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By Yascha Mounk
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  • Lincoln Would Reject “Heritage America”
    Vice President JD Vance on January 22, 2026 in Toledo, Ohio. (Photo by Jim Watson-Pool/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    On July 10, 1858, Abraham Lincoln reminded Americans that half the country couldn’t trace a connection to the signers of the Declaration of Independence by blood or by soil. That half is now the vast majority. For most, our ancestors didn’t walk down Philadelphia’s cobbled streets, let alone hunch over that document in Independence Hall.

    If having such a connection is all that defines an American, most of us wouldn’t be American at all. Thankfully, Lincoln argued, the one “electric cord” that runs through us all is a love of freedom and equality, irrespective of ancestry. An embrace of the Declaration’s sentiments is as good as blood relation to its signers, for it’s the American creed that “link[s] those patriotic hearts” together.

    Today, segments of the Right disagree.

    In the national conservative circles of MAGA, “Heritage Americans” have begun to claim that they, with ancestry dating back to the Civil War or earlier, are more worthy of the American label. They argue that loyalty should be measured by lineage, especially when—as the Department of Homeland Security put it—“The Enemies Are At The Gates.”

    After receiving a year’s worth of xenophobic comments on X, Ohio’s Republican candidate for governor, Vivek Ramaswamy, sought to rebut the Heritage American argument in The New York Times:

    No matter your ancestry, if you wait your turn and obtain citizenship, you are every bit as American as a Mayflower descendant, as long as you subscribe to the creed of the American founding and the culture that was born of it.

    There’s that electric cord again—and it’s logically consistent, Ramaswamy insists. Equating loyalty with lineage wrongly implies that the nth-generation Irish-American Biden is more at home than Trump, the son and grandson of immigrants. Are Puritans, with their city upon a hill, better exemplars than their rowdy, gold-hungry predecessors at Jamestown? Surely, descendants of Patriots are more American than those of Loyalists? When pushed to its extreme, the Heritage America argument falls apart.

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    Ramaswamy has since left social media, heartened by the cheers he received for his arguments at Turning Point USA’s AmericaFest. But the battle hasn’t been won. It’s easy enough to refute blood-and-soil reasoning at its worst, especially the incessant clamoring in Ramaswamy’s comment section. There are, however, more sophisticated counterpoints to Lincoln’s creedal definition—rebuttals advanced by our very own Vice President JD Vance.

    In an address to the Claremont Institute last summer, Vance noted several problems with recognizing America as “just an idea” and basing American identity on the mere adoption of a creed.

    Crucial to his argument is a memory of his children exploring the Great Plains. Watching their awe, he remembered the Americans who toiled to build his civilization, his family’s “shelter and sustenance.” Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were embodied in those fields, extracted from an ether of abstractions and maxims and distilled into a sensation of utter reverence.

    For Vance, Lincoln’s conception belies this reverence. Creedalism insists upon a shared appreciation of American rights and freedoms, but to what end? “True citizenship” is not a laundry list of privileges owed to you, Vance argues. It’s a commitment to serve your fellow countrymen. It’s a rejection of the notion that America is a “contradictory” or “unfinished” project. True citizenship is gratitude, and with it, an obligation to promote the country’s greatness.

    Vance expects everyone—“whether their ancestors were here before the Revolutionary War, or whether they arrived on our shores just a few short months ago”—to feel this sense of duty. It’s then notable that, in the very same speech, he insists:

    We’re a particular place, with a particular people, and a particular set of beliefs and way of life.

    To be clear, Vance has since criticized the out-and-out Heritage American stance, explaining that American identity can’t just be claimed by “some connection to the late 17th century” via genetics. Yet he argues that generational accretion of that Americanness matters. Creedal nationalists mistakenly believe that possessing the right beliefs helps you absorb American culture overnight, neglecting generations of shared lingo, art, music, and other cultural markers “you [can’t] teach in a book.”

    In their view, the country simply cannot import millions of people, even if they wholeheartedly embrace our beliefs, and expect that “America won’t be changed for the worse.” There are customs and traditions that unite Americans, Vance observes, be it the food eaten for dinner or the sports teams followed. Countless individuals may appreciate American ideals, but can they feel grateful for day-to-day American life? Perhaps not. He continues: “For the vast bulk of Americans, it’s where we’re born… and where we ourselves will one day be buried.”

    On its face, Vance’s point seems innocuous. It’s true that our modern customs are, in part, carried over from our nation’s “point of departure,” as Alexis de Tocqueville writes in Democracy in America. For instance, our political norms, beginning with the Mayflower Compact, have been honed for three centuries; what we conceive of as liberal democracy cannot be impervious to the ways in which generations of people lived it.

    It’s also clear that the various cultural markers Vance speaks of, however quotidian, do form a uniquely American sensibility. Consider that last winter, Ramaswamy himself criticized an “American mediocrity” that glorifies jocks over valedictorians, hangouts over extracurriculars. Clearly, he recognizes Americanness as something identifiable—distinct enough to have its own flaws. It’s as John Steinbeck observes in America and Americans: while abroad, Steinbeck would be “instantly picked out as an American,” as would his Cherokee and Japanese neighbors. There’s an immediately recognizable American look, inexplicable to the world and to ourselves.

    Here lies the difficulty of adopting Lincoln’s creedal conception.

    There is a popularized and distinctive American identity and some people will display this Americanness more effortlessly than others. Yet Lincoln would say that one is no more a citizen than the other. There is a significance to the first Americans’ actions, for they set in motion certain habits that have reinforced our moral commitments. Yet Lincoln would deny that blood relation to the Founders confers any superior claim to the country. Americans rely upon this principled restraint lest any one cultural trait be exploited and framed as the true mark of a citizen. By tracing a spiritual connection back to the Founding, everyone can and must insist upon their belonging here.

    Unfortunately for Vance, Lincoln’s conception allows for a polyphony of diverse, dissenting voices. You can be tethered by the electric cord and still be all that Vance detests, be it a “childless cat lady” or a Zohran Mamdani. You can embrace the moral sentiment of the Declaration while also denouncing—or, as seen in Minneapolis, losing your life to denounce—government action. Two dead Americans cannot be smeared as deranged leftist agitators before their bodies have gone cold.

    The electric cord is too inclusive for Vance. So instead, he deploys ambiguously trite phrases like “distinctive people” and “way of life,” pandering to his base’s kitschy imagination of American identity. He claims Americans “won’t fight for abstractions,” as if we’re incapable of defending moral causes, fit only to serve a concrete people and homeland. He binds Americanness—at least for the “vast bulk” of us—to land and lineage, infusing patriotism with a tribalistic sharpness. Vance may be sanitizing the Heritage American argument, but his message is clear: gratitude for this country looks and feels a “particular” way and, perhaps, not everyone is capable of it.

    Vance’s conception of citizenship betrays a pathetic indolence. Our history’s great statesmen honored the creedal definition not because it was politically expedient, but because it was right. In turn, they accepted the charge of governing a nation whose citizens disagree with each other, who take off their shoes and throw them at the television once in a while—a “great American moment,” President Reagan joked. Vance’s moral and civic laziness, on the other hand, is a search in vain for convenience. It’s no surprise when it then degenerates into the classic “us versus them” bile.

    It’s easy to see why Vance wishes to flatten Lincoln’s idealism in favor of identitarian homogeneity—and has largely succeeded. After all, the electric cord represents one of America’s most exacting maxims.

    For one, the electric cord asks more of you than the crude comparisons of physical features, language, and religion common to national identity formation around the world. Those with the adequate “Heritage” pedigree must believe they’re no more a citizen than an individual naturalized just a year ago. This humility is a choice, requiring a moral and civic forbearance unthinkable in the not-so-distant past.

    Importantly, belief in the electric cord demands more than the base requirements of a tolerant liberalism, more than the “every man is orthodox to himself” mentality of cordial but strange bedfellows. By sharing one creed, Americans must conceive of every man as brethren, a bond deeper than a mutually pragmatic distaste of dying in religious wars. This imperative requires an inclusivity and hospitality foreign to most other countries—an undeniably counterintuitive aspiration.

    Second, Lincoln requires self-confidence on the part of newer Americans. The recent immigrant slowly loses his mother tongue and defends his odd packed lunches at school. He’s teased over a foreign habit here, an incorrect pronunciation there. To tell him he’s just as American as the classmate with the white-picket-fence and family traditions inked in parchment… well, you’re asking this child to disbelieve what he sees with his own eyes.

    James Baldwin’s Notes of a Native Son is particularly resonant in this regard. A Black man in an isolated Swiss outpost, Baldwin believed that even the most illiterate villagers would relate to the works of Dante, Shakespeare, and Rembrandt more than he. From the Chartres Cathedral to the Empire State Building, these weren’t “[his] creations, they did not contain [his] history.” Similarly, you’re asking the newly naturalized to have faith that creedal loyalty gives them an equal stake in America—that they too have ownership of the Empire State. See how tough this can be?

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    Lincoln’s electric cord demands unabashed and unrelenting idealism on the part of both old and new Americans. Yet, for over a decade, Americans have been encouraged to set aside their collective moral instincts in favor of basal self-interest. Our leaders have stooped to a low, anti-intellectual politics of name-calling—insults Vance himself can’t unequivocally denounce, even those leveled against his own wife. Meanwhile, online bots, with their divisive, propagandist spam, make up half of all Internet traffic. This is happening when six in ten Americans report feelings of isolation, rarely spending time with anyone, let alone those from different backgrounds.

    Our nation is divided, psychologically tattered and fatigued. Vance knows this. With every hackneyed immigrant joke, he goads that clannish urge to retreat into ourselves and our own.

    Unfortunately, lofty claims that “democracy is on the ballot” failed to resonate. Electric cord stump speeches may similarly fail.

    If American leaders wish to reinvigorate the creedal definition, they must inculcate Lincoln’s maxim, creating daily reminders of the electric cord.

    Civic education programs ought to teach young Americans that their futures are bound up together, even when separated by physical and digital chasms. National service opportunities must place adolescents into diverse communities across America so they can see just how unrealistic—how undesirable—the Heritage American conception is. New projects in technology and infrastructure should be emblems of America as the land of ingenuity and excellence, not merely the land of a particular people and custom.

    Consciously reaffirming Lincoln’s creedal conception will require embedding the electric cord in everything taught and everything built. His conception is certainly demanding, asking Americans to orient their understanding of citizenship towards a humble, yet self-assured, commitment to shared ideals. But Americans can do this. They can aspire to more exalted civic virtues—even if they need the occasional reminder. Vance’s “people won’t fight for abstractions” refrain does not have to win out. His tribalism does not have to be our endgame.

    Dhriti Jagadish studies Government at Claremont McKenna College, concentrating in political theory. She is an editor for the Henry Salvatori Center’s The Forum and a staff writer for the Claremont Independent.

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  • They Keep Lying To Us
    Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem speaks on January 24 after the killing of Alex Pretti. (Photo by Al Drago/Getty Images.)

    Who are you gonna believe: Kristi Noem in a bomber jacket or your own lyin’ eyes?

    In the wake of the second killing this month of a U.S. citizen in the streets of Minneapolis, what’s become completely clear is the extent to which statements by federal agencies are unmoored from any sort of reality as glimpsed by eyewitness cell phone footage.

    Here is the shooting of ICU nurse Alex Pretti, as described by Noem, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in a press conference:

    An individual approached officers with a 9-millimeter semi-automatic handgun. The officers attempted to disarm this individual but the armed suspect reacted violently. Fearing for his life and for the lives of his fellow officers around him, an agent fired defensive shots. Medics were on the scene immediately and attempted to deliver medical aid to the subject, but he was pronounced dead at the scene. The suspect also had two magazines with ammunition in them that held dozens of rounds. He also had no ID. This looks like a situation where an individual arrived at the scene to inflict maximum damage and to kill law enforcement.

    Responding to a question, Noem described Pretti’s actions as consistent with “domestic terrorism”—an assessment that mirrors her depiction of the killing of Renee Good earlier this month.

    In a parallel press conference, senior Border Patrol officer Greg Bovino described Pretti as having intent to carry out “a massacre.”

    Video of the shooting, verified as authentic by The New York Times, seems to contradict virtually all of the administration’s statements. In multiple angles of coverage, Pretti is holding a cell phone at eye level with one hand and nothing in the other hand. He is standing in the middle of the road at the start of the incident. When an ICE officer pushes a woman into a snow bank, Pretti appears to move past the officer and to her aid. He has his hands in the air and is moving in the direction of the woman when the officer begins to pepper spray him. His hands are on the ground at the point when ICE agents drag him away and begin to physically subdue him. Once he is down, five officers restrain him, including one who appears to be beating him with a pepper spray canister—all without any indication of active resistance on Pretti’s part. While he is on the ground, his weapon is discovered on him and removed by an officer just prior to another officer opening fire on him. (The alleged discovery of additional magazines attached to Pretti’s gun is immaterial in this case—he was a licensed handgun holder and the presence of extra ammunition is no proof of intent.)

    As with the killing of Renee Good, there are a few “black boxes” here. None of the camera footage is close enough to get audio of the interaction between Pretti and the ICE officers. It is clear that they were exchanging words, but it is unknown if Pretti threatened them in any way. Pivotally, the swarm of ICE agents around Pretti when he is on the ground obstructs the cameras and makes it unclear if he was reaching for a gun prior to the moment he was shot. As best I can make out—and this is also the assessment of The New York Times in their frame-by-frame analysis of the fatal moment—one officer found Pretti’s gun on him and the shout of “gun” may have been the instigation for another officer to unholster his weapon and begin firing.

    But there is no indication from the video of anything resembling the motive federal authorities peremptorily assigned to Pretti. For that matter, the video also shows officers standing around after the shooting making no immediate attempt to provide medical assistance to Pretti as he lies prone on the ground. There remains no evidence whatsoever of intent to “kill” or to “massacre” law enforcement—and every bit of available video documentation from the scene points in a very different direction.

    So what happens now? Well, clearly, Donald Trump and co. see the error of their ways. They remember that they are public servants sworn to uphold the Constitution and to defend the people of the United States. They recognize that a spectacularly misguided operation to send 3,000 ICE and Border Patrol agents to an American city 1,500 miles from the Mexican border in order to deport illegal aliens and root out fraud has resulted in the shooting deaths of a poet and a Veterans Affairs nurse, has torn apart the fabric of the city and the country, and has incited probably the worst jurisdictional crisis in decades, with municipal and state government now in a ferocious turf battle with the federal government. At this point the federales notice that they are not wanted in Minnesota; that, as video footage amply demonstrates, the ICE/Border Patrol agents are badly unequipped for the kinds of arrests that they are routinely carrying out; and that it is time to step back and take a breath before the situation—as it inevitably will if the status quo continues—escalates further.

    The above paragraph is, of course, wishful thinking. The administration has, even after Pretti’s killing, doubled down on the brutal operation, and on their alternate reality rhetoric to justify it. “The Mayor and the Governor are inciting insurrection,” Trump wrote in one of his Truth Social posts. Vice President JD Vance encouraged the narrative of insurrection by the state government. “This level of engineered chaos is unique to Minneapolis,” he said of mass protests against ICE actions. “It is the direct consequence of far left agitators, working with local authorities.” And, last week, the Justice Department issued subpoenas for Minnesota Governor Tim Walz and Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey for their alleged encouragement of insurrection.

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    It is almost impossible to overstate just how much of a tinderbox the situation in Minneapolis is—with trigger-happy federal agents, well outside their usual jurisdiction, violently engaging an inflamed citizenry; with different branches of the government at loggerheads; with their armed representatives now in the same city streets and answering to very different chains of command; and all of this with top-level political figures initiating legal proceedings and hurling insults at one another. (Trump has called Walz “retarded,” while Walz has characterized ICE as Trump’s “Gestapo” and Frey has demanded that ICE “get the fuck out” of Minneapolis.)

    Meanwhile, Senator Chuck Schumer, the Democratic Minority Leader, has announced that Senate Democrats will refuse to approve an omnibus budgetary authorization if it includes additional funding for ICE—which makes a fresh government shutdown all but inevitable.

    Even within this charged atmosphere, it is possible that all of this will end short of further clashes or the implementation of the Insurrection Act—as right-wingers online have been urging Trump to do. Over the past year, Trump and the Department of Homeland Security have been fairly nimble at moving ICE around the country, and there is a chance that Trump will decide that he has made whatever point he wishes to make in Minneapolis and declare victory in some fashion and move on. But it already seems like the situation is getting worse before it gets better. The polarization of American society could not be more acute, with whole communities blowing whistles to warn of the approach of U.S. law enforcement and with vast wings of the U.S. government essentially accusing one another of illegitimacy. What’s happening in Minnesota right now is probably the worst constitutional crisis in the United States since Kent State and the height of the Vietnam War protests—and with the added element of nasty jurisdictional disputes between federal and local branches of government, which recall Little Rock and the integration struggles of the ‘50s. And, really, there is no particular reason to think that anything will improve.

    As, by now, a seasoned participant in this grim new ritual in American life of watching shooting videos and then watching the press conferences as the different sides parse the videos in their own diametrically opposed ways, what maybe strikes me more than anything is something that should be minor but isn’t—the way the officials carry themselves. The Republicans appear, always, surrounded by a gaggle of stony-faced security officer types. The civilian officials tend to be in their own pseudo-military get-ups—Noem, this time, looks like she’s about to hop in an airplane cockpit; for her initial press conference on the Renee Good shooting, she was in a cowboy hat. The surrounding officers nod and react only at a mention of the travails of working in law enforcement.

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    Meanwhile, on the other side of the aisle, it’s honestly a bit of a circus. Walz and Frey’s speeches are accompanied always by a sign language interpreter whose facial expressions and broad gestures have a way of attracting as much attention as what’s being said. The officials tend to be a bit more rumpled—the impression they’re giving is of honest civilians caught in a crossfire. Their own gaggle of law enforcement is always impressively diverse and without the kind of thousand-yard stare that the federales tend to practice. In other words, the two sides look completely different from one another: they are projecting an entirely different vision of power.

    I have always been skeptical of the notion that our polarized political atmosphere will lead to civil war. It’s a very different situation from, say, the 1850s and ‘60s, and the different sides aren’t in different territorial groupings in quite the same way. But, looking at the videos, what becomes very clear is that Americans have divided themselves into two entirely distinct tribes, with different values, different markers, different styles of communication. For a long time this was politics as usual. Now, we seem to be witnessing it crossing over into something else.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

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  • After Davos
    Donald Trump arrives back in the U.S. from the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 22, 2026. (Photo by Celal Gunes/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!

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    Things became momentarily calmer at the close of the annual World Economic Forum meeting at Davos than they were at its beginning. Donald Trump clawed back his threats to take Greenland from Denmark by force, and reached some sort of “deal” with Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, on Arctic security.

    Trump’s climbdown—his “Trump always chickens out” moment—was driven by several factors. Probably the most important was the decline in the U.S. stock and bond markets in reaction to his Greenland threats. But the Europeans also played things reasonably well. The Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, and the foreign minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, asserted that the issue of sovereignty over Greenland was non-negotiable, and did not seek to meet with Trump. Had such a meeting taken place, it would have given the impression that sovereignty was up for grabs, pending an agreement on price. Denmark also received strong support from its other European allies.

    The other event at Davos was Trump’s effort to convene a “Board of Peace” that grew out of the UN-backed committee to deal with the future of Gaza. The charter of this organization is laughable: Trump has made himself the chairman of the Board indefinitely, with the sole power to accept or reject new members. His term in this position will last beyond his presidency, and permanent membership in the organization can be bought for a $1 billion contribution. Countries signing up at Davos included the Persian Gulf states and other Arab countries, a handful of Central Asian states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Argentina. All of these countries had some previous relationship with Trump or want something from him; aside from Bulgaria, not a single European or East Asian democracy was willing to join (Hungary of course does not qualify as a democracy).

    Trump caused a major crisis in the NATO alliance over Greenland, and resolved that crisis by backing down. Foreign ministries around the world were sent into a tizzy, but then, in the end, were told, “never mind.”

    This does not mean that everyone can now rest easy. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney was right when he asserted that there has been a “rupture” and not simply a transition in the international order. Henceforth, no American ally can count on U.S. support, and middle powers will have to act on their own and cooperate to make up for this loss.

    Moreover, every country in the world will now have to deal with a burden of uncertainty as to how the United States will act in the future. Its foreign policy will not be driven by any fixed set of ideas or institutional arrangements, but rather by the erratic thoughts of a single aging and mentally unstable individual.

    In watching Trump over the past year, I’ve come to realize that the usual tools international observers bring to foreign policy analysis—political science, economics, sociology, and the like—are not nearly as important as psychology, both individual and social. The evolution of Trump’s policies can only be understood in relation to his own mind and motivations.

    Trump was elected as an isolationist. He campaigned from the start as a critic of America’s “forever wars,” nation-building, and entangling alliances. This all changed last summer. As the conflict between Israel and Iran deepened, he clearly hoped to stay out of it. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cleared the way for intervention by knocking out Iran’s air defenses, so that the United States could safely bomb the Fordow nuclear enrichment plant in a one-and-done attack. Trump suddenly realized that he had a potent military instrument at his disposal, and that he had gotten plaudits for using it.

    Constitutionally, he had clear authority as commander-in-chief to use force without the sorts of legal constraints that restricted his ability to use the military against domestic protesters. This realization paved the way for military action against Venezuela. The snatching of Nicolás Maduro and his wife in early January once again demonstrated to him the efficacy of his military instrument, and it was against this background that he started to talk once again about acquiring Greenland.

    I would liken Donald Trump to a ten-year-old boy who has discovered a flame thrower in his parents’ backyard, and has come to realize that he can burn up anything he wants with it. He’s now actively looking for other things he can set on fire.

    There is one big problem with this psychological evolution. Trump has consistently overestimated the power of the United States relative to other countries. This was evident in his trade war with China. At one point after “Liberation Day” last year, he threatened 145 percent tariffs on the country. China was ready, and responded with a ban on exports of rare earth compounds and metals. This was something that Trump had obviously not reckoned with in advance, and he was immediately forced to back down as everyone from Detroit automakers to defense contractors told him that the ban would absolutely cripple the American economy and American national security.

    Trump has so far been able to use his military instrument against weak international players, like a crippled Iran or a crumbling Venezuela. He’s also been lucky: In the Caracas raid, a big Chinook helicopter was hit and narrowly escaped destruction. Had it gone down, Trump would have looked more like Jimmy Carter in 1979. His overestimation of American power may continue as he tries to run Venezuela by remote control and extract oil from it. What is not clear is how he would use the military against a big player like China.

    In judging Trump’s overall behavior, one thing is clear: he is not an institutionalist. Rather, he is a destroyer of institutions who wants to replace them with his own preferences, which inevitably benefit him personally. An institution is a rule or structure that is not dependent on a single individual, one that survives the departure of the institution’s creator. For all of the noise surrounding Trump’s daily activities, he has left virtually no institutional legacy. The Republican-controlled Congress has passed very little legislation, and spending levels are much the same as they were under Biden. (The one exception to this may be ICE, which will need to be reformed or dismantled by a subsequent administration.) His economic policy, beginning with tariffs, is a mass of idiosyncratic one-off decisions that produce no guidance for the future. Trump has intervened to take equity in certain companies, to block disfavored mergers, or to seek price caps for pharmaceuticals or credit card interest. He and members of his administration have also taken advantage of his discretionary powers to enrich themselves in countless ways.

    Trump’s enduring legacy is not an institutional structure, but rather a highly toxic culture that has been adopted by many of the president’s followers and will live on after he is gone. Threats against Greenland, NATO, and individual European countries mean that no ally will be able to trust commitments made by the United States again. Discourse by government officials has been degraded. Cabinet officers and press secretaries know that they don’t have to respond to questions they don’t like because they can simply insult the questioner. And companies will understand that they need to seek individual favors rather than general policies governing entire sectors.

    In the wake of Davos, Europeans need to move in the opposite direction. They need to strengthen the European Union if it is to be taken seriously by the United States, China, Russia, or any other power. This will require two things. In the economic sphere, the EU needs to move to a true single market so that European firms can scale up and be competitive with those from the United States and China. And in the political sphere, the EU needs to move toward qualified majority voting, so that decisions cannot be vetoed by a single small player like Hungary or Slovakia. Only with this kind of centralization can the EU exert influence commensurate with its size and overall economic heft.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • Gašper Beguš on Why Language Doesn’t Make Humans Special

    Gašper  Beguš is an Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley, where he focuses on interpretable AI and combines linguistics, cognitive science, machine learning, neuroscience, and marine biology.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Gašper Beguš discuss what makes human language exceptional compared to animal communication, whether whales and other animals have true language capabilities, and how properties like cultural transmission and recursion distinguish human speech.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I have a very simple question for you to start off with. What is language and in what ways is the human capacity to communicate by the use of language exceptional in the animal kingdom, or in fact in the world beyond animals?

    Gašper Beguš: Actually, it’s not a simple question at all. It’s an extremely complex question. Nobody has a really good definition of language. Maybe definitions are not even that useful. For a while, we’ve defined language as the thing that sets us apart from animals. So it’s the communication system that humans have. But if you look closely, I think the better question is what properties of human language exist and what are the uniquely human properties about our language.

    Mounk: Before we get there, what’s an example of some form of language that animals might use, for example?

    Beguš: Animals have alarm calls. There is some acoustic vocalization, and that denotes a danger from above or danger from the ground. Those alarm calls are oftentimes not learned vocalizations. With language, you want to have a learned culturally transmitted vocalization. Not something like a cry that you come preborn with, but something that you learn from your caregivers.

    Mounk: A dog might yelp when they’re in pain, and a dog in the United States and in Germany and in South Africa is going to yelp more or less the same way, and dogs have an innate ability to understand that that is a fellow member of a species that’s in pain. But that’s not language because it’s not culturally transmitted. It doesn’t vary in this kind of way. It’s not specific enough. Is that what you’re saying?

    Beguš: Yeah. For example, you take a vervet monkey or a Campbell’s monkey and have that monkey grow up in the other monkey’s world. That first species will still speak its own innate cries. Whereas if we want to have language, our language is obviously culturally learned. You can take any child, and any child can hear, at the beginning of their lives, any language contrast, any sounds of language, and then slowly they build their internal neural connections in such a way that they only hear and attend to the language that they actually hear. But in principle, a child can learn any language. So it’s learned communication. It changes a lot. We have dialects. The reason we have dialects is because at some point there’s a mother language, and then there are daughter languages, and the daughter languages arise because of mutations and changes in language. So those are all the things that you’re looking for.

    Then there are more complex things you have to look for in animals. So is there a lexical principle? Can they talk about things that are not immediately present? I would say there are two broad ways to study language in non-humans. One is to take our language and train other animals in our language. Those would be called language-trained animals.

    Mounk: I became obsessed a number of years ago with all of the very cute dogs on Instagram—and, I suppose, TikTok, though I don’t use TikTok—which use buttons with words. There’s a very long history of us fooling ourselves into thinking that animals are communicating with us. There’s a horse by the name of Clever Hans, and it turned out that, in some ways, I forget whether the owner knew that they were kind of cheating and giving hand signals or whether they were doing it unwittingly, I forget the details of the case, but it turned out that Hans wasn’t as clever as he seemed.

    But there are some really remarkable clips in which it does seem like these dogs that have access to 100, 150 buttons construct these relatively long sentences, if you want to call them that. They don’t quite have grammar, which are situationally appropriate, and which don’t seem like they’re just pressing a random button like “love you” because they know that their owner seems to be happy when they press that button. There seems to be something more than that going on. Is there?

    Beguš: Well, there are even more impressive studies done in the 90s. I started my research in animals with Irene Pepperberg, who was the pioneer of language-trained animals, who had one of the smartest parrots that ever lived, Alex. There’s work on bonobos. Kanzi the bonobo recently passed away, and they tried to bring some interface to the animals so that they could communicate with humans. There’s also work on dolphins, for example.

    So Kanzi had this keyboard with symbols that had nothing to do with the object they described, and he was able to use them and even combine them. With parrots, it’s great because they don’t need any interface at all. They learned to mimic our human language to perfection. I have recordings of Alex, actually, and I’m studying them. It’s just so amazing how close they can mimic us and master mimicking our language to the degree that we are never able to do the other way around. So that was kind of the first insight into how smart animals are, because parrots probably were considered smart at that time, but not exceptionally smart.

    Now you have Irene Pepperberg training Alex the parrot, and Alex could count up to three or four. Not only that, you could give it a plate of green balls and blue squares and ask him how many green balls, and it would count and distinguish compositionally between shape and objects and so on. That really was maybe the first time we really started to appreciate their intelligence. So that’s animal communication or language-trained animals, where you take human language and you try to instill it upon animals.

    Mounk: That’s not a language that animals use to communicate with each other, but it shows that they have a capacity to process language in some kind of way, since we’re able to teach a version of our language to them and then they can use that to communicate with us. What about forms of language that animals have to communicate with each other? For those of you who are listening to this or reading the transcript, I see your face nicely framed by many whales in a beautiful poster hanging behind you.

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    Whales seem to be quite remarkable in the way they communicate, including the fact, as my producer Leo points out to me, that supposedly baby whales babble in the same way that human babies babble, seemingly to sort of learn how to communicate, to learn to make the sounds that they need to in order to then accurately communicate to other members of a species. Is that a good example of animal communication within one species of animals, and what kind of languages they have?

    Beguš: Well, that’s where it becomes really difficult. Because you train an animal in your human language. You understand what the animal is saying because it’s your language. But if you’re observing animals in the wild, you don’t know that language. You don’t speak that language. You don’t even know what is meaningful in that language, if anything at all.

    So you go from this terrain where you have your language and you understand most of the things. Kanzi was probably at the level of a three-year-old human baby. It’s always good to think of this animal research in developmental terms. So roughly, if you compare it to a human child, where are they, how many words, what kind of abilities?

    Then you go into animals in the wild, and that’s where we’re really just starting in some ways. First of all, back in the day, there wasn’t as sophisticated recording equipment available. It just takes a lot of work. For example, whales live in the open ocean. They dive very deep. It’s not easy to record them and try to see what they do.

    So a lot of animals communicate for mating purposes. They vocalize for mating purposes. So you have birdsong. Birdsongs that are learned, not innate. The father usually teaches male offspring to sing. The idea is, I’m very fit, because in addition to searching for food, I can also practice these beautiful notes.

    Mounk: But I imagine that a skeptic would say that that doesn’t count as language because it’s a form of communication, obviously, but it’s really a form of signaling. It’s just showing that I have the extra time and resources to sit around with my dad and be taught this beautiful melody, and I can put protein, whatever else it takes, into my vocal cords so I have a nice, loud voice, and all of that is a signal of evolutionary fitness, in the same kind of way in which a peacock has a beautiful tail. The tail doesn’t mean anything, presumably. Perhaps it does, and we’ve missed it. But it’s not like the pattern of a tail has a semantic meaning. It’s a sign of evolutionary fitness.

    So presumably, even though those melodies are passed on from bird to bird, there may be differences within a species in how they sing and so on. A skeptic would say that’s not language in the kind of way in which perhaps whales have language.

    Beguš: That’s where we get to whales. The mating function is not that exciting from a perspective of human language or comparing human language to other species. But birds have alarm calls, and monkeys have alarm calls. Now the really interesting things happen with whales. The reason why I love studying whales is because they don’t vocalize for mating at all, at least the whales I study don’t. Humpback whales do vocalize for mating. Sperm whales form complex societies. Based on the dialects they speak, they form families and clans. Crucially, they communicate. They exchange vocalizations, learned vocalizations. We know they’re learned because the baby whales babble.

    There’s a lot of variation and dialects, and so they exchange those communications while hunting, before hunting, before they dive two kilometers deep to hunt, and when socializing and during giving birth.

    Mounk: Presumably one difference would be that if you take a bird from one locality and put it in the vicinity of other birds of that species, the birds of that species might go, wow, we haven’t heard that melody before. That might make the melody more attractive or less attractive to them. But they would still get the melody in the same way as they might get the melody of a bird in the vicinity. Whereas with whales, because it is culturally bound in that way, it appears to be the fact that the dialect they use changes depending on the part of the tribe or the group of whales you’re talking about. If you were able to take a whale from a completely different geography and put it in communication with other whales, they might struggle to understand each other in the way that I would struggle to understand somebody if I was dropped in the middle of Vietnam and people there didn’t happen to speak English.

    Beguš: Some birds’ vocalizations are learned as well. It’s actually interesting. You cannot learn human language as a human unless you get linguistic input and you hear language from the beginning. So there are some really unfortunate cases of child neglect or abuse where children were not able to get language until they were around twelve. That’s the critical period. You’re never going to be able to fully master human language if you don’t get it. The same happens with birds. There are some experiments back in the day where, if a bird with learned communication is not exposed to the father’s song, it will never master it to the same level as if it’s exposed to it from birth. Now with whales, we cannot do such experiments. They would be ethically really problematic.

    Mounk: I think with birds it even takes a number of generations to build back up the complexity of birdsong, though it was there previously and so on. I take the point that you made earlier that birdsong changes, it’s passed down from father to son and therefore changes. But I meant something slightly different. We may not be able to do the experiment, but there’s reason to believe that the function of whale language depends on mutual comprehension of the content of what they’re saying. Because different sets of whales have particular linguistic conventions that help them communicate, if you introduced a whale from a totally different group, they may not be able to communicate with each other what otherwise they would.

    Whereas with a bird, where the purpose is just a mating call, the purpose is to show how beautiful the birdsong is. If you take a bird from the same species but a different geographic region, that may be a very different song from the local ones, but there wouldn’t be that barrier to comprehension. They would register that the bird sings an interesting song and that it seems to take a lot of evolutionary resources. So perhaps that’s a good signal of evolutionary fitness. It wouldn’t lose the communicative potential in the same way that it might in the case of whales.

    Beguš: That’s certainly true for mating songs. The question is that some birds also have learned vocalizations for alarm calls, for example. That’s when it becomes interesting in birds. For birds, in a sense, they’re much easier to study, because there’s a lot of work in animal communication research on birds and elephants. We share so many things with birds and elephants. You can conceptualize a predator in birds or elephants. They have trees, they have air, they have ground, all these things that are familiar to us.

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    Then you come to whales and you don’t even know how to represent the presence of a predator because the ocean is so vast and the light doesn’t travel at all in the ocean. The light gets in water and gets lost so fast. We are so visual in some ways that we try to represent things visually, but whales probably don’t represent things as much visually as they do with sound. They navigate, orient themselves, hunt, and escape predators by emitting echolocation sounds and then hearing what comes back. So it’s really difficult to conceptualize their world and make a good model of their world, because underwater life is just so different.

    Mounk: I think we have some different gradations. We have birds that have forms of communication, but it mostly seems to be things like mating calls. We have whales. It’s very hard to know exactly what’s going on, but it seems to share some additional features with human language, like the fact that there are different languages and dialects and so on. Is there something specific about human language? How is it that human language is different from what whales seem to be doing?

    Beguš: Well, I can tell you roughly what the story was for sixty years and how we should change it. The idea was that human language is completely different, and for all sorts of reasons. One was that the main aspect of human language that was considered uniquely human was the so-called recursion. It’s a slightly complex property of language, but roughly it says that you can take one element and embed it into an element of the same type. Yascha said that Gasper said that whales have language. You can always make that sentence larger by saying Leo said that Yascha said that Gasper said that whales have language, and so on. It’s this kind of infinite loop of language.

    That hasn’t been found. There are some attempts in birdsong, but in the animal kingdom in the wild that principle hasn’t really been found. It’s a very complex principle, and there’s so much we still don’t know about animals that I’m not really surprised that it hasn’t been found. There are other things, like the idea that animals cannot talk about things that are not immediately present. They don’t talk about things that are in the past or in the future. They have only immediate reference.

    A lot of these things were debunked by research at various levels. With language-trained animals, bonobos were able to go to another room and talk about things. One favorite example is Alex the parrot saying “banari” for apple. He couldn’t say apple because it’s difficult for them to say P, so he made up a word, banarry. An apple tastes like a banana but looks like a cherry. He put words together, which shows productive compositional compounding.

    Across the research, if you take these studies seriously, you realize that there’s very little that is uniquely human about language. Not every other species has all the properties of human language, but there are bits and pieces across animals, especially language-trained animals. We’re only starting to uncover the richness of animal communication in the wild. Slowly, the properties of human language that are exclusively human are being taken away.

    The big step now is also artificial intelligence models. That’s a different story, but some of the things that we thought were uniquely human and never achievable are now achievable in these large language models.

    Mounk: There are these incredibly cute Instagram videos of humans communicating with dogs in various ways, and that’s remarkable. But what’s even more astonishing is that I now communicate in natural language with some artificial entity that can easily pass itself off as human these days, that can pass the famous Turing test.

    This is very different from what computers did when I was younger. For a long time, we had these symbolic languages that we built, programming languages, and they basically told the computer exactly what digits to manipulate in response to some kind of request. So that was this artificial interface that we needed to learn and that needed to be hard-baked into the computer for us to be able to communicate. That was very useful. It allowed me to run some statistical analyses in a language like R. It allowed much more sophisticated computer programmers to come up with things like Windows, so that we have a visual interface to still tell the computer what to do on the basis of me clicking, and that generates some kind of code, and that symbolic language tells the computer what to do. That’s just vastly different from what we’re able to do today.

    Now I can say, hey Claude, tell me a poem, and it will. I can say, I don’t like this part of it. It speaks to me in some ways like a human, some ways not like a human, but using human language. Have these AI systems learned language? Are they cleverly pretending to have learned language? Would that even be a meaningful distinction for us, given that we can now have these in-depth, sophisticated communications in human language with this non-human entity, an entity that is not even an animal, unlike dogs and whales and birds and all these other things we’ve talked about?

    Beguš: I think what these models have shown us is that you do not need language-specific or human-specific apparatus, either in your brain or anywhere else. They show us what properties of language are something a general cognitive device can learn. Because animals obviously are intelligent, and it was thought that they’re intelligent but don’t have language because you need something specific about language.

    The reason for that was the idea that we get little data as humans. Within two or three years, a child learns language pretty well, and that is impressive. If you think about it, especially because I do a lot of modeling not with text but in a way that human babies actually learn from sound, a human baby needs to learn impressively. Just take a single word like apple. Imagine you’re learning the word apple. You see an apple and you hear “apple” sometimes, but sometimes you hear the word apple and you don’t see an apple. Sometimes you see an apple and you don’t hear anything.

    Imagine all the things a child hears and all the things a child sees. It needs to make that match, that correspondence between the sound that denotes something and the actual object in the real world. That’s not an easy thing. We’re trying to model things with ecological data, meaning the same amounts of data that a child gets, and it’s not easy. Of course, artificial AI models are slightly different. They’re modeled according to our brains, but you still have to computer-program them. They have their own quirks, and they need more data, much more data. But at the end of the day, they learn things.

    Mounk: So two points just to draw out here to make sure that people follow. First, we’ve gone over that in past conversations with Geoffrey Hinton and David Bau and so on. But if you can give people a very short primer on what you mean by AI systems being kind of like the human brain. Obviously, I assume you’re referring to the fact that they’re both forms of neural networks and that, in key ways, the particular form of artificial intelligence that we’ve gotten turned out to make much bigger advances than the alternative of symbolic AI that people had considered for a long time is in some ways deliberately modeled on the human brain.

    The second point to draw out is this remarkable thing that humans actually go by much less data and use much less energy. This is a point that a good friend of mine, who’s a neuroscientist, made to me about his child. His child has encountered vastly less language than ChatGPT has in its training data and runs on cornflakes and the occasional hot dog. Whereas the amount of energy that is used to train the cutting-edge AI models is just vastly more. So just explain those two facets to us.

    Beguš: Well, first of all, large language models that we mostly talk about these days don’t learn like human babies do at all. They learn from text, and human babies learn a lot about language before they can read. They can speak by the age of six when they start reading. So reading is kind of secondary. Text is just a secondary representation of language. That’s why they’re slightly different.

    I think we also need to build models that are more like humans. But it’s still true. To finish my thought, what LLMs tell us is the limits of what can be learned with artificial intelligence. What are the limits? I don’t think they tell us how humans learn language. They just give us the limits, and that’s impressive. But they’re not really learning in the same way as humans do.

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    So to go back to your question about the relationship between the brain and AI, AI is, in a sense, a rough mathematical approximation of how neurons work. The idea is that you can learn concepts and really complex things through the connections between units that are called neurons.

    It’s a really exciting time now because AI is advancing and neuroscience is advancing, and we’re starting to gain understanding. You can use an AI model to simulate what’s going on in our brain. You can use our brain to better understand what AI is doing. One of the big topics these days is how AI is learning and whether we can interpret it and look inside it. That’s something I’m really curious about as well. The idea is that we now have an artificial approximation of the human brain. There are a lot of interesting experiments we can do and potentially use those tools for all sorts of things, including scientific insight and trying to understand what animals are saying.

    Mounk: Now, help me clear up a confusion that I have here. In my limited understanding of linguistics, I thought that the leading theory for how humans are able to acquire language so fast and are able to communicate was proposed by Noam Chomsky, and it’s called universal grammar. I will probably butcher the details here, but the broad idea is that there’s a set of grammatical possibilities that are hard-coded into the brain, into the architecture of our mind. Then there are a bunch of switches that flip one way or another depending on the kind of language that you encounter as a baby and as an infant. Rather than having to learn grammar from scratch, there are pre-existing modalities, and that makes it much more efficient. That helps to explain why, with cornflakes and hot dogs, dear Gabriel can now speak the English language, which is remarkable.

    You can see that by the fact that there are grammatical rules that we as humans follow without ever being aware of them. I don’t think that more than 0.01 percent of the listeners to this podcast are going to be able to explain to me off the cuff the rule that governs the order adjectives go in the English language. Yet they will know that “the little blue house” is grammatical and “the blue little house” is not grammatical. The explanation for that seems to be rooted, in some ways, in universal grammar.

    Presumably, we don’t really understand the architecture of the brain well enough to have replicated whatever structure this is supposed to be rooted in in these AI models. It’s not like people at Anthropic are studying Chomsky’s models of universal grammar and saying that they have to arrange layers of neurons in a very particular way to code for human language. All we did was throw a bunch of data at these very sophisticated machines, and they picked up on it. In fact, Claude today is 99.99 percent of the time going to say “the little blue house” and not “the blue little house” because it too has figured out the basic rules of language. Does that create a problem for Chomsky’s theory of universal grammar? Does that indicate that perhaps linguists were wrong about that?

    Beguš: You can think of that historically. Linguistics of the 60s was influenced by the computer science of the 60s. Exactly what you said at the beginning. That’s how computers used to work. You had a preprogrammed program, and it performed rules according to what you preprogrammed. So the worldview was that there’s a code. There was a background code. There was probably a genetic code that had all those rules, all those switches, all those if-then statements. So language was considered an if-then statement.

    Now the paradigm is changing. From logic and if-then statements, we went into neural nets. When you say ninety-nine percent of the time, exactly, those are not rules anymore. Those are tendencies based on trained neural networks. So from rules to neural networks in computer science meant that linguistics is now seeing things differently. People have been arguing for this approach before. The idea is that you learn all the rules from being exposed to data and making those connections inside your brain, those neural connections. At the end of the day, you’re speaking as you’ve been taught by your parents.

    I have a pet hypothesis for how we can conceptualize language. We can say it’s informative imitation, and that’s it. Whatever comes after that is a matter of complexity. A child is born and needs to imitate what it hears from the parents. It makes neural connections such that, gradually, you’re approximating what parents are saying, and your vocalizations need to carry information that your caregivers are able to decode. It’s encoding information by imitation and decoding it. Once you have that, you loosen the limits and can admit more things into the idea of language. Then it becomes a matter of complexity. Maybe humans have more complex language than whales, but the basic principle is imitation and informative transmission of information through vocalizations.

    I want to say one more thing about LLMs and what they contribute to linguistics. Because they are able to do language now, this idea that you need a prearranged, innate program, some genetic mutation that allowed language, is gone. All you need is a general-purpose pattern discoverer or recognizer. That is really important. That is really powerful.

    Another big question in that arena is the relationship between language and thought. For the Chomskyan tradition, language and thought are intrinsically connected. You cannot have complex thought without complex language. What neuroscience is realizing now is that maybe language is just a final stage, an externalization algorithm. You have complex thought and complex processing, and language is taking that complex thought and linearizing it into sentences and words. There’s interesting work on aphasia patients showing that they can do mathematical operations but cannot express them. You can have a stroke in an area of the brain that damages language.

    That is another paradigm shift. If language is just an externalization algorithm, then animals and other species might have complex inner lives. We just haven’t figured out the window into those lives yet. In some cases we have. With Alex the parrot, we used our own language. We taught Alex our language and were able to see that it could count and do complex operations. For other species, we just haven’t found that window yet. The hope is that we do.

    Mounk: That last thought you had is fascinating to me, and that’s the first time I’m hearing this. To follow this carefully, the idea is that we might assume that what’s going on when you’re reflecting on something, should I choose this restaurant or should I choose that restaurant, should I take this job or should I take that job, should I become a monk or should I become an actor, is a linguistic process. It’s nearly like I’m writing out the arguments for doing A or the arguments for doing B and raising objections to it. Even if that’s not spoken aloud, and unless I’m a little bit nuts, even if I don’t fully understand those words, and even if I don’t have an internal monologue all of the time, what’s going on is basically in the form of language.

    Now you’re saying that this is not how AI seems to reason. It’s not how AI seems to produce language. We force them to do that a little bit nowadays with reasoning models. We can see a quasi chain of thought, but that’s actually not what seems to be going on in the layers of neurons that are activating and all of that. Perhaps that’s also not what’s going on in the brain when I’m deliberating about something. What’s going on is some very different process. The last step of that is that, in my own brain, I translate that into language or have an internal voice. Or if I want to explain to you, Gasper, what it is that I’m thinking, I fall back on conventions in order to speak to you. I translate, unconsciously, this set of thoughts into language as a tool for communication. That’s quite a striking thought. Is this one hypothesis among others at the moment?

    Beguš: Yeah, it’s pretty complex. Maybe all the concepts. Obviously, you have words to denote things. But when you do processing, are you thinking in this higher-level space that doesn’t necessarily tie each concept to a word? Then you go back and explain everything in words. That’s probably one model that I would subscribe to at this point. The jury is still out, but the idea is that complex thinking does not always involve discrete words.

    Some people have an inner voice. Fedorenko says that other people don’t. But the idea is that I think both AI and the human brain operate in many ways quite similarly. There are interesting experiments you can perform in that area. The idea is that language does not penetrate all layers of complex thought. It’s probably easier to be intelligent if you have ways to label things, call objects, and represent them. But when you do complex math, you don’t need the entirety of language.

    When you calculate eight times seven, maybe you remember that one from primary school. But if I ask you something more complex, you would do some sort of reasoning, but you would not narrate it in words. One of the most difficult exercises in elementary school is “explain your answer.” You have to externalize everything and explain it step by step.

    One really interesting aspect about LLMs is the so-called chain of thought. LLMs become much better when they are not just answering immediately, that knee-jerk reaction to a question, but when they are able to internally subdivide complex questions into simpler ones and then give a final answer. When you asked me what language is, I first started dissecting things. When we allowed LLMs to do that, they became very good.

    They also started doing language very well. When you mentioned that readers would not be able to explain why it’s “a big blue car” and not “a blue big car,” LLMs started explaining that. They became very good once they had chain of thought.

    Going back to chain of thought, it’s interesting to look inside those LLMs and see what they’re doing. Sometimes they produce complete gibberish, yet the answer is still perfectly correct. The chain itself was something we trained them to produce, to explain how they got to the answer. That may indicate that what’s going on in thought is some kind of high-level combination of concepts that we are computing effectively, and then we go back to language and explain it. That would be the relationship between language and thought that I currently subscribe to. But there’s still a lot of work to be done for that question to be fully answered.

    Mounk: How does that relate to this idea that I always hear bandied about in these discussions of artificial intelligence and LLMs, of these bots just being stochastic parrots? I think there are two things going on here. One is that I think this is a bit of a deepity. For those who don’t know the term, a deepity is the idea that love is but a word, and it’s also modern baby talk. The claim that love is but a word relies on a straightforward interpretation that is obviously true. Love is a word in the English language. But there’s a deeper sense that would be more interesting and actually turns out to be implausible, which is that there’s no such thing as romantic love in the world, that people don’t really feel it, that you can’t really trust anybody, or whatever else you might take to be the implication of that sentence. I think that interpretation is untrue, unrealistic, and shouldn’t be taken very seriously.

    The seeming depth of the phrase trades on switching back and forth between those two meanings. I think when people talk about stochastic parrots, something similar is happening. There’s a sense in which it’s obviously true. The way these models are trained is next-token prediction. You give them a bunch of text and say, here are the first forty-seven words. What do you think the forty-eighth word, or more specifically token, is? Over a set of processes, they get better at doing that. So yes, they’re trained to predict the next token, and in that sense they’re like a stochastic parrot.

    But there’s another sense people seem to imply, which is more like the famous example of monkeys spending an infinite amount of time typing randomly on a keyboard until they produce the works of Shakespeare, where there’s no goal-directed process going on. To me, in the first sense, yes, LLMs are stochastic parrots in a trivial and uninteresting way. In the second sense, it’s just not true. LLMs sometimes mess up, but it’s not the case that they just produce random gibberish and once in a blue moon it happens to be meaningful. Most of the time, they address my question in a clearly goal-directed way, which indicates some kind of understanding.

    That’s my general thought listening to you. This is the first time I’m formulating it in this particular way about the stochastic parrot idea. The other thing is that the way you’ve been talking about how humans acquire language, and perhaps how other animals acquire language, sounds somewhat similar to stochastic parrots too. Once we have the right understanding of the sense in which other animals might be stochastic parrots, are we ourselves not also stochastic parrots?

    Beguš: Those are some really deep questions. I think we are, in a sense, stochastic parrots. That’s a somewhat controversial opinion. I think we need to understand that LLMs do not learn language like humans. That’s both good and bad. I think people are conflating two things here.

    We have LLMs. They can reason about incredibly complex things. It’s not just that they’re providing answers. With chain of thought, they can not only do language and be correct ninety-nine percent of the time with rules they were never taught, but they can also reason about language. They can have metalinguistic awareness. They can do higher-level reasoning and higher-level mathematics.

    It’s hard to know exactly what it means to be a stochastic parrot, but the performance they show is impressive enough that I don’t think you can reduce everything they do to a very simple operation. I think what’s happening is that they learn concepts about the world in ways that are similar to how we learn concepts about the world. The mapping between concepts in our brain probably has some relationship to the mapping between connections in their artificial neural networks. They’re able to make those connections, process complex concepts, and deliver impressive performance. Five years ago, none of this conversation would have been happening, and that’s remarkable.

    But that’s an engineering product. What becomes problematic is to ask whether they’re doing things in exactly the same way we are, given that we’ve built them to do something different. Humans learn language by listening, speaking, imitating, and getting messages across to the people around us. That distinction is important.

    We can use the same architectures and principles from neural networks to build models that are more realistic. Models that need to speak, listen, and interact with the environment. I think we’re going to see very exciting results there, and even better improvements. That will help us understand whether we are similar or different and what the underlying mechanisms are. We need to distinguish between scientific simulations and an engineering product.

    Mounk: That’s very interesting. What do you think the implications of this are for how much further progress is going to go on in LLMs? One very simple confusion I have is whether there’s something like an upper limit on intelligence in general, and then, secondarily, whether there’s something like an upper limit on the intelligence of a machine that is trained on the work product of a species that has an upper limit on its intelligence, even if that has biological reasons.

    If the best we can feed LLMs in training is the best text we can come up with, and a bunch of other things, is there some way that they can bootstrap themselves off that and go off into a completely different realm of thought? Or is there a reason to think that inherently they’re going to stall out at the top level of human intelligence because that’s all the training that went into it? I don’t know if this question even makes sense, but help me puzzle through this.

    Beguš: No, it makes perfect sense. It’s a million-dollar question. I think it’s one we need to look to other species to answer. We talked about the exclusivity of language. In previous worldviews, you needed a language-specific center, organ, instincts, whatever. The other worldview is that you just increase capacity and all these things that we cherish about intelligence and language emerge. Humans are very smart primates, and as you increase the complexity of the brain, things emerge on their own.

    I’m much more in the second camp. In the modeling work I do, we build AI models like LLMs, but more realistic ones that learn from speech only and are more brain-inspired. A lot of the things that linguists cherish as symbolic computation emerge. I can show that something like a phoneme or a morpheme, which in the Chomskyan world was considered a rule or a symbol, emerges in neural computation. These neural networks are incredibly efficient, and symbolic-like computation emerges, as it does in our brain. If you increase capacity, the capacity for symbolic-like processing increases, and all of a sudden you have language.

    In my opinion, language is a continuum and consciousness is a continuum. As you increase capacity, a lot of the things that we cherish about intelligence emerge. Under that worldview, if you increase the capacity of LLMs or other models, intelligence will increase or emerge. As for an upper limit, some people think LLMs are the wrong way to think about intelligence. But what we’re seeing is that from GPT-2 to 3 to 3.5 to 4, and so on, as you increase parameters, performance continues to increase. If you subscribe to this worldview, I don’t have a convincing argument that at some point they will just level off and stop improving.

    One thing I observe in my work with AI models is that they’re not necessarily original. They’re very creative, but I define originality as proposing something that has never been proposed before. Modigliani is an amazing painter not just because he combined styles, but because he proposed a completely new one. That’s something I’m not seeing yet. That may be because companies don’t want to release very original models, since that could go in bad directions. In general, all else being equal, as you increase connections, intelligence increases.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Gašper discuss using artificial intelligence to gain insights into Whalish, what creativity shows us about humanity, and what it means to be conscious. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr
  • Abundance, Hope, Homelessness
    Tents of homeless people are seen on a sidewalk amid rainfall on January 3, 2026 in Los Angeles, California. (Photo by Qian Weizhong/VCG via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    At a time when we desperately seek hope, Los Angeles’ continuing crisis of homelessness is an unlikely place to look. Indeed, LA’s homelessness is Exhibit Number One in Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s indictment of progressive governance in their best-selling 2025 book Abundance.

    But hope can be evoked in a variety of ways.

    Abundance is a clarion call for bold, decisive action. It offers a vision of a public sector that again plays its crucial market-complementing role of helping to build the things needed for a good life, and, in so doing, helps renew the legitimacy of the public sphere. The case for Abundance-style top-down decisiveness is compelling—but only for some problems, and only some of the time.

    As those of us who spent decades wrestling with the challenges of achieving practical gains in the midst of political and institutional complexity have learned, while some problems lend themselves to high-visibility boldness, others call for effort that—though also results-focused—gives more weight to deliberation, transparency, and collaboration with non-governmental stakeholders: a marathon rather than a sprint. Misdiagnosing the nature of the problem at hand can result in overpromising, disillusionment, and deepening cynicism.

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    LA’s evolving effort to address homelessness offers valuable insight into both the hazards of over-promising and, in recent years, the gains that can come from an approach centered around engaging with complexity—skillfully, determinedly—and focusing on results.

    At first sight, LA’s homelessness challenge can appear well-suited to top-down action: provide support and affordable housing for the 70,000 or so people identified as homeless in early 2025, about 50,000 of whom live on the streets. Housing 50-70,000 people with little or no capacity to support themselves in the near term is a formidable, but seemingly manageable, task. As per the title of an influential book that provides an important building block for Abundance’s critique of progressive governance in LA, the cause—and remedy—of LA’s homelessness crisis seems straightforward: Homelessness is a Housing Problem. LA has among the most expensive housing markets in the United States. Address the regulatory obstacles and other cost drivers of affordable housing and, over time, LA’s homelessness crisis would largely solve itself.

    In 2016 and 2017, LA voters approved both a $1.2 billion bond for new affordable housing, and a new one-quarter percent sales tax to finance homeless services. However, within a few years it became apparent that these initiatives fell far short of what was needed.

    Lack of effort is not the reason for the continuing shortfall. Contrary to popular perception, LA has a large-scale program underway to address its homelessness crisis. In 2024, for example, roughly 30,000 people lived in permanent supportive housing; an additional 20,000 received time-limited rental subsidies or vouchers to help them exit homelessness; and about 35,000 people spent some time in interim housing facilities. Further, innovative “encampment resolution” programs—the city’s Inside Safe program, and the county’s Pathway Home program—helped achieve a decline of about 15 percent between 2023 and 2025 in the number of people living on the streets. But it is very uncertain whether these gains can be sustained, both because of new fiscal challenges (on which more a little later), and because the usual way in which homelessness is understood captures only the tip of the iceberg of LA’s challenge.

    Homelessness generally is measured in annual point-in-time counts—but the resulting number reflects only a moment in an ongoing flow. In LA County, roughly 60,000 people become newly homeless each year, a cumulative total of 300,000 people over five years. While most self-resolve within a year or two, a significant minority become chronically homeless, with deepening mental health and substance abuse challenges.

    To keep pace with the ongoing inflow, a fully scaled-up response requires far more resources than were authorized in 2016 and 2017. The cost of providing permanent supportive housing in LA is in the order of $40,000 per adult household per year—an amount that, reflecting LA’s exorbitant housing costs, is roughly double the national average of $20,000. Add the costs of temporary rental support for people exiting homelessness, of interim housing, of outreach and basic services for people living on the street, of prevention assistance for households on the brink of becoming homeless, and of system administration—and the total annual spending for a response scaled to decisively resolve LA’s homelessness crisis would be well in excess of $2 billion.

    Resources aside, addressing homelessness also raises difficult questions about competing interests and competing values. Without a stronger sense of shared purpose, hyper-local civic and political opposition can put sand in the wheels of state-level reforms to ease regulatory and local-zoning constraints on the construction of new housing. Also, from a radically different perspective, attempts to ruthlessly clear unsheltered homeless people from the streets, without regard for the many ways in which they are vulnerable—and with nowhere for them to go—will (appropriately) be met with revulsion and resistance.

    Homelessness is thus a classic example of a “wicked” problem—one that is politically contested, value-laden, and embedded in complex social systems with multiple, conflicting stakeholder perspectives. Problems like these need something very different from top-down assertions of authority. They need a foundation of broad-based civic legitimacy: goals that are clear, ambitious, achievable, and widely accepted; public resources that are used efficiently and effectively; and processes of decision-making that help narrow the gap between civil society and formal political and bureaucratic processes—doing so in a way that is radically different from the performative and time-consuming public engagement processes devastatingly critiqued in Abundance.

    This brings us to governance.

    Unlike, say, New York City, where decision-making is centralized, governance in the LA region is notoriously fragmented: responsibilities are divvied up between a powerful LA County Board of Supervisors and 88 independent municipalities, including LA City. The result has been that LA has long been largely “flying blind” in its response to homelessness—with many actors and many activities, but no overall picture of how much is being spent, who does what, or where overlaps occur. The whole has been way less than the sum of its parts.

    In the wake of the failure of their earlier efforts to reduce homelessness, LA’s political and civic leaders did not succumb to recrimination. Instead, they embraced problem-focused governance reform. The reforms comprise an innovative combination of hierarchical and horizontal governance arrangements. Together, these arrangements have provided a platform for a far-reaching, ongoing effort to restructure the region’s approach to homelessness.

    The hierarchical reform involved the creation in 2025 of a powerful new Los Angeles County-wide Department of Homeless Services and Housing (HSH), a consolidation of pre-existing fragmented programs, plus a partial clawback of resources and programs from a homeless services body that had been (quite ineffectually) governed as a joint-powers city/county authority.

    Complementing HSH (in fact, preceding it chronologically) were formal state- and county-level initiatives to establish three horizontal governance bodies: in 2022, a California Senate law mandated the creation of the Los Angeles County Affordable Housing Solutions Agency; in 2023, the LA County Board of Supervisors authorized the establishment of a Leadership Table and an Executive Committee for Regional Homeless Alignment. These horizontal arrangements help strengthen legitimacy by making goals, tradeoffs, and responsibilities explicit, transparent and shared among stakeholders who might otherwise contest them from the outside.

    Innovative governance is, of course, not an end in itself. It only makes a practical difference insofar as it supports the desired direction of change on the ground. 2025 witnessed a sustained effort to turn intent into results-focused action, including in response to an unexpected budget crisis, originating in part in Washington, D.C.

    An early fruit of the new arrangement was agreement among stakeholders on a hitherto-missing “north star” for efforts to reduce homelessness. They collaboratively crafted a set of ambitious and achievable top-line goals for 2030, which were then formally adopted by local government. One goal targets a reduction in the number of people living on the streets by about a third by 2030. A second aims for a 20% reduction in the number of people who become homeless each year. A third aims to increase the number of people who exit homelessness into permanent housing from just under 20,000 in 2025 to 30,000 in 2030.

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    In recent years, the number of new housing units coming onstream in LA has risen quite substantially—from about 17,000 per annum in the latter 2010s to over 28,000 in 2024. However, over 90 percent of this new supply is for households earning at least 120% of area median income. The number of new units coming onstream each year that would be affordable for the roughly 480,000 renter households earning less than 50% of median LA income is projected to rise from a paltry 1,700 in 2025 to a marginally less paltry 2,400 in 2030. The 2030 goal for new affordable units signals what those working to expand the supply of affordable housing view as doable in a five-year time span.

    Housing aside, in the short and medium-term, progress in both meeting the 2030 goals and sustaining civic legitimacy will need to come from better resource use—from no longer flying blind, but transparently and credibly addressing the classic questions of effectiveness and efficiency, and then acting on what is learned.

    Efficiency gains can come from ensuring that organizations that receive public resources use them well, and also by transforming a fragmented system based on individual providers into one in which homeless people can more seamlessly access the services they need. Over the course of 2025, specialized multistakeholder teams agreed on a detailed set of indicators to be used as a basis for benchmarking provider performance. Work is also moving forward rapidly to provide harmonized information on the full range of service providers across Los Angeles County—what each does, and what resources they receive.

    For effectiveness, an ambitious effort is underway to assess the relative social and financial value of a variety of interventions. Relevant questions include: Which interventions are most effective in reducing the number of people falling into homelessness? What facilitates rapid exit from homelessness? Which services and supports—psychological and social support, rental subsidies, interim housing—best help homeless people get permanently housed? Are scarce dollars better spent on time-limited rental subsidies or permanent supportive housing? Work on questions such as these is likely to create major opportunities for reallocating resources towards underfunded activities that cost-effectively deliver high social returns.

    But even as work to address efficiency and effectiveness gets underway, the new governance arrangements face a trial by fire. An unanticipated fiscal crisis—the result of a combination of cost escalations, the drying up of short-term state and local financing, and federal budget cuts—has necessitated major budget restructuring, conducted at breakneck speed.

    In making budget cuts, there has been a determined effort to protect the number of permanent and interim beds available to house the homeless. This has come at the cost of significant reductions elsewhere. These include a sharp decline in time-limited rental subsidies (from over $200 million in 2024/5 to under $100 million projected for 2026/7) along with about $127 million of planned cuts in 2026/7 for a wide range of homeless services (including the elimination of 32 ongoing programs).

    By making trade-offs more visible and more contested, the fiscal belt-tightening has placed renewed pressure on civic legitimacy. The way in which these pressures are being addressed is very different from Abundance’s implicit prescription. Instead of headline-making “just do it” decisiveness, the process of deciding which homeless services to cut has included intensive back-and-forth dialogue on trade-offs with the Leadership Table and the Executive Committee, along with a series of open forums. The result has been broad acceptance of the legitimacy and necessity of the proposed cuts, notwithstanding the pain they will cause for both providers and service recipients.

    More broadly, LA’s experience in addressing homelessness over the past decade suggests that, especially in addressing “wicked” problems, clarion calls for bold action risk backfiring—not because ambition is misplaced, but because the pathways to durable change are different. LA’s false start in 2016 and 2017 highlights the hazards of over-promising and under-delivering. By contrast, the momentum of recent years points to the potential of a very different pathway.

    Inspiration need not come only from headline-making boldness. Bringing attention to the practical can also inspire people—in its focus on concrete gains, in its evocation of human agency, in its commitment to building a shared understanding of the complexity of the challenge, and in the power that can come from cultivating shared (problem-level) purpose to get things done. Embracing workaday realities need not detract from Abundance’s vision; it can align with it—and, in its practicality, give it greater potency.

    To be sure, what comes next is uncertain. LA has to balance unexpected fiscal stringency on the one hand, and the massive, ongoing needs of an effective system to reduce homelessness on the other. More efficient and effective use of resources will be key both to finding that balance, and to sustaining civic legitimacy. Can LA’s hard-won, innovative, and results-focused center hold in the face of the adversities that are sure to come? Over the course of 2026, the answer will become increasingly evident.

    Brian Levy teaches at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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  • Why I'm Rooting Against My Own Country
    Danish soldiers arrive at Nuuk airport, Greenland, on January 19, 2026. (Photo by Mads Claus Rasmussen / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Last weekend, President Trump threatened to impose escalating tariffs on several of the United States’ closest European allies in an effort to annex Greenland from Denmark. Trump said he would ratchet up tariffs on Europe by 10 percent and that duties would increase to 25 percent in June if the United States didn’t “own” the territory by then.

    European leaders refused. They issued a series of defiant condemnations. European troops landed in Greenland. When the European Parliament met on Wednesday, it halted work on a major trade deal between the United States and the EU. By Wednesday evening, Trump caved and announced the “framework of a future deal with respect to Greenland”—and the territory remains, for now, under Danish control.

    The image of European soldiers disembarking from transport aircraft in response to threats from the United States is not one that America’s allies will soon forget. Nor will I. At that moment, I felt greater solidarity with Denmark, France, Germany, and other European states than with the government of my own country—which was trying to bully a stalwart ally into sacrificing its sovereignty and territorial integrity for the president’s vanity.

    This realization was jarring, as I consider myself a patriotic American. But it’s possible to love one’s country while feeling deep disillusionment about its behavior. When it looked like there was going to be a trade war between the United States and Europe, I hoped Europe would win. I also felt this way when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office early last year, and I spoke with many Americans who shared this sense of shame. Zelenskyy is the president of an embattled democracy who courageously remained in Kyiv as Russian tanks rolled across the Ukrainian border. Watching the president and vice president insult, threaten, and lecture him—and demand gratitude after drastically slashing U.S. support for Ukraine—was a dismal spectacle.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    The past year has demonstrated that the United States is no longer the leader of the free world. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney observed at the World Economic Forum this week, there has been a “rupture” in the liberal international order. He didn’t need to say it explicitly, but he was referring to the United States’ abdication of its outsize role in holding that order together. As Trump becomes increasingly erratic, bellicose, and illiberal, Europe must assume responsibility for defending the principles of NATO and the global order that the United States has anchored since the end of World War II.

    Americans, meanwhile, must choose patriotism over nationalism. This means supporting the countries that remain committed to liberal democracy even when they confront the United States. There’s a profound difference between loving your country—I always will, regardless of what the United States does or becomes—and supporting its government no matter what.

    This is a distinction that nationalists reject. During a recent speech at the Claremont Institute, Vance argued that fidelity to the “creedal principles of America” isn’t enough to make someone American. He said it’s time to “redefine the meaning of American citizenship in the twenty-first century.” This redefinition has less to do with the United States’ founding liberal principles than with cultural homogeneity: “America is not just an idea,” Vance said. “We’re a particular place with a particular people and a particular set of beliefs and way of life.” He declared that the “people whose ancestors fought in the Civil War have a hell of a lot more claim over America” than other citizens. Trump recently expressed an even uglier form of parochialism when he described Somali Americans as “garbage” and declared that immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country.”

    This insular view of American identity leaves less room for solidarity between democracies—and it’s no wonder that Vance is more hostile to Europe than anyone else in the administration. Nationalism of this sort tends to descend into jingoism. After the Venezuela operation, Katie Miller (wife of Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff) posted a picture of Greenland with an American flag superimposed over the map with the caption “SOON.” Senior members of the administration have been posting similar memes, while MAGA influencers have been crowing about American dominance and calling for a new age of imperialism.

    The Founders, by contrast, constantly emphasized the universalism of America’s founding principles. Alexander Hamilton said the American Revolution was a vindication of the “sacred rights of mankind.” The Founders were powerfully influenced by Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke, who argued that natural rights are the innate possession of every human being. Thomas Jefferson observed that “All eyes are opened or opening, to the rights of man” and looked forward to the day when all people would “assume the blessings and security of self-government.”

    The United States, in other words, is an idea. There’s no religious or cultural test for citizenship—but we do demand that Americans take their oath to the creedal principles that Vance believes are secondary to heritage.

    That’s why, for millions of Americans, patriotism and citizenship have nothing to do with how many generations of their family are buried in American soil. I’m proud to be an American because the United States embodies universal values such as democracy and the rule of law. But when another part of the world embodies those values more completely—which Europe clearly does in the dispute over Greenland—then it has my support.

    It’s true that European countries have spent the past year placating Trump with flattery, gifts, and diplomatic overtures—an appeasement campaign that culminated in a trade deal that accepts 15 percent tariffs on European goods with very few concessions from the United States. The Trump administration repaid this acquiescence with contempt. During his speech in Davos, he repeatedly claimed that the United States has received “absolutely nothing in return” for its role in NATO—apparently forgetting that the only time the alliance has ever invoked Article 5 in defense of a member state was after the September 11 attacks.

    But in the past few days, Europe has demonstrated that it can function as a powerful check on Trump’s illiberalism. It challenged Trump’s claim to dominance over Greenland, and he quickly buckled. Trump has left Europe with no alternative but to pursue strategic autonomy, and over time this will make the continent a heavier counterweight to the United States. While there are historic risks associated with European rearmament—particularly given the rise of the populist right in countries like Germany and France—these risks are outweighed by the threat of overreliance on the United States as Trump does everything in his power to dismantle the liberal international order.

    As an American, it’s depressing and infuriating to see my country devolve from the arsenal of democracy into just another marauding and rapacious great power. But as a liberal, there’s some comfort in seeing other democracies stand up for the values America used to defend.

    Matt Johnson is an essayist and the author of How Hitchens Can Save the Left: Rediscovering Fearless Liberalism in an Age of Counter-Enlightenment.

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  • This Week At Persuasion
    Snow! In Freudenberg, Germany. (Photo by Ina FASSBENDER / AFP via Getty Images)
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, January 23, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

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  • Britain Has Forgotten How to Be Free
    Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park, London, on May 14, 2023. (Photo by Leon Neal/Getty Images.)

    This week, I received a private Substack message from a Persuasion subscriber. Assuming it was a query about their subscription or the podcast, I attempted to open it—only to discover that it was blocked unless I provided evidence that I am over the age of 18. The UK’s Online Safety Act (OSA) has struck again—leading Substack to block all private messages unless the recipient can verify their age.1

    Over the last 18 months, the grip of the OSA has become more apparent to internet users with each click. The law was passed by the British parliament in October 2023 but came into effect in stages, the last of which was in July 2025. Among other things, it requires tech companies to take action against illegal content on their platforms, such as child sexual abuse, revenge porn, and fraud. Concerningly, however, the OSA also requires tech companies to protect children from content that is not illegal, but which is nevertheless deemed “harmful.”

    The two categories of legal-but-harmful content are worryingly fluid. “Primary priority content” includes pornography and content that promotes suicide, self-harm, or eating disorders. “Priority content” includes content that children “should be given age-appropriate access to,” such as “bullying,” “abusive or hateful content,” and content depicting or encouraging “serious violence or injury.”

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    In practice, this means that all internet users in the UK wishing to access content that is legal but “harmful” must prove that they are over the age of 18. This may be done through facial recognition, uploading a photo of a government-issued ID, or credit checks.

    It also means that companies such as Substack, out of caution, slap blanket bans on certain types of content (such as direct messages) that may not be in any way harmful. Chris Best, CEO of Substack, has voiced concern about the OSA, writing:

    In a climate of genuine anxiety about children’s exposure to harmful content, the Online Safety Act can sound like a careful, commonsense response. But what I’ve learned is that in practice, it pushes toward something much darker: a system of mass political censorship unlike anywhere else in the western world.

    On top of the chilling effect of the OSA, there are serious privacy concerns. The data uploaded by users to verify their age—containing sensitive information such as passport photos—is stored in vast, potentially insecure databases. This was highlighted by a recent data breach into the third-party service used by Discord to confirm users’ ages. While the identity of the hackers was not confirmed, Discord claimed it was an extortion attempt and that the total number of users whose sensitive information was exposed was around 70,000.

    The desire to protect children from harm is understandable. There is a huge amount of bad content online, and it can have real-world consequences. For example, young people with eating disorders have long been exposed to pro-anorexia communities, in which users share tips and “thinspiration” images to encourage each other to become even more ill. Such groups are pernicious, often reappearing elsewhere on the internet once they are shut down. Nobody should want children to be exposed to such communities.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    But any attempt to protect children online must also be balanced against the right to freedom of expression for adults. In this, the OSA has gone too far—particularly since it has been introduced in a context of increasing restrictions on speech in the UK.

    Take the rise of “non-crime hate incidents” (NCHIs), which for years have been used to undermine free speech in the UK. NCHIs are defined as “any non-crime incident which is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by hostility or prejudice.” They are logged in police records and may be flagged in a background check. NCHIs were introduced after an inquiry into the high-profile racist murder of teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993, with the aim of tackling criminal abuse. The idea was to help the police map out where policing resources should be prioritized and prevent incidents that “could escalate into more serious harm.”

    While data about this policy is very patchy, the introduction of NCHIs does not seem to have had the desired effect. According to a report by the think tank Policy Exchange, “There is currently limited, if any, evidence to demonstrate that the large-scale recording of NCHIs has enabled police officers to prevent the ‘escalation’ of situations into serious criminality.”

    And, until recently, all that was required to log an NCHI was that someone felt they had been targeted. This changed following the case of former policeman Harry Miller, who had an NCHI logged against him for transphobia after he tweeted, among other things: “I was assigned mammal at birth, but my orientation is fish. Don’t mis-species me.” In its judgment, the Court of Appeals highlighted the “chilling effect” such legislation has on free speech and expression, and in 2023 new guidelines for NCHIs were published, emphasizing that NCHIs should only be logged in cases where a more objective standard of “hostility or prejudice” is met.

    However, this has not stopped NCHIs being used to silence people. In the year up to September 2024, around 14,000 NCHIs were recorded in England and Wales. In August 2025, gender critical journalist Helen Joyce discovered that, a year earlier, she had been reported for a NCHI after referring to a transgender co-panellist as a man and a “fetishist” due to comments the individual had made during the panel. Despite logging the incident in their records, the police never told Joyce about it.

    Around the same time, Irish comedian Graham Linehan was arrested at Heathrow Airport on suspicion of inciting violence on X, with posts such as, “If a trans-identified male is in a female-only space, he is committing a violent, abusive act. Make a scene, call the cops and if all else fails, punch him in the balls.” The charges were dropped, and the Metropolitan Police announced afterward that it would no longer investigate non-crime hate incidents. In December 2025, amid growing backlash, police leaders confirmed that they would recommend NCHIs be scrapped in favor of a “sensible” new approach that only focuses on the most serious “anti-social behavior.”

    But this does not mean that threats to free speech in the UK have gone away.

    In July 2025, a direct action group known as Palestine Action was banned under the Terrorism Act 2000, after activists broke into RAF Brize Norton and damaged military transport aircraft alleged to be supplying weaponry to Israel. The decision to ban the group was condemned by human rights experts.

    Shortly after, the group organized a sit-in protest in Parliament Square, in which protestors held up signs reading, “I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action.” Over 500 demonstrators were arrested, 112 of whom were over 70 years old, and by October 2025, over 2,000 people had been arrested simply for holding placards supporting Palestine Action. (The proscription of Palestine Action is currently being challenged in the courts.)

    Also last summer, a man named Hamit Coskun was fined £240 for a “religiously aggravated public order offence” after burning a Quran and shouting profanities against Islam outside the Turkish consulate in London. Meanwhile, a man who assaulted him with a knife during his protest was spared jail, with the judge noting that the man had felt “deeply offended” by Coskun’s actions.

    Finally, five years after showing an image of the Prophet Muhammad during a religious studies class, a teacher in Batley, Yorkshire, remains in hiding due to threats from parents against him and his family. A 2024 independent review found that “the growing targeting of teachers and the teaching of controversial subjects beyond blasphemy is being increasingly viewed as too high risk.”

    Unlike in the United States, free speech in the UK is not enshrined in a constitution, but has instead developed as a tradition, beginning in the 16th century and gradually expanding in the centuries since. In law, freedom of expression is protected under Article 10 of the 1998 Human Rights Act—though the key passage is dangerously ambiguous, allowing the government to restrict speech if they deem it necessary to prevent “disorder or crime” or protect “health or morals.”

    To make matters worse, free speech in Britain is often seen as a right-wing issue, especially when it comes to the debate around women’s rights and transgender rights. The assumption that free speech is a right-wing cause is exacerbated by figures in the Trump administration calling attention to the erosion of free speech in the UK. (J.D. Vance, for example, has warned that Britain is going down a “dark path,” though his kind concern here is undermined by the numerous actions the Trump administration is itself taking against free speech in the United States.)

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    What the UK needs is to inspire a fundamental appreciation for free speech across the political spectrum. Too often, free speech is seen as a controversial value that only matters if you want to say something very, very bad. Instead, we need to champion our long history of celebrating free speech and use this to demonstrate why it’s so important.

    This means that legislation such as the OSA must be repealed. While protecting children is important, introducing the concept of content that is legal but “harmful,” as well as requiring users to submit personal information to verify their age, creates a vague category that can be adjusted or amended depending on fluid definitions of harm.

    Repealing the OSA would also let adults like me read potentially upsetting or angry Substack comments in peace—without having to provide evidence that we’re mature enough to handle it.

    Leonora Barclay is Head of Podcasts at Persuasion.

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  • The Democratic Socialists of America Are Rejecting Democracy
    Tristan Bavol-Marques presenting during the livestream. (Photo via YouTube.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    “I want to be clear on where I stand. I believe both Nicolás Maduro and Miguel Díaz-Canel are dictators,” said Zohran Mamdani per a statement issued by his campaign to the media shortly after an appearance on The Moment podcast with Paola and Jorge Ramos. When questioned about his perception of both Latin American rulers, Mamdani had responded in a much milder manner, stating that Maduro’s government had been “one of repression” and that he had not thought much about Díaz-Canel’s tenure. His clarification brought relief and hope to many Venezuelans and Cubans who have fled tyranny to find a home in New York City. It seemed like his words would open a new chapter in the political organization he has belonged to since 2017, one in which separation of powers, respect for human rights, and free and fair elections would be at the forefront of its philosophy.

    Others in the same organization that I’ve befriended since I moved to New York have—just as Mamdani did last year—assured me that they condemn the crimes Chávez and Maduro have committed against my compatriots and that they do not see the movement they headed as a model. But a livestream hosted on the Democratic Socialists of America’s main YouTube channel on January 6 calling for protests against Maduro’s capture has left me with the following conclusion: they are not democratic.

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    “Stand in solidarity with President Maduro, with the First Lady,” says DSA member Luisa Martínez—who was part of a delegation that met with Maduro himself in 2021—at the beginning of the recording. She briefly goes over the meeting’s agenda and continues with a list of demands that, she insists, DSA members and supporters should make to U.S. elected officials: (1) free Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores immediately, (2) pass the War Powers Resolution in Congress, (3) impeach Donald Trump over his strikes in Venezuela, (4) “no war for oil,” and (5) end all Venezuela-related sanctions. Strikingly, no mention is made regarding the demands that Venezuelans have made to Maduro throughout the years for greater democracy.

    The mic is passed on to Tristan Bavol-Marques and Savannah Kuang to give a brief lesson on contemporary Venezuelan history. Both have been to Venezuela and promoted messaging in support of Maduro’s regime. Bavol-Marques was present in 2022 for the International Summit Against Fascism—a quite ironic name, for the rabidly nationalist, military-directed government that has ruled over Venezuela has often been described by its citizens, especially by late democratic socialist leader Teodoro Petkoff, as fascistic.

    Kuang was accredited to observe the 2024 presidential election, whereas high-profile international observers, including those in neighboring Colombia, were denied entry to Venezuela at the last minute. Despite the clear-cut evidence that opposition politician Edmundo González had won—certified by the long-standing electoral monitoring organization the Carter Center, among others—she parroted the claims of Maduro’s cronies that he had won the election in her report back to her fellow DSA members.

    Bavol-Marques and Kuang begin by explaining, in their view, what the United States wants with Venezuela. As expected, they mention oil, but they also say that the United States has combated Chavismo “to crush any hope of twenty-first century socialism,” to set an example of sorts following the fall of the Soviet Union.

    They move on to discuss the Caracazo, a series of protests and lootings that followed the austerity measures passed by President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989, which were heavily repressed by Venezuela’s security forces after lasting for six days: an event Venezuelans remember with shame. There are, nonetheless, important mistakes in how they frame this event. For example, they call Pérez’s government a right-wing one, failing to mention that he led the nationalization of the oil industry in the seventies, and that his party belongs to the Socialist International. I was pleasantly surprised that, as they moved on to talk about the rise of Hugo Chávez—Maduro’s predecessor—and his political movement, they acknowledged that he first attempted to reach power through a failed military coup.

    Yet they proceed to say that he “[used] oil wealth to fund expansive social programs to benefit the poor of Venezuela,” which “[drew] ire from [the] U.S. Empire.” These claims overlook the admirable growth and social mobility Venezuelans experienced during most of the twentieth century due to oil-funded programs of those years, such as the Gran Mariscal Ayacucho scholarships put in place by Pérez’s first government. This program allowed many from working-class backgrounds to pursue graduate studies in the United States and share their expertise with folks back home. Later on, they talk about the short-lived coup of 2002, an event that Chavistas still invoke today to demonize opposition figures and movements, even if the vast majority did not participate in that episode.

    Then they move onto what they consider to be two successes of the Bolivarian Revolution: Misión Vivienda and the communal system. The former, a program that was purported to allow working-class Venezuelans to live in affordable, dignified housing, has been widely seen as a failure in the country. Bavol-Marques says that through Misión Vivienda, a million quality homes have been built, yet these have had widespread structural defects such as filtrations and unstable walls; beneficiaries have not been given property titles, making them vulnerable to evictions if found to disagree with the politics of Chavismo; and houses have been built under opaque contracting conditions marked by missing funds and inflated figures. As for the communes, which they present as decentralized units that allow for a more horizontal mode of governance: these are councils led by governing party members and closely watched by colectivos—pro-Chávez paramilitary groups—that have allowed for more efficient top-down control of working-class neighborhoods.

    Neither Misión Vivienda nor the communal system are proof of poverty-reducing, democratic governance. On the contrary, they are proof of rampant corruption and carelessness and the authoritarian tactics that Chávez and Maduro have enacted.

    Kuang gives a brief overview of sanctions that have been applied to the Maduro dictatorship. But the sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry that many on the Left have pointed to as the cause of the suffering of Venezuelans were imposed only in 2019, whereas the humanitarian crisis began in the mid-2010s.

    After Bavol-Marques and Kuang end their presentation, other DSA members hop on the livestream to state their support for the campaign in favor of Nicolás Maduro’s release. While this part is less substantial, one detail is particularly irksome: New York City Council Member Alexa Avilés claims that eighty civilians died in the strikes of January 3, which is a blatant lie. So far, two civilian deaths have been confirmed; the rest have been military officers, including thirty-two of the Cuban agents who made up Maduro’s security ring.

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    Let me be clear: I do not believe that every DSA sympathizer or member is necessarily against democracy. Out of concern over past U.S. mishaps abroad and growing inequality within America’s borders, many have found this organization enticing. Nonetheless, as long as they do not question the legitimacy of Maduro’s dictatorship, nor point out the corruption and authoritarianism that has defined Chavismo since its early days, they do not stand with the Venezuelan people; they are standing with authoritarianism. In any case, the folks who hosted this livestream undoubtedly are, I insist, not democratic. And as long as they hold authority within the DSA over this issue, it is quite difficult for Venezuelans to take their purported commitment to democracy seriously (especially progressive Venezuelans who have suffered the brunt of Maduro’s dictatorship).

    “This blatant pursuit of regime change doesn’t just affect those abroad, it directly impacts New Yorkers, including tens of thousands of Venezuelans who call this city home. My focus is their safety and the safety of every New Yorker,” posted Zohran Mamdani on X the day of Maduro’s capture. I can only wonder: is Mamdani that disconnected from the suffering of Venezuelans who find themselves in a vulnerable situation in the United States precisely because of Maduro and his cronies, who now dream of going home because of these recent events? Has he not read the indictment of the Southern District Court against Maduro—a legally solid one, per The Atlantic—which showcases how his actions have threatened the safety of New Yorkers? Is he caving in to the still-not-severed ties between the Democratic Socialists of America and the violent, corrupt caste that has plunged Venezuela into ruin? Many Venezuelans in New York, including myself, have expressed our willingness to talk to anyone about this issue, yet as far as I know, no effort from the mayor to reach out to the community has been made.

    Hopefully, DSA members with their hearts in the right place will speak out against this perspective and pressure their leaders to stand with the Venezuelan people. If not, left-leaning Americans should realize the dangers of this organization and stand with Venezuelans and their dreams of dignity.

    Carlos Egaña is a Brooklyn-based Venezuelan writer and educator.

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  • Another Reminder That Biology Matters in Elite Sports
    Runners participate during the 2025 TCS New York City Marathon. (Photo by Dave Hashim for NYRR /New York Road Runners via Getty Images.)

    Marathons are one of the most inclusive institutions in modern life. Anyone can enter a marathon (or road race of any distance) and compete side by side—rich or poor, old or young, seasoned racer or first-timer, able-bodied or adaptive athletes. The starting line doesn’t check ideology, income, or appearance. A marathon is, by design, open to the world: thousands of individuals running the same distance on the same day under the same conditions. Some approach it as a battle against fellow competitors; others see it as a solo race against the clock.

    Because participation is already universal, the competitive divisions within a marathon serve a different purpose: to make comparisons fair. Age brackets ensure a 25-year-old and a 60-year-old can each chase meaningful goals, even though their maximal physical capacities differ. The women’s division accounts for systematic biological differences that would otherwise push female performances off the podium entirely. Wheelchair athletes often finish minutes ahead of the fastest runners. Other para-athlete divisions allow athletes with distinct physical differences to race each other on even terms.

    Competitive categories exist only where biology creates consistent, predictable differences in elite performance. Far from being exclusionary, these categories are what make the marathon inclusive. They give everyone—from elite professionals to recreational joggers to people with disabilities—a way to measure themselves objectively against competitors whose biology makes their performances meaningfully comparable. If such biological differences do not exist, neither does the justification for a separate category.

    In recent years, however, some races have added non-binary divisions. New York Road Runners (NYRR), which helped pioneer the practice, describes its initiatives as an effort to “provide equity and access to athletes who identify beyond and outside of the gender binary.” The goal is humane, and gender identity is deeply meaningful for many people. However, non-binary runners already share the same physiological basis for competition as everyone else. That shared biology is what makes the marathon a single community event; it’s also why there is no athletic justification for a separate competitive category.

    The introduction of non-binary divisions represents a shift in the purpose of competitive categories: every other division in the marathon exists to equalize biological or functional differences, not to recognize identity. Yet the Philadelphia Marathon provides equal prize money for men’s, women’s, and non-binary categories, and some NYRR races do the same. The 2026 and 2027 Boston Marathon, one of the few races that has a qualifying standard, requires men to run 30 minutes faster than those in the women’s divisions across all age groups. The non-binary standard aligns with the women’s field, even though the group may include runners with male biology.

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    The discomfort some non-binary runners feel when checking a “male” or “female” box is understandable; no form can fully capture the complexity of identity. But the box exists for a narrow purpose—because biology, not identity, determines how performances can be compared fairly. (This is a separate issue from that of intersex athletes, which involves biological variations that can be directly relevant to performance.)

    Some races, like the Tokyo Marathon, handle this tension by allowing runners to register as non-binary for participation and recognition while still using sex-based categories for awards. It is a model that separates identity from competition. The distinction keeps the sport fair without denying anyone’s sense of self. A similar balance exists in elite track. Olympian Nikki Hiltz, who identifies as a transgender and non-binary athlete, competes in the women’s category because of their female physiology. Hiltz has expressed discomfort about “navigating the very gendered world of athletics,” yet the competition remains fair (Hiltz does not use gender-affirming hormone therapy, which would confer an unfair physical advantage). Commentators now respectfully use Hiltz’s they/them pronouns.

    Part of the confusion in this debate comes from the tendency to conflate identity with biology. An analogy to medicine is useful here. A medical form does not ask about sex in order to validate identity; it asks because sex influences physiology, drug metabolism, and risk. Neither medicine nor sport is making a statement about the legitimacy of anyone’s gender identity. They are simply sorting people by the variables that matter for the task at hand. This is also why a marathon does not ask for education level, ethnicity, family structure, or income—those aspects of identity shape a person’s life, but they do not affect competitive potential. The absence of a dedicated competitive division does not imply that any group is unwelcome; contemporary marathons typically already allow all adults to participate.

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    Some argue that social or emotional challenges tied to gender identity may indirectly limit training opportunities, thus justifying the introduction of new categories. Those obstacles deserve empathy. But sport cannot turn every disadvantage into its own competitive division. Many runners train through hardship: parents juggling childcare, shift workers on erratic schedules, cancer survivors rebuilding stamina, people fasting for religious observance, individuals recovering from addiction or incarceration. New York Road Runners explicitly acknowledges the unique needs of nursing mothers, financially under-resourced runners, and historically underrepresented communities in its inclusivity initiatives—yet it does not create competitive categories for any of these groups. If identity (or personal challenge) alone justified competitive divisions, there would be no limiting principle.

    All of this points to a broader concern. When a sport begins treating identity as equivalent to a physiological category, it sends a subtle but consequential message: performance gaps rooted in biology no longer matter. Once a sport signals that biology is optional or negotiable, it becomes easier for the broader running community to carry that assumption into other contexts. The marathon has long drawn its meaning from a simple covenant: anyone may participate, but the competition must remain grounded in the realities of the human body. Preserving that principle is what keeps the sport inclusive, comprehensible, and worth taking seriously.

    James Smoliga is a professor in the Department of Rehabilitation Sciences at Tufts University School of Medicine and writes the Substack Beyond the Abstract.

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