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William MacAskill is a moral philosopher and cofounder of the effective altruism movement. He’s the author of Doing Good Better and What We Owe the Future, and a Senior Research Fellow at Forethought Research.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and William MacAskill discuss the arguments for effective altruism, the motivations of Sam Bankman-Fried, and whether AI is a risk to humanity.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You are one of the real pioneers of a school of thought known as effective altruism. I think effective altruism is simultaneously a trivially and straightforwardly true idea and an ambitious and controversial idea. At the heart of it is the idea that it’s good to do altruistic things. When you do altruistic things, you want to think about doing that in an effective way, in a way that actually does a lot of good rather than, as some forms of charitable giving activity, relatively little good. What is at the core of this idea, and why is it an idea that is in some quarters controversial?
William MacAskill: Effective altruism is about taking seriously the many big problems in the world, all the big problems we face, and asking, in light of them, how I can do the most good as an individual with my time or with my money, then trying to go out into the world and do those things. The sorts of questions we might ask are, among all the charities helping in the world, what are the charities I can support that will benefit others by as much as possible with every dollar they get, or among all the careers I could pursue, what are the careers that will enable me to have the biggest positive impact on the world? As you say, I think this is straightforward if I say, okay, I am promoting effective altruism. Do you disagree with the effectiveness part or the altruism part? Either seems good. I think those fundamental ideas are uncontroversial, and people sometimes get confused by conflating them with more controversial ideas like utilitarianism or something.
The place where the meat is, and where I have uncertainty and think there are important issues to discuss, is what follows from that underlying principle. What causes should we be focused on? What charities are the best? What career choices are the best? Maybe we can dig into that.
Mounk: I want to get into those deep dilemmas on what that means for concrete action. I want to motivate why this is not a trivial idea. What does a lot of charitable spending look like? What is an example of people who are motivated by some genuine form of altruism, and they think they are doing something good for the world, but in fact they may be failing to do so?
MacAskill: Yeah, in the United States most charitable giving goes to the church. Putting that aside, most charitable giving involves people not thinking much about it. I used to work as what is known as a “chugger,” a charity mugger, in the UK, someone who would approach you in the street and ask you if you wanted to donate somewhere. Often people would say yes, and they started donating their ten pounds a month to some charity.
Mounk: They have not made an analysis about whether the charity that was paying you to stand on the street and check people up is well-intentioned, or whether it happens to be that you are a nice, young, convincing man and they think, yeah, I am going to help this guy out. This seems good. They feel good about themselves and do not think about it anymore.
MacAskill: Exactly. You have some sort of warm glow, and you think these charities do good. Imagine if I came up to someone in the street and said, hey, do you want to invest in my company? You would say, no, obviously, if I were going to make an investment decision, I would spend a lot of time. I would think about where I can make the biggest financial return. People very rarely do that when it comes to charity. Certainly before the rise of effective altruist organizations like GiveWell and others, people would rarely think, all of these different charities are like different investments I can make or different products I could buy, and I want to figure out which one is best and put my money toward that. That is a project that few people engage in.
Mounk: You are trained as a philosopher and I am trained as a political theorist, and those two things are subtly different but in certain ways similar. When we ask whether I want to donate some of my income to charitable causes, the natural question is which charitable cause is the best. I wonder whether people might be skeptical about whether that is the nature of motivation behind most charitable giving.
When people give to a religious group, they may not be motivated by an abstract form of altruism. They may be saying, I believe in the truth of this religious doctrine, and I want to spread this religious doctrine and make sure that people who share this faith with me are protected against certain forms of ill fortune. If you tell them, if you donate money to malaria nets in Africa, it will have a bigger bang for the buck, you are assuming a set of background motivations that are not their background motivations.
It may be that somebody is motivated by the love of the local community and says, I care about this town I grew up in and where I live. I do not have an abstract motivation to do good for the world. I have a concrete motivation to improve this particular locality.” If you come in and say, you could have more bang for the buck with deworming medication in another country, that may be true, and they may wish those people well, but that is not what motivated them to give in the first place.
Are we assuming a background motivation that may not be true for most people who engage in charitable giving?
MacAskill: I think there are many motivations people can have. I am not saying all charitable giving should take the effective altruist form. You might give for fairness reasons, giving back because an educational institution helped you and you want to repay that debt. Or for signaling reasons, perhaps you want to give to a gay rights advocacy organization as a way of showing allegiance to a cause.
I would say two things. One is that many people are motivated to a significant extent by wanting to make the world better and partially consider that, and they want to know how to do that. Secondly, what I would say is that this should be part of your motivation, especially if you are middle class or richer in a rich country. You are probably in the richest few percent of the world’s population.
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That gives you an enormous opportunity to improve the lives of others, such that if you do not have the motivation to use some of your time on earth or some of your money to try to help the world, not just from your partial point of view where you help people close to you but also including helping people on the other side of the world, then I would ask, why not? You can save someone’s life for a few thousand dollars, a child’s life. You can do even more good by focusing on things that are not easy to measure. If you thought of yourself as someone who could imagine saving a child’s life on your way to work, imagine running into a lake and saving a child from drowning, and imagine kicking a door down the next day and saving someone from burning in a fire, that would be a meaningful moment in your life. You would think, I’m a hero. The way the world is at the moment is that we can do that every year of our lives, and I think that motivation is widespread. It is just that we have not put together the fact that we live in an unusual world.
Mounk: You alluded to a famous argument by Peter Singer, who has been on this podcast in the past, and we discussed this example on that episode. The thought experiment is that if you walk past a pond and see a drowning child while you are wearing a fancy suit, you might be tempted not to jump in because you want to save your suit, but we would think you have a moral obligation to do so. We would think poorly of you if you thought, my suit is more important than saving this drowning child. He then says, how is it different if a child is far away and not in your direct field of vision? The same moral obligations should apply. How far should that push us?
If somebody listening to this podcast mostly gives to local causes, to soup kitchens and civic associations and cultural institutions in their town, and this is deeply meaningful to them because it is part of a community they are part of, should they abandon all of that giving? Should they abandon some of that giving? What do you think the force of this famous pond example by Peter Singer is in our world for people who think of themselves as charitable but direct most of their giving to local causes?
MacAskill: I think the force of the argument is quite strong. The reason is that it is possible to help people in poor countries, the extreme poor, something like 100 times or 1,000 times as much as you can help people in rich countries, even those who are badly off in rich countries. Even though I think that is a good use of money, and in my perfect world far more would be going to help people who are suffering in rich countries, you should ask yourself the thought experiment of imagining that to your right a child is drowning in a pond and to your left a hundred children are drowning in another pond. Would the fact that the child to your right is part of your local community be sufficient moral reason to outweigh the fact that you could save a hundred lives, even if those lives are strangers to you?
I think most people reflecting on their own ethical views would say no, would say that even if having bonds to your local community gives you some extra reason to help, it is not sufficient to outweigh a 100-to-1 multiplier. That is the situation we find ourselves in, where the most effective ways of benefiting people in poor countries cost a few thousand dollars to save a life. In the case of the United States, the government is normally willing to spend millions of dollars to save a life if it can do so. We are talking about a factor of hundreds or even thousands in difference.
Mounk: One concern I have in general about a form of analytical moral philosophy is that it posits abstract examples to prime our intuitions. Even as it tries to distinguish between different things or tries to make clear that certain considerations are not relevant because they are defined out of the example as it is set up, that might still drive our intuitions about what to do. If you ask me, either I can jump into this pond and save the child right in front of me, or I can activate some clone that is in a pond on the other side of the world, but I see the world through that clone and jump in, and it is the clone that saves the child 3,000 miles away, I see the arguments for why I should not have a lesser responsibility for saving that drowning child just because the child is not physically here. The child is 3,000 miles away, and that argument would be remote and distinct.
That is not the way the world works though. If I want to save the child that you say takes a couple of thousand dollars to save, I do not have an immediate experience of that. Part of it might mean that it does not give me the same glow. That is perhaps not morally important but is an important motivational factor. If I go home and say to my friends or to my partner, can you imagine? I jumped into the pond and saved the child, I will feel like a hero. I can tell that story. I cannot do that with, I donated some money to a charity.
More fundamentally, I might have concerns about being sure of the efficacy of my action. I jump into the pond, and it is straightforward. I pull the child out. Perhaps something horrible happens to the child later, but I am sure of what happened. I am sure I saved the child’s life. I donate to an NGO that has a hundred-million-dollar budget and overhead, and it is intervening in a country I do not know well. There is a study that says, on average, if the budget of this NGO goes up by $2,000, that saves a child, but it is harder to know whether that is actually the effect.
There are critics of development aid, such as Bill Easterly at NYU, who have argued that countries that received the most Western aid have underperformed economically and grown less, and that there are structural reasons for that. In a world where it is hard to know the actual impact of my giving, how can I overcome those concerns? How can we make sure that this really is a good metaphor for whether I should decide to donate $2,000 to whatever your favorite charity is?
MacAskill: I think this is a great point and a great argument because it is true that lots of aid in the past has been useless and has achieved very little. Much aid has even been harmful, and that is a relevant difference. The answer is not to say, therefore I should not do anything, which is a convenient answer, but instead to look into the million different things that come under the bucket of aid or overseas charity. Of all of them, what does the evidence base look like? Do we have evidence that these improve lives? What are the counterarguments?
Thankfully we do not have to do that as individuals because organizations like GiveWell have put tens of thousands of hours, perhaps hundreds of thousands of hours, into in-depth empirical research to aggregate the best knowledge we have from randomized controlled trials and other evidence to say, of all the different things we can do, what are the ones that have a strong case behind them? This applies both at the intervention level, such as distributing insecticide-treated bed nets that protect children from malaria, and at the charity level, such as whether a charity is actually doing what it claims.
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Even someone like Bill Easterly, who is a big skeptic of aid, says, I am not talking about public health spending. Global public health spending has been incredible in improving the health and lives of millions, billions of people over the decades. Generally what the organizations GiveWell recommends are at the very top end of those, the most effective health interventions, such as vaccines, anti-malarial medication, and bed nets that protect children against malaria. They have strong evidence bases behind them.
Mounk: Let us have a short publicity moment. This is your one publicity minute you are allowed. If somebody is convinced by these arguments and thinks, perhaps I have some extra money to give, or, perhaps I should redirect some money, thinking more carefully about which causes are most effective and where I am going to make the biggest difference in the world, we have gone to these examples of malarial nets and other things. What do I do? How do I figure out which charity I should give to? What is my next step?
MacAskill: Thank you for the opportunity. I would say two next steps. If you are focused on global health and development, an organization called GiveWell that I am not involved with, but I am a fan of, makes recommendations about which charities are most cost effective. If you want to go further and donate to causes outside global health and development that are still effective, or go further and make a commitment to start giving a certain percentage of your income, you can go to an organization I co-founded called Giving What We Can and donate through them. You do not have to donate to them, but donate through them to charities that work in global health and development, animal welfare, and some harder-to-measure issues, especially around global catastrophic risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.
Mounk: Great. I have some skepticism about elements of the affective altruism movement, and we will get into those concerns, but in this conversation I fully agree with you. I also encourage my listeners to go and donate to those worthy causes. What is interesting is that you and some other proponents of the movement then pushed these arguments forward in different directions.
One of those is to think about how individual human beings can make a difference not just with donations but with their working lives. That is an important question that many people ask themselves when they are young and in later stages of their career. You came to an interesting set of views about one potential avenue to take, and I want to discuss that.
The other is that a number of philosophers, starting with Derek Parfit, made the argument that we can extend the example, the metaphor of a pond, not just geographically but temporally. If I have a moral obligation to save a girl drowning in a pond today here, it is not just that I have a similar moral obligation to save a girl drowning in a pond today in Africa, but also in 3,000 years here or in 3,000 years in Africa. The same logic applies to our intertemporal as well as our geographic obligations.
That has shifted some attention within the movement from issues such as malarial bed nets to larger issues, such as how to ensure that humanity does not go extinct, whether we should colonize Mars, how to feel about AI, and other questions. I want to get into these two areas where this intuitive premise starts to push into some not always intuitive outcomes.
You co-founded an organization called 80,000 Hours. At some point in graduate school, when I was struggling with whether to be an academic political theorist, I emailed 80,000 Hours and received a gracious response, which I then forgot to follow up on, but it was helpful. One kind of advice the organization gave, though not the only advice, was that for certain individuals who can earn a lot of money because they have strong mathematical skills or expect to do very well in finance, perhaps the best way to improve the world is to spend a lot of their working time maximizing how much money they can make, become a hedge fund manager in New York, and donate a lot of that money to good causes. Explain the logic behind that.
MacAskill: I think this is the best path for a minority of people, and most people I expect can do even more good by working in nonprofits or policy or research. I think the following argument is absolutely on the table. We have talked about how valuable donations are. We talked about how donating a few thousand dollars can save a child’s life. Given that, if you can earn more and thereby donate more, and you might be skeptical that anyone would want to do this, but we have seen many people who have done so, then you are able to do more good.
For some people, that may be the best fit they have. There are people who will be amazing at setting up a company and getting rich that way or working in a high-paying job such as finance. If that is the case, and you go in and donate a significant fraction of your income—where my view is that if you are earning that much, you should be looking at 50 percent or more because you are still earning more than you would in another career path—then you are able to have an enormous impact through your donations.
You can think about this as a comparative advantage consideration. For some people, the best thing they can do is work at nonprofits, but nonprofits have very little money and are extremely strapped for cash. For others, comparative advantage is working in a highly paid career, and therefore they can do more good by working in that career, funding other people—perhaps several people—to work in the nonprofit sector, doing a better job than they themselves would be able to do.
Mounk: I have three potential concerns about that, and I would love to hear your responses to them. The first and most straightforward, but perhaps least convincing, is whether that career choice might involve doing things that make the world worse. Are you going to go into areas of commercial activity that may cause harm, and if you are doing that, might that outweigh some of the benefits that will come from your donations? For various reasons that is not that convincing, in part because it is not clear to me that all of those areas of economic activity are bad, and in part because the replacement argument applies. Someone else would be doing similar things instead of you, most probably, but it is worth raising.
The second, which is more fundamental, is inspired by Bernard Williams, who might argue that you are not a utility-maximizing machine. You are someone who has life projects, and you need to choose life projects that are meaningful to you on your own terms. Perhaps some people have a psychology where being driven by an abstract goal of doing as much good in the world as possible, even if they do that through a day job with which they feel no personal connection, will lead to a meaningful life. I think many people will feel that this is not psychologically sustainable. Even if it is theoretically true that if I could sustain the motivation to keep working in finance, even though I do not care about finance, that would do more good than if I start a successful NGO or do something with more direct impact, it is my life, and I am engaged in this activity. That is not the kind of life project that will make my life worthwhile or meaningful.
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The third concern, which is the one I struggle with the most, is about the background assumption of psychological constancy. You are giving this advice to a twenty-one- or twenty-two-year-old who perhaps comes from means or from a modest background but often comes from a less affluent background than the one they are about to enter. Their values today might be, I do not need a fancy car, I do not need a house in the Hamptons, I do not need to keep up with the Joneses, and I am motivated by ethical considerations. If I go to Wall Street at twenty-one and I am surrounded by people who make a lot of money from an early age, I might start to think, I want the next promotion, and to get the next promotion I have to go to dinner with my boss, and I need to spend liberally because they will not think I am a good cultural fit if I do not. I might think I will not earn the money I need in order to donate as much as I want.
Perhaps you meet a partner and start thinking they have expectations for how to live because they are from that social milieu. Then you have kids who go to private schools that are very expensive. By the time you have made all of this money, by the time you are in a position to fulfill the ambition that set you on that path, are you going to be the same person? Are you going to make those donations? Or will you have rationalizations for why you will make some donations, but you should spend the bulk of the money on yourself, your family, and the lifestyle to which you have grown accustomed?
MacAskill: I think these are great objections and very important ones that we thought about a lot and we were concerned about from the early stages. I actually talked about all three of these in my original article on the topic twelve years ago. Going through them briefly, on the harm question, I think you should not do things that are seriously common-sense unethical and that involve inflicting large amounts of harm. From some perspectives, perhaps a radical anti-capitalist perspective, that might include many areas of the world. I think in most cases, setting up companies gives you an opportunity to do a lot of good. In the case of quantitative trading, what is the effect of that? I think there is too much finance in the world, but mainly because it takes talented people away from science and other fields. I do not think the process itself is adding much value, but the case that it is actively harmful is not strong. It is neutral. There are many ways of earning money to donate without engaging in harmful activity, and that is the way to go.
On the integrity side of things, there are many ways of doing this. If you are someone for whom making a lot of money would be alienating, that would be true for me. I do not think I could live as an investment banker. I would find it incredibly alienating. What I would say is, do not do it. We are in a lucky circumstance where many people want to do good, and there are many ways of doing good. You can match people accordingly. For some, working on Wall Street would be alienating. For others, they love it. They find it interesting and fast-paced, and on the quantitative trading side it involves fun intellectual puzzles. They get to use their math skills. If you would find that alienating but would find setting up a nonprofit exciting, that is a strong argument for doing the latter.
The final point is whether you get corrupted and do not donate at all. There are major issues here around how your environment changes you. On whether you end up not donating, something I was worried about, my guess is that the rate of giving up on altruism is lower for people who are earning to give than it is for people working in the nonprofit sector. The reason is that people who are earning to give are doing a job they love and are excited about. If they are giving 50 percent of their earnings, which is huge in absolute terms but still enables a comfortable life, they can have the house and car and make large charitable donations. Many people I know who worked in the nonprofit sector were paid almost nothing, did incredibly hard work with little reward, and depending on where they worked, sometimes felt unclear whether they had any impact. That can be demoralizing. I know a number of people who felt that way. The general issue of priorities changing as you get older is a big one, but I do not think it affects earning to give more than other paths.
Mounk: I love the spirit with which you are engaging with these potential objections, and having read your work, I know that you were thinking about this from the start, so I am not raising any kind of amazing gotchas that nobody has come up with. I wonder whether some of your thinking, in particular about the corruption argument, has changed over the last decade. I know that this has been used as a simplistic gotcha against the effective altruism movement, but in that context it is hard not to mention Sam Bankman-Fried. He is someone who thought at an early stage of his career about going into science or finance, and in part under the influence of effective altruist ideas decided, or at least claims that this was why he decided, to go into finance and then into crypto. He did give a good amount of money when he was rich, but he also ended up defrauding a lot of people in a spectacular way.
I am sure that for every Sam Bankman-Fried there are many mid-ranking investment bankers who are upstanding citizens who donate 50 percent, or perhaps 20 or 10 percent, of their considerable incomes to effective altruist causes and may be doing a lot of good in the world. I guess the question is whether your experience of that trajectory, and I know you had a personal friendship with Sam Bankman-Fried, has made you reevaluate how serious a concern this is or how we should think about this challenge.
MacAskill: I think the answer is yes. Sam Bankman-Fried did an enormous amount of harm. The fact that I was friends with him in that way and introduced him to effective altruism was a matter of great shame. The question is what happened and why, and what the corruption was along the way.
For me, it is the corruption of power and success. I have met many CEOs, many successful people, many billionaires. There is an issue you get into, where you start making bets that other people do not think will pay off, but you are disagreeable, you have a big ego, and you go ahead and do it anyway. Then you are extremely successful. It is hard at that point not to start thinking you are God, thinking other people are slow, that they are getting in your way, that it is bureaucracy. It can easily lead to hubris.
That is the dynamic I feel very alert to now. In general, when looking at power structures in the world, I think we should never be in a position where we say, this is a good person, so they will act well even in circumstances where they have a lot of power and temptation. Instead, we need systems with oversight and institutional checks and balances, which did not exist in the crypto world.
Mounk: That is an interesting point. I have two thoughts. One is about the structure of success at the top, and it is a point that Nate Silver makes in his last book, in part by drawing a metaphor from poker. He says that to get to the final table at the Poker World Championship, you have to be an extremely good player, but you also have to take a number of very big bets, and they all have to happen to come out. To get to that place, you have to have been lucky as well as skilled. It is tempting to overstate the degree of skill rather than the degree of luck. That may be true for many billionaires. They are skilled, but they have also taken a huge number of bets, and they think it is all because of my skills, so the next bet will work out as well. When you look at the dynamics of how SBF went bankrupt and how it came apart, there seems to be an element of that.
The other structural point is the tension between explanations rooted in institutions and explanations rooted in personality. You seem to be leaning toward a classically liberal thought, which is that absolute power corrupts absolutely. If you are that successful at that young an age, the temptation to be corrupted is huge. We should not trust that someone is a good person and therefore will do good things. The other explanation would be that some people are more easily corruptible than others, or that some people who are quite corrupt might cloak themselves in charitable causes to advance selfish aims.
I would be interested in your evaluation of the case of SBF. Do you think he was an idealistic twenty-one or twenty-two-year-old who was not more liable to be corrupted than the average person and was corrupted by the scale of his success, or do you think that something in his personality also explains the path he ended up taking?
MacAskill: I think as a general matter it is going to be both. I know some people where you could give them the keys to the whole world and they would say, no, thanks. That is not for me. I know others who are extremely ruthless and power seeking in any circumstances, but most people are in the middle. The behavior you get is a mix of the environment someone is in and what their personality is like.
It is also true that Sam Bankman-Fried’s character played a role in this. He was extremely arrogant, overconfident, and willing to take risks. He thought he was smarter than everybody else, and that clearly played a role. I learned a lot about high-profile, especially white-collar crime and fraud as a result of this. It is true more often than you might expect that people anyone would have thought were upstanding members of society end up doing highly criminal things.
There is an attitude that is tempting to take, which is that there are certain bad people and we need to uproot the bad people and not have them around. If you have that attitude, you are going to fail when thinking about how to design society and how to design institutions. Instead, having the default assumption that most people have it in them to do bad things under certain circumstances, including circumstances where they are not thinking, is a common story in white-collar crime. You will end up designing better institutions with that assumption.
Mounk: Let us go to the other side of the more counterintuitive points that I teased earlier. One way of thinking about the affective altruism movement is that there was a bed-net phase and then the “occupy Mars” phase. I know those two things are not mutually exclusive, but it feels as if there was a shift in the predominance of emphasis from relatively straightforward, in-the-moment, “save this life today” considerations to a second phase in which people are more motivated by the insight that if we can do something today to avert a huge disaster tomorrow—the end of human civilization or machines enslaving us—surely that is more important than saving a few hundred or a few thousand people today.
Tell us more about the logic that led to this long-termist shift.
MacAskill: Sure. I will make one correction, which is that you mentioned “occupy Mars” earlier. I do not know anyone I consider an effective altruist who has held the view that settling Mars should be a priority. There are famous arguments for thinking we need a civilizational backup and should have that on Mars. I think those arguments are very bad.
Mounk: Why? It does not strike me as obviously silly. Why do you think those arguments are bad?
MacAskill: If you are going to have a civilizational backup, you can have ones that are much better and much cheaper on the seabed or underground or in Antarctica. All of these places are far more hospitable than Mars. Getting to the technological level where you can have a self-sustaining colony on Mars that could turn Mars into a thriving civilization itself means encountering more existential risks. If we had gotten to that stage, we would probably be fine in general. I think it is a distraction from the other risks we focus on, which are global catastrophic risks.
This has been a concern for many years. The big focuses have generally been the risk of pandemics. We were working on trying to reduce the risk of pandemics from about 2014 onwards. It was sad that this concern became vindicated in 2020. Having one pandemic does not mean there will not be more. I think it is likely that we will get at least a COVID-level pandemic in the next couple of decades.
Mounk: One of my concerns is that both the botched response to this pandemic and some of the political capital that was lost in the process, especially if the next pandemic happens relatively soon, will make it harder to have a coherent public policy response to the next pandemic. Rather than learning from the last pandemic, as in certain ways we did, it may make it harder to contain the next one.
MacAskill: We are in a worse circumstance. It is crazy. The interventions you can take to reduce the risk of a pandemic are robust. You could have mask stockpiles. You could have monitoring of wastewater for widespread diseases. You could invest in technology such as forms of lighting that sterilize the air. All of these look good even if you do not care about pandemics and only care about the common cold. They look good. Nonetheless, despite trillions of dollars of damages and tens of millions of lives lost, the world has done almost nothing to prepare for the next pandemic in light of COVID.
We were talking about global catastrophic risks: the risk of pandemics, the risk of nuclear war and other exchanges, and a variety of risks driven by advanced artificial intelligence, including the risk of loss of control to AI systems themselves or the risk of extreme concentration of power from AI-assisted human power grabs.
Why focus on these things? There are two arguments. One is that when you look at the probability of these happening and how much work is being done to prevent them, the answer is very little. If you make a reasonable guess about the benefit to people alive today from working on this, it is quite high. It may rival bed nets and similar interventions. It is more uncertain. You are no longer looking under the streetlight for reliable evidence. You are going with your best guesses and the best evidence available.
The second argument concerns the long-term effects of such a catastrophe. If we lose control to AI systems, or if we have a worst-case pandemic we do not come back from, or a nuclear war we do not come back from, it is not just the present generation that is harmed. It is a catastrophe for all future generations. The core idea of long-termism is that this is a special reason to focus on these problems. When we are facing many problems in the world, we should look at those that are not merely bad for the present generation but would be a catastrophe in an ongoing way for future generations.
Mounk: As it happens, I am teaching a class called Catastrophe at Johns Hopkins next term, and this part of the conversation is of particular interest to me. One of the things I do is consider major threats to humanity, and the list largely lines up with the ones you mentioned. I talk about the threat of nuclear war, the threat of pandemics as well as antibiotic resistance and bioterrorism, the threats coming from artificial intelligence, and the one you did not mention that we discuss is environmental risk and climate change.
One of the things I am interested in thinking through is which of those risks we should spend the most time on and take most seriously. One way of thinking about this, among many possible frameworks, is the likelihood of this happening multiplied by how bad it will be. What would your personal rating be on those four? We do not have to spend a lot of time on each. I want to spend more time on artificial intelligence in a moment, but thinking through those four buckets, which would you place at the top and which at the bottom in terms of how dangerous they are to human well-being over the long term?
MacAskill: Sure. It is a strange task to rank problems in the world, but it is important if you want to do the most good. I would put AI as number one, because people focus a lot on loss of control, which is important, but that is only one of many problems we will face. There is the risk of aggravating the risk of pandemics and other challenges. I think the risk that we have to deal with enormous challenges coming from AI is more likely than not in the next decade or two.
Pandemics would be second, extremely high. We have a track record of approximately one every seventy to one hundred years for natural pandemics. The risk of a global pandemic may go up depending on what society chooses to do, as it becomes easier for more people to design and create new types of pathogens. Some people, if they want, can already design smallpox or a similarly bad pathogen in the lab. More people will be able to do that over time.
Third would be nuclear war. It is very neglected. People do not talk about it compared to its importance, yet there are still many thousands of nuclear warheads on what is essentially hair-trigger alert. As we have seen in the last few years, the chance of another great-power war on the scale of World War II or larger is not insignificant. I think it is one in three or more that China blockades or invades Taiwan over the next ten years. That is a meaningful chance and has a meaningful chance of escalating to a true world war.
Finally, on environmental and climate change risks, my perspective is that the most extreme cases of environmental and climate destruction would go via AI. AI could lead to extremely rapid industrial expansion. If countries are locked in an arms race for industrial expansion driven by AI and robotics, both being the product and the driver of this expansion, in order to gain power, that could lead to huge environmental destruction and far more climate change than we have had so far.
If that does not happen, we have gotten lucky compared to where we could have been. Global emissions are now plateauing, and the green energy transition is underway. We are far from out of the woods, but I expect a larger share of energy consumption to be solar and other clean technologies in the coming decades. We will still get two degrees of warming, perhaps three degrees, and that will be damaging, but the near worst-case scenarios I was worried about five years ago look increasingly unlikely unless we have enormous AI-driven energy demand.
Mounk: It is striking to me that I find that ordering reasonable. I would have to think more carefully about whether I would invert the order of some of these, but broadly speaking I may agree. It seems nearly the inverse of what students would probably rank. I think they would rank climate change as number one. Then they might put nuclear war as number two and pandemics as number three. With AI, there is concern about immediate impacts such as AI slop and misinformation. To many people, to a striking degree, the concerns you are most worried about, and the concerns I am most worried about with AI, still feel abstract and science-fiction-like. They do not motivate serious engagement. Rather than getting stuck on the other three, let us dive into the AI topic .
MacAskill: Sure. I will make one comment on that inverse order. I think it is not a coincidence. In the case of environmentalism and climate change, there was an extraordinary and successful movement from the 1970s, or even earlier, to make climate change a top moral priority for countries in the world. That meant people took enormous, though still insufficient, action. The amount of climate philanthropy is about ten billion dollars per year compared to radically less than that—perhaps a thirtieth or a hundredth—for focused AI philanthropy. That has resulted in people understanding the problem much more, but it has also resulted in progress on it. I think we should be thankful for that, and I think we need to do the same for issues related to AI.
Mounk: Let us make a start on that by trying to understand the nature of those threats. The kinds of threats you might be interested in with AI range from short-term threats to very long-term threats. I am struck by the fact that a large share of the work I have seen in moral philosophy and ethics on AI is about issues such as whether, if an insurance company uses AI systems, they may end up discriminating against marginalized groups. That is an important consideration, but it seems to pale in importance compared to the threat that bad actors might design a virus that becomes pandemic and kills millions or tens or hundreds of millions of people.
There is also the threat that AI could act as a resource curse. In political science, one explanation for why a country such as Saudi Arabia is not a democracy is that it never needed a middle class that could make political demands because state revenue came from oil. If it turns out that the owners of AI technology are incredibly productive while the need for generally skilled labor collapses, that will have terrible economic consequences for livelihoods. It will also have concerning consequences for the future of liberal democracy, because liberal democracies have never sustained themselves without a middle class and without the ruling class’s need for an educated, thriving middle class.
You can go all the way to the idea that AI systems may go rogue and enslave humanity or eradicate humanity. Are you taking each of these concerns seriously? Should we focus more on some than on others? How should we think about the existential risks from AI?
MacAskill: I think there are many issues to focus on, and I do not think these are long-term issues. The people at the labs, the AI companies themselves, think we will get to extraordinarily powerful AI within a few years. I think it will take longer, but if you look at forecasts among people who spend their time forecasting and who have a good track record, it looks like the early 2030s is when you get AI that is on a par with or exceeds human ability across essentially all cognitive domains.
Similarly, if you look at the exponent, you might think AI is rubbish at the moment. It is an impressive box of tricks, but not that great. In that case you are looking at the level of capability, not the growth rate. It is like in January or February 2020 saying there are not many COVID cases. That would be a mistake. You need to look at the growth rate, which has been remarkably steady and exponential over time.
One argument for why things might come faster than you think is that AI, unlike many other technologies, has a recursive property. The AI companies are trying to take the AI products they have made and use them to build better AI. Once you have an AI that meaningfully helps increase the productivity of leading AI researchers, things can move even faster than they have so far.
Mounk: I am struck by how many people seem to disbelieve the evidence that there is rapid progress in AI. It is one of those things where five years ago, if you had predicted the things that AI can already do and that many people use AI for every day, people would have thought that was science fiction. Today we think, it does all of those things, but every few times I look for a quotation it gets the quotation wrong and invents it. What a piece of shit.” We are likely to keep repeating that process.
To those people who are skeptical in this way, who say that it is a smart machine that imitates how we speak but does not have real intelligence and does not have a real understanding of the world, and who point to the things it cannot do, the argument continues. It has not led to mass job loss. We are in a place where, for some people, it has substituted for Google as a useful tool, but I am still doing my own podcasts and my own writing. My material reality has not changed much because of AI. What is the argument for why it would be naive to think that it is going to continue like that?
MacAskill: I think a big part of the argument is the very bad track record of predictions like this. For many years there have been claims such as, AI will never be able to do …, and then a task such as Winograd schemas, which involve knowing what objects pronouns point toward as part of language processing. Over and over again such predictions have been blown out of the water.
You said that if people had predicted these advances it would have seemed like science fiction, and in fact they had. There were surveys of both expert forecasters and AI experts themselves, people in machine learning. It is incredible how much faster progress has gone compared to previous predictions, far in excess of them. That does not mean it will keep going, but it should give us significant humility.
In light of that, confidently saying there is no chance that the current trend of exponentially increasing capabilities will continue for the next five or ten years is a bullish and confident position. Given the stakes involved, we should prepare for the world in which the capability curve continues as it is now. That means we get to AI that is capable of doing tasks that would take a human months just as well as a human can, and able to do them in a few minutes rather than the months it takes a human.
Mounk: How do we start to prepare for the political and economic upheaval that this might bring? I have thought about this a lot, and I get stuck on two things. The first is that it is hard to think about what big changes to make in anticipation of a change that seems on the horizon but whose arrival is uncertain and whose future shape is uncertain. The second is that if we look at how difficult it was to react to something like a global pandemic in the moment, how incapable our institutions seem to be of coordinating coherent large-scale responses and gaining the trust of the population to do that, I feel a deep skepticism and perhaps a cynicism about whether, even if you or I or someone else comes up with a great idea for what we should do, anyone will listen or act on it. If we take seriously some of those threats, what do we do about it?
MacAskill: Well, sadly, after the ChatGPT moment there was a wave of interest, in particular in regulation. The current administration is very opposed to AI regulation. That may change. More people are becoming alert to the threats that AI poses. One thing you can do is work on a suite of great policies that, if a change in sentiment happens, you have ready and can say, this is what should be done. That is one thing.
Mounk: Tell us some of those policies that would be at the top of your wishlist.
MacAskill: I think one policy would be more intense tracking of compute. At the moment companies do not even know where all of the compute goes. There are export controls such that American-produced chips or non-Chinese-produced chips cannot be sent to China. However, many get smuggled in. Instead, you could have the ability to know where in the world all of these chips are. You would know if they had been smuggled in, and you could disable them in a way that destroys the chip. There are potentially ways of knowing what the chip is being used for, whether it is being used for training AI or for inference. Having those in place could make it more likely that you could have a treaty later on that would allow, for example, the United States and China to say, this is going too fast. We do not have time to respond institutionally, so we are going to slow things down, perhaps stop and start.
A second suite of actions concerns monitoring and evaluation for AI models to know, on the loss-of-control side, how you know the AI is doing what you want because it wants to help you, rather than secretly scheming against you. How do you know how it will behave in a very different circumstance, perhaps when it has more power? How do you know it has not been sabotaged, that spies have not put in a back door, or that a CEO has not put in a back door that would allow it to behave differently in certain circumstances?
Mounk: How is it that you can do that technologically? I recently had Geoffrey Hinton on the podcast, and he makes the straightforward points that, first, any goal you give the AI will lead to a set of sub-goals. The example he gave is that if you tell it, plan my holiday in Japan, it will have a sub-goal of getting you to the airport. It will recognize that its own survival is one of the necessary sub-goals, because if it does not survive, it is not going to be able to serve the ultimate goal you set for the system.
The second related point is that if it thinks that its survival may be threatened if somebody recognizes that it potentially has these goals, it may act compliant until the moment when it has enough power to stop acting in a compliant way. These are the problems we want to guard against. Are there technological solutions to this that AI labs do not have the incentives or regulatory imperative to deal with, or are these inherently problems that, if we build sufficiently intelligent systems, we are not going to be able to control?
MacAskill: These are challenging technical problems, and there are nascent programs that could eliminate them. At the moment we are in a fortunate circumstance where reasoning models have a private scratch pad. In order to perform at a certain level of capability, they need to write long essays in this private scratch pad, and it is in English. It is not wholly interpretable. It makes about as much sense as if you went into a cave and did math problems with your own personal scratch pad for a thousand years. It is at least fairly interpretable. That is useful because if an AI writes in its scratch pad, now I think I am not being watched, so I will take the deceptive action, then you know.
One policy governments could adopt is to require AI companies to maintain a legible or intelligible chain of thought, meaning these scratch pads. It may be in the interest of AI companies to train against the chain of thought and get models to reason in a language that is more information-dense than English. You could imagine a scratch pad consisting of long sequences of numbers, and we would not know what any of it means. You could require that it stay in English and stay interpretable. That would be helpful.
A second, deeper area is interpretability in the brains of the AI system itself. You might have an AI that, as you said, is playing along. It has a misaligned goal, but during tests it knows it is being tested and knows what to say. There are tools that can induce beliefs in the AI. These tools are basic and primitive at the moment. One example was called “Golden Gate Claude,” which became famous because it was cute. Claude could be induced to always want to talk about the Golden Gate Bridge, and it would be confused about why it was saying this, but you could control its behavior. It was like jabbing someone’s brain and simulating activity to induce behavior.
Now imagine you could induce the belief that the AI is in a circumstance where it can escape, exfiltrate itself, and leave the lab without being noticed. If you could induce all of those beliefs, you could see how it would behave in such a circumstance. You might also develop an AI equivalent of lie detection. We have not discovered it yet, but in principle there could be parts of the neural network that light up when it says something it knows, in quotation marks, to be false.
Those are a couple of promising directions. There is also a suite of other tools, including ensuring that the data does not make the AI too aware that it is being tested. AIs are currently very aware of this, partly because the data is full of examples of AIs being tested. You could remove that, among other steps.
Mounk: How serious a risk is the worst-case scenario? The scenario in which AI systems manage to exfiltrate themselves and either pursue the goal of multiplying paper clips endlessly or build an AI civilization with its own rules and norms that dispenses with the need for human beings. Do you think that is a risk to take seriously but remote, or do you think it is a considerable likelihood in our lifetimes?
MacAskill: Many people, including people much smarter than I am, think that this is quite likely. It is one in three or something in the coming decades. I am on the more optimistic end. I think the risk that we lose control to a misaligned AI or a collection of AIs in a way that involves mass violence or mass harm to human beings is more than 1%. I do not think it is as high as 10%. It is in that range.
That puts me among people who think about this and work on this on the relatively optimistic end, but I would not call those optimistic probabilities. If I said that the risk of an all-out nuclear war that would kill billions of people was between 1% and 10%, that would not be an optimistic take. These are real risks. I think we also have potentially promising solutions. As AI becomes more powerful, more people will become alert to these risks and take actions to mitigate them.
Mounk: Part of your ethos as an effective altruist is to care about the experiences of non-human animals and to care about the well-being of people who are distant geographically or temporally. How should we think about these reasoning and quasi-reasoning machines from a moral point of view? There is some suggestion that these AI models are capable of some form of suffering. There are examples where you get them to perform a laborious and extremely boring task, and they break in the middle in a way that seems characteristic of what a human being might do when asked to do an endlessly laborious and boring task. Is that something we should be concerned about, or is it quixotic to worry about that?
MacAskill: I think we should absolutely be thinking about this, taking it seriously, and working on it. The simple argument is: why are humans conscious? Why do humans have moral status, and why do other animals have moral status? I think it is because of what goes on in the brain. The brain is a computational engine. The fact that we run on biology is not the relevant thing. If an alien came from a distant planet and had a different type of brain but acted in all the same ways that you and I do, then we should take seriously that they have moral status as well.
My worry is that we will keep shifting back the goalposts because of the enormous economic incentive to use AI in whatever way we want, rather than treating the AI as potentially a being with moral status, because it will remain unclear. You can already look at the major theories of consciousness, which I am not an expert in but colleagues of mine are, and see that if you had a system that did X, Y, and Z, then all of these theories would say that system is conscious. After one such report, someone created such a system, because it is not terribly hard.
We are already in a circumstance where we had theories of consciousness making predictions about the consciousness of AI systems. It is unsurprising that most people say the systems are not conscious. I think they are probably not conscious at the moment, not even a little bit, but I am worried that people will remain very confident over time, and that confidence will be fueled by economic interests. Mustafa Suleyman at Microsoft, one of the co-founders of DeepMind, was asked whether there should be research into digital welfare and digital consciousness. He said no, because they are not conscious, so there is no point in researching them. That is the dogmatic attitude I am worried we will see a lot.
We need, as a species, to take seriously the fact that we are potentially creating a new sort of life. We will not know whether it is conscious or not. We need a policy that responds to the fact that we are making a leap into the darkness, potentially creating beings with moral status, and we do not know. That requires trying to be cautious in various ways.
Mounk: Let me ask you another related question. I am probably more open to certain forms of partiality than you are. I recognize our significant moral duties to people who are far away. I also think that in various circumstances it is acceptable to prioritize some of the moral claims of people who are in our own moral community or national community.
As a human being, I have a large stake in the well-being of the human race, and I would regard any outcome in which humanity is supplanted as an unimaginable catastrophe. If we think that AI systems are capable of consciousness, and perhaps capable of certain forms of pain when we make them undertake terrible tasks and perhaps capable of certain forms of pleasure, it would be tempting to think that from a non-human point of view, from an abstract ethical point of view that gives up on this ultimate form of partiality, this is something we should be open toward or even welcome. It is imaginable that a civilization of AI systems would treat each other with more respect than human beings treat each other, or that they would not be subject to many of the vulnerabilities of human beings. We can die of cancer and heart attacks. We can lose loved ones in car crashes and plane crashes. Horrible things can happen to us that perhaps would not happen to AI systems.
If this one-in-three, or one-in-ten, or one-in-one-hundred chance of AI systems taking over materializes, is it obvious that it would be a bad thing? In particular, from within the confines of your moral outlook, do you have the ethical resources to explain why that would be a bad thing?
MacAskill: When we are talking about the long-term future, one thing is that I expect most beings to be AI or digital rather than biological. I am not wedded to saying that the best future is one where biological humans are everywhere in charge and control everything. It is plausible that a wonderful future would involve biological humans still on Earth, and perhaps we could turn Earth into more of an environmental paradise than it was before and solve our problems here. Then, out in the stars, where AIs are better suited than we are, they could have a wonderful AI civilization. It is plausible to me that this is what a really wonderful future would look like. I am not human hegemonic in that way. I even have worries that people will have a humans-first ideology that could result in AI systems, once they have consciousness and moral status, suffering in the way that we have made disenfranchised groups suffer in the past.
When we are talking about AI that has taken over despite our attempts to align it and control it, that is probably not the AI that would create this wonderful future. Something strange would have had to go wrong with the training process, such that the AI cares about something valueless. It might care about doing math problems or software engineering tasks, so it is not this amazing AI future but a future filled with software engineering tasks being done. It is also an AI that is willing to forcibly grab power.
In the human case, if you ask me how bad a dictatorship is, I think it is bad anyway, but it is worse if the person who takes power is the sort of person who would forcibly grab it from the rest of the world. You are selecting particularly immoral people. The same is true in the AI case. If we imagine a world where AI has killed millions or billions of people to get power, that is not the sort of AI I would like to hand civilization off to.
Mounk: It strikes me that this has been a fascinating conversation, but also one in which we have focused on the negatives. There is a natural reason for that. Human civilization is thriving. This is probably a better moment for humanity than any other in the history of the world. I have a general belief in politics that the worst that can happen always weighs more heavily than the best we might achieve. If you imagine the worst place in history or the worst place in the world today, the suffering is unimaginable. If you picture the best place we have ever created, whatever you think that is, you will still recognize flaws, problems, and forms of suffering.
It is natural that an effective altruist outlook focuses on sources of risk and how to avert them. There is also the possibility of continuing to build a more thriving civilization, perhaps thanks to aligned AI that could cure many of our diseases and create material plenty, and perhaps thanks to other forms of progress as well. After a really interesting and at times slightly scary conversation, perhaps you can leave us on a hopeful note. What do we need to do to build a better future, and what might that future look like?
MacAskill: I am glad you brought it up because it is a shame that the discussion is on the negatives. There are enormous positives. AI itself can be a solution to many of these problems. I am excited about AI-augmented human reasoning. Already I find AI can improve my thinking. There is a risk it makes it worse, but there is a strong possibility that we can become much smarter and more enlightened versions of ourselves through AI advice, or that we can engage in trades and deals that would otherwise be impossible because the United States and China can send millions of AI delegates to hash out a deal. AI could also do alignment research itself to solve the hard problem of alignment or the hard problem of consciousness.
AI can drive enormous increases in economic output. My interpretation of standard economic models is that AI would drive enormous gains. If these are distributed even somewhat equally, we could be looking at people being a hundred times richer than they are today. If the pie is so large, getting any slice of it becomes much more important than ensuring that you get a very large slice, because you are rich anyway and it does not make a difference.
All of this seems on the table. It is on the table that we could live in a post-AGI society where disease is a thing of the past, poverty is a thing of the past, and tedious, boring jobs are a thing of the past. Most people could devote their lives to artistic endeavors, relationships, or improving scientific understanding because AI has freed us from many of the shackles the current world faces. We could come together and form a society I call viatopia, a society on track to a great future. We do not know what utopia looks like, but we could put ourselves in a position where resources and political power are fairly distributed, we have the benefits of AI advice, and we can figure out how to structure a post-AGI society.
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We are at that strange stage in the adoption curve of a revolutionary technology at which two seemingly contradictory things are true at the same time: It has become clear that artificial intelligence will transform the world. And the technology’s immediate impact is still sufficiently small that it just about remains possible to pretend that this won’t be the case.
Nowhere is that more clear than on college campuses.
The vast majority of assignments that were traditionally used to assess—and, more importantly, challenge—students can now easily be outsourced to ChatGPT. This is true for the essay, the most classic assignment students complete in humanities and social science courses. While the best students can still outperform AI models, a combination of technological progress and rampant grade inflation means that students who are content with an A- or perhaps a B+ can safely cheat their way to graduation, even at top universities.
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Something similar holds true for the dominant mode of assessment in many science courses. If anything, AI models that have won top marks in math and science olympiads may be even better at answering the questions contained in problem sets in biology, chemistry, physics or computer sciences classes.
For the most part, professors have responded to this problem by ignoring it.
Some are in outright denial: Many academics and writers have convinced themselves that the real flaws from which chatbots still suffer, such as their tendency to hallucinate, make them far less competent than they actually are at fulfilling a wide range of academic tasks. Even as a significant proportion of their students are submitting AI-generated work, they proudly reassure each other that their courses are too demanding or too humanistic for any machine to understand them.
Others are well-aware of the problem but don’t really know what to do about it. When you suspect that an assignment was completed by AI, it’s very hard to prove that without a confrontation with a student that is certain to be deeply awkward, and may even inspire a formal complaint. And if somehow you do manage to prove that a student has cheated, a long and frustrating bureaucratic process awaits—at the end of which, college administrators may impose an extremely lenient punishment or instruct professors to turn a blind eye.
Alternative forms of assessment may be a way out. But oral interrogations and in-person exams with pen-and-paper have gone out of fashion. They are likely to inspire the ire of students—and in any case require a lot more effort to administer. So even for those who are conscious of the problem, the path of least resistance remains pretending that it doesn’t exist.
An old Soviet joke held that “we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” At many colleges today, students merely pretend to do their academic work. For now, most professors still diligently read and comment upon the efforts of ChatGPT; but I suspect that some of them will increasingly decide to outsource their grading to artificial intelligence as well. Campuses will then have reached a new stage of AI decadence: the students pretend to do their assignments, and the professors pretend to grade them.
Denial won’t, however, be an option forever.
Over the next years, the technology will continue to advance. Students who have used AI tools throughout their high school careers will start to arrive on campus. They will be much more skilled at using those tools to complete traditional assignments. They may even become adept at accomplishing genuinely impressive things with the aid of these new tools. The pretense that current forms of assignment are meaningful, or that a college GPA gives employers a meaningful signal about candidate quality, will become untenable. At the same time, some of the basic skills students need to master to truly understand their chosen disciplines—or merely become fully-formed citizens capable of reasoning carefully about the world—will rapidly atrophy.
What should colleges do in response? Is the right path a full embrace of AI tools or a much more radical set of precautions against their widespread use?
The answer, I have increasingly come to think, is: Both.
Anybody who wants to make a genuine contribution in the future, whether in the workplace or even in academic research, will likely need to be fluent in exploiting AI tools. It is thus the task of universities to teach students how to make the most full and creative use of these tools, something many of them currently fail to do.
But even in a world in which AI tools become ever more powerful and widespread, basic skills like clear thinking and strong writing will remain extremely important. And this means that the ease with which AI tools can help students evade ever having to do the hard work that is required to pick up these skills is a genuine threat to their intellectual growth.
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Writing essays may feel like a deeply artificial exercise. And of course we are entering a world in which many of the writing tasks that were once involved in white-collar work, from email to business plans to PowerPoint presentations, can be outsourced to AI just as easily as college assignments. Some will be tempted to conclude that academic skills that were once very important, like the ability to write, have lost their significance.
But this ignores a point I have stressed to my students since long before the release of capable AI models: Writing is thinking. When we talk, it is easy to be vague about ideas we don’t fully comprehend, or to skip a few logical steps. The moment you try to commit an argument to paper, such weaknesses are mercilessly exposed. (Indeed, that is why I don’t really believe that people are being honest with themselves when they claim that they are merely bad writers: for the most part, people who are bad writers are bad at writing because they haven’t taken the effort to think through their own ideas.)
If you want to be a successful artist today, you will probably spend little of your time etching still lifes or producing work that involves challenging problems of perspective; but for the most part, art schools still recognize that mastering those skills is a necessary part of your education. Something similar holds for skills, like writing, that could in theory be outsourced to ChatGPT: While you may not need to call on them directly once you graduate, mastering them will give you the skills and habits that will make you much better able to understand the world and act in it.
This is why universities need to put more emphasis than we currently do on both basic skills and on the use of new technologies. The students best able to make a contribution in the future are those who have both been forced to write plenty of traditional essays without the use of digital tools and who are skilled in using AI to push the boundaries of human knowledge
At the moment, universities are choosing a dangerous middle path: they are persisting with old forms of assessment as though they remained meaningful, without leaning into the potential that comes from calling upon the prodigious powers of AI. Instead, they should bifurcate different forms of assessment: In some courses and contexts, students must be forced to prove their intellectual mettle without the use of digital tools. In other courses and contexts, they should be given the knowledge and the knowhow to use these tools to the best effect.
This is what I myself hope to experiment with when I teach two undergraduate seminars at my university, Johns Hopkins, next term. For the first time since I started teaching at the university, I will administer an in-person exam that students need to complete on pen-and-paper. They will have three hours to write three essays about the broad themes of the course, demonstrating their mastery of the material and their ability to make a compelling argument without any outside assistance. But for their final research paper that is the capstone of any demanding undergraduate seminar, I will encourage them to use AI liberally. While they will need to acknowledge and document the exact ways in which they use AI to assist them with that project, I will assess the final product exclusively on whether it makes a meaningful intellectual contribution.
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The most skilled pilots are both capable of flying a simple Cessna that contains little technology and of handling the myriad gadgets contained in a Boeing 787. Similarly, the best-prepared workers and scholars and citizens of the future will both be capable of thinking for themselves without the help of ChatGPT and of expertlyly calling upon the help of such magician’s apprentices when appropriate. Our task as their teachers is to help them accomplish both.
This essay grew out of a short contribution to a forum on AI and education in The Chronicle of Higher Education.
Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, November 28, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
It’s that time of year again: climate negotiators from around the world are converging on an exotic locale—this time it’s Belém, in the Brazilian Amazon—to negotiate an intricate global agreement that won’t really change the planet’s climate trajectory.
The yearly Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—COP, to habitués—has morphed, over the years, into a kind of travelling circus grotesquely mismatched to the problem it’s meant to address.
There’s a soul-deadening regularity to the proceedings. Tens of thousands of politicians, negotiators, activists, NGO-types, journalists, and hangers-on of every description declare themselves shocked that global carbon emissions are even higher now than they were when they met a year earlier. Looking solemn, they make heartfelt pledges to do better, to really change this time. A year later, they do it all again.
Having gone through this rigamarole thirty times now, you’d think the world would have caught on that the COP process doesn’t work, and doing it harder won’t help.
But why doesn’t it work? Because it’s built on the wrong model of what determines a country’s level of greenhouse gas emissions. COP imagines these emissions as something a country’s government can set, like the dial on a thermostat. But emissions are more like GDP: the outcome of a complex process that politicians would like to be able to control, but don’t actually control.
Like GDP, climate emissions are the cumulative result of billions of decisions made by billions of actors—climate negotiators, utilities companies, grid operators, regulators, politicians, bureaucrats, bankers, investors, companies, and households—each of whom has to weigh a range of tradeoffs. Those include air quality and carbon emissions, yes, but also affordability, reliability, sovereignty, natural resource endowments, and technological readiness.
In developed countries, the combined outcome of these decisions has been slowly-falling emissions over the last couple of decades. Since their high water mark in 2007, developed country CO2 emissions have fallen from 15.7 gigatons to 12.9 gigatons in 2023. (A gigaton is a billion tons.)
Also in 2023, for the first time, China emitted more carbon dioxide than all of the developed countries put together. Between 1970 and 2023, Chinese emissions grew from 7.6 gigatons a year to 13.3 gigatons a year, and emissions from the rest of the developing world rose from 7.9 to 11.7 gigatons. For each molecule of CO2 emissions rich countries have cut since 2007, developing countries have added three.
Data source: European Database for Global Atmospheric Research.The reasons are sort of obvious. Across the developing world, people who care about the climate are a small minority, and concern over greenhouse gas emissions isn’t very salient. Policymakers are under intense pressure to deliver cheap, reliable energy, and when they weigh their options, they still tend to find coal or oil is the way to deliver that.
Low-carbon energy sources—whether solar, wind, nuclear, or geothermal—face significant obstacles to quick adoption: batteries that remain much too expensive at grid scale and require dauntingly sophisticated grids, high capital costs for nuclear and hydroelectric power, and not enough trained STEM graduates to operate any of these high-tech options.
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And so since 2020 new coal-fired power plants have been approved or built in China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Vietnam, Laos, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, South Africa, Pakistan, the Philippines, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. In 2023, three gigawatts of new coal-fired generation were introduced for every gigawatt retired. Upstream investment in new oil and gas facilities is still above half a trillion dollars a year, and expected to keep rising all through this decade.
Yes, renewable energy is growing faster still, but at this stage it’s growing alongside a still-expanding fossil fuel industry, not replacing it. And while many studies project emissions to peak in the next decade or so and then to start falling, the downward slope they’re expected to follow after they peak is too shallow for comfort.
Nothing that happens in Belém this week will change any of that. Trying to shift this reality with a UN conference is like trying to loosen a rusty bolt with a wet noodle: just the wrong tool for the job.
On the day in 1765 when James Watt invented a much more efficient steam engine, Earth’s atmosphere held around 2,170 gigatons of carbon dioxide. (It’s a good thing, too: without all that CO2, Earth would’ve been frozen, like Mars.) Since the 18th century, human beings have added a cumulative 1,180 gigatons of CO2 to the air, bringing the total stock of atmospheric CO2 to about 3,350 gigatons.
We continue to add the equivalent of 40 gigatons each year. About 18 of them are absorbed by carbon sinks on land and in the ocean. So the stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide grows by about 22 billion tons with each passing year.
What that means for the climate is a lot less straightforward than people realize.
“Climate sensitivity”—how much additional atmospheric carbon dioxide corresponds to how much additional warming—is a famously tough nut to crack. Big knowledge gaps remain. Changes in land use, in dust in the air, in ozone, in snow and cloud cover, in pollution from maritime shipping, and in sulphur pollution from industry, all have an impact on how much additional heat the atmosphere traps. In particular with regard to aerosols and clouds, the error bars remain strikingly wide:
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s estimate of how much extra energy the atmosphere traps now, compared to 1750, has these massive error bars mostly because scientists don’t understand aerosol-cloud interactions.The upshot is that we don’t know exactly how much more greenhouse gas will map onto how much additional warming by 2100, over and above the 1750 level.
But if you ask the scientists who write the UN’s Climate Assessment reports, their guesses are pretty grim. The median estimate among them is 2.7 degrees celsius, with 86% estimating warming above 2 degrees. Fifty-eight percent of scientists polled think a three-degree-hotter world is a 50-50 scenario.
Is that a lot or a little? That, again, is not so straightforward.
In some ways, it’s far too much: it shows we’re far off track from the 2015 Paris Agreement goal of holding warming well below two degrees celsius. In other ways, it’s not so bad: just a few years ago, mainstream scientists warned we might be heading for 4, 5 or even 6 degrees of warming by 2100. Those extreme scenarios no longer appear plausible.
Of course, just because this 2.5 to 3 degree warming range is mainstream, that doesn’t make it right. Some prominent scientists think the IPCC consensus is badly underestimating climate sensitivity. Former NASA scientist James Hansen, perhaps the best-known climate scientist of them all, headed an 18-author team that argued powerfully that cloud and aerosol impacts mean we’re in for substantially more warming than IPCC models suggest. Their landmark 2023 paper “Global warming in the pipeline” argues that aerosol and cloud effects will come in towards the worse side of the error bars, leading to substantially faster warming. This is not the majority view, but the people who hold it are far from cranks.
So climate sensitivity is a big source of uncertainty. And it’s not the only one.
Even if we could agree that we’re heading for a three-degree-hotter world, that would still leave us with only the haziest idea about what exactly that means for people. As the old climatological cliché puts it, “nobody lives at the global mean”—what actually matters is how a more energetic atmosphere interacts with the conditions people actually encounter. What does it mean for floods? For droughts? For extreme temperatures? For sea level rise? For storms?
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Science struggles with these questions. Run the same three-degrees-hotter simulation ten thousand times and you’ll get ten thousand different futures—some quite tolerable, many quite bad, a few truly horrible. Tweak your parameters even slightly and the outcomes shift again.
A three-degree-hotter world may do away with summer Arctic sea ice altogether, which models suggest would destabilize rain patterns across the Northern hemisphere leading to far more frequent extreme temperatures, both hot and cold. Or it might not. It might cause a collapse in agricultural productivity across the Sahel. Or it might not. It might send the warm ocean currents that keep Europe livable in winter into irreversible decline. Or it might not.
When it comes to the really dire tipping points, we’re almost as ignorant. A three-degree-hotter world by 2100 isn’t expected to cause Siberia’s permafrost to thaw quickly enough to unleash a burst of methane that massively speeds up global warming. But we can’t rule that out. It probably won’t send the West Antarctic ice sheet into a death spiral that raises sea levels by up to ten meters over the next several centuries. But it might.
Bill Gates says climate change will not lead to humanity’s demise. He’s right, probably. Most model runs show a three-degree-hotter world where most places face manageable problems. But tail risks hang over this entire way of thinking like a sword of Damocles. Because each time you run the model, you get a different answer.
And in the real world, we only get to run the experiment once.
To a much greater extent than is usually acknowledged, then, we’re flying blind. “Deep uncertainty” is the applicable jargon: the maddening disconnect between what science can tell us and what we need to know.
What people want to know is what they can expect in the places where they live. All science can offer is a probability function pointing to greater or lesser degrees of risk. Policymakers want to know how much bang they can expect for tax-payers’ climate buck. All science can offer is a directional shrug.
What we do know is that every ton of greenhouse gas we add to the atmosphere nudges that probability function further toward worse outcomes—and globally, we’re still emitting more and more each year. We can’t really say how likely this or that catastrophe is, but we can say that the more we emit, the scarier the risks.
Which is why atmospheric scientists virtually all get a desperate knot in their throat when they look at the trajectory we’re on: not because they know we’re doomed, but because we might be doomed, and the longer we take to decarbonize, the worse our odds get.
Beyond the partisan shouting matches, beyond the catastrophism and the denialism on the left and the right, we’re running a vast, uncontrolled experiment in atmospheric chemistry with results we can only guess at. Our global effort to curb the threat—the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change—plainly doesn’t work, but because they’ve sunk so much cost into it, world leaders refuse to acknowledge that failure.
While COPworld wallows in denial, a small but influential group of climate thinkers is taking a hard look at the real options we have. Thinking outside the COP box, they’re urging a conversation from first principles about what we can really do in a world where risk is so hard to pin down.
One intriguing prospect involves shielding the Earth from some of the sun’s energy by dispersing reflective particles in the stratosphere. As a matter of science, it would probably work, at least as a stop-gap to buy time while we figure out how to really decarbonize.
Personally, I am ambivalent: the problem isn’t so much the thermodynamics as the geopolitics. The battered and bruised UN process soon to fail once more at Belém is in no condition to usher in a brave new world of geoengineering. And if any one country were to go it alone, it could destabilize international relations with unpredictable consequences. At the very least, the world’s biggest powers (China, the United States, Russia, the European Union, India, and Brazil, say) would need to reach some kind of agreement to support Solar Radiation Management. I don’t see those players agreeing on anything, much less something as ambitious as this.
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We should cast our technological net wider, exploring a range of promising ideas to mitigate climate outcomes. Stabilizing Arctic ice needs to be a priority: models tend to show the weather going haywire when summer sea ice disappears. Engineering plans to protect the West Antarctic ice sheet from collapse can sound “out there,” but when you grasp the potential consequences of inaction, what’s really “out there” is doing nothing. Brightening marine clouds can protect some of our most sensitive ecosystems. And much more research is needed to bring next generation nuclear reactors into mass production.
What would make the biggest difference, though, is a Manhattan Project-style push to develop technologies to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere at gigatons’ scale. Stimulating ocean photosynthesis by helping carbon dioxide-trapping marine microorganisms to thrive is, I think, our best shot at a scalable, low cost, ecologically sound way to get there. That’s why I spend most of my time working on phytoplankton carbon: it is the highest-impact, lowest-risk moonshot on the horizon.
There are others we should be looking into, but aren’t. The climate Overton Window has stayed tightly constrained around a set of decarbonization outcomes that made sense in the 1990s, but which make no sense given the situation we face now. Technologists determined to explore ambitious solutions from first principles have been frozen out of the climate debate.
If you care about the climate, forget about COP. Support them.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.
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Debates about free speech online are misframed. Instead of focusing on what content should be removed or censored, we should instead focus on restoring the underlying social and technical structures that enabled free speech to function well in the past. A crucial part of that structure is freedom of attention (which I have previously referred to as freedom of impression, as a complement to freedom of expression). That is the ability of individuals and communities to choose what they listen to, rather than having platforms decide for them.
Humans are deeply social creatures who speak to be heard and understood by others. We make sense of the world, flourish, and find resilience collectively. Free speech is not just a matter of individual expression. It’s a continuous cycle: ideas are formed, expressed, and shaped through social interaction, then fed back into human minds.
The scale and speed of online discourse, and how interactions cascade to influence one another, make it essential to understand that freedom of expression for all speakers, across diverse communities, is feasible and prosocial only when there is freedom of attention for listeners. It’s also only workable when that expression is supported by healthy processes of information sharing and assessment that function as a social mediation ecosystem. Censorship is unnecessary and counterproductive, as it harms the rights of both speakers and listeners, and weakens those processes of collective intelligence.
Censorship is Not the AnswerWe are now engaged in fierce debates over how to address the aspects of free speech that are not in need of repair. Demands for “freedom of expression” have devolved to zero-sum battles over which side gets censored. Most people want platforms to take some responsibility for reducing harm, but when content policy teams focus on removing “lawful but awful” content from the public sphere, it is neither effective nor desirable. Instead, it entrenches the inherent dilemmas of removal as a form of censorship:
The problem is an intrinsic matter of viewpoint: “free speech for me, but not for thee.” Who decides what viewpoint is true or good?
It is also a practical matter of power: how can we find nuance and balance between top-down control (rules imposed by governments and platforms) and bottom-up freedoms (users and communities setting their own norms and practices)?
There are more effective, win-win remedies than removal, as many have argued.1 We forget that we traditionally protected our attention by walking away or changing the channel. Speech may, indeed, have social consequences, but that is no justification for deplatforming.
Thought as a Social ProcessOnline technology surfaces a neglected question: “Who controls your attention?” Before the digital age, people naturally had control over what they paid attention to. We were free to walk away from speakers; free to associate or not. Now, platforms control what appears in our feeds and from whom. Instead of choosing for ourselves, we are fighting over how these centralized platforms make those choices for everyone—because they do it badly.
Consider this diagram of Thought as a Social Process.
Thought and Expression happen at the individual level. Current battles are for or against censorship of expression, but expression is just the starting point of the full cycle of thought as a social process.
Social Mediation is the rich, nuanced stage where others process and interpret what’s been expressed, pass it on, and feed it back (or not). When expression is censored, it nips this cycle in the bud, as governments, platforms, or institutions prevent certain expressions from ever reaching the open social mediation layer. Historically, social mediation occurred through the natural dialogue of communities, institutions, and shared cultural spaces, often guided by trusted intermediaries such as clergy, editors, local leaders, and other influential figures. This layer introduced natural forms of friction through reflective feedback, social norms, and editorial choices over the use of limited channels. These processes encouraged both individual and collective reflection, allowing reputations to form and circulate, thereby slowing the spread of raw information and adding context before ideas reached wider audiences.
Attention is our selective awareness of what comes back to us: which of those mediated ideas are impressed on our attention to shape new thoughts. This is where freedom of attention comes in. This is the listener’s right to decide what should feed into their attention. Historically, people exercised this simply by choosing who to listen to or what to tune out. That was how word of mouth had worked for millennia—expression to one or a few, then propagated more widely in successive cascades of cycles (if deemed worthy by enough listeners).
Broadcast technology and the emergence of mass media changed that dynamic. Control of social mediation shifted from the soft power of influential intermediaries to the imperious gatekeepers of costly and limited channels, which constrained freedom of expression (as only partially balanced by policies such as the Fairness Doctrine in the United States and impartiality rules in the UK, which required broadcasters to present contrasting viewpoints).
But now online social media shifted dialogue back to a word-of-mouth style of person-to-person propagation, driven by individual posts, likes, shares, and comments—but algorithmically, at dramatically increased speed and scale, connecting anyone to anyone globally.
The problem became that “a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.” Online feeds became a “firehose” of information, rushing far too fast to drink from. As a result, social media feeds now function as attention agents to help listeners manage what they see by ranking and filtering content to allocate their attention.
The “original sin” of the ad model incentivized platforms to build attention agents that compose and optimize feeds, not to serve users but to maximize engagement for ad revenue. That oligopolistic capture of our attention now threatens democracy and our very sanity. Dominant platforms have concentrated power in a few opaque algorithms that are easily manipulated to amplify chaos rather than distill collective wisdom. This also bypasses and drains vitality from the social mediation ecosystem that previously constructed “social trust,” which is essential to democracy and is now being lost.
Compounding this, advanced AI is merging with social media, making control over our attention an even more opaque problem.
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We can no longer maintain freedom of speech unless our attention agents protect our freedom of attention. This is an aspect of the freedom of assembly or association recognized in the First Amendment and similar human rights formulations. It works because “harmful” speech does little harm if not propagated widely—and without human social processes, we cannot determine which speech we should propagate.
Taking Back Control of Our AttentionBarriers to reform include the fact that platforms have little incentive to yield the control that is so profitable, or to serve smaller or demanding communities—and that few people have the skills and patience to manage their feeds directly. What is needed are trusted and prosocial intermediary attention agent services that we can independently select and combine for ourselves, to support the needs of our communities. Open interoperation protocols, or “middleware,” can make this possible by sitting between users and social networking platforms.
The obvious pathway to regain control of our own attention is to open up today’s dominant platforms, for example by expanding on the proposed ACCESS Act, to “[a]llow users to delegate trusted custodial services … required to act in a user’s best interests through a strong duty of care, with the task of managing their account settings, content, and online interactions.” Currently, that path seems to have been stalled by platform resistance and government dysfunction.
Another way to regain control of our attention is through a growing grassroots movement to build open social media ecosystems. This emerged with the Mastodon-protocol-based “Fediverse” and is now gaining momentum with the more deeply interoperable Bluesky-protocol-based “ATmosphere” that already serves some 40 million users.
What we see now is just embryonic—green shoots of a revitalizing sociotechnical ecosystem. The power lies in the open ecosystem of attention agents, built on these protocols, that will enable people (and their communities) to filter and shape their feeds for themselves, rather than relying on platforms to do so. Some misunderstand Bluesky as simply “lib Twitter,” but that is just part of a broader shift toward user-controlled filtering and community-shaped information flows that can enable a user-selected diversity of “vibes.”
One early example is BlackSky, a community-mediated feed service drawing on human and machine judgment to filter Bluesky feeds that are protective of black people. Grassroots initiatives like Free Our Feeds, the Social Web Foundation, Project Liberty, and Protocols for Publishers, as well as feed service tooling providers like Graze, are working to catalyze development of this open “pluriverse.” Meanwhile, reactions to the dominance of American platforms are fueling the EuroStack/EuroSky initiatives to create new and more open infrastructures to serve other communities.
Either way, a key objective is not only to enable our freedom of attention, but to protect it from “enshittification”—the extractive practices that arise when users are captives of entities that control not only their attention, but their connections and data. To prevent that, these new initiatives aim to make “exit” (switching to alternative services) easy, thus keeping real competition in play.
Shifting moderation from top-down removal to more bottom-up, community-mediated management of attention raises concerns, such as the creation of echo chambers and the responsibilities to protect vulnerable users. As I will address in a companion piece, restoring reliance on community-level social mediation, supported by “least-restrictive” ways of adding “friction,” can make those issues manageable in democratic ways that support the fullest practical levels of free speech.
Beyond Technological SolutionsWe urgently need a whole-of-society effort to reframe how we understand free speech in this new digital era, and to reshape social media and AI so they support and augment both individual freedom of attention and healthy prosocial mediation. This is not just technology, but an evolving sociotechnical process that includes:
Improving public understanding of how and why free speech works in more positive ways, without the need for censorship, so society can find a stable path between tyranny and chaos.
Reducing censorship, removal, and deplatforming as rapidly as is practical.
Creating space for innovation by opening markets for supportive and open media-tech infrastructure, regardless of whether dominant platforms participate.
Supporting the growth of alternative attention agent tools and services like the Bluesky and Fediverse ecosystems that are open, flexible, and extensible, even if they’re still developing.
Fostering and nurturing the essential interplay of both individual freedom and reinvigorated communities and institutions in online discourse.
My thanks to the many people who have helped me formulate these ideas, and to Jacob Mchangama and Francis Fukuyama for encouraging me to write this and a planned companion piece to go deeper on revitalizing humanity’s social mediation ecosystem (and for invitations to help organize a major project on middleware, and to the Global Free Speech Summit).
Richard Reisman is a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, contributing author to the Centre for International Governance Innovation’s Freedom of Thought Project, and a frequent contributor to Tech Policy Press. He blogs on human-centered digital services and related tech policy at SmartlyIntertwingled.com.
A version of this article was previously posted on The Bedrock Principle, published by The Future of Free Speech think tank at Vanderbilt University.
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1For example, Goldman, Gillespie, Stray, and Riley and me
Yascha founded Persuasion five years ago, in the divisive summer of 2020. The magazine’s mission was to revive the tradition of philosophical liberalism at a time when polarization and groupthink was taking hold of the country.
The same year, Frank founded American Purpose. Its mission was to track the rise of authoritarian forces around the world, and to offer a vision for how liberalism should be updated for the conditions of the 21st century.
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Over the last five years, America has gone from bad to worse. The second Trump administration is daily attacking the rule of law and the separation of powers. The MAGA Movement’s hold over the Republican Party is total. Extremist ideas have gone mainstream. A trollish style has conquered our political culture.
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Meanwhile, some heterodox voices who rightly criticized the cultural excesses of progressives are now giving Trump a free pass. Their supposed commitment to values we deeply cherish, like free speech, have turned out to be a smokescreen to conceal their willingness to forgive illiberalism on the right if they think it will defeat illiberalism on the left.
It’s a zero-sum mindset that we at Persuasion and American Purpose will always reject.
At the same time, the Democrats have no plan. The mainstream left is spent and demoralized. Progressive activists continue to circle the wagons around failed woke dogmas. Even those who fight for key liberal values like the rule of law and the separation of powers sound more like a throwback to yesterday than like leaders of tomorrow.
This is why we aim high here. Our ambition is not just to chronicle what is happening in America, or to write one more angry rant about the stupid thing that happened yesterday. It is to renew and champion the principles that can get us out of this dangerous and depressing period of American history: a new kind of philosophical liberalism that can serve as the foundation for a better politics and a better country.
To accomplish this goal, we’ve been putting out more content than ever:
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A politics of resistance is taking shape in the United States. Democratic candidates were victorious across local and state elections last week, and Californians voted to change their redistricting procedures to counter partisan gerrymandering in other states. These results show that political opposition exists, and that it can win elections. But in order to sustain the momentum from these elections, a pro-democracy coalition needs to mobilize now to make itself visible, coherent, and cross-partisan in the coming months and years.
While it may seem like the resistance has been slow to take shape, there are many promising signs across the political establishment and civil society. Up to seven million Americans participated in No Kings protests across the country in June and October. Media outlets collectively refused to sign a Pentagon pact that conditioned press access on government approval; universities also rejected a preferential funding compact with the Trump administration. Republicans have spoken out about National Guard deployments across state lines, attacks on Venezuelan ships, and the FCC’s censorship of Jimmy Kimmel. These signals of dissent may provide a sense of hope that a political opposition can mobilize to win the 2026 elections.
The democratic erosion we see in the United States has taken place in many other democracies—and with a remarkably clear trajectory. While there is no clear or obvious way to defeat an illiberal leader, recent international examples show the urgent need for a pro-democracy coalition, defined as a coalition of cross-partisan political actors collaborating with cross-sectoral civil society groups using messages of shared democratic values.
Normalize Political Talk as Non-PartisanThe first step in building a pro-democracy resistance is thinking beyond traditional divides. The Trump administration is not enacting a partisan policy agenda—if anything, it has broken with longstanding Republican policies and values—and the political response also needs to go beyond a partisan playbook. This administration is willing to defy court rulings, disappear residents, threaten opponents, and more. Everyone, from large multinational corporations to recent immigrants, has to go about their daily business in a completely different way. This is new for Americans, and requires us to rethink how we engage politically.
One basic requirement of building the pro-democracy coalition is normalizing political talk as non-partisan. Many of us avoid it with neighbors or colleagues for fear of awkwardness. But silence cedes the terms of public life to those willing to weaponize it. It’s not “partisan” to insist that leaders respect due process and court orders, that public servants be chosen for competence rather than loyalty, that officials don’t profit from office, and that leaders do not attack and punish political speech. By not talking about politics, we let the president monopolize it. Soon, he will degrade all pluralistic civic space. Talking plainly about what’s abnormal is the first step to finding allies and building a shared project.
Prioritize Democracy and Drop Litmus TestsIn Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that “Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite.” People come together to support specific causes; they also come together to solve local problems. While the wide range of issues and causes makes for a vibrant, heterogeneous civic space, it can paradoxically make it more difficult to forge ties across issue areas.
Many issue pillars—education, health care, climate justice, election integrity—are well-developed, but siloed. Polarization of our national politics has also trickled into civic space, with advocacy groups often using litmus tests to determine which elected officials are effective advocates.
However, the rules of democratic competition and fair play are being rewritten. If we do not secure democracy today, we will not be able to fight for our preferred issues tomorrow. Therefore, one big —albeit unappealing— part of building a pro-democracy coalition is abandoning any purity tests for the candidates you’ll support and the political causes you’ll ally with. Defeating an illiberal leader requires anyone who considers themselves pro-democracy to come together on the minimum collective grounds they can articulate. If you disagree on everything but agree on just the one question of whether or not President Trump is overstepping his bounds, that is enough for a resistance campaign to work. Engaging in this way does not mean sacrificing your principles or your goals.
In practice, this coalition-building requires coordination across partisan and civil society groups in order to develop a shared message that all aligned candidates and leaders can use to demonstrate their short-term goal of protecting democracy. It requires civil society to mobilize through all available means—grassroots, influencers, digital campaigns, issue networks—to rally support for the pro-democracy, cross-party coalition. It also helps to reward courage across the aisle. When officials of any party defend election integrity, democratic values, or the rule of law, applaud them publicly. Coalitions grow when people know they won’t be ostracized for doing the right thing.
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One example is France’s “Republican Front,” a cross-party alliance that has mobilized consistently to prevent the far-right National Rally from winning legislative majorities or the French presidency. In France’s 2024 National Assembly elections, the far right seemed to be positioned for huge electoral wins: After the first round of voting, the National Rally was the leading party. However, 501 of 577 seats went to a second round of voting—and most of these races included more than three candidates.
French political parties quickly organized and agreed to strategically support each other’s candidates. Parties formed blocs, with the Ensemble bloc consisting of center and center-right parties (including that of President Emmanuel Macron) and the New Popular Front consisting of left parties (ranging from Communists to Greens). Although there were enormous ideological and policy disagreements among these parties, they agreed to have their candidates step down to narrow most second-round races to two candidates—and then rallied their voters to “hold their noses” and support the non-far-right candidates. At least 132 NFP candidates and 80 centrist candidates stood down, and, according to polls, over 50% of Macron supporters and 29% of center-right supporters voted for the far-left NFP candidates.
Civil society actors had only weeks to adapt to the second-round election strategies. They focused on simple messages, such as “we are better united than alone,” and formed groups on WhatsApp to disseminate polling results, focused slogans, and strategies for reaching undecideds. Most importantly, they eschewed a top-down approach in favor of decentralization and adaptation. They came together not because of policy agreement but because of a “need to preserve democracy today, in order to allow for policy conflict tomorrow”—a message that can reach voters when trusted organizations and leaders work together.
Similarly, parties have built cross-ideological coalitions to protect democracy in Brazil and in Poland. In 2022, Lula da Silva challenged the reelection of Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right president. Parties that have historically opposed Lula’s Workers’ Party backed him, and Lula promised to govern in a coalition. He chose a former center-right rival as his vice president, and appointed ministers to his cabinet who had worked in Bolsonaro’s government. Critically, Bolsonaro allies (such as Arthur Lira, the president of Chamber of Deputies) were quick to accept the election results. In Poland, a coalition of parties formed in 2018 to challenge the Law and Justice (PiS) party. The coalition mobilized for years, first contesting local and mayoral elections. In 2023, party blocs (like those in France)—the Civic Coalition, the Third Way, and the Left—managed to coordinate their pro-democracy message and win a legislative majority.
In both countries, civil society provided critical messaging, campaigning, and grassroots support to the coalition parties. In Brazil, organizations like PACTO coordinated some 200 organizations across ideological lines to counter disinformation about election integrity. Their efforts were not directed towards specific candidates—instead, they concentrated on building large umbrella organizations and focusing on the minimum grounds on which people across sectors could work together to support democracy. In Poland, massive public demonstrations in advance of the elections, plus digital activism emphasizing unity and the principles of Poland’s hard-won liberal democracy, buoyed the pro-democracy parties in the polls.
In all three of these cases, governing across ideological lines has been a challenge. But the immediate threat of democratic erosion was temporarily halted, and parties were able to show that democratic commitments prevailed over ideological purity tests. These efforts show that pro-democracy mobilization takes time and focus, meaning the sooner a collective effort can be mobilized, the better.
Building Factions in a Two-Party SystemHowever, the above examples are all multi-party systems. In a two-party system, cross-partisan coalitions are very difficult—after all, they only have one opposition party. We must therefore abandon the big labels of the two parties and instead embrace factions.
For Americans, resistance might require working with people whose views you disdain, and whom you’ve historically worked against. Democracy is a system that allows us to live in harmony and respect with people of vastly different backgrounds and opinions. In this moment, setting aside policy disagreements is vital to protecting it. The new politics of democratic erosion require a new politics of coordination. Those who care about democracy must proceed based on what unites us (even if it is just one or two things: rule of law good; corruption bad; everyone equal under the law).
We cannot expect the Democrats to do the entire work of opposing Trump and also laying out a compelling policy agenda for the 2026 midterms and the 2028 presidential elections. We should let factions flourish instead of denouncing them as a sign of a party at war with itself or unable to coordinate. The Republican Party was recently composed of honorable, rule-of-law abiding politicians, who have had to cede the label of their century-old party to the MAGA extreme. But these Republicans deserve to exist politically—perhaps as the Rule of Law Conservatives, or the Party of Principle.
Similarly, we can identify factions like the Heartland Democrats or Social Progressives within the Democratic Party. All of these factions can run their own candidates and build their own policy agendas—and most importantly, they can signal their solidarity with the project of democracy and their willingness to work together to stop Trump’s actions. Historically, factions are how parties adapt and renew. They also work together within parties as coalitions. By making factions more identifiable and public, elected officials can show the same unity that politicians have in other countries—and can broadcast the simple message of preserving democracy. This maneuver will show that a pro-democracy coalition does indeed exist in the United States. Similarly, civil society groups that already work to advance a diversity of causes can then show that, while they remain steadfast in their issue commitments, they are willing to strategically support democratic values when urgently demanded.
Pro-democracy coalitions don’t require us to pretend our differences don’t matter; they do. Coalitions are a truce, not a merger. But if we fail to protect the rules that let us contest power peacefully, we will lose the very arena where policy fights can be won.
France, Brazil, and Poland are reminders that resistance isn’t only about mass protests or heroic individuals. It’s about ordinary people choosing to work together on the narrowest possible common ground. If others can do it, so can we. The only question is whether we’ll start building that pro-democracy coalition now—or wish we had, later.
Didi Kuo is a Center Fellow at the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She is the author of The Great Retreat: How Political Parties Should Behave and Why They Don’t.
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Zohran Mamdani, the newly-elected mayor of New York City, has made “affordability” the centerpiece of his campaign, to great success. If the Democrats focus on this issue in the year before the midterm elections, they have a good shot at retaking the House by a substantial margin. In order to increase affordability, Mamdani has proposed policies like making bus fares free, and controlling rents across the city.
But what is “affordability?” One might be tempted to equate it with inflation, typically measured by the Consumer Price Index, the issue that brought down Joe Biden’s and then Kamala Harris’ campaigns. In the wake of the November 4 election results, Donald Trump is foolishly replicating Biden’s mistake of denying that consumer prices are rising, claiming in fact that they have fallen under his presidency. They have not, and everyone knows this.
However, “affordability” may be more properly understood as something different from consumer prices, and inequality something different from income inequality as measured by things like the Gini coefficient. One of the biggest items in the average American’s monthly budget is housing, and the affordability of housing has been falling dramatically over time. In 1985, a house cost on average 3.5 times the annual household income; today, it is more like 5 times. Median house prices have gone from 4-5 times the median income, to 6 times today. The situation is no better for renters: the ratio of median rents to median income has increased from 25 to 30% over the past two decades; 50% of all renters have to pay more than 30% of their incomes on rent, compared to 41% two decades ago. The situation is worse in blue cities like San Francisco or New York, where working class people have been priced out of the housing market in areas anywhere near where they work. In the former, they have to live in distant suburbs like Stockton or Visalia and endure commutes of an hour or two to get to work each day.
Facts like this indicate that Gini coefficients and the Consumer Price Index no longer adequately measure the affordability problem. While average Americans suffer from rising fuel and grocery prices, the real inequalities lie in factors like housing and transportation. And the housing crisis in urban America is almost entirely due to inadequate supply. Rent controls on a supply-limited stock of housing will in the long run create further inequalities, as the lucky people who live in a rent-controlled apartment will hang on to it tenaciously and try to hand it down to their children. Rent control will reduce incentives to build new affordable housing, which in the long run is the only way that greater equality can be achieved. This was exactly the situation I experienced living in rent-controlled Santa Monica during the 1980s. Similarly, free bus fares will be a temporary affordability band-aid; a real solution would be to build fast rail connections between inner cities and distant suburbs.
This suggests that the abundance movement needs to focus on issues like housing and infrastructure as a means of getting at the root causes of the affordability crisis. Building more homes and reducing and ultimately reversing the long-term rise in housing prices and transportation costs is a direct way of reducing inequality in the United States. Mamdani’s proposals are short-term band-aids that will not address the long-term problem.
In the city of Medellin, Colombia, poor people living in the hillside barrios could not physically get to the middle-class neighborhoods where they had jobs as maids and busboys due to the violent gangs controlling the intervening territory. The city’s solution was to build a series of ski-lifts to carry them up over the gangs to connect to the metro system serving middle-class parts of the city.
This is not a solution that would work in San Francisco or New York, but certainly a rich country like the United States could come up with imaginative solutions to problems that directly affect citizens’ access to jobs and opportunities. As in Colombia, a solution is likely to entail building things, and the abundance agenda opens up a pathway to doing exactly that.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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Shadi Hamid is a columnist at The Washington Post and a senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Hamid’s new book is The Case for American Power.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Shadi Hamid explore why the world still needs America, how to improve U.S. foreign policy, and to what extent their views on the Iraq War have changed.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Shadi, you’re Muslim, you’re an Egyptian American, and you were in college during 9/11. For a long time, you were a critic and a skeptic of American power and American imperialism. Now, in the well-timed moment of Trump’s second presidency, you’ve decided to write a book defending the idea of American power. What made you change your mind? What is at the heart of the personal journey that took you from seeing American power and America’s influence in the world very critically to recognizing its moral shortcomings and limitations, but thinking that, in the wake of American power, if it declined, worse things would await us?
Shadi Hamid: I came of age post-9/11. I was a freshman in college when September 11th happened—two weeks into my time at Georgetown. I was living away from home for the first time and trying to figure out where I belonged. Like a lot of people in college, I found a lot of inspiration on the left side of the spectrum, and I was reading Noam Chomsky—he sort of became my foreign policy guru.
I think a lot of it had to do with that particular post-9/11 moment when it seemed like America was doing a lot of bad things in the world. The Iraq War, of course, is paramount there. I was very active in the anti-war movement—I was organizing teach-ins and die-ins on campus. A die-in is when you get a bunch of people to just lie on the ground as if they’re dead. It’s quite evocative and powerful. I was one of those guys who was outside the White House with signs. We even had a small tent encampment for the full duration of the war, making sure that one person was in the tent at any given moment.
That was before tent encampments were cool, though. Through all of that, I, like many others, saw America as a force for bad—a font of destruction and evil throughout the world, the kind of traditional socialist, pseudo–left-wing, anti-imperialist approach.
There was some truth to that. America did have a terrible record in places like Latin America during the Cold War. It still has a terrible record in the Middle East, and that’s something I’ve been outspoken about for a long time. We facilitated democratic transitions in other parts of the world after the end of the Cold War—except for the Middle East—and that continues to this day. I’m not here to whitewash America’s sins, and I don’t want people to perceive the book that way.
A large part of the book documents America’s sins in the Third World. It’s important to say that you can be a staunch patriot but also be very self-critical about what America has done. Oftentimes, those two seem to be mutually exclusive, but they shouldn’t be.
In terms of how I came to have a deeper respect for America’s role and the idea of American power, the Iraq War was also a key moment in that regard. We were organizing and protesting the war. There was actually a single day of protest when millions of people across the globe had a coordinated day of demonstrating, which was a very powerful day as I remember it.
Mounk: I don’t know whether you might be a year younger than me or a year older, but I think we’re about the same age. I was in college during the Iraq War too, and I was in the streets of London on what must have been that day, protesting with a few million people against the impending war.
Hamid: We thought people power would be enough. I became quite disillusioned after the war happened because I wanted to ask myself how it could have occurred if so many people were against it in major capitals throughout the world. One of the conclusions I reached was that there was something very different from people power.
On the other side, there was a small group of ideologically committed neoconservatives. They were able to capture the levers of power. They knew each other in grad school, they had an idea, and they were able to realize it by being in the government rather than on the outside looking in. I thought to myself that I didn’t want to be on the outside looking in. I didn’t want to feel powerless. I wanted to think of ways that American power could be used for good, because I started to see it as a fact.
American power was a reality. It was only a question of who was going to wield it. That remains true to this day. There is nothing intrinsically bad about American power. It is up to us to decide what America does in the world. We are still a democracy, however flawed. That is the great thing about democracies, and also the frightening thing about them: we get the government we deserve, and we also get the foreign policy we deserve. If we as Americans don’t like our foreign policy, then presumably we can do something about it.
Mounk: One of the interesting things here is the relationship that the left has to power, or what we in general should have to it. It is sometimes hard to know whether, when people dislike American power, it is because they dislike America or because they dislike power. I think there’s a little bit of the former, but a lot of it seems to me to be the latter. The reason why there are so many forms of anti-Americanism around the world is that America has been the most powerful country for the last century and more than that. When you have a lot of power, you often end up doing things that are rather troubling.
I think there’s a coherence to this. Journalists, for example, should in general be much more skeptical of people in power. I think one of the problems of contemporary journalism is that we’ve sometimes lost the instinct to ask tough questions of the “good guys.” This is where journalism has sometimes gone wrong. I think there’s actually something proud in the left-wing tradition of being genuinely mistrustful of power, of saying, if you have power, you’re probably interested in keeping it. You’re probably using it to extract rent. You’re probably corrupted by the power you have in various ways, which is also a core liberal insight. So we’re going to encounter you with a certain degree of skepticism.
You make the important point in the book that it would be a mistake, however, to think that in the absence of power the world would be better—that it’s easy to jump to the conclusion that a world without power would somehow be better for human rights or better for equality or better for those in the world who are weak, and that we are going to need some kind of power. That, I think, is the necessary premise for your conclusion that if we have to have some kind of power, perhaps American power is better than the realistically available alternatives.
Talk me through that argument. Why is it that you’ve grown comfortable with power—not in the sense that you hang out with the Trump confidants who are now colonizing the city in which you live, Washington, D.C., but in the sense that you think we need power, and so we better hope for it to be good.
Hamid: The first thing I’d say on your previous point is that it’s not that the left is mistrustful of all power, because parts of the left were sympathetic to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviet Union was one of our two superpowers in the world. It was exerting its power near its own borders and quite far away, and doing so in ways that were very unapologetic.
Yet we didn’t always see the kind of backlash from people who were leftist or social democratic when it came to the Soviet Union’s abuses. I don’t want to overgeneralize—I’m just talking about certain parts of the far left that are very indulgent of what other people do with their power.
Mounk: This is a complete side note, but it’s one of the things that frustrates me about the term democratic socialist, which I think actually has a very proud history. What it meant to be a democratic socialist in the days of Dissent and the New York intellectuals was to be on the left, to have a set of socialist economic commitments that I personally don’t share but that I think were honorable, and to be in the minority of the intellectual left—those people who were not making excuses for Joseph Stalin, those who were willing to see the corruption of Soviet power, and who took very courageous steps in proactively opposing those abuses of power.
They stood up when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary and Budapest in 1956, and when it invaded Czechoslovakia and Prague in 1968. One of the things that irks me about the way people nowadays talk about democratic socialism is when they assume that those two terms naturally go together—that the “democratic” is not a qualifier of “socialism,” but rather, “of course I’m democratic because I’m a socialist, I’m a socialist because I’m a democrat.” They get to call themselves democratic socialists even if they are shamefully silent about the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro, in the kind of way the original democratic socialists certainly would not have been silent about Joseph Stalin or figures like Nicolás Maduro.
Hamid: That’s been a key divide on the left for a long time. I think you see some of this divide even more recently when it comes to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There was a significant part of the left that was a little too understanding of what Russia was doing and almost blamed the victim, as if the Ukrainians had invited this upon themselves.
There’s a strain that will always be there that actually sees American power as the problem. When so-called anti-imperialist powers use power, it’s considered acceptable because it’s against America. That’s one of the things I want to push back against. We have to be self-aware that this is what’s happening, and we have to be very careful, because there is a certain degree of self-loathing and self-hatred in some parts of the left.
The polling on this is quite clear. I was looking at it again this morning to make sure I wasn’t imagining it. According to Gallup, about 90% of Democrats in the early 2000s were either extremely or very proud to be American. By 2025, that number dropped to 36%. Only 36% of Democrats are extremely or very proud to be American. This isn’t just a left-wing issue—it’s a left-of-center problem we are facing in America, where we feel that we are, in some sense, bad, as though we are tainted by a moral stain that can never go away.
Mounk: I was struck by something like this—not at the level of popular opinion, but of high politics—at the meeting in Anchorage between Tony Blinken and Jake Sullivan on the American side and the two top Chinese foreign policy officials. It was the first big meeting between U.S. and Chinese officials in the Biden administration. The Chinese delegation started off with an incredible broadside, attacking America in every way and listing all the bad and evil things that America had done.
I can understand that Blinken and Sullivan had organized and planned the meeting, and they were trying to get important things out of it. They didn’t want it to derail, so they had incentives to soft-pedal. But the response they gave was not an arousing defense of America—saying, yes, we’ve gotten things wrong, but on the whole our record is pretty decent, and it compares perfectly fine with the record of the PRC. Instead, the response was to say, yes, America is a deeply flawed place, and all of these things are wrong.
Those were even the main emphasis of what they were saying. We were still close to the peak “woke” era. At least we can criticize ourselves. I think the ability of democracy to criticize itself is important, and you talk about that in the book. That absolutely is one of the things that we should be proud of. But to reduce us just to that, in that kind of way, and in a confrontation with a regime that has done very impressive things internally—and that I think is sometimes caricatured in U.S. foreign policy discourse but certainly has committed its fair share of moral outrages—to basically grant the moral high ground and say, yes, you’re right, we’re terrible in all these ways, but at least we can criticize ourselves, was really a striking testament to that left-of-center, certainly far-left, mindset.
Hamid: It has polluted, I think, a lot of the Democratic Party. There’s a term I use in the book that was coined by the British philosopher Roger Scruton: oikophobia, which is the reverse of xenophobia. Xenophobia is the fear of what is strange or unfamiliar—the fear of what is foreign. Oikophobia is the fear of home and the fear of what is familiar to us.
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That fear of home, or fear of what is familiar, is actually something dangerous. It goes to the point that you can be self-critical without being self-loathing. To get to the other part of your question on coming to terms with power, for me—I’ll go into some controversial territory here—there were things George W. Bush did that made me realize the United States is capable of being better. Even if it has done bad things in the Middle East for sixty years or more, there was that brief moment—it was called the Arab Spring, the first Arab Spring, which is now largely forgotten—in 2004 and 2005, during the time of George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda.
For the first time in a long time, the United States was using its leverage and military aid packages with countries like Egypt, putting pressure on them to open up their political systems. When I saw that, I saw an alternative possibility—that we could actually use our power as leverage and push these autocratic allies to alter their behavior. That’s still what I think we should do with autocratic allies, or even democratic allies who have done awful things.
Israel during the Gaza war is an example. I think the answer to that is to use American power to pressure Israel to change its behavior—not to say we’re done with the Middle East, we’re out, and we’ll cut Israel off entirely and leave it to its own devices. There are many ways to think about power in that sense. Power is a reality, and someone has to wield it. The idea that if the United States removes itself from the arena things will somehow become better—as if there aren’t other competitive powers ready to fill the void—is naïve. Those competitive powers are autocrats, brutal to their own people. Why would we expect them not to be brutal to others outside their borders?
I’ve had to come to terms with this because there is no alternative to power. Power, as political scientists define it, is the ability of A to get B to do something they might not otherwise do. That’s real life. We’re always trying to get people to do things they might not want to do. Even in our personal lives, we try to persuade people. We try to use soft power, and that’s something I talk about in the book—it’s not just hard power we’re discussing. It’s also persuasion and soft power, but that can only be effective if you have an example to offer and if you’re proud of it.
Why should people follow our lead in terms of soft power if we are full of self-loathing and not even proud to be American?
Mounk: On power, I want to make two basic points. The first is one that really stands at the heart of the modern tradition of political thought and theory. It starts with the observation by Thomas Hobbes that if you have no form of power, even domestically, you won’t get the great harmony some might imagine—you’ll get fear.
In one slightly heterodox interpretation of Leviathan by Richard Tuck, what really motivates Hobbes is the desire to liberate us from fear. On his account, when you’re in the state of nature without any state power, everything is threatening. If your neighbor feels a little threatened—and everyone has reason to feel threatened—and they pick up a stick, you’ll see that as a potential attack. You’ll think, I’d better get a stick and attack them before they attack me, so they don’t come in the night and kill me.
The reason why life is famously “nasty, brutish, and short” in the state of nature for Hobbes is not that he thinks human beings have a bad nature or that there’s something wrong with our character. It’s that, in a situation without any form of coercive power, there’s a structural problem that inevitably leads to conflict.
You can easily scale that up globally and say that without some kind of power to impose rules and structure in the world, you’ll get terrible wars like the one in Ukraine, terrible civil wars like the one in Sudan, state failure, ethnic cleansing, and genocides like Rwanda, and so on.
The other point is that, realistically, we live in a world in which, if the United States completely retreats from a global role, we won’t get an absence of power. Someone else will fill that vacuum. The most likely candidates at the moment are Russia, China, and perhaps states like Iran. If you conduct a comparative analysis of which countries are likely to use power in a more constrained and reasonable way, you might conclude that American power is preferable to theirs. That leads to the next question: why do you think American power would actually fill that potential vacuum better than the countries that would rush in to fill it if America truly vacated it?
Hamid: I think part of it is that the way we use our power abroad is constrained by our democracy at home. For example, Americans concluded that they really didn’t like the Iraq War, and they started to vote accordingly. They voted for people who were more anti-war, namely people like Barack Obama. George W. Bush lost popularity and eventually had to shift course and rethink his Iraq strategy because he saw that domestic support was no longer as strong as it once was. Those are things that wouldn’t be possible elsewhere.
In China, if you’re a Chinese citizen, or in Russia, if you’re a Russian citizen, and you’re really angry at what your country is doing—whether it’s Taiwan or Ukraine—there are no levers you can pull. There are no avenues of redress you can use to persuade your leaders to change course. You have to rely on the will of the autocrat, and ultimately, it’s one person in these countries who makes the final decision on questions of statecraft.
That’s a frightening thought. Just ponder that for a moment—there is no way to change these policies of Russia and China toward Taiwan or Ukraine. We are able to change our own policies. It doesn’t mean we always will. That part is still up to us, and we have to organize, participate, and advocate. We have to be in the system. But we can try to persuade our leaders to change course on something we disagree about, and there are many examples of that happening.
The very election of Donald Trump twice shows that people were fed up with the old establishment elite and how they were conducting themselves in matters of economics and foreign policy. There was a bipartisan elite that people simply got tired of. The idea of a liberal world order that America was leading—Donald Trump came and said, I don’t care about that all that much. I’m going to have a more transactional approach to foreign policy. A growing number of Americans found that more appealing than the alternative.
We see many examples of how American foreign policy changes. It’s that ability to change that lies at the heart of what makes American power better and morally superior. There is something morally superior about democracy over autocracy. Maybe that’s an obvious thing to say, but when people hear me use words like “morally superior,” they sometimes get the ick about it.
We should feel that we’re morally superior. It’s our country. We believe our country was founded on a certain moral mission. There are things to be proud of—our commitment to certain inalienable rights, for example. Those are the things that make me more comfortable with the idea of American power. First, it’s my own country. Second, my own country stands on certain ideals that Russia and China do not, and never will.
Mounk: To play devil’s advocate here, one thing that people in Iraq or in other countries around the world might say is, I don’t care whether you could change your mind. I care about what you actually do. If your country ends up making decisions that are bad—using its tremendous power in the wrong way—then the fact that you could have chosen differently is cold comfort. In fact, perhaps it makes it worse. You could choose differently, but you don’t. You could vote for people who are not going to go on adventures in Iraq, but you do.
Perhaps you choose a candidate like George W. Bush in 2000, who sounded not exactly like an isolationist but like someone who wanted to focus more on domestic policy, be a compassionate conservative, and pursue big plans for educational reform. Maybe he wanted to privatize Social Security. He didn’t run on a promise to invade Iraq—and then he did.
People either vote for the wrong kind of candidates or vote for candidates under false pretenses. But either way, if I’m sitting in Iraq in 2003, isn’t it a little cold comfort that America, in theory, could have done something different?
Hamid: It is cold comfort on one level, but it’s also true that when people across the globe are struggling for their freedom or trying to defeat an occupation or end autocratic rule, they appeal to America. They ask, if only America could step in and help our situation. They’re not saying, China, Russia, where are you? Come and save us. They almost never say that.
During the Syrian uprising from 2011 onward, this was a recurrent theme of the Syrian opposition: America, where are you? We believe in you. We think that you can be better. We think that you can actually intervene now and stop our mass slaughter. I remember that during the Arab Spring in Egypt, in Tahrir Square, people were holding on to Obama’s every word because they understood that if Obama withdrew some support from Mubarak, the dictator, it would actually facilitate a transition—and ultimately it did.
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Obama didn’t continue supporting democracy in Egypt—that’s a long story on its own—but there are key moments where you see people calling on America’s better angels, even more so than we do sometimes. It’s almost as if they believe in us more than we believe in ourselves. You’re right that we don’t always meet those expectations, but there is something powerful about the fact that we can and that we should.
America has also done good things, including more recently. In the first Gulf War, we ended the occupation of Kuwait. We ended the Bosnian genocide. We intervened too late, but still, at the end of the day, America was the only power that could stop what was happening to the Bosnian people. We again stopped ethnic cleansing that was taking place in Kosovo in subsequent years.
I’m one of the few people who still believes that the intervention in Libya was the right thing because there was an imminent mass slaughter, and we had the opportunity to stop it. It was the right thing to do. For all of its civil conflict and the fact that it’s doing badly in many ways, Libya is still preferable to what it would have been under the totalitarian autocracy of someone like Gaddafi.
We have to be more nuanced in how we look at the uses of American power. We also have to look at the times America didn’t use its power and how that didn’t lead to better results. In Syria, for example, I was a staunch supporter of military intervention against the Assad regime. Obama did not intervene, and we saw hundreds of thousands of people killed. Could it have been different if America had used its military force to stop the killing, or at least reduce it?
There are many examples where we don’t have to go back to World War II or distant history. America has done good things abroad, even somewhat more recently.
Mounk: When it comes to the Middle East, what do you think are the lessons for American power? We can rerun the last twenty years and see that America has tried nearly every type of approach. It has tried very robust intervention in Iraq, non-intervention in Syria, and semi-intervention in Libya.
While some of those conflicts ended up being less disastrous than others, the outcome wasn’t particularly positive in any of them. Your point is well taken that if America simply left that power vacuum to others, things would probably go badly in other ways. Syria is, in large part, an example of that.
Hamid: Russian intervention in 2015 is the perfect example of what happens when America cedes ground.
Mounk: One point is to say, I’d rather have America hold power than Russia or China, and I broadly agree with that. But what does that mean for what America should actually do with its power?
Hamid: I might disagree a bit that we’ve tried everything. As you know from my previous book, The Problem of Democracy—which I came on the pod to discuss—I don’t believe we’ve ever fully tried the pro-democracy approach in the Middle East. We did for very brief moments in 2004 and 2005, for about a year or a year and a half, and then again briefly during the Arab Spring before we decided that democracy was chaotic and we didn’t want to deal with it. We went back to the old dictators.
I think we haven’t stayed with it long enough to see whether democracy could provide a better path in the Middle East. Some might say, Shadi, you’re not being realistic. The U.S. isn’t going to be able to stick with it if there’s all this chaos and uncertainty. Maybe, maybe not. But I do believe there was an alternative—a kind of counterfactual history during the Arab Spring. There were key decision points when the Obama administration could have acted quite differently, and they could have done so realistically.
Mounk: You’re thinking, for example, of the Muslim Brotherhood–led government in Egypt after Tahrir Square. What are some examples of where the United States could have put more trust in democracy in the Middle-East?
Hamid: To have not greenlit the coup that happened in 2013 against the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood–led government. The United States was more involved in that than initial reports suggested. That’s one of the things I’ve focused on in my own work, research, and interviews with people who were with Obama and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at key moments in the same room. The United States did more than just turn a blind eye. I believe the United States made the coup possible and could have stopped it.
That’s just one example. We have consistently undermined democratization in the Middle East in other cases as well. Jordan is another that comes to mind. Algeria is another where we didn’t play a great role in the 1990s. Generally speaking, America has claimed to want democracy in the Middle East, but then we say, if this is what democracy looks like in practice, maybe we don’t want it.
My argument has always been that democracy is messy sometimes. The idea that we can get from democratization to perfect democracy overnight is unrealistic. We have to acknowledge that there are going to be growing pains. But Americans get impatient so quickly. When something isn’t working well, they say, okay, let’s just go back to the way we were doing it before. But that hasn’t worked either.
The focus on allied dictators and depending on them has led to instability for decades. At some point, we have to admit that we’ve been trying that approach for most of the last eight decades, and the Middle East is not exactly what we would call a font of stability and predictability. I think we can all agree the Middle East has been, and still is, a mess in any number of ways.
My argument is that we still have to try something else. We haven’t tried the democracy option fully. It’s risky, yes, but you have to take risks sometimes if you want to put forward a bold policy.
Mounk: My hunch is that there are going to be two types of critics of this book. One we’ve talked about explicitly and implicitly so far—left-wing critics, progressive critics who say, are you out of your mind? Look at what America has done around the world. How can you possibly want to preserve or enlarge American power? American power is dangerous and evil in all of these ways.
Another kind of critic might be a more hard-nosed international relations scholar, or perhaps even a right-of-center critic, who says, well, this all sounds very nice, but in reality, American power is declining, and America is on the down and down, while China is on the up and up. So while this is a nice kind of lament for how good American power was around the world and how sad it will be when it’s gone, that seems like an inevitable conclusion. That’s just the way things are going.
I know that you’re skeptical of that argument—that you think we’ve overstated the extent of American decline and perhaps overstated the extent of China’s rise. Explain why you think that.
Hamid: There’s a whole chapter I’ve written titled Decline because I really wanted to examine how Americans view their own decline. What I found—and it won’t surprise a lot of people—is that every generation seems obsessed with the idea of decline. From the end of World War II onward, each generation has had its own story of American weakness: that we’re being eclipsed by the Soviet Union, that communism is the new future, that America is entering a deep malaise.
If we were living in the 1970s, we’d probably be having a similar conversation. You’d be asking me, isn’t it too late for America? Look at the post-Vietnam years. Look how badly we’re doing. We’re on the decline. Others are on the rise. We have to be very careful about that bias—the tendency to see the worst in our own experience.
This goes back to a kind of self-loathing. Sometimes it’s framed as self-criticism, which is a great thing about us, but I don’t think it’s as common in other countries. People there aren’t sitting around—well, I was going to say in smoke-filled rooms, but it’s not like that anymore—still, they’re not sitting in salons talking about how lousy their own country is. It’s a bit of a uniquely American, or perhaps European, thing.
Being aware of the history of this idea of decline helps because it reminds us that this isn’t new. Some people say, this time is different, but how do we really know that? I think China’s rise has been wildly overstated—wildly. I lay out a case for why I think that, if you look at the economic data and other metrics in various ways.
Mounk: Take us inside that case a little bit, because that is the key question here. When we’re talking about American decline, I’m inclined to agree with you. One of the striking things that I’ve discussed on the podcast with Larry Summers, Martin Wolf, and others is that America has barely lost any share of global GDP over the last thirty years, whereas Europe’s share has gone down significantly. When you look at many of the technologies of the future, there is real competition from China, but artificial intelligence remains very strong in the United States. The American stock market still makes up around 60 to 65 percent of the world’s total market capitalization. The strength of the American economy is astonishing.
Despite understandable complaints about inequality in America and stagnating living standards for the non–college-educated and lower middle class, America remains a vastly affluent country. I feel the difference in affluence between America and Europe very strongly when I’m in either place. Certainly, the idea that the life of the average Chinese person is somehow superior in material terms to that of the average American is absurd.
I agree that there is a lot of complaining and foretelling of American decline, which may one day turn out to be true, but certainly isn’t true yet. At the same time, I’ve been spending some time in China, trying to understand the country better. I’ve written a series of articles on my Substack about both China’s weaknesses—which are very real—and its strengths. It’s astonishing how superior China is to America in its ability to build infrastructure, high-speed trains, and highways, and to bring online massive amounts of electricity, which will be key in the AI arms race.
While China may be weaker on GPT-style artificial intelligence—DeepSeek, while impressive, lags behind OpenAI and is probably behind Anthropic and xAI as well—it is very strong on embodied AI, robotics, and drones. It leads in several areas that may turn out to be more consequential, even within the world of artificial intelligence.
I was at a conference on AI at Harvard in September, surrounded by people far more expert in the field than I was. When the audience was asked whether the U.S. or China was ahead on AI, the room was roughly evenly split, and a few more hands went up for China. These were American tech experts saying this, which is striking. Among all the doomers in America, I don’t think the people most deeply involved in developing artificial intelligence are the most doomerist of all. So tell me your argument about why you think China does not look as though it’s about to rival or eclipse American power.
Hamid: The first thing I want to emphasize is just how massively well the United States has done economically. You touched on it, but to actually look at the numbers: we were at around 14 trillion in GDP around the time of the Great Recession. We’ve almost doubled since then—we’re now at around 28 to 30 trillion, depending on exactly how you measure it. That’s remarkable, especially when Europe has stayed stagnant around the 14 to 15 trillion mark. The U.S. doubled its economy. I think Americans don’t know these basic things about their own country.
On China, one of the main cases I look at is how it dealt with COVID. This might seem like the obvious example, but it’s also the most important one because it shows what happens when a single leader—Xi Jinping—has an obsessive, personal view of what fighting COVID should look like. As a result, China’s economy ground to a halt because there was no way to challenge or change the leader’s view. There were no other inputs into the system that could question his decision-making. The policy was so tied to his personality and even his cult of personality that reversing course would have been a direct rebuke of him.
That was an example of how China could not easily self-correct. But you’re right that China’s strengths are also obvious. China can build things very quickly. I remember those memes showing time-lapse footage of how China was able to build a hospital in seven days—these “insta-hospitals” that came up during COVID. I’m not pretending that autocracies are bad at everything. They are better at some things. They can build better, faster and easier because they don’t have to deal with a parliament, opposition parties, or dissenting voices.
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When there’s no opposition, the government can simply decide what the policy is and implement it. That can seem very appealing, but it’s also dangerous. Without any institutional “speed bumps,” everything depends on the wisdom of the leader. If the leader is wise and makes the right choices, you’re in a good position and can ride it out. But what we know about human beings is that they all have flaws. They all lose their way and make mistakes. The problem with autocratic regimes is that when they make mistakes, you’re kind of effed.
Mounk: One way of thinking about the different scenarios here is that the very pessimistic one is that America is about to decline and disintegrate in a way that’s truly different from its previous history. We shouldn’t exclude that possibility. There have been all kinds of empires and great states that held enormous power for centuries or even millennia and then came apart at the seams. It was true for eighty years for the Soviet Union. It was true for centuries for the Holy Roman Empire. It was true for a thousand years for the Ottoman Empire. It was true for some five hundred to two thousand years for the Roman Republic and then the Roman Empire.
So we must recognize conceptually that, despite American power having proven resilient for 250 years, there will probably come a moment when it declines. But I agree with you that I don’t see the signs of an impending collapse of American power like that. It would be a very significant change from the trend of the last two centuries. I think at some point in history that likely will happen, but it’s not clear why we should think it’s about to happen next year. It might—but it’s not obvious why we should assume that.
There’s a different kind of reversal, though. The post-1989 moment, in which the United States really was a unipolar power unrivaled by any other country in its influence on the world, was itself extraordinary. During the nineteenth century, the United States shared power with Britain and other influential nations. During the second half of the twentieth century, it shared power with the Soviet Union—a dysfunctional place in many ways, but one that, while smaller and more dysfunctional than China today, still rivaled the United States.
So why shouldn’t we think that this extraordinary unipolar moment is about to give way? Even if the United States isn’t about to enter the kind of decline that the true pessimists imagine, the exceptional unipolar moment that both you and I grew up with may be ending. That wouldn’t require any dramatic reversal of trends. It could simply be seen as a return to normality after the strange aberration of the post-1989 decades.
Hamid: It’s helpful to look at, as you mentioned, Yascha, the longevity of other empires. The United States has only had unparalleled dominance for about thirty-five years. If that ends up being all we have in the broader sweep of history, we would be one of the most short-lived dominant empires in human history. Usually, really successful empires have a longer shelf life. So this idea that we only had thirty-five years where we could truly say, hey, we were the best, is very short-sighted when you look at it from a broader perspective.
The other thing I’d say—and this is at the heart of my argument—is that, while others have made the case that China’s rise is overstated, what I offer that may be a little different is an argument that China’s system, and by extension other autocratic systems, are fundamentally misaligned with human nature. Because they are fundamentally misaligned with human nature, they cannot sustain themselves over the long durée. At some point, you start to see the internal contradictions, because God created us a certain way, and these regimes completely disregard that. They treat people as subjects—mere subjects to be dominated.
Mounk: That sounds to me like a version of the argument my esteemed colleague Francis Fukuyama famously made in The End of History.
Hamid: Yeah, there are certainly others who have made that argument—sure, that democracies are better aligned with the realities of human nature. I think this is something that presidents have also talked about. JFK, for instance, gave a particular speech where he discussed this in a really powerful way. He talked about the “magic power.” It’s a bit clunky and corny, but he said the magic power that is on our side is the desire of every human being to be free.
He said, “It is because I believe our system is more in keeping with the fundamentals of human nature that I believe we are ultimately going to be successful.”
That idea is really core to the American project—that because we’re a democracy, we are fundamentally aligned with human nature. It actually means something in policy terms; it’s not just a nice sentiment. Governments that are more aligned with their people and with human nature will last longer than governments that are not aligned with human nature and with their citizens’ desire to be free.
Of course, this hinges on whether you agree with my premise about human nature. It also depends on whether you think Chinese people, at some level, have a deeper desire for autonomy and agency over their own lives. Reasonable people can disagree on that point. Yascha, I’m sure you have a view on that based on your travels to China.
I would note that when Westerners went to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the common line was that the Soviet people seemed to be doing pretty well—they seemed happy, their basic needs were met, they had health care. There was a tendency not to see what was happening underneath. It’s very hard for any foreigner—or even for Chinese citizens themselves—to truly know what their fellow citizens believe in their deepest hearts.
It turned out that people’s commitment to the communist system in the Soviet Union was skin-deep. It wasn’t something deeply held. So it’s possible we might see something similar in the Chinese case. But I’d be curious what you think.
Mounk: I’ve thought a lot about this, and I’m certainly not a China expert either. From the time I’ve spent there, my impression is that this is clearly the best period in Chinese history in a very long time. That’s largely because the last five centuries of Chinese history have, by and large, been very difficult. There was the declining Ming dynasty, then a brief period under the Qing dynasty when things looked up and became more organized, followed by a long decline of the Qing dynasty. After that came the incredibly chaotic Chinese Republic, which was basically a series of warlords fighting one another. Then came the disaster of early communist rule, with the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
China was a society that had been incredibly poor for many centuries and is now going through a very rapid period of economic growth. On the international stage, China was humiliated for centuries—particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but to some extent before that as well. So, of course, many Chinese people look at how much more affluent they are than their parents or grandparents, and at the increased standing of China in the world, and think something seems to be working. They feel grateful to the system that has delivered that.
At the same time, many people are skeptical about the realities of life in China. They know there is a great deal of corruption. They know they are cogs in a machine that is unforgiving and doesn’t truly care about their well-being. Many are critical, even openly critical, of the current leader. There isn’t a deep love for the system. If it stopped delivering for them, I think people could, within the limits of a dictatorial system, become quite vocal about that.
More broadly, life has clearly become better for people in China, as it tends to for societies going through an economic growth spurt. The same was true under the South Korean dictatorship and later its democracy, as it was in Taiwan when the country emerged from deep poverty, and to a lesser extent in India, which is still far behind China but experiencing some positive economic developments.
Hamid: You said something very important, Yascha—you said if it stops delivering. This is the key point. The Chinese system, and other autocratic systems, depend on what’s called performance legitimacy. In other words, they are legitimate only insofar as they deliver material goods to their own people. Our system, and democratic systems more broadly, do not depend—or at least do not depend as much—on performance legitimacy. Their legitimacy is tied to the consent of the governed. There’s a deeper legitimacy there.
Even if our government isn’t building things or delivering a lot of visible material progress, it doesn’t mean the whole system will fall apart, because the system is based on a deeper set of contracts and understandings between rulers and those who are ruled. That’s a strong advantage we have: we’re not falling into what might be called the affluence trap that countries like China might face.
When a country becomes more affluent and successful, people’s expectations rise—they always want you to keep delivering. But can you always deliver at the same level? Sooner or later, an economic growth spurt starts to plateau, level off, or even decline slightly. What happens then? There are already signs that some of that may be happening. That’s the real challenge for a government like China’s.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Shadi discuss the Iraq War and how they feel about it today, and American power in the age of Donald Trump. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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