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By Yascha Mounk
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  • How to Confront Highbrow Misinformation
    (Photo via Getty.)

    When confronted with the growing popularity of populist, extremist, and generally destructive ideas over the past decade or so, many establishment politicians, journalists, and experts have blamed “misinformation” (see also “disinformation,” “fake news” “information disorder,” and “post-truth”).

    Although this narrative comes in different forms, it typically involves three core ideas: (1) misinformation is widespread, (2) it is much worse than in the recent past, and (3) it is highly impactful in driving worrying political trends and developments.

    But there is much to question about this narrative. For example, this narrative exaggerates both the quality of the past information environment and the gullibility of ordinary voters. The narrative is also self-serving. By explaining support for populism as a result of manipulation and misinformation, it exempts establishment institutions from any blame for anti-establishment politics. Finally, the idea that “misinformation” is the kind of thing that mainstream journalists and experts can detect and regulate presupposes that misinformation is not a significant problem within their institutions. As many have pointed out, this assumption is highly questionable. There is a substantial amount of what Matt Yglesias calls “elite misinformation,” although there are good reasons to prefer Joseph Heath’s “highbrow misinformation” as an adaptation of that term.

    Now is a good time for those in “elite” or “highbrow” circles to look to their own houses before casting stones, and to consider how the dissemination of “misinformation” can be an issue even in credentialed, institutionalized settings.

    Let’s take a few examples of these patterns:

    Climate Change

    A vast amount of energy and funding is directed at addressing the problems of climate misinformation. The overwhelming majority of the focus here is on climate denialism, a category of misinformation prevalent on the political right. This focus therefore overlooks highbrow misinformation surrounding climate change skewed in favor of mainstream progressive narratives, which tend towards alarmism and catastrophism, as well as simplistic morality tales aimed at condemning capitalism and corporations.

    This highbrow misinformation includes reporting and punditry that encourage the widespread but mistaken ideas that climate change is likely to cause human extinction or civilizational collapse, that it is forecast to make the world poorer than it is now, that deaths from natural disasters have increased as a consequence of climate change, that a small number of corporations produce the overwhelming majority of carbon emissions, and that fossil fuel companies receive vast state subsidies. To the extent that large numbers of people hold such beliefs, it is not because of right-wing denialists. It is because mainstream reporting on the topic is often highly misleading.

    Such misleading reporting is not immaterial. For example, one survey from 2023 suggested that nearly two-thirds of Americans aged 16-25 endorsed the statement that “Humanity is doomed” due to climate change, with more than half (52%) claiming that they are hesitant to have children as a result. A study in the same year in Canada reported nearly half (48%) of young people saying that they also think humanity is doomed.

    Gender Parity

    Several years ago, Jordan Peterson went extremely viral in part due to his Channel 4 interview with Cathy Newman. One of the simple points that Peterson made in the interview is that the widely reported gender pay gap (e.g., that women earn 85 cents for every dollar a man earns) refers to an average pay disparity that doesn’t control for differences such as industry, occupation, experience, education, working hours, and so on. This means that the mere existence of the pay disparity doesn’t prove discrimination.

    In the aftermath, I spoke to many ordinary people (especially guys) who were blown away by Peterson’s observation and felt that they had been lied to by mainstream media and politicians on this issue. On the one hand, this was a surprising reaction because the points that he made were obvious to anyone even moderately knowledgeable about these things, not to mention anyone familiar with what conservatives think. On the other hand, the feeling was understandable, given that the mainstream presentation of this issue is highly misleading.

    By presenting the pay gap as proof of gender-based discrimination, or as part of an argument for why women deserve “equal pay for equal work,” the mainstream presentation often falsely implies that men and women are being paid radically different amounts for doing the same job. This likely explains why so many people seem to be misinformed about this, and why Peterson’s arguments could come as an explosive revelation to so many.

    Youth Gender Medicine

    For several years, I assumed that there was a lot of high-quality medical evidence supporting the efficacy and safety of youth gender medicine (i.e., treatments like “puberty blockers” and hormone therapy for young teens), as well as evidence suggesting that those who don’t get specific treatments are at high risk for suicide. I thought this because I’m the sort of person who generally trusts what expert organizations, academics, professional journalists, and those in my social network (mostly, highly-educated progressives) say about things.

    Given this, I was surprised when the Cass Review was published in the UK, clearly demonstrating that the scientific evidence for much of the mainstream discourse surrounding youth gender medicine is extremely weak.

    As Helen Lewis points out in The Atlantic, there has been a powerful “liberal misinformation bubble” surrounding youth gender medicine. This has been reinforced by many authoritative figures’ incessant repetition of the unsupported claim that children are likely to kill themselves unless they transition. But it has also been upheld by powerful social pressures in place for several years that stigmatized anyone who challenged this apparent consensus. For example, a former head of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health has likened skepticism of youth gender medicine to Holocaust denial.

    Race, Ethnicity, and Crime

    For many years, I also assumed that all discourse about the over-representation of Pakistani-heritage men in “grooming gangs” in the UK was part of a sinister disinformation campaign by the far right. I thought this because a prominent Home Office Report in 2020 strongly implied that any concerns about the over-representation of this group in perpetrating such crimes were at odds with reliable evidence, as did multiple mainstream outlets. Although I was aware that some prominent people had claimed differently, many of them (e.g., Elon Musk and Tommy Robinson) strike me as extremely unreliable and racist, so I didn’t trust what they said.

    Given this, I was surprised when I read Baroness Casey’s recent in-depth report on this issue. She points out just how bad and misleading the mainstream reporting on this topic has been, with a culture of “denial” and “flawed data… used repeatedly to dismiss claims about ‘Asian grooming gangs’ as sensationalized, biased or untrue.” For example, the official Home Office Report from 2020 alleged that “the ethnicity of group-based CSE [child sexual exploitation] offenders is in line with… the general population, with the majority of offenders being White.” This “finding” from the report was then repeatedly quoted in other official reports and in the mainstream media. As Casey points out, the actual data provides no support for such conclusions. In two-thirds of cases, the ethnicity of perpetrators has simply not been recorded, which, she argues, is itself an “appalling” scandal and “major failing” partly rooted in politically-motivated evasion. “Instead of examining whether there is disproportionality in ethnicity or cultural factors at play in certain types of offending,” she notes, “we found many examples of organizations avoiding the topic altogether for fear of appearing racist, raising community tensions, or causing community cohesion problems.” Moreover, in several areas where data has been collected (Greater Manchester, South Yorkshire, and West Yorkshire), it shows “disproportionate numbers of men from Asian ethnic backgrounds amongst suspects for group-based child sexual exploitation.”

    Understanding Highbrow Misinformation

    Of course, these examples are far from an exhaustive list of cases of highbrow misinformation. (For other relatively clear-cut examples, one can look at reporting on how 60 percent of Americans live paycheck to paycheck, how maternal mortality rates have dramatically risen in the last twenty years in the United States, claims about global happiness rankings, and much establishment punditry and reporting surrounding the pandemic).

    There is a general pattern here in the dissemination of material. Highbrow misinformation primarily misinforms audiences not through explicit falsehoods but through forms of communication that select, omit, frame, and contextualize information in misleading ways, signal-boosting some facts, de-emphasizing others, placing real statistics in deceptive contexts, and soliciting commentary from experts offering preferred opinions. Ruxandra Teslo calls this “Haut Bourgeois Propaganda,” which contrasts with the kind of “brute misinformation” (i.e., outright lies and fake news) often associated with lowbrow sources and alternative media.

    A second feature of my examples of highbrow misinformation is that they are all designed to favor politically progressive narratives. There are multiple reasons for this. There also is such a thing as progressive misinformation that isn’t highbrow, but what is of overwhelming significance is educational polarization.

    Over the past couple of decades, people with university (and especially advanced) degrees have become increasingly culturally progressive, while those without degrees have shifted to become more supportive of culturally conservative, often populist politics. This means that the highly-educated, credentialed professionals who staff our most prestigious institutions, including our knowledge-producing institutions, typically share culturally progressive attitudes and values. Even non-populist conservative politicians usually have much more progressive cultural views than ordinary voters.

    The result is a homogeneity of outlook in institutions. Institutions of knowledge are based around the idea that, although biases can be powerful at the individual level, they tend to cancel out at the collective level—people tend to be pretty good at unmasking and criticizing other people’s biases. The problem is that this process breaks down in contexts where everyone or almost everyone has the same biases. When that happens, individual biases don’t cancel each other out; they compound and reinforce each other. And that is the case in many of our established knowledge-producing institutions today.

    In general, highbrow information environments often create a culture that discourages people from communicating truths in tension with progressive ideology or correcting falsehoods supportive of it.

    How Bad Is Highbrow Misinformation?

    From experience, even highly-educated professionals who acknowledge the existence of highbrow misinformation mostly downplay its harms. One reason for this is contrastive: when you compare the flaws of the highbrow information environment with its main rivals (alternative and “populist” media, conspiracy theory culture, TikTok feeds, etc.), it comes out looking pretty good. I will return to this point below.

    However, another influential argument is simply that the effects of highbrow misinformation, even when real, are benign or even positive. This goes hand in hand with the idea that most highbrow misinformation is “well-intentioned.” If one thinks that climate change, transphobia, gender inequality, racism, and so on are crises, then maybe misleading communication is fine if it leads people to take them seriously.

    This attitude is another critical factor driving highbrow misinformation. In many cases, academics, reporters, pundits, and politicians believe that conveying selective or simplified messages—“noble lies” or at least noble half-truths—will cause audiences to support noble causes.

    This attitude is pernicious.

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    First, the popular idea that progressive misinformation is “well-intentioned” whereas non-progressive misinformation is “ill-intentioned” is shockingly self-serving. Most people who communicate misleading ideas will convince themselves that they are doing so for some higher purpose or noble ideal. That’s why it’s important to enforce norms across the board rather than letting people or factions police their own behaviour. This includes basic norms of honesty, accuracy, and respect for one’s audience.

    Second, people need to be able to trust experts and establishment knowledge-producing institutions. If such institutions uphold a culture that tolerates or even encourages misleading communication when it aligns with progressive values, that trust will evaporate. In this sense, any short-term political benefits that highbrow misinformation might have will be outweighed by growing institutional mistrust and resentment among a diverse public with different values and ideological allegiances. I suspect that this is a significant factor explaining why so many people have lost trust in institutions like universities and legacy media in recent decades.

    Finally, for all the examples of highbrow misinformation I have listed, they are scandals! It’s terrible if large numbers of people mistakenly believe that humans are doomed due to climate change, or that they inhabit a society where men and women are being paid radically different amounts for doing the same job, or that they can’t trust establishment institutions to investigate topics whenever they connect to progressive values or taboos among educated elites. These are not trivial issues. And it is an extreme indictment of our institutions that the people who identify and object to such institutional failures are often stigmatized more than those who participate in them.

    How Should We Respond?

    For these reasons, I think it’s partly understandable that, when some people discover that the establishment presentation of many issues is highly misleading, they become angry, outraged, resentful, and sometimes “radicalized.” They come to think that they are being systematically lied to, assuming that the rot might go extremely deep. If people would lie about some things, they think, maybe they would lie about everything.

    Nevertheless, although this dynamic can partly explain why people lose trust in establishment knowledge-producing institutions, it cannot explain why so many people embrace far worse information sources. This includes most of “alternative” media and the increasingly influential cranks, conspiracy theorists, and bigots who thrive within this space.

    It’s noteworthy also that for almost all examples of highbrow misinformation documented above, their detection and critique comes from people working within establishment institutions. In other words, the primary way that anyone can discover the truth about topics like climate change, grooming gangs, youth gender medicine, or anything else, relative to which misinformation (including highbrow misinformation) can be identified, is by relying on credentialed experts and professional journalists operating within these institutions.

    This doesn’t mean that nobody operating within the world of contrarian punditry or alternative media ever says anything true. But usually when figures in alternative media make legitimate critiques of establishment narratives, they’re drawing on knowledge produced by establishment institutions. For example, when Elon Musk decided to turn his attention to the issue of grooming gangs in the UK, almost all of the actual “evidence” he and others on the far right cited came from official government reports and professional journalists operating within establishment institutions. When Musk and his allies did introduce genuinely new information into the conversation not reported by establishment sources, it overwhelmingly involved absurd falsehoods and fake news.

    Ultimately, this shouldn’t be surprising.

    Discovering the truth about complex issues is extremely challenging. The default state of political debate and public opinion involves wholesale capitulation to prescientific intuitions, tribal mythology, and ideological delusion. To overcome such ignorance and misperceptions, you need hard-won, fragile institutions that can support activities like careful data collection, scientific research, investigative journalism, and fact-based reporting. The thriving world of “alternative media” has not created such institutions, or even shown any evidence that it recognizes their necessity. Instead, it has mostly abandoned the project of uncovering and reporting knowledge altogether.

    Sometimes, such observations are used to dismiss the significance of highbrow misinformation, or to argue that establishment institutions are sufficiently diverse and self-correcting that there is nothing to worry about. I hope it’s clear from what I’ve written already that I disagree with this. Our institutions need urgent reform. They need more ideological diversity and stronger norms against pernicious forms of motivated reasoning and progressive groupthink. But “reform” is different from destruction.

    In other words, highbrow misinformation is a huge institutional problem. But it’s a solvable problem, not an excuse to replace our only hope for acquiring knowledge in complex, modern societies with an informational state of nature dominated by charlatans, demagogues, and bullshitters.

    A version of this essay originally appeared in Conspicuous Cognition.

    Dan Williams is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He works on issues at the intersection of science, politics, and technology. He blogs at www.conspicuouscognition.com.

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  • Daniela Salazar on State Violence in Ecuador

    Francis Fukuyama and Daniela Salazar, a former judge in the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, discuss what Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa’s recent declaration of a state of emergency in five states means, the increase in state violence and human rights violations, and why a new constitution isn’t the solution. You can watch the conversation below.

    All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.

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  • George Packer on Liberal Values in Authoritarian Times

    George Packer is an award-winning author and staff writer at The Atlantic. His latest book is The Emergency.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and George Packer discuss authoritarianism in fiction, living humanist values in morally complex times, and how the Democrats can defeat Donald Trump.

    Note: This conversation was recorded on October 21, 2025.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I always enjoy reading you, but I have to say that I have never had a chance to go to your back catalogue of novels that you wrote in the 1990s. It was a special pleasure, in preparation for this conversation, to read a novel we’ve talked about for a long time and that I’ve been excited to read. It is now coming out, and I think it is really beautiful, moving, insightful, infuriating, and lovely.

    It is obviously a compelling work of fiction, and it’s also a parable of this political moment. What is it about America’s evolution over the last five or ten years that you thought was worth capturing in the form of this parable? What most worries you about this political moment, and why did you think that fiction was the natural form to capture that?

    George Packer: I’d been trying to capture it in journalism for more than ten years, maybe for twenty-five years, charting our seemingly relentless decline in some ways. I felt I’d reached diminishing returns with that. Journalism is always going to have a big place in my work and in what we need in this country, but I risked repeating myself and never quite getting below—not the surface, but maybe the second or third depth—to the real depth of things. There were experiences I knew I wasn’t able to convey through nonfiction: the experience of just what it feels like to be alive in America going through this profound crisis, what it feels like to be a parent in a crisis like this, and to be a member of a society that seems to be tearing itself apart.

    Although I’ve written about some of that in nonfiction, there’s a real limit to what I could explore. I wanted to explore that feeling as deeply as I could. To do that, I felt I needed to go back to fiction. Even though fiction wasn’t always good to me—those two novels from the ’90s your listeners are not going to know about, very few people do, which is one reason why I turned to journalism after trying my hand at being a novelist—I’ve come back to fiction because I think we need imagination to understand reality and to understand a reality as seemingly unreal as the one we’re living through.

    I felt we need more than just an imaginative work; we need a work that doesn’t rely on realism. So this novel is more in the tradition of some of my favorite works: 1984 by George Orwell, Waiting for the Barbarians by J. M. Coetzee, The Plague by Albert Camus, The Handmaid’s Tale by Margaret Atwood. They are sometimes called dystopian or sometimes called allegorical, but they are fictions that try to get at the heart of what we’re living through in the present by getting away from the present—by not using the here and now, the familiar names, the familiar issues, the familiar events.

    When you can get away from those, you can get closer to the truth. You clear the field for the emotion of it and even for the ideas, in their purest form, to come out because you’re not distracted by the journalistic nature of fiction that tries to write about the present. So I thought I needed to write something like those books that I love reading, and I tried my hand at it with The Emergency.

    Mounk: One thing that those books have in common is a kind of warning about what might be around the political corner. They’re driven by fear—by well-founded fear, in some of those cases—of what may be about to happen. So they have a kind of foil. In 1984, it is Stalin’s Soviet Union, with perhaps some minor notes of other political systems as well.

    The Handmaid’s Tale, I think, imagines a kind of Christian theocracy being around the corner. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of that book fall partly on whether or not you think that is, in fact, the right fear to have at the moment. Is it fair to say that if those are the fears, then at least one of the central fears of The Emergency is how political movements that claim to be moral, claim to unify us, claim to be trying to create a purer world, can end up deeply backfiring?

    Packer: Absolutely. This is an old theme in politics and in literature: the utopian impulse, which is present in The Emergency, both in the city where some of the action takes place and in the countryside where the story goes, is often accompanied by a will to power.

    That will to power manifests in different ways—sometimes through violence and ordinary, ugly coercion, and other times through moral pressure, which we’ve certainly lived through and which you and I have talked about a lot in this country. It seems to me that the left in this country uses moral coercion more often, and the right uses the threat of violence, although that is certainly not limited to the right. In both cases, it is always under the guise of making our society better—in fact, making it perfect.

    That perfection is the real danger because then you have to eliminate all the elements that are contaminating it and are holding it back from perfection. In The Emergency, it is the young people who are driving this, and that is the key. It is a generational rebellion against the elders, both urban and rural. The young bring that idealistic energy that we need, but they also bring a certain naivete about power and a willingness to trash the norms of the older generation because those norms are tiresome, have failed them, and have left them with the ashes of a civilization. So why not just get rid of it all and start over? That is the driving impulse in the movements that take over in The Emergency.

    Mounk: I’m going to try to balance my instinct to get into some of the particular ideas in the book and some of the plot while also avoiding spoilers, because it is an exciting book that works very beautifully as political allegory but also, I think, is just a good read. You don’t want to give away everything. But tell us a little bit about what The Emergency is.

    One of the things that strikes me as powerful in this book is the kind of background diagnosis of how an old order, which is recognized to be nonviable, begins to collapse. The empire that falls in The Emergency certainly is not a one-to-one equivalent of the America of 2000 or 2010 or anything like that, but it does feel like an old order that, for all its deep flaws and injustices, also has a certain humanism—a way in which it allows for meaningful lives, manages to sustain the basics of relative prosperity, and upholds a rule of law of sorts.

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    You realize at the beginning of the book that this order had, for much longer than the protagonist perhaps fully realized, already started to fall apart—that it had been decaying without people necessarily noticing. It falls away at the beginning of the book, and that collapse is what sets The Emergency in motion.

    Tell us a little bit about the extent to which that old order is meant to read as an allegory for our political order. It is quite different in all kinds of ways, but it obviously also feels overripe for the plucking. It feels as though a whole set of rules, norms, and taboos that we thought would reign in our political system suddenly turn out not to have any force anymore. It also turns out that perhaps some of the people who pretended to believe in this order never really did—or at least had ceased to do so.

    I was thinking about the extent to which we are meant to see our order as obsolete in the same kind of way that the order preceding The Emergency, the one that gives the novel its title, turns out to have been obsolete in the opening pages of the book.

    Packer: It’s the way Ernest Hemingway described going bankrupt—gradually and then suddenly. There’s this slow erosion of people’s attachment to the old order, to the old ways, without even knowing that they’re losing it. Then it collapses quite suddenly, almost comically. It’s so sudden and so unprompted. Why has it collapsed? It’s never really clear. What I write is that it died of boredom and loss of faith in itself.

    Mounk: Which sounds, of course, like a callback to the last paragraph of the famous essay by Persuasion colleague Francis Fukuyama—that boredom at the end of history may serve to get history going again.

    Packer: It does. That’s a good gloss on The Emergency. I do feel that we, in this country—for all of the clash and fever and constant turmoil and ferment—in some ways find it very hard to say why this is happening. What terrible injustices, what risk of extinction, what existential threat is causing us to tear up all the norms, the laws, the Constitution itself? It is, in some ways, incomprehensible to me.

    Mounk: I’ve been thinking about the fact that I am now old enough that, for the first time in my adult life, I genuinely and deeply feel like the world has changed fundamentally—not only since I was two or three years old when the Soviet Union still existed, but since I went to university in the year 2000 at the age of eighteen. I think there are few twenty-five-year periods that have seen a similarly significant change, and the ones that have usually included cataclysmic events in the middle.

    The world looks very different in 1950 than it did in 1925, but you have World War II in the middle. That is obvious; it is not hard to understand why the world looks different in 1950 than it did in 1925. Of course, there are all kinds of interesting, important, and shocking events that happened between 2000 and 2025—9/11, the Great Recession—but they do not equal the importance of something like World War II. Yet the extent to which the world looks different today than it did twenty-five years ago is perhaps similarly extreme. It is hard to understand.

    Packer: I wrote The Unwinding, a nonfiction book, to try to describe and, to some degree, explain this transformation—mostly to describe it. That was in 2013. Some people have said it anticipated the coming of Trump. I did not anticipate the coming of Trump, but the book describes a landscape in which a figure like Trump is quite thinkable. Yet even that book doesn’t fundamentally answer the question of why this successful, prosperous, relatively-united, militarily-immense democracy is in the process of, if not destroying itself, at least weakening and hurting itself.

    In a way, I avoided answering that question in The Emergency by simply saying boredom and loss of faith. I think there is an element of that in our country—a loss of faith in our country. Where does that come from? There are many complicated reasons. But the book begins with that as the premise for all that happens afterward. What’s important is what happens afterward: the empire collapses, there is no government, and suddenly the old citizens of the empire have to figure out a way to govern themselves, to run their city or their countryside, their farm.

    Over the course of the book, we learn what has replaced the empire. In both cases, it has been replaced by ideology. In the city, it is a utopian vision of the future that includes a kind of non-digital AI, because there is no digital technology in the novel. I wanted to get away from anything that would make it seem too close to our time and situation. When I got too close to our time, I felt the novel weakening. When I allowed myself to invent freely and follow instincts that seemed crazy to me—like the “better humans” who are the non-digital AI—it felt stronger. It felt like I was building a world.

    That world is one in which the young have pretty much decided that the old have failed them and do not need to be listened to. But it is really a novel about those older people and their relationship to their children. The main character is a doctor, Hugo Rustin, a respected surgeon and chief of a hospital in the city. He struggles with the new order, which does not respect him or his experience. It feels like an affront. He tries to adjust because he wants to stay close to his daughter—his wife as well, but especially his daughter—who has turned against her father’s values.

    He cannot adjust and gets in trouble at the hospital. In a sense, he is disgraced and must figure out a way to reestablish his identity, his values, and his reputation in the eyes of his community and especially his daughter. In a way, it is about a liberal—a man who has lost his place, who no longer has a home politically, within his family, or even in his work. He becomes uprooted and sets out into the countryside with his daughter on a quixotic mission that is ill-considered and risky. That mission drives most of the plot.

    Out in the countryside, there is another upheaval taking place, led once again by the young, who are overthrowing their parents and creating their own utopia—a backward-looking, reactionary utopia that is intolerant, misogynistic, and based on physical strength rather than moral virtue. You can see the analogies and the resonances, but the more the novel moves away from one-to-one parallels, the more I think it succeeds both as a novel and as an allegory.

    Mounk: I like the degrees of abstraction in the novel. The plot has forward motion and is compelling. It doesn’t feel like an abstract rumination at all. However, because there are no specific place names—it’s not as though this is Washington, D.C., or New York—the names are kept vague. It is simply “the Empire.” There is a certain level of abstraction in the naming conventions of the book. It also lacks the features of modern technology—there’s nobody on Twitter, X, or TikTok, or anything like that.

    Packer: Although there is a version of social media, it is physical. It is a crowd of people standing in the main square of the city, all coming to the same idea at the same time. It is essentially mob thinking—the kind of mob thinking we know well from social media and the way it applies pressure on any other thinking individual—but it is not digital; it is in person.

    Mounk: I thought about the human microphone in Occupy Wall Street while reading those passages of the book. I don’t know if that inspired it or not, but that was my mental image of it in a way.

    Packer: I was at Occupy Wall Street, writing about it quite a lot back then. That experience definitely showed me that you don’t need an iPhone to form a physical mob—one that doesn’t threaten anyone physically but applies a kind of pressure that might be even more unbearable than physical pressure.

    Mounk: I think that the allegory does work because it has that level of abstraction, but it is an allegory. I do read a lot of what happens in the city as an allegory on the social justice movement. The way in which the protagonist in his role as a doctor commits an infraction by shouting at a nurse, and then there is this kind of restorative justice circle he is forced into, which is meant to be very kind. The idea is that it is meant to reconcile everybody and for everybody to get along afterward. But actually, it is obviously a very coercive tool that punishes anybody who is not going along with the “spirit of together.” The idea of together is actually deeply divisive and deeply coercive.

    It obviously seems to recall some of the excesses of a woke movement over the last ten years. Tell me more about the allegory of what is going on in the countryside. Would it be too simple to say that this is a bizarro world, an Emergency-land, Packer-world version of the MAGA movement?

    Packer: Well, it is based on it. You are right that “together,” the ideology of the young in the city, is certainly based on the social justice movement. Although there is no race as a factor, there is no sexual identity as a factor. It is abstracted in that way. What “together” is about is moral perfection and even cognitive perfection, which is where the better humans, the AI figures, come in.

    For sure, I am just trying to get more at the deeper impulses. What is it about wokeness? It is that will to perfect everything—perfect language, perfect society, perfect relations between people in society. It is appealing to a young person if they feel that the society they were raised in has collapsed because of the decadence and indifference of their parents. Why wouldn’t they want to start over? When Selva, the daughter of the doctor, tells him, “I just want to take a match and burn the past. Burn it all up,” she is saying, you have failed me. So why should I go along with those humanistic values of yours that you raised me on? They failed.

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    In the countryside, there is a family of farmers whom the doctor’s family has gotten to know over the years from their regular camping trips to the area near the farm. The doctor, Rustin, and his daughter Selva, on this humanitarian mission they go out on, come to that farm and find that everything has changed. There is no longer the bonhomie, the easy rapport—perhaps condescending, perhaps a little fake—between the urban and rural people that had always been there. Instead, there is tension, suspicion, paranoia, resentment, even conspiracy thinking.

    On the farm, the young men have essentially taken over and are in a kind of military training that is a rebuke to the stolid, one-day-at-a-time, just-do-your-chores-and-everything-will-be-fine attitude of the old. There is a little Bronze Age Pervert in there. There is a little Manosphere. There is a worship of the body, of strength, of physical power, and an infatuation with violence. I would say there is a contempt, if not hatred, for girls and women. It is a broad satire. It is not one-to-one. I do not have all the various intellectual strands of MAGA that I have just been reading about in a very good book called Furious Minds by Laura K. Field.

    There are no Straussians in my book. There are no national conservatives. But there is a spirit, a feeling of anger, of hatred, of toppling all the old gods, and of real resentment toward the city people who apparently had gotten along fine with the country people, but it turns out that under the surface there was always resentment and a sense that even books and words are a threat—a way to control them, a way to keep them down. What the young men in the rural area want is to get away from words toward something more primal, which is a kind of animalism, a worship of animal power. They take these animal identities, which become a philosophical counterpart to the machine identities in the city of the better humans.

    That is certainly where MAGA and wokeness—a word I have always tried to avoid, but sometimes you just cannot help it—come into the intellectual superstructure of the story.

    Mounk: It feels like Hugo’s sensibility is, in many ways, what I would take your sensibility to be—a kind of liberal humanist attempt to persevere with dignity through this chaos. Not that I think he is you in every respect, but his voice feels not entirely unlike that of a George Packer I know.

    He has two principal relationships. There are all kinds of relationships, of course. One of the two children is too young to have a really complicated relationship with, I would say. But there is the relationship with his wife, who also gets taken up, in certain ways, with the spirit of “together,” and that leads to some tensions in the marriage. Then there is the relationship with his daughter. It feels to me that the relationship with the daughter is somehow more at the heart of the novel than the relationship with his wife.

    Talk us through these two conflicts—what they represent, how they are similar and different, and why, if you agree with me, one of those feels more central to the novel, and, I think, to the question of his time, than the other.

    Packer: I do agree with you. I think the reason, Yascha, is that I am guilty as charged as somehow akin to Dr. Hugo Rustin, but I wanted to put him and his liberal humanism under maximum pressure and not let it be the guiding principle of the novel, but instead something that comes undone. My son, when he heard I was writing this novel, said to me, “Just don’t make the doctor right about everything. He needs to be wrong about things. Otherwise, it won’t be interesting.” Great advice from a young person. In a way, the novel breaks him, and then he has to come back in some fashion.

    It shows that his belief, which is essentially that if we all listen to each other and empathize with each other, we will be able to solve all our problems and live in harmony, is naïve. That is a bit of a caricature, but not too much. It is a liberal view, and it is very much a creed of his. He lives by it. He raises his children by it. He treats his patients by it. The reason the daughter, Selva, is the key character is because she puts the most pressure on it. They have been very close throughout her life. She is fourteen when the novel takes place, and with the collapse of the Empire, her own identity collapses.

    All she wanted was to make her father happy and to be a great student. She has excelled at her exams, the all-important exams that determine your future. If you do well on them, you are made for life in your father’s guild. There are these old, medieval-type guilds in the city. If you do badly, you become an “excess burgher,” a kind of superfluous person in the city whose trajectory is probably going to be downhill. It is a vicious meritocracy, not unlike aspects of our own educated society.

    The wife, Annabel—their marriage had been happy—but when the emergency comes, she finds herself dissatisfied. She sees all this ferment around her and realizes she is still living the same conventional life as a mother, a wife, a good member of society. She takes on responsibilities in the city, what is called self-org, or self-organization, that threaten him—not because she does anything truly threatening, but because suddenly his wife, who had been his helper, becomes independent and not an appendage. He had always been the family’s outward face toward the city. He knows it is wrong to feel threatened by that, but he cannot help it. He wants her to say, “We are still the same,” and she cannot.

    That relationship is under pressure. It does not completely disintegrate, but it shows his limits as a man, a husband, and a member of this city. The daughter, though, is the one who really forces him to ask himself, what have I tried to teach my children, and why has it not worked? What can I say to her now, when in some ways I have been proved wrong about a lot of things? The farther they travel into the countryside, the more she understands what is happening and can keep them from danger, while he is the one who keeps getting it wrong and putting them in danger.

    That is a profoundly upsetting thing for a father who has taken his daughter into risky territory. Their relationship is the emotional core—the thing that makes the book quiver, that gives it resonance. Neither of my children is portrayed in this novel. Our dog is somewhat portrayed. My children do not make an appearance, and neither does my wife. The family is blameless. I am the guilty party. But that relationship between father and daughter is what emotionally matters most to me—the thing that makes it vibrate as a novel has to.

    Mounk: The relationship between the protagonist and Selva, the daughter, is in many ways the emotional core of the novel, but it does not end with Selva. It ends with a scene between Hugo, the protagonist, and his wife, Annabel. I do not think that reading the last few lines of a novel gives away too much of the plot, so I am going to risk doing so. If you are too worried about having the ending given away, you can skip forward a few seconds, but I do not think it matters.

    Their relationship, as you said, has come under strain in various ways. Suffice it to say that things are now not in a very good place in this fictional universe that is integrated in all kinds of ways. But the protagonist and his wife are deciding to go forward with the work of assisting people who are in danger or in need in various ways.

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    The last lines of the novel are: “There was another knock at the door. They went on looking at each other, and his long acquaintance with her face allowed him to imagine her thoughts. Something was ending, and they were too old to understand. What came after would belong to their children. But they would go on opening the door, and in this way they would live.”

    Is it too much to read into this a kind of incantation to humanist liberals—people who may feel that the world is spiraling out of control, that what they thought they could take for granted they no longer can—that perhaps they can never truly understand what is happening in this moment, but that the right response to that is to continue to live by their creed and to live by small-v virtues, like an insistence on opening the door to people of varied kinds and with various ideologies? Or is that too straightforward a reading of this ending?

    Packer: I think it’s a good reading, Yascha, thank you. His creed, which he calls “rather self-congratulatory humanism,” has really been pulverized over the course of the novel. So at the end, it is not a grand creed. It does not have a lot of capital-letter abstractions attached to it. It has become quite simple and reduced but may be stronger for that. It is exactly what you say. It is just to follow a decent impulse, to try to keep a connection to other people, to open the door even to people you do not know, even to people who might hate you, and to try to help them.

    It is a kind of reduced moral code, but for me, once that is gone, it is over. Then there is no point in fighting for anything. Perhaps, over time, that very simple, reduced impulse can become the basis for a new society. We do not know, because the novel ends with the words that you just read. But I could not end it with utter despair, because we are still alive. I have children, and I still love my country, and I still feel the daily danger of giving up.

    Daily danger—what do we do? This is something people constantly ask me, and I am sure you as well. What can we do about all of this? I do not really have a good answer. There are lots of political answers and strategic answers, but the novel is not about that. The moral answer is: go on opening the door and try to live that way. So there is a little affirming flame, a very small, flickering affirming flame, in those last lines.

    Mounk: I think we have done what we can to give people a sense of the novel, and all that is left is to go and read it. But what does that mean in Trump’s America—to enter fully out of your fictional world and into our political moment? Faced with the depredations of a Trump administration, faced with the fact that the opposition to it seems to be flailing in many ways, and that perhaps some of the most successful opposition voices, like Gavin Newsom—who now is absolutely favored, according to polls, to win the nomination—seem to be succeeding in part by emulating Trump, not in terms of many of the moral stances and so on, but certainly in terms of some of the style, of aping him on social media and so on.

    What does it mean to go on with the small-v virtues of a humanist, of a liberal, in a moment that seems to escape our comprehension and that seems to conspire against every instinct in that? A moment that has humbled, and I think should have humbled, us liberals and us humanists in terms of our failure to capture the imagination of our fellow citizens, to formulate a coherent response to the demands of this political moment. I sympathize with this. I found the ending very moving, in part because, while I am perhaps a few years younger than you and a few years younger than the protagonist in the novel, I too saw myself in him. But what does that mean concretely in our political situation?

    Packer: First, I think it is a great mistake to emulate or imitate Trump’s style, because it is not just a style. It is an attitude toward human beings and toward politics, toward the country. The video that Trump released right after the No Kings rallies, with himself as king flying a fighter plane over a city of protesters and dumping an astonishing amount of human excrement all over them, just coating them in it—unfortunately, there is an anticipation of this at the end of The Emergency. I had some deep, maybe only partly conscious, sense that this is where we are headed: toward the enshitification of our society.

    Sure enough, Trump is always there ahead of us. He is always ready to go lower, because that is where he lives. He wants everyone down there. That is where he thrives. He does not thrive up in the sunny uplands. Why would we want to join him there? As Mark Twain said about wrestling a pig, “You can’t win, and it amuses the pig no end.” So do not try to out-Trump Trump.

    But what else can you do? Is it a sucker’s game to show up at a No Kings rally and be moved by the signs that say, “We’re better than this,” “I love USA,” “Make Orwell fiction again”? That was one sign I saw. I was moved, but I also thought, well, what is all this going to lead to? It is a sort of first step: we are here, we have not disappeared, we have not given up on the country. Decency still exists, but it feels powerless.

    I am not a political strategist, Yascha. You are much better at this, much smarter at this. I am sure we agree about a lot of things the opposition could do in terms of policy and also about the limits of that, because I do think we are at a point where policy just does not cut it for most voters. It is all about identity—tribal, political, racial, whatever identity—and we have had that for a while. Now it seems fixed. You cannot promise to bring rural broadband to Arkansas and expect Arkansas to start voting for the Democratic president who brought it to them. It does not work that way anymore.

    How do you overcome that? I would say at least begin with those basic human qualities that still unite people. I still think most people want a decent society, do not want violence, do not like the contempt and the vitriol and the hatred that we live with on a daily basis. They want what is good for their neighbor and even for their compatriot, and they are afraid of the direction we are going in. If you can start with that, which is an almost non-political position to begin from, that might lead you to answer the more political questions and even the policy questions about what might reach people who think that you are the enemy—because that is where we are. If we disagree, we are the enemy.

    Mounk: I have a two-part answer, one of which is very straightforward, and I am reasonably convinced of it. It is not that original, but it would make a big difference. I think if Democrats want to win the midterms in 2026, and particularly if they want to win the presidential elections in 2028, they need to go into the political center. What Trump is doing is much more dangerous to democracy and morally much worse, but Trump’s Republican Party is way out of the cultural mainstream of the United States. Unfortunately, the Democrats are, on a number of positions, as well. Those positions are not as important, those issues are not as important, but in the minds of many voters, they matter.

    I do think that the first political party which manages to go back into the political center—which I think means, on economic terms, believing in capitalism and in the promise of economic growth and private initiative but also believing in a welfare state and in making sure that the rich and big corporations pay their fair share of taxes, while also recognizing that crony capitalism is one of our realities and that we need to fight against it—will win. A political position that, on culture, is patriotic, believes that America as a nation of immigrants is capable of recognizing the contributions people from all over the world have made and are making to the country, wants people to be able to live and let live irrespective of what sexual orientation or gender identity they may have, but that also is able to recognize the importance of having control of your own borders, and that not just bigots or transphobes have concerns about biological males competing in elite-level female sports, and so on and so forth. I think that position is the winning position. If Democrats can go there first, they are going to win in 2028.

    Winning in 2028 is really important, given what might happen if Trump’s successors are in power for another four or eight years. Now, I think there is a more fundamental thing, because that will be enough, I think, to win in 2028 with a reasonably charismatic candidate—not a once-in-a-generation candidate—but it is not going to be enough to fundamentally push Trump’s Republican Party out of political contention such that it forces the Republicans to reform and to come back to the drawing table.

    For that, I think we need to recognize the way—and this is why the ending of the novel resonated with me—in which we have not understood how the world has changed. The basic narrative that we tell ourselves, the deep story, as someone like Arlie Hochschild might put it, is that we are the future, and the people who are challenging us—whether that is Donald Trump in the United States or Reform in the United Kingdom or the AfD in Germany—are the past. I keep going back to this German word ewiggestriger, which became popular after World War II and referred to the old Nazis, those who were forever of yesteryear. I think we think of our political opponents as ewiggestriger—they are stuck in the past.

    In a way, that is a self-exculpatory phrase, because it means we know that we are going to be the future, that we have already won. It is a very triumphalist assumption. I increasingly think that many voters look at us and say, you are the ones speaking the language of the past. You are the ones speaking the language of 2000, not of 2025. For all their flaws, it is actually the populists who sound like today—who feel like they have understood that the old taboos, the old rules, no longer apply. They are the ones living in the present. You are the ones living in the past.

    Packer: They’ve also mastered the media of the present rather than clinging to the media of the past.

    Mounk: Exactly. I think the more fundamental challenge is how do we once again start to sound like the present or the future? Perhaps there is a hint—the end of the novel spoke to me—but I also thought, and I do not mean that the protagonist of your novel has to solve the problems of Trump’s America or be the guide to how to reinvent ourselves. That is too much to ask of him. But I was a little bit like, no, that is deeply decent, and he is a very winning character for all of his flaws as a result.

    Still, I feel like we owe more. We owe, at least in the real world—not in the fictional world—an attempt to reinvent our compass and our language in such a way that we actually give these values a fighting chance.

    Packer: Yeah, well, we cannot ask that of poor Hugo Rustin. He has been through a lot by the end of the novel, and it is enough that he is still treating patients in his front room in the middle of a civil war. But of course, we have to ask it of ourselves. I mean, I feel something is ending, and I am too old to understand. I do feel that. That is, in some way, the credo of those last lines.

    But that does not mean I can retire and sit on the sidelines and watch another generation try to figure it out, because as long as we are alive, we have an obligation to do that. What you said earlier about moving to the center—I am with you on most of that. Maybe on economics, I push a little more to the left, to the anti-monopoly and to the criticism of crony capitalism, which I know you mentioned, but I would center that.

    I think corruption is a powerful concern for ordinary Americans, and Trump manipulated it before becoming the most corrupt president in history. I think a Democrat should really emphasize that Qatari jet and the meme coins that are flowing into Trump’s family bank.

    Mounk: I think it is an interesting minor disagreement. I know that is not your main point, but it is worth spelling out. I am not sure I disagree, which is to say that I think both of those things need to be very strong, and they do not actually stand in competition with each other. I think, in the way you speak, you need to make it clear that you believe in our economic system, that you believe in making people richer, and that you believe in giving people opportunity.

    You believe not just in raising the minimum wage, but in allowing aspirations to thrive. Too often, Democrats do not sound like that—certainly those on the left of the party, but even those in the middle. At the same time, you need to make it authentic that you are angry at Trump’s corruption and that you are angry at all kinds of other things in our political system, like how hard it is to understand, before you get a treatment from a doctor, how much you are going to have to pay for it, and whether, if you are less economically fortunate than you or me, going through this procedure might compromise your ability to pay rent or not. I think you can be equally forceful about both of those, and the trick is not to put them in competition.

    Packer: They should not compete because they are related. Crony capitalism, Trump’s corruption, and the way in which Congress has ensured a tax system that is deeply unfair while gutting the IRS from ever being able to catch rich tax cheats, et cetera, et cetera, are part of what is holding back the aspirations of ordinary people. You do not want to tell people, we are just going to make sure everyone has the same amount, we are going to give you economic security, we are going to make sure that you get your Social Security check and your Medicare. That should be the minimum.

    But it should not be the message, because the message has to appeal to people’s aspirations, because we are and always will be a country of strivers. Striving right now is running headlong into—I use the word oligarchy—I would say Trump and the people who were on stage with him at his inauguration are hurting our children, hurting our workers, hurting our economy. That should not be a hard message to pair with the aspirational one.

    On cultural issues, you know I agree with you. I think it has been a disaster that the left has dragged the Democratic Party so far on identity issues, on immigration, on language and speech, et cetera. I still would ask you, because you are an expert, do you think those policy changes, without some deeper work at organizing and forming connections in those deep-red areas that Democrats have abandoned—which takes years, it is not about one election, it is not about one message for one election—can swing an election any longer? Maybe those handful of votes that can tip the swing states one way or the other, but not anything decisive. We will still have Trump’s populism, and it will still be a really powerful force.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and George discuss how the Democrats can broaden their appeal, and how to reinvigorate liberalism. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    53 min
  • In Defence of Striving
    Edinburg North High School Mariachi Band. (Photo by Frazer Harrison/Getty Images for SXSW.)

    Polarization is at an all-time high. It can feel daunting—perhaps even misguided—to engage in meaningful dialogue with those holding starkly different views. What does it mean to champion pluralism in such a moment? Persuasion’s new series on the future of pluralism, generously supported by the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations, features essays and podcast interviews that make the case for civic dialogue and highlight inspiring examples of it in practice. You can find past installments here.

    One of the hardest things to explain about what it’s like to live in Japan has to do with a single word: majime.

    It means something like earnest striving, or wholesome seriousness. That’s easy enough to understand. What’s harder to wrap your head around is the role it plays in Japanese society, where a majime attitude is the default setting for social interaction.

    I see it through my 14-year-old’s eyes. Growing up in Canada, she had adopted the standard North American teenage girl persona: slightly detached, snarky, above it all. In other words, the exact opposite of majime. When we moved to Japan, she and her brother realized they’d have to flip the script if they wanted to fit in at public school: the kind of simple-minded earnestness that would have gotten them pilloried in a Montreal schoolyard is positively de rigueur in Tokyo.

    Studying hard for a difficult test? Majime. Snarking at someone for being a try-hard? Not majime. Paying close attention in class and participating enthusiastically in class projects? Majime. Following all the rules out of an earnest conviction that everyone is better off if everyone follows the rules? Very majime. Giving your best effort at the school sports festival? Majime. Developing a meta narrative about how dorky this all sounds? Not majime at all.

    The surprising bit is that my 14-year-old actually kind of likes her new majime self. She’s very aware that it would be bizarre if she behaved this way in Canada, but when everyone is doing it, it’s kind of comforting. Majime creates a safe space for doing your best, and that’s empowering.

    For some time, I toyed with the idea of writing a piece about majime as a uniquely Japanese organizing principle for society. I had it all written out in my head, I was about to pitch it. But then I saw, of all things, a Netflix documentary about Texas high schoolers in the incredibly competitive world of high school varsity mariachis in the Rio Grande Valley, and I changed my mind.

    2023’s Going Varsity in Mariachi is many things: a compelling sports film, a crash course in Mexican folklore, a love letter to the Rio Grande. But I saw it as something else: a manifesto for American majime.

    Until I noticed the title on the screen attached to the back of seat 13C, I had simply not known that competitive varsity mariachi was a thing. But in a superbly executed 105 minutes, directors Sam Osborn and Alejandra Vasquez introduce us to this world and to the people in it.

    The mariachis we meet are largely, but not only, Mexican American kids doing the most Mexican thing possible in the most American way imaginable. Along the Rio Grande, the competition circuit between mariachi bands is intense in a way that will be immediately familiar to anyone who ever did anything competitive in a U.S. public high school, with its divisions, its regional and state championships, its long road trips and nerves and excitement.

    Mariachi, we learn, is not easy. Everybody has to sing, and everybody has to play either the violin, a brass instrument, or an “armonía” instrument, usually guitar, but always including one “guitarrón”—a giant bass guitar whose particular role in the band is a source of no end of drama in the film. More than that, you have to perform, you have to embody the spirit of mariachi: proud, a little haughty, and very serious about the music.

    The biggest eye-opener, for me, was the absolute tsunami of Mexican-American majime the film features. The kids in competitive mariachi are not well off. They face steep costs if they want to access higher education, which many of them do. Music scholarships are central to their strategies for trying to get there.

    They are visibly, unashamedly strivers: they earnestly want a better life for themselves, and they’re earnestly working hard to achieve it. They’re teammates, fully aware that they can all succeed collectively only if each and every one of them succeeds individually. So they work hard towards a common goal. They don’t waste time on meta discourses.

    Which made me realize that there is nothing, in the end, distinctively Japanese about majime. Kids who want to strive perform at their best when they’re in an environment that’s conducive to striving. And you can create that environment in the Rio Grande Valley just as well as you can in Tokyo.

    What’s most interesting about Going Varsity in Mariachi, though, is its politics. As in, it doesn’t have any. The filmmakers are very careful to keep any explicitly political narrative out of the film. Which is canny on their part, because the ideology that the film champions has been so out of fashion for so long, we hardly ever hear about it anymore: multiculturalism.

    Multiculturalism was the bright, hopeful vision for racial integration and harmony some of us were into back in the 1990s. Rejecting the old-fashioned assimilation of Melting Pot ideology, multiculturalism promised that cultures could remain vibrant in a new soil, enriching the lives of everyone in the places where they took root. Multiculturalism was to be the open and accepting part of a beautiful act of cultural miscegenation, with groups joyously sharing the best of themselves, adding it to a common stock.

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    The concept was left for dead long ago. Which is what made it so startling to see the principle so fully articulated in Going Varsity in Mariachi. Two of the girls in the band, Bella Luna and Roxanne Ruiz, enact one of the sweetest and most wholesome lesbian romances I’ve ever seen on screen. Their difference is accepted, not dwelt upon.

    And then there are the white kids. The band, obviously, is mostly Mexican American, as are the communities. But there are a few Anglo kids in these mariachi bands. Their Spanish may not be as fluent, but they gotta sing too, everyone has to sing. In the film, you see them welcomed warmly into this group where they are a very small minority, and simply embraced… as long as they play well.

    Much of the drama in the film comes from precisely one of these white kids, Drake, paired with that fearsome instrument: el guitarrón. Mariachi bands don’t have conductors, and the bass guitarrón keeps time for the entire ensemble: mess up there, and you mess up everything.

    Halfway through the film, Drake breaks one of the key commandments of majime: thou shalt always show up. He misses several practices hanging out with his girlfriend, and has to be kicked out of the band. The crisis moment in the film is a crisis of integration: could it be that white kids just can’t thrive at something this Mexican? Spoiler alert: Drake of course does pull himself back together, rejoins the band, and plays his guitarrón to glory.

    It would strike all of the members of the band as ludicrous to suggest that Drake was engaged in some crime of cultural appropriation. He earned the right to wear that costume and be a mariachi by how much work he put into learning the guitarrón. Practicing a huge, unwieldy Mexican instrument is not something normal white 15-year-olds do in Texas, but he was doing it—and that made him one of them.

    And that is the lost promise of multiculturalism: that we can bring our cultures together beautifully, but it’ll only work if we do it in a spirit of majime. That skin color really is irrelevant, or at any rate much, much less relevant than the work you do. That all kinds of different people can strive earnestly together. And that, ultimately, the best way to manage our differences is to set up our societies that enable that to happen all the time.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Superintelligence Isn't Enough

    Predictions that artificial general intelligence (AGI) will lead to machines that are smarter than human beings abound. But superintelligence is unlikely to lead to the kind of explosive economic growth that some predict, because intelligence is only one of many inputs necessary to sustain economic growth. You can watch the video of this episode below.

    All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.

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    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Frankly Fukuyama & Persuasion

    0 min
  • The Most Important Supreme Court Case of the Year (So Far)
    The Supreme Court on November 5, 2025 (Photo by Chen Mengtong/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images.)

    American patriots began their rebellion against the British Crown in part because Parliament, in faraway London, forced them to pay taxes on imported goods without their consent.

    Their slogan, “no taxation without representation,” evolved into a foundational principle of the United States. The idea that government cannot extract revenue from the people without clear authority from legislators of their choosing was so important to the Founders that they wrote it into the first article of the Constitution. That provision assigned Congress the power “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”

    You wouldn’t think we’d be relitigating this on the eve of the nation’s 250th birthday. But we are, because President Trump has asserted the power to levy tariffs without any debate or vote in Congress.

    Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a lawsuit brought by small businesses and states who are affected by the tariffs and want to stop them. It’s a big deal for the economy. But it’s also a historic test of the judiciary’s willingness to act as an independent check on the executive.

    Trump claims that striking down the tariffs would “destroy” the country. He probably intended that remark as pressure on the Court and its majority of six conservative Republican justices, including three he appointed during his first term.

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    The reassuring news is that, based on their questions and comments yesterday, a critical mass of the Court’s conservatives seems to understand the stakes and to be willing to stand up to the president.

    “The really key part of the context here, if not the dispositive one ... is the constitutional assignment of the taxing power to Congress,” Justice Neil Gorsuch noted. “The power to reach into the pockets of the American people is just different and it’s been different since the founding and the Navigation Acts that were part of the spark of the American revolution, where Parliament asserted the power to tax to regulate commerce.”

    If indeed the mood at oral argument translates into a ruling against the president, the Republican-majority court will have gone a long way toward countering the Democratic allegations that it is a partisan rubber-stamp for Trump.

    That charge stems from a series of recent rulings on the Court’s so-called “shadow docket,” in which the conservative majority dissolved lower court injunctions and allowed Trump to freeze foreign aid, fire federal employees, and base some immigration enforcement tactics on race and language, pending resolution of the underlying lawsuits against those policies.

    Each time, liberal justices vigorously dissented, arguing that the conservative majority was ratifying Trump’s excesses. Technically, however, these were what lawyers call “interlocutory” decisions, not judgments on those cases’ underlying merits.

    The tariffs case is the first time the justices themselves are taking responsibility for a final decision on one of Trump’s signature policies—probably the signature policy of his second term. And they don’t seem fazed by the possibility that he’ll resist and trigger a constitutional crisis.

    If so, that can only enhance the Court’s legitimacy. Indeed, if the conservative justices consciously saved political capital by avoiding confrontation with Trump until the most opportune moment, they chose a good issue on which to make their stand. Tariffs are not popular. If the Court rules against him it would be hard for the president to resist: doing so would entail trying to collect tariffs from hundreds of U.S. companies whose general counsels would be advising them that they don’t have to pay.

    What’s more, the legal arguments in favor of the president’s position are extremely weak, which became increasingly evident as yesterday’s session wore on.

    Trump claimed that Congress had delegated him the power to impose the tariffs through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law authorizing the president to “regulate” the “importation” of “any property” to deal with “unusual and extraordinary threats” originating abroad.

    Previous presidents have used the IEEPA to impose asset freezes, trade embargoes, and other economic sanctions against adversaries such as Iran. President Trump declared “unusual and extraordinary threats” caused by the U.S. trade deficit with multiple foreign partners, including allies such as Japan, as well as the flow of migrants and fentanyl from Mexico, Canada and China. Earlier this year, he imposed steep, coercive tariffs on them, citing the “regulate importation” language in the IEEPA.

    No president has ever read the law that way before. That was only logical, since the statute was one of several from the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate period, during which Congress tried to limit executive power in both domestic and foreign affairs. One such episode on Congress’s mind in that period was President Nixon’s imposition of an “emergency” 10 percent tariff on trading partners in 1971.

    At oral argument, Trump’s solicitor general, D. John Sauer, tried to sell the theory that the tariffs are just a form of import regulation—“regulatory tariffs,” as he called them.

    Chief Justice John Roberts wasn’t buying it. He told Sauer he didn’t think Congress would have ceded such vast power through such indirect language.

    “The justification is being used for a power to impose tariffs on any product, from any country, in any amount, for any length of time,” Roberts said. “It does seem like that’s major authority, and the basis for that claim seems to be a misfit.”

    This was a reference to the “major questions doctrine,” which the Court had previously used to strike down Biden administration executive overreach on student loan forgiveness and other dubious stretches of statutory authority. This hint that Roberts wants to apply it consistently to a president of his own party was especially significant.

    Trump’s policy might have a foreign policy goal, the chief justice noted, but it works through “the imposition of taxes on Americans, and that has always been the core power of Congress.”

    Nor was Justice Amy Coney Barrett, a Trump appointee, convinced. “Can you point to any other place in the code or any other time in history where that phrase together—‘regulate importation’—has been used to confer tariff‑imposing authority?” she asked Sauer. He couldn’t come up with a satisfactory answer.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    Trying to salvage his case, Sauer found himself jettisoning one of the administration’s main public justifications for the tariffs: the hundreds of billions of dollars they have already brought into the Treasury. In the run-up to the oral argument, the administration warned about having to refund all that money if the Court rules against Trump. Sauer’s brief mentioned estimates that the tariffs will bring in $4 trillion over the next decade, implying that revenue raising was a long-term goal of the policy.

    Yet to the Court, he insisted that the purpose of the tariffs was not to help fund the government but to help the president negotiate better trade deals and bring back manufacturing: “the fact that they raise revenue is only incidental,” Sauer claimed.

    In short, yesterday’s argument laid bare the pretextual nature of Trump’s legal claim, and exposed the authoritarian spirit at its core. Like many would-be political strongmen, the president professes that the country’s problems are so urgent, and his solutions so necessary, that there is no time to waste on legislative deliberation.

    Trump himself basically confessed this in an interview with 60 Minutes: “If they take away the power of tariffs from us, and it has to be quick and nimble, you can’t have Congress, well, hundreds of people have to look. They can’t even agree to continue a country,” he said, alluding to the government shutdown. “You can’t have Congress here. This has to be quick and nimble.”

    Justice Clarence Thomas was one of the few on the Court to evince any sympathy for Trump’s position, though even he seemed a bit half-hearted about it.

    Late in the argument, he offered attorney Neal Katyal, who was representing the tariff opponents, a hypothetical question seemingly designed to make Katyal’s argument appear less reasonable.

    “If one of our major trading partners, for example, China, held a U.S. citizen hostage,” Thomas asked, “could the President, short of embargoing or setting quotas, say the most effective way to gain leverage is to impose a tariff for the purpose of leveraging his position to recover our hostage?”

    “No, your honor,” Katyal responded. Import quotas or an embargo might be authorized under the IEEPA, but “tariffs are different.”

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    This was exactly the right answer. Yes, striking down the tariffs might reduce Trump’s leverage in international negotiations. It might cost the government a lot of future revenue and create what Barrett conceded would be a “mess” over possibly refunding what it’s collected so far.

    But there are limits on what people in power can do, even for the sake of laudable goals, lest they violate fundamental liberties as the Founders defined them. And one thing the Founders wanted to prohibit was taxing the American people absent clear authority from Congress—period.

    In fact, if you had to express the essence of the Constitution in a phrase, it would be: the ends do not justify the means. The tariff case gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to reaffirm that principle. And from what we saw yesterday, the justices might just be about to seize it.

    Charles Lane is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for The Free Press.

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    0 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    An activity too cold for the UK at this time of year: The annual Witches and Warlocks Paddle on October 25, 2025 in Morro Bay, California. (Photo by Ruby Wallau/Getty Images.)
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, November 28, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

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    0 min
  • The Good Fight Club: Mayor Mamdani, the Crackup at Heritage, and the Death of Dick Cheney

    In this conversation, Sam Kahn, Mike Pesca, Christine Rosen, and Yascha Mounk discuss what the election results mean for the direction of the Democrats, what the Heritage Foundation scandal shows about anti-Semitism on the right, and Dick Cheney’s mixed legacy.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

    Mike is the host of The Gist, the longest-running daily news and analysis podcast in existence.

    Christine Rosen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She is also a monthly columnist for Commentary magazine, one of the cohosts of The Commentary Magazine Daily Podcast, a fellow at the University of Virginia’s Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, and senior editor at The New Atlantis.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: It is Wednesday, November 5th, and this is the 11th installment of The Good Fight Club. Today, I am delighted to be rejoined by my friend Mike Pesca, who is the host of the excellent daily podcast The Gist. I have, for the second time on the podcast but for the first time on The Good Fight Club, Christine Rosen, who is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and not the Heritage Foundation. I have, for the first time—in either The Good Fight Club or the podcast as a whole—my dear colleague Sam Kahn, who is a frequent voice in the pages of Persuasion, of which he is an editor, as well as the author of the Castalia Substack.

    We are recording this on the morning after the mid-midterms of 2025, in which Democrats did very well across the board, winning all statewide races in Virginia and a very good result in the House of Delegates there. They also won, after some trepidation, the gubernatorial race in New Jersey, and of course the Democratic nominee, Democratic Socialist Zohran Mamdani, won the mayoral race in New York City. Mike, what do you make of these elections?

    Mike Pesca: I think that though it was expected that the Democrats would win, perhaps we retroactively discredit some of the coverage beforehand. Well, the race looks close in New Jersey, Jack Ciattarelli making inroads. Not really. The Harris–Walz ticket won by only six points in New Jersey in the presidential election, if you want to take that as a baseline, and Mikie Sherrill won by 13 against Ciattarelli. So maybe we could say, well, New Jersey is a Democratic state. Two days ago, you could come across dozens of stories about the supposedly close race. It was not close in Virginia, nor was it close in the Virginia down-ballot races that had some controversy.

    Other races, like in Maine—which is a very purple state, as we know, with Susan Collins being the senator there—very roundly rejected a requirement to bring IDs to the polls. In California, with their Proposition 50, there will be redistricting. For someone like me, who, if I had to choose, would definitely say Democrat over Republican but is mostly a centrist, there was a veering away from pure radicalism when given the choice.

    I will just say that although Mamdani has a mandate, it is a 10-point mandate. Around 10% was the margin of victory, so maybe that will rein him in a little rather than him thinking that he has all New Yorkers behind him. That is one data point.

    The other I would point to did not get as much coverage, but I was interested—and concerned—by the Seattle mayor’s race, where a woman named Katie Wilson, not a governor or even a former state senator, was an activist. She has run a nonprofit organization with no employees. In the primary, she beat the incumbent Mayor Harrell by 10 points, and it looked like she, without any experience and with very left-wing ideas, was going to be mayor. But not so right now. Harrell has a pretty decent lead, and that could change, but it looks like for the first time—in, I think, four consecutive elections—the incumbent mayor of Seattle will win. He is not that popular, but the idea that the electorate, especially in very blue places, is going to react as resoundingly as it can in as firm an anti-Trump direction as possible, is not entirely true.

    I do not care about centrism, but I do care about rationality and moderation, and there is hope for those two things.

    Mounk: Christine, are Democrats in array to the extent that Mike is telling us? Should this make Democrats optimistic about their ability to make big inroads in the House of Representatives in the midterms and winning the presidential elections in 2028? Or could this be a Pyrrhic victory?

    Christine Rosen: I think they do have reason to be optimistic, and the Republicans have reasons for concern, mainly because of two data points that struck me in these elections. One is that in places like New Jersey and Virginia, where a non-college-educated, nonwhite population had voted for Trump in 2024, they swung back to the Democrats this time. Those are the voters who told pollsters their key concern was not the culture war or foreign policy, but kitchen-table economic issues. Those were the things that I think Spanberger, in particular, spoke to on the campaign trail very effectively. That raises alarms for Republicans who think that with Trump not on the ballot next time—and that very fragile but interesting coalition he built in the last election—they have to win those voters back.

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

    If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

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    The other thing that was really striking to me was the gender divide among young people. Young women were overwhelmingly voting blue in these elections, most remarkably in New York City, but also in Virginia and New Jersey. That suggests another thing: the Republican coalition is not reaching those women, and they should probably think about why. Both of those things, looking ahead to 2026 and then to 2028, are issues the Republican Party has to be concerned about.

    The reaction of Trump to this election was also notable. First, he claimed that the California ballot initiative might have been fraudulent. Then he stamped his feet and said, “Well, the reason you lost is that I wasn’t on the ballot,” which actually is true as a matter of politics but very disheartening if you are a Republican looking at next year. His demands for loyalty, his continuing government shutdown, and some of the statements he has made about that suggest to me that Republicans are going to have to start thinking about whether to treat this man who has dominated their politics for the last decade as a lame duck—and what the risks of that might be—or whether to continue on the loyalty train, and what that will do in the midterms.

    Mounk: Sam, you wrote a pretty downcast piece about Zohran Mamdani a few days ago, published in Persuasion. You then said that his victory speech reconciled you to him somewhat, you told me earlier today. What are we to make of Mamdani? What will his mayoralty mean for New York City? Is he, as so many media outlets in the United States and especially in Europe are saying, the future of the Democratic Party?

    Sam Kahn: I have jumped on the bandwagon a little bit since writing my anti-Mamdani piece. I really have two minds about him. First, he is really charismatic. I was very impressed by the victory speech; it hit all the right notes. He probably did that throughout the campaign. In this era, what matters far more than anything else—more than policy—is personality politics. To some extent, Trump and Obama proved it in different ways. If you have the gift for this, then you kind of deserve to be the standard-bearer for your party in some way, and he has that gift. It is very hard to take that away from him.

    On the other hand, for one thing, I am like the last Andrew Cuomo fan. I thought he was an excellent governor. I thought he really proved something in 2020 when he took the national stage from Trump at a critical moment. I understand that he is kind of damaged goods now, but basically, I felt that New York City would be lucky to have him. I was surprised that he did as poorly as he did. If he had won, that would have really sent a message that the Democrats had gotten over the woke era, that they were back to the center, that they had a guy who really radiates authority, knows what he is doing, and has managerial experience.

    Unfortunately, with Mamdani, I am sure he will be fine as a mayor. New York City is ungovernable anyway, so he will be no worse than his predecessors. But he is really a target, and being mayor of New York is actually the worst possible position to be that target because it means he cannot really speak to a national audience, while the Fox News crowd can focus on him. So I think it is a real liability for 2026, unfortunately.

    Mounk: I have to say that I have been of two minds about this election in New York and the broader election over the last few days. I am very glad the Democrats are in array. It is very important for them to be in a good position to take back the House of Representatives and at least make inroads in the Senate in the general midterms next year. I also worry that they may take the wrong lesson from this election and think that they are on a better path than they might be.

    Mamdani is somebody with whom I am predisposed to have deep disagreements on policy and other things. I do not think that a rent-freeze in New York is actually going to accomplish anything. You already have deep underinvestment in those apartments and that housing because it is not financially rewarding to landlords. So we basically leave a lot of these apartments languishing, and people live under very poor conditions in many of them. I do not think that Citibank grocery stores are going to improve on the many supermarkets and bodegas in New York City. I roll my eyes at many proclamations that he is the genuine voice of the marginalized and underserved in New York.

    It is very striking that he did extremely well in neighborhoods like Prospect Heights, where I am based. He did extremely well in Morningside Heights, where I lived for many years, close to Columbia University. He did much worse in many of the outlying boroughs. There is an incredible cross-tab from the exit poll in which he does better among New Yorkers who make more than $100,000 a year than among New Yorkers who make less than $100,000 a year. He does better among New Yorkers who rent in the private market than among those who live in rent-stabilized housing, who would actually have the most immediate benefit from some of his proposals.

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    So I really am not predisposed to think that he is a wonderful thing. I have to say, though, conversely, when I look at someone like Abigail Spanberger, who is a center-left moderate holding many of the views that I hold, I wish her every success as governor of Virginia. Having said that, if you watch the victory speech of Abigail Spanberger and her debate performance, and then you watch Zohran Mamdani’s debate performance and victory speech, it is very hard not to think that Mamdani is onto something. There is something so lifeless and bloodless in the moderates in the Democratic Party—so scared of their own shadow, so incapable of clearly stating their positions on important issues, speaking in consultant-led platitudes—that it is very hard to cheer them on.

    Mamdani, who stands for a lot of things I do not agree with, has an authenticity and a charm that, despite my disagreements with him, speaks to me. I am worried that Democrats seem to be stuck between candidates like Mamdani and AOC, and others who are far too far to the left to be credible national candidates. They can do well in a city like New York, but they are not going to be a good brand for Democrats in the midterms next year or in 2028. Moderates like Spanberger, with whom I agree on a lot, just do not seem to be compelling candidates and are going to be weak for other reasons. Mike, am I talking myself into too much pessimism here?

    Pesca: I think that Mamdani has charm but not authenticity. In fact, he has so much charm that he has convinced a smart guy like you that he might have authenticity. There was a phrase you used that told me a lot about whether he is the future of the Democratic Party: “In Europe, they think so.” I would look at that as a somewhat negative indicator. Why would Mamdani be the future? He got a million votes; Spanberger got two million votes. No one is saying that Spanberger is going to run for president or be the future, but we think that she has a good chance to govern well. I do not think that Mamdani is going to get most of his proposals through, or that the ones he gets through will be particularly sound. City-run grocery stores—one in each borough—might sell a melon to consumers for three dollars, but it will cost taxpayers twelve.

    Mamdani is great at speeches, ideas, smiling, and, to give him credit, putting his finger on the mood of the electorate and how communication works now. But as you said, he has the misfortune of being in a role where he actually has to deliver governance. This is one of the things about AOC. She is great at what she does, but what she does is not governing. Since Mamdani will be asked to govern, I think that will hurt his overall standing.

    I do think you are right: this is where American politics are. The man or woman who speaks well, performs well on vertical videos, and understands color schemes and presentation will often thrive. But in terms of delivering actual policies—and this is not just wonkery—that still correlates with appeal, not just talking about ideas but implementing them. Do you not think that one of the reasons soaring rhetoric connects so easily is that it is directly correlated with the impossibility of many of those programs working? That cannot be overstated. A politician gets much credit if they never have to put their policies into practice, as Bernie Sanders has not had to. But now that Mamdani has to, we will get a little bit of a taste of the pudding.

    Rosen: I think that, plus Sam’s earlier point about well-done performative politics, shows that the right and the left have now both experienced this. There is a vast middle in this country, and I think you saw them turn out in the Virginia election in particular. Even though you have this milquetoast consultant-speak coming out of Spanberger’s mouth, they want that because, after the experience of the last two decades, they have started to say, we just want things to work again. Just make things work.

    Mamdani will have a huge challenge with that. He already has Kathy Hochul on the record saying that most of the things he is promising are not going to happen. She is not going to raise taxes to give him the money to do many of those schemes. In the rest of the country, people just want things to get done. They are worried about how much their groceries cost and what the tariff regime is going to do, which is before the court today as we are recording this.

    The inconsistency and capriciousness of so many political leaders on the left and the right these days only go so far. That is where I think both Mike and Sam are onto something about performativeness being initially appealing, but voters are very swiftly judging on results. That is as our system should work, I think.

    Kahn: Yeah, I think the results, in a way, do not matter too much. There are a few things that we kind of know are going to happen. One is that he will be okay. He will not be able to deliver on many of the things he promised, but whatever. De Blasio was a weak mayor. Eric Adams was a weak mayor. These things do not really spread that far beyond New York. There was a mayor in the forties who, I think at one point, kind of walked off and sought asylum in Mexico because it was such a difficult job. That is mostly a true story. It was after he had finished his term.

    Mamdani is savvy enough that he will walk back from some of it. What matters with him is going to be crime. I think everybody is going to be looking to see whether crime spikes in New York City. If he does anything in the direction of abolishing the police or some of the decriminalization policies that happened on the West Coast, that will be a huge target for MAGA to go after.

    I think we know how he is going to play out nationally. It will be, as Mike said, basically the same thing as AOC. It will rile up the left, he will get his soundbites out there, but there will also be a lot from the other side that will make him an easy target.

    There are a couple of really interesting things with this. I think there is a kind of schism coming within the Democratic Party. Spanberger versus Mamdani is a good way to talk about it. It feels like the Democrats are giving up on the Third Way in a sense, going back to the politics of the seventies or eighties. I heard a lot of that in Mamdani’s speech—forget about caution, return to this socialist-tinged, working-class ideal. That is pretty interesting.

    I also think Israel is going to become a real schismatic point for the Democrats because of Mamdani globalizing the Intifada and saying he is going to arrest Netanyahu if he shows up in New York. It has not yet been so nationally divisive for the party, but I feel like that is coming in the next few years, and it may be hugely disruptive for them.

    Mounk: Look, I think perhaps our disagreement is less about Mamdani than it is about the state of the moderates in the Democratic Party. How you feel about that depends a little on what you think the goal is. To me, the goal is that you see Donald Trump and his followers, who I think represent a serious danger to the American Republic. You see that this is not a unique American moment; if you look at the polls right now, you have right-wing populist movements—many less extreme than Trump, some more extreme than Trump—leading in the polls in Britain, France, Germany, and many other countries across Europe.

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    To me, the question is: what does it take to get out of this not just political moment, but political era? To do that, you need a set of moderate politicians who are able to do two things at the same time: have some authentic, broad appeal that makes people excited about them, and distance themselves from extreme positions that will drive many swing voters into the hands of these authoritarian populists.

    Mamdani, for all your complaints about his lack of genuine authenticity and its somewhat manufactured nature, has something. You look at the victory speech—I was surprised by how much he, I think quite consciously, emulated Obama in various ways. You can say that it is all a smart, clever trick or whatever, but I get through that speech without boredom. Even as my brain tells me I do not agree, I think, all right, here is something. I try to watch Spanberger’s speech all the way through—it is a challenge.

    Then there are other people who have a set of policy positions that work, or that work somewhat better at least, and have that moderation. Spanberger is not going to scare anybody, but that may be enough in 2028, and that is not nothing. I do not mean Spanberger personally, but some candidate like her. Trump is doing enough crazy stuff that people are going to be really tired, and you see key voting blocs coming back to the Democratic Party, at least on a temporary basis. Younger voters, Latinos, and others who made Trump president in 2024 are not as enchanted by him. It may not end up being that hard to win the 2028 election for Democrats.

    Rosen: Trump will not be on the ballot in 2028. In 2026, I think you are right. Democratic turnout in all these elections was massive for an off-year, odd-year election—and it bodes well for them for 2026. The anti-Trump message will remain. They will look at the nominee, JD Vance, and obviously label him Trump 2.0. But there is a need there, and that struggle between the Spanberger’s “I will govern reasonably” message and the charisma of a Mamdani is real—he invoked Eugene Debs too.

    I am sure that sent lots of people to check who Eugene Debs was. He was unabashed about being a socialist, but he is not in a socialist country, and he cannot make this country socialist. Eugene Debs learned that over and over again running for president and in prison. How Mamdani will think about how to tone that message, we will see. He is a little like Obama in the sense of charisma and the ability to draw and keep a crowd, but I think he is much less savvy politically in the long term in thinking about how to hone his message going forward.

    Pesca: Yascha, Spanberger is not a great moderate communicator or an inspiring person, but moderates who are plausibly on the short list of people who could be the Democratic nominee do this well, depending on your taste. Buttigieg at least strikes chords in me, and Jon Ossoff, and, talking about Obama, Josh Shapiro—there is talent there, people who can communicate. I just think that it used to be more true that delivering for a politician was a pathway to success. Now I think that when we elect politicians, we essentially elect people who are critics.

    Trump always does this. He criticizes as if he is an outsider when he is the most powerful man in the world and actually runs the agencies he seems to be nitpicking. But we reward someone who best describes the problem these days. If you have a track record of having had to deal with the problem, it is going to hurt you.

    Look at Gavin Newsom. If Gavin Newsom did not have a state to run but had a PR shop to run, or had a Senate seat where we do not expect results—especially if your party is not in power—if Gavin Newsom were just a guy with a lot of access to social media and the camera, he would be doing much better than he does, because he is saddled with the actual facts of misgovernance to a large degree in that state. That, I think, is the position Mamdani is going to be in.

    I just need to say this: I too was a Cuomo backer in terms of his tenure as governor being good. He ran such a bad campaign. He ran out of things to say. Articulate the three ideas he had—you could not do that. He tried to beat something with nothing, although the nothing was, “I’ll add 5,000 more cops,” at a time when crime is not bad and people rank it as a low concern.

    The Cuomo of governing, when he was the first governor to see gay marriage passed, clearly has lost many miles off his fastball. Now I guess he is moving to Florida, or at least that is what he says he is going to do.

    Mounk: I am going to end this segment with the stupidest thing you can do as a commentator, which is to make a point estimate about what is going to happen in American politics. Obviously, I do not actually think this precise scenario is going to play out, but if I had to give you one scenario of how the next ten years are going to unfold right now, I would say that we end up with Democratic nominee and running mate Gavin Newsom and Abigail Spanberger in 2028. They narrowly win against JD Vance, become quite unpopular relatively quickly, and Donald Trump Jr. becomes president in 2032. That is why I am pessimistic, and hopefully I am wrong. I am sure to be wrong about this. I think that is a 10% likelihood, but I think it is as likely as any other scenario I can think of right now.

    Christine, a lot of people have been biting their tongues at a rival think tank to yours in Washington, D.C. There was a complicated series of events in which Tucker Carlson—who, as Damon Linker argued in Persuasion, has become the main conduit for antisemites to become semi-respectable in American life—invited Nick Fuentes, the leader of the Groyper movement and someone with openly racist and antisemitic views, onto his show. He gave him a very friendly interview and received some criticism for it. At that point, the head of the Heritage Foundation—the most influential think tank on the American right today, certainly within the Trump movement—defended Carlson’s choice to do so.

    Heritage has a one-voice policy, which makes it very difficult for employees of the think tank to publicly disagree with the president or other members of Heritage. A few fellows and board members have subtly undercut the president of Heritage by posting memes such as one showing a person standing up courageously to say an obvious truth, captioned “Nazis are bad.” Robert George, the distinguished political philosopher at Princeton and a board member of Heritage, wrote a social media post that was reprinted by National Review, which implicitly but quite clearly distanced himself from this defense of Carlson.

    What is going on at Heritage, and what does that tell us about the mainstreaming of antisemitism and other kinds of sewer ideologies on the American right and far right today?

    Rosen: A couple of thoughts. First, I have never been more grateful that my employer has never had a one-voice policy. I argue with my colleagues publicly and privately almost daily, and I appreciate that. We have a lot more freewheeling discussion and debate. I think a lot of our work is, in that sense, more trusted. The Heritage policy has been around a long time, but it has been enforced in a particular way since Kevin Roberts became the president.

    A lot of people left when he first came on because of how that policy was starting to be enforced with regard to the first Trump administration. What has broken out into the open here is, I think, a really overdue but necessary bit of hygiene on the right. Antisemitism among what is now called the Groyper movement—but basically the online right—has been going on for quite some time. I can recall emails I received during the first Trump administration because I write for a Jewish conservative magazine that contained absolutely toxic antisemitism.

    What Kevin Roberts did was to endorse Tucker Carlson, and this is why I think he should no longer be the leader of a major conservative institution. I hope the board removes him. He is giving an endorsement to Tucker Carlson, who is the preeminent launderer of toxic ideas now—not just on the right, but in general. He is not just antisemitic; he is anti-American. He is pro-Russia and pro-Iran. The people he has on his show and the ideas he is trying to mainstream are toxic. These are bad ideas. He has every right to have these people on—he has every right to have Fuentes on. I am, as you know, a free speech absolutist on this.

    But what is happening here is a conservative institution endorsing him for doing that. It is not about deplatforming, however much Kevin Roberts of Heritage wants to claim it is. It is about signaling very loudly to everyone on the right that they want to mainstream these figures because they think they need them in their coalition. They believe they need all these angry, racist, antisemitic, misogynistic people on their side. A lot of people on the right quickly and loudly said no. Not enough, although I will point out that the Speaker of the House, the leader of the Senate, and many other elected officials on the right—Josh Hawley recently said something, too—stated that this is not politics. Ted Cruz did as well. You know who did not say anything? The president or the vice president.

    I do think, especially around Vance, there is a strange sort of winking and nodding to that group, and there has been since the last election. But I would not say it is just a problem on the right. Antisemitism is also a serious problem on the left. The irony is that I do not think it would be unusual at all to see someone like Tucker Carlson have someone like Mamdani on his show to talk about, say, government-run grocery stores. Tucker liked them in Russia; maybe he would like them there.

    The point is that this has been a clarifying moment for many on the right who did not want to see that problem for a long time, and now they have to speak out. I think Robbie George’s statement was very effective. I wish he had actually called out Tucker Carlson in that statement. Tucker is someone many of us used to work with back in The Weekly Standard days. His journey is something that many have pretended not to see for a very long time, but it is past time to call out what he is doing, what he is saying, and the people he is platforming and promoting, and to say that these ideas do not belong anywhere in tolerable conservative movements.

    The fact that a president of a conservative institution like Heritage did not seem to think it was a big deal to endorse that makes me appalled, though I am heartened by the fact that this is what everyone on the right has been arguing about for the last few weeks. That shows me there is still a line that cannot be crossed, and I hope we police that line. Not a free speech line, not a deplatforming or cancellation line—that is not what this is about. This is about ideas that are so far outside the mainstream, they should not be tolerated by anyone.

    Pesca: I think a one-voice policy for a think tank makes about as much sense as a one-voice policy for an opera company. You necessarily get a degraded product. You cannot even be or call yourself a think tank if you have a one-voice policy, right? You are just a megaphone. If the megaphone gets wrangled away by the most odious elements in our society, you are spewing garbage, which is exactly the case.

    So these are my thoughts on it. I totally echo Christine’s being appalled by all this. As far as analysis, I will just talk about two things. One is Richard Hanania—he was or is a heterodox, interesting thinker. He had some scandals in his past and used to be quite right wing. He had an interesting observation, which is maybe something to consider. Democrats once made their entire moral universe center around oppressed minorities, so one could not expect them to stand up to pushy black trans activists around the year 2020. The equivalent for the right now is the young male who is racist, angry, and sexually frustrated—the Groyper. People like Trump and Vance cannot denounce him. That argument suggests that the way the parties and ideological movements are structured allows this stuff to happen.

    The other thing I would say is that when you have a “no enemies to the right” or “no enemies to the left” policy, it is fine to have that secretly and not to announce it. But once it is known, it becomes an incentive. Everyone on the right will know there will be no opposition to them, or everyone on the far left will think the same. There are no immunities in the body to stop it, and inevitably we will get the outpouring of the worst, most radical ideology once we have told the world that we will do nothing to stop it. Some of that phenomenon is playing out now.

    Kahn: I am just shocked that there is a line. I really am. I do not know why it would be this as opposed to anything else that Trump has been doing. My sense, looking at it from basically the other side of the aisle, is that there are these fantasies on the left, among liberals, of MAGA pulling itself apart. I think that is what is happening with the Epstein files. This seems to be one of those moments where people think there will be some third rail they will hit and the whole thing will disintegrate. I just do not think it will.

    I think the Republicans have united so completely behind Trump. He is, in terms of handling the mass media side of it, the Putin of this. He is so on point. He has everybody with him. I would be very surprised if this turns into anything more than an intramural scrimmage.

    Mounk: I do not think this is a question about whether Republicans or conservatives are going to draw a line between themselves and Trump. That boat has sailed. I think the question is how far Trump and Vance, importantly, are going to go in incorporating the far end of the right into their coalition. They seem to be on the fence about that.

    We have seen some people whom Christine mentioned, including elected officials, probably at some cost to themselves, say that this is not where they are willing to go. Who knew that Ted Cruz was a man of principle? In many cases he is not, but on this particular issue, he at least for now appears to have said that it is not where he is willing to go.

    I do not think that Trump himself is there. He has always played with racism in various ways and sometimes with antisemitic tropes, but he is not himself a Groyper. The question is whether, in a year or two or three, Trump or Vance will actually talk like a Groyper. Are they going to campaign with somebody like Nick Fuentes? I know that Trump, I believe, had dinner with Fuentes at some point at Mar-a-Lago. There is a difference between playing footsie with that part of the right and fully embracing them in the way that Tucker Carlson has. That, to me, is the real stake of this moment.

    Rosen: Some partial hints as to what the answer to that question might be had already come before this Heritage scandal. The young Republicans who were trading antisemitic and Nazi memes all around their chat rooms and saying “ha ha ha, isn’t this funny”—when that was exposed, J.D. Vance said, “It’s just kids being kids.” These were men in their thirties, men and women, I should say, in this chat group. These were adults, many of them in positions of political responsibility.

    I really mark that as a moment where he failed in his position as a leader. Because if he is the next generation, if he is the one to carry MAGA forward and somehow make this a real political movement rather than just a cult of personality around Trump, then he has to start drawing lines all the time. He drew a very clear line there—and that line was to downplay it and call it a joke, to say, aren’t you in on the joke? That is exactly how all these Groypers talk about anything when they are exposed for their racism and antisemitism. That younger generation is the one he is courting right now, and it worries me that he has not drawn that line.

    Mounk: There may be an important structural difference between Trump and Vance. The scary thing about Trump is the tremendous personal loyalty that a part of the American population has to him. That is what allows him to be tremendously corrupt and to attack American institutions with abandon. There is also one positive side to that, which is that it makes him very flexible. Since the loyalty people have to him is a personal bond, they will go along with him.

    I think it actually makes it easier for Trump, if he chooses, to say, these people are a little nuts. They are not really part of our coalition. Vance does not have that personal connection to the voters. Perhaps he will be able to build it. I am not sure that he ever will. If he does not, then he will need to function as a kind of coalitional political leader who is very worried about any one voice or influential media figure he might lose.

    With very few exceptions, the biggest influencers on the right know they can never go against Trump because their audiences have such tremendous personal loyalty to him. They can absolutely go against J.D. Vance. So he is going to be afraid of losing Tucker Carlson, of losing Nick Fuentes. That might make Vance more susceptible to those disgusting calculations.

    Rosen: He’ll push out of his coalition people who would have stayed had he not invited those guys in. He’ll lose; there’s a subtraction problem here too.

    Pesca: That’s always the question. We saw that with Tucker Carlson, when he and Trump got into the spat about the definition of making America great and putting America first. Trump shut that down and said, I invented that. I get to define what putting America first is. Trump has always had the calculation that if you stand with him, he will not criticize you. That may be instinct, but it has served him well. It really has.

    You could point to one or two cases, such as when he told the Proud Boys to “stand back and stand by.” His future actions do show that he likes having a quasi–Brown Shirt military organization at his beck and call. It is true that Trump has always said, I’m not going to have enemies from within. I’m not going to cast out people who support me. That works for Trump for the reasons that you articulated.

    Then you talked about why that might not work for Vance, but your calculation was, isn’t it the case that if you allow the Groypers in, Fuentes in, you will appall other people? I don’t know if that is the case. It’s not the case with Trump, because he has the cult of personality. It’s easy for people of our mindset and morals to think that an association with Nick Fuentes is going to hurt you. But look at the million-plus people who follow him. They may see him as a couple of things: a truth-teller on this dangerous issue of Israel where no one is allowed to tell the truth, a plain speaker, and someone who, like Trump, says offensive things. That alone is seen as funny or gives credibility or appeals to a portion of the coalition—very young guys who are online and otherwise ungettable. I’m not 100% sure that even for a non-Trump politician, toe-touching with these horrible people is a net negative, given where Republicans are today.

    Kahn: It feels like a microcosm of the whole thing that we still can’t figure out whether Trump in aggregate is an edgelord or serious about what he’s doing. That’s the whole thing with Fuentes. It’s all edgelord stuff. It’s all a big joke. Damon Linker’s piece was very good about that. Then there’s this moment when you see the bottom of the pool, and it feels like this cosplaying, retro Nazi stuff.

    We spent basically eight years trying to figure it out. I think Russians, in a similar case, spent sixteen or twenty years trying to figure it out with Putin—what was going on, whether it was all about tweaking the opposition, holding onto power, getting as many yachts as you could, or whether one day you’re suddenly going to invade Ukraine. I think with Trump, we’re starting to see that he is more serious than we thought at the beginning. Maybe this is one of these moments when these guys really are willing to go there, even if they’re sort of joking, but they’re also sort of not.

    Rosen: To that point, there’s a big mistake on the right. They’re mistaking saying outrageous, unspeakable things as acts of courage. It’s like, as Mike said, “No one else can talk about this, but I am brave and bold and courageous enough to say it.” It’s not courage that these people are exhibiting. You’re just saying something horrible, and you shouldn’t be doing that.

    Mounk: That seems like a fitting conclusion to this part of the conversation. This is one of the topics where I find it really hard to know where we’re going to be in two or three years. I’m dreading where we might be in two or three years, but we’ll have to follow this story in future Good Fight Clubs.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Christine, Sam, and Mike reflect on Dick Cheney’s legacy and the impact of the Iraq War. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    47 min
  • I've Analyzed Democrats' Rhetoric. Here's How They Can Win
    James Taylor performing at the 2012 Democratic convention. (Photo by Nikki Kahn/The Washington Post.)

    The map below shows the state of the U.S. Senate after the 2012 election: a blue state indicates both of the state’s senators are Democrats, a red state indicates both are Republicans, and a purple state means there’s one senator from each party.1

    Notice anything interesting about this map?

    As a result of the 2012 election, a whopping 16 states had both a Democratic and a Republican U.S. senator.

    As of 2025, only two states have representation from both parties.2

    In what seems impossible in the 2025 context, Democrats remarkably held both Senate seats in Montana and West Virginia. They held one of the two Senate seats in Louisiana, South Dakota, Indiana, North Dakota, and Florida.

    This isn’t ancient American history—it was the reality of our political environment just about a decade ago.

    Meanwhile, in 2025, pundits warn of a permanent Republican majority in the Senate.

    Yes, the Democrats had a strong night last night with wins in Virginia’s and New Jersey’s gubernatorial races and in down-ballot races across the country, but those are a handful of elections in an off-cycle year and do not dent the Republicans’ dominance in the middle of the country and particularly in the Senate. Across the country, Republicans have been dominating in U.S. Senate elections not only in traditionally red states but also in rural states with smaller populations like Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota due to their support among non-college voters who make up majorities in those populations. Because every state sends two senators to Congress no matter the size of the state, Democrats winning these smaller population states could lead to an advantage in the Senate.

    As you see in the 2012 map, Democrats used to be able to win in those states. But the party’s transformation is keeping Democrats from being competitive in places where they once had trust among voters.

    The cause of that transformation is simple: Since 2012, the Democratic Party shifted from being a blue collar, working and middle class-focused coalition to a party heavily prioritizing grievance and identity politics, extreme purity tests, and issues that mattered least to voters.

    In 2012, the Democratic Party platform focused relentlessly on jobs and the middle class. Obama’s message? Rebuild the economy from the middle out, not the top down. Obama and his allies centered attacks on Mitt Romney’s approach to entitlement programs and his treatment of workers.

    On issues like immigration, Obama often broke with progressive immigration advocates, and millions of illegal immigrants were deported during his tenure. At the time, this marked a record high for deportations in U.S. history, earning Obama the nickname “Deporter-in-Chief” from progressive critics.

    Obama’s approach was reflected in the party’s platform—a symbolic document, but one that gives clues about the party’s priorities.

    The 2012 Democratic Party platform led with:

    Four years ago, Democrats, independents, and many Republicans came together as Americans to move our country forward. We were in the midst of the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression, the previous administration had put two wars on our nation’s credit card, and the American Dream had slipped out of reach for too many.

    Today, our economy is growing again, al-Qaeda is weaker than at any point since 9/11, and our manufacturing sector is growing for the first time in more than a decade. But there is more we need to do, and so we come together again to continue what we started. We gather to reclaim the basic bargain that built the largest middle class and the most prosperous nation on Earth—the simple principle that in America, hard work should pay off, responsibility should be rewarded, and each one of us should be able to go as far as our talent and drive take us.

    Not only did the platform lead with an emphasis on the importance of bipartisan collaboration, Democrats bragged about their national security prowess and their commitment to the actualization of the American Dream for every worker.

    2012 Democrats were focused on the middle class, and they used phrases like “hard work” and “responsibility.” Democrats even acknowledge that those who demonstrate more talent and work harder may get ahead, and that’s okay.

    These shifts in how Democrats think and what they prioritize are evidenced in the 2024 platform, which leads not with a message on the state of the nation, economy, or (their favorite word) democracy, but with a land acknowledgement.

    The 2024 Democratic Party platform led with:

    The Democratic National Committee wishes to acknowledge that we gather together to state our values on lands that have been stewarded through many centuries by the ancestors and descendants of Tribal Nations who have been here since time immemorial. We honor the communities native to this continent, and recognize that our country was built on Indigenous homelands. We pay our respects to the millions of Indigenous people throughout history who have protected our lands, waters, and animals.

    You have to read down to the fifth paragraph of the 2024 platform to get to the first policy-substantive lines of text, which reads:

    Our nation is at an inflection point. What kind of America will we be? A land of more freedom, or less freedom? More rights or fewer? An economy rigged for the rich and powerful, or where everyone has a fair shot at getting ahead? Will we lower the temperature in our politics and come together, or treat each other as enemies instead?

    The section headers in the 2012 party platform also stand out: “Rebuilding Middle Class Security,” “Cutting Waste, Reducing the Deficit, Asking All to Pay Their Fair Share,” “21st Century Government: Transparent and Accountable,” and “Ensuring Safety and Quality of Life.”

    Deficit reduction didn’t garner a section heading in 2024, but “Tackling the Climate Crisis” did.

    To prove we’re not cherry-picking, Welcome—an organization dedicated to “a common-sense renewal of the Democratic Party”—in its Deciding to Win ran a comprehensive analysis of every word in the platform, and the changes are illustrative. We draw on thousands of election results, hundreds of public polls and academic papers, dozens of case studies, and surveys of more than 500,000 voters we conducted since the 2024 election.

    If you compare the full text of the 2012 and 2024 Democratic Party platforms, words that increased in use the most were: Black, White, Latino/Latina, climate, LGTBQ, transgender, and environmental justice.

    The words that decreased in use the most between 2012 and 2024? Economy, jobs, middle class, men, crime, fathers, and tax cuts.

    And it’s not just the emphasis and language that has changed since 2012. Here’s how Democrats talked about deportation in their 2012 platform:

    The Department of Homeland Security is prioritizing the deportation of criminals who endanger our communities over the deportation of immigrants who do not pose a threat, such as children who came here through no fault of their own and are pursuing an education.

    In 2012, Democrats were distinguishing themselves from Republicans based on who Democrats deport: criminals versus immigrants who don’t pose a threat.

    But here’s how Democrats addressed deportation in 2024:

    President Biden has also taken steps to preserve and expand Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for individuals from countries experiencing armed conflicts, natural disasters, or other crises, giving thousands authorization to live and work in the United States without fear of deportation for a temporary period.

    In 2024, Democrats distinguished themselves from Republicans based on their willingness to deport people at all.

    And voters noticed.

    The result of moves like this is shown in the chart below: Democrats are increasingly (correctly) perceived as more liberal. The chart shows the share of voters who describe Democrats as “too liberal” in all the polls that asked the question. Democrats increased from around 45% of voters calling them “too liberal” to more than 55%, a massive shift in an era when elections are normally decided by less than 3% of the vote.

    The platform changes are also reflected in what voters perceive Democrats to be prioritizing.

    While voters want to see Democrats prioritize cost of living, middle class issues, and healthcare, they believe Democrats are focused on protecting illegal immigrants, LGBTQ issues, and raising their taxes.

    The chart below shows what voters say they want Democrats to prioritize: Social Security, Medicare, and costs.

    The next chart shows the gap between what voters want Democrats to prioritize and what they perceive Democrats to be prioritizing. A positive number indicates that voters believe Democrats prioritize the issue too much, while a negative number means it’s prioritized too little.

    The chart shows voters believe Democrats are not sufficiently prioritizing issues like securing the border, lowering prices, and addressing crime. On the other hand, voters believe Democrats prioritize the rights of illegal immigrants, LGBTQ rights, and raising taxes too much.

    The natural question here is obvious: why have Democrats made this dramatic shift to the left? The 2012 Democratic platform worked to reflect the views of the average American. And if you asked the average modern Democratic voter if they believed the 2012 platform was too conservative on immigration, few would.

    Democrats’ shift to the left hasn’t been driven by voters. In 2012, 22% of voters self-identified as liberal, which is not far from the 25% who do today.

    Instead, Democrats have shifted left from the 2012 platform to the 2024 platform because the Democratic party has been overtaken by an activist class that works to advance the priorities of progressives—not the sentiments of the median voter. Rhetorically, Democrats have also participated in the politics of evasion by not specifically articulating what they believe or don’t believe when it comes to the issues.

    If you think back to the successful coalition of 2012, winning means turning down the volume of (and tuning out) activists and staffers to instead focus on what the voters believe.

    It means substantively, authentically differentiating the Democratic Party brand. It means having the courage to say what you believe about issues like immigration, abortion, transgender athletes, domestic oil production, and crime, and prioritizing local issues to align with where voters are. It means being a depolarizer, not a polarizer. It also means not being fooled by a transient result like Zohran Mamdani’s mayoral victory in New York City. The kinds of progressive issues that Mamdani leans into may work with liberal voters in a blue city, but the data suggests that they do not translate well to national politics, where 71% of voters identify as moderate or conservative and, over the past decade, have made their stances well known.

    If Democrats care about this country as much as they say they do, they would respect voters enough to align with where they are on the issues.

    That is deciding to win.

    Lauren Harper Pope is a Welcome co-founder focusing on effective political depolarization and centrist faction-building on the left. Lauren lives in South Carolina and is an alumna of the University of South Carolina.

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    1

    The green indicates an independent senator who caucuses with Democrats.

    2

    Maine has a Republican (Susan Collins) and an independent who caucuses with Democrats (Angus King) in the U.S. Senate.

    0 min

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