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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
This piece was first published in Al-Jazeera and is reposted with kind permission.
Iran is living through one of the most dangerous moments in its post-revolutionary history. Nationwide protests have become sustained rather than episodic. As a new wave of unrest spread across the country, violence intensified. These events have revived a familiar question: Is Iran heading toward another 1979?
The temptation to rely on this analogy is understandable. Images of mass mobilization and rapidly recurring protests evoke memories of the final months of the Shah’s rule. Yet the comparison is ultimately misleading.
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The success of the 1979 revolution cannot be explained solely by mass mobilization. Instead, its triumph was ensured by the convergence of coordinated opposition under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and, more decisively, the ruling elites’ inability to effectively repress dissent. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had cancer, was heavily medicated, and was visibly indecisive. His leadership faltered during crises. He left the country twice amid political upheaval, first in 1953 after being challenged by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and again in January 1979 as protests spread nationwide.
Equally important, the Shah’s repressive apparatus was fragmented and socially heterogeneous. Apart from SAVAK, the Shah’s central intelligence organization, the police and gendarmerie were tasked with maintaining social order, while the Iranian army focused on territorial defense instead of political repression.
These institutions lacked systematic ideological vetting and drew personnel from diverse social and ideological backgrounds. When the Shah left the country, some segments of the police stopped their repressive tactics and cooperated with protesters to maintain public order while senior military commanders hesitated, prioritized self-preservation, and ultimately abandoned the monarchy.
The situation today is fundamentally different. Unlike the Shah, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s leadership is not marked by hesitation or indecision during crises.
Since assuming the position of supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei has overseen a profound transformation of the Islamic Republic into what I describe as a theocratic security state that relies more on repression than societal consent. As the supreme leader, he presides over a highly institutionalized, cohesive, ideologically committed, and deeply invested coercive apparatus. This structural reality, rather than popular sentiment alone, defines the limits of revolutionary change in Iran today.
The Islamic Republic’s coercive power is not concentrated in a single institution. Instead, it is distributed across overlapping organizations with redundant chains of command. These forces are concentrated within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij, the police, the intelligence services and the social networks attached to them.
Iran’s coercive institutions are dominated by the regime’s hardcore supporters. Their loyalty is not merely transactional. It is ideological, institutional and generational. Ideological vetting and patronage ensure that their loyalty is not only enforced but actively cultivated.
Their social mobility, economic security and sense of identity are tied to the survival of the regime and Khamenei’s leadership. For them, regime collapse is not a political transition; it is an existential threat. In moments of crisis, these loyalists act preemptively to prevent the diffusion of protest and frame unrest as foreign-backed sedition, lowering internal barriers to violence.
Consequently, even protests that are larger and more widespread geographically than those in 1979 would not fundamentally challenge the regime. Instead, they would lead to stricter repression. This highlights a key lesson: Protests by themselves do not cause revolutions.
Revolutions occur when mass unrest intersects with elite paralysis or defection. That happened in 1979, but it has not happened now.
What could alter this equilibrium is not protest alone but a direct shock to the regime’s leadership structure. External intervention, particularly by the United States, would likely aim to disrupt elite coordination by targeting senior political and security figures with strikes.
Such an approach would only generate a genuine regime crisis if it removed Khamenei himself. Power in the Islamic Republic has been heavily centralized within the office of the supreme leader and his inner circle. His sudden absence could trigger elite confrontation over succession and weaken cohesion at the top.
But intervention could also reinforce loyalist unity. If Khamenei survived, core supporters within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij and the intelligence services would almost certainly close ranks, as they have done during previous external confrontations. Under those conditions, elite defection remains unlikely.
Even in the event of regime collapse, Iran would not face the institutional vacuum seen in some post-intervention states. The country’s modern bureaucracy, which has maintained continuity since the early 20th century, would likely continue functioning in the short term. Administrative breakdown would be constrained by state capacity, social organization and national identity.
Some warn that the fall of the Islamic Republic would inevitably lead to a prolonged insurgency. That risk cannot be dismissed. However, unlike the cases of Iraq or Afghanistan, in Iran there would not be external state actors willing and able to finance, organize and sustain armed radical movements. Iranian society has also shown deep resistance to religious extremism and political radicalism. It is possible that instability following regime collapse could be contained.
The real danger, then, is not that Iran is on the verge of repeating 1979, but that persistent reliance on that analogy blinds policymakers to how the Islamic Republic functions today. Misreading the nature of power in Iran does not increase the chances of peaceful change. It increases the likelihood that Iranians themselves will bear the cost of repression, escalation and prolonged uncertainty.
Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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As the Iranian regime faces the greatest ever challenge to its authority, we are pleased to publish this piece by Roohola Ramezani, a journalist and philosopher who left the country a few days after the government imposed a total information blackout. Having witnessed firsthand the uprising taking place inside Iran, Roohola analyzes the new ideology of resistance that has seized the streets.
—The editors.
For decades, the world has viewed Iran through a series of familiar, if increasingly obsolete, lenses. From the “clash of civilizations” to the “struggle for reform” and the poignant aesthetics of “Women, Life, Freedom,” Western observers have sought a narrative that fits their own political taxonomy.
But today, as the Islamic Republic plunges the country into total digital darkness—cutting fiber optics and cellular signals alike—a new reality is hardening in the silence. The information that trickles out via Starlink and clandestine dispatches reveals a fundamental shift that many in the West find difficult to reconcile with their existing frameworks: Iranians are no longer asking for a seat at the table. They are demanding a different table entirely.
The movement that has gripped Iran since December 28 is not a plea for human rights within a theological framework, nor is it a subset of global identity politics. It is a profound, pragmatic, and increasingly radical return to secular nationalism. The protests originated in the bazaars and spread to the most conservative provinces; in doing so, they moved past the reformist nuances that have enchanted liberal Western media for 20 years. This is a movement of ideological exhaustion. Almost 50 years after an “Islamic Revolution” that has delivered only economic ruin and international pariah status, the Iranian street has embraced a blunt realism.
Central to this new political imagination is a surprising turn toward “restorationism.” Where Western commentators see a feminist uprising, the people on the ground are increasingly chanting for the return of the Pahlavi monarchy—not as a return to absolute autocracy, but as a symbolic and institutional bulwark against the perceived failure of clerical “republicanism.” What Iranians want is to cease being an extraordinary ideological project and to finally become a “normal” country.
The global embrace of the “Women, Life, Freedom” slogan following the death of Mahsa Amini and the protests of 2022 was a masterclass in Western media consumption. It provided a clean narrative: brave women burning headscarves in defiance of a bearded, medieval patriarchy. While this feminist core was—and remains—a vital catalyst of dissatisfaction with the regime, the Western focus often acted as a filter, screening out the more uncomfortable, systemic demands of the movement.
For the shopkeeper in Isfahan or the laborer in Khuzestan, the hijab is not just an oppressive piece of clothing; it is the most visible thread in a tapestry of ideological control that has strangled the national economy. To many Iranians, framing this exclusively as a “rights-based” struggle feels like a simplification. They see a Western media landscape that is eager to support Iranian women’s right to show their hair, yet remains hesitant to cover the burning of mosques or explicit calls for the total dismantling of the clerical state.
This disconnect reveals a deeper tension between Iranian aspirations and Western progressive sensibilities. The movement has moved beyond “reform”—the hope that the system can be fixed from within—to a desire to “overthrow” (barandazi) the system entirely, reclaiming the state from an entity they view as an occupying ideological force.
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of this movement for Western intellectuals to digest is the surge in monarchist sentiment. In the squares of Tehran and the streets of smaller, traditionally religious towns, the chant “this is the last battle; Pahlavi is returning” has become a staple. This reference to Reza Pahlavi—exiled son of the Western-backed Shah deposed by the 1979 Islamic revolution—is not a collective amnesia regarding that era. It is a calculated, pragmatic response to the failure of “republicanism”—a word that, in the Middle East, has become synonymous with either Islamic fundamentalism or military dictatorship.
Many Iranian intellectuals now argue that in a society where religious institutions have been deeply entrenched for centuries—and radically weaponized for the last half-century—any future republic inevitably risks collapsing back into an “Islamic Republic.” They point to the grim reality that the current theocracy already claims the title of a republic, using its mechanisms to give a veneer of popular mandate to clerical rule. The growing consensus among the opposition, therefore, is that democracy is perfectly compatible with monarchy. By pointing to stable, secular democracies like Sweden, Japan, or the United Kingdom, they argue that a constitutional monarchy can serve as a neutral institutional anchor that a fragile, newly-formed republic might lack. The throne is reimagined not as a seat of power, but as a secular shield—a protective shell ensuring that the national interest takes precedence over sectarian interest.
This movement does not align with the political “right” as this term is understood in the West. Rather, it claims that in the specific context of Iran, liberal ends—human rights, individual autonomy, and the rule of law—can only be secured through what Westerners might call the “conservative” means of constitutional monarchy.
Consequently, Pahlavi has emerged as the focal point for this aspiration—not necessarily as a king in the traditional sense, but as a symbol of a “normal,” secular, pro-Western country. His supporters view him as the only figure capable of uniting disparate groups and managing a transition that avoids the chaos of a power vacuum.
For decades, Western diplomacy has been predicated on the idea that the Iranian people are caught between “hardliners” and “reformists.” Today, that binary is dead. The current movement is characterized by a visceral, almost existential rejection of the clerical establishment as a whole.
The sense of betrayal has been fueled by recent revelations about the national budget, showing massive increases for unproductive religious institutions and ideological propaganda machines even as the country faces a staggering deficit. Iranians see their national wealth being cannibalized to fund a “theological vanity project” that has no interest in the welfare of the citizenry.
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This “New Iranism” places the movement in direct friction with the international progressive movement. The increasingly prominent slogan “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, my life only for Iran” is the phrase that’s perhaps the most misunderstood. To Western leftists, this sounds like parochialism or even heartless isolationism. To an Iranian, it is a cry of anti-colonial resistance against their own government. The Iranian street has increasingly come to view the Palestinian cause—to which the Iranian regime has dedicated massive resources—as a black hole into which their life savings, infrastructure, and international standing are disappearing.
This is why, during last year’s twelve-day war between the Islamic Republic and Israel, many Iranians openly celebrated strikes against regime infrastructure, viewing foreign military pressure as a potential catalyst for liberation. This is not “pro-war” sentiment in the traditional sense; it is the desperation of a captive population.
Likewise, a widely-held view among the protesters today is that the current regime structure is fundamentally incapable of economic reform because its very survival depends on an anti-Western, anti-American ideology that necessitates isolation. This realization has led to a controversial shift in the Iranian political imagination: a growing openness to external pressure. When segments of the Iranian intelligentsia, including liberals and former leftists, sign letters to Western leaders asking for “maximum pressure” and “targeted strikes,” they are not abandoning their country’s sovereignty. They are articulating a belief that the internal mechanism for change has been so thoroughly crushed by digital blackouts and paramilitary violence that only an external shock can break the stalemate.
Iranians want neither a better version of the Islamic Republic nor a utopian revolution. They want the extraordinary era of Iranian history to end. They want to return to being a normal nation state that prioritizes its borders over ideological “frontiers,” its citizens over “martyrs,” and its future over seventh-century grievances.
A fierce, secular realism is emerging. The protest movement is redefining Iranian identity not through the lens of a “Global South” struggle against the West, but as a struggle to rejoin the West’s political and economic orbit. It’s a movement that does not fit neatly into the categories of anti-imperialism or identity politics; but it is, nevertheless, perhaps the most authentic democratic project of our time.
Roohola Ramezani is an Iranian journalist and writer with a PhD in philosophy. He writes on ideology, political discourses, and Middle Eastern politics.
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Given the nature of my work, I’m in coalitions—and a lot of conversations—focused on fortifying American democracy. And like everyone, the promises and threats associated with the rapid advancement of AI technology are top of mind for me.
When it comes to scientific discovery, optimism abounds. The promise that AI tools like AlphaFold will accelerate biomedical discovery—from new antibiotics to deeper insights into the proteins driving Alzheimer’s and cancer—sparks excitement. But there’s also a pessimism that lingers in these conversations, especially when it comes to what the future holds for workers who are not at the frontiers of science. If you write code or oversee routine managerial processes, the thinking goes, your days of productive employment are numbered. And a jobless citizenry does not bode well for democracy.
Nobel Laureate Daron Acemoğlu warns that much of today’s AI innovation is too focused on automation for its own sake, a technological path that dampens labor demand, suppresses wages, and channels the gains of innovation upward rather than outward. That path could undermine the economic foundations on which liberal democracy historically rests: broad-based prosperity, widespread opportunity for productive contribution, and a sense among citizens that they have a stake in democracy’s future.
A healthy democracy, my friends correctly observe, requires not only rights and representation, but the civic capacities that come from meaningful participation in economic life. If AI drains that sense of contribution by automating away broad swaths of work, the polity loses its civic umph: the strength and independence a self-governing people needs to hold democratic institutions accountable. Another Nobel Laureate, Geoffrey Hinton, observes that an economically irrelevant citizenry becomes increasingly invisible to democratic institutions, accelerating government capture by politically-favored tech giants.
The vibe in these conversations, in other words, is not technophobic reaction. It’s a more nuanced concern that concentrated technological power and widespread economic displacement comprise a mutually reinforcing threat to democracy.
These concerns have led many pro-democracy voices to call for sweeping regulatory and policy fixes, like taxing and restricting the development of labor-saving AI, or, alternatively, allowing AI to develop, but redirecting profits to a sovereign wealth fund to support permanently displaced workers in the jobless economy of the future.
In these conversations, the fear beneath the fear is that human potential has hit its outer bounds, and that from here on out, technology will always surpass human effort in both quality and cost. From that vantage point, sweeping, top-down remedies seem like the obvious course.
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To my economist’s ear, some aspects of this narrative ring true. Basic economic theory predicts that, for a given level of quality, producers will replace high-cost inputs and processes, including those that involve human effort, with lower-cost alternatives. Such substitution effects are part of the entrepreneurial function.
But the other part of the entrepreneurial function is to search for complementarities: new configurations of resources, human and otherwise, that generate new streams of value. It’s this part of the story that, more often than not, goes missing in democracy-focused conversations about AI.
That missing piece is critical if we are to understand not only the processes that will shape our economic future, but our lives as democratic citizens.
Throughout the history of the modern world, every new wave of material progress has been a story of complements far more than a story of substitutes. James Watt’s improvements to the steam engine, for example, began as a substitution story. His design replaced the less efficient Newcomen engine used to pump water from coal mines. It also displaced entire mining crews who tended older engines and made up for their inefficiencies. But the moment Watt’s steady, high-torque design proved reliable, it set off a cascade of discoveries in how physical and human capital could be recombined. Mines dug deeper, textile mills moved off riverbanks, ironworks scaled in ways no waterwheel could support, and, soon after, steamships and then railroads reconfigured the patterns of economic life. What began as a cost-saving substitution rapidly became a platform for entirely new kinds of human contribution: new skills, new industries, new forms of organization.
And it wasn’t just the industrial landscape that changed. Steam-powered textile mills offered many women their first opportunity for waged employment, growing bank accounts, and a measure of independence that coverture—the legal doctrine that subsumed a woman’s legal rights and property under her husband—had long denied. As economist Jayme Lemke observes, those gains rippled outward. Western territories eager to attract workers and investment expanded married women’s property and contract rights. Steam-powered railroads provided the affordable means to seize those opportunities, setting in motion reforms that ultimately broadened women’s democratic standing.
But complementarities emerge only through a decentralized process of experimentation, as countless individuals and firms test new ways of combining tools, skills, and ideas. These new configurations can’t be anticipated in advance because their development is not primarily an engineering problem—it’s a discovery problem. It takes the market process itself to reveal which new configurations will thrive.
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Just as importantly, we rarely see the future beneficiaries of those new arrangements at the moment when the disruptive effects of substitution are most visible. The first power looms did not announce that young women would soon earn wages of their own and springboard a process of emancipatory change. As with new patterns of economic life, new patterns of democratic life had to be discovered.
When I raise historical examples of how material and social progress has unfolded, many colleagues in the pro-democracy community respond, drawing on thinkers like Geoffrey Hinton and UC Berkeley’s Stuart Russell, that today’s frontier AI represents a genuinely new category of technological change. Earlier waves of innovation, from the steam engine to electrification to the rise of computing, automated narrow domains of human effort but always left some sphere of distinctly human advantage intact. Steam and electricity displaced muscle power; computers handled rote cognitive tasks; but humans still retained a clear upper hand in higher-order reasoning, judgment, and creative problem-solving.
By contrast, they argue, artificial general intelligence appears poised to outperform humans across the full cognitive spectrum, including in domains previously assumed to be uniquely ours. If machines surpass us not only physically but intellectually, it’s unclear what special arena of relevance or productive contribution remains for people. And because these capabilities appear to be advancing at unprecedented speed, the worry is not merely sector-specific disruption, but the possibility of labor displacement on a society-wide scale, arriving all at once rather than over generations.
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But this narrative misses a crucial piece of the plot. Even in a world where every task we can name has been taken on by more capable machines, human beings will want and imagine a still better set of circumstances. This is not a moral failing. It’s a feature of the human condition. At every stage of human development, even when we’ve achieved previously-unimaginable material abundance, the first thing we do is identify (in ourselves and others) further unmet needs—some base and petty, others higher order—that we just simply didn’t see before, because fulfilling them was beyond the horizon of possibility.
And here again, complementarity reenters the story. The moment that we recognize that something could be better, a sort of restlessness sets in, and the mind seeks out new combinations of tools, capabilities, and know-how that might make it so.
Yes, agentic AI may eventually perform many tasks we once considered uniquely human. But it cannot extinguish the human impulse to perceive what is missing and the mental work that spontaneously imagines how things might be otherwise. That impulse is what keeps humans perpetually intertwined with the value-creation loop. And it is how humans remain active contributors to progress, a mode of agency that underwrites not only economic renewal but the independence and initiative that democratic life requires.
And if all this still feels abstract, consider two ways the complementarity dynamic is already unfolding around us. First, look at the care economy. The United States faces critical shortages in childcare, eldercare, hospice work, and disability services—sectors where the work is rooted not in narrow tasks, but in empathy, trust, and the relational texture of daily life. Early evidence suggests that AI tools are reducing administrative burdens, improving scheduling, aiding communication, and helping caregivers tailor support to individual needs. As those tools lower costs and expand effective capacity, demand for human-centered care grows rather than shrinks.
Second, if you are one of the 63 percent of American adults who uses AI regularly, look at your own experience. Since these tools entered daily life, how many new needs have you noticed, little frictions you want smoothed, small creative ideas you want executed, gaps in your workflow you now see clearly? And how many times have you reached for an AI system, not to replace what you were doing, but to get started faster, to explore an idea, to shape something half-formed in your mind? You did not need to be a tech entrepreneur to do this. The moment a new tool appears, the human mind begins searching for ways to recombine it with what it already knows. That instinct that has us restlessly, creatively, and stubbornly pursuing new ways to satisfy unmet need is the starting point of every new complementarity.
If we treat the future as a closed system with no room for human agency to discover new needs and new configurations of resources to meet them, we will construct policy remedies that make it so, dampening the human impulse that drives discovery. In the name of protecting democracy, we could undermine the generative capacities on which democratic vitality depends.
The question before us is therefore not simply how to manage the risks of AI, but how to preserve and expand the domain in which human beings can act, imagine, and recombine the tools at hand. A society that sees only substitution will prepare for humanity’s retreat; a society that recognizes complementarity will bet on humanity’s potential. The danger is not that AI will make humans irrelevant. The danger is that we might build a political and economic order that expects us to be.
Emily Chamlee-Wright is the president and CEO of the Institute for Humane Studies.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
Eleven months ago, I wrote an article trying to capture the shock and disappointment Ukrainians felt in February 2025 after a sharp shift in U.S. policy. How have these eleven months unfolded for us, and how do we in Ukraine see the situation today?
This is not an article about Ukrainian gratitude or Ukrainian resentment. It is about why the current approach is not bringing peace—and why deeper cooperation with Ukraine directly serves American interests, including the security of U.S. allies, global trust in American leadership, and the deterrence of nuclear blackmail.
For the past year, Ukraine has been under fire, with daily heavy fighting on the front lines; regular strikes on Ukrainian cities using all types of long-range weapons, with numerous civilian casualties, including children; systematic attacks on energy infrastructure aimed at depriving Ukrainians of electricity—and, in winter, of heat as well; and continuous psychological pressure designed to force a war-weary society to capitulate. Soon it will be four years since the start of the full-scale invasion, and twelve years since the war first began with the invasion of Crimea.
Throughout 2025, the U.S. administration, led by President Donald Trump, pursued persistent peace efforts. At first, it appeared to Washington that organizing peace talks and reaching an agreement would not be difficult; relatively short timelines were discussed. Over time, those timelines stretched—and eventually disappeared from public discussion altogether. Eleven months of effort now appear to have produced no result. How could this happen? Why did such sustained efforts, backed by the immense authority and political weight of the United States, fail to deliver?
I can offer a perspective from Kyiv—one shaped by the fact that we live next to Russia, spent a long time within a single state, and know our neighbor’s history and political culture well.
In my view, there are several systemic blind spots that make it difficult for the United States to see a viable path toward peace for Ukraine, and at the same time toward strengthening American credibility and the international order.
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The causes of the war
Moscow is not fighting for territory. Russia already has vast territories of its own—many of them underdeveloped and neglected. Moscow is fighting to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation, because without Ukraine, Russia cannot be an empire, as former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeziński argued decades ago. These motives and goals have been stated repeatedly by Vladimir Putin and his closest associates.
Russia’s attitude toward the United States
Some in Washington believe Russia could be a U.S. partner. Indeed, “resetting” relations with Russia has been an objective of multiple administrations, both Democratic and Republican. Yet the Kremlin openly declares its goal of revising the outcome of the Cold War—a war it lost to the United States. In Russian thinking, the United States is a strategic adversary, and Russia seeks revenge for that defeat.
The military situation
Some within the Trump administration appear to believe that the Russian army is steadily winning and that Ukraine “has no cards.” If that were the case, why has Russia failed to capture a single major Ukrainian city? The reality is that after two years of continuous mass assaults, Russia has seized less than 1.5 percent of Ukrainian territory—despite the full mobilization of its resources. At current rates of advance, it would take many years for Russia to occupy the territories from which Putin demands Ukraine withdraw. Russia does not dominate at sea, in the air, or in cyberspace.
Russia’s military power
Historically, Russia has lost wars more often than it has won them. Its victory in World War II was achieved with decisive American military and industrial assistance, and through the opening of a second front involving U.S. forces. Many of Russia’s past military successes were achieved with substantial Ukrainian participation.
Russia–China relations
Detaching Russia from China appears to be a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. Belief in the feasibility of this goal may prove to be the greatest geopolitical error of the first half of the twenty-first century. A “reverse Nixon” is no longer possible. The split between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War occurred at a moment of deep hostility between them. Today, the relationship is at its closest point. Russia cannot wage this war without China’s economic and technological support; it has already become China’s junior partner.
Prospects for American businesses in Russia
U.S. investors are not lining up to exploit Russian resources. They remember the experience of large-scale nationalizations and the complete absence of meaningful property-rights protection over the last few years.
Russian political culture
Russia’s leadership, shaped by KGB service, treats distortion of reality as a primary political instrument. Negotiations are used tactically, not as a path to compromise. Fabricated claims—such as the allegation that Ukraine is ruled by Nazis—or repeated false announcements about the capture of the Ukrainian city of Kupiansk—later disproven when President Zelenskyy visited the city himself—are illustrative examples.
I am confident that there are professionals within the State Department, the U.S. Armed Forces, and the intelligence community who understand all of this. I hope these systemic illusions—some of them carefully laid traps by the Kremlin—will be taken into account as future policy decisions are made.
So let us return to how U.S. policy is perceived in Ukraine. Ukrainians are sincerely grateful to the American people and government for their continued support and peace initiatives. Presidents change in both Ukraine and the United States, but mutual goodwill and support have long been the foundation of the relationship between our countries.
At the same time, as we can see, peace initiatives have not produced results. From Kyiv, the process looks like an endless déjà vu, a closed loop: Again and again, the U.S. president proposes peace plans, and again and again the Russian dictator rejects them. When arguments run out, another fabrication appears. The American leader continues to invest effort, and the cycle begins anew. Meanwhile, Putin merely imitates negotiations—dangling promises of lucrative economic projects while omitting any mention of the absence of investor protections in Russia.
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Diplomacy and peacemaking work when all parties genuinely want peace. When one side seeks revenge for a war it lost to the United States thirty-five years ago, the possibilities of diplomacy are inherently limited.
Friends of mine in the United States ask how Ukrainians perceive the current U.S. course on Ukraine. From what I have outlined above, it should be clear why my answer is “with surprise.” But this is not about Ukrainian interests—the United States is under no obligation to prioritize them. It’s about America’s own interests.
Close cooperation with Ukraine benefits the United States for several reasons. First, Ukraine is actively weakening the anti-American axis, using its own people, with real results and without U.S. casualties. Second, Ukraine is fighting a twenty-first century war and gaining combat experience that will be invaluable to the United States—knowledge that cannot be acquired through exercises alone. Third, Ukraine provides practical proof of a conclusion that serves U.S. interests: nuclear blackmail is not an effective strategy. Fourth, Ukraine opens significant opportunities for the American defense industry and the innovative technology sector. Fifth, effective U.S. assistance to Ukraine strengthens America’s standing with allies in all regions, especially in Southeast Asia.
This list could be much longer. Supporting Ukraine is not altruism—it is a highly effective way to protect American strategic interests in a new geopolitical reality.
Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and the Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council.
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Rebecca Goldstein is a philosopher and novelist. Her latest book is The Mattering Instinct: How Our Deepest Longing Drives Us and Divides Us.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Rebecca Goldstein discuss why humans have an instinct to matter beyond mere survival, the different approaches people use to feel significant, and whether the desire to matter is a psychological flaw we should overcome or an essential part of human dignity.
We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our series on Liberal Virtues and Values.
That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.
This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I’m really looking forward to this conversation. I look forward to talking about some of the broader themes of your considerable work.
But let’s start with your latest, which is about something that I’ve been thinking a lot about. I think it’s hard to think in a systematic way, and you do in the book. It’s about the “mattering instinct.” It’s about the fact that it’s so important to most human beings to matter, to have an impact on the world in some kind of way, and how to think about that. To start with the first question, this is one of those things human beings just like to do. It’s like looking at the sea or looking into the distance, and it just is part of what human life is. So we don’t often question why that is the case. Why is it, do you think, that human beings have, not every single one, but most of us, this deep need to matter? Why aren’t we content just having a good life and having some fun? Enjoying our time on Earth, and who cares about this weird thing called mattering?
Rebecca Goldstein: The way I explain what mattering is begins with the concept itself, which is interesting, and with the fact that, at least in English, we derive it from the noun matter, the stuff of the universe.
There are interesting ideas here in the relationship between the noun and the verb. We have this capacity to step outside of ourselves and interrogate ourselves. That comes from our very large brains and from our capacity for self-reflection. It doesn’t take much self-reflection to realize that we pay a tremendous amount of attention to ourselves. We can’t help it. To pursue our lives, we have to give ourselves a tremendous amount of attention. Neuroscientists call this the “default mode network,” where you’re not paying attention to anything outside, to the environment. What are you thinking about then? Yourself. You’re fantasizing about yourself and thinking about your past and your future.
There is a good reason why we do this. It goes all the way back to the supreme law of physics : the second law of thermodynamics. All living creatures have to put their own thriving and flourishing first, using their energy to push back against entropy. But because we have this capacity for self-reflection, we can step outside and say: if mattering means being deserving of attention, and if we assess how much something matters by how much attention we give it, then we must think that we are the thing that matters most in the universe. Short of lunacy, none of us think this. We realize that we are not the thing that matters most in the universe.
That realization creates a kind of unease, an existential unease, as we try to make the amount of attention we are forced to give ourselves more commensurable with how much we really matter. And so we try to matter.
Mounk: Let’s dive into this distinction between all other animals and humans. It’s obvious why animals want to eat and survive moment to moment. That’s relatively straightforward.
There’s a slightly more complicated explanation for why we tend to prioritize things that let us pass down our genes, but that still has a relatively straightforward explanation in evolutionary biology. Over many generations, every species has been selected to prioritize having offspring that are genetically related to them, because individuals who didn’t have those instincts didn’t pass on their genes and tended to die out over time. That part is straightforward.
What’s interesting about the mattering instinct that human beings tend to have is that it’s often not obvious that it gives us evolutionary advantages. I’m sure some evolutionary biologist will come up with a story about why this has evolutionary roots, but it seems much less obvious. There are many individuals who willingly participate in wars in which they’re likely to die because they think what matters to them is belonging to a nation and fighting for its grandeur. There are people who go on suicide missions because they believe it will allow their names to live on in glory as martyrs after they die.
There are all kinds of behaviors we engage in that are detrimental to our immediate, basic interests, like survival, and that probably make it less likely that we go on to have offspring. Yet some individuals are so driven by this overriding need to make a mark on the world that they engage in these behaviors anyway. That seems like a much bigger puzzle.
Goldstein: It is a big puzzle. I call it the mattering instinct, but it is not really an instinct. As you’ve pointed out, it doesn’t necessarily have adaptive value. Instead, it’s the result of two different instincts, both of which we can explain in terms of adaptive value.
One is self-mattering, which is built into every living thing. Every organism puts its own flourishing and survival before everything else. That is the organizing principle of all instincts. It’s deeper than any particular instinct.
The other is an adaptation that humans alone have developed: the ability to step outside of ourselves, to look at ourselves, and to interrogate ourselves. This grows out of what psychologists call theory of mind, our capacity to understand others, which clearly has adaptive value.
That capacity is especially important for creatures as gregarious and altricial as we are. We are altricial, meaning we are dependent on others for a very long time. Our big brains take decades to fully develop, into our early twenties. As a result, we rely on caretakers and on others for an unusually long period.
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Because of that, we develop a highly sophisticated theory of mind for understanding others. We can then turn that capacity inward, engaging in self-reflection and self-interrogation. We look at how much we matter to ourselves, at the self-mattering built into us as living systems, and we ask whether we are really deserving of that attention.
From there, we try to find ways to justify it. As you’ve noted, some people channel this longing to matter into making an impact on the world, into changing it. Steve Jobs famously said that you should live in a way that makes a dent in the universe. But there are many other ways in which the mattering instinct is addressed.
Mounk: So you have a classification of four kinds of ways. Obviously, there are some that don’t fit neatly into one category, but it’s a helpful classification of four ways in which most humans try to matter, and some people are much more attracted to one of those categories than to the others. What are those four?
Goldstein: I have to say, ever since I started thinking about this more than four decades ago, I’ve been talking to people about it. If you sit next to me on a bus, sooner or later I’m going to start talking to you about your own sense of mattering and how you try to appease it. I have yet to meet anybody who doesn’t know what I’m talking about or who doesn’t have an answer that fits, one way or another, into these four strategies. Like all empirical hypotheses, it’s open to falsification, but so far, this is what I’ve found.
So the four types are the following. There’s transcendent mattering, social mattering, heroic mattering, and competitive mattering. What I’ve found is that most people have aspects of all of these in themselves, but one tends to predominate in a given individual.
Transcendent mattering is a religious or spiritual response to the longing to matter. It involves a leap of faith in a transcendent presence who the believer believes purposefully created them. That produces a very strong sense of mattering, this transcendent or spiritual notion of mattering. It’s the idea that you were purposefully created by the greatest being that exists and that you have a role to play in the narrative of eternity. That is a very strong sense of mattering.
Mounk: I want to get into more detail about each of these buckets, and about the pros and cons of each way of trying to matter, and whether there’s an objectively best one. But before I do that, I want to ask a more basic question. Is this whole thing just a mistake?
There are philosophical traditions that try to reconcile us to our objective insignificance. Most human beings are not going to matter, certainly not in the sense that some of these categories aim for, like the total transformation of the world. But perhaps not even in the other senses. The Stoics, for example, want us to play our social roles in the world, but to be indifferent to our standing in it. We are bit players doing our part, and we shouldn’t indulge vain fantasies about how much we matter.
There are also religious traditions that teach us to let go of this individualistic urge to make a mark on the world. Some suggest that this is actually what allows us to become happier. Jonathan Rauch has been on the podcast a number of times, and in one of my favorite conversations with him we talked about his book The Happiness Curve. It shows that people are least happy in middle age. Perhaps that’s when people are most intensely trying to make a mark on the world, desperately trying to have an impact, while starting to realize it’s not going to be the impact they hoped for.
People tend to become happier again in older age, even as they develop health problems and face other difficulties. Reflecting back on that conversation, one possible reason is that this is the stage of life when people reconcile themselves to the fact that they don’t matter to the world as deeply as they imagined at twenty-five, or as they may have desperately clung to at forty-five.
So is the real advice simply to get over this strange quirk in our psychology? Or do you think that mattering, and the desire to matter, is actually a positive thing that, if approached in the right way, we should embrace and hold on to?
Goldstein: I don’t understand it as synonymous with making a mark in the world or with grandiose plans. I think it’s something much broader, and it takes in many different types of people. Not everybody wants to make a mark in the world, but everybody wants to feel that they have somehow earned the attention that they pay to themselves, and that they have to pay to themselves, and their commitment to their own life.
I’ve spoken to people who are severely depressed, and what they say is, I don’t matter. I might as well not have shown up for my existence at all. I am nothing. Nobody wants to feel like that. Most of us are not heroic strivers. That’s one way of trying to appease the longing to matter. But it might be through one’s beliefs, it might be through one’s religious beliefs, it might be through one’s social connections. There are many different ways.
To feel that there is nothing truly worthy about oneself while one is so obsessively and incessantly focused on oneself is unbearable. Even the yogi meditating on top of a mountaintop is committed to his life. He’s trying to get past his ego, and that is what I call his mattering project. It takes a tremendous amount of discipline and rigor. But it’s not going to help him in his life to find out that the next yogi on the other mountaintop has gotten past his ego. It’s our own life that we’re committed to and trying to do something with.
This can go very, very wrong, the mattering instinct. But I also think there’s something quite beautiful about it, and it actually reconciles me to my species, at a time when I often feel the need for reconciliation. We’re engaged in some pretty horrible things right now, many of them motivated by the longing to matter, which can go badly awry.
But when we talk about intrinsic human dignity, I think what we’re gesturing toward, very vaguely, is this need to justify ourselves in our own eyes. It really has to do with being able to live with ourselves, given how obsessed we are with ourselves. It’s what makes us the value-seeking creatures that we are. That can go very wrong. But the mere fact that we want to justify ourselves to ourselves is something rather good. It’s not primarily about justifying ourselves to others. That may come into play, depending on the individual, but that’s not what I mean by the mattering instinct.
Mounk: So let me try to reframe the question, amend it to a perhaps subtler hypothesis. One way of saying this is that perhaps we are consumed by this need to matter. I think this is the way in which some moral traditions put it. And we should just recognize that we don’t matter in any significant way, and that tranquility and a more sensible life plan lie in that.
Another way of putting it is that there are good and bad ways of trying to matter, ways that are well-adjusted and ways that are ill-adjusted. That’s probably true. Clearly, the person who blows themselves up because they love the idea of seeing themselves in the newspaper is ill-adjusted. The person who tries to matter by invading a neighboring country is ill-adjusted. That’s relatively straightforward.
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But does that map onto your four categories or not? Is it too simple to say that competitors are inherently trying to matter in the wrong way? That perhaps heroic strivers, of whom we probably know many, given that we’re in the intellectual world and are writers and so on, are inherently trying to accomplish something that is hugely unlikely to work out, and have gotten the wrong end of the stick?
Is it the transcenders and the socializers, the people who want to root their importance in community, in helping others, in family life, or perhaps in being connected to some larger spiritual, religious, or philosophical tradition, who really have it right? Or is that also too simple? Is it instead true that heroic striving is also good, that it’s how we’ve managed to create some of the great achievements of humanity, and that even though it often goes wrong, it’s also how we got Plato and Aristotle and John Stuart Mill and Martin Luther King, and whoever else you want to include?
So how should we think about what counts as a healthy manifestation of the mattering instinct and what counts as an unhealthy manifestation? It doesn’t feel to me as though you think we should cleanly rule out any one of these categories. But it also doesn’t feel purely descriptive. It does seem as though competitive mattering may be more likely to go wrong than transcendent or social mattering. But perhaps I’m misunderstanding that.
Goldstein: All of them can go wrong. Socializers can go wrong. Maybe I should just very quickly state what I mean by these four. All of them can go very wrong.
The transcendent is a religious or spiritual response. It holds that there is some transcendent being, whether you call it God or not, who created the laws of nature. The sense of the transcenders is that they were intentionally created and that they have a role to play in the narrative of eternity. This is a very large sense of mattering, and nothing else can compare to it. That’s not a reason to argue for it or against it.
Then there are heroic strivers. Heroic strivers have some standard of excellence in mind that they want to achieve. They’re not going after fame. I give many examples and tell a lot of stories in the book, because theory is theoretical. Heroic striving can take the form of intellectual, artistic, athletic, or ethical standards.
I tell the story of one ethical heroic striver. He was an atheist, a very strong atheist, but he was a kind of secular saint. His name was Baba Amte. He was born in India, and he truly had a heroic personality. It was never about trying to impress others. He was trying to reconcile himself to himself. He had very high standards, and he set out to conquer leprosy.
Leprosy has traditionally marked the people who mattered the least. To call somebody a leper is to say they are a complete pariah, going back to ancient times, including in the Bible. He heroically devoted himself to this cause. His story is amazing. He even infected himself with the leprosy bacillus. It turned out he had natural immunity, as most of us do. But he did extraordinary work in India.
When people would call him a saint, he would be very annoyed. For him, it was simply that he had chosen to do something truly heroic. It took an ethical form. He did a tremendous amount of good through his heroic striving. Do I wish he had been different? Of course not. So heroic striving can take many different forms, but it’s hard to be a heroic striver.
Mounk: So let’s stick with the heroic strivers for a moment. How would you gloss this? What do you think is a well-adjusted heroic striver, if there is such a thing, and who is an ill-adjusted heroic striver?
Does this partially depend on the luck of the draw, on whether you end up being successful? If you are single-minded about making an artistic mark, an intellectual mark, or some contribution to the world—curing leprosy, or whatever it is—and it turns out that you’re just not that good, what then? Perhaps you have some local success, but fifty years later people completely forget about you. Or you keep thinking, my first few novels weren’t published, but the fourth novel is going to transform the world. There are so many famous writers who weren’t recognized in their lifetimes, and eventually people are going to recognize my brilliance. And sadly, you’re just deluded about this.
So to what extent does whether a heroic striver has a coherent life plan depend on the happenstance of their talent or the success they find in the world? And to what extent is it a deeper question about how they are leading their life, and how they understand what they are doing?
Goldstein: If you actually think about it, because we’re trying to justify ourselves, we’re taking on this extra burden in being human, and that’s what existential crises are all about.
Most of my life was spent as a professor, and it was sometimes my very unpleasant task to tell a graduate student, I don’t think you have it. I don’t think you’re going to make it in this field. I felt it was my responsibility to do that because otherwise they were in for a lot of frustration, disappointment, and hard work that was going to go nowhere. In that role, I was acting as a mattering adjudicator. Professors have to be mattering adjudicators. Editors are mattering adjudicators.
Not every mattering project that someone undertakes has mattering adjudicators, but it’s a sad fact that some do. In my field, I’m subject to mattering adjudicators. Whether my work gets published or not isn’t up to me.
I tell the story of a friend of mine who was a very, very good musician, a classical guitarist. He had a lot of success. He got into a conservatory, which is very hard to do. But he couldn’t make a career as a professional classical guitarist. That world is extremely difficult. There isn’t much written specifically for classical guitar, and orchestras don’t hire you. You either make it on the concert stage or you end up playing weddings.
After a period of deep depression, he gave up that mattering project. He took a job teaching comparative literature and became a writer. He is still a heroic striver. What I’ve noticed is that if you have that kind of temperament, if you want to prove your mattering to yourself through creativity, and one project doesn’t work out, the hardest thing is knowing when to give it up. Sometimes the right move is to switch to something else that is also creative.
There has to be a kind of flexibility. Sometimes there’s a real mismatch. Sometimes parents want their child to be a heroic striver, and their heart just isn’t in it. That’s not who they are.
Mounk: I think the heroic striver bucket is probably the one most likely to lead to disappointment. My mother is a classical musician. She’s a conductor, and I think she’s had a very fulfilling career. But I once saw a study that I find fascinating, which showed that among skilled professionals, orchestra musicians are some of the least happy people.
I think the reason is related to the story of your friend. You grow up with hopes of becoming a soloist. People fawn over you for the incredible skill and talent you display. To become any kind of professional musician, you have to be extraordinary. Then you don’t quite make it as a soloist, and you become part of a collective. If you play beautifully, nobody really notices. If you make one mistake, you get shouted at, it’s audible, and you feel ashamed. Even if you were drawn to music partly out of love for it, you were also drawn by a heroic striver personality. Day to day, you’re treated as an expendable part of a collective that isn’t individual at all. The gap between those two realities helps explain why orchestra musicians tend to be so unhappy.
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Let’s move to another bucket, the competitive one, which I think can go wrong in many ways. With heroic striving, I can see how it can go completely wrong, and I can also see how many of the people we most admire probably fall into that bucket. With the competitive one, it’s easy to see how it goes wrong. You can become consumed by undermining a corporate rival, engaging in intrigue to get them fired. You can become obsessed with resentment toward someone who beat you to a fellowship in high school, carrying a chip on your shoulder and trying to outperform them. You can even see it at the level of nations, where people obsess over injustices inflicted by a neighboring country centuries ago.
So where is the positive side? Is it simply that this competitive streak is also how we build a productive economy, sports, and similar domains? It feels harder to see how the competitive instinct can take a genuinely positive form.
Goldstein: One thing I have to keep reiterating is that we don’t have much choice in how we respond to this shared longing. There are personality types, and I bring up a theory of personality, the Murray–McClelland theory of personality, which fits very well in describing how we respond to this shared longing.
It’s very hard to be competitive, and it’s very hard to be around competitive people. When I start talking to them about their mattering, about whether they think they matter, they sometimes become a little self-conscious. The way they hear the question mirrors how others hear it. Transcenders hear the question as, do I matter to the universe? Was I purposefully created? Socializers hear it as, do I matter to others? Heroic strivers hear it as, am I doing something really worth doing? Am I fulfilling my own ambitions for excellence? Competitors hear it as, do I matter more than others? That’s how they hear the question of mattering. They think of mattering in zero-sum terms. For them to matter, others must matter less. They are always in an adversarial position with others. The one frequent exception is family, because family members are often experienced as extensions of oneself, so the sense of competition is muted.
Donald Trump is a perfect example. He is an extreme competitor. He can be on the side of those who are the fruit of his loins, but everyone else is adversarial. You are either praising him or opposing him. This posture is deeply insecure.
Mounk: Right. It’s a particular form of competitor that takes everything to be a zero-sum battle. I’m sure people who are competitors tend to be more likely to think in zero-sum terms, but I think it’s a particular combination of an extreme competitor and someone who has an extremely zero-sum worldview. It’s not just that I’m competitive and I want to win. It’s that I see every situation as a competition, and I have to win every competition.
Goldstein: I make a distinction between individual competitors and group competitors. Group competitors think, I belong to the group that matters the most, and I’m in an adversarial position with people from other groups, especially if I consider them lesser and if I think they’re gaining on me.
One of the people I profiled is an ex–Nazi skinhead. He has, in fact, become what I would call an ethical heroic striver. His whole life is now about doing penance for his earlier acts of violence. He is actually now Jewish.
Mounk: It seems to be going a little too far. I’m glad for every Nazi who stops being a Nazi. I’m not sure they have to convert to Judaism. Having grown up in Germany and being Jewish, I didn’t meet many Nazis who converted to Judaism, but I did meet many children and grandchildren of senior Nazis who tried to expiate perceived historical guilt by converting to Judaism. There was always something slightly creepy about it.
Goldstein: In any case, he was someone who suffered great deprivation in his childhood, a lack of care and nurturing. He came from a terrible situation. When he met Nazi skinheads who told him, of course you matter. You matter so much more than all these people who are trying to rob you of your mattering. Look in the mirror and you will see how much you matter. You are a white, heterosexual American male. You matter.
Mounk: You still owe me a positive example of a competitor.
Goldstein: Ah, yes, this is someone I’m not going to mention by name. He’s a Nobel laureate in science, somebody I know. A mutual friend who also knows him said to me, this person was happy for all of fifteen minutes in his life when he got that call from Stockholm, and then it dawned on him that others have also gotten the Nobel Prize.
Mounk: That’s not a positive example.
Goldstein: He did good work. From the outside, you would think that he was a heroic striver. He used his great talent, his great intelligence, and his scientific ability to do very good work that, in fact, benefits all of us.
Mounk: The good thing about being a competitor is the positive externalities. Perhaps you want to be the biggest supermarket magnate. The way to do that is to lower prices and be ruthlessly efficient. That might have some negative impacts on the world, but it also allows people to have cheap food that they can have nice dinners with.
I have a story about this, which is secondhand, so I’m going to be careful not to make it obvious who this is. This is someone who is a neighbor, in a college town in the United States, of a prominent academic. They are in a long-running property dispute because this acquaintance of mine is doing renovations on the house, and the prominent neighbor is an incredible stickler for the rules. Every tiny municipal rule that the contractors break in any way immediately earns a long, formal email and complaint.
One day, this acquaintance reads in the news in the morning that the neighbor has won a Nobel Prize. They think this might be a nice opportunity to extend an olive branch and say, look, I know we haven’t always gotten along that well, but congratulations, what a wonderful thing. If you’re in the mood to celebrate, we’re around. We have a bottle of champagne in the fridge. Feel free to drop by.
They get an email back within ten minutes saying, thank you very much for your offer, that’s very kind. By the way, yesterday your contractors did X and Y, followed by a long list of other things the contractors did wrong. Within an hour of getting the Nobel Prize, this person was continuing to point out minor infractions of municipal rules.
Goldstein: We have to work with what we have, our temperaments. Some people are hyper-competitive, but that can change.
My friend, the ex-Nazi skinhead, shows that change is possible. Of all the people I’ve spoken to over these many decades of talking to people about this, he stands out. By the way, this is not the kind of philosophy I was trained to do. I’m trained in philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics, technical work. But when I hit on this topic, I found that it opened the door to the most interesting conversations with other people.
What has impressed me over the years is the sheer diversity of ways people try to respond to this longing. One way or another, everybody is responding to it. Socializers, by the way, are not immune to things going wrong. Mattering to others is not always benign. They, too, have pathological forms.
For example, some people try to matter to others by dominating them. That domination can occur within families. I once spoke to the victim of a love bomber. He completely dominated this young woman’s life for years, then moved on to the next person. She later discovered that her intense love affair had been preceded by another woman, and another. This was a serial love bomber. For him, mattering to others meant dominating them.
I love reading advice columns in newspapers. So much of it is about socializers. Their whole sense of mattering is bound up with relationships, sometimes even with complete strangers. For example, there’s the craving for fame, mattering to a large number of strangers who pay attention to you.
I tell this story about Kevin Bacon, the movie star. He’s constantly swamped by people wanting autographs and selfies, and he became curious about what it would be like to be anonymous. So he put on a prosthetic nose and glasses and went to a very busy mall in Los Angeles. He later said it totally sucked. Nobody came over to say how much they loved him. Nobody paid him any attention at all. He said it was horrible.
Studies have shown that among millennials, the desire for fame can be so strong that people are willing to give up close relationships and romantic relationships for it. That, too, is a form of mattering to others, mattering to a large group of strangers.
Mounk: Do you put that in the bucket of socializers?
Goldstein: Yes, I do, because it’s mattering to others. You’re depending on others.
Mounk: Right. Fame is presumably one way this can go wrong. I imagine there are others. One positive aspect is that an achievable way to matter in the world is to matter to your family, your friends, and the people in your community. That’s one reason I love teaching as part of the portfolio of things I do. In a very straightforward way, you walk into a classroom on an off day and you realize that twenty or fifty or a hundred people are bored. You walk into a classroom when you’re on, and it’s a meaningful intellectual experience, people are learning something, and it feels like you’ve made a difference. Some of the mentorship relationships you have with students are meaningful as well. It’s a concrete answer to how you matter in the world, very different from trying to write texts that might be read years from now.
But there are also many ways in which relationships can go wrong. They can go wrong because you want to dominate others, or because you want to be famous in a Paris-Hilton-type way. Some cases are more extreme. I’m thinking of people with Munchausen by proxy syndrome, where mothers invent illnesses for their children because they want to be seen as heroic caretakers, rescuing a sick child, battling cancer, being indispensable. In some cases, they even persuade the child that the child is deeply ill because it makes the child more reliant on them. These are ways in which trying to matter through socializing can go horribly wrong.
So what should we learn from all of this? These are incredibly insightful points about each of these groups. As an analytical lens, it’s very helpful. It’s going to change how I think about the world. But one question I’m left with is how to make sure, in my own life, that I end up on the aligned rather than the misaligned side of this.
Different listeners will see themselves in different buckets. Some will think of themselves as competitors, others as heroic strivers, transcenders, or socializers. Is the advice different depending on the bucket? Or is there an overarching set of advice you can give? What lessons should we draw from this conversation?
Goldstein: I think there are two questions here. One is how well one’s mattering project is serving oneself. That always needs to be evaluated. Are you flourishing? Are you feeling that your life is going well?
The other concerns our connections with others. As gregarious creatures, we all need those connections. These two things, self-flourishing and connection with others, are the cornerstones of our flourishing. Both can go wrong. If you don’t have deep connections with others, you suffer the sadness of loneliness. But there are also bad ways of trying to respond to this longing to matter.
At that point, we have to bring in ethics. Something can feel wonderful and still be wrong. You might think you’ve invaded Poland and it’s going really well. But you ought not to be doing this. That’s the normative dimension.
We also have a tendency to proselytize. We want to show that what we’re doing isn’t just arbitrary. We want to think this matters because of who I am, because this is my talent, because this is what I do. We want to believe there’s something objective about it. But if it really is objective, then shouldn’t everybody be doing it the same way?
Mounk: On a side note, I think part of it is wanting to justify it, and part of it is projection. I’m not a super competitive person, but if you see the world in deeply competitive terms, it’s very hard to imagine that other people don’t. And if they don’t, they seem like suckers within that value scheme.
Goldstein: Yes, there’s a lot of that too. It’s like we have a whole range of examples. We know the transcenders do this. People ground some metaphysical view of reality and think we’re all living in that reality, so we all ought to be whatever fills in the blank, accepting Jesus as our savior, or something like that.
What I’ve found is that this happens all across what I call the mattering map, which lays out these different ways of responding to the longing to matter. I have scientists who say that discovering the laws of nature is the most important thing we can do, and they wonder why everybody isn’t seeking their mattering through understanding the objective laws of nature.
Then there’s the fashion editor Diana Friedland, who says that if you don’t dress well, you’re nothing. I include bodybuilders who say that people who can’t do a deadlift might as well not have been born. All of these are universalizing claims.
Mounk: This is a side note, but I actually think that this is one of the things that helps humans be reconciled to the world. One of the things that makes certain kinds of high school environments so brutal is that there is a single unified scheme of social regard that everybody roughly agrees on, who’s at the top of it and who’s at the bottom of it. There is one set of attributes that are particularly valued. That is brutal, because if you’re toward the bottom of that hierarchy, low status is imposed on you in an extreme way.
One of the great things about liberal societies, and about pluralistic societies more generally, is that there are many different schemes of valuation. Most people tend to gravitate toward the scheme of valuation that they’re relatively good at. It’s because you’re deeply interested in knitting that you place value in the knitting community. If you’re respected in that community, you can say, I’m one of the most respected knitters in my town, people ask me for advice, and that matters to me. You may not be able to bodybuild, but that doesn’t matter.
By contrast, a bodybuilder might say that knitting is ridiculous and that bodybuilding is what matters. People respect them because they have muscles. The fact that we self-select into schemes of valuation in which we are likely better than we would be at a random selection of activities is one of the things that helps us reconcile ourselves to our place in the world within a pluralistic society.
Goldstein: I’m thinking about a party I once went to when I was at Princeton with a bunch of very high-level scientists. They started talking about high school and how they were bullied. These were top people, and they talked about how they could never get any girls, or any men, if that’s what they wanted. There was a real sense of triumph. Look where we are now. That is true, but it’s also something it would be good to be able to see in all of us.
It’s a practice I go through all the time because I’m appalled by many people, both publicly and privately. I’m always asking myself, how are they trying to prove to themselves that they matter? Seeing the humanity in that and sympathizing with what’s going on has helped me in recent years.
You asked how we can tell what is going right and what is going wrong. My answer comes from the second law of thermodynamics. Life is resistance against disorder. That is the direction all living systems move in. Life is counter-entropic. Entropy means disorder, and more precisely, transformation from within. Every closed physical system moves toward disorder, which is the end of that system’s ability to function. For a system to function, it requires a certain level of order. The more complex the system, the more ways it can go wrong.
Living systems are extremely complex. They are ecosystems. We are constantly taking in energy. What do we do with that energy? We resist entropy. Life itself is resistance. That’s what life is. In general, the things we think of as good goals require order and knowledge. In the book, I explain why that is. This principle will never be falsified by experience. It is genuinely objective. So the way to evaluate how you are living your life is first to ask whether it is working for you. Are you flourishing? Does it feel right?
But you also have to ask how you are relating to entropy. Are you creating more disorder in the world, including in other people’s lives? Are you invading a country? Are you harming the people around you and making them miserable? Or are you on the side of life itself, resisting disorder and moving toward greater order in the world? This aligns with the intuitions we already have: beauty is better than ugliness, love is better than hatred, knowledge is better than ignorance, clarity is better than confusion. All of the things we recognize as better are things that require order.
Mounk: My only worry about this, and I mean it partly as a joke and partly seriously, is that it seems to imply that Switzerland is better than Italy. Of course, as any friend of mine knows, Italy is better than Switzerland.
What falls under this concept of order, and what does not? A lot of what is wonderful in life is spontaneity and things like that, which do entail a certain kind of disorder. I assume you’re talking about a different kind of order, but perhaps you can clarify what kind of order you have in mind.
Goldstein: Yeah, exactly. There are many different values that go into it. In some sense, a dictatorship is more ordered than a democracy. I’m thinking of Plato right now, and he very much disliked democracy because it was so disordered. But Plato was wrong. Democracy is better. Why? Because another thing we have to include in the evaluation is that all humans matter to the same extent.
There are many different ways of evaluating what matters here. It’s complicated. It’s just a sort of gross way of thinking.
It’s the way I think about my evaluations of people. There are certain people I look at and think, they’re on the side of entropy. They are entropy on two legs. They are clogging things up. Other people are just the opposite. So that’s a way of assessing things, but it’s complicated.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Rebecca discuss the impact of artificial intelligence on the human conception of mattering, and Rebecca’s experience as a heroic striver. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
One of the fundamental problems with populist leaders is that they love to do so many outrageous things that it becomes incredibly hard to separate the grave from the trivial, the wheat from the chaff, the action that is worth pondering at length from the one that will inspire an endless litany of ephemeral takes. But over the course of the dozen or so years of my life which I have now spent thinking about figures like Viktor Orbán and Recep Erdoğan and Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu, I have developed strong views about what is a distraction and what is actually consequential.
What tends to be a distraction is individual breaches of run-of-the-mill political norms. I fully understand why people are dismayed when populists hurl insults at their enemies, insist on claims that are evidently untrue, or engage in shameless self-flattery. It is certainly important to stay attuned to the ways in which this poisons a political culture, laying the ground for a personality cult and making it easier to demonize the opposition. But when the media obsesses over every tasteless remark made by a political leader, it hands him total control over the political agenda—and many ordinary people wrongly get the impression that objections to him are rooted in the aesthetic sensibilities of the professional-managerial class rather than the actual damage he is doing to the country.
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Far more consequential are breaches of the fundamental political norms that make democracy possible. There are numerous such norms. They include such things as a willingness to respect the decisions of the courts, to appoint key officials on the basis of competence rather than blind loyalty, and to accept the outcome of free and fair elections. But when I look at the countries which have fared the worst under the rule of populists, from Turkey to Venezuela, there are two fundamental norms which stand out as especially important in terms of their impact on ordinary people.
The first of these fundamental norms is that the state should not be able to prosecute political opponents on spurious grounds. The ability of the state to imprison its citizens is one of the most fearsome powers it holds. When the machinery of justice is perverted to serve as a tool of revenge against anybody who stands up to the government, it creates an especially chilling effect on the opposition’s ability to restrain abuses of power. And while the first prosecutions are usually directed against political elites that have little in common with ordinary people, they often broaden to go after ordinary citizens. This is how authoritarian populists have, again and again, used supposedly legal means to transform formal democracies into de facto autocracies.
The second of these fundamental norms is that there must be some limit on the extent to which economic policy is subject to the will and the whim of the central government. For politicians who are subject to the electoral cycle, it is always tempting to juice the economy in such a way that their countries find themselves at the top of a boom in an election year. The easiest way to do that is to ease monetary policy to stimulate the economy. But this also leads to significant inflationary pressures. And when partisan apparatchiks rather than serious economists are setting interest rates, those inflationary pressures can easily turn into unstoppable spirals.
There are many missteps which explain how both Turkey and Venezuela went from flawed-but-real democracies with unequal-but-flourishing economic systems to repressive autocracies that are in the grip of inflationary spirals which are impoverishing much of their population. But the fact that both Hugo Chávez (as well as his successor, Nicolás Maduro) and Erdoğan (as well as his son-in-law, Turkey’s longtime finance minister) repeatedly broke these two fundamental norms is probably more responsible for the disastrous outcomes for ordinary Turks and Venezuelans than any other single step they took.
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That is what makes the news that the Department of Justice is prosecuting Jerome Powell, the Chair of the Federal Reserve, particularly striking. In a crowded news environment, it will be tempting to write this off as one more norm that the Trump White House has decided to break, one more extreme thing about which we should roll our eyes before moving on to discuss yet another unhinged post on Truth Social. But it is far more significant than that.
Powell is only the latest in a litany of political opponents, from James Comey to Letitia James, that Trump’s Department of Justice has prosecuted for evidently partisan reasons. In the case of Powell, the ostensible ground for his prosecution is that he supposedly perjured himself in his testimony regarding the costly renovation of the Fed’s headquarters. But the Trump administration is barely even trying to conceal its true motivation: a battle over the control of America’s monetary policy.
Trump has repeatedly voiced his displeasure with Powell’s reluctance to lower interest rates as far and as fast as he prefers, and has put enormous pressure on him to resign before his statutory term ends this year. In other words, Trump has, in a single political act, doubled down on his willingness to dispense with the two most important guardrails which stand between the freedom and prosperity of the United States and the fear and impoverishment experienced by countries like Turkey and Venezuela.
This is not to say that the same fate necessarily awaits the United States. For now, significant checks and balances remain. Getting grand juries to indict defendants is notoriously easy in America; as one prosecutor famously put it in the 1980s, he could get a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich.” Securing convictions is thankfully much harder. Indeed, the Trump administration’s previous attempts to go after James Comey and Letitia James—on similarly spurious grounds in the case of the former, on marginally less spurious grounds in the case of the latter—both failed badly.
Thanks to the statutory independence of the Fed, it even seems likely that Powell will be able to serve the rest of his term. More likely than not, monetary policy in the United States will continue to be set by a competent economist until May.
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But none of this diminishes the significance of this step. The desire of the Trump administration to break with our system’s most important guardrails is more evident than ever. If they succeed, the victim will not just be a decent public servant unjustly prosecuted, but rather the livelihood of millions of Americans, including both those who hate and those who love Trump.
Just over a week ago, Trump captured Nicolás Maduro in a spectacular raid on Caracas. While there are good reasons to worry that things won’t actually improve for ordinary people in Venezuela, Maduro was a brutal dictator who undoubtedly deserves to be in chains. That makes the timing of Powell’s indictment bitterly ironic: the man who ordered Maduro’s capture is, in his own country, now emulating the worst sins of the regime that led Venezuela into such a terrible political and economic catastrophe.
There are many reasons to fear that this protest movement could end badly. The regime could once again decide to crack down on its own citizens, killing dozens or hundreds or perhaps thousands of them in the process. (Indeed, according to eyewitness reports, it has already started doing so.) Power might shift from the ailing Ayatollah Khamenei to the Revolutionary Guards, perhaps lifting some restrictions on the country’s women but frustrating the broader political and economic aspirations of the population. Even a transition to democracy need not bring lasting results, as the failed experiments with democratic rule from Egypt to Tunisia prove.
But the sympathies of every single person who believes in freedom and equality and the basic rights of women should be with those courageous millions in Iran. And yet, across the West, there has in the face of these historic protests been a deafening silence.
This silence has been evident in mainstream media outlets, from the British Broadcasting Corporation to National Public Radio, that have been oddly slow to grasp the importance of this moment. Worse, when those outlets did deign to cover the events, they often downplayed the significance of the protests; in a few especially egregious cases, reporters even seemed to harbor sympathies for the country’s brutal regime. (At the outset of the protests, The Guardian even published an op-ed by Abbas Aragchi, Iran’s foreign minister.)
The silence has been even more deafening in the left-wing newspapers and magazines of the anglophone world. On Saturday morning, I searched the principal publications of the American left for any mention of Iran. There was nothing on the websites of The Nation or The New Republic or Jacobin or Slate or even Dissent.
There are some straightforward explanations for why a lot of attention is currently elsewhere. There is good reason for American media outlets to focus on what is happening in Venezuela, and in Minnesota, and more broadly on the various outrages daily perpetrated by the White House. And it is genuinely hard to report on a country that tightly controls foreign journalists and currently has a nationwide internet blackout. At Persuasion, we have been lucky to publish a moving essay by an anonymous Iranian who has written for us before. On the podcast, I have been fortunate to have a deep conversation with Scott Anderson about the country’s revolutions, past and present. But is it really so difficult to have some staff writer type up a report about what is happening in the country, or to source an op-ed by some Iranian in exile about their hopes for their country?
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The silence is far from random; it is a choice. And while I suspect that this choice is not fully conscious, and that the people making that choice haven’t fully spelled out the logic which motivates it, even to themselves, it ultimately goes back to a very simple calculation that (as he pointed out more eloquently than anybody else) has plagued leftist intellectuals ever since the days of George Orwell.
For far too many progressives and leftists, their founding commitment is not to some principle or aspiration for the world. It is to believing that their own countries and societies are at the root of profound evil. This creates in their minds a simple demonology: Anybody who is on “our side” must be bad and anybody who is on the “other side” is presumptively good. As Orwell said about some of the intellectuals of his day, their “real though unacknowledged motive appears to be hatred of western democracy and admiration for totalitarianism.”
It has in the past week not been difficult to find especially harebrained leftists who follow this logic to its bitter end: ones who malign Iranian protesters as hapless agents of imperialism, or for that matter are unwilling to acknowledge that Nicolás Maduro was a terrible dictator. But most are a little more subtle than that. They don’t go all the way toward celebrating Khamenei or Maduro; but nor can they quite bring themselves to hope for the downfall of the regimes they built.
I have, since I started to be politically conscious, been a man of the left. I joined the German Social Democratic Party at the age of 13 and still believe in many of the same ideals as I did then: in international solidarity; in the need for a generous welfare state; in the supreme evil of racial hatred and ethnic cleansing and war. I would love once again to feel part of a mass movement that stands up for those values in a principled manner. But with a left that finds itself unable to cheer on the brave women and men now taking to the streets of Tehran and so many other Iranian cities, I have little in common.
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Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!
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For several years following the American invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, my academic focus was on the problem of nation building. Washington had caused the collapse of two governments, and its foreign policy objectives could not be met unless it created minimally stable successors. But it was evident that U.S. policymakers had little idea of how to bring this about. This line of research resulted in two books, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, published in 2004, and an edited volume, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, published in 2006. The bottom line of this research was that both state building and its more ambitious counterpart, nation building, were long and costly efforts that had to be undertaken with substantial buy-in from local populations. Equally important was the fact that the American public typically didn’t have the patience to see these projects through to completion, leaving the target countries broken and unstable.
I stopped working on this issue when it became clear in the aftermath of Iraq that the United States would not likely be engaging in further nation building exercises for the foreseeable future. But here we are, 20 years later, facing a similar kind of project in Venezuela. Donald Trump had campaigned as an isolationist opposed to nation building and “forever wars,” but he has now taken on a new ambitious project, and doesn’t seem to understand the challenges he faces.
Trump for the time being has opted for a strategy of nation building-lite: he has decapitated the Maduro regime and stated a minimal (and utterly cynical) goal of extracting as much oil wealth as possible from Venezuela. He has eschewed the objective of restoring Venezuelan democracy and turned his back on María Corina Machado, a genuinely popular leader of the Venezuelan democratic opposition. Trump has anointed Delcy Rodríguez, a former regime firebrand and now acting president, as his partner, and has started to push American oil companies to re-enter the country and restore its decayed capacity.
This definition of American objectives of course sends a terrible signal to the rest of the world: the United States is back in the game of old-fashioned imperialism where it will use its military might to extract as much wealth for itself as possible. Trump has encased this in a spheres-of-influence rhetoric that virtually gives Russia and China permission to act similarly in their own respective spheres.
Trump seems to think that he can execute such a strategy by remote control from Washington. Though he expressed an openness to putting “boots on the ground,” he has shown little inclination to do so to date. The question facing his administration is whether such a minimalist effort can possibly succeed. One of the hard truths of earlier interventions is the virtual inevitability of mission creep, where unforeseen events will trigger cascading levels of involvement.
There are several reasons for thinking that nation building-lite won’t work.
The first has to do with oil and economics. Trump met with leading oil executives on January 9 and suggested that they plan to invest $100 billion in restoring Venezuela’s oil capacity in the coming years. It is an understatement to say he got a cool reception. Darren Woods, the Exxon Mobil CEO, said that, after two prior expropriations, re-entering would “require some pretty significant changes,” and that at the moment the country was “uninvestable.” Large-scale investments require political stability, and that is something that Trump cannot guarantee.
There are clear reasons why the country will remain unstable for the foreseeable future. Trump has placed his bets on continuing rule by a regime that has amply demonstrated both its unpopularity as well as its massive incompetence and corruption. Because of the U.S. blockade of Venezuelan oil, the country faces a major economic collapse in the short run, and a humanitarian crisis will not be a good look for the United States. The country remains highly polarized between supporters of the Maduro regime and the broader anti-Maduro population. The former are armed and ready to use violence against any anti-regime protest. It is not clear that Delcy Rodríguez can control her own colleagues, who may not quietly accept the role of American proxies and see their rents taken away. She may also be unable to control the armed militias and criminal gangs that rule much of the country. In the longer run, Venezuela cannot begin pumping more oil unless it restores PDVSA, the state oil company, that had been emptied of competent engineers and managers years ago under Hugo Chávez. Competent staff will not return unless they can be assured of their continuing safety and security.
In other words, even the minimalist objective of restoring Venezuela’s oil output cannot be achieved without establishing a more legitimate government, and de-fanging the multitude of groups with guns. All of this could in principle be done with American boots on the ground; it cannot be achieved through diktats from Washington. Democratic legitimacy is not an idealistic luxury that can be overlooked by powerful people; it is itself a component of power.
It is not just PDVSA engineers who need to return. Nearly eight million Venezuelans have left the country since Chávez and Maduro came to power, fleeing economic collapse and repression. This diaspora has placed a huge burden on the whole region, affecting not just neighbors like Colombia and Ecuador, but distant countries like Chile which recently elected a right-wing president who campaigned against immigrants. And of course there is a huge Venezuelan community in the United States, one that Trump himself has falsely inveighed against as a source of drugs and crime. Creating conditions under which these refugees can return is not just a moral imperative; it is necessary if the country is to ever recover economically. That émigré community contains many extremely talented people, but they will not return as long as the regime remains in power.
The need for a stable, legitimate government then suggests a more hopeful path forward. Trump has shown no interest in restoring Venezuelan democracy, and it is probably the case that the United States had no choice in the short run but to work with parts of the Maduro regime. But democratic legitimacy will matter greatly in the medium to longer term. Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, Venezuela has a long and well-established democratic tradition, as evidenced by the massive vote last year for Edmundo González, which was overturned by Maduro and his colleagues. The path to a legitimate government lies in a new election, which even Donald Trump may come to see as necessary at some point. A free and fair election will be resisted fiercely by remnants of the Maduro regime, but here U.S. leverage may make a difference. Even in the absence of boots on the ground, the United States could insist on oversight by the Organization of American States (OAS) or other foreign observers this time around.
That’s a best-case outcome for nation building-lite, and one that is not terribly likely. One clear lesson from prior nation building exercises is that the first priority in any such situation is security, something that takes precedence over democracy in the short run. Venezuela today has one of the highest murder rates in the Western hemisphere. The big threats to security come from the regime itself, and from the criminal gangs and militias that it has fostered. It is hard to see how this problem can be solved by diktat from Washington, which means that there will be mounting pressure for more direct forms of intervention. It is this kind of logic that led to mission creep in Afghanistan and Iraq, and I am not sure that the Trump administration will avoid this any more than its predecessors. Nation building-lite will thus evolve into full-bodied nation building.
I should further note that even if the most optimistic medium-term scenario plays out—that is, there is a new election and a democratic opposition comes to power—the nation building game is not over. Another painful lesson from the past is that opposition groups rooted in civil society often lack the knowledge and skills to govern effectively. Assembling a deep bench of technocrats with real world experience ahead of time will be critical. Many such people exist in the émigré community, but they need to be mobilized ahead of time and be assured of strong continuing support. Whether this will be forthcoming from an administration that has so far focused on undercutting America’s own state capacity remains to be seen.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Scott Anderson is a veteran war correspondent and a contributing writer at The New York Times Magazine. His latest book is King of Kings: The Iranian Revolution—A Story of Hubris, Delusion and Catastrophic Miscalculation.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Scott Anderson discuss whether the current protests could finally topple Iran’s theocratic regime, what role the Revolutionary Guard might play in determining the country’s future, and whether a democratic Iran could emerge from the ashes of the Islamic Republic.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Mounk: So we recorded a wonderful, deep, historical dive into Iran in, I believe, July of last year. And I was really looking forward to releasing that episode and thought perhaps we can wait for some topical hook that’ll make that episode more relevant. And boy, did we get a topical hook over the last days.
There are these wonderful, inspiring pictures that also make me a little bit scared about what may be around the corner from Iran with just huge numbers of people taking to the streets to call for the end of the regime of the mullahs in a more open and more concerted way than probably at any point since 1979. What’s your read on the situation in Tehran and so many other cities around Iran today? Should we get our hopes up for an end to this regime?
Anderson: I think more than probably ever in the last 45 years, the regime is in serious, serious trouble. There have been moments in the past when it was in somewhat trouble.
What’s different this time with these protests? The regime in the past has always been very adept at playing one segment of society off against another. The religious against the more secular, the rural against the urban. The Women’s Freedom protests of three years ago, they were able to talk about it being—she was a Kurdish woman, the woman who was killed by the morality police—to kind of play the ethnic card.
This time, that’s not going to work because this is an economic collapse that has happened with the devaluation of Iran. So everybody is affected. Playing off one side against the other is just not going to work this time. The second thing that’s quite different is you now have an Iranian president, Pezeshkian, who’s come out in sort of solidarity, or at least in sympathy with the protesters.
He doesn’t have an awful lot of genuine power—Supreme Leader Khamenei does—but what he has is a voice, and that voice cannot really be shut up. So you have a very different dynamic taking place now than you’ve ever had before.
Mounk: What would it actually take for these protests to topple the regime? A lot of the time political scientists assume that as long as the regime stays united, it can be deeply unpopular, it can constitute a small portion of a population, it is able to see off challenges to it., But what I’m also afraid of is that you could imagine the Revolutionary Guard starting to fire in even more massive ways than they already have in the last days on protesters and using simple brute force to crack down on this movement.
The question is whether cracks start appearing within the regime. The president semi-claiming to be on the side of protest might be one sign of that. Defecting elite members would obviously be a key sign of that. What do you think it would take and are we seeing the signs of that happening?
Anderson: Well, I think the great unknown quantity here is what the Revolutionary Guard, the defenders of the regime, and the military, actually doesRather like Egypt or mainland China, the Revolutionary Guard is a force unto itself. It’s an economic force. It’s a corporation. So what you have is a military that is not just supporting the regime for philosophical or theological reasons, but for economic reasons.
Their bread and butter is at stake here. So I really think that what you could see is an end of the theocracy, but I fear what could replace it is a military dictatorship. And I think it could get very, very bloody because I don’t think the Revolutionary Guard are going to accede to stepping aside peacefully. This could get very, very ugly.
Mounk: So the Revolutionary Guard have this weird double nature, and you know this better than I do so correct me if I’m misdescribing it. They were among the vanguard of the revolution. They were the people supposed to protect the revolution, to ensure that it succeeds and that it can’t be overthrown. They were supposed therefore to have, in the Iranian context, this deeply religious mission.
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But as you’re pointing out, they are now effectively running large parts of the Iranian economy. And one of the main reasons why somebody may have aspired around 2005 or 2010 to become a senior member of the Revolutionary Guards is that that comes with a huge amount of material and other privileges in society. And so even as this is supposed to be a deeply theocratic institution, it is also run by a lot of people who may simply be social climbers, materially ambitious people.
Is it imaginable that the Revolutionary Guard kind of rebrands itself as a military caste more similar to a place like Egypt where the military tends to have a more secular bent? It’s a little bit hard to imagine, but you’re right that perhaps the incentive-based perspective would say they’re simply going to guard the material interests. What they really don’t want to give up is a cushy lifestyle, and perhaps they’re willing to overthrow some of the religious pieties. It’s a little hard to imagine, but is that what you think?
Anderson: Yeah Egypt is actually a good case study of that. When the dissent against [Hosni] Mubarak reached a certain point, essentially the military stepped in and forced him to leave. And then they went through elections, but they stood in the wings waiting for the Muslim Brotherhood to kind of fall on its face. And then they stepped back in again.
I think all through that brief period between Mubarak being overthrown and General Sisi coming back in, the military was just waiting its time. And I think you could see something very similar now in Iran. If the price for the Revolutionary Guard is getting rid of [Ali] Khamenei and the ayatollahs around him and putting in some sort of a military regime or a Muslim-lite regime, the Revolutionary Guard would do that.
Again, I think that money corrupts and I think when you have this incredible economic power that the Revolutionary Guard has, which has been harnessed over these past four and a half decades, I just don’t see them stepping aside on that lightly. So there may be a shell game played like there was kind of in Egypt. But barring that, I think it’s going to get very, very bloody very quickly.
Mounk: So listeners will enjoy our deep conversation we had a few months ago that really gives you a sense of how the Shah fell and how this religious regime rose. One of the key moments was when it became obvious that people were so afraid of a revolution that the top people started to flee.
And we are not quite at that point yet on Friday morning or early afternoon Eastern Time as we’re recording this, but there are rumors of this being about to happen. There are rumors that the spiritual leadership may be seeking refuge in Russia, or at least making arrangements to be able to seek refuge in Russia if the time comes for that. Are there any echoes between 1979 and the situation in Tehran today?
Anderson: It’s not unimaginable. Now I have to realize I have to contradict almost everything I said back in July. The situation in Iran has changed so dramatically in the past two weeks. I’ve been talking with people in the opposition in Iran all summer and into the fall and winter. And as I think I mentioned back when we talked last, there was a real feeling of despondency among the opposition.
The American and Israeli bombings of Iran in July produced this tremendous rallying around the flag effect. And what opposition people were telling me then was, if we go to the streets now and demonstrate against the regime, we’re going to be painted as lackeys of the Americans and the Israelis. So they really felt that the opposition movement had been kind of set back. And they were estimating a couple of years.
What’s different this time is the economic collapse has spread all the way across—all sectors of society have been affected by this. So the thing of playing off one against the other is not working. I was talking to people who are in Iran as recently as three, maybe four days ago now. Can’t talk to them now, all communication’s been cut off. But they were getting more and more hopeful. And I think that now with the events of the past 48 hours, I haven’t spoken with anyone in the past 48 hours, I can imagine it’s.
Mounk: Is this something on which you’ve changed your mind? In our conversation in July, I think we briefly talked about Reza Pahlavi and you said that it seemed very unlikely for him to come back. This is something that, knowing much less about Iran, I shared. It just seems like, having been the legitimate pretender to the throne since 1979 and spent his entire life in exile in the suburbs of D.C.—I believe in Maryland—the idea that you would go back and take office in Iran just seems absurd.
But it is striking that that is the chant that you’re hearing in the streets of Iran. And that, of course, because there’s so little of an organized opposition movement because of the depth of repression within the country and because the exiled community of Iranians is very split, he is, in a sense, the most natural focal point. And so just to play devil’s advocate here, I think he’d be unlikely to return as a dictator or as a ruler. But constitutional monarchies have a pretty good track record in the modern world.
And there are lots of modern countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and Denmark and Sweden that have constitutional monarchs. And I think that ambitious a man as Reza Pahlavi may be, if you told him the deal is you come back and you oversee the democratic transition, you get to be a national hero a little bit like Juan Carlos of Spain until his latter years and various scandals diminished his reputation. That seems pretty appealing for a man in his, I believe, mid or perhaps late 60s. Is it still unimaginable?
Anderson: Going to Crown Prince Reza, and again talking about the parallels to ’79, I think of Khomeini. Khomeini was in exile as Reza is now. He was seen as an unlikely leader of the country, but he was seen as the person who could kind of serve as spiritual guide—the figurehead that everyone could rally around. Of course, Khomeini had other plans once he got back to Tehran.
But it’s fascinating to me that the crowds that 45 years ago were chanting “long live Khomeini” are now calling for the Shah to come back, for the Shah’s son to come back. Again, with this idea that somehow he would be the figurehead while a democracy took hold.
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I don’t think that Crown Prince Reza could pull off a Khomeini. He’s not going to take absolute power. It would not work. He may come back as a figurehead if this all plays out in that scenario, but I don’t see him wielding real power.
Mounk: Let’s dream for a moment. Let’s imagine that the regime is toppled. Let’s imagine that they manage to work out some kind of deal with the military that gives the military a nice status in society without keeping its complete stranglehold over the economy, and civil-military relations are managed to such an extent that you actually have a space for a genuine democracy.
What would that democracy look like? How much of a democratic history does Iran have? To what extent has the country secularized? Obviously, I think there is a segment of the Iranian population that is deeply resentful about the religious dictates from the top. There’s a very low fertility rate in Iran. I believe women are more likely to have university degrees than men, young women at least. It is in many ways a society that is secularized, I imagine, but there are also deep pockets of genuine—not just religious feeling, which is of course compatible with democracy—but allegiance to the theocracy and hostility to secular democracy that also exist in Iran.
And then of course, there are the fault lines that exist in many countries in the world, but that make it hard for democracy to take hold: regional differences, ethnic divisions, and other kinds of things. If Iran were to have free and fair elections in 2027, do you think there’s a realistic hope that democracy in a country that is relatively affluent by comparison to other countries struggling to be democratic, that has this bottled up longing for a more secular democratic set of institutions, would stick? Or do you think that Iran would likely end up like the countries of the Arab Spring, the last of which has just seen its democracy die in Tunisia over the course of the last years?
Anderson: I would say that Iran probably has a better chance of actually emerging into a democracy than most countries in the Middle East. It has at least a parliamentary tradition, even though that parliament has largely been a rubber stamp for—well, certainly for the past century.
You have two elements of society in Iran that would—this is going to sound elitist—but that do give hope for a kind of democratic outcome. One, you have this enormous Iranian diaspora: millions of Iranians of the wealthy and upper middle class who left Iran in the wake of the Shah’s departure. And you also have a similar class of society within Iran today. You do have a very educated, very wealthy, affluent class
You do have this kind of educated elite that could steer the country towards a democratic outcome, one that you wouldn’t have in, say, Syria or Iraq. So I think there is a chance that it could be a democratic outcome. But I go back to what I think the huge question mark right now is—what the Revolutionary Guard does.
If we just play out the scenario, let’s say the Ayatollahs go into exile and the military steps in and says, we’re going to maintain order, we’re going to stay in power until we can maintain order. And that becomes a dictatorship. Then what happens to the opposition that are in the streets right now? They’re not going against a fossilized theocratic regime, but against a professional army. And I think that could get very, very nasty.
Mounk: I have the same fears, unfortunately. Let’s talk a little bit about what the situation of women in Iran would be under those different scenarios. Obviously, there’s a scenario in which the Ayatollahs don’t lose power, and it probably is still the most likely scenario.
And they might decide that in order to regain power, they have to repurify the country and reimpose the hold of the norms they believe to be holy with even greater vengeance than over the last years. You could imagine that the tiny spaces for self-expression that exist in that society today might be eliminated. You could also imagine them saying, all right, perhaps we need to make certain kinds of concessions, and we loosen the obligation to wear a headscarf in certain ways or something like that.
The second scenario I guess we should think through is the Revolutionary Guard scenario. The Ayatollahs flee, the Revolutionary Guards keep power. I guess in that scenario, you wouldn’t have democracy, you may still have a very corrupt economy, but the thing that it might be easiest for them to give on is some of those personal liberties. That might be the easiest thing to sacrifice from their point of view, but perhaps I’m not thinking through that in the right way. And the third question, of course, is what do you think happened to women and how do you think Iranian women will be able to realize their aspirations if we did have a genuine transition to democracy?
Anderson: It’s hard to imagine that Iran is much more liberal now, certainly when it comes to social interchange, than it was even five years ago. The regime so far has been, I mean, I say adept in knowing when to relieve the pressure a little bit. For example, just with the hijab, women do not have to wear head scarves now, at least in most major Iranian cities. They’re not harassed like they were even just three years ago.
That is all very difficult to roll back, I think, at this point. And as you said, you have this enormous educated class of Iranian women. I just don’t see the system as it is even now continuing to hold.
What you’ve always had in Iran, certainly in the last 10, 15 years—people of the educated class, people of the upper class, they’re not the people taking bullets from the Basijis in the streets. They’re not being clubbed, they’re not being beaten to death by the morality police. Those people have always had a certain immunity from the theocratic regime. And I think that is what is collapsing now. You could say in a way that segment of society was sort of bought off by the regime. And I think with this economic collapse that you’re seeing now, that’s just not working.
A few days ago the regime announced that they were going to give everybody $7 of a payment to help with the 40 percent inflation. Well, $7 is not going to solve the regime’s problems.
Mounk: Yeah.
Anderson: It tends to be students, tends to be intellectuals, tends to be residents of the biggest cities. And those kinds of movements are then relatively easy to beat back. It is when those brave activists who keep the flame of opposition alive for year after year after year suddenly fuse with a much broader economically based discontent where people are angry. Perhaps they also disliked all of that stuff, right? They also suffered from all of that stuff. They also disagreed with the regime on a million other things.
But it’s the moment when they feel like, I don’t know what to make for dinner for my kids. I don’t know if I’m going to be able to pay the electricity bill. I’m not sure that I’m going to be able to heat my apartment in the winter. They say, this is now worth going on the streets for. And that’s sort of what feels like the difference between the protests we’ve seen again and again in Iranian history. Because the very brave Iranian opposition has tried to stand up to this regime a few years ago with the Women Life Freedom Movement around, I believe, 2008 around a rigged election in which there were hopes for a more moderate president and the Green Movement. Again and again. But it is now that the living conditions of ordinary Iranians have become so much worse that you see a much broader mass-based movement.
Mounk: What was that for you to move?
Anderson: That’s right. Again, with echoes of 1978-79, the Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah was basically born on the backs of young, uneducated men from the countryside who had come into the city trying to find their piece of the Iranian economic miracle. And then when the recession hit, they’re stuck in these awful shanty towns on the outskirts of Tehran and other Iranian cities. And I strongly suspect it’s going to be that same kind of demographic group that is going to, if this does become a revolution and very bloody, that is going to be the class of people that are going to take most of the bullets.
It’s not going to be university students, it’s not going to be college professors or intellectuals. It’s going to be those people who now have absolutely no future.
Mounk: So let’s take a step back here. After the attacks on the Iranian nuclear program in June carried out by Israel and by the United States, it felt as though they may have set back the aspirations of the Iranian opposition. As you were saying, when you were talking to people in the summer, they felt like if we go out to protest now, it looks like we’re on the side of the least popular nations in Iran, and that’s not going to put us in good stead.
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From the perspective of today, it does seem as though some of the attacks and some of the sanctions imposed by America over the last year are at least an indirect cause of these protests. I certainly am no admirer of the current occupant of the White House and while I am very happy that this dictator is behind bars because like the Iranian regime with which he was very close, he was a terrible dictator, I fear that the outlook for actual improvements in Venezuela seem to be slim. But do us critics of Trump and the White House have to say—their policy of humiliating Iran, of showing the weakness of the leadership, of making it very hard for Iran to thrive economically, of leaving the deal that the Biden administration and before the Obama administration had cut with Iran. Is all of that working? Is all of that part of the reason for what’s going on in the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities today?
Anderson: In a strange way, I feel—and again, I’m reminded of Jimmy Carter. I never thought I’d put Trump and Carter in the same sentence. Jimmy Carter came in with his whole emphasis on human rights, and I think that had a knock-on effect throughout the world, including in Iran. It gave support to people who were against dictatorships and care about human rights. I think it emboldened the Iranian opposition against the shah.
Similarly, Trump’s kind of scattershot approach to the world, the kind of madman theory of “you never know what he’s going to do next”—and that carries a certain power—I think has probably emboldened the opposition inside Iran.
That said, nobody likes to have their country bombed by a foreign power. And that’s why I was speaking up this summer from the opposition people saying the bombing was the worst thing that could happen to us. It’s very difficult to say what is really driving this. How much of it is being encouraged by the Americans? Are people seeing what happened to Maduro in Venezuela and seeing hope in that?
I tend to feel it’s more just this utter economic collapse. People just—in one week they saw their life savings turn to dust. And I think on top of everything else, all the other problems they’ve had with the regime, the food shortages, the embargo, they’ve just reached a breaking point.
Mounk: Tell us a little bit about what the impact of a change of regime in Iran would be on the region.
The Iranian regime has obviously been malign in its ruthless control of Iranian society and its cruel treatment of any opposition leaders within the country. There’s also been a very malign influence in the Middle East more broadly with its support of Hamas and other organizations. How would the Middle East transform in a post-Ayatollah Iran?
Anderson: My hunch would be any region comes in whether it’s revolutionary garner or democratic regime or some other dictator—I think that they would immediately cut their proxy forces. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen—they’ve all been kind of decimated in the last two years, primarily by the Israelis. So their role as a regional power is already kind of finished.
If I were to become Iranian president tomorrow, the first thing I would do would be to repair fences with the other Middle Eastern countries around me that are run by you—to get over the whole Sunni-Shia split that has been so exacerbated by the Iranian regime the past 45 years. I think if they do that, they would be met with quite a bit of goodwill in the region. They have been a pariah state and increasingly so as they’ve stepped up their support of these proxy regimes in the past 15 years. But I think other regimes in the region, certainly the Saudis, would very much appreciate seeing Iran cut off their ties to these different guerrilla groups around the region.
Mounk: Again, I’m very hopeful about the situation in Iran and am conscious that there’s a very high likelihood that we’re getting ahead of ourselves. My hunch continues to be that negative outcomes are more likely than positive outcomes.
Anderson: Well, I think that if the Trump administration were smart, they would just stay out of things for a while. The first thing I would be looking for inside Iran would be a fracturing of the Iranian military. Is there going to become a reluctance of the military to just wantonly machine gun people in the streets?
Again, it reminds me a bit of Egypt in the Arab Spring. People who know the Egyptian military—not the commanders at the top who were the head of the corporation, but the guys they put out on the streets—the Egyptian military has a limited appetite for murdering its own people.
I don’t think you could say the same about the Syrian government or the Iraqi military. So it’s going to be interesting how that will play in Iran. If this really keeps on, if the demonstrations get more violent, if the vandalism or the burning of government buildings really takes off, is the Iranian military, the men in the streets, going to be willing to just machine gun their countrymen?
That’s really what did in the Shah in ’78, ’79. From the Shah on down, he did not have an appetite for wantonly massacring people. So that is the first thing I would look for—cracks within the Iranian military.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Scott discuss the causes of the Iranian Revolution, the warning signs, and what this means for Iran today. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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