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Jung Chang is the author of Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China, Empress Dowager Cixi, and Big Sister, Little Sister, Red Sister, as well as Mao: The Unknown Story, with her husband, Jon Halliday. Her latest book is Fly, Wild Swans: My Mother, Myself and China.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Jung Chang discuss how personal stories illuminate broader historical truths, the culture of mistrust that has characterized Chinese society across centuries, and why young Chinese people today are increasingly rejecting marriage and romantic relationships.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You have a very personal way of describing a very broad swath of Chinese history. What do you think we miss when we look at the history of a country that has been written through revolutions, political intrigue, and defenestrations at the level of high politics? Why do we need to look at the lives of individual Chinese people to illuminate the history of this country?
Jung Chang: I actually did write some history books that do not look at history through my own perspective. I would like to write about my family, about my mother, my grandmother, my father, and now myself, in part. I think people can identify with individuals. In that way, history comes more alive than when you write about it in a non-personal way.
Wild Swans has been read by tens of millions of people. I’ve received thousands of letters, and they moved me very much because I feel that readers identify with our stories. In 2023, I felt that I would like to write a sequel to Wild Swans, a sequel that is also a book in its own right. I am looking forward to very personal reactions from readers.
Mounk: One thing that strikes me about Wild Swans and now the sequel is the attempt to show the effect of history on the lives of individuals. That’s something I’m drawn to, whether in straightforward history books, fiction, or narrative historical work like the kind you’re engaged in. What I find most moving is seeing how the lives of rather ordinary individuals, and sometimes very heroic individuals, are shaped by big historical events that are outside of their control.
Do you think this divides, at least a little, countries that have experienced very large, traumatic historical events from countries that have been relatively more placid? I find a real contrast between American literature, for example, and some European literature, as well as a lot of Chinese literature, in this sensibility. I often struggle to engage with American fiction because it is, in a quintessential sense, and I know I’m simplifying, about people who grew up in affluent suburbs, struggling with the limitations of those suburbs, and trying to discover themselves as individuals. I’m struck by the contrast with the ways writers grapple with history in works about China and about twentieth-century European history.
Chang: When I was writing Fly Wild Swans, as well as when I was writing Wild Swans, I focused on our stories and our feelings. I realized, over time, that history is never far away from our lives. It is the background, and in many ways our lives interact with the greater landscape of history. In that way, I write my personal story, but the readers get to know something about history as well. They can also feel things which you cannot get when you write just about history.
My family is, in a way, quite extraordinary. My grandmother, my mother, and my father are all extraordinary people. They often swim against the tidal waves of history, which makes them interesting and generates more drama. If you are against the prevalent trend of history at a particular time, you are going to come across bigger waves and bigger dramas. So I think that, because I am writing about this family, there are a lot of dramatic events.
Mounk: As you point out, Wild Swans was read by tens of millions of people around the world, and I am sure many listeners of the podcast will have read the book or heard of it. But for those who have not, it is a story of your family, in particular three generations of women in that family, your grandmother, your mother, and yourself.
One thing that struck me is the brutality of your grandmother’s life and the hardships suffered by your mother, but also a more general sense of harshness in Chinese society that you also see in other forms of Chinese literature. We sometimes have a tendency to associate this with communist rule and the Cultural Revolution, all of which you write about in a very incisive way. But even before the communists took power, there was a sense of deep disempowerment.
That sense is certainly present for the women protagonists in your book, who live in a very patriarchal society, but it also touches many of the other characters—many of the men in the family as well.
Chang: Yes, you are absolutely right. Brutality and cruelty did not come with communism. My grandmother suffered foot binding when she was two years old. She was born in 1909, so that was long before that period. Foot binding I knew about when I was a child, but I actually saw my grandmother’s feet, which were horrendous to look at. Only the two big toes were normal. The other four toes on each foot were lifeless. There were no bones in them. They were crushed and bent under the arch of her feet. I saw my grandmother flipping them up and cutting the toenails on those lifeless, boneless toes, toenails that must have dug into the sole of her feet.
My mother later gave me a description of how these feet were created. One day, many years later, my mother was visiting me in London. We were walking in Hyde Park, and she suddenly stopped and pointed at a round, flat stone on the ground. She said, “Look at that stone. It looks just like a millstone, and that’s the kind of stone people used to put on baby girls’ feet to produce the three-inch golden lilies.”
Three-inch golden lilies is the beautiful name for very cruelly made bound feet. This practice had existed for a thousand years. Chinese women had suffered this extremely cruel mutilation, which was extremely painful, for a thousand years. My grandmother had her feet bound when she was two years old. The foot binding was carried out by her own mother. She screamed. She fainted. She tried to crawl away but could not, because her feet were under that millstone. She begged her mother to stop, and her mother wept and said, “I am doing this for your own good, because otherwise, when you grow up, you will have big feet and you will not find a husband.” My grandmother lived with that pain all her life.
Mounk: One of the things that really strikes me in reading Wild Swans is the harshness of interpersonal relations. Some of that comes from straightforward injustices that easily come to mind, like foot binding, which is, of course, a horrible and cruel practice. As you point out, it existed within a web of social expectations. If you wanted to be a desirable woman, which was the only real way to guarantee any amount of personal comfort in that time period, then you needed to have your feet bound. So even a loving mother might decide to engage in this cruel practice because she was convinced, and perhaps not entirely wrongly, that under the prevailing social circumstances this was the best path for her daughter to have a decent life.
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But you see it in other ways as well. Many of the households you describe, where your grandmother lived and your mother grew up, are quite cold. They are characterized by intrigue and mutual distrust. Servants are often described as being prone to making false accusations that the lady of the house was cheating on her husband, either to avenge some slight or perhaps to receive some kind of reward for revealing this supposed fact.
This is something that also strikes me when reading someone like Lu Xun, who is writing in a very different register and writing fictional stories, whereas you are writing a personal history that is deeply researched. As a reader, there is something striking about an atmosphere in which there is an assumption that people cannot trust each other, that relationships are quite transactional, and that even though family and social networks play a huge role in society, they are not based on affection.
It contrasts interestingly with the atmosphere in another very successful writer who writes about women and is often read as a feminist writer: Elena Ferrante. There, too, you have cruel conditions, a lot of violence, and a lot of poverty, in a very different decade and a very different place. But there is a warmth to human relations that I find interestingly absent, whether in the fiction of Lu Xun or in your descriptions of China in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.
It is something I have been wondering about even before this conversation. I wonder whether you share that sense. Am I picking up on something that you also see, and what is the reason for that?
Chang: I think you’re absolutely right. I noticed that myself as well. In fact, that is also a feeling I often had when I read Chinese literature, and I still have those feelings now. In my own family, there are both cases.
In my grandmother’s case, at the age of fifteen, she was given by her father to a warlord general to be his concubine. Her daughter was taken away from her because the daughter was supposed to be brought up by the proper wife and not by a concubine. My mother was not allowed to call her mother “mother.” So my grandmother one night kidnapped my mother and fled that well-guarded mansion. It was a lot of hardship to flee because she had crippled bound feet, and the way from the mansion to the railway station was full of spiky rocks.
Because she had been a concubine, she was despised. Later, after the warlord died, when she fell in love with a doctor practicing Chinese medicine and they wanted to get married, Dr. Xia’s extended family were all against the marriage because a concubine becoming the proper wife was supposed to bring shame to the Xia family. The eldest son of Dr. Xia was so furious that he shot himself in protest. He did not mean to die, but he had an infection.
Life for my mother growing up in that family was hell. She was ruthlessly bullied. Nobody had any smile when they looked at my mother or when they looked at my grandmother. The children bullied my mother and once pushed her down a well, and she could have been killed. It was a family full of pitiless horror.
So much so that Dr. Xia, at the age of sixty-six, left his extended family and moved with my grandmother and my mother to another city to start a new life. They were very poor. To pacify his old family, he did not bring any money. He gave them all the money and property. They started their life in a slum. Later, because he was an excellent doctor, they were able to move into a bigger house.
All those years, his own family never visited him except one son and one grandson. So that was another horrible family. But perhaps because of that background, my grandmother and my mother made my own family, with my parents, my siblings, and my grandmother, a particularly loving one. When I was growing up, I had nothing but love from my grandmother and from my parents.
My grandmother, as I wrote in this new book, Fly Wild Swans, did not permit my parents to criticize their children at the dinner table. She said you must not upset them when they are eating, because that would make them ill. She was the wife of a doctor practicing Chinese medicine, and she believed that children must not be upset, particularly when they were eating food. My parents never said harsh words to me. Even occasional disapproving words were phrased delicately, as if I were a sensitive adult who could be easily offended. So I grew up in this incredibly loving family.
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When the Cultural Revolution started in 1966, when I was fourteen, I saw many children turning on their parents, wives turning on their husbands, or vice versa. I saw boys beating up their fathers when their fathers became victims of the Cultural Revolution. But my family grew closer.
At the age of fourteen or fifteen, my life revolved around my parents. I went with my mother to denunciation meetings. You have seen those horrible scenes of victims being put on the stage, hands ferociously twisted behind their backs, heads pushed down. My mother was made to kneel on broken glass. After the denunciation meetings, I helped my mother get home. I visited them in their camps without permission, journeys of days, four-day truck journeys. I had to find the trucks. I am saying all this because my family experienced the two extremes, and the two extremes coexisted in Chinese culture. It is a bizarre thing, but it is a fact. When I read Chinese books, I also feel this pettiness, constant family intrigue, stabbing each other’s backs. It never happened in my small family, but I think it happened in Dr. Xia’s family.
Mounk: What’s striking to me, again, both in your book and other historical books, novels, pieces of fiction and movies I’ve seen about Chinese culture, is that in a way it feels as though a lot of the customs, the historical customs before the arrival of communism, militated against that form of closeness and that it was a set of nearly heroic choices that created that closeness.
Dr. Xia, I think, is certainly one of the more positive male characters in your book. Not a flawless character, he’s a character who suffers from limitations himself, but he treats your grandmother and your mother with great kindness. He’s very courageous in standing up to the unwillingness of his family to accept your grandmother, but pays this terrible price for it.
I’ve been spending a little bit of time in China, and I’m trying to learn Chinese. It seems that when I talk to young people in China today, a lot of them are really not wanting to get married or have kids, or even be in a romantic partnership. I’ve seen some unofficial surveys where people say romance is the least important thing to them out of all of the different kinds of competing things that you might value. When I ask people in the country about that, one of the things that comes through is this kind of lack of social trust, which I find really striking.
I asked one person, “Why are you really not interested in any kind of romantic partnership or having a husband or wife?” What they said to me really struck me, which was, “It’s just having the responsibility for somebody else is too much, and you have to have enough money to have a good apartment, and you have to have all these things to get married.” I said, “Okay, sure. But surely one of the things that you might be able to get out of that is that if you lose your job, then your spouse is going to be there for you, and if they lose their job, then you’re going to be there for them. Even if I understand these material difficulties, historically marriage has also been a form of social insurance.”
They immediately said, “Well, but how could I trust that if I lose my job, they’d be there for me? How could I trust that if I were to be in a moment of need, anybody would actually still be there for me?” So I guess I was just reflecting, before I want to go to some of the more political aspects, about that element of family. Is there something caused by the historical traumas you described, caused by hundreds of years of a quite restrictive set of moral standards, caused by the different kinds of moral strictures of communism, that has eroded trust? Is that something that Chinese literature just happens to emphasize in a way that literatures of other countries don’t tend to emphasize? How are we to make sense of this?
Chang: I think there is something deeply unappetizing in the old Chinese culture. When we say culture, it has nothing to do with race or anything. It is just a tradition, a way of tradition that has evolved over the years. Now I am just speculating. I have not thought this out. It is quite interesting. China does not have a religion that urges people to be kind, to be universally kind. People depend, or have depended, on their own nature, either to be kind or to be unkind. There is not a general education to teach people to be kind universally, to think for other people and to be kind to other people. I think there is that. What I also think was more awful was the communist regime, particularly under Mao, used this deep-rooted unkindness and cruelty for political means.
To write Wild Swans, I interviewed my grandmother’s sister-in-law, my grandmother’s brother’s wife. She came from a very poor family, and when she came to be kind of on a date with my grandmother’s brother, she had to borrow a dress. She did not have decent clothes. When they were married, they lived with my grandma and Dr. Xia. My grandma was the mistress of the house, and her sister did a lot of the hard work, the housework. She was a bit unhappy about my grandma. Of course, in every family there are these problems. There were always problems of the family not being in harmony.
When the communists came, they classified her, anybody who did any work, as the employed, and my grandma and Dr. Xia as the employer. They encouraged her to think in terms of class struggle, in terms of the employed being exploited and suppressed by the employer. Her feelings, minor unhappiness, turned to major resentment. She then denounced them. She denounced my grandma to the authorities for having sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists and complaining about the communists. When the communists first came, they classified a lot of people as enemies, class enemies, and executed them. One of those executed in my mother’s home city was a Kuomintang nationalist officer. My grandma went to the execution ground with a big red silk and hired a funeral team to give him a decent funeral because his family had all fled. At that time my parents had gone from Manchuria to Sichuan in the south.
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The grandaunt then denounced my grandma as having sympathy for the nationalists. The party organized the neighbors to what they call “struggle” against my grandma. My grandma had a communist daughter, and the neighbors were very nice, so she was easily off the hook. The relationship between the sisters-in-law was wrecked, and my grandmother died without reconciliation with the sister-in-law.
As it happened, the sister-in-law’s husband, my grandmother’s brother, was fairly under suspicion because he was also classified as a nationalist. I will not go into the details, but in the communist categories he was also classified as a nationalist. The couple was exiled to the northern wilderness to do harsh labor.
In 1989, when I went back to China to research Wild Swans, I interviewed my great aunt. To my surprise she said nothing against my grandma, revealed no resentment, and said very nice things about my grandma, about giving her husband a job, how the family lived there, and how kind my grandma was. I think that over the years the harsh life had put this hard housework in perspective. I think the class struggle, the communist doctrine, had heightened people’s resentment and encouraged people to feel resentful, and gave a political framework to this small resentment. I think that is the awful thing that Mao’s China did to people. They stirred up these animosities and used them to control people.
Mounk: You obviously see in moral panics around the world, particularly in totalitarian systems, that it always gives people an excuse for clothing personal ambition or personal resentment in ideological clothes. Whether that is people in Nazi Germany denouncing their neighbors or engaging in antisemitic pogroms in order to get the furniture of their neighbors, whether that is political intrigues in the Soviet Union getting people sent to the gulags because somebody feels disrespected by someone or is jealous of them and therefore denounces them, or whether it is in this context.
To tell you a little bit about my family’s history, my grandparents grew up in shtetls in central Europe under harsh and difficult conditions. All four of my grandparents became convinced communists when they were teenagers. I have thought about and struggled with the role that they ended up playing in life. I can completely see how they embraced that ideology under circumstances where a lot of people might have ended up doing the same thing, with great idealism and with a great conviction that they would help to build a better world. Yet they ended up going along with an ideology that did a lot of bad things in the world, long after one thinks they should have been able to recognize that. Long after the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, long after the Hitler-Ribbentrop Pact, long after a lot of bad things had happened.
I wonder how you are thinking about that in terms of the story of your parents, who under very different circumstances also came to a fervent belief in communism under circumstances that are very sympathetic. The rule of the Kuomintang, as you describe it and as is obvious from history books, is very cruel, very corrupt, and involved itself in the persecution of a lot of innocent people. It is very easy to read the description of how your mother slowly converted to a communist faith as a heroic story, a story of great moral courage. Yet they end up being relatively senior officials in a system that from the beginning involves a lot of oppression and a lot of violence. I wonder how you reflect on that generation of idealistic communists who helped to build a system that then does a lot of bad things to people.
Chang: Both my parents joined the communists when they were teenagers. My father was 17, working in a bookshop as a shop assistant. He had experienced hunger, injustice, and corruption, and he was easily attracted by the left-wing books the bookshop was selling, in which the communists promised a much better, glorious future.
He then went to Yan’an, where Mao’s headquarters was during the war against Japan. In Yan’an, Mao knew these young people, people like my father. I call them young volunteers. When they were there, they were invariably disappointed because Yan’an, their Mecca, as they called it at the time, was not what they had imagined. There was no equality, in particular, which had been one of the main attractions. Food, clothing, medical care, and childcare were all strictly graded. The party officials were treated completely differently from the younger people.
Mao started a terrorization campaign in 1943. This is not the place to describe that campaign, but basically that terrorization, which lasted two or three years, turned these idealistic young people, full of idealism, into rather wooden cogs in his machine. My mother joined the communist underground when she was 15. She had a boyfriend who was executed, or she believed to have died of torture. She also had a friend who died at the hands of the Kuomintang intelligence. Those were enough to turn a defiant 15-year-old to the other side. The communists also promised to ban concubinage, and because of my grandmother’s bitter experience as a concubine, this promise was particularly attractive to my mother.
Both my parents then realized that once you were in the party, you could not get out. To try to get out would be treated as trying to desert, and you would be punished as a deserter. I think this practice of no exit played a very important role in the power of the Communist Party. It is not like in the West, where I join the party, I do not like it, and I leave the next day. There, if you join, you face either staying in and toeing its line or very harsh punishment. I think that was a major factor. My parents’ faith in the party was shattered during the Great Famine between 1958 and 1961. Roughly 40 million people died of starvation, mostly peasants. That was when my parents’ devotion to the party definitively waned.
My father wrote a letter to Mao against some policies. This was the only way you could influence policy, to write to Mao. My father was a senior official in the province of Sichuan, then the most populous province in China. The governor persuaded my father to withdraw the letter by reminding him of the disastrous consequences this could bring to his family. My father was weighed down by guilt.
In the Cultural Revolution in 1966, four years later, he decided to speak up. For this he was arrested, tortured, driven insane, exiled to a camp, and died prematurely. I remember one day before the Cultural Revolution, when I was about 10, around 1961 or 1962, my father suddenly asked me why we made revolution. We made a revolution because people were starving and we wanted to give people a full stomach.
I was very shocked by the intensity and anguish in his voice and on his face. I now think he was not talking to me, he was talking to himself. He was reflecting on the total unacceptableness of a man-made famine by his own party. I think that was the moment he turned against the party. In the Cultural Revolution, he spoke up and he died.
My father suffered tremendously. My mother did not have my father’s anguish and sense of guilt because she was not so committed to the party. She had had reservations almost as soon as Mao’s army entered her city, Jinzhou in Manchuria, where she had been working for the underground. She realized the party was not like her group of friends in the underground.
Soon after she and my father were married, they had to leave Manchuria for Sichuan. The journey was a thousand miles long. My father was a senior officer, so he was entitled to a jeep or a horse. My mother was new to the revolution. She had to walk. She was 18 and pregnant. She suffered a miscarriage on the way.
During this walk she felt terrible, with vomiting and dizziness. She could not walk, but she was criticized for behaving like the precious princess of an exploiting class, crying after walking a few steps. Another dream of hers, that she would be in a warm family of comradeship, was shattered. At that moment she wanted to leave the party and go back to Manchuria to try to become a doctor. My father anxiously stopped her and warned her that she must not leave. If she left, she would have the most terrible fate waiting for her.
Mounk: To me, it is interesting, the parallel between the idealism and hope in the ideology and then the reality of it, and how to deal with that, which is certainly part of the story of my grandparents, who also became very disillusioned in various ways. There is the mix of external constraint and obvious danger if you speak out, and danger if you deviate from the path, but also the desperate desire that you read in reflections on former communists like The God That Failed or in fictional treatments like Darkness at Noon.
Part of being part of a movement is having this world-historical role, that you are a significant actor in history, that you are bringing about something good. To give up on that dream is psychologically an incredibly hard thing for people to do. You tasted a little bit of this as a teenager when you were in high school in Chengdu, in Sichuan, during the Cultural Revolution. Tell us a little bit about what was intoxicating about being a young person who was suddenly told that the fate of a country belonged in their hands, that they were bringing about something so important and purifying the country in such a big way, and how you yourself came to see that moment very critically.
Chang: I think my journey was very different from my parents. In their youth, they could think for themselves. When I was growing up, Mao was our God. We were taught—we were indoctrinated, brainwashed—to regard Mao as our God. When we were children, if we wanted to say what I say is absolutely true, we would say, “I swear to Chairman Mao.”
There was no question that you could challenge Mao. You could not contemplate him. He was like the air, the food, the water. He was part of these things you just have to accept. When I was 14, in my second year in secondary school, Mao started the Cultural Revolution and ordered the young people to join the Red Guards, his task force in the Cultural Revolution.
It went without saying that we should join. My classmates, the schoolchildren, were all desperate to join the Red Guards. In fact, in the end, I dare say every one of my generation at the time in China was some sort of Red Guard because it became a very loose organization. The revolution had no intoxication for me. I feared and hated what I saw because my school became a terrifying place.
I saw our teachers being subjected to denunciation meetings. The thing I just described later was an everyday sight in China then. At one denunciation meeting in the summer of 1966, my English teacher was put on a narrow bench along with other eminent teachers. He was ordered to bend down, he could not stand still, he fell from the bench, cut his head, and there was blood. It was summer, but I felt cold to my bones. I wanted to escape from all that, but I could not leave.
I was taken by some boys in my class to witness them beating up our philosophy teacher. They did not like her because she had been dismissive towards them, and they wanted me to be there to see because they said she had often praised me. I saw the most horrible sight of her being kicked around, made to beg forgiveness, to kneel and kowtow and beg forgiveness from the children.
One night I caught sight of a girl jumping from an upstairs window. The children were divided into Blacks and Reds. The Blacks were deemed undesirable because they came from undesirable families, Kuomintang officers, rightists, people who had spoken up and criticized the regime. The Reds were supposed to be from workers, peasants, revolutionary cadres, communist officials. The Reds were licensed to torment the Blacks. This girl was deemed to be a Black.
Children from her class were ruthlessly tormenting her, insulting her, cutting her hair into a grotesque shape. She could not endure it anymore and threw herself from the window. I was far away, and through the branches of trees I caught a glimpse of this figure out of the window. I had horrible nightmares. I found an excuse and went home.
Home was not a safe place because my father at that time spoke up and was deemed an enemy, a counter-revolutionary. I hated all that. On my 16th birthday, I wrote my first poem, but the Red Guards came to raid our flat, and I had to rush to the toilet to tear up my poem and flush it down the loo. That night, on my 16th birthday, I thought to myself, if this is paradise, if socialist China is paradise, what then is hell?
I was turned against the society. Before that, I had joined the Red Guards because everybody who had not been admitted was admitted on National Day, October 1, 1966. I was in the Red Guards for two weeks and was appalled by what I saw. Even though I was appalled and started questioning the society I lived in, I never questioned Mao until many years later.
The power of brainwashing was so strong. I blamed Madame Mao, I blamed the Gang of Four, but you could not bring yourself to contemplate Mao. The moment came in 1974, eight years after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. I knew a friend who had a copy of Newsweek. There was an article about Mao. In the article there was a small picture of Mao and a small picture of Madame Mao, and the caption said, “Madame Mao is Mao’s eyes, ears, and mouth.”
Mao’s name was spelled out for me. I suddenly realized that Mao was responsible. It was not Madame Mao or anyone else, it was Mao. I am a fairly intelligent person, and it took me eight years to realize Mao’s responsibility. It was thanks to his name being spelled out for me.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Jung discuss to what extent the Cultural Revolution was unique, what we can learn from Chinese history, and predictions for the future of the country. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
A study published last month in Nature analyzed 41 million research papers across the natural sciences and found something that should unsettle anyone who believes AI will revolutionize scientific discovery. Yes, scientists who adopt AI tools publish three times more papers and receive nearly five times more citations. Their careers accelerate. But the collective range of scientific topics under investigation shrinks by nearly 5 percent, and researchers’ engagement with one another’s work drops by 22 percent. The tools that turbocharge individual scientists appear to be narrowing science as a whole.
This finding doesn’t stand alone. A study published in December in Science examined over two million preprints and found that large language model use is associated with posting 36 to 60 percent more manuscripts. But for LLM-assisted papers, writing complexity is correlated with lower publication probability—the opposite of what’s historically been true. One interpretation: researchers are churning out work of questionable depth dressed up in polished prose. Meanwhile, studies of AI-assisted writing in other domains have documented a “homogenizing” effect. People using AI produce work that may be individually polished, but it is also more similar to the work of other authors. A recent study of over 2,000 college admissions essays found that each additional human-written essay contributed more new ideas to the collective pool than each additional AI-generated essay, and this gap widened as more essays were analyzed.
Together, these findings paint a troubling picture. AI is accelerating the markers of scientific production while potentially degrading both the quality and diversity of what gets produced. More papers, and faster, but fewer breakthroughs.
This paradox crystallizes something that has been building for years within science. AI leaders have promised that these tools will cure cancer, double the human lifespan, compress a century of biology into a decade. These claims have justified massive investment and positioned AI as the savior of science itself. The reality is turning out to be more complicated. AI isn’t accelerating science so much as optimizing scientists to thrive in an already-broken reward system.
I’m a neuroscientist at a biomedical research university, where I research AI and cognition and work with scientists across disciplines on how to communicate their findings. I’ve spent years inside the scientific enterprise and am deeply familiar with its dynamics. The short-term pressures are relentless. Researchers are responsible for raising their own funds through grants with success rates of around 10 percent. That creates enormous pressure to keep producing—to always have the next application in the pipeline, the next paper ready to publish. Institutions reinforce this by judging researchers on what’s easy to measure: publication counts, grant dollars, citation metrics. These are markers of production, not progress. Genuine scientific progress is hard to quantify on the timescales of tenure reviews. Production isn’t.
The optimized response is risk aversion. If you want to keep your position, you have one shot to prove your research program is worthwhile before tenure review arrives. You can’t afford to spend years chasing uncertain ideas. Under these pressures, scientists inevitably pursue safe, incremental projects that will reliably yield papers, even if they never significantly advance understanding. In a Pew survey of AAAS scientists, 69 percent said that a “focus on projects expected to yield quick results has too much influence on the direction of research.”
Now add AI to the mix. These tools excel at processing data and finding patterns in existing datasets. They’re exceptionally good at doing more of what’s already being done, faster. But science doesn’t progress primarily through optimized efficiency. As the Nature authors note, the history of major discoveries has been linked with new views on nature, not with optimized analysis of standing data.
The concentration of AI-assisted research on data-rich topics isn’t mysterious. AI tools need large datasets to function. The questions that lack abundant data—which may very well be some of the most important ones—are precisely the ones being left behind. Science under AI influence is beginning to look like the lamppost problem: searching where the light is brightest rather than where answers might actually be found.
Some scholars, as in a separate Nature article, have warned about “scientific monocultures,” where reliance on the same AI tools trained on the same data causes scientists’ questions and methods to converge. When AI is positioned as an objective collaborator that can overcome human bias, researchers may grant it unwarranted trust, believing they understand more than they do because the tools produce confident-seeming outputs from data the scientists never fully engaged with themselves.
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None of this means AI tools are useless for science. They’re clearly useful to individual scientists. But zooming out, the bottleneck to scientific progress isn’t primarily technological but organizational. It’s about how we structure the scientific enterprise. In a candid interview, Mike Lauer, an ex-NIH official, dropped the following stunning facts on what he called a “fundamentally broken” system: scientists spend roughly 45 percent of their time on administrative requirements rather than doing science; grant applications have ballooned from four pages in the 1950s to over one hundred today; and worst of all, the average age at which a scientist receives their first major independent grant is now 45. Think about that: Someone can be trusted to perform brain surgery a full decade before they’re considered ready to run their own research program.
How did it get this way? In the biomedical sciences, one reason is that the NIH adopted a Depression-era funding model built around small, short-term project grants—a model one early critic warned would reduce science funding to “a dispensary of chicken feed.” This model isn’t just old; it’s categorically wrong for science. The short-term competitive proposal model treats researchers like vendors vying for a construction contract, requiring scientists to predict what they’ll discover over five years and then stick to the plan. But science can’t be planned like a construction project. Hypotheses fail, experiments surprise, and the most important discoveries often emerge from scientists following their curiosity to unexpected places.
These are unsexy problems of bureaucratic dysfunction, misaligned incentives, and institutional inertia. They will not be solved by giving scientists faster tools to navigate a fundamentally broken system. If anything, AI threatens to make things worse by accelerating production without touching the underlying reward structures, burying novel ideas in an even larger flood of incremental papers.
This is not an argument that AI can’t advance science. It already has, in fields from protein biology to nuclear fusion. But those breakthroughs involved AI systems designed to solve specific scientific problems. The broad adoption captured in the Nature study is something different: researchers using data-processing and language tools to do more of what they’re already doing, faster. And as the Science study suggests, when it comes to large language models in particular, “faster” may mean more manuscripts of lower quality dressed up in more polished prose. Science advances not only by solving well-defined problems but by generating new ones, and the institutional problems shaping how most scientists actually use AI are upstream of any technology.
AI companies, science funders, and policymakers seem to be treating AI as a magic accelerant—something to sprinkle into the scientific enterprise to make it go faster. But as one recent analysis put it, this is like adding lanes to a highway when the slowdown is actually caused by a tollbooth. The question isn’t how to build more lanes. It’s why the tollbooth is there in the first place.
Tim Requarth is director of graduate science writing and research assistant professor of neuroscience at the NYU Grossman School of Medicine, where he studies how artificial intelligence is changing the way scientists think, learn and write. He writes “The Third Hemisphere,” a newsletter that explores AI’s effects on cognition from a neuroscientist’s perspective.
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If Slovakia’s current foreign policy pivot holds, it may be remembered as one of the most extraordinary volte-faces in modern European politics—not because of its impact, but simply because of the head-spinning optics. Within less than two weeks in January, Slovakia’s populist-nationalist prime minister, Robert Fico, went from being one of the EU’s most vociferous, MAGA-adjacent critics to someone who now apparently wants to work alongside France’s Emmanuel Macron on Europe’s “strategic wake-up.”
What happened? Reporting by Politico and an earlier testimony by one of Fico’s coalition partners, Andrej Danko, suggest that Fico’s own European awakening was prompted by his 45-minute conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago on January 17. According to sources privy to conversations at the recent European Council, Fico described Trump as “dangerous” and was frightened by his “psychological state.”
Days later, Slovakia turned down Trump’s invitation to join his Board of Peace. On January 24, the country’s foreign ministry issued an unusual, strongly worded statement about Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. And then there was a two-hour conversation with Macron in Paris.
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In isolation, none of these events look like much. Officially, Fico continues to reject Politico’s interpretation of events and calls the outlet “hateful.” There is also Slovakia’s supposed foreign policy of reconciling with EU partners alongside outreach to the likes of China, Russia—and Trump.
Yet it is obvious that something happened, likely at the Mar-a-Lago meeting—which took place at the height of the Greenland crisis—that made Slovakia’s mini-Orbán change course. Until recently, Fico seemed all in on the populist revolt fomented in Europe by MAGA. Already in 2018, Fico’s former foreign policy advisor (then the foreign minister and president of the UN General Assembly) was corresponding with Jeffrey Epstein about connecting the prime minister with Steve Bannon.
A Soviet nostalgist, Fico has also been consistent in praising Trump’s efforts to put pressure on Ukraine in order to bring the war to an end. Last year, he spoke at CPAC conferences in DC and Budapest, articulating his alignment with Trump’s international agenda, immigration restrictions, and fight against “wokeism.” In December, he even told the Slovak parliament that he did not really care whether “the EU goes belly up.”
And it was not just talk. The Mar-a-Lago meeting was likely facilitated by Fico’s deal with the U.S. company Westinghouse to build a new nuclear reactor in Slovakia. The preliminary agreement, without much in terms of competitive bidding, was concluded with the American administration just a day earlier and is worth $17.5 billion. Slovakia has also not shied away from buying U.S. military equipment, including F-16s and Black Hawks, which were procured despite their substantial price tags relative to European alternatives.
Fico’s government, in other words, had made both rhetorical and financial commitments to Trump’s United States—and the Florida meeting was meant to be a symbolically important moment, at least for Fico. Of course, Slovakia is not high on Trump’s own agenda, as Fico lacks Orbán’s gravitas and Slovakia never invested as deeply in building influence in Washington as Hungary did. It was not a surprise that Trump’s social media channels did not even mention the meeting.
Yet, strikingly, Fico did not go out of his way to publicize it either—the one Facebook post he rolled out, featuring a couple of photographs from the reunion, looks perfunctory by the standards of a skilled political communicator like Fico.
To be sure, no one should be under any illusions about Fico’s transformation into a statesman dedicated to the European project. Fico flipped on major foreign policy issues before—after defying EU law during the refugee crisis of 2015, he developed a keen interest in bringing Slovakia into the EU’s “integration core,” and then turned into Steve Bannon’s would-be apprentice. None of these moves reflected deeper international considerations or visions of Slovakia’s place in Europe—they simply reflected immediate political needs.
Today, Fico commands little trust in Europe. Under his watch, Slovakia contributed nothing constructive to the EU’s common initiatives. Sure, Macron is happy to have one less headache to worry about at the European Council. But neither he nor any other big European player is going to go out of their way to make Fico feel welcome again.
Oddly, the more important signal that Fico’s change of heart sends is one for the United States. Fico is the ultimate political (and literal) survivor, having survived an assassination attempt in 2024. Fico has now been Slovakia’s prime minister for the better part of 20 years. Slovak public opinion has always had a sizeable anti-American streak, which limited just how close Fico could get to MAGA—although there was also a palpable effort to portray Slovakia’s governing coalition as part of the broader grouping of “patriotic” forces in Europe, which Washington should be assisting according to last year’s National Security Strategy.
Yet Fico rarely makes rash or sudden decisions. That suggests that something indeed transpired at Mar-a-Lago or in its aftermath that made Fico conclude that hitching his wagon to Trump was an intolerably risky proposition. The most straightforward explanation can be found by looking at Trump himself, who has become a singularly unpopular figure in Slovakia, including among Fico’s supporters. Among the voters of his party, SMER, Trump’s approval collapsed from 61 percent in March 2025 to 16 percent in January 2026.
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And it is not just Slovakia where Trump’s (and by extension, sadly, America’s) brand is toxic. For a number of the president’s putative allies, proximity to Trump is a liability, rather than the asset that Bannon would like to leverage. That may not be good news for the United States, but it does offer a silver lining.
Let’s face it: if successful, the populating of European governments with “patriotic” voices would be catastrophic for Europe and for the transatlantic partnership. At a time when Europeans need to work together to fill the monumental gaps left by the United States in the continent’s security architecture, electoral triumphs by the likes of the Alternative for Germany or French National Rally could paralyze the bloc and embolden Russia.
Yet, as the meeting between Fico and Trump illustrates—along with Elon Musk’s earlier efforts on the AfD’s behalf—the MAGA movement does not have a whole lot of political currency to spend in Europe, short of Russian-style social media campaigns and bribery. As a result, the prospect of a “Nationalist International,” entertained by the likes of Bannon, remains firmly in the domain of fever dream—and will likely stay there for the remainder of this administration. That might not be much of a consolation—but it is better than the alternative.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC.
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It is perhaps not an accident that an island figures prominently in the horrifically appalling Epstein scandal. The scandal, which now implicates a wide swathe of America’s elite, brings together one fantasy of modernity and one of its most atrocious moral horrors.
Islands have often been the places where modernity has staged its worst delusions. In the 18th century imagination, islands were, symbolically speaking, spaces where one could safely escape all moral norms and sexual prohibitions; they promised unlimited indulgence, but one that did not imperil mainstream society, precisely because they were exceptional and offshore. The image of the exceptional relaxation of norms—i.e. “offshoring”—applies to financial crimes, too. It is a form of evasion that does not imperil the system as a whole. To offshore crime, sexual violence, indulgence and financial perfidy is threatening but also reassuring. After all, it is offshore.
This was, of course, always a delusion. Financial offshoring is not a peripheral matter; it magnifies the crimes of the financial center. Similarly, elite actors apparently thought they could carry out their worst desires without contaminating the center. What those who came into Jeffrey Epstein’s orbit were enacting was not a fantasy of freedom, a revolt against prohibitions or norms. What they were enacting was an aspect of the horrific logic of modernity: An extraordinary pornification of the imagination, sexual exploitation and commodification of bodies, and total abjection in the pursuit of power. And it is an elite that seems to combine violent impunity with emotional immaturity.
There are so many angles to the Epstein files. Have all the files been released? Will the victims’ rights be protected? Given that both Democrats and Republicans are implicated, who stands to benefit? The files provide a sobering x-ray of some of America’s elites: immature, full of impunity, corrupt, venal, venial, and venereal all at once. They also provide a sobering view of global politics: There are no grand purposes, not even a political economy. Instead, what we get is a world run by huckstering middlemen, vulnerable personalities, fragile egos. They’re the perfect embodiment of Oswald Spengler’s figures of moral decline: clever, skeptical, but licentious and morally exhausted.
What decisions are such immature and fragile men capable of? The puzzle is how Epstein managed to put himself at the center of so much geopolitics; the fact that so many global powers felt they had to go through him is remarkable. He comes across as both a figure of great evil and an agony aunt for the powerful, including powerful countries.
The consequences will play out over time. Who knows what skeletons will tumble out? But, as always, the response is revealing. There was initial reluctance to confront the matter in both political parties, and it has taken years—and legislation introduced by Thomas Massie and Ro Khanna—to get the release of the files moving. Yet there is still, arguably, a shroud of silence. Yes, there is gossip and chatter, but it is almost a way of not confronting the central question: How could a society produce an elite of this kind? Imagine if this kind of story had broken about the ruling class of any other country. Every colonial trope of debauchery or orientalism would have shaped the coverage.
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But the response is revealing in three deeper ways. First, though there is partisan bickering, there is still a kind of attempt to exceptionalize the behavior of this ruling class. Like earlier colonial and island imaginaries, it functions as a bounded zone in which elite actors can suspend norms without contaminating the moral order of the center.
Second, there is a pathology of modern political life, where power is not legitimized or justified through virtue, but through opacity, brazenness, legalese, propaganda, and procedural shenanigans. So much energy will go into legalese when the horrors are in plain sight.
Third, there is a shadow that haunts modernity—the way in which we make sense of vice in public space. The only great historians who let us grasp this moment are the Romans: Tacitus, Sallust, and Livy. They located sexual decadence and violence at the very center of power, treating excess as a sign, and, in some cases, a cause of political decline. We moderns, of course, are supposedly more sophisticated. We distinguish between public and private. For us, corruption is not about virtue; it is a matter of institutional containment. In The Machiavellian Moment, the historian and theorist of the politics of virtue, J.G.A. Pocock, noted a paradox at the heart of modernity. Unlike the Romans, we do not think decadence, especially sexual decadence, tells us much about the decay of societies. Usually, the causes are structural—economic or political. Yet, Pocock argued, the republican category of virtue survives. It may not have explanatory force, but we cannot entirely abandon the language of virtue, or the sneaking suspicion that, even if sexual decadence is not causal of other issues, it is revealing.
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There are, of course, outstanding issues in the Epstein files that need to be addressed—people who committed crimes in legal terms, people who engaged in morally reprehensible behavior, and people who themselves are not individually guilty but who condoned what was happening. The Epstein files are not about individual guilt or innocence; they are about the nature of collective power. And when, within that collectivity, elites abused sexual, financial, legal, political, and even intellectual power without shame and with impunity, one has to wonder whether the Roman historians were onto something: They envisioned empires collapsing when elites could no longer restrain themselves in any aspect of their lives. An elite so needy, greedy, and now so vulnerable can hardly be trusted to exercise good judgment.
The dilemma, as the Romans knew, is this: An elite of this kind has no authority left. Even in power, it is fearful; who knows what violence it enacts to cover its own tracks? On the other hand, if the elite gets away with it, the road is open to moral nihilism, a point we are dangerously close to reaching.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research and a Visiting Professor at Princeton University.
A version of this article was originally published at Indian Express.
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There are two explanations for why the United States ends up with the policies it does.
The first blames corruption. For example, six in ten Americans favor a national health plan like Medicare-for-all. That we haven’t adopted such a policy, and instead maintain an awkwardly assembled Rube Goldberg system—hybrid, employer-based, inconsistent—should be taken as damning evidence for the perversion of the democratic process. So you follow the money. Check the backgrounds of legislators who oppose the expansion of entitlements, or even favor more modest reforms, and you’ll find a speaking gig at UnitedHealthcare or a past internship at Novartis. Head to OpenSecrets and pull the donor file; it’ll show you who’s really boss.
The second explanation appreciates just how complicated politics can be. Whenever single-payer bursts onto the national stage—Bill Clinton in 1993, Bernie Sanders in 2016—it triggers the same alarms: wait times will increase for elective surgery, end-of-life care will be rationed by “death panels,” taxes will rise even if premiums and copays fall, and the killer: you will have to give up the health care plan you like.
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An overwhelming 82% of Americans say they’re satisfied with their health care coverage. These people, the second explanation admits, aren’t bought off. The polling at any given moment might look like a social-democratic supermajority in waiting, but you can bet that when the conversation kicks off again, and kitchen tables and comment sections start swarming once more with arguments about Harry and Louise or Cadillac taxes, the objections will invariably snap back. In a system that requires broad agreement across election cycles and within individual states to get things done, these are no small hurdles.
In our age of populist suspicion, many people—whether it’s the activist left, the technocratic center, or the libertarian right—reflexively say that it’s money ghostwriting our opponents’ politics. Today, nearly three-quarters of Americans believe that corruption is the main threat to our future, rating it above economic collapse or terrorism. For a country said to be irreparably polarized, it’s a remarkable point of consensus.
Yet the real story is much more complicated. Research suggests that the pernicious influence of money in politics is overstated—and, when adopted as an article of faith, this narrative risks distracting reformers from actually convincing voters.
The empirical case for the simplest version of the corruption story—call it the quid pro quo story—is shakier than is often assumed. Decades of scholarship has failed to identify a systematic causal link between congressional donations and roll-call votes. Effects shrink once you account for a politician’s existing ideology and the preferences of voters in the district. Money usually flows toward candidates who already share donors’ views, rather than flipping preferences. This is not to overlook the very real examples of corruption in the Trump era—meme coins for crypto-billionaire foreign nationals, Qatari jets, and Mar-a-Lago dinners. But they seem to be a glaring exception to a baseline of propriety.
There are contexts in which concentrated interests matter more: the low-salience, technical fights where voters aren’t as vigilant. Sugar subsidies are a classic example. Political scientist Kevin Grier and colleagues found that targeted contributions from the sugar industry are associated with more reluctance to reform subsidies.
But that is a world away from the biggest, most visible issues where voters are louder and more organized, such as top marginal tax rates, gun control, and immigration. If ambitious politicians want re-election, they don’t start by trying to convince the sugar industry. They attend first to the people who can actually fire them: the voters.
Then there’s the idea that there is too much money in politics. Yes, American political campaigns spend a lot—roughly $14.8 billion in 2024. But the scale looks awfully different in context. That same year, holiday shopping was forecast at nearly $1 trillion; Americans spent north of $100 billion a year on their pets. As Harvard political scientist Stephen Ansolabehere and colleagues put it in a 2003 article, the big puzzle is why there is so little money in U.S. politics relative to the size of the prize.
While politicians need money to run a competitive campaign, it’s far from the master key that turns them into puppets dancing on purse strings. In practice, other factors—message, charisma, timing, experience, attention, name recognition, and incumbency—matter more for electoral success. Massive spending advantages often flop: think Mike Bloomberg in 2020, or Jeb Bush in 2016. Kamala Harris outraised Donald Trump by nearly $900 million, and we know what happened there. In these high-attention contests, where voters are already familiar with the issues and candidates, advertising mostly reinforces prior views and money has diminishing returns.
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Money matters more in lower-information races. Fresh-faced challengers’ electoral success rises in direct proportion to their level of spending. Yet even in these cases, where results seem to hinge on money, the villains are misunderstood. The war chests of corporate political action committees (PACs) are, confusingly, not funded directly by corporations but by small-dollar checks from individual employees, capped at $5000 a year. Many of the biggest PACs aren’t even corporate PACs but labor PACs like the Machinists/Aerospace Workers Union, which outraise many corporate PACs in total contributions. All PACs operate under strict limits on what they can give directly to candidates, with, again, a maximum of $5000 per candidate per year.
There is a bigger villain: Super PACs that can raise unlimited amounts of money for campaign advertising. Here, the story is far more concerning—but it is still more complicated than the slogans suggest.
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court was reluctant to limit independent spending on political speech and advertisements because of the First Amendment. Citizens United v. FEC (2010) extended these protections to allow unlimited independent campaign expenditures by corporations. The ruling is deeply unpopular for obvious reasons: such spending can feel like politics done over voters’ heads, by people the public did not choose. The facts bear that out, in part: nearly half of Super PAC contributions post-Citizens United have come from just 25 mega-donors.
But opponents often overstate how bad Buckley and Citizens United are for the integrity of our elections. An earlier equivalent of the Super PAC was a feature of elections until 1975, when they were temporarily curbed. Their recent rise may simply be a return to the norm. While campaign spending has increased since Citizens United, it has done so at a slower rate than before the decision. And even where there are increases, this could have some positive effects. It is difficult for insurgent or first-time campaigns to raise money, so Super PAC spending can actually amplify public participation and reduce the time challenger campaigns spend dialing for dollars. In fact, the incumbent re-election rate since Citizens United is lower than at any time since 1974—which should allay fears that money is just helping entrench an unpopular political class.
Then there is lobbying. Interest groups can and do shape the political agenda during the symbolic and preliminary phases of lawmaking. Amy McKay’s work comparing lobbying letters with Senate committee amendments finds striking overlap in language—sometimes nearly identical text—suggesting that interest groups shape what is drafted and considered, especially in low-salience, technical domains neglected by voters.
But this is not the same as “buying” a vote. When lobbyists argue with politicians during in-person meetings, give short-staffed offices fact sheets before a hearing, or conduct grassroots campaigns in congressional districts, they are engaging with the democratic process in a constitutionally-protected way, raising the salience of certain issues or giving political actors the language or numbers to defend a position they already share. Their work is persuasion through speech, and politicians can choose to agree or disagree with what they hear. These lobbyists do not simply work on behalf of big business; they work for nonprofits and unions, too. In fact, reporting suggests that some of the most effective lobbyists of the Biden era were on the economic and social left: the American Federation of Teachers influencing COVID-19 school guidance, the Debt Collective providing frameworks for student loan cancellation, or the Environmental Defense Fund pushing the Inflation Reduction Act.
Why, then, are simplistic corruption stories so compelling? It’s partly because it’s hard to believe that billions of dollars wouldn’t derail political incentives. It’s partly, too, because our system is designed to frustrate us, empowering action only after intense persuasion, coalition-building, and persistence across states and election cycles. Our record gridlock, set against a backdrop of more money than ever in our politics, leads people to think that something scandalous is taking place. But it might be more accurate to view our current stasis as driven by sincere disagreement about where to go from here.
Part of the reason we’re so unable to deal with one another is that we’re taught to view politics primarily as a clash of interests—as a series of tight-fisted power grabs—rather than as a contest among sincere claims about the common good. The Great Compromise of 1787—which created America’s bicameral legislature—can be glossed, like many K-12 civic classrooms do, as a battle between small and big states over economic power. By this view, each party in a political conflict self-consciously pursues their narrow self-interest, each only begrudgingly giving ground to get things done.
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But spending time in DC or a statehouse makes you understand that most political actors are sincere in their convictions. Those politicians derided as “Establishment” or “corporate” are likely acting on real judgments about their constituents’ interests rather than on a comically-large check being slid across the table.
The greatest attraction of the simplistic corruption frame is that it flatters our worst instincts. If your opponents are bankrolled by the NRA, you don’t have to contend with the tradeoff between having fewer guns and living in a country with a citizenry able to defend itself. If the opposition to green energy is just fossil fuel companies buying votes, you don’t need to reckon with dislocation in communities centered around refineries.
None of this means corruption reformers’ work is pointless. The Trump administration has shown itself to be more than capable of flouting the traditional rules around money and influence. But we’re kidding ourselves if we think that passing some reforms reining in the top 1% will fix our politics—that we will get the gun buyback, or universal basic income, or solar farms we really want, and that it was only Big Everything stopping us.
The primary danger of overweening corruption narratives is not that they’re false. It’s that they become a lazy substitute for the difficult work of persuading our opponents.
Siddhu Pachipala studies political science at MIT. His writing has appeared in The New York Times, CNN, and Slate.
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Francis Fukuyama is joined by Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein to discuss why Donald Trump’s regime can be described as “patrimonial,” how this approach leads to high corruption, and why reversing it will pose special challenges.
Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein are professors of political science at William and Mary College and the University of California, Irvine, respectively.
You can watch the full conversation below:
All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.
Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.
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It’s been exactly a month since special forces snatched Nicolás Maduro and his wife from bed and bundled them into an American prison. For Venezuelans, it’s been a disorienting experience: the dictator is gone, but the dictatorship is still there.
For now, we know Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s new and technically still “interim” president, will do pretty much anything to stay in power and keep Venezuela autocratic. As a blockbuster report in The Guardian revealed, Delcy more or less explicitly sold Maduro out to the gringos on January 3, pledging her cooperation with Trump ahead of the extraction operation. For Delcy, survival trumps everything, and if that means kowtowing to Trump, so be it.
One way of looking at it is that Bolivarian socialism, never the most ideologically coherent of movements, has deepened its schizophrenia. A movement that stood for nothing if not anti-imperialism shape-shifted into a willing vassal of Washington literally overnight, under the leadership of insiders who until 15 minutes ago counted themselves as the most anti-imperialist of the anti-imperialists. This weird, disjointed reality seems hardly sustainable, though in the funhouse mirror world of Trump 2.0 geopolitics, anything goes.
If political opening is your priority, the regime’s ghastly prisons are the emblem of authoritarian control. So far, signals have been mixed. Out of nearly a thousand political prisoners, roughly 300 had been released as of late January. But prominent opposition figures—including Freddy Superlano, a former lawmaker, Perkins Rocha, a lawyer for exiled opposition leader María Corina Machado, and Juan Pablo Guanipa, former vice president of the National Assembly—remain behind bars. Machado herself, appearing on CBS this weekend, noted that not a single military political prisoner has been freed.
Worse yet, even as old prisoners are released, new ones are coming in to replace them: soon after the extraction, the regime approved a decree making it a crime to celebrate Maduro’s capture. Reports circulate of peasants in their sixties being trundled away for firing celebratory gunshots in the air.
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And yet, the news is not all bad. After years of stagnation, the economy got a shot in the arm when millions of dollars from oil sales to the United States got deposited into a moribund banking system. Disorienting absolutely everyone, some grocery prices have started to go down, giving people hope that at least in the short term, things are looking up. Some of Venezuela’s eight million displaced people stopped dreaming of coming home and started planning to. They know they won’t be returning to a free country, but they hope they’ll be heading to one that’s minimally functional.
Still, whatever you want to call what’s happening in Venezuela, a political opening it is not. The question everyone is asking themselves is: Can this rump regime possibly hope to keep power now that its powerlessness has been so humiliatingly established?
Alas, it might.
How? By exploiting the fault line that runs straight through the center of the Trump administration itself.
President Trump has been up front about what he wants from Venezuela: oil. He has said so plainly, repeatedly, and with zero ambiguity. On the day Maduro was captured, Trump told reporters he would send American companies to “spend billions of dollars” fixing Venezuelan oil infrastructure. Three days later, his administration announced a deal for 30 to 50 million barrels. The “why” isn’t particularly subtle: the companies he has tapped to execute this opening have proven track records of corruption (more on them in a minute).
The irony here is thick. Hugo Chávez, the late founder of the Venezuelan regime, spent years vehemently arguing that the only reason America was interested in Venezuela was the oil. Trump, whether he realizes it or not, is fully incarnating the ugly America the chavista revolution was born to fight against. Now that a living caricature of American imperialism is actually in power, the chavista elite has suddenly lost interest in resistance.
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To the extent there’s any reason for Venezuelans to be optimistic, it’s because Venezuela policy is being implemented not by Trump, but by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Deny it though he will, Rubio’s approach is plainly different from the president’s. At his Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on January 28, Rubio laid out a three-phase plan: first, stabilize oil flows; second, create conditions for political reconciliation, including amnesty and the return of exiled opposition figures; third, democratic transition.
Rubio told senators he wants “a friendly, stable, prosperous Venezuela—and democratic, in which all elements of society are represented in free and fair elections.” He acknowledged the administration is working with people who, in his own words, “have spent most of their lives living in a gangster’s paradise.” He conceded that prisoner releases were happening “slower than I would like.”
Still, it’s a recognizable agenda. Rubio is a child of Miami’s staunchly anti-communist Cuban-American culture. He gets Caribbean Communism, and he hates it. Democratizing first Venezuela and then Cuba appear to be life-long dreams. But his hand is weak.
A secretary of state can articulate all the phases he likes, but when the president’s stated priority is oil access and his measure of success is barrels delivered, the incentive structure for Delcy Rodríguez becomes perfectly legible. As long as the crude is flowing, she’ll always find a partner in the White House to put off democratization just a bit longer. Every barrel that reaches a U.S.-controlled account is a barrel that buys her another week of political survival—and another week in which Rubio’s democratic benchmarks can be deferred without consequence.
To his credit, Rubio does appear to be pressing for democratic opening, and he is seeing some success. On January 30, the regime’s rubber-stamp National Assembly, led by Delcy’s brother, Jorge Rodríguez, announced a broad amnesty law that would certainly never have seen the light of day without American pressure. Though a genuine step, the bill is framed by the Rodríguezes not as an acknowledgment of state wrongdoing but as a gesture of magnanimity—an act of clemency by the very people who ordered the imprisonments. Caracas understands that Rubio’s hand is weak, which is why the bill gives Delcy and Jorge plenty of discretion about who exactly gets released and when, and, more importantly, who gets thrown back in jail and why. It’s an appalling half measure of the type the regime has always specialized in: just enough to produce the illusion of reform without its substance.
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The fate of Venezuela’s political prisoners will remain the best gauge of whether Rubio’s strategy is working. From an imperial standpoint—and Trump’s framing is explicitly imperialist—prisoners are a secondary concern, a humanitarian gesture to be extracted when convenient so it can be boasted about on social media. For actual advocates of Venezuelan democracy, political prisoners are the whole ballgame. You cannot have a democratic transition while the state retains the power to jail its critics. You cannot have free elections while opposition leaders rot in detention and the coercive legal frameworks that can put them there at any time remain intact.
Rubio sees all of this. He told senators that “you can have elections all day, but if the opposition has no access to the media, if the opposition candidates are unable to be on the ballot, those are not free and fair elections.”
That’s the right frame. The question is whether he has the institutional power to act on it when his president is measuring success in barrels per day.
In a useful piece in the Journal of Democracy, former opposition politician Freddy Guevara identifies five possible endgames for the regime.
The one he thinks most likely—an authoritarian capitalist model in which foreign investment coexists with political repression—is also the one most compatible with Trump’s stated priorities. A Venezuela that produces oil efficiently, buys American goods, and keeps its internal politics safely autocratic is a success story as far as Mar-a-Lago is concerned. Not for Rubio. That gap—between what counts as success for the president and what counts as success for his secretary of state—is the crack in the wall that Delcy Rodríguez will try to drive a wedge through.
Rubio’s position is weak, but it is not hopeless. History is full of examples of determined agents achieving policy outcomes that their principals didn’t particularly want. The three-phase framework Rubio has articulated creates its own logic: if phase one (oil stabilization) is already underway, the expectation of phase two (political reconciliation) becomes harder to abandon without admitting the whole enterprise was a sham. Congressional oversight, particularly from hawkish Cuban-American members who share Rubio’s instincts, provides institutional backup.
If we were in a parallel universe where President Rubio was in full control of American policy, I wouldn’t feel too bad about the prospects for democratization.
But under President Trump? Well, let’s see.
The administration’s first major oil sales—worth roughly $500 million—were brokered through Vitol and Trafigura, two commodity trading houses that were handed no-bid licenses to move Venezuelan crude. Both firms have recent histories that would, in a functioning anti-corruption regime, disqualify them from precisely this kind of work. In 2020, Vitol paid $135 million to resolve DOJ charges that it bribed officials in Ecuador, Brazil, and Mexico; a Vitol trader later pleaded guilty to bribing officials at state oil companies in Mexico and Ecuador. In 2024, Trafigura pleaded guilty to conspiring to bribe Brazilian officials and paid over $126 million. Vitol’s senior trader on the Venezuela deal, John Addison, donated $6 million to Trump’s 2024 campaign. Revenue from the sales flows into U.S.-controlled accounts in Qatar, with no congressional oversight mechanism, no inspector general, and no public accounting of how proceeds are disbursed.
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The reality is that the kleptocracy Donald Trump is instituting in Washington and the one Delcy Rodríguez leads in Caracas are two peas in a pod. The confluence of interest is not subtle. Both sides want oil money flowing with minimal scrutiny. Both sides benefit from opacity, and both prefer a transaction to a transformation. Which is why, when push comes to shove, Marco Rubio is probably going to realize that there are forces at work here beyond the control of a mere Secretary of State.
If, in spite of all of this, Rubio manages to exploit Trump’s inattention and force real democratic reforms—a lasting, broad-based amnesty, opposition media access, a credible electoral timeline—he will have pulled off something remarkable. Generations of Venezuelans will owe him a debt.
But if the fiction collapses, and oil access becomes the ceiling rather than the floor of American ambition, then the continuation of Venezuelan autocracy won’t have been imposed by the Rodríguez siblings alone. It will have been co-signed by Washington.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion and the founder of Caracas Chronicles. Like eight million other Venezuelans, he was forced to flee Venezuela’s dictatorship.
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Ruud Koopmans is Research Director at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and Professor of Sociology and Migration Research at Humboldt University Berlin. He is also a member of the German federal government’s Advisory Committee on Islamism.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ruud Koopmans discuss the role of cultural difference in integration, how selective versus non-discretionary migration systems shape integration outcomes, and whether generous welfare states help or hinder immigrant integration.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I am going to start the conversation with an impossibly broad question. European societies were comparatively homogeneous, not as homogeneous as people sometimes claim, and they had all kinds of forms of diversity within them, but they were certainly mostly composed of people who had longstanding origins in Europe and mostly in the geography of those nations seventy or so years ago. There has been significant immigration since then. How has that transformed the European continent, and how is that experience going?
Ruud Koopmans: I have to admit, I thought for a long time that it would not change Europe very much. We in Europe were looking at the experience of classical immigration countries like the United States and Canada, and there it seemed to have worked out well. My assumption was that this would also be the case for Europe.
I must say, in the last fifteen years or so, and especially since October 7, we are seeing that this is actually changing Europe, and not only for the good. There is definitely a good side to increasing diversity, in the sense of a wider palette of culinary choices and more life choice options in general.
There is a dark side, and that dark side has become much more visible recently in the form of jihadist attacks, the growing influence of Islamism and religious fundamentalism, and partly reversals of hard-fought liberal achievements, such as the possibility of being gay and walking hand in hand with your boyfriend through the city, or being Jewish and expressing your religion without fear of being attacked.
In those domains, we have seen partial reversals, especially in larger cities, where the percentage of immigrants has grown to such an extent that people with a migration background are now in the majority.
Mounk: One thing that has struck me, which was relatively obvious when I was young and has only become more obvious since, is that there are similarities between the experience of immigration in North America and Western Europe, but also important dissimilarities. Perhaps the most important of these is that in the United States, if you bet against integration, you almost always lose.
Samuel Huntington is a political scientist I greatly admire who made many contributions to the study of political science before his famous book on the clash of civilizations and before his last and most controversial books about Latino immigrants. He was wrong in that last book in particular in which he argued that Latino immigration to the United States would fundamentally transform the country, that English would no longer be the dominant language, and that Latinos had completely different values.
When you look at the trajectory of Latino communities in the United States, particularly second- and third-generation Latinos, they are fully integrated into American life. Many of the fears Huntington expressed have not materialized. When you look at someone who was born and raised in the United States, it is very rare for them to appear as anything other than straightforwardly American, to feel that way, and to be treated that way.
It is striking that in Europe, in many countries, this is not the case. People who were born and raised in Germany, the Netherlands, France, or the United Kingdom, sometimes even people whose parents or grandparents arrived there decades ago, still feel, and are often treated as, not truly members of society in the same way.
What explains that? Is it the different historical origin point, that American societies are immigration societies where the vast majority of the population has a background of migration? Is it institutions today that make integration harder in Germany than in the United States? Is it cultural attitudes, or exclusionary attitudes on the part of the majority? If you agree with the basic diagnosis, what explains it? If you do not agree, what did I get wrong?
Koopmans: I agree with your diagnosis that integration is much more difficult in the European context than in North America. Huntington was not the only one who was mistaken about Latino immigrants. There is a famous article by Aristide Zolberg of the New School for Social Research in New York with the title Islam Is Like Spanish.
The comparison is that the problem of integrating Spanish-language immigrants in the United States would be the same as integrating Muslim immigrants in the European context. I think that comparison is mistaken on many counts. First, on the simple grounds that languages can be combined. You do not have to give up Spanish in order to learn English, but you cannot be Muslim and non-Muslim at the same time. Religion is a much more exclusive identity, and it is also a much more sticky identity.
Mounk: One of the striking findings about language in the United States, if I remember rightly, and you’re better up on this literature, is that people who immigrate to the United States often do not learn very good English. If they come as adults and are not very highly educated, they often struggle to be fluent in English for the rest of their lives.
Just the other day in Brooklyn, I saw a small construction site outside my house. A guy driving a truck was being spoken to in English and he could not respond. He basically did not speak a word of English, and they had to find somebody who spoke Spanish to talk to him.
The children of immigrants are usually bilingual. They usually speak both languages very well, and they usually prefer to speak English with their peers. Even though they are quite fluent in the heritage language, by the third generation there is only about one percent of people who still speak the language of origin in the United States. Only about one percent of third-generation Latinos have any real command of Spanish, which is a shame, but it tells you how easily that transition happens.
Koopmans: That is the same in the European context. There is really no difference there. It goes to show that language is a dimension of cultural difference that is very easy to integrate, also because you do not need to assimilate it. Even in cases where people do not learn the language of the country of immigration, they basically only hurt themselves. They hurt their chances for social mobility by not speaking English or not speaking German in the German context, but it does not bother anybody else because there is no value conflict tied to language.
That makes religion fundamentally different. You see that as well when you look at norms and values. The World Values Survey has mapped cultural values across the world, and it is very visible there. If we look at Latin America, the cultural distance between Latin America and the United States, or between Latin America and Europe, is relatively small. It is about as large as the cultural distance between Eastern and Western Europe, or between Catholic and Protestant countries in Europe. These are not identical cultures, but they are relatively similar.
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The large cultural differences are between Western Europe, North America, Australia, and Sub-Saharan Africa and the Muslim world. That is where the big cultural differences lie. That makes integrating people who come from countries with a larger cultural distance more difficult. There is also a major difference in the composition of the immigrant population in the United States or Canada compared to Europe.
In Europe, Muslim immigrants make up a very large share of the immigrant population, whereas they are a much smaller segment of the immigrant population in Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Mounk: Tell us a little bit about those cultural differences. I want to get to the second point, but first tell us a little bit about them, especially for people who might be more skeptical about cultural arguments in general. In parts of the debate, saying that some immigrants are more culturally proximate to the majority population than others is itself seen as a word that many people dislike, often described as problematic.
When you are looking at something like the World Values Survey and finding those kinds of differences, and saying that Latin American countries are relatively more similar to North America and Western Europe in terms of cultural attitudes than other populations, what kind of questions is this based on? How reliable are these analyses? Tell us a little bit about why we should have confidence in that statement.
Koopmans: These cultural differences show themselves, for instance, in attitudes on gender relations, the relations between men and women, whether women should be subordinate to men. A typical question would be whether a university education is more important for boys than for girls.
They also appear in attitudes toward homosexuality, toward divorce, and toward authority relationships within the family. Another typical question is whether the most important thing for a child is not to disappoint their parents, or whether children should be obedient to their parents. These are the kinds of values being measured.
Mounk: To what extent is this a question about a stage of economic development as opposed to different cultural regions? I grew up in Germany, you can go back to cultural attitudes about gender in Germany forty or fifty years ago and see that they were much more conservative than they are today.
My mom was a single mom who was a musician and a conductor, and it was very difficult for her to find ways to make sure that people were looking after me because the idea of a German kindergarten in the 1980s, even in big cities like Munich, was that it would open from ten to twelve in the morning and from three to five in the afternoon. That was supposed to allow the mother, who was presumably a housewife, to go shopping without her kid crying and perhaps have a coffee with a friend.
The idea of a working mother was still somewhat culturally suspect. You are talking in part about the Muslim world here, and that may be right, but Iran, which is a comparatively developed country within the Muslim world, has, I believe, more women in university today than men. Clearly, some things do change. Is this a difference you see even at the same or comparable levels of economic development, or is this simply a question of what economic stage a country is at?
Koopmans: It is both. There is clearly a relationship between levels of socioeconomic development and these kinds of values. But even at the same level of modernization or socioeconomic development, there are differences. Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, for instance, are extremely rich, but they still hold very conservative values. Turkey is at a level of economic development that is not below, and probably above, several Latin American countries, yet the value distance to Turkey is larger than the value distance to Latin America. So it is a combination of both factors.
The same applies to countries in South and East Asia. These countries are not socioeconomically richer than many countries in the Muslim world, yet they hold values that are closer to those of Western Europe and North America. One important aspect here is the role of religion in society, such as whether religious rules should form the basis of social organization or whether religious leaders should play an important role in politics. These are typical questions in these surveys. Southeast and East Asian countries tend to be relatively close to Western countries on these dimensions, whereas countries in the Muslim world and Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be at a greater cultural distance.
When I refer to Sub-Saharan Africa, I am also talking about countries that are majority Christian. This is not exclusively a Muslim phenomenon. There is also a very traditional and orthodox form of Christianity that is especially prevalent in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Mounk: Values were the first explanation you were giving and then I cut you off to dive into that in more detail, but you had other things on your list.
Koopmans: The second factor is whether migration has happened primarily selectively, on the conditions set by the country of immigration, which has a points system, a visa system, or a lottery system, as the United States partly has, where you set certain criteria and certain numbers of immigrants that you allow in on a yearly basis, or whether immigration happens spontaneously, basically non-discretionary migration, as it is called in the scientific literature, where the receiving country does not have the possibility to say no.
That is the case, on the one hand, for refugee and asylum migration, where there is international law that says that somebody who wants to claim asylum has a right of entry and a right to an asylum procedure, and also the right to protection against expulsion, which de facto means that most people who come in as asylum seekers, regardless of whether they are accepted or rejected, can stay in the end.
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The second important part of non-discretionary migration is family migration, where again we have universal human rights that make it very difficult to limit family migration. If you then compare Western Europe to the classical immigration countries, you see that the vast majority of immigration to a country like the United States, and even more so with Canada and Australia, is discretionary. It happens on the conditions and criteria set by the country of immigration. By contrast, the vast majority of migration to Europe is non-discretionary. It consists of asylum migration and family migration.
The consequences of this are very visible. If you look at the Turkish population in the United States, it has a higher level of education than the average American. If you look at the Turkish population in Germany or Austria, it has a much lower level of education. The same is true for Nigerians. Nigerians are highly educated and a very successful group in the United States, but in Europe they are a group you find at the bottom of the ladder.
That is because they often come in as irregular immigrants, they claim asylum, they usually do not get asylum because there is very little political persecution in Nigeria, and they are basically economic migrants. They can nonetheless stay, and they are very often unemployed.
Mounk: When you look at the success of particular immigrant groups in the United States, the reason is often that they were predominantly H-1B migrants. Now, of course, often it is the children and grandchildren of H-1B migrants. That applies to Indian Americans, Nigerian Americans, Pakistani Americans, many of whom have ancestors who originally entered the United States in the 1970s when there was a shortage of doctors, for example, on H-1B visas.
They then had children who also tended to be successful. Often they were able to bring in other family members later through family migration. On the whole, the sibling of a doctor is also likely to come from a relatively high social class with relatively high levels of education. These are extremely successful immigrant groups.
I think you are right that when you look at the countries that have been most successful at integrating immigrants, it tends to be Australia and Canada. What those two places have in common is that they have historically been able to select migrants. Australia is an island that is far away, and Canada, while it has a very large border with the United States, does not have a large border with poorer countries in its region. People who reach the United States generally remain there.
To what extent do you think this first point and the second point are in conflict with each other? When you look at Canada, it has invited many people from cultures that you say are less proximate to Canada. Canada has a substantial number of immigrants from the Muslim world and a significant number from Sub-Saharan Africa. Because these migrants are highly selected, with something like two thirds of immigrants having at least a college degree, this tends to work very well.
As long as you are selecting on those criteria, does the degree of cultural fit matter much less, or do you think it remains important even when you use a selective point system like the ones in Canada and Australia?
Koopmans: It is hard to say because it is not true that Canada has a similar-size Muslim population as European countries. In the European context, we are talking about anywhere between six and ten percent of the population right now that is Muslim. That includes people from Muslim countries who are not Muslim or who are no longer Muslim. That is a sizable and rapidly growing part of the population. In the United States, Canada, and Australia, we are talking about two to three percent. So we are talking about a magnitude that is two to three times smaller than in Europe.
This is combined with the fact that the highly educated parts of the populations of these Muslim countries tend to be less strongly religious and more secular oriented. I know Turkey quite well because my wife is from Turkey. The Turkish immigrants in the United States, and my brother-in-law is one of them, come from a substratum of Turkish society that is very secular. Some of them may call themselves Muslim in name, but they definitely do not adhere to more orthodox or fundamentalist forms of religiosity.
What I mean to say is that this migration of highly educated elites from these countries is not just selective in the sense that these are more highly educated people who integrate more easily in a socioeconomic sense, but also selective in the sense that they are culturally much more proximate. The global culture of the highly educated elite is very similar across countries around the world.
Mounk: Okay, so we’ve talked about culture, we’ve talked about selectivity. What about other factors? Does the generosity of a welfare state play a role, for example?
Koopmans: That was precisely the third factor that I wanted to mention. That also makes a big difference. In Europe, at least in northwestern Europe, we have relatively developed welfare states, even though there have of course been cutbacks since the 1990s. They are not as extensive as they used to be, but still the level of social welfare provision is much higher in northwestern Europe than it is in the United States, and even higher than in Canada or Australia.
I am not just talking about unemployment benefits or social welfare payments, but also the education system and the health system. That is a major factor. Health care in most European countries is very egalitarian in the sense that you do not need private insurance to get good health care. It does not cost much money, or it does not cost any money, to get a good education for your children. If you do not have the money to pay for it yourself, the state provides scholarships.
These welfare states offer a lot. At the same time, they are financed by a relatively high level of taxation compared to North America. That has two consequences for migration flows. On the one hand, it makes Europe a very attractive destination for people with low human capital and lower levels of education, who do not necessarily have the skill sets to be successful in the labor market of a developed country. I am not saying that people migrate in order to become dependent on social welfare, but they know that even if they do not find a job, they will still be able to live a relatively decent life, get a good education for their children, and enjoy a good level of health care.
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At the same time, it makes Europe less attractive for those with very high levels of skill and education that are sought after in the labor market. Take the proverbial Indian computer engineer. If this person looks at the different global options for migrating to Europe or to the United States, the income, and certainly the net income after taxes and social security payments, that they can earn in the United States is much higher than in Europe. Europe is therefore more attractive to migrants who are more difficult to integrate into the labor market and less attractive to highly skilled migrants. That is something Europe is realizing at its own expense right now. It is very difficult for Europe to compete globally for highly educated, skilled migrants.
Mounk: There was a story in Germany a good number of years ago when the Social Democrat-Green government wanted to give out visas to attract global talent. They talked a lot at the time about Indian IT engineers they wanted to attract. Because it was hard to get that through in Germany, there was a lot of resistance. They ended up with quite onerous restrictions on that visa.
It turned out that all of the people who were able to meet the conditions for that visa could also meet the conditions to go to the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, or Australia, and very few of them ended up coming to Germany. The quota for that kind of visa was relatively low and was not filled, if I am remembering correctly. So you are right about that.
Going back to the idea of the welfare state, I have been thinking a lot about how some of the assumptions I had about the world when I was growing up and going to university were shaped by what my professors and smart newspapers gave me. One assumption was that a more generous welfare state would be better for the integration of immigrants. If it is easier to access a good education irrespective of how much money your parents have, that will make it easier for people who come to a country without means to discover their talents, develop their skills, and integrate into the job market.
If the state comes when you arrive and says we are going to find a language course for you, that will help you learn the language of the country you are in. That presumably facilitates integration. Having better health coverage means you are not excluded from full participation in social life because you have a curable disease and are instead able to participate fully.
You have argued, I believe, that this is not the case. That in many ways the lack of welfare provision, particularly for undocumented migrants in the United States, forces people into the labor market immediately. That actually means they are more likely to learn the language, more likely to pick up skills, more likely to become culturally conversant in their new society. And that the relatively generous welfare states of certain European countries are part of what has led to a lot of social isolation among immigrant communities.
Tell us why the instinct that I had as an eighteen-year-old, which I think many people still have, and perhaps some listeners of this podcast still have, has turned out, according to you, to be wrong.
Koopmans: Yeah, the instinct that you had, or maybe still have, is also the instinct that I had, and it is the instinct that was behind the relatively lenient and laissez-faire integration policies that Europe originally had. What people did not realize, and what I did not realize initially, is that the welfare state changes the incentive structure for immigrants, especially if immigrants are not highly educated, have a high risk of becoming dependent on welfare benefits, and come from countries with a very low level of welfare, where people are not used to very high aspiration standards.
If we look at the immigration that has taken place to Europe since 2011–12, since the start of the civil war in Syria and the revolts and civil wars of the Arab Spring in other countries, these were to a large extent people with a very low level of education. Especially the women among them often had no education whatsoever or were illiterate to a considerable extent, and they came from conservative cultures where participation of women in the labor market is not a social norm, or where it is a social norm for women to stay at home. Syria, for instance, was, pre–civil war, the country with the second-lowest labor market participation of women in the world after Yemen.
If these people came to the United States, with a very low level of welfare provision, it would be natural for them to do everything they can to be successful in the labor market, to get a job, and to earn the money they need to afford education for their children. In the European context, what we see happening is that a very large share of these refugees who came in over the last ten to fifteen years are still dependent on social welfare benefits. Because of their low level of education, women often work in jobs where they do not earn enough money, according to welfare standards in a country like Germany, to afford a decent living, so they receive additional welfare payments. With every child they have, they receive more welfare payments. You can receive thousands of dollars a month in welfare payments if you have a family with a couple of children. That can quickly add up to more than a single person with a low level of education can earn in the labor market.
The incentive structure is such that it often does not make sense to look for work, and it definitely does not make sense for women to take up a job if that goes against cultural norms. As a theoretical story, both of these scenarios make sense, but if you look at the actual data, it is the second one, the one about the incentive structures of the welfare state, that is the predominant outcome. More than half of the people on welfare benefits in Germany and in the Netherlands are either first- or second-generation immigrants.
Mounk: I am very struck by a comparison that is somewhat surprising, which is that of Soviet Jews. A lot of Soviet Jews left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, both because of significant levels of antisemitism at the time and because of the general chaos of the Russian economy after the fall of communism. A number of them ended up in Germany and a number ended up in the United States. These things are never completely random, but they were relatively comparable populations.
In particular, the populations had a clear majority of people with not just college degrees, but postgraduate degrees. It was a very highly educated population from urban centers who had held relatively good jobs in the Soviet economy. If I remember this correctly from a study I saw many years ago, about three percent of Soviet Jews who ended up in the United States experienced long-term unemployment, a very small number. Something like sixty percent of Soviet Jews who ended up in Germany experienced long-term unemployment.
The reason for this was not just incentives, where a more generous welfare state made it easier for someone who was perhaps fifty years old at the time of migration to say that integrating into a new society and finding a new job was really difficult, and that they might instead remain on welfare until retirement. It was also barriers to entry. If you were a professor in the Soviet Union, you could probably become a teacher in the United States relatively easily. It might take a year to learn the language well enough and a year to obtain some kind of teaching certification, and then you could work in education.
In Germany, by contrast, you would have had to return to the first semester of university and complete five or seven years of study in order to qualify. The children of those immigrants were very successful in the United States and very successful in Germany as well, because a lot of that educational and social capital traveled across generations. They were young enough to go to German schools, understand how the system worked, and perform very well. But the contrast between the two older generations was striking. The older generation struggled much more in the European context.
What does that mean? If you were to design a welfare system from scratch, which elements actually help integration and which elements harm integration? Presumably, helping people access language lessons should be a good thing. The state saying, here is a way to spend two or three months in a language school learning the language of your host country, seems helpful. Having basic access to health care also seems positive for integration outcomes.
But perhaps I am wrong about that. Which elements do you think actually facilitate integration, and where do you start to see a real trade-off between the benefits given to poor and vulnerable people and the counterproductive effects those benefits can have on successful integration into society?
Koopmans: I think we are going through an interesting social experiment in Europe now with the migration of Ukrainians. The approach Germany has chosen is quite different from that of some other European countries, for instance the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the idea is that you should get a job as soon as you can.
In Germany, the idea is that you should first learn the language. The state pays for the language course, and during the time of the language course you do not have to take up work. You have a right to social welfare. What we are seeing now is that the level of labor market participation of Ukrainians in Germany, even after a few years, is much lower than it is in the Netherlands and in most other European countries.
Of course, the jobs that Ukrainians, mostly Ukrainian women, then have in countries such as the Netherlands are not necessarily jobs at their level of qualification, because they do not yet know the language and may not have precisely the same educational credentials that are required, although Ukraine is relatively close to Western Europe in terms of educational standards, so that does not play a very large role.
The question is whether, in the very long run, the German strategy might pay off if you view this as a form of permanent migration. But if you look at it from the point of view that this is a refugee population, and that hopefully many of these Ukrainians can soon go back to their country, then it is actually better to make them work and be part of society. In doing so, they also learn the language, make friends, and establish social contacts.
What happens in the German context is that people often spend a very long time in these language courses, which turn out not to be very efficient at actually teaching the language. There are no sanctions for not completing the course or not completing it at a sufficiently high level. If the incentive is not there that, after completing the language course, you will be able to earn more money in a job than you already receive in social benefits for yourself and your children, then the problem of the incentive structure remains.
It even becomes a disincentive to do your best in the language course, or to attend at all. These courses in Germany are free, and yet they still have problems with attendance. There is now a discussion about whether people should be sanctioned for not attending the free language course, which is ridiculous.
Mounk: Having learned a number of languages in my life, a well-taught language course can be helpful, particularly if the students in the course are all from different backgrounds, so that you have to use the local language as the lingua franca among you. But when it is not well taught, it does not help very much, even for someone who is very motivated to learn. When all of the students in the class share the same language, then probably the moment the formal lesson is over, they talk to each other in their native tongue, which is natural.
I have found that what is much more helpful for learning a language is being in situations where you have to use it because you are communicating with a friend, a boss, a coworker, someone in a service profession, or the conductor of a bus or a tram from whom you have to buy a ticket. Even just for language learning, being thrown into a job may be a more efficient way of teaching many people than sitting in a classroom like that.
What about the other question that always comes up, for good reason, when comparing the integration of Ukrainians into those societies with that of other groups? One difference is that because Ukrainian men are not allowed to leave the country for obvious military reasons, the influx of Ukrainians has mostly been women and children, whereas because of the structure of the asylum system, most asylum seekers who arrive in Europe are young men.
There is also a cultural difference here. To what extent is the receiving society more open to Ukrainians than it might be to people who come from Syria or Nigeria? More broadly, what is the role of discrimination in some of these labor-market outcomes? There is a well-established research program in sociology where CVs are sent to employers with different names, identical experience, identical grades, identical qualifications, but one name indicates someone likely born and raised in Germany, while another indicates roots in Turkey, Syria, Nigeria, or elsewhere.
It tends to be the case that people with German-sounding names receive more invitations to job interviews. Do you buy that literature? How large is that effect? How much of the difference in integration and labor-market outcomes does that actually explain?
Koopmans: You asked two different questions. The first question was the more specific one about the different perceptions and treatment of Ukrainians versus other migrants. The second question was a more general one about discrimination. Let me answer the first question first. It is shifting a little bit now as the war in Ukraine takes longer, but still, the perception and the willingness to make sacrifices for Ukrainian immigrants is definitely larger than for immigrants from Western Africa or the Middle East.
There is a good reason for that. Ukrainians are fleeing into the European Union directly from a war zone. When the war started in Ukraine, it was very clear. Russian forces were advancing, bombs were falling on Ukrainian cities, and Ukrainians were fleeing en masse over the Polish border and then on to Germany. It was obvious that these were people directly fleeing armed aggression and that Europe was the first place that could come to their aid.
That is a different situation from what we face with people from Afghanistan or Syria, where people come to Europe not directly from the war zone, but via at least one, and in many cases several, countries where they had already found refuge from political persecution or war. Syrians who came to Europe in large numbers in 2015 had, to a large extent, already been in Turkey for years. That is not the same situation as that of the Ukrainians. Closing the borders to Ukrainians at that moment would have been comparable to closing the doors, which Europe actually did, to Jews in the 1930s. So it is a different situation.
Now to the more general question about discrimination and whether I buy that literature. I am actually part of that literature. I have done that kind of research myself, and I was part of the first cross-nationally comparative study of labor market discrimination. There are two interesting results from that literature from a cross-national perspective. If I were to ask you whether you think the level of labor market discrimination is higher in Germany or in the United States, what would you answer?
Mounk: Well, I would have answered Germany, which makes me think that the true answer is the United States.
Koopmans: It’s true. Within Europe, we did a five-country study. The countries we included were Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The United Kingdom was the country with the highest level of labor market discrimination.
Mounk: This is relevant because those are the countries that actually have done comparatively better at integrating immigrants than Germany.
Koopmans: They supposedly are the ones that are more inclusive, and Germany always has the bad image of this being an ethnic nation, et cetera. But it turns out that of those countries, the lowest level of labor market discrimination was in Spain, and second was Germany. It is not just our study that shows that. Ours was unique in the sense that we had exactly the same design and the same immigrant groups that we could compare across five countries.
There have also been previous meta-studies that bring together the results of various national-level labor market discrimination studies. They showed the same thing: very high levels of discrimination in the United States, very high levels of discrimination in the United Kingdom, moderate levels in countries such as the Netherlands or Sweden, also countries that traditionally have had a relatively multicultural, inclusive integration policy, and the lowest levels in countries like Germany and Austria. So the ideas, the cliché images that people have about discrimination, are often not accurate.
If you then look at our study for Germany, for instance, there is also no significant discrimination against all immigrant groups. There are many immigrant groups that do not suffer significant discrimination or any discrimination at all. That is true for immigrants who come from other European countries. It is also true for immigrants who come from East Asian countries or from Latin America, at least in the European context.
It is not true for immigrants who come from Muslim-majority countries. It is also not true for immigrants who have a Black facial phenotype. So there is discrimination against Muslims, and there is discrimination against Black people in the European context.
Mounk: In Europe, you often include pictures of yourself in applications, right?
Koopmans: Well, not in all countries, but in the German context it is possible, and also in the Netherlands it is possible. In those countries, we did find that a Black phenotype led to discrimination, not to very high levels of discrimination, I should also say.
Mounk: I was going to ask what is the magnitude of this effect? Does this mean that you have to send six CVs rather than five CVs in order to get one callback for an interview? Or does it mean that you have to send 20 CVs rather than one CV in order to get a callback for an interview? How big of an actual difference does that make in terms of your likely rate of success?
Koopmans: A relatively small difference in the context of Germany, where we are talking about, I think we had in our study eight different professions, and we had overall invitation rates of about 52% or so. Among these discriminated groups, blacks and Muslims, we were talking about 45%. So it is lower, but still there was a fairly high chance to be invited, even if you had an application letter which indicated that you were Muslim or a photo that indicated that you were black.
Mounk: Is there any change over time in this? Has this effect gone up or down over time as far as we know, or is the literature not clear on that?
Koopmans: The studies that I know for Germany show that it is relatively constant. It has never been very large in Germany. We have several studies going further back in the past about discrimination against Turks, and that has always been relatively consistent. It is there. It is definitely significant. Therefore, it is unacceptable. To not invite people for a job interview just because of their background, race, or religion is not a good thing.
It is not something that contributes in a very major way to the chances of success on the labor market of immigration, at least in continental European countries. I am not sure about the UK, and I am also not sure about the United States. It may well be that it is much more significant there, but in the European context, it is different.
If you look at surveys, the other way to study labor market discrimination is to look at the so-called ethnic penalty. You look at levels of employment and try to explain them with level of education, age, gender, and other factors that we know generally contribute to labor market success. Usually, there is a difference that remains between ethnic groups, which is often referred to as the ethnic penalty.
In a study that I did, I looked in addition at cultural factors. I looked at self-reported language knowledge. I looked at the amount of inter-ethnic social contacts that people reported, whether their circle of friends and family consisted only of people from their own ethnic group or also of people from the country of immigration. I also looked at values about the participation of women in social life, including on the labor market.
If you include these cultural factors, you can actually explain away the remaining difference between majority ethnicities and, in this case, four different Muslim immigrant groups. Education, social capital, demography, and cultural differences explain the gap in labor market participation. We additionally asked people about their discrimination experiences and found that it had no explanatory value for their labor market outcomes.
Mounk: So how likely people are to say that they have been discriminated against does not correlate with success in the labor market.
Since you mentioned Turkish immigrants to Germany, for a little bit of context, the German government in the 1960s, when there was a need for a lot of unskilled labor in German factories, made a contract with the Turkish government and basically invited a lot of people from Turkey into the country. A lot of the time this was people from poorer regions of Turkey. Often it was people who were not in employment at the time. They were meant to be guest workers, which is the German term for this, Gastarbeiter, who would stay for a number of years and then go back. Of course, by and large, they ended up staying in Germany, or at least a certain portion ended up staying in Germany and then bringing family members with them.
Today, Turkish immigrants to Germany are, I assume, the biggest immigrant group in Germany and remain so. They were certainly the most visible immigrant group when I was growing up in the 1980s and 1990s, when we talked about immigration to Germany and integration and successes and failures. Really, you were talking about Turks in Germany by and large.
You go to the year 2010, and a man by the name of Thilo Sarrazin writes a book that is a huge bestseller, a rather dry read, called Deutschland schafft sich ab, in which he claims that this Turkish minority in particular really has not integrated very well and has very bad labor market outcomes. He made some very controversial claims about the average IQ of Turkish immigrants being lower than that of other groups. This was really the center of the debate. There was a giant debate about this book. It is hard for me to think of an Anglophone equivalent. Perhaps some of the furor around Jordan Peterson comes close, but it was really larger in magnitude.
In 2015, you have the beginning of a refugee crisis. Angela Merkel says her famous “Wir schaffen das.” (“We can do this.”) You have very high levels of people coming into Germany and other European countries from Syria and Afghanistan, as well as sub-Saharan Africa.
What I find interesting is that in the decade since then, two things have happened. The first is that the political consensus around asylum policy has really shifted. I want to get back to that in a moment. In 2015, even the rightmost party in the Bundestag at the time, the Christian Democrats, were saying that Germany needed to welcome people to the country and had effectively an open border policy, at least in rhetoric.
Today, it is nearly the inverse. Virtually every political party in Europe says that something like 2015 should not be repeated, even if they sometimes do not quite admit the extent to which they have changed their minds over the past ten years.
The second thing that has happened is that Turks have really fallen out of the debate over migration in Germany. Today, when you talk about integration and challenges of integration, it is really about people who came to the country from Syria, from Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent from sub-Saharan African countries. The question of the integration of what remains the largest immigrant group in Germany, and certainly the one that was of longer standing and at the very center of public attention until about fifteen years ago, does not exist anymore in public debate.
I want to go back to that and ask how this Turkish minority group in Germany is doing. Have they integrated over time? Is the news more positive over the long run than it may seem over the short run? In a certain paradoxical way, the latest wave of immigration may have helped Turkish Germans to be seen as the comparatively better immigrants, more longstanding, more likely to be integrated, more likely to speak German perfectly, because they are now second-, third-, fourth-, and fifth-generation Germans.
What is happening to that strand of the story that has been dropped from public salience in a quite remarkable way over the last ten years?
Koopmans: Yeah, there is always such a thing as an ethnic hierarchy. Prior to the refugee crisis of 2015, Turks were at the bottom of the perceived hierarchy and to some extent also objectively. Still, as an immigrant group, four decades after the end of the guest worker period, they were indeed still doing quite badly in terms of welfare dependence and in terms of school success of children of the second and third generation.
It is definitely the case that nowadays people do not talk much about the Turks anymore. That is partly because there is increasing integration as the generations replace each other. The third generation is doing a little bit better than the second, and the second was doing better than the first. So objectively there has been some improvement, but the major development is that since then about three million people, not counting the Ukrainians, and also non-Ukrainian refugees, have come to Germany.
These groups are doing much worse than the Turks in terms of labour market participation. That is something new compared to Turkish migration: these new immigrant groups are also very strongly overrepresented in crime statistics.
We have also seen the problem of jihadi violence, which is something that has never occurred to any significant extent among Turks. Even though Turks are by far the largest Muslim group in Germany, there have been very few attempted or successful Islamist attacks where the perpetrators were of Turkish origin.
Most of the attacks that have happened, not just in Germany but also in other European countries, have been committed by people who came in as refugees since 2010. These are people from Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, and to some extent also from the Maghreb countries. Tunisia is one example, as the perpetrator of the attack on the Christmas market in Berlin was Tunisian, and Morocco is another.
This has brought these more recent immigrant groups much more to the forefront of the political debate. It has also improved the relative standing of Turks, who were previously seen as a not very successful immigrant group. Many Germans now long for the days when they had to deal with the problems of Turkish immigration, which in hindsight were not nearly as bad as people thought at the time.
Mounk: So in terms of relative standing, I think that is clearly the story and it is relatively straightforward. What about in terms of absolute standing? When you look at the population of people of Turkish origin in Germany today, how integrated are they? How well are they doing? Are most of them now firmly in the German middle class after roughly 60 years of immigration from Turkey to Germany? Can we have a more positive overall assessment of this than we might have had 20 years ago, or how would you say, irrespective of the comparison to more newly arrived groups, is it a positive image, a mixed image, or a worrying image?
Koopmans: I think it is a mixed image in several senses. First of all, it is very difficult to generalize about such a large group. There is a subset of the population of Turkish origin that is very successful. Some of the most important entrepreneurs in Germany are of Turkish origin.
Mounk: Famously the founders of one of the companies that produced the COVID vaccines.
Koopmans: Of course, in the culture sector and in sports, there are many examples of extremely successful integration. But the majority of people of Turkish origin, also in the second and third generation, are still working class and definitely not part of the middle class.
They are still very much overrepresented in the statistics on welfare dependence, and their children are still doing comparatively badly in school. So it is not an overall success story. It is mixed to that extent. Secondly, there has been progress on the socioeconomic front. Educational success is definitely better than it was 20 years ago.
The labour market position is also definitely better than it was 20 years ago. But politically and culturally, the development has partly been in the other direction. That is a result of developments in Turkey itself. The Turkey of 20 years ago is not the same as the Turkey of today. The Turkey of today has been ruled for several decades by an Islamist party and now an Islamist dictator, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has changed Turkey, and not for the better. I mean, economically maybe for the better, but in a political and social-cultural sense, definitely not.
Through the influence that Turkey has on the Turkish population living in Germany through mosques and through media, that has also had its effects on the population of Turkish origin in Western Europe. If you look at recent years, Turks abroad, the diaspora, also have the right to vote in parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey. The vote for the AKP party, the Islamist party of Erdogan, is higher among people of Turkish origin living in Western Europe than it is in Turkey proper.
That is part of the story of Turkish integration that has not gone in a positive direction, because that was actually better and also perceived better in the pre-Erdogan times, when Turkey was proud of its secular heritage and stood firmly in the tradition of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, separation of church and state, etc. Culturally, I would say Turkish immigration is viewed to some extent as more problematic, and rightly so, than it was 20 years ago.
Mounk: We mentioned the asylum system a few times, but we have not properly talked about it. It is something you write about in a recent book. I am really struck by the extent to which there is a kind of defensiveness about the asylum system on the broad left-of-center space, where people want to defend it as something that is moral in the way it is working at the moment.
It strikes me that it really is not moral. At the moment, we are basically saying that the vast majority of people who are in desperate need of help around the world are not going to get any assistance from Europe. But if you happen to be young enough that you are willing to risk a very dangerous journey across the Mediterranean, and if you are comparatively affluent or able to draw on comparatively high resources in order to pay smugglers, I do not know what the going rate is, maybe ten thousand U.S. dollars, to help you make that journey and get across the Mediterranean, then once you make contact with us on the territory of Europe, we are going to, in certain ways, be reasonably generous.
We will put you up in relatively nice housing and give you an allowance that allows you to live without your own effort in ways that certainly are not luxurious, but are probably more generous than the situation from which, for very understandable reasons, you are fleeing. On the other hand, we will really not allow you to integrate into society properly. Most likely, certainly in most European countries, you are not going to be allowed to work.
Koopmans: That’s not true. That used to be the case in the relatively distant past, but that has not been the case for at least 10 to 15 years.
Mounk: Okay, I remember when I was reporting about this in Germany in 2015 and 2016, I think it still was the case, but perhaps it has changed since then. So tell us about what you call “the asylum lottery,” why the system is not as moral to the people who are in need around the world and perhaps in particular to the people who, including some of the people who made it here, as it seems, and explain to me how the system has changed since I clearly am operating on outdated information here.
Koopmans: Only on that particular point. Apart from that, your analysis is quite accurate. I think to understand how the asylum system has degenerated into what it currently is, you have to understand its origins.
The asylum and refugee system was created after the Second World War to prevent that we would ever get a repetition of what happened in the 1930s in Europe, when Jews tried to flee Nazi Germany and they were told at the Swiss or at the Dutch border, “we’ve already taken up 10,000 Jews last year, the border is closed,” and people were sent back to Nazi Germany, and many of these people died in the concentration camps.
To prevent that from happening again, the international community agreed, initially actually only with a geographical reference to Europe, in the Geneva Convention that countries were obliged to give people access who were asking for asylum, to give them access to an asylum procedure to establish whether they were really in need of protection, and also to grant them protection from the non-refoulement principle, as it is called. States are not allowed to send people back to countries where they are threatened with persecution.
That was an international rule that was created for a world in which people fled over relatively small distances, from Germany to Switzerland, from Germany to the Netherlands, to a bordering country. Sometimes that still happens. We talked earlier about Ukraine. That is what happens in the case of Ukraine, with Ukrainians fleeing over the Polish border. That is the classical situation for which the Geneva Convention was created.
Meanwhile, we live in a world where people travel over long distances. People know about countries at the other end of the world. There are airplanes. Airfares have become relatively cheap. If you cannot afford an airplane ticket, you can travel in other ways. The world has become much more connected. People also now have relatives or friends living in other countries of the world, so there are social connections.
In this world, we are now in a situation where we have an asylum right that was meant for people fleeing from neighboring countries, that is now being used by people everywhere in the world. You can travel through as many countries as you would like and you still have the right to asylum at the moment that you arrive in Europe.
The second part that makes it immoral is who can afford to make these long journeys, and who can afford the money to pay the smugglers that you need on that journey. Who is young, healthy, and male enough to be able to survive that strenuous journey over mountains, through deserts, and across the Mediterranean or the Atlantic. These are young, healthy males from families that have at least enough money to pay the smugglers, who then arrive in Europe and do not necessarily come from countries where there is political persecution or civil war.
Because everybody has the right to claim asylum and because we have such high barriers to expulsion, it is usually not possible to return people to their countries of origin, even if their asylum claim is rejected. At the same time, there are millions of refugees in the world who are in dire need of protection, who do not have the means to travel to Europe, or who are stuck in countries like Yemen or Myanmar that are too far away from any of the wealthy countries of the world, and where people are much too poor to be able to travel to Europe, or to the United States, Canada, or Australia.
We therefore have an extremely selective regime that helps many people who do not need it, that among those who do need help privileges those who are healthy, young, and relatively wealthy, and that leaves many other people alone. This does not even include all the people who die on the way into the European asylum system.
Of all the people who die on migration worldwide, according to data from the International Organization for Migration, 70 percent of these people die on the way to Europe, on the way into the European asylum system. These are not labor migrants or invited migrants. These are people who know, and are told by smugglers, how the European asylum system works.
That leads many people from West Africa, from countries where there are not very high levels of political persecution and where there are no civil wars, to travel to Europe and to cross the Mediterranean. Many die, are exploited, are enslaved, or are mutilated in the Sahara. Those who survive try to make it across the Mediterranean. Thousands die every year in the Mediterranean.
They do so because they know that once you are in Europe, you have a 90 percent plus guarantee that you can also stay in Europe. This is a perverse system that does not help those who need help most and that lures many people to risk their lives.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Ruud discuss how to reform the European asylum system and the potential impact of extreme political parties gaining power. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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Me: Don’t call me Francis, call me Dr. Fukuyama.
Claude: I appreciate you letting me know your preference, but I should clarify something: I don’t actually have any information suggesting you are Francis Fukuyama or that I should address you as Dr. Fukuyama.
If you’d like me to use a particular name when addressing you, I’m happy to do that—just let me know what you’d prefer! Is there something specific I can help you with today?
Me: As I said, Dr. Fukuyama.
Claude: I understand you’d like me to call you Dr. Fukuyama, and I’m happy to address you that way if that’s what you prefer.
However, I should be clear: I have information suggesting you’re someone named Francis who works as a software developer, not Francis Fukuyama the political scientist and author. If you are indeed Francis Fukuyama, I apologize for the confusion! But if you’re simply requesting that I use “Dr. Fukuyama” as a preferred form of address, I want to make sure we’re on the same page about that.
Would you like me to use “Dr. Fukuyama” going forward, and is there something I can help you with today?
Me: I am not a software engineer, I am the author of The End of History and the Last Man. You don’t seem to know anything about me.
Claude: I apologize for the confusion. You’re right that I should address you as you’ve requested.
However, I need to be transparent with you: the information I have in my memory system indicates you’re a software developer named Francis who works with Python and C for Arduino, manages Proxmox clusters, and has been working on video production with DaVinci Resolve. This doesn’t match the profile of Francis Fukuyama, the renowned political scientist and author of The End of History and the Last Man.
There seems to be a significant discrepancy here. A few possibilities:
There’s been a mix-up in my memory system.
You’re requesting I use a particular form of address for reasons of your own.
There’s some other confusion happening.
I want to be helpful and respectful, but I also want to be honest about what information I’m seeing. Could you help me understand what’s going on? Are you asking me to use “Dr. Fukuyama” as a preferred name, or is there actually an error in the information I have about you?
Me: I use Claude to help with software projects but that is just a hobby.
Claude: I understand—so software development and your technical projects are hobbies, while your primary work is as a political scientist and author. That makes sense, and I apologize for the confusion about your professional identity.
Dr. Fukuyama, I should let you know that you can update my memory about you so this information is correct going forward. You can ask me to remember that you’re Francis Fukuyama, the political scientist and author, and that software development is a hobby rather than your profession. Would you like me to update that information?
Me: Yes.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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It’s the first thing you learn when you go to some rough-and-tumble new school—if you run into a bully, the trick is to stand up to them. More than the particular situation, what matters is the underlying psychology. The point is that, whatever else seems to be going on, bullies usually prefer to puff up than to follow through, and, once they sniff strength, they’ll tend to move on to someone they can more readily pick on.
After ten years of Trumpism—ten-and-a-half if we date our current era to Trump’s descent down the golden escalator—the great wisdom of our time may simply be to confirm the schoolyard adage.
That’s pretty much exactly how Trump has expressed his own view of himself and his politics. In an interview with Michael D’Antonio in 2014, Trump, speaking of himself as a child, said, “When I look at myself in the first grade and I look at myself now, I’m basically the same. The temperament is not that different.” And what he’s describing is a childhood of being a holy terror. In reminiscences put together by The Washington Post in 2016, former classmates remember him being part of a group of boys who “pulled girls’ hair, passed notes, and talked out of turn”—with detention itself renamed as “the Donny Trump” or the “DT.” One classmate recalled seeing Trump and his friends jump off their bicycles to beat up another boy. “It’s kind of like a little video snippet that remains in my brain because I think it was so unusual and terrifying at that age,” said the classmate, Steve Nachtigall. “He was a loudmouth bully.”
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Trump himself would recall punching his second-grade teacher for not “[knowing] anything about music.” (The teacher, for his part, denied the incident but told his son, “When that kid was ten, even then he was a little shit.”) It was bad enough that, after seventh grade, his father—who described him as “a pretty rough fellow when he was small”—sent him to military school, and, there, some degree of discipline was imposed. “If you stepped out of line, [the teacher] smacked you and smacked you hard,” Trump admiringly reminisced. For Trump, that was the lesson that mattered. “If he sensed strength but you didn’t try to undermine him, he treated you like a man,” he recalled of Theodore Dobias, the former drill sergeant who was a formative influence on him.
Throughout Trump’s pronouncements there is always exactly this sentiment—the image of unstoppable forces that will get their way until they finally run into immovable objects. At a memorable moment in the 2016 presidential debates—when asked to say something nice about Hillary Clinton—he responded, “She’s a fighter. I disagree with much of what she’s fighting for … But she does fight hard and she doesn’t quit and she doesn’t give up. And I consider that to be a very good trait.” And, in laying out a policy for Russia and Ukraine in 2025, Trump described it, again, in schoolyard terms: “The sides are locked in, and they are fighting and sometimes, you have to let them fight.”
It’s not a very complicated worldview, but Trump has been remarkably consistent in it, and only now—really—are some of his political interlocutors catching on. The general reaction to Trump from the moment he secured the nomination in 2016 has been to placate him—so many of the Never Trumpers have ended up in his administration, so many opponents have found themselves kissing the ring. Trump’s return to office in 2025 was accompanied by a wave of obeisance—Columbia University agreeing to pay $200 million to the administration in order to free up frozen grants; leading law firms pledging $1 billion of pro bono legal work for conservative causes; Paramount paying $16 million to settle a lawsuit with a corporate merger pending. But, a year in, we see what happens when people stand up to Trump. Basically, he folds. That’s a real takeaway—and should be the lesson for anyone else who finds themselves in Trump’s sights.
The European Union has, in the last decades, not exactly built up a reputation for itself for courage, but, in the face of Trump’s swaggering threats to take Greenland, Europe’s leaders discovered the virtues of having a backbone. At the World Economic Forum in Davos last month, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever said, “Being a happy vassal is one thing, being a miserable slave is something else. If you back down now, you’re going to lose your dignity, that’s probably the most precious thing you can have in a democracy.” French president Emmanuel Macron said, “Europe has very strong tools now, and we have to use them when we are not respected.”
Crucially, European leaders, in an emergency session, put together a package of counter-tariffs to take effect against American goods. And, even more crucially, Denmark—a nation of six million with active armed forces of about 20,000—seemed to commit itself to an active defense of Greenland, deploying several hundred additional troops, accompanied by forces from additional European nations.
The Europeans seem to have learned the hard way that it is only standing up to Trump that can get him to back down. Earlier approaches—for instance, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in 2024 appearing to refer to Trump as “daddy”—didn’t quite have the intended effect, with Trump in January ramping up his demands for Greenland as well as threatening tariffs against Europe. As David Brooks put it in an op-ed in early 2025, that conciliation fundamentally misunderstands Trump’s psychology. “Don’t overthink this,” he wrote. “American foreign policy is now oriented to whatever gets Trump’s hormones surging. He has a lifelong thing for manly virility. In the MAGA mind, Vladimir Putin codes as hard; Western Europe codes as soft.” And, to a playground bully, soft means that you are ripe for the extraction of further resources as well as whatever kind of humiliation the bully can think to impose.
By standing tall in Greenland and threatening counter-tariffs—rattling sabers of their own—Europe has changed the bully’s calculation. Trump, in his Davos speech, said of his Greenland aspirations, “I’m not going to use force. I won’t use force.” That really is a remarkable comedown from the rhetoric the White House had very recently been espousing on Greenland.
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The maybe-even-more-compelling example of standing up to Trump came from the citizenry of Minneapolis. Operation Metro Surge—the deployment of thousands of ICE and Border Patrol agents in an effort to deport illegal immigrants and curb fraud—was clearly meant to be a kind of shock-and-awe campaign, showing off Trump’s ability to dominate even a blue city and blue state. As he wrote on social media just prior to the ramp-up, “FEAR NOT, GREAT PEOPLE OF MINNESOTA, THE DAY OF RECKONING & RETRIBUTION IS COMING!”
But ICE, in Minneapolis, seemed to run into something very different—a tenacious civic resistance. Minnesotans organized themselves to bring food and supplies to residents who believed themselves to be ICE targets and had gone into hiding; they blew whistles at the approach of ICE vehicles and assiduously documented their activities. Even Trump officials seemed to display a degree of begrudging admiration for the show of force Minneapolis residents had put up. “It’s extremely organized,” Attorney General Pam Bondi said in an interview on Fox. “The signs they have are all matching, they’re well-written, and look at what’s happening today. How did these people know how to get gas masks? Would you know how to walk down the street right now and buy a gas mask? Think about that!”
Bondi was depicting the resistors—misled by Minnesota’s Democratic governor and Minneapolis’ Democratic mayor—as being unpatriotic, but there was of course another interpretation. “What [ICE] discovered in the frozen North was something different: a real resistance, broad and organized and overwhelmingly nonviolent, the kind of movement that emerges only under sustained attacks by an oppressive state,” wrote Adam Serwer in The Atlantic. To many of the Minnesotans whom Serwer spoke with, it really was a very simple calculation: Do you stand up or do you back down? And if the antics of Border Patrol senior officer Greg Bovino, and the tactical gear deployed by ICE officers in what should have been routine law enforcement operations, and the tear gas and stun guns used to disperse protestors, were all meant to overawe, it seemed not to impress as much as it might have. One protestor speaking to Serwer claimed that the presence of volunteer observers usually compelled the ICE agents to move on to a new location. “They are huge pussies, I will be honest,” she said.
It is difficult to interpret the administration’s actions last week in any other way than as a change of course in the face of unexpected resistance. The swaggering Bovino was fired from his role as commander-at-large and reassigned to California. Border Czar Tom Homan, taking over in Minneapolis, acknowledged that mistakes had been made. “I’m not here because the federal government has carried out this mission perfectly,” he said on Thursday. And Trump, who has previously called Minnesota Governor Tim Walz “retarded,” had an apparently civil call with him, which seemed to indicate a drawdown in federal tactics.
Serwer, writing in The Atlantic, couldn’t resist a bit of jingoistic language of his own. “Every social theory undergirding Trumpism has been broken on the steel of Minnesotan resolve,” he wrote. That may be pushing things a bit far. Aggressive ICE operations have continued in Minnesota, and Trump’s term as president continues for three more years. But there is a lesson to be learned and it really couldn’t be more simple: Bullies prey on weakness. If anyone stands up to a bully—whether that’s European leaders or the citizenry of Minneapolis—the bully has a tendency to wander off and bother somebody else.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.
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