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By Yascha Mounk
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  • Episode 178: Geoffrey Ward on the American Revolution

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    For our first episode of 2026, Richard talks to Geoffrey Ward, author of The American Revolution: An Intimate History (Knopf).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

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    29 min
  • Trump Is Going For Regime Change in Venezuela

    We are delighted to feature Francis Fukuyama in the pages of Persuasion once again. Some of you may not know that he writes a regular column, “Frankly Fukuyama,” which is proudly part of the Persuasion family, and which you need to manually opt in to receive.

    To get all of Frank’s writing—and to get articles from American Purpose, the magazine he founded, and its culture-focused podcast, Bookstack—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons.

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    Venezuelans living in Chile celebrate the capture of Nicolas Maduro (Photo by Javier TORRES / AFP via Getty Images)

    Now that the Trump administration has gone ahead and captured Venezuela’s leader Nicolás Maduro, we need to shift quickly from debating the wisdom of the intervention to thinking about how to deal with the aftermath. I don’t think that the legality of the American action should be our critical focus right now, for reasons I will get into at the end of this article. The real issue should be how to restore democracy to Venezuela, and how to create the conditions under which the 8 million people who have fled the country can return home.

    The Trump administration is now engaged in bringing about regime change in Venezuela, and will be embroiled in a nation-building exercise there for the foreseeable future. This is very ironic, of course, given Trump’s earlier attacks on America’s “forever wars” in the Middle East. There is a powerful logic to regime change, however, since bad international behavior stems largely from bad domestic politics, and you’re not going to change one without changing the other. The problem, of course, is that nation-building is really, really hard, and the United States doesn’t have a good track record in this regard.

    The United States has had a lot of experience with regime change in recent years, most of it pretty unpleasant. It was not able to transform either Afghanistan or Iraq into stable democracies, despite the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives—Afghan, Iraqi, and American. America has also used military force multiple times in the Western hemisphere: in Cuba in the 1890s, in Mexico in the early 1900s, in Nicaragua in the 1930s, in Central America in the 1980s, and in the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Grenada. Only the latter three interventions could be deemed successful in producing stable democratic outcomes.

    However, there is a danger of jumping to premature conclusions from these historical precedents. Afghanistan and Iraq in particular are very different countries from Venezuela, and the challenges they posed were very different from what we will likely experience in our hemisphere.

    The problem in Afghanistan began with the fact that it never possessed a real state, much less a modern one. The country was more like a federation of powerful tribal and ethnic groups that, even under the monarchy, only paid nominal allegiance to Kabul. The reason it had no centralized state was due to its mountainous geography, which over the centuries prevented the kind of state formation that had occurred in neighboring Iran and Turkey. The country was divided ethnically, religiously, and linguistically, and subject to intervention from its better-organized neighbors. The ruling Pashtun ethnicity was split between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that porous border made it impossible to exert authority from Kabul.

    Iraq, by contrast, did have a state—a state that was too strong and tyrannical. It was not, however, a coherent nation, but rather a country assembled in colonial times from three very different Ottoman vilayets. The Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish regions had little in common, and were only being held together by a brutal Ba’athist dictatorship. The United States moreover sought to stabilize both Iraq and Afghanistan in a period when an extremist form of Islam promoted by Saudi Arabia was sweeping much of the Muslim world.

    A final consideration is that Afghanistan and Iraq were as different culturally from the United States and other Western democracies as one can imagine. Islam was critical to the identities of both countries, and neither had any prior historical experience with liberalism or democracy. The populations of both countries were distrustful of the United States because of Washington’s support of Israel. Both countries, particularly Afghanistan, were at a low level of economic development, with Iraq suffering from all of the dysfunctions of a resource-dependent country.

    It should be obvious that Venezuela is in a very different historical and cultural context. It has always regarded itself as part of “the West.” It has been a reasonably successful democracy since the 1958 Pacto de Punto Fijo ended the Jiménez dictatorship. The two leading parties, COPEI and Acción Democrática, were elite-led, and presided over a society with high levels of socio-economic inequality (as in many other Latin American countries). Nonetheless, there were regular elections, a growing middle class, and citizens who enjoyed a high degree of individual freedom.

    All of this ended when Hugo Chávez was first elected president in 1998, to be succeeded upon his death by Maduro. Their management of the economy was disastrous, with GDP shrinking by two thirds, and eight million of the country’s 28 million inhabitants fleeing as refugees.

    The strength of the democratic tradition in Venezuela could be seen in last year’s presidential election. María Corina Machado, who was awarded this year’s Nobel Peace Prize, was disqualified on specious grounds, and replaced by Edmundo González as a stand-in. The democratic opposition placed observers in every polling place around the country, and made careful copies of the actual vote tabulations. These demonstrated that González won the election by over 30 percentage points; the regime nonetheless declared Maduro the winner and began to systematically jail leaders of the opposition still in the country.

    Thus Venezuela has a legitimately elected democratic leadership in González and Machado. None of this existed in Afghanistan or Iraq, where the Bush administration struggled to find someone—anyone—to take over the country. The democratic opposition is not only legitimate, but well-organized, drawing on the huge Venezuelan émigré community all over Latin America and in the United States. It has been busy making plans for a transition back to democracy.

    The Trump administration may get plaudits in the short run for having removed Maduro, but will face a turbulent and potentially violent situation in Venezuela itself, as regime survivors try to protect themselves. Trump in his initial news conference after the intervention has said that the United States will run Venezuela directly for the time being. He doesn’t have the faintest idea what he is getting into.

    The central challenge in Venezuela today is different from the interventions of the 2000s. The Maduro regime’s power was based on the military, and a network of supporters hailing from poor neighborhoods around the country that it organized into militias. While there is strong evidence that many enlisted soldiers voted for Machado last year, the regime created a huge number of generals and admirals who have a direct stake in the regime’s survival, running various kinds of drug-smuggling and sanctions-busting operations. These senior officers have no future in a democratic Venezuela; indeed, many of them would be subject to criminal charges locally and in the United States were the regime to fall. They can be expected to resist a new regime fiercely, and have the weapons and organization to do so.

    This is what happened in Cuba. The Castro regime was originally driven by ideology, but after the passing of Fidel Castro and the retirement of his brother Raúl, it has fallen into the hands of a powerful security apparatus that profits directly from criminal activity and foreign supporters like Russia and China that want to defy the United States. Indeed, that Cuban apparatus has been critical to the Maduro regime’s survival.

    In the course of his career, Trump has shown no interest in promoting democracy abroad, just as he cares little for it at home. At his news conference on Saturday, he made it clear that his major objective was securing Venezuela’s oil resources, which he claims the United States “owns.” Keep in mind that Trump once said that the United States made a mistake in not grabbing Iraq’s oil reserves after invading the country. If this is the real motive going forward, then Trump will be strongly tempted to make a deal with some strongman leader, including one coming out of the Maduro regime, who promises to stabilize the country through any means necessary.

    All of this moves us further into a world where “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”

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    I promised to return to the question of the legality of the intervention. There has already been a chorus of criticism based on assertions that the administration was acting illegally, in terms of both international and domestic law.

    Of these two arguments, the latter is stronger than the former. The sad fact is that there is no such thing as legally binding international law. The United States has signed up to a number of international conventions that theoretically limit its unilateral use of force, but it has regularly violated them, or gotten around them on dubious legal grounds. This was, notably, true in the interventions in Kosovo under Bill Clinton and the Iraq War under George W. Bush, when the United States could not secure UN Security Council approval for the operations.

    There is a stronger case to be made for violating American law regarding war powers. After Vietnam, Congress tightened up the conditions under which a president could use military force abroad. George H. W. Bush and his son were careful to get Congressional approval for their Persian Gulf interventions. However, U.S. courts have granted presidents much more discretionary authority in foreign policy than in domestic affairs. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that seeking prior Congressional authorization of war powers would have undercut the element of surprise. Whether or not he is right about this, it is easy to see the courts approving the move as part of the president’s authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

    Rather than focusing on the issue of the legality of intervention, we ought to focus on motives and outcomes. For better or worse, the use of force internationally is justified more often by the results it achieves than by its legality. There is a powerful moral argument to be made that Maduro was an illegitimate dictator, one who not only oppressed his own people, but destabilized the entire region by fostering criminal gangs and sending millions of countrymen fleeing into nearby countries.

    If the United States succeeds in restoring to power a democratically elected regime that is stable and able to welcome back the millions of refugees currently in exile, then people are not going to worry about the means by which this was accomplished. On the other hand, if Venezuela falls into anomic violence, or if the United States puts a new dictator in place and grabs its oil assets, then history will judge this as an unprecedented act of piracy that will set a horrible example for world order.

    The same could have been said about Iraq. If the Bush administration had discovered WMDs after the invasion, if the Iraqi people had greeted the Americans as liberators, and if the country had emerged as a stable liberal democracy, then the lack of a Security Council resolution would have been a minor footnote to history.

    The real historical lessons that we should have learned are not that the Afghan-Iraqi quagmires will inevitably repeat themselves; there is indeed a hopeful path forward towards a democratic outcome in Venezuela. Rather, the real lesson is that the United States isn’t very good at nation-building, and seldom has the patience or expertise to bring it about.

    Given the second Trump administration’s track record in its first year in office, I am unfortunately not counting on it to be either wise or effective in its management of a post-Maduro Venezuela. On behalf of my Venezuelan friends, I hope that I will be proven wrong about this.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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    0 min
  • Maduro Is Gone—Venezuela’s Dictatorship Is Not
    Fire at Venezuela’s largest military complex after U.S. strikes on January 3, 2026. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images.)

    First things first: the stunningly audacious raid that extracted Nicolás Maduro and his wife from Venezuela is a genuinely history-making victory for Donald Trump. At a cost of zero American lives, the United States captured a singularly destructive force: a dictator whose record of criminality and misrule blighted millions of Venezuelan lives and destabilized politics in the entire Western hemisphere.

    After clumsily stealing an election he had plainly lost by a landslide eighteen months ago, Nicolás Maduro kept running the Venezuelan state as a sprawling criminal syndicate. Along with his powerbroker wife, Cilia Flores, he belongs in a prison cell as surely as anyone I can think of. Which is why you’ll be hard pressed to find a Venezuelan who doesn’t, on some level, rejoice at last night’s news.

    In the weeks leading up to this history-making raid, I more than once rolled my eyes at reports that the United States might be planning an extraction operation to effectively kidnap a sitting president. The idea seemed just fantastical and theatrical, not to say harebrained. Well, they did it, and anyone who tells you they’re not at least a little bit impressed by the feat is probably lying.

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    Venezuelans today are waking up to an unrecognizable country. Like every dictatorship, Maduro’s had invested heavily in the myth of its own invincibility. And yet the regime is very much still in place, albeit in a weird, decapitated state. State TV is still running regime propaganda, Vice President (soon, one surmises, to shed the “vice”) Delcy Rodríguez is still fulminating on behalf of the Venezuelan government, the hardline interior minister Diosdado Cabello is still giving fire-breathing speeches condemning American aggression, Maduro’s notoriously repressive attorney general, Tarek William Saab, is still out mining the night’s events for propaganda points. The entire ghastly apparatus of state repression that Hugo Chávez built and Nicolás Maduro perfected appears, for now, to be fully in control of the country.

    Maduro is gone. It’s tempting to think that, without him, the regime will implode. But Maduro’s was never the kind of personalist system that depends on a single leader. It was always more of a team effort, with a constellation of influential figures like Rodríguez and Cabello teaming up with Cuban intelligence to keep dissent at bay. In other words, the kind of regime that could very well survive decapitation. And if it does, Venezuelans will get the worst of it.

    For three decades, the most trustworthy principle for interpreting Venezuelan affairs has been a simple heuristic: whatever outcome makes Venezuelans’ lives most miserable is always to be treated as the odds-on-favorite. If, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio apparently told Senator Mike Lee, the United States really isn’t planning any follow-on actions against the rump regime, then for Venezuelans on the ground nothing may change. Things could get even worse: you can easily imagine a wounded and humiliated Chavista successor ratcheting up state repression to rebuild the regime’s now tattered aura of invincibility.

    Maduro’s abduction could easily become an all-purpose excuse to crack down on any and every sign of dissent: any expression of dissatisfaction will surely be used as evidence of connivance with the American enemy. Trump’s stunning one-day win could be remembered for heralding an even darker stage in Venezuela’s path towards totalitarianism.

    At the same time, as the post-9/11 era showed, if the United States did attempt to install a democratic government, that too could go wrong in a million ways. This is not to mention the fact that the operation was carried out illegally, with no Congressional authorization, and that the precedent of superpowers deciding which foreign leaders to capture may not always lead to the downfall of people as evil as Maduro.

    All through this latest round of American pressure, the specter of half-measures has loomed large over Venezuela’s future. The Bolivarian regime is always at its most vicious when it feels most threatened, and, right now, it must feel enormously threatened. Time and again, when the regime feels threatened, it’s ordinary Venezuelans who pay the price.

    Donald Trump and Marco Rubio will take a victory lap today. They deserve it. They’ve struck an enormous blow against a genuinely evil regime. But they’ve not overthrown it. Chavismo is very much still in control of Venezuela. Bloodied, weakened, humiliated, yes, but still in control, and newly motivated to exert even more state terror in a bid to stay in power.

    Venezuelans all around the world are celebrating the fall of a vicious tyrant. But if the regime manages to ride out this storm, we won’t be celebrating for long.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion and the founder of Caracas Chronicles. Like eight million other Venezuelans, he was forced to flee Venezuela’s dictatorship.

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    0 min
  • Why the Iranian Regime Endures
    (Photo by Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Iran is once again experiencing a wave of nationwide protests. The Islamic Republic’s history of popular unrest dates back to the early 1990s, when rising economic inequality and growing public frustration triggered widespread demonstrations in rural and impoverished areas. The first major post-Revolution uprising occurred in 1999, following a government crackdown on students and intellectuals. The 2009 Green Movement marked a critical turning point. Millions took to the streets to protest alleged electoral fraud by former hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and to demand political reform.

    A few years later, the 2017-2018 protests reflected deepening economic grievances across social classes, while the 2019 demonstrations, triggered by a sudden fuel price hike, evolved into one of the most extensive uprisings in the Islamic Republic’s history. The state responded with extreme violence, killing more than 1500 people in under a week.

    Most recently, the 2022 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the morality police ignited a powerful movement centered on women’s rights, political freedom, and resistance to systemic repression. Again, the regime brutally repressed this movement, killed hundreds of Iranian youths, and intentionally blinded hundreds by shooting them in the eyes.

    The current protests, which began last Sunday, are following a similar trajectory. As in 2019, the trigger was economic grievance, which has led Iranian demonstrators to pour into the streets and demand the dismantling of the regime.

    Yet despite their scale and intensity, all previous protests failed. What might the future hold for this current round?

    To answer this question, one should examine the regime’s resilience in the face of repeated mass dissent. The key factor is the structure of the Iranian state itself. Over time, the Islamic Republic has transformed into a highly centralized and professionalized security state, capable of managing, containing, and suppressing dissent with remarkable efficiency. Its resilience is not accidental but the result of decades of institutional learning and strategic adaptation.

    At the center of this system are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Basij militia, militarized law enforcement, and a massive network of low-ranking security offices that exist in every corner of Iran’s bureaucracy. These institutions operate not only as coercive forces but also as deeply embedded actors within Iran’s political, economic, and social life. Their expansive reach allows the regime to monitor society closely and to neutralize dissent at an early stage. Surveillance, intimidation, and selective repression have become routine tools of governance.

    These security institutions, originally established to uphold the political order and safeguard the regime, have become deeply integrated. They have transformed the Islamic Republic from a revolutionary theocracy into a modern security state.

    Unlike the Pahlavi monarchy, which collapsed amid mass mobilization during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Islamic Republic has internalized the lessons of revolutionary vulnerability. It has invested heavily in intelligence capabilities, cyber monitoring, and psychological operations. The regime now anticipates unrest rather than merely reacting to it, using data-driven surveillance and preemptive repression to prevent protests from coalescing into a unified movement.

    One of the most significant obstacles to political transformation in Iran is the fragmentation of the opposition. Over decades, the regime has systematically weakened alternative centers of power through repression, exile, and targeted assassinations. This strategy has left opposition movements divided, leaderless, and often ideologically fragmented.

    Although protesters broadly demand political change, they remain divided over its nature. Some call for a secular republic; others advocate reforms within the existing system; and a growing segment supports a return to monarchy. This trend is visible in chants such as “Javid Shah,” “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed,” and “This is the final battle, Pahlavi will return.” These slogans, heard in cities such as Arak, Rasht, and Khorramabad, reflect renewed symbolic support for the exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who has publicly endorsed the protest movement and urged unity, including appeals to the security forces to defect.

    Yet this diversity of visions weakens collective action. The regime exploits these divisions through a deliberate strategy of divide and rule, ensuring that no single movement or figure can consolidate sufficient support. By controlling narratives and amplifying internal disagreements, the state prevents the emergence of a unified opposition capable of challenging its authority.

    The resilience of Iran’s regime is also reinforced by its international partnerships. In recent years, Tehran has deepened strategic cooperation with authoritarian allies, most notably Russia and China. These relationships have strengthened Iran’s internal security capacity and reduced the effectiveness of external pressure.

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    Through long-term agreements like the 25-year partnership with China and cooperation with Russia from 2024 to 2025, Iran has gained access to digital authoritarian tools. These include deep packet inspection for internet shutdowns, AI facial recognition for social control, and advanced mobile tracking, enabling the move from reactive repression to predictive control. Russia has expanded as a supplier of anti-riot and electronic warfare systems, with cooperation agreements extending into the late 2020s. China’s “Safe City” infrastructure in Tehran and Isfahan has integrated high-resolution surveillance cameras with law enforcement databases, transforming cities’ ability to monitor unrest.

    This international support network has significantly reduced the effectiveness of sanctions and external pressure, providing the regime with both technological resilience and strategic insulation.

    The growing divide between Iranian society and the ruling system is undeniable. Repeated waves of protest demonstrate a deep and persistent rejection of authoritarian governance. Yet the failure of these movements to produce meaningful change underscores the regime’s ability to adapt, repress, and endure.

    As Iran enters 2026, the current unrest represents not a temporary eruption but part of a long struggle against an entrenched security state. While popular demands for dignity, freedom, and accountability continue to grow, the regime’s sophisticated coercive apparatus remains firmly in place.

    Any meaningful transformation will require confronting this deeply embedded architecture. Without a strategy capable of neutralizing the state’s coercive power and overcoming opposition fragmentation, the prospect of democratic change remains distant. The struggle continues, but the balance of power still favors a regime that has perfected the art of survival.

    Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.

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    0 min
  • My Third Winter of War
    A damaged house following Russian attacks in Kyiv on December 28, 2025. (Photo by Tetiana Dzhafarova / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Regular readers will know that, since shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Persuasion has been following the war through the voice of one Ukrainian, Kateryna Kibarova. Kateryna’s accounts of the ongoing horrors—from the first days, to her return home to Bucha, to the fear of constant drone attacks on Kyiv—capture the seemingly never-ending nightmare facing civilians far from the frontlines.

    This winter, as Ukraine’s future remains deeply uncertain and the capital routinely faces aerial bombardment, Kateryna wrote to say that a recent air raid had caused damage in her neighborhood and blown out one of her windows. What follows is her most recent dispatch on the aftermath of that attack and the continuing challenges of daily life. (You can read all of Kateryna’s installments here.)

    Members of the Persuasion team—in our individual capacity—are raising some funds to help Kateryna offset the cost of the emergency window replacement. If you’d like to consider supporting this effort, we’ve set up a GoFundMe page here.

    Wishing you a peaceful start to 2026, and with thanks for being part of our community,

    David, Senior Advisor

    by Kateryna Kibarova

    Last year, things were easier because the electricity and gas infrastructure was not attacked to the same extent. This year, they really carried out intense shelling of the energy sector and gas hubs. Energy workers once needed hours for repairs—now they take days. Absolutely everyone is cut off.

    We have special Telegram groups, “Ukrainian Power Grids,” with subgroups for each region. You receive an updated list and a schedule. In the evening when I go to bed, I check the schedule to understand what time I need to get up to get ready for work. You adjust your schedule if, for example, there will be no power from 6am to 11am. I’ll get up at 4am to get ready for work, dry my hair. But these schedules are often unpredictable, and I have to go to work with a wet head.

    A difficult stage has begun, because it is winter and there is very little gas and electricity. The state can’t cope. This year, they didn’t even start the heating season on time. Usually the radiators in apartment buildings begin to warm up when the temperature drops below 59 degrees. The first sectors to be launched are kindergartens, hospitals, schools. We had a very cold summer and the fall was also very cold. By mid-October, the heating season would normally have been launched. It’s one thing when you walk along the street if the sun is shining on a 45-degree day. When you sit in an apartment, you just freeze.

    This fall, I lived for some time with acquaintances at their home, which they heated with a large fireplace. Other people used electric heaters and overloaded the system. Now people have huge generators, but there are crazy power surges and sometimes the generators catch fire. Our utility systems aren’t adapted to this. One house in Khmelnytskyi exploded because they were turning the gas on, turning it off, and something went wrong. Tragically, people died.

    The company where I work ordered powerful generators from Europe. They told everyone that whoever has no light can come, can wash up, charge phones. They put in little sofas for people to lie down. If you go with a wet head, you take a hair dryer with you. Large businesses are very serious about providing for their staff. At stores you can sit down, take a break, get warm, heat up. They offer you warm tea. Businesses take care of Ukrainians and try, in difficult conditions, to create comfortable places where you can put your thoughts in order or answer calls.

    But scammers are also very busy here. They steal money from card accounts overnight. I fell for a scam, so I decided to save money and travel on public transport. One day an air alert began and all transport stopped. When this happens you cannot move anywhere, you are simply dropped off, stand in huge lines, and you don’t know what to do. I just started crying. People are frozen in horror. You don’t know if a rocket is coming, you have nowhere to hide, there is no bomb shelter anywhere nearby. It’s cold outside, and you are trying to somehow think about what to do next and how to save yourself.

    There have been very heavy attacks on Kyiv with drones and missiles. You see these Shahed drones flying over apartments and killing families. You don’t know if you will be next or not. People have started going into bomb shelters more often.

    During one attack, I got scared and ran out into the corridor of my building. They’d shot down many Shahed drones in the neighborhood, and there were fires. When I went back home it was dark, and in the morning I woke up because it was cold—some kind of wind was blowing through the apartment. I went into one of the rooms and saw the window had been blown out badly. The curtains were still hanging. It’s good that I wasn’t in there when it happened, because I would have been slashed by the fragments.

    There used to be a repair program for things like that, but now there are so many victims that the program no longer works. We sealed up the window with plastic wrap, and it was like that for a while. During this time I lived at my aunt’s. It’s harder for me to get to work from her place. But compared to people who lose their entire homes, their apartments, mine was a slight scare. Our local TV channels interviewed one man who lives in the center of Kyiv. It often gets hit there. He has already changed his windows eight times. He says, “Every time I still change them in the hope that this will be the last time.”

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    No one can say this happens accidentally. They attack near hospitals, houses. You see for yourself that they are targeting the population. You can drive through Kyiv and see scorched apartments. You understand that there were people who died there. One morning, my Dad called from Zaporizhzhia and said, “I don’t remember it ever being like this, so many rockets flew over the house. I thought, That’s it, this is the end.”

    Many people have started getting sick, especially after attacks. It is very strange that so many people just get knocked off their feet. It hits the throat, it hits hard. And I myself was sick recently with COVID. My voice disappeared. The worst thing is that Russia is now tactically hitting medicine warehouses, and because of this many people cannot get vital medicines. My colleague was asking for a medicine that only just became available at the pharmacy near my house. I arrived there, and the pharmacist told me that their warehouse was completely destroyed. Only today did a truck arrive from Germany with the drug. I bought four packs for my colleague.

    And then there’s the political situation. One day we hear that Donald Trump has talked to Putin, that things are sort of getting better. Then we get bombed again, everything is smashed, people die. Then Trump says he’s disappointed with Putin. Every time he says something like, “Putin disappointed me,” my colleagues and I laugh. These are political games that are won and lost by casualties among the civilian population. And how many of our military have died? How many young guys, young girls? It’s a horror. And it’s difficult to speak about anything else, because, unfortunately, we are just pawns in this big game—nothing more.

    Kateryna Kibarova is a Ukrainian economist and resident of Bucha.

    With translation assistance and thanks to Julia Sushytska and Alisa Slaughter. This transcript has been edited for concision and clarity.

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    0 min
  • Our Top Books of 2025—Podcast Edition
    Richard Aldous (Host of Bookstack)

    We’ve had some cracking new books on Bookstack in 2025, not least by Simon Ball on political assassination, Tevi Troy on the relationship between business and politics, and Joan Williams on why the Democratic Party seems to have abandoned the working class. But I’ve long been fascinated by President Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and now finally he has the biography he deserves. Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, America’s Great Power Prophet by Edward Luce brilliantly captures Brzezinski’s originality as well as his coruscating wit. Brzezinski was a contemporary of Henry Kissinger, and like him was an emigrant to the United States. Together they were leading figures among that rising breed of scholar-politicians of the postwar period—“all knowing grand viziers to the sultans of their time.”

    While conventional wisdom in the late sixties and seventies was that the United States was going to the dogs, Brzezinski predicted a new age of American dominance. He also rejected the popular convergence theory, believing instead, as President Reagan would, that U.S.-led capitalism would grind Soviet communism into the dirt. That kind of originality made Brzezinski useful to people like the Rockefellers and, most of all, to the rising Democrat Jimmy Carter, who appointed him national security advisor in 1977.

    Brzezinski was often criticized as a cynical realist in the vein of Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. His typically blunt response was that “world politics is not a kindergarten.” Carter became increasingly offended by Zbig’s realism, preferring instead to stake out the moral highground. Read another Bookstack author, Scott Anderson, in King of Kings: The Iranian Revolution: A Story of Hubris, Delusion and Catastrophic Miscalculation, for a day-by-day account of how it worked out when Carter’s idealism ran into the realism of Ayatollah Khomeini. It’s a reminder that even the most brilliant political advisor is ultimately only as good as the principal he serves. But in Zbig, at least, the life of Zbigniew Brzezinski also makes for an exceptional political biography.

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    Leonora Barclay (Head of Podcasts)

    My favorite part of my job is to read so many books—and to see if the authors live up to my expectations of them. So I greatly enjoyed Helen Lewis’ The Genius Myth, which explores how our choice of who we place on a pedestal has changed over time, and what this tells us about our society.

    Lewis argues that, since the Middle Ages, we’ve seen “genius” as being a special kind of person—a Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, a William Shakespeare, a Steve Jobs. We love our geniuses to have some sort of tragic or complex life, such as dying young, being addicted to something destructive, or having a love life that requires a diagram to understand. Jane Austen, for example, lived a disappointingly dull life, which has led to her being excluded from some compilations of geniuses.

    Despite these challenges, we persist in hoping that geniuses can share their greatness with us. Lewis uses the example of the organization Mensa—the world’s largest high-IQ society—which initially thought it could poll its membership on leading issues of the day, so the world could gain from their insights. Unfortunately, outside their individual subjects of expertise, the Mensa members turned out to be just like everyone else.

    This human desire to put someone on a pedestal cropped up again in my other favorite book this year, Charlatans by Moisés Naím and Persuasion’s own Quico Toro. Traditionally, they argue, charlatans were pretty limited to either selling health products or “get rich quick” schemes. However, driven by the Internet, our near-universal screen addiction, and corresponding loneliness and social isolation, we now live in a “charlatanogenic” culture, with lots of opportunities to idolize and be scammed: the promise of love, the meaning of life, connecting with aliens, and much more.

    Of course, one particular charlatan in our culture springs to mind, and Naím and Toro explore the impact of charlatans in politics too, arguing that the tactics Donald Trump used even before running for office (“the big, attention-getting promises with scant follow-up, the serial deception, and the obsession with money”) echo those of history’s biggest charlatans. A depressing observation, but a great read!

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    Francis Fukuyama (Host of Frankly Fukuyama)

    The book I’d like to feature is Furious Minds by Laura K. Field. This is a book that deals comprehensively with the intellectual origins of the MAGA right. I was particularly interested in interviewing Laura because of her background. She was trained as a Straussian—that is, by second and third generation students of Leo Strauss, the political theorist who wrote about the “crisis of modernity” and published dense commentaries on a host of philosophers including Maimonides, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Xenophon, and many others. I myself have a similar background, having been a student of two teachers Laura writes about, Allan Bloom at Cornell and Harvey Mansfield at Harvard.

    What I wanted to learn from Laura was where a certain group of Straussians went wrong, such that they ended up becoming big supporters of Donald Trump. This group includes John Eastman, Michael Pack, and Michael Anton—the latter the author of the famous “Flight 93” article in The Claremont Review of Books, which claimed that the United States would continue in a terminal death spiral unless voters rolled the dice and voted for Trump in 2016.

    Many people are aware of the divide between so-called “East Coast” and “West Coast” Straussians, the latter associated with the Claremont Institute and Strauss’ student Harry Jaffa. Jaffa was the author of the excellent book Crisis of the House Divided on the 1858 debates between Abraham Lincoln and Senator Stephen Douglas. In that book, he argued that Stephen Douglas’ arguments for states’ rights and federalism in the U.S. Constitution were ultimately trumped by the Declaration of Independence’s assertion that “all men are created equal,” and that, contrary to Douglas, democratic majorities of white voters in the South could not legitimize slavery. Yet today, Claremonters are echoing Douglas in their calls for a return to the “original” Constitution, and downplaying the promise of equality in Jefferson’s Declaration.

    Laura’s book goes way beyond the Straussian world, however, to cover other right-wing writers like Curtis Yarvin and Costin Alamariu (a.k.a. “Bronze Age Pervert”), who are much more Nietzschean. In my interview with her, she went out of her way to defend the general Straussian approach to teaching political philosophy, and expressed gratitude to her teachers for opening her eyes to the great Western philosophical tradition.

    In this I very much agree with Laura. Like many second-generation students of Strauss, I benefited enormously from my classes with Bloom and Mansfield. I can easily recognize some of the blinkers that such an education induces (such as disdain for social science and empiricism more generally). But nonetheless I am grateful for having received a true liberal education. Laura’s book is an excellent introduction to that world, as well as an alarming account of what has happened to America in the age of Trump.

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    Yascha Mounk (Host of The Good Fight)

    This year has been consumed by the radical antics of the Trump administration. As a result, I have spent more of my time than is probably healthy looking at the latest headlines. But that is also why I have particularly enjoyed the writing of podcast guests that have expanded my horizons: ones that inspired me to think about broader themes which will remain relevant long after depressing outrages—like Trump’s recent decision to add his name to the Kennedy Center—are (hopefully) long forgotten.

    A lot of smart and educated people I talk to still worry that the world is headed toward a crisis of overpopulation. But as Dean Spears and Mike Geruso explain in their book After the Spike, this is a mistake. In most countries, a low fertility rate is the more pressing problem today—and while the world’s population will continue to rise for a few decades, it is likely to crash soon after. Spears and Geruso are hardly the first to make this point; but this is the best primer on this topic for a general audience I have found so far.

    As faithful readers of these pages will know, another topic I have been thinking about a lot is China. Perhaps no writer about the country enjoys greater respect both within the United States and in China than Peter Hessler. His best-known book, River Town, written when Hessler was teaching English at a small university in a remote corner of Sichuan in the 1990s, tells the story of the Reform Era, when China, still desperately poor, was growing at a frantic pace. But it is his latest book, Other Rivers, written when Hessler returned to the province to teach in Chengdu, that I found to be more touching: it chronicles the lives of his former students, and contrasts their fates with that of a younger generation growing up in a country that is vastly more affluent—but also, in important ways, less full of hope.

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    0 min
  • Ivan Krastev on 2026

    Ivan Krastev is the chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies and Albert Hirschman Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, IWM Vienna.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ivan Krastev discuss international reactions to the Trump administration, Europe’s weaknesses, and the impact of changing demographics worldwide.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We’re recording this at the end of the year 2025. I thought about how to round off the year for myself and for the podcast. The obvious way to do that seemed to be having conversations with two people who have most helped me think about the world and given me orientation in very disorienting times. I’m having one conversation with our friend and colleague Francis Fukuyama, and another conversation with you, as a kind of year in review.

    We could start in many places, but a natural place to start, in some ways, is the White House. You said on an earlier episode of the podcast this year that the Trump White House was a kind of revolutionary movement, and that part of a revolution is that it always self-radicalizes and that you don’t really know where you end up. It feels as though the Trump White House has been self-radicalizing, but perhaps in the last few months it has also been getting stuck. How should we think about what is going on at the heart of American power?

    Ivan Krastev: I’m sure you will know better, because one of the interesting things about revolutionary dynamics is that it’s better to be where the action is. This is very much about how you feel it and how people are reacting to it. What was important this year was the speed. If you go back, you have the feeling that in January you were transferred from a normal train to a fast train, and everything started happening very fast. But it was not very clear what the destination was.

    What you’re sensing, in my view, when you say that it feels stuck, is that people are puzzled about where the train is going. Funnily enough, it was very fast and very radical, but what was the objective? That, in my view, is starting to paralyze Trump himself, because he was jumping from one small issue to another. The grand narrative was missing. There is no big story anymore that he’s telling.

    From this point of view, even when you look at the national security strategy, it reads much more like a transcript of his mind than a story for the future. It’s more a story of what he has done than of what he is going to do. That, I believe, captures the broader sense.

    The second point is that, interestingly enough, over this year a lot of things have happened, but neither the fears of people who believed this was the end of the world nor the hopes of his supporters came true. This is true of the economy. There were the tariffs. Many liberal economists said this is where inflation would break out, and it didn’t. His supporters said there would be tariffs and manufacturing jobs would come back, and that didn’t happen either.

    So, strangely enough, a lot has happened, but nothing really changed at the level of how people perceive their lives. This is probably what people mean when they talk about peak Trump, the sense that the energy he came in with has been exhausted without it being very clear what the next thing is that he can do.

    Mounk: That’s interesting. Part of it is the speed. There are two things. The first is that so many things were happening at the beginning that it felt like the “move fast and break things” approach in the famous Silicon Valley parlance, and it felt like they were going somewhere. Now that we’ve had more time to take stock and assess what they were doing, it looks more like a toddler who can run around and break a lot of things very fast, but who is running in a circle with no particular direction.

    The other thing is that it does feel as though the speed with which the administration is doing things has slowed down a little bit. Right now, and I’m very aware of the risk of being premature here, because we would have said one thing in March 2025, another thing in June 2025, and another thing now, and the story may still look very different in two or three years, it looks as though some of the restraints on government are holding better than it felt like in March or April 2025.

    The Supreme Court may rule tariffs unconstitutional, at least in the way they were passed. That’s not certain, but it’s what many legal experts expect based on the oral arguments in that case. The administration has certainly played with slow-walking its response to adverse legal rulings. In some cases, it has deported people who were already on planes when judgments came down, in ways that were deliberately close to the line. But it hasn’t yet simply ignored a court ruling outright.

    There’s now the prospect of Democrats winning back the House of Representatives in 2026 and being able to limit Trump’s power in other ways if they regain control of at least one chamber of Congress. Do you feel like the Trump revolution has slowed in those ways as well, or is that premature? What should we expect for the coming twelve months?

    Krastev: Many things, of course, can change, because this is also about how people react over time. But in my view, he exhausted a lot of the energy that came with him in petty fights. In a strange way, the most interesting story about the Trumpian revolution is that it has the energy and the anger, but no future project.

    A large project could be totally utopian. You can like it or dislike it, but it allows you to have a story and to focus on the big things. Because of who he is, and because of the narcissistic nature of the leader, which became the narcissistic nature of the regime, what happened over this year is that he aged in front of our eyes. Revolutions do not like aging.

    When he entered, because of the energy, he was an old young man. He was very energetic. He was doing this and doing that. Now the cameras are capturing him sleeping, not being there, and this is changing the perception of people, including those around him.

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

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    Last week, I was working with colleagues from the European Council on Foreign Relations on their global survey. It covers twenty-one countries, eleven in Europe, as well as China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa. It’s interesting to compare the data with a year ago and see how the world has started to view him differently.

    Because the data will be public on January 15, I don’t want to go into too much detail, but there are two striking things from this year when viewed from global public opinion rather than American public opinion. This was the year when everyone was talking about Trump. But when you look at the data now, there’s a widespread sense that the next ten years are going to be the Chinese decade.

    We see this every year, but you may be surprised by how suddenly people have become convinced that China has the upper hand, and how the rise of China is no longer scaring people. That is the interesting story in the data.

    Mounk: Is that because views of America have become so negative that China looks like a relatively better alternative? Is it because views of China have become more positive? Is it that people have simply gotten used to the idea? What do you think has changed that perception?

    Krastev: Of course, America has lost ground in some parts of the globe. For example, South Africans have changed their views of the U.S. quite significantly. But something very important has changed.

    During the Biden period, there was both fear and expectation of a return to bipolarity. The United States confronting China, a renewed great-power confrontation. When Trump came in, there was an inertia that assumed this was what would happen. The paradox of this one year is that Trump was extremely polarizing in domestic politics, but he was depolarizing in international politics.

    This happened because tariffs hit everyone. He was making deals with the Chinese. He was making deals with the Russians. Suddenly, for many people, China became another name for multipolarity. That does not mean America is declining or going to be ousted, but China stopped looking as dangerous and aggressive.

    Many international relations scholars believed the rise of China would push countries and publics toward the United States. Instead, you now see public opinion in places like India warming toward China, despite a long history of conflict. This is quite interesting, because there was so much focus on Trump that many people missed how these dynamics were changing.

    Part of it is that China managed to stand up to him without appearing particularly aggressive, even though it was. Another part is that he disoriented everyone else. From a European perspective, when Trump came to power, leaders knew they would have a difficult time. They assumed that even if Trump was challenging, the U.S.-China confrontation was so central that Europe would remain necessary.

    Instead, we ended up in a situation reflected even in the national security strategy, where every region is largely on its own. There is no overarching frame. This matters because so many things happened so quickly. The speed was enormous. But at the end of this year, there is more of a feeling of exhaustion than a sense of major achievement relative to the objectives the administration set for itself.

    Mounk: How do you think this is going to play out? I want to come back to the United States, but let’s stay with the question around China for a moment. It’s striking that over the course of the past year, attitudes seem to have become more accepting of China playing a major role going forward.

    In part, that’s because for many parts of the world, China is going to pose an even bigger challenge. When you’re sitting in Europe and you see that the United States is now imposing significant tariffs on Chinese goods, that’s going to lead to even more competition from Chinese imports elsewhere. It’s going to become harder and harder for China to export, for example, car technology to the United States, and that creates a massive problem for the German car industry.

    If you’re sitting in Berlin, Paris, or Vienna at the end of 2025, you might think the challenge from China is actually bigger than it was a year ago, not necessarily because China is doing anything particularly wrong, but because of these broader dynamics. Yet the perception seems to be moving in the opposite direction.

    Is it that, for medium powers like Germany or France, the idea of a multipolar world is more appealing because it offers more room for maneuver? Do you think being less concerned about China is a rational response, or do you think it’s short-sighted and underestimates the nature of the challenges we’re now facing?

    Krastev: This mood, of course, can change. Any crisis can change it. But in a strange way, the decline of American power and the rise of China are perceived by many as a rebalancing. One thing that, in my view, Trump got wrong was focusing almost entirely on trade and the economy. There was an implicit sense of not talking about ideas and, to be honest, not talking much about war or other issues either.

    Suddenly, he started competing with the Chinese on their own terrain, and that is a game you cannot win. Fifty percent of global manufacturing production now comes from China. China also managed to stand up to Trump without looking hysterical or aggressive. They pushed back and created a sense of predictability.

    If you look at Europe, on one level it is clearly threatened by the Chinese shock you’re describing. There will be more and more cheap goods entering European markets. Macron said during his visit to Beijing that Europe has no option but to consider tariffs to protect its industries. But because Trump confronted Europe so directly, Europeans have become much more cautious than before. They are asking whether they can really afford an ideological confrontation with Washington, a military confrontation with Russia, and an economic war with China at the same time.

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    I don’t believe this response is limited to Europe, and I don’t think it’s unique to middle powers either. In my view, middle powers share three characteristics. First, they are very ambitious. In moments of disorder, they tend to see opportunities more than risks, partly because they are status-conscious. In a more disorderly world, there are more ways to assert status.

    Second, room for maneuver is critical for middle powers. Being a middle power means hedging. In a world where America is loud and present but not disciplining, hedging becomes easier. It was much harder to hedge in a period of strong ideological confrontation, when you were expected to take sides and clearly define who you were.

    Third, because Trump tried to engage personally in nearly every conflict and play a role everywhere, a new kind of middleman position has emerged. This goes beyond traditional middle powers. Some countries have become professional mediators. Look at Qatar, the Emirates, or Saudi Arabia. In a certain sense, there are now more mediators than disputes.

    This position has been strengthened by two characteristics of Trump’s diplomacy. The first is his belief that, in order to solve a conflict, you should not know very much about it. I’m saying this, to be honest, with a certain level of sympathy. If you know too much, you know very clearly what cannot happen, and sometimes you need an outsider to break a status quo. From that point of view, there is probably some truth to the idea that, particularly if you want to disrupt an existing equilibrium rather than simply close a deal, an outsider can help.

    The second point is that, because he operates through non-professional diplomats, personal friends, and businesspeople, the world has suddenly become very monarchic. When you look at relations between the great powers, almost with the exception of China, it can feel as though it’s not states negotiating but families. You see figures like Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Kushner meeting Mr. Dmitriev, who is close to Putin’s family. In both cases, foreign ministries are reading the news to understand what was negotiated.

    I believe this nineteenth-century flavor is critically important. The personalization of power, which in my view has been fueled by social media and its ability to amplify this anti-institutional dynamic, allows many things to happen. At the same time, you begin to lose clarity about what exactly has happened.

    Mounk: Where does that leave Europe? There’s been a lot of talk this year about Europe’s weakness. The phrase you used earlier, that Europe is in an ideological confrontation with the United States, a military or proximate military confrontation with Russia, and an economic confrontation with China, captures how embattled the continent is.

    I tend to have a quite pessimistic view of both the current state of Europe and the extent to which European political and intellectual elites have understood the stakes of the moment. There’s an assumption in the European public, which I’ve seen in a number of opinion polls, that France twenty-five or fifty years from now, or Germany twenty-five or fifty years from now, will look more or less like today, just a little worse. I’m not convinced that future exists, or that it’s a realistic prospect for how things might go.

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    Perhaps I’m overstating the point. Perhaps being a middle power, or a collection of middle powers, depending on whether you think of Europe as a single entity or of Germany and France as separate countries, will offer significant opportunities in this new multipolar world. Perhaps Europe can maintain a military alliance with the United States while relying less on American predominance, and continue trading extensively with China, managing tariffs and other measures along the way.

    It may be that ten or fifteen years of crisis, during which European industry has fallen behind, could allow Europe to discover new areas of economic strength where it can compete. How dire is Europe’s situation likely to be in this new, more monarchical, more multipolar, and perhaps more transactional world that you’re describing?

    Krastev: It has been said that Europe is the most vulnerable part of the world these days. Of course, this is also because it is the wealthiest. As a result, this combination of vulnerability and wealth, which means that everyone is trying to see what they can get out of you, is quite clear. If you look at opinion polls, and our polls show the same, Europeans themselves are the most doubtful about Europe.

    This creates a situation in which the European project was really prepared for a different world, and that world has disappeared. On one side, you have Russia at war, and it was never a secret that Russia sees the very existence of the European Union as an obstacle to its foreign policy objectives in Europe. On the other side, you have an American president who is essentially saying the same thing. He is saying that what is not a nation-state does not have the legitimacy to exist.

    If you are a European citizen or leader, this is deeply shocking, because Europe has gone through too many kinds of disintegration to know that the cost of unraveling is very high, particularly with an aging population and a stagnating economy. Normally, when you think about the future, you don’t know what is going to happen. Only Nostradamus knows that. But you usually know what is not going to happen. You have certain assumptions about what cannot happen.

    At the core of the current crisis is the belief among Europeans that the United States, under Trump, could side with Russia over Europe on the Ukrainian crisis. That possibility is destroying many of the assumptions on which their world has been based.

    Suddenly, there is a sense that many solid assumptions no longer hold. You can have crises in relationships, problems here and there, but not everywhere at once. From this point of view, the European Union is beginning, in many respects, to resemble the Habsburg Empire, which survived only insofar as it could convince others that its existence was in their interest. There is a growing feeling that this momentum is being lost.

    At the same time, this opens an interesting question about what could happen next. For me, that makes 2026 particularly important. Because of President Trump and his highly ideological politics, one effect has been the encouragement of political parties in Europe that see their relationship with the Trump administration as a political strength.

    The key question is what happens if Democrats win Congress. If that happens, Europe will face a very interesting choice. Trump-aligned forces in Europe implicitly hope that Trump will remain in power for a long time. Otherwise, they can expect that if European politics becomes defined by American domestic politics, a Democratic return would be very damaging for them.

    This raises the possibility that even some far-right parties and mainstream parties could renegotiate a basic consensus on Europe. What should the European Union be? What should remain, for example, of the single economic space? What should change and what should not? From this point of view, the end of 2026 and the beginning of 2027 may be the most critical moment.

    The strength of the Trumpian right in Europe is closely tied to Trump’s own strength. This is not because there are no domestic reasons for support of these parties, but because Trump’s existence allows them to act as European players rather than merely national ones. Many of these parties no longer dream of exiting the European Union. They want to change it. From this perspective, what seems clear is that the European Union is unlikely to survive in the institutional and ideological form in which it was originally created. The major renegotiations of the European Union will be shaped largely by relations with the United States on one side and Russia on the other.

    Mounk: One change during 2025 is that at the beginning of this year, you had a fresh Labour government that was already having a bad start but was still sufficiently new that it looked like it might get its problems under control. You had in France a political system that was under obvious strain, but there still seemed to be relatively good prospects of some kind of coherent, moderate candidate emerging for the presidential elections in 2027. You also had a fresh government in Germany with Friedrich Merz, or perhaps that came a few months into the year.

    Now, at the end of this year, you have Nigel Farage’s Reform Party leading in the polls. In the Westminster system, you can get a big majority with 32 or 33 percent in a fragmented party system. By the same token, if you lose five or six percentage points, you can suddenly go from a projected majority of seats to being a minor player. But according to current polls, Nigel Farage would have a majority of his own in Westminster whenever the next elections come.

    In France, you have Jordan Bardella leading opinion polls very clearly for the first round, where he would get about 33 percent of the vote, while the next candidate would get around 16 percent. He is also leading in matchups for the second round against virtually every competitor, relatively narrowly against some center and center-right candidates like Édouard Philippe, and very clearly against any candidate on the left.

    In Germany, you have Alternative für Deutschland, the most radical of the right-wing populist parties in major European countries. It does not look like it is about to govern nationally, but it is either even with or ahead of the Christian Democrats in most national polls. It may, for the first time, enter government in some state parliaments in East Germany, and depending on how things go, it may even win an absolute majority in some of those state parliaments after elections due to take place in 2026.

    One question raised by all of this concerns transatlantic relations. I’ve been saying repeatedly since Trump’s national security strategy was published that many European mainstream outlets want to frame this as an ideological battle between the United States and Europe. But I think it is an ideological battle within the United States and within Europe. The Democratic Party does not agree with the national security strategy. Jake Sullivan, Joe Biden’s national security advisor, who was on my podcast in February or March, does not agree with it. By the same token, many people in Europe, including spokespeople for parties that may be in government in London, Paris, and perhaps eventually Berlin in the coming years, do agree with it.

    So one question is whether this becomes the new basis for transatlantic understanding. Are we facing a breakdown of the transatlantic relationship, or a shift of that relationship onto a very different ideological track?

    The second question posed by those opinion polls in Britain, France, and Germany is where we are in what I think of as an epochal struggle over European populism. Are we losing across the board? Does this family of political parties continue to rise unabated? Should that temper any optimism we might draw from the fact that Democrats appear poised to retake the House of Representatives in 2026?

    Krastev: On one level, I don’t believe the Cold War or post–Cold War West can be restored. This type of relationship between Europe and the United States that was typical for the last thirty years cannot return, for a very simple reason. It was based on the fact that regardless of who came to power, these relations did not change dramatically.

    Now, and I agree with you on this, the dynamics of the relationship between the United States and Europe are very much defined by domestic politics on both sides. On the right, you have an alternative project. Not the West as the free world, not the Cold War West, which was universalist and centered on relations between the United States and Europe, but the idea of the civilization of the West. This is very clearly reflected in the security strategy, where the West is framed as a kind of Christian civilization, a white civilization.

    The question is how stable this project can be. Here there are several issues, including some ironies of history. If you look at why Trump’s America is so unhappy and furious with Europe, it is because Europe has become Americanized. The discussions about multiculturalism and being more open to migration are ideas normally associated with America, not Europe.

    It is also ironic because the United States was founded as an alternative to the old Europe of nation-states, closed nation-states. It was the New World. Now, in a strange way, the Trump administration resembles a migrant who left Europe two hundred and fifty years ago, built a life elsewhere, no longer likes the place where it lives, looks back, and says, what happened to the country I came from? I want to go back, but it is no longer the same country.

    I understand this story, but I don’t believe you can easily build a civilizational alliance on this basis. That alliance would require America to be ideologically present in Europe while reducing its military presence and financial commitments, while arguing that Europe should spend more on defense and be able to defend itself.

    This brings us to the second part of the problem you’re touching on. We are likely to see a much more militarized Germany at the same time as a Germany in which the AfD could eventually enter government. How does that change Europe? The far-right parties we are talking about, to different degrees, are sympathetic to major elements of the Trump administration’s agenda, particularly on immigration and national culture.

    At the same time, historically, they are in competition with one another. I don’t believe Marine Le Pen would be particularly happy to see a future in which Germany’s defense budget is three times larger than France’s. That is the interesting part of the story. One thing that also matters to me is that Trump is a nationalist, but he is a nationalist without history.

    Mounk: When Tucker Carlson interviewed Putin, the first hour was essentially a history lesson about all the ways Russia has been wronged and why it needs to regain its grandeur. It’s very hard to imagine Trump giving a one-hour history lesson with the same knowledge and conviction.

    Krastev: It’s not even about knowledge. He does not believe that history matters. In a certain way, what is interesting about Trump is that he is not interested in what happened before he was born, and honestly, he is not interested in what is going to happen after he leaves office. One moment that always stayed with me was when he was recounting a conversation with the Chinese president and said that she told him he would not invade Taiwan while he was in office.

    From this point of view, you have an extremely important difference in time horizons. On one side, you have Putin, and you also have Xi, who think in terms of centuries. This is excessive, but it is real. The Russian president asks for ninth-century archives to be brought to him. He wants to see original documents. He meets archaeologists to understand where Russians come from. On the other side, you have the President of the United States saying that he is not thinking in terms of centuries, but in terms of weeks, because the world is moving so fast.

    This creates a problem, because the nationalists on the European side share several characteristics. These parties are driven by deep demographic anxiety, by dramatically changing populations, and by the feeling that the country is no longer home, because home is a place you understand and believe you understand, and that feeling is gone.

    At the same time, when you look at their projects, many voters for far-right parties are migrants themselves, but they want to migrate to the past. They are not dreaming of a different economic model. They are dreaming of a different demographic and ethnic composition of society, which is extremely difficult to achieve. It is particularly difficult because demographic change is so dramatic. This is what drives these parties, but it is also what paralyzes them.

    One figure really struck me in the U.S. national security strategy. There is half a page devoted to Africa. In 1900, twenty-five percent of the world’s population lived in Europe, and between eight and nine percent lived in Africa. If United Nations projections are correct, by 2100, six percent of the world’s population will live in Europe, and forty percent will live in Africa.

    You then end up with a security strategy that treats Africa as a footnote and tells Europeans to be who they used to be. That is not easy, because demographic decline, low fertility rates, and the failure of governments to address these issues are already realities. These societies have already been remade. Instead of trying to understand how they can be governed, what can be achieved and what cannot, there is this dream of returning to the past, and that is not going to work.

    Paradoxically, if you look at American history, this logic does not work there either. Even the idea of “white,” which did not exist in Europe before the emergence of America, was an inclusive concept. “White” emerged because Bulgarians like me, Jews, Italians, and Irish were not considered white in the eyes of Germans or Englishmen.

    Instead of focusing on how to redefine the world so that societies can function and be governed, we retreat into nostalgia. There is a difference between nationalism and nostalgia. The real drama of Europe is that there is national sentiment, but there are no longer national economies.

    When we ask what is going to happen, imagine the European Union disintegrates and you are left with nation-states. What does the Bulgarian nation-state look like? What is the Bulgarian national economy? What kind of protectionism is possible at the level of the state? How does it compete with anyone?

    There is a major contradiction between a world increasingly organized around large spaces and civilizational states, and a U.S. political offer that encourages fragmentation in Europe while proposing civilizational alliances. I find this deeply disturbing.

    Mounk: Let’s pick up for a moment on this idea of demographic anxieties that you’ve talked about a lot. There are two elements here. One is immigration. In the United States, the choices of the Biden administration that led to a large influx of migrants across the southern border were probably one of the reasons Donald Trump was able to win re-election in 2024. There was a very detailed article in The New York Times a few weeks ago that went deeply into some of the choices the Biden administration made and why it made them. Reading it, the whole thing felt like a bit of a train wreck.

    In Europe, there are strong reasons to think that the expressed preference of the population for many decades to have more control over borders and less immigration, combined with the inability or unwillingness of policy elites to deliver on that preference, is one of the main reasons for the emergence of right-wing populist parties. In the study of populism, it used to feel like there were many new ideas emerging every year because it was such a fresh field. At this point, the number of genuinely new ideas seems to be diminishing, and much of the research is circling similar themes.

    There was, however, a very good article published in 2025 by Laurenz Guenther on what he called a cultural representation gap. One of the things he showed very vividly was that in 2013, the average German voter’s view on immigration was to the right of the average member of parliament from the Christian Democrats, which at the time was the most right-wing party in the Bundestag. That meant there was a large gap between the views of the average voter and those of the most right-wing party in parliament. What happened next was that this space was filled by Alternative für Deutschland, and immigration remains the most potent recruiting ground for these parties, particularly in Europe.

    As you’re saying, though, there’s a deeper question. One question is how to deal with border enforcement and how to avoid continually handing such a large electoral gift to populist parties. The deeper question is why populations around the world feel unable to reproduce themselves in the way that historically happened, through having children and raising the next generation of citizens within the country.

    This is a deep problem across Europe, particularly in Southern and Central Europe, but throughout the continent. It’s now a major issue in the United States. It’s also a problem in India, where fertility rates have fallen below replacement level. It’s a significant issue in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where fertility is around 1.6 children per woman. It is a massive problem in East Asia. China is likely to be one of the dominant powers over the next ten or twenty years, but if it wants to remain dominant over fifty or one hundred years, it will have to address its severe depopulation challenges.

    How is this going to play out? Are countries going to find ways to encourage citizens to have more children, or are we heading toward worldwide depopulation?

    Krastev: This is an incredibly important story, demography, because in my view it has several elements that are dramatically different from any other period before. Demographic fears have existed before. In the nineteenth century, there were strong demographic fears about overpopulation. That was Malthus. There would be too many people and not enough food and economic resources. For the first time in history, what we are facing is the fear of depopulation. This is new and it has three critical parts. The first is not simply that fertility rates are now very low. It is that we cannot understand why. They are low everywhere. They are low in rich countries and poor countries. They are low in autocracies like China and in democratic countries like those in Europe. Normally, one would expect fertility to stabilize around replacement level, about 2.1, based on theories of demographic transition, women’s education, and gender equality. But suddenly, even in countries with very generous social systems and highly egalitarian societies, like Finland, fertility rates are extremely low.

    I am not even touching on South Korea, which looks almost suicidal in demographic terms. In places like Russia and Iran, all of this is blamed on a Western conspiracy. The narrative is that because liberals in the West do not have children, they do not want others to have children either, so they promote feminism and gay rights. Part of the anti-gay propaganda in many of these countries is explicitly about fertility rates. But the reality is that governments can spend a great deal of money trying to incentivize young couples to have children, and it does not work. In countries like Hungary, around five percent of GDP goes to policies aimed at reversing demographic decline, and the results are modest. You do not just have a demographic problem. You have a demographic problem without a solution. Governments do not know what to do.

    The second element is that for a long time people believed technology would help. Artificial intelligence, automation, and robotics would compensate for labor shortages, especially in caring for aging populations. But technology has become a source of fear as well. We hope technology will solve demographic problems, but we also fear it, particularly artificial intelligence. People are not only afraid of being replaced by migrants from Africa, the only region with strong demographic growth. They are also afraid of being replaced by robots.

    This fear is combined with another factor: the concentration of wealth and technological development has created the prospect of individual immortality. You may remember the famous conversation between Putin and Xi about people living to 150 years and organ replacement. This creates the idea that a small group may be able to buy immortality, while most people remain mortal. This is a new kind of inequality that feels impossible to bridge. It resembles ancient Greek mythology, with a few immortals determining the lives of mortals.

    Previously, people accepted individual mortality because something larger would endure. One of those things was the nation. You would die, but your children would remain, and their children after them, along with a shared culture. Now there are no children. You face the mortality of the individual and the mortality of the nation.

    The third element of demographic anxiety is political. The fear is not just that newcomers will take jobs, but that they will outvote you. There is also the fear that governments will select migrants based on how they are expected to vote. This obsession destabilizes the basic understanding of political community: who belongs, how belonging is defined, and what identity means.

    I often use a simple example. There is an Italian restaurant in Vienna that was originally founded by Italian owners. It was later bought by someone else. Now the owner is not Italian. The waiters have never been to Italy, do not speak Italian, and do not know much about Italy. But the restaurant has Italian music and an Italian menu. Is this an Italian restaurant? For me, it is. For an Italian customer who expects to speak with someone from the same place, it may not be. This captures a deeper identity conflict.

    This reflects a clash between two ideas of majority in democratic politics. One is the historical majority that formed the nation. The other is the electoral majority that emerges on election night, which can be ethnically very different. The first person to experience this clash may have been the first president of Poland in the 1920s. He was elected and survived only a short time before being assassinated. His killers argued that he was elected by minorities, Jews and Ukrainians, and therefore could not be the president of Poland.

    This tension between migration, democracy, and the remaking of nations is critically important. Civilizational discourse does not help, because it only says “defend,” without offering solutions. At the same time, Trump captures some very real anxieties, particularly in Eastern Europe. For Eastern Europeans, ethnic homogeneity of the state was understood as a lesson of the twentieth century. People say populations have always moved in Europe, but the difference is that twentieth-century movement resulted in ethnically homogeneous states, especially in the East. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are examples. This homogeneity was produced through population transfers, the Holocaust, and the expulsion of Germans.

    What we are now witnessing in Europe is the unmaking of these ethnically homogeneous states. This raises further questions. Are Bulgarians in Germany part of the problem Trump talks about? Or are migrants only those coming from outside Europe? Then comes the question of Islam. This is also striking, because in the imagination of the American far right, Russia is a white Christian nation. In reality, Russia has the largest Muslim population of any European country, and one of the strongest centers of political Islam is Chechnya.

    We are living in a world where policies are increasingly driven by anxieties rather than ideologies or solution-oriented strategies.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Ivan discuss how artificial intelligence is changing both the future and present day, and make predic

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    55 min
  • A Holiday Plea From Frank and Yascha

    Dear readers,

    As this turbulent year comes to a close, we want to take a moment to thank all of our subscribers for your support in 2025. Our Persuasion and American Purpose community has grown to over 110,000 subscribers in almost every country in the world. Thank you to all of you—we value your support more than we can say.

    This holiday season, we have a special request: If you’re able to, please consider making a donation to Persuasion. As a registered nonprofit, we depend on grants, donations, and paying subscribers to pay our staff and writers. We’re grateful for anything you can give, and if you’re in the United States, any donations are tax deductible.

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    2025 has been a huge year. With authoritarianism on the rise, we launched the “Why Liberalism” series, showcasing new and classical ideas within the liberal tradition and how they can guide us today. We’ve also increased our podcast output, introducing The Good Fight Club—a panel format in which Yascha and special guests react to the week’s news and trending topics—and launching the Frankly Fukuyama podcast. Furthermore, American Purpose has highlighted some of the overlooked impacts of the Trump administration on the civil service.

    We’ve also seen our physical community grow—building on the longstanding success of the Persuasion London Chapter, we’ve launched chapters in New York, Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia.

    2026 looks to be a critical year for democracy both in the United States and globally, and we’re committed to providing quality content dissecting events and key themes. Your donation will help us to keep holding the administration to account, exploring ways to respond, and, of course, providing a liberal answer to the challenges faced by our country and the world.

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    If you can’t make a donation but can think of a special someone who would enjoy our content, please consider giving a gift subscription this holiday season.

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    Thank you again for supporting Persuasion and American Purpose. We wish you a relaxing and joyful holiday season.

    Yascha & Frank

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    0 min
  • Don't Jawbone AI Companies
    A Senate committee hearing on “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan” in Washington, DC. (Photo by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images.)

    “Well, then you need to shut it down.”

    That was Republican Senator Marsha Blackburn’s reaction when a Google executive explained during a recent Senate hearing that large language models (LLMs) sometimes “hallucinate” and generate false information. The Tennessee senator was outraged that Google’s open-source model Gemma had fabricated defamatory stories about her and a conservative activist. The next day Google disabled consumer access to Gemma.

    Blackburn’s demand captures a dangerous moment for AI and free expression. As generative AI is embedded into search engines, email, and word processors, it will mediate ever larger parts of the information ecosystem that people rely on. Governments are discovering that they can pressure companies to censor what may be the most consequential communications technology since the printing press.

    Recent efforts go well beyond combating clearly illegal content such as child sexual abuse material. From Brussels to New Delhi, Warsaw to Washington, officials are wielding regulations, threats, and public shaming to shape what information, ideas, and perspectives billions of people can access through AI.

    In October, the Dutch Data Protection Authority warned that AI chatbots made by OpenAI, xAI, and Mistral are “unreliable and clearly biased,” since they produced voter recommendations that tilted toward far-left and far-right parties ahead of national elections.

    Support the Persuasion family this holiday season! We are a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    The regulator argued such behavior could violate the EU’s new AI Act, which requires powerful models to mitigate ill-defined “systemic risks,” including “negative effects on … society as a whole.” It referred the matter to the European Commission, which can impose fines of up to 7 percent of global annual turnover for non-compliance.

    In July 2025, Poland’s government reported xAI to the European Commission after X’s chatbot Grok generated antisemitic content and offensive comments about Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. A spokesperson for the Commission told journalists, “We are taking these potential issues very seriously … we are in touch with the national authorities and with X itself.”

    Government crackdowns in authoritarian and illiberal states, meanwhile, provide a disturbing demonstration of the stakes involved. In July 2025, a Turkish court partially banned Grok for generating content “insulting” toward religion and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. When asked in February 2024 whether India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi was a fascist, Google’s Gemini cited experts who had characterized his policies as such, pointing to “Hindu nationalist ideology” and a “crackdown on dissent.” India’s Minister of State for IT declared that this response violated Indian laws. Google apologized and, until at least December 2024, Gemini responded “I can’t help with that right now” when asked about Modi and fascism. In other words, a prominent global tech company, whose products are relied upon by billions for reliable search results, filtered its most sophisticated technology to appease a government offended by content citing expert statements.

    In the United States, and to a lesser degree other open democracies, legal protections for free speech will provide a buffer against overt state censorship of LLMs. But in many countries around the world, free speech exists only on paper. And even where it is legally protected, governments frequently engage in jawboning: informal pressure meant to push companies to restrict lawful speech without leaving fingerprints. Officials can hint at investigations, regulation, or licensing consequences if companies do not “cooperate.” In July, for example, Missouri’s attorney general Andrew Bailey sent letters to major AI companies threatening investigations under state deceptive advertising laws if they failed to provide data about alleged political biases in the outputs of their chatbots.

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    There are ways that the largest AI companies can disincentivize jawboning and mitigate the effects. Companies may not always be able to refuse government requests to censor outputs when faced with potentially ruinous fines, criminal sanctions for executives, or blanket bans. But through transparency they can make sure that their users know what their governments want to hide or manipulate.

    Major AI developers should create a public, searchable database—a Jawboning Repository—where they disclose every government request to censor, filter, or modify their LLMs or chatbots—and how they responded. Requests should be logged by country, agency, legal justification, and category (e.g. “hate speech,” “national security,” “insulting the leader”).

    This would build on existing efforts such as the Lumen database for internet takedown requests and the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression’s model legislation requiring U.S. agencies to log contact with social media firms.

    Google already documents government requests to remove content from its search engine and YouTube. Anthropic and OpenAI publish government requests for user data, and Meta lets users track content restrictions on its platforms by national governments. But while tech companies do provide discrete transparency initiatives, none include government requests for AI censorship. Moreover, the initiatives that exist vary widely in methodology, detail, and user friendliness.

    By creating a comprehensive Jawboning Repository covering the most popular LLMs, companies will significantly enhance the public’s insight into government attempts to censor AI models. This will force governments to defend their actions in the court of public opinion. Such transparency will deter the most egregious overreach—and preserve the promise of AI as a tool for expanding, rather than constraining, human knowledge and expression.

    Jacob Mchangama is the Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech and a research professor at Vanderbilt University. He is also a Senior Fellow at The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) and the author of Free Speech: A History From Socrates to Social Media.

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    0 min
  • Francis Fukuyama on 2025 (With Transcript)

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama discuss why Donald Trump is flagging, whether American institutions are resilient enough to survive, and the future of Ukraine.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We’re recording this at the end of 2025. It truly has been an eventful year, an impactful year. It feels like it unfolded in two phases.

    The first phase was Donald Trump assuming office, and turning out to be impressively efficient at and taking control of the reins of power, much more so than during his first term. For a few months, it felt as though the entire architecture of the American government was changing.

    In the last months, it has felt as though that revolution has begun to slow in various ways. The title of the piece you published recently in Persuasion is Don’t Panic, Trump Is Flagging. Where do you think we are now, at the end of this year, in terms of the Trump administration and its ability to transform America?

    Frank Fukuyama: Well, Yascha, you’ve made that whole account in a morally neutral way. The question is whether he’s been transformative and effective rather than whether he’s been good or bad. I think the good-or-bad issue is probably the prior one.

    To me, the surprising thing was actually how bad he became in his second term in office. I had written various things at the time of the election. Many centrist Republican friends of mine were saying he wasn’t so bad the first time around and that he would probably be good for the economy, and so on and so forth. I felt that this was not likely to happen, that he was going to be much worse the second time around.

    Even I did not anticipate how much worse he would be. He has pursued a very explicit authoritarian agenda, trying to do everything through executive order, bypassing Congress, and trying to ignore the courts as much as possible.

    He then engaged in a revenge tour. The Susie Wiles interview that appeared in Vanity Fair pointed to this. She thought she had an agreement that he would only pursue the revenge part of his agenda for 90 days, and he actually intensified it after that.

    Mounk: That is an extraordinary thing to say in the first place: You have 90 days to take revenge and then we’ll get serious.

    Fukuyama: He completely ignored that supposed agreement, and the revenge part of the term has really kicked in very powerfully. In terms of effectiveness, that is actually the one saving grace: a lot of the incompetence from the first term seems to have reappeared.

    Part of it is that the things he wants to do simply cannot be done. You can’t invent a charge and get a grand jury to indict somebody who hasn’t done anything wrong. That is clearly the case with both Letitia James and James Comey. Only Donald Trump thinks they actually committed a crime, but they couldn’t get a legitimate prosecutor to make that case. When they did get an incompetent prosecutor to try, the grand jury rejected the charges, which is extraordinary, because grand juries in the United States almost never reject charges.

    Mounk: The famous line from a New York prosecutor in the 1980s was, I could indict a ham sandwich if I so chose.

    Fukuyama: That’s right. It turns out they couldn’t indict a ham sandwich. In fact, the felony indictment for the person who threw a ham sandwich at an ICE officer also failed to stick. You are retreating back into a comedy of errors of the sort seen in the first term, which I think is good for the cause of justice per se. It is also very revealing of the bad intentions now playing out.

    I think people who follow the Justice Department are completely appalled by how Pam Bondi has succeeded in hollowing it out. The entire Civil Rights Division and a very large number of prosecutors and attorneys have either left the department or been forced out. Morale has plummeted because everyone can see what is happening, and they are not serious about law enforcement.

    If we want to talk about what was unusual about this year, one major factor has to be the extraordinary level of political corruption this administration has engaged in. It begins with the pardons. Everyone expected him to pardon the January 6th defendants. He said he would not pardon those who committed serious violence, but that promise was abandoned almost immediately. He is effectively selling pardons. Any wealthy person who wants to get out of jail approaches him through an intermediary and walks free.

    For an administration that claims to be waging a war on illegal drugs, why pardon the former president of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández, who was convicted of extremely serious drug charges? Those charges originated during the first Trump administration.

    Mounk: That was remarkable to me. There are pieces of corruption where you can see how it serves Trump’s financial interests. There are other pieces where it seems like he is building political alliances. That case, though, seemed to defy logic even beyond the usual level of outrageousness.

    Fukuyama: I suspect that, in time, we are going to learn why it happened. I suspect that there will be some personal element to it, where somebody in the Trump orbit is benefiting personally from his release, because that seems to be the way he is conducting many of these pardons and, frankly, foreign policy. India received a 50 percent tariff because Prime Minister Modi would not support his bid to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

    If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

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    It is really hard to describe what his foreign policy is, since much of it is dictated by his personal needs and his desire for personal glory rather than any concept of national interest.

    This is why he has been crosswise with parts of his MAGA base. They expected him to be a consistent isolationist, and he has been anything but. These are all surprises that occurred over the course of 2025, and things that I think even the most pessimistic among us did not anticipate.

    Mounk: There’s a great, if depressing, tour d’horizon, and I agree with you that I had low expectations of a Trump administration, but they were significantly exceeded in how bad things have been. Before we get more into the substance of things, I’m struck by the fact that the Trump administration is proof that shamelessness really works in life.

    The level of shamelessness around some of the corrupt behavior and some of the personality-cult elements is striking. There was a recent newsreel that really pales in comparison to many other things that have happened over the last twelve months, but it stood out to me. There used to be free entry to national parks on Juneteenth for the past few years and on Martin Luther King Day for much longer. Both of those were cut by the Trump administration, which is part of a broader cultural agenda that is perhaps unsurprising coming from the MAGA movement.

    They then granted free entry to national parks on Donald Trump’s birthday. Who cares which days people have free entry to national parks? There are much worse things happening in the U.S. government. But Trump’s entire career has been proof, over and over again, that this form of shamelessness works.

    You’ve thought a lot about human passions, the importance of thymos in politics, and the way some people like Donald Trump might be driven by megalomania, by an attempt not just to have self-respect but to dominate others. What explains the way we seem to forgive the shamelessness of people like Donald Trump?

    Why does that behavior not lead us to rebel in the way we would if a friend or acquaintance behaved similarly in our daily lives? We would say we want to cut this person out of our lives. We’re sick of them. Yet when it appears on a larger political canvas, we forgive it.

    That is what I find so interesting about Donald Trump. Many people who vote for him are good Americans who are polite and kind and would not tolerate a neighbor or acquaintance who behaved the way Donald Trump does. Yet they vote for him.

    Some may vote for him grudgingly, thinking they share his political views but dislike his conduct. Others seem to enjoy, on the large political stage, what they would never tolerate in their personal lives. I’ve never quite been able to make sense of that.

    Fukuyama: I do think that a lot of this is facilitated by the internet. We now have this electronically mediated form of communication with other people that does not impose any barriers on the most base instincts people have.

    If you think about it, when I was young, say in the 1960s, if you wanted to openly insult people on a large scale, how would you do it? You would go to a bar and yell at somebody, but that would be the limit of the reach of what you could say. Now you can speak to millions of people at the same time, and you are going to get more people engaged if you say something insulting or gross.

    There has also been an element of fear that has induced many sensible Republicans to toe the line with respect to Trump, because he has this fanatical base that he can threaten people with. That will be interesting now, because I do perceive that there are cracks in that front. The moment people begin to lose their fear of Trump, the whole thing could come crashing down fairly quickly.

    We have been waiting for this to happen for the last eight years, and it has not yet. But people are now realizing that he is only going to be around for at most another three years. They have to think about their future after Trump.

    Mounk: Is that a matter of Trump getting old, being term limited, or becoming unpopular? Is it a mix of those three things?

    Fukuyama: I think it is all three of those things. His health and his mental state are clearly deteriorating. He always rambled and said strange things, but it is getting worse. Yesterday or the day before, he posted on Truth Social around 160 times. Somebody compiled a list of those posts, and most of them are completely deranged. He is reposting the most bizarre conspiracy theories out there. I think of it as being a little bit like the emperor Caligula, who made his horse into a senator or consul. At a certain point, it goes to your head.

    This is a general problem with presidents and presidential systems. The whole system is designed to feed the ego of whoever is president, because in a presidential administration, everyone around you wants something from you and fears you. Even a mild-mannered president like Jimmy Carter ended up acting in uncharacteristic ways because of the power the office gives you.

    When you take somebody like Trump, who is already a narcissist and very self-preoccupied, and give him that kind of power, along with the narrative that he was persecuted and then proved everyone wrong by getting re-elected, you end up with a personality that believes it can do absolutely anything. That is the behavior we have been seeing. At a certain point, that fear is going to erode, and we are already seeing some signs of that.

    Mounk: If, in 2026, Democrats do take back the House of Representatives and perhaps have a strong showing in the Senate, that will accelerate that process. That is one of the big things to watch in the coming year.

    If your thesis is that the administration is getting stuck at the moment, there are two ways of projecting that into the future. One is that it has run out of energy. It had a set of agenda points it wanted to put in place at the beginning. It had a theory about how to transform the United States. Through a mix of the limits of that program, incompetence, and some pushback from other branches of government, including the judiciary, which I think has been more consequential than some people have portrayed, it has gotten stuck.

    The result could be a kind of flailing about for the next three years. The other way of thinking about it is that, as the administration realizes it is stuck, it becomes more desperate to get unstuck. Trump is clearly someone who is always hyperactive. He is not someone who fades quietly. There are presidents who get stuck in a second term, run out of time, look ahead to their presidential library, and accept that they are fading away. It is very hard to imagine that trajectory for Trump.

    It is obviously good news if the administration is getting stuck. There is also a concern that this could lead to desperation, which could make the administration even more radical than it has been in its first year.

    How do you think this dynamic is going to play out? We are recording a 2025 year in review. Trump took office on January 20, 2025. We are less than a quarter of the way through this term, with a little over three years left. I do not want you to be too cheerful at the end of the year, but how is this going to play out? What are they going to do to get the cart out of the mud?

    Fukuyama: One immediate fear is the coming midterm election in November 2026. By intention, Trump and his fellow Republicans would be perfectly happy to try to manipulate that election the way they tried in previous ones. It is going to be hard for them to do that because midterm elections are handled by states and municipalities, lower levels of government. The federal government, fortunately, does not have a major role in administering elections.

    It will also be difficult if the polls are right about the size of the potential blue wave next November. It is one thing to manipulate an election that is off by two or three points, as in many previous elections. If the Democratic challenger is ahead by ten points, that becomes much harder. At that stage, you are stuck with the citizens’ choice.

    If escalation were to happen beyond that point, it would require actions such as calling in ICE or the military to prevent an opponent from taking power. That is the point at which, without wanting to sound overly Pollyannaish, it is hard to imagine that if Trump tried to use one of these power agencies to overturn election results, they would simply salute and obey.

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    That concern sits in the background of discussions about going after Mark Kelly and other national security Democrats who advise soldiers not to obey unlawful orders. Trump is likely anticipating that he may issue unlawful orders and wants to ensure personal loyalty.

    This ultimately comes down to a question we do not know the answer to: how would they react? One particularly worrisome area is ICE. It now has a budget larger than the FBI and larger than any other domestic law enforcement agency. It is recruiting very rapidly, and the people willing to join ICE at this point are likely to be strong Trump supporters.

    It is possible that by next November he will have a coercive instrument that is personally loyal to him, which creates some frightening possibilities for how it could be used. Still, it is hard to believe that this would not be a bridge too far, even for him, to use what would amount to military force to stay in power. What do you think?

    Mounk: Frank, you asked me a question that I want to respond to, but I am going to respond with another question. I think the assessment depends on the answer to the following issue.

    There is one way of understanding what has happened over the last nine months that would make us relatively optimistic about the robustness of American institutions. This is a government that is breaking norms and rules, doing real damage, engaging in corruption, and committing serious abuses. Yet it does not seem close to concentrating power in a way that makes it impossible to report on the administration or criticize it. There is no media subjugation. The New York Times is not praising Donald Trump every day.

    As you noted, there are concerns about local-level interference in the midterm elections. Still, I agree that it seems unlikely they could prevent a Democratic majority from taking seats in the House if Democrats win. The question then becomes why this is the case.

    Is it because American institutions are undergoing an extraordinary stress test and, imperfectly and at great moral cost, are actually holding? Are they stopping Trump from concentrating power in the way Erdoğan has done in Turkey?

    Or is it because the Trump administration is less competent than it initially appeared? Does it have less of a plan than it seemed in the first months? Is Trump too focused on personal revenge, too distracted, too consumed by posting rants on Truth Social? In that case, despite the extreme norm-breaking, we are not seeing a true stress test.

    How are you reading this? How much confidence should we take from the apparent resilience of the system so far? To what extent is this simply good luck that, alongside his contempt for democratic norms, Trump is distractible, irascible, and more focused on personal advancement and corruption than on a systematic effort to dismantle the checks on his power?

    Fukuyama: Both of those things can be true at the same time. It could be that he is not as competent at dismantling democracy as he could be, and that there is also much more resistance than he anticipated. I am fairly confident that American institutions are going to survive the next year and that Democrats are likely to win the House. If that happens, Trump’s power will be significantly diminished.

    The reason I say this is that a more coercive scenario, in which election results are ignored and force is used to maintain power, does not seem to be actively discussed by insiders. Republican loyalists and Trump loyalists are scrambling to decide what they will do once Democrats take over the House. They are not talking about going to Trump and telling him to call out ICE to prevent Democrats from taking their seats. Nobody is speaking that way.

    I take that as a sign that people still respect basic democratic institutions. If voters clearly say they do not want this administration, there is a widespread assumption that power will have to be handed over. To plot a much more dangerous takeover would require a level of planning and coordination that I do not see evidence of.

    I also think this goes beyond Trump himself. If you look at how he behaved around past elections, his efforts were always slapdash and reactive. I do not see signs that he is seriously contemplating the use of ICE or other coercive forces to overturn an election at this point.

    Mounk: But what if he did? That is the counterfactual. I agree that it does not seem likely, but in terms of our confidence that the American republic is going to survive not just Trump, but Vance or Donald Trump Jr., or whoever may come down the pipe in the next twenty years, do the last months give you more or less confidence that institutions could withstand a more systematic, cool-headed attempt to bring them down?

    Fukuyama: A lot of it has to do with the senior leadership of all the power institutions. Although Pete Hegseth has been trying to replace “woke” senior officers, I think that the socialization of the officer corps in the U.S. military is actually pretty thorough. They are going to have to purge a lot more people if they are going to find generals who would be willing to order their troops to support a totally illegal and unconstitutional seizure of power.

    I think that even within the power institutions, it is divided. Governors theoretically control the National Guard. Police forces are completely separate. ICE is a new organization. Can they actually be used as the tip of the spear to take over the U.S. government? I do not know. That seems like a pretty difficult scenario to imagine, given that there are a lot of other organized groups with guns that might resist that.

    I am not sure that anybody wants to walk down a path where you are fighting one of these organizations against the other.

    Mounk: I think there is a lot of very loose talk about civil war. Certainly, on some of the definitions of civil war that are current in political science at the moment, you can imaginably get to a civil war in the United States, but that is because they have defined a civil war down to about a hundred people who die from political violence over the course of a year in the United States.

    We probably already have a few dozen a year in various ways, including assassinations and people who die in protests and other things. Might you get across the hundred line? Yes, that is absolutely imaginable.

    To get to anything that a lay person would actually recognize as a civil war, you would have to have different strands of the administration of the American state squaring off against each other because of different interpretations about who is in charge or whether they should obey an unlawful order. I do not think that is completely unimaginable, but I think we are quite far away from that.

    Fukuyama: We have also had some examples where he sent National Guard troops from other states, from red states into blue cities. When we were imagining what a conflict would look like, it would be something like that, where the local authorities would resist these federal incursions.

    They have been pretty cautious. They have done terrible things like arresting U.S. citizens and so forth, but they have not really pushed things to a real confrontation where the potential for that existed. Again, it gives you a little bit of hope that when push comes to shove, it is really not going to lead to violence.

    Mounk: I have to say that nowadays, one is not always impressed when dealing with various agencies of the American state. But every time that I have dealt with senior military officers or been invited to institutions like the Naval Academy, I have seen deeply serious people and deeply serious institutions. I think that this is a great asset that the United States retains.

    We have not quite dealt with or covered the judicial element here. There are very different interpretations about whether the Supreme Court is doing Donald Trump’s bidding, which is the most extreme interpretation, whether it is trying to sidestep the biggest conflicts in order to avoid incurring Trump’s wrath, or whether there are more optimistic interpretations according to which it has a conservative majority that roughly reflects what the Federalist Society would have wanted in 2013 or 2014, before Donald Trump entered politics. Under that view, it really is a constitutionalist force that is going to rein in straightforward abuses of power and extreme abuses of power by Trump. Where do you fall along that interpretive spectrum?

    One of the ways in which a Trump administration might try to get unstuck is by starting to ignore judicial rulings in a more extreme way than it has so far. This year, there were various points when a judge said that you cannot deport this person, and the administration said, they are already on the plane. We did not get there in time. Some of that was not sincere. Sometimes they did want to flout those rulings to some extent. But so far, they have not simply said, in response to a major ruling about what they have to do going forward, we are just going to ignore the Supreme Court. How many troops do you have?

    That is a dog that has not barked yet. Might that dog bark in the next three years? How do you see the balance between the executive and the judicial branches going forward over that period?

    Fukuyama: Well, the lower levels of the federal judiciary have been very good, I think. They have actually pushed back against some of the patently illegal things that Trump has tried to do through executive order. So the big question is really the Supreme Court. I would say by the time we all come back from Christmas break, we are going to know there are three really big cases that are in front of the Supreme Court right now where there is probably going to be a decision.

    Not waiting until the end of the term in June, but within the next few weeks. So one is the 14th Amendment birthright citizenship case. The second is a tariffs case. The third is the overturning of Humphrey’s Executor. My prediction right now is that Trump is actually going to lose on both the tariffs and the 14th Amendment cases, and he will probably win and succeed on the Humphrey’s Executor one.

    Mounk: Which is roughly consonant with the Federalist Society theory of the case? The Federalist Society before Trump entered politics would likely have been in favor of overturning something like Humphrey’s Executor, but not have suggested the other two points.

    Fukuyama: That is right. You can see this. The Wall Street Journal has been very critical of birthright citizenship and the tariffs, certainly, but actually are all in favor of overturning Humphrey’s Executor, and they kind of represent traditional conservative republicanism. I think that based on the oral arguments before the court on the tariffs, it is a real uphill struggle to defend the current policy. I think that the 14th Amendment one is just so contrary to the obvious text of the Constitution. That one revolves around this one little phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”

    The 14th Amendment says that all persons born and naturalized in the territory of the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States. The conservatives are trying to overturn this on that little phrase, that somehow immigrants, illegal immigrants, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. First of all, if you are an originalist, this is a completely fraudulent argument because what that is referring to is actually Native Americans, because at the time that the 14th Amendment was passed, you still had Indian tribes that were regarded as sovereign nations.

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    I think what that phrase is referring to is the fact that they are still sovereign and we are going to respect that they do not simply come under the jurisdiction of the United States because they have their own sovereignty. It is also just not the case that illegal immigrants are not subject to the laws of the United States. They may be evading those laws, but they are certainly subject to them.

    I really do not see grounds for seriously overturning the 14th Amendment. Then the political question becomes: if Trump suffers these two major setbacks, what is he going to do ? I am not sure he can do much of anything except flail around. Certainly with the tariffs, he will try to find other legal authorities to keep them in place. But it is going to be really messy. There are going to be all these lawsuits trying to get back the tariff money that companies had to surrender to the government. It does not look good for him if that were to happen.

    Mounk: When you look around the world, the picture of the United States is in a sense mixed, which is to say that it has really been a very, very bad year for the United States, but you can also see perhaps Trump’s time in the limelight beginning to end.

    It is not that hard to imagine Democrats winning in 2028, though of course the Democratic Party has its own deep challenges of unpopularity which remain. You look around the West more broadly and it just becomes extremely obvious that this political moment is not over. We thought that Poland might have turned a corner in recent elections, and then the presidential elections went for the representative of a Law and Justice right-wing populist party.

    You see Giorgia Meloni quite firmly in office in Italy, even though at least in foreign policy she has proven to be more moderate than might have been expected. Most importantly, you see in polls Nigel Farage’s Reform leading in Britain, Jordan Bardella or Marine Le Pen, depending on who will run, which turns on a court ruling, leading quite clearly in presidential polls in France.

    The Alternative for Germany is the number one party in national opinion polls. That does not mean that it would be likely to rule those federal elections, which are quite a while away in any case, because it is a system of proportional representation and they are not anywhere close to an absolute majority. They may very well enter government in the first state parliaments in East Germany and may even get an absolute majority in one of them.

    Clearly, whatever this moment is, it is not over. Whatever is driving the rise of these populist parties is continuing. The phenomenal weakness of the moderates on the center left or on the center right is continuing to deepen.

    I do think that that should give us an expectation for the United States that, in conjunction with what is happening in Britain, France, and Germany, and what you have seen in Poland with a quick backlash to a more moderate government, I very easily can imagine Democrats winning in 2028 because the Trump administration is going off the rails and is way outside the cultural mainstream of the United States.

    Trump is now quite unpopular and it is not clear that he has a successor who has his charisma and all of that. It is not hard to imagine a Democrat winning in 2028, a Democrat winning in 2032 and 2036, even if Republicans run very extreme candidates. Democrats actually building the broad political majority that will be required to last and move beyond this moment is much harder to imagine given the international context. How do you assess this overall moment for democracy outside of the United States, or beyond the United States?

    Fukuyama: Well, those are two separate questions which we should discuss in turn. I think that the danger in Europe is clear, but there is also a danger that if you catastrophize too much, you get discouraged and think that you cannot really fight back. I think there are plenty of ways of fighting back. One of the most important things about Europe is actually the fact that they have got proportional representation.

    That leads to none of these populist parties actually getting a majority in their legislatures. At that point, even if they do better in the coming elections, the other parties have two choices. They can actually form a coalition or they can form a cordon sanitaire. That is what the Austrian parties are doing right now to keep the Freedom Party out of power.

    Either way, I think that reduces the threat from these populist parties. Going into a coalition with them may be the better of the two strategies because, generally speaking, this happened both with Geert Wilders’ party in the Netherlands and with the Danish People’s Party. They were part of coalitions, and they had to govern, and they had to actually make compromises.

    They could not pose as these radical outsiders that were going to change everything. People just lost interest in them. I think that there are ways of dealing with them. There are also things that we do not know, like Jordan Bardella in France. From a lot of his behavior, it seems like, at the moment at least, he is much closer to Giorgia Meloni than to Viktor Orbán.

    He has been meeting with business leaders, and I think that the French people themselves are not willing to give up on the EU and turn hard against it the way the Hungarians have. They have got a presidential system. They have got a winner-take-all system, even though it is a two-round system. There is going to be one president of France, but I am not convinced that if it is him, it is necessarily going to be such a disastrous outcome.

    Again, all these things are interdependent. By the time these European elections happen, if Trump really looks like he is on his way out, that is also going to affect them and make the populist parties not seem like an inevitable wave that is going to hit everybody, but rather like a shot that was taken and just missed the target.

    Mounk: I agree with much of what you said, just to play devil’s advocate on two points. The first is that neither Britain nor France really have a proportional representation system. In Britain, you are right that Nigel Farage is far from having 50% of the vote in opinion polls. But if the polls do not change from what they are at the moment, he probably would have a clear majority of his own in Parliament.

    Obviously in France, as you pointed out, it is a runoff presidential system. Bardella is very likely to be in the second round of the election, and he is leading in most matchups, certainly against any left-leaning candidate. Against some center, center-right candidates like Édouard Philippe, it looks around 50–50, and that is a little bit harder to call. But that is actually extraordinary.

    Even against those center-right or center-centrist candidates, he really is leading. When you match him up against somebody like Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the far-left candidate, Mélenchon may very well get through to the second round because he has a big personal following, even though he is very unpopular among the French electorate as a whole. Bardella may win by 75% or more. It would be the inverse of that famous election in 2002, where Jacques Chirac was running for a second term in office against Jean-Marie Le Pen, when 80% of French people voted for the center-right, moderate candidate.

    This time around, it may be the far-right candidate, the inheritor of Le Pen’s movement, that may win a supermajority in that election if it really ends up being a matchup against Mélenchon. Then what does that do to where Europe stands?

    I agree with you that Farage and Bardella are probably more moderate figures than Trump in a number of ways. It is certainly true. Farage was an enemy of the European Union and one of the reasons why Britain left the European Union. Bardella is not saying that he wants to leave the European Union. I have heard, though, that he has said in private conversations to people that he is going to go to Frankfurt, to the European Central Bank, as one of his first acts in office and say either you are buying our debt and helping us out of our budgetary crisis or everything is going to blow up, and France is too big to fail.

    There is certainly, I do not think he wants to leave the EU, but I think he wants to make demands of the EU that are going to be very hard for Germany and the Netherlands and other countries to swallow, in a way that would lead to a significant political crisis in the EU.

    The final point I want to make is that if you can take populist parties in as a junior coalition partner, that seems to have been a good strategy in certain circumstances. That has happened in the Netherlands and some other countries where they ultimately were forced into taking decisions and having responsibility for government. They were unable to deliver on all of their aspirations, and that led to them bleeding support.

    However, in many of these countries, it is now going to be a question of whether the center-right party wants to be the junior coalition partner that puts them into the prime minister’s chair, that puts them into the president’s seat, that is going to make them take power altogether. That seems to me like a much harder calculation.

    Fukuyama: Although even having a junior coalition partner is still going to force you to back off of certain extreme positions. Look, I am not looking forward to Europe’s future, particularly the lack of really inspiring leaders. Keir Starmer has been one of the worst. Everybody breathes a big sigh of relief when he was elected after all these crazy people that conservatives were putting up, but he has just been so uninspiring.

    Mounk: Starmer, I think, is a genuine warning for the Democrats in the United States. Starmer won a big electoral victory, a relatively narrow one in terms of popular vote, but with a huge parliamentary majority, a very successful election. He won it because people were sick of a Conservative Party that had ruled poorly, that had gotten more extreme in various ways, even though Rishi Sunak, the last Conservative prime minister, was a relative moderate.

    They were relieved that the Labour Party was run by somebody more moderate than Jeremy Corbyn and others, and that was enough to get him elected. Once you are in office, people do not judge you by the alternatives they have evaded in the past. They judge you by whether you have a programme and whether you have a vision. Keir Starmer does not have that. That is a big difference to the Third Way, which had flaws of its own.

    Back when Bill Clinton was elected in the United States and when Tony Blair was elected in Britain, they did actually have a program. Part of that was a program of cultural renewal, which felt real at the time. The whole moment of Cool Britannia, not Rule Britannia, but Cool Britannia, the more modern, exciting Britain.

    I remember when Gerhard Schröder was elected in Germany, not somebody who ended up having a distinguished chancellorship and certainly not somebody who ended up having a distinguished post-chancellorship as a stooge of Vladimir Putin’s. I was 16 years old. I had been ruled all of my life by Helmut Kohl. Schröder signified this kind of cultural liberation, this moving on from this dodgy Germany of the 1980s and early 1990s. There was a moment of excitement.

    Starmer did not have any of that. When you lack all of that and all you are is I am not Boris Johnson and I am not Jeremy Corbyn, then very quickly you are going to be judged very negatively. Are we meeting the moment intellectually? Do we need to renew the liberal tradition in order to get out of this moment? Do we need to renew what it is like for people committed to liberal democracy to make a real offer to voters?

    Do we need to throw the kind of assumptions that I was raised with as somebody who came of age politically in the early 2000s overboard in a much more radical way in order to start from scratch? Or do you think we have the intellectual building blocks of what a world after Donald Trump and Nigel Farage looks like, and we just need to get politicians to buy into it and build on it? How lost are we intellectually, do you think?

    Fukuyama: Well, I do not know the answer to that. I do think there is a way forward for liberals. As you know, I have been very much a fan of this abundance agenda, but it has to do really with state power and executive authority. So one thing that Trump has done that is going to outlast him is that he has changed the nature of executive authority.

    I think that one of the reasons that you get these strongman populist leaders appealing to people is that existing liberal governments are just stuck. They cannot do stuff. They have accumulated way too many rules and constraints and so forth. It shows up in a lot of ways. The shoot-him-in-the-legs instinct comes from police forces that are very constrained in the way they go after criminals.

    This is very much an issue in Latin America, where they really do have an out-of-control crime problem, and democratic governments following strict rule of law have simply not been able to deal with this issue. In the United States, I think it really does have to do with things like infrastructure and the ability to do public projects, which really are very constrained.

    We just had this example of a public toilet, one public toilet, just one toilet, one toilet seat costing $1.7 million and taking years to construct. I think that, as Mark Dunkelman has argued, we have gone through these phases, either Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian. The Hamiltonians want to use state power effectively to do things in the common interest, and the Jeffersonians are extremely suspicious of concentrated state power and therefore want to spread it out as far as they can.

    Really since the 1960s, we have been in a very Jeffersonian moment where power is really pushed down to civil society, to localities. Here in California, a lot of cities have been able to block really important statewide and, in fact, nationally important projects because of that shift in the balance of power. So I think that what abundance signifies is a recognition that state power, democratically legitimated and staying within the boundaries of the rule of law, can actually be used for good purposes.

    We have had a couple of generations of young Americans who do not believe that it is possible, that the enemy is the government. There they join hands with traditional conservatives that never liked the government. So I think that any vision for reviving liberalism has to be built around a different conception of the state, that a democratically legitimated state can actually do things. It needs to be freed to do things in many different domains, not simply building things, but also dealing with a lot of problems that just seem beyond the capacity of contemporary government.

    That is my general feeling about it. It is not a departure from liberalism, because liberal societies used to be able to do this. I keep using this example, but in the early 1930s the United States built the Golden Gate Bridge and the Tennessee Valley Authority. All of these things happened within the space of three or four years. That was kind of peak Hamiltonianism, when the Roosevelt administration used the government to do a lot of progressive things. I think that is a vision that we could and really need to return to.

    Mounk: To what extent is the problem that liberalism with a capital L, or just democratic norms, are often being invoked to justify things that are deeply inefficient and unjustifiable in ways that are not exactly right? It is not that liberalism or democratic norms require those things. One example of this is that there is so much process around getting anything built.

    Supposedly this is because of the rule of law, and because of liberalism and individual rights. But it is really because of a set of legal procedures, administrative procedures, and environmental laws that we have chosen. We absolutely had the rule of law in periods of American history where you could build a railway, and in fact a railway is good for the environment. It is not required by that.

    Another area of this relates to immigration. When you look at Europe, a lot of very basic abilities to close the border and deport people are being undercut by extremely generous interpretations of a European charter of human rights and other doctrines by European judges. You are effectively forcing a lot of people to choose between whether they want to respect the rule of law or whether they want to have some sense that their politicians are able to do something about borders.

    You frame the question that way, where people say they care more about limiting immigration than they care about democracy, and you end up with a huge problem. The third area of this is public safety. There you have comparative differences. Europe has more of a welfare state and, in general, lower levels of crime than the United States.

    But also in a European supermarket, if you go in and steal a bunch of stuff, there is going to be a security guard who will tackle you and detain you until the police arrive. You are probably not going to go to jail for very long because European laws are not particularly punitive, but they will stop you from doing this.

    In the United States, for reasons I have never fully understood, there is a new pharmacy in my neighborhood in New York where half of the things are locked up. This is a famous talking point. It is striking. Part of the reason is that if I went in there, picked up a bunch of things, and walked out, the security guard would not stop me because of rules they are told to follow.

    Perhaps that is because there are more guns in the United States, or insurance, or whatever the reason. But there are democracies in Europe that are able to set things up so that when a store has a security guard, the guard will actually stop you from stealing. That makes things more functional than saying you will let someone go and perhaps a police officer will later review the video footage and arrest them. Most likely that is never going to happen.

    How is it that we can diffuse this real conflict between the rule of law and democracy and our ability to get things done, a conflict that is real not for unchangeable reasons, but because we have made bad choices?

    Fukuyama: Well, I think that most of the constraints on our ability to do things are the result of bad choices and are completely unnecessary. I could entertain you for the next hour just telling you stories of ridiculous rules that make it very difficult to build things or make decisions. You are absolutely right.

    For example, in Britain, why is Nigel Farage making a comeback right now? In 2016, the British people voted narrowly, to be sure, to leave the European Union. The thing that was most upsetting to them was high levels of immigration. Despite that vote, and despite the trauma of leaving the EU, levels of immigration went up after that vote.

    I think that the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights did play a role in making it very hard. I remember David Cameron at one point, there was a Syrian terrorist in Britain who had actually committed violent offenses in Britain, and they wanted to send him back to Syria, and the European court would not let them do that. That seems to me a perfect example of there being too much rule of law.

    It is very difficult, it seems, for any modern liberal democracy to actually roll things back. They have a hard time making a trade-off between having yet more rules and procedures and goals like efficiency and effectiveness. But it has got to be done. I think that if you do not do it, you are going to be constantly subject to these strongmen who are going to say, “I am just going to ignore the rule of law completely and smash everything.” There has got to be a middle ground between those positions.

    Mounk: Another striking example of this comes from Rory Stewart, the British politician, back when he was in charge of the UK Development Agency. He was Secretary of State for International Development. He discovered that some part of the money was going through to an organization that he had reason to mistrust. I forget whether he was basically certain that it was going to support terrorist violence or whether it was a suspicion, but he thought we really should not be giving money to this organization.

    He goes through this kind of extraordinary process that he had to go through, and the extent to which he had to keep getting senior civil servants into his office and corralling them to say, have we stopped paying the money? It was because of bureaucratic procedures and hurdles and the rule of law and all kinds of things that it was virtually impossible for him to make sure the British state would stop giving money to this dangerous group.

    It is extraordinary. None of that justifies any of what Trump has been doing, but it explains why people look at something like that and say, perhaps that is what we need. I think getting that under control from within, by people who actually care about good governance and the rule of law and protecting it, is exactly the case.

    I do not want to go on too much longer, but a little bit more of an international outlook. What is the situation in Ukraine at the end of 2025? Are we going to see an end to that horrible war in 2026? Is there any chance left of seeing an end to that war, not a just end to that war, because I do not think that is realistic at all, but at least one that avoids that conflict being reignited by Russia within the next few years and gives some relatively basic security guarantees to Ukraine?

    Fukuyama: Well, I am very worried about Ukraine after four years of really horrible fighting. Anything that is on the table right now is only going to delay a Russian attempt to take over. It is quite remarkable that Putin has not given an inch. There was this recent meeting with Zelenskyy and European leaders where they were trying to modify the 28-point document to actually strengthen some of the guarantees and walk back some of the territorial concessions.

    Even if they can get Trump to support this, it is not clear to me that Putin is going to agree to any of it. I think it probably will require much more unilateral measures on the part of the Europeans. They have got to overcome the reluctance of Belgium to release the sequestered Russian money.

    Ukraine needs about $30 billion of budget support every year. The Europeans have been giving that, but they cannot do that forever. There are ways of getting around it, but European decision-making being what it is, it can be vetoed very easily by one reluctant party. Right now, I do not know exactly where that stands. They are certainly trying to get past that veto, and that of Hungary and Slovakia, but whether they will succeed is still very dicey.

    The most outrageous thing, I think, is the capitulation, the moral capitulation, involved in this idea that we are actually going to make business deals and that our major objective in this negotiation should not be the security of a democratic Ukraine, but new opportunities for joint US–Russian business ventures that the whole Trump family can get involved in. It is so repulsive and appalling. I am not really optimistic about any of that. Even if all the optimistic things I said about next year’s election come true, I do not think it is going to happen early enough to really help Ukraine much.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Frank discuss what to look out for in 2026 and whether Europe has any hope of renewal. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 6 min

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