Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • The Good Fight Club: A Warm Welcome for MBS, the Future of MAGA, and Democrat Infighting

    In this week’s conversation, Ed Luce, Russ Muirhead, Lauren Harper Pope, and Yascha Mounk discuss the recent Saudi visit and what it says about Donald Trump’s broader foreign policy, the direction of the MAGA movement, and the fallout in the Democratic Party from Marie Gluesenkamp Perez challenging Chuy Garcia’s succession scheme.

    Edward Luce is the U.S. national editor and a columnist at the Financial Times, and the author of Zbig: The life of Zbig Brzezinski: America’s Great Power Prophet.

    Russell Muirhead teaches Government at Dartmouth College. He is the author, with Nancy Rosenblum, of Ungoverning: The Attack on the Administrative State and the Politics of Chaos. He serves in the New Hampshire House of Representatives where he focuses on election law.

    Lauren Harper Pope is a Welcome Co-Founder working to depolarize American politics and strengthen a centrist faction of the Democratic Party that wins and governs responsibly through work with The Welcome Party (c4), WelcomePAC, and The Welcome Democracy Institute (c3). Lauren leads the coordinated (hard side) program for WelcomePAC, and she writes at WelcomeStack.org.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Welcome to the twelfth installment of the Good Fight Club. I have an extra special panel for you today. We have Edward Luce, who is the U.S. national editor and columnist at the Financial Times and the author of Zbig, an excellent new biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski. We have Russell Muirhead, who teaches political theory and politics at Dartmouth College. He serves in the New Hampshire Legislature and is the co-author, with one of my thesis advisors, Nancy Rosenblum, of the book Un-Governing. Last but not least, we have Lauren Harper Pope, who is the co-founder of Welcome, an organization fighting for a more moderate, centrist Democratic Party capable of winning elections.

    Russ, we have had yet one more round of indignity from the Oval Office. The visit of MBS, the leader of Saudi Arabia, was welcomed very warmly to the White House. Donald Trump even became angry about journalists asking questions about Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist who was murdered a number of years ago.

    Russell Muirhead: We should not be surprised anymore. On the other hand, it is essential to maintain an ability to be shocked because it is the only thing that allows us to maintain elemental values. I was shocked again when Donald Trump dismissed any concern about the brutal murder of the journalist, Washington Post columnist Khashoggi, in 2018 by the Saudi regime. When asked about it by an ABC reporter, he was indignant. He attacked ABC and the reporter, and he brushed off the whole event, saying, things happen. There are a lot of people who did not like this guy. It was a complete rejection of any value of a free press or of the freedom of reporters to ask questions.

    We all understand that in the international world you have to be willing to sit down with unsavory characters. The United States has to do business at some level with Saudi Arabia. We are not too pure for that. It is possible to do that and also maintain some elemental sense of what makes us who we are. That is what we saw once again fed into the wood chipper.

    Edward Luce: I could not agree more. I would add to Russell’s point about what makes us who we are. What we have become, I think, was reflected in the guest list for the state dinner that Trump hosted for MBS. Elon Musk is now back in favor, but Donald Jr. was there. Most of the plutocracy was there. Like any deals the Trump administration does with other patrimonial regimes, this is driven by business. The distinction between public and private has been obliterated. Trump is really like, l’état, c’est moi. If you want to do deals with him, you have to operate in the same way.

    We are in the strange phenomenon of regimes that are run by ruling families finding it far easier to do business with the Trump administration than regimes that follow the rule of law. Mark Carney cannot offer to buy two billion dollars’ worth of stablecoin and push it through the Trump and Wyckoff kids’ crypto vehicle. The Qataris can do that. The Saudis can do that. The Pakistanis can do that. The Indians cannot. The regimes that get on well with Trump are the ones where l’état, c’est them. That is not who we were, but for the time being that is who we are.

    Muirhead: This is the thing. It is the obliteration of what you could call a state. A state is an impersonal thing that you serve, and it has its own interests independent of any individual. It is the recreation of a realm, a personal realm. You think it is all about one person, the president. If that president is displaced, then we will go back to normal politics where we have a state again. We may never have a state like the one we used to have. It is very likely that whoever succeeds this president will inherit this realm and perhaps a mentality of the realm. There is no guarantee that if a Democrat were president, they would bring back a sense of the state.

    Lauren Harper Pope: Yeah, I appreciate Russell’s comments about states and statesmanship. One of my buddies, Daniel Stead, was heading up an effort called Leading to Govern. He is working with local legislators like Future Caucus and New Deal Leaders to reestablish what it means to govern and to have a sense of statesmanship within political parties and government. When the left has a tendency to completely cancel people, and the right tends to completely overlook people’s genuine shortcomings and actual offenses and illegitimacies, we forsake balance. That produces not only political polarization, but statesmanship-based political polarization. You either completely let someone go or you embrace them fully. There needs to be a restoration of balance in how we approach these sad and delicate situations.

    Muirhead: I’m with you, Lauren. I didn’t know Dan Stead was working on that. That sounds really cool. It is also the idea of a public—something that not just statesmen but ordinary politicians serve, something they put themselves into the service of, as opposed to a person who issues decrees. When I look at young people today, the only politics they have ever seen is a politics of decree, a politics of the strongman. That is why I say there is no guarantee that we get all of this back: a sense of the public, a sense of what a state is, an idea of what governing means.

    Mounk: How do we make sense of Trump’s foreign policy more broadly? It feels like at the beginning there were a bunch of initiatives from Trump. He seemed to have this idea of taking over the Panama Canal and Greenland. All of that has been slightly forgotten now. He has vacillated a bunch on things like Ukraine. As we’re recording this on Thursday morning US time, it looks as though the US may force Ukraine to sign up to a rather unfavorable peace deal, but details are sparse and it’s unclear exactly what’s going to happen. A lot seems rather reactive. Is there a coherent Trump policy here? Is it all just in the interest of Trump’s political standing and his personal wealth? Is it just driven by the desire to overturn the foreign policy consensus in every possible way? What is actually going on here?

    Muirhead: What we see in foreign policy is, on the one hand, a policy revolution. America First is a genuine change from the commitment to a kind of liberal international order. It obviously elevates the idea of zero-sum relations. We’re either winning or losing in all of our relations with every other country as opposed to the liberal idea that the entire world can become more prosperous, more free, and more secure simultaneously. So we’re getting something really different there.

    On the other hand, we’re also getting a degradation of the policy state. It’s not clear we have a foreign policy at all. What we have is a very powerful person, the most powerful person in the world, issuing a set of decrees, entering into a range of ad hoc deals, whether it’s Cambodia and Thailand, Rwanda and the Congo, whether it’s Armenia and Azerbaijan, India and Pakistan, Israel or Ukraine and Russia. It’s not clear that any of these deals hold, that they reflect any set of principles, or that there’s any institution that will maintain the enforcement of them.

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    Donald Trump’s getting very high marks for foreign policy. This is where he’s succeeding in the eyes of the public in the most definitive way. His approval ratings are very high. So I think we’re going to see a lot more ambition and action. He’s aching for a Nobel Prize. The question is whether the United States of America has any kind of genuine policy with respect to the international world or whether we have decrees that reflect the latest needs and moods of the great leader.

    Mounk: Do you see any coherence in Trump’s foreign policy, anything that we can make sense of? I had different theories at different times. Over the first nine months, I used to argue, for example, that one way of making sense of it is that he sees the world in terms of spheres of influence. He wants to let other people do whatever they want in their sphere of influence, but he feels that the United States should take advantage of its own sphere of influence much more so than it has done historically. I certainly think that that is part of it and perhaps that explains why he doesn’t really care about what MBS does in Saudi Arabia, certainly, and the region more broadly, as long as he doesn’t interfere with American interests. I’m not sure that these attempts to try and make sense of it in a coherent way really work that well.

    Luce: They call it “sane washing.” To a certain extent, I agree. There is a very crude “Kissinger spheres of interest” about Trump. But tariffs are not just his key economic policy. Tariffs are at the heart of his foreign policy, and tariffs are a tool of leverage to get transactional deals.

    Those deals make no distinction between public and private. The family is being enriched. That is a constant. We have no China policy. There is no coherent China policy, but the most significant foreign policy event of 2025, in my view, was Trump’s de facto surrender in this truce that he agreed with Xi Jinping in Busan at the G20 in South Korea.

    It was an acknowledgement that, at least for the time being, that China has a bigger bazooka, namely its stranglehold on rare earth, than the United States, namely its ability to cut off access to the American domestic market. That was a watershed moment that does not cast much light on what Trump’s foreign policy philosophy is. I do not think he has a foreign policy philosophy. The one thing I would ask Russell—I agree with everything you’ve said, Russell—is whether there is some degree of continuity in terms of the break from free trade, in terms of not liking forever wars, the withdrawal from Afghanistan. There is some continuity with Biden.

    Muirhead: Trump has in many respects George McGovern’s foreign policy. He hates being engaged in foreign wars. He doesn’t mind green lighting an attack on Tehran, but he doesn’t want to be in foreign wars. He is very skeptical about the international footprint of the American military. He is much more comfortable deploying the American military in Charlotte, North Carolina than deploying it in Europe. I don’t know if it’s proper to call him on the right or on the left. He is certainly authoritarian, but wherever he is, there is a kind of alignment with certain left views of American foreign policy over the last 50 years and the left’s criticism of America’s imperialistic international footprint.

    His tariff policy has more in common with Bernie Sanders’ economic policies than with Larry Summers or the traditional policies of the Republican Party. That is where there is sometimes a bewildering aspect to the policy revolution that we’re witnessing, alongside the degradation of a policy state and elemental institutions of government.

    One other element is massive increases in defense spending. Thirteen percent increase in the Pentagon’s budget, which is not insignificant, alongside a purging of generals. Twenty-four generals have been fired or sidelined, often without any explanation. Sometimes there is a story that goes up on right-wing social media and Hegseth fires a general. Anyone who worked in the office of former General Mark Milley has had their career stalled or has been fired.

    The phrase he used in his first term was “my generals.” It was a locution then. Now that is being put into practice. You have to factor that into the idea that there is not necessarily foreign policy when this military instrument of foreign policy is being rendered into an instrument of personal command.

    Mounk: All of this is happening against the background of an increasingly open debate about the direction of the MAGA movement and perhaps who might become the successor of Donald J. Trump. There is a feeling, some people are saying, of Trump becoming a lame duck. I think that is vastly overstated, but at least people are starting to position themselves and position the movement for what might come once he is longer in office.

    Ed, talk us through this rollicking and at times rather scary debate about what the Republican Party might become after Trump.

    Luce: There are many strands to it, but the key shift here that we have seen since the off-year elections in New York and Virginia and elsewhere is that for a full decade the Republican line has been whatever Trump says goes. He has an iron grip over this party. The party is essentially a Trump cult. If you oppose Trump, Trump will vaporize you like a boat in the Caribbean.

    That has changed quite dramatically. Marjorie Taylor Greene, Tom Massie, Lauren Boebert, and Laura Ingraham as an interviewer on Fox News are asking much tougher questions than the mainstream media. We are seeing Republicans take on Trump not from the old party, not from the Rob Portman, Mitt Romney portion of the party, which is defunct, but from the MAGA perspective, saying he is departing from MAGA. One of their criticisms is you have not released the Epstein files. Another is you are becoming a globalist. Another is you are hanging out with foreigners, and you seem to like their company more than your own rally goers and your own base.

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    The fact that in order to try to stop the discharge petition from passing to release the Epstein files he brings in Lauren Boebert to the Situation Room as one of the four Republican votes, trying to get her to reverse her position, and fails, is significant. That is as intimidating and awe-inspiring a setting as a president can ask a lone legislator to face, and she stuck to her guns. I am no fan of Lauren Boebert, and I am no fan of Marjorie Taylor Greene, but the courage they have displayed has paid off. That dispelled a certain dark magical Trump grip over the party, and it is very hard to restore what he had before. They have shown you can take him on, and you can make him climb down.

    At the same time there is a much more foreboding and troubling debate in the Republican Party about whether anti-Semitism is acceptable. That is essentially what it is. Is neo-Nazism acceptable? Are the Groypers acceptable? Tucker Carlson having Nick Fuentes on legitimizes a voice that was previously unhygienic. The fact that JD Vance, who is probably the favorite in this battle for the MAGA succession, has not repudiated Nick Fuentes’ heritage, of course, is in turmoil over the same issue. This is the culmination of many years in which MAGA has said you can hate brown people, you can hate women, you can hate gays, you can hate others, but stop at Jews. There is a certain logic that says why should we stop at Jews? The great replacement theory says Jews are the liberal puppet masters who are creating the multiculturalism we hate. There is a logic to that within MAGA thinking. It is a troubling direction precisely because there is a MAGA logic to it. But the overarching theme here is that Trump’s grip, his stranglehold over this party, is broken. I do not think it can be reestablished in the form that it was before.

    Mounk: Lauren, are we at one day going to be in the deeply horrible and paradoxical situation of being nostalgic for the relatively sane and calm Republican Party of Donald Trump? Is that something we have to start being able to imagine?

    Harper Pope: I actually think about this often. To Ed’s point, not necessarily about the anti-Semitism piece but in general, we kind of lucked out in some ways with a Trump who did not have that more maniacal strategy of someone who is more white nationalist and far right in a lot of ways. I think that the Democratic Party in particular has shown it is completely ill-equipped to combat something that Edward was referencing.

    I think that when it comes to Marjorie Taylor Greene and Lauren Boebert, it is fascinating to be in this political moment where Lauren Boebert and Marjorie Taylor Greene are defecting from Trump and saying, hey, look, we are taking back our power to show that we have a piece of this Republican Party puzzle as well. It is an interesting dynamic, and I am interested to see how it unfolds because I was reading a piece this morning about Marjorie Taylor Greene’s district. It was asking in man-on-the-street interviews, are you okay with Marjorie Taylor Greene wanting to release Epstein files and being this voice to try to return the priorities of the Republican Party to things like cost of living?

    They were saying, yes, we are okay with that. The general population of America can be very anti-establishment in itself anyway. That is where populism comes into play. When you think about the voters in her district, and granted, Trump overperformed Marjorie Taylor Greene by about four points this past election cycle, when you think about her response in this political moment, people appreciate her courage. They appreciate her trying to refocus the president on the cost of living and healthcare and things that are deeply important to the voters in her district, which is a largely rural district. It is interesting to see how it plays out, but I commend those two Republicans for having the guts to do it. I want to see what happens next.

    Mounk: I have a little bit of trouble letting pass, for I agree with much of what you said, the words of comment on Wilbert and Marjorie Taylor Greene. This may be one of those cases where people are so nuts that they disagree with somebody who is nuts in a different way, and two minuses make a temporary plus. I certainly do not think that they are principled or sensible in any deep way. It is interesting to see that coalition fracturing.

    Russ, you deal with Republicans not every day but many days of the week as a legislator in New Hampshire. I know that you try very hard to be collegial with many of them and have some good working relationships with some of them. I also know that you find some of them to be deeply frustrating. From the perspective of New Hampshire, where do you think the Republican Party might go?

    Muirhead: I think what we are seeing in every state and in the country is a kind of movement between the more traditional politics that are interest-based and principle-based that have roots in institutions where people meet face to face, like unions for the Democratic Party and churches for the Republican Party. You could call that traditional politics. There is a movement between that and a more movement-based politics. The MAGA movement is this breeze, this wind that nobody can control. There are no local chapters, there are no buildings, there are no chapter presidents or officers, and there are no monthly meetings of MAGA.

    Marjorie Taylor Greene is intuiting the movement. She is intuiting the movement as it exists in her district. So is Donald Trump. Donald Trump has had brilliant intuitions for what is necessary to cohere this movement and gather its force behind him. He is the sail, and he catches this wind. This movement is a force that no one can control. It is hard to know when it is going to stop, when it is going to change directions, or when its velocity is going to change. It is hard to use it in any predictable way.

    A principle-based politics like the conservatism of Ronald Reagan is a much more sedate, settled, and predictable kind of party politics and interstate politics, where you say we are going to serve, even on social issues, the interests that traditional Christians have with respect to family structure or whatever. That is a much more settled and policy-based politics. What we are seeing is the very difficult efforts by intuitively brilliant people like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Donald Trump to master movement politics, and it is not easy.

    Lauren, you mentioned the inability of the Democratic Party. I am curious to hear more about that. How do you see the skills or lack of skills in the Democratic Party?

    Harper Pope: I find it frustrating. One of the major criticisms that I and even Welcome have sometimes of the left is that the left in general, the Democratic Party, is very much into anti-Trump rhetoric of saying, we have to fight, we have to protest, and it has become predictable. It is a lazy talking point in a lot of ways because American voters want the Democratic Party to focus on and prioritize the issues that are closest to home for them. This past election cycle Democrats were prioritizing abortion and democracy, and voters wanted them to focus on immigration, inflation, and the economy. Those are the things that the Republican Party was focused on.

    More in Common even released a report about the priorities gap. Voters perceive Democrats to be prioritizing certain issues when they want Democrats to prioritize issues that matter to them. When it comes to anti-Trump rhetoric, yes, we should have some level of animosity or resistance toward this administration, but when you make it the talking point of every person in power and talk about it in every vein, the American voter already knows what Trump is doing and where he stands on issues. He is not the new guy coming down the escalator from ten years ago. When you talk about anti-Trumpism, you have to transition as a party to talking about what voters want you to prioritize.

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    To your point, Russ, the party has become a predictable entity that is always going to resist Trump on everything. Why do we not have more strategy in our opposition to show people that we are not only focused on the median voter’s priorities, but that we also have our own compelling vision for the future? I am in the centrist faction of the party. Many people criticize centrism by saying you are moderates who do not believe in anything. It is not that. Our friend Yair Zivan talks about having centrism as an actual vision for the future. It is not just the non-extremes. It has its own value system and case for what governance should look like.

    When you think about Democrats being in power, we need to do a better job of framing what we would be doing if we were in power at this point. We have regained ground on healthcare. Blue Rose put out research recently showing that healthcare is regaining trust among voters. But we still do not have the high ground on immigration, Social Security or the economy. How do we reframe our narrative to show that we are not just talking about Trump, but talking about what we would be doing if we were in power at this moment?

    Muirhead: Lauren, what would you think about a Democratic party that spoke the language of fiscal conservatism or balanced budgets for the sake of maintaining Social Security? Is that something you’d recommend to the party?

    Harper Pope: Uttering the words fiscal responsibility would be nice every once in a while. Democrats do not prioritize national debt. Americans know what that is like. Marigold Sinclair-Prez talks about this. Americans do not like being in debt themselves. They do not like the country being in debt either. The party has forsaken this responsibility to govern and to be able to pass budgets that are trying to be balanced.

    Clinton had a balanced budget thirty years ago. Why can we not talk about our aspirations to regain that sense for the country’s credit? To your point, we do not talk about fiscal responsibility. We talk about raising taxes, and we talk about what we can do with all that new tax money, but we do not talk about ways to balance the budget, which is a completely missed opportunity.

    Muirhead: If you do not like Medicare, if you never liked Medicare, if you do not like Social Security from the very beginning of Social Security and wished it had never come around, if you hate nutritional support and would rather have Americans eating dog food than having them be well nourished, if you want to get rid of SNAP, the best way to do all three of those things is to bankrupt the country. That is what we are seeing. We are seeing the bankruptcy, the fiscal bankruptcy, not just of the government but of the country, with deficits that are beyond description. It seems like it is going to fall to the Democratic Party to fix it. If anyone defends fiscal responsibility for the sake of maintaining these essential things, it is going to have to be the Democrats.

    Mounk: There are big differences between the left and the right. Even though I have warned both about right-wing populism and left-wing identitarianism, I do not think that the threats are of equal moral stature. There does seem to be one interesting parallel, which is that the conservative movement and the values of the tripartite coalition that made up the traditional Republican Party are genuinely different from Donald Trump, and they are generally different from Nick Fuentes and others who are growing their influence over the right-wing social media ecosystem. Those generally different ideals have had trouble withstanding that hostile takeover from the further right, trying to explain that these are values of our own that are different, that are distinctive, and that we should stick by.

    They have been tarnished with the word “RINO,” Republican in name only, with “sellouts,” in such a way that they have been forced to surrender or have been pushed out of the coalition. It is striking to me that this dynamic is somewhat similar on the left. In writing about identity politics and other things, I have repeatedly argued that we should not fall for what I call not-too-farism. There is a way to look at some of those successes and say, they want the right thing, they are just going a little bit too far. As Lauren points out, the kind of values for which I stand are different in a principled way. They have different goals. They think about the world in different ways. They have a completely different theory about how you make political change and how we have been able to overcome many of the deepest injustices in our nation’s history.

    It often seems on the left as well that the perception of moderate Democrats is, you are just less good left-wingers, just ones that do not have the courage of your conviction. There is a danger of a similar kind of hostile takeover. Why is this happening? Is this just the dynamics of social media? What is going on such that it is impossible at the moment to defend a philosophically liberal left-wing tradition or a philosophically liberal conservative tradition against those hostile attacks?

    Luce: I take a slightly different view about left-right Democrats. I think it depends on what you define as left-wing and what you define as right-wing. If you define left-wing as identity politics, then there has been a more robust pushback against that, and it is necessary and overdue. The degree to which Berkeley liberalism has been wrecking the Democratic brand across the country should be well understood. We saw signs in those off-year elections with Spanberger, Mikie Sherrill, and other campaigns that changing the subject is needed. This moral hectoring, this search for heretics as opposed to converts, is not a politics that serves the Democratic Party well, and we should know that by now.

    I am a foreigner, not a Democrat, but I would like to see the Democratic Party rebound and continue to rebound. There is a new phenomenon of left-wing young people on economics. There is a rebound of Marxism going on, and Mamdani has not been written off as a flash in the pan or a purely New York phenomenon. That understates the degree to which young Americans under 30 are, on economics, more left-wing than we have seen in the last generation. They are a deeply cynical generation. They are deeply cynical and quite anti-American. There is a lot of Chomsky in their worldview. There is a lot of them discussing the Communist Manifesto in their perspective, and Mamdani spoke to that.

    If you asked Spanberger and Mikie Sherrill whether we should have the American definition of socialism, which is socialized healthcare, basically single payer, they would say yes. It would not just be Mamdani. That is backed up by public opinion polls. I do not know what we mean by left-right anymore within the Democratic Party or across the political spectrum. Identity politics is a losing track for the Democrats, and I am encouraged to see that its peak may have passed.

    Muirhead: I think on so-called identitarianism or identity politics, it is both a matter of integrity and political prudence. The Democratic Party has to stand for non-discrimination and has to stand against the humiliation of minorities, whether they are minorities because of their gender identity, their sexual orientation, their race, small religions, or anything. This is absolutely essential. We cannot be liberals without standing against discrimination and humiliation. We have to be uncompromising on that.

    Imposing controversial conceptions of identity on the community via bureaucratic rules is not necessary, and that is alienating. There is a core that Democrats have to stand true to. I am with you, Lauren, on the fundamentals. This is a party that should be talking about the stuff that everybody wants, which is that everybody wants to be able to aspire to own their home. It is maybe not realistic to think every adult is going to succeed at that. We need to take that aspiration seriously and make it a real aspiration that those who, as Clinton said, work hard and play by the rules can realistically hope to attain.

    Everyone needs to be educated, whether it is vocational education or a more intellectual liberal arts education, without being bankrupted. Kids are taking on so much debt. It costs so much to go to a state university. It costs so much to go to a community college. Access not just to basic healthcare but to healthcare generally, is fundamental. Housing, education, healthcare—this is not identitarianism; it is the promise of American life. I think what I hear you say, Lauren, is that this is what the Democratic Party has to be about.

    Harper Pope: Welcome recently published a product called Deciding to Win. We actually have a tangible hardback book authored by Simon Bazelon. Long story short, Deciding to Win is that it is an effort based on Nancy Pelosi’s quote about deciding to win. Welcome Fest this past year had the theme of responsibility, taking responsibility to win.

    When we talk about the issues, we need to move the Democratic Party back to the center of the country, not back to the center of the party. If we are looking to regain the love and support of the median D.C. voter, that is easy. When we want to talk about actually competing in states like Iowa and Ohio and other states where we used to have a Democratic senator representing us, we have to be willing to come to the center on these issues.

    One thing about moderation and centrism is that it is not just talking about the priorities of voters, which is very important. It is being willing to avoid the absolutism of the extremism that the progressive faction has been championing. We do not need to have open borders. We need moderation on immigration.

    You mentioned Mamdani earlier. Mamdani moderated his positions, and it helped him have a victory. He was talking about defunding the police, and then for his mayoral campaign, he walked that back, saying, we do not need to defund the police, I apologize for that. The Democratic Party as a whole has failed to apologize and to show that it is evolving.

    I said this earlier this week on C-SPAN: we do not need to save this version of the Democratic Party. We need to evolve this party. We need to come back to the center of the country on issues and prioritize the things that voters want us to be prioritizing.

    Muirhead: I haven’t heard other people say that. It is a really astute observation that Mamdani moved to the center.

    Harper Pope: I would not say he moved to the center on everything, but he moderated his defund the police position, and we give kudos to him for that. Trump moderated last cycle. Trump was being talked about as doing a national abortion ban, and he said no. Trump moderated his abortion stance to be able to win last cycle. We do not talk about the people on the extremes moderating to show that moderation does give you victories.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Edward, Russell, and Lauren discuss the criticisms of Marie Gluesenkamp Perez from within the Democratic Party after she called out Chuy Garcia’s plan to choose his successor. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    41 min
  • What Does Nick Fuentes Think He’s Doing?
    (Nick Fuentes on the PBD podcast. Image via Youtube.)

    I did Model UN a little bit in high school and always felt that there was something off about it. The real UN is, of course, hopelessly boring, so to liven up the ersatz version of it, you have to introduce a few rogue elements—you need a dose of fanaticism (I remember our team trying to claim that Suriname, which we represented, was majorly invested in trying to curb genocide in Darfur) and you have to be a bit opportunistic: you’re being taught the lawyerly skills of being able to argue any position, no matter how noxious, with equal conviction. And then at the upper levels of Model UN, a bit of backstabbing helps as well—the real art to a conference is to develop a coalition and then to sell out that coalition so you get all the credit.

    Yes, there definitely is a dark side to Model UN, but it didn’t seem like that big of a deal until the delegate from hell, Nick Fuentes, showed up in the national discourse and seemed to take the whole country in a new, and much twerpier, direction.

    In an interview on Patrick Bet-David’s podcast PBD, Fuentes made it clear that this pretty much exactly is his origin story. He was more or less fully formed as an annoying right-wing contrarian by the time he got to high school and had his insufferability down pat—“When I was in Model UN, I was one of the best guys on the team, I would win first place every week,” Fuentes recalled. But the Model UN club faculty advisor gave him John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy to read and that gave young delegate Fuentes a new and exciting element to add to his right-wing portfolio beyond just the usual diet of Breitbart News and Prager University.

    And, like any debater finding a master theory of the case, Fuentes was quick to realize what he had in his hands. As a way to be provocative, anti-Semitism is hard to beat, and—as anti-Semites have realized for a long, long time—anti-Semitism has a cozy way of explaining just about everything. By the time the terrible child had reached college, he was carving out an anti-Semitic niche for himself within the alt-right movement—which led to his ostracism from leaders of the movement—but with his interview with Tucker Carlson in October, this new brand of anti-Semitism, workshopped for years on Fuentes’ “America First” show, seemed to jump the gate and enter the mainstream.

    If we try to understand Fuentes and what he represents, this seems to be the place to start, even if the white nationalist sentiments are maybe baked in a layer deeper. In the same PBD interview, here is how he explained it: “It’s important to impress upon you and maybe everybody where I grew up. It’s like this pocket of America that never changed. It’s a baseball town. Everybody’s white. Everybody’s obsessed with baseball … Take a trip down to Western Springs, Illinois, you’ll see what I mean. It’s like the land that time forgot.”

    But Fuentes seemed to quickly recognize that an advocacy of baseball would only take him so far, and, once he’d hit on praising Hitler and discussing world Jewry—and breaking the cordon sanitaire that American politics as a whole had towards anti-Semitism—then the sky was the limit as far as provocation was concerned. And there really was very little, it turned out, that couldn’t be explained through anti-Semitism. On his show, he argued that JFK was killed because he had opposed Israel’s nuclear weapons program—or maybe it was that JFK was killed because he had tried to get the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to register as a foreign agent, or maybe it was both, but, anyway, it was pretty definitely the Jews. “So this is an occupied nation,” Fuentes continued, describing the United States as “a vassal of Israel.”

    It is a note that we haven’t heard on a mass scale in American politics in quite some time, but it’s also not a new story—“it’s maybe old ideas presented in a new way,” as Fuentes said on PBD. And to put the right lens on Fuentes it may be worth doing a short refresher on modern anti-Semitism.

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    Historians tend to divide anti-Semitism into different parts. There’s a hoary old tradition of Christian anti-Semitism with blood libels and Christian children baked into matzah mix and a pogrom whenever things got a little slow in your village, and that sort of thing. By the late 19th century, the “Jewish Question” that had so bedeviled earlier generations seemed to have resolved itself—Jews had full citizenship in all German states by 1871 and Christian anti-Semitism seemed to be on the wane, together with a general decline in religiosity. At which point an entirely new anti-Semitism suddenly sprouted up. Wilhelm Marr, “the patriarch of anti-Semitism,” published The Victory of Judaism Over Germandom in 1879 and founded The League of Anti-Semites the same year, with a doctrine of blood-based “anti-Semitism” replacing the earlier religion-based “anti-Judaism.” Marr himself at the end of his life would distance himself from anti-Semitism and conclude that, really, it was the greater force of the Industrial Revolution that had generated social upheaval in Germany. And that’s been the general academic understanding of what the new anti-Semitism really entailed—it was a disgruntlement with modernity and with cosmopolitanism, with Jews serving as a scapegoat.

    The English writer Hilaire Belloc, no mean anti-Semite himself, would observe at a quieter moment, “the European so misunderstands the Jew that he imputes to him powers which neither he nor any other poor mortal can ever exercise.” But in the heat of politics it was often hard to remember that. The changes of modernity were so sweeping that it helped to reduce the scale of it by bringing things down to a more manageable cast of the Rothschilds and Syndicate and the Elders of Zion.

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    The sense of crisis that beset rapidly-industrializing nations in the 19th century has its parallels in our time. The longing for agriculture seems to have been replaced by nostalgia for baseball and barbecue in a small town. The understanding is that a solidly American way of life has been sold out by globalism—by foreign wars, foreign investments, and ever-escalating national debt. In another video, a rant against Ben Shapiro, Fuentes laid out his general complaint in a way that, I suspect, resonated with some enormous number of listeners: “Our country is broke. Our future is mortgaged. We’re debt slaves to the government and Black Rock.” If Trump built his movement around a rejection of outsourcing and the deindustrialization of the heartland, he never entirely spelled out who was responsible. Fuentes, however, does—and it’s a familiar formula. It’s the bankers, and the bankers are Jewish. And to that, he adds a new element. The anti-Semites of an earlier era didn’t have Israel to kick around, but Fuentes does. Here, for instance, is his theory of how the Iraq War came about:

    Because [Kennedy] tried to make sure that Israel just like all the other countries did not nuclearize because we’re against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and they killed him for it. And that set in motion something that eventually led to 9/11, the biggest attack on our soil in history, and then that set in motion the biggest strategic disaster in the history of the United States, which is the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror and the present situation we find ourselves in in the Middle East. Are you starting to get it now?

    How well it all fits together! How many factors—corporate pursuit of profits, bipartisan excitement about new markets in the ‘90s, warmongering generated largely by the Republican Party after 9/11—fade out of the equation, and all that’s left to explain fifty years of economic and foreign policy is Israel, AIPAC, the cunning Jews, and the simple baseball-loving volk of the Chicago suburbs being led along as if on a string.

    But to get to this time-honored position, you have to get around a certain national consensus—in a word, you have to get around V-E Day and the last real moment of national unity, which happened to be an international war fought and won against the worst-ever enemy of the Jews. It’s a real obstacle, and when Trump dreams of “making America great again” he often seems to be dreaming explicitly of this time—Bannon brought close to tears whenever he watches 12 O’Clock High, Trump looking to surround himself with the “central casting” version of a mid-20th century style national security apparatus.

    But Fuentes has been willing to work past all of this. His strategy here is to studiously downplay the importance of Nazism. The “Hitler apologetic” clips of Fuentes are what have gotten the most play around the web, so it can be a little hard to follow how his understanding of Nazism fits into his overall scheme. Here is how he puts it in one of his videos: “To the extent that we make jokes about Hitler … it is basically to treat this in a sacrilegious way, it is to blaspheme this religion, it is to destroy the sacred cow, the idol of the Holocaust.”

    In other words: “shut up Jews.” The argument—and this hearkens back to the pre-war “genteel anti-Semitism” that had a way of overlooking or excusing Hitler’s racial laws—is that the Holocaust is a glorified form of victimhood politics. As Fuentes explicitly puts it, “I’m trying to get to a point where Hitler is like every other leader.” And Fuentes would very much like to replace that point of mid-20th century anti-Nazi unity with something different—a “heritage conservatism” that reaches back to 19th century nativist strains and that views all immigration as an assault on an ethnicity-based national identity. If that makes it sound like Jewishness is incidental to Fuentes’ vision, though, it’s not—and a great deal of airtime on his show is taken up with his pushing back against right-wing critics who want him to tone down his anti-Semitism. “‘Hey well, we’re gonna moderate on the Hitler stuff, right?’ he imagines an interlocutor saying to him, to which Fuentes responds, “and it’s like no, I’m not.’” It really is important for him to get around the nostalgia for the post-World War II consensus and to substitute a vision from a much earlier era of a white ethnostate.

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    This, certainly, is confusing to other conservatives, and there was a kind of eye-popping moment during the Carlson interview, which played out pretty much exactly like the church pastor inviting a misbehaving youth into his office expecting to find common ground in Christ’s love only to discover that the lad really had sold his soul to the devil. For professional reasons both Fuentes and Carlson had a great deal at stake in making the interview as genial as possible, and much of it had a kind of bachelorette party feel of forgiving past slights (“I thought you were a Fed!” / “I thought you were a Fed!”) until they stumbled over the real crux of their disagreement. “God created every person as an individual not as a group. No woman gave birth to a community. We hate that thinking, right? Collectivist thinking like that. That’s identity politics. … But we’re not going to be that, right or no?” said Carlson, who, over the course of his many career turns, maybe had lost track of what he actually stood for. Fuentes, though, was quick to set him straight. “You say identity politics like it’s a bad thing. I think identity is a reality.”

    In their eagerness to be friendly, Carlson and Fuentes tried once again to strenuously agree with each other, but they had come across maybe the deepest divide of all—the question of how moral responsibility is assessed—and, coincidentally or not, it echoed the deep divide within 19th century anti-Semitism. For Carlson, steeped in a Judeo-Christian tradition, morality is ultimately individual and a matter of one’s actions. For Fuentes, it is identitarian and a question in the end of blood—a person could act in certain ways based only on their heredity. A divide much along these lines became particularly poisonous when the old Christian anti-Semitism, which emphasized conversion for Jews, gave way to another blood-based form of anti-Semitism where even conversion to Christianity couldn’t obviate the fundamental stain. For historians of anti-Semitism, it was that ultra-nationalist view that represented a truly virulent turn in anti-Semitism’s history, and in our time we have been treated to seeing it articulated right under the eyes of the befuddled Carlson.

    There is much blame to go around for this dark turn in the discourse. Attempts to censor Fuentes—he has been kicked off just about every possible social media platform and at one point was on a TSA no-fly list—seem not to have worked and succeeded only in making him something of a martyr. The bro-ish, edgelord tendencies of the internet have given cover, through various forms of threadbare irony, to his toxic ideology. The left takes the lion’s share of the blame for bringing identity into the forefront of political discourse, along with its evident implication that groups are to blame for the actions of anyone in their group and that guilt can never entirely be washed away. And then people like Carlson guilelessly bring the abhorrent ideology closer to the mainstream and in so doing launder it for mass consumption.

    And now here we are. Whatever else we might have disagreed on in our politics, it used to be that we could agree on this: Hitler bad; Holocaust bad; defeating Hitler good. Now, lots of people aren’t so sure. Populists and demagogues have throughout history discovered the explanatory power of anti-Semitism, and now the world’s worst Model UNer has as well, and in almost exactly the same form that Wilhelm Marr stumbled across back in 1880. The usual question with Fuentes—of whether he’s sincere in his anti-Semitism, or basically kidding—doesn’t matter. Anti-Semitism tends always to be an opportunistic mode of thought—like a favorite hat that can be taken off and put back on but that is always deployable when some really tidy explanation is called for for some vexing societal problem. Cognizant of where it can lead to, the West, with startling unanimity, has imposed a kind of public moratorium on anti-Semitism for the last 75 years, but the cynical will sooner or later find their way to it, as Fuentes did somewhere in the doldrums of some high school Model UN conference and then spent the next decade milking it for all it was worth. It really was nice to have a break from this particular strand of politics for as long as we did, but no longer. In a major way, anti-Semitism has reentered our discourse and, now, all bets are off.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

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  • This Week At Persuasion
    The Lumiere light show in Durham, England. Beautiful city. It’s not always grim up North. (Photo by Ian Forsyth/Getty Images.)
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, November 28, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

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  • Permitting Reform Alone Is No Panacea
    Cleaning up East Palo Alto after the 1998 flooding. (Photo By Carlos Avila Gonzalez/The San Francisco Chronicle via Getty Images.)

    This is part of a new American Purpose series “Abundance in America,” in which Francis Fukuyama and other leading intellectuals explore the barriers preventing infrastructure projects in the United States, why they’re needed, and how to create a country that builds.

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    One set of ideas for reworking Democratic policies following the 2024 presidential election is the abundance agenda. A core element of this initiative is reforming permitting processes, especially pertaining to critical infrastructure projects. Until recently, this was primarily a Republican concern. The business community complained that permitting problems held up commercial development and created economic inefficiencies. However, it became clearer to Democrats after the Biden administration’s Bipartisan Infrastructure Act and Inflation Reduction Act passed that the same problems could delay, or even kill, green infrastructure projects as well.

    Permitting reform causes less angst for Republicans because many of them care less about the regulatory goals behind the permits. For Democrats, on the other hand, abandoning the intent of environmental and safety regulation is not an option. Their challenge is how to navigate the need to build critical infrastructure more efficiently without undermining legitimate regulatory goals.

    The permitting reform topic has been particularly contentious in California for decades. California has long had a reputation for being over-regulated and highly taxed—causing it, critics claim, to lose businesses like SpaceX, Oracle, Chevron, and the like to our nemesis state, Texas. The reality is more nuanced, but the concern about business conditions is widespread and has important implications for the state’s budget. Inside the California Democratic Party, the question often pits ardent environmentalists against centrists.

    Nonetheless, California has shown that Democrats can undertake serious permitting reform if they so choose, such as putting limits on grounds on which a permit can be denied and imposing time limits on the length of a permitting process. Permitting reform is an important goal, but infrastructure projects are difficult for many reasons beyond the permitting processes. It is a necessary first step, but not a sufficient solution.

    Understanding the Problem

    What does over-regulated mean? To some, it means the sheer number of laws and regulations on the books. The Mercatus Center, for instance, claims that California is the most over-regulated state because its review of the state’s administrative codes 2023-24 revealed that they contained over 420,000 regulatory restrictive words, which was more than other states by orders of magnitude in several cases (e.g. Idaho, 31,000). Many of these provisions have nothing to do with economic development or the environment.

    A high volume of environmental and safety regulation brings more citizen and business actions into potential play. Large infrastructure projects can fall simultaneously under the domain of local, state and federal agencies (vertical fracture) and across multiple agencies at each level of government (horizontal fracture). That means there are multiple veto points at which opposition groups can stop or delay the permitting process. Transaction costs increase with each agency that must be consulted. A mitigation deal with one agency might have to be renegotiated after consultation with another agency. A separate, serial review by multiple agencies is usually prolonged and frustrating. While it helps to put all the agency officers in the same room, it will not expedite the process if they lack final decision-making authority and must ship the ultimate approval to a higher level.

    When environmentalists use veto points to stop shopping malls, this obstruction seems to them like a good idea. But when it holds up or causes the cancellation of utility-scale wind and solar farms or prescriptive burns for wildfires, it seems more problematic. As the saying goes in politics, “where you stand depends upon where you sit.”

    Another factor in permit obstruction is the democratization of administrative processes. Because of well-intentioned reforms since the 1970s, regulatory decision-making has been opened up by Freedom of Information Act requirements, open meeting laws and other transparency measures. The premise of these reforms was that allowing the public to view what had previously been done in secrecy would restore confidence and legitimacy to administrative processes. In my book Democracy More or Less, I refer to this as the “more democracy is always better” assumption: i.e. that more procedural openness will improve decision-making and make it less susceptible to special interest capture. However, that is true only if the public is well informed, motivated, and participates in representative numbers—which rarely happens in administrative proceedings.

    As compared to city council, state legislative, or congressional hearings, an administrative hearing typically receives less press coverage and sparse public attendance, unless a group of citizens has a specific complaint about a problem that directly affects them. Interest groups either send their lobbyists and government affairs officers or hire outside consultants to monitor the proceedings for them. Organized and well-resourced neighborhood groups might also attend when alerted, but the potential for selection bias is omnipresent with state and local administrative hearings.

    At the same time, vague bill language means agencies are placed in the position of making legislative rather than purely administrative decisions. The greater the discretion allotted to agencies, the more an administrative process opens controversies the legislative body wanted to avoid. Environmental bills, for example, often allocate considerable flexibility. One defensible reason for this is an acknowledgement of the contextual variation of environmental conditions in different ecological settings. However, the raw political reason for this is to pass the hot political potato down the intergovernmental line. Handing legislative tasks to administrative agencies, for good or bad reasons, undermines issue closure. Passing an environmental bill all-too-often re-starts ongoing re-litigation over what a bill should do.

    Procedural fracture and skewed participation can interact perversely in a state that clusters by wealth. Regulatory authority of stationary air pollution in California is regionally subdivided. The Central Valley CARB (a redder region and home to agribusiness and industry) is far laxer with its air pollution regulations than its Bay Area counterpart. The membership of the regional board members varies predictably across areas, with agribusiness and industry dominating in the more polluted Central Valley region and environmentalists and liberals in the Bay Area. Regional regulatory fracture results in considerable regulatory variance. Add in the differences in educational attainment and English language facility in different regions, and you get even more regulatory variance.

    When it comes to green infrastructure, there can be permitting obstruction across and within party lines. Several Republican counties with ample amounts of open land for large wind and solar farms in California such as San Bernardino, Glenn and Shasta have passed measures limiting them to a few restricted areas due to noise and visual blight. In the more populated, solidly blue, coastal side of the state, the expense of the land and the same nuisance objections preclude even the mere consideration of siting them there.

    Environmental groups also use permitting opportunities to delay or obstruct utility scale wind and solar to prevent potential damage to wildlife such as birds or turtles. In some ideal world, these issues would be hashed out and compromised at the legislative or electoral levels as opposed to site-by-site permitting battles. These same tensions are also fought out over permitting desalination plants, allocating surface water for aquifer replenishment, repurposing farmlands, building high speed rail, etc., keeping lawyers, economists, and consultants fully employed.

    One might suppose that universities are oblivious to these issues, but that is not so. A good example of this is the problem that my university, Stanford, faced when trying to enhance protection from flooding in the San Francisquito Creek, which borders the Western side of the campus. The creek overflowed into major parts of Palo Alto in 1998, and five entities that either bordered or had jurisdiction over the creek entered into a Joint Point Powers agreement to create better physical protection from future creek flooding that will likely worsen with climate change.

    After organizing itself, the Joint Powers Authority came up with plans to widen and raise the levees at the bottom of the creek to prevent it backing up onto Stanford property and other neighbors. This ultimately required state and federal approval from eight different agencies, i.e. a great deal of procedural fracture and complexity.

    The process also attracted many stakeholders such as environmental groups, who were concerned about the effects of diverting the flooding into a marsh area that contained two endangered species that few people knew about; golfers who did not like how it would reconfigure the front nine of their course; justice groups who claimed to be worried that the levees on the poorer East Palo side would be several inches lower than on the wealthier Palo Alto side; and the NIMBYs who saw an opportunity to get rid of the small airport for people who needed to practice taking off and landing multiple times in a day. As a frequent hiker of the trail underneath the landing path, I could sympathize with that objection.

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    In the end, responding to the technical objections raised at both the state and federal levels—that often sounded like pretexts—the process went on for years at great expense. The final completion of the first part of the project was in 2019, and subsequent pieces were finished in 2024 with another due in 2026, over a quarter of a century after the initial planning started. In the meantime, the risk of flooding in the lower income East Palo Alto Area was unaddressed while all these other issues were contested. Did Democrats appreciate the problem? In the words of one writing in the Palo Alto newspaper:

    In the nine years I was on the Parks and Recreation Commission, ending December 2012, I attended and participated in countless meetings about the creek and the golf course. I found it to be frustrating how protracted the process of working through all the various issues around this project was … I will remain a Democrat, but this is a classic example of a criticism that Republicans voice about the heavy hand of government getting in the way of local government best serving its local citizens.

    Are there solutions to the permitting problem that do not involve gutting environmental laws? Yes. Are Democratic politicians willing to take them? Yes, sometimes. In 2014, during a drought that ultimately lasted three years, Governor Jerry Brown issued executive orders that suspended parts of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to expedite emergency regulations and temporary permits for water supply projects. But, for all the reasons that Trump has demonstrated at the national level, emergency powers should be temporary and used sparingly.

    A more relevant example is two laws passed to expedite the permitting of charging stations for electric vehicles. Among other provisions, they required that permits must be automatically approved unless there is a specific, adverse impact to public health and safety (as opposed to reviews based on aesthetics or zoning); it required online applications with a task checklist, and binding timelines for permit approval.

    When it did not appear that the number of level three charging stations was increasing at the hoped-for rate after the reform, the state suspected that local communities were slow-walking the permitting process. The Bill Lane Center for the American West undertook the task of investigating for the Governor’s Go-BIZ office. What we discovered was that cities were indeed trying to turn the state law into local ordinances, but the complexity of approving large projects involved multiple departments that slowed the process to some degree.

    But more importantly, the real problem was the difficulty of hooking up to the grid (called “energization” in the trade). Grid congestion and coordination issues were the real reasons that permitting reform by itself could not solve the problem of creating as many level three charging stations as the state’s ambitious decarbonization goals required.

    And therein lies an important caveat to the permitting emphasis that some abundance agenda advocates take. Building infrastructure has many problems and permitting is just one. There are political problems (e.g. voters are more concerned about day-to-day problems than those that affect future generations); financial problems (e.g. these are expensive projects and government commitment to them shifts with political tides); and underlying political problems (e.g. NIMBYism and partisanship) that will remain.

    Permitting reform is a good thing, but it is not a miracle cure for what ails U.S. infrastructure development.

    Bruce Cain is a Political Science Professor at Stanford and writes about problems of democracy and Environmental Governance.

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  • 272 Words That Changed America
    (Photo via Getty Images.)

    On November 19, 1863—exactly 162 years ago today—Abraham Lincoln delivered the most famous speech in American oratory.

    The Gettysburg Address was given at the commemoration of a new national cemetery to mark the battle of Gettysburg that had occurred some four months before. The main speaker of the day was the Reverend Edward Everett; Lincoln was invited at the last minute and asked to perform “the last solemn act of dedication.” Everett’s speech lasted over two hours; Lincoln’s under three minutes. For most of the 15,000 people who had assembled that day, Lincoln’s speech was over before it began, yet in 272 words he accomplished nothing less than the creation of American democracy.

    It is an urban legend that Lincoln’s speech was written on the back of an envelope on the train journey up to Gettysburg. This is false, but in America, as the saying goes, when the legend becomes fact, print the legend. He continued to refine the text during the trip, but we know that he took extraordinary care in composing his speeches.

    Lincoln rarely travelled during the war. Given the fact that the trip from Washington to Gettysburg was not an easy one and involved various transfers, we can infer that this was a speech he very much wanted to deliver. It was the speech that he had been preparing for his entire adult life.

    The Gettysburg Address begins by reminding its audience of the date of the American founding. Lincoln places our beginning at 1776, the year of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. The famous opening, “Four score and seven years ago,” is deliberately biblical and archaic. His reference to “our fathers” is intended to recall the biblical patriarchs who “brought forth” and “conceived” a new nation. The language of conception, birth, and rebirth runs throughout the text.

    But the most striking aspect of the speech is its reformulation of the idea of equality. In a text intended to recall and honor the framers, Lincoln shows his greatest departure from them. Thomas Jefferson had declared “we hold these truths to be self-evident” that all persons are created equal. A self-evident truth is true by definition of its terms alone. The language of self-evidence comes from logic and mathematics.

    For Lincoln, however, equality was a proposition to which we must remain dedicated. No one needs to be dedicated to the Pythagorean theorem—it remains true despite what people may believe—but this is not the case with a term like equality. Lincoln endows it with an existential quality that requires faith and commitment. It must undergo a trial by fire before its truth can be realized. He offers no guarantee that the proposition that all men are created equal will be proven true. Its verification depends entirely on us.

    It is to this ideal that we must remain dedicated. The words “dedicate” or “dedicated” are used five times; the words “consecrate” or “consecrated” twice; and the word “devotion” twice also. The speech makes no formal recognition of theology—it mentions only once “this nation, under God”—but Lincoln’s goal is to endow the founding with a sacred beginning.

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    No word is more important in the Gettysburg Address than the numerous uses of the first-person plural pronoun: “we are engaged,” “we are met on a great battlefield,” “we have come to dedicate,” “we cannot dedicate,” “we cannot consecrate,” “we cannot hallow,” “it is rather for us,” “the great task remaining before us,” “we here highly resolve.” It is not “I” but “we” about whom he is speaking. We are part of a great collective noun.

    But who, exactly, is this “we”? The audience at Gettysburg? The Northern dead? The soldiers in the field? All Americans both North and South? Lincoln did not use the word “democracy” in his speech, but his three-fold reference to government “of the people, by the people, for the people” gives the speech an undeniably democratic character. His goal was not simply to defend the Union and the Constitution, but to shape the principles of democratic peoplehood.

    It was at Gettysburg that Lincoln transformed the struggle to preserve the Union into a struggle to create democracy. From now on, it will no longer be possible to think of the government simply as a contract between the states or even between individuals, but as a nation composed of a people with a common moral purpose without which democratic government would be impossible. Lincoln’s address is a momentous exercise in nation-building. It was at this moment that America became not a collection of states or a mass of individuals, but a people.

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    The Gettysburg Address begins with a reference to “this continent”—the land and the soil—but it concludes with a reference to the “earth,” suggesting that the struggle for democracy is not just an American phenomenon but something that will affect the future of mankind. The speech reveals an upward trajectory from the particular to the universal. The war may have begun as a purely sectional conflict between North and South, but it has become part of a global struggle for democracy.

    Lincoln’s promise of “a new birth of freedom”—a startlingly ambitious phrase, almost a revolutionary one—announced his attempt to endow democracy with a new beginning, purified from the stain of slavery and rooted in respect for the dignity of every human being. It was Lincoln who gave to democracy the uniquely aspirational meaning that we attribute to it today. When we speak of democracy, we do so in the language that Lincoln created.

    Steven B. Smith is the Alfred Cowles Professor of Political Science at Yale where he teaches political theory.

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  • How the Internet Made the Far-Right
    Alt-right Internet personalities Nick Fuentes and Alex Jones in 2020. (Photo by Zach Roberts/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    When Politico published racist and antisemitic messages from a Young Republican group chat in October, the surprise was as much who was talking as what they said. These weren’t anons who’d been unmasked as political operatives. They were already inside the machine, joking that they “love Hitler”—under their government names, in writing, in an ostensibly professional space. Their tone was casual, the jokes lifted from an online dialect so pervasive that for the already terminally online, it hardly registered as shocking. Offensive, sure. Shocking? No.

    That dialect—and it is a dialect—did not just suddenly materialize in 2016. It was forged during well over a decade of digital upheaval, as the wall between the Internet’s margins and its mainstream gave way. Its roots run back to early Bulletin Board Systems, listservs, and public library terminals; it threads through forums and blogs before finding a new home on imageboards.

    The story, as it incarnates in its current form, begins with Gamergate, rises through the alt-right’s brief media reign, and settles in the pandemic years, when Twitter laid bare the id of American politics.

    The first turning point came in 2014, when a breakup between a game developer, Zoë Quinn, and her ex-boyfriend Eron Gjoni spilled into public view and metastasized into Gamergate. The “torturously complex” sequence of events has famously been hard to tease apart—the original accusation made by Gjoni that Quinn had traded sexual favors for a positive review of her video game, Depression Quest, fell apart—but the general grievances of Gjoni’s blog post rerouted themselves into complaints about the presence of women in the gaming community and the perception of favorable treatment of those women. What Gamergate was depends on whom you ask and which side of the political aisle they’re on.

    For many gamers, most of them young and male, it was about corruption and bias, as in the soon-to-be-widespread slogan, “ethics in games journalism.” For them, Gamergate became a kind of political awakening, an introduction to the understanding that the media lies, that journalists and women aren’t to be trusted, and, perhaps most importantly, that trolling works. To journalists and women in gaming, though, Gamergate was understood as something else entirely: a campaign of harassment, doxxing, and threats that exposed the machinery of online mobbing.

    In practice, Gamergate was both a digital populist rebellion—a toxic one, to be sure—and a deluge of harassment and intimidation. I’ve even heard it likened, half-jokingly, to an “Arab Spring” for gamers—a too-flattering comparison, but one that reveals how many on the right still understand it. Those too young to witness Gamergate now treat it like others treat physical-world war stories: a mythic redpill origin tale about the moment the veil first lifted, and they understood how power really worked.

    By 2016, that sensibility had found its next form.

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    The alt-right, for all the subsequent attempts to define it, was not a coherent ideological movement. It was a fragment—an expression—of a larger online ecosystem which included several discrete subcultures that eventually escaped containment. Taken together, the alt-right was characterized by a defiance aimed at both progressive culture and establishment conservatism. If it possessed any real throughline, it was the way it weaponized the language of the Internet: trolling and mockery.

    Early claims that “conservative is the new punk rock” were apt in at least one way. Much of the movement’s aesthetic—Nazi imagery included—was designed to shock rather than to persuade. Yet, as time went on, it became clear that many within the movement weren’t being “ironic.” They believed it. They really were antisemitic. They really were white nationalists. It wasn’t a joke. Irony gave them cover, at least for a time. If a joke landed, it worked as propaganda. If it failed, it was “just trolling.”

    In her excellent book about the alt-right, Black Pill, Elle Reeve calls this “visibility warfare”: each act of exposure fed the movement’s reach. Every denunciation bred new avatars, aesthetics, and offshoots—people who saw this alt-right thing and wanted to be a part of it, and created something in its shadow.

    The alt-right’s real innovation was learning to weaponize a particularly Internet-native spectacle, to treat outrage as both recruitment and entertainment. It mutated and burrowed, like mold on bread.

    Charlottesville was the breaking point.

    In response to the removal of Confederate monuments in Virginia, far-right groups, including Klansmen and neo-Fascists, gathered in Charlottesville for the “Unite the Right rally.” At one march, white nationalists carried tiki torches and shouted “Jews will not replace us.” The chaotic weekend ended with one far-right marcher plowing his car into a crowd of counter-protestors, killing one and injuring 35. The rally’s violence (which was also from some leftist agitators, not only the right-wing protestors) and the ensuing lawsuits shattered the alt-right’s momentum, though it didn’t entirely extinguish its energy. Things changed, and, for the participants, the stakes rose. A spirit of paranoia replaced the humor.

    And so, the people who once called themselves “alt-right” scattered. Some, like National Policy Institute Executive Director Evan McLaren, renounced the label altogether—claiming that he “was a right-winger until [he] grew up.” Richard Spencer, the media’s chosen face of the alt-right, re-emerged as a Democrat-voting writer and podcaster who champions an ideology he calls “Apolloism.” He’s among several figures who are now what you might call post-right: disgusted with what the alt-right, and the right at large, had become while occasionally still hanging onto some of their old white identitarianism.

    Others rebranded or outgrew the label—situating themselves within a more respectable expression of conservatism. Their reasons were both cynical and sincere. Some were pushed into exile on Telegram, only to reappear on X after Elon Musk loosened moderation in 2023, an uncanny alt-right night of the living dead.

    The online right, the broader ecosystem from which the alt-right emerged, was always a larger force. It had existed before the alt-right and would outlast it. It was and is sprawling, running from mainstream conservative entertainers to libertarians to neoreactionary bloggers like Curtis Yarvin to traditionalist Catholic sedevacantists to post-liberal intellectuals to ecofascists to out-and-out white nationalists. The alt-right—ultimately, a network of people, a scene, with Breitbart News as a highly-visible manifestation of an outlet influenced by their aesthetics—had simply been its loudest, most combustible node. The node that the media paid most attention to; the node that loved the media attention as much as the media loved paying attention to them. Between 2018 and 2020, new figures emerged who hadn’t been part of the original scene and found something in its defiance appealing.

    Of the smaller subcultures that emerged from the alt-right’s collapse, the “dissident right” was the most self-consciously intellectual, the most aesthetically refined, and ultimately one of the most influential. It came out of forums, blogs, and “Frogtwitter”—a group chat that included many now-famous right-wing Internet personalities. In the wake of alt-right doxxings—mass “unmaskings” that revealed people’s legal names and cost many people their jobs—it treated anonymity as sacred. Don’t organize. No online romances, reciprocated or otherwise—lust is a security risk. Don’t become a “facef–”—online slang for someone who reveals their real identity and uses their real face. You’re not here to become a talking head on Fox News, are you? There were feds—federal agents or informants—everywhere, or so everyone thought.

    As the subculture grew—attracting attention from people like the hosts of the popular podcast Red Scare—the paranoia began to dissipate, though not completely. The New York Times columnist Ross Douthat would eventually call it a “right-wing counterculture—an edgy, radical-seeming alternative to the status quo.”

    Roger Ruin, a blogger who once moved in these circles and now writes retrospectively, describes this evolution as inevitable. The “Optics Wars,” he argues, forced the movement to shed its explicit neo-Nazism and reemerge in subtler, stylized forms—religious, populist, ironic. The tone of the alt-right endured even as the ideology fractured.

    And then there was Twitter.

    The platform had long blurred the line between the fringe and the professional world, and the pandemic made that mix complete. During lockdowns—when almost everyone was dangerously online—an expanding alternative media ecosystem fed on the energy of anonymous reactionaries who supplied memes, aesthetics, and ideas, while public commentators repackaged them for wider audiences.

    Some anons attempted serious projects: translations, essays, philosophy. Others were provocateurs. Many were simply racists who were good at posting. Whatever their motives, they set the rhythm of online conservatism. The anons were funny, they drove engagement, and they created the impression of a living, energetic right-wing intellectual scene.

    In the digital-native media market, they won the battle.

    Those pursuing more “serious” work were often older—shaped by decades in the blogosphere and on forums—as opposed to the loudest edge cases that dominated public imagination. They were people with intellectual ambitions who didn’t fit neatly into any sanctioned ideological home (for good reason!), and who ended up developing their ideas online.

    Many of them, above all, were Internet personalities. Sharing their work with anons instead of academics, they picked up the idiom of their surroundings: irreverent, ironic, performatively unserious, even when the ideas underneath were not. Some of those ideas—like “human biodiversity,” the argument that different races have inherently different physical and mental capabilities—sat far outside the mainstream. But the people advancing them were, in some cases, not stereotypical cranks, and readers could tell.

    The boundaries between these circles and the mainstream right were porous. Journalists, think tankers, and academics lurked in the same spaces, borrowing language and aesthetics or engaging directly. The exchange was often stylistic, not ideological, though occasionally it was both. Recall the time Ron DeSantis campaign aide Nate Hochman retweeted a Sonnenrad (sun wheel)—a symbol associated with neo-Nazi groups—in a campaign video. It was a bizarre scene, to say the least. Hochman claimed ignorance—that he didn’t know what a Sonnenrad was. Many people rolled their eyes at this, “Sure.” It was at once too obscure and too obviously associated with Nazism to take what he said at face value.

    But on the other hand, if you spend a lot of time on Twitter, you might be inclined to believe him—it’s just in the water there, with images and ideas drifting across discourse-lines. At any rate the Hochman Affair was paradigmatic of Twitter’s impact on politics. Irony, detachment, and a studied hostility to moral language became the lingua franca of conservatism itself. One has to wonder if an administration now posting AI-generated meme slop would have done so had they spent less time on Twitter. I tend to believe they wouldn’t.

    The right isn’t alone in this, though.

    A decade earlier, a different corner of the Internet had been shaping its own political sensibility (and it wasn’t the first time online subcultures spilled into real institutions). If Tumblr helped cultivate the identity politics that would later influence a generation of progressive journalists, activists, and academics, Twitter was doing something parallel on the right. The “ironic right” emerged as Twitter’s counterpart to Tumblr’s “social justice left.”

    Conservatives noticed the engagement this style generated. Young aides, NGO staffers, Hill workers, and magazine writers started adopting the tone of anonymous posters because it performed well online and conferred cultural fluency. It had social cachet. Their favorite podcasters spoke in this language—maybe it got them invited to cool group chats. In some cases, the anons and the institutional actors were literally the same people.

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    A new circulation pattern developed: reactionary ideas moved through influencers, staffers, and journalists with the same ease that Tumblr’s identity politics once traveled through fan communities. What’s left isn’t a movement, just a mood; politics as vibe.

    And now the landscape is shifting once more. As platforms like TikTok, Instagram Reels, and YouTube Shorts have come to dominate online attention, the Internet is moving from text to short-form video. It’s about personality, not wit. Where text-based platforms rewarded clever wordplay, video platforms reward the ability to hold attention in seconds. Today, Governor Gavin Newsom mimics the way Trump tweets—he tries to signal he’s a poster. The official DHS account on X posts the most incomprehensibly juvenile and offensive memes—as in, to take one example of many, a Studio Ghibli-style image of a stony-faced white officer handcuffing a weeping Hispanic woman. Billionaires like Elon Musk long to be a “poster.” Tomorrow, they may long to be streamers and TikTokers—a style of posting that has been popular for years, but, now, seems to be competing in influence.

    The style that built 4chan and early Twitter—dense with in-jokes, irony, and textual sophistication—no longer works as well in this new environment. What began as a joke became a shared language. It’s how people talk now. And now, things are changing again. The irony, as Reeve observes, is that the networked culture once expected to democratize speech has instead blurred sincerity and parody so thoroughly that it’s often impossible to tell where one ends and the other begins.

    Katherine Dee is a tech correspondent at The Spectator and a columnist at Tablet. Her work has also appeared in GQ, Pirate Wires, UnHerd, The Free Press, and elsewhere. She hosts a weekly call-in show on her Internet-culture blog, default.blog.

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  • James Loxton on Democracies and Dictators

    James Loxton is a Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Sydney. He is the author of Authoritarianism: A Very Short Introduction.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and James Loxton explore different types of authoritarian regimes, why they fail, and whether the United States passes the fear test.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We talk a lot about democracy, which are themselves hard to define. Most listeners probably have a sense of what they mean by democracy. When we talk about dictatorship, authoritarianism, those are such broad concepts, incorporating such different regime forms. What is an authoritarian system? What is a dictatorship?

    James Loxton: The way that authoritarianism is used today, it is simply a shorthand for all non-democratic regimes. I like to think about the big three—the big three types of authoritarian regime. Those are military regimes, single party regimes, and personalist regimes. Each of those subtypes of authoritarianism is really different.

    But that’s also not an exhaustive list. You can have, for example, theocracies and potentially other kinds of authoritarian regimes as well. But this is what, in political science, we call a residual category. So democracy is actually defined quite clearly, and we can talk about the defining criteria of democracy. If any of those criteria are violated, the regime is, by definition, a dictatorship.

    Mounk: I feel like you’ve left out—I suppose because they’re not very prevalent today—what traditionally would have been the most important form of authoritarian regime, which is just some form of monarchy in which the king, or sometimes the queen, held tremendous power, right?

    Loxton: Some people do like to distinguish between monarchies and what are known as personalist dictatorships. When I say monarchies, I’m not talking about Great Britain, Sweden or Japan—constitutional monarchies. I’m talking about actual ruling monarchies like Saudi Arabia. Some people like to distinguish between monarchies and personalist dictatorships. If you want to do that, that’s fine. I think it really has to do with how seriously you take the idea of royal bloodlines. I don’t take it particularly seriously, but whether that person is called a king or whether it’s just President-for-Life So-and-so who then tries to pass power to a son, it’s pretty much the same thing in my mind.

    Mounk: What’s interesting is that democracy emerges, obviously, in ancient Athens. You can argue we had democracies in certain Italian city-states. But really, it’s a very rare regime type until quite recently. So one way of thinking about this is that, throughout history, this residual category of dictatorship or authoritarianism encompassed effectively every regime in the world.

    Loxton: Absolutely.

    Mounk: Historically, a lot of places were monarchies. Tell us about what those systems were like, what we know about them, and then perhaps talk about how that compares to Venezuela today, which I suppose you would call a personalist dictatorship or something like that. There are some important differences between Louis XIV and 17th–18th century France and then contemporary Venezuela or Saudi Arabia and so on.

    Loxton: Absolutely. So I think what I would say—and what you were kind of gesturing towards before—is that authoritarianism is the norm. For all of human history, pretty much, or at least post–hunter-gatherer societies, the vast majority of polities have been under some form of non-democratic rule. Democracy is really the exception. The fact that we now think of this as the natural way of being—personally, I believe that democracy is a better form of government than authoritarianism—that’s actually a really new idea. Even when we talk about what we think of as the quintessential democracy of the ancient world, which is ancient Athens—that would not meet modern standards of democracy; it wouldn’t come even close to it.

    Maybe 10 to 20% of the population were citizens and were therefore allowed to participate in politics. There’s absolutely no respect for something like what we would call civil liberties today. Socrates, Athens’ most famous citizen, was famously sentenced to death for basically being an infidel and for corrupting the youth. So even ancient Athens would not meet modern standards of democracy.

    Mounk: The other thing that brings that out is that, obviously, the way systems work and the kind of performance they have is going to vary hugely. Under the heading of authoritarianism we have everything from ancient Sparta to small tribal societies in Africa or elsewhere, to contemporary China and Iran—those are so heterogeneous that it’s hard to generalize about them.

    How does this typology of three different types of dictatorship start to help us think about this? I’m sure that there are different political scientists who cut up the space in slightly different ways, but why is one common-sense way within the field of cutting up authoritarian systems in those three types? What does that allow us to understand about their nature that is important?

    Loxton: The term authoritarianism is actually an old one—it dates back to the 1850s in the English language. It didn’t mean quite what it means now. At the time, it referred to a kind of personality type: people who preferred obedience to authority over personal liberties. Only in the second half of the 20th century did the term begin to be used to describe political regimes.

    The person most associated with that shift—using authoritarianism to describe a kind of regime—is the famous Spanish sociologist and political scientist Juan Linz. His formative experiences were the Spanish Civil War and then living under the decades-long Franco regime. Clearly, the Franco regime was not a democracy, and yet, when he compared it to Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, he realized it was quite different.

    Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, especially under Stalin, were described as totalitarian regimes, and there was a lot of interest in studying totalitarianism. People like Hannah Arendt, of course, wrote about it. Linz said that was a worthy topic of study, absolutely. But most non-democratic regimes in the world are not actually that similar to Stalinism or Hitlerism. They’re probably more similar to the Franco regime. And so he began to talk about authoritarianism.

    Since then, the term has morphed—and arguably has become too broad. I can see in your questions a bit of skepticism. I mean, wait, this term really extends from everything in the ancient world right up to contemporary Venezuela? That’s a bit weird, isn’t it? And the answer may well be yes. But that is, for better or worse, how it is used in political science: a residual category for regimes that are not democracies.

    Mounk: Before we delve into some of these different regime types, you brought up the distinction between totalitarian systems and non-totalitarian systems. My understanding is that that’s a separate conceptual distinction from the one we laid out earlier—between military, personalistic, and other kinds of dictatorship.

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    Now, another way I think about this—and tell me whether that’s how you’d describe it as well—is that a totalitarian political system, like many fascist and communist systems, wants total mobilization of society. You have to be political. If you’re ten years old, you have to join the youth organization—the fascist youth organization in a fascist country, the communist youth organization in a communist country. There are big displays of the public mobilization of the populace. Everything becomes political in this society. The system wants you to participate in politics—of course, only in the one sanctioned form of politics—but it does want you to participate.

    Whereas in a lot of dictatorships, life is rather different. A lot of dictatorships say, of course, if you come out in the street and protest against this authoritarian regime, well, then you’re in trouble. But otherwise, go home, watch TV, do your job—we’re not going to make your whole life political. There are going to be cases that lie somewhere in between. But is that what we mean when we talk about totalitarian versus non-totalitarian forms of authoritarianism?

    Loxton: When Linz talked about totalitarianism versus authoritarianism, he was really talking about three different things. One of those was what you just gestured toward—whether or not the population was supposed to get actively involved in politics. Linz grew up in Spain—he was Spanish—but his father was German, so he also knew Germany pretty well. As you mentioned, the youth organization in Nazi Germany was the Hitler Youth. In the Soviet Union, there was some kind of equivalent organization. The Boy Scouts were banned. You were expected to join organizations like that. You were expected to vote in these ridiculous, meaningless electoral rituals where the ruling party would win 99% of the vote. You were supposed to get actively involved. In authoritarian regimes, according to Linz, it was the opposite. You were really supposed to keep your head down and your mouth shut—and if you did that, then you were doing what you were meant to do in an authoritarian regime.

    So I find all of this stuff really interesting from a historical point of view, but I don’t actually think it’s that relevant from a contemporary point of view—largely because totalitarianism, as it was understood in the 20th century, has largely disappeared. The only unambiguously totalitarian regime we still have in the world today is North Korea.

    Mounk: That’s a very interesting point, and perhaps we can come back to talk about why that is—and I share that judgment. A place like China, which is often described as totalitarian in some Western media, is clearly an authoritarian system but not, I think, a totalitarian one.

    All right, so we’ve been teasing this distinction between three different forms of dictatorship. Tell us about what the specific characteristics are of each of them. What is specific, for example, about a military dictatorship? How does it differ from the others?

    Loxton: Okay, actually, let’s turn back the clock a little bit, because I do want to talk about each of the three subtypes of authoritarianism—the big three, as I call them—but first, it’s important to understand what a democracy is. Again, authoritarianism is defined negatively; it’s a residual category.

    Political scientists, by and large, use something known as the procedural minimum definition of democracy. To meet that definition, you have to have free and fair elections, universal adult suffrage, and protection for a broad array of civil liberties. If you remove even one of those things, the regime is no longer a democracy. By definition, it is an authoritarian regime. So we actually have a pretty exacting standard when it comes to defining democracy. But when we talk about authoritarian regimes—when we talk about a regime that does not meet all of those criteria—that can mean many different things.

    So let’s start with military regimes. I study Latin America primarily. There’s a long history of military regimes. There are none at the moment, but at the end of the 1970s, the majority of countries in the region were actually under military rule. What does that mean? First of all, military regimes are born through a coup—that’s a violent, illegal seizure of power by the armed forces. And second, there’s some kind of collective rule on the part of the armed forces. This is not just General So-and-so who has absolute power. There’s some kind of collective rule by the armed forces. That’s military rule. There are still multiple military regimes in the world today.

    Single-party regimes—that’s just what it sounds like. There’s this great quote that I love by the great Polish political scientist Adam Szymborski, where he says that democracy is a system in which parties lose elections. Well, single-party regimes are the opposite. This is a system in which parties do not lose elections. Either they simply don’t hold national elections—so that would be China under the CCP—or they hold national elections but then put their finger on the scale in order to ensure that they always win. That would be something like Mexico from 1929 until 2000. It was ruled by a single party called the PRI.

    Finally, you have a personalist regime. That is a regime where, as the name suggests, one person has absolute power. He doesn’t need to defer to party bigwigs like in a single-party regime. He doesn’t need to defer to a military junta like in a military regime. He has absolute power. The military is his goon squad, the treasury is his personal bank account, and often a cult of personality is built around that person.

    Mounk: This is, I think, a very interesting distinction that might be unintuitive to many people who will say, well, isn’t the whole point of any authoritarian regime that there’s one person at the center of the system who ultimately makes the decisions? And if you cross that person in some kind of way, you might find yourself at the very least expelled from power—and quite likely in jail or perhaps executed.

    When you go to some of the examples of one-party rule in the Soviet Union, somebody like Joseph Stalin disappeared a lot of people to the Gulag. There’s some striking statistic in the speech by Khrushchev—his successor—criticizing Stalin famously at the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union, the so-called “Secret Speech,” in which he says something like—I’m going to get the numbers wrong: of the two hundred members of some senior executive committee in the party at the 18th Party Congress, about 150 were defenestrated in some way—many of them died, etc.

    What does it mean, in a military dictatorship or in a one-party system that hasn’t degenerated into personalistic rule, to actually have constraints on the ruler? When we say this is not a personalistic system, there really is some form of collective rule—within a military organization, within a political party—that puts some amount of constraint on the ultimate decision-maker. What does that look like? How does that sustain itself?

    Loxton: I think that the main difference between these three major subtypes of authoritarianism that I talked about is who really has the final word. I’ll give you an interesting example. This is the case of Chile, a country that I know well. From 1973 until 1990, Chile was under military rule. But there was also one general who rose to the top—he became kind of the first among equals—and that was General Pinochet.

    So was this a personalist regime or was it a military regime? Well, this one person had more power than anybody else, but there was also a military junta. We actually didn’t find out until the very end of that regime who really did have the final word. And it turns out that the junta had the final word. Pinochet carried out a plebiscite in 1988 in which the population was asked, should Pinochet stay in power or not? A majority voted no. He wanted to overturn the results, send the tanks into the street, and clamp down. The other members of the junta said, actually, no, you can’t do that. He was forced to back down. But that’s not quite the question that you were asking.

    Mounk: Let me double-click on that for a second, because there’s a lot of interesting material in there. One thing that might be suggested is that it’s kind of Schrödinger’s dictatorship, right? Not just we as observers, but perhaps the participants in the system didn’t really know who ultimately held the power.

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    It’s not necessarily the case that in 1982 Pinochet knew he didn’t fully hold the power, or that the other members of the military regime knew they ultimately did. It may have come down to that decisive moment in 1988 when the chips were revealed and some of the participants were surprised by it. Presumably, if Pinochet ordered the military to go out into the street and make sure he would stay in power, he did that in part because he thought there was at least a chance the military would obey him. It turned out, to his surprise, that it didn’t.

    Loxton: Yeah, that’s a nice way of putting it. One reason why that’s true is that in many—in fact, I would say most, perhaps all—dictatorships, the really important rules of the game are not written down anywhere. We just take for granted in democracies that the constitution matters, that the law matters, and that hopefully you have some kind of functional judicial system that’s actually able to be the referee when there are disagreements.

    In authoritarian regimes, though, it’s very different. These regimes are dominated by what political scientists call informal institutions. These are rules that are not written down but that, by and large, people know and respect. Sometimes that can even include something as important as who’s actually in charge.

    Many personalist dictators prefer to rule behind puppets. I’ll give you an extreme example. The Dominican Republic, for about 30 years in the 20th century, was under the rule of a man named Rafael Trujillo. He changed the name of the capital city from Santo Domingo to Trujillo City. That gives you a sense of what kind of dictator he was. But for much of his time in power, technically, he wasn’t the president. There was some kind of puppet president. Still, everybody really knew who was actually in power. The same thing happened with Putin. He stepped down for one term, ostensibly, in favor of Medvedev. But everybody knew that wasn’t really true.

    So sometimes with informal institutions, even though they’re not written down, everyone kind of does know what the real rules of the game are. But I think you raise a really interesting point: when the rules are not actually written down and there’s no formal umpire to weigh in when there are disagreements, there is a bit of wiggle room. There’s room for disagreement and misinterpretation.

    Mounk: What are the mechanisms that help to sustain that form of collective rule within a dictatorship? In a liberal democracy, you have constitutional rules that aren’t always fully obeyed, but are hopefully followed relatively closely most of the time. Those rules establish checks and balances, impose limits on the power of the president or the prime minister, and define decision-making procedures—say, in foreign policy—that might be relatively autonomous. Political leaders can direct policy in many ways, but for a law to come into effect, they also need a majority in parliament. There’s usually some kind of court that can overrule what they do.

    In dictatorships, those formal checks and balances are normally absent. On paper, they may have similar institutions, but in practice, the Supreme Court is not going to overrule the will of the dictator, because all the judges have been hand-selected by the system. They understand what would happen if they went against the regime—it would end very badly for them.

    Yet, it sounds like some places aren’t just party states on paper. The senior members of a political party really do have power that constrains the head of the party in reality. There also seem to be military juntas—military regimes—in which there may be a primus inter pares, someone who has a little more power than the others, but where power is nonetheless meaningfully constrained. What are the mechanisms that are able to sustain that over time, in the absence of the kinds of checks and balances you have in a democracy?

    Loxton: Terror, purges, violence. One of the strangest things about authoritarian regimes is that the scariest place to be is often right around the people at the top. Interestingly, this is explored more deeply in political fiction than in political science texts.

    Everybody’s read 1984—an amazing book. Winston Smith, this completely ordinary man in an absolutely terrible dictatorship, the worst regime ever conceived, is eventually imprisoned, tortured, and killed. But Winston Smith is actually not an ordinary person. He is a member of the Party, which Orwell tells us makes up only 15% of the country. The proles, as he calls them—85% of the population—more or less do what they want. If they really get out of line, they’ll disappear, but the people who are constantly being surveilled and disappeared are Party members.

    There’s actually a whole genre of fiction from Latin America called the dictator novel that often explores this dynamic. I mentioned Trujillo earlier. Mario Vargas Llosa, the amazing Peruvian political scientist who died recently, wrote a book about Trujillo called The Feast of the Goat that’s really all about this—how Trujillo would subject his highest-level officials to unthinkable humiliations as a way of exerting his power, so they never seriously considered challenging him.

    Mounk: I believe Saddam Hussein was shooting people live on television who were members of his own regime. Going back to the Soviet Union, it was a terrible regime for everyone in the country. But actually, an average citizen or an average peasant had a much smaller likelihood of being killed than a very senior member of the Politburo during many stretches of Soviet history. That really is striking. Why does that happen? I’m not entirely sure about the logic here. Surely, in many of these examples, that kind of internal repression is precisely what leads to the collapse of one-party systems or military regimes. If you’re saying purges, terror, etc., are the mechanisms used to maintain control, shouldn’t that be exactly how a one-party state or a military junta ends up dissolving into a personalistic regime? Where perhaps, on paper, it’s still the party that rules, but in practice, there’s only one person.

    One way of thinking about this, perhaps, is to look at the Soviet Union. Would you say that, at different stages of the Soviet Union’s history, it was either a one-party state or a personalistic regime? That at the height of the terror and purges—at the height of Stalin’s power—it was effectively a personalistic regime, but at other moments there was some genuine form of collective rule, such that it could be described as a one-party state?

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    Similarly, with military regimes—it might start with six generals gaining power and holding each other in check to some degree, with some kind of collective decision-making. But then, using the very tools we’ve been talking about—like terror and purges—one general becomes so much more powerful than the others that there are effectively no constraints on his power, and he becomes a personalistic dictator.

    Loxton: Political scientists who have looked at different kinds of authoritarian regimes find that some tend to last longer than others. So let’s talk about the big three again: military regimes, single-party regimes, and personalist regimes. Barbara Geddes and her collaborators have crunched the numbers and found that military regimes, on average, are the shortest-lived of the big three. Then you have personalist regimes. Finally, you have single-party regimes. That’s probably not just a coincidence. There are enough examples of all of these different types of regimes that there’s likely something going on here. So why do military regimes tend to break down more quickly than other kinds of authoritarian regimes? A big part of it, I think, is that the military can imagine a life after dictatorship. The military existed before the regime, and it will exist after the regime. So, after a certain point, much of the armed forces might just decide, you know what? We’ll just return to the barracks and do what we did before.

    Mounk: Also presumably, a lot of the rank and file of the military are still going to be employed, because the country presumably needs to preserve the military. They might also hold some power in reserve in ways that are much harder for other systems to replicate. They’re still going to have the guns, so even once they have returned formal political authority to civilians, they retain ways of expressing threats and making demands. It’s very difficult for civilian authorities not to listen to those, even after a transition to democracy.

    Loxton: The term for that is tutelary powers, and it is true that after military rule ends, militaries will often try to maintain some kind of tutelage over elected governments. What about personalist regimes? Personalist regimes are very different from military regimes because, for the person at the top, it’s hard to imagine a life after dictatorship. For all of the flunkies around that person—including those in the military who only got their positions because they were sycophants—they also know they’re probably going to face a pretty tough life if the regime ever comes to an end. They do absolutely everything possible to hold on. At the same time, they alienate much of the population because the regime is so patently illegitimate. That leaves you with a regime that will probably last a bit longer than a military regime on average, but that will eventually come crumbling down.

    Finally, you have single-party regimes, which by and large last longer than either military regimes or personalist regimes. The reason single-party regimes probably do this is that they try to depersonalize the leadership. The Soviet Union under Stalin became a pretty personalist regime, and after Stalin it became more of a single-party regime. Or take China under Mao—that was a personalist regime that later depersonalized, and has now personalized again under Xi. The lines between these different categories can get pretty blurry. But the more a regime depends on a single person—who may or may not be making wise decisions—the riskier it is for that regime’s long-term survival. That, I think, is why single-party regimes so often last much longer.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about the performance of these regimes—bearing in mind, of course, that the authoritarian system in Zimbabwe is totally different from the one in China, which is totally different from the one in North Korea, which is totally different from the one in Turkey. It’s obviously hard to overgeneralize. But what do we know about whether, for example, dictatorships or democracies perform better on things like economic growth or providing for their citizens? How does that performance vary across different types of regime? Is there strong evidence that personalistic forms of regime do significantly worse on some of these metrics than those that are more institutionalized—regimes that have constraints from a party system or a broader military group?

    Loxton: So I think there’s a kind of popular myth that authoritarian regimes are better at providing economic development than democracies. Political scientists who have looked into this—and many studies have examined it—have found that it’s probably a wash. Some authoritarian regimes do well when it comes to the economy, but most do not. Some democracies also do well economically, but many—perhaps most—do not.

    A really important point to make here is that when we’re talking about regime type—democracy versus dictatorship—that’s completely unrelated to whether a country is well or poorly governed. These two things are entirely orthogonal to each other. There’s no guarantee that democracy will provide good government, just as there’s no guarantee that authoritarian regimes will provide good government.

    Mounk: This is going to be a little bit shocking to some of my listeners, because they might think, well, isn’t that part of the point of having democracy? That you assure yourself certain forms of good governance? Isn’t part of the point of democracy to have checks and balances and rules that constrain the powerful? Isn’t the goal to make sure that those who hold power aren’t able to use it to benefit themselves, to be corrupt, to enrich their allies, or to favor certain parts of the country over others? If democracy, empirically speaking, doesn’t consistently deliver on all of that—then what’s the point? Why do we care so much?

    Loxton: I think that many people living under authoritarianism hope, or even expect, that when the regime comes to an end, the economy will start growing, the welfare state will suddenly become generous, and everything will be better. That is almost never true. In fact, sometimes things get worse initially, because authoritarian regimes often collapse in the context of an economic crisis or a loss in war—something that makes it very hard for the new government to govern effectively. That creates a recipe for disappointment. You get regime change, and then five or ten years go by, and things have barely shifted. So what is the point?

    The economist and philosopher Amartya Sen—who won the Nobel Prize—wrote a terrific essay in 1999 called The Universal Value of Democracy. He makes a distinction between what he calls the instrumental value of democracy and the intrinsic value of democracy. Instrumental value means: do I get something good out of democracy? Let’s say, good government. And often the answer is—not really, not especially.

    But then there’s this idea of an intrinsic value to democracy. That might be something relatively small—some people might see it that way—like knowing you have the right to go to a protest if you want, or to say something critical about the leader on social media, or to write a grumpy op-ed. Most people will never do any of those things. But knowing that you can, Sen would say, is valuable in and of itself.

    Then there are more extreme things: knowing, for example, that you will never be abducted, drugged, and dropped to your death in the sea—as occurred in Argentina from 1976 to 1983, when it was under military rule. That kind of extreme repression, which some authoritarian regimes engage in, is something we can by and large feel secure won’t happen to us under a democracy. So in my view, the strongest argument in favor of democracy is this idea of its intrinsic value. The jury is still out, I guess, on the instrumental.

    Mounk: That’s interesting. Part of the intrinsic value of democracy, you would think, is the sense that we are choosing our own fate—that, in some way, collectively, we are writing the rules of our own society. So even though there are certain rules on the books in democracies and certain rules on the books in dictatorships, at least we are the co-authors of the rules that bind us.

    Now, of course, the problem with that argument is—and perhaps here we’re veering back into talking about democracy rather than authoritarianism—a lot of people don’t feel meaningfully represented in democracies. They might say that this core promise of democracy, which literally means “rule of the people,” isn’t being upheld. In fact, popular views often aren’t translated into public policies. That may be one of the background reasons why the intrinsic value of democracy feels less meaningful to many citizens, even in longstanding democracies, than we might hope.

    Loxton: Yes, I read a very interesting book by a guy named Yascha Mounk called The People versus Democracy about precisely this topic. That is true, of course. What I would say is that even though democracy does not guarantee good government—it does not guarantee “peace, order, and good government,” to quote from the Canadian Constitution—it at least gives us the chance to secure those things. There’s absolutely no guarantee that they will magically materialize once we have a democracy. But because we are allowed to elect our leaders, and because we are allowed to challenge them—through protests, through critical media, by forming new organizations, by forming new parties—we at least have the opportunity to get the things we value.

    Whereas in authoritarian regimes, there’s just no chance of doing that. You hope that the rulers of the country will decide, for whatever reason, that they would prefer the economy to develop rather than completely pillage the state. But do you really want to leave that up to the whims of General So-and-so? I don’t.

    Mounk: You said earlier that there’s a popular myth that dictatorships tend to be better for economic development than democracies. I would bet that a very large reason for that perception is the contrast between China and India. These are both countries that have done pretty well economically over the last 20 or 30 years. They’re both much more affluent than they were a few decades ago. But if you go back—perhaps 40 years or so—India and China were similarly poor.

    Today, I believe the United States is about six times richer than China, and China is about six times richer than India. So the difference between China and India is very significant. For people tempted to say, these are two of the most important and most populous countries in the world—and look at how much better China is doing, it seems natural to attribute that to China’s system. Surely, they might argue, this is in part because of the large-scale, rational development enabled by centralized control—because a single decision-maker can override local resistance to major projects, like the Three Gorges Dam. This centralization, some would say, is what allowed China to go from having no high-speed rail 15 or 20 years ago to having 50% of the world’s high-speed rail mileage today. Doesn’t that show that dictatorships can be much more effective than democracies? What’s your response to that? Why shouldn’t we generalize from that case? And what other factors may explain the development gap between these two countries?

    Loxton: So India and China—the world’s two most populous countries—are, to my mind, the two most important countries in the world. It would be an exaggeration to call it a natural experiment, but it’s kind of interesting that India became independent in 1947 and China had its revolution in 1949. So let’s follow their trajectories and see what happens. If you look at GDP per capita—and I encourage your listeners to actually just go and Google this; it’s very easy to do—the World Bank has great data. If you track GDP per capita in both countries, it was virtually identical until the 1990s. Then they start to diverge, and after that, they really, really diverge. As you pointed out, China is now many times richer than India.

    But for the first 40 years or so of the Chinese communist regime, it was doing as badly as—or in many ways, worse than—India. In fact, in some respects, it was a lot worse. I mentioned Amartya Sen earlier, the Nobel Prize–winning economist. He won his Nobel Prize in part for demonstrating that under democracy, there are no mass famines. Democracy may not ensure that people enjoy a high standard of living, and it may not ensure good government, but it does ensure that millions of people do not die of hunger. That used to happen in India under British colonial rule. It certainly happened in China under Mao’s rule. The Great Leap Forward—probably the least accurately named event in world history—resulted in something like 50 million people dying, completely unnecessarily, due to utterly misguided economic policies dreamed up by one man who knew nothing about economics. That kind of catastrophe can happen in an authoritarian regime. It did happen in China. But the opposite can also happen, as it has since Deng Xiaoping took over—and especially over the past few decades.

    Mounk: Yeah, and I guess I would add to that that there are also some differences between China and India that may help explain the greater difficulty of achieving rapid economic development in India. China is actually quite a diverse place. There are many different ethnic groups and a vast variety of languages—not just Mandarin and Cantonese, but all kinds of local languages and dialects that are mutually incomprehensible. I’ve spent some time in Shanghai, for example, and Shanghainese comes from the Wu language family, which is distinct from both Mandarin and Cantonese and is not mutually intelligible by and large.

    That said, China is, I believe, over 90 percent Han Chinese. It has a very long history of extraordinary state capacity—a strong sense of itself as a unified nation and culture that goes back a very long time. In India, by contrast, you have a huge variety of regional ethnicities and regional languages. Hindi has been far less historically dominant than Mandarin dialects were in China. India also has much more significant religious diversity—most notably, a majority Hindu population alongside a very significant Muslim minority. All of those factors, you might think, in various ways make it harder to develop an economy at the speed that China did.

    Loxton: Maybe. All of those supposed advantages that China had didn’t seem to have helped very much until Deng Xiaoping opened up the economy. When Mao was in charge, it was just a complete and utter fiasco.

    Mounk: I guess that’s the other argument you can make—that India was under the Raj, under colonial rule, and then when it opened up, people joked that it came under the license Raj. It was an incredibly protectionist economy, and India too has had some market reforms over the last decades. They were much less radical than what Deng Xiaoping did in China. So I guess another way of explaining this is simply by different economic policy. Now you might think, of course, that that goes back to the contrast between democracy and dictatorship. That one of the reasons why China could pursue much more radical free market policies and prove that they work is that there was a lot of power concentrated in Deng Xiaoping when he became convinced of the wisdom of his policies. And when they worked, then they sort of became hard to roll back, whereas in India, there were certainly some more free market-oriented politicians at various points, but their power was so constrained that they were not able to go nearly as far with those reforms. Therefore they were less successful, therefore they gained less of a political constituency, it was harder to sustain them. Though India certainly has liberalized significantly from the days of a license Raj, its economy has many, many more restrictions, rules, protections, bureaucratic obstacles than China does in various ways. And so that might be a way of sort of arguing back to: look, dictatorship isn’t always good, but perhaps for a certain form of development, it takes that kind of single decision-making power. How would you respond to that argument?

    Loxton: I am going to respond to this in a way that might seem a little bit strange, but just bear with me. So you know that there are people—those who admit that they don’t have magical powers describe themselves as mentalists, and then those who pretend they do have magical powers—they describe themselves as psychics. They do something pretty amazing. They’ll apparently read people’s minds sometimes. The way they’ll do this is they’ll say, for example, okay, I’ve got an A name coming to my mind. Does that mean anything to you? No? Okay, no—actually, I think it’s a P name? No? Okay, actually a T name… Then you’ll say T... My wife’s name is Teresa—that’s amazing. How did you know that? People remember the hits, but they forget the misses. A skilled mentalist can do this in such a way that they kind of just take you for a ride.

    I think the same thing happens—and this comes back to this myth of authoritarian regimes being better at economic development. We remember the hits, but we forget the misses. I’ll give you a few of the hits. China since 1978. Taiwan during the entire period of one-party KMT rule—so 1949 until 2000. South Korea under military dictator Park Chung-hee. Chile under military dictator Augusto Pinochet. Wow, that’s amazing. Authoritarian regimes are really good at economic development.

    If you look at some of the misses, though—what about the Democratic Republic of Congo under Joseph Mobutu? Or Nigeria under military rule? Or China under Mao? Or really the vast majority of authoritarian regimes, which have very little to show for themselves?

    Mounk: North Korea, Cambodia under Pol Pot, Venezuela after Chavez, etc.

    Loxton: Exactly. So I’m not saying that we shouldn’t—I think it’s incredible what has happened in China in recent decades. It was incredible what the KMT did in Taiwan. It was incredible what Park Chung-hee did. I’m not saying that that excuses any of their repression, but it’s very interesting. All of those cases are very interesting. The reason they’re so interesting is because they’re so unusual. They are atypical, not typical.

    Mounk: Is one way of thinking about this that the variance is going to be bigger in dictatorships than in democracies? Which is to say that in democracies, a much more sensible argument is that economic development might not be great, might involve a lot of poverty, but there aren’t going to be any famines, right? The worst-case scenario is likely to be averted.

    Now, conversely, you might say if somebody has a really sensible set of economic policies that can help lead a country like China rapidly out of poverty and into more or less middle-income status, they’re going to be able to do that in a dictatorship as well, just because there’s so much more concentrated power. It’s harder to do in a democracy like India—the free market people just aren’t able to go as far as they are in China.

    So there’s a kind of institutional reason to think that what it means to have institutional constraints on what you can do is that if you’re doing something really bad, somebody is going to be able to stop some of the really bad things you’re doing. If you’re doing something really good, somebody’s going to be able to stop some of the really good things you’re doing. And so perhaps you get lower variance—a lower variety in the outcomes—clustered a little bit closer together than in a dictatorship, where you might get some really positive cases and some really negative cases.

    Loxton: Yeah, maybe. I’m not actually sure. But again, my understanding is that the large end studies show that there’s really no relationship between regime type and development outcomes. So I do think that this is largely a myth.

    Mounk: All right, well, perhaps there’s a research hypothesis to follow up with. I know they’ve looked at variance specifically—probably they did. What about one argument I’ve heard, which is this distinction within dictatorship? You’ve distinguished between totalitarian and non-totalitarian regimes, and you’ve distinguished between personalistic regimes and those other kinds of regimes. Is it true, in general, that the results—the outcomes—of relatively more institutionalized dictatorships, the ones where there’s some significant power to constrain the ultimate decision-maker, tend to be better than those of personalistic dictatorships? Better than those where one person really does call the shots in such a way that it’s very hard even for the inner circles—even for the dictator’s historical allies—to say, this seems a little bit nuts. I hear reports that in this part of the country, people don’t have anything to eat. We’re about to engage in a big military adventure against our neighboring country. That might end pretty badly. Let’s not do that. Is there some systematic evidence of that, or do you regard that as more of an unproven hypothesis?

    Loxton: This reminds me of what has been called the dictator trap. I am going to answer your question, but it’ll take a moment to get there.

    Dictators do not like to be contradicted. They don’t like to hear the word no—even less do they like to be told that their ideas are infeasible, or immoral, or insane. The more powerful a particular leader becomes, the more likely they are to be surrounded by sycophants who tell them whatever they want to hear and simply avoid giving them bad information.

    One thing I’ve heard is that in China under Mao, during the Great Leap Forward, the reports of starvation were not always actually making their way up to the top leadership, because nobody wanted to bear that bad news. They knew the consequences would be severe. Or take Russia under Putin—who was going to tell Putin, actually, Ukraine is a real country. They do have a sense of identity. They probably will fight back. This isn’t going to be over in two days. I would not have wanted to be the official who told that to Putin, because things would not turn out very well for that person.

    So I think it is probably true that the more power is invested in a single person, the more likely they are to fall into this dictator trap—where they’re simply surrounded by sycophants who tell them whatever they want to hear, until one day they make some insane decision, like invading Ukraine or trying to carry out the Great Leap Forward.

    Mounk: Yeah, and that I think is an important point, because it both shows when some of these authoritarian regimes might be comparatively more effective—when there are actually still effective mechanisms for transmitting information so that the person at the top knows if a part of the population is starving, in the extreme case, or knows if there’s extreme corruption in some part of the state.

    Loxton: Can I give you a very interesting example of that? There’s a wonderful political scientist named Martin Dimitrov—I believe he’s Bulgarian, but much of his work is about Bulgaria, and he has also studied other communist regimes. One of the things he has looked at is the fact that in the Eastern Bloc—especially in Bulgaria, but I believe this is true in multiple communist countries—there was an active effort by the ruling party to get citizens to complain. To file formal complaints about things like the elevator in my building isn’t working, or the lines in the supermarket are too long. These bread-and-butter issues, if left unaddressed, could build up and threaten the regime by fueling widespread public anger. The regime wanted to know what people really thought—at least on those day-to-day matters—so that it could get ahead of the discontent and actually solve those problems.

    People did this. According to Dimitrov, in one year in the 1980s, something like 10% of the entire population made some kind of formal complaint to the authorities about X, Y, or Z. What they didn’t do was tell the authorities, actually, this whole communist thing—we don’t really like it. We’d like to have a complete regime change. People understood what information they were allowed to give, and what information they were not.

    Mounk: That’s very interesting. My understanding from some researchers is that China uses similar mechanisms very effectively. If complaints about some local official swell sufficiently—sometimes in public fora like social media—those officials will often be removed and punished. That becomes a way to ensure continued information flow. If there’s a real coefficient somewhere that is particularly bad, that figure gets removed. This helps maintain some form of regime legitimacy.

    The problem with personalistic systems is that those information flows might be cut off. The dictator might become sufficiently enamored with himself—sufficiently intolerant of any form of dissent—that he no longer has any realistic understanding of what’s actually going on in the country. That’s where you tend to get the really, really bad results. That’s why this question about whether you can stop the authoritarian system from degenerating into a personalistic form of rule is very important.

    I want to touch on another paradox, which is that, by definition, authoritarian systems allow no—or very limited—rival centers of power. By definition, they don’t have ways to change the political regime or the team in power through public consultation. One very minimalist definition of democracy is that there are multiple teams competing for power, and it’s unclear which of them will be in power in five or ten or twenty years. That is absent in dictatorships. All of that would lead you to believe that authoritarianism is an extremely stable form of government. Since power is concentrated at the top and there are no formal mechanisms for regime change, it should persist for a very long time.

    Yet, every democracy in the world is born out of some form of authoritarianism. We have plenty of examples—some of which you’ve already touched on—of authoritarian regimes collapsing and falling apart. When do these regimes fall apart, and why do they do that? Why do they seem so susceptible to being replaced, when the whole goal is to not be replaced?

    Loxton: So one thing that I would challenge you on is this idea that, by definition, there are no rival centers of power. I don’t think that’s true. Many authoritarian regimes do allow some kind of opposition to exist, and/or other organizations that are not explicitly political but that nevertheless could potentially become some rival power center. The Catholic Church is a great example. Military regimes in countries like Brazil or Chile, or even Poland’s communist regime, allowed quite a lot of autonomy for the Catholic Church. Uncoincidentally, the Catholic Church ended up really spearheading the struggle for democracy in all three of those countries—in Chile and Brazil, and in Poland once Karol Wojtyła became John Paul II and then visited his native country, I think in 1979. One year later, Solidarity emerges. That is not a coincidence. Some authoritarian regimes do actually allow organizations like the Catholic Church to maintain a significant degree of autonomy. But to your question—why do authoritarian regimes eventually fall? Because most of them eventually do. There’s no one answer to that question. But I would say that all authoritarian regimes face a handful of similar problems—problems that simply do not exist in democracies to the same degree.

    Earlier on, we were talking about—and you were a little bit skeptical, I think—how big a tent the topic of authoritarianism is, how broadly political scientists seem to use this category. But it turns out that, whether you’re a military regime, or a single-party regime, or a personalist regime, there are a number of dilemmas that you often face.

    One is what we were just talking about earlier: the problem of information. The fact that dictators simply do not—often do not—get accurate information. That is a much bigger problem in authoritarian regimes than in democracies.

    Another is the problem of legitimacy. We hear the term “legitimacy” all the time, but what does that actually mean? It’s a moral concept. It’s the answer to the question: what right do you have to rule? In democracies, the answer is simple—well, the people elected us in the most recent election. Authoritarian regimes don’t have that answer because, by definition, they did not come to power in free and fair elections with universal suffrage and full civil liberties. That means they need to find their legitimacy somewhere else. Sometimes they hitch that on their performance. That has been China for several decades now, and its performance has been absolutely extraordinary. But what happens when the economy eventually stops growing? Which it will. If you have based your legitimacy on the idea that “the economy will grow forever under us,” and then it stops growing, then you’re in trouble. Or what if, for example, your performance does not have to do with the economy, but it has to do with national glory—under us, we made X country great again. We restored the Soviet Union. We took back Ukraine. What if Russia eventually loses the war in Ukraine? It doesn’t seem likely to happen at the moment, but God knows what’s going to happen. Who expected this war to still be going on several years later? If Russia were to lose that war, that would be a pretty serious blow for Putin.

    So economic crises are one major reason that authoritarian regimes often fall. Loss in a war is another really bad thing to have happen to you if you are at the top of an authoritarian regime.

    Mounk: What are the internal mechanisms by which these regimes then fall? Obviously, that differs very strongly across these different types. But is the decisive factor in whether a military regime falls or a one-party state falls popular protest? Is it, as I think political science sometimes suggests, splits in the regime—where the regime is no longer able to keep the loyalty of some of the insiders who start to switch sides and basically do the bidding of the populace that is deeply unhappy?

    What is most dangerous to an authoritarian regime in terms of who might betray it, and how does that process tend to work?

    Loxton: Popular protests can play a major role. Look at Tunisia or Egypt during the Arab Spring, where dictators were overthrown and both of those countries briefly became democracies—Tunisia for a bit longer. Or a place like the Philippines during the People Power Revolution of the 1980s. Or throughout Eastern Europe, when people took to the streets in their millions in order to call for an end to communism. I think mass protests really did matter in all of these countries.

    However, we can also think of examples where there were mass protests and the people in power just decided to kill the protesters. That was China in 1989. Most people in the world have heard of the Tiananmen Square massacre. The fact that that happened in 1989 was not a coincidence.

    Communist regimes were falling throughout Eastern Europe in 1989, and it seemed like China was going to be the next domino to fall. People in China did what they did in countries like Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia and East Germany. They took to the streets, they demanded change, and in China, they just decided to kill hundreds or possibly thousands of people. We’ve seen that recently in places like Nicaragua or Venezuela. It does seem that if the authorities have no qualms about massacring people, locking people up, torturing them in large numbers—and crucially, if they hang together—they can pretty much beat back any kind of protest, no matter how big it is. That is why political scientists, as you mentioned earlier, often really focus instead on what’s happening at the elite level and whether there’s a split in the ruling coalition. In particular, people like Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter talk about the split between what are called hardliners and softliners. Once you have some kind of a split, plus mass protests, that’s when things get pretty iffy for the authoritarian regime.

    Mounk: Is there any clear pattern on the ideological orientation of authoritarian regimes, particularly in the modern age? Are they equally represented on the left, the right and in parts of the ideological spectrum that we can’t clearly attribute to the left or the right? Are they so idiosyncratic that those labels aren’t really helpful? How should we think about political ideology and authoritarian regimes?

    Loxton: I’m glad you asked that question. I don’t have a count off the top of my head, but I would guess that you have just as many right-wing dictatorships as left-wing dictatorships and vice versa. The reason that I’m glad you asked that question is that I think a lot of ideologues have a real blindness when it comes to dictatorships on their side of the aisle. To this day, there are a lot of people in the world who have this romantic idea of communist Cuba. If you actually study communist Cuba, it is completely indefensible—just completely and utterly indefensible. It is one of the most repressive dictatorships in the world, but it’s left wing, and if you’re on the left, you’re supposed to like it.

    The same is true, during the Cold War, for regimes on the right—apartheid South Africa, Taiwan under the KMT, Chile under Pinochet. All of these were just absolutely awful dictatorships, but people like Jean Kirkpatrick were willing to give regimes on their side of the aisle a pass. We talked about how democracy and dictatorship form one axis, and good government and bad government form another axis—and they are completely orthogonal. The same is true when it comes to ideology. We have democracy and dictatorship on one axis, and we have left and right on another axis, and they are completely orthogonal. It is so important for those of us who care about democracy, who want to preserve our democracies, or for those of us who live in dictatorships but would like to see an eventual transition to democracy, to accept this basic idea and to be willing to challenge authoritarians on our side of the aisle, because if you’re unwilling to do that, that is more likely than not a recipe for democratic breakdown.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and James discuss the state of democracy in the United States. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 10 min
  • Why We Need Abundance

    Francis Fukuyama is interviewed by Leonora Barclay, Head of Podcasts at Persuasion, about what’s stopping the United States from building infrastructure, how to encourage public participation without holding projects back, and why abundance is the solution to many affordability issues in America today.

    All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison and Leonora Barclay.

    Connect with us!

    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Frankly Fukuyama & Persuasion

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  • No, Trump 2.0. Is Not Normal Constitutional Evolution
    Donald Trump on November 16, 2025. (Photo by Roberto Schmidt/Getty Images.)

    How should we understand the character of the American political present?

    Are we living through the radical transformation of American democracy into a competitive (or even uncompetitive) authoritarian system?

    Or are we merely experiencing the fulfillment of longstanding antiliberal and anti-democratic trends in American politics in general and the Republican Party in particular?

    Or do we merely find ourselves at a rare (but nonetheless democratically legitimate) moment of rapid constitutional evolution to the right after nearly a century of consistently leftward shifts?

    These possibilities form the core of one of the best essays I’ve read about the second Trump administration. Writing in the Boston Review, law professors Jedediah Britton-Purdy and David Pozen ask a seemingly simple (but in fact quite complicated) question: “What Are We Living Through?” In that essay—and in a 32-minute podcast interview Jack Goldsmith conducted with Pozen last week—they answer the question in a way I deeply respect and that I can easily relate to from my experience of teaching and writing about current affairs during the opening year of the second Trump administration.

    Story 1: The Radical Imposition of Authoritarianism

    The first narrative is favored by most pundits, journalists, and academics of the liberal center—the center left and center right. It holds that Donald Trump’s presidency is a radical departure from American political history and norms. Both have been firmly liberal and democratic, whereas Trump is a would-be dictator. We’re therefore living through a moment of radical discontinuity that’s culminating in an acute constitutional crisis that seeks to replace democratic self-government with “autocracy, kleptocracy, fascism, patrimonialism, gangsterism, or another cousin of authoritarianism.”

    On the basis of this interpretation, those in the liberal center tend to encourage and model an all-hands-on-deck posture of “resistance” and emergency. In practical terms, this often involves an effort to forge a cross-partisan or cross-ideological “popular front” coalition in defense of democracy and in forthright opposition to incipient authoritarianism. This is how the presidential campaign of Kamala Harris ended up doing events with conservative Liz Cheney last fall and warning loudly in the final weeks of the campaign about the threat of fascism emanating from the MAGA right.

    Story 2: The Fulfillment of Longstanding Anti-Democratic Trends

    The second narrative tends to be affirmed by those on the left, as well as by some libertarians. Where the first account emphasizes discontinuity between the American past and present, the second one points to evidence of underlying continuity over time. American democracy has always been fragile, with individual rights recognized and enforced haphazardly and inconsistently down through the decades and centuries. The presidency has likewise been moving in a more powerful and less accountable direction for decades. This means that Trump has mainly “highlighted and exacerbated preexisting pathologies,” rather than breaking radically from a mostly laudable past and imposing wholly unprecedented authoritarian changes. Trumpism is merely a more aggressive form of what we saw, in different ways, during the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush.

    Given this emphasis on longstanding continuities and trends, it’s no surprise that this second story tends to be paired with much more sweeping proposals to change aspects of the American constitutional system and economic order that have supposedly landed us in our present predicament. These proposals usually involve sweeping reforms of the political system (a ban on gerrymandering; adding states to dilute the power of the right in the U.S. Senate and Electoral College; diminishing the power of the federal courts) and economic order (fighting oligarchy, monopoly, and financialization, as well as making health care and child care available to all).

    Story 3: A Perfectly Legitimate Constitutional Rupture

    Then there is the third and final narrative, which is favored by more thoughtful defenders of the Trump administration, as well as some independent analysts. It holds that we’re living through a perfectly (or at least potentially) legitimate “constitutional regime change.” As Britton-Purdy and Pozen summarize this outlook, the Trump administration is “following a playbook developed during the New Deal and refined in the civil rights era.” It involves “Trump’s team … employing all the tools at its disposal to reshape the balance of power across state and society in line with campaign pledges to curb illegal immigration, shrink the federal workforce, restore religion in the public sphere, and advance a ‘colorblind’ conception of racial equality.”

    Think of the liberal-reform presidencies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson, except with the ideological valance reversed. The right considered much of what happened during those presidencies an assault on the constitutional order. It’s more accurate to say that both involved a change of constitutional orientation that quickly came to be an accepted evolution of the nation’s fundamental law. That’s exactly what the second Trump administration is attempting to achieve, only for different ends. This implies it is striving to effectuate a constitutional rupture, but not a rupture with democracy as such.

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    As one would expect, affirming this interpretation of the present implies a very different kind of response to what the Trump administration is doing. Just as Democrats thought those who opposed the New Deal and the court rulings and legislative accomplishments of the civil rights era should stand down in their opposition, so those who favor the “regime change” view of the present suggest that opponents of the administration’s agenda should nonetheless allow it to proceed without suggesting it is fundamentally illegitimate. Let Trump govern, allow him to exercise the powers of the presidency, and all of this will proceed much more smoothly. To the extent that the country is inching in the direction of a genuine constitutional crisis, it’s largely the fault of “resistance” judges, lawmakers, and members of the mainstream media, all of whom refuse to accept that Trump won the 2016 and 2024 elections fair and square and should be shown the same level of deference accorded any other president.

    Testing Story 3

    It’s quite rare for scholars and journalists to avoid falling into one of these camps and defending its outlook to the exclusion of the others. That’s why I find Britton-Purdy’s and Pozen’s effort to give each view its due extremely helpful—not least because, as they note early on in the essay, “The stakes of this disagreement are high, the shape of it disorienting. From within each script, people in the others tend to look either dangerously complacent or risibly hysterical. Americans are deeply divided not just over partisan preferences or ‘alternative facts’ but over the basic direction and meaning of our politics.”

    I find myself having to come to terms with the fact that I have embraced all three outlooks at various times over the past year. In the months immediately following Trump’s second inauguration, when the new administration was moving at breakneck speed in multiple directions at once and I was attempting to make sense of it all while teaching a course at the University of Pennsylvania called “Trump 2.0,” I inclined toward the first story. But at other times, like in a recent op-ed for the New York Times about the past and possible future of the GOP, I emphasized long-term continuities on the American right. And then there are times when I’ve wondered if Noah Millman—not at all a Trump supporter—was right, back in February, to note present-day parallels to prior constitution ruptures.

    I will admit that there’s a real comfort in embracing the third story. During the 1930s, those who favored the laissez-faire policies of the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations were right when they said that the New Deal’s many moves to expand the power and scope of the federal government were unprecedented and seemed to defy core American assumptions about limited government going all the way back to the founding period. Some even suggested it amounted to a dictatorial power grab. That’s certainly how a majority of Supreme Court justices viewed FDR’s program—at least until it relented and accepted the legitimacy of the shift toward modern liberalism.

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    Might that be what we’re living through now? Something that to many of us looks and feels like authoritarianism but is merely a change of orientation that before long will become a new American normal?

    As I said, that would be a kind of relief, because it would mean what’s happening is less ruinously destabilizing than a collapse into outright authoritarianism.

    Unfortunately, though, the evidence for such a legitimate democratic shift is pretty weak. FDR won his first election, in 1932, with 57.4 percent of the vote. That rose to 60.8 percent in 1936. His party, meanwhile, picked up 97 seats in the House and 12 in the Senate in 1932. After the 1936 election, Democrats controlled the House by the enormous margin of 334 to 88 seats, while their margin in the Senate (75 to 17) was no less jaw-dropping.

    If that isn’t a democratic mandate for change, I’m not sure what would be. Trump, by contrast, was re-elected with 49.8 percent of the vote, while his party’s hold on both houses of Congress is razor thin.

    More importantly, Trump has violated laws and norms of democratic governance to a more extreme degree than FDR or LBJ ever dreamed of doing. He’s ended the Justice Department’s independence and turned it into a vehicle for rewarding his friends and punishing his enemies. He’s usurped congressional authority on imposing tariffs, as well as hiring and firing the heads of ostensibly independent agencies. He’s bombed a series of Venezuelan boats without congressional authorization and without providing any evidence to Congress or the public to back up assertions that the vessels were being used to advance what the administration calls “narcoterrorism.” He’s deployed the National Guard, as well as masked and unbadged ICE officers, to cities over the objection of local officials, and sometimes in violation of court orders. And he’s pushed personal corruption far beyond anything seen before, most recently in demanding his own Justice Department pay $230 million in compensatory damages for investigating and bringing criminal charges against him during the Biden administration.

    Regardless of his popular mandate, these and many other acts make the second Trump administration something far more radical than a legitimate constitutional evolution.

    Stories 1 and 2 for the Win

    If Trump had chosen to govern with a lighter hand and sought to convert more voters to his side with demonstrations of good will and competence, he and his party might have gained in approval over the past year, giving them a stronger hand to play, while also avoiding his most egregiously dictatorial and corrupt acts. But of course, he chose the reverse—to act boldly and recklessly on every front all at once, which has led his own and his party’s approval to tank, thereby weakening his hand going forward.

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    That isn’t a foundation for a legitimate shift of constitutional orientation. On the contrary, it could be an occasion for even more egregious and illegitimate seizures of presidential power. Which probably means that our good-faith disagreements about what we’re living through should remain focused on the first and second stories and relegate the third to the category of self-justificatory propaganda for the right’s autocratic ambitions.

    What are we living through? Something pretty darn dangerous, regardless of how far back we’re inclined to trace its roots.

    Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

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  • A Manifesto for Liberal Trans Activism
    Protestor waving transgender pride flag outside U.S. Supreme Court, June 18, 2025. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker.)

    By virtually any measure, trans activism has failed in the United States. It has proven itself a decisively losing electoral issue, been repudiated by the Supreme Court, lost the culture war, alienated a majority of society, and caused public opinion to turn against trans people. Trans activism ignited a trans backlash—one whose flames now threaten to consume LGBT rights more broadly. As a result, many political moderates are now quietly backing away from trans issues.

    Nobody wants to be burned again. But trans activism was only a losing issue because it was pursued by extremist bullies within the framework of a radical and authoritarian far-left ideology. Critical social justice monopolized trans activism and sucked all the oxygen out of the room, giving the impression that their methods and beliefs were the only way to advocate for trans people. This is not so. A non-dogmatic, non-zero-sum, philosophically liberal approach to trans rights is not only possible - it is essential now more than ever.

    At the outset, it’s worth diving into the numbers to get a sense of the damage the current model of trans activism has done. In 2010, when trans issues were still years away from becoming a major topic in political discourse, the nonprofit database Guidestar catalogued 553 active LGBT foundations in the United States. Of these, most were focused on LGB rights, with trans advocacy playing a small role. In 2025, Guidestar brings up over 12,000 organizations tagged with “transgender,” and, unlike in 2010, trans is not a tacked-on afterthought—it’s the star of the show. In 2022, at the height of radical trans activism’s cultural influence, a report from Funders for LGBT Issues found that causes dedicated to trans, non-binary, and gender-nonconforming people received 8.5 times more foundation grant dollars than gay-, lesbian-, and bisexual-specific causes put together. What’s so striking is that over this span, as trans activism increased, societal attitudes toward key facets of trans politics deteriorated.

    When the American public was first polled about trans issues, their responses showed a remarkable open-mindedness. But the more they were exposed to trans activism, the more their opinions soured. In 2017, 44% of U.S. adults believed that it was possible for one’s gender to be different from their biological sex, whereas 54% thought that one’s gender could not be different from their sex. In the half-decade that followed, transgender nonprofit funding increased by more than 113%. Yet by 2022, public opinion had moved in the wrong direction, with just 38% of Americans saying that one’s gender can be different from their sex, and 60% saying that being a man or a woman is determined at birth (that figure is 68% today).

    We see similar results in other areas. In 2016, 53% of Americans opposed any legislation that would force trans people to use specific public bathrooms. In 2025, that number stands at 26%. In 2017, 68% supported trans people’s right to serve in the military—by 2025, 58%. Between 2021 and 2025, the support for trans women in female sports fell 10 points to a mere 24%. A New York Times poll from this year found that 79% of voters, including two-thirds of Democrats, said that trans women must not be allowed to compete in women’s sports. The survey also found that 71% of Americans (and 54% of Dems) similarly believed that puberty-blocking drugs and hormone treatments should never be given to minors. Asked if they believed trans people had a form of mental illness, 53.5% disagreed in 2016. By 2018 and 2019, that figure had ticked down to 51%. After that, pollsters stopped asking the question. Anyone who has spent any amount of time outside of left-wing enclaves discussing trans issues with everyday Americans will not have to wonder why.

    Even the support for basic legal protections has declined. In 2017, 64% supported anti-discrimination legal protections for trans people in housing, employment, and public spaces. In 2025, that number dropped to 56%. Recent surveys show that 60% believe it is immoral to transition one’s gender, and 66% oppose trans people changing their gender on driver’s licenses or passports.

    Source: Pew Research.

    The proliferation of trans activism appears to be correlated with a backlash not only against trans issues but against the LGBT community as a whole. From 2022 to 2025, Gallup polls found that support for same-sex marriage fell from 71% to 68% and Americans’ belief in the “moral acceptability” of same-sex relations fell from 71% to 64%. In 2019, 75% of U.S. adults believed that same-sex couples should be allowed to adopt children. In 2025, that’s down to 61%. Republican politicians have seized on these trends, introducing thousands of bills to crack down on trans-related policies as well as LGB issues, sex ed, and Pride events. Right-wing culture warriors also went to war against Pride Month itself, effectively boycotting and bullying corporations across the country into staying silent about Pride every June. Today, the word “gay” has come back into common online parlance as a synonym for “dumb,” and presidential candidates can ride “Kamala is for they/them” ads to a 2.7 percentage point gain and electoral victory.

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    What went wrong? How did the left-wing trans movement squander a society’s worth of open-minded goodwill? Perhaps the biggest blunder was their refusal to compromise, especially over the most contentious policy areas, such as trans women in female-only spaces or youth gender medicine. On both of these fronts, activists steamrolled over scientific and ethical complexities, blithely dismissed or actively hid risks, and placed themselves at odds with a large majority of society. To make matters worse, they approached these issues, and all others, with an air of unassailable moral superiority and certainty that brooked no discussion. Anyone who expressed skepticism was either bombarded with alarming but misleading stats, or guilt-tripped, or screamed at, or systematically maligned, lied about, and lumped in with the far right. The movement tried to impose sweeping and unpopular changes without ever even attempting to persuade anyone. Their go-to strategy was public shaming, censorship, excommunication, and bullying. Activists behaved in a manner that made no sense unless the goal was to get people to hate them, and by extension, their cause.

    The radical version of trans activism was destined to fail, and so it did. But it’s not the only approach. Rather than framing trans rights as a zero-sum fight that must be won at the expense of everyone else, we can make the liberal case—as the women’s rights, Civil Rights, and LGB rights movements have done before—that we all flourish more in a society that honors individual freedom, equality before the law, and the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

    What does this mean specifically? It means clearly defining terms, respecting science, building consensus from the ground up, taking a broad-minded and liberal view of gender-nonconformity, orienting away from conflict and toward integration, safeguarding free expression and the right to question or disagree, and fostering good faith conversation.

    Sex, Gender, and Science

    First, let’s clarify a major source of confusion by defining and differentiating sex and gender. A decade or two ago, distinguishing sex from gender was a point of emphasis for early trans activists. In the past decade, however, that same claim has become controversial. Sex refers to biology and reproduction. Males produce small gametes (sex cells) known as sperm. Females produce larger gametes known as eggs. Everyone is born either male or female, and while a very small percentage of people may have ambiguous sexual characteristics due to intersex conditions, they do not produce a third and distinct type of gamete. Bodies can manifest physical attributes that are all over the map, but that does not make sex a spectrum. Sex is, in fact, a binary. While the distant day may come when medical science enables people to truly change their sex, such transformations are not presently possible.

    Gender, by contrast, refers not to biology, but to cultural practices and identity. Gender represents cultural expectations for the two sexes as well as how an individual feels or identifies (or not) with their sex. While sex is a binary, gender is a spectrum because it’s a social construct that includes how we think about male-ness and female-ness. But how we think about the sexes doesn’t change the nature of our biology itself. There’s no limit to how many genders there can be in principle, because gender is a fundamentally subjective concept for every individual to decide on their own. To be transgender is to be someone who identifies with a gender different from the one culturally associated with their sex, and who usually, though not necessarily, takes steps—either socially, medically, or surgically—to express their identity.

    Differentiating sex and gender is crucial for making sense of transness as a concept, as well as cutting through the noise of the surrounding discourse. Both the ardent anti- and pro-trans camps fail to make this distinction. Radical trans activists willfully conflate sex and gender in order to cast sex as a spectrum or, in some cases, even deny its existence outright. Aside from being straightforwardly unscientific, this presents obvious logistical problems. If sex is synonymous with gender, or itself made up, then what is a trans person transitioning away from? What are they transitioning toward? It’s hard to advocate for something that is incoherently defined.

    Conflating sex and gender also shifts the understanding of sexual orientation away from its grounding in sex and into the amorphous realm of gender. This redefined paradigm allows radical activists to tar bisexuality as transphobic for supposedly reinforcing a gender binary. It also allows them to castigate gays and lesbians for having attractions based on sex rather than gender identity, and to label straight people as “genital fetishists” if they express sex-based attractions.

    On the other end, the anti-trans coalition has a tendency either to use “gender” purely as a synonym for “sex” or to deny that gender exists at all. This, too, presents obvious problems. To reiterate, gender is a concept that signifies how people think and feel about their sex—doing away with it does not magically abolish the wide range of feelings people have about their sex, nor how they relate to their sex. People with this “gender-critical” mindset seem to operate under the misapprehension that they can suppress a phenomenon they find threatening—transgenderism—by simply removing the language that represents the feelings trans people have. This is the flawed logic of all language policing. The reality, of course, is that real human experiences cannot be defined out of existence, and neither can science.

    The movement for gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights understood that science was on their side. Activists leveraged psychological research disproving the falsehood that homosexuality was a mental illness, used data to establish the biological basis for same-sex behavior, and cited social scientific findings demonstrating that conversion therapy was as ineffective as it was inhumane. Similarly, there is no need for trans activists to contradict the science of sex, and their messaging becomes incoherent when they try. Progress is rarely built on the denial of science.

    Saying No Thanks to Old-Fashioned Gender Norms

    Liberals fought for decades to broaden society’s view of gender and to deemphasize old, narrow-minded stereotypes about masculinity and femininity, and they succeeded. In 1936, 72% of Americans thought women should only be homemakers. By 2022, that figure had fallen to 25%. Gendered jobs are declining, stay-at-home dads are on the rise, and support for same-sex marriage, despite its slight dip, remains at over two-thirds. A boy is no less a boy because he plays with Barbie dolls, and a girl is no less a girl because she plays baseball. To be a tomboy was once frowned upon. Then it became normal and accepted. That was real progress. Today, a tomboy in our culture is more likely to go through childhood and adolescence being encouraged and prodded to declare that they are, in fact, a trans boy. Whether this, too, is progress is doubtful.

    One reason why most people don’t believe that it is possible to even be transgender is that transness, as a concept, has been hyperinflated to the point of devaluation in many people’s minds. Trans activism has expanded “transgender” into an umbrella term that encompasses not merely people who have undergone medical or surgical transition, nor those with gender dysphoria or who identify as a gender different from their sex, but increasingly anyone who is simply gender-nonconforming. Right away, this moves us backward in time. Suggesting to gender-nonconforming people, especially children, that they may be trans or trans-adjacent because they do not conform to simplistic and old-fashioned cultural stereotypes around masculinity (if they’re male) or femininity (if they’re female) is and always has been sexist. If we are to grow the percentage of society that believes it is possible to be trans, we must set clear parameters on how we define it. For trans to become an infinite concept or a proxy for gender-nonconformity not only erodes decades of liberal progress on changing gender roles and norms—it undermines trans people and our ability to shift public opinion.

    The need to set boundaries has implications that reach almost every trans-related policy controversy. For example, the ethos of self-identification (known as “self-ID”), which asserts that the only evidence needed to show that a given individual is trans is that they say they are trans, presents problems for trans advocacy.

    There are people for whom profound gender distress manifests at a very young age—people who have been well-assessed by clinicians and who would convince even many trans-skeptics that they are quite plainly gender dysphoric. Then there are people who, much later in life, and with no discernible history of gender distress or transness, come out as trans. Lumping these groups together might seem inclusive, but in practice, it ends up harming the former. To say that anyone can declare themselves to be trans at any time and that their say-so is the only form of legal verification needed is politically self-defeating. To vehemently eschew any standards by which one can demonstrate that they are who they say they are renders the project of trans advocacy, especially in controversial edge cases, impossible for most people to take seriously except as a radical and threatening agenda. It also arms the transphobes on the hard right with needless political ammunition.

    Trans Rights Versus Trans Acceptance

    With LGB rights, attitudes changed before the laws. By 2011, a majority of U.S. adults supported same-sex marriage, but it wasn’t until 2015 that it became the law of the land. This is the usual order of progress: change minds first, then policy will follow. With trans rights, curiously, the inverse appears to be the case.

    Source: Gallup.

    In the landmark 2020 decision Bostock v. Clayton County, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that transgender people were protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against workplace discrimination. The Bostock ruling also ensured that the Fair Housing Act within the Civil Rights Act of 1968 included transgender people in protections against housing discrimination. Even with the activist-induced backslide, a clear majority of the public is still on the same page and believes trans people should be legally protected from discrimination in housing, employment, and other areas.

    Most of the hard work of establishing legal protections has already been done, which speaks to the benefits of living in a liberal society where equality under the law is an enshrined value. What remains is to convince the public that it is possible to be transgender, and to foster not merely support for basic rights, but also the social acceptance of trans people. This is best achieved not by dividing people, but by bringing them together.

    Trans Equality Means Trans Integration

    In the 1980s and 90s, when gay, lesbian, and bisexual activists began pushing for same-sex marriage, radicals within the LGB movement pushed back. They wanted nothing to do with mainstream society, straight people, or institutions like marriage, which they considered heteronormative, patriarchal, and oppressive. They wanted to be a separate counterculture. The result, predictably, was backlash. Gay separatists succeeded only at making it easier for the Christian right to argue that LGBT people were trying to destroy the family. But moderate activists understood that true equality could only be achieved not by existing in parallel to and separate from mainstream society, but by integrating into it. In the end, the radicals and religious fundamentalists both lost, and LGBT rights won.

    We see a similar divide today within the movement for trans equality, between activists fighting for the right of trans people to join mainstream society and activists who want to remake mainstream society in the image of trans people. Whether it’s trying to overwrite sex with gender in medical schools, or erase the word “woman” from media publications, or change awards to be gender-neutral, efforts in virtually every area of society have tried to impose radical trans politics onto society.

    While such efforts may have been undertaken with the intention of helping trans people feel more comfortable, they created unnecessary antagonisms that make trans equality seem like a hostile cultural takeover. It underscores the arguments of anti-trans feminists that trans rights must come at the expense of women’s rights, and gives fodder to the hard right to gin up fears of social upheaval. The goal should be ensuring that trans people are accepted throughout society, rather than forcing society to upend countless conventions and traditions to cater to a very small percentage of people.

    Conversation and the Centrality of Free Expression

    If and when trans activism reorients its ethos, then the thornier conversations about edge cases can be most meaningfully had—and they must be conversations. Progress in a free society cannot be imposed against the will of the public by executive, institutional, or activist fiat without the public subsequently raising new leaders and institutions to undo it. Issues surrounding trans women in female sports, prisons, and rape shelters, as well as youth gender medicine, have to be openly and freely discussed without threats or stigma, and with the understanding that these conversations can take years to come to a consensus.

    People must be allowed to dissent, disagree, question, think out loud, and, yes, be wrong without it ruining their life or ability to make a living. As we have seen, fostering a culture that erodes our norms around free expression will only harm trans people in the long run. Free speech is the cornerstone of all other freedoms, including LGBT rights. It’s what has enabled the incredible strides we have made over the past century. It is our most powerful weapon.

    It may be that in the end, after much deliberation, debate, and compromise, a consensus forms around support for trans adults to have access to any and all medical treatments they may desire, but that teenagers below a specified age cannot give informed consent. It may be that society agrees to educate high schoolers about transgender matters but not elementary schoolers. It may be that we can agree to allow trans men in male sports but not trans women in female sports, or only in some sports. It may be that people eventually agree to allow trans women in female prisons, but only after a more rigorous standard is set for what qualifies one as a trans woman. Or we may come to a different consensus on any one of these issues.

    This approach may never satisfy the hardliners in the anti-trans coalition, but no campaign to win hearts and minds ever needs to persuade everyone. People with “fuck your pronouns” in their social media bios, or who comment on hundreds of trans-related posts calling every other person a “groomer,” are probably not reachable, and certainly not the target demographic. Political activists rarely seek to, much less succeed in, convincing their staunchest opponents. Rather, they aim their efforts at the general public, especially those on the fence or whose views are not particularly strong.

    By the same token, the most extreme radicals in trans activist spaces, for whom the notion of compromise is anathema, may denounce and repudiate this whole process. They have deputized themselves as the arbiters of what constitutes being pro-trans and what constitutes transphobia, as though they alone are in possession of some received truth that only a bigot could object to. But the proof is in the pudding. As radical trans activism proliferates, public attitudes about trans people backslide. In their obsession with maximalist purity politics, these activists have become a liability to the very community they set out to champion.

    It would be the understatement of the century to say that opinions differ on trans issues. The only way we can begin to close these chasms and resume progressing toward a freer and more tolerant future is by building bridges. If there is a single, overarching theme that a new iteration of trans activism should embody, it is the universalist ideal that we are all ultimately the same and that we are all in this together.

    We may never come to an agreement on every specific policy question in a way that fully satisfies all parties. But we can all recognize—must all recognize—that whatever our views, trans people are, first and foremost, people, and they deserve the same respect, courtesy, consideration, legal protections, and equality under the law as anyone else. “Trans women are women” has, as an organizing (and often shrieked) mantra, produced results that no one is satisfied with. Perhaps a better version would be “trans people are people.”

    Jamie Paul is a writer based in Greater Philadelphia, founder of American Dreaming, managing editor at Queer Majority, and contributing editor at Bi.org.

    A version of this essay originally appeared in Queer Majority.

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