Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Gabrielius Landsbergis on What Next For Europe

    Francis Fukuyama is joined by Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, to discuss Ukraine, Russia, and the war’s impact on the rest of Europe.

    All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.

    Connect with us!

    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Frankly Fukuyama & Persuasion

    29 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    The Bunnings Scarehouse launch at Bunnings Alexandria on October 28, 2025 in Sydney, Australia. (Photo by Hanna Lassen/Getty Images for Bunnings.)
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, November 28, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

    Read more

    0 min
  • Liberalism As Mob Boss
    Actually existing liberalism, according to post-liberals.

    “Why Liberalism” is an ongoing series by Persuasion in collaboration with the Institute for Humane Studies. In today’s instalment, Alexandre Lefebvre tackles a key question that divides liberals and their critics on the right: Is liberalism procedural and neutral? Or is it theocratic and coercive?

    To receive future installments of “Why Liberalism” directly into your inbox, and sustain our ability to publish more series like this, please consider becoming a paying subscriber to Persuasion today!

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    One of the best villains in recent pop culture is Gustavo Fring from Breaking Bad and its spinoff Better Call Saul. If you haven’t seen these shows, Fring is the seemingly respectable owner of a chain of fast-food chicken restaurants across the American Southwest. He comes across as professional, fastidious, courteous, fair-minded, community-oriented, and quietly charming.

    All that, however, is a front for a stone-cold gangster, one of the most powerful and feared drug distributors in the country.

    The main thing about Fring is that he rarely gets his hands dirty. He seldom threatens or yells. But behind the scenes, he steadily builds influence through institutions, bureaucracies, and relationships. His power is ambient. He operates through a network of enforcers who ensure that everything runs according to his vision.

    If I had to pick a single character to symbolize how conservatives think of liberalism—and more specifically, the liberal state—it would be Fring.

    What Are We Even Talking About?

    I want to map a fundamental misunderstanding that fuels today’s culture wars between liberals and conservatives. The fact is that neither side accepts the picture the other paints of what Western liberal democracies actually look like. And if the two camps can’t agree on a shared description of the world they inhabit, then constructive dialogue and effective compromise become nearly impossible.

    The idea of liberalism as mob boss—call it the Gustavo Fring Theory—is my attempt to sketch a reality both sides might recognize. To work up to it, I need to lay out, in stark terms, the basic divide in how liberals and conservatives view liberalism.

    Many conservatives, especially those who call themselves anti- or post-liberal, describe actually existing liberal democracies as if they were one step away from being theocratic or totalitarian. Just listen to two of the leading intellectuals of the new American right.

    Adrian Vermeule, a key figure in the modern revival of the concept of natural law, scoffs at the idea that liberalism is a secular, pluralist framework. It’s theological, through and through. “The main fact about our lived political order,” he writes, “is that the public sphere is dominated by a very particular comprehensive or perfectionist version of liberalism, which is aggressively sacramental and liturgical.”

    Meanwhile, Patrick Deneen—the political theorist closest to a court philosopher that Americans have, thanks to his relationship with JD Vance and his influence on conservative thought—argues that liberal institutions have a single overriding purpose: social control. The liberal obsession with personal choice and autonomy goes hand in glove with the expansion of state power and domination. Liberalism, he argues in his 2018 book Why Liberalism Failed, has two final destinations: “the liberated individual and the controlling state.”

    Now, when liberals hear stuff like this, their first reaction is: what universe are these bad-faith, hysterical babies living in? Look around! No one’s being forced to do anything. The very fact that these critics can voice their grievances so loudly and so often is proof that liberalism doesn’t punish heretics. It doesn’t even have them!

    Liberals, to put it positively, see their ideology as inclusive, pluralist, and grounded in respect for persons and their choices. This is reflected most clearly in their deep concern about state overreach—especially their conviction that the state must never impose controversial conceptions of the good life on its citizens. From this perspective, liberalism isn’t a covert moral regime. It’s the opposite: the only political framework that explicitly renounces the authority to prescribe how people ought to live. A liberal state doesn’t pass laws to refine the tastes or improve the character of its citizens. It refrains from judging the relative worth of different ways of life altogether.

    But this is the crucial point: liberals believe that a liberal democratic state is neutral. Not morally neutral, of course. To draw on an old distinction in German philosophy, the liberal state takes sides on morality: upholding principles of justice for all its members. Liberals want their state to champion broad values like fairness, tolerance, and reciprocity—the sort of values that allow diverse individuals to live together in the same society. But it remains agnostic on ethics: the specific visions of the good life that individuals and communities within that society choose for themselves. The liberal state refuses to dictate how people should live. It doesn’t tell you to believe in God or not, how to spend your time or money, what kind of life to pursue, or what beliefs to hold. Hegel would say that such a state concerns itself with the universal rules that bind citizens together, while leaving the rich substance of Sittlichkeit—the concrete ways of living, valuing, and belonging—to emerge from the free life of civil society.

    That’s why liberals are so often dumbfounded by the conservative critique. It’s baffling that anyone would look at this arrangement and see tacit theocracy or proto-totalitarianism. And so, their reply to conservatives goes something like this:

    “You have rights, I have rights. The state isn’t telling you not to be religious. So long as you’re not harming anyone, it doesn’t care how you raise your kids, what kind of sex you have, how you spend your money, or anything else. The liberal state doesn’t even try to justify its laws and policies by appealing to a shared ideal of the good life. It tries to mind its own damn business. What other ideology does that? You do you and I’ll do me. What are we even talking about?”

    The Gustavo Fring Theory

    Let’s continue this dialogue a moment longer. When conservatives hear liberals talking in this perfectly standard way, they’re bound to wonder if they’re being trolled. Are liberals this culpably naive? Or are they just diabolically clever? Because they’re drawing a nice, tidy line that feels completely artificial in the current culture.

    “Look, liberals,” they say, “you only claim that your precious neutral state doesn’t tell people how to live because the horse has already bolted. Liberalism has won the culture war, so naturally the state can now keep its hands clean. Civil society—and media, and universities, and big business, and dating apps, and progressive parenting, and so much more—is doing the dirty work for it.”

    This is liberalism as mob boss, Gustavo Fring style. And I confess, as an out-and-out liberal, I’m sympathetic to the conservative framing. But if you prefer a more neutral term, an Italian political theorist came up with one nearly a hundred years ago: hegemony. Liberalism isn’t just a political framework—it’s hegemonic. And whether or not its elite classes say so out loud, it behaves like a hegemon.

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    When Antonio Gramsci formulated his theory of hegemony from a prison cell in the 1930s, he was trying to understand why revolutionary change hadn’t happened in the West the way Marx had predicted. His answer: in liberal capitalist societies, the ruling classes maintain control not just through economic power or state violence, but by making their ideology feel like common sense—when its values, norms, and assumptions are taken for granted by everyone. Hegemony is that old trick of the devil’s: convincing people he doesn’t exist while secretly infiltrating everything.

    Unmasking liberal hegemony is the go-to move of conservative critics. Sometimes the diagnosis is an unspecific spray—for example, when Deneen states that liberalism “is not merely, as is often portrayed, a narrowly political project of constitutional government and juridical defense of rights. Rather, it seeks to transform all of human life and the world.” Other interventions are targeted: Christopher Rufo on higher education, Ross Douthat on the culture industries, Vivek Ramaswamy and Sohrab Ahmari on woke corporate America, Mary Harrington on the biomedical reshaping of sex and gender, Mark Levin on the press, Yoram Hazony on the family.

    Whatever their differences, all of these contributions can be summed up in a shared grievance: liberalism and the liberal worldview aren’t just found in the state but in just about every mainstream institution, relationship, and piece of entertainment in our lives. It’s the air we breathe and it’s absolutely suffocating.

    Whether or not conservative fears are exaggerated is beside the point. Perception matters more than fact. What motivates action isn’t always what’s true, but what feels true. And what many conservatives feel is that there’s no longer a place for them in liberal society. More troubling still, from their standpoint, it may seem necessary to resist liberalism and, when opportunity strikes, to use the power and purse of the state to advance their own vision of the good life. That impulse is all the more likely if they become convinced they can’t win the culture war without it.

    Which brings us to our volatile moment. Around the world, conservatives and populists are using the state and state power as a means of restoring their vision of what it means to live a good and flourishing life. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has shuttered a dissident university and rolled out sweeping family‑oriented policies which exceed the country’s entire military budget. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has fused populism with Hindutva, a Hindu nationalist doctrine championed by paramilitary volunteer organizations. In Russia, Vladimir Putin publishes long, semi-mystical essays on the Russian soul and its historic destiny.

    MAGA may be late to the game but many of its leaders are jumping in with both feet. The United States government, they argue, should be repurposed for ethical—and even spiritual—ends. That’s the only way to defeat a liberalism that covertly controls civil society and the wider background culture. As Kevin Roberts, President of the Heritage Foundation and lead editor of Project 2025, stated in a recent speech: “It is time to play offense—boldly. To challenge [liberal] institutions with our own. To outbuild them in education, in media, in law, and in the public square.”

    This isn’t a fringe view. It’s rapidly becoming the intellectual backbone of post-liberal conservatism in the United States. To what end? Roberts couldn’t be clearer: “We do not fight for power for its own sake. We fight for the freedom to live virtuously. To raise children in righteousness. To worship without fear. To order our lives toward the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. [Our American] golden age is about remembering what is eternal—and rebuilding a nation that reflects it.”

    The urgent question for liberals is how they should respond.

    The Liberal Regime

    Admission is the first step. Yes, the conservative view of the liberal state as a mob boss is polemical. But it’s onto something. To be clear—particularly in the wake of the shocking assassination of Charlie Kirk—the metaphor is sociological, not violent: liberalism’s reach extends through persuasion, norms, and institutions, not through force. With that said, liberals need to recognize that they are, in fact, hegemons.

    Liberal ideals have permeated nearly every aspect of civil society, private life, and the broader cultural backdrop of Western democracies. Individual freedom, fairness, reciprocity, and tolerance aren’t just political ideals or legal principles. They’re the foundation of a comprehensive way of life, one that many of us who support liberalism have adopted, consciously or not, as a worldview. This condition of being culturally dominant yet committed to non-imposition defines the liberal predicament. It sets the terms on which liberals must learn to govern wisely.

    In the preface to one of the greatest works in the history of political thought, the author wrote “I would consider myself the happiest of mortals if I could make it so that men were able to cure themselves of their prejudices. Here I call prejudices not what makes one unaware of certain things but what makes one unaware of oneself.”

    The author was Montesquieu, and the book was The Spirit of the Laws. Montesquieu’s big idea was that there are qualitatively different types of political system in the world—he identified aristocracy, democracy, monarchy, and tyranny—and that each has its own animating force, or what we might call its vibe. These regimes don’t just run differently; they feel different. In monarchy, the key emotion is honor: it keeps everyone chasing status within the rules, turning vanity into order. In democracy, it’s love of country. In tyranny, it’s fear.

    The whole job of being an elite in a given regime, Montesquieu argued, is to recognize and reinforce its animating spirit. To be a nobleman, for instance, is to infuse the laws, institutions, and everyday manners with a spirit of honor. Tyrants do the same with fear. And to fail in this—to ignore the vibe of your own regime and try to rule as if you were in another—isn’t just an oversight or a mismatch. It’s harmful idiocy, an undermining of the very core of your power and identity. That was the prejudice Montesquieu wrote against: a blindness that leaves you ignorant not just of the world, but of yourself and what makes you tick.

    Liberals need a dose of that. Because conservatives are right: liberalism isn’t just a procedural framework or a neutral structure. It’s a regime, in the full sense that Aristotle called politeia and Montesquieu gouvernement—a swirl of politics, society, and culture that shapes how people live, what they value, what they aspire to, and what they’re ashamed of. It wasn’t for nothing that Deneen titled his most recent book Regime Change. And fair enough: he’s calling liberals out for pretending they’re just managing procedures when they’re actually shaping culture. For claiming to stand above the fray while setting the terms of the debate. For soulcrafting while denying that they’re in the business of souls.

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    So let’s drop the act. We liberals do dominate the culture, at least for the time being. But we get to choose how we dominate it.

    The liberal state need not impose a vision of the good life on its citizens. A comprehensive yet pluralist liberalism can own its cultural dominance without turning it into a program of moral compulsion. Yes, our common life is steeped in liberal habits, and yes, those habits shape how we live. But the state’s job is to protect the moral framework that makes pluralism possible, not to conscript every citizen into a single vision of the good. In the old language, that means promoting morality (the universal principles of justice and fairness that bind us together) while leaving ethics (the thick, varied ways of life people choose) to flourish on their own. That’s how liberalism can be both a comprehensive way of life and a home for many others who don’t share liberal values.

    Why should liberals exercise this restraint? It’s not because we are a bunch of nice milquetoasts. It’s because we need to learn Montesquieu’s core lesson about every regime that’s ever existed: adhere to your principles, or risk turning into something else. Every regime has its animating spirit, and the mark of a wise elite is to govern in keeping with it. For liberalism, that spirit is humility, openness, pluralism, compromise, and proportion. The challenge is to be the most generous and decent hegemon our principles will allow.

    Some might call this mob boss liberalism. I prefer to call it a regime that believes in itself.

    Alexandre Lefebvre is Professor of Politics and Philosophy at the University of Sydney and author of Liberalism As A Way Of Life.

    Also in Why Liberalism:

    The “Why Liberalism” series is a project by Persuasion in partnership with the Institute for Humane Studies (IHS). IHS is a non-profit organization that promotes a freer, more humane, and open society by connecting and supporting talented graduate students, scholars, and other intellectuals who are advancing the principles and practice of freedom. For additional information and details, media, programmatic, and funding opportunities, visit TheIHS.org.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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  • Bellow’s Warning
    Saul Bellow in 1982. (Photo by Ulf Andersen/Getty Images.)

    In the late 1980s, the early Cancel Culture movement scored its first-ever prime kill: the writer Saul Bellow. At the time of his blacklisting, Bellow had been publishing for more than four decades, managing to rack up along the way a Pulitzer, the Nobel Prize for Literature and three National Book Awards for Fiction—a record that stands to this day.

    Bellow was easily the most garlanded novelist in the whole of American Letters. But that meant nothing to the P.C. mobs out for his scalp who, when they finally got it, pushed us ever closer to the sort of dystopian future that Bellow had been warning the public about for years, in both fiction and non-fiction. On March 10, 1994, a now-cancelled Bellow, age 78, wrote in The New York Times:

    My critics, many of whom could not locate Papua New Guinea on the map, want to convict me of contempt for multiculturalism and defamation of the third world. I am an elderly white male—a Jew, to boot. Ideal for their purposes… Open discussion of many major public questions has for some time now been taboo. We can’t open our mouths without being denounced as racists, misogynists, supremacists, imperialists or fascists.

    Bellow was defending himself, at long last, against the thing that had gotten him cancelled: charges of racism stemming from an article published in The New York Times Magazine in January 1988, in which he had, in the course of a conversation about ongoing efforts to cancel the Western Civilization class at Stanford, allegedly made the comment to journalist James Atlas, “Who is the Tolstoy of the Zulus? The Proust of the Papuans? I’d be glad to read them”—a seeming slap against non-white authors.

    Atlas naturally included the comment in his piece, which set off a fury against Bellow in the press, in bookchat land, and in academe, whose uniform groves were beginning to squeeze out conservatives, or any indeed anyone whose viewpoints were not approved by the authorities. Political correctness was kicking into high gear, even in the late Eighties and early Nineties.

    Bellow wrote elsewhere that he had not meant to imply that non-white societies are inferior. “Of course primitive societies have their arts and their wisdom,” he noted, “and in the West books are under attack.”

    But the damage was done. Bellow’s biographer Zachary Leader reports:

    Few words by Bellow [the “Papuans and Zulus” remark] have done more to alienate liberal and academic opinion than these, or to banish his fiction from college syllabuses. Robert Pippin [political philosophy professor at the University of Chicago] remembers being “stunned that even at the University of Chicago so many people expressed contempt for Bellow, hated him, for that remark.”

    And so, thanks to a single remark made in the presence of a journalist, Saul Bellow was effectively cancelled. His banishment made for an unhappy ending to one of the great American literary careers.

    At present, Bellow’s absence from our literary landscape is noticeable. His name, I’ve found, more often than not draws a blank, even among literary types. In 2019, liberal writer Aviya Kushner, writing for the Jewish news website The Forward, remarked that she had great difficulty finding Bellow’s books even in Chicago, Bellow’s hometown. She notes: “I remembered that in my undergraduate and graduate education, including two graduate degrees in creative writing, I was never taught any work by Bellow, and this might be his real problem: he’s not taught anymore, so younger readers don’t encounter him, and therefore don’t have him in their home libraries.”

    But it wasn’t just the “Papuans and Zulus” comment that did Bellow in. At the time of his canceling, Bellow had been irritating the left for years. In 1977 he gave a lecture in Chicago at the Drake Hotel (also reported in Leader’s biography) in which he mused on a growing sense among the intelligentsia that America was a bad country that cares only about profit, warmongering, and neglects the well-being of “the blacks, the children, the women, the aged, the poor.” (Where have we heard that before?) He specifically mourns the decay of the American city thanks to crime, drugs and welfare, and the decay of schools, whose teachers are among the highest-paid in the country, yet:

    I have entered classrooms in which pupils wandered about knocking out rhythms on the walls absorbed in their transistors. No one seemed to grasp that the room had a center. No one heeded the teacher when she spoke... [The kids] are blank, unformed [who] live convulsively, in turbulence and darkness of mind. They do not know the meaning of words like ‘above,’ ‘below,’ ‘beyond’… [yet] they have a demonic knowledge of sexual acts, guns, drugs, and devices, which are not vices here.

    The observation was published in the Chicago Sun-Times and set off a predictable firestorm of criticism among black intellectuals—“the analytical furies,” as Bellow called them. Academics from the University of Chicago published a letter denouncing the speech as racist, and demanded a public apology, and further demanded that such “racist statements” not be published in a newspaper. A key part of their opposition to Bellow’s remarks was that he had not given sufficient consideration to the “causes” of the problems he mentioned.

    But Bellow did not apologize, nor did he shut up. He told William Kennedy in Esquire in 1982:

    We’re now in the fourth or fifth welfare generation, people who’ve never worked, people sealed out, set aside, and they looked to me like a doomed population… They’ve racked up a most extensive failure which has cost billions of dollars and employed millions of people and achieved nothing. The cities continue on this giant slide.

    A lifelong Democrat, Bellow became increasingly convinced that liberal policies were harming, not helping, the nation. He became an admirer of Ronald Reagan and an outspoken supporter of Israel: a “neocon,” per his critics, a word no less a pejorative then than it is now.

    “He did have what I would call a bad reaction to the 1960s,” his son Adam Bellow says in the 2022 PBS “American Masters” documentary, a film which comes with a disclaimer warning of the “depictions of derogatory imagery in historical context” for adults at risk of meltdown.

    Bellow’s outrage at the lawlessness and decay of the Sixties, and his own burgeoning conservatism, are most visible in his 1970 novel Mr. Sammler’s Planet, one of the fullest and most stinging indictments of this much-gloried-in decade. Often called a “neoconservative classic,” the novel follows one Artur Sammler, an elderly Jewish professor at Columbia, as he watches his place of work, his city, and his country descend into chaos. In the book’s most famous scene, Professor Sammler is giving a talk on British writers. When he mentions Orwell, a genius long reviled by the left as a right-winger for his anti-authoritarian stances, he is interrupted and heckled by goonish students who begin hurling personal insults at the old chap for his age and suspected sexual impotence. Sammler eventually has to be hustled out of the auditorium by a female student.

    Pondering the abuse he’d suffered at the hands of the hecklers, Sammler is astonished at how braindead and anti-thought American youth have become in the very places where they were to have been educated. He notes that the reasoned debates of the ages have been replaced by shallowness, intolerance and ignorance, by “militancy, explosiveness, abusiveness, tooth-showing, Barbary ape howling.”

    I couldn’t help but think about all this some months ago as I watched the hordes of protesters take over numerous university campuses (including Columbia), shouting anti-U.S., anti-Israel mantras. In fact, Mr. Sammler’s Planet was born out of the campus takeover of Columbia in April of ‘68, which Bellow, and the entire country, had witnessed. Left-wing agitators made demands about a number of things, including the divestment of university businesses associations linked to the Department of Defense. Leader’s biography of Bellow reports that numerous campus buildings were occupied over the course of that hateful spring, including Hamilton Hall, which was also taken over this past spring. A dean was taken hostage. Students posed for pictures in the president’s chair, and black protesters insisted that white protesters move to a segregated space, as neo-segregation and reverse racism, presently celebrated by the left, made their first appearances. One student jumped on a policeman from an upper-story window, leaving the cop permanently paralyzed. Columbia finally called in the NYPD a week into the madness and arrested 700 people. 130 protesters were injured, including faculty.

    The American intellectual world seemed to be hurdling toward Stalinism. Neither Sammler nor his creator approved. “I think that a great many writers have associated themselves with the youth and with revolution and with these feelings,” Bellow says in a grainy interview clip included in the PBS film. “But that was at an earlier moment. Now the young don’t have very much use for them or even for literature and they’re in a highly anti-cultural mood. They’ve gotten hold of the idea of the Cultural Revolution, which as far as I can see consists in not reading, and destroying books, libraries and other cultural property.”

    One can’t talk about Saul Bellow’s politics without talking about Israel. No dummy, Bellow was a sophisticated political thinker—a theorist, even—and was a vocal supporter of the state of Israel from its inception. The existence of the tiny, beleaguered state was a decisive factor, I believe, in his thinking, and in his left-to-right transformation—and his cancellation.

    As a Jew, he took anti-Semitism, and anti-Israelism of the sort that’s fashionable now, very personally, and did not hesitate to make his feelings known on these subjects, which he did most fully in his 1976 memoir-travelogue To Jerusalem and Back—his only book-length work of nonfiction, just 182 pages, which was based on notes he took while visiting Israel in 1975. In the book’s opening pages, Bellow states flatly that the left loathes Israel, seeing it “as a reactionary small country [that] abuses its Arab population,” a prejudice that is easily detectable in the press. He mentions his own spat with Le Monde, France’s major newspaper, to whom he wrote a letter in 1973 criticizing, among other things, Sartre’s public statements on Israel. The French paper did not publish the letter, or even acknowledge it, despite its being hand-delivered.

    “Since 1973,” Bellow writes, “Le Monde has openly taken the side of the Arabs in their struggle with Israel. It supports terrorists.” Bellow notes that Israel, like the United States, is frequently accused of perpetrating all sorts of evil against others by actors not fit to hurl stones:

    Where Israel is concerned, the world swells with moral consciousness... They do not ask that the African peasant or the illiterate fellah should be moral by our standards... But some of them do appear to believe that the Jews, with their precious and refining record of suffering, have a unique obligation to hold up the moral burdens everyone else has dumped.

    Upon publication, and even more so now, To Jerusalem and Back is skewered by critics for Bellow’s supposed inability to criticize Israel. But that is not true. He does criticize Israelis, mainly for their seeming lassitude regarding their own survival. Bellow notes the decline he sees among the general population, and how much worse it is since his last visit to Israel years before, fresh off its victory in the 1967 war. “Everyone looks much shabbier,” he writes, like a grandparent sizing up his own progeny.

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    For this noticeable slide, Bellow credits Israel’s near-defeat by the Egyptians in the 1973 war. He wonders if Israelis are losing the will to fight, or even to care. And with the extremely high Arab birth rate, much higher than that of Israelis, the burgeoning wealth and technology of the Arab states (to include military technology), and the increasing prevalence of the Arab narrative in world opinion, he reaches the fateful, worrisome conclusion: Israel’s future is not guaranteed.

    “The Arabs are continually gaining strength,” he writes, “while Israel becomes weaker.”

    Looking at the attacks of October 7, how the Israelis were taken by surprise and infiltrated by relative amateurs in mere hang gliders, and massacred in such large numbers, and how quickly the pro-Hamas narrative took hold in the world media, particularly among our youth—with, according to one poll, six in ten Americans ages 18-24 saying what Hamas did was “justified”—one finds it difficult to shrug off Bellow’s warning. He ends To Jerusalem and Back by stating flatly, “The root of the problem is simply this—that the Arabs will not agree to the existence of Israel.”

    Reading Bellow, one gets the sense that his concern was not just for the existence of the state of Israel, but for Western Civilization itself. He was fascinated by the future, and futurists—the name “Wells,” referencing H.G., appears 26 times, by my count, in Mr. Sammler’s Planet—but it’s clear that he did not believe the future looked particularly bright for any of us, particularly not for those of us in the Free World. Recall the title of his 1994 essay collection: It All Adds Up: From the Dim Past to the Uncertain Future.

    In his 1982 novel The Dean’s December, another book that deals with political correctness, academe, and futurism, there is a character named Spangler, which is, of course, very close to “Spengler,” i.e. Oswald, author of the famously pessimistic The Decline of the West. Oswald Spengler is mentioned by name in Mr. Sammler’s Planet, and The Decline of the West is mentioned several times in his 1964 novel Herzog. Like Spengler, Bellow seems not at all confident that the West’s future is secure.

    But his starkest warnings about the world shaping up around us are to be found in To Jerusalem and Back:

    Liberal democracy is as brief as a bubble … We forget … that as a species we are generally close to the “state of nature,” as Thomas Hobbes described—a nasty, brutish, pitiless condition in which men are too fearful of death to give much thought to freedom (…) In world history liberty is an exceptional condition… Periods of liberty have been very brief… The free countries are curiously lethargic about their freedom.

    As a political scientist and political critic of literature, I can say that the foregoing is among the best summations of human politics that I’ve ever read, from a man who describes himself in the same book merely as “an interested amateur—a learner.” John Locke couldn’t have put it better.

    This was the voice, and mind, of Solomon “Saul” Bellow working at its most prodigious level—he whom the left saw fit to cancel, but whose prescient work and Orwellian voice ring true through the decades. His warning should be heeded if we are to save our civilization from the double poison of neo-Marxism and anti-Semitism presently being injected into the heart of the West. That can’t be accomplished if his books remain blacklisted.

    Erik Lewis holds a Bachelor’s in Political Science from Clemson University and a Master’s in Politics of the Middle East and North Africa from the University of London.

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  • Geoffrey Hinton on Artificial Intelligence

    Geoffrey Hinton is a cognitive psychologist and computer scientist known as the “godfather of AI.” He was awarded the 2024 Nobel Prize in Physics, along with John Hopfield.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Geoffrey Hinton discuss what neuroscience teaches us about AI, how humans and machines learn, and the existential risks of AI.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You are known as the godfather of AI. AI has gone through strange periods—times of great excitement about AI in the past and then AI winters, when people thought that the technical requirements for making AI work did not yet exist or that the whole concept was misguided and was never going to work out in any useful way.

    Tell us about why it took so many run-ups, so many attempts to get to the huge AI boom we have now, and the way in which AI—whatever its future is, and I hope that we will have a chance to talk more about that toward the end of our conversation—is now clearly integrated into all kinds of useful processes in the world.

    Geoffrey Hinton: During the last century, there were two approaches to AI. The main approach that almost everybody took was to base it on logic. They said that what is special about people is their ability to reason. They focused on the ability to reason, and logic was their model for that. That approach did not work. It could have worked, but it did not work very well, and that led to some AI winters.

    There was an alternative approach that started in the 1950s with people like von Neumann and Turing, who unfortunately both died young. This approach was to base AI on neural networks—the biological inspiration rather than the logical inspiration. The alternative approach said that rather than trying to understand reasoning, you need to understand things like perception, intuition, and motor control. The way they work in the brain is by changing connection strengths between neurons in a neural network.

    We ought to try to understand how that is done and worry about reasoning later. At the beginning of this century, that approach suddenly started working much better than the logic-based approach. Almost everything we now call AI is not the old-fashioned AI that uses logic, but the new-fashioned AI that uses neural networks.

    Mounk: Everything is always obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but if you are trying to figure out how to build a machine that is intelligent from first principles, the logical approach would have seemed very intuitive. We need to teach it that two plus two is four, we need to teach it how certain physical things about the world work, and we need to teach it the basic rules of logic. Then we throw a bunch of computation at it, and it can come to conclusions that we might not be able to reach.

    Why do you think that approach failed? What is it about this alternative approach that you were so key in championing that turned out to be more generative of useful technology?

    Hinton: Human thinking can be divided into sequential, conscious, deliberate, logical reasoning, which involves effort and is what Daniel Kahneman calls type two, and immediate intuition, which does not normally involve effort. The people who believed in symbolic AI were focusing on type two—conscious, deliberate reasoning—without trying to solve the problem of how we do intuition, how we do analogies, and how we do perception.

    It turns out that it is much better to start with how you do those things, which many animals can do too. They can do perception, and they can do motor control. Once you have solved that, reasoning comes next. They started from what was distinctly human rather than starting from basic biology—how other animals do it. Obviously, we are just a jumped-up ape, and you need to understand how animals think.

    Mounk: One of the interesting things is that when we think about what intelligence is, we have a bias where we tend to think about what makes us as human beings distinct from other species. What is that extra last mile of intelligence that we have that other animals cannot have? But a lot of that intelligence is built on top of skills that are actually incredibly complex, but they do not seem as remarkable to us because a cat has them, a lion has them, a dog has them, and an elephant has them.

    These include how to perceive what is going on in the world around us, how to make basic calculations about where to place our foot so we do not fall into an abyss, and how to perceive when a predator is approaching. All of those things are not what are called type two systems. When we ask what makes us intelligent, that is probably not the first question that comes to us because we share those traits with many other animals, but that is actually in some ways the more remarkable achievement. Then we can go on to ask what we need for that last extra mile.

    Hinton: Let me give you an example of a piece of thinking that you cannot do with logic but can do with intuition. For most males in our culture, the answer is obvious. It turns out that it is not so obvious for females in our culture, but for males in our culture, you will find the answer is obvious. Suppose I give you a choice between two alternatives, and neither alternative makes sense. Both alternatives are clearly nonsense, but one seems better than the other.

    Alternative one is that all dogs are female and all cats are male. Alternative two is that all dogs are male and all cats are female. Most males in our culture find it obvious that all dogs are male and all cats are female. That seems more natural. Dogs are loud and noisy, and they chase after cats. That reaction is immediate. You did not do any reasoning about it; it just felt right. It felt less wrong that way around than the other way around. Why is that? You cannot explain that with logic.

    Mounk: Another example is presumably certain rules of language. I am not sure exactly how something like universal grammar fits into that, but the fact that we know it is “the little warm red house” and not “the warm little red house” or “the warm red little house” shows that there is a particular kind of order.

    Hinton: I think that depends on what language you speak. I do not actually believe in universal grammar, and these large language models do not believe in it either. The large language models are doing something that Chomsky would have said was impossible. In fact, he still says it is impossible. They start off with no innate knowledge of language, they just see a lot of language, and they end up knowing grammar extremely well. They did not have any innate knowledge.

    Mounk: Whatever the explanation for that is—and I did not mean to make this a debate about universal grammar—it is true that a competent speaker of English will put adjectives of size, color, kind, and so on in a particular order without thinking logically about it. It is not as though you are thinking, which adjective should go where? If you are learning the language and are not a native speaker, you may have learned the rule that grammarians have deduced over time and then think, does “little” go before “blue,” or does “blue” go before “little”?

    As a ten-year-old competent speaker of a language, you do it automatically. It turns out that ChatGPT does it automatically in some way too, whatever exactly “automatic” means here. It does not, however, operate as you might have thought—that somebody gave ChatGPT the rules of the English language specifying that this kind of adjective goes before that kind of adjective. Yet ChatGPT, from all of the data it is given, deduces where to put the adjective of size.

    Hinton: Yes, but what it shows is that you don’t need any innate knowledge of language. You just need to see a lot of language and have a fairly universal learning mechanism, which is just the opposite of what Chomsky said.

    Mounk: That is very interesting. Chomsky argues that there are certain kinds of presets that get pushed in one direction or another and that this is what allows us to do this. What you are saying is that this is not necessary. All that is necessary is the neurons in our brain seeing a lot of data and detecting the patterns in that data without ever being explicitly told what that pattern is. Is that roughly right?

    Hinton: Yes, exactly. This example with cats and dogs shows that we have strong intuitions about things without even thinking about them. The question is why. The answer, according to people who work on neural networks, is that you have a representation of “cat.” The meaning of the word “cat” is a large bunch of activated features, each feature corresponding to a neuron that is active. A cat is a thing that is animate, hairy, about the size of a breadbox, and domestic, or it might be domestic.

    Dogs are another big bunch of features that overlap a lot, so dogs are quite similar to cats. If you ask about the similarity between a cat and a woman versus a cat and a man, a cat is more similar to a woman for males in our culture, and a dog is more similar to a man. You can analyze it that way. It is simply obvious that a cat is more similar to a woman than to a man, and a dog is more similar to a man than to a woman. That is what is going on when you instantly know which way around seems natural. It is very different from logical reasoning.

    Mounk: Explain how that works in the human brain and how you were inspired, in some ways, by your knowledge of neuroscience in thinking about a way of teaching machines those kinds of things without putting hard-coded logic rules into the machine, which has proven not to work.

    Hinton: It is probably easiest to start by explaining it through visual perception. Once I have explained how you learn to do visual perception, it is relatively simple to see how you could learn language. Let us start with visual perception. Suppose you have many images that contain a bird and many images that do not contain a bird, and you want to build a neural network that, when you put in an image of a bird, activates the output that says “bird,” and when you put in an image that is not of a bird, activates the output that says “not bird.”

    You have layers of neurons that are going to detect various kinds of features. The kinds of features they detect were inspired by research on the brain, looking at what neurons in the brain get excited by. Suppose we have a thousand-by-thousand image, and suppose it is just a gray-level image to keep things simple—no colors for now. You have a million numbers that tell you the brightness of each pixel in that thousand-by-thousand image. If you think of it in computational terms, I give you a million numbers, and you have to say “bird” or “not bird.”

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    Those individual numbers are not very helpful because a bird might be an ostrich about to peck you on the nose or a seagull in the far distance. They are both birds, but they are very different. You have to be able to deal with huge differences in what kind of bird it is, what pose it is in, how big it is, and where it is in the image, but still get all the birds and exclude all the non-birds.

    The first thing you do in a vision system is detect little bits of edge all over the image. Here is how a neural net would detect a little bit of edge. Suppose you have a column of three pixels, and next to it on the left and on the right, another column of three pixels—three vertically in a column and three vertically next to them, for a total of six pixels. You want to detect when the three pixels on the left are brighter than the three pixels on the right, because that will be an edge—a little piece of edge.

    You could have a neuron whose inputs come from those pixels and give it big positive inputs from the pixels on the left and big negative inputs from the pixels on the right. If a pixel on the right is bright, it sends a big negative input to the neuron saying, “please don’t turn on.” If a pixel on the left is bright, it sends a big positive input saying, “please turn on.” If the pixels on the left and the pixels on the right are of equal brightness, the big negative input cancels out the big positive input, and the neuron does not turn on. But if the pixels on the left are bright and the pixels on the right are dim, you get a big positive input from the left and nothing from the right, and the neuron turns on.

    If you set the connection strengths—the weights on the connections that tell each pixel how to vote for whether the neuron should be on or off—correctly, you can make something that detects a small edge. To begin with, do not worry about how we would learn this; instead, think about how we would hand-design it. I have shown you how to hand-design something that detects when the three pixels on the left are brighter than the three pixels on the right.

    Now you need to do that in all positions in the image, so you need hundreds of thousands of these detectors, and you need them in all different orientations. You will need millions of them and probably at different scales. You need ones that detect small sharp edges, like when you are reading black print on a white page, and ones that detect big fuzzy edges, like when you are looking at clouds, because clouds hide edges, but they are fuzzy.

    We now have tens of millions of neurons that are good for detecting edges anywhere in the image, at any orientation, at any scale. That is our first layer of feature detectors. When we put in an image, a small subset of those will activate, telling us where the edges are in the image. That is still not good enough for detecting birds. If I tell you I have a little piece of vertical edge here, is it a bird? That does not tell you much.

    We need a second layer of feature detectors that take as input these edges. For example, we might have a detector looking for a row of edges that slope up slightly and another row that slope down slightly, meeting at a point. You need detectors like that all over the image, because something like that might be the beak of a bird. You might also have neurons in that layer that detect six edges forming a kind of ring, because something like that might be the eye of a bird.

    In the next layer, we detect things like possible beaks, eyes, and maybe feet—something that looks like a chicken’s foot or the tip of a wing. So now we have a bunch of neurons detecting little features typical of birds. In the following layer, we might look for combinations of those. For example, a detector might look for a possible beak and a possible eye in the right relative positions to form the head of a bird—the eye above the beak and slightly to one side. You have neurons looking for that all over the image. You need a huge number of neurons to do this, but fortunately, we have billions of them.

    Mounk: That is all very useful, but let me ask a few simple questions, both to avoid misunderstandings and to get you to clarify some things that I or our listeners may get wrong. The way you are describing this still feels a little as if somebody is inputting a set of rules to the system. It sounds as if somebody is saying, “birds have beaks, and beaks look roughly like this.” It sounds as if we are designing the system from first principles to look for beaks and alert us when there are beaks.

    Somehow, the system learns to pick up features of birds by itself in the same way that ChatGPT did not have someone explain to it, “first go the adjectives of size, then go the adjectives of color,” whichever way around it is. It picked up on that by itself. How is it that this system is picking up on that by itself? It seems that it has seen a thousand pictures of birds and a thousand pictures of non-birds, and those thousand pictures of birds have something in common, which is some beak-like feature. So it starts looking out for that. You are not telling AI this. AI is deducing it from the data that has been given to it. How does it do that?

    Hinton: In order to explain that, it is good to start by saying, if I was building it by hand, what would I build? We need to know what the target of learning is. I am describing how I would build multiple layers of features so I could detect a bird. I got to the layer where you are looking for a combination of a beak and an eye, and that might be the head of a bird. In that layer, you might have many detectors that detect the wing of a bird, the leg of a bird, or the head of a bird. If you see several of those things, it is a good indication that it is a bird.

    To begin with, the intensity of an individual pixel is not evidence for a bird. It does not tell you anything about whether there is a bird. Even when you get a little bit of edge, that does not tell you whether it is a bird. If you get two bits of edge that join and make a potential beak, that is some evidence it might be a bird, but not very good evidence, because there are many other things that join in a beak-like shape—the corner of a table seen at an angle, for example, makes a shape like that.

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    Once you start seeing the eye of a bird and the beak of a bird, and you see other combinations that are obvious features of birds, you begin to get good evidence that there is a bird there. I have explained what kind of system we want to build. We want these layers of features, and in each layer, you detect combinations of the features in the layer below until you have combinations specific to birds and can say it is a bird.

    The question is, how do you learn all those connection strengths? How do you learn to have a detector that has big positive inputs from three little bits of edge sloping down and three little bits of edge sloping up like this? How do you decide that those six bits of edge should have big positive weights to this detector and all the other features you detected should have no weights to this detector? They are irrelevant. You are just looking for those six features, those six edges.

    Now I am going to explain an obvious way to do it that is clearly inefficient but gives you an idea of what is going on. There are three stages to explain how it learns. First, what are you trying to learn? Second, understand a simple way of doing it to get a feel for what is going on. Then I will show you how to do it better.

    The simple way of doing it is this. You start with all these layers of neurons and you put random weights between the neurons. You have connection strengths from one layer to the next, and they are all random numbers, some small positive numbers, some small negative numbers. You put in an image of a bird and see what it outputs. With random numbers, it might say 50 percent it is a bird and 50 percent it is not a bird.

    That is not useful, but you can ask the following question. Suppose I took one of those connection strengths, just one of them, and made it slightly bigger. Clearly, the output will change slightly. I change one of the connection strengths slightly and ask, does it now say 50.001 percent chance it is a bird and 49.999 percent chance it is not a bird? Did it get better or worse, assuming it was a bird?

    If I take an image of a non-bird, I would like that change to make it more likely to say it is a non-bird and less likely to say it is a bird. You might think that you now have enough evidence to change the connection strength a little bit, but you do not, because for this particular image, it turns out that increasing that connection strength helped, but it may not help on all images. It may make it worse on other images. There may be many other bird images where increasing that connection strength makes it less likely to be a bird.

    Mounk: Perhaps this image is of a bird against the sunset, and the color is mostly purple. What you actually taught the system is that if a color is mostly purple, then you should say it is a bird. That will make it less likely, on average, to guess correctly. Is that the kind of example you have in mind?

    Hinton: Exactly. That is right. You need to share a large number of examples. You take a random collection of examples, a few hundred of them. For these few hundred examples, you ask whether changing this connection strength improves things. Did increasing it a bit improve things or make them worse? If it improved things, you increase the connection strength. If it made things worse, you decrease the connection strength.

    We just did a small experiment. We took a few hundred images and observed whether changing this connection strength slightly improved or worsened the outcome. If it improved things, we increased it a bit.

    Mounk: When we do this, is this a primitive form of what we call learning? I know that when we talk about AI, we always talk about learning.

    Hinton: That would be a learning algorithm. It is a kind of evolutionary learning algorithm. It is like making a small mutation and seeing whether it helps. If it helps, you keep it. The problem is that in your brain you have a hundred trillion connections. In a large neural network, you might have hundreds of billions of connections. You have to do this for each connection, increasing or decreasing it slightly.

    Each time you perform one of those experiments, you must run it on hundreds of images to see if it truly helps. This process would be incredibly slow. Even if you had only a billion connections, you would have to run a hundred images through a billion connections across all these layers just to decide whether to increase one connection strength slightly. It would work in the end. If you kept doing that for billions of years, you would eventually get a neural network that was good at recognizing birds.

    Mounk: This is not an abstract problem because, for many of the early stages of AI development, one of the basic problems was that you could make these machines learn, but it required an incredible amount of computing power, and not enough computing power was available. Even today, computing power is one of the constraints on developing more intelligent systems. This idea that we had a basic set of methods to allow neural networks to learn but were constrained by resources was very important.

    A key part of your work, as I understand it, was to think about how to design these learning processes in a way that is more efficient—sufficiently efficient so that, with the computing power available at the time, which was much more limited than today, we could achieve something potentially useful. How do you adjust this learning process? How do you transform it to make it not prohibitively computation-intensive?

    Hinton: Even with all the computing power we have today, that particular learning algorithm, where you try changing one connection at a time and seeing if it helps, would still be completely hopeless. It is much too inefficient. What you would like to do is figure out, for all of the connection strengths at the same time, whether increasing them slightly or decreasing them slightly helps.

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    You would like a way to compute, for every connection strength simultaneously, whether to increase it or decrease it slightly. If you could do that, and if there were a billion connections, you would go a billion times faster than the simple algorithm.

    There is an algorithm called backpropagation that does this. Roughly, it works as follows. You put in an image and run it forward through the layers of feature detectors to decide whether it is a bird or not a bird. Suppose it says 55% it is a bird and 45% it is not a bird, and suppose it actually was a bird. You would like to increase that 55% or decrease the 45%.

    You take the discrepancy between the network’s output and the desired output. You would like it to give 100% bird, but it said 55% bird, so there is a 45% discrepancy. You take that difference and send it backward through the network using the same connections. There is a method for sending it backward that is straightforward if you know calculus, and if you do not, do not worry about it.

    There is a way of sending that information backward through the network so that, once it has gone from the output back to the input, you can compute for every connection whether you should increase or decrease it. You then change all billion connections at the same time, making the process a billion times faster. This is called backpropagation, and it works.

    Mounk: So backpropagation literally means sending it back through the system. That is what the word “backpropagation” refers to in this context, I take it.

    Hinton: You propagate this error backward through the system. You then try to figure out, for every neuron in the system, whether to make it a little more active or a little less active. Once you know that, and whether to make it a little more active or a little less active, you know how to change its incoming connection strengths to achieve it.

    Mounk: Let us do a little backpropagation ourselves. I am going to try to restate what I just heard. My understanding is that backpropagation is one of the real contributions that you made to this field.

    Hinton: Let me correct that. Many people invented backpropagation. Our main contribution—the contribution of Ronald Hart, Williams, and me—was to show that backpropagation would learn the senses of words and would learn interesting representations.

    Mounk: Thank you for the clarification. I do not want to overstate your very significant contribution. So, we are trying to figure out if this is a bird or not. You feed it an image. It tells you there is a 55% likelihood that it is a bird. When we think about what it does to send this result back through the system, it is saying, what would all the neurons have looked like if it had come back with the answer 100%? Based on that, you then adjust the weights to say, all right, that seems closer to the kind of setup we should be having. Is that roughly on track, or did I completely misstate that?

    Hinton: That is roughly on track, but not quite on track. You are not trying to solve the problem of how to change the weight so you get exactly the right answer. You are trying to solve the problem of how to change the connection strength so your answer is a little bit better. You said we are trying to figure out how we should change the neuron so it says 100% bird. We are not really trying to do that. If it says 55% bird, we are trying to figure out how to change the connection strength so it says 55.001% bird. In other words, we are asking how to change the connection strength to make it just a tiny bit better. That is what calculus is all about.

    Mounk: Once the importance of backpropagation became clear, along with the contributions of others, how far along were you toward the basic conceptual foundation of contemporary artificial intelligence? What was the bridge? What other elements still needed to be pioneered and developed, along with the increase in computing power and resources, to reach the degree of artificial intelligence that we have today?

    Hinton: In 1986, we showed that the backpropagation algorithm could learn the senses of words in a very simple toy example. We were very optimistic. We thought we had figured out how to make systems learn layers of features, how to make them learn to do vision, and that we would be able to make them learn to do language. We believed we had solved it and that everything would be wonderful. It was acceptable for some tasks.

    It was, for example, fairly good at reading the ZIP codes on envelopes and the numerical amounts on checks. At one point, it read the numerical amounts on about 10% of the checks in North America. That was in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, it would not scale up to recognizing real objects in real images, such as identifying a bird whether it was a seagull in the distance or an ostrich up close.

    We did not know at that time what the problem was. The problem was mainly that we did not have enough data or enough compute power. If we had said that at the time, people would have dismissed it as an excuse, saying we were merely claiming that a bigger model would work. They did indeed say that, and it was somewhat embarrassing to insist that a thousand times as much data and a thousand times as much compute might help.

    In fact, what we really needed was a million times as much data and a million times as much compute, and then it worked very well. There were other technical advances, but the main advances were the availability of much faster compute and much more data. The additional data came from the web, and the faster compute came from GPUs, particularly Nvidia GPUs, which were easier to program. When I say easier to program, they were still difficult, but much easier than most parallel systems.

    Mounk: Presumably one of the reasons data is so important in all of this is that we have assumed, in this example, that we have an image of a bird for which we already know whether or not it is in fact a bird. If we did not have something against which we could measure the system, or something on which to base the accuracy of the model’s predictions, the learning algorithm would not work. We need large numbers of images for which we are reasonably confident that they are birds or that they are not birds. Is that right?

    Hinton: With computer vision, for a long time, we didn’t have a big data set like that. We needed a data set with millions of images that were accurately labeled or fairly accurately labeled. We didn’t have it. Someone called Fei-Fei Li, who was a junior professor, realized that if we had a big labeled database like that, a data set, it would make a huge difference to whether neural nets could do vision.

    She didn’t actually necessarily think it would be neural nets, but she did think it would make a huge difference to where the computers would get to be good at doing vision and recognizing objects and images. She went to a lot of effort to build a huge database, and that was crucial. The digitized images were there on the web, but they also needed somebody to provide labels for them all. Now you don’t get the same problem in language.

    The reason you don’t get the same problem in language is because you use the next word as the label. So you say, I’ve seen a string of words; they’re the input. From this string of words I’ve already seen, can I predict the next word? Of course, the next word is part of the data. You don’t need anybody to tell you what the next word is. When someone gives you a document, you see all the next words given each context. So the nice thing about language, and the reason you can have trillions of examples with language, is because you don’t need someone to give you labels.

    There is research using neural networks on language where you say, does this movie review have a positive sentiment or a negative sentiment toward the movie? Someone has to hand label that. For a while, people did a lot of research like that. But if you just try to predict the next word, that’s called self-supervised because the data itself contains the label. Now you don’t need all those human labelers.

    Mounk: You said earlier that, by something like the late 1980s, the basic conceptual foundations for contemporary artificial intelligence were in place. The truth of it at that time was we just needed more compute and more data. That sounded off. It sounded like making excuses for why the system wasn’t yet working as well as it might one day. Yet it turned out to be true.

    Hinton: There was also another reason. It wasn’t just that they didn’t believe a bigger one would work. The symbolic community was convinced that if you started with random connection strengths and just adjusted them like this, you would get trapped at local optima. It’s a bit like if you’re in a mountain range and you just go uphill, you’ll end up at the top of a small foothill. If you keep trying to go uphill, that’s as far as you can go.

    You have to be willing to go downhill to get to the top of Mount Everest. It turned out they were wrong. It turned out that on a normal landscape in three dimensions, that will happen—you’ll get trapped at a local optimum on the top of a foothill. In these neural nets, you may not get to the very best set of connection strengths, but you will get to a very good set of connection strengths.

    If you don’t get to the top of Mount Everest, you’ll get to the top of some nearby very high peak. People didn’t know that. That was just an empirical result. It was a big surprise to the symbolic AI people that if you just kept creeping along, improving the weights to make the answer a little bit better, you would learn incredibly impressive things.

    Mounk: Perhaps let’s stick with this contrast for just one moment because I think to a lot of people it seems that human intelligence is more like the symbolic AI people might predict. The way we reason about the world is that we have these rules of logic, and we’re applying them and doing these calculations based on those rules of logic, and that’s how we reach a firm and logical conclusion. One of the ways to attack current AI systems is the idea that they’re just “stochastic parrots”—that all they are is predicting the statistical likelihood of the next word being something.

    I take it that a lot of the skepticism of the symbolic AI community about whether or not you were going to get somewhere with the approach that you helped to champion was that this is just not how you get to real intelligence. Of course, you yourself are actually quite inspired by neuroscience in many ways and by our understanding of how neurons in our brain work. The way in which human minds learn is different from AI in many important respects but seems in some ways actually more analogous to being neural networks themselves and to getting a bunch of data and trying to predict which response to that has given me reinforcements in the world and which response to that hasn’t given me reinforcements in the world.

    Hinton: Okay, let’s start with the stochastic parrots. The people who talk about stochastic parrots are typically linguists strongly influenced by Chomsky, who believed that language was basically innate. Chomsky was adamantly opposed to statistics. He thought it was discrete rules, and that’s how language works, and statistics is just sort of silly. That’s not how language works. It turns out he’s completely wrong, according to me, so I can’t let you get away with that.

    Also, the idea that just predicting the next word can’t possibly be how you learn language is deeply wrong. If you think about it, if you want to do a not very good job of predicting the next word, you can just use simple statistics. For example, you could keep a big table of phrases, and if you see the words “fish and,” you could look in your big table and see that “fish and chips” occurred a lot. So “chips” is a pretty likely next word because we’ve seen lots of occurrences of “fish and chips.” That would be simple co-occurrence statistics. The people who talk about stochastic parrots—that’s their model of statistics. That’s what they’re arguing against. But that’s not at all how these neural nets work. They don’t really understand how they work, particularly Chomsky.

    If you think about it, suppose you want to do a really good job of predicting the next word—not just a moderately good job by keeping a table of how often particular phrases occur, but a really good job, the best job that could be done. To do that, you have to understand what the person is saying. If I design a system that’s going to end up doing a really good job of predicting the next word, the only way it can do that is by understanding what was said.

    What’s impressive is that training these big language models just to predict the next word forces them to understand what’s being said. In particular, if the next word is the first word of the answer to a question and the context is the question, if you don’t understand the question, you’re not going to be very good at predicting the answer. The stochastic parrot people don’t seem to understand that just predicting the next word forces you to understand what’s being said.

    Mounk: I’m not sure that we disagree. I was trying to put my understanding of what it is that those who object to this believe. I’m not sure that we disagree on this, actually. I was trying to give voice to that critique, but also to say that it seems to me that there’s something about the ways in which models of artificial intelligence today engage in learning that seems more similar to the human brain.

    It strikes me, when I speak to friends of mine who are neuroscientists, that we still don’t fully understand how the human brain works. But what I wanted to ask you is how similar you think the learning mechanisms of these AI models today are to what’s going on in the human brain. In some ways, the inspiration for that was partially to understand how neurons work together in the human brain. That’s why that metaphor is there. That’s why we’re talking about neurons and neural nets in the context of AI.

    Do you think that the basic mechanisms going on in a neural net that is being fed with a bunch of data and learning how to interpret the question so that it can give that answer are the same kind of thing that’s going on in a human baby when it is learning to maneuver around the world and to eventually answer the questions that its parents put to it? Or do you think that there is a fundamental difference between those two things?

    Hinton: Okay, so that’s a huge open question. For me, that’s probably the most important question in neuroscience: how similar is the way the brain learns to how these large language models learn? At a very abstract level, I believe it’s quite similar. At that level, large language models have a way—this backpropagation algorithm—of figuring out for each connection strength whether to increase or decrease it to make the whole system work better.

    That’s actually called the gradient—the direction you should go in to improve things. The brain probably has the same thing but may not get the gradient in the same way. We don’t know how the brain figures out for each connection strength whether to increase or decrease it. What we do know from these large language models is that if you can get that information—which we get using backpropagation in the large language models—then you can build very impressive systems just by trying to predict the next word.

    So we know that if you get the gradient, you can learn very effectively. We don’t know how the brain gets the gradient. There have been many attempts to show how the cortex—the newer part of the brain—can get these gradients so that it can learn the way large language models do. Nobody has been highly successful in that. There have been many theories, some of them moderately plausible, but none that work really well. Hopefully, eventually someone will figure it out.

    There are some reasons for believing the brain might have a different algorithm. Backpropagation works by figuring out that if you have a lot of experience—like trillions of examples—and not many connections, maybe a mere trillion connections, it can still optimize. These large language models, the biggest ones, have about a trillion connections but trillions of examples. So they have many more examples than connections. They are trying to squeeze lots of knowledge into not many connections—trillions of bits of knowledge into only a trillion connections.

    Our brains are very different. We only live for about two billion seconds. We don’t have trillions of experiences, just a few billion. We have lots of connections—connections to spare—but not much experience. So our brain has to deal with a different regime: limited experience but abundant connections. Backpropagation, on the other hand, is very good when you have lots of experience but are limited in the number of connections. So they are solving somewhat different problems.

    Mounk: If one of the constraints on how to make AI models smarter than they are at the moment is that we may run out of high-quality data—since data is incredibly sparse because it’s so important to this process—then is it imaginable that we might be able to emulate some of the mechanisms that the human brain uses to extract so much understanding of the world from relatively less informational input?

    Hinton: Yes, that is possible. It’s possible that the brain is using some other way of getting gradients that’s not quite the same as backpropagation, and that might let you learn faster. I think a more promising approach at present for artificial intelligence is to see how you can deal with the data limitation.

    There are areas in which we don’t worry about a shortage of data. For example, AlphaGo or AlphaZero that play chess. Nobody there worries about a shortage of data—at least not now. To begin with, when they made Go-playing programs with neural nets, they got the neural net to copy the moves of experts. You only have so many moves by experts. With the popularity of chess now, you have billions of moves, but it’s still probably not trillions—or maybe only a few trillion.

    Nobody worries about that when training a chess or Go program because it generates its own data. What happens in things like AlphaGo is that it plays against itself. There are two neural nets that give it its intuition. I’ll talk about chess because I know chess much better than I know Go, and I imagine most of the viewers of this podcast know more about chess than Go.

    So we’re making a chess-playing program. It has one neural net that can look at a board position and say how good that position is. It just looks at it and says, “Hey, that’s good for me.” It has another neural net that can look at a board position and say, “This will be a good move to make.” If you know a little about chess, if the other player has a backward pawn, it’s very good to put a knight just in front of that backward pawn. It stops the pawn from advancing, and there are no other pawns that can take it. That’s a little bit of intuition about what a good move is.

    In AlphaZero, it has far more sophisticated intuitions. Those are the two neural nets. The question is, how does it train them? It plays against itself using what’s called Monte Carlo rollout, which is roughly: “If I go there, then maybe he’ll go there, and then I’ll go here, and then—whoops—I’ll be in a terrible situation.” From that, you can figure out that you shouldn’t go there. Your neural net suggested a move, but after repeated rollouts—“If I go here, he goes there”—you discover it always seems to end in a loss if you do that move.

    That’s a bad move. You thought it was good, but it’s bad. The Monte Carlo rollout gives you your information about whether it’s a good or bad move. You then modify the neural net that previously said, “That’s a great move,” by adjusting it: “That’s not such a great move.” The neural nets get trained using the results of this Monte Carlo rollout, which is like conscious, explicit reasoning: “If I go here, he goes there, I go here…” It’s sequential. Chess players can do it fast, but it’s still fairly sequential. That process is what’s used to train intuition.

    It’s like that for a lot of what we do. You have intuitive beliefs, then you do some reasoning. In doing that reasoning, you use your intuitions. As a result, you discover your intuition was wrong, so you go back and revise it. That’s an example where you didn’t need anyone external to give you training examples. Most people have a lot of beliefs, and if they were to reason through them, they’d discover those beliefs aren’t consistent. Something’s wrong—either the reasoning, or one of the premises, or the conclusion—so they need to change something.

    As soon as you’ve got something like reasoning working, you can generate your own training data. That’s a nice example of what people in MAGA don’t do. They don’t reason and say, “I have all these beliefs, and they’re not consistent.” It doesn’t worry them. They have strong intuitions and stick with them even though they’re inconsistent. It’s very annoying for people who believe in reasoning.

    Reasoning is very important for tuning your intuitions. That’s one way you can get training data without needing others to provide it. It’s what’s used in chess and Go already, and it works very well in closed worlds. For mathematics, for example, it’s a kind of closed world. You can make conjectures about what might be true and then try proving them. You can have conjectures that seem very plausible at first then reason a bit and discover they must be wrong.

    You might have a conjecture that there’s a biggest number. Suppose you’re a five-year-old and you think there must be a biggest number. Then you think, but if I add one to that, I’d get an even bigger number—so there can’t be a biggest number. That’s an example where you didn’t need training examples; you just needed reasoning.

    That’s one way AI is going to get around the data limitation. The large language models, I think, are already doing some of that. Demis Hassabis, I know, believes in that method of getting yourself a lot more training data without needing external data.

    Mounk: That’s very interesting. On the point you were making earlier, I remember arguing with somebody once where I thought I had a very convincing logical argument and said, “We either can believe this or believe that. On pain of inconsistency, you have to accept this conclusion.” They said, “Well, I choose inconsistency.” It’s rarely said so explicitly, but it is very infuriating. That is not something you can do. Some people say, “I don’t mind. I care more about having belief X and belief Y and belief Z than I care about having a consistent worldview,” and that makes it very hard to argue with such people.

    Hinton: There’s a name for that. The name for choosing inconsistency is faith. The whole Enlightenment was about choosing reason over faith, and we’re losing it.

    Mounk: Indeed. We’re at the tail end of the Enlightenment, unless we can help it and fight back. To go to one other point, you were saying earlier that there was this moment when you and some others believed that if we had more computation and more data, we would be able to make progress. Some people just believed that. It seems to me that there’s now a question about how fast the continuing progress of AI is and whether we’re going to get to much smarter systems in two years or in five years, and perhaps even to something like artificial general intelligence, just by throwing more data at it or more compute at it.

    Perhaps we might see smaller innovations, like figuring out better ways for these systems to create the data on which they’ve been trained, or we might need a real, more revolutionary change in how some of those learning algorithms work or how these systems are able to take learnings from limited amounts of data.

    What do you think is the truth of this? In ten years, in twenty years, are we just going to have very rapid linear improvement, or even exponential improvement, in the intelligence of these AI systems by throwing more compute at basically the same architecture? Or do you think we’re going to need real changes in architecture to make a significant leap forward from where we are today?

    Hinton: Okay, so nobody knows for sure. What we’ve seen so far is that for quite a long period, just scaling things up made them work better. That’s still the case, but there are problems with scaling up because you need huge amounts of computing power and huge amounts of data. We know that scaling it up will make it work better, but we may have practical problems doing so. We also know that new scientific ideas and new architectures, like transformers, will make it work a lot better.

    In 2017, people at Google figured out transformers and published the research. ChatGPT was basically based on using transformers. We can reasonably expect that there will be more scientific breakthroughs like that. We don’t know what they’ll be or when they’ll occur, because if we knew that, we would have already done them. We can also expect there will be many engineering advances. Over the last few years, engineering has gotten much better. You see things like DeepSeek that may have benefited from distilling knowledge from bigger models, but there is always room for better engineering. This field is very young—it has only been active for a few years—so there’s a lot of room for engineering improvements that will make everything much more efficient. That may ultimately be how we deal with the need for far more compute.

    There is a school of thought that has been around for a while, whose most vocal proponent is probably Gary Marcus. He really believed in symbolic AI, which is all about having symbolic expressions and rules for manipulating them. He argues that we need to go back to that approach to make serious progress in reasoning. That hasn’t been the case so far. If you look at the progress in reasoning that has been made, it’s not like there’s some special internal symbolic language.

    Symbolic AI basically believed—put simply—that if I give you a sentence in English, what you need to do is turn it into a sentence in some special internal symbolic language that’s unambiguous. You could then operate on that expression using rules to derive new expressions. That’s what logic is, and that’s how reasoning was supposed to work. Reasoning in these models now works quite well, and it doesn’t work like that at all.

    There is no special internal symbolic language. Inside, it’s just activations of neurons in these neural nets. The only symbolic language is natural language. Those are symbols, but they exist at the input and output. If you look at how these models do reasoning, they do it by predicting the next word, then looking at what they predicted, and then predicting the next word after that. They can do thinking like that.

    You give them a context, and by predicting words, they create a kind of scratch pad for thinking. They can see the words they’ve predicted and then reflect on them and predict more words. That’s what thinking is in these systems, and that’s why we can see them thinking. It’s not at all like the symbolic way of doing it. They are producing symbols, but those symbols exist only at the level of input and output, not as part of a special internal language.

    My own view is that people who want hybrid systems—consisting of neural nets for the input and output and symbolic AI for the reasoning—are trying to cling to the past. I have an analogy for this. Suppose you took someone who manufactures gasoline engines and said, “Electric motors are actually better. There are all sorts of things that make them superior to gasoline engines.” After a while, the car manufacturer agrees and says, “Okay, I accept that electric motors are better. So here’s what we’re going to do: we’ll use the electric motors for injecting the gasoline into the engine.”

    That’s what they actually do—it’s called fuel injection—and it’s quite helpful, but it’s not the main point. It’s an attempt to hold on to your gasoline engine while adding your electric motor. That’s what I think these hybrid systems are like.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Geoffrey discuss the benefits and the risks of AI. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 3 min
  • Zohran Mamdani Is a Spectacular Own Goal
    Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on October 26, 2025. (Photo by Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images.)

    In 2024, the Democratic Party suffered about as terrible an electoral rebuke as it’s possible to have. They lost—decisively—to a candidate whose last act in office had been trying to attack his own Congress. They lost ground among Hispanics to a candidate who favored mass deportations and among African-Americans to a candidate who—as events would prove—was dedicated to rolling back landmark pieces of civil rights legislation. They lost not just a state or two in the vaunted Blue Wall—remember when losing Wisconsin in 2016 was a shock?—but every brick of the entire fortress. The party’s approval as a whole has sunk to 29%—the lowest of any party since the start of this polling category.

    What a gift a defeat like that is! What a chance to take stock and really consider, without any mitigating excuses, why your party is losing as badly as it is! And there were—pretty obviously—two main factors contributing to the Democrats’ defeat. One was the problem of gerontocracy and the inability to connect with a younger digitally-forward voting public. And the other was the party’s inability to seize the common-sense middle ground, to present themselves as the adults in the room. They somehow managed to be seen, in pre-election polling, as the more extreme party—and this against an opponent who wants to lock up his political rivals and invade Greenland.

    So the solution to the party’s woes really was pretty simple. First of all, they needed a cohort of candidates who knew how to use a smart phone. And second, they needed those candidates to just please—for the love of Christ—not be crazier than the other side, which, honestly, really shouldn’t be that hard of a bar to clear.

    With the impending election of 34-year-old Zohran Mamdani—the clear frontrunner to be mayor of New York—they are at last taking a significant step to putting the gerontocracy demon behind them, but they are flunking the test to mark themselves as the party of the center, and doing so in a way that suggests that they will just never ever learn from their mistakes.

    Heading towards the 2026 midterms, if not 2028, the Democrats have nothing but soft targets as they try to be the party of common sense—how about challenging raids by masked ICE agents on American workplaces? Or the National Guard deployed in peacetime to American cities? Instead, we all know what’s about to happen: the Fox News crowd gets to come after “Soviet-style” state-run grocery stores in New York or “globalize the intifada” or defund the police, that bear trap which, through Mamdani’s embrace of the position in 2020, the Dems are about to run straight back into. These sorts of issues have been Trump’s ace in the hole in his last elections—autonomous zones and decriminalization policies were the gift that West Coast mayors gave Trump in the 2020-2024 cycles. But with an actual socialist running the country’s largest blue city, Trump will have just about all the ammunition he needs to hammer at the Dems all the way to 2028.

    Let’s give credit where it’s due. Mamdani knows a reel from a livestream. His sprinting at the camera—which seems to be the signature move of his campaign videos—isn’t necessarily the pathbreaking political cinema that his supporters make it out to be, but for a party that has had a pronounced senility problem in its standard-bearers, the Dems should take youth and energy where they can get it. And Mamdani is a savvy-enough politician. A recent New York Times profile has made much of the listening tour he took with the city’s powerful and of his campaign trail tendency to shy away from some of his earlier, more extreme positions.

    But, oh, what rage bait those early positions were, what catnip for Fox News viewers. He had to apologize for a “Defund the NYPD” tweet from 2020. He has struggled mightily to distance himself from the phrase “Globalize the Intifada”—this in the city with the world’s second-largest Jewish population. He has held to his promise to arrest Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu the next time he visits New York—no matter that that’s probably illegal and no matter the international chaos that would create.

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    And then there are the city-run grocery stores, the millionaires’ tax, the rent freezes, none of which he likely has the authority to enact but which so perfectly confirm every wild stereotype that every Fox News host has of what Democrats really want. And then there’s—as Cuomo cruelly but not unjustly pointed out in the final mayoral debate—the fact that Mamdani has “never had a job, [has] never accomplished anything.” It’s all the same pie-in-the-sky idealism that led to the autonomous enclaves and to decriminalization movements and “Abolish the Police” drives and the various excesses of the Peak Woke era—while law-and-order broke down in pockets of liberal cities and progressives gave the impression of being kids playing in the sandbox and the Fox News crowd lapped it all up and the Trumpies had all the talking points they needed. In case you think I’m being melodramatic, by the way, the National Republican Congressional Committee has already rolled out a plan to make Mamdani the target of their 2026 midterm campaign, making use of Mamdani’s 41% unfavorability rating in national polling (against 25% favorable) to exploit a can’t-miss opportunity to depict the Democrats as “anti-police, pro-defund” socialists.

    So here we are again. The party that lost the center in 2024 drifts—the first chance it gets—over to the loony left. For once, we can’t get mad at the Democratic panjandrums—Mamdani was a long shot who, thanks to his own campaign charisma, brought himself to the doorstep of City Hall—but Democratic voters really should, by this stage of Trumpism, have a better self-preservation instinct than what they have shown. In the digital media age, a mayoral election isn’t just about the city where it’s held. It’s about how it’s reflected on the national stage. Trump was able to make the most of the 2020 events in Minneapolis, and in West Coast cities, and some of the excesses of the trans rights movement, to win the hearts and minds of the country in 2024. If Democrats can’t learn from this, they’re going to keep losing in national elections over and over and over again.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

    As a nonpartisan nonprofit, Persuasion does not take an editorial position on political campaigns or candidates and aims to represent a variety of views. The positions, policies, or strategies articulated in the publications and podcast are those of the authors and speakers alone.

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  • Politics As Self-Deception
    The House Judiciary Hearing on Censorship on September 3, 2025 in Washington, D.C. (Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images.)

    Accusations of hypocrisy over free speech are being hurled across the Western political spectrum. Nick Clegg, the liberal former deputy prime minister of Britain, where I live, recently accused American conservatives such as JD Vance of “rank hypocrisy” for criticizing UK speech laws while stifling dissent at home. Meanwhile, in The New York Times, conservative commentator Bret Stephens cataloged examples of progressives justifying censorship in recent years until they suddenly “cared about free speech again” when Jimmy Kimmel was taken off-air.

    Greg Lukianoff has suggested that we are pretty much all hypocrites. “If you’re a free-speech lawyer, you face a choice,” he said. “Either expect to be disappointed by people of all political stripes—or go crazy.” That may well be true, but I don’t think it tells the whole story. While there are certainly outright hypocrites on both sides being consciously deceitful, there is likely also a deeper human force at play: our remarkable capacity for self-deception.

    We are masters at persuading ourselves of what we want to believe. This shapes not just our everyday choices but also our politics and moral reasoning. Crucially, because self-deception operates under the radar of our awareness, it’s much harder to pinpoint and correct than conscious hypocrisy.

    Psychologists have long known how flattering our self-perceptions are. The “better-than-average-effect” describes how most people consider themselves above average in intelligence, morality, and kindness. College students think their personalities are more complex than their peers’; drivers hospitalized after causing accidents still consider themselves better drivers than most others. College instructors believe they’re better teachers than their colleagues. In one study, prisoners convicted of violent crimes rated themselves as more moral, kind, and trustworthy not only than the average inmate, but than the average citizen.

    This tendency transcends culture. While Westerners tend to self-index on individualistic traits like ambition and originality, East Asians do the same on collectivist virtues like loyalty and respectfulness. In other words, we overrate ourselves on the qualities our society prizes.

    Importantly for the discussion about free speech, people are more likely to overrate themselves on attributes that are ambiguous or difficult to verify—such as questions of morality—than on traits that are easily verifiable, such as math skills. It is harder to convince ourselves we’re good at math if we’ve never done well on a math test than it is to convince ourselves we’re good people.

    Where does our tendency for self-deception come from? Some evolutionary psychologists argue that it evolved as a tool for deceiving others more effectively, which can bring substantial benefits to the deceiver. If we can convince ourselves of a dubious claim, we don’t display tells like hesitation or visible anxiety that betray lying. The salesman who convinces himself his product is good (even if it’s mediocre) is more persuasive. The politician who believes their policy is righteous sounds more authentic. Importantly, both appear confident, and confident people are believed more than those seen as lacking confidence. As Mark Twain put it: “When a person cannot deceive himself, the chances are against his being able to deceive other people.”

    Self-deception also fuels optimism, another adaptive and valued trait. People who convince themselves they can overcome daunting challenges against improbable odds make those challenges appear manageable to others, thus inspiring them. Optimists persist longer and tend to perform better, increasing their chances of success in life. Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama may have had little in common, but they both had an ability to make others feel optimistic. And people gravitated towards them. (Readers may remember the crowds chanting “Yes We Can” in 2008.)

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    Self-deception is also cognitively efficient. The philosopher Daniel Statman noted that conscious deceit is “exhausting work.” To consciously maintain a lie while knowing the truth requires constant mental juggling—hence the elaborate training and handling that spies require. But those who truly believe at least a part of their own story can relax into it, freeing their minds from having to handle both truth and fiction. We are also more convincing when, like actors, we really “get into character,” and at least partly internalize the values we espouse. This is likely one of the reasons Donald Trump contradicts himself so effortlessly without any visible strain. He has developed the ability to convince himself of whatever he is saying at any given moment. He thus comes across as authentic.

    Other psychologists see self-deception less as a tool for manipulation than as a psychological shield—our defense against fear, pain, and loss. The person who refuses to see evidence of a cheating spouse. The addict who insists they can “quit anytime.” The terminally ill patient who believes they’ll recover. All illustrate how present and sometimes necessary denial can be in our everyday lives. Without some self-deception, life would be unbearable.

    Whatever its roots, self-deception profoundly shapes how we process information. For instance, we demand different levels of evidence depending on whether a piece of information is welcome or unwelcome. We demand overwhelming proof for bad news or for claims that threaten our identity or worldview, while accepting the flimsiest evidence for good news. If someone praises our nation or group as creative and hardworking, we nod along; if someone calls it lazy and dishonest, we protest this as stereotyping. Both are instances of stereotypes, but we don’t reject positive stereotypes, only negative ones.

    So too in politics. Conservatives demand rigorous proof that there is an issue with free speech today now that their side is in power, while progressives are setting the evidence bar much lower. Likewise, progressives require much less evidence to believe a white person is racist than to be persuaded a black person is racist.

    I once attended a debate on British colonialism. I chatted with a white progressive academic and mentioned it is estimated that Nigeria’s rulers have looted some $600 billion since independence. “I suspect that’s more than the British managed to extract from Nigeria throughout the period they colonized it,” I said, half-jokingly.

    “I’m sure that’s not the case,” she swiftly responded.

    I waited for questions on how credible the $600 billion figure I quoted was or for her to cite what evidence she had of how much Britain had extracted from colonial Nigeria. But she promptly steered the discussion elsewhere instead. The very idea that African rulers could be exploiting their people more drastically than the European colonialists had was a possibility too anathema to her worldview to be seriously considered. She was sure it was impossible. That is how self-deception works; it is less that we consciously lie to ourselves than that we don’t look too closely. We can hence preserve both our self-image and political identity while still feeling “rational.”

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    Which is why many conservatives today, in the United States and elsewhere, simply refuse to look too closely at efforts by the Trump administration to curb free speech. Progressive objections are dismissed as hysteria or mere discomfort with what Donald Trump Jr. now describes as “Consequence Culture.” But this is exactly how progressives used to rationalize censoriousness. Accusations of cancel culture were dismissed as the hysterical reactions of privileged white men threatened by demands for justice. As Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez put it in 2020: “The term ‘cancel culture’ comes from entitlement … Odds are you’re not actually cancelled, you’re just being challenged, held accountable, or unliked.”

    Recognizing all of this should make us not cynical but humble. And perhaps hopeful. Few people consciously betray their ideals, and true hypocrites are quite rare. More often, people reinterpret their ideals to fit changing circumstances. The contradictions surrounding free speech are thus not simply a matter of hypocrisy or power plays, but of a deeper human need to see ourselves as moral even while defending our tribe and self-interest.

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    And that is precisely why free speech matters. It is not just a political right but a safeguard: a mirror that can reveal our own distortions. Open debate forces societies to test their stories against reality, and individuals to confront their own blind spots. But a mirror only works if we dare to look into it.

    The greatest threat to free expression today isn’t just censorship. It’s our waning appetite for self-scrutiny. Defending free expression means defending the discomfort that comes with it—the possibility that our opponents might be right, and that we may well be wrong. And that would not be the end of the world. If we can learn to question not just our adversaries’ motives but our own as well, we may yet preserve the honesty and freedom for which most of us still seem to yearn.

    Remi Adekoya teaches Politics at the University of York.

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  • Accelerating Abundance in America
    This could be us! (Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!

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    With this post, I’m beginning a series on concrete ways in which we could implement an abundance agenda in the United States. The abundance movement seeks a new political model that focuses on getting the country to build things again, particularly housing and public infrastructure. The inability to get things done has undermined the government’s legitimacy and fueled the Trumpian drive to undermine existing institutions.

    The inability to build things is particularly apparent in blue states like California where I live, which promised high-speed rail service between LA and San Francisco back in the 1990s, and may complete a small segment in the Central Valley by the end of the decade. California has seen the accumulation of generations of rules that make the completion of projects extremely difficult. There are many potential targets by which the process could be simplified, but I want to start with the problem of public participation. Both normatively and practically, this is one of the thorniest issues with which modern democracies need to deal.

    The formal rules of American democracy state that the people express their will by voting every two or four years for representatives, who will then deliberate, pass laws, and instruct the executive to implement them. While these basic electoral institutions remain foundational in any democracy, it has been a long time since anyone believed that they were by themselves adequate to create a healthy democracy. There are several reasons for this.

    First, a voting citizen is sending a very weak signal to his or her representatives regarding preferences, a signal that gets mixed with a lot of noise by the time it is received and hopefully implemented. Most modern democracies for that reason have sought to create numerous other channels by which citizens can indicate preferences. These include public hearings, town halls, referenda, recalls, notice-and-comment, and many others.

    Second, legislatures themselves are very imperfect; they can be highly partisan, captured by interest groups, or corrupted outright. In California, progressives like Governor Hiram Johnson in the early 20th century inserted initiatives, recalls, and referenda into the state constitution precisely to allow citizens to bypass the state legislature, which many regarded as hopelessly in the pockets of corporations.

    Third, there is a tradition in American politics that believes that human beings are by nature political animals who flourish only if they can govern themselves. As in ancient Athens, they are not passive recipients of benefits given them by their rulers. This is sometimes referred to as a small-R republican tradition that believes that democracy needs to promote public-spirited and virtuous citizens.

    Many Americans seem to have a vestigial memory of the New England town meeting praised by Alexis de Tocqueville as one of the great schools of American democracy. Such town hall meetings continue to exist, and continue to play important roles in local governance in small towns dealing with local issues.

    The problem today, of course, begins with the problem of scale. Very few Americans live in small towns, and the policies that affect them are more often made at much higher levels—municipal, state, and federal. It is impossible to apply the town hall paradigm at the scale of a democracy of some 340 million people. Those larger institutions are today dominated by two highly polarized political parties that have ceased deliberating; the old description of the Senate as the “world’s greatest deliberative body” is today a cruel joke.

    There have been many efforts to inject higher levels of direct citizen participation into American democracy. One of the earliest efforts was the creation of a notice-and-comment process in the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In recognition that very many decisions affecting citizens were being taken by an expanding administrative state, the APA allowed any citizen to comment on a rule change by a federal agency, and required the agency to respond and, if necessary, to modify the rule in response.

    In addition to notice-and-comment, legislatures at all levels solicit public participation by holding public hearings in which outside groups are invited to present their views. But here we run into what might be called the fundamental defect of modern public participation. American civil society is itself highly organized; in fact, one might argue that it is over-organized. Societal interests are represented by highly professionalized and well-funded interest groups, whose main purpose is to show up at hearings and lobby Congress and the public on behalf of favored policies. They are for the most part not interested in deliberating about whether these policies will benefit the community as a whole. While their interaction may lead to compromise outcomes, those outcomes are often defined by the narrow interests of multiple organized groups. Ordinary citizens often don’t have the time, motivation, or resources to express their views in such hearings, and end up being under-represented.

    We see this phenomenon occurring all the time in public hearings over new housing or infrastructure projects. Many blue states like California confront a severe housing crisis, driven by the lack of availability of affordable housing or the necessary infrastructure to support denser populations. A public hearing on a new building project will typically attract participation from developers, labor unions, existing homeowners, and environmental activists, who often take polarized and highly predictable positions. The people who are not represented at such meetings are, for example, young people who are unable to buy their first home, homeowners locked into their current houses because of exorbitant prices, or workers who might be well served by better public transportation. The latter groups may encompass a majority of citizens, but they are typically not organized or represented in the public discussion.

    The over-organization of civil society is what weakened the initiative process in California, which as noted above was a populist innovation designed to bypass legacy democratic institutions. Within a decade or two of their introduction, the same well-funded interest groups that dominated the legislature learned how to manipulate the initiative process. In a large state like California, getting the necessary signatures to place an initiative on the ballot, and then to have the initiative passed, requires a high degree of organization and millions of dollars in funding for television advertising. It is easy to disguise the real source or implications of an initiative, and to manipulate low-information citizens.

    An over-organized civil society has also distorted the notice-and-comment process. While the latter provides agencies with useful feedback, this channel today has become highly dysfunctional. Scale is once again at fault: with major rule changes, an agency can receive well over a million comments, requiring huge expenditures of time by agency staff to respond. The process can be gamed by interest groups that flood the zone with comments, or else slow the process by suing the agency over failures to respond adequately to individual comments.

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    A final problem with existing forms of public participation has been pointed out by my Stanford colleague Jim Fishkin, director of the Deliberative Democracy Lab at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. Since the time of the Greeks, the ideal of democracy has been a group of citizens who could rationally debate a common course of action. Technology has in many ways undermined the possibility of genuine political deliberation in the U.S. Congress. Many older members note that deliberation ended when C-SPAN began televising Congressional hearings. Members began speaking not to fellow legislators, but to TV audiences at home. Various reform initiatives with the well-meaning intention of increasing transparency decreased opportunities for members to actually hold discussions with one another on a face-to-face basis. To the extent that deliberation happens, it now occurs in back-room negotiations over omnibus spending bills.

    The problem of public participation can thus be stated as follows. Public input to democratic decision-making is absolutely necessary. It is inevitable that organized interest groups will play a big role in any open process. But it is important to structure that process in such a way that:

    1. It can operate at a sufficiently large scale;

    2. It cannot be easily captured by well-resourced and well-organized interest groups;

    3. It can occur over a much shorter time period to facilitate efficient public decision-making;

    4. And that participation be at least minimally deliberative.

    So how do we design new participatory institutions to meet these conditions? That will be the subject of subsequent blog posts.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • Dan Wang on China and the United States

    Dan Wang is a research fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution and author of Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Dan Wang explore the conflict between the United States as a society of lawyers and China as a society of engineers, what this means for their relationship, and why the two countries are more similar than they may first appear.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We are in the seventh round of what is probably going to be a thirty-five-round trade war between the United States and China. Who knows exactly where it’s going to stand or what’s going to happen to that trade war in the few days between when we’re having this conversation and when it’ll likely air. But I think you have a helpful way of thinking about the broader contrast between the United States and China. There are obviously many similarities and many contrasts, but the key contrast you draw is between a society of lawyers and a society of engineers. What do you mean by that, and how can that help us illuminate the political tensions between China and the United States?

    Dan Wang: In the first Trump administration, I was living through the third and fourth bouts of the trade war while I was in Beijing. We thought that being in the third or fourth round of a seven- or eight-round fight wasn’t so bad—you could see the end. Now we’re in round seventeen, and who knows where the end is. I’m still struck by my time in Beijing, when it seemed that either side was going to move quickly toward a trade deal, and then either side would walk away. There was a time when Trump walked away, and there was a time when Xi walked away. After Xi walked away, the Trump administration designated Huawei onto the entity list, which really morphed the trade war into much more of a tech war. It’s always dangerous to try to predict what happens, but my sense is that the negotiation talks are not going to produce any sort of durable peace in our lifetime.

    Mounk: Yeah, it seems like neither a hot war nor a cold war, but a kind of series of indeterminate skirmishes where each side so far has pulled back from the brink yet also hasn’t really wanted to embrace a trade peace—to stay with the metaphor.

    Wang: I think if we were in something like a cold war, perhaps that would be something more desirable. I think the previous Cold War was a complete disaster for all sorts of third countries. The Cold War grew very hot for them. But if we understand the Cold War as not a hot war, first of all, and, second of all, as competition on the level of two systems, then maybe we should hope for something like a cold war, in which we’re competing without hot means through two systems.

    I was really struck by the early days of the second Trump administration, when Trump announced really high tariffs on China—tariffs that eventually reached 150% before pulling back pretty substantially. What made Trump pull back pretty substantially and conclude a trade truce with China before concluding one with any putative American allies like Canada, Europe, or Japan? It was because Xi Jinping decided to retaliate pretty severely and limit the exports of rare earth minerals. Without rare earth minerals, as well as their associated magnets, a lot of auto manufacturers in the West, including in Germany and in the U.S., could no longer maintain production.

    There were these news headlines saying that a Chicago plant of Ford Motors had to stop production of a line because they could no longer get rare earth minerals. I think the really striking contrast between the U.S. and China is also illuminated by this trade war. The trade war itself is a product of the lawyerly society using these tariffs as well as legalisms to try to constrain China’s rise.

    Xi Jinping responded by being an engineer and saying, well, we’re not going to give you some of these products that we alone know how to make. Rare earth magnets are something that China makes about 90% of the world’s supply of. By denying that to the Americans, it has really been able to strangle a lot of the American economy.

    Mounk: So tell us about what makes America a lawyerly society. Before we talk more about China, what do you mean by saying that America is a lawyerly society, and what strengths and weaknesses does that give the United States?

    Wang: The United States has been ruled by lawyers for a very long time. If we take a look at many of the founding fathers, most of them were lawyers. The Declaration of Independence reads like the start of a legal brief. Among America’s first sixteen presidents, from George Washington to Abraham Lincoln, thirteen of them were lawyers. The lawyerly society has persisted into the present day, especially among the Democratic Party. Among the Democratic nominees for president, every single nominee between 1980 and 2024 went to law school.

    Mounk: That’s actually a remarkable stat. It was obvious to me that lawyers play a huge role in American society. That point about the founding fathers didn’t seem surprising. I knew individually about each of the Democratic Party nominees or presidents that they had gone to law school, but the fact that every single one had gone to law school since 1980 is really quite striking.

    Wang: I think there is a sense in which Donald Trump is also somewhat a product of the lawyerly society. Trump is not a lawyer. He did not go to law school, but many parts of his governing style seem to be a product of the lawyerly society.

    Mounk: Well, this is where I was a little bit skeptical earlier. When you were saying the trade war is a product in part of that lawyerly society, I think as a general diagnosis of what America is like, that seems to me quite right. But isn’t a lot of Trumpism and populism, a rebellion against the lawyerly society? Isn’t the way to understand the current administration, in many ways, about the will to break with many of the democratic norms and regular procedures that make it impossible for a properly elected non-lawyer president to do what he really wants and what he claims represents the will of the people? Isn’t what we’re living through, in many ways, precisely a rebellion against the lawyerly society?

    Wang: Here’s the theory of the case that Trump is a product rather than a rebellion against the lawyerly society. You cannot understand the business career of Donald Trump without seeing that lawsuits are absolutely central to his career. This man has sued absolutely everyone. He sued his former business partners, his political opponents, and his former lawyers.

    He, as president, sued The New York Times for $15 billion, which a judge quickly tossed. This is a man who has been with lawyers throughout his entire life, and he understands the law very well. There is something in his governing style in which he is flinging accusations left and right, trying to intimidate people, and trying to establish guilt in the court of public opinion as a way to make people seem unfit.

    The issue with the lawyerly society is that the drawback of the lawyerly society is that lawyers are mostly focused on obstruction. They stop everything, good or bad. What you do not have are stupid ideas like the one-child policy. What you also do not have is functioning infrastructure almost anywhere in the United States because it simply cannot build many important things.

    A virtue of the lawyerly society is that it guarantees a degree of pluralism and due process, and these are correct and important. But a virtue and a benefit, both at the same time, is that the lawyerly society works very well for the rich. There is no better country in the world where it is great to be super rich. If you are super rich in China, the Communist Party will probably cut you down at some point.

    If you are super rich in Europe, you face very high tax rates and all sorts of issues there. In America, the country works very well for the super rich. If you are rich in New York City, you do not really have to deal with high housing costs. You buy one of these units in one of the skinny skyscrapers that overlook Central Park. You do not take the subway to work. That is quite fine.

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    In the United States, you can easily transmute your wealth into political influence in some way. This again describes Donald Trump relatively well. This is someone who understands the law. He is able to take advantage of and abuse the system in many ways. There are many ways in which Donald Trump is wrecking political as well as judicial norms. But I would say he is more a product than a rebellion against the society.

    Mounk: All right, we will come back to this discussion. Tell us about the other half of that contrast. If America is a lawyerly society and that really helps to explain how the country works, you are saying China is a society of engineers. How is that true, and what does that tell us about China?

    Wang: Let’s look again at the elites. China is a country I call the engineering state because, at various points, the entirety of the Standing Committee of the Politburo have had degrees in engineering, and this is engineering of a very Soviet sort. In 2002, in the Hu Jintao era, every single member of the Standing Committee had degrees in subjects that included hydraulic engineering, geology, electrical engineering, thermal engineering, and others.

    The issue with engineers is that they tend to treat the physical environment as purely an engineering exercise. China has really distinguished itself over the last few decades in being able to build a lot, whether that is highways, bridges, hyperscalers, homes, coal, solar, wind, or nuclear—you name it, China has been able to build it. You can go through some of the countryside as well as the big cities in China and see exactly how much they have been able to build.

    They also treat the economy as an engineering exercise. I was living in China in 2021 when Xi Jinping, off the hubris of feeling like he controlled zero COVID, decided to initiate what he thought would be a controlled demolition of the real estate sector based on the leverage rates of state-owned developers. He also decided to punish many tech companies, including people like Jack Ma and sectors like online education as well as video games. The problem with China is that, fundamentally, the Communist Party also sees itself as engineers of the soul.

    They engage in extensive social engineering as well. I write a lot about the one-child policy as well as zero COVID, in which the number is right there in the name. There is no ambiguity about what one child or zero COVID really means. They engineer the environment, the economy, as well as society.

    Mounk: I want to return to understanding the United States through this lens and China through this lens, but to push on this analogy a little bit with a couple of objections. The first is this: is this really about a different way in which those two societies are shaped, or is it about different stages of development? You go back to the United States in the 1930s, and it was also true that the founding fathers had all been lawyers. It was also true that many of the presidents during that period were trained as lawyers. It was also true that, relative to every country in the world, America had a huge number of lawyers per capita. But America was able to build, and it did build.

    When the Empire State Building went up, the speed with which it was built was incredible. At some points, one floor went up per day. Some of that seems to be about how developed a society is. If you are still relatively poor, if you have a lot of space that has not yet been occupied, if the value and worth of existing property are much less, if your processes have not yet become Byzantine over many decades and centuries of people trying to defend their property, then you value the creation of new things more than the maintenance of everything that exists. Once societies are very rich, once existing property is worth an incredible amount of money, and once incumbent interests have had many decades to seek rent and put procedural roadblocks into further development, it becomes harder and harder.

    There is a very clear contrast between America eighty or one hundred years ago and today, which is not explained by the idea that America somehow was not a society of lawyers then. It is explained by the fact that the economy has matured in positive but also in negative ways since that time. The question is, might China not face some of those same problems? When you look at the huge dam projects that China built, those were obviously disruptive to many people. They also created a lot of economic value. That was easier to do at a time when the villages that were displaced were very poor and perhaps both more open to the opportunities that would bring and less powerful in trying to defend themselves against those changes.

    If a government now wanted to put in place a policy that was similarly disruptive to the residents of Shanghai or Beijing or even another second- or third-tier city, it would be much harder to do, both because of the actual economic dislocation and because the people who would be impacted by that would have more power that they can exercise, even in a non-democratic regime, in various ways. So is this actually about China versus the U.S., or is this about societies at a very rapid pace of development, as America was in the 1920s and 1930s and as China is today, versus societies that have been affluent for much longer and therefore start to atrophy in many ways?

    Wang: I think there is certainly a lot to this Mancur Olson case of interest groups really slowing everything down. The first thing I will acknowledge is that the United States was a proto-engineering state itself. I trace this history from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, in which the political elites, who were indeed all lawyers, realized that they had this vast territory with immigrants flowing through, and the political elites decided to build a lot of infrastructure throughout the country. There were canal systems, train systems, and cities like Chicago and Manhattan built skyscrapers that the world had not seen before. In the twentieth century, there were giant projects like the Hoover Dam, the Manhattan Project, the Apollo missions, and the interstate highway system.

    What happened next was that, throughout the 1960s, people rebelled against the proto-American engineering state. People were tired of Robert Moses ramming highways through dense New York neighborhoods. People realized that the Department of Agriculture was spraying DDT everywhere, as well as other pesticides that hurt much of the ecology. People were also tired of rule by technocrats in the Pentagon who got America into gigantic land wars in Asia. People reacted against the American engineering state.

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    The character of lawyers themselves substantially changed. One hundred years ago, most lawyers were working for places like Wall Street. They were creative deal-making types working for the robber barons, trying to raise bonds for railroads or use eminent domain to remove people from land. Even in the New Deal, when America was building a great deal, FDR’s cabinet was full of lawyers. Things shifted throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when people reacted against the engineering state, and the lawyers turned into people more like litigators and regulators. This movement was led by Ralph Nader and other student leaders who did everything they could to constrain the government.

    If you look at some of Ralph Nader’s rhetoric, it converges with Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric, saying that government is the problem, not the solution. They said, “sue the bastards,” referring to the government, not to companies. That is the history I trace of how the lawyerly society in its modern incarnation took shape. Lawyers shifted from being creative dealmakers into litigators interested in stopping power.

    China will not have similar problems because China has no lawyerly tradition to draw from. The law has never been a major practice in China. In the Confucian schema, you have civil servants, the military, and merchants at the bottom. Where are the lawyers in all of this? They are nowhere to be found.

    Mounk: You do have a tradition of Chinese legalism as a philosophical tradition that was, in some complicated ways, a counterpoint to Confucianism. It is the minor key of Chinese history, but it is a minor key that pervades Chinese history.

    Wang: Some people would argue that it is actually a major key, and that Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism are much more the minor key. My sense of China’s history is that there has not been the development of a major liberal tradition, mostly because the emperor captured the entire intelligentsia through the exam system. If you wanted to get anywhere in court, you had to take these exams, and you did not get very far in court by advocating for constraints on state power.

    There was no liberal tradition that emerged in China to say, maybe the emperor should respect the aristocrats or the merchants, because everyone was interested in maximizing the discretion of the court rather than maximizing the discretion of the individual. Given that China has less of this liberal tradition to draw on, they are still building a lot. You mentioned dams—China built the Three Gorges Dam mostly throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Earlier this summer, they announced another dam that will be three times larger than the Three Gorges Dam, which will be high up in the Himalayas in Tibet.

    That project will displace fewer people because fewer people live there, but they are very much still building. I expect that the composition of the Chinese elite will not change substantially to be educated at law schools anytime soon, and they will continue to build because they truly value building.

    Mounk: Tell us a little about how this engineering state has built the country. Generally educated people, and listeners to my podcast in particular, will be aware of the huge industrial progress in China—the astonishing progress in infrastructure and the speed with which China has gone from having no high-speed rail to having the majority of all the high-speed rail lines in the world.

    As someone who has both lived in China and traveled widely there, tell us how that has really shaped modern China.

    Wang: Let me start with a story. In the summer of 2021, when I was sweltering in Shanghai, I decided to gather two friends to go with me on a bike ride. We went to the southwestern province of Guizhou, which is relatively inaccessible. It is quite poor—China’s fourth poorest province—far away from the prosperous coasts. Over five days of cycling through the Chinese countryside, I saw that Guizhou has much better-developed levels of infrastructure than almost anywhere in the United States and arguably most parts of Europe as well.

    Guizhou–again, China’s fourth poorest province–has about fifteen airports. It has forty-five of the world’s tallest bridges. It has high-speed rail. I was thinking that New York State or California, two of America’s richest states, basically do not have very functional infrastructure at all. This is where I return to my schema that the lawyerly society works really well if you are among the American super rich but does not work very well if you are among the working or middle class.

    I understand China, as the engineering state, to be one that is going to build a great deal of infrastructure. It has determined that the public interest lies in simply having more infrastructure—and perhaps it is right. I do not think that the biggest thing residents of Guizhou want is yet another bridge or an airport they might never be able to afford to fly from. But the Leninist system of China says, we know what is best for you, and we are going to give you a lot of infrastructure, good and hard. That is one of the distinguishing features of China: it has built a vast amount of infrastructure of every sort.

    China built its first highway in 1993. Eighteen years later, it built an America’s worth of highways. Nine years after that, it built another America’s worth of highways. In terms of energy deployment, China is on track to deploy about 500 gigawatts of solar this year. The U.S. is on track to deploy about 50, an order of magnitude difference. In nuclear energy as well, China is building, building, building, and that remains a distinguishing feature.

    Mounk: I have traveled much less in China than you have, but it is astonishing to see how developed these high-speed railway lines are, not just between major cities like Shanghai and Nanjing or Shanghai and Beijing on the same line, but also in somewhat smaller cities like Yiwu, which are connected by the same kind of high-speed rail line. These cities also have giant stations and very frequent trains. That probably does a lot for ordinary people. These trains are relatively cheap, and they are widely used.

    When I had Peter Hessler on the podcast, he talked in his book about how long it would have taken to go from the town in which he taught in the 1990s in Sichuan to the next regional capital. It would have been basically a day’s journey using a mixture of boats and trains. Now, you can get there in an hour or an hour and a half, and that is surely a genuine benefit to people there. Of course, the question is when you start hitting diminishing returns or when you run out of road. At some point, you have built high-speed rail between all of the first-tier cities, second-tier cities, third-tier cities, and most of the fourth-tier cities. Continuing to do so eventually no longer makes sense.

    You can then go into the business of maintaining all of this amazing infrastructure, and that itself is a heroic task if you have built that much of it. Still, it feels like that is a toolbox that is more useful to a particular stage of economic development than to a later stage of development. Once you have connected every town with a high-speed railway line, you have to think about other ways to sustain economic growth.

    Wang: Yes, I think they are slowing down, and there is a realization that they should not build so much. At a first approximation, they would say something like, are we building too much high-speed rail? What we are doing is lifting the third-tier cities into second-tier cities, and once they have high-speed rail, that will happen. If you say they are building a bridge to nowhere, they respond, two nowheres will become two somewheres once we have this bridge.

    There is something to that logic, but I absolutely agree that they are going to be hitting diminishing returns. They probably hit diminishing returns five years ago, and yet they continue to build. That is a problem, but the other part of the engineering state is manufacturing success. We can look beyond public works and see how much China has built in terms of goods of every sort.

    Right now, China is making about one-third of global manufactured products, and that share is set to rise over the next few years. China is a leader in electric vehicles, and its electric vehicles are better and cheaper than their European, Japanese, or American counterparts. China is also a leader in clean technology and in industrial robotics. It is going from strength to strength, patching up its weaknesses in semiconductors, while the United States and Europe seem to be deindustrializing, in part due to China. The engineering state is very good at making all sorts of products that people want.

    Mounk: It used to be that China was the manufacturing center for cheap goods around the world, and it is still able to compete on price for many goods to a considerable degree. In part, that is because, despite the overall size of the Chinese economy and the fact that there are now many affluent Chinese, there is still a huge portion of the population that does not make much money by global standards. But China has really moved up the value chain and is now competing in very specialized, high-skill manufacturing—not just in headline industries like electric vehicles, but in all kinds of different industries.

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    A place like Germany, which used to pride itself on being the export world champion, is now facing competition on quality and on the ability to deliver very specialized, intricate goods, not just in the car sector but in many other branches of industry as well. Do you think that is a recipe for ongoing economic growth and affluence? Is there space in the world economic system for a large country like China to remain specialized in those kinds of manufacturing goods? Or does China have to change its internal economic model, encourage much more consumption, and move further into the provision of global services and other areas in order to sustain its economic growth over time?

    Wang: Another part of my case that China is an engineering state is that it has been profoundly uninterested in getting more into consumption. There is greater lip service to the idea that consumption should be more important, but China is simply not spending enough or doing enough redistribution throughout its economy. I am really struck that this country–ruled by a Communist Party that celebrates the birthdays of Karl Marx, sings “The Internationale,” and has all the pageantry of a beautiful communist state–seems to me to be one of the most right-wing regimes in the world.

    If I look at China and the degree to which it is really valuing manufacturing as well as keeping out immigrants, this seems to me to be 1950s Eisenhower America. China’s transfer payments are really low. According to the OECD figures that I scrounged up, about 30% of Europe’s economy is spent on redistribution, about 20% of America’s economy is spent on redistribution, and in China that figure is 10%. It has a pretty threadbare social welfare net.

    This is a country that arrests union organizers, tries to disrupt Marxist reading groups, and has very traditional gender norms. At a first approximation, it looks like the most right-wing big country in the world. There is something quite striking about how focused it is on production and not very much on consumption. Economists have been calling for a long time for China to rebalance, but it does not look like Xi Jinping is interested, because they are really motivated to produce more goods.

    They have a manufacturing target that says manufacturing should stay relatively stable in the economy as a share, not like the United States or even Germany, in which the share of manufacturing has declined over the last few years. China will not achieve that because of natural economic forces, but at least they pay lip service to the idea that manufacturing ought to be really important. I think a lot about the Communist Party understanding the failures of China over the past two centuries, in which it was subject to the predation of European imperialist forces and then the fascist invasion by Japan, as China was weak because it had almost no science and technology. That is a very reasonable idea to believe, and the Communist Party really, really believes it.

    Every country in the world would like to say, yeah, we like technology, we want to be a high-tech leader, but the Communist Party means it and believes it more than any other entity. They are willing to invest a lot into semiconductor projects that fail. They have relatively strong risk tolerance. Even when there are a lot of frauds, they do not throw up their hands and say, let’s give up on technology pursuit. They still really, really want this. I am quite nervous about the future fate of Germany, Europe in general, as well as the United States. Can I make a case that Europe is really screwed here? Are you interested?

    Mounk: Yes, I am always interested in pessimistic takes about the continent of my birth, and sadly, I fear that I am going to agree with your analysis. Go ahead.

    Wang: I spent quite a lot of the summer traveling throughout Europe. My wife is from Austria, so we spent a little time in Austria and Switzerland, and we spent the majority of two months in Denmark. Denmark is a country that is supposed to have done very well in the European Union, and indeed it has.

    Mounk: Mostly thanks to American overconsumers and the extent to which weight-loss drugs have floated the Danish economy.

    Wang: Yes, we can thank McDonald’s for that. But I think there is a pessimistic case even on that. When I was living in Copenhagen, I was really struck one day when I was checking the news and saw that the share price of Novo Nordisk had fallen by 30%. They fired the CEO. What happened there? It turns out that it was in substantial part because of competition from American biotech firms. Eli Lilly has really out-competed a lot of Novo Nordisk. Novo Nordisk also had its own missteps.

    As I spent two months over the summer in Europe, it still felt super complacent to me. On the one hand, they are going to be deindustrialized by the Chinese. Already, the German industrial sector has been substantially shrinking. Some of the estimates I have seen suggest that Europe’s energy costs are roughly five times higher than China’s energy costs. It is obvious now that European manufactured exports to China have been declining, and Germany would not be in a technical recession if it were still able to export as much to China.

    On the other hand, Europe’s leading firms are going to be out-competed by American biotech, software, and financial services firms. Right now, a lot of the European equity market is supported by the fact that rich Chinese are buying French handbags, which does not seem like a durable long-term success. Europe does not have much of a software sector, and its financial sector is also going to be ravaged by American competition, which is simply much more efficient.

    As the economy weakens, I do not expect politics to improve. It looks like in every major country now, the right-populist parties are outpolling the ruling incumbent parties. Last year, the FPÖ, the right-wing party in Austria, already won a plurality. There are always a few cases in which these right-wing parties win pluralities but are unable to form coalition governments. I wonder if, as the economy weakens, politics will probably not get better. That is my pessimistic case for Europe, Yascha. Am I wrong?

    Mounk: I fear that you are right. Just to underline it with a few facts and observations, I may have said in this podcast before that Nvidia, the now-largest U.S. company, is worth more in terms of stock market capitalization than the entire German stock market. One American company is now the size of all German public corporations put together, which is really astonishing. The largest tech company in Germany is called SAP. It was founded in 1968, and the only times I encounter SAP are when I have to file my expenses to Johns Hopkins University or in other contexts where there are legacy software systems that have been difficult to replace and transition away from. That is the great hope of software in Germany.

    I participated recently in the launch in France of a program called Project France 2050, which is organized, ironically, by the Ministry of the Plan that used to make the French five-year plans after World War II. It is called the Ministry of the Plan—that is its name—and I think it has a longer name that involves strategy or something similar. But the word plan is in the name of this entity. They conducted an opinion poll that was very interesting, showing that most French people did not expect huge changes. When they were asked about the various ways in which the country might change fundamentally, they tended to say that it was unlikely.

    However, when asked whether things were going to be better or worse—whether the economy, the ability to find a job, equality, or democracy were going to be better—most respondents thought those things would be somewhat worse. The vision that Europeans have is of a future that is kind of like today, just worse. It is like today, except a little less good. I actually think that future does not exist.

    Europe either manages to reinvent itself and recognize that it needs to be a first-rate player in the world—perhaps not in every dimension, but in many—that it needs to compete in manufacturing with China or in services with the United States, or ideally with both, and that it must play a role in the technologies of the future, not just electric cars, but also artificial intelligence, in which Europe currently plays no significant role at all. Or Europe will crash in a way that is much worse than even those pessimistic respondents to that poll imagined.

    I think Europe’s future is bifurcated. There is a small chance of Europe managing to reinvent itself, understand the gravity of the situation, and make fundamental reforms. Or the decline may be much more steep and rapid than even those pessimistic respondents to that poll assumed.

    Wang: Something that strikes me about Europe is that they are constantly talking about how this is now a wake-up call for Europe. I see a dozen wake-up calls a day before breakfast for Europeans, and they do not seem to reform themselves substantially. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was supposed to be a wake-up call for Europe. Donald Trump’s threats against Greenland were supposed to be a wake-up call. China’s denial of rare earth magnets to German automakers was yet another one.

    The more wake-up calls you have, and the more you declare something to be a wake-up call, the more drowsy it makes people because they are tired of that kind of rhetoric. What I do not quite understand is this: I start my book by saying that Chinese and Americans are the most alike people in the world. I have plenty of Americans who tell me, after working in Chinese factories or traveling there, that they feel much more comfortable with the Chinese than with Europeans. Europeans are almost a different species from the Chinese and American cultures, which really prize hustle.

    They are entrepreneurial and pragmatic people—both the Americans and the Chinese—and both have a get-it-done energy. They both have a love of the technological sublime, and they are both great powers that feel a sense of superiority and believe that smaller countries simply have to listen to them. What that produces is a lot of shortcuts that both countries take, but those shortcuts are part of the hustle energy.

    Americans have a saying that private entrepreneurs really want to make donuts, while countries at the level of governments are craving raw geopolitical power, and they will get it by hook or by crook. That kind of energy is missing in Europe. Many people in Europe do not even seem interested in making money anymore. Salaries are low, taxes are high, and nobody wants to make donuts anymore.

    When I look at the EU, they seem to be waffling. If Donald Trump raises tariffs on them, Ursula von der Leyen’s response is, okay, how much? There is no sense of power among Europeans. So how do you actually achieve a wake-up call when all of the previous ones have failed to rouse you?

    Mounk: How would you rate the United States compared to Europe? You are talking about the fact that America has a more entrepreneurial spirit, that people still want to make donuts and all those things. At the same time, some of the problems you identify are present in the United States as well. America has been deindustrializing, not as deeply as Europe, but to a significant extent. Part of the problem of the society of lawyers, as you pointed out, is the impossibility of building high-speed rail. You have a nice contrast between high-speed rail in California—or the lack of it—and high-speed rail in China in the book.

    There are many dimensions on which it would be possible to be similarly pessimistic about the United States. Some of the biggest and most inventive companies in the world remain in the United States. It is striking that over the last thirty or so years, Europe’s share of global GDP has declined significantly, while America’s share has gone down only slightly. It has managed to keep its place in the global economy to an astonishing degree. America today retains something like sixty percent or more of the world’s stock market capitalization.

    Is America still before the fall, unable to retain its incredibly privileged position in the world economy? Or does America, unlike Europe, have genuine strengths that will allow it to remain economically successful in a very different mode from China for a long time?

    Wang: It is very difficult to say, but I am much more optimistic about the United States, at least relative to Europe, and I think still relative to China. The first issue is that the United States has deindustrialized more than Europe, not less, as you suggest. About 11% of America’s GDP is involved in manufacturing.

    If we look at a highly industrialized country like Germany, it is closer to 20%, and obviously Germany is different. Europe has, I think, better manufacturing success than the United States. The U.S. manufacturing sector has been very weak. If we look at these apex manufacturers like Intel, Boeing, or the Detroit automakers and Tesla, all of them have run into substantial problems not actually related much to China.

    Its defense industrial base has also substantially rusted. They cannot build any rail. The high-speed rail in California should be recognized as a national humiliation. It should really be either canceled or completed—ideally by the Chinese—because it should not be dragged out for much longer. But the case for being somewhat optimistic or hopeful about America is that the entrepreneurs, as the kids say in Silicon Valley, where I am speaking to you from, still have a choice. They are interested in making donuts. Nvidia is worth over four trillion dollars. There are a handful of companies worth over three trillion dollars.

    We can debate how much these valuations really matter. I am a little skeptical of them—they are simply a financial fiction—but that is still significant. The entrepreneurial class in America still looks transcendent and much more powerful than its European counterparts. It was actually spending quite a lot of time in Europe that made me a little more hopeful about Donald Trump as well.

    Let me say clearly that I am disappointed, shocked, and stressed out by most of the actions that Donald Trump has imposed throughout his second administration: attacks on the judiciary, ICE raids, and the terror he is spreading among less-fortunate Americans. I am stressed out by all of these things. But it was walking through Copenhagen, which feels so stable, that made me a little more hopeful about Trump.

    In Copenhagen, very little changes. As I spent more time there, I thought that Donald Trump is the wrong answer to every question, but he is able to raise questions that perhaps should be asked. What should be done with parts of the American economy, parts of the American government, and parts of higher education in America? He is always the wrong answer to these questions, but at least these questions are being asked in a way that Europeans are not very interested in asking.

    Mounk: From a perspective that is between the continents, how do you see the American debate about abundance? I assume that you agree, as I do, with the broad premise that we need to build a lot more things—that the answer to many of our social, economic, and political problems is to have more housing available, better infrastructure, and all those things. That would create more economic opportunity and help address problems like the rising costs of housing, which now take away so much of America’s putative affluence.

    Do you think that America is going to be able to put in place an abundant society? Do you think that the society of lawyers will be able to learn some of the lessons of the Chinese engineering state, or are you pessimistic about America’s prospects in this regard?

    Wang: Generally, my disposition is to be a gloomy pessimist, but given that I am speaking to you now from Silicon Valley, I want to self-identify as a bright and sunny optimist from California. On abundance, I want to be optimistic. To put my cards on the table, I am a partisan for abundance. I spoke at the Abundance Conference last month, and I want to be hopeful that we are able to figure out abundance.

    To me, abundance has two clear pillars. The first is speaking mostly to the left, to say that the American left needs to be much more focused on the supply side rather than just subsidizing demand whenever prices rise. The second is that abundance is interested in building state capacity, such that California High-Speed Rail is able to build rather than remain mired in the desert. That seems to me to be a clear and strong political program: California and New York, as well as other blue states, should not simply tolerate the emigration of their people into red states because they cannot afford to build.

    There is something very strange that I do not understand—how the Democrats cannot grasp the fact that the more people emigrate, the less political power they will have. Liberals and the left should be interested in building greater state power. Now, can the lawyerly society actually overcome this? That is going to be a challenge because, as I state, the Democrats are the more lawyerly party. They are the party where the law school students tend to go.

    The level of cultural change I am interested in is to shift more law students away from the problems of the 1960s. I was a fellow at Yale Law School and saw this up close. Students there are still mostly interested in solving the problems of the 1960s. People regularly invoke the name of Robert Moses to resist building almost anything at all. Many are still deeply invested in the idea that social-impact legislation is the highest form of practice.

    I think we should think instead about building capacities within government rather than trying to tear down government once more. What I am interested in is changing the culture of the lawyerly elites to say that it is good to build, that it is great to build political power, rather than to continue litigating the problems of the 1960s instead of solving the problems of the 2020s.

    Mounk: There is one thing that I find really striking about China today, and I have been trying to understand it. I have asked many people about it and have never had a fully satisfactory answer. China is now influential in many realms, but the area in which it continues to lack is soft power, particularly cultural influence around the world. Chinese cuisine is very popular—and I love Chinese cuisine, by the way. There is a lot of Sichuan food around the world. There is not very much Yunnanese food, but there are excellent culinary traditions in Yunnan. There are reserves of Chinese dishes that foreigners could come to discover and love.

    For example, I am trying to learn Chinese, and I find it difficult to find Chinese shows that I personally enjoy watching. There is very little good content in terms of an average sitcom or drama that one could watch without feeling that it is a slog. Japan and South Korea have had major cultural moments with anime, films, and television shows, but China has not had that in the same way.

    I am struck by the fact that most highly-educated people in the West would struggle to name more than three or four living Chinese people who are actually living and working in China. They can name Xi Jinping, perhaps Ai Weiwei, and maybe one or two athletes—but that is about it.

    Do you share that diagnosis? Do you think that is about to change? Is it simply that China’s wealth is so recent that it has not had time to develop that soft power yet? Or are there more fundamental reasons for why China lacks that soft power, perhaps in part related to how a non-democratic regime constrains creativity?

    Wang: I think that, unfortunately, the answer is very simple, and I fully agree with your diagnosis. One of the most controversial claims I have been making for years is that China is a puny underperformer in terms of the creation of a global culture. I think it is a puny underperformer because it is the engineering state.

    What are some of these cultural products? Cuisine, I think, is not a recent cultural creation. But what are some cultural products that China has actually produced over the last few years or decades? People might be able to name The Three-Body Problem. Perhaps people might claim TikTok, although TikTok is mostly not showing Chinese content to its users. Maybe a few art-house movies, maybe Yao Ming and basketball—but that is about it. Relative to Japan and South Korea, I think that is exactly the right comparison. Out of Japan, you have anime, manga, the Sony Walkman, the Game Boy, and Mario. Out of South Korea, you have K-pop, Squid Game, Parasite, and all sorts of great movies.

    The simple answer is that the engineers cannot take a joke. Engineers are not very fun people to talk to at parties. They do not even want to talk to you most of the time. I remember being struck last year when a comedian in Shanghai made a joke involving a military slogan. In response, China closed almost all comedy clubs in Shanghai for several months. That is the sort of thing that happens in an engineering state. Engineers are censorious people. They censor whatever they cannot understand.

    I think that is the chief reason that China, even with people who are incredibly creative, has not become a global cultural powerhouse. Chinese youths have amazing memes. Chinese people are very funny. I come from Yunnan, and I am a partisan for the southwest of China, where I think people from Sichuan and Yunnan really do like to sit around over tea and make jokes. I think we are the funniest region of China, and I am always very sad that all of these creative talents are suppressed and strangled by the engineers.

    I also wish that Yunnan food could become globally popular, but the challenge is that Yunnan cuisine really prizes fresh ingredients like mushrooms. It is hard to find even great Yunnan cuisine in Beijing and Shanghai, to say nothing of London or Amsterdam. I wish that Yunnan cuisine could be exported. I actually had great Yunnan food in Cupertino last week. Let us make Yunnan cuisine more global. I am all for that.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Dan discuss the role of artificial intelligence, how moving to Canada as a boy impacted Dan’s life, and why so many people in China still choose to emigrate. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    58 min
  • Open Societies Are Stronger Than They Appear
    George Orwell at his typewriter. (Photo: ullstein bild Dtl. via Getty.)

    Across the modern New Right, or the climate-activist left, there is a widespread belief that the very characteristics which were once hailed as America’s strengths are weaknesses. Pluralism, it’s often said, makes our society disparate and fractious. The rule of law hampers the government’s ability to solve big problems. And erratic election results remove leaders before they have a chance to implement lasting change.

    Some populists, fearing weakness more than totalitarianism, want to eliminate the diversity of our society in favor of unity. There’s a tendency among environmental activists to believe that the scale of the climate crisis requires doing away with free choice and democratic governance.

    But in all cases, these critics mistake strength for weakness. Many on the New Right in particular confuse projection with actual strength. They imagine that our enemies are about to eclipse us, that Russia and China will lead the future as America and the West inevitably decline. But real strength tends to be more about flexibility than unity. Open societies tend to be more adaptable than closed ones. And as we head into a period of history in which the lure of the closed society appears to be irresistibly growing, it’s worth remembering that we have all seen this movie before in the failures of closed societies, whether fascist or communist, throughout the 20th century. Now is a good time to consider how tough open societies really are—and why there is such a persistent tendency to underestimate their resilience.

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    The polymath Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a derivatives trader and philosopher of uncertainty, gives the example of the mouse and the elephant. The elephant dwarfs the mouse. But if an elephant falls from twice its own height, it breaks all of its bones. If the mouse falls from ten times its height, it runs away easily.

    Because we evolved in an environment in which size connoted strength, we mistake the size of the authoritarian government for strength. We don’t see the brittleness of the elephant’s bones. The idea is that our common sense—our primitive brain—can so often mislead us in the highly-complex modern environments that we find ourselves in, and a different kind of thinking is called for that emphasizes redundancy, diversification, openness, and, maybe most importantly, a deep layer of humility.

    It’s certainly striking that we see the same errors continually recurring. Throughout the 20th century, prominent commentators believed that the free world was declining and autocracy was the future. At every turn, they were proven wrong, and yet the same tired predictions keep cropping up. During the Cold War, many anticommunists believed they were on the losing side. Many on the left believed the USSR had a conviction and purpose that the West couldn’t hope to match. In the 1920s and ‘30s, American journalists and academics hailed both communism and fascism. The great investigative reporter Lincoln Steffens famously returned from the Soviet Union claiming he had “been over into the future and it [worked].” He also said that God “formed Mussolini out of the rib of Italy.” Mussolini in particular was beloved by American intellectuals from Columbia University’s president to muckraking journalists such as Ida Tarbell and Anne O’Hare McCormick.

    Even opponents of totalitarianism thought it might be inevitable. James Burnham’s 1941 The Managerial Revolution (now popular in some corners of the New Right) contains some of this fascination with authoritarian power projection. Burnham assumed that capitalism would give way to a new “managerial class” that would impose centralized planning. Elsewhere, Burnham juxtaposed the “fanaticism” of the Nazis with the supposed “apathy” of Britain and France. Throughout his work, he worried that free societies would prove too weak to resist creeping despotism.

    But Burnham should largely have been discredited by events in his own time, as George Orwell noted in his 1946 essay “Second Thoughts on James Burnham.” Orwell wrote:

    Power worship blurs political judgement because it leads, almost unavoidably, to the belief that present trends will continue … Such a manner of thinking is bound to lead to mistaken prophecies, because, even when it gauges the direction of events rightly, it will miscalculate their tempo. Within the space of five years Burnham foretold the domination of Russia by Germany and of Germany by Russia. In each case he was obeying the same instinct: the instinct to bow down before the conqueror of the moment, to accept the existing trend as irreversible.

    The polarity between Burnham and Orwell mirrors what we see today in writers who argue that America is a spent force and “post-liberalism” is needed to revitalize our sclerotic culture. Thinkers like Burnham saw the trends of the moment—the weakness of democracies, the apparently inexorable rise of the totalitarian states—and assumed they would continue forever. It is not difficult for the contemporary equivalents of Burnham to see division and balkanization in America—but they repeat Burnham’s mistake when they assume these trends will continue in a straight line and lead to our downfall.

    History, however, doesn’t work like this. Crises are usually unexpected and so too are their solutions. A dynamic and vibrant society which allows for a range of institutions is more likely than a top-down society to contain within it elements which will resist a crisis and even grow stronger.

    In his 2012 work Antifragile: Things That Gain From Disorder, Taleb attempted to account for this seeming paradox by contrasting the relatively simple environments in which “common sense” developed with the far more complex environments that we now find ourselves in and in which “black swan” events are ever more likely and have to be accounted for with “antifragile” systems. A perfect example would be the common-sense way in which “systematically preventing forest fires from taking place ‘to be safe’ makes the big one much worse.”

    So many of our policies then are held hostage by our outdated “common-sense” thinking, which tends only to make our societies that much more fragile. We think we’re protecting the economy when we impose greater state control, but we’re actually introducing barriers to adaptation that drag us down when external or internal shocks make adaptation necessary. We imagine that centralizing vast powers in a single authority creates a stronger society—which is exactly the wrong thing to do in a hyper-complex environment. We hope that by growing our government, we will be able to meet the challenges of the 21st century. But the more we try to control our economy, especially from the top down, the more we weaken it and set it up for failure. Taleb achieved a sort of proof-of-concept for his views with his 2007 book The Black Swan, which seemed, in retrospect, to be one of the better accounts of the financial crisis that hit the next year—demonstrating the limitations of “optimized” thinking and the inevitability of transformative “black swan” events.

    The antidote, in Taleb’s view, is to get away from common sense and the primitive need to control and to accept a degree of randomness and volatility. The free market—the antithesis of centralized planning—is not only more fluid and flexible and can therefore better respond to shocks, it also avoids the “doubling-down” common in highly-regulated markets which can make minor crises systemic. Redundancy, distribution of power, and permission to innovate can make a society robust to the same shocks that would tear apart a more ironclad, muscle-bound system.

    We can see some of these dynamics playing out in the spreading contemporary animus towards the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution certainly seems less than a fully-optimized system of managerial control, and thinkers on both the left and right have argued that, accordingly, the Constitution isn’t up to the challenges of the 21st century. But, with Taleb to help guide us, we can see that that’s exactly the wrong approach and underestimates the core strengths of the Constitution. The Constitution establishes a federal system of overlapping sovereignty, with a supreme national government sharing power with separate state governments whose power isn’t delegated by the national government. It is precisely this decentralization (similar to, as Taleb notes, the federalism of Switzerland’s cantons) which makes American society robust to the sort of rapid regime change we see in various parts of the world today. Or, as James Madison put it in Federalist 10, “any… improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.”

    The American Founders studied classical and Enlightenment philosophy. But they also studied the history of republican forms of government and why they failed, in order to understand how those failures might be averted. The Constitution they created is now the oldest in the world.

    Taleb writes of “the Lindy effect” that technologies which have already survived the longest are the likeliest to survive into the future, and the newer a technology, the more quickly it will become obsolete. That our Constitution has survived as long as it has says something about its durability. But its durability is not a mere accident. Its structure is more robust and resistant to shocks than most other constitutions. It is a model of antifragility, of a system with redundancies and apparent inefficiencies built into it—and the features that so often prove unpopular, that are less than fully “optimized,” are precisely those that help ensure its resilience.

    There is decentralization. Also, the fact that change is slow. And frequent elections mean that coalitions rarely reign long enough to enact their will, unless they represent a true and lasting majority of the popular will in a majority of the states. Where an authoritarian leader can decree that a nation will pursue a particular direction, a society like ours requires buy-in from a sustainable majority, with the consequence that a new societal direction must be deeper and broader (and therefore more real) than in a top-down society in which ephemeral power-projection can substitute for actual change at the ground level.

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    The resilience of the Constitution offers a useful model for the challenges to come in the next decades. Because we cannot predict the future, we cannot, as Taleb argues, prepare for shocks. The best we can do is to ensure that our systems contain enough redundancy and adaptability to handle them.

    The critics of free societies are right when they say that unions, businesses, churches, civic organizations, universities, non-profits, and thousands of other institutions pull us in different directions. They are right when they say that autocracies have unity that we lack, whether they point to Putin’s Russia or Mussolini’s Italy. But they are wrong to imagine that diversification makes free societies weak, or that streamlining renders closed societies strong. Instead, it is free societies that are set up to survive and thrive in an uncertain future, and closed societies which mask weakness.

    That isn’t to say that free societies will always defeat closed ones, nor that history always moves in the direction of greater freedom. Humans will probably always make the same mistakes we have throughout history. But for those today who want to ditch freedom in the name of strength, don’t be fooled by the illusion of power.

    Ben Connelly is a writer and long-distance runner living in Virginia. His Substack is Hardihood Books where he writes a mix of fiction and nonfiction.

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