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As that bon vivant Eustace Tilley might have put it, The New Yorker was recently spotted in an unlikely locale—on Substack. In a jaunty little note, the storied magazine declared, “Yep, we’re on Substack toö. Your favorite hundred year-old magazine is crashing the party.” And the reaction on the platform was… a bit different from what might have been expected. “Oh FUCK OFF please,” wrote one user in a comment that was liked over 100 times. “Who actually reads and enjoys this?” wrote another. “More and more the NYer feels like an artifact, no longer relevant to our time,” wrote The Literarian Gazette. “They’re not even sure what they do anymore,” wrote the essayist Jacob Savage.
The problem, really, was about register—and seemed to be entirely lost on The New Yorker. It was exactly as if your mother, who had abandoned you as a child to run off with the general manager of a golf club, had now returned to the neighborhood and wanted to be your best friend. The New Yorker—it’s absolutely true—is just about everybody’s favorite hundred-year-old magazine. It has a reputation for combining fun and sophistication that is unparalleled, and the magazine inspires a certain loyalty that is unimaginable in virtually any other publication. Ben Yagoda, in his magisterial history About Town: The New Yorker and the World It Made, opens with the anecdote of a nurse speaking to a dying soldier at the end of World War II and discovering that what he really wanted to talk about, most of all, was The New Yorker. That example, if extreme, is representative. In over seven hundred responses Yagoda received from a survey, the overwhelming sensibility was that The New Yorker was part of the deep structure of everybody’s intellectual life—respondents decorated their houses in New Yorker covers, spent decades trying to win the caption contest, described themselves as being “nourished” by The New Yorker or having their sense of humor “created” by The New Yorker.
And at 100, The New Yorker is barely showing its age. It is venerable, storied, indestructible, but has the same saucy tone of your very brightest child about to put on a living room extravaganza. Which is exactly the problem.
The New Yorker didn’t have quite the effortless path to success that everybody sort of assumes it did. It was founded, as Yagoda writes, “on champagne vapor”—an offshoot of the Algonquin Round Table, with the seed capital put up by the editor’s poker buddy and, for a while, it was, by all accounts, terrible. The blog My Life 100 Years Ago helpfully reads through the first issue—the racist cartoons, the sophomoric jokes—and, out of many candidates, settles on the following line as the single most boring from the gossip section: “Jerome (‘Jerry’) D. Kern was in town one day buying some second-hand books.” The kind of permanent souvenir of that time is the image of “Eustace Tilley,” the fictional monocled dandy who has been the logo of The New Yorker from that day to this. Tilley was meant to poke fun at other serious-seeming literary magazines of the day, but there was always the danger that the accusation could land on The New Yorker itself—that it was an extension of what the critic Edmund Wilson called the class of “people who had been taught a certain kind of gentility, who had played the same games and read the same children’s books—all of which they were now able to mock from a level of New York sophistication.”
Based on its early years, there was no particular reason to ever think that The New Yorker would outgrow the specter of Eustace Tilley. There was very little serious journalism, the short stories were basically glorified scene pieces, and the aroma of the student lounge clung to everything. But then, at some point in the 1930s, the miracle happened. A new group of streetwise writers, most famously Joseph Mitchell and A.J. Liebling, found their way into the magazine and introduced a grit and seriousness that had been utterly lacking in the frothy early years. To Yagoda, the magazine actually reached its peak in the ‘30s, but other accounts put the turning-point a little further forward—to the decision, in 1946, to turn the entire issue over to John Hersey’s searing account of the destruction of Hiroshima; or to the publication of J.D. Salinger’s short story “A Perfect Day for Bananafish” in 1948, which launched Salinger’s career and vaulted The New Yorker’s fiction department beyond the scene-y pieces of an earlier era.
I teach a journalism class, and when I do I seem to always find myself back in this same moment in time—when, in Yagoda’s framing, “lowlife [was] ascendant.” The new generation of writers worked hard to get beyond Eustace Tilley. “We were thinking about the best way we could write about the city without all the literary framework,” Mitchell recalled, and what they came up with transformed journalism forever. In 1942, Mitchell published a piece called “Professor Sea Gull” about a “Bowery Bum” named Joe Gould. It opens, “Joe Gould is a jaunty and emaciated little man who has been a notable in the cafeterias, diners, barrooms, and dumps for a quarter of a century.” The challenge for me teaching this piece is that it’s always difficult not to get a little misty with the idea of what the piece represents—that anybody is interesting, that, in the higher order of things, anybody is worthy of a New Yorker profile, that if you look and listen in the right way you find that any homeless person you pass on the street is worthy of a full book (or, in a way, of the entire career that Mitchell devoted to Gould).
As I continue with the course, I make my way through a greatest hits of other New Yorker pieces—all of them espousing the same virtues. There’s Alex Prud’Homme’s “Albert Yeganeh: The Man Behind the Soups,” the basis for the Seinfeld “Soup Nazi” episode in which the reader is perfectly on the knife’s edge between seeing Yeganeh as crazy, as a big city amusement, and understanding that his madness is a form of perfectionism worthy of any artist. There’s Ian Frazier’s “My Son Is The Naked Cowboy,” in which Frazier sits next to the father of the Times Square street attraction famous for wandering the city in his underwear and just lets him talk and it turns out—I have to be on my guard against mistiness here too—that the naked cowboy’s father is just really, really proud of him for having found his way in life. And there’s a tireless Good Samaritan who knocks on the windows of idling vehicles and asks them to turn off the engine to help the environment—and is, as often as not, flipped off or screamed at for his trouble. And there’s A.J. Liebling’s wartime obsession with “Mollie,” a Times Square busboy who somehow captured 600 Italian soldiers singlehandedly, and on and on it goes.
But something peculiar happens when I look at the more recent catalog. There’s a piece on “The Many Stages of Cynthia Nixon.” And one on how “Chloe Zhao Has Looked Into the Void.” And on how “Sarah Sherman Is Grosser Than You Think.” And on how “Mikie Sherill Intends To Move Fast.” And I have to scroll a long, long way, in other words, to find an article about somebody who has never appeared on HBO or has not been elected to office. Joe Gould—and the Naked Cowboy’s father and Albert Yeganeh driving himself to ever greater heights to perfect his soups—are all a long way away.
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And the same goes if I start flipping around in the other sections—everywhere there’s the same overpowering sense that The New Yorker, which more or less invented profile writing and championed a very particular curious and irreverent sensibility, is no longer for or about anybody you know. The articles I’ve mentioned would all look perfectly at home if they were published instead in Vanity Fair. The sensibility is that it’s meant to be about people who’ve arrived—it’s something like Puck with a hundred-year head start. And, as The New Yorker, with all due fanfare and stentoriousness, celebrates its first century, it’s become clear also that it’s no longer really The New Yorker—the logo is there and the covers and cartoons are there, but the spirit that animated The New Yorker throughout its long golden era is finally gone.
This isn’t the first time that the more magpie-ish among us have claimed that The New Yorker has lost its way. Yagoda concedes that by the ‘70s or ‘80s The New Yorker was a “creepy place”—one aspiring editor, for his first assignment, found himself taking dictation from an old racing reporter who phoned in stories from his hospital bed about wholly imaginary horse races. An attempted takeover by Warren Buffett was stymied by the stratagem of setting up Buffett with the magazine’s longtime editor, at which point Buffett saw what he was up against and promptly divested his stock. In 1986, a book-length parody of The New Yorker appeared entitled Snooze. As far back as 1999, the writer and former New Yorker staffer Renata Adler declared, “As I write this, The New Yorker is dead.”
The usual story from this point is that after a period of ownership and editorial changes, The New Yorker found stability under editor David Remnick, who led the magazine into a new golden age. The internet presented an existential challenge, as it did to all print publications, but The New Yorker managed the transition better than most, with a robust online publication complementary to the print magazine, as well as podcast and video content. “The New Yorker has not only adapted to the digital age but thrived in it,” reported The Conversation earlier this year. In an interview for the Netflix documentary The New Yorker at 100, Remnick said simply, “The New Yorker is a miracle, ok?”
That’s the usual story. My contention is that The New Yorker has lost its soul, is now virtually interchangeable with a number of other publications, and is—spiritually speaking—in something like terminal decline, just another gilded gargoyle on the cathedral of polite thinking. Those are unprovable statements and whether you agree with them or not depends on your reading sensibility, but let’s consider a few areas of striking weakness.
In its fiction, The New Yorker was famous above all for launching the careers of writers. J.D. Salinger, John Updike, John O’Hara, John Cheever, James Thurber, E. B. White, Ann Beattie, among many, many others, got their real breaks through The New Yorker. There’s a sort of iconic story of literary persistence in which Beattie, then a college instructor, sent a submission to The New Yorker. An assistant pulled it out of the slush pile. Roger Angell, the chief fiction editor, sent a note to Beattie asking her to send future submissions to him directly. He passed on the next 13 stories she sent him, but when Angell finally bought one, he couldn’t have been happier if he had written it himself: “I think this is just about the best news of the year,” he wrote to Beattie. “There is nothing that gives me more pleasure than at last sending an enthusiastic yes to a writer who has persisted through as many rejections and rebuffs as you have.”
It’s a heart-warming story, but it could not happen now. Bill Buford, who was The New Yorker’s fiction editor for eight years, admitted that he hadn’t taken a single story from slush during that time, and Deborah Treisman, the current fiction editor, appears not to have either. That wouldn’t be particularly a big deal—lots of magazines limit submissions to “agent enquiries only”—except that The New Yorker keeps an open inbox and promises to read “all submissions within 90 days.” In other words, it is still masquerading as the magazine that discovered Beattie and profiled Gould, but in fact the real path to entry is to already be a part of whatever club Eustace Tilley is a member of. Even apart from the evident dishonesty in its policy, what The New Yorker’s down-portcullis approach seems to have done is to produce a stale, safe, walled garden of forgettable fiction. In a somewhat embarrassing moment in The New Yorker at 100, Treisman, in an editorial meeting, complains that one story under consideration is “right on that borderline of being like ten other stories,” to which her fellow editor less-than-ringingly responds, “I’d be borderline in favor.”
The same criticism goes for the Shouts & Murmurs section, which can feel like a roundtable of all of Eustace Tilley’s most toffish friends complaining about their imaginary problems. (The article “This Bowl Has One Hundred Grams of Protein,” on the website front page at the time of publication, can stand in for all the rest—unless you feel that “So You Want to Come to My New Vinyl-Listening Bar” covers it better.) And for the profiles, which have turned into frothy celebrity-bait. And for the attempts to connect with the American heartland in the Trump era, which often are embarrassingly tone-deaf. (In the documentary, staff writer Andrew Marantz concedes that The New Yorker’s haters may have a point when they accuse The New Yorker of being “elitist motherfuckers” and the magazine’s editorial department then carefully adds an accent aigu over the “e” in “élitist.”) And same goes for many of the reviews, which have become so predictable in their superior moralism that Charlie Kaufman dedicated an entire novel, Antkind, to parodying the movie critic Richard Brody’s wokey sententiousness.
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When you start to take all that away, there’s not much left. Yes, The New Yorker has had some astonishing successes in the Remnick era—Ronan Farrow’s piece on Harvey Weinstein did a great deal to topple Weinstein and to spark the #MeToo movement; Luke Mogelson has had a gift for popping up everywhere from a trench to the Donbas to the mob storming the Capitol in 2021. But try to think of the last time The New Yorker has broken a story or captured the discourse in a way that used to be routine for them—and my guess is that you’ll find yourself thinking for quite some time.
The reasons The New Yorker may have struggled in the 21st century are certainly not entirely their fault. The landscape of journalism is very different. “Stories” are being broken all the time in social media posts; a “talk of the town” is hardly needed to generate gossip. A publication like The New Yorker is, very often, reduced to commentary on subjects that everybody else already has opinions about. And in that commentary there is an unmistakable tendency to just wish all the problems of the contemporary world away, to pretend that it is still 1925 and the only people one really needs to hear from are those in one’s club. (In one of The New Yorker’s earliest successful gags, the workers down an open manhole are discussing who and who isn’t a Whitney—talking exactly like high society would talk—and it can feel as if that actually is the heart of the publication: Eustace Tilley’s recurring fantasy that everybody else in the city and country actually turns out to be exactly like him.)
The New Yorker at 100 gives yet another glimpse of how this smugness plays out. Remnick, in an attempt to blow the dust away, has a meeting where he asks a group of the paper’s old guard what New Yorker traditions have outlived their time, and then he brings up the question of voice. “One subject that has come up for decades and decades is the following: I’m worried that I won’t be able to write in my voice,” Remnick says but gets no further than that. “When I have very occasionally had that experience, it’s ‘cause they’re bad writers,” one of the editors responds. At which point the room erupts in a chorus of Eustace Tilley-ish chuckles, and the issue, presumably, is laid to rest for another hundred years. And never mind that some of those bad writers who have complained are E. B. White, Louise Bogan, John O’Hara, Kay Boyle, Irwin Shaw, Edmund Wilson, Rumer Godden, Roald Dahl, Elizabeth Bishop, Tom Wolfe, and Renata Adler (Dahl, for instance, claimed the magazine’s edits made him vow to give up writing and become a bookie instead); and never mind that some of the writers The New Yorker has managed to reject, in what Yagoda calls “a grim anthology,” include Kurt Vonnegut, Flannery O’Connor, Jack Kerouac, Joseph Heller, Gertrude Stein, and Thomas Pynchon.
The point that Eustace Tilley might make, peering extra intently through his monocle, is that The New Yorker, my dear, has always been snobby. Actually, the snobbishness precedes the magazine itself. “The New Yorker will be the magazine which is not edited for the old lady in Dubuque,” its 1924 prospectus declared. (This, by the way, produced one of the better counter-offensives in literary history when an extremely erudite and cultured old lady from Dubuque showed up in New York in 1964 and gracefully did the rounds of the talk shows.) And, yes, it’s true that The New Yorker is proudly sophisticated. But sophistication and snootiness are very different—at its best, The New Yorker is always rooting for the little guy, its writers perfectly willing to chuck everything and wander around the city with Joe Gould. Or, as David Remnick put it in the documentary, “I want it to be great [and] I want it to be humane.”
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It’s that sense of the humane that goes missing in the endless welter of celebrity profiles and smug cultural commentary—and, without it, The New Yorker loses all capacity to be great, no matter how assiduously they fact-check or how many rewrites they put their writers through. And that means that, when The New Yorker half-heartedly decides to leave its ivory tower and rub shoulders with the people for a bit, the people just aren’t really having it—any more than The New Yorker could expect the guys down the manholes to actually be discussing the pedigree of the Whitneys. The balance that the magazine has had to strike has always been razor-thin, but for it to work—this was what Mitchell and Liebling discovered in the ‘30s—you have to actually go down into the manholes and hear what, in New Yorker parlance, the “lowlifes” have to say. If you don’t do that, it’s just the ghost of Eustace Tilley goofing around with all of his monocled friends.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion, writes the Substack Castalia, and edits The Republic of Letters.
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Given the sheer number of summits, talks, and bilateral negotiations held between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia since the start of Trump’s time in office, one would be forgiven for getting a dash of déjà vu around the latest talks between Ukraine’s Zelenskyy and Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff in Berlin. The issues at play are still essentially the same ones as back in February—security guarantees for Ukraine and territorial concessions to Russia.
But this time is different, and Ukraine is in more trouble than it has been in at any time since Trump’s return to office. Ukraine has already indicated that it is willing to make significant concessions in its negotiating stance. Its few allies in the Trump administration have been sidelined, and Europe is in no position to pick up the slack from ebbing U.S. support. Ironically, Ukraine’s greatest friend at the moment is—in a sense—Vladimir Putin, whose intransigence stands in the way of a deal favorable to Russia and risks alienating Trump. But with Trump’s patience running thin, Ukraine may very soon find itself forced to accept a deal it does not want.
As always, the deck is stacked against Zelenskyy. Trump and his envoys want a quick end to the war above all else, treating critical issues like territorial control and the security architecture of post-war Eastern Europe like pesky details standing in the way of Trump’s much-coveted “ninth” peace deal (on top of the eight he already claims to have overseen in various global conflicts). Zelenskyy has been doing everything in his power to meet the U.S. president halfway, but this time it may well not be enough. Trump seems to have decided that the quickest way to end the war is to force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s terms.
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Trump has been drifting toward this conclusion for some time now, and Russia’s latest rejection of Trump’s peace proposal earlier this month has apparently only added fuel to the fire. Yuri Ushakov, one of Russia’s top negotiators, has said that any Ukrainian or European suggestions for a peace proposal would be met with “sharp objections,” while Russia’s ambassador to the UK claimed that the only thing Ukraine should be negotiating on is its “surrender.” The Trump administration has clearly internalized this mindset, and during the Berlin talks it reportedly insisted that Ukraine would have to withdraw from the parts of Donetsk Oblast it currently controls in order for a peace deal to be possible—a goal Russia has been pursuing since the start of its invasion.
In response to Trump’s demands, Zelenskyy has agreed to hold elections in Ukraine, and, to sweeten the deal, he has also shockingly agreed to give up his country’s NATO aspirations—a massive shift in Ukrainian policy. But even though such strategies have successfully allowed Zelenskyy to make Russia look like the spoiler in Trump’s eyes in the past, this time they will achieve little besides convincing Trump that Zelenskyy may indeed be pliable enough for the United States and Russia to ram through whatever further concessions they desire.
Zelenskyy has several options at his disposal, but none of them are good. As always, he can try to lean on Europe to support him diplomatically vis-à-vis Trump, to fund Ukraine’s defense, and to provide security guarantees against Russia in the near term and after an eventual ceasefire.
This is seemingly the path he has taken in the wake of the Berlin talks—German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has flattered Trump, put out a statement emphasizing Ukraine’s post-war security needs, and gathered European leaders from Poland to the UK to lend support to Ukraine.
But it’s no secret that Europe’s pull is largely illusory—ever since the start of the current stage of negotiations, EU leaders have been unable to have any meaningful impact on the proposals Trump has offered the Russians. Putin has made serious efforts to depict the Europeans as being “on the side of war,” and it seems the Trump administration has taken the bait—the U.S. president increasingly sees the Europeans as adversaries, as the latest National Security Strategy makes clear. In talks following the Berlin negotiations, the Europeans have unveiled their proposal for security guarantees for Ukraine that include cooperation with the United States and a European-led “multinational force” operating inside Ukraine, and while this is encouraging for Zelenskyy, it is far from clear that the United States will commit to the proposal. Russia has balked at the presence of any NATO member forces in Ukraine after the war, and there is little reason to think Trump’s team would press Putin on this point.
Unfortunately for Europe and Ukraine, all such peace plans necessarily require American buy-in. Despite advances in its defense industry and its cohesiveness on the diplomatic front against the United States, Europe still clearly cannot match U.S. support for Ukraine, either militarily or on the intelligence front. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte conceded this month that Europe has no Plan B outside of relying on America for aid to Ukraine, even though the Trump administration has indicated it will withdraw much of its support by 2027.
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Perhaps the only bright spot Ukraine can count on at this stage is its own armed forces, which have been taking every opportunity available to them to demonstrate that Russia’s slow march across Ukraine’s east is far from unstoppable. After Russia publicly claimed that it had captured the town of Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast, Ukrainian forces swiftly eliminated Russian soldiers in the area, clearing the town enough for Zelenskyy himself to be able to visit and film a triumphant video not far from the frontlines. There was certainly good reason for his trip—a great deal of Trump’s pro-Russia tilt is based on the perception of an inexorable Russian advance. While it’s unclear whether the Ukrainians will be able to replicate their victory at Kupyansk along other, more dug-in parts of the frontline, the battle could demonstrate to Trump that Russia is far from invincible—if he’s paying attention, that is.
The sad truth for Zelenskyy, though, is that all of this may be too little, too late. Sooner or later, Zelenskyy will have to make the choice he predicted in a somber video at the end of November—“either the loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner.” If he chooses the former, he will see his country carved up by an enemy and former ally. If he chooses the latter, he will see the United States abandon him in favor of a new economic and political thaw with Russia, leaving Ukraine and Europe at Russia’s mercy.
Michal Kranz is a Warsaw-based journalist who covers Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He has reported from the ground during the war in Ukraine, covered politics and society in Lebanon, and regularly reports on regional developments from Poland.
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When people today ponder the assassination of John F. Kennedy 62 years ago, possibly the question most asked is: Would Kennedy have pulled American troops out of Vietnam? But in light of President Donald Trump’s makeover of D.C.’s Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, it becomes equally pertinent to inquire: What might have been the consequences of Kennedy’s espousal of a “more civilized” America?
Twenty-seven days before he died, President Kennedy delivered an arts address at Amherst College. He said in part: “I see little of more importance to the future of our country and our civilization than full recognition of the place of the artist.” Four weeks later Kennedy was poised to announce the appointment of Richard Goodwin, an inner-circle New Frontier activist, as his arts advisor. Though the president was no aesthete, he was a cultural Cold Warrior intent on challenging Soviet Russia in every department of human activity—including the performing arts in which Russia excelled. And he respected and admired his First Lady’s impassioned engagement with music and dance.
A notable third party in this endeavor was Leonard Bernstein, then music director of the New York Philharmonic. Bernstein tirelessly advocated for a more sophisticated America. When Pablo Casals and Igor Stravinsky were fêted at the Kennedy White House, Bernstein was there. He also socialized with Jack and Jackie. He saw Kennedy’s New Frontier as a beacon light for an American artistic future that could stand up to Old World traditions.
Here’s a Bernstein anecdote: In 1959, when the State Department sent him to Soviet Russia with his New York musicians, Bernstein was counselled by a Russian bureaucrat not to perform Charles Ives’ The Unanswered Question. According to an eyewitness, Bernstein arose, said “Fuck you!”, and left the room. He proudly performed (and encored) the Ives piece, introducing Russian audiences to an American musical genius. Fourteen years later, at the second Nixon inauguration, he mounted an anti-Vietnam concert at the same moment the president hosted the Philadelphia Orchestra in a program including Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture (with cannon blasts). Bernstein chose Haydn’s pacifist Mass in Time of War, performed to an overflow audience at the National Cathedral. He was a man who seized center stage fearlessly and effortlessly.
Neither Kennedy nor Bernstein could have envisioned the arts initiative transpiring in D.C. right now: the apparent redirection of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), the presidential plan for an NEH-funded Garden of Heroes, and the performance of the Star-Spangled Banner at all 2025-26 National Symphony concerts. Meanwhile, the president has purged the Kennedy Center board and made himself chairman. And he’s replaced the Center’s president with Richard Grenell, once a controversial ambassador, and now engaged in re-targeting arts programing “for the masses.” Among other things, Grenell has reportedly mandated a “break-even policy” for every performance. In arts administration, this is a formula bound to kill inspiration.
Most recently, Trump’s “Vision for a Golden Age in Arts and Culture” included the flagship Kennedy Center Honors: lifetime achievements awards begun in 1978. This time, they were hosted (as never before) by the president himself. The honorees, chosen with Trump’s “98%” involvement, were actor Sylvester Stallone, disco singer Gloria Gaynor, country musician George Strait, Phantom of the Opera star Michael Crawford, and the rock band Kiss—“among the greatest artists … ever to walk the face of the earth,” Trump said. Whatever one makes of that claim, previous honorees, starting in 1978 and 1979—George Balanchine, Marian Anderson, Fred Astaire, Richard Rodgers, Aaron Copland, Ella Fitzgerald, Martha Graham, and Tennessee Williams—have contributed more to an American lineage of creativity, today imperiled as never before by the erosion of cultural memory. And all this at a time when the major national charitable foundations have pulled arts funding in favor of social justice programs, and when affluent Americans are no longer as predisposed as their parents were to underwrite orchestras and museums.
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So it is pertinent to ask: What might Goodwin have accomplished? And how might Bernstein have responded, were he alive today? Certainly the New Frontier would have elevated the arts as an American priority. Kennedy himself, ever the Cold Warrior, opposed direct government arts grants in favor of “free artists” thriving in “free societies”—a naïve view. But the arts endowment was already in sight. And the First Lady was an avid Russophile. Her initial guest at the White House was Balanchine, a supreme product of St. Petersburg and Paris. She sought advice on how she could help. Balanchine urged that she become America’s “spiritual savior.”
As for Bernstein—when Jackie Kennedy invited him to take over artistic direction of the Kennedy Center, he refused, but agreed to compose something for the Center’s opening concert in 1971. This turned out to be an anti-war Mass protesting the Vietnam War. It is virtually impossible to imagine him, during the decades of Vietnam and Watergate, agreeing to lead an imposed performance of the national anthem. He would have protested—prominently, loudly—the dismantling of the endowments. When in 1977 he was invited to testify in favor of a White House Conference on the Arts, he instead urged the House Subcommittee on Select Education to prioritize musical literacy: “I am sad to say, we are still an uncultured nation and no amount of granting or funding is ever going to change that” unless “reading and understanding of music be taught to our children from the very beginning of their school life.” (It also bears remembering that in Israel—a country long dear to him—Bernstein aligned himself with Teddy Kollek and other advocates of Israeli/Arab co-existence, and worried about Jewish sectarianism.)
Memorializing her husband with—significantly—an arts initiative, Jackie Kennedy envisioned a D.C. performing arts complex of international stature. Though Trump’s complaints about woke excess are by no means unfounded, the Kennedy Center has never seemed more provincial than today.
Since this nation’s founding, some have pondered whether democracy and the arts—and also whether capitalism and the arts—are somehow inimical. Certainly there is an impressive lineage of writings analyzing an American aversion to artists and intellectuals. Alexis de Tocqueville, nearly two centuries ago, observed among the citizens of the United States “a distaste for all that is old.” Assessing an expanded “circle of readers,” he discerned “a taste for the useful over the love of the beautiful,” for the “mass produced and mediocre.” Many decades later, American politicians of note included no John Adams or Thomas Jefferson—cosmopolites of humbling intellectual attainment. In 1962, the historian Richard Hofstadter produced a Pulitzer Prize-winning study of Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. He adduced a New World stereotype that holds the “genius” to be lazy, undisciplined, neurotic, imprudent, and awkward. He blamed democratization, utilitarianism, and evangelical Protestantism. An enduring philosophical argument against the American arts was launched in the 1930s by Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School: capitalism embraced a mistaken notion of the artist as a distant actor, unfettered and autonomous. The very DNA of American democracy—its notion of “freedom”—was in the Frankfurt view a misguided myth.
The misgivings inherent to these critiques foresaw that the American arts would suffer neglect. Neither Tocqueville nor Hofstadter nor Adorno, however, envisioned a vigorous White House initiative that would deploy the arts as an ideological cudgel. Concomitantly, a pugnacious pseudo-history stressing white Christian roots does no more favors for the arts than its woke equivalent; both pollute a necessary seedbed for creative expression. The American past is short, fragile, controversial—and precious. Today’s arts debacle is the least noticed, least discussed, least understood American crisis.
That the arts are a necessary source of national identity became the nub of Leonard Bernstein’s American vocation—until he lost faith and decamped to Vienna. It was equally understood by John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Never have Kennedy’s words sounded timelier:
I look forward to a great future for America, a future in which our country will match its military strength with our moral restraint, its wealth with our wisdom, its power with our purpose. I look forward to an America which will not be afraid of grace and beauty, which will protect the beauty of our natural environment … And I look forward to an America which commands respect throughout the world not only for its strength but for its civilization as well.
Joseph Horowitz’s books include The Propaganda of Freedom: JFK, Shostakovich, Stravinsky, and the Cultural Cold War. His book-in-progress studies Leonard Bernstein and cultural leadership. A concert producer and arts administrator of long experience, he has produced musical events at the Kennedy Center.
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We are delighted to feature Francis Fukuyama in the pages of Persuasion once again. Some of you may not know that he writes a regular column, “Frankly Fukuyama,” which is proudly part of the Persuasion family, and which you need to manually opt in to receive.
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Over the past decade, and particularly over the past year, it has been hard not to indulge in catastrophic thinking. What began in the early 2010s as a “democratic recession” has morphed into a full-blown retreat of democratic government across the world, and nowhere more so than in the United States. Donald Trump’s second term was always expected to be bad, but his actions have been so much worse than even last year’s pessimists—and I include myself in that group—imagined.
Domestically, he has hollowed out the Justice Department and turned it into an instrument of personal revenge. With ICE, he is in the process of creating the country’s largest law enforcement agency, loyal primarily to himself rather than to the law, whose agents have gone after law-abiding migrants and swept up U.S. citizens with no due process. He has put a charlatan in charge of America’s public health service, and has indiscriminately fired civil servants and closed entire agencies in ways that will undermine government capacity for years to come.
It is in foreign policy, however, that some of the most immediate damage is being done. He has sided with Russia in its unjust war against Ukraine, having his incompetent negotiator Steve Witkoff insert Russian demands into a so-called “peace plan” that would ratify a total capitulation to Moscow. He has levied tariffs on every country in the world except for authoritarian friends like Russia, and denigrated America’s closest allies. And he has shown a clear preference for strongman authoritarian government, being open to any non-democratic country (including China) ready to make a deal with him. Foreign leaders have come to understand that the way to influence American policy is to bribe the president personally.
It is at this point that domestic policy joins hands with foreign policy. Trump has accepted emoluments that have had a direct impact on national policies, like the plane gifted him by Qatar, or the gold bar presented by the Swiss. He has presided over the most corrupt administration in American history, with his family profiting to the tune of billions of dollars from crypto investments he legalized. He has used his pardon power to free criminals like former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández, as well as countless American swindlers and fraudsters. Time will doubtless reveal a plethora of other side deals that he has been able to use his presidential powers to keep hidden up to now.
Given this record, it is easy to imagine that things will continue to get worse, and that America’s self-degradation has not yet found a bottom. I have been traveling in Asia and Europe recently, and in both regions I get asked the same questions: What happened to the American system of checks and balances? What should American allies do, now that the United States has pulled the rug out from under them? Do we have an alternative to obsequiously bowing to Trump and pleading for him to spare us the worst, as everyone from American law firms to NATO allies has learned to do up to now?
I think it is very important at this juncture for former American friends not to engage in catastrophic thinking, because catastrophe may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. During the first Trump term, I warned friends not to assume that the world would at some point snap back to what it was prior to 2016, or that Trumpist populism was just a passing phase. There were too many shifts in right-wing coalitions around the world for this to happen.
But it is important to understand that Trumpism is also not a permanent condition. I believe that already in the first year of his second term, we have experienced peak Trump, and that his power will decline steadily as time goes on.
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There are two important checks on Trump’s power. The first and most important are elections. The United States will have a midterm election next November, and by all indications the Democrats will reclaim the House of Representatives by a substantial margin. The off-year vote this past November 4 showed across-the-board Democratic victories, from the mayor’s election in New York City to the governors’ races in New Jersey and Virginia, and countless smaller races in red states like Georgia. Mikie Sherrill defeated her Republican opponent by a margin of 13 points in what had been predicted to be a close race, while Abigail Spanberger won by 15 points. Black and Hispanic voters, who gave Trump the winning margin in 2025, have moved back to the Democratic column in large numbers. For the first time in decades, a Democrat was recently elected mayor of Miami.
These margins are important because the Republicans will try to manipulate the outcomes of the 2026 vote. They can do that in close contests, but not in elections where Democrats are leading by double-digit margins. Trump’s efforts to force Republican legislators to gerrymander electoral districts has also hit a wall with Indiana Republicans refusing to go along, and California approving an initiative to change its districts to more than offset Texas. As a result, a number of Republican members are reading the handwriting on the wall and announcing that they will not run for re-election because they don’t want to be in the out-of-office party.
Meanwhile, Trump’s popularity rating has fallen to the mid 30s. The reason is pretty clear: he promised to lower prices, and insists that they are lower, when anyone can see that they have risen under his administration. He is replicating Joe Biden’s mistake in 2024, and indeed seems to think that he can win future elections simply by manically repeating Biden’s name in speeches.
The second check against Trump’s power lies in the courts. The lower levels of the federal judiciary have been blocking a host of Trump actions. Pam Bondi’s Justice Department has been stymied in its revenge campaign against Trump opponents like James Comey and Letitia James; grand juries have refused to make indictments and Trump’s handpicked prosecutor, Lindsey Halligan, has been disqualified in a comedy of incompetence and errors. Many of Trump’s executive orders have been rendered void by lower courts.
The big question is, of course, the Supreme Court and its 6-3 conservative majority. But Trump’s ability to bend it to his will may be limited. The most important case by far before the Court is the decision on the constitutionality of his tariffs; from the questioning during oral arguments, it seems that many of the conservative justices were highly skeptical of the administration’s position that the tariffs are not taxes. Trump recently renewed his push to have birthright citizenship revoked, but his arguments there are extremely weak, especially for any justice that considers him or herself an originalist. Were the tariffs to be declared unconstitutional, the most important pillar of Trump’s agenda would collapse.
A powerful indicator of Trump’s growing weakness is the fact that Republicans are increasingly willing to criticize him and vote contrary to his wishes. In this regard the Jeffrey Epstein scandal has been critical. In my experience, educated people have not tended to take this sort of thing seriously. But the idea that powerful elites were running a pedophile ring and covering up its existence has been central to many MAGA conservatives. This story was key to QAnon’s very identity. And it turns out that this was not a conspiracy theory after all, but an actual conspiracy, one that Trump and allies like House Speaker Mike Johnson have invested huge amounts of political capital in covering up. The vote to approve the discharge petition to force Johnson to release the Justice Department’s files on Epstein was 427-1, with 4 MAGA Republicans (Thomas Massie, Marjorie Taylor Greene, Lauren Boebert, and Nancy Mace) leading the charge despite intense White House lobbying to change their vote.
Trump and Pam Bondi will doubtless continue to try to limit release of the most damaging files, but this is a gift that will keep on giving as Trump’s close ties to Epstein are documented in countless emails and videos.
The spell has been broken. Republicans have been held in line by fear that Trump would turn against them in Truth Social posts and by backing primary opponents. But he is a lame duck president with just over three years left of his presidency, and electoral viability after 2028 is now beginning to outweigh fear of short-term consequences. Republicans have joined Democrats in questioning the legality of the administration’s Caribbean boat strikes, and openly complaining about the impact of tariffs on their constituents. (It is important to remember that, unlike immigration, there was never a strong popular consensus among conservatives over tariff policy, and there are powerful business interests opposing them.) Corporations and corporate leaders have begun to speak up; Costco for example has sued the administration over tariffs.
Things will only get worse for Trump in 2026. Inflation will likely rise at a faster pace as companies exhaust the inventories they stockpiled this time last year. There will be military action against Venezuela and many of the conflicts that Trump claims to have solved will flare again, as with Thailand and Cambodia. Trump will lose either way on tariffs: if they are ruled unconstitutional, he will have to hand back the over $100 billion already collected in duties or be mired in litigation, or else he will have to deal with the economic albatross he has hung around the economy’s neck. Finally, Trump is clearly not healthy: he increasingly resembles his nemesis, the aging Joe Biden.
All of this brings us back to how America’s allies should deal with the United States. Just as with Republicans at home, they should lose their fear of Trump and start pushing back against his crazy policies. Countries that have done so already, like Brazil, India, and China, have come out ahead in the confrontation. The EU in particular made a craven deal earlier this year on tariffs, and should take the opportunity to renegotiate. Trump will not be around forever, and will likely be significantly weaker after next November as a Democratic House takes office and begins hearings and investigations.
Unfortunately, not everyone has time to wait Trump out. Ukraine in particular is being pressured to accept an unjust and unsustainable peace deal by Washington. Putin has not relaxed his maximalist demands one iota; he is still insisting that Ukraine evacuate four oblasts that it claims for itself, including the Donbas “fortress belt” that has held the Russians back for four years now. Nor has he given way on security guarantees for Ukraine, or his demands for limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces and weaponry.
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It is important to remember that though he is president, Donald Trump does not necessarily represent America. Recent polls show that over 60% of Americans favor continued aid, including military aid, to Ukraine, and that the percentage of Republicans favoring aid has been rising. For that reason, it is critical that the Europeans press their efforts to gain access to the Russian assets held in Belgium and use them to help Ukraine survive. The EU is held back by the consensus requirement in foreign policy; it should be clear that Europe will never become a serious international power if this condition is not modified. This may be an opportunity to act.
In the United States, we need to start thinking seriously about what the country will look like after Trump. Our goal should absolutely not be to restore the status quo ante, except for the general admonition that the next president should obey the law once again. The nature of executive power will be very different going forward, and that power can be used for good purposes by a good (or at least, not so bad) future president.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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Not long ago, a friend looked at what was happening in Washington and said, “James Madison must be turning over in his grave.” I checked the U.S. Geological Survey’s earthquake tracker and, sure enough, its map showed a cluster of quakes right around his grave in Montpelier, Virginia.
The cause: the separation of powers system that he inserted into the Constitution is—almost—dead. Congress has lost its constitutional role to shape and constrain executive power. That’s been underway for years, but the Trump administration has cemented it.
The shift is so deep and profound that it will be very, very hard to get the Constitution back to the balance that Madison designed.
First, Trump buried the government under an unprecedented blizzard of executive orders. Since Ronald Reagan, the average annual number of executive orders has ranged between 35 (for Obama) and 55 for Trump (in his first term). Biden wasn’t far behind with 41.
Trump has already hit 218 for his first year (as of early December). Negotiating with Congress is inconvenient for presidents, and all of them like to legislate through executive action, but Trump has made it a central part of his strategy.
Second, Trump has treated congressional appropriations as mere suggestions. In under a year, he has already accounted for 40% of all rescissions in the last 50 years. In addition, the Government Accountability Office has found that the administration violated the law in impounding funds more than half a dozen times, for everything from electric vehicle charging and Head Start to medical research and FEMA funds, with impoundments totaling more than $400 billion.
The administration’s position flows from the unitary executive model: Congress might appropriate money, but the president can decide whether to spend it. Congress’s “power of the purse,” Madison wrote in Federalist 58, “may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people.” Unless, that is, the president grabs away the power of the purse. Upsetting that balance, Hamilton argued a bit later, “would destroy that division of powers, on which political liberty is founded; and would furnish one body with all the means of tyranny.” Hamilton was the strongest advocate of executive power among the founders, but he never would have countenanced going this far.
Third, Team Trump has wiped out major functions of government by kicking away their administrative support. Only Congress can eliminate agencies and the functions they administer, but the administration has effectively wiped out foreign aid by firing virtually everyone working for the U.S. Agency for International Development.
He’s weakened education programs by parceling out functions of six Department of Education offices to four different agencies. As part of the plan, the administration is busting up congressional oversight. Indian Education programs are moving to the Interior Department and international education programs are going to the State Department. Major grant programs for elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education are being sent to the Labor Department. The first two moves would uproot programs from the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Subcommittee. The last one would remove the oversight that members of Congress are used to. It’s a two-fer: making good on his promise to (almost) kill the Department of Education, and weakening Congress while he’s at it.
Fourth, Congress isn’t getting any help from the Supreme Court, which has so far winked at the administration’s steps. Most analysts reading the Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo have—correctly—seen it as overruling its previous holding in Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., which ruled that executive branch experts deserved deference in interpreting the law. The remedy: Congress could legislate in more detail to limit administrators. But it’s unrealistic to expect Congress to do this. In that case, the Court held, the courts would supply the interpretation. So in a bold stroke, Loper Bright weakens Congress even more than the executive branch.
Then, in the oral arguments over Trump v. Kelly, the Court seemed poised to increase executive power even further by overruling the 90-year-old precedent in Humphrey’s Executor, which held that the president could not dismiss the heads of independent regulatory commissions. Lost in the scuffles over the case is an important undercurrent: Congress created these independent regulatory commissions and insulated the commissioners from removal only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” If the Court upends Humphrey’s, as expected, it would also radically trim the ability to define the role and power of administrative agencies.
From there, it would be a very short step for the Court to rule that the president can fire any executive branch employee. That would torpedo the fundamental principles of the merit system that Congress established in the Pendleton Act in 1883 and has continuously reinforced for more than 140 years since. Little would then be left of Congress’s balance of power with the executive branch, if the president can dismiss those in charge of implementing the laws Congress passes, gut the agencies in charge of implementing them, and refuse to spend money for congressionally authorized programs, for good measure.
Finally, Congress is at a strategic disadvantage in reining in the executive branch. The founders deliberately created Congress as a “cool and deliberate” branch, as Federalist 63 puts it. Conservatives point to the wisdom of a “deliberative republic,” captured in Congress.
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But that is anything but what is happening. Steve Bannon famously talked about the need to “flood the zone with s***.” The more the Trump administration floods the zone, the more disoriented Congress becomes. It was never meant to move fast, and flooding the zone has meant Congress has become even more unable to move at all.
It would be tempting to suggest that a different president, a different Congress, and a different Supreme Court might be able to unravel all this. Team Trump, however, is moving so fast that it intends to make that impossible. And even if a different president tried to do so, it would inevitably begin by reversing Trump’s executive orders using more executive orders, which would continue to relegate Congress to the back bench.
Congress could choose to rise up, but that would require Congress to do what it has been increasingly unable to do. Since 1997, it’s been unable to pass a budget on time—and since 1998, it has only twice managed to pass a continuing resolution that covered more than half the fiscal year.
The founders created Congress as the “people’s house,” and labored far more over Article I of the Constitution than over the president’s powers in Article II. That’s because they thought that the ultimate safeguard against presidential overreach was a robust Congress. They guessed wrong.
The sad conclusion is that Trump’s speed and skill, matched by Congress’s torpor, has virtually killed the separation of powers. Be on the watch for more tremors around Montpelier.
Donald F. Kettl is Professor Emeritus and Former Dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. He is the author, with William D. Eggers, of Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems.
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A good way to understand our current predicament as Americans is to imagine that we are a bear in the woods being attacked by hungry wolves. And our paw is caught in a trap.
The wolves are politicians. Some are gray, some are black, but wolves are wolves. We are all of us, together, that bear. It doesn’t matter what side of America’s yawning political divide you stand on. Both sides feel like they’re being attacked by wolves.
And so we are driven to close ranks. In October, Gallup reported, a gob-smacking 91 percent of Republicans approved of the job that President Donald Trump is doing. Just 6 percent of Democrats did. Such a historically wide gulf tells us that each side fears it will get torn apart whenever the other side is in charge.
One side fears the shredding of safety nets, federal programs, and commitments to inclusion and honest history. The other side fears the destruction of traditional family mores, religion, and parental control.
Every two years, Americans spend an average of $15 billion on campaign advertising trying to fend off the wolves attacking them. But we just end up changing which wolves are briefly ascendant.
Maybe we could fend off those wolves once and for all—if we could just get our foot out of that dang trap.
But what’s the trap?
The trap is an electoral system that has been captured by party processes gone wrong. We’ve had decades of changes—some of them well-intentioned, some about accruing power—to how our political parties operate. They have left us in a place where most members of Congress are elected by only 5 to 8 percent of the electorate in their districts.
The combination of gerrymandering and low-turnout partisan primaries means that as long as a candidate appeals to the most intense and active members of their base, they can sail into office. After that, the incumbency advantage insulates them even more.
Our members of Congress don’t work for us. They don’t work for the bulk of Americans—most of whom, these days, are independent, not registered to a party. They work for that 5 to 8 percent sliver of partisans. And so they have little reason to make deals that would compromise the ideological positions for which they were elected.
Presto. You’ve got a Congress so split along ideological lines that only very rarely can it get any legislation past the Senate filibuster. And what does a dysfunctional Congress give you? A power vacuum.
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Back in England in the 1760s and 1770s, the complaint in London was that Parliament had lost legislative supremacy. That is why people began to call King George III a tyrant.
Today, the U.S. Congress has lost legislative supremacy, too.
Let’s take a closer look at the trap, which has been created by the fact that our political institutions are controlled by two exceptionally unhealthy parties.
Democrats and Republicans have both learned that declines in membership needn’t diminish their ability to win control of the nation’s institutions. Thanks to gerrymandering and low-turnout primaries, each of America’s two major parties can control the most powerful nation on Earth with less than one-third of the population calling the party home. Every year, our two parties get better at claiming ever more power for a continuously shrinking membership base. This is corruption of the worst kind, because it distorts the fundamental distribution of power in our system of self-governance. Political scientist Lee Drutman has called this the “two-party doom-loop”—a terrible duopoly that has taken possession of our institutions.
How can the doom-loop be broken? Two reform strategies have been proposed in democracy renovation circles.
One set of reformers seeks to end the two-party doom-loop by encouraging the formation of new parties. Some would like to see the kind of multi-party landscape that operates in European parliamentary systems. For this group, ranked-choice voting or fusion ballots like New York uses are the necessary solutions.
A second set of reformers takes an anti-party position, wishing to see parties diminished, to be replaced by centrist, problem-solving politicians who are able to forge bridge-building coalitions. These reformers hope for the America George Washington dreamed of—a land without factions.
In my view, neither dream is realistic nor matches the necessities either of democratic politics in general or American politics in particular.
First, parties are necessary for healthy democracies. They are mediating organizations that connect people at the local level to larger national issues, and they serve as information clearinghouses. They simplify for ordinary citizens the job of thinking about the many issues a citizen might want to weigh in determining their vote.
Second, America will never settle permanently into a European-style multi-party system. The combination of federalism and our elected executive will continually drive our politics toward a two-party equilibrium. The story of the 19th century reflects the natural state of our institutions. Two major parties emerge for a time; then they split, or else minor parties emerge, and the country goes through a period of realignment—as when the Republicans emerged from the Whigs—and eventually the chaos of multiple parties resolves back to two dominant ones.
To get ourselves, America, out of the trap we’re in, we have to change the operating conditions for our parties. They need incentives to work for the American people, not just for themselves and their shrinking number of members.
Two reforms are needed to achieve this.
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First, we should abolish taxpayer-funded party primaries. Parties should have to compete for the whole electorate, rather than being able to claim power based on low-turnout, gerrymandered primaries. In their place, taxpayers should fund an all-party primary. All candidates from all parties should run on the same first ballot so the parties are forced to compete for the whole electorate at every turn. Then the top vote-getters can go on to a final round.
Four states already work this way: Louisiana, California, Washington, and Alaska. In the first three states, two finalists go on to the final round. In Alaska, four finalists move on and voters get to use ranked-choice voting—using their ballot to indicate their first, second and third choice—in the general round. Two more—Massachusetts and Oklahoma—are working on getting similar reforms through in November 2026.
Candidates from these states span the political spectrum. The system seems to have brought Washington State a somewhat more progressive politics, while California has seen some moderation (possibly also the result of independent redistricting there). Louisiana and Alaska are both more conservative. But the overall result is clear: Across the spectrum, these states have politicians who are more willing to make deals across party lines. They don’t have to live with the fear of being primaried for stepping out of line.
Second, the barriers to entry for new parties need to be lowered. The initiative in Massachusetts includes some details that move in that direction. Parties would still be able to hold endorsement conventions and candidates can carry those endorsements on the ballot. But, if the measure passes, they will also be able to carry more than one endorsement. Imagine a ballot where you have a Republican candidate with a Republican Party endorsement; a Republican candidate with a Libertarian Party endorsement; a Democratic candidate with the Democratic Party endorsement; a Democratic candidate with a Working Families Party endorsement; an Independent candidate, and so on. The Massachusetts measure also establishes the primary election as the vote base for determining whether a party wins major party status, thus lowering the barrier to entry into our politics for new parties.
An important point: people frequently think that democracy renovation is a long-term game, but that’s wrong. Every two years, we have a chance to change the rules that govern how our parties operate. In each election cycle, achieving all the change that we can to our system is absolutely as urgent as fending off the wolves we fear the most.
Here’s why all-party primaries are the key to breaking free of the bear trap: If we are successful at establishing them, more people will be able to run on the primary ballot. Voters will routinely have actual choices, not the sparse subset of candidates one of the major parties puts forward. Public debate will be improved. Challengers will have a better chance of winning. Incumbents will be rewarded for figuring out how to appeal to the whole electorate.
Yes, this does mean that, if you’re an activist with a cause, you’ll have to make your case to everyone. But it seems to me that this, fundamentally, is the necessary work of constitutional democracy—even for activist causes. The work starts by shutting down fear of one’s fellow citizens and replacing it with curiosity. Government is only for the people when it is by the people, and government by the people requires being prepared to speak to all the people.
It turns out, then, that the trap we’re in is not merely the institutional problem of party primaries. It is also fear of our fellow citizens. Let’s start beating back the fear by scenario-planning how to fight elections in new conditions. There is a better world on the other side of freeing the bear. Let’s not be trapped by fear itself.
Danielle Allen is the James Bryant Conant University Professor at Harvard University, where she also directs the Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Ethics.
A longer version of this essay was originally published at The Renovator.
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Kelly Born is the founding director of the Packard Foundation’s Democracy, Rights, and Governance initiative.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Kelly Born explore how AI could impact democracy and society—and how to respond.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: We’ve known each other for a long time. We run into each other at all kinds of conferences. But you gave a really interesting presentation at a conference I was at recently—helping us think through the different kinds of impacts that AI is going to have on the political world.
Before we dive into some of those in more detail, how should we think about this—from the obvious, straightforward ways in which AI is already influencing the world, to the more remote but potentially far more impactful ways in which it might transform the world 5, 10, or 20 years from now?
Kelly Born: My sense is that AI is going to impact just about everything. This is a general-purpose technology. As with any kind of major technological change in the past—whether it’s the printing press, radio, TV, or the internet—you see huge social, political, and economic changes as a result.
But I think AI is a little bit different for a few reasons. First, it’s a true general-purpose technology. It’s not like social media, which primarily affects communications. AI is going to affect health, science, national security, banking, transportation—basically every sector.
Not only will it have this incredibly broad impact, but it’s being deployed faster than pretty much any technology we’ve ever seen. So we have far less time as a society—and as a democracy—to adapt.
Mounk: Explain that claim to me, because I think it’s something that people who think about AI have heard a lot about, but which may not be as obvious to others. There’s this weird residual skepticism about AI in a lot of the population saying it’s kind of useless, that it hallucinates a lot, and that it doesn’t actually work. When you say it’s being adopted faster than any other technology, what’s the evidence for that?
Born: Granted, it’s based on a lot of company disclosures about uptake, but you’re seeing usage in the hundreds of millions. I think you’re also seeing that everyone is talking about it and using it. So I think you don’t just need to take the companies’ word for it—it’s very much in the zeitgeist and clearly being adopted quickly.
Mounk: When you look at how many millions of users are even paying for OpenAI every month now, as well as for other AI platforms, there’s a question about whether or not the huge investments these companies are putting into the technology are going to be sustained by those expenditures.
But when you’re just looking at the share of consumers in the United States who now actually proactively pay for some AI platform, it’s a very large number of people. So for technology that’s only really been out there in a commercialized way for three years now, that is actually very rapid take-up—which seems to indicate that at least those people seem to think, rightly or wrongly, that it’s delivering some value.
Born: I think that’s right. It is being adopted quickly, and it’s a technology that’s being adopted on top of a society that is really unstable—a lot of challenges around trust in institutions, polarization and economic inequality that are pretty significant. Introducing a general purpose technology thus quickly, I think, is cause for concern.
Mounk: One thing that I find really interesting is that when people talk about AI, I sometimes feel it’s very polarized between the people who think it’s completely useless and just hallucinates, and the people who think that in three years it’s going to be so intelligent that we’re all going to be unemployed. It’s also polarized between people who worry about very small, concrete things and these vast, intangible things.
On the one hand, a lot of the literature on ethics and AI is about algorithmic discrimination. When some AI system is helping to determine what the price of your influence is, it might end up discriminating against vulnerable groups in all kinds of ways, which of course is a bad outcome, but feels like a relatively small element in how it might influence the world. On the other side of this, you have people like Nate Soares, who was on the podcast recently and co-authored with Eliezer Yudkowsky this book, If Anybody Builds It, Everybody Dies. That’s the idea that the end of humanity is around the corner if we don’t put a moratorium on AI tomorrow. Tell us a little bit about what’s in between those two things. What are all the different kinds of impacts that you’re trying to think through that are a little bit beyond these very straightforward, immediate impacts, but perhaps not quite as far as the super-intelligent AI is going to enslave you and all of your children.
Born: I’ve been working in democracy for a while now, so I think about it in terms of the implications for democracy. The way I tend to hold it in my head, because there are so many different ways that AI is going to impact democracy, is to think about it as a series of concentric circles. You start with the most obvious bullseye that everyone thinks about when it comes to AI and elections, and you think about the pros and cons in each of these domains.
For example, in the elections context, on the positive side, we know that election administrators in the U.S. are really under-resourced, so they’re starting to use it to locate polling places, verify mailing addresses, and this kind of thing. Of course, there are all kinds of risks. The disinformation side of things is talked about a lot, but also the phishing attacks that it enables. There’s the really obvious stuff of the machinery of democracy, elections, and then you move one circle out to government use of AI across the executive, legislative, judicial, and military domains. You’re seeing cities deploying it to improve bus routes, or the State Department saying they’ve reduced time spent on FOIA requests by about 60%.
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There are implications for the machinery of democracy, elections and governance, and then you get out to what I think of as the prerequisites for democracy: political engagement and culture. One circle out from that is the information ecosystem. Beyond that are the socioeconomic conditions, concentrations of wealth and power, and labor market implications. One level further out are the geopolitical conditions, including the relative balance of power between authoritarian and democratic nations and how we’re engaging vis-à-vis China. The furthest circle out is the systemic or existential risk circle, where a lot of the bio risk and cyber risk lives. When people talk about AI killing us all, that’s the circle they’re referring to.
What’s confusing in this field right now, particularly when people talk about AI and democracy, is that discussions jump across all of these levels, from the very nitty-gritty of the machinery to the preconditions for democratic governments, or even the world itself, to survive.
Mounk: I think that’s a really helpful way of organizing the different kinds of spheres in which AI is going to have an impact. Obviously, those spheres are interrelated. The point of this is not to say that these are somehow completely separate spheres from each other, but it helps with conceptual clarity to think about them in those terms. Why don’t we start with a narrower one of those concentric circles and then move out a little bit? When it comes to government, that is one of the areas where you might think the potential for positive impact is relatively higher than in some of those other areas. If AI systems really do make us more productive and are able to improve the delivery of government services, that would obviously be a good thing.
The skeptic in me wants to say, first, that whether or not it’s able to do that depends, in general, on whether it’s possible to adopt this technology as seamlessly as people predict. There are studies which claim that 95% of companies that have tried to implement AI into their processes end up not using it that much after a little while. That might be a question of the stage of the technology, but it raises a broader question.
If the MTA uses AI to analyze which routes are most sensible and whether it should change where it runs some buses, is the new route map actually going to be better than the old route map, or is it going to fail at that? There are also ethical concerns about whether some government decisions are being made by an algorithm that we don’t fully understand and where we don’t really know what goes into that decision. Should we be comfortable with that? Does that potentially lead to certain forms of discrimination, or does it belie the idea of government by the people and for the people? If a machine is making those decisions for us, does that erode democratic agency?
How are you thinking about the pros and cons of how AI is going to transform the way in which our government actually does its job on an average Wednesday?
Born: It’s a complicated space. I think that we are clearly seeing benefits already. There was a great study by a group at Stanford that worked with the city of San Francisco to review thousands of pages of reporting requirements that were required by the federal government and found that something like 35% of them just weren’t used or reviewed. They used that data to go back and advocate to no longer be required to submit these reports.
There are clearly places where people are already finding value with the technology. I’m seeing ideas for things like policy sandboxes in the legislative branch. Could you create an AI system that would allow policymakers to think through an environmental policy they want to consider, run that through four different potential future scenarios, and theorize how that policy might play out in the real world under each of those scenarios and how they might want to tweak it or future-proof it? You’re seeing all kinds of interesting ideas, some of which are already showing actual results, and others that are much more at earlier stages. I do think that this is an area where there’s probably more potential benefit than cost, particularly at a time when we really need to improve trust in the ability of democratic institutions to deliver.
There are significant risks. There are horror stories, like the Michigan MIDAS one that’s often brought up, where it was deployed to screen unemployment benefits for thousands of people and had an unbelievably high inaccuracy rate, and people were bankrupted as a result. That was in 2013, and we’ve moved a long way since then. I’m not saying there aren’t problems here. There are very real risks. A lot of people are clear-eyed now about trying to build retrieval-augmented generation systems where you have a very narrowly defined corpus that you’re pulling from, which reduces the opportunity for bias relative to what we’ve seen before.
People are also working through questions about how to keep humans in the loop. To your point about government by and for the people, I often think about how The Economist talks about democracy ratings and the threat of autocracy and technocracy as parallel risks. The question of whether you keep humans in the loop is a really important one, but there are ways to design systems that are at least less biased than what we’ve seen so far.
Mounk: I think there’s a risk in assuming that if there’s an AI system involved and some form of bias might result, that is completely unacceptable, while tacitly assuming that the status quo or the hypothetical alternative involves no bias at all. One obvious example of this in a different context are debates about Waymo, which, according to the best studies we have so far, has a much better road safety record than human drivers. It seems likely that if we adopted many more self-driving cars at the current level of technology, let alone the level we might get to in five or ten years, we would save thousands of lives across the United States every year and tens or even hundreds of thousands of lives across the world. But when there are instances where a Waymo ran over a cat in San Francisco, it suddenly becomes unacceptable.
We would obviously want to be very careful not to increase discrimination in our society through the incorporation of AI systems. A good goal is zero discrimination, but that can’t be the precondition for adopting AI systems. If an AI system reduces the amount of bias and discrimination in decision-making about whatever state benefits we want to give out, that seems like an improvement over the status quo. It seems strange to require that the standard be zero bias from day one.
Born: I think the idea that people shouldn’t compare these systems to the Almighty but compare them to the alternative continues to have legs. I do want to caveat, though, that no one is pretending or saying that these systems don’t have bias. Everyone at this point clearly agrees that these systems are being trained on the corpus of human knowledge, which itself has bias built into it.
Your point about the alternative is important. The alternative is not a perfect human decision-making system. It’s years and years of wait times on decisions that themselves might also be biased.
Mounk: That brings me to the other point. I thought it was very interesting what you said about how FOIA, Freedom of Information Act requests, can now be dealt with more easily. The idea, presumably, is that part of that process is going through a large number of documents and figuring out which are relevant and which are not, and some of that can be automated. You’re then able to respond to these important requests in a more timely manner, which is obviously what the laws aimed at making government transparent were supposed to achieve.
Of course, it’s an arms race. I’m struck by the fact that I spoke to someone who works with a large department store, and they have a real problem in their legal department. In the past, many customers wrote letters that clearly came from people without much legal expertise and made demands that didn’t seem very plausible, so it was easy to say that these were not reasonable requests. Now they’re getting a glut of letters that sound much more sophisticated because they were written by ChatGPT or some other AI system, and the legal department is having huge trouble keeping up with all of those requests.
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Presumably, the same thing is going to happen in the case of government. On the one hand, the government is going to be better able to respond to citizen requests, which is a good thing. On the other hand, it’s also going to be much easier to bring spurious lawsuits to gum up the bureaucracy for any building project, with plausible-sounding objections to some environmental review.
It’s hard to know where this arms race is going to end up. Is the improved ability to deliver certain services going to be the dominant factor, or is the improved ability of some well-meaning citizens, and some less well-meaning special interest groups or people who simply want to gum up the system, going to be more powerful? Which side of this arms race is going to prevail is very hard to predict.
Born: I think what you’re pointing to is that notice and comment is already broken, and we’re already seeing that. There’s one world in which you imagine that AI is part of the problem and breaking it, and another in which it’s part of the solution and helping to screen it. You hear a lot of people in conversations talking about a future where AI agents become more dominant on the scene, and you end up with a bunch of AI agents in dialogue with each other. Government agents are screening inbound information, and citizen agents are flooding them with information.
There’s another area of work that I do that we may not have talked about before. In addition to working on AI and democracy, we also work on improving the effectiveness of government. This question about who wins the arms race is often predicated on the idea that the system is going to stay more or less stable as it is right now, with notice-and-comment sessions or similar mechanisms. We’re also in conversations with groups about how to reimagine the future of governing institutions in ways that might offer completely different alternatives to notice and comment altogether.
There’s an interesting question about where we’re going to see an arms race within existing systems and where we’re going to see entirely new systems invented, which will then have arms races of their own to contend with.
Mounk: That’s a really good point. The arms race dimension is going to be present in any system, but the question is how the system is going to change to try to accommodate this technology. If we move up a little bit on this ladder of concerns to points around political culture and engagement, and more broadly the information ecosystem, this is where we start to worry about whether we’re still going to be able to have real conversations as citizens.
So much content produced on the internet, including op-ed articles published in newspapers and certainly much of what we see on social media, may increasingly be produced by AI systems, and that could degrade our ability to speak to each other more broadly. What I worry about is the emergence of an age of cynicism. What happens when there are fake videos everywhere? It’s not necessarily that people will believe those fake videos, but that you never quite know for sure what is authentic and what is not, which can breed a generally cynical attitude toward the world.
People start to feel that they can’t really know what’s true or false, or what’s real, and that may be quite corrosive of the basic factfulness we need for a democratic system to work in a meaningful way.
Born: I think that’s right. I tend to think of the information-ecosystem impacts, at least the negative ones, in three buckets. The one that people worry about the most, but that I’m actually not quite as concerned about, is the persuasion piece, the idea that someone’s going to flip their vote or that this content is going to change people’s minds. My sense is that, unfortunately, we’re at a place where we’re so polarized that, at least within the existing political system, persuasion is harder. Sure, if a new kind of Pizzagate comes up, you might convince someone of something, but I’m a little bit less concerned, like you, about the persuasion piece.
I’m more concerned about learned nihilism, the liar’s dividend, the sense that nothing is true and anything is possible. This resembles the Russian model of propaganda, where there’s so much noise that no one can make sense of anything. I think that’s the second bucket. The third bucket, which we talk about less, involves questions around quality erosion, the corpus of human knowledge, and what’s going to happen there. There’s the copyright conversation and what incentives are going to look like to create new content in the future, but there are other pieces I worry about as well.
Model collapse comes up a lot, the idea of when models start ingesting their own outputs and no longer have new content to build on. There are also questions about how we interact with knowledge itself. When you use Google, you ask a question, get ten responses, and can think through them. When you ask voice assistants or similar systems a question, they have to produce a single answer, which can vastly oversimplify the world and the truth. So it’s not just persuasion and not just the liar’s dividend or nihilism. It’s also about how this changes the overall corpus of information we’re working with and how we interact with knowledge.
Mounk: I wonder whether the concerns about echo chambers and filter bubbles, which are quite old at this point and around which the empirical evidence is quite mixed, may finally come true. The idea that we end up in an echo chamber online is intuitively appealing. There is some evidence that this may be true to a certain extent. When we encounter content from people who disagree with us, it’s often not representative but instead the most extreme and enraging content on the other side. But it’s been less clear than people think that this is actually happening in a systematic way.
The pre-existing media landscape was already one in which, if you were progressive, you might have read The Nation, and if you were conservative, you might have read National Review. It’s not as though everyone was consuming politically neutral content all the time. But you could imagine that there’s a very obvious tendency, at least for now, in these chatbots to want to please you. They’re literally programmed to get positive feedback and trained to produce text that the user is likely to enjoy. As these models get more mature and competition between model companies intensifies, each will have a strong incentive to figure out ways for these systems to speak directly to your tastes.
I already find that when friends of mine show me questions they’ve put to ChatGPT, it often has a different tone than what I get because it has adapted over time to what they seem to like hearing and how they speak to it. You could imagine that if you have a very progressive worldview, these chatbots are going to say, of course you’re right, this is objectively how things are, and then draw on the smartest writing that supports your point of view while denigrating opposing views. On the other hand, if you’re very conservative, it might say that progressives are completely wrong and agree with you instead.
Perhaps we could figure out a way not to do that. The designers of these systems might recognize the danger and try to impose some kind of common reality based on what they think is best. But that seems just as problematic. That would mean someone in Silicon Valley is deciding which political values these AI systems represent as the obvious true state of the world. They might hold values I agree with, or values I find deeply troubling, or they might simply get important factual questions wrong. It’s not even clear what the right state of affairs would be here. Either way, it’s something that seems deeply fraught with danger.
Born: I would add to the concerns about sycophancy the question of who determines truth. Related to sycophancy is the ability to handle conflict. A successful democracy requires the ability to engage in spirited debate, and the sycophancy we’re seeing in these models is a challenge to that.
There are also studies, some of which have been questioned or debunked, that look at the idea of cognitive decline associated with model use. I’m still trying to get my arms around this, but at least theoretically it makes sense. These studies involve brain mapping, comparing what happens in conversation with another person, with using Google, and with interacting with GPT-style systems. Some of these studies raise methodological concerns, but people are still probing these questions. How does a person’s ability to engage in democracy develop if they grow up interacting primarily with a sycophantic, agentic AI model, experience very little conflict, and don’t engage in their own research? What kind of capacity does that produce for meaningful democratic debate?
Mounk: There’s also a question about how the technology itself will develop. I’m a little skeptical of some of these claims for now, and perhaps that’s just based on how I use these systems, but I find that I’m able to dig down in a back-and-forth with ChatGPT in a way that feels different from going down Wikipedia rabbit holes, where you often stay at a certain level of generality.
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I realized recently that I hadn’t kept up as much as I would have liked with the impact that Giorgia Meloni’s government has had on Italy itself. There’s been a lot of writing on her role in the international system, where she’s turned out to be more Atlanticist than expected, but I wasn’t really up to speed on the details of a constitutional reform she’s trying to put forward. For that kind of issue, it can be helpful to say, I don’t quite understand the nature of this proposal, give me more detail, what are the pros and cons, and it feels to me that my brain is just as active as if I were trying to find relevant articles in Italian newspapers or on Wikipedia.
It’s still a process of building literacy. One striking thing is that the main mode of interaction so far involves typing and reading, which is a form of literacy. But just as social media started in a relatively text-based form and eventually evolved into something like TikTok, which is mostly video, and then influenced every other platform, we’re likely to see something similar with AI. It’s already possible to speak to AI systems by voice, and you see major AI companies investing heavily in feeds where video content is delivered continuously and users are much more passive.
I’m skeptical of some of the studies so far about how we currently engage with AI in this respect, but they may end up being directionally right about where the technology is heading and what the dominant mode of engagement with AI is likely to be for most people, for much of the day, in the future.
Born: I think that’s right. It really depends on how you’re using it and what you’re using it to do. When I’m doing research, I had dinner last week with one of the guys who was among the first twenty people at Anthropic, and we were talking about how we were using AI. He said that he takes one week a month and tries to do everything using it, meaning he doesn’t do anything without first trying to use AI.
I find that sometimes I’m thinking much more clearly. Like you said, when I’m doing research, I’m going back and forth as if I’m talking to the world’s expert on some topic, going deep into understanding the nuance. But when I try to get AI to write something for me, it’s often a disaster, and I feel like I’m getting dumber the more I read it. So it really depends. I don’t think there’s a single answer about how it’s going to impact cognitive competence.
Mounk: One of the concerns I have, motivated in part by teaching and by the way universities are currently dealing with AI, is that many academics, and probably high school teachers as well, are deeply naïve about what AI is able to do. I’ve talked to a number of people who say that while AI might be able to get a B-minus on standard assignments, it wouldn’t be able to handle their more creative ones.
On standard essay-based assignments in the humanities and social sciences, AI today is able to get an A-minus or an A in just about any class at the universities I’ve taught at, including Harvard and Johns Hopkins. Those creative assignments would also be well within its capabilities. As a result, there’s a whole generation of students being educated right now who may never have written an essay in high school because it’s too tempting to have ChatGPT do it, and who may never write an essay in college.
In my view, the act of thinking often requires writing. When people say they’re bad at writing, harsh as that sounds, it’s often because they haven’t learned how to think. Once you try to commit words to paper, you realize where you’ve made logical leaps and what you haven’t fully thought through. In that sense, I’m very worried about cognitive loss unless academics get smarter about how to address this.
For the first time in my life, at Johns Hopkins, I’m going to give students a pen-and-paper exam. At the same time, I’ll allow them to use AI as much as they want when writing the final paper. On the one hand, I want them to explore AI to produce the best product they can, which still requires their own thinking and some of their own writing. On the other hand, I’m going to sit them down in a classroom and have them answer general questions about the themes of the course to make sure they can still think through the material and articulate clear, coherent thoughts in their own voice.
At the moment, it’s probably possible to get through college while doing very little of that. To a remarkable degree, the system seems to be in denial about this so far. Tell me about the socioeconomic conditions.
Born: Can I take a step back quickly? There’s a piece we missed, which is political engagement and political culture. We talked about this a little in terms of broken mechanisms for engagement, how people voice opinions in a democracy. We talked about information, which is often a one-way street where people collect facts and make decisions based on that. But the engagement piece is interesting as well.
Here, you’re seeing at least four challenges. One is broken systems, including the flooded notice-and-comment and feedback loops we discussed. There’s also concern about active silencing, including doxxing, trolling, and state surveillance, and what that does to democratic conversation. Then there’s passive silencing, or thin engagement, where people participate in online deliberative democracy processes in a very shallow way. They check a box, engage through AI rather than with other people, opt out altogether, or begin deferring civic engagement to AI agents as those come online.
I tend to think about these as four buckets: broken systems, active silencing, passive silencing, and thin engagement. On the challenges side, those are the issues people are grappling with. At the same time, there are some genuinely interesting developments. A lot of work at Google’s Jigsaw has pivoted toward AI-powered citizen assemblies. You’re seeing new forms of polling and sentiment analysis. In the movement-building space, people are using these tools to better understand authoritarian regimes, including identifying pillars of power or financial backing behind events like protests in Georgia or ICE deployments in Los Angeles.
These tools are also being used to go deeper in understanding the power and funding structures behind many movements. There are likely to be significant changes in how people engage with democratic institutions and with each other as these technologies play out. I didn’t want to miss that, because there’s a whole ecosystem of nonprofits and civil society actors actively trying to figure this out.
Mounk: That’s really fascinating, and I agree it’s important. What’s more important is if 80% of us lose our jobs. I’m joking, but to move up one further step in this ladder, to this bucket of socioeconomic conditions, that seems to be one where it’s hardest to predict what’s going to happen. As you’ve established, it’s hard to predict what’s going to happen in any of those buckets, but this is one where the uncertainty feels especially radical.
On the one hand, there are people who say that past technological disruptions have always led to significant job loss in some categories, but people just retooled. There’s the example of radiologists. A bunch of things that radiologists used to do have been automated. People thought that as a result radiologists’ wages would go down and that a lot of radiologists would get fired. Instead, what’s happened is that we just use a lot more radiology, and radiologists now actually spend a lot more of their time on high-value tasks rather than relatively simple, repetitive tasks that they had to do before. On the whole, this seems like a happy story.
On the other hand, we’ve never had a system that has a general intelligence that matches that of most, and perhaps soon all, human beings. In the past, when you could print books and the people who had painstakingly copied books line by line were no longer needed, those were skilled people, and the economy still had a need for skilled people in all kinds of areas. They went and did something else. Perhaps not the people who were fifty years old, for whom it was tragic, but the next generation was fine. Is that still true when the machine can do anything that a human can do intellectually at the same level? That’s really unclear to me.
When thinking through these impacts on socioeconomic conditions, are we going to live in a world of plenty where we still need skilled human beings for all kinds of things, or are we going to have an ability to do a lot of things through machines while nobody is making wages and the entire socioeconomic basis of our economic and political systems gives way? How are you thinking about this?
Born: I agree. I think this is the biggest question, and it’s the one where there’s a huge range of uncertainty. I talked to some people at tech companies, and they say we’re going to see 20% unemployment in the next couple of years as a result of these technologies. The last stats I heard from the IMF were that 60% of jobs in advanced economies could be affected. McKinsey, I think one of their stats was 14% of the global workforce. The estimates are all over the map, and as a result it’s hard to plan.
What makes it even harder is that no one seems to have a plan. I recently had a conversation with the former head of the future of work for the Newsom administration, and the conversation was very much, so what’s the plan? There wasn’t one. There are a lot of scholars working on this, and there are some interesting ideas on the table. Most have moved away from universal basic income for a couple of reasons. It seems hard to pull off financially, and there are questions about the dignity of work and whether people want a universal basic income, at least politically across the board.
Then people started moving to the idea of universal basic capital. The distinction is that you’re entitled to capital if you’re an owner of an asset. If you have universal basic compute, you reap dividends from ownership of that asset. You can make the argument that because all of humanity, over many hundreds of years, has contributed to the corpus of human knowledge on which these models are trained, we should all have a stake in that. There are precedents for this. Alaska’s oil dividend model pays out a few thousand dollars a year to citizens, and no one seems particularly angry about it. It appears to work reasonably well.
I’ve also seen people move to the idea that maybe redistribution isn’t the right approach and that the focus should be on predistribution. The argument there is that we need to increase worker rights and worker participation in decisions about how technologies are deployed, so they have greater bargaining power. Other arguments focus on guaranteed employment, which seems to have some bipartisan support. In communities that are hardest hit, the community could come together to identify the jobs most needed, with paid reskilling rather than unpaid reskilling.
There are a lot of ideas being discussed, but the basic point is that no one has a good plan, and the potential impacts are enormous. Every major economic disruption in history has been followed by massive political upheaval. It’s concerning that no one has a plan here.
Mounk: Two thoughts on this. The first is that I agree with you that there are a lot of ideas in this space, and none of them seem particularly convincing for a host of reasons. We could go through each of them, but that might be overdoing it. There are very significant logistical and financial problems with all of them, and also a problem of meaning. If people don’t have jobs that give them some kind of meaning in the world, that is a big personal challenge, and it can become a big political challenge.
Inventing jobs that an AI system might do just as well, but that humans still do because of rules and regulations, is, at best, a very short-term solution. One way or another, all of these solutions seem to fall into one of those buckets. Another thing I think is really helpful is the concept of an AI resource curse. In political science, there’s long literature on why Saudi Arabia and other countries like it are not democracies.
One obvious answer is that democracies tend to emerge when monarchs and other people in charge really need an educated middle class as a revenue base. That gives them an incentive to invest in education, and it makes it easier for citizens to make demands because they can say, you’re living off our taxes, and in return we want political representation and a say in what happens with that money. If a monarch or dictator has access to a lot of resources simply from selling oil, you never get the socioeconomic mechanisms that empower a middle class to make those political demands. That tends to be very bad for long-term economic development.
One way of thinking about AI, if it ends up replacing a lot of middle-class jobs and leading to a much more polarized income distribution, is as a form of resource curse. It would mean that people at the top of society are less needful of ordinary citizens for tax income, less needful of an educated citizenry, and less needful of a military recruited from citizens.
You could imagine that, at some point, even though this still feels a bit science fiction, it may not be far off historically, many security needs are outsourced to drones, robots, or other systems. In that world, leaders no longer need a loyal citizenry staffing the core elements of security forces. All of that would be a structural boon to people at the top of society.
Born: I think you’re touching on two different pieces here, and I’d love to unpack them. The first is the question about dignity. Even if we had universal basic capital, compute, income, whatever you want to call it, that question feels more solvable to me. I used to do scenario planning years ago, mostly for the intelligence community. I was in the private sector before coming into philanthropy, and we would do future and forecasting work to think about what the world might look like in 2050 and what the national security implications could be if Sino-Russian relations evolved in a particular way.
We did something similar recently for the democracy field and had to work hard to think about scenarios in 2050 that could actually go well, given all the different trends, with AI being one among many, alongside declining birth rates, climate change, and growing gender gaps. We explored a lot of terrain, and the way we were able to arrive at dignity in an AI-fueled world was by getting back to service in one’s community. That was essentially the only path we could identify that involved both heavy reliance on AI and some level of dignity. That felt like something you could at least theoretically imagine.
The challenge on the power side you’re talking about, the resource curse and the fact that we might not need a middle class anymore, is much harder. At a time when we have figures like Bezos earning whatever it is, a million dollars an hour, we don’t quite know what to do about the floor and how to ensure everyone is taken care of. We do have ideas about how to handle the ceiling and how to prevent people from accruing so much wealth and power that it becomes impossible for average citizens to have economic, and therefore political, agency. But that again comes down to political will.
I sometimes like to unpack these questions by asking where we genuinely don’t know what to do, and where we actually do know what would need to be done but haven’t yet found the political will to do it.
Mounk: That’s a really helpful distinction. We could spend a lot more time talking about this subject, but I want to make sure we cover one more area you teased earlier, which is the geopolitical context. Once again, there are so many facets to this. One is great power competition. We already see that the prospect of increasingly powerful AI, and the kind of power this would give states, is leading to competition between China and the U.S., which might make cooperation on other dimensions more difficult.
There’s also the element of military technology. How is the nature of the international system transformed if you can mass-produce drones that can attack another country and civilians in a very significant way? What happens to internal security? Does it become much easier to assassinate people if you can send a tiny killer drone to kill a politician while they’re giving a speech or something like that? Those are questions about the geopolitical implications of AI itself.
One thing that’s really striking when you read some of the more optimistic or pessimistic accounts, from people who think AI is going to grow incredibly powerful very quickly but are deeply worried about alignment, is the assumption that the current era is temporary. They imagine that the period in which OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google have cutting-edge AI models developed inside private companies with relatively minimal security apparatus is going to be over very soon.
At some point, the national security state may step in and say that the implications for national security are so significant that this will start to look more like the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, behind barbed wire and security clearances, rather than a set of private labs tinkering independently. How are you thinking about these different elements of the geopolitical context of AI?
Born: It’s a complicated space, particularly given that this is the first really major technology that has been developed in the private sector rather than by government. Because there’s such a strong narrative around an AI arms race with China, and concerns about losing economic or military dominance, that drives a story many people find very compelling: that we can’t regulate these technologies lest we end up at a disadvantage to an authoritarian state, putting democracies at a permanent setback.
Here, you’ve seen a lot of Track II dialogues with China, mostly in the safety category. Nobody wants anyone to be able to develop a bioweapon or something like that. But there’s much less collaboration beyond that, as countries try to figure out who’s going to come out dominant.
What troubles me most about this conversation is that the risk of being outcompeted by China is both real and a very convenient narrative that serves company interests, because it can be used to justify no regulation at all. I’m not naïve about this. We don’t want bad regulation. But we do need some guardrails in place to ensure that these technologies benefit self-government and democratic rule.
I believe it’s possible to balance those goals. There’s good data suggesting this. I remember a lot of discussion about GDPR and claims that it would completely crush tech companies in Europe. From what I’ve seen, European profits, at least for Google, basically doubled between the introduction of GDPR and today. There has to be a way to put sensible regulations in place that protect democratic values while still competing in this arms race with China.
Mounk: This is a great segue to the next section of the conversation. You have all of these concerns we’ve talked about. We’ve also discussed concerns about existential risk, which I’ve covered extensively on the podcast with other people like Nate Soares, so we can skip that for the moment.
There’s a huge panoply of opportunities and a huge panoply of risks and concerns. How do you think about the public policy response to all of this? Is this really ten separate questions that require ten completely separate answers, or is there some emerging set of schools of thought about the general approach we should take to channeling and regulating this overall space?
Born: I do think we will need some distinct or bespoke interventions in each of those concentric circles. More importantly, there are some foundational, cross-cutting interventions that would be really helpful. I would say there are probably fifteen or twenty that are being legitimately discussed among informed populations, including universal basic income, trade restrictions, and issues around data center placement.
In our work in philanthropy, we don’t take policy positions. It would be ironic to be very supportive of democracy and then come in heavy-handed with the idea that we have all the answers. I believe in a democratic conversation around these questions. That said, there does seem to be a real consensus, at least around three cross-cutting needs: transparency, privacy, and restrictions on government use of these technologies.
There’s a lot of conversation about the kinds of transparency we need to enable democratic accountability and visibility. I think about transparency along the policy stack. If you think about data and infrastructure and how that’s being built out, then compute, and then move to data collection, questions arise about what data models are being trained on and what kinds of bias and copyright protections are in place. Then you move to model development and finally to deployment, looking at how models are actually being used and how they’re impacting people. There’s a need for transparency at every layer of the stack.
A good example comes from infrastructure placement. In Oregon, people were trying to understand how much water Google was using. If I recall correctly, they were a couple of years into a drought and had to file suit against the government to get access to data showing that Google was using something like 30% of the water in that county. That points to a real need for basic transparency laws. We need that information to hold companies accountable.
Privacy law is another area we could spend much more time on. I sometimes tell friends that in the United States there are roughly a thousand licensed data brokers, each holding about 1,500 data points on any given person. One striking figure is that every second, something like 1.7 megabytes of data, enough to fill an 800-page book, are collected about us. I had to do a lot of research to understand what that even looks like. The collection itself isn’t necessarily the problem. The issue is how that data is used to make decisions and inferences, and the risks of surveillance, as we’ve seen in China, are significant.
Then there are restrictions on government use. There’s a fair amount of consensus that while there may be areas where we want to be careful about bias, there are others where these technologies simply shouldn’t be allowed in a democracy. Mass surveillance, predictive policing, and social scoring fall into that category. These are areas where there appears to be broad agreement among the public, even if that doesn’t necessarily translate into policy right away.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Kelly discuss the existential risks of AI, how governments should respond, and the role partisan politics plays in responses to new technology. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
A few hours ago, in a very lighthearted way, I was putting out a questionnaire to a Gen Zer in an attempt to test “intergenerational understanding” for an article I was writing, and one of the phrases I instinctively sent out was from The Princess Bride: “Life is pain, highness, anybody who says differently is selling something.”
I was in a nice mood and didn’t feel like checking the news or the WhatsApp messages that were starting to pile up, and when I finally did they were about the murder of Rob Reiner and his wife Michele, and whether this publication could work up any response to it.
The cognitive disconnect for something like this is total. Rob Reiner, for several generations of Americans, occupies a uniquely happy place in their imagination. This Is Spinal Tap was named the funniest movie of all time in a Time Out survey. When Harry Met Sally defined the romantic comedy and, for about a decade, changed the way everybody ate turkey sandwiches and thought about the New Year’s song. And The Princess Bride was in a special category entirely of its own—when an ESPN analyst suddenly began doing an entire football game recap in Princess Bride references, he found that his fellow analysts had no trouble at all keeping up. When I wanted to check whether the young were still basically alright, it was a Princess Bride quote that first came to me.
So hearing that Rob Reiner and his wife Michele were murdered inside their home, allegedly by their son, is the sort of thing that just doesn’t compute—it’s like hearing that Mr Rogers was brutally killed or Bert and Ernie met a violent death. This was not, it seems, an ideological or political crime; but fighting for headline space with the shooting at Brown University and the shooting at Bondi Beach, it’s very hard to shake the impulse to get a little zeitgeisty, and to feel that something or other that was promised about the way the world worked has been decisively, irrevocably ruptured.
Reiner’s movies were almost unimaginable except set against a backdrop of ease and plenty. The stakes tended always to be ludicrously low—the crisis in The Princess Bride is the kid in the Bears jersey not wanting to have his grandfather read to him, while in This Is Spinal Tap, it’s being out of proportion with one’s stage props; the peak of emotion in When Harry Met Sally is that a young woman is concerned that she’s “going to be 40 someday.”
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It’s incredible how far away that whole world feels right now.
Reiner’s life coincided with a golden age in American history—he was born in 1947 to one of the leading show business families in the United States. His great run of films stretching from 1984’s This Is Spinal Tap to 1995’s The American President overlapped with a period of unprecedented prosperity and the fall of the Soviet Union. A particular sensibility came with that—a limitless optimism, which wasn’t exactly naive, but had a worldview built into it according to which, no matter what, you keep moving forward and eventually things do work out in the end.
That sensibility comes through very strongly in the interviews and public statements Reiner made about his son Nick’s addictions. Nick had very openly struggled with drugs and psychological issues—according to a People Magazine article in 2016, he had first gone to rehab around his 15th birthday, had been through 17 rehab stays by the time he was 22, and had had stints of homelessness.
Reiner, at least in public, very clearly believed in the light at the end of the tunnel. In an interview with The Los Angeles Times in 2015, Reiner indicated that he regretted the “tough love” approach he had been encouraged to adopt and wished he had simply been softer with Nick. “We were desperate and because the people had diplomas on their wall, we listened to them when we should have been listening to our son,” Reiner said. And there was the evident hope as well that art would be redemptive. “Our relationship had gotten so much closer,” Reiner said of working on the 2016 film Being Charlie, which Reiner directed and Nick co-wrote and which was closely based on Nick’s difficulties with addiction.
At the time of Reiner’s death, his murder is in competition with a trifecta of terrible news stories—the Bondi Beach shooting in which at least 15 people were killed by gunmen while celebrating Hanukkah and the shooting at Brown University in which two people were killed. The very clear sense is of having entered into dark times—the kind of story where it’s not clear that optimism will prevail or that there will in fact be a happy ending. A year after Franklin Foer in an Atlantic article declared, “The golden age of American Jews is ending,” anti-Semitic violence has become commonplace. Mass shootings and school shootings are so frequent that what is produced is a society of distrust—it turns out, for instance, that two of the survivors of the Brown shooting had survived other school shootings.
There is a great deal of intellectual effort at the moment to try to understand what went wrong, how we got from the idyll that backdropped When Harry Met Sally and The Princess Bride to the fraying social fabric that we have right now—the deindustrialization and hollowing-out of the heartland, the inability to pass meaningful gun control legislation, the hyper-partisanship in Washington, the internet and the deracination it brings all come in for consideration, but there is no clear answer and probably there never will be. The greatest casualty of it in some sense is the worldview that somebody like Rob Reiner seemed to embody—the good-humored, endlessly humane belief that, somehow or other, things would work out. What we’re dealing with at the moment is the recognition that it’s possible they may not.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.
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