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It’s a great party. But as the music gets louder, the lights dimmer, and the drinks stronger, you already know how it ends: a miserable day in bed nursing an epic hangover. So why not one more margarita before calling that Uber?
Welcome to the AI Bubble. All the warning signs are there, and the aftermath is equally predictable. But with your portfolio brushing the stratosphere, why not spike it with a little margin? You may think your ETF is diversified, but with more than half of the S&P 500’s gains for 2025 coming from the so-called “Magnificent Seven” AI-exposed stocks, you’ve already doubled down on one massive bet—that the new wave of Generative AI will soon drive exponential earnings growth far into the future.
Unfortunately, the history of technological advances suggests a more cautious approach. Unforeseen innovations and financial bubbles go together like thunder and lightning. Sudden breakthroughs attract the attention of entrepreneurs, and investors soon follow. What’s it going to be worth, and how quickly? When no one knows, valuations soar as speculators—afraid of missing out on the next big thing—pile in at any price.
But the path to unlocking real value is never as smooth as it may appear at first. As futurist Paul Saffo once cautioned, “Never mistake a clear view for a short distance.” From railroads to electric lights, recorded music, automobiles, airplanes, radio, TV, and even the Internet, it often takes years—if not decades—for use cases to become clear and markets to develop, as consumers and businesses learn how to adjust their activities to take advantage of the new technology. Penicillin was discovered in 1928, but, despite its obvious life-saving potential, it wasn’t available by prescription to the general public until 1946, after methods for mass production and purification were finally developed. A recent study by McKinsey found that 80% of companies with pilot Generative AI projects report no meaningful contributions to their bottom lines so far, while other studies have reported wildly varying results.
In true bubble fashion, the race today is not to build useful products, but to attract the attention of investors, largely by beating competitors at specialized benchmarks only vaguely related to real-world scenarios. To put this in perspective, imagine that the only thing early car companies cared about was whose vehicles could circuit a race track the fastest. That wouldn’t help you get to work on time, any more than a program that can earn a gold medal score at the math Olympiad (Google’s Gemini) is going to help you get your taxes done.
What could possibly go wrong? Consider the mad rush to build supersized datacenters in remote locations to train and run large-scale Generative AI models, known as “foundation models.” Jensen Huang, CEO of graphics processing unit (GPU) chip maker Nvidia, projected on a recent earnings call that datacenter spending could exceed $1 trillion per year within the next few years. Luckily for him, one third to one half of this capital expense will be GPUs. But sober analysts don’t see reasonable prospects that all this investment will pay back in a relevant time frame. Advanced semiconductors have a typical shelf life of about three years, after which they are practically worthless. As Harris Kupperman, Chief Investment Officer of Praetorian Capital bluntly put it, “There just isn’t enough revenue and there never can be enough revenue.”
What’s driving the apparently insatiable demanad for AI chips? CB Insights tracks more than 1,300 AI startups with valuations of over $100 million, including 498 AI “unicorns”—companies with valuations of $1 billion or more. Many are training their own proprietary large-scale foundation AI models that consume enormous amounts of resources, fueling a bidding war for computing power, or “compute.” These models are the operating systems of the future—they will be the substrate on which practical AI applications will run. But how many foundation models does the world really need? History suggests two or three at most.
In 1930, there were 44 American car manufacturing companies. By 1935, fewer than a dozen remained, and 90% of the sales were made by General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. At the height of the Internet boom, there were dozens of browser and search engines companies, including AltaVista, Lycos, Excite, InfoSeek, and Ask Jeeves. Google now accounts for over 90% of web search traffic, with Microsoft’s Bing taking the next 4%. Today, just two smartphone operating systems—Google’s Android and Apple’s IOS—account for virtually the entire market. (The next biggest is Samsung, at 0.2%.)
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Investors of a certain age will remember when sky’s-the-limit projections of future Internet traffic fueled a furious build-out of network capacity. When that demand failed to materialize on schedule, several multi-billion-dollar companies imploded spectacularly. Do the names Global Crossing, WorldCom, 360networks, Exodus, and NorthPoint ring a bell? They were only the tip of the iceberg, dragging down Lucent, Nortel, Corning, Ciena, and Cisco with them. And that was just the infrastructure companies—a side show to the parade of failed Internet “startups” like Pets.com, Webvan, and eToys. Think AI companies like OpenAI and Anthropic—sporting multi-hundred-billion dollar private-market valuations—can’t possibly fail? Ask the founders of AOL, Netscape and Yahoo!, to name just a few.
But that’s only half the story. What’s yet to play out is that the real value in Generative AI can be delivered for a small fraction of today’s cost. Specialized systems for specific applications and industries—such as healthcare, education, manufacturing, entertainment, advertising, law, financial services and software engineering—will be able to run on your own laptop or phone, without the need to reach out to “the cloud.” Apple gets this, as evidenced by its recently-announced M5 chip for AI applications. The system that interprets your CAT scan won’t also need to generate pictures of cats. Your self-driving car won’t also need to make plane reservations.
The mantra of today’s U.S.-based Generative AI companies is that what matters is scale—and that’s why enormous piles of capital are required to buy computing power. But Nvidia may be only one software engineering advance away from seeing this business model gutted.
If necessity is the mother of invention, the West has inadvertently set up the Chinese to win the AI race. Deprived of the opportunity to purchase precious Nvidia GPU chips, Chinese companies have been forced to develop their own alternatives, such as Huawei’s Ascend series. While these chips currently don’t match the performance of their U.S. counterparts, there’s a simple, practical solution: use more of them to train AI models. Huawei’s CloudMatrix architecture connects about five times as many chips to achieve a level of performance equivalent to the best Nvidia processors.
Chinese AI software engineers have stepped in to fill the gap, by focusing on increasing efficiency without sacrificing performance. The famous DeepSeek wake-up call—when, in January of this year, a relatively unknown Chinese company demonstrated that its product was comparable in baseline performance to the major U.S. chatbots for a small fraction of the training and running costs—is the vanguard of faster, cheaper, more powerful systems. This was not a fluke. Since then several other Chinese companies, including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Zhipu AI, and ByteDance have released world-class generative AI products with similar economics.
But the biggest advantage these Chinese companies may have is the cost and availability of electricity. A kilowatt of electricity costs about eight cents in China, compared to an average of eighteen cents in the United States. And China has already built out more than twice the generating capacity it currently uses, leaving the United States scrambling to catch up.
Revanchist and regressive economic policies are going to make things even worse. We can prohibit the sale of Chinese products and services in the United States, but the rest of the world—whose GDP is three times the size of America’s—knows better. If comparable products are available at far lower prices, which country’s wares are likely to be more successful? China is poised to own this emerging market, as it does clean energy technologies, batteries, cars, telecommunications equipment, and numerous other industries.
Why listen to me? Not only is this not my first bubble, it’s not even my first AI bubble. I was dead center of a now-forgotten boom in AI during the mid-1980s. Investor interest in so-called “expert systems”—early rule-based programs that failed to live up to their promise—drove a wave of investment in AI startups, many of which went public before crashing and burning. That wave was even based on the same mistaken assumption—that to “do AI,” you needed an expensive, specialized computer called a “Lisp machine.” That bubble burst in part due to the realization that the emerging wave of personal computers could do the same job at a fraction of the cost.
All this said, this time is different, in the sense that Generative AI is a major technological advance that will improve the way we live and work—as the Internet has. So what is it good for, and how much value will it create? It’s too early to definitively answer these questions, which alone should give rational investors pause. But at least so far, the evidence suggests three primary sources of value.
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First, personal productivity. OpenAI, which created ChatGPT, has an annualized revenue run rate of about $20 billion. But at least so far, 75% of that revenue is coming from consumers purchasing monthly subscriptions, as opposed to corporate customers using the technology to expand their products and services. Anyone who tries this technology can plainly see that it’s great for writing documents, drafting presentations, reducing the effort of doing your own research, making pictures, and composing bespoke poetry and songs. The value of these benefits is so diffuse that economists have difficulty measuring it. How much do word processors and spreadsheets contribute to the economy? As Nobel laureate Robert Solow sagely observed, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”
Second, the distribution of expertise. Generative AI systems, despite their flaws, are great consultants on just about any topic, from diagnosing medical issues to planning a vacation, offering love advice, or explaining how to fix a broken toaster. Even the currently available products hold the promise of transforming medicine, education, and many other fields of specialization.
Third, an unrecognized benefit of Generative AI systems is that they can serve as universal interfaces—between people and machines (as in software engineering), between machines and machines (as in factory robots), and, importantly, between computers and computers (as in “agentic AI”). Tremendous value is siloed within our vast hodge-podge of special-purpose programs and databases; Generative AI offers the means to unlock this treasure trove.
But the salient question for investors is not what value the new technology will create, but who will pay for it, and how much? J.P Morgan estimates that $650 billion in additional annual revenue will be required just to deliver a 10% return on the currently announced AI investments. Achieving that would require users to spend more than three times as much on Generative AI systems as they currently spend on personal computer software from companies like Microsoft. Is that plausible? No—particularly given the prospect of heavy competition driving down prices in the future.
More likely, the benefits and revenue from AI will not play out on a scale and time frame sufficient to justify the current levels of investment. With respect to just the datacenter buildout, we may be creating a new man-made ecological disaster: miles of idle computer servers rusting away in buildings too expensive to cool, leaching toxic substances into the soil of remote deserts, with no one left in sight to hold accountable.
But why should you care if a bunch of deep-pocketed investors lose their shirts? Because that’s not the only downside of the AI bubble. Harvard economist Jason Furman calculates that excluding hardware and software investment, U.S. GDP grew at an anemic 0.1% annual rate in the first half of this year. The frenzy around AI provides cover for policymakers to adopt regressive or self-defeating economic policies that don’t improve the underlying health of the economy. When so much money is concentrated in questionable investments, less is available for more productive uses. And, when the unwinding begins, it will spread to many industries that took rosy projections too seriously, including energy utilities, construction companies, building material suppliers, and others.
So when will the bubble burst? Conventional wisdom says you never know. But it’s really not that uncertain. Almost by definition, investors part with their money when they expect to get it back at a profit in the future. In a well-managed economy, this occurs when value is created, increasing the future price of an asset. But that’s not the only way to profit. As long as there’s a reasonable expectation that someone will take a stake off your hands at a higher price, the game continues. The Internet bubble burst not when investors realized returns were a long way off, but when investment banks could no longer peddle risky companies to so-called retail investors—mom and pops looking to build their retirement nest eggs.
The bad news is that this process—taking AI companies public—has barely begun, and the not-so-novel twist the financial industry is now exploring is how to package up the infrastructure investments as debt in opaque bundles of so-called Special Purpose Vehicles. The plan is to market these to less-sophisticated investors poorly equipped to understand that these assets—special-purpose buildings and computers—depreciate rapidly. We may be heading for a duet combining the “greatest hits” of the 2000 dot-com bubble and the 2008 housing crisis.
During the dot-com bubble, annual private investment in Internet companies and infrastructure peaked at around $32 billion, and public investment (people buying Internet stocks) was around $260 billion. Most of that was lost in the crash of 2000, and it took the stock market about 12 years to fully recover. Today’s AI-related private spending is estimated to be about six times as high.
In short, no one has ever made money betting that the cost of computing and bandwidth would go up, or that people and companies would adopt new technologies en masse overnight. And no amount of tequila today will make the coming deflation easier to stomach.
Jerry Kaplan teaches Social and Economic Impact of Artificial Intelligence at Stanford University. His latest book, Generative Artificial Intelligence: What Everyone Needs to Know, was published by Oxford University Press in 2024.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
To say that we live in unhinged geopolitical times is an understatement—and things may get worse still. Whatever the outcome of the current round of outreach to Russia by the Trump administration, the direction of travel is unmistakable. In fact, if an end to hostilities is agreed under U.S. pressure, Russia is likely to pose an even greater threat to its neighbors as the Kremlin will have to channel its war machine somewhere.
To believe in the existence of NATO as a real, credible military force to deter Russian aggression against the Baltic states, which Putin sees as a legitimate target, now requires a real suspension of disbelief. Imagine a Europe in 2030 in which NATO’s Article 5 has been exposed to be as hollow as the Budapest Memorandum. Perhaps Western Europeans would step in and fill the void—but perhaps not.
Worse yet, if current political trends hold, an unravelling of NATO as an effective military alliance might go hand-in-hand with the demise of the EU—especially if National Rally and/or Alternative for Germany accede to power in France and Germany, respectively. The collapse might not be immediate or dramatic. It may look like Brexit, but it may also take the form of either of the two key countries withdrawing from various aspects of EU policymaking and law. It is one thing when Viktor Orbán decides to be difficult; it would be quite another if a President Jordan Bardella or a Chancellor Alice Weidel demanded a thorough renegotiation of key aspects of European architecture or unilaterally withdrew from parts of EU law.
For countries in my part of the world, Eastern Europe, that prospect raises the question of how to preserve the achievements of 1989—which EU and NATO memberships were supposed to guarantee. Previous generations of Eastern European political leaders made the bet that U.S. security guarantees and European economic integration were the safest paths toward freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity. They were absolutely right under the circumstances that they faced—yet our generation might face radically different circumstances in which those two paths are not available.
Different responses to the challenge are conceivable. Yet the obvious one, namely some version of a stronger EU, or “European strategic autonomy,” begs the question, as it assumes away the European component of the current predicament. Sure, it would be nice if the prospect of a non-benign nationalist takeover of France or Germany went away, or if the EU responded to the failure of U.S. leadership by getting its act together—but this is far from a foregone conclusion. It is equally probable, if not more probable, that NATO and the EU were conceived as complementary elements, rather than as artefacts that can be substituted for one another. As a result, if one of them crumbles, the decay of the other will accelerate.
The more “robust” answer is for countries on the north-eastern periphery of Europe—confronted with an aggressive Russia, a hollowing out of NATO’s security guarantees, and a potential breakdown of the EU—to work together to create a new political project: a “federation” including the Nordic countries, Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Ukraine—and possibly others.
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Historically, federal political projects have arisen as ways of managing internal diversity in the face of shared challenges, oftentimes emerging in times of geopolitical distress, as in the case of the union between England and Scotland—or the early United States, where Benjamin Franklin supposedly quipped that “we must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.” In Eastern Europe, too, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth emerged as a bulwark against the threat of Teutonic knights and later also of an aggressive Muscovy. It also provided the benefit of bringing local Slavic populations into the fold of Western Christendom, as opposed to Russian Orthodoxy.
To be sure, there have been many calls for federalizing the EU. The idea never materialized, for a simple reason: the bloc is too big and too heterogeneous. EU-27, or even just the Eurozone countries, never saw eye-to-eye on major strategic or economic questions such as a common European nuclear deterrent (as opposed to a French one), or a European welfare state. The sense of a shared threat from Russia, apparent in Europe’s north and east, is much weaker further west and south. In the current debate over frozen Russian assets, Belgium is not willing to take on even the most theoretical of risks for the sake of helping Ukraine—suggesting that the country’s elites simply do not see themselves as concerned with the consequences of a possible Russian victory.
What a Limited EU Federation Would Look LikeBut what remains a bridge too far for the EU-27 might be possible for a smaller subset of countries, especially when faced with an existential threat in the form of an aggressive Russia operating in a post-American world. In an ironic twist of history, just as the United States celebrates the 250th anniversary of its founding, the federalist ideas that inspired it can also influence the region that owes much of its current success to the wisdom and perseverance of earlier generations of American policymakers.
The “North-Eastern Federation” could be a very thin one, initially delegating only a small number of powers to its center: foreign policy (including nuclear deterrence), trade, and the internal market. Unlike the EU, which has evolved into an unwieldy body with fingers in all areas of public policy and oftentimes without a clear focus, this Federation would be forced by circumstances to focus on the essentials, leaving the luxury causes du jour for some later date—or for the national governments to resolve themselves. The project would thus, by necessity, mirror the idea of subsidiarity—that higher forms of political authority exist only to address tasks that cannot adequately be dealt with at lower levels of government.
Since most of the countries in question are already EU member states, this project could align with their EU commitments. In practice, those that are not in the EU apply the bulk of EU law anyway (Norway, Iceland) or are in the process of negotiating accession into the bloc (Ukraine). For Ukraine in particular, federalizing with EU member states could accelerate the process of joining the bloc—not unlike in the case of East Germany, which became absorbed into the European Economic Community without a formal accession process. The Federation would enable participating countries to deepen the internal market in ways that have proven too difficult at the EU level, in services or in building a savings and investment union that would enable the emergence of a more significant venture capital ecosystem.
The Federation would need the power to tax and issue debt—something that has proven elusive at the EU level but might be more straightforward among countries in a better fiscal shape. Ukraine, devastated by war, is an exception. But by being a bulwark against Russian aggression, Ukraine has paid far more than its fair share of the price of admission into the club and future transfers needed to rebuild it—a proposition that is an easier sell to Ukraine’s neighbors, aware of its importance, than to European countries further away, more likely to be indifferent to its future.
In economic terms, the Federation would be a formidable force—even more since it would encompass the more economically nimble, less heavily-regulated countries of the European continent. Even without Ukraine, the Federation’s GDP, at some $2.9 trillion, would surpass Russia’s. With Ukraine, it would rival the GDP of France.
The idea of building new political institutions in Eastern Europe may seem farfetched, but it is simply a logical extension of the already existing, more loosely-structured initiatives uniting countries of the region. In the 2010s, the Three Seas Initiative sought to foster north-south connectivity on NATO’s eastern flank. Back then, common infrastructure projects and enhanced political dialogue, with the support of the United States, may have seemed sufficient to address the shared security challenge. However, as the geopolitical outlook for the region radically deteriorates, and may worsen even further, more ambitious thinking becomes necessary. After all, as has been proven many times by history, the alternative to hanging together is hanging separately.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a contributing editor at American Purpose.
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Richard Thaler is the Charles R. Walgreen Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He is the co-author, with Cass Sunstein, of Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, and is the 2017 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Richard Thaler explore to what extent humans behave rationally, how nudge theory works, and whether we should outsource questions about life to ChatGPT.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Your big contribution is in the field of behavioral economics, and it comes against a background that is often invoked but is perhaps a lot less true today as a result of your work, of economics making a bunch of assumptions about people acting in rational ways. To those of my listeners who have not taken Econ 101 or who took it too long ago to have this present in their mind, what kind of assumptions are we talking about when we are saying that economics, at one point in time, assumed that people would behave in these rational ways?
Richard Thaler: I do not even think we have to add “at one point in time.” So economics, as traditionally done and more or less as still done, is a theory of maximizing agents. What distinguishes economics from other social science disciplines is precisely that assumption that the agents in the economy are consumers and workers and employers and government officials, and they all solve any problem by solving for the best possible outcome. There are some additional assumptions, more or less for convenience, such as that people are selfish and do not care at all about others. That is a core assumption, but not at the heart of economics, though it is often assumed. And all of this, of course, is counterfactual.
Mounk: I think the point of some of these assumptions and the point also of more formal rational choice models, which often hinge on those assumptions, is sometimes insufficiently understood. This is not necessarily that economists say that people act in these ways all of the time, or that political scientists who have increasingly started to incorporate rational choice models into their work think that under all circumstances political leaders or individual voters or citizens act in a rational way. It is the hope, the idea, that by making some very simple assumptions about the world, you can explain a large percentage of it. With a few simple assumptions you do not get 100% of the way to the truth, but you might get 90–95% of the truth. It is a really good first approximation as to what could happen, how to understand the world.
Do you still find those assumptions useful in that kind of way? To what extent, under what kind of circumstances, should we deviate from that assumption in trying to understand the social world?
Thaler: Well, Milton Friedman in the 60s famously argued that it did not matter if people were incapable of solving these problems as long as they behaved as if they were doing that. Those two words, as if. Economists justified what they were doing for a long time with those two words. The first paper I wrote in what is now called behavioral economics in 1980 took on those two words and said, no, they do not. Friedman had a famous analogy. He said suppose we look at a professional billiards player. The billiards player does not know trigonometry and physics and all the things that would be necessary to actually solve the problem, but acts as if he or she did.
My response to that is, well, in economics we are not limiting ourselves to professionals. Suppose we go into a pub and there are two guys playing pool. What are they going to do? They are probably going to aim at a ball that is closest to a pocket with an idea that they are taking the shot that is most likely to work. They often miss. They are not thinking more than one step ahead, whereas a professional would be thinking three shots ahead. So the model would just be wrong.
If we think about something like the model for people saving for retirement, that is enormously complicated. Somebody in their 40s is assumed to be calculating more or less accurately their future lifetime income, how much they would need to save to smooth over their lifetime, invest properly, and so forth and so on. This is a preposterous assumption.
But those models are still useful. I think they are useful as normative models, that is, models of the way you should behave. If you go to a financial advisor, that person’s job is to help you do that.
How much do you want to give to your heirs? How well do you want to live in retirement? There is software to do that. But the idea that people are doing that in their head is ridiculous. It is also leaving out self-control problems. In order to implement that plan, I cannot get tempted by some new sports car or a posh trip to Italy to eat some good food. So no, the models are useful to say how agents that do not exist would solve, but then it is an empirical question whether those models work.
Mounk: Some of this now seems obvious thanks to your work and the work of others in the field of behavioral economics, but it must not have felt at all obvious when you set out on doing this work. What first set you off on that? How did you look at this line saying people act as if they were rational agents in this kind of way and think that smells wrong? Was that a particular observation about the empirical world in a particular field of economics? Did you come in with a critical mindset about standard economics, or were you at first taken in by it? How did you get towards that avenue of research?
Thaler: I think it started when I was in graduate school, and I like to say I was the first economist who bothered to look out the window, possibly because I was bored with the lectures. It started with a list of funny behavior, dumb stuff people do, that I thought illustrated important points. There is a now well-known story about a dinner party I had, and there was some roast in the oven. Over some adult beverages I brought out a large bowl of cashew nuts, and people started nibbling that with their cocktails, and the bowl started to disappear, and I was worried about our appetites.
So I grabbed the bowl and hid it in the kitchen. This was a group of economists, and when I came back, everyone thanked me. Thank God you got rid of those cashews. We were going to eat them. It being a dinner of economists, the conversation became very boring and technical.
Mounk: We are supposed to be rational agents. How can taking away a choice make us better off? I think perhaps revealed preference here is truer than stated preference.
Thaler: Yeah, well, but it is an asset allocation problem. Maybe you would like to consume both. I think the consensus at the table was that our cashew-to-roast ratio was going to be incorrect. We have all had the experience of deciding after the fact that the alcohol consumption was greater than optimum. Another one of these early examples was about what economists call the sunk cost fallacy. The idea is that if you have paid for something, the amount you paid for it is gone and is not recoverable, and therefore you should ignore it in future decisions.
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Here is an example. You paid a significant amount of money to attend some concert, and that evening you get a text from a friend whose flight has been canceled, who was changing planes in Chicago or wherever you are living, and says, I am free for dinner. Are you? Let us assume that if on any other night of the year you were given a choice of going to that concert or seeing your friend, whom you see only occasionally, you would say that is a no-brainer. But many people would make the mistake of saying, I paid all that money for that.
So I had this list and I was not sure what to do with it. Then I discovered the work of the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. We are in the mid-1970s at this point. They had a big idea, which was that when dealing with complicated problems, people take mental shortcuts, which is entirely sensible, but those shortcuts lead to systematic deviations from the rational economic model, like the two we have just mentioned.
There was a guy called Herbert Simon who was a behavioral economist before the term existed. He got fed up with debating with economists and became a pioneer in artificial intelligence instead—maybe a better goal. He had the idea that people satisfice, that is, they do not try to solve some problem; they figure out some solution that is good enough and quit, which is entirely sensible, but economists more or less ignored him. He was given a Nobel Prize, but that means he impressed seven Swedes. It does not mean he necessarily impressed the profession. I think the reason for that is they did not know what to do with him.
Mounk: Let me see whether I understand this. The idea is that when you are satisficing, you are saying, I am just going to operate at a rough approximation of a solution. But those approximations do not necessarily go off in one direction or the other direction. It means that you do not get a very detailed answer, and you might sometimes be off five points in one direction, sometimes five points in the other direction. But since it does not systematically bias your estimates of what is going to happen, economists felt like, interesting point, well-deserved Nobel Prize, but we can ignore that. So in order to actually change your profession, you needed to find examples where those mental shortcuts or those ways in which we are not acting in a rational way systematically make us choose something that is different from what the model suggests. Is that the idea?
Thaler: That is right. Here is an example from this early Kahneman and Tversky work. This research was not about decisions but about judgments and forecasts. Suppose I say to you, in the United States, what is the ratio of deaths by homicide to deaths by suicide? Most people will say, homicides may be twice as likely as suicides, but the opposite is true. There are about twice as many suicides. Kahneman and Tversky said this is because people use what they call the availability heuristic. We estimate something’s likelihood by how easy it is to recall instances of it.
Mounk: Since murders are much more covered in the news than suicides, they are much more available to us when we are looking for these examples.
Thaler: This is in spite of the fact that, at least for people in our socioeconomic class, we almost certainly know more people who committed suicide than died by homicide. There is a different lens we could have looked through that, even with availability, would have gotten this right, but it is the news bias that creates this. I read those papers and became excited and said, wait, here we go. There is a way of doing this that cannot be ignored. That was the beginning.
Mounk: What is interesting is that you ended up collaborating with them in various ways, but they were mostly looking at social psychology more broadly. Some of the examples they were giving were economic or had applications to economics, but you then built on that to show that in a broad range of economic situations we do not act rationally, including sometimes sophisticated economic actors, not just the average employee who does not like to think about economics too much, who is choosing some random retirement plan and perhaps is not maximizing the way in which income will be smoothed over time. Some sophisticated actors in the economy end up deviating from expectations of rationality as well. Tell us about some of those examples in economics.
Thaler: Sometime in the mid-1980s, I was offered the opportunity to start writing a quarterly column in a brand new economics journal called the Journal of Economic Perspectives, a journal that still exists and is the only economics journal that is accessible to non-economists. That journal still exists and is free to anybody. The column I was asked to write was on anomalies.
These are departures from economic theory. I wrote that column for four years, and when I had enough that looked like a book, I stapled those together and had a book called The Winner’s Curse. We will get to what the winner’s curse is in a minute. These were empirical facts that are embarrassing to economists. Recently, I collaborated with a young co-author to go back and look at those old columns and ask whether those findings were true. Many of the early ones were based on experiments, motivated by psychologists, laboratory experiments with undergrads at low stakes. There is something called the replication crisis in some parts of psychology. Is there a replication crisis in behavioral economics? What we have shown in this new book is that there was no replication crisis in this field, and that many of the early studies based on students running experiments have now been replicated with experts doing something for a living.
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Let us take the example of the title chapter of that book, The Winner’s Curse. What is the winner’s curse? The idea is that in an auction where the winner gets something that is worth the same to everyone, it is often the case that the high bidder, the winner of the auction, loses money. Here is a simple lab or classroom experiment. Fill a jar with coins. Count them. Say there is, for example, $75 worth of coins. You auction off the jar. The high bidder wins that amount of money. They do not have to take the coins. What happens? The average bid is conservative, perhaps $40, but the winning bid is almost always more than $75. The winner is cursed.
This was not discovered by psychologists or renegade economists. It was discovered by engineers at Atlantic Richfield Oil Company who were drilling for oil in what I stubbornly continue to call the Gulf of Mexico. What they noticed was that there were hundreds of plots that were divvied up. They bid for many of them. On the ones they won, there was usually less oil than their geologists had predicted. They began to wonder what was going on. Did they have lousy geologists? Were they just unlucky? Then they realized the bids they won were not a random set of bids.
Mounk: It is the bids where we were relatively optimistic compared to the guesses everyone else made. We might have bid on ninety other oil fields, and on each of those fields we were on the money or below what the true yield was. But those were the bids we did not win.
Thaler: Compare the strategy of hiring experts and trying to figure out the optimal bid for each plot with another strategy of bidding one dollar for every plot. You will win some, and you will never overpay. A friend of mine and I used to bid in wine auctions, and that was the strategy we used, making very low bids. There was one auction in Los Angeles where there were demonstrations and people could not show up at the physical site, and our bids that had been faxed—this is an old story—won. We ended up with quite a lot of very good inexpensive wine as a result. That is what a smart strategic bidder does to overcome the winner’s curse.
Mounk: Explain to me where the irrationality lies here. In itself, hiring the best experts to make bids is not irrational, and it does not sound like there were psychological biases going on. The bias of the bidders was not, as you might expect from some of the Kahneman examples, that this oil field had been in the news a lot or that it had a name that made it sound especially promising. It was not a case of someone thinking, I am confident about this; I am going to put a lot of money in, the way someone might bet on a horse because its name reminds them of a lucky word.
The structure of the auction is such that if ten really smart people make an estimate, it is natural that there will be some spread between the estimates, even if each of them is acting rationally. It is a second-order irrationality. The irrationality lies in not recognizing the structural feature of the market and adjusting what otherwise would seem like a very reasonable approach to it as a result. The bid itself was not irrational. It was the overall strategy of bidding, given that you would only win the auctions in the instances when you were higher than everybody else.
Thaler: That is right. Compare it with a famous example from Keynes. John Maynard Keynes, one of the great twentieth-century economists, in his famous book The General Theory, offered a very sexist example from the time. The newspapers used to run contests where there would be photographs of one hundred attractive women, and the contestants, presumably nearly all of whom were men on the train—I always visualize them looking at their newspaper—had the job of picking the five who would be judged the prettiest by everyone else.
Keynes said this was his model of the stock market. The goal is not to correctly say who is the prettiest; it is to say who others will think are the prettiest. Or, as Keynes said, it is actually who others will think others will think others will think.
Here is a version of this, a little game that economists now call the beauty contest game in honor of Keynes.
We say that everybody in this room—imagine we have one hundred people in a room—is going to guess a number from zero to one hundred, with the goal of guessing as close as possible to two-thirds of the average guess. We might look around the room and say these guys are mostly asleep, not paying much attention. Maybe they will guess at random. If people guess at random, their average guess will be fifty, so we should guess two-thirds of that, which is thirty-three. Then we say, wait, maybe some people are awake and have realized they should guess thirty-three, so I should guess twenty-two. But some people may think that. The question is how many steps people take.
The rational economic model of this guessing game, the Nash equilibrium, is to guess zero. Let us say everyone guesses three; you want to guess two. If everyone guesses two, you want to guess 1.3. I have played this game dozens of times, and zero has never won. I played this game in the Financial Times with two business-class tickets, London to the United States, offered to the winner, and the winning guess was thirteen.
Mounk: You go some way toward that and realize some of the logic, but you do not go all the way because some people do not understand the logic of the game and therefore do not go there, or because you expect that some people will not fully follow the logic and therefore it is rational not to go to zero. Seemingly it is rational to go to zero, assuming that everyone else is rational, but if you correctly assume that everyone else is not rational, then guessing zero is irrational, and guessing somewhere in the middle is better.
Thaler: What you guess depends greatly on who you are playing with. If I play that with University of Chicago MBA students, then a number in the low teens is a good guess. I played this in my granddaughter’s high school economics class, and a number in the twenties won. She submitted it, and everyone thought it was rigged.
Mounk: She has just listened to you at the dinner table too often. There is a nice story that vastly oversimplifies the state of research: you can have people play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. If you want to listen back to what a Prisoner’s Dilemma is, Steven Pinker and I discussed it in some detail in a recent podcast I had with him. The idea is that most people in the world do not act as instructed by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. There have been many studies of people all over the world in different cultures and different professional statuses, and by and large people do not behave as the Prisoner’s Dilemma predicts, except apparently—this may be somewhat apocryphal—economics grad students, who reliably act as the Prisoner’s Dilemma instructs them to and therefore find it much harder to cooperate with each other than any other group of humans.
Thaler: That is a somewhat controversial finding, but it is approximately right. One of the things we have done in this book is ask how we can get outside the lab and raise the stakes. I have managed to write three academic papers using data from game shows. There is a delightful UK game show with the odd title Golden Balls that ends with a high-stakes Prisoner’s Dilemma. They call it split or steal.
There are two people who have won some money, and each can say “split” or “steal.” If they both split, they split. If one steals and the other splits, the one who steals gets everything. If they both steal, they both get nothing. You can find two really interesting episodes on YouTube, one for a hundred thousand pounds. This is well beyond the research budget of most universities. I will not spoil the ending.
Mounk: I believe that one person normally reassures the other that they are going to split. Trust me, of course I am going to split. I am going to be the good upstanding citizen. Sometimes, when they are relatively sure that the other person has been induced by those assurances to be the good upstanding citizen and to split, they secretly steal and get all of the money. In one episode someone inverts the strategy—I know that is the episode you are thinking of—and says, I am going to steal. Whatever you do, I am going to steal, and it leads to a hilarious outcome.
Thaler: Yes, that episode is priceless. He broke the game, but everyone else played by the rules, and the behavior is exactly the same. There is a little more cooperation in that game than in a laboratory experiment for ten dollars.
There is another old economics game called the ultimatum game, where you and I are asked to share one hundred dollars. The rules are that I make you an offer you can accept or reject. If you accept, you get what I offered. If you reject, we both get nothing. Economic theory says you will take anything, so I should offer you a dollar or maybe a penny. Real people find low offers insulting. The results of that game are that offers of less than twenty percent are usually rejected. Profit-maximizing offers are about forty percent. The results do not change if you multiply the stakes by ten or one hundred or go to a country where you can afford to pay a month’s wages.
Mounk: We have done a tour d’horizon of the different ways in which economists once assumed that people behave rationally. Some economists still assume that people behave rationally, but we see in lab experiments, in behavior on game shows, and in the way people bid on oil fields that they do not behave as rationally as was assumed. What are the implications of that for economics, and what are the implications for public policy?
Presumably one thing that might change—and this is where your work with another recent podcast guest, Cass Sunstein, comes in—is that if we assume people make rational choices, then all we need to do is offer them a set of fair choices, such as where to invest their retirement savings or whether to save for retirement at all, and then it is up to them. If we recognize that people are likely to make choices that are irrational in ways detrimental to their well-being, we might start to think about how to manipulate the choice architecture. We might ask whether we can nudge them toward the right course of action so that they still have freedom of choice and can decline the nudge, but we end up with many more people saving adequately for retirement.
Talk us through a variety of implications of this research, including your influential book on nudging with Cass Sunstein.
Thaler: Sure. Let us take the following example. Listeners who are not from America have read about the horrors of the U.S. healthcare system, and it is pretty horrible. We spend more than anyone else and get average care. The system is also very complicated.
There was one company that decided—there was probably some economist who worked for them—that they would offer health insurance to their workers with four variables to choose from: how big the deductible is and similar details. Think of it as a restaurant menu: how many courses, fish or meat, how many desserts. They gave employees every possible option and said, pick one. There were forty-eight combinations.
It turned out that many of these options were dominated by one of the alternatives. Dominated meaning there was an option that was guaranteed to cost less no matter how much healthcare you consumed. A rational agent would start by eliminating all the dominated options. In game theory that is an explicit assumption: agents cross out the choices they absolutely should not take and then pick from the remaining ones.
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Remember, this was not an experiment. This was something a company did with twenty-five thousand employees, and more than half chose dominated options.
Mounk: They were leaving money on the table. They could have chosen combinations that meant less money paid up front and less money even if they got sick.
Thaler: The average household spent at least $400 too much and possibly more depending on how much healthcare they consumed. That shows in a blunt way that if you give people a complicated problem, they do not solve it. Giving people all the options is not a good way to do it. It would be like going back to the restaurant example. You would not go to a restaurant where they give you a list of all their ingredients. That would be horrible. The best dinner is, here are five things you would never have dreamed of ordering. Watch what we do and taste what we do.
The book Cass Sunstein and I wrote called Nudge came out in 2008, and then we did an update that we called The Final Edition, a title I insisted on to prevent Cass from rewriting it. We suggested that for hard problems, you should give people some help. I would have eliminated all the dominated options in that plan if they had hired me as the consultant.
The irony is that they used one of our favorite tricks: they offered a default plan. If you do not make a choice, here is a plan. People did not take it. I think the reason is that it is like going to a salad bar and composing a Caesar salad. You are being nudged to do it yourself.
Anyway, our book argued that there are many places where we can help people make better choices. The example we like to talk about is GPS. When we wrote the book, we had each just bought our first iPhones, and we did not have GPS in our pockets. I am very geographically challenged, so having GPS in my pocket is very good for me.
What we would like is for life to be more like wandering around in a strange city with GPS in your pocket. If I had worked at that company, I would have wanted an app that could help. Maybe now, with the right prompts, you could feed the choices into ChatGPT and give it a little nudge, and the AI might help you choose. A good one would start by eliminating the dominated options.
Our book is full of ways in which we can make the world more like wandering around the streets of a strange city with GPS in your pocket, rather than using one of those old maps I could not even figure out how to refold, much less navigate.
Mounk: I just went through a great American annual tradition of choosing my benefits for the upcoming year. There were many windows asking whether I wanted to spend $4.74 per pay period to get some kind of accident insurance and all kinds of other questions, all of which I outsourced to ChatGPT. I have no idea whether ChatGPT gave me good answers, but it was certainly rational to spend more of my time thinking about the world and less of my time making those low-stakes decisions.
Thaler: Here’s some free advice to your listeners: decline all extended warranties. There you go. Free.
Mounk: The other point I want to make is that I have a longstanding theory that the only invention of the last thirty years that is not just net good for humanity, but virtually a costless gain for humanity, is Google Maps. I remember so many stressful car drives as a child where you were looking at a map and forgot where exactly you were on the map and had to stop and ask seven people, with no idea when you would arrive.
Later, when there was MapQuest, you had what I think was an even worse equilibrium: these step-by-step instructions. If you managed on a long drive to follow all of the instructions exactly, then you were golden. But inevitably you would miss one of those turns, and at that point you might not even have a map in your hands, and you would be completely lost. I think that led to a lot of fights between couples, for example.
It is not just that Google Maps means people now on average arrive faster because they are less likely to take a wrong turn. I would not be surprised if it leads to fewer accidents because you are not, at the last second, saying, no, this is the exit, and trying to get over to the exit at the last moment. The domestic tranquility of being able to follow these instructions is substantial. Of all the different inventions over the last thirty or forty years, if there were a Nobel Prize for inventions, this one should get it.
Thaler: I absolutely agree, and that is why I always use it as the metaphor for what we would like to do to the rest of life.
Mounk: One of the other examples you give is that when there is free money on the table, where your employer contributes significant income to you if you put a minimum amount of money into retirement savings, many employees do not do that unless there is a default setting. That is another area in which having that “nudge”—saying, you can opt out for whatever financial reasons you do not want to spend that three or four percent of salary pre-tax—still allows you to opt out, but ensures that employees who have not thought about it and have not gotten around to making a selection are automatically opted in. There is a nudge toward participating in this program, and if for some reason you choose to opt out, you are free to do so.
There are many other examples. With health insurance, for instance, an employer that offers health insurance should nudge you into being opted into the health insurance so that if you forget to sign up, you do not suddenly find yourself without coverage. Even if you have another form of coverage, you can still opt out proactively.
One way you describe this framework is as “libertarian paternalism.” There is a paternalistic element, which is the idea that under most circumstances policymakers know what is beneficial: most people should save for retirement, and most employees want health insurance. The nudge pushes you in that direction. There is also a libertarian element because it is a defeasible pre-selection—you can opt out. This appears to solve a longstanding problem in ethics. On the one hand, people often make choices that undermine their own well-being, and we want to intervene to improve outcomes. On the other hand, we ask whether the state should be telling people how to live. This framework appears to offer a middle ground.
It also relies on a background assumption about a pretty competent state and a benevolent government, about experts who know what is good for you. We are in a moment where there is sometimes wrongly and sometimes perhaps rightly a lot of skepticism about all of those things. How do you think this framework of how to improve the world in the year 2025, with the particular government we have in the United States, with the governments we have waiting in other countries—not just some of the specific empirical examples that I am less interested in—do you think that the ethical appeal of this idea of libertarian paternalism remains as strong? Or do you think, in an age where people have these fundamental concerns about expertise, about the government, about the reliability of those who are in government, we should grow a little bit more skeptical about that paradigm?
Thaler: One of the things that makes us comfortable about that agenda is that we have critics on both sides. You sketched an argument, as you just did, that if we have an authoritarian and, in the United States, obviously incompetent government, do we want to give them more power? On the other hand, we have critics who say that we have been too wimpy, that we should not stop at nudging—we should mandate. My response to those critics is to say, really? During the first Trump term, I would ask them whether they were aware of who was president and whether they actually wanted to give him more power.
Even competent governments make mistakes, so we view the opt-out feature as an insurance policy. The choice architect—and the choice architect need not be the government; it could be the employer—decides how to devise the best route. The engineers at Google Maps decide the trade-off between saving time and making turns every block. My impression is that they have improved that app over the years toward fewer unnecessary turns. I do not need to make twelve turns to save one minute; I will stop at a few lights.
There are other critics who view all nudging as evil and say that we should boost instead of nudge. I do not know exactly what the difference is, but part of it is meant to be education. If we go back to that health insurance example, what are we going to do—give people a PhD in economics to enable them to solve that problem? I do not think so. I am always in favor of making it easier. That is my goal for all of these policies: to make it easier for people to choose the option that is best for them. Sometimes the solution will be to create a default. Here is a counterexample, and one where people think they know what policy Cass and I prefer and are wrong. That is organ donations.
Mounk: Well, I have read enough of your work that I know the answer, unfortunately. I guess you would think that the naive reader of Nudge might think, well, obviously they are going to want you to opt in to organ donations because it is important that we have enough organs to save people whose life might be saved by it. But because relatives at the point of decision still get a word, if they do not feel like you, my relative who has had this horrible car accident, really thought this through and we are not sure about whether they really would have wanted to, they can override that choice in the end. That is why the original nudge architecture does not work. Therefore we should do what instead, Richard?
Thaler: Right, excellent, A plus answer. In fact, the default does work in the sense that if the default is to become an organ donor, almost no one opts out, but that does not save any lives because the family members are told, well, your loved one did not opt out of being an organ donor. So do you not think we should go with his or her wishes? What wishes? We prefer a prompted choice. Ask people when they renew their driver’s license, would you like to be an organ donor? Keep asking until they say yes, then stop asking.
In the United States, there is a rule called first-person consent, which means the person who made a choice, their wishes count. That is the choice architecture we prefer. It is also the one that saves the most lives. In the UK, one of the first meetings I had after the Cameron coalition government was elected, we discussed this topic in Number 10 and decided not to adopt this presumed consent rule. Sometime later, I think during the Boris era, they switched to what we think is a worse policy, and people blame me, and I say, do not blame me.
Mounk: We were joking earlier about ChatGPT, but it occurs to me that as I was going through these 23 or so screens to make my choices of various benefit options and various additional things that I can opt into and so on, which range from key questions like health insurance to some kind of special commuter account, I have to figure out whether or not you are actually going to use it and whether you are going to be actually submitting it. If it is not used up, then you lose it. On the one hand, it is rational to put a bunch of money in because it is going to save you money because it is pre-taxed, so you are not taxing the money that goes into it. On the other hand, there is a chance that you are not going to use it up, in which case you lose all of it. It is not high stakes, but it is pretty complicated.
There is a preset option that the interface gives me. I do not know if that was always the case or if that is a result of nudge, but they do nudge you toward some option or another. It is not that there are three tick boxes without anything preselected. If you just click next, it has one. On a lot of these screens, what I did was copy and paste it into ChatGPT and say, what shall I do? ChatGPT has become for a lot of these things the kind of nudge in chief.
Is that a good thing or a bad thing? Do you think that ChatGPT on the whole is going to be better at prompting us in the right decisions than the preset nudges? Is this the thing that OpenAI and other AI companies should do to make sure that those AI systems actually nudge us in a healthy rather than unhealthy direction? How is nudging transformed in the age of AI?
Thaler: Yeah, well, you really should invite my young co-author Alex Imas to do an interview with you, who knows a thousand times more about AI than me. I think AI certainly has the potential to help a lot, but you would want to tell it a lot about your preferences. I have a friend who is an active AI user who has had ChatGPT read all of his emails and learn as much about him as possible in order to help him be a better version of himself.
We are so new into this. Yes, it certainly has the possibility to help, but it also can hallucinate. I would want it asking me the right questions. I think there is a lot of talk about regulation of AI, which is not a topic that I am qualified to talk about, but I do think that what we absolutely need is AI to be auditable, meaning it should be possible for us to give it tests and see what it does.
Certainly, AI could be very helpful. Choosing the right health insurance options is not harder than navigating a route from New York to Chicago.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Richard discuss why we need behavioral economics. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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Jill Lepore just provided an object lesson in how American universities can return to their purpose and win back the trust of the American people.
Lepore, a renowned historian, Harvard professor, and New Yorker staff writer, made this statement to David Leonhardt of The New York Times about how the intellectual culture at Harvard changed around 2014:
Students started showing up, determined that their job in a classroom was to humiliate one another and possibly catch a professor in saying something that was a violation of what they believed to be a way you can speak … This entire campus became incredibly prosecutorial.
She continued:
[I]t just surprises me to no end when people are like: Well, there was really never a problem on campuses. I don’t know what college campus they’re talking about … I just think it’s silly to deny that that existed, that it didn’t harm a lot of people, that it wasn’t wildly out of control on many occasions.
And in a subsequent conversation with Evan Goldstein of The Chronicle of Higher Education, Lepore went even further. She said that the culture at Harvard got so “miserable” that she felt like she could not do intellectual work anymore. She could not teach the way she wanted to teach, because students refused to read viewpoints that they disagreed with. She could not publish essays she wanted to publish because colleagues warned her that, for example, her writing comparing the #MeToo movement to various moral panics would “destroy [her] life.”
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She felt so suffocated that she resolved to leave higher education altogether. At breakfast on the day she planned to announce her resignation, one of her kids convinced her to stay.
“I look back on that time with considerable shame at my unwillingness to speak out,” she told Goldstein.
What I found so refreshing about Lepore’s statements is the recognition that, while hostile forces might be able to destroy your operations, it’s you yourself who are in a unique position to corrupt your own purpose and squander your credibility. And then there’s the clarity about what the road back requires:
Face the problem.
Name the problem.
Recognize how bad it was, and still is.
Confess that you should have done more.
Take full responsibility.
Resist the temptation to make an excuse by saying “but the other side is worse”—and yet still guard against the other side’s assaults.
I’m curious whether Lepore’s comments will inspire others to come forward and make similar statements.
Right now, seven in ten people think American higher education is heading in the wrong direction, and the suffocating dominance of progressive ideology is one reason for this. The ideological skew may be especially acute in higher education, but it is a problem for civil society more broadly.
In his recently published book, The Nonprofit Crisis, Greg Berman correctly identifies the central issue: “The hidden crisis facing nonprofits is the declining public confidence in the sector.” He cites studies which show that roughly half of Americans do not trust civic institutions.
A key reason for this is the increasingly ideological bent of many nonprofits. Berman quotes from a study of the effects of ideology on trust: “Higher perceived politicization of institutions consistently predicted lower trust, often with large effect sizes. Similar patterns were observed between institutions, such that the institutions perceived as the most politicized were also the least trusted.”
Exhibit A may well be the Sierra Club, long amongst the most widely-trusted environmental organizations. Last month, a front page story in the Sunday New York Times titled “The Sierra Club Embraced Social Justice. Then It Tore Itself Apart” detailed how a precipitous decline in both fundraising and membership (at a time when the Trump administration is gutting environmental regulation) can be directly linked to the organization’s embrace of progressive social justice causes that undermined its prior strategy of bringing strange bedfellows (like Michael Bloomberg and teachers’ unions) together for the environment.
I found one particular story especially telling. At a board meeting, a Sierra Club director noted that 108 staff members were part of the “national equity investment” while only two staff members were devoted to saving the Arctic wildlife refuge from Donald Trump’s attacks.
“I don’t think we have our priorities straight,” the trustee said. Nobody else on the board agreed. The budget, as it was proposed, passed.
The decline of the Sierra Club, the Times concluded, “helps Mr. Trump. But it was not his doing. The Sierra Club did this to itself.”
In his research, Berman found that “The best way for nonprofits to begin to address the corrosive problem of declining public trust, in sum, is to do an outstanding job of whatever their core work may be.” Wokeness derailed the core work of many civic institutions, from Harvard to the Sierra Club. There are people who say the worst of it is over. But this dramatically understates the problem.
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It is good news that bias response teams are being replaced by civil discourse centers on campuses, but wokeness is not going anywhere in higher education. Syllabi with a progressive skew are still being written, campus administrators are still being hired with a 12-1 liberal to conservative ratio, cultures are still being entrenched.
My field of sociology, for example, has one Republican for every 44 registered Democrats. Twenty percent of sociology professors identify as far left. Even with a mammoth effort, it will take generations for the field to become anywhere near ideologically balanced.
Wokeness is literally written into the career competencies of the National Association of Colleges and Employers (NACE), the leading professional association for job readiness with 17,000 dues-paying members. According to NACE, graduates who are ready for the job market “engage in anti-oppressive practices that actively challenge the systems, structures, and policies of racism and inequity.”
Towards the end of her interview with Evan Goldstein, Jill Lepore said, “I don’t want anything that I say … to give an inch, not a millimeter, to the conservative claim that the Trump administration has any right to say who universities can and cannot hire and admit to their programs.”
I think that’s exactly right. Naming the problem of suffocating progressiveness in higher education is not an endorsement of the Trump administration’s strategy of demolition and conquest. The goal is to squarely face your own problems so that you can begin to right the ship, and name the challenges clearly so that you regain the trust of the American people.
“As a Catholic, I believe in confession, and contrition, and in making amends,” Lepore said.
Whatever your spiritual convictions, these are necessary steps.
Eboo Patel is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.
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President Donald J. Trump’s Columbus Day proclamation, on October 9, pledged “to reclaim [Christopher Columbus’s] extraordinary legacy of faith, courage, perseverance, and virtue from the left-wing arsonists who have sought to destroy his name and dishonor his memory.” Implicitly disavowing the increasingly widespread celebration of Indigenous People’s Day, Trump called Columbus “a prime target of a vicious and merciless campaign to erase our history, slander our heroes, and attack our heritage.” Guided by “steadfast prayer,” his journey “carried thousands of years of wisdom, philosophy, reason, and culture across the Atlantic into the Americas—paving the way for the ultimate triumph of Western civilization less than three centuries later on July 4, 1776 … He planted a majestic cross in a mighty act of devotion, dedicating the land to God and setting in motion America’s proud birthright of faith.”
In the context of anti-immigration rhetoric, the MAGA espousal of a Christian America is provocatively exclusionary. Its most obvious targets are Muslims. However, as I happened to be on the Pine Ridge reservation in western South Dakota on Columbus Day, I had a different thought. Pine Ridge was the site of the last military engagement between the United States Army and Native America: the Wounded Knee massacre of 1890, in which perhaps more than 200 Lakota men, women, and children were murdered by soldiers sent by President Benjamin Harrison.
Also connecting the dots was the Trump cabinet member with the loudest Christian credentials: Secretary of War Peter Hegseth. During the Biden Administration, General Lloyd Austin, as Secretary of Defense, ordered an inquiry into Wounded Knee to ensure that none of the 20 soldiers awarded Medals of Honor “were recognized for conduct inconsistent with the nation’s highest military honor.” Enter Hegseth, in September, to announce that the medals would not be rescinded. He praised the recipients as “brave soldiers” and added: “We’re making it clear that they deserve those medals.”
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I visited Pine Ridge accompanying the fourth Lakota Music Project tour of the South Dakota Symphony. This initiative, now fully twenty years old, was conceived of by SDSO Music Director Delta David Gier in consultation with Lakota and Dakota leaders throughout the state in an attempt to deploy music to promote mutual understanding where a climate of mistrust has long prevailed. Gier himself happens to be a devout Christian. He told me: “I find it absolutely bewildering that we’re at a point where my faith has been attached to a right-wing political viewpoint. It’s directly opposite to what Jesus Christ not only taught, but demonstrated with his acceptance of the other, his ministry to the other.”
The participants in the week-long tour included nine members of the South Dakota Symphony. They also included the five members of the Creekside Singers—a Lakota drumming group based on Pine Ridge—as well as Bryan Akipa, a celebrated Dakota flutist who lives on the Sisseton reservation to the east. I asked Emanuel Black Bear, the leader of the Creekside Singers, about the recent statements of Trump and Hegseth on Columbus Day and Wounded Knee. “We know the truth,” he said. “So why should I worry about what they say? My life doesn’t involve them. My preservation, my culture, my language doesn’t involve them. It’s like the old saying: how you feel about me is none of my business. Their minds are made up already. All I can do is teach my children.”
Black Bear’s 21-year-old son, Ari, is now the lead Creekside singer. In fact, all five members of the group belong to the same extended Pine Ridge family. Black Bear’s father-in-law, Chris Eagle Hawk, is a tribal elder whose grandparents sailed to Europe with Buffalo Bill. At the age of six, he was removed from his family and sent to a government boarding school. “They put me in a strange chair and started cutting my hair,” he told me. “To a Lakota your hair is your spirit. I saw my hair on the floor and started crying. When they cut my hair they killed my spirit. Then they took away everything I owned. I had a little toy car. That was the only toy I ever had and I cherished it. They took that, too. They made us ashamed of our language and our beliefs. But we would speak Lakota in secret.” As a high school senior, Chris Eagle Hawk was transferred to the Santa Fe Institute of American Indian Arts. “It was like somebody turned the lights back on. I could be who I am. And I was ready to listen.”
One of the stops on the Lakota Music Tour was the city of Mission in the Rosebud reservation (population 1,135). The local performers included the Black Pipe Singers, 21 Lakota schoolchildren, ages 8 to 10, whose singing and drumming conveyed fervor and inspiration. I found myself thinking about the rootlessness of Gen Z—of young Americans questing for something in which to believe. The Creekside Singers and the Black Pipe Singers, however beleaguered their daily lives, believe in their cultural inheritance. At the same time, it is an inheritance difficult to merge with the contemporary American experience, let alone with New World notions of a “proud Christian birthright.” This is the conundrum that the Lakota Music Project seeks to address.
The place of Native America has been debated for as long as there has been a United States. And music has long been integral to this debate. In the early history of American classical music, the most influential proponent of Native America was an ecumenical outsider: the Czech composer Antonin Dvořák, who led New York City’s National Conservatory from 1892 to 1895. Dvořák arrived already fascinated by Indians and by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s The Song of Hiawatha, which he had read in Czech. He attended the Buffalo Bill show, and, in Spillville, Iowa, he closely observed the songs and dances of the Kickapoo Medicine Show’s Native American entertainers.
Dvořák inspired America’s fledgling concert composers to pay attention to Native America—which resulted in a musical “Indianists” movement lasting into the 1930s. Of its hundreds of symphonies and sonatas, songs and operas, the most enduring is Dvořák’s own New World Symphony (1893), in which Longfellow’s Hiawatha is a central influence. The movement produced a mountain of kitsch unremembered today. Equally unremembered are the Indianist compositions of Arthur Farwell, who detested kitsch and revered Native America. Unlike Dvořák, Farwell studied and adapted actual Indian tunes. Music like his astringent Navajo War Dance No. 2 for solo piano (1904) deserves to be known as an achievement parallel to the contemporaneous folk song adaptations of Béla Bartók in Hungary. Instead, Farwell—if recalled at all—is condemned for “cultural appropriation” alongside such Indianist merchandisers as Charles Wakefield Cadman, whose mellifluous From the Land of the Sky-Blue Water (1909) was once widely performed. The Trump White House enjoys no monopoly on phony history.
Much later, Louis Ballard (1931-2007), a Native American composer, restarted the movement to evoke Native America in the concert hall. Today, an increasing number of composers, both Native and non-Native, explore the resources of American Indian chant. South Dakota’s Lakota Music Project has taken a lead, commissioning, performing, and recording new works. The Creekside Singers and Bryan Akipa, key figures in the recent tour, have participated in the creative process. Another crucial participant has been an Austrian-American scholar of Lakota Music: Ronnie Theisz, who decades ago left New York City to teach at Black Hills State University.
The aspiration to marry Lakota and Dakota song with European instruments is complex; it is no wonder that neither Dvořák nor Farwell ever attempted it. But the two pieces premiered on the Lakota Music Project tour mark a breakthrough—a persuasive synthesis is achieved. The composers are Jeffrey Paul, who as the South Dakota Symphony’s principal oboist has known Bryan Akipa for nearly twenty years; and Derek Bermel, who lives in Brooklyn and has long specialized in integrating non-Western musical traditions.
Titled Songbird and Goose, Paul’s new piece combines Akipa’s wooden flute with a string quartet and wind quintet. Unlike his previous compositions for a similar grouping, it is less a description of nature than an abstract meditation ignited by a palpitating Akipa melody. Its serene energy is intoxicating. “Just discovering the sheer beauty of the sounds that Bryan makes with a wooden flute was staggering for me,” Paul says. He’s fascinated by the aromatic pitch fluctuations aerating Akipa’s tunes. “I tried to tap into the color of his instrument without trying to compose ‘Indian’ music. I wanted to be respectful both to Dakota culture and to the Western European classical tradition.”
Bermel’s Lakota Refrains, meanwhile, uses the same nine symphony musicians in combination with the Creekside Singers, whose songs he studied in consultation with Emanuel Black Bear over a period of two years. He fractures and recombines a series of Lakota tunes, creating a pounding cross-cultural mosaic. Not only do two musical genres feed off one another; the musicians themselves mutually ignite in performance. The final movement is based on a Lakota processional dance. At every one of the nine performances on tour, members of the audience—native and non-Native—spontaneously arose and formed a chain of dancers. At the final performance, in Sioux Falls, the dancers numbered more than 100. “I was absolutely overwhelmed to find the entire space filled with people holding hands and dancing,” Gier recalls. “It took my breath away.” Bermel, too, had never envisioned a dancing audience. “If we’re going to have a common future, it has to start with mutual respect,” he reflects. “The Lakotas have had a long time to respect our legacy. I think we need to start to look at the Lakota legacy that has persisted through great trials and attempted erasures. I think it’s the first step toward having a common future. And I think that attempt is at least a start. I think it can elevate us all.”
President Trump proclaimed that Christopher Columbus’s “noble mission” was “to discover a new trade route to Asia, bring glory to Spain, and spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ to distant lands.” Secretary Hegseth said of the Wounded Knee soldiers: “They deserve those medals.” The historian Heather Cox Richardson, author of Wounded Knee: Party Politics and the Road to an American Massacre, challenged both statements in a pair of posts dated September 26 and October 12. President Benjamin Harrison’s disastrous decision to send troops to Wounded Knee, she wrote, was linked to a battle over control of the South Dakota legislature. “Frenzied soldiers killed every Lakota they could find … The outcry against this butchery started in the Army itself.” General Nelson Miles, who commanded the Division of the Missouri that included Pine Ridge, “was incensed that the simple surrender of a peaceful band of Lakotas had become what he called a ‘criminal military blunder and a horrible massacre of women and children.’” Of Columbus Day, Richardson wrote that it “began in the 1920s, when a resurgent Ku Klux Klan tried to create a lilly-white country by attacking not just Black Americans, but also immigrants, Jews, and Catholics”—including the Catholic fraternal organization the Knights of Columbus. An Italian lobbying effort eventually led to a 1934 Columbus Day proclamation by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “aware of the need to solidify his new Democratic coalition by welcoming all Democratic voters.”
In South Dakota, Bishop Scott Bullock of Rapid City wrote of Hegseth’s announcement: “If we deny our part in history we deepen the harm. We cannot lie about the past without perpetuating injustice and moral blindness. We acknowledge the government’s intent to honor its troops, yet we reject any narrative that erases the humanity of the victims or glorifies acts of violence.”
The ongoing discourse on Native America is ultimately a discourse about origins. What Lakota origins may have to do with American origins will remain a necessary puzzle demanding diligent attention. Not a puzzle is the Lakota preservation of a cultural inheritance at various moments threatened, distorted, or denied. Never before in American history has the perseverance of cultural and historical memory been more inspirational—or more necessary.
Joseph Horowitz is the author of 14 books about the American musical experience. His December 1 NPR documentary about the Lakota Music Project tour, sampling the music of Jeffrey Paul and Derek Bermel, is archived here.
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‘Member DOGE? ‘Member the excitement that the year started out with? There was Elon with a buzzsaw. There was a righteous effort to shed $1 trillion—or maybe it was $2 trillion?—from the federal budget.
If that strikes only a distant chord, maybe it’s because it’s been lost in all the other swirling promises with which Trump started his second term. There was going to be the annexation of Greenland—“one way or the other we’re going to get it,” Trump announced in March—and which was then, according to an actual House of Representatives bill, going to be called “Red, White, and Blueland.” And then the Panama Canal was going to be taken “back,” as Trump vowed in his inaugural address, and then Canada was going to be the 51st state.
These things do stick in one’s memory. What leaves less of an impression is the denouement—is the inglorious end of DOGE, which signaled its demise in June when “staffers packed up their clothes and bedding” from the government building where they had been sleeping for months and which then was pronounced dead in November with the terse statement of Office of Personnel Management head Scott Kupor that “that doesn’t exist” when somebody thought to ask him about DOGE. And, as for Red, White, and Blueland? The “taking back” of the Canal Zone? Canada as the 51st state?
Somewhere in the same bin of neglected projects along with DOGE.
So what exactly do we do with this? What do we make of being, basically, jerked around by the headlines of the last calendar year? Well, there are two ways to think about it. One is that it’s all part of the cunning of the Trump administration—a “flood the zone” strategy in which opponents are distracted by some of the surface outrages while Trump’s more disciplined shock troops create lasting change within the body politic. If you believe that, then the Greenland, Panama, and Canada threats are all fanfare to appeal to the six-year-old boy in all of us, while what really matters is the deployment of troops to American cities, the often-sadistic deportations, and significant reallocations of the federal budget. The other way to think about it is that there is light at the end of the tunnel, that Trump in the second term is fundamentally as chaotic as he’s always been, that there was no master plan beyond what was executed in the first few months of his return to office, and now the administration is just flailing around without any particular idea of what it wants to achieve. If that’s the case, those worried about the Trump administration can breathe something like a sigh of relief. Trump hasn’t magically become a canny puller of administrative levers, as he often seemed to be in early 2025. He is distracted and prone to losing interest in initiatives almost as soon as he launches them—and he may well find himself on the back foot by the time the 2026 midterms roll around.
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And if it’s possible to see the Trump administration without its bluster, we find ourselves looking at the shape of something that much more resembles the first term than what we thought we were dealing with for most of 2025. And the first term was in many ways much less consequential than it seemed when Trump was elected in 2016. There were deep corporate tax cuts. There was a business-first policy that kept the stock market high but gave short shrift to everything else. And the overall capacity of the state was quietly chipped away at. When an actual crisis arrived with the 2020 pandemic, it was up to individual states to handle the response, which they did with precious little coordination from the White House.
This iteration of Trump comes with a few new notes—the assault on universities and law firms, the rollback of civil rights legislation, the deep cuts into the federal workforce. These aren’t to be underestimated. The deployment of troops to American cities and the mass immigration raids push American politics into a dangerously unprecedented space, and the entire balance of power between the executive and congressional branches has been disrupted.
But if we extrapolate out from the present moment, the enduring legacy of the Trump administration may well be chaos and missing receipts. That’s what DOGE, after all the sound and fury, amounted to. In October, The New York Times attempted to report on how much money DOGE had actually cut and concluded the following: “Outside budget experts can’t nail down a number. Even congressional appropriators—the people who decide how federal funds should be spent in the first place—don’t know. And the public may never have a clear answer.”
In other words, we just have absolutely no idea. Estimates range from the $214 billion in savings that DOGE claimed to $14 billion in rescission requests that were actually submitted to Congress to $410 billion of “a larger universe” of frozen allocations that Democrats say never reached their Congressionally-mandated recipients. According to the White House, it wasn’t that DOGE disappeared altogether after June, it was that its responsibilities were distributed around different agencies, above all to the all-powerful White House Office of Management and Budget, while much of that money has entered a black hole. The movement of allocated Congressional money is supposed to be readily transparent, but the OMB removed a legally required public database tracking those payments and many of them were held up on a variety of technicalities. Which, as often as not, seems to be the last anybody ever hears of those appropriations. “There absolutely must be [unspent money]—they did cancel a bunch of contracts worth a lot of money,” American Enterprise Institute’s Nat Malkus told The New York Times in reference to DOGE. “There are open questions about, Where did that money go?”
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When I spoke to him, Malkus described miscounting in all kinds of directions. On the one hand, DOGE employed a kind of creative accounting that vastly overestimated the savings it would achieve from canceled contracts. On the other hand, there’s money that genuinely was cut—Malkus estimates about $16 billion—that hasn’t been returned to the Treasury and has entered into what Malkus calls “an accounting abyss” in which most of the money is likely sitting with the appropriate agency but can’t be used for a new purpose or program without a fresh appropriation.
Not quite the crusade for transparency in government that was indicated when Elon waved a buzzsaw on a stage in February, let alone the $5,000 dividend check for individual Americans that Trump said was a possibility back when Elon was saving “so many millions, billions—hundreds of billions,” as Trump itemized it with his own less-than-precise accounting.
All of this may be starting to feel a bit familiar. During his first term Trump managed to add somewhere on the order of $8 trillion to the national deficit, according to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. That borrowing was largely needed to cover the loss of around $2.5 trillion in tax revenues stemming from Trump’s cuts. And when all is said and done, that’s what the bottom-line of the first term looked like: debt added, services cut, and the state unable to generate a meaningful coordinated response to the pandemic—although, when in panic-mode, it did eventually add $3.6 trillion to the debt line in Covid relief.
It’s still possible that things may get worse than that. Trump’s campaign trail isolationism has given way to a schoolboy’s joy in ordering bombing strikes all over the world—against Yemen, against Iran, against alleged drug smugglers off Venezuela. He could easily find himself pulled into a major war somewhere or other. But now that we’re approaching the one-year mark, a more sober view of the Trump administration comes into focus—that the new boss looks a lot like the old boss, and that distractibility and chaos predominate over the jackbooted sheen that the Trump 2.0 legionnaires sometimes seem to possess. There has been a lot of big talk from the White House, a lot of territories that were supposed to be American by now, but as we take our brief glimpse of the graveyard of forgotten initiatives out the rear view window, the pattern that is most apparent is the chaos, the missing money, and the state getting weaker as a result—which, if the last time around is any indication, will only become fully apparent at the moment when you most need a state.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.
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Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, January 23, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
Francis Fukuyama and Laura K. Field, author of Furious Minds: The Making of the MAGA New Right, explore the ideological roots of Trumpism, the role of gender in the New Right, and the complicated legacy of Leo Strauss.
All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.
Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.
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Cloning is back, baby—and with it, our fascination. No longer carrying a thrilling frisson of disaster, it slowly appears to be becoming part of the domestic everyday. With last month’s announcement that his dog Junie is a clone of his late pit bull mix Lua, former NFL quarterback Tom Brady has joined Barbra Streisand and Paris Hilton among others in the celebrity trend of cloning beloved—and sadly deceased—pets. Brady explains that Colossal Biosciences, a company in which he is also an investor, “gave my family a second chance with a clone of our beloved dog.”
This is a booming business: the announcement came at a time when Colossal announced it has acquired Viagen Pets & Equine, a company claiming to have cloned the most animals in the world. While Colossal positions itself as a noble de-extinction project, Viagen appeals purely to emotion, with its glossy website advertising “the science of keeping love alive.”
Across the world, cloning pets is becoming ever more popular, with a price tag of $50,000 for a cat or a dog, increasing to $85,000 for a horse. Viagen describes itself as helping you “continue life’s journey with the companion who changed everything,” apparently forgetting that the one certainty in anyone’s life journey is death. “When love leaves a mark that deep,” it continues, “you deserve a way to hold on.”
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These reassurances that cloning simply perpetuates the bond shared between owner and the original pet seem to be working. Although Viagen does not reveal how many animals they have cloned so far, it is certainly in the hundreds, and increasing each year.
The appeal is obvious. Pets are firmly part of many people’s families, and indeed are often given more attention and adoration than inconveniently distant or elderly relatives. Dogs in particular demand a daily routine, with walks and regular mealtimes in addition to vet bills and trips to the grooming salon, providing constant reminders of their loss. My Maltese, Maude, is only four and already I’m dreading the day I come home to find her toys and clothes but no little dog waiting for me. Who wouldn’t want their precious companion back, especially in cute puppy form?
Yet I’m cynical of the promise of pet cloning. It’s simply not true that clones are, in any meaningful sense, the same as the original.
I’m an identical twin—a natural clone. Identical twins are even more similar to each other than a clone is to its DNA donor, because they often share the same upbringing and environment. Yet, as I know first-hand, that doesn’t mean our personalities are the same. If you were planning a party that I couldn’t make and so invited my sister instead, thinking she’d bring the same joie de vivre and bubbly demeanor that I do, you’d be very disappointed when she turned up and sat in the corner as a wry observer—one who, for that matter, is 4cm shorter than the twin you wanted.
Twins are often celebrated as being mirrors of each other’s lives. Stories like the Jim twins of Ohio—who were separated at birth, met at 39, and discovered their lives resembled each other to a spooky degree, including both having first wives named Linda and second wives named Betty—set the tone for how we think about twins. “We even use the same slang,” said Jim Lewis when the brothers were reunited. “A lot of times, I’ll start to say something, and he’ll finish it!”
Thomas J. Bouchard Jr., director of the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart Project, was certainly impressed by the Jims: “When you start to compound the coincidences, they become highly unlikely very quickly. In fact, I’m flabbergasted by some of the similarities.” The study found that “on multiple measures of personality and temperament, occupational and leisure-time interests, and social attitudes, monozygotic twins reared apart are about as similar as are monozygotic twins reared together.”
But this narrative conveniently glosses over a number of things. Linda and Betty were common names at the time, and one of the Jims had married a third wife while the other was still on his second. The idyllic view of “two halves of a whole” has been challenged on a more fundamental level, too. Researchers have argued that because the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart relied on volunteers, it was more likely to attract twins with greater similarity. The study also didn’t publish raw data or full case histories, making it harder to examine the extent of the similarities. A further complication with twin studies is that, while researchers have assumed that identical twins and fraternal twins have the same upbringing, this is not necessarily the case. Identical twins spend so much time together that it is unclear which attributes might be genetic and which environmental or social.
What’s more, epigenetics—the study of how environmental factors influence the way genes are expressed—explains why it’s wrong to expect twins to be truly identical. As individuals in their own right, each twin will necessarily have different experiences, and make different choices about their lifestyles. They will face different stresses, each of which could impact how their genes work, despite having the same genetic makeup. One study found that 35% of identical twin pairs had significant differences in their epigenetic profile—particularly when the twins were older, which suggests that these differences increase over time. This may explain why identical twins tend to have different outcomes in life, contracting different diseases, marrying at different times, and even why they can have different tolerances to pain.
In other words, our DNA, including epigenetics, clearly influences us in many ways; at the same time, we are more than just our genes. Throughout history, philosophers and scientists have debated if nature or nurture is more significant—it seems the answer is that both have an impact.
I’ve always been outgoing while my sister has been more reserved, but it is impossible to untangle to what extent this is genetic and to what extent it’s a result of growing up together, adapting to the other’s strengths and weaknesses. Since a young age we have wanted to be seen as people in our own right instead of two halves of one whole. While there is a cultural expectation that twins are best friends fused together throughout their lives, deidentification with one’s twin seems to be a natural part of becoming an adult. For identical twins, it is a tremendous insult to be told you’re exactly the same as each other—and to be positioned as a replacement for a deceased companion, no matter how adored, would be even worse. Rather, to be respected as an individual is a much-prized gift.
An icon and a clone. (Photo courtesy of the author.)The same respect should be given to cloned pets—to be appreciated for their own personality and habits, not compared with an increasingly distant forerunner. Companies such as Colossal and Viagen promise that the past can be brought back; that a copy is enough to continue the bond with the much-loved original; that death isn’t an end. But to create a new dog and declare it will resolve the owner’s grief does not bring the pet back or undo its loss. An owner will eventually see the tiny differences add up, and the pet will feel it isn’t good enough without understanding why. Like Fitzgerald’s Gatsby fighting to change the past, pretending that a replacement is the same is futile.
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Genetics can be copied, but experiences can’t be—the clone won’t have the same likes or fears of the original, and the owner will be forced to create new memories with them instead of reliving old ones. Would my dog still be Maude if she didn’t recognize the word “brunch,” know all the names of both her friends and mine, or take the Tube with the studied indifference of a daily commuter? While similar experiences would be shared with the new dog, their reaction would depend on their own personality and associations. How could they be the same?
For the sake of both owner and pet, we should accept the finality of death. We feel deep love for those we care about in part because of our fragility; to love anyone is to acknowledge that there will one day be a goodbye. Any new life—whether a clone, twin, or dog—should be loved for its own self.
Leonora Barclay is Head of Podcasts at Persuasion.
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Abigail Marsh is a professor in the Department of Psychology and the Interdisciplinary Neuroscience Program at Georgetown University.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Abigail Marsh explore what to do if a child you know might be psychopathic, whether psychopathy is linked to charisma and success, and how to protect yourself.
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This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: How should we think about what a psychopath—or do you prefer sociopath—actually is?
Abigail Marsh: That is a great question. There is this weird dichotomy in how people talk about the disorder. The term sociopath is vastly preferred in the media and literature. There are a couple of very famous memoirs that came out about people who were self-described sociopaths. It is not a term that is used anymore by clinicians or researchers. We primarily use the term psychopathy. I do not even use the term psychopath anymore, mainly because it occurred to me that we do not refer to any other people by their disorder anymore. We do not refer to somebody as “a schizophrenic” or “an anorexic” anymore. We have switched to a kind of person-first language, and I have thought that people with psychopathy probably deserve the same.
All that said, psychopathy is a personality disorder. It is not in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, the DSM, that is used to define and diagnose other personality disorders, for complicated reasons. It is a clinical disorder, and it is characterized by three main types of traits. One, a bold, fearless, dominant and socially dominant personality. Meanness or callousness is probably the trait people most closely associate with it: lack of remorse, lack of guilt, lack of compassion, etc. Finally, disinhibition, difficulty sticking to a plan, difficulty keeping promises, irresponsible behavior, sometimes very spontaneous, clearly poorly planned antisocial behavior that lands people in trouble.
Mounk: I once had somebody explain to me the difference between a sociopath and a psychopath as being that a psychopath is somebody who has, I guess in your language, all three of those sets of traits, who is disinhibited, who wants to dominate the world, and who ends up doing really bad acts. A sociopath may be somebody who does not have fellow feeling, who does not feel remorse if they have hurt somebody, who does not feel bad about things they have done in the world, but who may be relatively well adjusted, who may think that it is in their interest not to hurt others because they might go to jail or other bad things might happen, but is still lacking that dimension of fellow feeling.
You are saying that there is not this principled distinction between the term sociopath and the term psychopath. Is there a distinction between those two types of people? Would you say that there are some people who have this one set of traits quite strongly but not the other sets of traits, or are they really correlated with each other?
Marsh: Such good questions. That is a really interesting description that you were given about the difference between the two. That is even a new one. I have heard probably 20 different descriptions, including clinicians and researchers describing the two terms and what distinguishes them. You will get many different explanations.
First, it is totally possible for people to be persistently antisocial but not because they lack the capacity for empathy or remorse. I would say that for most people with psychopathy, it is not that they totally lack the capacity for empathy or remorse, but it is very suppressed. They feel these emotions very mildly or very rarely, maybe only with reference to one or two people.
Mounk: That is interesting because I think we do also tend to think about it like it is a switch. Most people have it, and then some people do not have it at all, whereas you are talking about it nearly as a normal distribution. Most people have it to a relatively typical degree, and then a bunch of people have it less than others, but they might still feel it for their mom or for their best friend or for the person they love, but not for anybody else. They might feel it more dimly than others. What do you think is the distribution? Is it something like a normal distribution, or how should we think about this?
Marsh: I think it is certainly a distribution. It has that classic bell-curve shape. It is probably shifted so that most people are on the plenty-of-empathy side of the distribution. The tail of people who experience very little empathy and compassion is a long tail, but a very small number of people are down there. I have worked with people who say they have never experienced anything like what most people describe as empathy or remorse or compassion. They exist, but that is a small percent of people, much smaller than the percent of people who say they wish that they could experience less empathy and compassion for others.
Mounk: Interesting, because that too can be debilitating if you inadvertently step on a bug and you are so empathetic for the natural world that you are terribly guilt-ridden about having inadvertently done that. That also seems like a kind of ill-adjustedness.
Marsh: It can be. Empathy, compassion, and guilt swim together. That is the downside of being a compassionate, empathic person: you often feel guilt about not having done even better, even though you are probably a nicer person than average.
Mounk: Let us get back to empathy and what people who have really strong empathy feel as part of a conversation as well. Sticking with the other end of the spectrum, obviously one reason why we are interested in this topic is that it drives bad behavior. A lot of criminals, people who are serial killers, and perhaps some politicians who do terrible things seem to suffer from some form of psychopathy. What drives bad behavior here? Is it primarily this question of whether you have empathy for others? Or is it whether you have empathy for others plus those other ingredients? What do you think is predictive with the patients you work with? When do you think, oh dear, I’m worried for the people in their life? Is it just how little empathy they have for others, or is it that plus some other thing about them?
Marsh: Each one of these prongs that makes up psychopathy—the bold, socially dominant personality; the low empathy and compassion; and the disinhibition—can drive antisocial behavior for different reasons. I think of them as different kinds of gas or brakes. You can be a very antisocial person who has at least the capacity for empathy and compassion simply because you are so disinhibited: you see something, you want it, you act. Or you may be very bad at controlling your anger. You may have something like intermittent explosive disorder, where it is easy for things to get under your skin and you blow up in a disproportionate way, and afterward you feel awful. Each time this happens you think, I cannot believe I did this again, but it is too hard to control those emotions.
There are also people driven by status goals. People who are very bold and socially dominant often like having higher status than others. Sometimes those goals can drive antisocial acts even though the person has the capacity for empathy but chooses not to deploy it. They may view certain people as unworthy of empathy or compartmentalize their empathy.
There are many people who are functional in their normal social lives. They have a normal family life and long-term friendships—relationships that typically do not emerge in people who are truly, pathologically psychopathic, because it is very hard to maintain friendships when you view others as instrumental means to achieve your goals.
Mounk: At some point they’re gonna figure that out, feel used and won’t want to be your friend.
Marsh: Right, because in people who are highly psychopathic, the “friendship” was only ever based on a desire to get something out of it. It is not a typical way of bonding with others. But there are people who can form close bonds while still being so driven by their need to dominate or to acquire that their empathic capacity gets switched off or suppressed by those goals.
Mounk: I’m trying to think about what this model looks like. One perhaps overly simple way of describing it is that we have desires in the world, and we act in order to serve those desires. Then we have inhibitions. One obvious inhibition is empathy for others: I’m not going to do this because it will upset someone. Is the relationship between desire and inhibition something like one minus the other? How should we think about that relationship?
You can imagine someone who is highly empathetic but has uncontrollable rages and therefore behaves badly, or someone who has very little—perhaps no—compassion for others but is so impassive, so lacking in strong desires, that they calculate it is in their rational self-interest never to break the law or cause drama because they prefer a quiet life of sitting at home watching Netflix.
Marsh: There are plenty of psychopathic people exactly like that who do not particularly care about other people. They just want what they want. The stuff that they want is pretty easy for them to get for whatever reason. Maybe because they have particular cognitive skills and talents that make having a pretty easy life not that big of a challenge for them. I will say the other thing that makes psychopathy such a challenge is that the bold, dominant personality is associated with being fearless, which means being unafraid of being punished. The other thing that keeps people who are psychopathic from behaving in pro-social ways is that they do not fear the punishment that comes from behaving antisocially, so it is very difficult to contain their behavior using threats of jail or other serious punishments. They just want what they want.
Mounk: What is it that makes them unresponsive to that fear of punishment? Is it that they do not care that if they end up in jail for 20 years, they are just as happy in jail as they would be somewhere else? Or is it that they do not have mechanisms of self-control, that they basically fail the marshmallow test? How should we think about what drives that behavior?
Marsh: Many of them would definitely fail the marshmallow test. That is true of people who end up in jail in general. Even in a typical jail or prison, only a minority of people would be considered clinically psychopathic. Close to half, but not most people. Disinhibition and failure to control impulses or difficulty balancing risks and rewards is a major factor that puts people in detention. That is true of people with psychopathy too.
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They do not like jail. It is not that they want to be there. There does seem to be neurodevelopmental differences in them such that in their very early life they do not fear the punishment ahead of time. They do not like it when they get it, but they do not fear it ahead of time, and they do not do things to avoid the threat or the punishment even if they will not like it when they get it.
Mounk: You just mentioned a stat by the by that is striking. You said close to half of people in prison, as far as we know, have those psychopathic traits. How does that relate to the general population?
Marsh: Yeah, because psychopathy is a continuum. It is hard to put a clear marker on exactly what proportion of the population has psychopathy because it depends on where you decide to draw the clinical line. Most people estimate it is about one or two percent of the population that has clinically significant levels of psychopathy. That is in the general population. Of course, it is much higher in populations where people are doing enough antisocial things that they have ended up punished for it.
Mounk: It is, to the tune of 25x or 50x, more likely for someone who is psychopathic to end up in jail. Do we know something about what percentage of people with psychopathy will be imprisoned at some point in their lives?
Marsh: We do not know this at all. We do know there is something called the Pareto Principle, the 80-20 rule. For example, 20% of people are responsible for 80% of absenteeism in the workplace. That is true for all antisocial behavior. A small minority of the population is responsible for most antisocial acts. When you look at violent crime, some people have estimated that maybe 1% of the population is responsible for two thirds of all serious violent crime.
We do not know the odds that any particular person with psychopathy will offend over their lifetime. It is definitely higher than the average person. We did recently a big population study of psychopathy, and rates of offending were twice as high to 10 times as high as the general population, depending on the specific antisocial behavior in question. This is a paper that is about to come out. We found that the most common kinds of antisocial behavior that very high psychopathic people engage in, in terms of what they are most likely to have done, is risky, reckless driving.
Driving under the influence, not obeying traffic laws, driving way too fast, et cetera. The vast majority of highly psychopathic people have done that. Somewhat smaller percentages have been convicted or punished for it, but they all do it. A much smaller percent have committed assault, maybe 40%. Smaller proportions have been arrested for it.
Mounk: If we think again of these three different classes of character traits that are necessary according to the DSM to classify someone as psychopathic, are they correlated with each other? If you have one of these three character traits, does that make it more likely that you have the other two as well? Or are we simply saying that 15% of the population have each of those character traits, and the people who end up having psychopathy are the ones who happen to have 0.15 x 0.15 x 0.15, you probably end up with a little bit lower, so you would say 20% of each, and they are not correlated with each other? Does having one of these sets of character traits also drive the other or is it genetically related in some kind of way or related in terms of your upbringing? Or are they independent of each other?
Marsh: The top question is whether these three clusters of traits are correlated with each other. Yes, to some degree. The meanness and callousness and the disinhibition are strongly correlated with each other, maybe 0.4. Not 0.7 or they would be the same thing. The bold, dominant personality less so, as low as 0.15 probably. Although when you do the developmental studies that follow kids over time, that does seem to be the core trait. That is the first trait that we see emerging early in childhood that puts the child at risk for all the other sequela of psychopathic traits.
I will also mention that this triad of traits is not in the DSM diagnosis that is closest to psychopathy, which is antisocial personality disorder. Why they changed the name when they put it in the DSM, who is to say. I am sure you are aware of what a book created by committees the DSM is, and it has some flaws. A lot of these traits are in there, but you will not find this exact triad of traits in the DSM, nor will you find the term psychopathy.
Mounk: I would venture that a term invented by, I believe, your doctoral advisor, Steven Pinker, and a former guest on this podcast has something to do with this, which is a “euphemism treadmill.” If you find a term for something that has negative associations, the term itself will start to be negatively charged over time. Therefore people will say there is something offensive about the term, so let us not go with it. Even if something like psychopathy or sociopathy was invented as a relatively neutral term, over time we associated it with the underlying behaviors. It comes to seem like a slur word. Perhaps someone in the committee said, “We cannot call people that. Let us find a new term.”
Marsh: Yes, Steven Pinker was on my dissertation committee. I should mention he was not my advisor, but I appreciated his fantastic advice then. I appreciate this term, “euphemism treadmill,” which is a huge problem for psychopathy because it is an incredibly common disorder, and it is antisocial behavior. I should reinforce that the psychopathic traits that we see in adults are almost without exception present in adolescents and childhood in people who develop psychopathy. It is a disorder that occurs throughout the lifespan. It is the most common reason that children are referred to psychiatric care in childhood, antisocial behavior problems, not all of which is related to psychopathy, but a big chunk of it is.
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Yet there is very little help for the affected kids and families out there. There is so little in the way of resources or clinical training devoted to helping clinicians help these kids. On top of that, the clinician and researcher community does the population of patients a double-diservice by coming up with 8,000 terms that all mean more or less the same thing. “Sociopathy” was in part a remedy to the stigma that the term “psychopath” had. “Antisocial personality disorder,” same thing. It is, “Let us try to get the stigma away from having a disorder that causes you to do antisocial things all the time.” The reality is you are never going to take the stigma away from the disorder. Of course, if you do antisocial things persistently, that is going to be stigmatized. There is no getting around it.
The way we get rid of the stigma is by finding treatments for it so that people do not continue to perceive this as some sort of a “bad seed” moral disorder that is a permanent stain and we should just lock you up forever. That is how to get rid of the stigma.
Mounk: You mentioned that one of the first things you can diagnose in children is this desire to dominate, and that is the predictor of the other character traits emerging. At what age in a child’s development do we start to see warning signs, and how predictive are they? If you go and visit some relative of yours or the child of some friend, and they have some concerning set of behaviors, at three years old, at seven years old, at 10 years old, at what point can you say, hey, I am not a trained psychologist, but I am starting to be concerned here, and I am not being crazy?
Marsh: It is hard because the age two to three is statistically the most violent period of the lifespan because it is typical for little kids to have terrible tantrums and be quite violent in some cases, biting and doing things that do not happen later in life. It is hard. The thing that you are looking for in kids who are two to three years old, which most parents of kids who develop psychopathic traits will say is when they started noticing something was different, is this fearless personality, which mostly manifests in the kid not seeming scared of things that other kids are scared of: Big dogs, the dark, being alone, very high places, doing things that are unusually risky, and that includes not being afraid of punishments.
Mounk: But some of those might be good traits. How do you know? Where is the line? You want your kid to be happy-go-lucky and relatively fearless. It is a big dog, but it is our friend’s dog. You don’t have to be worried about it. You’re going to be proud if your kid says, hello, big doggy. What makes you know where the line is between having a kid that loves the world and has not had anything bad happen to them, and so they do not have a lot of fear, versus thinking, my God, perhaps I’m raising a little psychopath?
Marsh: This trait by itself is probably not enough to worry you. I will say that being afraid of something and loving something are two different axes so that people who love something will override their fear for it, even if they have a normal amount of fear. Alex Honnold, the free solo climber, is a famous example of this. He is not a fearless guy at all. He talks about how terrified he was before giving his TED Talk. People assume he must be fearless because of the climbs he does. The reality is he loves to climb. It gives him so much joy, he is so driven to do it that that overwhelms the regular amount of fear. That is how I am about dogs. Big dogs, small dogs, barking dogs, whatever. When I was a little kid, I would throw myself at all of them. It was not fearlessness; it was love.
You are looking for fearlessness across the gamut, including when it comes to punishment. For many little kids, having mom or dad get mad at you when you have done something you should not do is enough to make that behavior less likely going forward. Some kids might need a more structured reinforcement system like the “one, two, three magic” system, which I highly recommend, which results in timeout. One, Two, Three Magic is a book about how to use principles of behavioral psychology to help kids manage their behavior in a way that does not involve arguing or yelling or harsh punishment. It is behaviorism. When a child does something disruptive that they should not do, you count them. “That is one.” The first time they do it. “That is two.” The second time they do it, and on three, they have a mandatory timeout. No talking, no arguing, no explaining. They have a timeout. Kids hate timeouts. It is boring. That works.
Mounk: This is true in discussions of criminal law as well. When punishment is certain and immediate, that is the most likely deterrent, and this is applying the same thing to kids. Do not shout at the kid, but make sure you punish the kid.
Marsh: Yes, it should be swift, it should be certain, it does not need to be harsh. It should be annoying. Punishment has gotten a bad name. Punishment is any response that reduces the likelihood of that behavior in the future. When you are a parent, there is no possible way to only use reward and reinforcement to shape your kid’s behavior. Kids will do things they should not do sometimes. Using simple, swift, certain, annoying consequences like a timeout, for most kids that is plenty and that will shape their behavior fine. For kids who have this bold, fearless personality it will not. One of the problems is that most parents have no idea what they are dealing with. They think, I do not understand, I have other kids and this worked fine for them, why is this kid not responding to these mild punishments? Unfortunately, what happens is the parents ratchet up the punishment. The timeout did not work, now I am going to lock you in your room. Locking you in your room did not work, now I am going to start screaming at you. Maybe I am going to use physical punishment. The problem is if the kid does not fear the punishment in advance, none of that is going to work.
Now you have a kid who is fairly fearless and thinks that everybody around them is a jerk. They are being treated unfairly. They are being treated differently than the other kids around them, including their siblings. The reason is their behavior is different, but a little kid is not going to put that together. This is the developmental cycle it leads to. The fearless temperament sometimes is coupled with low affiliative desires. We do not know if those two things are intrinsically linked or if having both is extra bad. Low affiliation means they do not find affection as rewarding as other people.
Parents sometimes try to be respectful of the child and dial back on the affection. Not as many hugs, giving them their space, not snuggling with them because they do not seem to like it as much. That is the opposite of what you should do. Kids do not always know what they need. Kids who are not that sensitive to affection need extra of it. You do not want to lock them into bear hugs while they struggle. You use big warm smiles, lots of affectionate touches because that is what it takes to get through to them.
Mounk: Just to go back to how you are facing this three-year-old and you are trying to figure out, is a three-year-old just an asshole like many three-year-olds are assholes, or is it a special asshole? One thing I have observed with kids, friends and family members, et cetera, is that kids at that age, terrible twos, will behave in horrible ways. They will bite their parents and whatever. They will afterward feel obvious remorse. They will look crestfallen, they hurt mommy or daddy, and they will be hurt by the punishment, and you will see that they are thinking, what did I do? Is the absence of that a reliable indicator at that age? Is that something that even at that young age you can observe, or is that not a key thing to look out for?
Marsh: I would say it is a slightly less reliable indicator because that is something you also might see in a child with autistic traits. You might not see as much of that attention to other people’s sadness or anxiety or stress. If you couple that fearless personality with the lack of seeming to care if you have hurt somebody, it is normal for a two- or three-year-old who one minute is a screaming terror, if mom starts crying or seems sad, to say, oh, mommy, are you okay? Not in the middle of a tantrum necessarily, but most of the time you should see a little of that. That means the child is coming to intrinsically value other people’s welfare.
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That is a normal human trait that should develop. When the people you love are doing well, that should bring you joy automatically. When they are in distress, that should bring you distress automatically. Children need to develop that. Kids with psychopathy do not have that. Other people’s welfare does not have intrinsic value to them.
Mounk: You are starting to speak about how some parents understandably step back from expressing affection for kids who do not seem to value affection in the same way, but that is the wrong thing to do. How much agency is there? If by the age of a two- or three-year-old there is something wrong and you do everything right, you take the kid to a doctor first and a specialist, and they are diagnosed with, this kid is in danger of developing psychopathy or they may have inclination toward that, what can you do and how much of a difference is that going to make? If kids are born without that sense of empathy for others, is that something you can give them through treatments and therapy and the right behavioralism, or is the best you can hope for to manage that condition so that the outcomes are not as terrible as they often turn out to be?
Marsh: It is treatable. You are not going to bring a kid’s personality from one end of the spectrum to the other. If you are a parent of a child who is three, four, five years old and you are noticing punishment does not seem to do anything to your kid’s behavior when you punish them consistently, swiftly, and not too harshly for their behavior, they do not seem to care, they do not seem affectionate, they are misbehaving more than their peers, they are lying more often than usual, they might be starting to steal things, what do you do? Most people start out taking their kid to a pediatrician. It is likely the pediatrician will have no clue what is going on. They have not been trained to assess behavior problems in children, but hopefully they will assess. This is something. I co-founded an organization called the Society for the Prevention of Disorders of Aggression to try to work on some of these problems, but the problems are big. Hopefully they will recommend a child psychologist or social worker to assess the child next.
They may or may not know how to assess these problems in kids. They may, even if they recognize that your child probably qualifies for a diagnosis of conduct disorder, which is the child equivalent of psychopathy, or at least some of it is, or oppositional defiant disorder. Those are the major disorders names that we give kids who look like they are on a trajectory toward persistent antisocial behavior. They may deliberately give you a different diagnosis because there is fear of stigma, there is fear that families will reject these diagnoses. There is a misperception among many clinicians that they are untreatable. They may want to give a diagnosis like autism because resources will come your way if you have that diagnosis. They may give ADHD because it is a light definition and it is not offensive. Maybe even depression. They may decide the reason that this kid seems cold and unemotional is because they are depressed. It is common that parents get a wrong diagnosis. Even if you do get a right diagnosis, the odds of finding somebody trained to use a therapy that works is not high.
There is therapy that works. PCIT, Parent-Child Interaction Therapy, is therapy where the parents are trained in techniques that will bring out the best in the child, that will over time eliminate their antisocial behavior, show the kid warmth, more warmth than you think you need to show them, to develop a bond between you and the child so they care about you and they care what you want and they care what you think.
Mounk: Without going into too much detail, what kind of behaviors are there? What can you do as a parent? You were saying one thing is to show even more warmth to your kid. Most parents give a lot of warmth to most of their kids, right?
Marsh: I am sure you are familiar with the pop psych book about love languages, which has a kernel of truth. Sometimes parents fail to realize that the way they are showing their children love is not as interpretable to the child as they might think. For example, taking your kid to swim lessons and piano lessons and doctor’s appointments and PCA stuff is love. That is very much love. It does not feel like it to the kid. Being taken to the doctor is not feeling love. Making sure their clothes are clean and that they have had breakfast and get out the door on time are things loving parents do, but to a kid it feels like being harassed and nagged.
One of the things that PCIT entails, and many good behavioral therapy programs involve, is something called floor time, where you set aside five to ten minutes every day with your child to engage in behaviors that show that you care about your child, that you like them, that you approve of them, and that you feel positively about them. They involve things like, while your child is playing on the floor, imitating what they are doing, playing alongside them, narrating what they are doing, and positively commenting on what they are doing.
It feels simple and dumb, but in reality that is a moment when you are not nagging your child, you are not hustling them from one thing to another, you are not telling them what to do, you are not asking them questions, which many parents interpret as a sign of care, which it is, but to a child being endlessly peppered with questions—what did you do in school today? What did you have for lunch? Who did you sit next to?—feels like an interrogation. Floor time is an isolated time when you are showing approval and positive regard. It is amazing how much just ten minutes of that a day will do. A seven-minute workout does not seem like it should be enough to improve health, but it does. Ten minutes of floor time can do wonders for a child.
That is the baseline. Then there is a separate set of behaviors that parents engage in that help their child learn to avoid bad behaviors and adopt good ones through reinforcement.
Mounk: Interesting. In the best case, you can take a kid that has a tendency toward psychopathy and avert the worst kinds of outcomes. Tell us about how the life of a kid like that is likely to go. Then tell us what happens if you do not intervene in that kind of way and how the problems of misbehaving when you are three years old turn into the problems of misbehaving when you are 13 or 23.
Marsh: I will say that parents of kids with these problems are blamed and shamed routinely for their kid having this callous, remorseless personality. It sometimes does not help to say the solution is parenting management training, which reinforces the idea that you must be a really bad parent. That is not true. In general, the kids who develop these traits who are raised by parents who get them into some kind of therapy, or sometimes just figure out a way to manage their behavior, end up as kids who are not going to be the warmest, most cuddly people in the world.
They usually have learned good habits and strategies to get what they want that do not involve overtly breaking rules or hurting other people. They may end up in professions that attract extroverted people that are high risk, high reward, and offer a lot of status. There is evidence that jobs in finance and banking might attract a higher proportion of people with psychopathy than teaching, for example, just to name a quite different job.
Mounk: This is one of the questions that my producer Leo tasked me with asking, which is that there is a stereotype in our culture that certain kinds of successful people may be more likely to have traits of psychopathy, whether that is banking or surgeons or CEOs. Is there something to that, that having psychopathic traits makes you less likely to be successful, but that among some subsection of highly successful people the share of psychopaths is higher? Politics?
Marsh: My sense is that there is not a ton of great data on this. There is at least one very good study that found that among executive-level people in the business world, the proportion of people estimated to have clinically significant psychopathy, that top one or two percent, is about four percent. So double the regular population, maybe four times the regular population, but that is also 96 percent of them who do not have clinical psychopathy.
Mounk: Among the prison population you said it is close to 50%, and among these people it is 4%.It is a little elevated, but not enough to look at your cousin who is a CEO and say, you’re probably a psychopath; that is why you’re a CEO.
Marsh: People who go into high-risk, high-reward professions—surgery, politics, business—are more likely to be men for various reasons. Men score a little higher in psychopathy than women on average. There are more men than women at the very high end and more women than men at the very low end, but the average psychopathy scores of men and women are not that different. Professions that attract more men will have a higher level of psychopathy because they have more men. Even if you correct for that, there is probably a small effect.
A lot of those professions attract people who are high in the boldness trait that is characteristic of psychopathy: boldness, social dominance. That is sometimes called the adaptive arm of psychopathy or the adaptive feature of psychopathy that may help explain why some level of these traits persists in the population over evolution.
Mounk: Right. Risk-taking, bold, fearless. Someone who is a rock star performing for 150,000 people is going to be more fearless than the average person, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. It would explain some of that statistical correlation.
Marsh: Most personality variation is what makes the world go round. It is what makes life colorful. Most personality traits have a wide range that can be adaptive in particular contexts. Some contexts make it more adaptive to be introverted and some extroverted. That is true for psychopathic traits until you get to the very high end. That is not adaptive in almost any context because you burn bridges with everybody everywhere by mistreating them and using them for instrumental purposes. Bernie Madoff is an example of someone who, based on what is available biography-wise, was probably a psychopath. He was using people to meet his instrumental goals.
Mounk: What is the evidence for that? From my understanding of it, at the beginning he was running a relatively normal investment business. Then he made promises that were bigger than they should have been. Then he thought, damn, in order to keep this going, I have to take in more money, and it turned into a Ponzi scheme.
I do not know the details of the case, so I am probably missing elements of it. That seems like something an average asshole might end up in. He did not set off saying, I’m going to perpetuate the biggest financial fraud in history. He thought, I’m going to invest these people’s money and make a lot of profit. Then he thought, shit, either I go bankrupt now or I fudge the numbers. Ten years later, he’s in way over his head. What element of what he did indicates that there was more to it than that?
Marsh: It is a good question. I will say it has been a while since I dug into his biography. What you are looking for is never one thing, because you are right. It is plausible that someone leveraging the money they have to invest and trying to build up a bigger portfolio could get in over their head, not because they are trying to use people, but because they were trying to do the right thing and ended up getting people bankrupt. That could happen.
Information you look for to distinguish between someone who did one bad thing, even if it is a big bad thing, and someone who is truly psychopathic is patterns of behavior throughout different parts of their life. Here I am not talking about Bernie Madoff in particular because I am not confident enough about my memory of his biography. If you are looking at someone’s life to assess psychopathy on the basis of some antisocial thing they have done, you first want to look at their relationships over time. Do they have evidence of real friendships, friendships based on mutual affection and reciprocally benefiting one another? Romantic relationships, relationships with their children. Do those seem to be characterized by sincere affection? When something bad happens to someone you love, are you truly upset about it?
You want to look over time biographically. For people who are psychopathic, there is almost always evidence in early childhood that their behavior was difficult to control. For example, children who were sent to special schools that were trying to manage their behavior might indicate their behavior was unmanageable to their parents. It is not the only reason kids get sent to special schools, but it is a characteristic thing you might see. Was there evidence that they engaged in juvenile delinquency? Were they underperforming in school?
Those sorts of biographical details are helpful to look at. It is rare that people who are doing fraudulent, dishonest things in the business realm are not also doing things like that in the personal realm, maybe in romantic relationships. You want to look at multiple prongs to get an overall portrait of someone who does not care about other people’s welfare and is using other people to get what they want.
Mounk: We have another set of questions from Leo. One part of this is whether it is true that psychopaths are often particularly charismatic, that they have an ability to manipulate people that goes beyond that of the average person. Relatedly, we have the holidays coming up. If you go to your Christmas gathering or whatever your favorite holiday may be, and your cousin’s significant other that they are bringing over for the first time seems to have behaviors that may be indicative of psychopathy, how do you think through whether you are talking yourself into a rage and need to touch grass, or whether you have to be concerned for the well-being of your relative?
Marsh: This is what is confounding about psychopathy: how hard it is to detect in a casual interaction. It is impossible. I do not think any psychopathy researcher says there is any tell in casual conversation that reliably indicates someone is psychopathic because people who are psychopathic are shapeshifters. This is not true of everybody, but most of the psychopathic people I have worked with will say that they mask in most interactions. They present the face to the people they are interacting with that they think those people want to see. That often results in their being some of the most charming, likable, friendly people you will ever interact with. They do not seem fake. Most of us have too much confidence in our ability to detect deception in regular life. We are not good at it. Everybody I know who works with psychopathy has found themselves duped at least once.
You are out of luck when it comes to detecting psychopathy in your cousin’s new boyfriend unless you know someone who knows him and can say, that guy is not trustworthy. He talks a big game, and half the stuff he says is not true, and it is not clear why he was making it up. He has had six different jobs in the last two years, and nobody knows why. He cheated on his last girlfriend. That is the kind of biography you are looking for.
Whether people who are psychopathic are usually charismatic is hard to say. There is not good data on this. They certainly report that they are. They will say, yes, I am. That is not satisfying. It is possible that if you want to manipulate people, being charismatic is a good tool to do it. Many people who are psychopathic may develop a more charismatic demeanor in an effort to do that. It may also be the case that it is people who are very psychopathic and charismatic who cause trouble. Those are the ones you do not detect.
Mounk: Right. It is an availability bias where if there are a hundred people with psychopathy, the ninety who are not particularly charismatic are less successful, less likely to become celebrities, less likely to become elected office holders. The subset of psychopaths we think about when we consider the condition are the ones who are charismatic. That is a very good point.
Marsh: That is possible. There is not as much good data as I would like on whether having a conversation with the average person who is high in psychopathy makes them come across as more charismatic. What they come across as is a genuinely likable person who does not seem particularly antisocial. I have done a little research on this, not published, that people tend to conflate how nice a person is, how good a person is, with whether they personally like them. For example, we are overwhelmingly likely to assume that political figures on the opposite side of the aisle from ourselves are psychopathic. That is why I always urge people: just because this person has politics you do not like, whether they are a national politician or a voter, that is not a sign they are psychopathic. You do not like them, and I get that, but they may think they are doing the right thing sincerely and honestly.
Mounk: That is true for ascriptions of psychopathy. It is broadly true for ascriptions of moral evil. It is tempting to think that my way of seeing the world politically is so obviously true that anyone who disagrees with me must be stupid or a bad person. That is an assumption I see people make all the time. One of the things you get from attending focus groups and listening to people of very different political points of view is that they seem genuinely to be struggling to think about what is right. In a different way, one of the things you get from reading the most brilliant political thinkers of the past, who lived in different moments and therefore had different political assumptions and different values, is that there are many well-intentioned, smart people who have views that are very different from those that I have. That is the core to beginning to have any productive form of politics.
Marsh: Exactly. People can do things that you dislike, have beliefs that you dislike, and be a sincerely well-intentioned person who is trying to be moral and is being moral according to what they view as moral. That is important when trying to explain what psychopathy is and is not. It is not everybody who disagrees with you politically.
I have had more than one conversation with academics who say, well, I will tell you where you can find all the people with psychopathy. They are on the Republican side of the aisle. That is not how it works. The most famous social psychology experiment of all time, the Milgram study, was designed to dispel the idea that Germany was a nation full of psychopaths. The belief at the time was that you could never have had such a thing happen in Germany as what happened in World War II unless German people were unusually callous and heartless and cruel. That was not true at all.
Mounk: Well, obviously there is the historical point that it is hard to understand why Germans in 1925 were not psychopaths, and in 1943 they were all psychopaths, and by 1970 they were back to having normal psychologies. It is not a convincing explanation. You spend a lot of time with psychopaths. You spend time studying them in research setups where there are layers of confidentiality so that you elicit honest responses. Tell us what it is like, as best you can tell from speaking with those people, to be a psychopath. How do people think about their own condition? How do people think about the world?
Marsh: One thing I should mention is that there are a couple members of the organization I created who have been diagnosed with psychopathy. They have written well-known memoirs in the last couple of years. One is Patric Gagne and the other is Amy Thomas. I have valued them as colleagues. Part of the interactions I have with people with psychopathy is as colleagues. I come at this from different angles. The first work I did in people with clinical psychopathy, or callous unemotional traits, which is the euphemism we use for children, was in my postdoctoral research when we were doing brain imaging research trying to understand the neural basis of psychopathy. We interviewed kids from all over the greater Washington, D.C. area and interviewed their parents to get a better sense of what made these kids tick.
One of the interesting discrepancies we found was that there was a wide range in how aware the kids were that there was anything different about them. This is true of adults with not only psychopathy but conditions like bipolar disorder or stroke. Some people recognize that there is something different about them, and some people think there is nothing different about them and that everybody else is just like them. That makes a big difference when it comes to treatment. If someone has no idea there is anything different about them, it is hard to convince them to get treated.
The kids who recognized there was something different about them had reasonably good insight about the fact that they found themselves doing antisocial things repeatedly that other kids did not do. Some of them said they wished they knew how to stop because they could tell that it was not working out for them in the long term.
Mounk: They did not say, I wish I knew how to stop because it makes mommy and daddy sad. They said things like, I realize I keep getting punished for it, or, nobody seems to like me. What is it that bothers them?
Marsh: They say, this is not the life I want. I have talked to adults who say the same thing. They say, this is not the life I want. I want to have friends. I want to have a regular job. I want to do well in my life.
For many of the kids I worked with, they had been kicked out of multiple schools. This was not the life they wanted. Many of them had an image of what a good life looks like, and that was not it for almost anybody. Some of them did not care. There was a subset of kids who did not care. They found school boring. They did not see the point in doing well. Getting kicked out of multiple schools would hopefully end with no school, and they would have been happy. People who are psychopathic and in their teens or twenties are the least likely to appreciate that they are the source of their own problems and want to change. As time goes on, it is more common for people to say, I’m the problem. It’s me, to paraphrase Taylor Swift, and to have some sense that they could learn how to do better. Some of them do learn how to do better.
Some of the people I have talked to, out of a desire to not lose a romantic partner they realize has been a lucky outcome for them, have said things like, I was a way worse person before I started dating this woman. I do not want to lose her. I tried to act like a nice person for a year and a half, and then it started to click, and I started to want to be a nice person. It is almost like they gave themselves therapy, exactly what a therapist would tell you to do. You need to start acting like a nice person. Do the things a nice person would do. Learn how rewarding and beneficial that is, and eventually it becomes a habit and feels natural.
Mounk: When they succeed at that, do they now genuinely love their partner and genuinely have remorse when they act in ways that upset their partner? Or is it that they have, in a way Aristotle would have described, developed a habit of acting in a certain way until it becomes an automatism, and they have gotten out of the habit of acting in ways that upset or hurt the partner? But deep down, when the partner is upset, it still does not create the wrenching feeling that you and I have when we have done something to make somebody sad.
Marsh: I have talked to people for whom both are true. Some are one and some are the other. I have talked to people who said that the only time in their life they have felt something that approached love was when something bad happening to this person made them feel emotional, and they felt bad about it in a way they had never felt about anybody else. I think there are some people with psychopathy for whom there is a lingering latent capacity to experience something akin to real love. It just takes a lot. That person has to be very nice and a kind, affectionate partner. Other people never approached what I would call love, but there was mutual understanding and reciprocity in the relationship. It was a stable relationship where both people were glad they were in it. This person was motivated to keep up their end of the bargain, something like loyalty. I have talked to people who are psychopathic who say that over time they learned to feel something like loyalty, even if not love in a more emotional way. Are these people the norm? It is hard to say, maybe not. They give some cause for optimism about what is possible.
Other people with psychopathy who are less insightful will say, I just want to get what I want. All of my relationships with people are aimed at getting what I want and figuring out what they want from me. I give them what they want to the degree that I have to in order to get what I need. I do not like my job. I do not like people. I take a lot of drugs to feel something, to feel some sense of enjoyment. I engage in risky behavior like reckless driving to feel something. This is a crappy life, but this is the way I am.
Mounk: How honest and open are people about the lack of remorse for bad actions or some of the things they have done? I understand this is a context in which they know you are not going to report what they say to the police. What are the things they would tell you in that context? What are some of the shocking things people have told you?
Marsh: I cannot tell the details. Pretty shocking things. I have been shaken by some of the things I have heard in conversations. I wish I could tell the details, but I cannot. The research that we do is protected by a certificate of confidentiality from the NIH that protects us from having to reveal what we are told under subpoena, because we would never be able to do this research if the people we work with thought that we were going to reveal what they told us. We are mandatory reporters if they tell us about something they are going to do, if they are planning on hurting somebody else or themselves, or if there is any indicator of child or elder abuse. We have to report that. We tell them that. We say, if you tell us anything about these kinds of items, we are mandatory reporters, just like many professionals are. If it is something they did in the past, we would never be able to do this research if we could not guarantee that.
Mounk: If they have confessed to terrible crimes in this context, what do they sound like? Do they tell that to you the way I would say, oh yeah, today for lunch I went to a Japanese restaurant? What is the tone?
Marsh: Casual is the best way to describe it. Yes, this is something that I have done, because there is always a reason. One of the things that people with psychopathy are good at is externalizing blame. It was not, I did it because I wanted to. It was, they put me in this position. The classic line of abusive partners in domestic settings is, they made me do it. They pushed me to it. Domestic violence is something that people with psychopathy are more prone to. It is never your fault if you are psychopathic. Everything is somebody else’s fault. You get explanations like, they put me in this position. They told me they were going to tell on me, so I had to do what I had to do.
I have worked with people who explain what they do through a moral framework they created, where a “good person” will only physically hurt people who do racist things. I only hurt people who say or do things that are racist. It is an interesting moral framework because it channels their antisocial impulses in ways that are, in their view, relatively prosocial.
Mounk: That is interesting. There is some research suggesting that people with dark triad personality traits are attracted to political extremes because those are a cover or an excuse for engaging in these kinds of behaviors. The explanation would be the other way around because those extremes give an excuse for saying, most Americans are terrible human beings. That allows someone to engage in wanton cruelty online, participate in cancellation campaigns, or other kinds of things. It is a way to live out this desire within a socially sanctioned sphere.
Marsh: I have not talked about politics much with most of the participants we brought through, but it fits with what we know. We know that people who are very antisocial online are more likely to have psychopathic personality traits. It is not that you become a different person when you go online. That would have been a reasonable hypothesis, but it seems that people’s online behavior is a reflection of their real personality, even if they put on a more prosocial front in in-person settings and act under the cloak of anonymity online.
Mounk: I know that you also are interested in altruism, and we have talked about it a little earlier in the conversation. It strikes me from what we have talked about so far that the problem of altruism is somewhat ill-posed in philosophy and in biology. The basic paradox of altruism is why we evolve to have altruism. You could expect people who serve their own interests to be the most successful at passing on genes to the next generation. Over time, altruism would be selected out in a population. There are various ways of trying to explain that, group-level selection versus individual-level selection, et cetera. It strikes me that what you are describing is that if you have somebody who is not altruistic at all, who has no sense of care for others, the life outcomes end up being poor. Perhaps some amount of altruism is necessary for success, which seems paradoxical but gives a more straightforward explanation for why altruism has evolved as a human trait.
Marsh: Absolutely. I think that is a good way of putting it. To me, one of the strongest arguments for the idea that humans on average have the capacity for altruism is the existence of psychopathy. Psychopathy fundamentally boils down to not caring about other people’s welfare for its own sake. That is the trait that is important.
Mounk: One way of being skeptical about the existence of altruism is to say, well, people seem like they care about others all the time, but because you can get things out of seeming like you care for others, perhaps deep down we are not altruistic. You can make the same argument about pets. Your dog seems like he loves you, but he has realized this is a smart way of getting food and does not care about you. What you are saying is that if that were what everybody was like, everybody would suffer from psychopathy. That is what this would be, but we clearly see in the population that psychopathy is rare. Interesting.
Marsh: I will say that a cynical, untrusting personality tends to go along with being relatively untrustworthy and callous yourself. When I talk about my research with altruism in general audience settings and people ask questions that reveal fundamental disbelief in the possibility that people could be altruistic, I usually give an answer along the lines of, this question does not say much about what people are like as a whole. There is a spectrum of altruistic capacities in people, but your question has told me a lot about you.
Every so often, if they push me, because some people are very cynical about whether it is possible for people to genuinely care about other people, many of those people do not have that experience themselves. They do not care about other people. Some of them may live lives that are ordinary enough or prosocial enough that it has not occurred to them that there is something unusual about them. They think they are like everybody else. “We are all like this to some degree.”
Mounk: If anybody in the audience now thinks, oh my God, I am skeptical about altruism. Am I a psychopath?, how can people self-test whether they are or are not?
Marsh: Yes. You can go to my organization’s website, disordersofaggression.org, and there is a link you can click on for some screeners for psychopathy, totally anonymous.
Mounk: What kind of screeners or questions do you ask?
Marsh: The psychopathy screener we have for adults is called the TriPM, the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure, and it assesses those three bins of traits we asked about before. There are questions along the lines of, I have the ability not to let my emotions dictate my behavior, I like to do risky and dangerous things for fun, I am more competent and capable than the average person. It is questions that get at all the traits we have been talking about.
Mounk: I realize the pull of psychopathy is such that we have gone away from altruism again. One of the questions to ask about both of these traits is whether it is nature or nurture. Is there something in the constellation of the particular genes that a child has that makes them more likely to display these psychopathic traits, or on the other hand to be an ultra altruist, somebody who is particularly altruistic? Or is it something about the early childhood environment that triggers this in some way?
Marsh: I would say the best estimates are that about half the variation in these personality traits is genetic, which is true for most personality traits. The estimates always end up about there. About half the variation is genetic factors and about half is environmental factors, although not in a simple way, as you know, like shared environments. The socioeconomic status of your family and what kind of school you went to and whether your mom worked are none of the things that are terribly predictive of life outcomes in general, mostly because different kids respond differently to the same environmental variable. They do not affect every kid the same way, and you cannot make simple predictions. There is a strong genetic component to psychopathy, which I think is hopefully a relief to parents of kids who have these traits, that it is not like you caused the kid to have these traits.
Because there is a big non-genetic component, there is the capacity for environmental variables to help treat them. That is the good and the bad news.
Mounk: Sometimes the idea of genetic traits seems harsh or mean, but in a sense it is not. If we said this is all about upbringing, then if somebody has psychopathy it is probably that the mom was not loving enough or whatever sexist tropes you can immediately bring out. If there is a strong genetic component, and it is a polygenic trait, it is not one gene where you have one thing that is passed down and because of this gene you are a psychopath. It is a combination of many genes, and some of those combinations are more likely to result in these traits. You can have one sibling that does not have any inclination toward that at all and another sibling that does by random combination of genes. In a sense that is a less harsh view of the world, or at least a less harsh view of the responsibility of parents.
Marsh: I completely agree. Parents give themselves more credit and blame than they deserve. Children are agents of their upbringing in a way that is not clear in parenting books. Children elicit parenting from parents. They are not passive receptacles of things done to them. Children are also fairly robust. This is not an invitation for people to treat their children harshly. Your child will be attracted to certain kinds of outcomes, and they will want certain kinds of behavior from parents in ways that shape you in a complicated dance. Your job as a parent is not to shape your child to turn out some particular way.
There is the analogy of the gardener and the carpenter by the psychologist Alison Gopnik that I like. Parents think of themselves as carpenters too often, that they are trying to build a chair, and if they do this and they do that, then the chair will have a nice sturdy frame and strong back. That is not it. Throw away the wood. You are a gardener. Your child is a seed that could be a geranium seed or a marigold seed or a zinnia seed, and you have no idea what they are going to be. Your job is to try to help foster and let that seed grow as best you can. They are going to turn out the way they are going to turn out to some degree because genetics are powerful.
Mounk: That is a lovely analogy. I have a dear friend who is an avid listener to this podcast who studied sociology and used to ideologically believe that most outcomes are due to culture and social factors. Now, as she has children, she told me recently, I was wrong. Kids just come out one way or the other. Bringing them up in the right way, nurturing them, is important, but they are different from each other, and it is not because you treat one one way or the other another way.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Abigail discuss what to do if someone in your life may be psychopathic. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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