Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Another Reminder That Biology Matters in Elite Sports
    Runners participate during the 2025 TCS New York City Marathon. (Photo by Dave Hashim for NYRR /New York Road Runners via Getty Images.)

    Marathons are one of the most inclusive institutions in modern life. Anyone can enter a marathon (or road race of any distance) and compete side by side—rich or poor, old or young, seasoned racer or first-timer, able-bodied or adaptive athletes. The starting line doesn’t check ideology, income, or appearance. A marathon is, by design, open to the world: thousands of individuals running the same distance on the same day under the same conditions. Some approach it as a battle against fellow competitors; others see it as a solo race against the clock.

    Because participation is already universal, the competitive divisions within a marathon serve a different purpose: to make comparisons fair. Age brackets ensure a 25-year-old and a 60-year-old can each chase meaningful goals, even though their maximal physical capacities differ. The women’s division accounts for systematic biological differences that would otherwise push female performances off the podium entirely. Wheelchair athletes often finish minutes ahead of the fastest runners. Other para-athlete divisions allow athletes with distinct physical differences to race each other on even terms.

    Competitive categories exist only where biology creates consistent, predictable differences in elite performance. Far from being exclusionary, these categories are what make the marathon inclusive. They give everyone—from elite professionals to recreational joggers to people with disabilities—a way to measure themselves objectively against competitors whose biology makes their performances meaningfully comparable. If such biological differences do not exist, neither does the justification for a separate category.

    In recent years, however, some races have added non-binary divisions. New York Road Runners (NYRR), which helped pioneer the practice, describes its initiatives as an effort to “provide equity and access to athletes who identify beyond and outside of the gender binary.” The goal is humane, and gender identity is deeply meaningful for many people. However, non-binary runners already share the same physiological basis for competition as everyone else. That shared biology is what makes the marathon a single community event; it’s also why there is no athletic justification for a separate competitive category.

    The introduction of non-binary divisions represents a shift in the purpose of competitive categories: every other division in the marathon exists to equalize biological or functional differences, not to recognize identity. Yet the Philadelphia Marathon provides equal prize money for men’s, women’s, and non-binary categories, and some NYRR races do the same. The 2026 and 2027 Boston Marathon, one of the few races that has a qualifying standard, requires men to run 30 minutes faster than those in the women’s divisions across all age groups. The non-binary standard aligns with the women’s field, even though the group may include runners with male biology.

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    The discomfort some non-binary runners feel when checking a “male” or “female” box is understandable; no form can fully capture the complexity of identity. But the box exists for a narrow purpose—because biology, not identity, determines how performances can be compared fairly. (This is a separate issue from that of intersex athletes, which involves biological variations that can be directly relevant to performance.)

    Some races, like the Tokyo Marathon, handle this tension by allowing runners to register as non-binary for participation and recognition while still using sex-based categories for awards. It is a model that separates identity from competition. The distinction keeps the sport fair without denying anyone’s sense of self. A similar balance exists in elite track. Olympian Nikki Hiltz, who identifies as a transgender and non-binary athlete, competes in the women’s category because of their female physiology. Hiltz has expressed discomfort about “navigating the very gendered world of athletics,” yet the competition remains fair (Hiltz does not use gender-affirming hormone therapy, which would confer an unfair physical advantage). Commentators now respectfully use Hiltz’s they/them pronouns.

    Part of the confusion in this debate comes from the tendency to conflate identity with biology. An analogy to medicine is useful here. A medical form does not ask about sex in order to validate identity; it asks because sex influences physiology, drug metabolism, and risk. Neither medicine nor sport is making a statement about the legitimacy of anyone’s gender identity. They are simply sorting people by the variables that matter for the task at hand. This is also why a marathon does not ask for education level, ethnicity, family structure, or income—those aspects of identity shape a person’s life, but they do not affect competitive potential. The absence of a dedicated competitive division does not imply that any group is unwelcome; contemporary marathons typically already allow all adults to participate.

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    Some argue that social or emotional challenges tied to gender identity may indirectly limit training opportunities, thus justifying the introduction of new categories. Those obstacles deserve empathy. But sport cannot turn every disadvantage into its own competitive division. Many runners train through hardship: parents juggling childcare, shift workers on erratic schedules, cancer survivors rebuilding stamina, people fasting for religious observance, individuals recovering from addiction or incarceration. New York Road Runners explicitly acknowledges the unique needs of nursing mothers, financially under-resourced runners, and historically underrepresented communities in its inclusivity initiatives—yet it does not create competitive categories for any of these groups. If identity (or personal challenge) alone justified competitive divisions, there would be no limiting principle.

    All of this points to a broader concern. When a sport begins treating identity as equivalent to a physiological category, it sends a subtle but consequential message: performance gaps rooted in biology no longer matter. Once a sport signals that biology is optional or negotiable, it becomes easier for the broader running community to carry that assumption into other contexts. The marathon has long drawn its meaning from a simple covenant: anyone may participate, but the competition must remain grounded in the realities of the human body. Preserving that principle is what keeps the sport inclusive, comprehensible, and worth taking seriously.

    James Smoliga is a professor in the Department of Rehabilitation Sciences at Tufts University School of Medicine and writes the Substack Beyond the Abstract.

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  • Damon Linker on Why Trump 2.0 Is More Destructive Than Anyone Expected

    Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Damon Linker discuss how Trump’s second term has exceeded even pessimistic expectations, why the “adults in the room” from Trump’s first administration were more effective than critics acknowledged, and whether Trump’s economic promises can survive contact with reality.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I think all of us expected, Damon, that Trump’s second term was going to be eventful. It felt, when he was re-elected, that it was the end of an era, that any hopes that political scientists and commentators had had for a long time, that the first Trump term was an aberration and that it would be expunged from American history, had clearly turned out to be wrong. But I dare say that this administration seems to be more impactful and more extreme than even the pessimists expected 12 months ago. What’s your overall assessment 365 days in?

    Damon Linker: Well, that’s certainly the way it looks to me. As in a lot of my own Substack posts and in pieces that I wrote for Persuasion in the fall of 2024, I predicted that it would be crazier, more extreme, and more destructive than Trump 1.0, and, looking back on that, I can say that I got a lot of things right.

    But even I was shocked by the sheer destructive energy with which he lunged out of the gate on January 20, a year ago, and by the sheer pent-up ambition of all the people that Trump had around him. It was really in the last year of his first administration that he and his advisors finally started to figure out how to wield power in the executive branch, and they were just starting to get their act together to get some rather extreme reformist right-wing stuff going. Then he lost, and we had the craziness surrounding January 6, including the lead-up and the aftermath.

    There was then a short period when it looked like Trump was going to be history. He very quickly, over the next year or so, showed that he still controlled the base of his party and was going to be president again, or at least the nominee again if he wanted it. He did, and here we are. What happened over that intervening four years is that the people who had finally figured out how to break shit, if you will, coalesced around Trump. They figured out an agenda, figured out who would do what, and the second he was back in the White House, they hit the ground running, and they are still running.

    If anything, there might have been a bit of a lull late in 2025, when his polls started to sink with the whole shutdown drama, which was very much a pre-Trump phenomenon. This was the recurring drama of Republicans shutting down the government because they did not want to pass any spending bills. This dates back to the Tea Party era of 2011 to ‘13. That happened a lot. In that period, he seemed to be sagging a little, but since the beginning of January this year, it has been a kind of manic return to the earliest months of the administration.

    Mounk: Yeah, that’s a very interesting point. He obviously came into office with manic activity, with a record number of executive orders, with DOGE, with some of his announcements about foreign policy, with the intensification of funding and then action for deportation procedures, and security at the southern border. From perhaps June to November or December, it felt as though the administration was somewhat losing steam.

    The courts were really gumming up some of what Trump wanted to do. The federal courts proved to be quite resistant to many of the Trump projects. I would argue that even the Supreme Court, on some key things, was at least slowing down the Trump agenda at some points, or overturning it. I do not know anybody in the Trump administration, but I know people who know people, and they gave me interesting reports that a lot of the mid-ranking and junior members of the Trump administration started to feel like they were actually losing. They started to feel frustrated about not transforming America to the extent that they wanted.

    There was a moment, as recently as a month ago, when it would have been tempting to make the argument that the speed of this was starting to slow significantly, that Trump was very unpopular, that he was likely to lose the midterm elections, and that there were starting to be splits in the MAGA coalition. Perhaps he was even starting to feel a little bit like a lame duck.

    Then this capacity he has, this manic activity, came back and took over. Over the last weeks, we have seen not just ICE agents in Minnesota coming to a head with the killing of Renee Good and the doubling down of ICE activity in Minnesota, but also this frenetic activity in foreign policy, from the capture of Nicolás Maduro to threats of strikes against Iran that were not carried out, amid the brutal crackdown of protesters there.

    Now there has been a return to this relentless focus on Greenland, with this remarkable letter to the prime minister of Norway, basically saying that because Trump was not awarded the Nobel Prize, he is no longer all that interested in peace, and making these threats on Greenland, levying renewed tariffs on European partners. He held his inaugural address nearly a year ago, and two things strike me about that address. The first is that, on the surface level, he has done exactly what he promised. He said he would levy tariffs. He loved tariffs. He said he would be ruthless about immigration enforcement, and he has truly been ruthless about immigration enforcement. On a whole bunch of things, he has delivered exactly what he promised.

    Of course, he also made grandiose claims in that speech about the wonderful paradise that would follow from that, about the great prosperity it would bring America, and so on. On all of those things, he has not delivered. I do not believe that tariffs, for example, have actually improved the state of the American economy. On the contrary, they have not.

    It is striking that, though we are shocked by the radicalism of what he has done, especially when it comes to the rule of law, the politicization of the Department of Justice, the prosecution of Jim Comey, the investigation of Jay Powell, and so on, you can go back to the inaugural address and see that he told us exactly what he was going to do. He is a man of his word in that sense. For the great promises he made, however, he is certainly not living up to them. Are we wrong to be surprised? Should this all have been more obvious than perhaps it felt a year ago?

    Linker: Well, again, I think we’re largely talking about intensity, a kind of manic energy. So it’s true that if you just list the things he said he was going to do, he’s done them, and we shouldn’t be surprised. But he also speaks in such a hyperbolic way that you always assume that he’s exaggerating, puffing himself up, living in a world of rhetoric rather than action. What has been surprising is the extent to which the administration has actually been willing to follow through on some of the more outlandish promises that it was very easy to assume were just hyperbole.

    It’s one thing to bring up taking Greenland from Denmark and confronting NATO over that, or sabre-rattling, and then actually acting against Maduro and Venezuela. It’s one thing to say we’re going to send ICE all over the country and round up people in the interior, but it’s another to actually see it happen. Not that it’s being done very competently; it’s often very sloppy and done in a way almost as if it’s designed to antagonize people rather than build any kind of consensus in favor of it.

    But it’s the energy behind it, the drive to do it, and the fact that they now know in the White House what levers to pull to get things to happen within a day or two. When someone in the White House makes a call, it actually takes place, as opposed to the norm in the first Trump administration. In that first administration, Trump would have a meeting and he’d say, I want to withdraw troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible, and he would say that in 2017. Then, in mid-2020, it still hadn’t happened yet, because every time he would say it, the players in the room would say, oh, yes, yes, Mr. President, and then they’d leave. In the hallway outside, they’d say, we’re not going to do that because that’s crazy, and then it would just get dropped, and they’d hope that he’d forget about it.

    Six months later, he’d say, wait a minute, where are we on that withdrawal from Afghanistan? They’d say, yeah, yeah, we’re working on it, sir, and he’d leave, and they’d say, no, we’re not going to do that. That kind of bureaucratic obstructionism, in what Trump dubs the “deep state,” has disappeared for the most part. I think there is still some of it in some places.

    Mounk: Just on this point, Damon, it strikes me there are two ways of glossing this. One is that we owe an apology to the “adults in the room.” I feel like during the first Trump administration there was a lot of mockery and a lot of scorn, somewhat understandably, of the senior officials who stayed in their comfortable positions and continued to serve under Trump, and then briefed the press saying that, behind the scenes, they were stopping all the crazy stuff from happening.

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    When you compare the first Trump administration with the second Trump administration, there probably was more to that than I gave credit for at the time. Clearly, they were very effective at stopping those things. Of course, the other way of glossing this is that Trump’s fury at that obstructionism has some basis in reality. Trump at the time claimed that he was the elected president and that all of these people were running interference and stopping him from doing what he wanted to do. This was the deep state in action. Now, that also preserved us from some very bad outcomes that I think we are probably steering toward right now. But it is a strange kind of double-edged thing, and it is not obvious how to think about it.

    Linker: I think there’s a lot of truth to that, and I think it’s important to think about it in those terms. There’s a way in which the first of those scenarios, where we credit the so-called deep state for stopping Trump in the first administration, shows that a lot of the people who did that gumming up the works to keep his craziest instincts from actually breaking stuff were drawing on something that Republicans had been pretty comfortable with, to some extent since Reagan, but especially since the 1990s.

    There has been this dynamic on the right where the thought is that, to win elections, we have to feed red meat to the masses, the Republican electorate, because they’re angry and they want to hear all this nasty stuff attacking the left and liberals and so forth. But then, when we get into office, we’ll be the adults and we’ll govern responsibly.

    So you had this kind of two-step going on at all times. One way of telling the story of the past almost half century is that this rhetorical whipping up of the masses ends up breaking free of its leash, and then you get the tiger eating the face, all these metaphors and so forth. In a way, we’ve recapitulated that very story between the first Trump administration and the second.

    It’s as if, in the second, he came back with his supporters and with those who voted for him, at least the MAGA masses among Republicans, not the crossover voters who just didn’t like inflation and so voted for him this time, but the die-hard MAGA types on the right. They actually believed him, not just the old line about how you have to take him seriously but not literally. They believed him seriously and literally, and they want this stuff.

    They came in and saw that obstructionism from the first Trump administration as even more reason to be ruthless this time, to say, in effect, if Trump says we’re going to do X, we’re going to do X as soon as possible, because that’s what the people voted for, that’s what they expect, and we’re going to get it done.

    Now the problem, which maybe we want to pivot to a little bit on the economy, is that he made some promises there that were never going to happen. He’s not going to lower grocery prices. The only way to do that is deflation, which would actually be worse than inflation for the macroeconomy. There’s nothing the president can really do. You can do things to try to decrease inflation, and inflation itself is not that high.

    Mounk: The funny thing is that his conflict with Jay Powell is all about the fact that Trump wants to lower interest rates faster than Powell does. There is a partisan political logic to that, which is that lower interest rates juice the markets. If you want the economy to feel roaring hot while you are in office, there is a reason to want really low interest rates.

    Of course, low interest rates lead to inflation rather than deflation. So the pressure he is putting on Powell to change monetary policy goes directly against the promise, which was also core to that inaugural address that we talked about earlier, that he is going to lower grocery prices. All these different parts of his economic policy are therefore at cross purposes in a slightly confusing way.

    Linker: I often think Trump would not pass a macroeconomics 101 course in college. He sees everything through the lens of the fact that he is a real estate developer. When you are a real estate developer, the thing you want most of all is low interest rates, because that decreases your costs.

    Of course, it is also true that, for a lot of voters, when they complain about prices, they are not picking up The Wall Street Journal and saying, look at the actual inflation rate from week to week or month to month. That is not what they are talking about. They just mean that everything is more expensive now, and one of those things is credit card interest rates, car loan interest rates, and mortgage interest rates.

    Those do make life more expensive, and so Trump is thinking that he might not be able to make grocery prices go down, but he can force Jay Powell to lower interest rates. That would lower all of those rates that consumers are seeing in their daily, weekly, and monthly budgets and would make them happier with him.

    Mounk: That’s a fair point. There are some genuine economic problems with relatively high interest rates for mortgages, for example. Part of that is that if you have a low mortgage rate from the time when those were available, you are locked into whatever property you are in. If you wanted to move at this point and interest rates are significantly higher, the effective cost would be much greater. A lot of people are basically stuck in houses and apartments that may be in localities where they would not actually want to live. They might want to move to a different part of the country, but relatively high interest rates make that difficult. So that is a fair point.

    While we are talking about the economy, to what extent have we already reached what the fear has been for the last twelve months, which is a real destruction of the world trading order? I am struck by the fact that there are new unhinged announcements about tariffs all the time for all kinds of reasons. The latest is this extra ten percent on a bunch of European countries as a punitive tariff because Europeans will not just hand over Greenland to Trump.

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    At the same time, it feels like international trade is still happening, and we have not seen a collapse of globalization, at least over this timeframe. Will all of this just take a long time to show its pain? Is it that in five, ten, or twenty years our GDP is going to be much lower than it otherwise would have been? Is the process of deglobalization, of countries no longer trading with each other, just going to take a long time as supply chains adjust and so on? Why is it that some of the imminent economic Armageddon that was predicted by top economists before “liberation day” has not yet arrived?

    Linker: On economics, I am not a great expert, so I often defer to those I consider to know more. When it comes to longer-term predictions, I really can’t say. I would have assumed that after the trade apocalypse of last April, when Trump unilaterally slapped tariffs on almost every country in the world, some of them extraordinarily steep and beyond the range of anything that anyone would consider reasonable, this could lead to a depression. Of course, the stock market tanked, bond rates surged, and it looked for about two weeks like we could be plunging the global trading order into a depression.

    But then Trump backed down. He raised tariffs, he lowered them, he went up and down, and already you have seen the markets appear to have learned from that experience to just not pay attention to what he says. It has effectively no consequence on markets, including the bond market, which, inevitably, is going to trend upward given our enormous deficits and the indifference in Washington to doing anything about them. The longer-term trajectory for that is not great, but I do not see exactly how we can really predict what is going to happen. You would think that if we live in a world with more walls, where there is more friction between trading partners, both bilaterally and in the global system as a whole, that would make all of us poorer than we otherwise would have been in a high-growth, high-trade environment.

    I guess I would say that, but then again, we do not get to live the alternative timeline where we kept a more free trade regime and enjoyed those higher growth rates. The question is really what we settle in at, whether it is something like 1.5 percent annual average growth rather than 2.5 percent, and whether we notice it. We also have the fact that the dollar is down. That definitely makes it more expensive for us to purchase goods from abroad, but it also makes our products cheaper in the global order, and therefore it might balance out, and we will not really notice some of these things.

    The last thing I will say on this is that I really am surprised that the economy is doing as well as it is. It is not great, but we have not really entered a recession. We continue to have positive growth overall. I think we might have had one month where we dipped into negative growth last fall, but it was a momentary glitch and may even have been revised the following month. We are continuing to avoid a recession.

    Even after all of the incredibly unpredictable and insane announcements from the president, this makes long-term planning for businesses that have any kind of international trade—either on the selling end or on the end of needing parts from other countries in the supply chain to build products—extremely difficult. Calculations of what all this is going to cost, what products are going to cost, and how much can be sold based on those prices become almost impossible to make. I would have assumed that, given that huge injection of uncertainty into the system, the economy would be hobbled a lot more than it has been.

    Mounk: Another element where that happened was the investigation of Jay Powell. There is research in political science that shows that the election of a populist is very bad for economic performance. If it is a left-wing populist like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, it has an immediate negative effect because businesses are scared of those left-wing populists. They realize that it is going to be very hard to do business there, so they pull out investments and stop projects they were going to undertake, and so on.

    It then gets worse as these left-wing populists really concentrate power in their own hands, take control of monetary policy, often to help inflation, and so on. When you look at right-wing populists, economic performance often goes up a little bit in the first couple of years because businesses say that regulation is going to be cut and that it is going to be a more pro-business environment. Perhaps taxes are going to go down. But on a ten- or fifteen-year timeline, it ends up being very bad as well because of some of the same threats to the independence of economic policymaking.

    Turkey is a good example of that. Erdoğan was reasonably business-friendly at first. In the first years he was in office, the Turkish economy did quite well. Over time, that changed as Erdoğan and his circle took charge of a lot of economic policy in Turkey, and as the central bank wanted to juice the economy to make sure that Erdoğan’s popularity ratings did not fall too much. They ended up with very high levels of inflation that ate away at a lot of the wealth in Turkey.

    I would guess that people in financial markets know enough about this kind of thing that when they see the head of the Fed announcing that he is under investigation for purely political reasons, they would think that if the independence of the Fed is no longer assured, that is an important thing to take into account. I expected the markets to be down the next day. I forget now whether they were down half a point or whether they were up.

    I want to shift the terrain a little bit because we have a lot to cover. Another area where you could say everything has changed, or you could say that remarkably little has changed, is foreign policy. When I grew up in Europe, the hard left was always anti-American. The center left was quite ambivalent. In a place like Germany, they were not exactly anti-American, but they had reservations about the United States and did not want to be too close to America. They wanted to hedge and balance a little bit. The center right was fully pro-American.

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    Now the entire landscape has shifted. The center left is sounding like the hard left, and the center right is sounding at least like the center left. When you listen to conservative politicians in Germany like Friedrich Merz, or centrist politicians like Emmanuel Macron, or some of the leaders of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, it is very hard to find a center-right leader in an earlier period who was so suspicious of the United States and so unsure of the long-term alliance.

    That has very obvious reasons, such as tariff policies, repeated threats against Greenland, the national security strategy, and JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference. This feels like a sea change. The nature of the transatlantic relationship feels further transformed.

    On the other hand, Europe has limited options. European countries still need the United States for the war in Ukraine. They are still not able to defend their own continent, even though military expenditure is now going up quite significantly, particularly in Germany. They also have little of a plan for a world in which the alternatives to Washington are Putin and the Kremlin or Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.

    For all the rhetoric, Europe and America continue to be allied, more or less as they were. That would change if American soldiers suddenly showed up in Greenland. That really would mark the end of a seventy-five-year historical epoch. For now, it feels like the old order is over, but for lack of an alternative, everyone continues to act as though we are still in the old order. I am having trouble making sense of this. How should we think about it, Damon?

    Linker: I think if you take a longer-term view, this relationship has been fraying for a very long time, from Bush, the second Bush, and the Iraq War and all the tensions with Europe over that, to Obama coming in. He is given the Nobel Peace Prize, which of course is part of what is contributing to Trump insisting he deserves his own Nobel Peace Prize now.

    Obama comes in and wants to reverse what Bush did. He has the open hand to the Muslim world and wants much more of a revival of multilateralism with Europe to address common problems. Then the first Trump comes in and seems to have contempt for European allies and no use for NATO, but does not really do anything permanent to change it. Then Biden comes in and it is a reset. We are back to the way it was. We are back in charge. Everything is great. Then comes the second Trump.

    First of all, our behavior as a country appears to be that of someone suffering from multiple personality disorder. Once again, this raises the question of long-term planning, as I was saying when it comes to the economy. How do you plan long term for the future of the NATO alliance when the lead partner, which has the overwhelming bulk of the military backing for the alliance, is involved in this Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde routine that has been going on for a couple of decades?

    Then there is the fact that Trump, people stupidly I think, tried to think about Trump and foreign policy in terms of isolationism. He is a peacemaker. He wants peace. He is anti-war. I do not think that is the right axis for thinking about this at all. He simply has not one shred of concern for democracy promotion, the liberal international order, rules-based policymaking, or international law. That entire dimension is at the very core of how Europe thinks about these things.

    In the United States, especially for Republicans, this has always been more a matter of lip service. Republicans have always opposed the International Criminal Court, for example, and have always been willing to set aside international law considerations if there is something they want to do that would conflict with them. Trump has truly blown up that whole level of thinking about foreign policy in favor of the crudest realpolitik calculation, where the interests of the country are viewed entirely through the lens of Trump’s conception of his personal interests, collapsed into the national interest.

    From the point of view of Europe, I can understand why they are simply flummoxed by what they are confronting. In some respects, Trump seems more hesitant to use force. On the other hand, he is quite quick to use force, but only in these little pinprick ways. You had a very smart piece a week or so ago where you talked about what is behind this acting out on the world stage, and you attributed it largely to two things: that he is very risk-averse and that he loves big, splashy headlines.

    Translated into concrete terms, that means that if you can grab someone with a high-tech SEAL invasion, put him on trial, and get headlines about how the president of a foreign country was snatched in the night without anyone dying, then that is great. There are no troops on the ground and nothing to worry about. He gets a good headline.

    Democracy promotion in Venezuela, however, gets no consideration whatsoever. We put in an alternative government that is no better than Maduro’s. The only difference is that it is willing to work with Trump and give him free oil tankers to sell on the world market, then stash the money in an account for him to use for his own purposes. That is insane by any reasonable standard of post-1945 foreign policy behavior, but that seems to be where we are.

    Mounk: I feel like over time I have built up a grand unified theory of Trump’s foreign policy, and I would say that it has three constitutive elements. The first is a zero-sum worldview, which obviously started with The Art of the Deal and has pervaded Trump’s thinking on every aspect of life since then. It is summed up by the old line about poker that if you do not know who the sucker at the table is, then it must be you. Trump thinks that there cannot be two winners in an agreement or a contract, and so you have to inflict pain on the other side, because if you are not, then it must mean that they are inflicting pain on you and that you just have not realized that you are the idiot who is being had.

    The second thing is that he clearly thinks about the world in terms of spheres of influence. Why is Trump so keen to exert control over the Panama Canal, a dog that has not really barked, that he talked about a lot at the beginning of his term but that might come back at any time, and Greenland? It is because those are in the Western Hemisphere. They are parts of what Trump considers to be America’s sphere of influence, and he feels that America should be able to do whatever it wants in that part of the world.

    By the same token, that is also why he does not care about Ukraine and why he does not seem to care much about Taiwan or perhaps other parts of East Asia. He feels that Ukraine is naturally Russia’s sphere of influence and that Taiwan is China’s sphere of influence, so why should we care all that much about what is going on there, other than perhaps needing some chips from TSMC? Other than that, he thinks it is natural that those places should be under the control of other powers.

    The third piece is the confusion around his claim that he wants to be measured by the wars that did not start. He is such a deep critic of the Iraq War, so why does he now do something like capturing Nicolás Maduro, and why is he talking about Greenland? I think the answer is that he has a playbook for the kinds of military operations he supports and the ones he does not.

    Something like the Iraq War, which takes hundreds of thousands of American troops on foreign territory, is extremely expensive and poses significant risks to American lives. Many American and Iraqi lives were lost, and that is not worth doing. But if you can have a spectacular action that is a surprise, that suddenly happens so that the American public wakes up and it is already over, that is different. Perhaps there is a risk of a couple of service members tragically dying, but it could be pulled off without a single casualty. Even if there are casualties, the number is on the digits of one hand. It shows strength and the ability to use superior military force, so why not?

    If you take these three things together, the zero-sum worldview, spheres-of-influence thinking, and this playbook that favors spectacular action when the long-term risk to American troops and the cost to the American military are low, you get what Trump has been doing.

    That means he could go on all kinds of adventures. It could involve sending soldiers to Nuuk and to Greenland, which I do not think we can rule out. It could involve occupying the Panama Canal at some point over the next three years. It could involve other spectacular strikes on real or perceived adversaries of the United States.

    What I do not think is going to happen is a conventional invasion of a country. Trump would not do that. Greenland is a slightly special case. It is a territory with fewer than one hundred thousand inhabitants and a vast landmass with basically no military fortifications. You could imagine him going for military conquest there because the risk of it turning into an Iraq-style quagmire is objectively very low, and so it does not go against his playbook in the same way.

    Linker: I assume he is going to get it and that no one is going to fire a shot. I think he believes it is in his interest for Europe to think that he would be willing to actually invade using military force, in quotes, because it is kind of absurd. We could conquer it in an afternoon by simply landing troops there. I do not think there would be any fight.

    I think he is going to combine things like that crazy letter he sent to the Norwegian prime minister, which a lot of people were freaking out about on Monday morning, with madman-theory-style threats. People say, my gosh, he is crazy, he actually wants to do this. He will combine that with maybe moving some military forces in the general area of the North Atlantic, as if he is going to invade, combined with trade war threats and new tariffs, with even bigger tariffs coming up in June.

    I assume that Europe is going to back down, and I think he could actually get Greenland. I do not think he would invade, but it is a bluff. We will have to see how it plays out.

    The other thing I would add to your schema, which I think is quite smart and right on most things, especially the part about spheres of influence, which I have written about in relation to Trump’s foreign policy thinking for a couple of years now, is the weird wild card of the Middle East.

    That region is not really in anyone’s immediate sphere of influence when it comes to the United States, Russia, and China. It is this other part of the world, and Africa is similar, of course. Trump could not care less about what goes on in Africa, even though, demographically, Africa is the future of the world in many ways, and what happens there is going to matter enormously over the next half century. He cannot think in those terms. His mind was forged in the 1980s and cannot go beyond that.

    The Middle East is different. All three of those major global powers in this Trumpian multipolar world have a stake in what happens there. I would say the Middle East is the most likely flash point for a very serious great power competition and conflict over the next few years.

    That is precisely because Trump has friends in the Emirates with whom he is deeply involved, and they have their interests vis-à-vis Iran. Trump despises the Iranian government and has threatened to bomb Iran, but he has also backed off from that.

    Strangely, and fitting very well with your analysis, it seems most likely that the United States would bomb only if it looked like the Iranian regime were already on its way out anyway. If the protests there had succeeded, or were half a day from succeeding, then bombing might have happened so that he could claim credit.

    The fact that they severely cracked down and killed thousands of protesters actually made him less likely to intervene, which is the diametric opposite of the liberal international approach. We went into Libya precisely when Gaddafi started bombing people who were protesting his regime. Trump does the opposite.

    Historically speaking, and even today, Russia has a lot at stake in various theaters of the Middle East. China also feels that what happens there matters to them. That is a place where you cannot simply rely on the logic of the near abroad and say, all right, Russia gets Ukraine, China gets Taiwan, we get Greenland, the Panama Canal, Venezuela, and anyone else unlucky enough to be in our neighborhood, because we are going to throw our weight around and use our enormous military advantages to bully everybody, including Canada. The Middle East is a kind of no man’s land that everyone wants to be their land, so I am nervous about that as a potential theater of conflict.

    Mounk: One thing I should say is that I do not think Trump is going to start a war of choice in the way that George W. Bush did in Iraq. Given how reckless many of his actions are internationally, it is sadly imaginable that he gets embroiled in a major war, whether in the Middle East or somewhere else.

    Those are two different things. I have worried from the start that his anti-war stance, coupled with his military foreign policy adventurism and its general ruthlessness, does not necessarily make it less likely that we will have a major armed conflict. The Middle East is one area where that might happen, but there are many others as well.

    Linker: Anytime you have someone who is behaving so unpredictably and recklessly, there is always the possibility that you get sucked into a war because of misunderstanding, mistakes, or miscalculations by others or by other powers. But when Trump is behaving the way he is, he is very much counting on this madman approach to keep everyone in line. That makes a lot of assumptions about everybody else not being as mad as he is.

    Mounk: I want to bring it back home to the United States for a little bit. We are in this weird place where there were a bunch of elections a few months ago and, as best we can tell, they were counted perfectly normally and ordinarily. In fact, Democrats had big victories, and it does not seem as though there was any kind of concerted attempt to undermine the outcome of those elections.

    A lot of our courts work perfectly normally. In fact, the rate at which the Trump administration has lost cases in federal courts is astonishing. It seems likely that the Supreme Court will rule against the Trump administration on some major things, and on some big things the Supreme Court has already ruled against Trump. There is still some amount of resistance to the politicization of the judiciary.

    The attempts to prosecute Jim Comey and Letitia James showed the extent to which prosecutors can be appointed to do the dirty job of going after political ends, and the extent to which the Department of Justice has deeply broken with its historical norms. At the same time, those lawsuits were thrown out by the courts as obviously frivolous, and neither Jim Comey nor Letitia James is in jail or even in the process of being prosecuted at the moment.

    At the same time, you have areas of American life that feel like laboratories in which the rule of law is starting to be suspended. First, you have the Department of Justice going after people, and even if those suits are eventually dropped, that has an incredibly intimidating and chilling effect. If you become a sufficiently high-profile critic of Donald Trump, you might have to contend with a criminal investigation, even if it is ultimately thrown out by the courts after many sleepless nights and considerable legal expenses that you will not get back.

    We have seen freedom of speech rights for U.S. citizens broadly respected, in the sense that nobody is in jail because of things they have said, or almost nobody. But for people who are in the United States on student visas, it looks very different. If they say something that the administration dislikes, the government can simply cancel their visa and send them home without any due process and without any reasonable case that they pose a threat to national security.

    Now, as you have written about vividly in your pages and in the pages of Persuasion, it looks like ICE is being deployed as an agency that is effectively putting parts of Minneapolis outside the rule of law. Is there still the rule of law in the United States? How bad have things gotten in this respect? How do we maneuver between these different facts that I have just recited?

    Linker: Well, my assessment of it is that it is a mixed bag, as you were just indicating in that list of things. But in general, it is bad. The trajectory is quite bad. I think that ICE is a menace. It is a kind of proto-secret police, sort of like an American Gestapo in the making. Its budget is going off the charts. I believe the coming year’s budget for ICE is larger than the budget for the FBI, the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Bureau, and a bunch of other federal law enforcement agencies combined. This is enormous. This is huge. They are hiring tons of people. As has been reported, they are hiring people often without proper vetting and then putting them out in the field without proper training.

    Then, as we saw with the shooting of Renee Good, when a terrible altercation like that happens, the administration, within hours, circumvents the possibility of any kind of investigation and announces ahead of time that there will be no federal investigation. The interest of local and state authorities in conducting their own investigations immediately gets stymied because the federal government refuses to comply with or cooperate in any such investigation. As you noted with the Justice Department, it has really been terribly damaged. The Justice Department has been shredded in its norms and is going to be the part of the federal government that will be hardest to fix after this, if it is even possible. The real thing we are seeing is that over the weekend it was announced that the Justice Department is looking into investigations of the governor of Minnesota, Tim Walz, and the mayor of Minneapolis, Jacob Frey, simply because they are supposedly obstructing the movements of ICE in Minneapolis.

    Over the weekend, there were reports, and I do not know because we are always in a weird funhouse mirror of social media reporting, and I have not yet seen independent reporting on it, of some anti-ICE protesters breaking into a church and disrupting a Baptist church service while looking for evidence that the pastor there was working for ICE. There were also images of people standing in their driveways with semi-automatic weapons, trying to protect themselves against ICE. Looking at those images, you would think America is going the way of the Irish Troubles. This looks like the beginning of a breakdown of law and order, which Trump has been looking for a pretext to invoke the Insurrection Act to address almost from day one. There is some noise right now that he is going to do it soon, maybe even today. There is talk of 1,500 troops being flown in from Alaska, potentially.

    It is all bad. It is really bad. At the macro level of the country as a whole, however, not everything has broken down. The courts are functioning. It is true that Trump has had some setbacks at the Supreme Court, although I would say that on the whole it has been pretty positive for him, especially on the front of unitary executive theory. He has basically been winning on that. We have not yet seen the tariff ruling. We will see. I suspect the Court will try to have it both ways, saying that the way he went about it was unconstitutional, but that the fact that the House voted to let him do it means he can get away with it for now, or something like that. So I think it is very much a mixed bag so far.

    Part of that is that at the highest level, the Supreme Court, even when it does not agree with Trump, can choose to rule very narrowly and give him a backhanded win. Many of the ways in which it has stood up to him have involved intermediary steps, such as lower court rulings, where the Court allows an injunction to stand while the case winds its way through the courts for the next year. There has not really been a Supreme Court decision ending a line of cases that flatly says, no, Trump, you cannot do this. Whether that eventually happens, and whether Trump accepts it or defies the Court, is still an open question that we have not yet seen answered. Thank goodness for that, but I suspect it will happen at some point.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Damon discuss recent changes to the media landscape, what Donald Trump will do next, and whether the Democrats can turn things around. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    57 min
  • Beyond Race
    Poor People’s March, June 19, 1968. (Photo by Arnold Sachs/AFP.)

    If Renee Good had been Black, the good word now would be that if she had been white, he wouldn’t have pulled the trigger.

    ICE agent Jonathan Ross, that is. It is an article of faith among many Black people, as well as sympathetic others, that the police shoot Black people in situations where they would not shoot a white person. This is typically asserted with tart, communal, high-five confidence, as if it were a reality as clear as the operations of gravity. I get it, since I used to be one of the people under this very impression, complete with the high-fives.

    But Ross did pull the trigger. And as tragic and unforgivable as Good’s murder was, it suggests—of all things—a way we might start thinking as Martin Luther King’s birthday gets us reflecting on what his legacy should be to us today.

    During his last year with us, King sought a new pathway after the signature victories against segregation and disenfranchisement in the form of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. His Poor People’s Campaign was going to foster a multiracial coalition, seeking justice for oppressed people of all walks.

    It seemed like something of a letdown to many at the time, as if he were retreating from the most important battle. To a new crop of more radical Black activists this was one more example of King being insufficiently “militant.” Stokely Carmichael thought the approach undermined a Black sense of solidarity. Local activists reported that poverty felt abstract compared to focusing on race or the vote. Many people were uncomfortable identifying as “poor.” I must admit having often had a guilty sense that the Poor People’s Campaign was something of an anticlimax in King’s career. If Black is the hardest race to be in America, a part of me thought that, in 1968, surely any campaigns of reform would have treated us as first in line. I always checked that impulse, but the point is that I had to.

    But King was right then, and would be even righter now. Ironically, Renee Good’s murder can help show why.

    A key thing about the tragedy of Good’s death is that what happened to her was not a one-off freak event but just a day in the life of the U.S. of A.—for white people.

    As “contrarian” on race as I am often thought to be, until only about ten years ago I assumed that the cops killed mostly Black people, with killings of whites a rare occurrence. In my book Losing the Race in 2000, while questioning various claims that racism remained an obstacle to Black success, I singled out the violence and murder at the hands of the cops as an exception, using the analogy of a house that has burned to the ground but with the chimney still standing. This even irritated many Republicans at the time who were hoping I would join their ranks.

    No one was more surprised than I when, in conversations with criminologist Peter Moskos as well as my online sparring partner, economist Glenn Loury, I learned that I wasn’t seeing the whole picture. Namely, in this U.S. of A., the police shoot hundreds more white people than Black ones every year. Moreover, as author and podcaster Coleman Hughes has written, “For every black person killed by the police, there is at least one white person (usually many) killed in a similar way.” For example, the day before cops broke into Black woman Breonna Taylor’s home and killed her, police in Potomac, Maryland had broken into white man Duncan Lemp’s home and killed him as well as wounding his girlfriend sleeping next to him. The way George Floyd was killed seemed so singularly brutal in 2020, but unknown to me until then was the case of a white man, Tony Timpa, who in 2016 was killed by cops in Dallas in a fashion tragically similar to what befell Floyd four years later.

    The actual number of Black people killed by cops is also vastly smaller than many think. One survey in 2020 of 980 people found that over half of the ones who identified as very liberal supposed that a thousand or more unarmed Black men are killed by police yearly, when the actual number in 2019 was 27, 13 by gunshot.

    To be sure, there is more to know than that. The cops kill more white people per year, but we must ask why Black people are killed by cops at a disproportionately high rate. The journalist Wesley Lowery has observed that Black people are about two-and-a-half times more likely to be killed by cops than their representation in the population would predict. It is understandable to suppose that the cause is racism: that in the heat of the moment, subconscious bias, and perhaps fear of Black people, makes cops pull the trigger.

    But the problem is that, actually, studies of the police’s encounters with people such as one by Harvard economist Roland Fryer have shown that, as counterintuitive as it may seem, cops are not more likely to shoot Black people. Another way of looking at the issue is that poverty makes one more likely to encounter law enforcement, and Black people are more likely to be poor than whites—an issue that the nation, hopefully, will eventually solve but which has this grievous additional effect. The figures on poverty corresponded neatly when Lowery made his observation about the 2½ times disproportion in 2016. That year the percentage of Black people living in poverty was about 2½ times that of whites (22 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively).

    America’s problem is less racist cops than just cops, and other figures of authority like Jonathan Ross, entrusted with firearms and ominously comfortable with killing people who frustrate them. It was common for police forces to be nakedly racist in the past, such as the Rodney King-era L.A.P.D. under Chief Daryl Gates and in the Philadelphia I grew up in where Mayor Frank Rizzo egged on the cops against Black people. But in 2026, the Black community’s take on the cops should be less “Cops are racist” than “Since more of us are poor, we are more likely to end up in tense situations with cops.”

    Martin Luther King’s birthday this year is an opportunity to consider hitting a kind of reset, returning to King’s idea that the main focus should be justice for all. We might reconsider the idea, whether overt or tacit, that Black Americans are ever a special question, ever an issue, ever out on a limb waiting for a promise unfulfilled.

    For example, surely it is important to help what used to be called the “underclass”—for whom poverty is not a step along the way to middle-class success but a multigenerational solid state. However, today’s underclass is as white as it is Black, with whites in under-served areas enduring an epidemic of unemployment and drug addiction. The American “underclass” we want to save now knows no race.

    Affirmative Action for Black people was a wise policy in the 1960s, with Lyndon Johnson famously saying at Howard University that “You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.” But Johnson said this in an America where the primary racial distinction was between white and Black, because immigration had been starkly limited since the 1920s.

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    That America ended with the Immigration Act of 1965, which created the highly diverse American population of today. Today, racial preference policies that give special attention to Black (and Latino) university applicants have been shown to all but require that Asian applicants reach a higher bar than any Black or Latino applicant would have to.

    Ideally these Asian applicants and their parents might understand that they need to make allowances for the extent to which Black people were deliberately held back in America in the past. But there are now so very many groups of people in America, all having dealt with the grinding hardships of starting over, as well as degrees of discrimination. Hoping they will willingly move over for Black and Latino people because of events largely in the distant past is a big ask. Most of us can probably imagine being in the position of Asian students and feeling the way they do. Once again King’s perspective speaks to us: focusing preferences on present-day socioeconomic circumstances—i.e. class, not skin color.

    The Supreme Court is eviscerating the Voting Rights Act of 1965, under the premise that racism has receded enough that it should no longer be necessary for states to submit changes in election laws to Federal approval. It is understandable that Black communities would see this invitation to redistrict as a threat. But in 2026, it can be hard to pinpoint just what the Black community’s unified platform is.

    Not that individual Black voters don’t have their particular concerns—it’s just that they vary among us. A study late last year documented that older Black voters cite racism as a priority in determining their elective choices. But among the younger 59%, what most influences their vote are health care and inflation, as is true of so many Americans of all races. Then, 7% among this cohort regularly vote Republican, most of them men, and 15% of Black voters—nearly one in seven—voted for Donald Trump in 2024. Today the Black vote is ever more simply the American vote.

    The new reality is clear even on the level of how creative people depict the Black presence. In the deliciously spare and weird television show Severance, the menacing manager, a quirky office worker, a woman the white male lead dates, and a woman helping him escape his bifurcated fate are all Black actors. In a version of Severance thirty years ago there would likely have been one Black character and likely in a far more stereotypically “Black” role.

    I think also of the late, great Broadway musical about cartoon legend Betty Boop, which I wrote about here during its run. A Black woman, Jasmine Amy Rogers, played Betty. White guys in the plot pursued her with her Blackness never remarked upon. We moderns could just see Jasmine Rogers’ Betty as a race-neutral person—judging her by the content of her character, as it were. The logo alone was a sign of the times—the top part was old-time white Betty Boop, but then below the waist was brown legs. The point was that Betty is both things, and thus a new kind of whole.

    The last thing I want to imply is that racism no longer exists. However, I look to degree: in some of racism’s remaining forms, the question is how much they even affect us. Research indicates that implicit bias exists but does not regularly determine people’s actual behavior. Meanwhile, the literature on what microaggressions are and whether they significantly affect people is conceptually vague and weak—with esteemed Emory psychologist Scott Lilienfeld, on the basis of a wide-ranging study, calling for “abandonment of the term ‘microaggression.’”

    Even when racism is less subtle, context matters. Fryer’s study, for example, showed mixed results. While cops shoot white people more, they nevertheless are more likely to rough Black people up physically and verbally. That is revolting and must change. But along with it, we must also consider the increasing number of physical attacks of Asians since the pandemic, the increasing number of antisemitic bombings and murders, and the attitude towards women indicated in what Ross apparently called Renee Good after executing her. And in other news: a brutal, ignorant, and imperialistic presidential administration, a perpetually stalemated Congress, the physical ravages of climate change, an opioid crisis, a broken and pitiless health care system. In front of this backdrop, I see Black America less as a community uniquely in crisis than as a people living within a nation in crisis.

    Many argue nevertheless that Black Americans’ past should be addressed with a program especially for us, i.e. reparations. A pioneering program in Evanston, Illinois has granted Black people mortgage assistance as reparations for what their ancestors endured, and the idea is being studied in other places. I have been skeptical about reparations in the past, but have softened somewhat of late. I would get nothing out of watching people be given money and thundering that they shouldn’t.

    However, I could get on board with reparations only if they were thought of as the final reckoning so many have waited for. I worry that many would feel it as a duty to approve reparations as just a beginning, with the idea there still remained the “real work” to be done. One example, typical in my experience, is a report by the Economic Policy Institute that requires that reparations include not just apology and payment, but “commitment to structural change designed to prevent future racial injustice”—as in, even after the payments, “It’s not over!”

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    This impulse would be understandable, actually. It would reflect the perspective we have always known, that feels familiar and even like a kind of comfort zone: our self-image as a people having come a long way but still with a long way to go, the mountaintop still unreached. It can be hard to quite imagine what American Blackness would be without this sense of suspension, an eternal in medias res.

    But it leaves us as the nation’s ever and future poster children. Today we should feel diminished by that characterization, impatient to be free of it even under conditions still less than perfect. We should join a battle against injustice and inequality that embraces all races. This is not a conservative position but a progressive one. I suspect Reverend King, looking upon us in 2026, would agree.

    John McWhorter is an associate professor of linguistics at Columbia University, a columnist for The New York Times, and a member of Persuasion’s Board of Advisors. He is the author of, most recently, Woke Racism: How a New Religion Has Betrayed Black America and Pronoun Trouble: The Story of Us in Seven Little Words.

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  • The Morality of a Mafia Boss
    President Donald Trump on January 13, 2026. (Photo by Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images.)

    In case you missed it: Earlier today Frank published an article responding to Trump’s tariff threats against NATO allies. Click here to read it!

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    Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.

    —Donald Trump, in answer to a question about whether there were any limits to his ability to use military force around the world.

    Although Donald Trump is a habitual liar about issues big and small, he is occasionally capable of surprising honesty. His statement to a group of New York Times reporters, quoted above, is one example. It contains two largely frank and correct assertions: first, that American international behavior is constrained by norms (i.e. “morality”) rather than law; and second, that the applicable norms are his personal ones, and not necessarily those shared by other nations.

    We should acknowledge the truth of the first, and be very frightened of the implications of the second.

    Trump’s action in snatching Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and putting him on trial in New York has been widely criticized for violating international law. In my view, law is not the central issue here. International law simply does not exist in the same sense as domestic law. There is no global sovereign that can either make or enforce international law. States may enter into treaties, compacts, alliances, and international agreements with one another, but those are entirely voluntary acts. States remain sovereign and can withdraw from prior commitments whenever they want, unlike citizens who cannot refuse to live under the laws of their country. The dominant international agreement which the United States is party to is the UN Charter, which forbids the use of force except as authorized by the UN Security Council. Over the years, the United States has repeatedly violated this rule, as when it intervened in Kosovo under President Clinton, or in Iraq under George W. Bush.

    International law is not so much law as a series of normative commitments that states will observe certain rules and constraints in the future. It is those normative constraints and not legality per se that are critical to international order, and it is those norms that we should focus on.

    For example, there has been a powerful norm since 1945 against territorial conquest: powerful states should not march armies across international borders and grab territory and resources from their neighbors. The “no conquest” norm was violated by Iraq in its 1990 takeover of Kuwait, and again by Russia in its seizure of Ukrainian territory in 2014 and 2022. The reason that the United States and other countries responded so forcefully in both cases was not due to the illegality of these invasions, but due to the way they openly trashed a critical international norm. By contrast, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, it observed the “no conquest” norm by limiting its objectives to neutralizing Iraqi WMDs and removing Saddam Hussein’s abusive regime. The United States made clear it had no intention of claiming Iraqi territory or oil resources for itself. So while it had not received “permission” from the UN Security Council, it was still acting within a familiar normative universe.

    So Trump is right that it is norms and not international law that will govern American behavior. The problem lies in his statement about “my morality”: Trump has the morality of a Mafia boss. He wants to use American power to acquire territory, resources, and prestige. His snatching of Maduro should be less shocking than his justification for the action: he wants to make “billions and billions” of dollars extracting oil from the ground and selling it for American benefit. In the past, he has claimed that this oil actually belongs to the United States, given that Venezuela had earlier nationalized the assets of American oil companies. Before that, he argued that the United States, having gone to the trouble of invading Iraq, should have stayed and claimed Iraq’s oil reserves for itself.

    Trump, in other words, is following in the footsteps of Russia and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in rejecting the “no conquest” norm. So it should surprise no one that Trump went on from targeting Venezuela’s oil to making claims on Greenland as well. It is not enough for Denmark to give the United States access to Greenland’s strategic facilities and mineral resources. The president stated, “Ownership is very important.” When asked why, he said, “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.” Trashing the “no conquest norm” is doubly upsetting to the international normative order in this case because the territory in question belongs to a longtime NATO ally.

    While international law may not be a strong constraint on the powerful, domestic law has been. The American constitutional system was deliberately designed to constrain the power of the executive by putting in place a rule of law, as well as constitutional checks and balances to prevent presidents from doing whatever they wanted. Americans have come to think of these constitutional checks as almost physical barriers like the Jersey walls on the side of highways that keep cars from veering off the road. Hence the metaphor of legal “guardrails” that protect society from an overweening executive.

    Our experience with the Trump administration, especially in its second term, should make it clear to everyone that formal laws are ultimately no stronger than the informal norms underlying them in their ability to constrain power. Laws are effective only if people believe in them, are willing to abide by them, and ultimately want the state to use its power to enforce them. But whether people take the law seriously is not a legal but a normative matter. If the executive ignores the law, denies its power, and indeed uses the power of the state in ways never intended by the law, then the rule of law collapses. The law becomes nothing more than the will of the executive, one more tool in the arsenal of a modern state. The distinction between law and norms disappears; everything becomes normative.

    It is clear that Trump has been chafing under the constraints of American law and would like to have the same freedom of action domestically that he has internationally. He has displayed a normative disregard for law from day one of his administration. He has issued a blizzard of executive orders that have skirted and in many cases clearly violated the law. For example, the law states conditions under which federal officials can be removed from their offices, and under which federal agencies can be dismantled. These laws were rapidly broken. The executive branch began to exercise budgetary authority, when the Constitution clearly locates that within the legislative branch. The administration took office declaring that birthright citizenship, something clearly asserted in the Fourteenth Amendment, was invalid.

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    Powers have traditionally been separated not just between the branches of government, but within the executive branch itself. By law or custom, certain functions like control over the money supply or prosecutorial authority have been walled off from elected politicians, because we do not trust politicians to act in the broad national interest. Those powers, once politicized, could become very dangerous to society as a whole. The current crisis over the administration’s attempt to indict Fed chair Jerome Powell implicates both of these separations: not only is Donald Trump seeking to take away the Fed’s autonomy to set monetary policy; he is also misusing the Justice Department by criminalizing disagreements over policy.

    Erosion of the normative order and its descent into Mafia-like behavior was on display last week in Minnesota. Police forces in democratic countries are trained to show restraint in their use of deadly force against citizens. Yet when an ICE agent shot Renee Good to death, he was immediately exonerated by both the president and by Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem. When videos revealed that the agent’s life was not in danger as Trump initially claimed, the president asserted that the agent was entitled to use force because he was being “disrespected.” Shooting someone for disrespect is a perfect encapsulation of Mafia morality, where “men of honor” are ready to kill over the smallest of slights.

    So Trump is right that we are only constrained by our own morality, and that his morality allows him to do anything he pleases.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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    0 min
  • Don’t Back Down, Europe
    People demonstrate against Trump’s plans to take Greenland, on January 17, 2026. (Photo by Alessandro Rampazzo/AFP via Getty Images.)

    Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!

    Click here to manage your account and toggle on the button to receive emails for Persuasion. And as ever, thank you for supporting our community.

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    Over the weekend, Donald Trump announced that he would be imposing a 10 percent tariff from February 1 on the eight European countries that had agreed to send forces to Greenland. He also announced that the tariffs would increase to 25 percent by June 1 if they did not agree to support the sale of the island to the United States. Over the past couple of months, there has been a debate over whether Trump is serious about claiming Greenland for himself, or just trolling the Europeans. He is indeed deadly serious.

    As an American, I have one thing to say to my many European friends: Do not back down in this confrontation. Up to now, both the EU and the major European powers have sought to appease Trump by offering him concessions, flattery, personal gifts, and other forms of tribute. This strategy has not worked and should be abandoned immediately.

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    Donald Trump is fundamentally a bully who wants to dominate everyone around him. Trying to placate him with concessions is a fool’s errand: he despises weakness and those who display it. Last spring, the EU cut a trade deal with him that accepted a 15 percent tariff on all European goods with no retaliation against American products. This was a bad decision; the EU (which in terms of population and wealth is on a par with the United States) should have taken a common position and retaliated.

    What makes any European think that conceding Greenland will mollify Trump? He will simply come back for more, later.

    The arguments that Europeans have used for a conciliatory policy are that they are still dependent on the United States for security, and need its help in dealing with Russia. They also argue that they don’t want to provoke a mutually destructive trade war.

    But at this point, Trump’s America has amply demonstrated that it will not be a reliable ally when push comes to shove. It has already abandoned Ukraine, and stated in November’s National Security Strategy that Europe has fallen behind the Western Hemisphere in terms of American priorities.

    Europeans should keep in mind that those countries that stood up to Trump’s threats in 2025, which include China, India, and Brazil, all did well and did not have to succumb. Domestic support for their leaders increased, and in China’s case the United States became much more cooperative.

    Europeans have to remember that Donald Trump is not the United States. A majority of Americans are dismayed and outraged by his policies, and will likely vote against him and the Republican Party in the coming midterm elections. It may be the case that the world will have to risk suffering a global recession as more countries stand up to Trump and retaliate against his policies. But a U.S. politician who wants to weaponize trade and use it as a lever for territorial expansion needs to be taught a painful lesson.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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    0 min
  • Episode 179: Georgios Varouxakis on the West

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    This week, Richard Aldous talks to Georgios Varouxakis, author of The West: The History of an Idea (Princeton University Press).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

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    27 min
  • ICE Is Imposing Autocracy in Minnesota
    Agents deploy tear gas as residents protest ICE in Minneapolis on January 14, 2026. (Photo by Madison Thorn/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    The Trump administration and its media cheerleaders responded to the shooting of Renee Nicole Good by lying about and demonizing the victim while valorizing the shooter. They also used the event as an occasion to intensify ICE’s actions in the Twin Cities.

    According to Mayor Jacob Frey of Minneapolis, there are currently 3,000 ICE officers swarming the city. That’s five times the total number of sworn officers who work on the city’s entire police force. They know they can act with impunity in inflicting violence on anyone they wish—undocumented immigrants, permanent residents, and American citizens.

    I remain deeply uncertain about what we can and should do about this dawning reality. But there is value in simply documenting it in its appalling details. We need to have our eyes wide open about this as we prepare for more—and worse.

    The Evidence

    Last weekend, Noah Smith wrote a powerful post about the Good shooting and, more broadly, about what ICE is doing in Minnesota and around the country. The piece contains a paragraph with links to reports of abuses committed against people up to that point:

    Here’s a video of ICE agents arresting two U.S. citizens in a Target. ... Here’s a video of an ICE agent brandishing a gun in the face of a protester. Here’s the story of ICE agents arresting a pastor who complained about an arrest he saw. Here’s a video of ICE agents arresting an American citizen and punching him repeatedly. Here’s a video of ICE agents threatening a bystander who complained about their reckless driving. … Here’s a video of ICE agents making a particularly brutal arrest while pointing their weapons at unarmed civilians nearby. … Here’s a video of ICE agents savagely beating and arresting a legal immigrant. ... Here’s a video of ICE agents pulling a disabled woman out of a car when she’s just trying to get to the doctor.

    Things have gotten substantially worse in the intervening week.

    Here’s a video of ICE using flash-bang grenades against protesters and reporters. Here’s a claim that ICE officers are knocking on doors, asking residents to identify the ethnicities of their neighbors. Here’s journalist Eric Levitz documenting how white nationalist memes and allusions have been posted on official government accounts over the past year. Here’s the news that the Department of Justice has opened a criminal investigation into Frey and Minnesota Governor Tim Walz over their statements condemning ICE activity.

    And here’s the text of an email from Jonathan Oppenheimer, the brother of Substacker Daniel Oppenheimer, who lives in St. Paul, Minnesota and works in its public schools:

    They are swarming our neighborhoods in unmarked cars; pulling people over at random; arresting and detaining people with no warrants or cause or justification other than being brown or black; intimidating people with assault weapons in their cars, at the local Target, and at nearly every immigrant-owned business; bashing out people’s windows after traffic stops and dragging them out of their cars; knocking on doors indiscriminately and asking people for documents or to turn on their neighbors. …

    [It] wasn’t real to me until I was seeing it up close and personal. Students of mine crying in my room because they’re scared to come to school. Students not showing up in the first place. Students getting pulled over for no reason and being told their car needed to be searched. Coming to work at a school every day where parents need to surround the premises in case they need to document a student or staff member being assaulted by a paramilitary force and whisked away to a detention center that our elected officials are not allowed to visit.

    The Twin Cities Are Living Under Authoritarian Rule

    This is wrong. And every American whose capacity for moral judgment has not been addled by partisan derangement should recognize it.

    Until five minutes ago, nearly anyone who saw these images and read these accounts about any place in the world would conclude, quite reasonably, that the people there were living under a dictatorship. Probable cause, rights of the accused, the need for search warrants, due process of any kind—ICE is proceeding as if such restrictions on government power no longer exist. These are extra-constitutional acts, and they are now happening on the streets of a major U.S. city every single day. The Trump administration is attempting to turn it into a new American normal.

    Call it authoritarianism, dictatorship, tyranny. Take your pick. It really doesn’t matter. The difference between life in a functional liberal democracy and life in a dictatorship is that in the former every citizen—as well as noncitizens to varying extents—has recourse to the law. The law applies to everyone. These laws, along with long-established rules and norms, limit state action against individuals. We all know this. Nearly every Republican knew this and swore by it as part of our national creed until, again, about five minutes ago.

    Now—in the past few weeks—the true shape, and vast scope, of what’s happening has come into focus. Not just undocumented immigrants who have committed crimes; not just undocumented immigrants who have overstayed visas; not just the foreign-born parents of children born in this country who are American citizens; but anyone, adult or child, suspected of protecting or harboring sympathy for any of the above; or who dares to protest their deportation, or film the actions of an ICE officer; or who even finds him- or herself driving down a street where an ICE raid is taking place—all of these people (and, in a deep-blue American city, that could be hundreds of thousands or even millions of people) have been expelled from the protected circle of those who enjoy recourse to the law.

    Is the United States now an authoritarian regime? At the level of the country as a whole, not yet. But in the Twin Cities of Minnesota, right now, it is. The Trump administration has constructed a laboratory of tyrannical rule and deployed ICE in the role of political vivisectionists.

    Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

    A version of this article was originally published at Notes from the Middleground.

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    0 min
  • Ian Bassin on How to Save American Democracy from Trump

    Ian Bassin is co-founder and Executive Director of Protect Democracy. He previously served as Associate White House Counsel.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ian Bassin discuss what democracy defenders got right about Trump’s authoritarian tactics, why institutional actors have failed to resist democratic backsliding, and the underlying drivers behind the global rise of illiberalism.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Ian, you and I started talking right around the election in 2016. We were both trying to make sense of what was happening in the world and what the first presidency—what we now know was the first presidency—of Donald Trump would mean for the United States and the world. You were starting an organization called Protect Democracy, which has since grown enormously and plays a really important role in the ecosystem of people trying to defend democratic norms and rules.

    Looking at where we are today, what do you think would have surprised us back in 2016 or 2017? What about where we are today do you think we might have expected nearly a decade ago?

    Ian Bassin: You’ve teed up an opportunity for maybe both of us to do something that would normally be considered impolite: say we were right. I don’t say that to be self-aggrandizing for either of us. I say it because I actually think it’s important to mark that fact for people to note. Michelle Goldberg has a piece in The New York Times this week that says the resistance libs were right.

    What I mean by that is that you and I both—and you in particular—really saw what was building around the world, which you’ve talked about on this podcast a lot: a global move away from democracy toward more illiberal, more authoritarian forms of government. We started talking right after the 2016 election because it was apparent that Trump’s election marked the real landing of that global dynamic here on American shores.

    What we built together with your advice—you and I spoke in November 2016 and December 2016, and I spoke with Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, Kim Scheppele, Tim Snyder, and Anne Applebaum—was grounded in the fact that all of you had been banging the drum for a while that we needed to be on guard. The idea of democracy was losing altitude, and this more competitive, hybrid form of authoritarianism was rising around the world. We needed to be prepared for it to reach the United States.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

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    One of the things I asked you and some of your peers in the field was what this looks like when it happens. Is there a pattern you can see play out? You’ve written about this, and you all basically said a version of the same thing: there is a pattern. You’re going to see the politicization of independent institutions like the civil service, law enforcement, and the military; the spreading of disinformation; the aggrandizing of executive power; the quashing of dissent; and the corrupting of elections. There was a playbook you laid out.

    Pretty much everything you said has come to pass. The big-picture answer to your question is that I’m not really surprised by anything we are seeing. These are the things that you and others in your field, and we at Protect Democracy, said were going to happen. That includes the detail that after Trump lost in 2020, it was Orbán 2.0 that was more dangerous than Orbán 1.0. During the years Orbán was out of power in Hungary, he built what he called a central political force field to protect himself and his allies when they returned to power, and then executed a much more devastating assault on the Hungarian system.

    We said there was a possibility that something like that would happen here. What we initially got wrong was that we thought it would be someone other than Trump who would pick up the mantle and do Trumpism 2.0. It took a while to realize that it was actually going to be Trump himself. During those intervening years, we were saying that this was the real danger.

    At the big-picture level, I’m not surprised by what we’re seeing. We’re seeing pretty much exactly what we expected.

    Mounk: That’s really interesting. I think I look back at how we saw the world in 2016 and 2017 a little more critically in some ways, but it will be interesting to tease that out over the course of the conversation. One way of thinking about this is to split the question into different component parts.

    One component part is whether we correctly predicted the nature of the attack on democratic norms and institutions that Donald Trump and his administration would push forward. Another question is whether we sufficiently understood both what had produced that moment and what the right ways were to resist and oppose those power grabs. On the first question, which is a very important one, I would immodestly give us pretty high marks. On the second question, I would give myself much lower marks, and that is something I have been trying to grapple with.

    Bassin: I think you have three questions in there. One of them, which I don’t want to gloss over, is how accurately we predicted the things he would do and the ways he would try to dismantle American democracy. On that question, I think we were quite accurate. The things you’ve written, and the document we put out in 2024 called The Authoritarian Playbook 2025, laid out what Trump would do if he came back into power.

    If you look at that document, it’s remarkably accurate: weaponizing law enforcement to go after his opponents, deploying the military to the streets of American cities. It was remarkably accurate. Thankfully, it wasn’t that hard to predict, because he told us, and his allies told us, what they were planning to do. That’s question one.

    Question two is about causes. What produced this moment? Why did it happen? What is driving it? That’s the one I’d like to spend some time on. Question three is about responses. What strategies would actually work? That’s where you suggested giving us collectively lower marks, and I think that’s right.

    When Trump was re-elected, I had a moment of existential crisis on a number of fronts. One was that we had been working as an organization for eight years to try to prevent the decline of American democracy into something more authoritarian, and now it was happening. There was a sense that we could not keep doing the same thing over and over again and fall into the Einsteinian trap of expecting different results.

    During the first Trump term, one of the things we relied on heavily was litigation in the courts as a way of checking autocratic consolidation. After Trump’s re-election, I was much more hesitant to put so much weight on that strategy. I worried that in 2025 we would devote enormous energy to court battles, win early victories in lower courts, and then see those victories erased when cases reached the Supreme Court.

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    I worried we would reach the end of the Supreme Court term in June with the croupier essentially wiping all our chips off the table because we had put them all in the courts basket. At the beginning of 2025, I thought it was important not to put all our chips on the courts and to recognize that we were facing a political problem more than a legal one.

    That led me to think we needed to put more chips on political coalition-building, of the kind you saw in places like Poland and Brazil to confront autocrats there. In practice, the court strategy has actually done better than I expected. The Supreme Court erased many lower-court wins, but those lower-court wins still mattered in slowing Trump down.

    The Court recently refused to allow him to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, Portland, and Los Angeles. I don’t think we can count on the Supreme Court, but the court strategy has performed better than I anticipated. The political organizing strategy, by contrast, has done worse than I expected. It has been extremely difficult to get institutional actors in this country to really lean in to protecting the system.

    I’ve been surprised by how often institutional actors have caved. We were wrong to think they would do better than they did. That brings us back to the second question, which is the one I want to ask you now. If we want to get out of this, we have to understand the drivers. We have to get at the underlying forces.

    I’m curious about your current assessment. You’ve been thinking about this for a long time. What is driving this moment of illiberalism and authoritarianism around the world? I don’t think I’ve asked you that question in a while, and I’d like to hear your current thoughts.

    Mounk: Why is it that Trump, and so many other politicians who in some ways are dissimilar to him but in many important ways are very similar to him, are riding high in the polls all around the Western world and beyond? We can double down on what strategies are working and what strategies are not working. I think there’s been a great little preview of each of those topics, and we have time to go into depth on each of them.

    Let’s start with our rueful victory lap. Let’s start with the thing where we were sadly right. We’re recording this a couple of days after it became public that the Department of Justice is investigating Jerome Powell for supposed perjury in congressional testimony relating to the renovation of the Federal Reserve. It is striking to me the extent to which Donald Trump has used his control over the Department of Justice to go after his political enemies.

    In this particular case, it is also striking that he’s doing that in the service of trying to increase his hold. In some of these cases, it was mostly to settle political scores. It was just people like Letitia James, who he has a deep personal gripe against. You cross me, I’m going to make you pay. In this case, it goes beyond that, because the animus really comes from the fact that Donald Trump has a very strong view about what kind of monetary policy he would like the Federal Reserve to pursue. He can’t directly fire the head of the Federal Reserve. This is an attempt to push out the head of the Federal Reserve, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, and to expand his power. It is really an attempt to put in place his loyalists into key parts of the state and then set policy that he agrees with.

    To me, that is one recent but very important case of how Trump is following this playbook, which is first to use control over the most important levers of the state to intimidate opponents, both the actual political opposition, in this case the Democratic Party, and non-partisan experts and technocrats like Jerome Powell, who’s no person’s idea of a radical Democrat. Second, to put his loyalists into positions of power where they serve his political interests rather than the judgment of what the best economic policy might be, of what interest rate would in the long run be best for the American economy, and so on. That’s one tiny little microcosm from the recent news about that.

    To go back to the 2016 question, I think that’s what we all predicted. I think we would have had some trouble really imagining that. In 2016 and 2017, I absolutely would have said this is the kind of thing that could eventually happen. Seeing it actually play out, seeing the extent of the politicization of the judiciary in going after partisan opponents, is striking. None of them have yet actually been put in jail, and the legal system has been relatively good at throwing out some of those lawsuits and so on. The extent to which the Department of Justice now is playing ball is really quite striking, isn’t it?

    Bassin: I was a couple of years ago with some allies in the pro-democracy space and coalition and was saying that we at Protect Democracy thought a particular thing was going to happen. I remember one of the people on the call saying, wow, you guys are the most paranoid motherfuckers in American politics. We took it a bit as a badge of honor. I’ve thought about making T-shirts that say that. Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not after you.

    In this case, I’m going to push back again. I am not surprised even by the brazenness of Trump directing the Department of Justice to indict Letitia James, James Comey, and Jerome Powell. I think it took two terms to get to this point. In the first term, he wanted to do these things. We had reports out of the administration that he was asking, why can’t we indict Andy McCabe and James Comey? The problem at the time was that there was still a relatively professionalized Department of Justice and FBI. Even the political appointees Trump himself put in place—Jeff Sessions, again, as you said, like Jerome Powell, nobody’s idea of a liberal Democrat—were unwilling to carry out Trump’s orders. It took part two of Trump’s project, his return to power, for him to understand that in order to do the things he wanted to do, he needed total and complete loyalty from the people in key positions.

    Mounk: Ironically, losing in 2020 was probably one of the best things that happened to him, because in 2020, I don’t think he had the staff and the laws. It took him four years in the wilderness to build on the political appointees of the first term, to write Project 2025, to continue to colonize the think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, and then to be able to come in with a completely different team in terms of loyalty and competence than what he had in 2016.

    Bassin: I actually don’t think there’s as much of a distinction between the Letitia James prosecution and what’s being now suggested about going after Jerome Powell. I suspect you and I might agree on this—that at the end of the day, you could look at them and say, well, with Powell, he’s trying to impose his will on an independent Federal Reserve, and with Letitia James, he’s just simply trying to seek revenge. But both of them are of a piece with his view that if you use the levers of power you have to coerce loyalty and demonstrate that nobody should cross you so that everyone does what you want.

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    One of the ways, for example, that he was able to get the prosecution in New York of Eric Adams dropped was he managed to get the Department of Justice to say to the lawyers in the US Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York who were resisting, we might prosecute you unless you do what we want. We will bludgeon you. And so those lawyers ended up eventually giving up or resigning—to their credit, actually resigning in protest because it was clear that there was nothing that was going to stop Trump and the people he had installed at the senior levels of the Department of Justice from going after them.

    So the prosecution of Letitia James and James Comey, in one sense, are revenge, but I think in a greater sense, they are a model of what will happen to you no matter who you are if you cross me. I’ve talked about this before. I grew up in New York City in the ‘70s and ‘80s. It was Donald Trump’s era in New York City. And it was also John Gotti’s era in New York City. Trump and Gotti were two of the most dominant characters in the New York City media, in the news, in the tabloids. Trump watched Gotti very closely, and his behavior very much apes the mafia style of behavior—of coercing loyalty, offering protection for those people who paid tribute.

    You look at what’s going on now with some of these deals where Nvidia’s allowed to sell its chips to China so long as they cut the government in on a 10 percent share, or US Steel has to give Trump the golden share decision making. As long as the Don is paid tribute, you get protection and you’re allowed to operate. Delcy Rodriguez is learning that right now in Venezuela. And if you cross the Don, well, then cement boots.

    Mounk: Nice chips, shame if something should happen to them.

    Bassin: There’s a line people remember from Goodfellas where Joe Pesci is being talked about, and the point is that if you come at him with a knife, he’ll come back with a gun. If you come at him with a gun, you’d better kill him, because he’ll keep coming back. That is essentially what Roy Cohn taught Donald Trump: if someone comes after you, come back at them twice as hard. That is how you get your way.

    That idea is obviously fundamentally at odds with liberal democracy and constitutionalism. The notion that we simply impose our will because we are strong enough—which Stephen Miller recently articulated in defense of what was happening in Venezuela and the threats against Greenland—is the animating ethos of Trumpism. I think it explains what is happening with Powell just as much as what is happening with Letitia James.

    Mounk: How do we think about what truly matters in this moment and what is less important in terms of what the Trump administration is doing? I want to take one example. I think the fact that a sitting president imposes, through legally somewhat dubious means, that one of the most significant cultural institutions in the country should carry his name—renaming the Kennedy Center the Trump Kennedy Center, and making sure that within a day or two the name Trump goes up above the name Kennedy on the actual building—is absolutely astonishing and striking.

    We do not have a tradition of sitting presidents naming things after themselves. We tend to name a lot of things after dead presidents, particularly those who were assassinated, like John F. Kennedy. In fact, the Kennedy Center was named in his honor a few months after his death. There is simply no precedent for a sitting president to say, I’m going to name this in my own name. When you add the fact that there was free entry to national parks on Martin Luther King Day, and Donald Trump canceled that free entry and made entry free instead on Donald Trump Day, which is to say his birthday, those things are astonishing.

    At the same time, with a slightly cold-blooded look, you might say that this is a distraction. Who cares what the Kennedy Center is called? Who cares when people get free entry to national parks? The things that really matter are prosecutions of political opponents and the building up of various paramilitary forces that have intense personal loyalty to Trump and can exert influence on the streets of American cities.

    How do we think about these softer things, which outrage people and do seem to build something like a personality cult, but also in some light appear to be more of a distraction, versus the things that from the perspective of democratic theory have more obvious significance?

    You’ve built a formidable organization over the last ten years, but you have limited resources. How do you think about which of these things you respond to? Which of these things should my listeners care about when they read about them in the news? Which of those things should people scream into the void about for a bit, have a beer to calm down, and then forget, focusing instead on something else?

    Bassin: Well, first we’re building a pantheon of people that Donald Trump is copying. We named John Gotti, maybe Joe Pesci’s character in Goodfellas. The one that comes to mind with respect to what you’re saying is Caligula, the Roman emperor who had people cut the heads off statues of formerly revered Roman figures in order to put his own head on those statues.

    Your question gets at one of the hardest things we have to wrestle with at an organization dedicated to preventing the United States from declining into a more authoritarian form of government. As you know, we have limited resources. How do we focus them? One of the things we went through over the last couple of months was really putting the screws to ourselves on answering this question.

    Steve Bannon and Donald Trump have talked about this idea of flooding the zone, of shock and awe, of doing so many things at once. This is really a strategy that borrows from some of the great military theorists of the past. Sun Tzu talks about this. If you can spread your opponent’s defenses thin enough, it becomes easier to defeat them. There is a very deliberate strategy here on Trump’s part, which is to take constant action on all fronts in order to create the challenge of dividing those of us who want to defend a vision of American democracy and freedom that we would like to hand off to the next generation.

    The risk is that we become so split and distracted by everything we are fighting on that we become weaker. At the organization, at Protect Democracy, we do a lot of litigating, as I mentioned, to try to hold the line. We do legislative work, which I can come back to later, including helping states pass laws under state law that allow people to hold federal officials accountable for constitutional violations, such as the horrific shooting of Renée Nicole Good that we saw in Minneapolis. We do legislative advocacy. We do technology work. We build software.

    We do a lot of things, and we cannot do everything. If we try to do everything, we will be net weaker for it. That is not to say that the naming of the Kennedy Center as the Trump Kennedy Center is not important. I do think it is important for reasons you and I would both appreciate, which is cultural dominance. The message is that there is nowhere you can look where I am not the center of attention and where I do not control.

    There is a reason personalist emperors, dictators, and autocrats do this. It is a way of demonstrating total domination, of bringing opposition to heel. Saddam had his statues everywhere. He was always watching you. He hovered over everything you did. This matters, but we have to order what we are going to focus on.

    The thing that we at Protect Democracy are focused on as the highest-order priority is protecting the integrity of American elections: the midterm elections coming up later this year and ultimately the 2028 election. You participated in an event we did in 2017, an initial summit for democracy right after Trump had been elected. We brought people together from across the political spectrum in Washington to preview what we were in for.

    You moderated a panel on which the Russian dissident Vladimir Kara-Murza spoke. At the end of the panel, you asked each of the panelists, all of whom had worked in autocratic countries, if they had one piece of advice from their experience for Americans who were about to get a window into what it is like to live in a country that is losing its democracy. I remember Vlad’s answer.

    He said that in the United States, you do not yet know who is going to win your next election. In Russia, they do. You are not where we are yet. Hold really tight to the fact that you do not yet know who is going to win the next election.

    His insight was that as long as there are regular opportunities for the public to choose whether to continue down a road or pivot to a different one, you have an escape valve. You have the ability to correct. That is the great thing about democracy, the ability to self-correct. That is, at the end of the day, the sine qua non.

    There are many other elements that contribute to this. We could talk about the effects of different things on the ability to meaningfully contest an election and protect it. At the end of the day, as long as we do not know who is going to win the next election and there is a meaningful opportunity and a fair process to contest it, and for someone else to win and have that win honored, we have the ability to survive this.

    That is our approach at Protect Democracy. Everything flows from the number-one question of how we make sure we maintain the ability to have free and fair elections. That involves more than making sure people can vote on election day or in the weeks leading up to it. It means making sure people can organize, argue, debate, criticize, receive information, and share information, and that the winners actually get seated.

    Everything we can do to protect that is the priority. The further something is from that core concern, even when it is horrific, inappropriate, offensive, problematic, and important, the further down the priority ladder it falls in terms of where we can devote our limited resources.

    Mounk: I have a thought and a question. The thought is that it has been a very eventful decade for all of us, but especially for Vladimir Kara-Murza, who courageously went back to Russia to fight against Vladimir Putin, was quickly taken prisoner, spent a long time in jail, was finally released somewhat recently, and is now back to fighting for a democratic future in Russia. I saw him speak about the experience and about his hopes for Russia last summer, and he was as impressive as ever.

    The question I have is where we are now with election security in the United States and with Donald Trump’s ability to subvert elections. His willingness to do so is quite clear. In 2016, an election he won, he kept claiming that there had been massive voter fraud in California and other places, and that he had won the popular vote despite reports to the contrary in what he called the lying press.

    In 2020, he did try to subvert the outcome of the election and to impede a peaceful transfer of power. He managed to impede it from happening peacefully, but he did not manage to impede it from happening at all. Joe Biden was able to take office on January 20, 2021.

    We now have midterm elections coming up in which, despite their own unpopularity, the Democrats look relatively likely to win the House of Representatives according to current polls and prediction markets. To what extent do you think Donald Trump is going to be able to subvert those midterm elections? Where are we in this process?

    Bassin: Well, let’s start with the good news, which is that our election system in the United States has been remarkably resilient. We had unbelievably successful elections in very difficult circumstances in 2020 during the pandemic. We had a remarkably successful free and fair election. Donald Trump lost that election and, as you noted, tried all manner of efforts to overturn that result. He was effectively thwarted at every turn and failed.

    The 2024 election was also remarkably successful. Donald Trump won that election, but the election itself was successful. We then had off-year elections in 2023 and so on. The election system has held up remarkably well. One reason for this is the original Federalist design, which is that it is highly decentralized.

    We do not really have one election in this country. We have thousands of small local elections that all ladder up to a national election. That Federalist design has really protected us. If we were to have a situation in which there were a national electoral apparatus running elections, that system would be much easier for Donald Trump to capture and control, in the way that he has, for example, captured and controlled the Department of Justice and other aspects of the federal machinery. I think he realizes this.

    Mounk: Yeah, just briefly, one of the times I most disagree with a friend of mine is when he publicly suggested that we should build a good national electoral institution that would have all the best practices and so on. I thought that was lunacy. The fact that American elections are so decentralized certainly allows for shenanigans here or there. It allows for simple technocratic failures like the famous hanging chads in Florida. It can lead to all kinds of problems, but it also makes it incredibly hard to take over the system in a centralized way.

    In a place like Hungary, there are nine people or seven people, however many, on the National Electoral Commission. If you manage to get a majority on that committee, you can do all kinds of shenanigans throughout the country driven by the center. Thank God there is not one national electoral committee into which Donald Trump can pack people, either through ordinary means, because every president gets to appoint new people every two years or something like that, or through some kind of extraordinary measures and then run the election centrally from within the control of the White House. Dangerous as the current situation is, that would be much, much more dangerous.

    Bassin: Look, we could film many episodes of The Good Fight talking about the ways in which the modern Republican Party has contributed to the mess that we’re in right now. One place where we can at least give Mitch McConnell some credit, and I hope the Republican Party will continue to do so, is that McConnell has been a strong supporter of the decentralized federalist nature of our election system and resistant to efforts to build more national structure into it. At least at this moment, hopefully he and his allies will continue to stand firm on that, because Donald Trump is going to try to bring more of the electoral apparatus under his control.

    Let’s talk about where we are and what is going to happen. First, I mentioned that we had a number of successful elections over the last couple of years. Those did not happen accidentally. It was not magic. There was a lot of effort put into protecting the system. Protecting our electoral system, making sure it can function, and defending it against Trump’s attacks is going to require all of those efforts again.

    In each of the prior elections, it helped to know what he was going to do. In 2020, for example, we knew he was going to claim that the initial ballots counted—the Election Day ballots—were the only valid ones. Those ballots were expected to show him ahead because of the distribution of who voted on Election Day versus by mail. That phenomenon was called the red mirage.

    It was going to look like he was ahead. Over time, as the mail ballots and the urban centers were counted, which tend to take longer, the picture was going to change. We should expect similar efforts again. I expect they are going to come out with reports saying that fraud was seen everywhere. There were some truly bananas conspiracy theories that Sidney Powell floated in 2020, including claims that American voting machines were infected by Venezuela.

    Mounk: Perhaps that is why Donald Trump wanted to remove Nicolás Maduro from power in Caracas—to take control of those voting machines.

    Bassin: I don’t think that is what drove the decision to invade Venezuela, but I do think they are going to take advantage of it. I think you are going to see Delcy Rodríguez or some other senior person in Venezuela, under pressure from the Trump administration, come forward and say, yes, Venezuela did interfere in the 2020 election.

    Trump is going to spend the next couple of months building a predicate case that American elections are rife with fraud, foreign interference, and cannot be trusted, in order to justify a federal attempted takeover and to get other actors to do the things he wants. It is a little bit like the play you are seeing in Minnesota right now, where they say there is rampant fraud, so they have to take away all the money and send forces in. You build a predicate and then you send the forces in. I think you are going to see Trump try to intervene more in the electoral apparatus on the basis of these claims.

    Just to be clear, you and I know this, but every real effort, every legitimate effort to look into claims of fraud in American elections finds that it is vanishingly small. The number of fraudulent voters or people who should not be voting is unimaginably small, orders of magnitude less than what it would take to raise questions about the outcome.

    The Heritage Foundation, the biggest champion of this, posted something on its website a couple of years ago cataloging all the cases of fraud that have been found around the country. You are talking about numbers in the two digits, like twelve cases. These are absurdly small numbers in a country this size, small enough to have absolutely zero impact on election outcomes. Trump is still going to try to run that play.

    Right now, according to Pew surveys, about 77 percent of Americans think elections reflect what actually happened, the will of the voters. When Trump tried to say right after 2020 that the election was stolen, he convinced only about 28 percent.

    If those numbers hold, he will not be able to disrupt these elections. If he is able to meaningfully change those numbers, if he uses his grip on the MAGA faithful and the Republican Party to shift things to where you have 50 percent of Americans saying elections can be trusted and 50 percent saying they cannot, then we are in trouble.

    At that point, I think he will be able to get apparatchiks around the country, people like Brad Raffensperger, who bravely resisted in 2020, to start saying that maybe something needs to be done. When he begins to say there will be no federal funds for Ohio unless they “clean up” their voter rolls and remove people with names that sound Hispanic, it will be very hard for him to convince the Mike DeWines of the world to do that unless he shifts the public narrative so that DeWine feels political pressure to act.

    That is why I think the ballgame initially is preventing him from inventing a phony narrative that elections cannot be trusted. Republicans should know who won the last major national election in 2024: Donald Trump. Mike Johnson became speaker because the elections worked.

    Mounk: I want to get back to the outlook for what to expect in the midterms and over the next roughly three years of Donald Trump’s second presidency at the end of our conversation. This feels like a good moment to shift to the second question we said we would try to answer, which is about the causes of this political moment. I know pretty clearly what I thought in 2016 and 2017, because I was working very intensely on The People vs. Democracy at the time. A large part of that book tried to explain the causes. What I said then was that there were three kinds of structural transformations happening in the background that help explain why people are dissatisfied with democracy and why there has been a rise in discontent.

    The first was the rise of the internet and social media, which allows people to bypass gatekeepers, makes it easier for new entrants to come into politics, and also makes it easier to polarize the public and to say things that would have been too outrageous to print or broadcast in the past. The second was a set of economic changes, most notably the fact that we no longer live in what, in retrospect, was an extraordinary period of rapid economic growth and rising living standards after World War II.

    That period really pacified the United States and other countries. It made many citizens feel that their living standards were improving so much faster than their parents’, and that their children would do even better than they did, that they were willing to give the system the benefit of the doubt. People no longer feel that, even though America has done somewhat well economically over the last thirty years.

    The third was a very rapid set of cultural and demographic changes, which has led some sections of the population to experience declines in social status in ways they are rebelling against. I would say two things about this. I would probably give myself something like five out of ten on that analysis.

    Some of the structural factors I identified were certainly at play, and much of what I said was roughly correct. I do wonder whether I was insufficiently attuned to some of the legitimate grievances people have with our broader culture and political system.

    One example is the way in which America, in particular, is deeply dominated by a professional managerial elite that has become out of touch with the rest of the country and often looks down on it in important ways. These are generally decent people. They are people like you and me, people in our social circles. Many of them are highly competent and did get to their positions through meritocratic competition in which they genuinely excelled.

    Still, it strikes me how separate their world is from that of ordinary people. There has also been a broader set of failures of elite institutions over the last twenty years. You could point to 9/11 and the response to it, the financial crisis in 2008, the failure in Europe to grapple with how complicated the migration wave around 2015 would be in real, on-the-ground ways, and then, of course, the pandemic.

    Institutions like the CDC promised year after year that they would prevent these kinds of crises or serve as rational guides if they happened, and they did not perform as well as they could have. When I look at all of this, as the first part of our conversation makes clear, I do not have a single positive word to say about Donald Trump, and I think what he is doing to democratic institutions is extremely dangerous.

    At the same time, I probably have more sympathy than I did in 2016 or 2017 for voters who say that things are working for people like us. If you have a master’s degree from a good university and a professional job in New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago, you live a good life. You tell others to respect institutions, and that makes some sense, but those institutions also screwed up badly over the last twenty years. I think I would have dismissed that way of thinking too easily ten years ago. I worry that we may still not fully grapple with that as one of the roots of what is happening now. I’ve been talking for a while, but I’m curious about your reaction and how you think about this.

    Bassin: For the sake of a good podcast, I would like to disagree, but I can’t. I pretty much agree with everything you just said. I have in front of me a small set of notes I was taking the other day during a similar conversation, where I was also thinking about what the drivers of this moment are. If we do not understand the drivers, we do not know how to reverse it.

    I am literally looking at my notes as you are speaking. The first item on the list was tech, new innovation. That innovation in communications and technology is something we have not yet fully metabolized as a society. I think this is number one. You listed it as number one. I listed it as number one. The reason I listed it first is that if you look at what is happening in the United States, as you have written, it is not just happening here. It is happening across Western Europe. It is happening in parts of South America. It is happening in a way across the world that suggests something beyond unique domestic dynamics has to be at play.

    The best answer for what has affected all of human society and civilization in this way is these radical changes in how we share information, understand reality, produce truth, and communicate. On that point, I agree with you. It is number one.

    Mounk: One very brief way to think about this from a perspective of comparative politics, and I’ve only hit upon this formulation relatively recently, is that when I teach this material now, I tell my students that any explanation for the rise of populism needs to pass three kinds of tests. The first is the temporal test. Why now? You can’t explain a change from a constant. The second is the geographic test. A lot of the explanations they give, like the economic stagnation one, which I think does help to explain why Michigan voted the way it did in 2016 in certain respects. But it doesn’t work very well for Poland or India or all kinds of other countries where populists have risen a lot in the last 20 years that are vastly more affluent than they were 20 or 30 years ago. So they don’t pass the geographic test.

    Then there’s a phenomenological test about whether the energy in our political system is where you would expect it to be given the nature of the explanation. That’s also one problem for the economic explanation, because I think a lot of people would like to think it’s because of inequality and so on. But then why aren’t the left-wing populists winning? Why is it mostly the right-wing populists who are winning? I don’t think social media explains everything, but I do think that it is the one that most obviously passes the temporal, the geographic, and the phenomenological test.

    Bassin: That is why we both have it as number one. Number two, as you did, is the economic trends, which notwithstanding what you just said, you did note as the second one. You put it well, which is that it is experiential as much as it is actual economic data. How do people feel about it? There is a lot of interesting psychological research about whether someone feels better about their own wellbeing if they have more in net total than someone else, or whether they feel worse if they are further from their neighbors. You could actually have more in absolute terms but be further from your neighbors and be more upset than someone who has less. I think those dynamics are at play.

    You mentioned the cultural one, and you located it, perhaps because we were speaking quickly, in the contest for power coming from groups that have historically been excluded. That is a piece of it, but there is more going on culturally than that. If you look at something Lindsey Graham posted the other day wishing Rand Paul a happy birthday, it was basically a schoolyard taunt. I forget the exact wording, but it was like the way kids try to one-up each other with your-mama jokes. Lindsey Graham was essentially doing a your-mama joke at Rand Paul to signal, look at me, I can do this better than someone else.

    Something is happening culturally where that kind of behavior is incentivized in a way it was not before. That is not just about who is contesting for power. There is something else going on. Maybe it is partly the incentives Donald Trump has created, but you see it coming from others as well. Elon Musk does it too. You see versions of it in Europe. Not exactly the same, but did Boris Johnson behave a bit like that? There is a broader coarsening and erosion of culture happening.

    That gives us those three factors. There are two more I want to add. One of them partly fails some of your tests, and we have disagreed about this. I think there are structural elements, at least in the United States context, that may not fully explain what is going on because they do not cross geographical boundaries, but they clearly contribute to the incentives.

    To give one example, I think the number-one policy issue in the United States that helps explain this moment is immigration. Donald Trump rode immigration to the White House twice. We are in this situation in large part because both George Bush and Barack Obama tried to solve immigration policy challenges and were thwarted. George Bush wrote in his memoir Decision Points that the reason he was unable to pass comprehensive immigration reform was gerrymandering and the fact that many members of Congress only had to worry about primaries and were therefore pulled to their extremist bases and refused compromise.

    Barack Obama ran into the same problem. Bush wrote that if any future president wanted to solve the problem of governing in this country, they would have to solve the gerrymandering problem. We are now in a situation where Joe Biden pulled immigration policy wildly to one extreme, which failed, and Donald Trump is now pulling it wildly to the other extreme, which will also fail. There is a new poll, as of the time we are recording this, showing that for the first time more Americans support abolishing ICE than oppose it. That is a remarkable swing of almost thirty points. Trump’s immigration agenda is wildly unpopular.

    We have gone from two presidents of different parties who tried to find compromise and failed to two presidents who tried to go to extremes and are also failing. Those are structural dynamics driving this problem. Viktor Orbán, trying to cement control over a Hungarian population that was not overwhelmingly supportive of his agenda, looked at the U.S. gerrymandering system and adopted aspects of it. Structural dynamics like that do not explain everything globally, but they matter a great deal in the U.S. case.

    The last piece I would add is leadership. The story of American politics over the last twenty years can largely be told through Barack Obama and Donald Trump. They have dominated American politics. The next era will depend not just on how we respond to the forces we have identified, but on who the leaders are and the force of their personalities.

    We need to do work on technology so that new tools empower democracy rather than authoritarianism. Artificial intelligence, in particular, is a better friend to authoritarianism than to democracy unless effort is made. We need work on the economic front. We need work on the cultural front. We need work on the structural front. The leadership problem may solve itself because political markets tend to produce leaders who meet the moment.

    One last point you made that I want to return to is your increased appreciation, since writing The People vs. Democracy, of the legitimacy of critiques of the governing class. I agree with you. What is interesting is that this critique runs from left to right. On the left, you see arguments about elite failure. On the right, Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed makes a similar critique, with different prescriptions. Even Steve Bannon gestures at it.

    Something has gone wrong in how the governing elite in the United States has managed its responsibilities. There will always be elites. The question is how they exercise responsibility toward the rest of the country. One of the earliest books to get this right was Chris Hayes’s Twilight of the Elites, which I think was prescient and underappreciated. Until we figure out how to reset the role elites play in society, we are going to remain unfinished in solving this problem.

    Mounk: A few thoughts on this. On the structural issue, I agree with a semi-endorsement of that explanation. Clearly, America’s political system has some quite particular features that create quite particular problems. The mixture of the primary system with gerrymandered constituencies and districts is a fairly unique issue.

    That cannot explain everything, because many countries have similar populist figures and similar forms of populism rising without majority political systems, gerrymandering, or primaries. Still, it is clearly a big part of what makes it so hard to overcome polarization in the United States. If you want to lean everything on that explanation, it will fail. If you think of it as one of the deeply contributing factors explaining why it is so difficult to solve issues like immigration policy, and the really terrible downstream consequences of that failure, then I absolutely agree it is a key part of the explanation.

    Bassin: Yascha, this is actually one of the points that we have disagreed on over the years. I’m glad we found some middle ground on this. It may not be the be all and end all explanation. I agree with you there. I can’t explain what’s happening globally, but it is clearly a problem in the United States that needs some degree of addressing.

    Mounk: It’s a contributing factor for sure. Did I change my mind about that? I would have thought that I had said that in the past, but perhaps I changed my mind about realizing or perhaps we just formulated it right this time.

    Bassin: I’m going to take it as a victory because we’ve agreed on so much over the years and even on this show, but this has been one of the points, I think, of tension between our approaches. I think we have found a formulation that works for both of us, and I’m going to say that’s a good victory here.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Ian explore how American culture has changed in the last 20 years, and how to protect the country’s democratic institutions. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr
  • “Heritage Americans” Want to Make Citizenship About Blood
    Supporters of ICE in Minnesota on January 9, 2026. (Photo by Mostafa Bassim/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    If I’m traveling outside of the United States, there’s a particular turn that the conversation has a tendency to take. I’ve come to think of it as the “nationality game.”

    I’ve often had this experience in a taxi cab where the driver, without any other preamble, will suddenly lock eyes with me through the rear-view mirror and ask “Where are you from?” “I’m American,” I say. In not a single instance of playing this game has that been a sufficient answer. My interlocutor, then, will knit their eyebrows in a very particular way, or drop their voice as if to invite confidences, and say, “Where are you really from?”

    From experience, I know how this game ends. If I say, “I’m Jewish,” the knitted brow will disappear and my interlocutor will be satisfied, but my part in the game is to delay that for as long as possible. “Like all Americans, I’m a mix,” I might reply. I might say that I grew up in New York, or I might volunteer that my ancestors came from different countries and arrived at very different times. “I’m basically a European mutt,” I’ll sometimes say, which has never, in all the times I’ve played this game, satisfied my interlocutor.

    I make a point of being difficult, but I also feel that my obfuscativeness contains a deeper truth—in the United States we almost never play this game, and for good reason. So many Americans are so mixed that to ask for a “nationality” is usually meaningless, as well as offensive—it means questioning a fundamental premise of their citizenship.

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    For the past two years, I’ve been living in Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia—which means that I get the “what is your nationality?” question a lot—and I’ve been trying to really think through why there is such a diametric difference in the understanding of what “nationality” means in the United States compared to most other places I’ve been in the world. That felt to me like an idle, pass-the-time-of-day sort of query until it popped up in a very big way in U.S. political discussion, and, more specifically, on the websites of a variety of government agencies.

    In July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) posted a painting on its Instagram of settlers in a Conestoga wagon celebrating the birth of their child and accompanied by the caption, “Remember Your Homeland’s Heritage.” Later that month, DHS posted “American Progress”—a painting closely associated with “Manifest Destiny”—on its Instagram along with the caption “A heritage to be proud of, a homeland worth defending.” Not to be outdone, the Department of Labor this month posted a highlight reel of events from American history surrounding a bust of George Washington along with the caption, “One Homeland. One People. One Heritage. Remember who you are, American.”

    Outrage followed. Much of it was directed against the lily whiteness of the figures depicted in the Conestoga wagon, as well as the whiteness of the allegorical figure of Columbia in the “American Progress” painting. “Some historians say that D.H.S.’ battle cry, in the context of the painting, glorifies racism,” The New York Times wrote. And much of the outrage directed against the Department of Labor’s post has questioned whether “One Homeland. One People. One Heritage” is a direct allusion to Nazi Germany’s “Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer.”

    Personally, I find it unlikely that anyone using those rhythms would not be aware of its resonance with Nazi sloganeering. But I want to bracket that out of this essay—it’s an unproven claim. What got my attention was the sudden ubiquity of the word “heritage,” and its theory of Americanness that runs counter to everything I cherish.

    Over the course of the past year, the “Heritage American” movement—something I’d never come across before—moved out of the fringe and into the MAGA core, driving the rhetoric of Trump administration agencies. The “coming-out moment” for Heritage Americanism may well have been JD Vance’s speech at the Claremont Institute in July 2025, in which he said:

    America is not just an idea. We’re a particular place with a particular people and a particular set of beliefs and way of life. Our ancestors realized that to carve a successful nation from new land meant creating new tangible things, new homes, new towns, new infrastructure, to tame a wild continent. That is our heritage as Americans.

    Which “particular people”? The answer may be supplied by the “Heritage American” movement that centers itself on American Reformer Magazine and a group of intellectuals including C. Jay Engel, Auron MacIntyre, and Ben Crenshaw, who write lucidly, if not always with perfect logical consistency, about what they have in mind.

    Let’s give them the floor for a bit. Here is how Engel explains it:

    When I say Heritage American, this is what I mean: those who are ethno-culturally tied to the ethos and spirit of the United States prior to its definitional transformation into a Propositional Nation after World War II….When we speak of heritage America, we speak of an actual body of institutions created by a nexus of a specific people; dominated and defined by Anglos and their children.

    Crenshaw, for his part, identifies “seven inheritances” that comprise Heritage America—the English language, Christianity, self-government, Christian government, liberty, equality under the law, and relationship with the physical land. He writes, “You might formally be an American citizen by birth or naturalization, but unless you understand these deeply-rooted and traditional aspects of American identity, you cannot be a Heritage American—a true American.”

    There is much in here that my Kyrgyz cab drivers would agree with. Many nations, all over the world, do have a distinct concept of an ethnically dominant nationality. That ethno-centric vision of a state is built into 19th century nationalism (which was also, at the time, part and parcel of “liberalism”) and may be understood to be its guiding impulse. The notion of the ethnocentric state is also at the core of the decolonization movement—and the belief in “self-determination” tends to be closely connected to the idea of rightful rule by a dominant ethnic majority.

    If that can be the case for national and decolonial movements all around the world, then why not also for the United States? And, actually, Engel adopts a strikingly decolonial position when he frames Heritage America as being under a state, essentially, of occupation by an “upper-class economic elite … working in tandem … with those on the economic margins of American life.”

    If we were to really try to steelman this position, we might do so through the work of Samuel Huntington. Huntington, in his classic—and controversial—1996 book Clash of Civilizations argued that the barriers between civilizations are essentially insuperable. He divided the world into seven or eight civilizations—Western, Slavic/Orthodox, Confucian/Chinese, Japanese, Latin American, Islamic, Hindu, and “possibly” African. It might readily be objected that these are apples and pears—some are religions and some are geographical territories and some are ethnicities—but the strongest way to put Huntington’s position may be that time does the work. Over the course of centuries, values inculcate themselves within given cultural territories and do not pass so easily beyond a civilization’s frontier.

    Indebted to Huntington and to the work of scholars like David Hackett Fischer, Paul Gottfried, and Donald Warren, the Heritage position would be that what is of value in the United States really is a distinct culture that took root over the course of several centuries. As Engel writes, “[Heritage America] is not an idea. It is a body of actual ways and habits and standards of culture and behavior, connected by a shared experience and the inheritance of that memory. It is communicated by certain aesthetics, certain art, certain folklore, certain music, and certain symbols.”

    The Heritage thinkers have a tendency to plug for some pretty arbitrary divides about what constitutes a “true American,” but what they seem to be getting at is some notion of civilization frontiers. Huntington would create a great deal of mischief with his argument for an exclusionary approach towards Hispanics based on the idea that Latin America (but not Europe) belonged to a distinctly different civilizational sphere than North America. The recent deployment of thousands of ICE agents to Minneapolis, ostensibly to stamp out fraud in the Somali community, is based largely on that Heritage premise—that Somalis come from a very different civilizational outlook. Beneath Donald Trump’s many diatribes against Somalis—he has called them “garbage” and said “I don’t want them in our country”—is the assumption that Somalis are from beyond the ambit of the West and are therefore unassimilable.

    If we try to give the Heritage view as much credit as we can, it is hard to argue that there is nothing in the notion of hard frontiers of outlook between different cultures. In my ex-pat life, I have become very aware of it. As much time as I spend in Kyrgyzstan, I know that I am very unlikely to ever fully understand the culture—differences in perspective are not surface but run through every imaginable interaction. Kyrgyz, unburdened by political correctness, tend to call it their “mentality,” and to treat it as something like the weather—an outlook that is not Western, that they may not necessarily be all that proud of, but that is just a fact of life.

    If, again, we try to be as understanding of Heritage as possible, what they are asking for seems to be something that the liberal sensibility is willing to grant just about anybody else other than American whites—pride in one’s history and background; and the ability to mobilize politically as ethnic majoritarians. “It is a particular way of life that is proud and exclusive, but is welcoming to those who want to live in this manner,” writes Crenshaw of Heritage America. And that sense of aggrieved pride runs all across the Heritage position. There is so much to be proud of in Western, and specifically American, history—and the Heritage perspective finds it perplexing that the progressive view would seem to reduce so much of that history to domination or “white supremacy” that needs to be atoned for.

    Like everything that’s truly dangerous, then, the Heritage movement has a certain internal coherence to it. It threatens to replace accepted notions of Americanness anchored in inclusivity and Constitutional authority with an amorphous but also sticky view of Americanness built around exactly when your distant ancestors got off a boat.

    There are a few problems with this. I currently live, actually, in a country that’s going through an ethno-nationalist revival, and am seeing what it’s like when the dominant ethnic majority calls the “shots” politically—and, basically, it stinks. The flip side of nationalism is, of course, xenophobia—the rise in nationalism makes ethnic minorities very nervous and has generated outbursts of violence in particular against Pakistani migrants and students in Kyrgyzstan.

    Ethno-nationalism also provides golden avenues for corruption, a work-around to any sort of meritocracy. In Kyrgyzstan, it’s always possible to work your way forward by wearing the right kind of hat or saying the right kind of phrase or appealing to the pedigree of one’s tribe, and that constant ancestral one-upmanship, along with the attendant obsessive focus on symbolic issues, comes at the expense of vital work like building infrastructure or developing sound, sustainable governance.

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    Then, the nationalities game, when you actually get into it, turns out to melt into incoherence. It’s not just that it really is meaningless to draw a line in the sand at 1880, as the Heritage blogger Ragnar Lifthrasir does, or after World War II, as Engel does, and say that immigrants who came before it are “true Americans” and those after it are not. It’s also that, when you really scratch deep enough, almost nobody can exactly build an identity around “descent.” If I ask myself whether I am a “Heritage American,” I would really have no idea. Yes, I do have branches of my family that were in America in the 17th century, including one that goes back, I believe, to the 1630s. But do those ancestors—that long line of Massachusetts potato farmers—somehow qualify me as more American than does the Italian branch who, within a generation of immigrating, sent five of their children to Yale and Harvard Medical School, or the Jewish branch who fought in World War II? My tangled family tree would, I imagine, be more typical of most Americans than not.

    Then there is the lesson of American history itself. The Founding Fathers left out ethnic or religious stipulations for citizenship or office. And while the United States had a nativist political tradition all through the 19th century, the engine of industrialization essentially all by itself discredited that stance. Westward expansion, rapid industrialization, and the emergence of America into global power status in the 20th century, are all unimaginable without the tide of immigration. Vance maybe inadvertently acknowledged as much in his Claremont speech when, in speaking of American “heritage,” he paid particular attention to engineering feats, to space flight and the Moon landing. Vance must have known that the history of American science would look very different without Nikola Tesla, Enrico Fermi, Albert Einstein, or the 117 foreign-born Nobel Prize winners who did their critical scientific work in the United States.

    And, actually, there is a view of the West, and of America, that shares some of Heritage’s premises while strenuously rejecting their conclusions. That view would hold that the West really does have a unique tradition of which there is an immense amount to be proud of, but that what makes the West distinct is precisely that it is not heritage-based. Scientific process, and complex managerial structures, and modern armies and systems of state administration are all based on a certain impersonalness—on members of the society being slotted into a given role based entirely on their individual fitness for the task as opposed to any question of ancestry or family network. Re-introduce kinship ties into the social structure and you lose precisely the feature that, over the last half-millennium, has made the West, and the United States as an extension of the West, so distinct and so successful.

    All of this might seem a bit theoretical if the Vice President of the United States, and the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Labor, hadn’t adopted explicitly “Heritage” rhetoric in their public utterances over the last six months and done so, specifically, to question the rule of law in citizenship cases and to impose subjective tests about whether or not certain populations, in this case Somalis, are deserving of inclusion in “Americanness.”

    The problem—apart from the total cruelty and inhumanity of the administration’s approach—is that it is, as the Heritage people are so quick to say of others, “un-American.” If you happen to believe, as I do, that the United States is a really distinct and successful country—a country to take pride in—the reasons for that are not the wonders of its folklore or symbols. All countries have folklore and symbols, and most struggle with management structures and with finding a rational path for individual advancement. The reason to take pride in the United States is the country’s unique synthetic identity structure in which your ancestry is the kind of thing you bring up only if all other conversational topics are exhausted, never to prove a point about yourself—in which a person is assessed not by where they are from, but only and entirely by what they do with their own life.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

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  • Why Human Rights Depend on the Nation State
    (Photo by David Jensen/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Around the turn of the millennium, when talk of the end of history still carried the weight of common sense, I was a law student imagining a future in human rights. In a moment that captured the mood, I remember a trade law professor announcing that he never wanted to hear “the S-word”—sovereignty—spoken in his classroom. The subtext was clear: the nation-state was a relic of history to be left behind by the enlightened citizens of a rising global order. Looking back, the hubris is clear. Sovereignty hadn’t vanished, even if the Overton window on campus had closed. The professor had simply tried to conjure it offstage by force of will.

    If sovereignty was unspeakable, nationalism was unforgivable. Among the educated classes, a whiff of genuine patriotism was treated as gauche—a lapse not just in judgment but in moral taste—something to be deflated with a knowing joke about “‘Murica.” That sensibility endures today. National pride sits at historic lows. Fewer than half of Gen Z Americans say they’re proud to be American. Many admit they’re even embarrassed by it.

    I came of age inside that post-Cold War world, part of the vanguard of the era’s globalizing projects: free trade, economic liberalization, good governance, peacebuilding, transitional justice, and human rights. Trained at Harvard, I went on to help negotiate United Nations treaties at the State Department and to document atrocities for Human Rights Watch in West Africa before turning to academia to teach human rights law.

    For much of that time, I believed in expanding the reach of international law. But from inside the machinery, I also watched where it stalled and where it overreached. Today, I see what should have been obvious to my younger self: the work of international human rights depends on the political communities it once hoped to transcend. Sovereignty and nationalism are not antagonists to the human rights project; they are its unacknowledged foundations.

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    Flash forward to the present, and the mindset that once treated sovereignty as suspect and nationalism as vaguely indecent hasn’t disappeared. Within the cosmopolitan strain of contemporary liberalism, the old reflexes persist: the recoil from nationalism, the suspicion of borders. And for most human rights professionals, rights are still imagined primarily as shields against the state. They are rarely understood as something that might depend on the strength of the state or the solidarity of its citizens. Yet solidarity is not a technocratic project that experts can engineer. It is a cultural accomplishment—the work of a nation rather than a government.

    The reflexive suspicion of nationalism isn’t baseless. The radical sense of belonging that can come with aggressive forms of nationalism has a dark side and can curdle into violence. This is the civics class consensus. The warning is practically baked into the curriculum. It is harder to see the downsides of the weak ties that often come with cosmopolitanism. For all its moral glamour, cosmopolitanism has always been a luxury belief—the creed of the well-traveled, well-credentialed, and well-heeled. It requires a certain degree of insulation from the vicissitudes of life to choose to belong nowhere. For many people without that luxury, the nation remains the largest form of belonging capable of sustaining the loyalty required to deliver social services, enforce laws, and preserve basic order.

    I’ve worked in places where that basic order has collapsed. In parts of the Sahel where authority dissolves a few miles outside the capital, the fragility of the human rights project becomes unmistakable. Life without a functioning state isn’t a human rights paradise; it’s Hobbes made flesh. Of course, the state is both monster and midwife. It is the one force that can strangle rights and the only force that can uphold them. Too little power and a society drifts toward the chaos of Somalia; too much and it begins to resemble China. Most people, given the choice, will pick order.

    But order alone doesn’t deliver rights. That depends on the character of the community behind the state—its sense of “we,” its willingness to restrain itself, its capacity to act together rather than fracture into tribes. That civic cohesion is the essence of nationhood, with a shared story and reciprocal obligations strong enough to hold a diverse democracy together. Without that civic “we,” human rights—like cosmopolitanism—float in midair. If anything, the human rights establishment is part of the problem. As human rights work professionalized, it drifted into a kind of bureaucratic cosmopolitanism—organized around donors and UN processes rather than a civic ground game in actual nations. Many NGOs sound more like policy consultancies than movements. A project meant to speak for people increasingly struggles to speak to them.

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    It did not have to unfold this way. The technocratic drift of international human rights institutions reflects a deeper imbalance within liberalism itself. The movement embraced liberalism’s idealism and universalist ambitions but neglected its countervailing virtues—prudence, respect for difference, and the dignity of communities governing themselves. But liberalism was never meant to be a creed of pure cosmopolitan abstraction. Its sturdier branches have always included self-determination and the recognition that human flourishing takes different forms in different places.

    Somewhere along the line, the machinery of international norm production lost sight of those anchoring liberal virtues. What began as the modest, civilizational minimum of the 1948 Universal Declaration has grown into an intricate thicket of hundreds of treaty rights—rules drafted far from the publics expected to live under them. Human rights bodies now venture well beyond basic protections, telling states how the media should portray disability, how families should understand maternity, and even requiring governments to “ensure” that every person enjoys the benefits of scientific progress. Some directives are so sweeping and undefined that it is hard to say what compliance would look like. The effect has been to put the human rights project at odds with the very liberal goods it requires to endure: democratic consent and a shared sense of political authorship.

    With this rights inflation, a crucial distinction has blurred. Rights exist to restrain majorities; legislatures exist to express them. When international bodies start turning policy preferences into “rights,” they stop defining a constitutional minimum and begin writing a global policy wish list. That is miles away from the Universal Declaration’s spare core of protections against torture, arbitrary detention, discrimination, and other basic assaults on dignity.

    What the moment requires is not another round of international invention but a change in posture—a liberalism that remembers its other half. Call it liberal localism: a recalibration that protects the essential floor of rights while recognizing that the work of building moral and political order happens closer to the ground. Rather than the assertive liberal internationalism of the 1990s—which presumed convergence—liberal localism accepts that different societies will pursue shared liberal goods through different institutional and cultural forms. It is less a retreat from universal principles than a recognition that liberal ends are most durable when reached through liberal means—persuasion, democratic authorship, and the slow work of consent in particular places.

    But even if international law were pared back to its proper constitutional minimum, there remains a deeper problem: the limits of solidarity. Human beings are not wired for the limitless empathy imagined by the loftier versions of the human rights project. Robin Dunbar’s famous number—that an individual can handle roughly 150 stable relationships—captures the narrow radius of social life we evolved to manage. Anything larger depends on shared narratives that persuade strangers they share a common fate. The faith, the flag, and the institutions of common life are among such foundational stories. When those narratives weaken, the political imagination shrinks back to smaller forms of tribe.

    Nationalism, for all its dangers, remains one of the few stories that can stretch across millions and still feel like home. Across much of the liberal world, loneliness and anxiety have surged even as prosperity has grown. The atomized individual, untethered from any deeper “we,” becomes easy prey for more combustible identities—conspiracies, crusades, and other forms of meaning without mercy. While “nationalism” is for many a tainted term that conjures only its blood-and-soil expressions, it comes in many varieties. There is also a civic or liberal nationalism, grounded not in ancestry but in shared laws, institutions, and commitments. It is the form that turns strangers into citizens and makes possible a pluralism that is generous but not unbounded, tolerant of difference without dissolving into a facile relativism.

    This is no easy task in hyper-diverse societies where the communal glue has thinned. As Robert Putnam observed decades ago, diversity can reduce trust and social cooperation—real challenges for any democracy. A healthy civic nationalism could help, but only if we learn how to speak of national belonging without embarrassment and recover a moral vocabulary for why it matters.

    Re-enchanting a healthy civic nationalism does not require whitewashing history; it requires holding competing truths at once. Every national story contains darkness and light, cruelty and aspiration. But on parts of the contemporary left, the only permissible version is a negative one—a recitation of sins unsoftened by grace. Zinn and Chomsky were right that American history needs scrutiny, but they flattened the picture in the opposite direction, turning the national narrative into a running indictment. A nation cannot survive on confession and self-flagellation alone. A society that defines itself solely by its failures eventually loses not only its pride but its will to repair.

    The irony is that this gloomier narrative persists even as millions of would-be immigrants risk their lives to reach the safe harbor of liberal democracy. People do not cross deserts and oceans for a country they consider wicked; they come because, for all its imperfections, liberal democracies remain among the freest and most humane places on earth. Yet the very conditions that make them attractive—openness, pluralism, mobility—also make cohesion harder to sustain. A shared sense of “we” amid rising immigration doesn’t emerge by default; it must be built through institutions that work, narratives that feel credible, and habits that bind strangers into citizens. It also means acknowledging what many avoid saying aloud: citizenship is more than an administrative technicality and cannot be extended without limit.

    A renewed civic nationalism, grounded in self-determination and pluralism, allows that diversity to flourish without collapsing into either boundless relativism or smothering homogeneity. In contrast, the millennial vision of a world pressed into a single moral template would not be progress but a form of spiritual clear-cutting, a loss of the human variety on which genuine universality depends.

    The path forward begins with two neglected virtues: civic belonging and moral modesty. The post–Cold War dream that the world could be governed from nowhere—by experts, courts, and NGOs—has run its course. Whatever we call this new multipolar world, the nation-state will play an increasingly prominent role. In this climate, the task will not be to transcend nations but to renew them—so that the language of rights, once again, has a home.

    Dustin N. Sharp is a professor at the Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego, where he writes on human rights, liberalism, and international politics. He is the author of Rethinking Transitional Justice for the Twenty-First Century.

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