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When I was growing up in Germany, I took it for granted that any Jewish institution—a museum or a synagogue, a school or a kindergarten—would need to be protected by armed guards. This made the security of Jewish life in New York City and other parts of the world all the more striking. How incredible that all of these Jewish institutions could just exist, without any apparent need for security!
Tragically, times have changed. That is why, over the last few years, I have sometimes talked about the Europeanization of American Jewry. A diaspora population that once lived in relative security has slowly had to adopt the practices which long characterized Jewish life in Europe.
After today’s awful terror attack, the same change will also come to Jews in Australia. As Claire Lehmann writes in this incisive piece, it doesn’t matter how far removed Jews are from the Middle East, geographically or ideologically: murderers intent on “globalizing the intifada” will always find an excuse to target them.
- Yascha
Bondi Beach, December 14, 2025. (Photo by David Gray / AFP via Getty Images.)Tonight’s massacre on Bondi Beach is the deadliest terrorist attack ever carried out on Australian soil, and the worst attack on Jewish civilians since October 7. Images circulating from the scene show at least two men, armed with shotguns, positioned on a footpath and a pedestrian bridge, firing toward the beach where a Hanukkah celebration was taking place. At least fifteen people are confirmed dead, with dozens more hospitalized. Undetonated improvised explosive devices were found at the scene.
NSW Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon said police have authorized the use of special powers to help identify and detain anyone who may have connections to the attack, including investigating the possibility of further offenders and suspicious items. One of the shooters has been identified as Naveed Akram by a senior law enforcement source, with police reportedly conducting a raid on a property linked to him in Sydney’s southwest.
This attack has wrenched Australians. While various antisemitic incidents have occurred in Australia in recent years, they have largely taken the form of arson, graffiti, and vandalism. The atrocity carried out today represents an escalation of extreme proportions, resembling something that supposedly only happens overseas—not here.
Until tonight, Australia’s experience of terrorism had been defined by relatively low casualty counts. The deadliest recognized terrorist attack on Australian soil before Bondi was the Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing in 1978, which killed three people. More recent incidents—including the Lindt Café siege in Sydney in 2014, the Brighton siege in Melbourne in 2017, and the Bourke Street stabbing in 2018—claimed one or two lives each. Numerous other plots were disrupted before execution. By death toll alone, the Bondi Beach massacre now exceeds every previous terrorist attack in Australian history.
What compounds the shock is not only the scale of the violence, but its setting: Bondi Beach, an iconic landmark of Sydney, and a symbol of Australia’s laidback self-image.
Video footage from the attack shows a civilian confronting one of the gunmen and grappling with him at close range. During the struggle, the civilian succeeds in wresting the weapon from the attacker, even as a second gunman continues firing from a nearby pedestrian bridge.
For many Jewish Australians, tonight’s massacre represents the escalation of a pattern they have long warned about. While the shock is real, so too is the dismay that this day was long predicted. In the months following October 7, the trajectory of antisemitic violence in Australia was already becoming clear.
As I wrote in December 2024:
A timeline published by The Australian this weekend exposes the timid response from Australia’s leaders. [Prime Minister Anthony] Albanese said nothing when a mob descended upon Central Shule Chabad Synagogue in Melbourne’s East on the anniversary of Kristallnacht. He said nothing when an anti-Israel convoy drove through Sydney’s Eastern suburbs, home to many Jewish Australians. He remained silent when families of Israeli hostages fled from protesters who ambushed them, calling them “baby killers.” No response came when a Melbourne professor had his office stormed, protesters calling him a “war criminal” for working with an Israeli university. Silence again when former Olympian, Australian Senator, and Indigenous woman Nova Peris was surrounded by an intimidating mob at the Great Synagogue in Sydney.
This pattern of unrestrained Jew-hatred was followed, months later, by mass demonstrations in Sydney in which portraits of Iran’s Supreme Leader were carried across the Harbour Bridge, alongside symbols associated with Islamist extremist groups.
In the aftermath of October 7, historian Jeffrey Herf described the ideological logic that connects antisemitism to mass violence: “Its barbarity may be shocking to many observers,” he wrote, “but it will not have surprised those familiar with the ideology of the perpetrators. This latest outburst of violence is the logical outcome of the Jew-hatred.”
Despite the recency of October 7, there has been widespread denial of antisemitism—globally and in Australia. Violence against Jews in Israel is routinely rationalized as something Israelis must have brought upon themselves: the inevitable consequence of history or some kind of provocation. This logic treats mass murder not as an expression of hatred, but as a reaction. Yet, as Paul Berman has argued, Islamist violence is driven not by grievance alone but also by a death-cult ideology that treats the murder of Jews as a calling.
Jewish Australians celebrating Hanukkah on Bondi Beach could not be further removed from the politics of the Middle East. And yet they, too, have been targeted—evidence that murderous ideology does not stop at borders, and does not require proximity to Israel to find its victims.
Claire Lehmann is the Founder of Quillette.
A version of this essay first appeared in Quillette.
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In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk, Timothy Garton Ash, Sabina Ćudić, and Nathalie Tocci explore the relationship between the United States and Europe, the Ukraine peace talks, and whether Europe has any hope of reinvigorating itself.
Timothy Garton Ash is the author of Homelands: A Personal History of Europe and writes the newsletter History of the Present.
Sabina Ćudić is a member of the National Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, vice president of the Foreign Relations Committee, vice president of the European liberals in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and the president of Naša stranka, a progressive, social-liberal political party.
Nathalie Tocci is Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Professor of Practice at the John Hopkins University SAIS, and independent non-executive director of the multi utility company Acea.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Welcome to the thirteenth edition of The Good Fight Club. Today we decided, given current events, to do a Europe extravaganza. We are going to think about what Donald Trump’s new national security strategy means for Europe, what is happening with the peace negotiations in Ukraine, and whether Europe can try to assure a decent future for Ukraine on its own. More broadly, the question that most interests me: how should Europe respond to this political moment? Is Europe destined to be a continental museum, or can it actually meet this political and historical moment? What does it need to do in order to accomplish that?
I have a star-studded panel of Europe experts—and some of my most beloved Europeans—with me today. In alphabetical order of last names, we have Timothy Garton Ash, the author of Homelands: A Personal History of Europe, as well as the Substack History of the Present.
We have Sabina Čudić, who is the president of a social liberal party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the vice president of the European Liberals in the Council of Europe, and one of our regular guests on The Good Fight Club.
We have, for the first time on the podcast, Nathalie Tocci. She is the director of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome, and she has a job title that she shares word for word with me: she is a professor of the practice at SAIS, though she has the good fortune of serving her duties in Bologna rather than Washington, D.C.
Let’s talk about this national security strategy. It was published to much shock and some fanfare last week. It is obviously the administration’s attempt to set out its priorities around the world. But a surprisingly large portion of the strategy was devoted to Europe. The document says that the Trump administration sees Europe as a key “civilizational ally,” talking up the importance of Europe in a way. But it also says that Europe, as it currently exists, is a deep problem for the United States, that it is on the way to self-destructing, and that the United States should think of many European governments and institutions as undermining the alliance because they do not share the values of Donald Trump.
Nathalie, make sense of what this document is and why it sent shockwaves around Europe.
Nathalie Tocci: Well, firstly, Yascha, let me point out that I actually think it is a rather coherent—and let me say even strategic—document. We have spent a long time over the last year and more describing the Trump administration as unpredictable, incoherent, and inconsistent. Actually, I think the national security strategy paints a rather coherent picture of the world. I would describe it as a picture of imperial collusion.
It is essentially a world in which there are empires. The United States is the first and foremost of those empires. It has a view of the Western Hemisphere—so obviously there is a big Latin American part of the story. But I would say that at least a big part of Europe belongs to the U.S.’s colonial menu. Then, of course, there is the Chinese empire, there is a Russian empire, and perhaps there are elements of tension and even competition, but broadly speaking, the intention is one of collusion with these other empires.
If we start from that premise, it is no surprise that Europe takes up so much space in this national security strategy. I think there is, in fact, a strategy toward Europe, one aimed at weakening and dividing Europe. Of course, this starts with the capitulation of Ukraine, which we will talk about a little later, but it does not end there. Indeed, I think there is very much an aim at disintegrating Europe.
Now, you may say—and you did start off by saying—that this is all about Europe as a civilizational ally, and the U.S.’s great concern for undemocratic practices in Europe and for “ethnic replacement.” I think that, frankly, this civilizational element is probably the least interesting part—or I should say the least sincere part—of the story. Because if there were, for instance, a real concern for migration in Europe, it would not explain why Italy, which has seen a very significant inflow of migrants since the far-right government took power three years ago, is being looked at as a shining example, while Denmark—with a Social Democratic government that has had an extremely restrictive migration policy—is not mentioned at all.
So I do not think there is a real concern for democracy, civilization or culture. What I do think is that these far-right, populist, nationalist governments or parties or movements in Europe serve the strategic purpose of undermining Europe. They are essentially the fifth columns. It is no surprise that they are exactly the same parties, governments and movements supported by others—especially Russia—who also want to weaken Europe.
So I actually think there is a strategic intent behind this national security strategy that fits within a broader worldview that is dreadful in many respects, but actually quite coherent.
Mounk: Timothy, does Trump want a weak Europe, or does he want a strong Europe that is run along the lines of MAGA ideology?
Timothy Garton Ash: I think he wants a different Europe, and a weak European Union. So I think the civilizational component of this is a bit more important than perhaps Nathalie was suggesting, although I entirely agree that it evokes a world in which the United States is one transactional great power among many, one empire among many.
When it says, for example, that within a few decades at the latest certain NATO members—i.e., in Europe—will become majority non-European, that is very clearly code for non-white. That is a pretty startling statement to find in a national security strategy of the United States. When it says “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations,” that is a declaration of political war against the European Union.
Particularly, by the way, Yascha, if what has been reported elsewhere is true—that an earlier version of this suggested that four EU member states, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Italy, should be wooed away from the current European Union. It is a frontal declaration of political war against the European Union.
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In historical context, I think it is interesting because, as you know very well, Yascha, for a large part of its history the United States was indifferent to Europe, wanted to stand apart from it, pulled away from its isolationism. Since 1945, we have had a United States that has supported a more liberal, more united Europe. This is the first time ever in history we have had a United States explicitly supporting an anti-liberal, xenophobic, nationalist, populist Europe. In a way, it is playing our own worst reactionary past in Europe back to us.
Mounk: Sabina, what does that look like from your part of the world? I agree with Timothy that the most striking—frankly shocking—line in that document was this idea that Europe will one day be majority non-Europeans. Do you think he thinks of Bosnians as European or non-European in that context?
Sabina Ćudić: Well, it depends which Bosnians, because in a country with a majority Muslim population—somewhere around 50 percent—certainly half of the country is not perceived as European, no doubt. When we talk about whether the document is strategic and coherent versus perhaps more haphazard, one can be strategic and coherent while still producing outcomes that are a total mess.
Nathalie underestimated the cultural, civilizational, religious, and racial aspects of the document. That does not mean those aspects are the strategic point of the document. I think the strategic point is the interest—business interests, economic interests—that stand behind it. In that sense, Europe and the European Union serve those interests. The EU’s high standards—environmental protection, mining, food production—are today seen as fully contrary to American interests.
We are currently living that in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The energy interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina today—the building of the southern interconnector, fully financed and awarded to an American bidder or corporation—are now, and I think completely wrongly, openly seen by the American administration as being contrary to American business interests. Specifically because of standards on coal production, clean versus dirty energy, and so on.
But I want to underline this: even if the cultural, racial, and religious aspects are a decoy, the implications—and the way the document was received in Europe—and the devastation it has already caused are significant. Psychological, anthropological, racial, religious tensions: the language alone, the publication of it alone, has already done enough damage. Particularly in my region, the concern now is: are we all waking up in the same paradigm, and are we all operating under the same cultural and civilizational assumptions?
Tocci: I totally agree that there is this vision of “we, the white and Christian West.” Clearly this is what underpins the document. I guess what I was trying to say is that if, for the sake of argument, you were to have the current German government pursuing an extremely restrictive migration policy, pushing for a rowing back on climate legislation, but still remaining fully committed to European integration, that would not be a government the Trump administration would support. This is what I was trying to get at. There is this overall cultural vision, but ultimately what is really underpinning this exercise is the aim of division and disintegration.
Garton Ash: I think this is spot on, which is that even if half of this does not happen, the impact has already been enormous. The way I feel it is: for Christ’s sake, this is really the last straw. After everything Trump has said, after Vance’s speech—which was a kind of official version of this at the Munich Security Conference—after the absolutely disgraceful 28-point peace plan proposal, the Russian-American proposal, this is it.
I am a lifelong British Euro-Atlanticist. Being British, one tends to be born that way, unlike if you are born in France—but consciously becoming so in the 1980s because of the great contribution the United States made to the liberation of Eastern Europe. At the time of the Iraq War, I wrote a book called Free World, which is all about how the Euro-Atlanticist option is the best one for Europe.
Now, when I hear all of this coming from the United States, what I feel—if you will pardon my French—is: if that is what you really think, if you really cannot see the difference between Zelenskyy and Putin, between Churchill and Hitler, between good and evil, between the aggressor and those who are attacked, then fuck off.
If I feel that, imagine what other Europeans are feeling. Now, of course, that is not a dispassionate intellectual analysis. It is not a policy prescription. But the feeling remains. Even if, wonder of wonders, the perfect Atlantist, pro-European liberal president comes back in 2029, it will never be “glad, confident morning” again. We will never again have that confidence that the United States is on our side. I do not know if the others agree.
Ćudić: Exactly. That is the point about the damage that has already been inflicted. That is exactly what I was thinking: even if we woke up next year with a complete reversal of results in the midterms and then new outcomes in three years, the damage to the confidence in the relationship has been done.
That will have a lasting impact, I think, not just in the short term but for future decades. Are you a reliable partner? If this war in Ukraine had been fought the way we fought it for the past couple of years, and then you have a complete U-turn and reversal, that has implications. In the same way, I think it is incredibly unfortunate that the Iraq intervention and the war in Afghanistan diminished our appetite for interventionism—which I am a big supporter of. They created a lasting echo of unjust war or unjust intervention. I think we are going to be experiencing the same. I just regret that I am a middle-aged woman who maybe will not live to see a full repair of confidence and relations.
Mounk: I have been struck by two things. I have done a lot of French, Italian, and German media over the course of the last week. The first is that when I was growing up, there was a lot of anti-Americanism in Europe. But that anti-Americanism came from the far left and from the far right. Then there was a kind of cautiously pro-American stance from the center-left in most European countries, which found all kinds of things about the United States ghastly but ultimately realized the United States was the natural partner of Europe. Then there was full-throated pro-Americanism from the center-right in most European countries, bar perhaps France.
That landscape has completely shifted. Now smart journalists—and also less smart and less thoughtful journalists—frame the whole issue as: is the United States out to get us? Is it our number one enemy? How do we protect ourselves from the United States? You see the same framing in the remarks of many center-right politicians from political parties that used to be the most pro-American. That, I think, is a sea change. As all of you point out, it is not going to suddenly change or disappear, even if Gavin Newsom or Josh Shapiro or Pete Buttigieg or whoever becomes president of the United States in 2029.
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I do have a question, which is that I found it striking to what extent the European public has framed this debate as a kind of culture war between the United States on one side and Europe on the other. It is: “these weird Americans under Donald Trump are attacking European values, and they hate Europe, and we should defend ourselves against them”. There is a very straightforward geographic logic to this.
But when I look at the societies on both sides of the Atlantic that I know pretty well, it feels very different to me. There are a lot of people in the United States who are shocked by this. Even though Europe cannot rely on those forces being dominant or in power all of the time, about half of the American population deeply and viscerally disagrees with the statements in this national security strategy.
On the other hand, when I look at Europe: who is leading the polls in the United Kingdom? It is Nigel Farage and the Reform Party, which is rather close to Donald Trump. Who is leading the polls in France? It is Jordan Bardella or Marine Le Pen, depending on who is allowed to run, and they have their own deep criticisms of the European Union. Who is leading, at least in some polls, in Germany? The Alternative for Germany, which itself shares many of the views about Europe becoming less European and this being a way in which the continent is abolishing itself.
So are America and Europe really as far apart as we think? Or is this simply a cultural war within each of these societies, in which, at the moment, it so happens that Donald Trump is in power in the United States and Britain and France and Germany are governed by people on the other side of the debate, while Italy is not, and Hungary is not, and who knows where Germany and France and Britain will be in a few years?
Garton Ash: This is not Europe versus the United States. That was the classic framing of the reactionary right in Europe and of the anti-American left in Europe. It is a culture war inside the West.
In a sense, it illustrates that the West still exists. There is a broader cultural, intellectual, and ideological conversation because what we are seeing here is the Trump administration backing one Europe against another. There is a battle of two Europes going on. There has always been an illiberal or anti-liberal Europe. It is very strongly represented by people like Viktor Orbán or Jordan Bardella or Nigel Farage.
What is new is that they are backing that Europe against a more liberal Europe, which we all support. But as you rightly say, Yascha, all my American friends—almost without exception—are as outraged as I am.
Tocci: I think that that’s right. But in a sense, precisely because of this, it’s what makes this inter- and intra-cultural war far more existential. We’re no longer in Iraq War days in which Americans renamed French fries freedom fries and hundreds of thousands got out on the streets in Europe to demonstrate against America’s invasion of Iraq. That was a classic Mars–Venus culture war, but it was a clear transatlantic culture war.
Whereas here, what makes this existential is that it is about fighting your enemy within who is being supported by those outside. So it is literally a battle for survival because it’s an internal battle. That is, I think, also what makes this fundamentally different.
I think you’re absolutely right in saying anti-Americanism used to come from the extremes and now it’s coming from the center. Well, it’s coming from the center because it’s that center—whether it’s center-left, center-right, liberals—that built that united Europe that once upon a time was supported by the United States and now is being undermined by the United States.
Ćudić: I think it’s incredibly important what you’re asking, and it gets to the center of a question that I’ve been pondering for some time now. It is not about Donald Trump supporting or creating these powers in Europe. What he’s incredibly skilled at, and has always been, is recognizing trends and profiting from them. He didn’t create these parties. Marie Le Pen was there before him. Farage was a member of the European Parliament before Donald Trump was in politics. The National Rally not created by Trump. The impact of people like Musk on electoral outcomes in Germany has been minuscule or nonexistent.
The way the national security strategy has been met—or not commented on—by these parties indicates that there is a risk for them in welcoming it, because even their voters perceive Donald Trump’s policy, or this administration’s policy, as bad for Germany. The same goes for France. In the UK, Reform UK is polling at around 36 percent, and even there, many voters are questioning whether America First comes at the expense of UK First, or Germany First, or France First.
What I am leaning to believe is that he has recognized, exactly as you described, Yascha, the trends in Europe and is riding that trend because it serves this administration on multiple fronts—both domestically and, more importantly, by weakening the European Union. It follows the sovereignist, anti-multilateralism agenda. Look at what these parties are advocating at home: coal production, moving away from Brussels bureaucracy, and, in the case of Reform UK, leading the Brexit movement. Similar discussions are taking place in Hungary, in France, and in Germany. So in that sense, you’re right; it is something whose similarity has been recognized and is now being exploited for particular interests.
Mounk: I want to make sure that we get to the question of how Europe should respond and how Europe can try to escape what, at the moment, it seems to be resigned to, which is a kind of museal future. But there is a pressing question that we need to address before we get to that, which is the situation of Ukraine. Timothy, the Trump administration has proposed a peace plan for Ukraine. It has attempted to negotiate without the direct involvement of various European parties. It is a little bit difficult to know what the state of any of these discussions is. Is there any chance at this point of assuring—not the ideal outcome of this horrible war, certainly, but at least some way to guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty over the territory that it currently controls in a lasting way that would deter further Russian aggression? Or do you think we have to start reconciling ourselves to a tragic outcome to this war?
Garton Ash: The answer to your question is yes, there definitely still is a way. This is the start of the answer to your larger question about how Europe responds.
You remember Eisenhower famously said he has two kinds of questions on his desk: urgent and important. The urgent are usually not important and the important are usually not urgent. But Ukraine is one that is both urgent and important, because the nature and character of Europe’s response to the entire Trump challenge starts here with Ukraine. It is not about day-to-day Trump management. It is not about track-changes diplomacy and trying to amend the latest American/Russian peace plan. What it is about is ensuring that we, as Europe, can enable Ukraine to continue to defend itself, because it is wrong to say Ukraine is losing this war. It is losing small amounts of territory, it is under a lot of pressure, its energy infrastructure is being bombed, its front lines are very thin, but it is not yet losing this war.
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Given sufficient military and economic support—which is why the issue that will be debated in just a few days’ time of using the Russian frozen assets held in Europe to give economic and therefore also military support to Ukraine is so crucial—Europe can enable Ukraine to continue. So the issue is not about any detail on the peace plans. The issue is whether Europe has the ability and the political will to sustain Ukraine even when Donald Trump is strongly tempted to try to sell it out. Potentially, we in Europe can do that. But it comes back to the question of political will.
Mounk: That to me is the million-dollar question about all of these peace plans, which depend ultimately more, as Timothy is saying, on Europe than on the United States. Whatever the details of the peace plan that is being negotiated at the moment, ultimately we will not really know what comes out of it until the parties get into a room and at least attempt to hash it out—if indeed Russia at this point is finally willing to do that. That has always been the sticking point.
The question then becomes: Does Europe continue to support Ukraine in the coming years in such a way that it deters further Russian aggression, or, the moment the weapons are finally silent, does Europe move on, forget all about it, and therefore make Ukraine tempting prey for Russia again? Perhaps it will make other European countries—perhaps even NATO countries—tempting prey for Russia.
Do we think that Europe is going to sustain the political will to make those investments, to become capable of providing security on its own continent even if some kind of peace deal is made? Or is the attention of European governments going to wander quickly to all of the other challenges and problems the continent faces, in such a way that we then invite a reigniting of this conflict within a matter of decades, or perhaps years, or—God forbid—months?
Garton Ash: That’s the right way to ask the question because security guarantees don’t exist. Ukraine knows that better than anyone because they had so-called security assurances in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. The only security guarantee is: my country is able to defend itself with the help of its allies. Even Article 5 of NATO is not a 100% security guarantee, as we’re finding out.
But also what I would just say is that I have—and I’d love to hear Sabina on this—what I would call the post-Dayton nightmare. There were all these magnificent speeches and gestures of European solidarity to Ukraine over the last three years, with some romantic idealization of Ukraine, as there was some romantic idealization of Bosnia. Then the Dayton accords happen. Think what you like of Dayton. But what happens afterwards is that the attention of the rest of Europe turns away because there has been “peace achieved.”
Sabina can speak to this better than anyone—here we are 30 years later and many of the fundamental problems have not been addressed. So that is my nightmare for Ukraine. Of course it’s Putin’s hope for Ukraine. Because obviously he wanted to control the whole country, but even if he doesn’t, if he controls, by the way, a territory the size of Portugal and Slovenia combined—because that’s what he roughly controls at the moment—and has a dysfunctional, demoralised, depopulated Ukraine that is also deeply insecure and very susceptible to Russian influence, he’s won.
Ćudić: Thank you, Timothy, because that’s exactly where I was heading with my line on this. Bosnia was under enormous pressure to sign the peace agreement that was signed in Dayton, Ohio, and it created our non-functioning constitution. As Timothy said, once the cameras are off and once it becomes an administrative dinosaur of a problem with a huge body and a tiny head, then there is not enough pressure to achieve something functioning.
However, functionality aside, even if you genuinely didn’t care about Ukraine, even if you couldn’t care less how much territory is demilitarized, how much is given to Russia or not given to Russia, there are long-term security implications for Europe for decades to come—even after Putin dies—if the lesson we get from here is: this pays off.
I know it’s intellectually lazy to constantly revert to the analogy of the policy of appeasement. But the reason why we revert to it is because we are frustrated that we haven’t learned the lesson. The consequences of Ukraine are enormous. But if the EU and America—here they are jointly to blame, and for a long time Europe was much more to blame than the United States—played the appeasement game in a place that’s far less consequential, being Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans, than the outcome of Ukraine, if local warlords such as Milorad Dodik and various Putin wannabes and direct Putin puppets were appeased for years, for decades, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am looking for a triumph of hope over experience in the sense that in Ukraine the mistakes will not be made again because the consequences for Europeans will be far larger.
So let’s assume the peace deal is signed. What does that mean for Estonia, for Lithuania, for Finland? What does it mean for Eastern Europe and Europe in general if the appetites of Russia grow? Because if we are relying on their rationality, it wasn’t perfectly rational to start this to begin with. So if we are starting from a place of “I wouldn’t do that, therefore why would Putin,” obviously we are in the wrong debate.
Mounk: Nathalie, Sabina is hoping for a triumph of hope over experience—a triumph that will depend in part on what countries in Europe that are less directly exposed to this danger, because they are more geographically distant, like Spain or Italy, are going to do. Now, it so happens that the Prime Minister of Italy, who I’m not a fan of and I imagine you’re not a fan of, has been relatively good on the issue of Ukraine. But that is in some sense ideological happenstance. A lot of the Italian political spectrum is much less willing to invest in Ukraine and to help defend Ukraine against Russia than Giorgia Meloni is, including some of the forces on the populist right that may very easily have been in office instead of her. Speaking from the perspective of Rome, do you think that we might see a triumph of hope over experience, or do we need to expect that experience will prove the better of us?
Tocci (36:04.079): Although over the last few years, I have tended to be quite dark when thinking about Europe, I actually think, and not just hope, that we will do it. Firstly, let me say that for all the talk about Trump and pressure on Zelenskyy and cozying up with Putin, Trump does not have all the cards at all. The United States, precisely because it has stopped providing military assistance to Ukraine, has lost significant leverage over Ukraine, and it never had much influence over Russia either—especially not if you are not even trying to exert the little influence that you do have.
So I actually think that Trump does not have the cards to impose a capitulation. I think Europeans have many more cards than the United States. They have the sanctions card—which, of course, is available to the United States as well, but the sanctions that really bite are European sanctions. They have the frozen-assets card, which Tim referred to. We have already seen a first, very important step: shifting the renewal mechanism for those frozen assets to qualified-majority rules. So we are no longer subject to Viktor Orbán’s blackmail. We are the ones providing economic and military support to Ukraine, precisely because the United States no longer does.
So I think we are at a time in which we do not have the cards to ensure a sustainable ceasefire today, but we do have the cards to prevent Ukrainian capitulation today. I actually think we are in a scenario in which, for the time being, the war will continue.
Now, this opens the question of whether, at some point when we do get to a sustainable ceasefire, Europeans will drop the ball on security. If we were to see a capitulation of Ukraine, we would probably not see Europeans dropping the ball on security, because that would mean opening the front gate for Russia’s security threats to other European countries.
If instead we get, at some point, to a sustainable ceasefire in Ukraine—well, firstly, when is that going to happen? Presumably it will happen at a time when the strategic culture in Europe has already changed. It has changed in Northern and Eastern Europe long ago. It has changed in Germany. Then you raise the question: what about other European countries? What about the Italys and Spains of this world?
My hunch is that when, in Europe, you have a critical mass of countries moving in a certain direction, the others—if only because they do not want to be left out—eventually jump on the train. Not because they believe in it; I actually do not think that Giorgia Meloni is particularly concerned about or committed to Ukraine. I think it has been expedient for her for a while, now less so, and she is trying to figure out how to wiggle out of this. But what she says to me—and not just she, but any Italian, Spanish, Dutch or Portuguese leader—is that none of them will ever want to be left out of something that eventually takes off.
I think a European security “something” is in the making, because on one hand the threat from Russia is not going away, and on the other hand the American abandonment—or betrayal—is not going away anytime soon. So, inevitably, there is a reaction taking place.
Mounk: The question of whether Europe can actually secure Ukraine’s security and, more broadly, step up to provide safety on its own continent is, I think, one very important facet of a broader question. I have been struck by the extent to which Europe has felt hopeless in determining its own fate in recent years as the change in America’s character has become clear.
You can see that on the security dimension. You can see that in the fact that the greatest ambition of Brussels seems to be to regulate technology like artificial intelligence that is produced elsewhere, rather than to have a realistic hope of being at the forefront of that technology itself. You can see that in the fact that, apparently, in 2024 the European Union took in more money from fines on American tech companies than it took in from taxation on European tech companies, which tells you something about the difference in size between these industries. You can see that in the orientation toward the future that I feel when I talk to young people in the United States or in Europe. I think a lot of European citizens have a vision of the future—which I would argue may not be realistic—in which everything in twenty or fifty years is going to be more or less like today, except a little bit worse. It is not clear to me that a world in which everything is “kind of like today,” even if somewhat worse, is realistically on the table.
So the question to me is: can Europe actually reinvent itself? Can Europe get out of a funk in which it assumes it will be a museum continent—proud of its history and its art and the beauty of its landscapes and cities, attracting tourists from around the world—but not at the forefront of technology, not a geopolitical actor in its own right, but rather a bloc buffeted between the forces in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and perhaps eventually Delhi and elsewhere? And can it become a continent that is also more optimistic about its economic future?
What would it take, both in terms of the steps that countries have to take and in terms of the change in mindset that we would need in how European citizens think about this problem? Sabina, why don’t you get us started with this set of questions.
Ćudić: I think the biggest challenge for European leaders in the upcoming three years is this devastating choice between the political mood of the voters of the day, which may be fickle, prone to trends and obviously highly influenced by the extreme right-wing’s skillful use of simplified political messaging, and whether, for example, what we are seeing in the struggles of the government in the UK—although we are not talking here about the EU, but still about a European power—to perhaps meet Reform voters halfway by minimizing, let’s say, the European Convention on Human Rights in order to appease those voters. That would be one strategy: trying to court these voters and digest them, in the way Angela Merkel did for mostly left-wing voters.
The other strategy would be a brave vision in which you create a trend rather than ride the trend in the way that Donald Trump is riding the trend of a populist moment, rather than creating it. I would advocate for the vision. I know I am again grabbing the cliché that crisis is an opportunity, though I would prefer opportunities outside of crisis; I have had enough of them in my life. There is an opportunity here. I think we are seeing a glimmer of that in the EU on qualified voting and on different ways that countries will now be joining. Not everyone will immediately have the same voting rights, because they have realized that, as unfair as it might be to overrule the will of the Hungarian people, it is even more unfair that all of Europe is held hostage by Viktor Orbán. These are the messages we are hearing now, and I don’t think we heard them five years ago—certainly not ten years ago. In that sense, I would not call Europe hopeless. I think it is seizing this opportunity, whether that is too late or not.
We also need to see this foreign US policy failing, in the sense of not delivering its promises. I think that is what will happen. The US is not winning over the European soul. The only people who believe that America is winning the ceasefire in Gaza, the peace plan for Ukraine, or the national security strategy that is supposedly going to save Europe are the staunchest of the upper ranks—the very epicenter of MAGA. But deep down, in their hearts and minds, the majority of Republican lawmakers have had enough experience in Congress and the Senate to know they are not winning, that they are appeasing the wrong people, and that they are actually selling themselves short.
People who were removed from sanctions lists here, who will probably be removed in Moldova, Belarus, potentially Georgia—what will the United States get in return for that? The perception currently, even in my part of the world, and perhaps especially in my part of the world, is that they are losing, that they are selling themselves short, and that they are not getting what was promised from these wannabe autocrats on the ground. I think we will see more of that.
Garton Ash: I actually think the question is even larger than the one you posed, Yascha, because I think the question of the future of Europe and of liberalism are now inextricably intertwined. What we are talking about, in a way, is a liberal Europe—and its pessimism, defeatism, and fatalism—but it is also liberal pessimism, defeatism, and fatalism more broadly. If liberal Europe goes, what other major geopolitical area is going to defend the substance of liberalism?
I think there are at least two dimensions to this. One is what Sabina was talking about: the politics—how do we see off the AfDs, the Rassemblement Nationales, the Reform UKs, thee Voxes and all the rest? Now, I think in the short term there is a question about the Trump influence. My observation would be that Vance’s support at the Munich Security Conference did actually give the AfD a boost in the German election soon thereafter. Certainly, in the other country that you and I know well, Poland, Trump’s support helped Noworowski get elected as president. But I think that is a short-term effect. As Sabina says, if Trump starts tanking, that effect is diminished.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Timothy, Sabina, and Nathalie discuss whether its risk averse culture is holding Europe back, why young people seem to lack agency compared with in the United States—and why we should still have hope. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
For Venezuelans, watching the news these days is surreal. Wherever we may be in the world—and about a quarter of us don’t live in Venezuela anymore—the spectacle of the world’s most powerful nation edging to war against your own is terrifying and thrilling at once. Terrifying for all the obvious reasons—war is hell, collateral damage is inevitable, and people we love will be in or near the firing line—and for less obvious reasons as well.
But it’s thrilling, too, because the vast majority of us hate the genuinely evil dictatorship that’s taken over our country, viscerally hate it for its rampant corruption, for its brazenly stolen elections, for its dictatorial repression, its mindless propaganda, for its indifference to its people’s suffering, and for the ghoulish torture chambers that backstop it all. We know for certain this ghastly regime will not leave power without violence, and now the Americans are all but offering to supply it. How could we not feel a little thrill?
Which is why many Venezuelans—including the opposition, led by this year’s Nobel Peace laureate, María Corina Machado—are thankful that the United States appears to be edging towards military action against the regime. In recent weeks, America has launched strikes on boats accused of smuggling drugs, built up its forces in the region, and, two days ago, seized an oil tanker off Venezuela’s coast. When you’ve been this oppressed by a government this awful for this long, you don’t ask too many questions when somebody finally decides to mount a rescue operation. Certainly among Venezuela’s diaspora, among the eight million of us who’ve been forced to leave, support for American military action is extremely strong. How Venezuelans still in Venezuela feel about it we don’t know, because it’s been a long time since it’s been safe for them to express themselves freely.
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And yet. And yet and yet. The fact remains that the America now edging towards war with this gruesome regime is not a normal America. It’s an increasingly lawless America, under a leadership contemptuous of democratic norms, of checks and balances, of constitutional government as such. It’s a polarized America, under a leadership that demonizes half of its own population. It’s an America run by an over-the-top narcissist, addicted to lying, who day by day tramples new norms and sheds new inhibitions, like the old one that kept American presidents from attacking other countries without at least some semblance of congressional authorization.
It is, in other words, an America that looks more and more like Venezuela looked 20 or 25 years ago, when we were just beginning our new misadventure with 21st century authoritarianism.
True enough, America’s own autocracy comes shrouded in rightwing phraseology nothing like the leftist framing we saw. But if there’s one thing Venezuelans ought to have learned, it’s that it doesn’t matter what bla bla bla autocrats clothe their power grabs in. Because autocrats aren’t interested in words, or principles, or ideas. They’re interested in power and money only, and treat language wholly instrumentally: just a means to an end.
The notion that this American administration would fight to bring democracy to Venezuela is preposterous on its face. It’s a small mercy that Donald Trump has not even pretended that’s what this confrontation is about. He claims it’s about drugs and migrants—neither of which makes much sense. The drug he’s most worried about, fentanyl, comes from China through Mexico, not Venezuela. The migrants who’ve reached the United States from Venezuela were forced out, in good part, by his policies—the whole point of Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions regime during his first term was to make living conditions in Venezuela intolerable.
President Nicolás Maduro, for his part, says this is really just another gringo grab for Venezuela’s oil. That makes a little more sense: Venezuela really does have an awful lot of oil, and it’s easy to imagine Trump administration insiders salivating at the prospect of getting carte blanche to go pump it out. But 2025 is not 1973. America is not exactly short of oil these days, and launching a war for a resource you’re a net exporter of is just not the normal way empires behave.
The reality, I suspect, is that the Trump administration’s fixation with Venezuela is about something much simpler and much stupider: dominance. Simple dominance. Trump really is acting, with regard to Maduro, the way Latin American leftists spent the last 80 years accusing American Imperialism of always acting: out of the sheer imperial imperative to be kowtowed to.
Insofar as any broader principle is involved at all—and that’s not very far—it’s simply that Trump really does believe in spheres of influence, and Venezuela happens to be geographically situated in his. In bullying Maduro, Trump aspires to nothing loftier than the principle that, within any given sphere of influence, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. Venezuelans ought to be scared of this… but not nearly as scared as Ukrainians and Taiwanese who, by this understanding, fall under Russia and China’s spheres, respectively.
Having gone through the horrors we have gone through, I don’t begrudge Venezuelans their revenge fantasies against Maduro’s genuinely evil regime. Smart, sane Venezuelans I know will read this column, agree with every word in it, and still want Trump to start dropping bombs on Maduro and his cronies. At this point, the hatreds in Venezuela are tribal—once you’ve seen a government destroy not just your life but the life of everyone you care about, you will side with its enemies, whoever they may be.
But we should at least have the presence of mind to grasp what we’re supporting. After a third of a century of autocracy, most Venezuelans alive today have no memory of democracy. The vast bulk of the educated people who might be able to rebuild one have left, and most just aren’t coming back. The Venezuelan state is now profoundly militarized, shot through with corruption and cronyism, brain-rotted by 25 years of strident, non-stop propaganda, and also bankrupt. Trump may be able to bomb the government out of power, but building a minimally decent state out of the rubble is an entirely different story. Ask your friendly neighborhood Libyan or Iraqi if you don’t believe me.
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Best case scenario, Venezuela will end up in the hands of a right-wing dictator, probably a young army officer who pushes out Maduro and his clique, inherits the chavista state, and changes only the slogans. He’ll kowtow to Washington instead of Moscow and he’ll do deals with ExxonMobil instead of Rosneft, but his cronies will stay atop the economy and the state just as surely as Maduro’s did. With sanctions relief and American investment, the economy may do a little better, and some migrants may be able to return. Democracy sure won’t.
Equally likely, though, is that the transition will be bungled, the state apparatus will creak and crumble, and the country will just collapse into 19th century-style anarchy. Different caudillos will arise in different regions, some more powerful, some less. The presidency in Caracas will keep changing hands, but who holds it will matter less and less. Venezuelans will tell grim jokes about how the Maduro regime was the good old days.
It brings me no joy to say this, because Venezuelans have already suffered too damn much. I hate Maduro’s regime as much as anyone. But the kind of transition this U.S. administration can offer us ain’t worth having.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
Democracy is under siege, both in the great global conflict of ideas and in the lived experience of people around the world. We are grappling with a democratic recession—a pull-back in the number of countries that fulfill accepted standards for the practices of party competition-based democracy. And there is the disquieting rise of competitive authoritarianism: regimes that keep many of the formal trappings of democracy but actually practice grossly uncompetitive or rigged elections.
Meanwhile, many countries are seeing the rise of populism, with parties that stir up popular anger and raise questions about whether, if they gain power, they will ever give it up. Hence the basic point of party competition-based democracy is at risk: that “the competitive struggle for the people’s vote,” as Joseph Schumpeter famously put it, should determine who is in power.
At a fundamental level, there are four basic challenges. First, assuming the point of democracy is to make a connection between “the will of the people” and what is actually done, it is very difficult even to assess the public will in our current media and social media environment. So many entities—some anonymous—are making great efforts to propagandize and distort public opinion for policy and electoral purposes, and there are so many efforts to mislead the public with misinformation and disinformation that it becomes very difficult to assess what they genuinely want. Many of us are in our own media enclaves, consuming viewpoints we find congenial with no idea what the arguments might be on the other side of the partisan divide.
Second, this flawed system of political communication fosters extreme partisan polarization. The two parties seem intractable and intense in their divisions. As one recent overview put it, our differences are not just polarized, they are “calcified,” and the result is deadlock. Deadlock leads to a perception that democracies cannot get anything done, further eroding legitimacy.
Third, when it comes to elections, most voting is based on the tribalism of party loyalties. Voters rarely depart from their parties and vote with their convictions on the issues (if they have them). They vote for their team. This makes elections less a contest of ideas and more a contest of mobilization, money and media gamesmanship. Winning an election is less a mandate than it is like the triumph of a sporting event.
Fourth, even if there were some solutions to these three problems, it would seem daunting or impossible to scale them. How could we possibly change the media habits and political norms of an entire society?
The problems confronting democracy are so profound, our disagreements so intense, that it might seem naïve to think deliberation could be the answer. Nevertheless, my answer is that, provided we can muster enough political will, there is promising evidence that the talking cure can work. It would need to be applied systematically, and in some novel ways, but it could eventually transform our republic.
Since 1994, I have led a research program that fosters deliberation with random samples of the public in projects around the world (now with 160 cases). The fundamental idea of deliberation is that people weigh competing reasons for and against policy proposals in a civil and evidence-based environment. While many people do this on occasion in natural settings, the effects can be heightened with an organized design.
We implement the idea with a system called Deliberative Polling, which can be conducted either face-to-face or online. The face-to-face versions, at least on a national basis, require transporting a good sample of people from all over the country to a single place for a weekend of discussion. The online versions have been made more cost-effective and practical through an AI-facilitated moderator for small group, video-based discussions developed with my colleagues at Stanford. It produces results very comparable to face-to-face projects with human moderators. Moderated discussion with diverse others has surprising and lasting effects. These effects, documented in peer-reviewed journals, are the basis for my argument.
In 2019, the first of several “America in One Room” projects—national experiments conducted with Helena, a global problem-solving organization, and with samples recruited by NORC, a nonpartisan research organization at the University of Chicago—demonstrated both dramatic depolarization across party differences and lasting effects on more deliberative voting. For example, before deliberation, 79% of the sample Republicans supported “forcing undocumented immigrants to return to their home countries before applying to live and work in the United States.” After deliberation this support dropped to 40%.
Similarly, before deliberation, only 36% of the Republicans supported Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), “which protects from deportation children brought to the United States by parents who entered illegally.” After deliberation this support rose to 61%. There were similar changes among the Republicans on other immigration questions (e.g. support for refugees). In all these cases, the changes were depolarizing in that the mean positions of the two parties moved closer together and, in particular, those taking the most extreme positions did too.
In the same project, Democrats also depolarized in comparison to Republicans. The movements were most striking on the most ambitious and expensive social programs. For example, Democrats initially supported “a government-funded baby bond for use in education or other purposes.” This bond, awarded at birth, would help with college or other needs when the child reaches adulthood (when we ran this question, it was a prominent proposal from Senator Cory Booker). But with deliberation, support dropped 41 points from 62% to 21%, moving much closer to the Republican position. Similarly, Democrats initially supported a version of “Medicare for All,” but that support also dropped substantially with deliberation from 70% to 56%, much closer to the Republican position. Overall, of 26 proposals that were highly polarized at the start, all 26 showed significant depolarization following deliberation, especially among those who started with the most extreme positions on either side of the partisan divide. These patterns were later replicated with similar projects on climate change and democratic reform. Deliberation depolarizes our most extreme differences.
But does it have any lasting effects? One indicator of lasting effects is how the deliberators vote up to a year later. We found that those who deliberated, as contrasted with a control group who did not deliberate, voted overwhelmingly according to their post-deliberation policy preferences in the 2020 presidential election. We replicated this effect with the 2021 national project America in One Room: Climate and Energy, which affected the voting by deliberators in the mid-term elections a year later.
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Deliberation appears to foster increased civic engagement in which citizens acquire a greater sense of political efficacy (they believe they have opinions worth listening to), continue to become more informed in the following months (as measured by knowledge questions), and vote in a way that implements their judgements on the issues.
This effect was particularly striking because the climate deliberators—a national sample of nearly a thousand—discussed the issues with our AI-assisted online video platform in about 100 small groups of 10. The online platform moderates the discussion and in principle could be used to reach much larger populations cost-effectively. In any case, these projects support the solution to the third problem: how can we foster more deliberative voting?
If deliberation has these effects, how can it be scaled? How can we create a more deliberative society? The answer, in my view, goes back to ancient Athens, which employed random samples deliberating on important public decisions, before, during and after the debates in the Assembly. Aristotle famously described the rotation method whereby citizens would each “rule and be ruled in turn.” This picture has usually been dismissed as an historical curiosity applicable only to very small states.
But there is now a “deliberative wave” around the world of random samples discussing complex and often contested policy questions, often on behalf of governments. Our projects have addressed many questions in different contexts. They have brought wind power to Texas, helped Japan and South Korea make decisions about nuclear power, helped desegregate the Roma-only schools in Bulgaria, helped formulate a ballot proposition in California, and assisted a major technology company in consulting its customers about the metaverse and about the future of AI. It has spread in schools as a form of civic education in the United States and become part of the process of constitutional change in Mongolia, producing two successful amendments—most recently an amendment adding proportional representation to the electoral system.
This is but a partial list of applications that have actually been tried. There are many other possibilities. Imagine if deliberation were employed with a national sample as a start to the U.S. primary season, representing the whole country under conditions where citizens could grapple with the issues, and giving birth to momentum in the subsequent primaries. Or imagine a national “Deliberation Day” in which all voters had an opportunity to deliberate before a national election. If deliberation were widely deployed to deal with difficult and contentious issues, the opportunities for each citizen to deliberate would multiply to the point that the rotation method would work at the large scale. Most of these applications could be done cost-effectively on our platform or other platforms with similar technology for deliberative discussion. As we have seen, intensive deliberation leaves its mark on the habits of citizenship and voting. These applications are each justifiable. But together they could add up to something more—a more deliberative society in which public opinion would be more meaningful, our most extreme divisions would moderate, and our democracy would be peopled by more deliberative voters. It is not an impossible fairy tale but a matter of collective political will. Over the long term we can energize a more substantive form of democracy.
James Fishkin is the Janet M. Peck Chair in International Communication, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Director of the Deliberative Democracy Lab at Stanford University. He is the author of Can Deliberation Cure the Ills of Democracy?
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For most of American history, higher education was dominated by men. But over the course of the last four decades, male dominance on campus has not just attenuated; largely unnoticed in the broader culture, women have started to outcompete men by a long stretch.
Women began to graduate from high school and college in greater numbers than men in the 1980s, and to obtain a majority of doctoral degrees in the 2000s. Today, girls represent two-thirds of all students who graduate with a GPA in the top 10 percent of their high school class, while boys represent two-thirds of all students who graduate with a GPA in the bottom 10 percent of their class.
The knock-on effect for higher education has been enormous. Undergraduate institutions in the United States currently enroll 8.9 million women, compared to only 6.5 million men. In 2021, men received just 42 percent of all bachelor’s degrees in the United States. The last time the gender imbalance among American undergraduates was similarly stark was at the end of the 1960s, when about three in five college students were male.
These changes are extremely visible on all kinds of campuses. Community colleges, historically black institutions, and big public schools are now heavily female. So, increasingly, are the country’s most selective private universities. Women make up the majority of incoming students at every Ivy League school except Dartmouth.
If they were to admit applicants without considering their sex, the best schools in the country would end up with incoming classes that have an even greater predominance of women than they already do. So, largely unnoticed by the public, they have started to embrace a solution to this supposed problem that is simple, effective, and manifestly unjust: affirmative action for men.
It is impossible to be certain just how blatant current forms of discrimination against female applicants are.
Colleges have no interest in a broader public debate about such a sensitive subject. So they closely guard the kind of data, like the average SAT scores of male and female admits, that would allow the uninitiated to assess how large a bonus they give to male applicants. This lack of transparency should, in and of itself, qualify as a major scandal.
But despite the paucity of publicly accessible data, there is strong reason to believe that the practice is widespread. Admissions rates by gender, which some colleges do publish, for example, usually show higher rates for men than for women. In the 2024-25 cycle, 29,917 women applied to Brown, and 1,309 were offered a slot, for an admission rate of just 4.4 percent. The number of men who applied was far lower: 18,960. Even so, the number of men who were offered a slot was actually somewhat higher, at 1,326, giving men a much higher admission rate of 7 percent.
For another, senior campus bureaucrats have publicly acknowledged that the practice is routine. “Gender parity is something that’s an institutional priority for most private colleges and universities in the United States,” Sara Harberson, a former dean of admissions and financial aid at Franklin & Marshall, recently said. Shayna Medley, a former admissions officer at Brandeis, was even more blunt: “The standards were certainly lower for male students.”
It is, in other words, an open secret in admissions circles that many highly selective universities now put a big thumb on the scale to help their male applicants and artificially deflate how big a share of the undergraduate population is female. As Susan Dominus concludes in a long article about the subject in the New York Times Magazine, “The easiest way for many competitive schools to fix their gender ratios lies in the selection process, at which point admissions officers often informally privilege male applicants.”
Discrimination is often driven by animus or prejudice. But while it is of course impossible to rule out the possibility that some admissions dean somewhere in the country has a bias in favor of male applicants, that likely isn’t the reason for how widespread this practice has become. Rather, universities are motivated by cold calculations of self-interest—and operate in the knowledge that these practices, while morally dubious, are perfectly legal.
Universities have become accustomed to seeing their students as paying customers, whose preferences for everything from lavish meal plans to easy As must be indulged at any cost. And since many prospective students, both male and female, express a strong preference for being on a campus that has rough gender parity, they do their best to accommodate these wishes.
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The stakes for colleges are even higher because they have traditionally prided themselves on the share of accepted students who choose to enroll at their institution. If one school stopped discriminating against women while its peers continued to do so, the gender balance on that particular campus would quickly and significantly shift. If this should in turn prompt some accepted students to enroll elsewhere, it would affect the university’s prized yield rate.
Many readers likely suspect that it must be illegal for universities to discriminate against women in such a blatant fashion. After all, civil rights era legislation prohibits universities from discriminating against students on the basis of their sex in many other contexts. Colleges are, for example, barred from offering disproportionately generous athletic scholarships to male students. Surely, similar constraints must also apply to the admissions process?
Not so. When these civil rights laws were drafted, many of the country’s leading universities were still single-sex. Elite colleges fought tooth and nail to win carve-outs from pending civil rights laws, ensuring that private colleges could continue to admit far more men than women if they so chose. Those same carve-outs now make the new regime of affirmative action for men presumptively legal for private colleges.
The incentives shaping the behavior of universities are real, and the law doesn’t appear to prohibit such practices. But that doesn’t make it morally justifiable for colleges to pick a less qualified male applicant over a more qualified female applicant.
Part of the problem with the current practice is that it is both individually rational and collectively futile. There are simply not enough young men who are motivated and prepared to excel at college. By giving a big leg-up to male applicants, the best colleges in the country can artificially boost the share of male students on their own campuses. But this only means that slightly less exclusive colleges wind up with even more lopsided sex ratios. Rather than solving the growing gender imbalance in higher education as a whole, affirmative action for men merely attenuates the problem at the very best schools while deepening it everywhere else.
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An even bigger part of the problem with the current practice is that it is unethical. A key argument for meritocracy is that it provides an institution that needs to allocate a small number of coveted slots among a large number of applicants with an explanation that it can in good conscience proffer to those whom it must disappoint. Applicants who are turned down from their dream school are always going to be sad. But if the college can truthfully tell them that they were rejected because other applicants had higher GPAs or better SAT scores, they should be able to see that the decision was made on fair criteria. If, by contrast, the college was sufficiently forthright to tell them that they were turned down for the sole reason that they are female, they would, for good reason, feel that the decision was made according to deeply unjust criteria.
Indeed, there is, if you pause to think about it, something fundamentally unseemly about administrators caring so much about the gender balance on campus. It may well be true that many applicants prefer colleges with roughly equal numbers of men and women, in part because they worry about the dating scene on campus. But should it really be the job of admissions officers to make sure that students have a suitable number of potential romantic partners available to them? And might some of the broader problems of academia—such as the extent to which it has become the training ground for a professional-managerial class that is increasingly out of touch with the rest of the country—not even be alleviated if a few college students had reason to venture off campus in search of a potential date once in a while?
There is a positive reason for the feminization of campus: Women have more opportunities than they did in the past, and they are working hard to seize them. There is also a negative reason: A growing share of men is doing poorly, with a substantial minority lacking all purpose or ambition.
The struggles of boys are especially stark at the high school level. According to the American Institute for Boys and Men, they are three times more likely than girls to be expelled from school. The ranks of young men who are not pursuing a degree, not formally employed, and not part of a vocational training program have swelled ominously: The share of such men has grown by about a third since the beginning of the century.
As Richard Reeves has chronicled in recent years, it really is a serious societal problem that boys are falling behind. A growing number of men dropping out isn’t just bad for economic prosperity; it also presages a rise in disease and loneliness, in crime and even deaths of despair. A healthy society needs both boys and girls to thrive.
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Fixing this problem should therefore be a serious political priority. And as Reeves has argued, there are significant reforms that can help boys succeed at higher rates. To name but one example, K-12 schools should consider embracing more forms of active learning, which, according to some prominent researchers in the field, is more suitable for the learning styles of young boys.
But it would be naïve to think that universities can, or should, fix this pipeline problem. If elementary and secondary schools are failing boys to such an extent that some of the most talented men are dropping out, then they are in need of serious reform; but those lost boys aren’t in any way helped by giving a male applicant who is already on a path to a good life an unfair advantage over a better qualified female competitor when they both apply to Harvard.
It is remarkable how little attention has so far been paid to the quiet scandal that is daily taking place in admissions offices around the country.
Part of the explanation for that quiet acquiescence, I think, lies in the fact that the country has for so long been consumed by the fight over race-based affirmative action. Another part of the reason lies in the secrecy with which colleges have instituted these practices, which makes it hard for their victims to recognize the injustices they have suffered. But perhaps the biggest part of the reason lies in a background assumption which has become such a well-entrenched part of American life that we have grown blind to its fundamental strangeness.
Admissions officers at elite schools have long ago convinced themselves that it is their job to socially engineer the “perfect” incoming class. They think they must make sure that each group of freshmen has the “right” racial balance; has somebody who can play the second violin in the university orchestra; includes a good number of students who are likely to make (or, better still, inherit) money they can donate to the university; and, apparently, that it should have a roughly equal ratio of men to women.
This assumption would strike most citizens of other countries as thoroughly odd. In Cambridge and Oxford, professors personally interview applicants with a focus on whether prospective students are likely to excel academically. In China and South Korea, students qualify for places at top universities through national exams that assign them a numerical score. Though none of those universities have a dean of admissions who claims to know the secret formula for how to create the perfect entering class, all of their orchestras somehow seem to find a second violinist who is up to the task.
The search for a “balanced” class amounts to verbal dress-up for rank discrimination. It is wrong when it entails disproportionately rejecting Asian applicants, a practice that widely persists even though it has officially become illegal. And it is just as wrong when it entails disproportionately rejecting women.
Ideally, colleges would recognize how indefensible this practice is of their own accord. If they don’t, the federal government should step in. For while it might sometimes be driven by the best of intentions, the search for the perfectly balanced entering class simply isn’t a good enough reason to discriminate against college applicants on the basis of their sex.
This article was originally published by The Dispatch.
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I recently returned from four weeks in Israel, a reporting trip for a book I’m writing. Two weeks in Tel Aviv, a week in the south, a week in Jerusalem. Some thirty interviews, and many informal conversations, with fellow alumni of the progressive Zionist youth movement in which I came of age, Americans who immigrated in the 1980s. Not a representative group of Israelis, but a deeply informed one, including the leader of the country’s environmental movement (who is also a former member of Knesset); the host of the most prominent English-language podcast on Israeli politics (who is also a historian and Tel Aviv city councilor); the opinion editor of The Times of Israel; the president of a major university; the head, past or present, of several leading human rights organizations; activists for feminism, religious pluralism, intergroup dialogue, and Palestinian-Israeli coexistence; educators; health professionals; and business people. Politically, they ranged from the center to the far left; religiously, from Orthodox to secular.
Plus, of course, I kept my eyes open: on the streets and at the holy sites, at a protest rally and along the roads, in suburbs, office buildings, a kibbutz. Here’s my sense of what I saw.
This is a country that is deeply traumatized, and not only because of October 7. The traumas are multiple, layered, ongoing. The trauma of October 7. The trauma of seeing images of October 7 replayed endlessly in the media. The trauma of the hostages. The trauma of urban combat, and of knowing that your loved ones are in it: of hundreds of soldiers killed, many thousands injured, many tens of thousands deployed into life-threatening situations. The trauma of repeated individual mobilizations—men in their 20s and 30s and 40s serving totals of 200, 300, 400 days—and of what the mobilizations have inflicted: the lost jobs, broken marriages, failed businesses. The trauma of waking up to discover that your country is surrounded by enemies, far more capable than you had thought, who really do want to murder every last one of you. The trauma of rockets and missiles and drones being aimed at your head, of air raid sirens, of wars within wars. The trauma, for liberals and leftists, academics and artists, of betrayal by your former allies in the West.
Miriam Schler was the longtime executive director of the Tel Aviv Sexual Assault Crisis Center. “So many who champion human rights, feminism and social justice,” she wrote a few weeks after the attacks, “some of whom I have long considered friends or looked up to for their moral courage, have been bending over backwards to justify atrocities and rationalize rape.”
(None of what I’m saying here is meant to minimize the trauma on the other side. This is a conflict of two peoples, each with deep wounds, valid grievances, and legitimate claims to a state. Anyone who cannot feel that is morally obtuse; anyone who doesn’t understand it cannot usefully contribute to a just and peaceful resolution.)
One friend told me that she’d been unable to get out of bed for months. Another said he hadn’t slept for more than fifteen consecutive minutes during his son’s deployment in Gaza. A third could not stop talking: about the prime minister and his cowardice, the government and its evil, the fact that his friends were sick of his incessant talking, the recognition that it was itself a post-traumatic symptom. Miriam has founded Kehilanu: Helping Israel Heal, a nonprofit dedicated to addressing the unprecedented scale of need. According to a report by the State Comptroller, she told me, nearly 40% of Israelis are suffering from trauma.
Still one more form of trauma must be tallied. I began to understand it at the weekly protest rally at Hostage Square in downtown Tel Aviv, the first one after the remaining living hostages had been released. To say the mood was lighter is to speak only in relative terms. Eighteen bodies remained unreturned, and the crowd was not going to let the government forget about them. Einav Zangauker, a leader of the hostage families, whose son had just been freed, gave a speech of fierce gratitude to those who’d stood beside her—who’d come out in heat and rain and cold, she said, week after week after week—but also of resolve and fury. Her words were iron spikes pounded one at a time into stone: indicting the prime minister, whose name invariably elicited jeers, indicting the Speaker of the Knesset, who had made a show of removing his yellow-ribbon lapel pin before Trump’s speech to the assembly earlier that week, as if the issue of the hostages were over. The issue of the hostages, Zangauker and others insisted that night, was not over.
This was a citizenry, I grasped, that had been abandoned by its government. Before October 7, when the latter had failed to prevent the attacks. On October 7, when it had failed to mount an effective response. After October 7, when it had failed to provide the victims, including hundreds of thousands displaced from the vicinity of Gaza and the northern border, with anything like adequate support. Not once had Netanyahu come to Hostage Square. Funds to rebuild the attacked kibbutzim had taken many months to be disbursed. The conduct of the war had deprioritized the hostages at every turn. My friend Abraham showed me a screenshot of a Times of Israel headline: “Health Ministry Opens Helpline for Medical Needs of Those Evacuated, Displaced.” It was dated November 1, 2023. “They opened up a helpline three and a half weeks into the war,” he said. “Can you imagine? Where were they for the last three and a half weeks?”
And yet, into that void, had stepped the citizenry itself. This was also viscerally evident that evening at the rally. “You are not alone,” went the crowd’s repeated chant, directed at the hostage families. “We are with you.” “Am Yisrael,” pronounced Zangauker with defiance, again and again: the nation of Israel, the Jewish people. Am Yisrael is standing with Am Yisrael.
I heard of this throughout my trip: how Israelis from across the political and religious spectrums, including Palestinians, had organized in response to the crisis, beginning on the very morning of October 7. A vegan restaurant prepared and distributed 3000 meals a day. A group of writers composed eulogies on behalf of the bereaved. Teams went in to clean up the homes of the displaced—who often fled at a few minutes’ notice, leaving food to go bad in refrigerators—in advance of their return. Teams built ramps and other accessibility features at the homes of disabled veterans ahead of their release from the hospital. Protective equipment for soldiers was purchased and brought from abroad. Warehouses were set up with clothing, diapers, anything that the displaced might need. If a child had a birthday, a cake was baked for them. If they played an instrument, one was sourced and delivered. “Anybody you talk to in Israel,” one friend told me early in my trip, “ask them what they did after October 7. Everybody did something.”
The country may be traumatized, in other words, but it is not demoralized. Instead, it has responded to the crisis with the sense of solidarity, the talent for organization, and the ethos of mutual aid that lie deep in Jewish culture, the products of millennia of life in the Diaspora, when Jews had no one to rely on but themselves, and that have characterized the country since the earliest days of the Zionist return. The one thing that Israelis understand, at least when circumstances force them to, is that they are all in it together. That they share a fate.
Which helps explain another fact that I registered during my trip, and that contributes to the country’s inner strength. Israel has a left, has liberals and progressives and socialists, who still believe in it. Who still identify with it, still sacrifice for it, still love it. Who, whatever their critiques and disillusionments, are still committed to perfecting it, and not just in the name of universal values, but also for its own sake, the sake of its unique, particular existence.
The same may be said of the young. There has been a lot of talk in Israel of this, and it began before October 7, with the protests against the government’s proposed judicial reforms in early 2023. Abraham described the largest, which took place the night that Netanyahu fired his defense minister, who opposed the proposals. “Now it’s not 300,000 people” in the street, he said, “it’s 800,000. Who is there is all the young people, and then I realize they’re singing. They were singing, ‘Try to steal our democracy, we’ll storm the Knesset. You’ve messed with the wrong generation.’ And while I see them doing this, a boy comes over and grabs me like that”—he put two fingers on my wrist, as if he were taking my pulse—“and he says, ‘Don’t you worry. We’ve got this.’ And eight months later, those kids were fighting in Gaza, fighting for us, and they’ve now become known as the greatest generation.”
It is also to the point—to several points—that they are a large generation. Israel is not a place, like so many in the world, that doesn’t seem sure that it wants to keep going. Jewish history selects for the survival instinct, and when people have been trying to get rid of you for two thousand years, you don’t give up that easily. Almost everyone I spoke with has three or four kids. Among the people I know in the States, the norm is two or one (or none). The discourse about the fertility crisis in the developed world invariably cites Israel as the exception (its current rate is roughly 2.8; the next highest industrialized countries come in around 1.7). The ultra-Orthodox bring up the average, but that is not the main explanation. Nor is the idea, which I heard expressed, that Israelis feel driven to make up for the Holocaust.
No, Israelis just like kids. They like being in large, close-knit families. I could feel this even in Tel Aviv, which in other ways resembles Brooklyn: how children are accommodated, normalized, enjoyed. In other words, the explanation is cultural (which means it can’t be replicated). Judaism is a family-centered religion, with many rituals conducted in the home, most obviously Sabbath dinner. My friend the university president has three young adult children, each with a partner and one with a baby. All of them come home, he said, at least two Friday evenings a month. This is, if anything, below average. The Sabbath, even among the secular, is a day consecrated to family.
Still, one shouldn’t overstate these themes. If most of the people I talked to have three or four kids, most of them also have at least one who is currently, perhaps permanently, overseas. If Israelis remain committed to the country’s future, by and large, more of them are leaving, with emigration since October 7 roughly double the previous annual average and expatriate communities growing in places like Portugal and Thailand. If the country demonstrates remarkable solidarity, especially in times of crisis, it also has savage internal divisions. There is widespread rage against the ultra-Orthodox for shirking military service while continuing to soak up public subsidies. One protest sticker said, “The secular are not slaves.” Another formulation that I’ve heard goes, “They pray for us, and we die for them.” The country’s political discourse is sulfurous; its politics, poisonous. Had the hostages been West Bank settlers instead of leftist kibbutzniks and festival-goers, some of the people I talked to insisted, they would’ve been out in a couple of weeks.
More than anything, my visit left me with a sense of just how complicated the country is, including, or especially, people’s feelings about the war. The same person who said, “I’m sorry that babies and children have to pay the price for the hatred of their parents, but we have no choice,” also spoke about the “moral injury” experienced by Israeli troops in Gaza from the things they’d had to do there, which has led dozens to take their own lives. The same one who told me that, contrary to the narrative one hears in Western media, there are many Israelis who are not in denial about the horrors in Gaza, that she herself reads Al Jazeera, The Jordan Times, the Lebanese Ya Libnan, and the London-based New Arab, also told me that she understands why many Jewish Israelis feel triggered when they hear Arabic on a bus.
A professor at my friend’s university who is one of tens of thousands of Israelis who have publicly protested the civilian deaths in Gaza has also, since October 7, had her academic articles consistently rejected, usually without their even being sent out for review, in international journals in which she used to publish routinely, and she is pissed about it. The guy who said that, given what their country did in Iraq, let alone Vietnam, Americans have no ground to stand on from which now to demonize Israel also spent 72 consecutive days during the winter of 2024 (and still spends one day a week) doing “protective presence” in the hills south of Hebron—meaning that at 64, along with a few other activists scarcely a third of his age, he lived in Palestinian villages, sleeping in a sleeping bag, going without hot water, and escorting shepherds with their flocks or children to school, to protect the local population from settler violence.
“It’s complicated”: this would ordinarily be the laziest, most useless conclusion a writer could offer. In this case, however, it may be the thing that most needs to be said. Opinions on Israel outside the country, be they for or against, are typically loud, enraged, extreme, self-righteous, proudly simplistic, profoundly underinformed, and ultimately about the speakers themselves. Former prime minister Shimon Peres told a story about visiting a school in Harlem and telling the children that he was from Jerusalem. “Jerusalem?” one boy said. “I thought that was in heaven.” More than any other country, Israel is for others an idea, a symbol, a fantasy, a screen, a mythological entity. It is good to be reminded now and then that it is also an actual place.
William Deresiewicz is an author, essayist, and critic. He is working on a historically situated memoir about being Jewish in modernity.
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Jill Lepore is the David Woods Kemper ’41 Professor of American History at Harvard University and professor of law at Harvard Law School. She is also a staff writer at The New Yorker. Her latest book is We the People: A History of the U.S. Constitution.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Jill Lepore discuss why historians have neglected the story of America, how to fix the toxicity in higher education, and whether we need more constitutional amendments.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I have been reading your work for a long time. I feel like one of the themes of your work, and one of the themes of public debate for the last ten or twenty years, has been trying to figure out how to think about the United States. Is the United States a story of great triumph—a story of building one of the largest, most successful, and most inclusive democracies in human history? Or is it the story of marginalization, exclusion, and injustice?
It seems to me—not to put words in your mouth—but you would likely answer something like both. Tell us about how you are thinking about this question, and how that inflects your historical work.
Jill Lepore: I should begin by saying I never started out as a historian wanting to write this kind of national account—being a national historian or trying to reckon with the question you pose, how should we think about the United States? That was never my question. I think it is an urgent public question and one that historians have generally failed to answer or even to engage with, because national history questions tend to be very dangerous. They tend to be self-satisfied and smug; national histories veer easily into blood-and-soil nationalism, trying to offer an account of a nation’s origins and its meaning.
Some sense of its historical possibility is closely associated with a kind of defensiveness about the idea of the nation. So American historians in particular, really since the 1960s, have not been principally engaged in asking this question: What is the meaning of the United States? How should we think about the United States and its past? That has largely been done politically, and that is what much of American politics revolves around. We have a very hyper-polarized political discourse in this country, and academic accounts of American history, which have generally been aligned with the left, take the position that American history can best be understood as a litany of atrocities that have never been fully reckoned with. Popular history, which is more closely aligned with the right, takes the position that American history is the story of a march of progress and prosperity and freedom, and that the United States is a beacon of liberty around the world.
These two accounts of the past—the one popular and the one academic—are not in conversation with one another at all. They are themselves, in part, the product of our hyper-polarized politics. For me, as a historian interested in groups, conflict, social history, labor history, the history of race relations, women’s history and all the other kinds of histories that were largely left out of the accounts of the American past that I was exposed to as a kid or even in college, I became really troubled by the popular account that misses all of that and therefore is wildly impoverished. Meanwhile, the academic discourse became more and more untethered, I think, from the greatness of the American story and from the genuine promise of the United States’ founding ideals.
So I would say I am a quite reluctant historian of the American nation as a project. But in the 2010s, I became really concerned about the gap between these two accounts and started writing more and more about the idea of the United States, beginning probably with the Tea Party movement, which began in 2008–2009 during Barack Obama’s election and early presidency. The movement sought its legitimacy in telling a particular story about the American Revolution that was unrecognizable to me as a historian of the American Revolution; its account of the American Revolution is bafflingly bizarre. I did a lot of reporting, I spent a lot of time with people in the Tea Party, and it convinced me that we are responsible for this gap. We academic historians are responsible for the gap between what the public thinks about the American past and what scholars know.
So I have been trying to bridge that gap in the work that I have done. I would not say it is my passion as an intellectual—far from it. It feels more like my duty as a citizen and as someone trying to contribute to civil society.
Mounk: Well, I am glad to feel that call of duty and that you are doing and have done that work. Two thoughts come to mind about what you have said so far. One is that academic history has often told, I think, a rather too simple story consisting of an exclusive focus on the atrocities in American history. Part of that is simply that it is not engaging some of those questions. I was a graduate student at Harvard, where you teach, and for a long time there was not a course offered in the history department on the American Revolution, for example. So there was no real attempt to grapple with some of those big questions in a lot of academic history.
The other thing that comes to mind is a conversation I recently had on this podcast with your colleague Randall Kennedy in the law school. What appealed to me about These Truths, your one-volume history of the United States, was that it was a concrete demonstration of a lie that I feel very strongly from both sides of the political spectrum at the moment. On one side, the lie is that in order to be patriotic and to have pride in America’s history, you cannot dwell too much on its dark sides. On the other side, the lie is that if you want to grapple critically with the role that race and racial exclusion have played in American history, or with the history of the exclusion of women from American history, then the only way to do that is through a kind of critical race theory lens. The only way to do that is through a lens that takes what is actually quite a modern, contemporary ideology and superimposes it on American history.
Lepore: The idea that Harvard did not teach a course on the American Revolution was a kind of right-wing canard for a long time, and it was factually not true. There was no course called “The American Revolution” in the course catalog for a number of years, but my amazing colleague Laurel Thatcher Ulrich taught a large general education lecture course called The Pursuit of Happiness that was about the founding and the ideas of the founding, looking at them across culture, space, and time. My wonderful colleague Vince Brown taught a comparative revolutions course on slave rebellions in the Caribbean in relation to the story of the American Revolution. My then colleague Jane Kamensky, who is now the head of Monticello, taught a course on the American Revolution while she was writing her magnificent book about Copley.
I taught a course that at some point was simply called “The American Revolution.” It was a research course on primary-source accounts of Boston and the American Revolution. These courses were not legible in a course catalog as old-school survey courses—first we have the founding class, then there is the American Revolution, then the Industrial Revolution, then the Civil War. They did not look like high school courses. Someone wrote an op-ed in The New York Times complaining, essentially, “Who are these idiots in the Harvard history department who do not teach the American Revolution?” We were all baffled. Should our course names be more legible? What was the problem?
Mounk: Course names in general should be more legible, probably mine as well. I remember this being told to me by two Harvard faculty members who were proposing to teach a course about the American Revolution and who felt that, at the time they were doing that, there were no other courses. So I did not get this from Fox News; I had this from some of your colleagues.
Lepore: I get that. I am just saying it is one of those things that gets batted around, that just became a thing online. I would point out that in the new Ken Burns twelve-hour series on the American Revolution, some of the most stunning academic historians who appear as talking heads—which is magnificent—are chiefly my colleagues: Phil Deloria, who also covered the American Revolution in his Native American history class; Vince Brown; and Maya Jasanoff. It really is material that we do teach and think about. So I do not need to derail your critique, because of course I agree with much of the critique as a whole, but I am tired of being a punching bag around things that make no sense.
Mounk: I did not mean to pick on the Harvard history department, of which I have fond memories from when I was a grad student. I was in the government department doing political theory, but I went to many events in the history department and had colleagues who were PhD students there. To name another example from the university where I now teach, Johns Hopkins, there is an initiative to ensure that some courses undergraduates take on the way to their BA degree would need to have a democracy theme. It could be in many different departments and could take many different approaches. There is very strong resistance to this among the faculty. Part of that is that faculty are always going to resist a university administration trying to impose anything on them; some of this is just normal bureaucratic politics. But I do think there is a broader concern, which I think we agree on, where we are not willing to contest some of those ideas, and then they become colonized both by people with less expertise and by people who might have a more simplistic view of them.
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To take a completely different example, I have long felt that the ascendancy of Jordan Peterson was, in many ways, a failure of moderate intellectuals, because he was willing to give very public advice to disoriented young men about how to structure and lead their lives. Again, I am sure there was somebody on the center right and probably even somebody on the center left engaged in the same enterprise, but there really was a vacuum that made it easy for somebody like Jordan Peterson to fill it. One way of putting this is that there is an instinct toward critique, which is trying to tear something down. That instinct made sense at a time when a deep understanding and worship of American history was a tangible feature of American life—when every five-year-old would learn the capitals of the American states by heart and there was a kind of unthinking civic pride. There was an understandable attempt to tear that down. I worry that at this moment, the basic orientation not just of history but of political science and many academic fields is still to take down this naive image and naive reverence for things, but that reverence no longer exists in society in the way we assume.
Lepore: I think that is fair, and yet it is being required. That is what the Trump campaign for patriotic education is. It is the absence of that which is now mandated by the federal government. So I do not rest as easily about that as maybe you do, but it is absolutely the case that a lot was evacuated from the teaching of American history that Americans really need—and that anyone studying in the United States, American or not, really needs.
For instance, constitutional history used to be taught in history departments; it is not anymore. It is not even really taught in law schools. Constitutional law is taught in law schools, which has a historical dimension in which constitutional law hopscotches from major Supreme Court decision to major Supreme Court decision. You then come to believe that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, and that there is no role for any other interlocutors in interpreting, understanding, or mending the Constitution. And that is a problem. It is a problem that history departments stopped teaching constitutional history or stopped teaching electoral political history. The politics that history departments generally taught for some decades was a kind of Foucauldian notion of power rather than how democracies work.
So, exactly as you say, there is a compensatory moment now. We do need to be teaching some things about citizenship, and there will be some requirements that history departments include in their curricula explanations of the origins of modern democracy. That there is resistance to that, I do frankly understand, because if it were coming from faculty and students and emerging from an intellectual commitment and a civic notion regarding the role of the university, that would be great. But what it often feels like at some of these institutions is capitulation to an increasingly interfering federal government that is dictating what must be taught and who may teach it.
I think that, and my guess is that even at a place like Johns Hopkins, the faculty resistance to you must now teach democracy and cherish it with your students is partly: is this what we should be teaching because we should be teaching it, or is this us trying to defend ourselves against further attacks from the federal government? And that is not okay.
Mounk: To be clear, this initiative at Johns Hopkins started well before 2024, so it is not a reaction to Trump being reelected. But I think that does pose a deeper problem for how to think about this in universities. I was not going to jump into this early in the conversation, but you recently gave a number of interviews in which you said that you were so perturbed by the rise of, for lack of a better word, woke ideas at Harvard and at other universities that you strongly considered resigning your position because the atmosphere had become so unbearable.
I think it does pose the question of how we deal with some of those failings within our universities. I worry that there was a moment in 2023 and 2024 when some of those excesses and shortcomings were becoming increasingly clear, and the majority of faculty—or plurality of faculty—who I think are center-left liberals, with a bit of a progressive bent but not all-out left-wing ideologues, were recognizing that and saying, okay, let us reform.
I worry that in this political moment, some of what the Trump administration does is indeed so extreme, and in particular some of its attacks on universities are so extreme, that there is a rally-around-the-flag effect. Any reform that in 2023 or 2024 you might have been able to get a majority of the faculty at Harvard or Johns Hopkins or any other leading university behind now immediately reads as either capitulation to the demands of the Trump administration or peremptory obedience. That creates a very bad dynamic, where we are unwilling to fix problems that we ourselves, in private moments, are willing to recognize, because any attempt to do so can quickly be coded and attacked as capitulating to the Trump administration.
So how do we reform the university, and how do we fix some of these problems, without falling into that trap?
Lepore: I do think that is tricky. I do think it requires being open and candid with one another, though not necessarily always with the public. I am not sure this needs to be discharged through a public forum. There are failures over the last twenty years or so within higher education that I would not describe as redounding to the problems of woke ideology. There are a lot of problems with higher education that have nothing to do with woke ideology, whatever that is meant to be.
I think it has to be possible to identify those things, be honest about them, disagree about what those failings were or whether they still exist, and address them, without all of that being seen as bound up with some kind of capitulation to the Trump administration. But I think that may be an argument for doing that within the walls of the academy and not in a public forum, which is why I am not the person who is out there making a career for myself talking about how higher education is such a problem. There are people who do that. That is a big part of the Jordan Peterson beat—the sort of exile from higher education.
In a way, the space that those characters take up in the public sphere makes it much more difficult for anyone else to speak honestly and candidly, because most reasonable people fear being classed with those self-congratulatory exiles.
Mounk: So what is the problem of the university in your mind? I agree that there are many problems, such as very high tuition fees and the fact that renovating the gym and ensuring the best possible athletic facilities often had a higher priority than paying adjunct faculty members decent wages. There are all kinds of things one can complain about in the university with very good reason that have nothing to do with that.
But I do not presume that the fact that Harvard sometimes had the wrong spending priorities is the reason you nearly resigned your job. From what you have said publicly, it does sound as though it has to do with an intellectual atmosphere in which, at least for a few years, it was very difficult—even for someone who is left of center and who, I do not know how you self-describe politically, but who clearly in many ways is progressive—to speak freely without fear of the kind of unpleasantness that made you think you might rather make a life for yourself outside academia.
Lepore: It might be useful to think historically here instead of autobiographically, which I do not think is all that fruitful. I spent a lot of time when I was working on my most recent book—that is, We the People: A History of the Constitution—thinking about the life of Charles Beard, who has always been one of my intellectual heroes. Beard, whose wife Mary Ritter Beard was also a famous and deservedly celebrated American historian and a pioneering historian of women, had been an eminent professor at Columbia and was most famous for a book he published in 1913 for which he was resoundingly attacked. It is a book called The Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. It really shook things up.
Beard was a progressive in the old-fashioned sense. He was a progressive of the Progressive Era. He was a political historian but also an economic historian. He was a very active progressive leader, very involved in the progressive cause of the 1910s, which chiefly involved attempts to amend the Constitution. The progressives, in fact, succeeded. They amended the Constitution four times between 1913 and 1920. Beard was involved in all of those efforts, which culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment granting women the right to vote, which Mary Ritter Beard was also, of course, involved in.
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But Beard wrote this book about the Constitution in which he argued that the Constitution’s origins were chiefly economic, that the framers of the Constitution were wealthy men—he spent a lot of time documenting their incomes and the sources of their income—and that they had devised a Constitution that protected their own property rights. It was largely read as an indictment of the Senate, which was considered the millionaire’s club at the time. Before the Seventeenth Amendment, the U.S. Senate was elected by members of the state legislatures, and you could basically bribe your way into the Senate if you had enough money.
Progressives had been trying for decades to get rid of the indirect election of the Senate, which had also been a feature of many state constitutions at the start and had been amended out of those state constitutions. It was a wildly anti-democratic provision. Could the people not elect their own representatives? Was that not the whole point? It had been successfully amended out of the state constitutions, but it was very difficult to get it amended out of the U.S. Constitution because it had to get through the Senate. The members of the Senate had no interest in being elected directly by the people because they all knew they would lose their jobs.
So part of the way Beard’s work was seen was as endorsing what became the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, by which progressives managed to get the Senate to approve the amendment to be elected by the people, in part by threatening to hold a constitutional convention. Beard had done this really interesting work, and then he was very defensive about it when reviews came out saying the book was attempting to amend the Constitution by writing a new history of it. It seemed very instrumentalist to his critics, who had some pure notion of the historian who somehow does not live in the time in which he is writing. He defended that, saying that this is what he found in the archives. This was the story he found in the archives, and he wanted to tell it.
Mounk: He claimed that he wasn’t aiming for political impact, even though that likely wasn’t true.
Lepore: Yes and that is interesting to me because I discovered that he was living in New York at the time. He founded and was for a long time a member of the committee to amend the federal Constitution. He was entirely involved—very much a political actor in a way that I am not. I am not on a committee to amend the Constitution. But Beard was an extremely principled person. During the First World War, the very conservative president of Columbia, Nicholas Butler, who was a constitutional conservative at a time when constitutional conservatism was being founded, required that faculty sign a loyalty oath to the United States.
The U.S. entry into the war in Europe was extremely unpopular in the United States. Wilson was despised for it, and therefore founded this ministry of propaganda to try to convince the American people that the Germans were evil and needed to be stopped. Beard, who actually supported the U.S. entry into the war, strongly opposed the loyalty oaths. When two of his colleagues were fired for refusing to sign them, he resigned in protest. I think it was 1917, right around when the Sedition Act was passed, when Eugene Debs was being arrested, and when there was widespread repression of political dissent and opposition to the war.
Beard, as a principled matter, retired. Because of the book he had written about the Constitution, he was by far the best-known American historian of his day. He moved to Connecticut and raised cows. I think a lot about what it took for Beard to leave academic life at a time of political repression. He continued writing history. He went on to write, with his wife, probably the best textbook of the time, The Rise of American Civilization. It came out, I think, in 1927. But he and his wife—and he alone—wrote a series of textbooks. He later taught at the New School for some time. He died, I think, in 1948. So he did have some later academic life.
But I think it is a good illustration of a principled engagement with the idea of free inquiry and of higher education and of the importance of the study of the American past, especially in times of political crisis, when the trial of ideas and the world of democracy are in question. Beard wrote a beautiful essay in 1934—I think it is called The Future of American Democracy. He was someone who found a way to celebrate what universities are for and yet could not be in a university. So my point in telling this tale is that I do not think this is a new dilemma. It is not as though we are living in some uniquely strange time. There is always a tension between the university and the state.
Mounk: Well, let me say two things about that. One is that it is clear and obvious to me that restrictions on what people can say—driven either by top-down political demands or by the preferences and moral strictures of a particular social milieu that has captured a part of society—are a very regular occurrence in human history. Many of the most famous instances of moral panics that we come to regret in retrospect fall precisely into that category. So the claim is certainly not that there was something unique about the American university in 2015 or 2018 in that respect.
But surely the inference from that is that this is all the more reason to be very clear and upfront about the nature of it and to speak out against it. You very elegantly answered my question with a historical metaphor. In the case of historical metaphors, there are always analogies—an element that is similar and an element that is dissimilar. You may argue that there are elements of dissimilarity here. But did you not inadvertently compare what it was like to be a professor at Harvard in 2018 to what it was like to be a professor at Columbia in 1917 or in 1932, which is actually quite a striking claim to make?
Lepore: Let us think of a different example. I was thinking about Francis Lieber, a German intellectual who immigrated to the United States in the 1820s. He is often described as the German Tocqueville. He could not get a job teaching in the North, and he took a job in South Carolina—then South Carolina College, now the University of South Carolina, I believe. He was an abolitionist, and he tried for decades to get out of South Carolina. Yet he became an owner of slaves. He owned other human beings. He wrote in his diary about these purchases. He was not a large plantation owner, but he had a number of women who worked as domestics in human bondage in his service.
He did not manage to get out of South Carolina until after Dred Scott—the 1857 decision of the Supreme Court that ruled that no Black American could ever be a citizen of the United States. He manages to get out, goes to Columbia, and there delivers a series of lectures on the Constitution renouncing secession. It is a really interesting story because you see someone who had wholly compromised a deeply held principle. He was not an antiracist, but he was opposed to human bondage. Yet he participated in it. He wrote these private letters to John C. Calhoun that he was unwilling to publish, and he let himself be completely suppressed as an intellectual by what we would describe as the academic job market. He simply could not get a job. In large part because he was Jewish, although that is contentious.
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Anyway, he then goes to Columbia, has this real blossoming, and gives a series of lectures that are widely published in newspapers. Lincoln then hires him to write the laws of war. He famously writes what becomes known as the Lieber Code, which is the basis of the Geneva Code. It is the set of laws of war that the United States adopts during the Civil War.
So he has this late-stage career in which he considers himself to be acting in accordance with his principles. But in my mind, it is a counterexample to Beard in terms of the relationship between intellectual complicity with the ideological position of the state and one’s own commitment to ideas and the freedom of ideas.
Mounk: I want to get into the history of the Constitution and your latest book in a moment, but just a final question on this. What lessons do you take from this contrast between Lieber and Beard for what it means to be true to yourself as an intellectual at a time when there are tremendous pressures on you, whether that is being an intellectual who wants to defend a substantive notion of liberal democracy in Hungary at a time when large parts of the state—and increasingly the academic system—are captured by loyalists to Viktor Orbán, or whether you are an intellectual or an academic who has certain views disfavored by their colleagues in the American academy in 2018?
Lepore: I do not know. Obviously I wrestled with that a lot over the last years, and I think I have failed to live up to my own principles. Far be it for me to suggest what those principles should be for anyone else or how they ought to honor them. You can tell I do not really want to talk about this. I would much rather talk about the work. But just to finish up this point, for me, there were many tough moments. One tough moment was when some students in a class I was teaching said they would not read the Dred Scott opinion, this 1857 Supreme Court decision by Chief Justice Roger Taney, which is considered one of the worst, if not the worst, opinions ever issued by the Supreme Court.
My goal in teaching was surely not to defend it. But the assignment was to engage in a debate in section over the question of whether the U.S. Constitution did or did not sanction slavery, based on a series of readings on that question from the 1850s, which included writings by Abraham Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, Frederick Douglass, and then the Dred Scott decision.
I remember sitting in my office thinking, I do not feel it is really true that I have to explain that you have to read historical documents even if you do not like them. That seemed like the most elementary piece of work for being a human in the world. I prepared something I might say—bring these students into office hours and say, here is the thing I want to explain—and I was just mad. Who told these people that you could simply say, I do not want to read that because I find it painful? Because if that is how you feel, you cannot read history. History is full of pain. People suffer. Literature is full of pain. Philosophy is full of pain. The human experience is full of pain and suffering and injustice. To gain any capacity to live a good life, you have to confront pain, injustice and suffering, find a way to think about it, reckon with it, remedy it and make amends for it.
If this is what my job is reduced to, saying that you actually have to do the reading, what am I doing? I think that is a good encapsulation. Sure, there were the firings, there was all kinds of nonsense going on. Honestly, these are very young people; I do not blame them. Whatever they brought, they did not get this from me. They got it somewhere. Yet they feel it with such tenacity. For me, that is different from Charles Beard’s problem. That is different from Francis Lieber’s problem. It is not really even about the university at all.
Mounk: That is perhaps more similar to what Theodor Adorno faced in 1968, when his students decided that he was actually a terrible reactionary and started protesting his lectures, et cetera. Pressure from students is a different thing from pressure from administrators. The thing that bugs me about this kind of response is that if somebody says, I just want to devote my life to thinking about pleasant things, and I just want to read pretty love stories, that is not my choice, but I think it is a coherent choice. If you love beauty and want to look at pretty pictures and read nice novels, I think that misunderstands what some of the most important pictures in the history of art are and what some of the most moving novels written by humans are. But fair enough—there are worse ways of spending a life.
What is strange and contradictory about this is the parallel insistence that we want to have a very negative view of the world and claim that we are fighting against injustice and suffering of every kind, but we do not want to grapple with its actual historical and contemporary nature because we are not going to read the texts. That is what is strange about it.
I promise this is the last question in this direction, but when I asked you whether there was a zeal that some students—never a majority—brought to the classroom, where they wanted to impose a certain view, it was not just, I personally do not want to read this text. It was, it sends the message that you are that kind of person for wanting us to read this text. There was an implicit threat in it. I have not found that anymore in the last few years. I know we agree on that. But something has changed in the mentality of the students. Perhaps, precisely, it is not that they do not believe in some of those ideas anymore; it is that what once felt like an organic movement of their generation has become something they have been taught by the culture—by parts of the culture at least—since elementary school or middle school or high school. Even if they believe in the ideas, they do not have the same fervency. I wonder whether you have felt that shift among the students in the last few years as well.
Lepore: Yeah, I do think it is the case that the students are less prosecutorial—in the sense of being less prosecutorial of one another—which was really the most painful thing to see. I can take it, but they are very young to be snapping at each other and recording each other in class and shaming one another. There is much less of that now. I think the inclination to take a critical stance on the syllabus is as old as the hills. There is always going to be, why didn’t you include this? and why did you not include that? It will change from year to year what they think should or should not be included. But zeal is a good word for it. There is less of that zeal and satisfaction—or the sense that that is the only kind of intellectual work worth doing.
Mounk: Let us get to the U.S. Constitution, which you discuss in your latest book. There is something paradoxical about the Constitution, in that it is in some ways the most successful political document in the history of mankind. It set up a vast continental republic that is about to celebrate its 250th anniversary. It is today the most—or one of the two most—powerful countries in the world. It has survived largely unchanged over a period in which other countries, including other relatively successful democracies, have gone through ten, twenty, thirty different constitutional documents.
At the same time, when you look at American politics today, it can feel as though some of the stuckness that animates the political divisions we see—the political frustrations that are among the contributing reasons people feel compelled to vote for someone like Donald Trump—also derives in some ways from the difficulty and the stickiness of that document. So how, as a historian, are you thinking about the successes and the limitations of this document?
Lepore: I think that Americans, on the whole, relative to people of other nations, have a great deal of veneration for the Constitution, which is based partly on a cultural predisposition but also on its longevity, which is extraordinarily unusual. Globally, the average lifespan of a constitution is nineteen years. Other nation-states revise and replace their constitutions all the time.
I think many Americans attribute American prosperity, prominence, and stability to the Constitution without necessarily knowing exactly why or what the mechanism is by which the Constitution provides that stability. It is often just assumed. Although state constitutions in the United States much more closely resemble the constitutions of other nation-states—because our state constitutions are revised and replaced frequently—Americans rarely think about them. Not so much replaced anymore, but there have been more than two hundred state constitutional conventions. My home state, Massachusetts, has the oldest written constitution still in effect, adopted in 1780, but it has been amended more than one hundred times.
I think many Americans do not even know they have state constitutions. Even when ballot questions come around that are amendments to the state constitution, it is not always clear what that is: Am I helping to pass a law? Is it a statute? What is it?
Mounk: They understand that it is some change, but they’re not thinking of it in terms of a constitution.
Lepore: You could say that the state constitutions work better. People have a better relationship with their state governments right now, I think, than they do with the federal government. I am sure there is political science literature on this that I have not consulted, and maybe it goes against this theory.
Mounk: Some of the most contentious questions are at the national level rather than the state level, right?
Lepore: all of our questions have been nationalized because we have a nationalized politics, because of changes in the media environment. So I do not know, but I think that one thing Americans do not feel about the U.S. Constitution is that they are the authors of it. And yet they are. That is the whole principle of our constitutional system—that this is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, as Lincoln said. He was summarizing the Declaration of Independence, but he was also constitutionalizing the Declaration of Independence. That was Lincoln’s chief contribution as a political thinker: to take these ideas that came from Black abolitionists who were attempting to merge the Declaration of Independence with the Constitution.
Part of the culture of veneration, which seems healthy, certainly veers into unhealthy territory in that Americans do not have a sense of their own political capacity as citizens to interpret or amend the Constitution. They do at certain times, in eras when the Constitution is being amended by the people, which has happened in bursts at different moments in time. But it has not happened really in our lifetimes. Nineteen seventy-one is the last time the U.S. Constitution was meaningfully amended. That is a long drought. So long that I do not think most Americans know the U.S. Constitution can be amended, much less have a vision for what they would want if they knew that it could. And I think that is an impoverishment of our political discourse.
I also think the fact that we no longer hold state constitutional conventions—which used to be very frequent—is significant. The last full constitutional convention was held in Rhode Island in 1986. I do not think a lot of great stuff necessarily comes out of them, but the convening itself—knowing that your state is electing delegates to go revise the state constitution—is a kind of civic renewal. It relies on a capacity for exercising the skills of democratic citizenship that I do not think we really have. A lot of those skills have atrophied.
I have spent a lot of time talking to different audiences around the country about this book, and people say, well, you are arguing we should have another constitutional convention—like a federal constitution. Isn’t that dangerous? It will result in a MAGA constitution. I am not making an argument about what we should or should not do. I often put it to people by saying: if trial by jury had been put on a shelf in 1971, if we had decided there were other methods that would be more fair—at this point you could have AI do it, right? The lie detector was invented in the 1920s to replace trial by jury. There are so many problems with jury results, and lawyers hate juries.
Mounk: In Britain, there’s currently a proposal by the Labour government in Britain to abolish juries for all but the most serious criminal cases.
Lepore: There is a lot of anti-jury sentiment in the legal community. So imagine, just as a counterfactual, that in 1971 this had succeeded and there was no more trial by jury for any kind of trial in the United States. Then imagine that in 2025 somebody said, I think we should bring back trial by jury. Would anybody support that? I put this to an audience—no, no one would support that. Twelve random people are going to decide whether my son is guilty of something or whether my daughter should be awarded this compensation?
That is sort of how I feel about amending the Constitution or the people’s capacity to hold a convention. We have just accepted that we are passive in the face of this, that there are better modes, that people in power are better positioned—and in this case, the people in power on the Supreme Court—to do this work. Yet I will say that I am a huge fan of trials by jury. Not because I think it necessarily leads to the most just and fair outcomes. I have not really inspected the literature on that, but I am sure there are reasons to be doubtful and to think it might be better to have judges make more of these decisions.
But going—even going and not being called for a jury—is a civic experience and an exercise in the development of the capacity of citizenship. Even watching the little video where they explain what your job is going to be on the jury is one of the few times that we still gather as citizens with a faith in our capacity to deliberate together reasonably in the face of competing strands of evidence and come to a true conclusion. That is a beautiful idea.
We could give up on that, and we could give up on the idea that we have the right to consent to be governed in the form of amending our own Constitution. But then what—democracy is just going to be elections every two or four years? It is like being a Christmas-and-Easter Catholic. I do not get it.
Mounk: I agree with you strongly about jury trials and their importance. I also agree that there are many concerning things that come out of effectively having made it impossible to amend the Constitution. There is a broader political science literature about semi-presidentialism, which argues that when the president and Congress usually have different majorities, that might seem like a great protection for democracy because it makes it incredibly hard to make political changes, including changes that would restrict democratic rights. But in practice, the gridlock that this leads to has very negative effects. Eventually people become so frustrated that they may be more willing to vote for a strongman who says, none of this is working. Give me the trust to do something about it.
I think that, in a parallel vein—I am arguing by analogy here—you might think that a constitution that is really rigid best preserves our liberties because you cannot have a small majority of deputies who happen to win one election go and abolish the First Amendment or abolish certain basic rights that we have. Certainly, in this political moment, I am quite glad that it is hard to make political changes in the United States because it provides constraints on what Trump can do in the White House.
But in fact, it also has many negative political impacts, one of which is that nine unelected judges become the de facto interpreters—and to some extent writers—of a constitutional order. Popular majorities continue to feel frustrated because even if they have a strong preference that goes against what those nine judges believe the Constitution to say, they are unable to make their voices heard. Perhaps that leads to a lot of frustration and dysfunction and polarization in our society. I find all of that very plausible. So I think, as often in politics, you are faced with a real trade-off: the trade-off of wanting some surety against the ability of changeable political majorities to impose their will immediately, and the fact that if you introduce too many veto points—and America has more veto points than virtually any other democracy in the world—then the very thing you are trying to guard against might be hastened by it.
Explain to me why it is that we feel there has been a change, because Britain is considering legislation to abolish jury trials, but we have not changed the mechanism by which we amend the Constitution. The mechanism is the same as it always was. Yet, as you point out, we have not had a constitutional amendment since 1971—over fifty years. You know the exact historical dates better than I do. As you pointed out, amendments have historically come in bursts; they tend to cluster around certain moments when there is a widely felt need for change. But I do not know if there had been a fifty-year period before 1971 in which there were no constitutional amendments at all.
So why is it that, even though we have not abolished our ability to make constitutional amendments—not changed the mechanism—it has now become so difficult? Is the way to change that social or political? Would you be in favor of a constitutional amendment that makes it easier to amend the Constitution? If we take that seriously as a concern, as you do, what does that mean for what we should do?
Lepore: I am just trying to run the math in my head. This is not the longest constitutional amendment drought. The Twelfth Amendment is 1803 and the Thirteenth is 1865. But of course, those were years when the issue most Americans were fighting about constitutionally was slavery, and they were unable to amend the Constitution to address it. There was no way an amendment could have resolved that—it led to a civil war. It would have been healthier if there were a series of amendments that could have addressed it.
That paralysis—the paralysis during which the Supreme Court assumed the authority, which is not written into the Constitution, to overturn the laws of Congress by declaring them unconstitutional—is the era in which the authority of the judiciary becomes supreme. And that is really a function of the failure of Americans to amend the Constitution and solve the problem of slavery by peaceable means. The amendment mechanism of the Constitution, Article V, is there in order to avert insurrection.
The founding idea, which came from the state constitutions, was: we have just been through this bloody revolution; we are going to write down our constitution, unlike England. We are going to write it down. If we write it down, the risk is that it will be fixed and too brittle. So we must have a mechanism to change it. It must be challenging and difficult to change, but it cannot be impossible, or else the only way to fundamentally change the structure of government will be by revolution. That is what they were trying to avoid.
So they came up with what they thought was a brilliant notion—this peaceable means to improve, to make amends, to correct, to repair, to adjust, to modernize. There are so many meanings of “amendment.” To your point, it immediately did not work, because there were questions that Americans could not solve through the mechanism of Article V, given sectionalism and given the party system, neither of which really existed when the document was drafted. They did not call it sectionalism, but there were huge sectional tensions underlying the compromises of the Constitution. But the party system did not exist.
Mounk: It is the most undertheorized part of every modern constitutional order. You read the great founders of modern democracy, and people do not really reckon with the existence of political parties because they did not yet exist.
Lepore: In 1787, there were no political parties in the United States. Political parties are antithetical to republicanism. Factionalism is what will destroy a republic. Of course there will never be political parties in our country. Therefore, when the framers put into the Constitution these double supermajority requirements—an amendment has to pass a two-thirds supermajority in both houses of Congress and three-quarters of the states—this is difficult, but it is not impossible. But then it becomes impossible. It becomes extremely difficult because the party system emerges by 1800.
Our modern era of hyper-polarization begins around 1968. In 1972, the ERA passed Congress and went to the states. It becomes part of the set of issues that is further polarizing the United States. Then, of course, it was not ratified, although there are people who would debate whether in fact it is in a de facto sense ratified. So, why cannot the Constitution be amended now? Polarization.
I worked with YouGov, the polling organization, and the group More in Common—a tremendously important research outfit—a few years ago, in 2022, to do some polling. We asked: if you could amend the Constitution by national popular vote, would you agree to these particular things?
It turned out there really was not that much that Americans—even with a simple majority national popular vote—could do. The big issues that people were divided on, they were too divided on to execute in an amendment. That is going from zero. Let us say you wanted to propose an amendment to abolish birthright citizenship. There has been a movement since about 1994, when the first member of Congress introduced an amendment to the Constitution to abolish birthright citizenship.
But because that is never going to get through by way of an Article V amendment, there is no chance that Americans would amend birthright citizenship out of the Constitution. It is not something Americans want. As you say, the insurrectionary attempt to do that by non-Article V means has been incredibly destabilizing. We have masked agents of the federal government pulling people out of preschool rooms and throwing them into unmarked vehicles, shipping them out of the country to a place they have never been before. That is what happens when we do not have the actual popular debate. There is no attempt to bring to the people this question in a meaningful way.
Mounk: How do we think about the promise of constitutional politics? Certainly if we say that we are collectively self-governing, but we are effectively governed by a document written 250 years ago or so, and which we know we are not realistically able to change—in part because of our divisions—it is not God-given; it is simply the fact that we cannot agree on things to such an extent that we would be able to amend it. But as you are rightly pointing out, constitutional amendment has effectively dropped off as a form of our politics. Whenever I have a student who writes an essay saying, we should have this constitutional amendment to do that, I roll my eyes because I think that is never going to happen. It is not that it is an unreasonable thing to want, depending on the suggestion. It is just that, as a political course of action, it seems quixotic because of the background conditions you are talking about.
Now, on the other hand, I do think there is a danger in politics of trying to blame the Constitution, or the difficulty of changing the Constitution, for things that actually have very little to do with it—things rooted in deep disagreements about what the country should look like. Perhaps the best example of this is the political history of Chile in recent years.
In its transition from the Pinochet regime, Chile ended up with an amended version of the constitution written in the latter years of that regime. It feels historically illegitimate because it still carries the whiff of the Pinochet years. There is also an argument that some of its provisions, including relatively mild supermajority requirements for certain forms of social spending, are the reason why many popular political causes are not being realized. So they ended up calling a constitutional convention that elected a very left-wing group of people to write a new constitution, and that constitution was so unpopular that it was voted down by the people.
Then there was a new constitutional convention which elected a very right-wing group of people. They wrote a constitution meant to appeal to the political right, and it too was voted down, whether by a large or small margin, but I believe by a similar margin. Now Chile is back to having the old constitution.
Would you be excited about a constitutional convention in the United States? Do you think this is something that could lead to a productive form of politics? Or would it simply be a very visible stage on which Lauren Boebert and whoever else could grandstand and shout at each other, and in the end we would either pass a bunch of crazy stuff or pass nothing at all because the convention could not gather the majorities required for us to agree on a different layout of a constitution?
Lepore: I am really not a policymaker. I do not have a prescription here, and I think it is worse than useless to offer prescriptions when you are not a policy person who thinks about policy. My sense is that we do not really have the civic capacity right now to hold a constitutional convention that would be fair and that would lead to changes that could succeed at ratification. You have to run before you walk, but you also have to get out of bed before you can walk. I feel like, for most Americans, national politics or their engagement with constitutionalism involves following stuff on social media and maybe voting.
That is the best case. I think people need to get off their ass a bit and be involved in: does my city need a new charter? Should my town revise the town codes around public accommodation or something like that? I think people need to be involved in their neighborhoods, in their towns, in their cities—build back civic capacity, face-to-face civic capacity—before the Tocqueville-in-the-1830s sense of people arguing about everything all the time face-to-face and constantly revising their city charters.
I think we would need to build that back before I would be optimistic about the outcome of a constitutional convention, which I have no opposition to. I just do not think—and I take from your comments that this is your disposition as well—that this seems likely to be a great democratic success, given the conditions on the ground at the moment.
Mounk: Is there a pattern in which it takes a very deep crisis—and it takes, to some extent, moving beyond that crisis—to have a moment of constitutional renovation? Right now we are in a crisis, and so it really does not feel likely. If ever there were a moment, perhaps it would be because the MAGA movement really does damage democracy to such an extent that there is a popular revulsion against it and a post-Trump moment in which people come together and say, hang on a second, this really took us in the wrong direction.
I am not sure how likely that is, by the way, or how soon it would come. But assuming something like that, there would then be the political space to say, all right, we have been through this. We recognize that we went down a road we did not want to go down. We now have a few years of relative political consensus. Let us come together and think about some of the changes we need in order to make sure this does not happen again.
Lepore: I honestly think that. I think I have a greater sense that that is possible than you do. There is a window of opportunity when it becomes possible to imagine amending the Constitution, and quite a lot can get done. The fear is that the stuff that will get done would be bad, but that is democracy—there is always the risk of losing when you put something to a popular vote. But I think that, in large part, this is one of the reasons I wrote the book, which is to say: if we want to imagine the Constitution being different, or imagine that we are the authors of it, we really have to have a better and much broader sense of the history of the Constitution—one that is not just a series of Supreme Court decisions but the history of the struggles of Americans who were left out of the Constitution to get into it.
That is a really illuminating and, I think, quite inspiring history, for all the setbacks and all the real deep challenges there. I think there are plenty of models for really effective constitution-making in the United States today. I would point in this case to Indigenous nations, who have been engaged in a wave of constitutional conventioning and amending and drafting since the early 1970s and the era of the American Indian movement. When people in Native nations decided to revise constitutions that they wrote in the 1930s as part of FDR’s Indian New Deal, there were some really interesting constitutional experiments going on in those constitutions. Those conventions have been vital and important for those polities.
So I think there is a lot of room to find inspiration. Not every story is Chile. You could think, for instance, of Ecuador—the Ecuador 2008 Constitution, which provided for the first time for the rights of nature, which has actually been upheld by the Constitutional Court of Ecuador. The oil and mining companies tried to get it junked this year with a referendum on whether there should be a constitutional convention. They wanted to rewrite the constitution for a bunch of reasons, but they really wanted to get rid of the rights-of-nature provision, and the people rejected it.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Jill explore whether there is a precedent for America’s current situation, and whether the United States is doomed. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
The current Supreme Court term is shaping up to be yet another historic one—this time devoted to settling which of Donald Trump’s many novel assertions of presidential power are legal.
On Friday, the news dropped that the Court will take up the legality of the president’s Inauguration Day executive order eliminating birthright citizenship—the automatic conferral of citizenship on any person born within the United States, regardless of the citizenship status of the children’s parents. That order has never gone into effect, because it immediately sparked lawsuits that resulted in lower courts issuing preliminary injunctions against its enforcement. When Solicitor General D. John Sauer made the government’s case before the Supreme Court last spring, he did not ask the justices to weigh in on the legality of the order itself but only on the propriety of lower courts issuing “universal” or “nationwide” injunctions. The resulting decision, Trump v. CASA, Inc., largely sided with the administration, ruling that such sweeping injunctions are often broader than necessary.
That has left the ultimate fate of birthright citizenship uncertain. We knew the Supreme Court would need to clarify its legality, but we didn’t know when it would do so. Now we do. The justices will hear oral arguments early next year in Barbara v. Trump, a case involving a class of babies born on or after February 20, 2025 who would be denied U.S. citizenship by Trump’s order, with a decision to follow by the end of the Court’s current term, in late June or early July of 2026.
The Battle AheadMAGA world obviously thinks Trump’s order should stand. Most non-MAGA lawyers and legal experts, on the other hand, consider it close to unthinkable that the Court could allow the elimination of birthright citizenship if the case is decided with even a modicum of good faith. The 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause reads: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States….” This passage has been widely interpreted, for more than a century and a half, to codify the English common-law doctrine of jus soli (right of the soil) and therefore to authorize birthright citizenship. Trump’s order will be shot down, by this view, unless the Supreme Court’s conservative majority acts as a rubber stamp, endorsing the president’s authoritarian effort to overturn the clear language of the 14th Amendment.
Yet the distressing fact is that the prevailing reading of the citizenship clause isn’t quite as obvious as defenders of birthright citizenship claim. Until recently, very few scholars dissented from that consensus. But a few did, and their arguments will be available to the Supreme Court’s conservatives, if they want to draw on them. That could give them all the ammunition they need to side with the president.
But the more likely outcome may be a decision that falls short of allowing Trump’s order to go into effect while also greatly undermining the constitutional foundation of birthright citizenship, the fate of which could be left in the hands of Congress.
The Birthright Citizenship ConsensusAnti-immigration activists on the right like to assert that the United States is alone in foolishly granting automatic citizenship to all people born on American soil, regardless of the immigration status of the child’s parents. But that isn’t true. Birthright citizenship is extremely rare across much of the world. But that isn’t the case in the Americas, from Canada on down through the nations of South America, where it is very much the norm.
With certain exceptions connected to foreign diplomats, slaves originating from Africa, and the Native American population of the continent, a version of jus soli prevailed in the United States from the beginning. After the ratification of the 14th Amendment in 1868, its citizenship clause tended to be interpreted as a codification of the longstanding practice of granting automatic citizenship to all children born on American soil.
This reading of the amendment received strong confirmation in 1898 from the Supreme Court, when it rejected the government’s argument that Wong Kim Ark, a man born in California to parents of Chinese immigrants, was not a citizen. In his majority opinion, Justice Horace Gray argued that the 14th Amendment “affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens.”
In the Nationality Act of 1940, and then in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that superseded it, Congress built on the majority opinion in United States v. Wong Kim Ark to codify its understanding of birthright citizenship. In the decades before and since that time, countless millions of people born in the United States to non-citizen parents have claimed American citizenship under these provisions.
Dissenting OpinionsWhen people dismiss the legitimacy of Trump’s executive order, they typically do so by pointing to this tradition: the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment; Wong Kim Ark; and the 1940 and 1952 laws. How could it be that all of these documents, rulings, and laws—and acts undertaken on their basis—could have been mistaken when no one until July 2018 even thought to question their validity?
July 2018 is when former Trump 1.0 official Michael Anton published an op-ed in the Washington Post arguing that the citizenship clause has been misconstrued. Interpreted correctly, Anton claimed, it confers automatic citizenship only on children of American citizens. Others must consent to join the pre-existing social compact and be positively invited to do so by those who already belong to that compact. Trump’s second-term executive order eliminating birthright citizenship grows out of these arguments.
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It turns out, though, that these arguments didn’t originate with Anton. Writing in dissent from the Supreme Court’s 1898 decision—Wong Kim Ark was decided 6-2—Chief Justice Melville Fuller claimed that Wong Kim Ark could not be a U.S. citizen because his parents were barred by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 from becoming American citizens. This kept them citizens of China who owed a duty to the emperor of China; they therefore could not be “completely subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, as stipulated in the relevant passage of the 14th Amendment. This meant that conferral of citizenship on their son could not be considered automatic upon his birth. He would have to apply for citizenship, and his application could well be rejected.
As scholars Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith argued in a controversial 1985 book, and then in a 2018 revisiting of their claims, this reading of the citizenship clause was not unique to Fuller. On the contrary, it was the expression of a longstanding tradition in American history that emphasized a “consensual” view of citizenship in which both the individual and state actively work to shape the political community.
Birthright citizenship, by contrast, descended from an older, “ascriptive” model rooted in English common law in which people became automatically subject to the king at birth. Schuck and Smith didn’t argue that either view was the right one, merely that neither was the self-evidently correct reading of the citizenship clause. Even though the ascriptive model of birthright citizenship had prevailed since the ratification of the 14th Amendment, Congress had the power to affirm the alternative, consensual view (and thus eliminate birthright citizenship) if it chose to.
As Rachel Morris explained in a recent article in the New Yorker about the strange afterlife of the book by Schuck and Smith, neither author considered himself a conservative nor thought that Congress should make such a change—merely that it could. Yet their claims were quickly seized upon by anti-immigration activists and then, decades later, by hard-right scholars at the Claremont Institute, and finally by the second Trump Administration.
The Endgame for Birthright CitizenshipIn other words, if the Supreme Court’s conservative majority wants to hand Trump a victory on birthright citizenship, there is history and scholarship they can rely on to make their case. At least up to a point.
Where I suspect even the most stridently conservative justices may opt for restraint is in granting the president the power to eliminate birthright citizenship by executive order. Schuck and Smith talked of Congress redefining citizenship, not the head of the executive branch. Assuming the high court doesn’t simply use Barbara v. Trump to slap down the administration’s ambitions in this area, I suspect they will come down roughly where Schuck and Smith did: If Republicans want to redefine citizenship in the United States, they need to do it via the people’s representatives in Congress.
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Given that Barbara v. Trump will be handed down at the end of the Court’s current term, that will leave Congress, with its razor-thin Republican majority, just a handful of months in which to attempt such a move before the party, in all likelihood, loses control of the House, and possibly the Senate as well, in 2026. This almost certainly means Republicans will need to return to fight another day, after they’ve won back control of Congress in a future election, to accomplish what Trump set out to do on the opening day of his second presidency.
That might sound like a loss for Trump and the MAGA right. But if the Supreme Court really does point the GOP toward a viable path to eliminating birthright citizenship in the not-too-distant future, that should be seen as a major victory for the political right in this country—one that will be directly traceable to Trump’s willingness to put the issue front-and-center in his Inauguration Day executive order.
In that respect, and in the longer run, Trump and his MAGA movement could well end up winning despite losing.
Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.
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