Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • There’s a Strange, Depressing Logic to Trump’s Foreign Policy

    One of my minor gripes about the last decade is that far too many smart people have spent far too much of their lives trying to make sense of the strange psyche and selfish motivations of one single man. As you know, I try to avoid writing too much about the actions of Donald Trump in these pages, and the many of you who have kindly filled out my survey over the holidays seem to like this approach: the number of people who want me to write about big issues like philosophy, technology and culture is much greater than those who want me to focus on the Trump White House or, for that matter, the state of the Democratic Party. (If you haven’t yet had a chance to fill out the survey, you can do so here.)

    So the bar for when I decide to write about Trump, and especially for when I try to offer an interpretation of what makes him tick or a guess as to what he might do next, is especially high. But as I have been reflecting on the daring capture of Nicolás Maduro, and the ignominious betrayal of Venezuela’s opposition movement, over the last days, a hunch I have long harbored about Trump’s foreign policy has slowly consolidated into a lightly-held theory.

    We tend to analyze foreign policy in terms of doctrines or ideologies. But from The Art of the Deal to his first primary campaign, Trump has always been more defined by a way of doing things than by a firmly held set of commitments or objectives about what to achieve in the world (other than to look out for Number One). That same mindset can help us make sense of Trump’s actions in Venezuela, and perhaps even to get some kind of handle on what kinds of actions the White House might pursue next.

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    From a traditional foreign policy perspective, it makes little sense that America would stage such a daring operation in Venezuela, only to hand the country over to a close ally of the dictator it just captured. But from the vantage point of Trump’s instincts and interests—from the view, that is, of the Trump Playbook rather than some imaginary Trump Doctrine—the events of the past week start to make a little bit of sense.

    For anybody who cares about the fate of Venezuela, it is getting clearer by the day that the country’s future is looking about as bleak as it did before Maduro was forcibly relocated to Brooklyn. And while Trump’s evident disregard for the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people is a key reason for that, the more profound explanation stems from the fact that the United States now faces two horns of a gnarly dilemma.

    One horn is for America to effect regime change by putting boots on the ground. This might actually help to topple a brutal regime that has arguably done more to worsen the prospects of a nation than any other ruling clique in any other country over the past two decades. But it would also involve enormous costs. Going roughly in order of most to least important consideration for the White House, it would be hugely unpopular, both among Trump’s political base and among the general public; potentially get the country stuck in a years-long quagmire, risking the lives of many American soldiers and costing enormous amounts of money; and kill a lot of Venezuelans.

    Another option is for America to accept that the Venezuelan regime stays in place essentially unchanged. In this scenario, Trump would keep touting the capture of Nicolás Maduro as a great accomplishment; come to some kind of minimum understanding with the new president, Delcy Rodríguez, that allows both sides to save face; and then turn a blind eye as the country continues to get poorer, many dissidents continue to languish in jail, and new victims of political repression join their ranks. It would have the advantage of avoiding all of the pitfalls of real regime change operations—and the small little downside of doing virtually nothing to lastingly defang the malign influence of the Venezuelan regime, either at home or abroad.

    For anybody who primarily cares about outcomes in foreign policy, this suggests that the operation is likely to turn into a terrible failure. And that likely failure makes the course of action chosen by the Trump administration puzzling. Are they so amateurish that they had no plan at all for what to do after Maduro’s capture? Did Trump feel he had to go after Maduro because the latter had taunted him by imitating his dancing? Was the real reason he betrayed María Corina Machado, the leader of the Venezuelan opposition, that she refused to hand him her Nobel Peace Prize?

    This way of looking at the matter has the advantage, which a lot of people understandably find to be emotionally satisfying, of portraying the Trump administration in the most venal and incompetent manner imaginable. But it also has the disadvantage of failing to understand what makes the administration tick, and therefore being unable to guide our imagination as to what might come next.

    There is, I suspect, a better analytical alternative. For while I don’t believe that Trump has a coherent foreign policy doctrine, it increasingly looks to me as though he has a somewhat predictable playbook. And the trick to understanding that playbook is to recognize the commonalities between the capture of Nicolás Maduro a few days ago and the bombing of Iran a few months ago.

    The first element of the Trump Playbook is a set of views about where America should project its force. As I have argued in the past, Trump clearly views the world in terms of spheres of influence. Whereas his predecessors saw themselves as the leaders of the free world, and wanted to project American strength around the globe, Trump is perfectly happy to carve it up into different fiefdoms. That is why he does not mind that Russia feels entitled to impose its will on Eastern Europe, and China increasingly claims dominion over East Asia. No wonder that his administration is deeply enamored with its bizarro version of the Monroe Doctrine. Where President James Monroe once vowed that European powers should desist from colonizing countries within the Western Hemisphere, the newly christened “Donroe Doctrine” holds that America is, by the eternal law of the stronger, entitled to do whatever it wants within its own sphere of influence.

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    The second, and more important, element of the Trump Playbook is a set of instincts and tactical rules of thumb about how America should project its force. These rules are relatively easy to summarize: Look for the element of surprise. Deploy America’s superior military strength to overpower the enemy. Design daring missions that risk the lives of few American soldiers and are effectively over by the time anybody learns about them. Make it spectacular, headline-grabbing, attention-commandeering. And don’t worry too much about what happens to the world in the weeks and months after the attack—for the general public will in any case have moved on to the next issue.

    The capture of Maduro is hardly the only instance of the Trump Playbook in action. Take the attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities last June: It made clever use of America’s air superiority and its ability to deploy bunker-busting ammunition that weighs 13.5 tons. It probably put no more than a couple of hundred American servicemembers in harm’s way. It delivered beautiful images of explosions. By the time Americans were waking up on the morning of June 22, the mission was already over. Trump characterized it as a spectacular success—and while members of the security community soon suggested that the damage to Iran’s nuclear program had likely been rather limited, the American public had moved on to debating other things by then.

    From this vantage point, the capture of Maduro, the purpose of which might otherwise elude a seasoned foreign policy analyst, has been just as big a success. This operation too made use of the enormous skill and might of the American armed forces, from the aircraft carrier parked in the Caribbean to the bravery of the elite special forces. It too took Americans by surprise, with the bulk of the action over by the time most of us woke up to the astonishing news that Maduro was in American hands. It too delivered incredible images that showcase the strength of the administration, such as the remarkable picture of Maduro aboard an American military vessel, sporting a Nike track suit, oversized protective headphones, and what looked like some kind of large sleep mask. And while this action is, sadly, unlikely to prove any more effective in fixing the underlying foreign policy challenges, Trump has probably once again been right to count on the American public to shift its attention to the next topic, from ICE killing an American citizen in Minneapolis to whatever horrors tomorrow’s news may have in store for us.

    One question journalists keep asking me when I am giving interviews about Trump’s foreign policy is whether Trump’s base is going to turn on him because of his use of force abroad.

    It is certainly possible that Trump will miscalculate and go on some ill-advised military adventure that grows to be deeply unpopular back home, even among his own supporters. As George W. Bush and Barack Obama—both of whom had ascended to the presidency in part on a promise to restrain the use of American power abroad—learned to their chagrin, any president who has access to so formidable a war machine will at times be seduced into using it in irrational ways.

    But if the president is clever enough to stick to the Trump Playbook, it is far from clear to me that this is going to happen. The objections to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have always been born of self-interest more than of ideology. Members of the MAGA Movement don’t have some principled problem with America using its power abroad; they simply thought that the enormous costs, human and financial, that these wars imposed on America were far too high.

    Some of these same voters may also dislike the idea of Trump bombing Iranian nuclear facilities or capturing Venezuelan dictators. But I suspect that most of them are cheering on his actions. He is, in their minds, living up to his promise of being strong and smart; in both cases, Trump showcased the country’s resolve to the world at little cost and with minimal risk to American lives.

    Early polling supports this hunch. The Economist just reported that only about half of MAGA supporters supported removing Maduro from office just before the invasion, with most of the rest likely fearing a major operation resembling that in Iraq. But in the wake of the operation, the vast majority are cheering on the operation. Eighty percent expressed a favorable position, with only 9 percent opposing it.1

    Recent events in Venezuela support this interpretation of the Trump administration.

    Over the past week, Trump has kept claiming that the United States would run, or somehow is running, Venezuela. Even while I remained skeptical that Trump had any desire to put boots on the ground, this raised the specter of an imminent invasion—and made me wonder whether I had really chosen the right frame for understanding the administration’s actions.

    But an invasion has become even less likely over the last 24 hours. Venezuela has started to liberate a significant number of political prisoners, one of the few good pieces of news in the country since Maduro’s capture. Trump used this as an occasion to claim that the Venezuelan government was fully cooperating, and to call off a second wave of attacks that had supposedly been planned. It looks increasingly as though he will let Rodríguez stay in power and rule much as before as long as she minimally pretends to play ball.

    Even so, I’m well aware that much could change. Trump is impulsive and he is deeply status-conscious. I would never want to rule out the possibility of him getting dragged into a major confrontation somewhere in the world. The Trump Playbook is neither a doctrine nor a rigid ideology. But while it can always be put back on the shelf, it is Trump’s go-to way of operating in foreign policy—and, for now, I find it to be a more useful frame for understanding and predicting his actions than any of the available alternatives.

    The question, then, becomes what target Trump is likely to pick for the next operation inspired by his playbook. Invading Canada is far too costly; Canada does have a real army, after all, and the resistance from the local population would likely be fierce and long-lasting.

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    Annexing Greenland might be more tempting. Doing so would likely lead to a fundamental break with America’s European partners, and it is clear that Greenlanders themselves would be deeply opposed to such a move. But Greenland does not have a real army defending it; last I checked, a main component of the Danish military presence on the island consisted of a (no-doubt adorable) unit of elite sled dogs. And the Trump administration might wager on the idea that it is much easier to bring 56,000 Greenlanders dispersed across a landmass of 836,000 square miles under control than it was to bring 25 million Iraqis concentrated on 169,000 square miles under control.

    Occupying the Panama Canal might be even more tempting. The United States controlled the Canal Zone for most of the twentieth century. Panama does not (at least officially) have an army at all. And the goal of the operation would be to seize an economically valuable asset rather than to rule a country.

    Leaders of other countries would be foolish to rule out any such actions. Europeans, in particular, have talked a lot over the past year about how unpredictable the United States has become without truly internalizing the lesson. Do Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen and Mette Frederiksen know what they would do if American troops marched into Nuuk tomorrow? I suspect they don’t, and that is a big problem.

    But the truth of it is that it’s likely impossible to predict the next move of the Trump administration. For the Trump Playbook thrives on the element of surprise. And the strategic purpose is often less important than the headlines it generates. In that sense, the next big American foreign policy adventure will probably share some of the characteristics often ascribed to the ending of a good story: it will be surprising but, at least in retrospect, feel inevitable.

    On the day before it happens, none of us will have predicted it. But after we wake up to hear the news, many of us will say: but of course this is the kind of thing that the Trump administration would come up with!

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    1

    To be sure, one reason for this change in attitude may be simple loyalty. Before the invasion the question was about the wisdom of a particular policy; now the question is about whether they still approve of their leader. But another reason is that the operation, as carried out, does not activate the reasons why many conservatives have come to oppose proactive uses of U.S. military force since Iraq and Afghanistan: they weren’t against America imposing its will on the world; they were against the cost that these military adventures imposed on America.

    0 min
  • Damon Linker on Leo Strauss, Glory, and Gender

    Damon Linker is a senior lecturer in political science at the University of Pennsylvania and writes the Substack “Notes from the Middleground.” He discusses divisions among Straussians, why an internal longing for glory drives so much of the right, and why gender remains such a divisive topic.

    All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.

    Connect with us!

    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Frankly Fukuyama & Persuasion

    48 min
  • Minnesota Burning
    Protesters clash with law enforcement outside an ICE facility on January 8, 2026. (Photo by Mostafa Bassim/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    Let’s talk about a very 21st century scene. There’s an incident somewhere in the United States. The incident slots itself in neatly along the lines of preexisting ideological divisions. As the incident is unfolding, witnesses pull out their cell phone cameras to record it and those images are soon plastered across the web. Everybody sees essentially the same scene and everybody draws drastically different conclusions, depending on what their prior political convictions happen to be. And the result is a society split almost perfectly in two—disagreeing not only about underlying principles but even about which camera angles of an event, and which speed of playback, and which audio track, it prefers to focus on.

    A textbook instance of this phenomenon occurred with the shooting death of Renee Nicole Good in Minneapolis this week at the hands of ICE agents. To some extent, the incident followed a familiar script—cell phone videos posted almost instantly online, with online sleuths carefully litigating the sequence of events. What was distinct about the Good shooting was that different governmental bodies, depending on their own inclinations, swiftly drew contrasting conclusions from the available footage, creating almost entirely different realities out of the same event and further exacerbating a schism between federal and local government.

    Speaking a few hours after the shooting and before Good had been publicly identified, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem described it as an “act of domestic terrorism,” in which Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers were carrying out an enforcement action and “a woman attacked them and those surrounding them and attempted to run them over and ram them with her vehicle”—at which point one of the officers “acted quickly and defensively shot” her.

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    President Donald Trump, in a Truth Social post, wrote, “I have just viewed the clip of the event which took place in Minneapolis, Minnesota. It is a horrible thing to watch … The woman driving the car was very disorderly, obstructing and resisting, who then violently, willfully, and viciously ran over the ICE Officer, who seems to have shot her in self defense. Based on the attached clip, it is hard to believe he is alive.”

    The attached clip Trump was referring to was taken from well in front of Good’s vehicle. It did show an officer quickly moving out of the way, and appearing to make contact with Good’s car, while gunshots can be distantly heard. The view of the shooting itself was obscured by Good’s car.

    Much of the rest of the internet was treated to a different clip and, with it, a very different interpretation of the incident. A cell phone video from behind Good’s vehicle showed her maroon Honda Pilot parked perpendicularly across a Minneapolis street, in an apparent attempt to obstruct the ICE operation, and three masked ICE agents approaching the vehicle. One agent pulls on the driver’s side door handle and appears to shout, “Get out of the fucking car,” at which point the driver backs up and starts to drive away. An ICE agent who had been standing in front of the vehicle moves to the driver’s side and fires multiple times into the driver’s seat. The video shows the vehicle, with the driver now evidently no longer in control, careening off the road.

    That was the clip that Minnesota Governor Tim Walz and Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey both clearly seemed to have in mind as they responded to the incident. “I’ve seen the video. Don’t believe this propaganda machine,” wrote Walz on X in a reference to Trump and Noem’s interpretations. Frey, in a press conference, said, “[ICE is] already trying to spin this as an action of self-defense. Having seen the video myself, I want to tell everybody directly: that is bullshit.” Trump himself seemed well aware of the existence of this clip. He wrote on Truth Social, “The woman screaming was, obviously, a professional agitator,” an evident reference to a bystander heard shouting in that clip, even as Trump chose to post the video from the front angle.

    It’s easy enough to understand why. In the rear-angle clip, the officer standing in front of the car never appears to be in any particular danger. He has time to put his phone down, draw his gun, and take aim as the car is moving towards him. As the car turns right, he pivots to the side of the vehicle, firing three times into the driver’s seat, twice as the vehicle has already moved past him, and then calmly reholsters his gun before slowly walking to the scene of the crash. What it looks like is an execution.

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    There is also very little in DHS guidelines to justify the actions of the officer. DHS’ department policy on the use of force holds that “Deadly force shall not be used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing subject,” while stipulating that “deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of a fleeing subject where the LEO [law enforcement officer] has a reasonable belief that the subject poses a significant threat of death or serious physical harm to the LEO or others and such force is necessary to prevent escape”—a circumstance that it would be a real stretch to apply here, especially to the officer’s second and third shots.

    All of that sets up a nasty jurisdictional dispute, with Walz, on behalf of the state, stating, “To Minnesotans, know that our administration is going to stop at nothing to seek accountability and justice,” even as the agent who fired the shots, masked throughout the incident and subject to a federal chain of command, retains his anonymity. It’s also far from clear that the incident is isolated. The shooting occurred as part of a federal deployment of around 2,000 agents to Minneapolis, which ICE’s acting director has called the agency’s “largest federal immigration operation ever” and which Walz, contrastingly, described as “a war that’s being waged against Minnesota.” In the aftermath of the shooting, Frey was blunt. “I have a message for ICE. Get the fuck out of Minneapolis,” he said.

    In other words, it is not easy to imagine a state of greater polarization—or of federal and local authorities more at odds with one another.

    It’s grimly fitting that the incident followed from another disputed piece of video footage—which was also, as The New York Times put it of the Renee Nicole Good video, “a political Rorschach test.’”

    Minnesota has for several years been dealing with a swirling fraud scandal related to abuse of social services handouts by, in large part, members of the state’s Somali community. A 2022 federal prosecution of a nonprofit called Feeding our Future led to the discovery that fraud—including organizations submitting invoices to the state for non-existent services—was widespread. Federal prosecutors, to date, have charged 98 individuals and convicted 62 in fraud schemes totaling over $1 billion—with 85 of those charged of Somali origin.

    In an op-ed for the Minnesota Reformer, Kayseh Magan, who is Somali-American and formerly worked as a fraud investigator for the Minnesota Attorney General, argued that fraud schemes in the Somali community are an open secret and abetted by flawed state policy. “Minnesota’s public programs don’t adequately guard against organized fraud,” he wrote. Ryan Pacyga, the attorney for one of the defendants in the fraud cases, likened the state’s lenient approach to endlessly refilling a cookie jar no matter how many times it was stolen from.

    The story reached national prominence in December with the release of a viral YouTube video by 23-year-old Nick Shirley, who visited Somali-run daycare centers, autism treatment centers, and home healthcare centers and discovered barren storefronts, shoddy signage, and recalcitrant employees with very few services apparently on offer. Shirley’s main gag was to pretend to try to enroll his fictitious son Joey in daycare only to be met with blank looks and slammed doors. His video—which has now been viewed over 3 million times on YouTube—complemented reporting by Christopher Rufo and Ryan Thorpe in the Manhattan Institute’s City Journal that millions of dollars of stolen funds had ended up back in Somalia, in some cases financing the terror group Al-Shabaab.

    But, again, what you saw in Shirley’s video depended largely on what you wanted to see. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune visited all ten of the facilities featured in Shirley’s video and claimed that at least four appeared to be viable businesses. “It’s not possible to see the children from the door where Shirley stood, but just down the hallway—painted with Disney characters—were three toy-lined rooms filled with sleeping Somali babies, toddlers and preschoolers,” the Star-Tribune reported of one of the daycare centers. “A middle-aged woman watched over the children as a Somali lullaby played softly in the background.”

    CBS News in Minnesota reported that, of the daycare centers Shirley visited, one opened after the time of his visit, and another, as security camera footage demonstrated, actually did have children inside that day. Meanwhile, Magan, the former fraud investigator who had written on fraud in the Somali community, argued in a separate op-ed that the fraudsters tended to be motivated by greed not ideology, and that no real evidence had emerged of fraud money reaching Al-Shabaab.

    Wherever the truth lay, it likely was somewhere between the complaisance of Democratic authorities and the hysteria of right-wing media outlets.

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    But whatever questions there might be about the reporting by Shirley and City Journal, it was enough for the Trump administration, which froze $10 billion in social services funds for five Democratic-run states, Minnesota included. The scandal appeared also to persuade Walz to forgo his effort to run for a third term as governor—a decision for which Shirley promptly took credit. “I ended Tim Walz,” he wrote on X.

    Critically, the focus on Somalis in Minnesota spurred Trump to send federal agents to the state this month in an operation intended to root out abuses within the Somali community and which, within a day of its launch, resulted in the shooting death of Good.

    The result is a spiraling situation that could hardly be more dangerous—with Minnesotans aggrieved by the presence of federal agents, and the agents, as the Good incident demonstrated, perfectly willing to engage in violence when crossed.

    This is not only a jurisdictional or a political issue. The thing to do in this situation is to call for cool heads to prevail, to deescalate tensions, to remember all the points that Americans have in common, but, honestly, there are many miles to go before healing can take place. At this point the two tribes in American life are so deeply hostile to each other that it’s impossible for them even to look at a video of the shooting of a woman and to see the same thing.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.

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    0 min
  • Trump Once Again Failed the Decency Test
    Source: Truth Social.

    In late November, Andrew Sullivan published a Substack post that has really stuck with me. Titled “The Question of Decency,” Sullivan was writing in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s dehumanizing “Quiet, piggy” comment to a female reporter on Air Force One.

    Sullivan was lamenting the extent to which American discourse has degraded, the way that cruelty and spite have become regular features of politics. He was also commenting on the extent to which the president of the United States himself is leading this new era of indecency.

    I was reminded of Sullivan’s article yesterday watching the news unfold of a U.S. citizen being shot dead by a federal agent in Minneapolis. The Trump administration’s reaction to the killing ranks as one of the most indecent displays of political cynicism and outright cruelty in recent memory.

    In verified videos of the event, Renee Nicole Good, who appeared to have parked her car parallel across a street to protest an ICE immigration crackdown in the area, is approached by several ICE agents who demand she get out of the vehicle. Rather than complying, she attempts to drive away. Briefly, she drives in the direction of one officer, who draws his gun and opens fire three times.

    The most plausible interpretation of the footage seems not to be that Good was attempting to run over the officer, but that she was attempting to flee. This is suggested by the wheels of the car, which appear to be executing a rightward turn. It was surely a scary situation for the officer. But when he shoots Good for the second and third time, she is already driving past him. He seems to be shooting into the driver’s window from the side. Shooting her dead, in other words, was likely not required for self-defense.

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    To me, this is the common-sense interpretation of the footage. Still, I am not a politician. A politician’s role is to urge caution, to not inflame tensions. To wait until the facts are known—all the facts, not the facts as they emerge chaotically from the internet. And let’s remember that a politician has a duty towards law enforcement, who really do have a very difficult job to do, especially in a free country where obstructive protests are common. But they also have a duty to the public to assure them that law enforcement is held to the highest standards of public safety; that any allegation or evidence of excessive force will be taken seriously. That’s the only way to build trust.

    In many other countries, the president would have issued a statement of condolence to the family of the dead woman. He would have urged calm, and warned people not to jump to conclusions. He would have assured the American people that the incident was under investigation, and that—polarizing as the immigration raids are, high as temperatures are running—the most important thing is for people to mourn the loss of human life. He would have had his own views on the incident, but he would not have expressed those views in the degraded, finger-pointing tenor of an anonymous Twitter troll.

    Trump’s response, by contrast, was to vilify the victim. He accused her of willfully attempting to mow down an officer. He asserted, without a shred of evidence, that an onlooker was a paid agitator. And—worst of all—he said nothing that even came close to the sort of human response to tragedy that we would expect of minimally decent human beings.

    I am not American. From the outside, it’s hard to comprehend the level of dysfunction that seems to have infected American society at the highest level, in which the head of state’s reaction to a loss of life is to sow division rather than heal it. It’s equally hard to overstate how unique this is, at least among Western liberal democracies. I can’t imagine many other heads of state reacting as Trump did—and as his entire administration seemed to do, with similarly inflammatory comments from Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and others describing Good as a terrorist. This isn’t about Trump being right-wing, or even a populist. There are plenty of other right-wing populists who would never have reacted in this way to a member of the public being shot dead by law enforcement.

    This is about Trump’s clear failings as a human being. Before he came onto the political scene in 2015, public figures (mostly) held themselves to certain standards of decency. They played politics, yes, but they also tried to bring the nation together in times of tragedy. And they often extended this courtesy to situations where the stakes were far smaller, such as when their supporters got just a little too mean and vindictive and needed to be reined in.

    During the first Trump presidency, it became customary, in a kind of “gotcha” moment, for progressives to wheel out a particular clip of John McCain defending his opponent, Barack Obama, during a rally ahead of the 2008 election. Sometimes this gesture felt trite. Not today. Today, I think it serves as a timely reminder of just how far American politics has fallen from decency.

    Luke Hallam is senior editor at Persuasion.

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  • The Good Fight Club: Maduro’s Capture, Trump’s Foreign Policy Vision, and the Future of American Power

    In this week’s episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk, Amanda Ripley, and George Packer examine the Trump administration’s capture of Nicolás Maduro and the chaotic aftermath in Venezuela, whether Trump’s foreign policy represents a coherent “shock and awe” strategy or a dangerous overreach, and the political outlook for 2026.

    Amanda Ripley is the co-founder of Good Conflict and author of High Conflict.

    George Packer is a staff writer at The Atlantic and author of The Emergency.

    Note: This episode was recorded on January 7, 2026.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I woke up on Sunday morning to a rather baffling request from a journalist I know in Italy asking me whether I would give her an interview about Nicolás Maduro. I thought, why do they want me to talk about Nicolas Maduro? Though he’s an interesting figure, what’s going on? So I opened The New York Times app and realized why that request might have been made.

    Maduro had been kidnapped in a rather Indiana Jones-esque expedition in the night from Saturday to Sunday. He is now in the Brooklyn Correctional Facility. Brooklyn Correctional Facility I had mixed feelings about this. I’m very concerned about Trump’s foreign policy in general, and this seemed to be in keeping with a lot of its worst traditions. At the same time, of course, Nicolas Maduro was a terrible and brutal dictator who certainly deserves to be in a prison cell about as much as any other political leader in the world.

    The problem is that the administration doesn’t really seem to have a plan for what’s next in Venezuela, and it doesn’t look like things are getting better. In fact, they may be getting worse. What’s your read of this rather confusing situation?

    George Packer: Yeah, it is pure confusion, because I think as far as we can tell from reports, the Trump administration did not go through the usual policymaking process in arriving at this action. It seems to have been something that was in the works for a long time, but there was absolutely no consultation with Congress, no preparation of the American people.

    I lived through the Iraq War and I remember a year-long public relations campaign by the Bush administration to prepare Americans for an invasion that was still quite confusing because the rationale for it was confusing. In this case, the rationale is utterly baffling because there are so many contradictory justifications being given by top people in the administration. There was no public relations campaign at all.

    There was a long campaign of bombing of alleged drug boats off the coast of Venezuela, threats, a large American military presence in the region, in the Caribbean, but no explanation. So we’ve had drug interdiction. We’ve had the enforcement of an indictment of a suspected narco trafficker. We’ve had oil that was supposedly stolen from the United States. We’ve had a new updated Monroe Doctrine that says that whatever we want to do in the Western Hemisphere, we will do. There seems to be a personal animus toward Maduro on the part of Trump. One New York Times reporter said when he kept seeing Maduro dancing on video, which Maduro was doing in the very last days as a sort of a middle finger, that was the final straw. It was a taunt that Trump wouldn’t take. I don’t know if that’s true, but it could be true. That’s the alarming thing—the mess of justifications and the total lack of any explanation that the American people could at least think about means that they haven’t thought about this hard and they haven’t planned for after Maduro.

    They were making it up as they went along. The press conferences were improv acts: We’re going to run it. Well, we’re not going to run it. We’re going to run the policy while those three guys behind me are going to run it. There was something comic and frightening about how little planning seemed to have been done.

    That’s all to say that I am extremely concerned and alarmed, and I share your utter revulsion toward Maduro. I’m shedding no tears over his now being immured in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Sunset Park a couple miles south of you and me.

    Mounk: The thing that I find striking is less the confusion about what the justification is. You’re right that it’s amazing they couldn’t get on the same page about it. It’s not that hard to tell some story that is coherent about why they wanted to do this, given the brutality of the regime. As well as—I think the country that has declined the most in affluence over the last 20 years, its GDP has just been decimated. In a relatively small country, eight million people have fled the regime both because of political repression—a thousand political prisoners by the way that nobody is talking about—as well as the economic devastation. People just couldn’t make a living. Anything that brings better leadership to that country would be welcome.

    The thing that most struck me is that they seem to have just as much confusion about what to do next as they do about the sources of this. By the looks of it, they seem to have persuaded themselves that they can somehow cut a deal with the new president, who was the vice president of Maduro, Rodriguez. There’s just no indication that there’s any daylight between her and Maduro. Her father was a communist radical. Her brother is a high ranking member of a regime renowned for his brutality. She has held every top position in this regime other than president until yesterday. She is renowned for her brutality as well.

    At her inauguration, she very warmly greeted the Chinese and Russian ambassadors. I just really don’t understand how the Trump administration seems to have convinced themselves that they can simply take out the top guy and the second in command is gonna deliver what they want. Amanda, can you make sense of any of this?

    Amanda Ripley: Particularly because it was so humiliating for Venezuela and its most powerful leaders. There is something deeply humiliating about what happened there from their point of view. Generally speaking, when people feel humiliated, it escalates conflict. Particularly people who operate through power and coercion. We’ve seen that with Trump and we will see it again here, it would be my prediction.

    So there does not seem to be a plan. I think it is really always very interesting to ask what is the story Trump and his entourage are telling themselves. Like what is the story they are telling themselves? It’s not coherent, as George said, it’s not consistent. But it is another example of the administration normalizing violence and the use of force without any attempt to sugarcoat it.

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    You see this in domestic politics, you see it in foreign policy. My best guess, and obviously there’s an infinite amount I don’t know, is that Trump is someone who enjoys the rush of power. He has had a couple of successful military precision campaigns. So that is seductive. Then we will probably see more of that until it starts to really brazenly fail.

    Packer: I think he’s put a lot of faith in just sheer force. Usually it’s Stephen Miller who gives the clearest account of the thinking of the Trump White House because he is the real ideologue there. He’s not a political figure. He’s not going to be running for office as far as we can tell. So he is the one who says what they’re really thinking. What he said to Jake Tapper the other morning was that this is the real world. I’m paraphrasing a bit. It is a world in which power and strength and force win. That is an iron law of history since the beginning of time.

    So it seems as if they have convinced themselves that the sheer might of the American military will be enough to coerce Delcy Rodriguez or whoever they have to go to after her to do their will because they don’t want to see thousands of American troops in Venezuela. They don’t want to go through allies. They don’t want to go through regional partners. They simply want it done. They want our will to be imposed.

    If you want that without all the complications and tragedies of the forever wars, you have to have a kind of wishful, almost magical thinking about the way in which power can coerce a foreign country to simply collapse, to cave in. We’re seeing already that that’s just not happening. So it’s a kind of foreign policy vision, magical vision, brutal vision with no moral value. It’s simply based on what we want. We are strong. We will do it. Might makes right. But we’re already seeing how that can blow up in your face or at least fail to do what you want. Then you have to ask yourself, what do we do next?

    Mounk: It seems there’s two vantage points from which to analyze this. From one vantage point, it doesn’t make any sense. From the other vantage point, it actually makes perfect sense. So from the vantage point of achieving real, tangible, long-term results in the world, I think it doesn’t make sense.

    Effectively, the United States now faces a dilemma where either they’ve done this spectacular action to extract Nicolas Maduro, and they leave it at that and simply pretend that they can deal with Delcy Rodriguez and perhaps for a year or two she cuts certain kinds of minor deals with the United States in order to keep them off her back. But effectively nothing changes.

    We’re already seeing headlines as we’re recording this morning that the repression in Venezuela has actually stepped up over the last days, that there’s new rounds of people being rounded up and so on. So nothing is going to get better for people in Venezuela. Perhaps there’ll be some minor deals with the United States that allow the Trump administration to claim some kind of minor victory, but really nothing’s happened.

    Or the next step probably would be something like boots on the ground, which both obviously would be highly risky and could go wrong for the people of Venezuela in a million ways and would be extremely unpopular with the MAGA base because what they don’t want is forever wars. What they don’t want is to risk American treasure and lives to go abroad. So there’s a fundamental dilemma about what’s going to happen next in Venezuela, which makes me very pessimistic.

    Packer: Not just the MAGA base, Yascha, the American people. There’s been absolutely no attempt to convince the public that this is in our national security interest to have troops in Venezuela.

    Mounk: I agree with you, George. I just mean the piece that’s relevant to the deliberations of the White House is probably that it would be unpopular with the MAGA base.

    There’s another logic where I think you can squint and you can start seeing a real modus operandi of the Trump administration. Look, it’s an administration that’s so chaotic and it has such different instincts and there’s different factions. I don’t want to overstate this, but if you look at what Trump did in Iran and what he did in Venezuela, and you extract that line out, you get a kind of coherence to it.

    What you do is you use massive American power for short-term actions that are spectacular, where we wake up and we go, whoa, this just happened. By the time we see it, it’s already over. It allows Trump to claim a great victory. I bombed the Iranian nuclear facilities and they’re obliterated, they’re gone—great media moment, everybody’s talking about it, I look strong. Look at this, Maduro in chains, in Sunset Park, in downtown Manhattan, look at what I did. And then you move on.

    The intelligence analysis seemed to suggest that the bombing of the Iranian nuclear facilities sadly did not lastingly damage the nuclear ambitions, or at least not nearly as much as the Trump administration claimed. Most likely capturing Maduro is not going to do anything for the country of Venezuela. But from a purely domestic political perspective, perhaps that doesn’t matter because Trump looks strong, he’s done something spectacular that nobody else would dare do, and then the topic moves on to whatever he does next week.

    Ripley: I think that’s a pretty good theory and it would be what a reality TV producer would do. You just need to jerk from one high visual to the next. You don’t actually need lasting, enduring change. So that’s an interesting theory.

    Packer: I agree, it makes psychological sense. This is how a malignant narcissist would conduct military actions. The problem for them is, first of all, I don’t think it has wowed and impressed the public so much as confused and maybe even frightened the public. I don’t think if there were instant polling on this, I don’t think it would show the vast majority of Americans behind this the way they were behind the initial invasion of Iraq, because again, there’s been absolutely no attempt to convince the public that Venezuela is any kind of threat to the United States.

    There is now this 25-year history of forever wars, which has made Americans extremely nervous about getting involved in regime change of any kind in other countries. Second, their level of hubris is extraordinary right now. They seem to be on a kind of military violence drug high. That, I think, is very likely to lead them to make serious mistakes. Who knows where it’ll be. Maybe it’ll be in Greenland. Maybe it’ll be against a NATO ally. Maybe it’ll be against a neighbor to the north.

    But I don’t trust that they see it as simply a little bit of a Broadway hit. I think they see it as world historical and as a new era that has left behind all the self-imposed restraints of the post-war decades. Now it’s America unrestrained. What could that lead to? Well, a hell of a lot, because we have a lot of power, more power than we’ve been willing to use because there’s been self-imposed restraints that don’t apply to them. So this is all kinds of ways in which they can overreach.

    Ripley: It’s a good point. And George, to your point, the day—literally Sunday, the day after this happened—there were protests in DC that I saw against it. So that’s very different from Iraq, right? In some ways, a perverse blessing that they didn’t spend a year bamboozling us with a PR campaign to convince us that this was our lifelong enemy, because I don’t think the American people are going to buy it. Of course, I’ve thought that about other things and been wrong. So we’ll see.

    Mounk: Yeah, we’ll see about that. I think most likely people have such strong opinions about Trump that unless he really ends up in a quagmire in Venezuela where suddenly there are tens of thousands of American soldiers in harm’s way, it’s not going to make a big difference to assessments of Trump one way or the other.

    But with the bombing of Iran, I think there was this moment. I remember all of the questions I was getting in media interviews at the time—is the MAGA base going to turn on him because of that and so on? I thought, well, no, if this is it, if he’s just like, hey, I bombed them, look at me, how strong I am, and that’s it, then nobody’s going to be upset with him about it in a few months. Perhaps the same is true in Venezuela, right? They’re going to be able to say, look, we kept this dictator, and then move on, and the fact that people are suffering and that nothing’s gotten better there probably doesn’t matter as much as we would hope to the American public.

    Packer: Can I answer that, Yascha? The MAGA base was a lot stronger six months ago than it is now in terms of its unity. I’m not saying that’s because of the bombing of Iran or because of the extraction of Maduro, but some of the hardcore base has turned against Trump, or at least is asking questions they weren’t asking six months ago.

    I think a lot of it has to do with the sense that he is not holding to his America First mantra, which has been the defining principle of his entire political career. Instead, he seems to be getting distracted by whether it’s Iran, whether it’s Ukraine, whether it’s Venezuela, whether it’s gonna be Greenland next, who knows? So I don’t think he’s as solid with his base as he has been, and I think foreign adventures are the main reason.

    Mounk: That’s interesting. I think it’s one of the reasons. I wouldn’t have put it as the main reason, but it’s interesting that that’s your assessment. I’d have thought there were other strong reasons.

    Let’s talk for a moment about what’s next on foreign policy. Greenland is an interesting thing. It’s something that the administration talked about a lot about a year ago. There are real concerns about it. I wrote an article at the time saying they really might in theory do this—we can’t just dismiss this as trolling, but it would be premature to dismiss this. Then it kind of went quiet for the last five or six months. I haven’t really heard much about it. It felt like one of those things from the fever dream of the first month of the administration when they seemed to be doing everything at once that sort of fell by the wayside.

    Packer: They suddenly talk about it again. Stephen Miller’s wife posted a map of Greenland with American flag colors on Twitter. As these things go, that caused the flurry. Then I think the flurry made the administration think, yeah, we kind of forgot about that. Why do we keep pushing on this?

    Should we take that seriously? Is there a real possibility that before the end of this term, which we still have a little over three years to go, that’s just going to be American troops in Greenland? It wouldn’t be hard to do in military terms. It would be an incredible rupture with America’s historic allies in Europe. And is anybody prepared for that?

    Do we think that leaders in Europe have thought through what on earth happens if tomorrow there’s American troops in Greenland? Are they just hoping this won’t happen? Is the world prepared for the level of crazy that might still be coming down the pike in terms of foreign policy from this administration?

    I think anyone who hasn’t learned the lesson that Trump loves to do what no one thinks he’ll do, that no one thinks anyone would do because it isn’t done, has just not absorbed the lesson of the Trump era. It’s quite possible. Look at the national security strategy, which they made a big deal of and which they seem to have been putting into practice within weeks in Venezuela. It just came out in November.

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    It essentially says this slice of the globe, the Western Hemisphere, is ours. Because we are the strongest power here, we will do what we want for our own interests. Our own interests can be defined so broadly that if there are Russian and Chinese ships in the Arctic Circle, Greenland is essential to our self-defense. They’ve already begun to lay out that argument.

    So I honestly don’t see why we should imagine they won’t do it and we should be prepared for them to do it and prepared for how Europe should respond. Yascha, you know Europe a lot better than I do, but whenever I go there, I have this feeling of, are you still in shock? Haven’t you absorbed this yet? Don’t you see what’s happening? Don’t you understand what he’s trying to do to you?

    The National Security Strategy made it so clear. He hates you. He hates your democracies. He hates your weakness and your dependence on us. If seizing Greenland is a way to push that into your face, the chances are greater that he’ll do it than that he won’t because this is what floats his boat. It’s what makes him tick.

    Europe keeps saying, yes, we must be prepared. We must begin to mount our own collective defense policy. We must increase defense spending. We must. Yet there’s still this shock because it is hard to get over 80 years of history in a couple of months. But that’s where we are. It’s where I think we’ll continue to be.

    Mounk: To be fair, it’s not been a couple of months, it’s been a decade that the Europeans should have and could have grappled with it.

    Ripley: I’m nervous about saying that he hates Europe. I think if we set this up as an existential crisis, it tends to lead to more rash, fear-based decisions. I don’t know that he certainly hates weakness and is quite frightened by his own weakness. That I think we can say for sure.

    He has a lot of impulses, we can say that for sure. He had this impulse in his first term, but it was checked by the people around him who were not there. His impulses change from day to day. I think, and this is easy to say, hard to do, I think the wise response to someone like this is to do the opposite of your first instinct. If Trump is normalizing naked raw power and violence, everyone else has to denormalize it. That includes American politicians, American voters, institutions, and the same goes in Europe. This is very hard to do. But this is the antidote to this kind of behavior.

    If you just meet him in kind, first of all, you can’t succeed because of the asymmetry in power right now. But also, you then are playing the same game and this dynamic never ends as we’ve seen. So I hope that Europe has been preparing for this for a long time and that those relationships are strong enough to act as a collective because that is the only good option here.

    Mounk: I think I agree with you largely, Amanda. I also have a slightly more complicated read of the national security strategy, which I think actually is testament to a political civil war that exists both within the United States and within Europe. It places the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump unsurprisingly on the side of that debate, which in Europe is represented by Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage and the AFD.

    But that debate exists within Europe just as much as it does within the United States. I think one of the things that that strategy made clear is that Europe matters to the Trump administration more than other places because they actually care about it. They think whatever happens in Saudi Arabia, we don’t care. That’s outside of our sphere of influence, but also, we just don’t have any cultural links with Saudi Arabia. Europe is actually our civilizational ally. The problem is that our civilizational ally is destroying itself.

    That’s why we have to care about how they’re governing themselves. That’s why we have to care that all of those moderate governments are screwing up and the only people who are its potential salvation are those forces on the far right. But of course, and I’ve said this in this podcast before, it’s imaginable that in 2029, we’re going to have a G7 in which the European nations are represented by Giorgia Meloni for Italy, who’s already the prime minister, by Jordan Bardella or perhaps Marine Le Pen if she’s allowed to run, who are leading by quite a lot in the polls for the presidency in France, by Nigel Farage, who is leading the polls to be prime minister of the United Kingdom, and then by Gavin Newsom or AOC in the United States.

    Then we’d have, in a way, the same ideological debate just with points reversed. The other point I agree with is that Europe has no alternative other than to try and somehow get through these three years because it’s been so weak for self-imposed reasons, because it still doesn’t have the military strength to defend itself. It’s starting to change that, but it’s not there because it’s economically so weak. Because if you don’t want to be dependent on Washington, realistically right now for Europe, that means being dependent on Moscow and Beijing, and that sure isn’t any better.

    Now, I think all of that goes out of the window if the United States invades Greenland. I do hope that somebody in the administration realizes that. If the United States annexes by force, a complicated territory with a complicated history, but a territory of one of the core European nations—at that point, that is just conflict. You can think about how to get out of high conflict five years down the line.

    But whatever you’re trying to do to get through this period and hope that somebody else can be in office in three years and muddle through and realize that you have to make the relationship with the United States work, because what are the alternatives? The day after there’s American troops in Greenland, that just goes out of the window. I don’t see how you can sustain that at that point.

    Packer: I don’t disagree with anything either of you said. It’s not just true, it’s obvious that Europe itself is divided and that part of the national security strategy was an attempt to enforce, empower one side of that division for these sort of grand civilizational reasons that you’re saying, Yascha. The sense that Europe is committing suicide. They’ve let in all these Muslim refugees. They are abandoning their Christian heritage. They’re allowing wokeness and progressivism to weaken their society, to weaken the state. Yes, all true.

    None of that tells me, though, why Trump wouldn’t follow his instincts to continue to use force, which seems to have succeeded twice in a very short period of time in Iran and in Venezuela.

    Mounk: I agree. I don’t think that’s a reason to preclude that possibility at all, sadly. I want to make sure that in a way we’ve been talking about Trump and the MAGA movement throughout this conversation, that we have just followed the strange new fixed point in editorial calendars, January 6th. It’s the five-year anniversary of the assault on the Capitol.

    I’m struck by the fact that in the first year and the second year after that event, there was a lot of coverage in newspapers on the anniversary, but it had an optimistic bent, not about the event itself, but about the fact that it seemed like the closing chapter of a nightmare that’s now firmly behind us. Of course, looking at it from the vantage points of five years on rather than one or two years on, it seems rather like a prelude to other things to come. Indeed, the people who committed violence on that day are now out of jail because of a presidential pardon. Amanda, what were your reflections on the fifth anniversary of January 6th?

    Ripley: It’s funny, January 6th in a lot of ways is like the pandemic. It’s like this unhealed wound that we have not begun to reckon with in the United States. It keeps coming up in different ways. Some are obvious. When the president pardons 1,600 people who were involved in violence, political violence, it sends a very clear message about what is allowed and what is encouraged. We know that at least 33 of those people have now faced charges for additional crimes since they stormed the Capitol, including one offender who was rearrested for threatening to kill the House minority leader.

    This is not surprising because we know that what motivates political violence is not typically ideology. So Trump being back in office doesn’t solve any of these problems. If you look at the people who have perpetrated acts of violence recently, and I’m talking about everything from the Brown University shootings to the Minnesota assassinations, you see again and again that the perpetrators do not have a consistent ideology, that ideology is the last spark in a chain of fires. Often, unfortunately, violence is the seduction. It’s violent empowerment that is pulling people into these acts. This is very easy to fall into online right now.

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    Again, this brings me back to this point that if you want to stop this, you have got to start denormalizing violence. There are some attempts to do this among politicians, among voters. I don’t think they’re getting enough attention or traction yet that you would need to see. But when polarization and violence becomes a political strategy, as Rachel Kleinfeld says, it takes politicians in part to unravel it. People look to the governors, to politicians. Mayors are a very useful, very important group here to say what’s acceptable. We need to make violence abnormal again in this country. So it’s very hard to do when the president is actively encouraging violence and contempt day after day after day. You are, though, seeing more and more politicians, especially Republicans, but also Democrats, very publicly reject this ideology and resign as a response.

    I think Marjorie Taylor Greene’s comments about polarization, her apology for her role in it, whatever you may think about her, were genuine. This is someone who was rattled to her core and she has faced up something like 700 death threats. She’s worried about her kids. This is when you typically see people defect from high conflict, when they are worried about their kids and when they experience such a shock to their system. That is horrible and it is an opportunity because the more people who stand up and say what she said, the less lonely it is to defect.

    I’ve said a lot of things, but I just want to pause there because I think the anniversary is deeply unsettling this year for many, many reasons. You saw a few dozen of those who had been pardoned on the mall yesterday protesting because, of course, they want more. They want reparations. They want Trump to reveal that the Democrats were behind it all because this kind of thing never ends. This kind of blame seeking and grievance religion. So the only answer to that is to do something quite starkly different. I think there are opportunities for that in a perverse way that there were not a year or two ago.

    Mounk: I want to hear what George has to say about this in one second, but I just want to ask you about one thing that surprised me in what you were saying, Amanda. I think we often have very similar instincts. I certainly welcome that Marjorie Taylor Greene is resigning, is criticizing the Trump administration in some ways. I have real trouble getting myself to be open-minded about her and about the motives behind her action. I just find that she has been such a toxic actor for the last years that in some ways she’s criticizing Trump.

    In some ways, she’s criticizing him from a kind of moderate-ish position. In some ways, she’s criticizing him from a more extreme position on some issues. It’s not clear to me whether she really has decided, you know what, I hate what I’ve become through this conflict, the kind of themes of your book and your work, and perhaps I need to extract myself from this conflict to have a better life. Or whether she’s just setting up a presidential run in 2028 in case people sour on Trump and there’s some weird lane for somebody who’s holier than the Pope in some complicated way.

    I was part of a private political discussion where people were saying, we have to embrace Marjorie Taylor Greene and this is how the coalition splinters. I said, look, if we wanted to vote for some bill before she resigns Congress that does some good in the world, sure, let’s try to get her to vote for that bill. But the idea that we should now embrace Marjorie Taylor Greene of all people just seems so loathsome to me. I’m so profoundly skeptical. Anyway, help me out of this confusion. Then I want to go back to the bigger themes and hear what George has to say on this.

    Ripley: You are correct to feel that way. She has not decided. She is not clear. She’s in a state of confusion and vacillation. That’s what you always see when people attempt to leave high conflict. Most of the time, they go back. So the betting odds are that she will go back to the conflict entrepreneur role that she has long played.

    That said, there is a huge opportunity here not to embrace her. Not to trust her, but to invite her to prove to us that she is a different person. That is gonna take years. That is a long play. But you need people like this to normalize standing up to Trump, to normalize talking about the mistakes they have made in the past. That is very difficult to do. Whatever else you may think about her, what she has done is quite risky and courageous and I promise you, extremely isolating and discombobulating.

    Packer: I’d like to pin a lot of hope on Marjorie Taylor Greene. It seems like waiting years for her to come all the way around from the toxic role she’s played in our politics is maybe something we can’t afford. What I’m thinking is January 6th led to a consensus that lasted three or four news cycles that this was a terrible day in American history, unprecedented, something never to be repeated, and that it was Trump’s fault.

    That consensus began to break down maybe by January 8th. By the end of January, you could just see that the Republican Party was going to fall silent on it and then was going to line up behind Trump, which is what happened. One reason we later learned from reporting was Republicans were afraid. They were afraid of violence. They were afraid of MAGA violence coming after them. Mitt Romney has said that to my colleague at the Atlantic, McKay Coppins.

    So what I see far more than any denormalization of January 6th, is a profound normalization on the side of half of our politics. The entire Republican Party for years has fallen at Trump’s feet. In some ways, not in spite of January 6th, but because of it, because that’s become a rallying cry. It’s become a false cause, a kind of lost cause that justified the most hateful rhetoric of the 2024 campaign and the utter corruption and weaponization of our judicial system in 2025.

    So the long term effect of January 6th has been obviously to deepen polarization and the loudest voices, the ones who get the most attention on it now are not the Liz Cheneys, the Adam Kinzingers, the Jamie Raskins, but instead the right and the Republicans who want to use it as a justification for any abuse of power, including, as Trump just did yesterday on January 6th, sort of threatening to corrupt the upcoming midterms because our elections are totally rigged. He said that to a Republican gathering and he said it on January 6th as a sort of vindication of January 6th and as a threat, I think, that the upcoming elections are going to be no safer from his willingness to break rules and break laws than the last one.

    So to me, January 6th has become a pall that hangs over our entire politics and has, as I think Amanda was suggesting, led to a kind of justification of violence on both sides. Let’s not forget Charlie Kirk. Let’s not forget the attempts on Trump’s life. Yes, usually the shooters do not have a clear ideology. They’re not going to say I’m doing this to avenge January 6th, but it’s in the air. It’s far more thinkable now. It’s far more thinkable than it was. How we purify the air—that’s something I don’t have an answer to as long as one half of our politics is committed to a lie that leads to violence.

    Ripley: Well, it’s interesting because we’ve talked about one threat, which is the normalization of violence and force. But another threat that is just as dangerous is the sense of powerlessness that people have, the sense that this kind of violence is inevitable. I’m glad you asked that because I do want to talk about that. I think that is very dangerous. The way that traditional news outlets cover these things makes most of us feel even more hopeless and powerless.

    So I’ve been spending a lot of time recently at Good Conflict trying to interview people who study violence and political violence in particular to understand how we could cover this differently to give people a fuller picture. Because there’s this weird irony happening—Trump and others are normalizing violence. We are seeing a spike in threats against elected officials, particularly women and people of color and Democrats. We are seeing a chilling effect that is having on both Republicans, as George said, and on Democrats.

    At the same time, America is on track to have the lowest homicide rate since the Flintstones premiered on TV. So we have this very interesting duality where we as a society are getting less violent than we have been in a very long time. That should be cause for huge celebration. I don’t know why I don’t see investigative pieces in The Atlantic and The New York Times every day about how that happened, what it means, what we can learn from it, the outliers on both ends, different states, different cities. That is some interesting stuff right there. We don’t cover it with anywhere near the attention that we cover the hypotheticals in Greenland, for example.

    We are talking about millions of Americans who have not suffered the agony of losing a loved one to murder this year and last year that would have otherwise been if we’d stayed where we were. So that’s a very big deal. When it comes to helping cover the acts of violence that are real and important—just January 5th, Vice President Vance said that someone had tried to break into his home in Ohio by hammering on the windows. This is real.

    We have these two things happening at the same time. Homicide is way down and political and targeted violence and anti-Semitism are way up. How do we cover it? Well, one thing that Bill Braniff, who works on this issue of terrorism and extremism told me is that every time we cover these acts of political violence or school shootings, we should incomplete thought

    Mounk: Amanda, that’s a question that in many ways you’re well positioned to answer. You’ve studied all kinds of conflicts in small personal contexts, but also in big political contexts that seemed completely intractable and where there was a real reduction in that. Of course, we’ve gone through that in American history. We had a civil war and after that, the union came back together in some kind of way. 1968 felt like the country might be falling apart. Then in the years after that, there was a lowering of political temperature.

    What would have to happen in the air, as George puts it, or in the constellation for us to step down from the high conflict that we’re engaged in at the moment? I imagine one precondition is probably Donald Trump leaving the political scene. But what beyond that do you think it would take?

    Ripley: Point out what the risk factors are because we know a lot now about these shooters. We know quite a bit and one thing we know is they almost always, especially school shooters, tell someone about what they’re gonna do. They almost always are people who have recently experienced a loss of status. Maybe they lost a job, maybe they’re being bullied. They almost always are socially isolated.

    Maybe they don’t have a relationship with a caring adult. Very often, increasingly, they have found dark corners on the internet, which by the way, any young boy can find in under 10 minutes, that glorify previous perpetrators. We have deep fakes that have previous school shooters doing things they didn’t even do that are creating a kind of environment called the true crime community where you have people admiring and glorifying this behavior, right?

    So there’s lots of opportunities here for AI regulation and other things that could happen. But in the meantime, it is very important that the public knows this. If someone you know and care about is talking about doing harm to themselves or others, you need to ask them some caring questions. You need to ask what they have in mind. You are not overreacting.

    It really matters if you do this. We have a lot of evidence now that you can interrupt this behavior. What people need most of all is to feel like someone gives a shit about them. Especially the men, and it’s mostly men perpetrating these acts. Doesn’t make it okay, I’m not excusing it, but I am saying there are things that all of us need to know about how to interrupt this.

    In the meantime, we need to focus on the politicians who are not doing what Trump is doing, including Republicans. There’s something called the Oklahoma City Declaration, which was written by Oklahoma City Mayor David Holt shortly after Charlie Kirk’s murder. 230 mayors have signed this thing, 41 states in Puerto Rico. This is a pledge that vows to condemn political violence in any form, to use restraint on social media, to refrain from dehumanizing other Americans or referring to them as evil or enemies, and to resist apocalyptic rhetoric. It is not perfect, but it is quite impressive. It is something that he has worked on. He and others, including many Democrats, are working to try to normalize the opposite of what Trump is doing. The National Governors Association, same thing. It’s not an accident that it is led by Oklahoma governor, Republican governor, Stitt. Oklahoma has muscle memory for political violence, being the site of the worst act of domestic terrorism in American history. So Utah is another interesting place to watch. There is a lot happening at the mayor and governor level. It is not happening in Congress, unfortunately, yet. But they are offering us a path.

    Packer: Amanda, that’s all incredibly inspiring and good. I really appreciate your bringing that to our listeners’ attention. So my question is, is it too late for Trump? Is there someone who can let him know that they give a shit about him before he attacks Greenland? Can we stop this next act of violence from happening before it’s too late? What do we have to do? Or is it too late?

    Ripley: Someone needs to hug that man right away. It’s an emergency.

    Mounk: I think that’s about 60 years too late.

    In the rest of this conversation, Amanda, George, and Yascha discuss predictions for 2026, from the upcoming midterms to the future of the Democrats. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    54 min
  • Here’s Why the Iranian Regime Seems Invincible
    A regime billboard in downtown Tehran on January 6, 2026. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    Over the past few decades, Iranians’ protests against the Islamic Republic have become a regular sight—bursts of defiance that light up the streets, fill the air with hope, and then fade away only to become a fire beneath ashes. Each protest seems bigger, braver, and more hopeful. Yet each time, the system endures.

    Still, hope doesn’t die. You can hear it in every conversation and encrypted message coming out of Iran: people still believe change is possible.

    Recent protests—ongoing since December 28—were sparked by a long-brewing economic crisis, particularly the collapsing Iranian rial and soaring inflation. They began with shopkeepers protesting in Tehran, but have since spread to a majority of provinces. Unlike earlier protest movements that were often confined to the middle class, the current round cuts across class divisions, involving people from diverse economic and ethnic backgrounds.

    Yet the way the government responded has remained the same. So far, over 30 protesters are reported to have been killed, and thousands more have been arrested. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said that “rioters should be put in their place,” and has vowed not to “yield to the enemy.”

    When the wave of Iranian student protests erupted in July 1999, I was thirteen years old. I kept hearing the same phrase over and over again from adults whispering around me: “Six more months. This regime has six months left.”

    I’ve heard that sentence repeated for more than two decades. And, despite the recent images rocking the country, the question remains: Why do the next six months never arrive?

    It’s not that Iranians lack the will, courage, or desire for change. People have protested, sacrificed, and died. Yet no uprising has delivered lasting structural change.

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    Some Iranians I have spoken to inside the country hope for outside intervention. “We need help, and we’ll take it from anyone,” several have told me. For people who face the oppression machine daily, it feels impossible to change the system from within. A regime born of revolution was built to survive any revolt.

    Trump’s recent threats—“If Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters … the United States of America will come to their rescue”—along with the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces, have reignited hope among many desperate Iranians who are willing to endure anything if it means the end of the Islamic Republic.

    But the Islamic Republic is exceptionally difficult to bring down for three main reasons: Its complicated structure of power, the leaderless nature of resistance, and the outside world’s quiet interest in maintaining the status quo.

    Unlike most countries, Iran operates as a web of power with, effectively, two governments stacked on top of one another: the elected layer that handles daily administration, and the unelected layer that holds real power. At the top sits Khamenei, who controls the military, intelligence, judiciary, and media, and can block any government decision. The Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts—88 clerics whose candidates are pre-approved by the Guardian Council, which also vets all elections. Enforcing this system is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel military answering directly to the Supreme Leader, which is in charge of businesses, intelligence operations, and protest suppression.

    The Islamic Republic is not a pyramid of power; it’s a maze. Every corridor looks like an exit until it loops back to the same center. The design isn’t accidental; it’s survival architecture.

    “Everyone in Iran works for the IRGC,” a young friend told me. “When I buy booze from the black market—do you know who sells it to me? The IRGC. To stay alive here, you have to feed the dragon.”

    In this closed system, even if someone kidnapped the Supreme Leader, the system itself could very well remain intact.

    Another reason the system survives is fear. Over the decades, the Islamic Republic has created a class of people who benefit from the regime, and another class who enforce it. They understand that if the system collapses, they will be the first to face arrest and trial—or worse, execution—while the more powerful figures escape abroad. That’s why the closer collapse is, the harder the regime lashes out—not because it feels confident, but because it feels cornered.

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    So when people protest, police and militias respond violently, making mass arrests without accountability. People disappear. Courts deliver harsh punishments—prison or execution—without any due process. State media reframes events as the work of foreign enemies.

    In this climate, anyone who emerges as a leader is arrested or killed quickly. But leaderless movements cannot negotiate or take power, and living under constant fear, no one is willing to step forward. Leaderless protests are brave, but fragile. They flare up and fade because there’s no safe structure to sustain them.

    Lack of a charismatic figure to unite the country has created a vacuum, leaving only one visible figure: Iran’s exiled prince, Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah. Many Iranians I’ve spoken to inside Iran consider him the only plausible option. This is evident in chants coming out of the recent protests, such as: “This is the final battle, Pahlavi will return,” and “Reza Shah, God bless your soul.” Older generations associate Pahlavi with the stability and prosperity they once knew; younger ones see him as a unifying figure.

    I asked a young friend in Isfahan whether she and her friends were considering Pahlavi as a leader. “We might not like him, but do we have any alternative?” she said. “There is no organized opposition at this moment, only the possibility of building one. And building one requires parties, platforms, legitimacy, and time. Refusing to support Pahlavi means supporting the Islamic Republic.” The strongest opposition to Pahlavi, meanwhile, often comes from the diaspora, who see him as both a step backward and a potential puppet of Western interests.

    It’s understandable that many Iranians find it difficult to trust outsiders or foreign countries, given the country’s history. Over the past 47 years, global powers have used Iran as leverage. Neighbors profit from instability and fluctuations in the oil market. Outside pressure rarely aims to end the system—it seeks to manage it. A weakened Iran is useful to the world; a free one is unpredictable.

    An uncle told me, “They say America will come and steal our oil. Let them. The Islamic Republic is stealing our lives every day.”

    He wasn’t making an argument for foreign intervention. He was expressing exhaustion. When survival becomes a daily battle, the question shifts from who is exploiting us to who is suffocating us. It becomes a hard philosophical question: Which loss feels more bearable—the loss of resources, or the loss of life itself?

    Political futures are impossible to forecast. A sudden intervention, a miraculous fall, or a clean transition are all unlikely. But change is inevitable. Generational shifts—and millions of quiet refusals—create cracks. We’ve already seen this happen with decades of resistance, and with the recent Woman, Life, Freedom movement launched in 2022, when the regime quietly loosened its grip on mandatory hijab enforcement.

    Toppling the regime isn’t about bravery or numbers. Nor is it simply about outside intervention. It’s about understanding the kind of system you’re fighting against.

    And so I still hear it, the same phrase that followed me through childhood: “Six more months. This regime has six months left.” The timing has been wrong so far, but the spirit behind it remains unbroken.

    The author of this article is an Iranian who wishes to remain anonymous.

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    0 min
  • Greedy Eyes On Greenland
    Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen on January 6, 2026. (Photo by Yoan Valat/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The U.S. intervention in Venezuela has prompted a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe, aimed at dissuading the Trump administration from acquiring Greenland, as it has repeatedly threatened to do in recent days. Should that happen, “everything stops,” including NATO, warned Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen.

    Given the administration’s disconcerting consistency on the subject, the ringing of alarm bells is fully justified. For arsonists in the administration—such as Stephen Miller, who argued that Greenland should “obviously” become a part of the United States—to abandon the idea, it will take much more than sweet talk and reminders of the usefulness of Denmark as a U.S. ally.

    European countries must start thinking about ways they may inflict pain on the United States should it commit an act of aggression against one of their own—and they should start articulating these actions explicitly to the United States, very much in the spirit of Trump’s own doctrine of “Fuck Around And Find Out.”

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    Alas, for some in Washington, the prospect of NATO’s end is akin to threatening them with a good time. Yet it is hard to imagine U.S. sales of military equipment to European countries would continue unabated if the United States is revealed to be not only an unreliable ally (which it already is) but also a direct threat to the sovereignty of European countries. And good luck to the United States attempting to project power in the Middle East without its bases in Germany, Italy, and Greece.

    The United States and Europe also have the deepest trade and investment relationship in the world. The United States holds almost $4 trillion worth of business assets in the EU. European businesses underwrite millions of jobs in the United States. Europeans should signal a willingness to drastically curtail such ties, even at substantial economic cost to themselves. U.S. tech giants have already been playing fast and loose with EU rules governing large platforms; if the United States becomes a threat to European territorial integrity, it is unthinkable that such companies—given the thin wall separating them from political power in Washington—could be allowed to operate in the EU.

    A further step would be the sanctions lists. Travel bans and asset freezes would have to be imposed on key administration figures as well as on its financial backers. Currently, Europe welcomes millions of ordinary Americans as tourists every year. Could it afford to do this during a confrontation with the United States? Would it want to?

    Even though this scenario sounds extreme, the point of articulating it explicitly is to make it clear that there would be large costs for the United States if the Trump administration pressed ahead with its plans for Greenland. If the risks seem limited—and if Trump continues to consider European leaders as weaklings—he might give his demented project a shot.

    The danger rises as Trump becomes weaker domestically. The most compelling reading of the stunt in Venezuela is unrelated to any strategic considerations—as highlighted by the fact that the administration had little in terms of a plan for the day after Maduro’s removal. The operation, however, has been a success in moving the domestic political conversation away from the Epstein files, the creeping stagflation and vulnerabilities presented by the current AI-driven economic growth, and the emerging cracks in the Republican coalition, which have been on full display in recent elections in Virginia and New Jersey. As Axios reported, even congressional Democrats had misgivings about criticizing the president.

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    If Trump’s position weakens again in the coming months, ever-riskier international stunts might become a way of managing his coalition and avoiding relegation to a permanent lame-duck status. And given the awesome power of the United States, Trump has real cards to play in the international domain. The EU must learn how to stand up for its own interests when threatened.

    The idea that, in response to U.S. threats, it is incumbent on Europe to “propose to Trump something that addresses the security concerns related to Greenland,” ideally dispatching Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni and Finnish president Alex Stubb, as some Atlanticists suggest, is indicative of a Stockholm Syndrome-like mentality, which brought Europe into its current predicament in the first place. Like all bullies, Trump responds to force. Alas, Europeans have invariably responded to his antics with appeasement and accommodation.

    While obviously cartoonish and frivolous, the U.S. threat to Greenland is in some ways a more acute problem than Russia’s war against Ukraine. One could make the argument, implausible as it is, that Putin’s ambitions stop at Ukraine and that his regime harbors no ill will against EU member states. The United States is, on the other hand, making a direct threat against Denmark. Neutralizing that threat—with a credible commitment to impose painful countermeasures—is a basic, necessary condition for the bloc’s survival as a geopolitical force of any relevance.

    None of this is to predict that Greenland’s annexation will materialize or that transatlantic relations must enter a period of deep freeze, akin to excising Russia from the Western economic space. Yet, even if Trump moves on and the current threat passes, Europeans must think about their economic and other vulnerabilities—not only toward China and Russia but also toward the United States. Washington already is an unreliable ally. It has walked away from the cause of helping Ukraine in its war and the prospect of it honoring its Article 5 commitments of mutual defense is slim.

    The Trump administration’s recent National Security Strategy sees the EU’s disintegration as a core U.S. interest—not containing and deterring Russia, not forging a deep economic partnership with Europeans to limit China’s role in the global economy, but rather U.S. endorsement of ethnocentric and nationalist forces in European elections. It is a fundamental category error to see this approach as “transactional” and to look for ways of appeasing Trump. This administration’s view of the world is gangster-like and colonialist. Europe’s choice is to either succumb to it or to stand up for its core interests.

    Besides dissuading a U.S. annexation of Greenland, Europe must underwrite Ukraine’s victory, build up its own defense-industrial base instead of purchasing U.S. systems, and take bold action on U.S.-supplied algorithmic content in its own public square. It must also abandon the illusion that deep economic, trade, and investment ties are a guarantee of a good and constructive transatlantic relationship. There will be a time to rebuild and repair the damage that is being inflicted on the alliance between Europe and the United States. That time, unfortunately, is not now.

    Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC and a contributing editor with American Purpose.

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    0 min
  • Finally, A Taiwanese President Who Will Stand Up To China
    Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te inspecting troops. (Photo by I-Hwa Cheng/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    For a staggering $15 million, a Taiwanese special forces pilot planned to defect by flying his CH-47 Chinook helicopter to a nearby Chinese aircraft carrier in a heinous act of treason designed to shatter the morale of the island’s military. Elsewhere, junior officers were blackmailed into filming propaganda videos, pledging to surrender to the People’s Liberation Army. These audacious plots, which took place in the past few years, are not isolated incidents. They are a narrow window into the vast, deeply entrenched network of espionage that Beijing has built in Taiwan for decades.

    Until recently, Taiwan’s response to this shadow invasion has been lackluster and inadequate. But under President Lai Ching-te, that has changed. Lai took office in the face of unprecedented hostility from Beijing and intractable political division at home. Undeterred, President Lai has initiated a bold counteroffensive, bringing the shadowy conflict into the light. He is confronting a threat that has metastasized deep within the nation’s most important institutions. Taiwan’s democracy may very well hinge on Lai’s ability to enlist his countrymen in this fight.

    His efforts have been refreshingly robust. Last year, in a landmark move, his administration officially designated the People’s Republic of China a “foreign hostile force,” and announced a sweeping 17-point national security initiative. This comprehensive strategy is designed to address five key vectors of attack: challenges to national sovereignty, military infiltration, the erosion of national identity, the subversion of civil society through “united front” operations, and the siren song of economic dependency schemes.

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    Lai’s plan crucially targets the epicenter of Beijing’s efforts to infiltrate Taiwan—the military. The Taiwanese armed forces constitute an astounding two-thirds of those accused in recent espionage cases. To address this, Lai’s plan reinstates military courts for active-duty personnel accused of espionage or treason. In the face of an active campaign to subvert the military from within, faster, more specialized, and more severe judicial consequences are a critical deterrent.

    Lai’s approach is already bearing fruit. In 2024, espionage-related indictments surged to 64, more than the previous two years combined. Taiwan’s revitalized security agencies are finally equipped and empowered to hunt down the threats that have been allowed to fester for years. The dismantling of the 10-person ring plotting the helicopter defection, a network using encrypted apps like Telegram and cryptocurrency payments to avoid detection, was a masterclass in modern counterintelligence. Beijing intended to demoralize Taiwan’s military and its people, sapping their will to resist. Instead, the severe prison sentences handed down, some exceeding 13 years, sent a clear message: The age of impunity is over.

    Lai’s resolve is further demonstrated by his willingness to pursue these threats to the highest levels, regardless of political affiliation. Investigations have exposed spies within the Presidential Office security detail and, in a politically charged move, led to the indictment of former officials affiliated with Lai’s own Democratic Progressive Party. This demonstrates a commitment to national security that transcends partisan politics, proving the fight is about protecting Taiwan, not consolidating power.

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    This work is made thornier by Taiwan’s fractious domestic politics. Lai is fighting a war on two fronts: one against Beijing’s spies, and another against political inertia and obstruction at home. He has called for a “whole-of-society” response, but a significant part of that society, led by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), remains unwilling to even name the threat. This deep political polarization is Beijing’s most powerful weapon. It paralyzes policymaking and fosters a dangerous complacency among a public that wishes to believe the status quo is stable. According to 2024 polling, 60% of Taiwanese favor maintaining the status quo indefinitely or for the near future. Lai’s crusade is built on the recognition that Beijing is actively working to make that status quo impossible to maintain. Lai must convince his people that the house is already on fire, or Beijing will succeed in burning it down.

    The failure of a citizen-led effort to recall 24 “pro-China” KMT politicians in July 2025 was a sobering reminder of this challenge. For many voters, abstract warnings about infiltration are drowned out by immediate concerns over the economy and cost of living—the very vulnerabilities that Chinese recruiters so skillfully exploit.

    Lai is leading a nation that must defend itself with one hand tied behind its back. He is asking an open society to confront a closed, authoritarian regime that weaponizes that very openness. Lai is not just defending an island; he is defending the frontline of democracy. If he succeeds, he will preserve Taiwan’s right to determine its own future and, in the process, offer a blueprint for free nations everywhere to defeat the corrosive influence of authoritarianism.

    Shahn Louis is the founder of Anansi Strategic Intelligence LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk firm. A former senior intelligence analyst with experience across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, he specializes in China analysis and East Asian regional dynamics.

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    0 min
  • We Already Know Who’s Winning the MAGA Civil War
    Nick Fuentes at a rally in 2024. (Photo by Dominic Gwinn via Getty Images.)

    It has been five years since those pictures of American “patriots” storming the Halls of Congress to stop the peaceful transfer of power first made their way into our social media feeds. Since then, January 6 has become a peculiar anniversary of infamy, and a constant fixture in editorial calendars.

    In the first years after 2021, that anniversary coverage had a celebratory undercurrent: somber though the occasion was, there was an assumption that it marked the end of a scary chapter in American history. Now, that assumption is—like so many others we have been too slow to discard over the past decade—starting to look hopelessly naive.

    Those who stormed the Capitol five years ago are now free thanks to a presidential pardon. And the most extreme voices on the right are in the ascendant, with a civil war about its future direction brewing between the radical and the even more radical wings of the MAGA movement. So to mark the fifth anniversary of January 6, we are honored to publish Damon Linker, a frequent contributor to our pages who has written a masterful, and frightening, essay on the future trajectory of the American right.

    Thanks for reading, today and always,

    —Yascha

    2025 was a hell of a year for American politics.

    It began with liberals and progressives feeling stunned and stupefied by the scope of Donald Trump’s victory the previous November, as well as by the subsequent “vibe shift” in the culture that seemed to portend reversals on multiple fronts for the hopes and aspirations of everyone found even a millimeter to the left of Trump. His second administration hit the ground sprinting, moving to assert presidential power over both the executive branch and the other two branches of the federal government with an eye to pursuing a range of unorthodox (hard right) policies on immigration, trade, regulations, foreign affairs, and public health.

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    The year ended with Trump’s political opposition feeling rejuvenated. Democrats did quite well in special elections, and they ran the tables in November’s off-year vote, giving them a head of steam as they head toward this year’s midterms. Trump’s approval ratings, meanwhile, have softened to the 30s. The result is a more upbeat mood on the center left than what prevailed a year ago. Ezra Klein of The New York Times gave voice to this change in conventional wisdom, as he so often does, by pronouncing in a recent column, “The Trump Vibe Shift Is Dead.”

    I’m allergic to this kind of happy talk. My judgment tells me nothing fundamental has changed for the better over the course of a year. On the contrary, I think our political culture is trending downward into a deepening pit of populist demagoguery shot through with new (if ominously familiar) forms of ugliness.

    Here is where I think we are, a little less than a quarter into the second Trump administration: We are firmly into a reflexively anti-establishment era of politics in which whichever party wins power in any given election will be relatively easily defeated in the following election. Democrats today can take comfort in this, because it implies they should be able to win the midterms and possibly also the presidency in 2028. But that is short-sighted, because it means that even if they do win in 2028, Republicans will be in a strong position to defeat them in the 2030 midterms and the 2032 presidential election.

    In other words, Republicans are highly likely to keep winning elections, no matter how radical they become.

    That points to the second dimension of where we are: The Republican Party is continuing to radicalize. This is probably the most disturbing political development of last year. For much of the past decade, people have been assuming Trump is some kind of pathological anomaly in our politics. Yes, many finally came around, after the 2024 election, to grudgingly acknowledge his talent for mobilizing otherwise disengaged voters. But the comforting conclusion most unwisely draw is that the political passions Trump has ignited will vanish as soon as he departs the scene, which, as a 79-year-old man, he inevitably will before long.

    This tendency to trace everything that’s happened in the GOP back to the distinctive charismatic appeal of Trump himself implies that his opponents, within both parties, can just wait him out. For many of the analysts who stake out this view, the fact that the MAGA right has increasingly succumbed to internecine squabbling in recent months confirms it.

    I think this is quite wrong. For one thing, it ignores the broader context in which right-populist personalities and parties continue to gain in electoral appeal around the democratic world. By 2029, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany could be led by such personalities and parties.

    Then there’s the fact that, within the American context, the cheery view attributes too much power to Trump. Yes, he has distinctive talents that Vice President JD Vance and others lack, but he gained traction with those talents because he was better at doing something others on the right had been attempting for years and even decades. From Pat Buchanan’s surprisingly potent challenge to George H.W. Bush in the Republican primaries of 1992, to Sarah Palin’s ability to whip up the right-wing crowds in 2008, to the grassroots Tea Party movement, to the succession of fire-breathing populist candidates who temporarily surged into the lead during the 2012 primaries, the Republican electorate lacked someone capable of fully breaking the hold of the non-populist leadership of the party. Trump accomplished this in waves, first in 2016, then again in the aftermath of January 6, 2021—five years ago today—and finally with his decisive victory in 2024.

    Which means that the destruction of the old order is behind us. It has been accomplished. Trump’s unique skills will no longer be as needed as they have been up to now.

    What we’re seeing with the recent surge of infighting among MAGA “influencers” is a battle for leadership within the post-Trump right. Will the winner be the old-guard “true conservative” faction? Or will it be harder-edged figures who combine an embrace of nativism and protectionism with a commitment to spreading extreme and often delusional conspiracy theories?

    The old, pre-Trump model of electoral politics on the right, from William F. Buckley’s National Review on down through the Reagan and Bush administrations, and then through the McCain and Romney campaigns, involved the first, more institutionalist group mobilizing the more populist second group for the sake of winning elections, after which the first group would run the show, throwing occasional policy scraps in the direction of the second group to keep its members minimally on side. When a prominent member of the second group got too rowdy, too demanding, too racist, too bigoted, or too conspiratorial, the first group would play the role of gatekeepers, policing the boundaries of acceptable speech and excommunicating key figures.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    But that model of coalition management doesn’t work anymore, because social media has created vast mobilized networks of the radicalized. This has shown that these right-wing dissenters vastly outnumber those who support responsible governance from the center right.

    If you want to understand this new reality, pay attention to the feud between online media personalities such as Ben Shapiro and Mark Levin—along with politicians such as Texas Senator Ted Cruz—on one side, and more extreme personalities and podcasters such as Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, and the ethno-nationalist Nick Fuentes on the other. Shapiro, in particular, has made headlines lately with his broadsides against the unhinged anti-Semitism of the populist rabblerousers. This has convinced some people that the right is descending into a civil war. But if it is, it’s a terribly lopsided one. For one thing, Shapiro originally hired Owens at The Daily Wire, thereby helping to launch her career into the stratosphere.

    But does Shapiro have the power even to attempt the kill? His podcast currently sits in the mid 40s in Spotify’s rankings. His ideological allies Levin and Cruz, meanwhile, don’t even crack the top 100. And Owens and Carlson? Both are regularly found in the middle of the top 10. And that doesn’t even count Fuentes’ fulminations, which take place off the grid of official rankings. His Twitter/X account is followed by 1.2 million people and his video podcast episodes are regularly viewed more than a million times each on Rumble.

    Some older figures on the right have placed their faith in JD Vance as a bulwark against the anti-Semitic throngs. As Trump’s heir apparent to lead the Republican Party into 2028, Vance will have to decide whether and how to draw lines between views that will be accepted and promoted within the GOP and those that will be expunged. Many on the right long for Vance to take a firm stand against Fuentes and his followers. But will he?

    So far, there’s no sign of it. And yes, that includes in the recent UnHerd interview, in which Vance told Fuentes (in the debased public rhetoric favored by populists) to “eat shit.” The vice president made clear that his rightward volley was provoked, not by any of Fuentes’ political views, but by him insulting Vance’s (South Asian) wife. “Anyone who attacks my wife,” Vance declared, will be attacked in turn, “whether their name is Jen Psaki or Nick Fuentes.”

    That’s right: the sitting vice president of the United States made clear he was equally inclined to rise up in defensive anger against a former White House press secretary from the mainstream opposition party and a man who regularly proclaims his admiration for Adolf Hitler and loathing for Jews.

    I’m afraid anyone placing their hopes in Vance serving in the role of gatekeeper or force for moderation is going to be sorely disappointed. He’s much more likely to serve as an enabler for the radical right. That’s because Vance understands the truth of the Republican Party’s electoral situation. It needs Fuentes’ rabid fanbase as part of its coalition. This doesn’t mean the GOP is on the cusp of becoming an outright Nazi party. But it does mean that it is going to welcome and accommodate Nazis as one important faction within itself—and Vance is going to oversee and encourage that ongoing ideological evolution.

    Sounds pretty gloomy!

    I know it does. But keep in mind that my analysis includes a prediction about a radicalizing Republican Party remaining not only politically viable but also politically vulnerable. Democrats will still sometimes win control of Congress and the presidency—and every time they do, they will get a chance to win back squandered trust and thereby prove themselves worthy of winning again.

    That’s a path that just might put us on a different trajectory as a country, away from recurring cycles of recrimination toward a more stable governing consensus. In the best of circumstances, such a consensus could even begin to serve as a firmer foundation for a new ideological equilibrium in which the extremes once again find themselves excluded from influence and power.

    I’m not sure it will happen, let alone when. But this is what would need to happen for the turbulence of the political present to fade, giving way to a new era of stability and effective, humane self-governance.

    Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

    A version of this article was originally published at Notes from the Middleground.

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  • Venezuela’s New President Is No Moderate
    Delcy Rodriguez in June 2025. (Photo by Pedro Mattey / AFP via Getty Images.)

    About a month ago, as America’s military presence in the Caribbean ramped up, The New York Times ran a feature on the figures that could imaginably step into the presidency in Nicolás Maduro’s absence. One heading was titled “The Moderate: Delcy Rodríguez, Vice President.”

    Venezuelan Twitter erupted.

    The moderate? Delcy?!?

    Have they lost their minds!?

    One after another, Venezuelans lined up to share instances of her awfulness: her tireless whitewashing of the regime’s crimes, the international sanctions she was under, her leadership of the sham constitutional convention Maduro had used to void the opposition’s win in parliamentary elections in 2017, and especially the close links she’s reputed to have with SEBIN, the hated secret police behind Venezuela’s most notorious political prison and torture center.

    To Venezuelans who had spent over a decade seeing in her one of Nicolás Maduro’s most ardent and uncompromising acolytes, calling her a “moderate” is an outrage. Here’s a woman who has held all of the most important offices of state—oil minister, minister of foreign affairs, president of the constituent assembly, vice president—and has never allowed any hint of sunlight to appear between her and Maduro.

    Earlier today, Delcy Rodríguez became the new president of Venezuela.

    Venezuelans know leftist fanaticism runs in Delcy’s family. Her brother Jorge has been one of the government’s highest-ranking and most toxic leaders for even longer than she has: a uniquely manipulative figure who’s earned a leading spot in the demonology of the Venezuelan opposition.

    Meanwhile, their father, Jorge Rodríguez Sr., is a martyr for the Venezuelan far left. Back in 1973, he founded perhaps the most extreme party in the constellation of far-left groups that soaked Venezuela in blood. The Liga Socialista was a tiny, explicitly pro-Cuban splinter from a larger (but still small) Marxist group that rejected the peace process that had ended Venezuela’s short-lived guerrilla war of the 1960s. Rejecting the Soviet Union’s leadership of international communism, these were die-hards committed to violent revolution across the developing world now, not later.

    In 1976, along with a small number of Liga Socialista activists, Delcy’s father masterminded the kidnapping of William Niehous, an American executive working for Owens-Illinois, the bottle manufacturer. Picked up by Venezuela’s then U.S.-aligned police, Jorge Sr. died under torture, but never gave up the whereabouts of the kidnapped gringo. Delcy and her brother have described witnessing her father’s appalling treatment, and she once described the Bolivarian revolution as “our personal revenge” for the human rights violations leftists suffered in that era.

    Passing from Nicolás Maduro to Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s presidency has just gone from one former Liga Socialista activist to another. That this out-and-out pro-Cuban extremist somehow managed to persuade the gringos that she’s a technocratic moderate they can do business with is one of the strangest twists of the bizarre 72 hours Venezuela has just lived through, which saw the United States kidnap Maduro and his wife and fly them to New York to face trial. That Marco Rubio—a Cuban-American Secretary of State with as clear an understanding as anyone of the toxic role Cuba has played in backstopping Venezuelan socialism—decided to play ball with Delcy is honestly just inexplicable.

    And yet there is a reason foreign journalists perceive Delcy as “moderate.” Reports keep saying she shows a different face when negotiating on behalf of the regime: affable, technocratic, reasonable. Fluent in English and French, she’s said to have a mastery of the details of energy and economic policy that always eluded Maduro. A former foreign minister, she appears well able to at least ape the conventions of normal international negotiations. People who deal with her one-on-one tend to come away impressed with her manner. Certainly, compared with the unembarrassed sadism of other senior regime figures like Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino, she is at least circumspect enough not to gloat over the violence she inflicts.

    In pure realpolitik terms, then, there’s a certain twisted logic to the United States’ decision to leave her in place. Donald Trump is undoubtedly right when he says she commands respect among the armed men who administer violence in Venezuela in a way an actual moderate never could—because she’s one of them. Given that Trump does not seem willing to really countenance a full-on invasion leading to an actual change of government, leaving the chavista regime intact follows as a matter of course. From the profoundly unappetizing menu of senior regime figures, you could, if you squint, see Delcy as marginally less horrible than the rest. Marginally.

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    Still, it’s difficult to express how deeply betrayed Venezuela’s democratic movement will feel seeing the United States actively backing a figure as toxic as Delcy Rodríguez as the head of the Venezuelan state. She may agree to do the kinds of imperialist oil deals Trump and Rubio have already plainly spelled out they will demand as the price of leaving her and the gaggle of criminals around her in power.

    But leaving Delcy in charge of Venezuela is not regime change, because she’s an emblem of the regime. It’s not even a relaxation of dictatorial conditions, because the hundreds of Venezuelans who have been languishing in Maduro’s prisons and torture chambers will just keep languishing in Delcy’s.

    Three weeks ago, I mused that the emergence of a democratic state following U.S. military action is unlikely. A more realistic outcome would see Venezuela “in the hands of a right-wing dictator who pushes out Maduro and his clique, inherits the chavista state, and changes only the slogans.” In the event, what we’re going to be stuck with is even more absurd: a left-wing dictator drawn from Maduro’s own clique who won’t even change the slogans, just cut some energy deals to make Donald Trump’s cronies in the oil industry rich.

    The prospect of Delcy Rodríguez teaming up with Trump to loot Venezuela’s fossil fuel resources makes me sick to my stomach. I’ve known all along the outcome would be bad. I didn’t think it would be this bad.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion and the founder of Caracas Chronicles. Like eight million other Venezuelans, he was forced to flee Venezuela’s dictatorship.

    Due to an editorial error, an earlier version of this piece stated that Delcy Rodríguez was appointed to head the constitutional convention in 2024, not 2017. We regret the error.

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