems likely to me that this issue is going to move not to the very center of the debate, but more centrally into it over the next few years, in one way or another. What is your view on this? Do you think there has been large-scale illegal discrimination on the basis of race and gender in faculty hiring at American universities? Do you think this will move more toward the center of the debate around higher education?
Diermeier: We just can’t have that. That’s the long and the short of it. As you point out, even if you are a strong supporter of race-conscious admissions, that’s about student admissions. That’s not about faculty hiring. Faculty hiring based on race or protected category issues was illegal all the time. You just can’t have that. It’s illegal. You can’t do it. When you find evidence of that, you have to stop it. It’s not that simple.
Now, how broad and how widespread that was is very difficult to say. My worry is that some universities just basically took a casual approach to that, in part because maybe they supported it deep down, and maybe also because university faculty hiring is very decentralized. I have to tell you, if you force diversity statements or you put a DEI representative on search committees, you shouldn’t be surprised that this is happening. People understand the cues and they act accordingly. All of that, I hope, is changing.
Blatantly illegal behavior is part of the past. It’s good that we are talking about it, but we can’t have it. That’s just that simple.
The same is true of discriminating hiring based on political viewpoint. Same thing. Faculty need to be hired based on their scholarly expertise, full stop. That’s it. I’ve been pretty vocal on that in the past. I think this is a very important thing. I don’t know how widespread it is. We’ll have to tackle it whenever it occurs.
Mounk: I’m curious about how you think about this. You were saying that the idea that these universities are producing graduates who hate America is an overstatement for rhetorical purposes, and I certainly co-sign that. I can see, however, why conservatives might feel unwelcome on campus for two subtly but importantly different reasons.
The first is that there is a supermajority of people on campus who deeply dislike the Republican Party and who probably do not recognize that there is a rich conservative tradition that would be worth taking seriously, even if, like me, you have very fundamental objections to Donald Trump. This, of course, in some ways comes downstream from some of the things we talked about in the first strand of our conversation.
It is now the case, I think, across the professional and general elite of the United States that we have seen strong polarization by educational status. The best predictor of whether somebody votes for Democrats or Republicans now is not income and not a bunch of other things. It is how educated you are. Obviously, at the educational institutions that mint that educational elite, you are going to have a supermajority of people on one side of the political aisle.
That does, I think, inflect how we think about ourselves and our blind spots in important ways. I remember many years ago, at Harvard Kennedy School, being at a dinner in which a speaker claimed that conservatives have a lot more money than progressives in American politics. They had basically counted up the budgets of all the explicitly conservative institutions—the Heritage Foundation and those kinds of places—as well as the explicitly progressive institutions, like the Roosevelt Institute. They found that the conservative institutions had more money.
I said, well, what about this dinner? We are sitting at the nicest restaurant in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with ten endowed professors who all had chairs at Harvard Kennedy School, all paid for by the lavish means of this institution. It was assumed as a ticket of entry—unspoken, just unimaginable—that somebody sitting there might not support the Democratic Party or might not be on the left side of the political aisle. All of that in the study had been counted as neutral money because Harvard, of course, is a nonpartisan 501(c)(3) charitable institution.
I do not think this is because of some conspiracy by the president of Harvard or the chancellor of Vanderbilt. It is not even really a conscious conspiracy by many of those professors who, by the way, have perfectly reasonable views. These were not radicals. These were mostly center-left liberal faculty members. In that milieu, it is simply assumed that you are on the left, in a way that would understandably make even a very reasonable, moderate conservative feel quite unwelcome and feel like they always have to watch themselves.
There is a second problem, which I think affects a minority of faculty members. That problem certainly exists. It involves faculty members who feel both motivated and empowered to use the classroom to impose their political views on students. I see this when I emphasize to students at the beginning of the term that I am going to play devil’s advocate and push points of view that I feel are under-voiced in the discussion.
I want them to bring their whole selves to the discussion. I want them to actually say what they think. I grade papers on the quality of the argument. I do not care whether I agree with the argument or not. I care that they make the argument as strongly and cogently as they can. It takes repeating this point a few times, and then seeing me in action in the classroom for a few weeks, for them to start trusting that I actually mean it.
I do sometimes hear from students, “I just got accustomed to writing in papers what I could tell my professor believed, because otherwise I might get a bad grade.” I do not think that is the case for most faculty members. It is enough, however, that students experience that a few times early in their education for them to learn the lesson: jump through the hoop, echo what my professors say, do not rock the boat.
GPA is a huge issue here. There is grade inflation. Everybody gets an A or an A-minus in most courses. One class where you get a B-minus because your professor is upset with what you were saying for ideological reasons is really going to push down your GPA. It is just not worth the risk. Are these two complaints fair and legible to you?
Diermeier: I think the evidence is super strong that this is certainly the case among students and even among faculty. What you call this kind of unspoken consensus, I would think of as an institutional orthodoxy. Those are the types of things that are just part of being part of an institution, and you stick out like a sore thumb if you’re not part of that.
The important part is that this is not destiny. You can do things to prevent it. What we’re finding right now is that the evidence is just mounting—survey evidence from students, from faculty, from what’s happening in classrooms—that this is a real problem. It is clearly a political problem. It is an educational problem, because students are no longer engaging with each other in serious debates and discussions. That is something you can do something about. That is not a given. There is no natural law or anything like that.
We were very concerned about this already when I arrived. What you do is you get clear about your principles. In our case, the principles are a commitment to free speech, what we call open forums, institutional neutrality, and what we call civil discourse, which is that you use arguments and reasoning and you don’t ostracize each other just because they have a different point of view. Remember, they’re members of one community. That’s number one.
Then you have to act accordingly when things get tough, like during October 7th, because people pay attention to that—whether you’re doing that, whether you’re even considering having BDS as part of your endowment or not. Those are important things that reinforce or challenge this institutional orthodoxy.
There is also a very important component on the student side, which I think is again underappreciated. We do enormously thoughtful and intentional work to recruit students to Vanderbilt, to attract students to Vanderbilt who have what you just described. They talk with each other. They’re curious. They have serious debates with each other. Still, even though we talk about it and have this framework, they’re worried. They’re worried because in their high schools they were not prepared for that, since the institutional orthodoxy is already present in their high school environment.
The result is that they come in, and first we have them all sign a pledge. These are our values. This is what we hold dear, just like an honor code. Then there is programming. The critical thing we’ve learned, however, is that the biggest problem is that they are worried they’re going to say something their peers consider outrageous and then be ostracized and excluded from parties. That’s their biggest fear.
At the core, you need to create a relationship of trust among students that this is how we do things around here. We’ve developed a whole program around that called Dialogue Vanderbilt. That’s the key.
Mounk: Tell us about that, because I agree that when I speak to students, the fear of a professor giving a bad grade is real—particularly in certain institutions. It is less so in my own, but I have heard it a lot in some other institutions, and it is certainly something that motivates students.
Part of campus life, part of that pressure-cooker environment, is that you are around your peers 24/7. You are not part of the normal community most people inhabit. The fear of saying something in the classroom that somebody takes objection to, or perhaps exaggerates, or perhaps completely distorts, and then makes a TikTok about—after which all of your neighbors, your suitemates, and the people you are friends with are no longer going to talk to you—is certainly real and very vivid in the minds of students.
I think part of the problem with the contemporary American university is that, in some ways, administrators decide too much for students. How, then, can a university shape a culture that remedies this without making the entire social scene even more one in which the assumed referee for everything is some student-life administrator who may themselves have quite strong ideological leanings and who may actually be part of the problem?
Diermeier: This is exactly the wrong way to do it. Having the administration constantly adjudicate this debate or that one is exactly the wrong approach. I want to start by telling you what the results are, and then I’m going to tell you what we’ve done and how we deal with this. Let me give you just a couple of pieces of evidence. We have very strong College Republicans and College Democrats on campus, and they jointly organized a debate entirely on their own, with no involvement from us, right before the presidential election. On most campuses, College Democrats and College Republicans do not even talk to each other. After Trump was shot, they issued a joint statement condemning the shooting and reaffirming their commitment to civil discourse. What we are seeing is students accepting that this is how we do things around here. It becomes a culture.
One of the most popular classes on our campus, which I think you’ll appreciate, is called Free Speech and Dangerous Ideas. There are about 450 sophomores in the class, and all they do is talk about controversial topics. Several things need to happen. Let me highlight a couple. First, the commitment to free speech has to be active. It cannot just be something you put in your bylaws. It has to be operationalized. What that means, for example, is that every registered student group or faculty member can bring any speaker to campus as they see fit. This is a commitment we have had since 1964. In 1967, for example, students organized what was called the Impact Symposia, where they brought Strom Thurmond and Stokely Carmichael to campus. You can imagine what that did at the time. That is how we do things around here.
Let me give you a more recent example, because the practical details are critical. Three weeks after October 7th, we had a strong chapter of Young Americans for Freedom on campus, a conservative student organization, and they brought a speaker to campus named Michael Knowles, a very conservative speaker who tends to attract controversy. The topic of his talk, three weeks after October 7th, was “In Praise of Settler Colonialism.” You can imagine that many of our students were very unhappy about that, but students have the right to bring anyone to campus as they see fit. It is not checked by us. It is not controlled by us. Other students can protest, but they cannot disrupt. We do not have a heckler’s veto. As you might imagine, this created a stir in the student community. I later had a discussion with the student newspaper, The Hustler. They said this was terrible, that it just created controversy, and they made the usual arguments. We sat down and said: let’s think about this. How should we do this in general? There are three doors. Door one is that we have no speakers on campus, because people can always be controversial. Door two is that students and faculty decide, as part of academic freedom. Door three is that I decide, or a committee I appoint decides. Of course, everybody wants door two.
Mounk: What they actually want is door four, which is that magically I decide, and people who think like me decide, and the sensitive decision always aligns with what I prefer. This is the door people always imagine exists in these free speech discussions.
Diermeier: Exactly. The important point is that the mechanism is critical. By making these decisions, you are implicitly adopting a governance mechanism for how decisions are made. You want to think about the mechanism, not about every individual case. That was a good moment for us as a university community, and people understood it.
We have not had any disruptions or speakers being shouted down. That is just part of the culture. You have to do it, and you have to reemphasize the principle when these controversies arise. The culture is reinforced in other ways as well. We have student ambassadors as part of Dialogue Vanderbilt, built into an advisory board that now has more than 150 members. There was so much demand for this that we expanded it to freshmen as well. You have to do a lot of things to signal that this is how we do things around here.
The last thing I would mention is that our faculty, through the Faculty Senate, recently passed a resolution on academic freedom. It was about as good as one could hope for. The vote was something like 56 to 4. That shows that the faculty is buying into this as well—not everyone, not all the time, but as part of the culture. This requires multiple things: principles, creating a culture, and then practicing it. Practicing it matters, because practice is how you reinforce that this is how we do things around here.
Mounk: This is what strikes me about this moment in universities. I think the societal trends do provide significant headwinds in terms of the partisan polarization by educational status, because of a number of other factors we’ll get to in the conversation. What strikes me is the reluctance of many university leaders to actually explain, both to the outside world and to the university community, what the university should be for.
This is not to say that they should impose political views on the university community. They certainly should not. They should be able to formulate basic principles like academic freedom and its importance to a culture of successful inquiry in convincing ways. So few of them try. This, to me, was the most striking lesson from those famous congressional hearings about anti-Semitism, to which the presidents of Harvard, MIT, and UPenn, I believe it was, had been invited.
It’s not that they made a couple of missteps under hostile questioning. It’s not that there are some incidents on those campuses which perhaps are really open to criticism. It’s that they made no concerted attempt to use this moment to speak to the American public about this is who we are, this is what our principles are, this is why we have great institutions that are actually doing something valuable that you should care about. It’s that unwillingness or inability to formulate that basic case which, to me, was infuriating.
Diermeier: I totally agree. I think there’s a reason why this is so difficult for many university leaders. We’ve seen mission drift. From my point of view—and it’s certainly what’s happening at Vanderbilt, and was happening at the University of Chicago as well—our mission, our purpose, is utterly clear. It’s about path-breaking research and a transformative education.
It’s about the creation of knowledge and then its dissemination or transmission. That’s what we do. We are not a political party. We’re not part of a political movement. That means we need to resist the temptation to act like one. That’s the whole essence of this debate over institutional neutrality. It is not about that. Our business is to create a platform where people can debate stuff. We want to encourage debate, not settle it, unless it is directly connected to the university.
The problem is that once you have a specific incident—just like in the free speech example—the pressure to take sides is super high. People do it, and then it drifts, and then the ship drifts a little bit more. It’s a little bit like a sailboat without a keel. Every time the wind moves, it drifts a little bit. The wind typically moves from one side, so things keep drifting in that direction.
Take an example. You have the Dobbs decision on abortion. Tennessee is a trigger-law state. That means the moment the Supreme Court decision came down, abortion became illegal in the state of Tennessee. That affects the university community directly. Institutional neutrality, just to be clear, means you focus on issues that directly affect universities and remain silent on issues that are beyond the purpose or core mission of the university.
Abortion is an interesting case. How do you think about it? Some universities said that the Dobbs decision—Berkeley, for example—is inconsistent with the mission of the university. That prohibiting or removing Roe v. Wade, a federal right to access abortion, is inconsistent with the mission of the university.
What we said is that we don’t have critics, and we don’t have a point of view on the Supreme Court. I don’t pretend to be a constitutional lawyer. My faculty has views all over the place. Some think Roe v. Wade was right. Some think it was decided incorrectly on constitutional grounds but is good public policy. That is exactly the kind of debate you want to have on campus.
What you don’t want to say is that a Supreme Court decision—which is not about the educational mission of the university, but about abortion generally—is inconsistent with the mission of the university. Think about how that feels if you are a law school professor who has written for thirty years that Roe v. Wade was decided incorrectly. Suddenly, your teaching is inconsistent with the purpose of the university.
That kind of thing goes on all the time. It has gone on in many different ways. You have to be clear about your mission, and then you have to act accordingly, even when it’s difficult. That’s the key. That has not happened.
When you then try to explain it to people, the problem is that you say, “We have a commitment to free speech,” and people look at the record and say, “No, you don’t. Here’s example one, two, three, four.” That’s the problem.
Mounk: I think certainly in the debate on free speech, including after October 7th, my position for a long time had been that many universities were in an impossible position because they had acted badly for many years before that. They had often censored people because of their viewpoints. They had often prosecuted students for saying things they did not like, in various ways, and punished them. They also had not properly imposed the one thing that every advocate of free speech agrees is important, which is limits on time, place, and manner. They had allowed students to disrupt events and so on, and had abandoned that over the last fifty years.
Suddenly, when universities were saying on the one hand that they were not going to punish genocidal speech, one community on campus said, why are you not punishing people for that if you are punishing people for all kinds of other things? On the other hand, Palestinian students understandably said, hang on a second. Suddenly you are telling us we cannot put up tents and cannot do all these things, but during Occupy Wall Street and all these other instances you did not take any action. That consistency over time is extremely important.
You were saying that the wind mostly blows from one side. In terms of the university community, that has for a long time been true. Right now, however, the wind is suddenly blowing in a rather gusty manner from the other side. The Trump administration was expected to be hostile to higher education in a number of ways, but it has taken much more robust and extreme actions than many had expected.
This includes the endowment tax you were talking about. It also includes direct targeting of particular universities, intense scrutiny of federal funding of universities, the cancellation of student visas for students who express disfavored viewpoints, and a whole host of other things.
How can a university that is serious about free speech stand up for those values at a time when doing so incurs huge financial risks? It turns out that even affluent private universities are deeply dependent on the financial support of the federal government. What has Vanderbilt done in response to this? What have other universities done? What do you think universities can do to protect academic freedom against a White House that is, I think, in many key ways, attacking it?
Diermeier: The description that the wind is blowing rather gustily from the other side right now is of course exactly correct. I think what you have right now is an administration that, as we said before, believes that universities have lost their way, have drifted dramatically to the left and they want to use every tool in their arsenal to fix that or to change that.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Daniel discuss how the Trump administration is undermining free speech in universities and what the long-term impact of this will be. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
In the beginning was scarcity, and scarcity was real, and survival was a way of life. Then, somewhere along the way, abundance happened.
And after abundance—or because of it—came stagnation.
And that paradox besetting everyone’s life had to produce a reaction sooner or later. And now we’re in the midst of the reaction.
AbundanceEconomist Tyler Cowen recently posted an interesting call for research proposals. His team is offering $25,000 to investigate how human minds navigate abundance.
Here is how the call described it:
By nearly every measure—life expectancy, wealth, freedom, technology—humanity has never been better off. As material hardships disappear, new psychological challenges emerge: decision fatigue from unlimited choice, more complex forms of social organization making new cognitive and emotional demands, crises of meaning without survival struggles.
Cowen’s team frames this as a research initiative “to understand the psychological tradeoffs of cultural, economic, and technological progress to ensure that mass abundance and freedom translate into mass flourishing.”
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A large, resource-rich nation can already produce almost everything it needs—or acquire what it doesn’t. It has things in abundance: assets, infrastructure, weapons, medicines, universities, people.
Scarcity is no longer the problem. Abundance is a new kind of problem—a psychological one. And, paradoxically, that abundance goes hand-in-hand with stagnation.
StagnationWe can turn again to Cowen, who has thought through these dynamics very deeply. Almost fifteen years ago, Cowen published The Great Stagnation. His core claim was simple: humanity had already discovered what was easy. The low-hanging fruit of innovation had been picked. What remained was harder, slower, and less transformative.
Economist Eli Dourado tracks the Great Stagnation in chart form and claims that the downturn started somewhere around 1973. Had pre-1973 productivity trends continued, the average U.S. income would be two times higher today than it currently is. What’s happening is that stagnation occurs within abundance, like a soft cushion within a hard-spring couch. The abundance—and the expectation of abundance—becomes the structure of the society. But stagnation is the air that we actually breathe—we never quite match the expectations of unfolding abundance that we all have; and, because of the underlying economic issues that Cowen identifies, we’re likely never to do so.
Indicators of abundance are still there. The stock market rises, creating the impression of progress. But many of those gains are offset by inflation, government debt, currency debasement, or simple speculation. Unemployment is low, yet it’s less than clear that many of those jobs generate true productivity as opposed to window-dressing. Speaking at Churchill College, Cambridge, in 2024, Cowen posed a telling question:
The story of the next twenty to thirty years will be—what’s it like to have an economy that’s maybe two-thirds stagnant?
If that’s our trajectory, stagnation may not be a phase. It may be the condition.
Internationalism and StagnationWhen material needs are met, additional inflows—of either more things or more people—no longer feel like enrichment. They feel like imported complexity.
Free trade, loose borders, and generous visa regimes amplify the psychological problems of abundance. They make people more aware of the stagnation within their own economies.
Thinking in these terms may help us to make sense of the surprising shift to nativism worldwide. The most recent session of Davos seemed to make official something that has been clear for some time. Donald Trump as expected made his case for tariffs. But even Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, in a much-praised speech, acknowledged: “The rules based order is fading.” Abundance, in terms of international trade, has not led to improvements in life domestically. In so many countries, the perception is of stagnation—whatever elites’ metrics may say to the contrary. That reaction is to be expected. Abundance—and internationalism—are, at a fundamental level, bewildering. Inwardness now makes a certain kind of sense.
Why More No Longer Feels BetterFeeling American is already difficult as it is. America tends to be treated not as an origin, but as a waypoint. A place you go to make money. Not a place to belong. Not a place to be born, to be happy, to grow old, or to die. Many outsiders—and even some naturalized citizens—relate to America this way: transactional rather than existential.
I arrived in America as a refugee from Bosnia, and for a long time I viewed it the same way. Like an orange—to be squeezed for as much juice as possible, for as long as possible. That image only disappeared when I had children, and they entered their teenage years firmly and exclusively American.
If America is only an economic destination—more like a very large Dubai than a shared homeland—then identity becomes provisional. And when identity is provisional, it’s hard to build shared meaning. It’s hard to build community.
Neighborhoods fragment. People cluster into bubbles. Shared reference points thin out. It becomes harder to feel American, to feel English, to feel Swedish—not in a legal sense, but in a lived one.
That’s where nativism kicks in. When belonging feels thin and provisional—when the current seems to be moving towards a bewildering internationalism—people reach for permanence. To make Americanness more substantive, nativists arrange their thinking around land owned, graves tended, ancestors who lived and died American. People seek rootedness because there is abundance and they don’t have to seek survival anymore. It’s an attempt, a clumsy one, to turn a place of opportunity back into a place of inheritance.
None of this makes the nativist tendency towards exclusion morally right—but it may help explain why liberal arguments that ignore culture now fall flat.
The narrative becomes not: we have so much abundance, let’s share it with the world (which was the pro-immigrant argument in the United States and Europe for a long time). It becomes: we are stagnating, we need to rebuild domestically, not let in more outsiders even if they may help GDP by some metric somewhere.
Maybe Culture Now Matters More Than IdeasI’m writing this from the Balkans. The other day I saw an advertisement for a local city taxi. “School is done and you’re still at work? Don’t worry—we’ll take care of your kids like they’re our own.” The video shows an eight-year-old calling a cab, getting in with a few friends, and riding home alone.
That kind of implied deeper trust is possible in small societies where people look familiar, where everybody knows everybody either directly or by proximity.
An eight-year-old getting into a cab alone anywhere in America feels unthinkable. It’s too big. It’s too unfamiliar.
Maybe loose immigration policies enrich the idea of America—the familiar claim that we are a nation of immigrants—but they dilute the culture that holds people together. There’s a corporate adage, popularized by McKinsey: culture eats strategy for breakfast. Maybe culture eats ideas for breakfast too. Maybe, in an age of abundance and stagnation, culture matters more than ideas.
Perhaps They Didn’t Intend To—But This Is What Was Defended in DavosIf stagnation hasn’t reversed itself despite decades of importing smart people from around the world, a question naturally emerges: what, exactly, is the argument for importing more?
What was defended in Davos—most directly by Trump, and implicitly acknowledged even by Carney—isn’t racial purity. Or economies. Or markets. It’s familiarity. Legibility. A shared grammar of everyday life. A psychology. A longing for belonging. Culture. Pride. Super Bowls and barbecues. Sharing the same holiday. Volunteering at the same church. Small things—but small things are where culture lives.
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What once seemed like an inevitable push toward ever-deeper globalization now meets resistance. If the shift feels dramatic, it may be because the psychological tension has been building quietly for years—abundance at scale paired with the lived experience of stagnation.
How these forces ultimately reshape politics remains to be seen. The dividing line may no longer run neatly between parties, but between competing instincts about motion and order—between mobility and rootedness, dynamism and cohesion. That tension is now the constant hum beneath so much of public life.
Sarah Majdov is a computer engineer and former enterprise architect who spent years in what she calls the “Goldilocks position” of corporate life—high enough to glimpse strategy, low enough to see how it actually plays out. She writes about stagnation, power, and the limits of modern dynamism. She is the author of Fatamorgana.
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On paper, Sanae Takaichi is the kind of leader Japanese people ought to hate. Bossy, opinionated, conspicuously unbothered by the rituals of consensus that grease every surface of Japanese official life, she comes across as everything the country’s political culture is designed to sand down. She doesn’t schmooze with captains of industry over kaiseki dinners at fancy Tokyo restaurants. She goes home and reads her briefing papers.
She plays drums in a heavy metal band—or used to in college, and still can, as South Korean president Lee Jae-myung discovered to his evident alarm at their January summit. She has opinions about Taiwan and isn’t shy about sharing them, which in the context of Japanese-Chinese diplomacy is roughly equivalent to setting your hair on fire at a funeral.
Something for everyone to hate.
And so the three months since Takaichi took office have been a bit of a surprise. A country that famously “doesn’t do” politics—where low voter turnout is a punchline and prime ministers are interchangeable grey suits cycling through a revolving door—has seen a wholly un-Japanese surge of popular enthusiasm for a national leader.
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If the TV news is to be believed, young women are copying her outfits, and teenagers are tracking down the exact model of her pink ballpoint pen. She placed third in the annual trend rankings for junior high and high school girls, wedged between an influencer and a boy band. Her nickname, “Sana,” has spawned “Sana-katsu”—essentially, fan activities—a term borrowed from idol culture and now applied to a 64-year-old conservative politician with rheumatoid arthritis.
One poll after her October inauguration put overall cabinet support at 71%. Among 18-to-39-year-olds, it was 80%. Another poll went further: among 18-to-29-year-olds, specifically, support hit 92%. That’s not a typo.
Yet another poll, with more conservative methodology, still found 78% support in the 18-to-39-year-old bracket in January—roughly 30 points higher than the previous prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, whom Takaichi replaced after he stepped down last year following a string of bad election results for the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Takaichi’s support among women (72%) ever so slightly outpaces her support among men (71%), which is worth noting because every liberal commentator in Tokyo has spent the past three months insisting that Takaichi doesn’t represent women.
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Then came the election. When she called a snap dissolution of parliament in late January—branded “the selfish dissolution” by opposition parties who resented being made to campaign in the dead of winter—the gamble looked risky. When she broke the LDP’s longstanding coalition with Komeito—a centrist party with roots in a strange Buddhist cult—commentators thought she’d straight-up lost her mind.
It turned out, instead, that voters didn’t mind the snow, and loathed the weird Buddhist hangers on. In the election, held last Sunday, the LDP won over two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives, surpassing the historic high-water marks of Japan’s most successful post-war leaders—Nakasone in 1986, Koizumi in 2005, and Abe in 2012. Until now, no single party has held a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house in the entire postwar era.
This isn’t about the LDP’s popularity. The party itself remains weighed down by financing scandals and decades of institutional rust. This is all about Takaichi. Voters told pollsters they were voting for her, often for the first time in their lives. One woman quoted in the Financial Times—a twenty-something in Tokyo who’d never before cast an LDP ballot—put it simply: “Japan needs someone different.”
What the hell is going on, exactly? Is this about policy or personality?
Japanese commentators are split, though the honest answer is probably: yes.
The personality case is strong. Takaichi’s brand rests on a perception that she is what the Japanese internet calls gachi—the real deal, dead serious, incapable of simply going through the motions. As the commentator Inoue Toshiyuki put it, young voters think she’s serious. Serious about politics. Serious about policy. Serious even, it turns out, about the drums.
She has a personal story to back this up. She wanted to attend a private university in Tokyo; her parents forced her into a national university with a six-hour daily commute because they didn’t think it was appropriate for a single girl to live alone. She broke through anyway—studying abroad, becoming a TV personality, entering politics, enduring a divorce, a remarriage, her husband’s declining health, and her own battle with rheumatoid arthritis. Japanese commentators call it haran banjō—a life of dramatic ups and downs—and it resonates in a culture that romanticizes perseverance.
Then there’s her work ethic, described as almost puritan. Takaichi doesn’t do the after-hours networking dinners: she’d rather be at home reading policy briefs. Whether this is principled or antisocial depends on your priors, but for a generation that associates the high cuisine ryōtei circuit with backroom corruption, it plays as refreshingly clean.
Then there’s her political brand. Takaichi is a conservative—not in the bland, split-the-difference way that characterizes usual LDP politicos, but in the muscular, conviction-driven register that Japanese politics generally filters out. She has visited Yasukuni, the incandescently controversial shrine that honors fallen Japanese soldiers very much including WWII-era war criminals, and she doesn’t apologize for it. She opposes allowing women to keep their own family names after marriage. She talks about constitutional revision to allow Japan to use its military more freely without whispering.
And, in November, she did something no previous Japanese prime minister had dared: she stated plainly, in a parliamentary session, that a Chinese military attack on Taiwan would constitute an “existential threat” to Japan, triggering the legal framework for collective self-defense.
Beijing lost its mind. The Chinese foreign ministry summoned Japan’s ambassador. Chinese state media ran furious editorials. A Chinese consul in Osaka posted on social media that Japan’s “dirty head” would be “cut off without hesitation.” China suspended travel advisories encouraging tourism to Japan.
From Takaichi’s perspective, this was perfect.
Polls showed 61% of respondents considered her remarks appropriate. The confrontation accomplished something extraordinary in Japanese politics: it made a security policy position popular. China’s overreaction made Takaichi’s nationalism cool, affirming the narrative that Japan faces a genuine external threat and needs a leader willing to name it. Some commentators suggested she’d bumbled into a confrontation, but she did no such thing. She walked in with her eyes open, and she walked out stronger.
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The deeper point is about coherence. Takaichi’s muscular conservatism and her personal style aren’t two separate things packaged together for electoral convenience. They’re expressions of the same disposition. The woman who wouldn’t give up on a six-hour commute is the same woman who won’t back down from Beijing. The woman who goes home to study instead of networking is the same woman who gives straight answers in parliament instead of hiding behind diplomatic mush.
This is what distinguishes her from the parade of grey suits who preceded her. It’s not that Kishida or Ishiba—Japan’s previous two prime ministers, who came and went without you ever having to learn their names—lacked policy positions. It’s that their positions felt detachable from their personalities, like accessories swapped out depending on the occasion. Takaichi’s don’t. The conviction and the person are fused, and in a political culture exhausted by decades of anodyne consensus management, that fusion registers as a kind of electric shock.
Does any of this suggest Japanese society is fundamentally changing? Maybe. But I’d be cautious.
I doubt a single Japanese man has washed a single extra dish since October just because there’s a woman running the country. Takaichi won’t transform gender relations, and she has zero interest in trying. She opposes the one reform—allowing women to keep their surname after marriage—that feminists have spent decades fighting for. The junior high schoolers tracking down her ballpoint pen aren’t budding feminists; they’re fans, in the same way they’d be fans of an idol or an influencer. The engagement is real, but it’s not political. Not really.
What Takaichi is exploring is Thatcherism with Japanese characteristics. She’s a strong woman operating in a patriarchal culture, and she succeeds not by challenging the patriarchy but by being so conspicuously competent that the patriarchy can’t find a handhold to push back. A conviction politician first, a woman second.
In 1980s Britain, Margaret Thatcher didn’t advance the cause of feminism one inch. She advanced the cause of Margaret Thatcher, and she did it by being better at the job than the men around her. That’s the mold Takaichi is following, consciously—she cites Thatcher as a role model—and it’s working.
This matters because the alternative—Japan’s consensus-seeking political mainstream, the politics of managed decline and diplomatic euphemism—looks increasingly out of step with the times. China is threatening Taiwan, and Japan sits directly in the path of any conflict. The United States is under the most erratic leadership in its history. Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on. The world feels more hostile than it has in decades, and the Japanese public seems to have concluded, with startling speed, that times like these call for someone who will say what she means and mean what she says.
That’s the Takaichi proposition. Not that she’ll remake Japanese society or close the gender gap or usher in progressive values. Just that she’ll be serious about the things you need a leader to be serious about: threats, policy, and the job itself.
In a country where the political class has spent a generation perfecting the art of studied vagueness, that turns out to be more than enough.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.
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This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “Abundance in America.” This series aims to analyze the challenges hindering growth and development, as well as how to build a coalition around abundance.
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The “abundance agenda” is a promising political movement. It offers Democrats a compelling message for a supply-starved electorate, and, more importantly, its advocates have correctly identified some of the procedural laws that currently make it hard for America to build. At first glance, the movement’s core message of “build more” doesn’t seem very divisive at all.
However, the abundance agenda is far more controversial than it seems, and the movement faces a difficult political path to reform for two reasons. First, the “scarcity coalition” that it is up against is far more powerful than abundance reformers have been willing to acknowledge to date. Second, in order to make truly meaningful reforms, the abundance movement will need to more directly confront long-held shibboleths among Democrats regarding environmental policy and community input.
The “abundance agenda” refers to a series of recent arguments and a political movement on the American left that advocate for adjusting procedural or environmental laws to allow the government (or the private sector in some areas like housing) to build more or do more: to build infrastructure, or to build housing, or to procure stuff, or do scientific research and so on. The most prominent of these recent arguments was set out in Abundance by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson. Another great, recent entry is Why Nothing Works by Marc Dunkelman, which argues that the American left took a clear “Jeffersonian” turn in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (contrasted with the “Hamiltonian” federal government of the New Deal) by enacting environmental and other laws that gave more power to stakeholders to sue or block governments trying to build. Yoni Applebaum’s Stuck is a similar entry that is focused specifically on housing. These arguments build on the ideas presented in Nicholas Bagley’s 2019 article “The Procedure Fetish,” which, broadly speaking, also argued that the Democratic Party had gone too far in promoting procedural rules and should refocus on building.
These are arguments for and about the American left, and I think this is the clearest way to understand the abundance agenda. I have also seen “abundance” terminology used to describe a broader coalition that includes deregulatory Republicans, or even parts of the MAGA movement—basically anyone who wants more growth or development. While it is certainly promising that abundance Democrats may be able to find bipartisan policy wins, I find that this broader definition of the “abundance” frame confuses more than it clarifies. The terminology of “abundance” is both informative and politically useful when it is used to describe one side of an internecine struggle on the American left, because it can unite a coalition of interest groups there that are otherwise disconnected and unable to effect change on their own.
Those groups that make up the abundance coalition include the burgeoning Yes-In-My-Backyard (YIMBY) movement to increase housing supply, the New Deal nostalgics, the centrist or deregulatory (aka “New Liberal”) wing of the Democratic Party, and a host of clean energy factions that want America to build more renewable energy or nuclear power infrastructure, or high-voltage, direct-current transmission lines. All of these groups on the American left want the state to not just have a bigger role in the economy; they want the state to be able to actually deliver on what it promises. The “abundance” framing is useful in that coalition-building sense, so that is how I’m using it here.
It also provides a useful contrast with the coalition that the abundance agenda is up against. I refer to this as the “scarcity coalition.” Its members would almost certainly object to that label as pejorative. However, it is apt for my purpose, which is to state that there is a large and powerful coalition of groups with a strong interest in preserving the status quo and resisting the reforms that the abundance agenda needs to enact in order to be successful.
I think that the abundance advocates have correctly identified the sources of difficulty America has building things today. I’m defining success as the act of actually reforming those laws, and winning political support among Democrats to do so.
The Scarcity AgendaAbundance supporters tend to understate both the political power and the motivation of their opposition. Regarding its power, they too often characterize the scarcity coalition as limited to a few overzealous environmental groups that file lawsuits against infrastructure or housing projects. While “the groups” are themselves certainly powerful interests within the Democratic Party, they make up a small yet very visible part of the scarcity coalition.
The base of the scarcity coalition is not the Sierra Club or the Natural Resources Defense Council; it is the relatively affluent urban or suburban Democrats. That is no small or powerless segment of the party. Its members own property in high demand urban areas or suburbs and have a homevoter’s interest in controlling the development around what is often their most concentrated investment.
The scarcity coalition’s political power is easy to underestimate. For any given project, the organized opposition tends to be a relatively small part of the community, along with environmental groups. Not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) groups today almost always note that their opposition is only to the particular project in question, as opposed to development in general. Yet while a small part of the scarcity coalition may oppose this or that infrastructure or housing project, the entire coalition has an interest in preserving the laws that grant small groups of stakeholders the power to intervene, delay, or veto those projects. Those very laws are precisely what the abundance agenda needs to reform in order to be successful.
Abundance advocates also tend to misunderstand or mischaracterize the motivation of the scarcity coalition. They often frame it as misguided idealism or as simply erring on the side of proceduralism too much. The best example of this is “everything bagel liberalism” in which well-intentioned procedural requirements—to complete an analysis, collect community input, or award contracts to small businesses, and so on—add up to very little getting done.
This significantly understates the motivation of the best-organized groups within the scarcity coalition. The status quo of laws that give small, well-organized groups the power to intervene in or threaten government actions or large private sector capital projects confers on those groups an extraordinary amount of political power, and in many cases direct funding. Today, big budget capital projects in the United States attract a veritable swarm of disparate interest groups claiming under-studied environmental or social impacts, and demanding compensation in the form of “mitigations.” Government agencies or private project sponsors are highly motivated to negotiate, because the outcome of any lawsuit is uncertain and financially devastating under current American procedural laws. This is why large infrastructure projects in the United States tend to become sprawling urban development initiatives, as a host of mitigating investments are added to the project scope.
My point is that the motivation of “the groups” is not simply ideological. There is an enormous amount of political power and money that would be disrupted by the reforms that the abundance agenda aims to make. This explains the ferocity of the criticism the abundance movement has received since it gained steam. It is also why so many of the arguments against the abundance agenda come off as tangential or even non sequiturs. Interest groups can be counted on to argue against reforms that disempower them.
Supporters of the abundance agenda have at times been surprised by the level of controversy it has provoked among left-leaning groups. I’ve been similarly puzzled—particularly by the amount of criticism that the movement has received on the grounds that abundance “centers” procedural reform instead of corporate power or oligopoly or antitrust. I simply do not see those things as mutually exclusive or understand why only one type of reform can be “centered” by Democrats.
However, I do have a simple explanation for the volume of pushback against the abundance agenda: the stakes are high.
How Abundance Can WinThe second reason abundance advocates have it hard is that their opponents will not allow them to have the argument that they want to have. They will need to more directly challenge some long-held ideas about environmental law and community input in order to successfully reform infrastructure development or increase housing supply in the United States.
The laws that enable various interest groups to intervene in public or private development projects were extraordinarily well-intentioned, and most Americans still broadly support the principles behind those laws. Those laws were intended to address issues like environmental protection, the preservation of historic buildings or endangered species, and to provide opportunities for local community input on development projects.
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There is little to argue with regarding the principles behind these laws, which is why most Americans rightfully support them. The reason America has so much difficulty building is because of the way those principles were applied by the laws that the abundance agenda needs to reform. That is a nuanced distinction which is almost entirely lost in contemporary debates or news coverage of procedural reforms. For instance, when California’s legislature enacted some moderate reforms of its environmental law last year, the New York Times referred to the reforms as “a collision between environmental values and everyday concerns.”
That makes the policy debate challenging. The abundance coalition needs to raise the salience of the laws that make it difficult to build housing or infrastructure in the United States, but doing so pushes the movement into uncomfortable territory: the principles of environmental protection, community input, preservation, and the like. As long as the salient debate over development is simply highlighting America’s poor development outcomes, and the detailed policy debates are limited to think tanks, lobbyists, and legislative staff, the scarcity coalition is in a strong position.
That isn’t just a theory. States like California were trying to reform development laws for decades before “abundance” became a national movement. Currently, California has produced many reforms and very poor results, because the scarcity coalition has been successful at watering down reforms and protecting the laws that matter.
The crux of the problem for the abundance movement is that arguments for procedural reforms must be made in the abstract, and in the abstract any society must make tradeoffs in development policy. Efficient development is on one end of the scale and other important issues like environmental impacts, social impacts, community input, or the preservation of endangered species are on the other. Everything on the scale is important, but acknowledging tradeoffs is an uphill political debate. This explains the scarcity coalition’s broad public messaging success over the last five decades. It is far easier, politically speaking, to claim that there is no tradeoff between, say, environmental protection and infrastructure development. To point out that such a tradeoff obviously exists and argue that we should account for it is a far greater challenge.
Of course, in the real world, none of these tradeoffs are made in the abstract. Agencies, elected representatives, and judges never decide between environmental protection or community input and development. They instead make specific decisions regarding specific tradeoffs on specific projects. At its core, development policy is less of a debate over competing principles or values, and more of a debate over process. And to the extent American development policy has gone awry, it has been a matter of process, rather than environmental values.
Those are better terms of debate for the abundance agenda, too. But even if the movement is able to reframe the debate over development policy from environmental principles to decision-making processes, it will still face a difficult task. The abundance agenda will need to remain true to the broad principles of environmental protection and community input while arguing for the reform of a generation of laws that were intended to promote those very same principles. In other words, the abundance agenda needs to argue that the previous generation of reformers got the principles right, but the process wrong.
The abundance agenda is a promising political movement. Its message has the potential to unite a number of currently divided interests on the American left into a coalition that could meaningfully effect change. However, the road ahead is difficult. The scarcity coalition opposing them is larger, wealthier, better organized, and highly motivated. To be successful, supporters of the abundance agenda will need to do more to point out the obvious flaws of the status quo. They’ll need to argue against some specific policies that the environmental movement got right in principle but wrong in practice, and their internecine conflict with the scarcity coalition will need to become much more direct.
Michael Bennon is a Research Scholar at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. He leads the center’s Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative.
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We’re delighted to feature this article as part of our new series on Liberal Virtues and Values.
That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.
This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we’ll feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.
According to popular perception, universities have become cesspools of radical left-wing indoctrination, dominated by cultural Marxism, critical race theory, and post-modernism. As someone who has been working on the inside through the past three decades of intellectual fads and enthusiasms, I am sorry to report that, not only is this false, it is the opposite of true. The hegemonic ideology in the fields of political philosophy, legal theory, and political science, throughout my entire career, has been American liberalism. And not just any old American liberalism, but rather the very specific manifestation of this tradition articulated in the work of John Rawls.
Indeed, the intellectual dominance of Rawls has been so complete, for so long, that we have all become desperately bored of talking about him. To provide a sense of the magnitude of the phenomenon, consider that, of the five most highly-cited works of English-language political philosophy published in the past century, two were written by Rawls, and the other three were written in response to Rawls. Political philosophy has basically been all Rawls all the time for as long as I can remember. Every decade or so a new book comes along, promising to shift the paradigm, to give us all something new to talk about. Each one has fizzled out, sending us all back to Rawls.
What explains this extraordinary persistence? How could this unassuming, and in many respects naive, American philosopher have come to bestride the world like a colossus? This is what I shall attempt to explain.
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Before getting to that, however, it is important to acknowledge some of the barriers to a proper appreciation of Rawls’ work. Many people have read a few chapters of Rawls but don’t really get why he is such a big deal. The problem is not that he wrote obscurely—his prose is perfectly ordinary, workaday English. He also used footnotes sparingly and spent very little time discussing the work of others, which makes his writing accessible even to those without much background. The major problem with his writing is that it is boring, and much of what he says seems self-evident. Because everything is so understated, it is easy to miss its importance.
Many readers have also been distracted by the fact that Rawls’ most well-known argument, about the “veil of ignorance” and the “difference principle,” doesn’t really work.1 In this respect, he is a bit like Immanuel Kant. Many readers have also had difficulty taking Kant’s work in moral philosophy seriously, because the argument for the “categorical imperative” that he supplies, in the second section of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, does not work either. But it is a terrible mistake to conclude from this that Kant had nothing interesting to say about morality, merely because his supreme principle of morality was wrong. What is important about Kant’s moral philosophy is the way he sets things up. It is his framing of the problem that revolutionized our thinking about morality, not the specific solution that he proposed.
The exact same thing is true of Rawls. Within my world of academic philosophy I’ve never met anyone who endorses the specific principle of justice that Rawls proposed. In order to understand the importance of his work, one must focus on the way that he frames the problems of modern liberalism, and of liberal political philosophy. (This is also why it is difficult to get a sense of Rawls’ importance from reading one of the many textbook introductions to his work, because these discussions tend to focus on the doctrinal elements of the view, which are the least defensible or interesting.)
Because Rawls was an American, in the better sense of the term, he starts out his most important book, A Theory of Justice, by stating, with perfect clarity and in plain English, precisely what he intends to do:
My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In order to do this, we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement.
This is the first and most important paradigm shift in Rawls’ view—but it’s easy to miss, because it’s expressed so simply. Classical 18th century social contract theory, which established the basic principles of liberalism, lacked generality, because it was only a theory about the state. It had nothing to say about the rest of society, other than that these domains should be free from state interference. This became an enormous weakness in the 19th century, with the progress of industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization, because it meant that social contract theory had nothing to say about a very long list of growing social problems, including pretty much anything going on in the economy. This is why liberalism practically died out in the early 20th century—it had abdicated the field when it came to discussing the most pressing issues of the day.
Rawls’ strategy for reviving liberalism was to reconceptualize the social contract in a more abstract way. The familiar story that one finds in Locke or Rousseau, about an initial “state of nature” that people seek to escape by creating a sovereign power, should be considered a metaphor for an initial condition in which individuals are failing to cooperate with one another, and so seek to escape from these collective action problems by creating institutions. Society, from this perspective, should be considered a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” governed by a basic institutional structure, which includes, but is not limited to, the state. Most importantly, the economy—the system of property rights and exchange relations—is a part of this institutional structure.
There are many different ways to organize a system of cooperation. This creates a choice problem that cannot be resolved simply through appeal to the self-interest of participants. We require a set of principles to determine the specific modalities of cooperation. A theory of justice, in Rawls’ sense of the term, is basically just a set of such principles. The major obstacle to reaching agreement is that self-interested individuals will be inclined to make self-serving proposals, which will naturally be rejected by others. The best way to achieve agreement is therefore to neutralize this tendency, by imagining that individuals must choose principles without knowing what position they will eventually occupy in society. A theory of justice, Rawls suggests, should consist of principles that would be endorsed under such a constraint. Plausible candidates include not just the economist’s favorite principle, Pareto efficiency, but also a suitably formulated principle of equality.
This reconceptualization of social contract theory accomplishes several things. First, it offers an enormous demystification of the concept of justice. Rather than viewing these principles as handed down by God, or as grasped through intuitions that we cannot explain or defend, Rawls sees justice arising organically out of our efforts to piece together stable systems of cooperation. This makes our attempts to secure justice part and parcel of the history of the human social world. (To put the point somewhat more philosophically, his normative principles are tied to a specific social ontology.) One can see in the trajectory of human civilization an attempt to create more extensive, more robust systems of cooperation, accompanied by increasingly sophisticated efforts to articulate the principles of justice that structure the more successful of those institutions. Part of what gives Rawls’ view staying power is the fact that this broader picture is so compelling (and the fact that rival views lack any comparable picture).
The other, more obvious, accomplishment in Rawls’ view is that it corrects the greatest weakness of classical liberalism, because its principles apply to all of society and not just the state. As a result, the question of whether the economy should be organized along capitalist or socialist lines, or something in between, becomes something that can be intelligibly debated within a liberal framework. Indeed, the Rawlsian view allows one to pose, and answer, extremely fine-grained questions about the proper role of the state in the economy. Classical liberalism, by contrast, tended to favor laissez-faire capitalism by default, rather than for any affirmative reason, because it lacked a theory of justice that could be applied to the private sector. Thus Rawls’ work inaugurated a “hundred schools of thought” period within Western liberalism, as theorists explored the implications of the view in different domains.
A Theory of Justice attracted a great deal of attention, and a great deal of criticism, when it was published in 1971. At the time, Rawls was still treating questions of political philosophy (such as “what is justice?”) the same way that Plato did—as a set of intellectual puzzles that needed to be solved (such that, once we figure out what justice is, we can proceed to build a society that will embody the ideal). The problem that he immediately encountered was also as old as Plato. Having put forward his most clever argument in support of his favored conception of justice, he found that most people still disagreed, and insisted on defending their own quite different views.
This led to the second big move in Rawls’ work, which took the form of a curve ball that he threw everyone in his second book, Political Liberalism. Most philosophers, when they encounter objections to their arguments, double down on the original method, trying to come up with better arguments, with the hope that this will silence the critics and end all disagreement. Rawls, however, took a different tack. If one were to imagine his response to critics stated conversationally, it would go something like this:
I have given you my preferred conception of justice. You have given me yours. Evidently we disagree. Furthermore, there are people out there who disagree with us both, even more strenuously—consider, for example, orthodox followers of various religious traditions. Perhaps someday, someone will come up with an argument so persuasive that consensus on these questions will be reached. But in the meantime, and despite our disagreements, we are still in a position to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation. In order to establish such a system of cooperation, though, we will require some principles. We might choose to think of these as principles of justice. Naturally, because we are trying to organize a system of cooperation among individuals who disagree about fundamental questions of justice, those principles cannot presuppose the correctness of any one particular view. They must instead be freestanding with respect to all those positions.
Again, with his gift for understatement, Rawls suggested that we refer to a theory that is freestanding in this way as a “political” conception of justice (hence the title of the book). He then suggested that the theory of justice presented in his previous work be considered, not the correct answer to the age-old question “what is justice?”, but rather as a candidate for adoption as a political conception of justice. We can think of it as the theory we should use for now, while we debate the question of what the best theory (in some stronger sense of the term) might be.
Many philosophers found this argument disorienting. Rather than making a move in the familiar game of philosophical argumentation, Rawls was overturning the board, recommending that we play a very different game. Instead of trying to answer the traditional first-order questions about the best form of society, the nature of the good, or the meaning of life, he suggested instead that we focus on a second-order task, of finding principles that would be acceptable to people who disagree with one another about the correct answers to these first-order questions.
This approach provides a very different way of thinking about traditional liberal ideas such as individual rights. I might believe that the best life requires solitary contemplation, while you are committed to unbridled hedonism, and yet despite these differences, we can nevertheless agree that we should each have a bundle of rights that protects our ability to pursue these incompatible visions—not least because they protect us each from interference by the other. Instead of trying to resolve the deeper questions that divide us, Rawls suggested that we focus on the shallowest possible bases of agreement, in order to achieve what he called an “overlapping consensus.”
Seen in this light, it is easy to understand why the recent anti-liberal polemics of “common good conservatives,” like Adrian Vermeule or Patrick Deneen, have been met with a collective yawn from academic philosophers. After Rawls, it is impossible to see these views as any sort of a challenge to liberalism, because they make no effort to think politically about questions of justice. These theorists are still playing the old game, seemingly oblivious to how Rawls changed the terms of the discussion. And so the liberal response to these theorists, to the extent that one is required, would be something like this:
Congratulations, you have done a great job articulating your preferred conception of the good life! Your next step should be to persuade all of your fellow Christians of the correctness of Catholic doctrine on these points, after which you should get to work on persuading all of the atheists, Muslims, Hindus, etc. Once you have achieved consensus then we can start to build this ideal society. But in the meantime, we are going to need some principles to govern our institutions, since there are many opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation among individuals who disagree about such questions. If you feel that you have something to contribute to this conversation, which is what the rest of us have been talking about, please don’t be shy.
Rawls, it should be noted, did not rule out the possibility that someday a moral genius might come along, able to articulate a vision of the good life so compelling that all of humanity would unite under the same banner. He grounded his commitment to political liberalism in what he called the “fact of pluralism,” in order to emphasize that reasonable disagreement about questions of the good life is, first and foremost, an empirical feature of the world that we live in, not a necessary one. At the same time, he did not think that this state of affairs was likely to change. He claimed rather that the exercise of human reason, under conditions of freedom and equality, would tend to produce more, not less, disagreement about the nature of the good life.
In other words, people of good will, confronted with the deeper questions of human existence, have a tendency to come up with different answers, without anyone necessarily making any errors of reasoning or judgment. The more freedom people have to consider and debate these questions, the greater the variety of answers they are likely to produce. Because of this, value pluralism should not be considered a passing phase, but rather the permanent condition of liberal democratic societies. The important point is that this sort of pluralism need not be a conversation-stopper when it comes to thinking about justice. A central objective of the liberal tradition, throughout its entire history, has been to find principles that can be defended without presupposing the correctness of any particular set of values.
These insights serve to explain why so many contemporary philosophers see the history of liberalism as divided between a pre- and post-Rawls era. Rawls is important not for the specific doctrines that he proposed, but rather for the general approach that he adopted toward the political questions facing modern societies. Of course, the revolution in liberal philosophy that he carried out brought its own difficulties. For example, unlike classical liberalism, modern liberalism is much more ambiguous in its understanding of both constitutional law and individual rights. Nor does it offer any easy answers to traditional questions about the role of electoral democracy in a liberal society. It cannot easily be extended to deal with questions of international law and global justice. Its application to minority rights, race relations, and family organization is contested. All of these weaknesses and ambiguities have elicited volumes of commentary and debate, which has been keeping political theorists busy for decades.
There is of course some irony in the fact that the great efflorescence of illiberalism that has been occurring in Western societies, contaminating both the left and the right, has been occurring at a time when liberal ideas enjoy unparallelled hegemony within the higher reaches of the academy. Although there has been some inclination to blame universities for corrupting the young, most of us who teach first-year courses will have observed that students are coming to us with already well-formed illiberal ideas, which we must challenge them to reconsider. I find myself now spending an entire lecture walking them through Rawls’ concept of “reasonable disagreement,” a topic that with previous generations merited no more than a five-minute summary.
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Similarly, there is a real problem with human resources staff running amok at many universities, my own included, but it’s not because they’ve been listening to our lectures! Because if they listened to what we are teaching, they would discover that we’ve all been spending an inordinate amount of time obsessing over the seemingly milquetoast but curiously persuasive liberalism of John Rawls.
Joseph Heath is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto and writes the Substack In Due Course.
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1For those who are interested in the details: Rawls claims that if individuals were forced to choose principles of justice for society not knowing which social position they would wind up occupying (i.e. behind a “veil of ignorance”), they would select the arrangement that maximizes benefit to the worst-off person (i.e. the “difference principle”). Critics were quick to point out that, if these individuals engaged in ordinary probabilistic reasoning, they would choose instead the arrangement that maximizes average benefit. They would only choose the difference principle if they were unusually risk-averse or paranoid (i.e. if they expected to have their eventual position determined by their worst enemy).
C. Thi Nguyen is a philosophy professor at the University of Utah. His latest book is The Score: How to Stop Playing Someone Else’s Game.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and C. Thi Nguyen discuss why metrics both help and harm institutional decision-making, how game design principles can improve classroom learning, and whether some aspects of human life are inherently unmeasurable.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Tim Scanlon, the moral philosopher who’s been on this podcast in the past, really hates debate because he thinks it’s antithetical to philosophy. I wasn’t meaning to start there at all, but it occurs to me that perhaps the way genuine intellectual disagreement and argument relates to the codified form of debate is actually what your book is about.
You’ve been thinking a lot about the role of metrics in the world. There’s a simple argument for metrics and a simple argument against metrics. After having reflected on your work, I’ve come to perhaps the obvious conclusion that both of those are too simple.
We need some metrics in order to be able to have productive processes, to be relatively efficient, to make sure that we actually are achieving something. When you’re trying to bake bread for your neighborhood, whether at the end of this process you have two loaves of bread and most people starve or a hundred loaves of bread and most people can have breakfast makes an obvious difference.
On the other hand, there are all of these different areas in which the metrics we use end up either misdirecting our productive processes or robbing us of the joy that activity should actually entail. In the most straightforward form, in some forms of central planning, you might end up with 100 loaves of bread, but they’re actually inedible. That’s not well captured in the metrics. As long as the 100 loaves of bread come out of the oven, it doesn’t matter that nobody will actually be able to eat them.
In a broader sense, you talk a lot in your work about how you got into philosophy because you love ideas, and then you got caught up in the system of rating research journals and rating philosophy departments. You found yourself trying to do the kind of work that’s going to be prized by those journals and by those departments, even if that’s more narrow than the things you’re actually interested in.
Obviously there’s a controversy around teaching at the middle and high school level. We want to make sure that people learn to read and do math, but if you have overly narrow metrics for them, it might actually teach to the test and not to the real skill that we’re trying to make sure they learn.
So how do we think about this paradox of metrics where we clearly need them? But the moment we adapt to them, there’s this huge danger that we get caught up in being misdirected in our productive efforts or in just losing the joy of what made us engage in philosophy or rock climbing or any number of activities in the first place.
Thi Nguyen: That’s a great place to start. I think you’re right. There are two fantasies that people have when they approach metrics. One fantasy is that the metric captures everything that’s important and we just need to optimize for it. The other fantasy is one that I had lived in in the past, which is that these things are just wholly terrible. They’re evil. They miss everything that’s important. We should just get rid of them and enter some kind of non-metricized utopia.
What I’ve come to think is not only do metrics have a very powerful function and a very powerful cost, but those are inextricably connected. Their good functioning is related to their cost. I started this in part because I was the liaison officer for my philosophy department in which I had to report learning outcomes. It’s very hard to report what you actually care about in philosophy. There’s not a lot of good standardized tests that are accessible and understandable and obviously legible.
Mounk: That’s true at two levels, by the way. What you might really care about is some understanding of deep issues in the world. That’s why philosophers are in the game. Even if you have a relatively utilitarian understanding of what the purpose of studying philosophy as an undergrad is, the purpose is that you become a really logical thinker who spots flaws in arguments and processes. Philosophers actually do end up doing very well if they go into all kinds of traditional areas of business because they have that skill set. Measuring the first thing is impossible, but even measuring that is really, really hard, right?
Nguyen: Yes. I remember one time I was running through this with a bunch of students in a tech ethics class and we were talking about the metrics that were actually being used in the university. They were like graduation speed and grade point average. I think around the time that I pointed out that my incentives were to get better student evaluations and to make my students’ grades go up—which I could just do by making the test easier—one of my students raised their hand and they were like, “So I thought the original problem that we were starting on is that university metrics didn’t capture subtler issues of virtue and community, but now it turns out they don’t even capture learning skills.”
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I think when you start to worry about this stuff, there’s one standard response: these are bad metrics, this particular batch of metrics, but we should just find better metrics. We need to do more refined work to find better metrics. I had this suspicion, and a lot of this book comes from trying to chase down the suspicion, that there were some areas of human life that did not metricize well or are inherently unable to be measured at institutional scale.
I want to point out one thing here. There are two different questions. One is the question of whether some part of life is essentially unquantifiable or essentially untrackable by a very subtle and sensitive science. That’s not the question that I’m really interested in. I’m interested in what the typical measures are that will rise to the top of the attention of a large scale institution.
Mounk: Explain to us, what is the specific thing that metrics should be doing and what is the universe of things that they shouldn’t be trying to do?
Nguyen: I think one of the clearest formulations I got was from the historian of quantification, Theodore Porter. This is the first moment where I felt like I was actually on the track of understanding what was going on.
He puts it this way—he was interested in why there’s this historical tendency of politicians and bureaucrats and administrators to reach for quantitative justification compulsively, even when the metrics were known to be bad. His explanation was something like this: there are two ways of knowing about the world, qualitative and quantitative. They’re good at different things. The problem comes from reaching compulsively for one, even when it’s inappropriate.
Qualitative reasoning is rich and subtle and context sensitive, but it travels badly between people from different contexts because it requires a huge amount of shared context and shared background to understand. Standard example: I’m a professor, I write student evaluations. They’re long written paragraphs that address multiple dimensions and use the language of philosophy and the language of intellectual virtue or whatever to talk about what’s going on in the student essay.
These evaluations won’t be easily comprehensible by distant people, by people in the business school and the CS department, and their evaluations won’t be comprehensible to me. Crucially, they won’t aggregate well, specifically because they’re so multi-dimensional. Each person writing qualitative evaluation is able to quickly on the fly decide what are the dimensions that matter. Do I want to talk about rigor or creativity or care or expressiveness? We don’t have to settle on the same one. So they don’t aggregate. This will be useless to someone in HR that has to hire a student if they’re confronted with every resume with 5,000 written evaluations.
So what Porter says is, quantitative numbers in an institution are designed to combat these problems on multiple fronts. The way they combat them is by pre-designing a shared stable context-invariant kernel—some chunk that is understood approximately the same across the institution or across the world, and we stabilize it. To make it easily comprehensible across many contexts, we have to make it very thin.
Again, I think the obvious example is letter grades. Everyone agrees what an A means, a B means, a C means, approximately. So we can all collect information into the same bucket and it aggregates instantly. Porter’s insight here is that the very thing that makes metrics socially powerful is the design process that removes context and nuance—the thing that makes it travel. He calls this the portability theory.
Mounk: There’s a trade-off between the portability and the richness of detail and capturing. The more you capture, the less portable it is and the less legible it is. So you’re always going to be choosing between those two constraints.
Nguyen: Right, there’s two dimensions under that. One is the less shared context we need, the easier it is to travel, and the other is the more freedom people have to reinterpret an evaluation and decide in the moment what matters, the less it’ll be able to aggregate. So you eliminate both of those. We prefix the dimensions of evaluation and we remove enough nuance to make it travel. This is called the portability theory.
He has this beautiful moment, I think you in particular would like this, where he says something like, “information is a specific thing, a way, a kind of human understanding that’s been prepared to travel to distant strangers and be understood in different contexts”. I find that so profound, and I think that stabs right at the heart of this inescapable tension. The reason metrics have social power is that they’re de-nuanced and that’s not something that we can hope to get around.
Instead, we should expect that there’s this constant trade-off and the things that are most legible at scale will be the least nuanced and we’re gonna have to use those to interact with each other. But also, we have to be constantly aware that they’ve achieved that kind of social centrality precisely because they’re de-nuancing. Then it becomes hard because that’s exactly the terms that everyone can understand instantly. Again, as Porter points out, that was the design goal. We achieved the design goal.
Mounk: Then we understand what the designer is meaning to achieve and also what it leaves out and we can try and compensate for what is lost in other ways.
I have two thoughts that come out of the really rich things you’ve been saying. The first is that you can sometimes see people who hate the idea of metrics by and large, who have adopted systems of information sharing that explicitly don’t rely on metrics fall back into the logic of metrics because of the inherent need for it for those information flows.
I’m thinking here of the fact that there is a kind of codified language in recommendation letters for graduate programs in the United States. Truth be told, I don’t know that codified language well enough, which is probably a problem for my students. But you write a rich letter of recommendation where you explain what’s so great about the student and why they could grow up to be an amazing scholar. And then in the last line, you’re supposed to say, “I recommend this student to you,” “I strongly recommend the student to you,” “I enthusiastically recommend this student to you.”
Basically, we’ve adopted this implicit set of norms where that modifier used there—whether you leave it out, or we say strongly, or we say enthusiastically, or unreservedly, or adamantly, I don’t know what the damn adjectives are—actually has become a metric. That word is actually what carries the most important information. We’re pretending that we’re engaged in this deep act of qualitative description. Actually the thing that matters is the one thing that is basically a secret code for one, two, three, or four, or five. That’s basically just a code for a number that you’re expressing, which is how exceptional or non-exceptional is this student?
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The other thing that I was thinking about is that there’s a basic problem in democratic theory, which is that you need rules and you need a constitution and you also need norms. Some people say—I had a student who argued this once—”Well, if we need all of these norms for the system to survive, if people have to refrain from playing constitutional hardball of various kinds, everything breaks down. Why don’t we just formalize all of these rules?” But that’s just never going to work. There is just not a way to formalize all of the rules. Some norms are going to stay norms without being able to be hardened into rules in that kind of way. There seems to be an analog here where you can probably improve metrics in various ways. There’s definitely better metrics and worse metrics. Some metrics are terribly designed and some metrics are pretty well designed. But we can never fully get around the metrics and the metrics are always going to lose something about the world.
Nguyen: These are two incredibly different and incredibly important questions. Let’s talk about your letter of recommendation example, which is so good first, because I think that’s simpler. The second thing is something I really want to talk to you about, because this is to me the most interesting thing that thinking about this stuff has thrown up about explicit rules.
But let’s go back to your letter. I think it’s such a good example. At first it’s a good example because it shows the twin needs. So we have one need for richness and complexity and the other need for clear, simple things that cross cut and just cut through complexity. This is not an accident. This is the basic nature of communication between limited beings. We want richness, but we also have so little time.
I think this is also a feature. I’ve been talking just about the metric side, but when you think about—since I think so much about scoring systems and games and rankings—one of the things we know is how incredibly motivating clear and simple numbers are as scores and goals. It is much easier to motivate yourself to run if you have a number that you’re trying to hit and you’re trying to make that number go up each time.
But the thing that I’m constantly worried about is—in the running case, I’m worried about just making that number go up forever without stepping back to wonder if that’s the right proxy. I think it’s very good for some people to do that for a while and then reflect: is this still the right target?
There’s something similar that happens with a letter of recommendation. I think there are two different ways to react to the case you have. One way is to treat it as just the right thing. We both have clear, simple communication and we have a rich context and both are accessible. When I do admissions, a lot of the times we use the simple language to do the really first rough pass. Then when we actually have to make decisions, we ignore that and we look at the text and we’re like, okay, what we’re looking for is someone that has these qualities.
So the letter of recommendation system you’re talking about makes both kinds of information available. But in some contexts, you can also imagine institutions that are just gonna isolate the simplified information and pull that out of context. I think a really easy way to see this happening is Rotten Tomatoes. A lot of times you get a movie review that is rich and detailed and complicated. They put the number rating at the bottom, because they don’t want you to look at the top and be like, “It’s this.” They want you to read the text and then see the approximation.
Mounk: It aggregates all of the reviews and it aggregates it by translating a rich 1,500 word review saying this was good, but I was disappointed with that, et cetera. And it just decides, is it good or is it bad?
Nguyen: I think there’s so many different ways of interacting with the systems and some systems make it really easy and make the qualitative stuff really prominent and the balance between them prominent and other systems are really good at extracting the quantitative and suppressing the other rich information and that kind of informational ecosystem is what’s really important.
It’s like what we try to do but also sometimes when you have both you have a choice but sometimes this system has done the pre-filtering for you and the rich qualitative information is very inaccessible. Then that system encourages engaging only with the thin number.
Mounk: That’s very interesting. How should we think about both what makes for a good rather than bad metric and what makes for a system in which the metric has an appropriate role versus a system in which the metric is given too little role or too much role?
Nguyen: That’s a superb question. So it seems really doubtful that any metric is good or bad across the board. It’s highly contextual. Here’s one of my favorite examples. I think a lot of us know that BMI, Body Mass Index, is a terrible way to manage your health if people just try to make their BMI go down.
But that’s not what BMI was built for. BMI was built as a large-scale public health measure that was like a kind of litmus test. If across an entire nation, BMI suddenly jumps five points suddenly, we know that something has happened.
Mounk: Or if it goes down a lot, which is not the problem today in the United States. If BMI suddenly craters, well, perhaps we’ve just discovered GLP-1, but most likely it’s because there’s a famine going on. So it’s really useful at that level.
Nguyen: Exactly. As used in the context of knowing exactly the degree to which it’s a rough measure that’s just a start to an investigation that’s supposed to be the first alarm bell for people to go looking to see if anything’s actually going on, there is no problem. Shifted to another context where people treat it as just the all-important goal that expresses a singular person’s health, terrible measure.
One way to think about what metrics are doing is that they are giving us objectivity for a very specific sense of objectivity. This is the case where we’re really close to thinking about the law. There are lots of senses of the term objective, but one sense of the term objective is that something is repeatable across multiple actors. This is usually, I think, the standard in the law. So a theater reporter calls this legal objectivity. We want different people looking at the same case to apply the same rule the same way.
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A standard example for me is what we actually care about in a lot of cases is intellectual and emotional maturity, but that doesn’t have legal objectivity. Eighteen years of age does have legal objectivity, so even if that’s imprecise, we use that.
I think a really common worry you hear right now is that metrics are deeply biased, and that’s true some of the time, but other times I think the deeper problem happens when the metric is perfectly objective but only tracks easily countable features.
A lot of the time, public health thinking concentrates on lifespan and mortality rate and doesn’t put into the equation things like happiness, community and tradition. I’m thinking about everything from decisions during COVID to recommendations about whether you should eat high-fat cheeses.
Again, it’s not to say that those numbers are false—and it’s not like it’s unimportant. But there’s this large-scale systematic biasing where public attention gets shifted toward the things that are very easy to count in a legally objective manner.
Mounk: That’s a great distinction. I recently had Atul Gawande on the podcast, and he was talking about a very similar topic, which is that we are great at extending the lifespan by a few months at the end of people’s lives. But, first, most healthcare spending is on those few months of life. Second, the quality of life that people have in that time tends to be terrible. They are constantly in the hospital, and they are in significant pain. You are drawing out the process of dying, often much longer than patients would want it to be.
That is downstream from the fact that the metric of “is this patient alive?” or “is this patient dead?” is pretty easy to measure, despite some hard cases. The metric of “was it a good death or a bad death?” is much harder. On the whole, did life go better for living those extra eight weeks in pain, half-conscious in the hospital, or not? That is incredibly difficult to assess.
That is a very important consideration. Now, I want to think through a hierarchy of complaints about this. One quick thought about discrimination is that criticism often measures against a baseline of perfection rather than a baseline of available alternatives. I know that is what you had in mind, but there is a line of criticism of the SATs for admissions. I did not do standardized tests growing up. It is not part of European educational culture, so I find them slightly bewildering. All of the studies indicate that, yes, SATs are somewhat discriminatory against certain ethnic groups and certain sociocultural or socioeconomic backgrounds, but they are far less discriminatory than the alternatives.
Those alternatives include things like personal statements, for which you can now have an AI model do the work, or you can pay for the most expensive tutor, and which rely on having parents with the money to send you volunteering in Paraguay so you can generate a compelling story. The question is not whether they are biased in all kinds of ways. The question is whether they are more or less biased than the alternative we are going to get. To criticize them without that comparison is simplistic.
What I actually want to get at is a hierarchy of failure modes of metrics. The first failure mode is the stark one that is incredibly important in politics and economics: measuring how many screws come off the assembly line without measuring whether they are usable screws. That is how the Soviet economy went bust. That is important, but relatively obvious.
The second failure mode involves unintended consequences that are more subtle. One of my critiques of the American grading system, coupled with grade inflation, is that it makes students incredibly risk-averse. In a system where a really good grade pulls up your GPA and a really bad grade pulls it down, you can afford to take some classes where you might underperform because you can also take classes where you overperform. Your overall GPA is not affected that much. But in a system where good students get an A in every course and one C-minus completely wrecks your GPA, you cannot afford to take that course. Nobody intended grade inflation to make it riskier to take hard courses, but that is the impact. That is a more subtle failure mode, but still relatively obvious.
What is really interesting about your work is a third kind of failure mode. The moment there is a metric, it changes the nature of the activity. Liberating ourselves from the metric can make us rediscover the beauty of the activity itself. The example you give is your attitude toward rock climbing and how that changed over time. Perhaps you can talk us through that.
Nguyen: You have your finger right on, I think, the kind of philosophical tension that I find incredibly rich here. Let me first say that you had a question a while back that I did not give an answer to, which is what metrics are systematically good at and systematically bad at. A general characterization we can give is that large-scale metrics are systematically bad. There are two claims. One is that when the demand is that they are highly usable at scale and highly public, they systemically eliminate high-expertise and high-skill judgment. The other is that, given that they have to be applied in a stable way, they are systematically bad at highly variable phenomena.
The philosopher Elizabeth Barnes has this great case. I talk about her in the book. One of the things she says is that health is the kind of thing that we are systematically not going to be able to measure. Her argument does not go via expertise. What her argument goes via is that health is interest-relative. What counts as a healthy knee for an Olympian who needs four years of maximum performance versus someone who wants to walk pain-free for their life are different notions of health, because they are indexed to different interests. That is another whole category of things that metrics are systematically hard to capture.
You asked about climbing, and this is really central for me. Part of the reason I wrote this book was that I ran into a puzzle that I did not know if anyone else was interested in, but I could not stop thinking about. I had written a bunch of stuff about games, and I had written that stuff because I had gotten frustrated with attempts to praise games as a kind of cinema, where all people talked about were the cutscenes, the dialogue, and the graphics. They did not talk about freedom or the quality of action. I really wanted to talk about how it felt, how rich the decisions were, and how interesting the decisions were.
One of the most interesting things I found was this moment from the great German board game designer Reiner Knizia, where he says, “The most important part of my game designer toolbox is the scoring system, because it sets the player’s desires.” I was a game player, and I thought that was exactly right. I was also a philosopher, and I thought, my God, that is so true and so deep, and so weird to put that so starkly.
What a game designer is doing is describing an alternate self with alternate desires and alternate abilities. You open up a rulebook, and it is like, okay, I am collecting sheep, or okay, I am killing my opponent, and you just want it.
Mounk: It is, in a way, a way of exploring a form of agency. What is it like to be somebody facing these constraints and having these goals? That is not what most people think when they start to play Settlers of Catan. But you are experiencing that modality of agency as you play Settlers of Catan. That is your argument, to be clear. I am echoing.
Nguyen: Yes. The way I ended up putting it was that the medium the game designer works in, as an artist, is the medium of agency itself. They are giving you different action abilities and different desires. This may be a too-geeky philosophy-of-art way to put it, but that is what I think is going on.
One of my favorite examples comes from the fact that I rock climb, but I also paint. I was thinking about how, when I am at the bottom of a cliff and I look up at it, my practical experience of the challenges of that cliff changes completely depending on whether my goal is to climb it or to paint it. Those goals completely change my relationship to all the parts of the cliff.
So half of what I had written was about how scoring systems are an essential part of this agency-bending, freeing, liberating practice of play. The other half was about exactly what you were talking about, and what we have been talking about so far: how metrics, as a kind of scoring system, narrow and sharpen our values down to a nub and make us unfree.
Mounk: There is a puzzle here. Why is it that, in one context, scores are what allow us to experience the joy of playing a game, and even deep forms of agency of different kinds, on your philosophical gloss, while in another context the KPIs your boss wants you to follow, even if you think they are stupid, are what make you feel so radically unfree in your job? Or why is it that the imperative to chase a high GPA to get a good job is what means that you do not take true pleasure in the process of your education?
Nguyen: Thinking about it that way really pressed on me is that for a long time I had the theory that scoring systems and institutions were bad because they were hyper-explicit, because instead of allowing room for discretion, we had written down exactly the application conditions. Then it took me about a year to realize that games are a precise counterexample. What enables the flexibility of plunging into alternate agencies in games is exactly that there are scoring systems that are hyper-explicit, that tell you exactly what you get points for. That is what makes it so easy to flow into them.
So I started thinking about my experience with rock climbing. Rock climbing is the thing that saved my soul during graduate school. I was burning out and depressed and working all the time when I started rock climbing. The interesting thing about rock climbing for me is that until I started, I was a very anti-physical person. I was against it. I thought it was dumb. I thought exercise was basically something you did to burn calories to lose weight. That was idiotic, but that is what I thought.
Rock climbing tuned me into something else, and it did so because of the scoring system. It told me to climb harder climbs inside a ranking system. Every rock climb has a community-established difficulty rating, and the internal scoring system is to climb harder routes. Interestingly, to climb harder routes I had to learn how to control and perceive my body. Over the course of that, I learned that movement was beautiful, and that subtle movement was incredibly beautiful, often in a way very similar to the beauty I found in philosophy, this kind of fine-grained subtlety, but also really different. I got that because of the rock-climbing scoring system.
After about five years, that scoring system stopped being useful to me, partially because I am just a mediocre climber with poor athletic ability. When I plateaued, the scoring system was good as long as I could keep improving. But at another stage of my life, as a parent and academic who is not that athletic, it started to destroy the joy of climbing to stay within the same scoring system. So I created an alternate goal set for myself. I started aiming to climb moderate routes as elegantly as I could, and I found again what I loved.
I think this is a microcosm of the complexity of scoring systems. They can profoundly help us by cluing us into an activity. One of the things that helped me understand this most was a book by Tal Brewer called The Retrieval of Ethics. He is a neo-Aristotelian ethicist. The Retrieval of Ethics is about how subtle the value of activities is, how easy it is to miss from the outside what matters, and how the only way to discover it is by doing the activity.
What you do, he argues, is go through a process of performing a rough and inept version of the activity, guided by a simple description. That helps you see more of what it is about. You then revise your sense of what is valuable and how to guide yourself, do it again, and arrive at something more refined. This happens in climbing, in philosophy, in cooking. Over time, you come to see the subtle value. But you need a blunt, simple version at first.
One of the upsides of clear scoring systems is that they are good starting conditions. They get us into the activity. But they are also inflexible and blunt. If you get stuck in a scoring system, you can lose sight of what matters. In that sense, they are similar to metrics. They are useful, clear, blunt, accessible systems. They get us into things quickly and are easy to communicate. But if you treat them inflexibly and get stuck in them, that is when the problems begin to accrue.
Mounk: Earlier we were talking about social problems, problems of incentivizing the right actions, of social allocation, and so on. Now it feels like the exact same tension is emerging from the perspective of engaging in an activity like rock climbing, cooking, knitting, or whatever it is that you have a passion for.
The poles of a complete absence of metrics and the tyranny of metrics end up being similarly undermining. If you have no metric at all and the bakery only produces two loaves of bread, that is not great. If you have the wrong metric and produce a hundred loaves of bread that are inedible, that is bad as well. In the same way, if you start weightlifting for the first time, as I did about nine or ten months ago, and you just lift a little bit every day, you do not get the joy of it. Part of the joy is seeing the progression you are making, pushing yourself. It is very hard to push yourself unless you keep some track of what your weight was ten days ago and whether you can add a few extra reps or jump up ten or twenty pounds for a session. You need the metric in order to experience joy.
But if you become obsessed with the metric when you are no longer progressing, and you are frustrated and no longer enjoying the activity, you also go wrong. You speak movingly about the beauty of climbing as being in tune with movement and elegance. If you forget that what you love is the elegance of movement and focus only on getting up the route, you lose something essential. So you need to cultivate a complex relationship to metrics.
I was also thinking about two archetypes. One is the striver student, whom you and I have taught many times. When I was a graduate student teaching for the first time, I met with my students at the beginning of term to get a sense of who they were. I asked one student how the term was going, and they said, not very well, I feel like I am falling behind on extracurriculars. That was different from the attitude at my university when I was an undergraduate. We did a lot of theater because we enjoyed it. There was no sense of CV building. It may be that doing theater helped people later in their careers, but that was not the mindset.
When I got to Harvard for my PhD, that was very much the mindset of the students. Everything had to count. The sad thing is that they probably did love theater or whatever they were doing, but they were no longer doing it for that reason. They were doing it to fill a line on a CV, and that changed their relationship to the activity. I am sure it robbed them of some of the joy.
On the other hand, we all know the smart, talented person who has no goals. Maybe they come from a rich background, maybe they are just drifting. They play all the time, live in the moment, and then twenty years later they are no longer playing. They are stuck. A complete lack of any attempt to achieve in a measurable, regimented way does not usually produce a flourishing creative spirit in midlife. It often produces someone stuck with the psychology of a sixteen-year-old but the constraints of an adult.
So there is something interesting here. The more obvious points we were making about social systems also apply at the individual level. If I want to enjoy rock climbing, cooking, weightlifting, knitting, or whatever it is, I do want a metric, but I do not want the metric to override why I do the activity in the first place. It is a complicated thing, not to solve, because I do not think it is solvable, but to navigate.
Nguyen: I think we are surfing scoring systems. What you are really talking about, and you put it beautifully, is our complex relationship with clarity and with very intensely clarified expressions. It is another rendition of exactly what we were talking about with letters of recommendation. This is why games are so fascinating to me, not just as a player, but as a philosopher who thinks about human agency and reason.
A lot of this started because, in two different places, I saw the same distinction. When I was in graduate school, my advisor, Barbara Herman, a Kantian ethicist, once said in a graduate seminar, after I said something, “You’re failing to distinguish between a goal and a purpose.” I replied that those were just the same word. She said, “No. When you have your friends over for a night of cards, the goal is to win, and the purpose is to have fun.” You know, deeply, that unless you are a very strange person, if you lose but had a great time in that context, it was a good evening. It was not a wasted evening.
That distinction is extremely important, and games illuminate something fascinating about us. Our purpose is often to have fun, or to relax, but the only way to get there is by hyper-focusing on a goal. I climb to clear my head, and I cannot clear my head by trying to clear my head. I clear my head by climbing. The same is true of fishing. One reason I fish is that staring intensely at the surface of the water, searching for rising trout, creates a meditative stance that I cannot reach directly.
We need very clear goals to get us into mental states we cannot otherwise approach. What games are, in a sense, are pre-packaged mental states. They say, “Do this,” and suddenly you are hyper-focused on balance. “Do this,” and suddenly you are focused on complex logical interplay, or geometric patterns in chess. They are pre-packaged.
That pre-packaged nature is both the strength and the weakness. The strength is that someone else has sculpted it, and we can just take it up. It is described so precisely. The weakness is that someone else made it.
This is the heart of the difference between games and metrics. I thought about this for years before arriving at an answer that finally satisfied me, and it is simple. You cannot easily change metrics. You can easily change games. If you do not like a particular game or scoring system, you can switch to another one, modify it, or house-rule it. Nothing in the social structure of games forces you to play Dungeons and Dragons or forces you to do CrossFit. There is an ecosystem of variation.
This is the most philosophical point for me. If I am playing Mario and I am not very good at it, and I play normally, while you are excellent and speed-run it, I might get 100 points and you get 10. If we ask how to compare those points, the answer is that we do not need to. There is no structural demand for cross-comparison in games.
That is the crucial difference with metrics. The power of metrics is that they enable cross-cutting, stabilized social interaction. To perform that function, they cannot be modified, detached, splintered, or house-ruled. If you do that, they lose their function.
Mounk: It’s interesting. That rings true to me. I was thinking of an example that explains why it rings true, or at least illustrates one way in which it rings true. Often, people start doing something as a hobby. They are good at it and they love it. It is one of the things that gives them the most joy in life. Then, because they are good at it, they realize they can monetize it in some way.
They can make a living off it, and at first they are excited. The thing they most love can become the thing they spend their waking hours doing. They can turn it into a job, and what could be better than that? You are an amateur musician and suddenly you realize you can live off doing music. Or you are really good at video games and suddenly it turns out that if you stream video games, you can make enough money to have a comfortable living. You are ecstatic.
In the process, though, you often encounter people who say that for the first two years they were happy, and then after five or ten years they start saying, “I’ve lost the joy in it.” One way of putting it is that it is no longer a hobby, it is a job. But I think the reason is that this distinction has been lost. Earlier, winning was the goal, but the purpose was to have fun. Now the purpose is to make an income.
So you have to win, because if you do not win, people stop watching your stream. You have shifted the nature of the activity in the process. When I think about some of the things I most enjoy doing, they are things that may have a professional character, but where it does not feel like that shift in metrics has happened. I need to finance running the podcast, but it is not my source of income. So for me, it is like this. I want people to listen to the conversation, and I am proud that we have built a good audience. Ultimately, though, what I care about is that I get an excuse to call you up and say, come have an interesting conversation with me for an hour and a half.
Nguyen: This is deeply true. I love the example of doing it for a living. I had been thinking of different examples, but that is a perfect one. There are two ways it hits. First, in a given game, we do not simply give ourselves over entirely to the local goal. We modulate it. When you are playing with friends, if you are too little competitive, the game is not fun. If you are too hyper-competitive, it is not fun either. When you know what the purpose is, you can regulate your relationship to the goal rather than follow it all the way out. There are gaming contexts where, to have the most fun, you need to be brutal, because that is what the game is designed to demand. There are other games where, if you go all out, you wreck the experience. You can modulate your experience depending on the game.
The second point, which is the really interesting one in the context of jobs, is that we often modulate the goal itself. When we are playing games, because we are not locked into a particular one, we can change the goal as we go. This happens a lot in fishing. Sometimes I fish for easy fish. Sometimes I fish to catch a lot of fish. Sometimes I go fishing to try to catch one big fish. I can modulate the goal depending on my mood, the environment, or what feels fun that day. That is possible because the goal is not linked to something downstream.
Once it becomes a job, you are locked in. You cannot modify the goal or tailor it to yourself. There is a deep sense in which what makes games distinctive lies in the broader ecosystem of play. This is a nineteenth-century insight about aesthetics. Kant argues that aesthetics is the realm where we are free to think about things differently because we are not locked into a practical purpose. Play is the space where we can reconceive what we are doing.
There is a related distinction from R.G. Collingwood, the philosopher of art, between art and craft. Craft is when we know exactly what we are trying to do in advance. We know the specifications and the ingredients, and we are locked into a procedure. Art is when you discover what you are trying to do as you are doing it, and discover what you are thinking as you go. That is exactly what you are pointing to. When you can no longer play with the goal, you can no longer reconfigure the activity.
What you often see in people who manage to sustain an activity over a long period of time is that they change how they do it, so that it tracks their changing selves and their changing sense of what matters.
Mounk: One of the things that really struck me is a student who, I think, watched one of your videos. I do not think it was a student of yours. She realized, in a very typical story, that she was a high-achieving student who worked really hard and was successful at gaming all of the metrics that life threw at her, and that she was unhappy because that was not what she actually wanted to do.
I think she wrote on the background of her phone something like, “Is this the game you want to be playing?” It is a kind of self-admonition, a reminder to always ask that question. It is not a simplistic version of this idea, which is very popular, that says, “Stop playing the game. Reject all the metrics. Just go hang out with your friends on a beach.” That is not the question she is asking.
What she is saying is more interesting. Life is going to consist of playing games, not just fun games on a game night with friends, but games like wanting to achieve at some endeavor. I want to become a professional philosopher, and that will involve publishing in certain places and jumping through a certain number of hoops. Even if it is inevitable that you will have to play certain kinds of games in life, you need to make sure that you do not get so caught up in a particular game and its rules that you end up doing an activity you do not actually want to be doing. So the right move is not to stop playing games. It is to keep reflecting on whether you are still playing the game that you actually want to be playing.
Nguyen: I think one of the reasons the games framing has turned out to be powerful for a lot of people is that, in our hearts, we know that games are voluntary and involve some degree of choice. Framing activities as games highlights that feature. One response to a lot of this material is, “Look, I just can’t. There are metrics. They’re connected to money. I can’t help it. I’ve got to do the thing.” Sometimes that is true. Some incentive systems are unavoidable, at least for practical reasons.
But I think that, a lot of the time, we have more degrees of freedom than we realize, and we forget that. This framing is a reminder that even if you do not have total freedom in the practical world, you usually have some. And you should not give that up accidentally.
Those degrees of freedom can take different forms. Sometimes it is changing the way you do your work. Sometimes it is making a decision about which work you want to be involved in. Sometimes it is changing the degree to which you hold a goal in your heart.
I am an academic. I will always have to report my citation rates and publication rankings to administrators. Those numbers have to pass through me. But I still have a choice about whether I treat them as mere informational signals, or as something I hold in my soul, or even something I ironize, laugh at, or occasionally try to tank just to see. There are degrees of freedom we can exert.
Mounk: I have been trying to think through what some of my economist friends might say in response to this conversation. This applies more at the institutional level than at the individual level. When I go back to the simple example of a bakery, they would say, “We actually have a great system for that, and it is the price system. It is supply and demand.”
If your purpose is to make sure people are well fed, then as a bakery you can say, “We offer really cheap products. They are not amazing, but they are fine and healthy.” You can turn a profit that way. You set your price low and a lot of people buy it. If you want to create the best croissant in the Île-de-France, you price it much higher. Fewer people buy it and you produce fewer croissants, but you can still make a profit because of the higher price.
Economists would claim that this is actually the richest system of incentives we have, and the best way of balancing competing objectives. It is a very straightforward system that we use every day in social life without thinking much about it. You can get a dollar cup of coffee at Dunkin’ Donuts, or you can go to a third-wave or boutique coffee shop, maybe a fourth-wave coffee shop now, and pay eight dollars and fifty cents for a coffee. Those are two very different kinds of coffee, and they allow the people producing them to engage in different forms of agency and different ways of interacting with the world, while still making an income. So how do you think about the price system, and the system of supply and demand, in relation to all of this?
Nguyen: I have an answer to this that I really want to try out on you, because I am not an economist. You know so much more about economics than me, so let me see what you think about this. Actually, let me back up a little bit and take a running start, because I just made a connection I have never made before because of the way you answered this.
One of the first places I started thinking about this was with transparency metrics, and I was really struggling to understand them. I was reading Onora O’Neill’s lectures on trust, and she has this great line where she says that people think transparency increases trust, but it actually decreases trust, because transparency asks experts to explain themselves to non-experts, and they cannot. So they have to make things up, and that becomes deceptive.
I think even worse than that, public transparency works by setting targets that are comprehensible to everybody, which is great because you cannot hide bias and corruption. But it is also terrible insofar as the actually important things in some spaces require a lot of expertise to see. Transparency metrics often end up looking like judging arts funding by box office sales or judging philosophy education by how quickly someone gets a job, because those are very publicly accessible metrics.
What I ended up thinking was that transparency involves another one of these trade-offs. It eliminates bias and corruption, but it also eliminates sensitivity and expertise in the name of accessibility. I just now realized that the response to the economics and price system might be something very similar.
What prices emphasize are values that are highly accessible and cross-cutting. I was thinking about this in relation to a story I tell in the book, which is a fully true story about my wife’s grandparents’ house in San Diego. Her grandfather was a naval engineer, and he built hidden staircases, weird bookshelves that folded into the wall, and secret rooms. They had an enormous food garden, a carefully designed ecosystem of interlinked plants that produced incredibly rich vegetables.
When they died, no one in the family was living in San Diego, so the house was sold to flippers. The flippers removed the bookcases, removed the secret passageways, bulldozed the food forest, and replaced it with concrete and grass. The reason was that all that weirdness would not sell well on the market, because its appeal was peculiar.
That is a simplistic story, but the worry is that what prices emphasize are values that are highly accessible and legible to a very large number of people. They tend to miss very local, specific, and subtle values. In particular, the values of arts in small-scale communities with very developed aesthetic sensibilities are often radically underrepresented by price, because those values are hard to access outside the community.
I do not yet have a perfectly clear way to put this, but there seems to be something deeply similar between the worry about transparency and the worry about prices. Both depend on aggregating what is quickly available, and so they tend to emphasize values that are legible at scale while underrepresenting highly subtle values.
Mounk: First, the price mechanism and supply and demand are a form of metric. Everything we have said about metrics so far applies. They are useful and important in many ways, and we cannot do without them, but they also oversimplify things in important respects. Measuring what is the best movie by overall box office revenue, or even by the profit it made for investors, would be a misunderstanding of what an aesthetic judgment about a meaningful piece of art is. Not that I think the average Oscar winner in recent years is systematically very different from, or necessarily better than, the highest–box office movie. That is a different issue, and communities of experts can go badly wrong.
The second thing I would say is that there are features of the price mechanism that are probably superior to many other metrics we might care about, and this has to do with the croissant example. Because anyone can offer a product to anyone at any price, and it only takes a relatively small subsection of the public to purchase that good for it to be viable, the price system allows people to express different forms of value through a single mechanism.
When I go to Lidl and buy a cheap croissant, I am expressing that what I want is something that tastes fine, gives me a bit of pleasure, and fits within a constrained budget. When I go to a boutique bakery in Brooklyn and buy a croissant for ten times the price, I am expressing that this is a luxury indulgence for me. I am a foodie, and the slight difference in quality matters more to me than the monetary cost. I am willing to invest in that because I am motivated by fine distinctions of taste.
Through the same metric, the price system, you can have these two radically different expressions of value in a way that other metrics, including those created in academia partly out of mistrust of market mechanisms, often fail to do. Instead, you end up with weird quasi-markets. In philosophy, which is my field, you end up with certain kinds of work being valued because of a monolithic scheme of what has become fashionable or ossified in a small number of journals. That can be far more flattening.
Put another way, I think you, whom I regard as one of the most creative and interesting philosophers writing today, are in some respects more valued in the commercial marketplace. Your book is published by Penguin Press, which is also my publisher, a large mainstream press. In contrast, the work you are doing right now would probably struggle to be published in the top philosophy journals in the United States. I do not want to misstate things. You are respected in academic philosophy. But in some ways, the market works better here. You do not have to sell this book to everyone. If 0.1 percent of the U.S. population bought it, it would be a huge commercial success. That allows for a better mechanism of value expression than some of the alternative metrics.
Nguyen: I am not an economist, but I think I agree with two parts of what you said. One is that, as an aggregator, the price system is open to different expressions of value. The other is that it also suffers from the same information-compression problem as metrics, because it is one method of aggregating values that is lossy in all kinds of ways. It is easy to come up with a list of things that seem extremely overvalued on the market and incredibly important things that seem undervalued.
I think I need to think a lot more about exactly the form of that lossiness. I have been thinking more about metrics established inside institutions than about how prices work. On the ground, when you work with metrics, you can see lots of examples where the metric clearly misses what is important. Porter and others have given explanations of how rigid metrics fail in that way.
In the marketplace, I can also see plenty of examples of misses, especially with high-variance, subtle things. The croissant example is interesting. A croissant in Brooklyn may actually be appropriately valued. But then I look at other aesthetic terrains, like indie tabletop role-playing games. People pour their lives into creating completely lovely, astonishingly innovative things, and they might sell a handful of five-dollar PDFs to a tiny audience.
I am not an economist, so I do not have a clean explanation of the difference, but there is a pattern. It is the same high-subtlety, high-variance stuff. It requires a lot of background knowledge that is often concentrated in a very small community, and in those cases prices seem to miss the value.
A croissant in Brooklyn is different because a large portion of the market understands what makes that croissant valuable. When I point to other cases where prices miss, they tend to involve small subcommunities that care deeply about something idiosyncratic, where the value is not particularly public or accessible. I wonder whether, in the croissant case, what is really going on is that, through historical and cultural happenstance, that value is broadly appreciated and therefore priced appropriately, whereas in other cases it is not.
Mounk: That’s a great point. That stands to reason, right? If something is a highly sophisticated, aesthetically appealing thing but sufficiently niche, it may struggle to find a market. That is not something the price system is going to encourage. Then there are questions about whether that should appropriately remain the realm of hobbyists, or whether the state should support certain forms of activity like that.
I have in the background the difference between the art scene in the United States and the art scene in Germany. Germans are often horrified that in America everything is left to the market. Some Americans are horrified that in Europe taxpayers subsidize someone going to the opera at three hundred euros a ticket. The answer is probably somewhere in the middle. The more multiplicity of metrics you can have, the better.
I think there are things about various forms of the arts in the United States, including the performing arts, that market incentives misshape. I also think there is something strange, artificial, and stagnant about the arts in Europe, including theater, which I used to do in Germany, because they are selected by some mix of experts and political interests.
Nguyen: We are back at the same point again. I think it is super interesting that I keep finding the same issue with transparency metrics. In the background, one of the things I found really striking about James Scott’s Seeing Like a State is how it helped organize these thoughts for me about information compression in large-scale institutions. One of the central moves of the book is to alternate examples between global capital markets and centralized communist governments, and to show that the same kinds of problems arise in both cases.
The upside of transparency is that it can break through stuck, dogmatic systems. The downside is that it misses sensitive, local weirdness, and those two things go together. We see the same structure again and again. Even the strongest critics of quantification culture will usually admit that when you have a system that is deeply sexist, and no one wants to admit it or believes how bad it is, you sometimes need a blunt metric. You need something like, “Look, you employ five percent women, and women perform just as well on standardized measures.” That kind of brute measure can cut through corruption and bias and break a system out of a lock.
I think the same is true of markets. In some cases, when there is no market at all, institutions can get trapped in very narrow feedback loops and a single way of thinking. The market can break in and disrupt that. But on the other side, both transparency metrics and markets miss weird, subtle values. The same bluntness that lets them break into a space also causes them to flatten what matters inside it.
One of my persistent worries about transparency is that it is extremely hard, from the outside, to tell the difference between bias and subtle expertise. That problem shows up very clearly in aesthetic domains. One of the ways I started thinking about this years ago was through quantified scoring systems and wine culture, and more generally through art. It is very hard to tell the difference between a group of posers and a group of people who are genuinely responding to something you do not yet see.
For a long time, I thought hard bop jazz, Coltrane and that whole tradition, was just random fast noise, and that people who claimed to love it were hipster poseurs. Then I got it, and I realized I had been wrong the entire time. That experience stuck with me.
So yes, I think there is a fascinating structural similarity here. Large-scale, blunt systems like markets and transparency metrics can break open closed spaces and disrupt entrenched bias, but they do so in a way that simultaneously misses an enormous amount of subtlety. Both effects come together in the same move.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Thi discuss how cooking combines both metrics and creativity, and recommendations for games. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Since shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Persuasion has been following the war through the voice of one Ukrainian, Kateryna Kibarova. Kateryna’s accounts of the ongoing horrors—from the first days, to her return home to Bucha, to surviving the most recent winter amid constant bombardment—capture the seemingly never-ending nightmare facing civilians far from the frontlines.
Following Kateryna’s last update during the holiday season, an unusually cold winter and repeated Russian targeting of the energy grid has made the situation in Kyiv dire. During a recent conversation, our call cut out as Kateryna’s makeshift home battery, charged during the few hours of electricity she has per day, failed. What follows is her most recent dispatch of life in this new reality. (You can read all of Kateryna’s installments here.)
In December, we announced the opening of a small fundraiser to help Kateryna repair a window broken by a nearby explosion. We—and she—were deeply moved by how quickly the community responded, surpassing our initial target in a matter of hours. Now, members of the Persuasion team—in our individual capacity—are once again raising some funds to help Kateryna as she seeks to replace her generator after repeated power surges destroyed it. If you’d like to consider supporting this effort, we’ve set up a GoFundMe page here.
With thanks for being part of our community, and for continuing to follow Kateryna’s story,
—David, Senior Advisor.
I had no heat in the apartment for a week. It was five degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) with no hot water, nothing. Because of the voltage fluctuations, the generator burned out. There are no repairmen who can fix it. Partly because of the massive mobilization, there aren’t any men left. There are no spare parts, either.
Technicians are trying to reconnect our power plants, to restore them. But we have voltage drops and fluctuations. If an outlet is supposed to run at 220 volts, we can have anywhere from 150 to 240 within a few seconds. Everything gets fried. Thank God they have now at least somewhat fixed my boiler so it’s usable—sort of usable.
We’re so burnt out that we’ve put life on pause. We are just waiting for something to change. In some districts of Kyiv, the situation is so critical due to the frost and lack of preparation that pipes in buildings just burst, and water floods the stairwells. People can’t even go down the stairs because it all freezes instantly. We have “heating points” pretty much everywhere now—tents that have gas burners where people can recover a little bit, charge their phones.
Buses and transport work very poorly. Metro lines are damaged, some are cut off. Trolleybuses need electricity, so they aren’t running, either. Whenever there is an air raid alert, people cannot get home. With weather like this, it’s like the end of the world. Rain pours down and freezes immediately.
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I don’t remember such frosts in my lifetime. Russia waits eagerly for people to be in complete disarray, and they recently struck during these frosts. Sixteen missiles hit two Kyiv thermal power plants. They are hitting the plants and substations on purpose. Some are already beyond repair and closed forever.
You go to work, you come in, you sit for a bit. But you can’t generate any ideas, you can’t work fully. Or, you’re driving, and there are alerts, missiles are flying, Shaheds, reconnaissance drones. You’re living in this sort of slow motion. People prioritize what they need to survive, like finding a generator somewhere. The good generators are expensive. And they think of children: you need to feed them, you need to wash them, you need to entertain them. But there is no water, no light, no heating, nothing.
And all of this piles up on your head just like a snowball.
Sometimes I see moms dragging their kids up twenty flights of stairs because the elevator doesn’t work. People with children set up a tent in a room, they heat that tent up with kerosene heaters, or some kind of aluminum pipe, or candles. They zip it up and sleep in there. It’s even better to put it on the bed. Can you even imagine? There are lots of “life-hacks.”
If the end of the world comes, Ukrainians will survive 100 percent. No other nation will be able to come up with what Ukrainians come up with, because we’ve already approached the point of madness. Here we are, sleeping in tents inside apartments, heating them just to survive. And then we go to work.
My Kyiv relatives are staying with me, and we have this hack: we go to the hardware store, buy firebricks, and heat them on the gas water heater. They absorb the heat, and then you put them in this iron wheelbarrow, like a metal basin, and they hold the heat for 12 hours, like radiators. We migrate like this from one apartment to another, all sleeping in one room so it’s warmer. It’s hard to call this life; it’s just survival.
A lot of businesses have closed. Coffee shops and flower shops and large restaurants. Why are restaurants important? Because people can’t eat anywhere except in restaurants if there is no water, no power, no heat at home. In some regions—Bucha, Irpin, the satellite cities—there is gas. But if the houses are taller than, I think, nine or 11 floors, they don’t have the right to install gas boilers or connect gas at all. And so practically all of Kyiv is on electricity. For a restaurant to function, it costs 10,000 to 15,000 hryvnias a day just to refuel the generator. That’s $300. They are expensive machines. And then there are safety considerations. Businesses take all this crazy responsibility on themselves.
I can manage—I drive home from work, stop by a shopping mall where there is electricity, and walk around, look at things, just kill time either until the outage ends or it’s time to heat the place. But elderly people sit in this cold, and in the evenings they say goodbye to their children as if it were the last time. There are cases of people freezing to death. The weather conditions create unbelievable amounts of black ice. I’ve never seen anything like it in my life. People fall and are killed.
We have unity, but it’s not like it was. Now everyone is on their own. The generators have blown out. And a heap of other things: the kids are sick, nobody is really visiting each other anymore. It’s understandable, because people get tired. When you’re fully charged up, you can give kindness and energy to other people. But when you’re just running on fumes—when you can’t even help yourself—how can you talk about helping others?
That’s why it’s now really just close family, and we try to somehow solve these issues—and even then, how do you solve them if they’re impossible to solve? That’s why it’s a scary situation. All the media is writing about Kyiv being on the brink of catastrophe and it’s 100 percent true. The situation is critical. They’ve advised us to build outdoor toilets because the sewage system is freezing up.
And so, it’s the 21st century—some people fly to space, they drive electric cars, all while Ukrainians are building toilets on the street.
We can’t predict what the future holds. Recently, I was so happy, I thought that tomorrow there would be power for seven hours in a row—and then they changed the routine back to three hours on, seven hours off. Seven, three, on, off, like some kind of torture. It’s unreal that we survive in such conditions.
It would be better if we’d just been buried under rubble rather than living this incomprehensible, senseless life where you rejoice over basics. We get a huge rush of endorphins when we take a shower. Or when we wash our hair, or wash clothes. Maslow’s Hierarchy is in such a state of shock that we’ve reverted to basic needs. The truth is stranger than fiction. It’s some kind of horror.
I look at the future and I see... I don’t see anything.
Kateryna Kibarova is a Ukrainian economist and resident of Bucha.
Translated from the Russian by Julia Sushytska and Alisa Slaughter. This transcript has been lightly edited for concision and clarity.
About the Translators: Julia Sushytska was born in L’viv and is a Visiting Assistant Professor in Comparative Studies in Literature and Culture at Occidental College. Alisa Slaughter is Professor of Creative Writing at the University of Redlands. They recently co-edited and translated a selection of essays and lectures by Merab Mamardashvili, A Spy for an Unknown Country (ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2020).
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Over at American Purpose, we are publishing an ongoing series called “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” Today, we decided to share the latest installment with all Persuasion readers! To make sure you receive all American Purpose content—and further exclusive writing by Francis Fukuyama—visit your account settings and toggle on the relevant buttons!
I’ve been watching the Apple TV series For All Mankind for the past few weeks. It’s a brilliantly produced show about the Apollo space program that creates an alternative history of the past 50 years. The starting premise is that the Soviets beat the United States to the moon in the mid-1960s, and proceeded to build a permanent base there. The Nixon administration was shocked into action, and after a first successful landing in 1969 it accelerated the schedule of subsequent Apollo missions to catch up. Instead of ending the Apollo program in 1972 with Apollo 17, they created a permanent U.S. moon base called Jamestown and flew dozens more missions over the succeeding years.
What is striking about this story is that it’s a reminder of how unbelievably impressive the Apollo program was. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the intention to land a man on the moon, and the United States actually followed through and accomplished that goal with Apollo 11 in 1969. For All Mankind illustrates both the scale of the ambition involved and the enormous risks that NASA took in accomplishing this feat.
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Many Americans may be surprised to learn that NASA has been trying to return to the moon for two decades now, but hasn’t been able to do so. Something has gone wrong with American state capacity. Getting to the moon in eight years under the Apollo program was perhaps the most vivid example of American government prowess. It came on the heels of other major accomplishments in the 20th century: big infrastructure projects like the Hoover Dam, the Golden Gate Bridge, and electrification of the upper South under the Tennessee Valley Authority; mobilization for the Second World War, and victory over Japan and Germany; and then, after the war, construction of the interstate highway system. The United States in this period was seen globally as the exemplar of modernity, a country able to master complex technology and use it for important public purposes.
Since the 1960s, however, American state capacity has declined. The United States has world-beating tech companies that are currently racing to build artificial intelligence data centers. The U.S. military remains the best in the world. But other parts of the government have struggled to master difficult tasks like building a high-speed rail system, rolling out healthcare.gov, or connecting rural communities with broadband.
This lack of capacity is evident in NASA itself. Why has it taken so long, and cost so much money, to repeat a feat that was accomplished 50 years ago?
Artemis is simply the latest name for a NASA effort to build a rocket, orbiter, and lunar lander that are capable of returning humans to the moon. Following the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003, President George W. Bush announced the end of the Space Shuttle program, and set a goal of returning to the moon by 2020. Artemis had its origins in the Constellation program, which included the Ares I and V rockets and an Orion space capsule. It sought to make use of engines and other components left over from the Space Shuttle. Constellation was never funded properly, and a commission led by aerospace guru Norm Augustine pointed to its fiscal unsustainability. The Obama administration consequently tried to shut it down and replace it with a collection of other goals, like sending astronauts to explore the asteroid belt.
More importantly, the technocrats at NASA had a vision for proceeding differently in the way they procured spacecraft. Lori Garver, the Deputy Administrator at NASA under Obama, proposed a Commercial Crew program that would solicit bids for a vehicle to transport astronauts into low Earth orbit—bids that could come from companies like SpaceX or Blue Origin in the newly emerging commercial space flight sector. Instead of having the government design and operate the spacecraft under traditional cost-plus contracting (as in the Constellation program), Commercial Crew would write fixed-cost contracts that allowed the private sector to compete in the design, construction, and operation of the spacecraft. Under this kind of contracting, they would have strong incentives to work quickly and efficiently.
The Obama administration’s effort to cancel the Constellation program met fierce opposition from Congress. This came particularly from senators representing states in which Ares and Orion were being built, as well as the old-line aerospace contractors like Boeing and Northrop Grumman and their workers. The confrontation between Congress and the White House led to a compromise: the Ares 5 booster was re-packaged as the Space Launch System (SLS), and funding for the Orion capsule was extended, while NASA was permitted to experiment with Commercial Crew. SLS and Orion were thus the legacy systems around which the Artemis program was to be built.
The idea of using the parts and knowledge left over from the Space Shuttle program sounded good on paper. But SLS was underfunded from the start, just as Constellation had been, and creating a new heavy lift vehicle from old parts proved both expensive and technically challenging. The SLS-Orion package was rebranded as Artemis in 2018, and continued to suffer big delays in launching. Costs ballooned to over $4 billion per launch. According to a report, “NASA continues to experience significant scope growth, cost increases, and schedule delays on its booster and RS-25 engine contracts, resulting in approximately $6 billion in cost increases and over 6 years in schedule delays above NASA’s original projections.” An uncrewed Artemis I finally flew successfully in 2022, and Artemis II is supposed to send four astronauts around the moon sometime this year (the current planned launch date is early March). NASA will be lucky if it can land humans on the moon by the end of this decade.
It is interesting to follow what happened to the innovative Commercial Crew program. Both Boeing and SpaceX were awarded contracts for Commercial Crew in 2014. Boeing received $4.2 billion while SpaceX received $2.6 billion. Since then, SpaceX’s Crew Dragon has flown almost 70 people in 18 manned missions, and 12 Dragon cargo International Space Station resupply missions. Boeing by contrast flew one unsuccessful flight in 2019. Starliner delivered two astronauts, Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams, to the International Space Station in 2024, but experienced multiple failures and stranded them there for nine months. They had to be rescued by a reconfigured SpaceX Crew Dragon. Though Starliner was a bust, the idea of competition in fixed-price contracting proved its worth.
Meanwhile, NASA’s failure to return to the moon in a timely fashion probably does not lie in a straightforward decline in its internal capacity. NASA remains staffed with competent engineers and administrators. The fundamental driver of dysfunction was rather the problem of what is called “state capture.” The money poured into Constellation-Ares-Orion-SLS was dictated by Congress. NASA itself was not of one mind back in 2010; Administrator Charlie Bolden was skeptical of the ability of new entrants like SpaceX to deliver, and was not fully supportive of the direction being pushed by Lori Garver. If there was a decline in capacity, it probably lay in those old-school industrial behemoths like Boeing, which in recent years has suffered big management problems not just with Starliner but with its 737 and 787 programs.
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The second reason the United States has had problems getting back to the moon is a combination of complacency and loss of national focus. Once the moon landing succeeded, the nation relaxed and shifted from space exploration to efforts to routinize space travel with the Space Shuttle program. Not only was this far less inspiring than the original Apollo program, it also failed in its own terms. Space flight did not become cheap and routine, nor, as the Columbia and Challenger accidents indicated, did it become safe.
But nor has NASA’s objective of returning to the moon sparked widespread public interest. For All Mankind suggests that competition with the Soviet Union drove continuing investment in a moon program. One would think that competition with China would play a similar role today, but that hasn’t materialized. Perhaps Americans are already cowed by China, which has managed to build the world’s largest high-speed rail network in less than a decade.
The problems of the Artemis program and America’s difficulties in returning to the moon are emblematic of a broader problem of declining American state capacity. NASA has been hobbled by the political mandates placed on it by Congress. Of course, Congress is the principal and NASA the agent in a democratic principal-agent relationship. But while members of Congress say they want to return to the moon, they are actually much more interested in maintaining employment in their districts and getting re-elected. Their goals are not forward-looking and innovative; rather, they are profoundly conservative. To maintain the status quo, they are happy to override and compromise the technical judgments of the experts they’ve hired to serve them.
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Conservatives complain endlessly that “unelected bureaucrats” have escaped the control of their democratically-elected masters and are implementing an agenda at odds with the wishes of the American people. Would this were so as far as NASA is concerned. The reality is rather the opposite: bureaucrats find themselves endlessly constrained by the narrow-minded and self-serving mandates placed on them by their political bosses. The Apollo program succeeded because NASA was given a single, overriding mandate to get to the moon by the end of the decade. It had much more freedom in how to achieve this goal than it does today.
As I will argue in subsequent articles, if Americans want to restore state capacity, they need to give bureaucrats more discretionary authority to do their jobs, fund them adequately, and eliminate the many political barriers that have been erected over the years that prevent them from doing so.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Are you sitting down? There’s big news from the Democratic Party. No, they haven’t developed a coherent plan to address ICE shooting civilians on American streets. Nor have they much to say about Trump’s foreign policy, which is so disruptive that it forced European nations to remember they have armies and deploy troops to Greenland.
No, this is much more important for the country. Kamala Harris has released a video. Standing in an office so generic it could be a Zoom background, a beaming Harris announces that KamalaHQ is being renamed Headquarters, “a place where you can go online to get basically the latest of what’s going on, and also to meet and revisit with some of our great, courageous leaders.” (Initially it was called Headquarters 67, presumably a reference to the already passé Gen Alpha meme, but it seems this was eventually deemed too cringe even for Harris.)
My first thought was surprise that KamalaHQ was still going, though presumably they’ve spent most of their time workshopping this inspirational new name. With one million followers on X and five million on TikTok, the appeal of rebranding the account is obvious.
“Conservatives build permanent organizing infrastructure. Progressives have historically built machines that dismantle after Election Day. Headquarters is the end of that cycle,” enthuses the accompanying press release. Launched in partnership with the progressive nonprofit People For The American Way, Headquarters will be a “new Gen-Z led progressive content hub.” In addition to its current channels, it will launch on YouTube, Substack (hello, neighbor!), and other platforms.
Look, I see the appeal. Harris is right that Democrats have struggled to keep momentum going after 2024. But the solution isn’t to pretend that a glossy website counts as a genuine gameplan. As the Democrats’ cringey YouTube channel showed us, the issue isn’t a lack of content. It’s a lack of substance.
In a world where even major multinational corporations are moving away from overproduced, professional-looking content in their branding, looking instead towards individual influencers and user-generated content, the Democrats seem unable to move beyond a media strategy from over a decade ago. Creating endless media channels, all of which repeat slick phrases in a desperate hope to catch on—and shouting very loudly at opponents who aren’t even watching—just reinforces how sad and out of touch they seem.
Every day, we see more signs of how much the media landscape has changed since the Democrats last understood it. Newspapers are shedding staff, social media channels are divided by political affiliation (with progressives on X mostly migrating to Bluesky), and the biggest new media stars are podcasters and YouTubers, each with their own personal brand and loyal following. The Democrats are slowly starting to explore these channels, but their fear of authenticity overshadows any genuine impact.
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This lack of interest in new media is indicative of something deeper—a lack of a clear plan for what the Democrats will do to fix the country. Harris’ defeat in 2024 should have forced not only a deep reckoning, but also a strategy to address the party’s issues and find a way to reach voters again. After scrapping their autopsy report, arguing that its release would be “counterproductive,” the Democrats have struggled to unite around any policies or develop any kind of roadmap for winning the midterms, let alone the next presidential election.
The goal of Headquarters is “to build an effort to mobilize pro-justice, pro-fairness, pro-democracy young people against far-right extremism.” (I’m not quite sure what it means to “build an effort to mobilize.” Why not just mobilize?) But by choosing this kind of platform, and with such a convoluted message, Harris and her team fundamentally misunderstand what, today, is attracting an increasing number of young people to the far right.
Globally, more and more young voters are choosing right-wing parties and reporting dissatisfaction with democracy. There is a deep feeling that our current political system and institutions don’t work. Part of the reason is that politicians seem ever more corporate and out of touch. Announcing a platform to “funnel young people into both online and offline action for progressive values” just isn’t a good enough response.
Frustrated with a lack of opportunities, feeling left behind and unheard—these are emotional responses to changes in our economy and social values, and cannot be addressed by someone in a suit burbling corporate-style jargon. Young people are often instinctively repelled by performative behaviors and attempts to be cool. They choose authenticity over polish. This is why many of the most popular podcasts and YouTube channels, with their raw and non-PC hosts, have so much appeal. These hosts deliberately construct parasocial relationships with listeners to make them feel part of a community that understands them.
Harris’ greatest weakness has always been her inability to appear like a normal person, and this is causing her, yet again, to retreat into strategic soundbites rather than actually listening and responding. Young people don’t want to “meet and revisit with some of our great, courageous leaders” through a soulless website and curated videos. They want to see a human being who sees them, too.
It’s hard not to see this as the Democrats workshopping possible TikTok memes as the country burns. Harris and her team are cringe—but the Trump administration is genuinely dangerous, undermining American democracy in ways that may be irreversible, and putting the lives of civilians, including U.S. citizens, at risk. It’s unforgivable that, over a year into Trump’s presidency, the Democrats still don’t have their act together. Forced to choose between those two options, I would choose cringe every time. I just wish the Democrats could give us more than polished videos and websites that ultimately say nothing.
“I’m really excited about it. Stay engaged, and I’ll see you out there,” Harris concludes in her video. I’m not sure where “out there” is, but I’ll be there anyway, underwhelmed.
Leonora Barclay is Head of Podcasts at Persuasion.
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