Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • The Real Cause of Populism

    In this conversation, Francis Fukuyama is joined by Jeremiah Johnson from the Center for New Liberalism to examine different possible reasons for our divided politics. They conclude that social media is the leading cause of the global rise of populism.

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    All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison and Leonora Barclay.

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    37 min
  • The Good Fight Club: Trump’s New Ballroom, a Looming Attack on Venezuela, and Why Social Media Explains the Rise of Populism

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk, Francis Fukuyama and Mona Charen discuss Trump’s latest actions, from demolishing the East Wing of the White House to demanding compensation from the Justice Department; whether the Trump administration’s bombing boats in Venezuela might lead to further military action; and the link between social media and populism.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Mona Charen, syndicated columnist and author, is Policy Editor of The Bulwark and host of two weekly podcasts: The Mona Charen Show and Just Between Us.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Welcome to the ninth installment of The Good Fight Club. Today I am joined by Mona Charen, as well as our regular co-host and panelist, Francis Fukuyama.

    We thought we would talk about what Trump has done, then we decided to consolidate it all into a general Trump-palooza. We’ve seen the demolition of parts of the East Wing of the White House to make way for his ballroom. We’ve seen Trump demand hundreds of millions of dollars from the Department of Justice as compensation for his own prosecution by that department—one that may have been greenlit by his own political appointees.

    We’re now seeing a number of Trump opponents being indicted one after another. Has the government been fully personalized and submitted to the will and whim of Donald Trump? Where are we at?

    Mona Charen: I should start the discussion about the demolition of the East Wing with a little bit of personal history, because I actually worked in that building back in the Reagan administration for about six months. I worked for First Lady Nancy Reagan, so I was in that building quite a bit. It’s wounding to me for that reason, but not just for that reason.

    I think many Americans are shocked by the images of bulldozers tearing down a part of the White House. Yes, it has only been in its current form since World War II, but that’s a long time, and a lot of history has transpired since then. It was the entrance through which tourists would begin their visit to the White House. They would see the garden Jacqueline Kennedy put in and the graceful colonnade. All of it was stately, proportional, and befitting a republic.

    The White House was carefully designed not to be a palace, not to be a king’s residence, not to be monarchical, but to be stately and suited to this country. For this president to simply demolish it in favor of a gaudy monstrosity of a ballroom is appalling.

    Yascha and Frank, to give you a sense of the scale—the current White House, including the West Wing, is about 55,000 square feet. That’s the entire structure, not counting the East Wing. The ballroom he proposes, which I’ve called Mar-a-White House, is 90,000 square feet. It will dwarf the existing White House.

    Mounk: In its defence, the most important function of the government is surely to hold balls and parties.

    Charen: Yes, exactly. You need an event space. It’s obscene to do this, and yet you can’t help it—the metaphor is screaming at all of us. This is the physical representation of what Trump is doing to the presidency and to the country. He is demolishing our history, demolishing our traditions, all in the name of erecting monuments to himself.

    Mounk: I have to say it’s very hard to predict what images will appear in history books that commemorate this era of American politics. One of them may be the attempted assassination of Donald Trump. There are many other images one might imagine surviving in the history books, but a bulldozer taking down part of the White House surely must be one of the candidates for that.

    Charen: They attempted to prevent Treasury Department employees from snapping photos, since the Treasury is just across the street, because they knew it would be a bad look.

    Francis Fukuyama: Jonathan Van Last on The Bulwark suggested a couple of days ago that it should be on the agenda of the next president to tear down all of these monuments in the name of historical preservation and restore the old building. I’m fully supportive of that because I really don’t think elected American presidents ought to be allowed to raise monuments to themselves.

    Mona’s exactly right—that’s what he’s doing. It’s also another illustration of his view of executive power. There is a process by which these architectural changes are vetted by people who care about the surroundings, the history, and everything else. He completely bypassed that. Even within his own administration, they didn’t talk about this. It was just his idea. Once again, it’s a complete abuse of executive power under this presidency.

    Mounk: Yeah, one of the striking things in this moment is that there are fears about what the personalization of the government will do to the rule of law and the separation of powers. I think we’re in a bad place there, but it’s not yet the case that most Americans are afraid they’re going to be chucked in jail if they criticize the president or anything like that. But just the sheer personalization of the government in ways that were hard to imagine ten months ago is really striking.

    This to me is what connects these two stories. The sitting president saying the Department of Justice owes me money and the Department of Justice apparently considering paying it back to him. I imagine the courts are going to have something to say about that, but it’s striking. A president wanting to make alterations to the White House is, in principle, an appropriate thing for a president to want to initiate. But there would have been some kind of process. There would have been some kind of way in which you would get in stakeholders and make decisions.

    It’s both the popular appeal but also the way in which this administration is going to really lose the patience of the American people by saying, I can just do stuff. If I think the East Wing sucks and we should have a big, beautiful ballroom, I’m just going to do it. Who’s the architect, even? Like who came up with these plans, by what process? It’s really striking that nothing seems to be able to stop Trump from doing this. Nothing seems to be able to stop him from the tariffs, for I guess the Supreme Court is going to eventually rule on that. Nothing seems to be able to stop him from bringing a bunch of dodgy indictments against his political enemies, even though perhaps they’re not going to end up being actually sentenced to prison terms.

    Charen: First of all, Yascha, I think your idea that the image of the bulldozer will go down in history is a good one because it is such a perfect metaphor. Yes, he is bulldozing all of the traditional checks that have restrained presidential whims in the past.

    Just on this topic—to make changes in the White House, you would normally have to go through the National Capital Planning Commission and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. You would get notice and comment from the public, and you would discuss it with Congress. None of that happened. He is bulldozing not just this part of the building, but all of the normal procedures that would have governed this kind of thing.

    There was an idea to build a federal building in New York a few years back, and they discovered that it had been a burial ground for black slaves in the seventeenth century. All construction was halted. In the name of historic preservation, the project was suspended. That is the way things normally work. Here, where it is a far more important historical building—a symbol of the country—it is simply bulldozed.

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    But also, Yascha, if I may, I’d like to push back a little on something you said a second ago, which is that people aren’t afraid of the president coming after them. I think you’re underestimating that. Some people are continuing to vigorously express their views, but many are holding back. Many are saying they chose to remain anonymous “for fear of retribution.” Read any story about what Trump is doing and you will see that quote repeated constantly—that people are afraid of retribution, they are afraid of being targeted.

    That certainly applies even to members of the press. One more thing: look at the list of companies that have contributed to this ballroom—companies giving money directly into Trump’s pocket—Amazon, Apple, Coinbase, Comcast, Google, HP, Union Pacific Railroad. It is amazing the degree to which all of these corporate titans are lining up to “bend the knee,” to “pay the Danegeld.” It’s a different country.

    Mounk: You have to wonder whether he’s going to give one of those companies naming rights—whether the biggest donor will be able to make it the “OpenAI at the White House Ballroom” or the “Amazon Ballroom.”

    Charen: I think the name has already been chosen. It’s the Donald J. Trump ballroom.

    Mounk: Frank, what do you think the import of the personalization of the American government is—beyond the sadness of this historical building being altered in this way, with its resident symbolism? In terms of the impact this is actually going to have on the functioning of the American government, what are the elements you’re most worried about? What are you watching to see whether we’re reaching yet another stage of escalation?

    Fukuyama: Well, domestically, the main focus has been on these prosecutions of James Comey and Letitia James. By the way, I actually think both of those are going to fall apart. They’re probably going to disqualify Lindsey Halligan as a prosecutor, and there’s simply not going to be a case. Something very similar could happen with Letitia James. Bolton, I think, is in bigger trouble because it sounds like that’s a much more serious indictment. But I actually think the system will work in terms of the other two frivolous attacks on Trump’s enemies.

    The personalization, I think, is most visible in foreign policy. There is no such thing as a “Trump Doctrine.” There’s no consistent set of principles that explain his foreign policy. He’s not an isolationist; he’s perfectly happy to use American power to interfere in the internal politics of Brazil, India, and a lot of other places. The thing that binds everything together is Donald Trump’s fragile ego.

    He’s against attacking Iran until he’s handed an opportunity on a silver platter to do it quickly—in and out—and declare victory. He’s offended by the fact that Prime Minister Modi doesn’t want to support his bid for a Nobel Prize, and so he throws forty years of cultivating good U.S.–Indian relations into the toilet. The only thing binding all of this together is his ego.

    These days, a lot of countries around the world are trying to calculate how they can use his expressed desire for a Nobel Peace Prize to manipulate American foreign policy. The thinking goes, if we make the right moves, maybe Trump will think he can get a prize for dealing with us, and we’ll get what we want. That’s the epitome of personalization. There’s no Trump Doctrine—there’s just Trump’s self-interest driving all of it.

    Mounk: That leads us naturally into the second set of topics we’re going to talk about, which is foreign policy. Frank, I know that you’ve been very interested and concerned about some of the Trump administration’s actions in bombing Venezuelan boats that are supposedly carrying drugs and operated by drug gangs. You think this might actually be the prelude to a more robust set of actions against the Maduro regime in Venezuela, even some kind of ground invasion.

    Tell us about what the Trump administration has been doing in that part of the world, and why you think a president who promised in his inaugural speech and his campaign that he was not going to get America into new wars—who did bomb Iran, but in a kind of very quick blitz that allowed him to tell Americans, this is the first war America has won in a long time, and it wasn’t a real war, and nobody really felt it, and it was over after a day—might now get embroiled in a military adventure that is probably going to be of much longer duration, much more perilous to American lives and treasure, and a much more substantial operation than the one we’ve previously seen.

    Fukuyama: I think some military action is going to happen because they’ve sent a ton of equipment down there. There are probably ten or a dozen American warships in the area. They’ve sent F-35s, drones, and lots of equipment. For them to back away from an actual military incursion after that kind of buildup is going to be pretty hard.

    They backgrounded the press. I don’t know who did it, but there was a story in The New York Times that the CIA is making plans to try to overthrow the Maduro regime. That’s not something leaked by a dissident voice in the administration to prevent it from happening—they obviously wanted people to know.

    The most optimistic construction you can put on all of this is that it’s basically a game of chicken. They’re hoping that Maduro—who is really not popular in Venezuela and not popular among the lower ranks of his own military—might actually be intimidated into seeking an out and stepping down. Then they get a quick win; they don’t actually have to do anything militarily, but they can claim a scalp by getting rid of him.

    By the way, that would be great if that could happen. All of my friends in the Venezuelan democratic opposition are just so frustrated at this point because in July 2024, they had an election in which the opposition candidate won by 30 or 40 points, and the regime still overturned it. They’ve kind of given up on peaceful ways of getting rid of Maduro. So the goal is fine.

    What I fear, though, is Trump’s psychology. He’s already gotten these foreign policy “wins.” In Gaza, he got the ceasefire—which is a genuine achievement because Netanyahu handed him that golden opportunity. Netanyahu also gave him an opportunity with bombing Iran, and he’s gotten away with both of those. So I think, in his mind, he’s thinking, I’m actually pretty good at this stuff. I don’t have to observe any of the limits that prior presidents thought they had to respect. I can get another easy win in Venezuela.

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    What I don’t think he’s considering is the next step: What if we really do get rid of Maduro? Because if that requires putting boots on the ground in Caracas, he might actually go ahead and do that. Obviously, the big worry is that even if you do get rid of Maduro, you’re going to have the same problem as in Iraq—you don’t have a plan for replacing him with a more reasonable regime. That leads to an internal dynamic where you get sucked in deeper and deeper because you don’t want to be responsible for leaving Venezuela in chaos, where all these gangs and narco-traffickers take over. That’s a formula for getting the United States involved much more deeply on the ground.

    Mounk: One of the genuine strengths that Trump has as a political leader is that he can somehow say he’s going to do things and then desist from them with less damage to him politically than other people would suffer. If other presidents had gone back and forth on what they were doing to a third or even a fifth of the extent that Trump has, they would be known as weak and as flip-floppers. Because Trump is such a bully and full of bluster, it actually buys him the ability to look like he’s going to do X, then stop doing X, sell that with the same gusto with which he sold doing X, and walk away politically unscathed.

    Perhaps you’re right that the gambit here is to put all of this pressure on Venezuela and hope that Maduro will somehow fall. If he does, that’s an amazing outcome, and I think we all agree that it would be. The vast majority of Venezuelans would agree as well. That would give Trump a third big policy win.

    I don’t think that’s likely. With dictatorships, it’s always very hard to know when they will fall, and Maduro is certainly unpopular. There must be people even within his regime who would love an opportunity to oust him. At the same time, he has proven to be very resilient. He has bought the loyalty of much of the officer class with bribes of enormous proportion. The officers are basically drug cartels, profiting very handsomely off it. As long as they continue to make those profits, they’re likely to remain loyal to the Maduro regime.

    Perhaps they now worry that a ground invasion by the United States would be the end of their trade and that it would be better to depose Maduro and install some other figure who continues the same basic record. It’s imaginable, but it doesn’t seem very likely.

    Fukuyama: No, I don’t think it’s likely at all. One of the interesting facts about Venezuela is that they have about ten times the number of flag officers—generals and admirals—that the United States does per number of enlisted people because Maduro has created this gigantic corps of people who are basically leeches. They’re all sucking off the drug revenues that the country can generate, and they have no future if Maduro falls. There’s no legitimate way for them to continue funding their villas in Miami or wherever.

    So, yes, I think the regime is going to be much more resilient. I do think that there is probably going to be some kind of overt military action that will escalate and maybe try to scare them a little bit more. But it’s very hard to see a really positive outcome from this.

    Mounk: Mona, what do you think is the game plan here? Are they hoping that Maduro will just vanish into thin air, or what are they up to?

    Charen: So there are a few ways to look at this. One is that Trump does have a style. You can compare his threats and escalation against Venezuela with his use of tariffs, where he will threaten, I will impose 100% tariffs on you. It’s a way to use shock and awe, then extract concessions, and finally back down from that original so-called bargaining position.

    So yours and Frank’s supposition that this is an attempt to bully and scare Maduro out of power—maybe that’s right, maybe that’s an extension of the same tactic. But it’s important to recognize a few things in terms of foreign policy. First of all, the attacks on Venezuela—which I think we all agree is a terrible regime, and the world would be far better off if it were replaced by something democratic and rights-respecting—have been based on lies and pretexts.

    The notion that Tren de Aragua is a paramilitary force that reports to Maduro and has been infiltrated into the United States is not true. The idea that the United States should take unilateral action, blowing up boats off the Venezuelan shore on the grounds that they may be smuggling drugs, is patently a violation of international law. It’s a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It’s a complete departure from the way the United States has conducted itself.

    There’s also the fact that if Trump actually makes war—kinetic war—on Venezuela by using some of those many military assets moving into the region, he will have a problem with parts of the MAGA base who were sold on “no more wars,” “no more forever wars,” “no more any wars.” They were already stirring a bit when he attacked Iran. This would be much larger than that.

    Finally, I would endorse everything Frank said about the risks of such an undertaking. There is absolutely no evidence that Trump or the people around him—certainly not Hegseth—are capable of thinking beyond a one-week time horizon. What comes next? What if you do attack? Have you considered all of the fallout that may happen? What if an even more vicious leader arises to take Maduro’s place from within the Maduro circle? There are all kinds of negative possibilities that I have no confidence this administration has thought through.

    Fukuyama: One concern I have is actually for María Corina Machado, the winner of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize, who is a wonderful person and a very strong leader. She guided the Venezuelan opposition through this whole process. She wasn’t allowed to run herself, so she supported the campaign of Edmundo González, who did win the election.

    She’s now in a very difficult position because she can’t alienate Trump. She did this clever thing after receiving the Nobel Prize—she called him and said, “I think you should have won it.” She understands how to play that game. But there’s already criticism of her from progressives, many of whom call her a fascist, which is a ridiculous label but it feeds into the broader Latin American strain of anti-Americanism.

    She faces very unpalatable choices. If she’s put in power by the Trump administration, that’s going to taint her, and it will taint her with many Americans too, since a lot of Americans can’t stand anything associated with Trump. Installing a regime in another country will naturally provoke disgust, and she doesn’t deserve that. She truly deserves to be the legitimate democratic leader of Venezuela.

    On the other hand, if there’s a failed attempt at regime change, that will also rebound on the heads of all our friends in Venezuela who are genuinely fighting for democracy. I’m really worried about this situation and how it will play out in domestic American politics as well.

    Mounk: I want to take this beyond Venezuela for a moment. One way that both of you seem to be thinking about what Trump is up to is that he’s taking these big foreign policy gambles. Sometimes they may be gambles where the likely outcome is positive, but there’s a very bad negative outcome at the tail end that he’s not considering.

    When you think of something like the bombing of Iran or, going back to the first Trump administration, the assassination of a key Iranian general—perhaps the likely outcome was that it would go okay. But there was a small, significant chance that Iran would decide to avenge itself on the United States in ways that would be truly terrible. It’s too early to rule out that this is what they are, in some way, planning—placing a dirty bomb somewhere in the United States or something else the Iranian regime would certainly be morally capable of doing.

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    When things have that kind of structure, the likely outcome is that things will go well, so the first few times you try it, they do. But that success emboldens you to keep doing it everywhere. Eventually, you hit the negative jackpot. Eventually, you stumble across the mine that explodes.

    What we’re seeing with the Trump administration is a president who promised—and had a lot of electoral appeal by saying—that he would make America less active in the world, that he would pull back the extension of the American empire, that he would focus on bread-and-butter national self-interest. Instead, he’s now driven by a mix of hyperactivity and personal self-aggrandizement to go on this series of small-scale military adventures.

    These are not the one big adventure of a Bush-style invasion of Iraq but a pattern of smaller military or foreign policy gambits. Perhaps he gets lucky and we all get lucky, and none of them go badly wrong. But if we have to expect another ten of these over the next three years, what happens when he gets bored of Venezuela? Whether he manages to have a huge success and Maduro is ousted—unlikely as that seems—or whether he pulls back at the last moment, what then? Do they go on to Panama? Greenland? All these other dogs that didn’t bark? What else are we to expect in the next three years?

    Fukuyama: Well, I think you have to understand that the only way to analyze Trump’s policy, either domestic or foreign is through personal psychology, not principles or policy positions. The domestic and foreign policies are of a piece. He came in believing, from the first term, that Article Two says I can do anything I want, but he was stopped from doing a lot of what he wanted to do.

    Now, in the second term, he’s saying to himself, Yeah, actually, I can go after political opponents. I can go after the prosecutors who went after me. I can bomb Iran. I can do all sorts of things. And look, he hasn’t suffered any consequences. All those people who told him he couldn’t—H.R. McMaster, Rex Tillerson—he thinks he’s proved them wrong.

    So this is just going to escalate, and unfortunately, one of these initiatives is going to end in a big disaster that everyone can see. It’s not going to be good for the country, and really, that’s the only thing that’s going to stop him. He’s like a ten-year-old with a flamethrower saying, wow, look, I can set this house on fire—that’s great! Nobody’s going to stop me.

    Charen: I’m old enough to remember when we had a Congress that did oversight. It used to hold the president’s feet to the fire. It used to call the secretaries of defense and state for public grilling. Congress is still the first branch. The notion of three coequal branches, as has been rightly said, is a myth. The founders intended—and thought, wrongly—that Congress would be the most powerful branch. Congress still has inherently tremendous power. But now that the Republican Party has chosen to sacrifice all of its power to the president, it makes it all the more pressing that the other party gain control of at least one house.

    We haven’t yet seen the Democratic Party come out of its low approval ratings, although it’s improving a little bit. So it is up to the voters. It shouldn’t have been up to the voters to do this. It should have been the major institutions that held fast, starting with Congress, against this usurpation and personalization of power, which was exactly what we fought a revolution to get away from. But that hasn’t happened. So now it really does fall to the people. The “No Kings” rallies were at least a sign of spirit and life out there in the electorate.

    Mounk: I’m sure we’ll come back to both the state of the Democrats and their likely fate in the midterms many times over upcoming Good Fight Clubs. For the final segment of this conversation, I want to do something that I think is important in these regular discussions: go beyond the political moment to some broader questions that help explain it.

    One of the key questions we should ask ourselves right now is, why is populism rising—not just in the United States, but seemingly everywhere? I’m in Switzerland as I’m recording this, speaking at an event. The comparatively moderate far-right populist party here is top of the polls and stronger than ever. In Britain, France, and Germany, populists are leading in the polls or at least tied. We see political figures who have won power in India and Turkey, and others who were in power but are now out, waiting to return in Brazil and Poland, among others.

    I’ve tried in the past to explain why that is, as have many others. One obvious explanation has always been the internet and social media—but it was usually listed alongside other possible causes. Frank, you recently published an article called “It’s the Internet, Stupid.” It’s one of the most-read pieces in the history of Persuasion. In it, you argue that while other causes may matter somewhat, the one truly convincing explanation is technological—the internet and social media.

    Why did you change your mind about that? Why do you now think the technological dimension is the key to understanding and explaining this phenomenon?

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha, Francis, and Mona explore how social media has led to a surge in populism, the link with political violence, and why the threat is greater than for previous technological revolutions. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    38 min
  • Hegseth’s Dangerous Obsession With Lethality
    War Secretary Pete Hegseth. (Photo by Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    If we wanted to take the goal of pure theory as the actual goal we set, and derive from that the means which we should apply, we would arrive by interactions to the extreme—but this conclusion would be a pure figment of the imagination, produced by a barely visible thread of logical sophistry.

    – Carl von Clausewitz

    We unleash overwhelming and punishing violence on the enemy. We also don’t fight with stupid rules of engagement. We untie the hands of our warfighters to intimidate, demoralize, hunt, and kill the enemies of our country. No more politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement.

    – Pete Hegseth

    In On War, Clausewitz wrote, perhaps too optimistically, that the tendency of war to turn extreme would find its counterweight in the principles of statecraft that abhor such a waste of effort. In Wilhelmine Germany, the army had largely escaped the oversight of any statesman, and its assertions of the necessity of extreme measures and total victory were not seriously questioned. The German army became involved in the systematic killing of civilians in colonial wars not through true military necessity nor because of a discrete political goal, but due to a culture that emphasized ever-increasing violence as a uniform tactic.

    Isabel Hull’s book on the military culture of the German Army is titled Absolute Destruction, and traces the consequences of the fixation on this concept through both the Wilhelmine era and the Third Reich. In particular, she traces how the pursuit of absolute destruction as a definition of victory turned into wanton killing of civilians during the Boxer Rebellion and to outright genocide when suppressing colonial rebellions. This drive to the extreme was ineffective and often counterproductive, being not just criminal, but a waste of effort.

    Unfortunately, the preoccupation with destruction as a proxy for victory has not remained a matter of history. “Lethality” has long been a buzzword at the Pentagon, but the second Trump administration has elevated it to an obsession. A recent speech by Pete Hegseth in which he presented his vision for how America’s military must change illustrates this.

    A Policy of Wanton Destruction

    Ideals of “lethality” or “absolute destruction of the enemy” appeal to the same impulse: the desire to destroy the one you hate. But the purpose of war is not destruction; rather, the purpose is to induce your enemy to fulfill your will, to gain something of political value. Clausewitz argues that the only reason the wars of “civilized” nations involve less wanton destruction than those of “uncivilized” ones is because the civilized have developed more effective uses of violence. But Clausewitz was by no means unaware of the ways in which the elemental forces of emotion could affect the conduct of war in all cases. As he wrote, “tensions can exist that make the eruption of war a veritable explosion.” Yet, in civilized nations, this does not give rise to a shapeless mass of primal violence, but rather violence that is molded by the state and civil society towards a political purpose with defined boundaries—based on the intensity of hostile feeling, but also rational interest.

    But we are talking here about something rather different from a war over something relatively minor which becomes a vast conflagration. We are talking about the choice of an armed forces or government to insist that extreme conduct in war is itself a means to victory. Clausewitz wrote much on the concept of the extreme in war, but he was concerned with the extremity of effort, of the extent to which a state or people might exert themselves in pursuit of victory. This is entirely distinct from the matter of how “extreme” or indiscriminate the conduct of a war might be. Wanton murder of civilians is not indicative of a higher degree of exertion towards victory. Murder of non-combatants may be more likely in a more passionate, all-encompassing struggle, but it may also be present in a minor skirmish with no serious aims. The decision to engage in violence towards civilians is either a raw, barbarous outburst by individuals, or it is a policy of the state. In either case, it cannot be considered as something belonging to war itself. It is either a personal act or an act of state distinct from the business of war.

    How can this be so? Does Clausewitz not define war as the “continuation of policy by other means”? Clausewitz also describes war as a duel on a larger scale. This image is useful because it demonstrates how it is the interaction between two wills that makes war a phenomenon distinct from the mere application of state power. Violence against the nonresisting is therefore no more war than a man shooting his wife is a duel. To kill civilians is a policy choice. It is also a crime. The mistake of considering it a part of war comes from the fact that it frequently accompanies war. But violence against civilians also includes the act of troops firing into a crowd of protestors, which certainly does not belong to war.

    But what is the significance of mistaking an act of policy for part of war, if war is the continuation of policy? Aside from what we have already said about the peculiar nature of war, it must be remembered that war is a means by which policy can be pursued, and so this error confuses means and ends. It disguises a political decision as military necessity to prevent it from being scrutinized on its own terms.

    The Golden Calf of Lethality

    The “lethality” fetish is one form of this confusion between means and ends. The term lacks any specific or direct meaning in the context of war. At first glance, this may seem surprising, but when we consider that battles are not typically won by exterminating the other side, the relative unimportance of killing per se is more easily explained. The cult of lethality represents the central conviction of the school of thought (if it can be called as much) advanced by Hegseth: that the key to victory is killing people. Reciprocally, defeat (including the defeat in Afghanistan) can be explained by failure to kill enough people. This poor understanding of war on all levels invites immediate comparisons to Stalin’s pithy (but apocryphal) statement that “Death solves all problems—no man, no problem,” and to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s attempt to quantify success in the Vietnam War in terms of body count.

    But this must be accounted a serious insult to McNamara, for Hegseth has much more in common with the former; he too cares little for whether the dead are civilians. In fact, the evidence before us suggests that he would prefer some number of civilians were amongst the dead as proof of the lethality with which the “operators” are “operating.” How else might we explain his veneration of those who have deliberately killed civilians? His recent attempt to get the final word and “settle history” by glorifying the criminals of Wounded Knee comes to mind as a particularly pathetic example of this behavior. More notably, Hegseth is secretary of defense for precisely one reason: he spent his time on Fox News during the first Trump administration defending convicted war criminal and alleged (by his comrades) murderer Eddie Gallagher. It was this that gained him the favor of President Trump. Hegseth’s lack of qualifications, lack of competence, and many personal failings were overlooked because he aligned with Trump in believing that implementing a caricature of the warrior aesthetic and targeting civilians is a sure means to victory.

    It’s worth discussing two reasons for why we should consider “lethality” deficient as a goal around which to orient a military. On the tactical level, killing the enemy is a means, not an end in itself. The end is to render him incapable of further resistance, for which purpose non-lethal injuries and surrender are no less suitable. Capturing prisoners in particular is generally superior to having to actually kill the enemy—convincing the enemy to give themselves up rather than sell their lives dearly will invariably be less costly. There is no rationale for giving special prominence to killing, and doing so will inherently obscure the larger goal.

    The second count of the weakness of lethality is its unsuitability as a metric on the strategic level. Battles may perhaps be won or lost on the basis of lethality (though I have argued to the contrary) but reducing the question of victory or defeat in war to whether there was enough lethality is plainly absurd. Strategy cannot be reduced to counting corpses. War is a political act, and so success can only be measured by progress towards achieving a political end. To take killing as the purpose of a military is to reduce the enterprise to a cargo cult, imitating behaviors without understanding their purpose.

    Idolatry of the “Warfighter”

    Another aspect of the Trump-Hegseth vision for reshaping America’s military is that of “returning” to the ideal of the hyper-masculine “warfighter.” The idea that “warrior spirit” is the deciding factor in war is common in history; we see it in machismo, élan, bushido, and general romantic ideals of heroism. We can even see it in Clausewitz’s citation of Napoleon’s claim that “the moral is to the physical as three is to one.”

    But from history we also see the impotence of raw courage and aggression in the face of superior organization, strategy, and materiél. The Romans did not lack courage at Cannae, nor the Gauls at Alesia, nor the Japanese on Iwo Jima, nor the Army of Virginia at Gettysburg, but that was far from enough to avoid defeat. We should not find this surprising. As war is the realm of danger, courage is the first military virtue, which allows the others to operate; it is necessary but not sufficient. There is no amount of courage that will protect against starvation or make good a lack of ammunition, so long as the enemy is not himself deficient in courage.

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    This gets to the fallacy at the heart of the fetishization of courage: the very fact that courage is essential means that modern militaries are highly adept at instilling it. In a business as deadly as war, the apex of human daring is soon achieved—that is, physical courage, the willingness to risk bodily harm, rather than the more elusive moral courage (for example of a commander to take a dangerous course and assume responsibility for it) which does not necessarily correlate with the first kind of courage.

    The development of physical courage therefore runs into sharply diminishing returns. “Warrior spirit” can therefore be no talisman against defeat. In a clash between the brave and the brave, marginally higher courage cannot compensate for deficiencies that come from neglecting all other fundamental parts of war, such as feeding, equipping, and maneuvering masses of people. It is this—not instilling courage—that is the true challenge of the practice of war.

    The Crusader for Incompetence

    Preoccupation with the aesthetics of the warrior and metrics like lethality are more than mere intellectual errors. With the zeal of an iconoclast, Hegseth has pursued the delusion that these hold the key to victory. The targets of his arson have been the real institutions that are useful for waging war, the unglamorous sinews that appear superfluous to someone who cannot be troubled to think deeply about the business. And this is not to mention the pretextual uses of these concepts to purge certain demographics from America’s military. The preoccupation with “lethality” and “warfighters” is already widespread, even if not in as perverse a magnitude as with Hegseth. The vacuousness of these terms is precisely their appeal. One may gesture at anything approvingly and bluster about its lethality or, just as easily, gesture disapprovingly and criticize its lack of lethality. What is key is not speaking in specifics, so you cannot be subject to any kind of criticism or risk being flatly wrong.

    The appeal to the mystical image of the “warfighter” is that it avoids having to discuss war in concrete terms. It sells the attractive myth that, by doing more of the parts of war that look cool and really make you feel like a man, you can actually win wars. Lame, pencil-pusher duties like logistics and map exercises are only around because of political correctness; real warriors spend all their time doing CQB drills and pushups. And let us not forget the importance of killing civilians. Once the warrior ethos is restored and every soldier is as happy to stab POWs as Eddie Gallagher allegedly was, the United States will never lose another war. It is the seductive promise that no serious introspection is needed for victory, only the satisfaction of base tendencies.

    It seems almost unfair to contrast these ideas of play-acting at soldiery with the genius of Clausewitz. But we must not forget that war is a serious business. It is easy and good to mock the fact that America has a buffoon for secretary of defense. But the impact of Hegseth and his school of thought will be measured in lives. Sooner or later, someone else will hold his office, but that is no guarantee that we will be free of the influence of these delusions. The only remedy is furthering the understanding of war as a serious affair requiring serious consideration, not the performance of a caricature.

    Kiran Pfitzner is a historian of civil-military relations and Clausewitz’s theory of war. He writes on those topics on Substack as @deadcarl.

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    0 min
  • The Great Feminization Hasn’t Gone Far Enough
    “I’m not like other girls, you see.” (Illustration by GraphicaArtis/Getty Images.)

    When I was 13 years old, most of the girls in my single-sex school failed a question on a science test: Why do teenage boys have higher levels of iron than girls?

    Different students took different approaches to the question. Maybe boys eat more red meat? Or their propensity for risk somehow gives them an added layer of protection?

    The answer is so obvious that you’re screaming at me: Boys don’t get periods. Our all-girls school had lulled us into a sense that the female is the default human. Of course, this brief period of tranquility didn’t last—soon we absorbed the concept developed by Simone de Beauvoir that man is default and woman is “Other.”

    Still, the intensity of an all-female environment has stayed with me in the decades since, so I read Helen Andrews’ recent viral essay “The Great Feminization” with interest and a raised eyebrow. Drawing on the blogger J. Stone, Andrews argues that many issues facing society today—especially wokeness—are in fact driven by the feminization of society. Andrews says, paraphrasing Stone, “all cancellations are feminine. Cancel culture is simply what women do whenever there are enough of them in a given organization or field.”

    Andrews’ argument relies on the fact that women are more likely to use ostracism and gossip to exclude or publicly shame individuals, and that these are the characteristics of left-wing cancel culture. She claims that as the number of women in various industries has grown, women began imposing these toxic norms in the workplace and public life in what she describes as a vast experiment in “social engineering.”

    There is a kernel of truth to Andrews’ claims. Like many women, I’ve felt the thrill of being part of a group excluding someone, and equally have felt the sting of ostracism myself. (Anyone who has ever joined a dysfunctional team at work knows that nothing unites a group like a common enemy, whether that’s a difficult boss or the person who takes away the free coffee.)

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    It’s true that prominent left-wing cancellations follow similar dynamics. In 2020, Matt Yglesias left Vox for Substack after (among other things) a colleague accused him of making her feel “less safe” for signing the pro-free speech Harper’s Letter. In 2023, Carole Hooven was forced to resign from Harvard for saying sex is biological and binary. According to a survey from the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), over half of academics are concerned about losing their jobs or reputations due to their words being used against them.

    What’s more, the surge of left-wing cancel culture during the 2010s and early 2020s did, roughly, coincide with increasing female participation in both education and the workplace. While female students have outnumbered male students since 1979, traditionally male subjects such as law and medicine became majority female only in 2016 and 2017, respectively. As Andrews points out, 55% of New York Times staff are now female. This broadly matches the timeline of the rise of wokeness and cancel culture.

    But scratch beneath the surface, and Andrews’ argument falls apart.

    First, the Great Feminization hypothesis relies on the sweeping assumption that men are rational, while women are emotional. Of course, anger—the emotion most associated with men—is excluded from this analysis, which is strange given that it guides so much of a certain president’s behavior. A great deal of the United States’ current foreign policy seems to be guided by perceived slights to Trump rather than the rational calculations we are assured men excel at.

    Meanwhile, history’s most futile wars give lie to the idea that women are uniquely driven by emotion. The Battle of the Somme—in which over one million soldiers were wounded or killed for a territorial gain of six miles—is hardly a glowing endorsement of men’s capacity for rational thought. And the recent wave of cancellations coming from the right in the wake of the murder of Charlie Kirk—much of it driven by conservative men—should make us skeptical that, as Andrews puts it, “men tend to be better at compartmentalizing than women” such that they keep politics from infecting everyday life.

    Then there is Andrews’ inaccurate characterization of female conflict strategies. In a recent tweet, she writes: “When the conflict is over, [men will] shake the other guy’s hand and accept the outcome gracefully. Women don’t have that. If you’re her enemy, you are subhuman garbage. No rules govern the fight; no shaking hands when it’s over. It is never over.” But this just doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. Peace agreements are 20% more likely to last at least two years, and 35% more likely to last 15 years, if women are part of the process.1 (Andrews also seems to contradict herself here—one moment she claims women prioritize “empathy over rationality,” and the next she acts as if women lack any empathy whatsoever.)

    What about her claim that feminization is the main culprit for wokeness? The timing is dubious. The number of women studying for and entering traditionally male professions has been on the rise for decades, yet wokeness of the sort Andrews is concerned about is a fairly recent phenomenon. (Yglesias dates the “Great Awokening” to around 2014). While Andrews argues that this is because organizations reached a tipping point once they became majority female (or were heading that way), this isn’t a satisfactory answer. Even with an increasingly female workforce, most managers and CEOs are still men. And as Andrews points out, only 33% of judges today are women, which doesn’t prevent her from applying her thesis to the legal profession.

    What other factors might explain wokeness? The timing fits more neatly with the rise of smartphones and social media. As Jonathan Haidt argues, these new tools triggered a wave of anxiety and depression among adolescents, as well as a broader concern for “safety” from perceived threats. Social media provided the perfect tools not only to amplify new ideas such as wokeness, but also to enforce sanctions on non-believers from the comfort of one’s own couch.

    This makes sense when you consider that left-wing cancel culture arguably peaked during the COVID pandemic in 2020, when everyone was scared, confused, and isolated. Had wokeness merely been an expression of typically female behavior, the pandemic would have had a much more limited effect—and indeed wokeness would have continued to grow in strength every year since then as more women entered the workforce, when in fact the opposite seems to be the case.

    The truth is that, in many ways, feminization hasn’t gone far enough—something that Andrews seems unable to recognize.

    Take medicine, a subject Andrews only touches on to make the implausible point that male doctors are better than female ones at keeping politics “out of the examination room.” Historically, female patients have faced a great deal of discrimination, from doctors dismissing their symptoms to exclusion from medical studies. In her memoir Giving Up The Ghost, the novelist Hilary Mantel described her excruciating experience with endometriosis, a condition that affects one in 10 women of reproductive age, yet which even today can take between four and 11 years to diagnose. Despite negative pregnancy tests and years of pain, a doctor dismissed Mantel’s pain with the words “there’s a baby in there.” (Mantel later had a hysterectomy, including removal of part of her bladder and bowel, as a result of the disease.)

    This is part of a broader trend: women are frequently ignored when reporting symptoms, and life-saving treatments are still not adequately tested for their impact on women’s bodies. The COVID vaccines were a huge scientific achievement—yet from early on in the vaccine rollout, women reported its effects on their menstrual cycle, from heavier periods to breakthrough bleeding in post-menopausal women. Vaccination studies simply didn’t look at menstrual side-effects, and both medical organizations and media outlets were initially dismissive of women’s reports. (Thankfully, the link has since been studied.)

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    Rather than admitting that there are some areas in which it would be better to listen to women more, Andrews is concerned with making sweeping statements about how feminization will lead to the end of Western civilization. “The field that frightens me most is the law. All of us depend on a functioning legal system, and, to be blunt, the rule of law will not survive the legal profession becoming majority female,” she frets, using Obama-era Title IX regulations as an example of what a feminized legal system might look like.

    This is a vast overstatement. There are real reasons to criticize the Obama-era Title IX regulations, in which many of those accused of sexual assault on college campuses had too little right to due process. While these rules came from an understandable desire to support survivors of rape and assault, in practice both women and men benefit from a fair system with due process at its heart.

    But Andrews’ claim that “the rule of law will not survive the legal profession becoming majority female” is ludicrous. Women are not immune to rationality, and the fact that women outperform men in areas of education that apparently play to male strengths, such as exams, suggests that we understand rules and arguments, too. In fact, female lawyers are 23% less likely to be sued for malpractice than male lawyers, and female partners win 12% more than men, showing that women are in fact competent at upholding the law.

    More broadly, Andrews is right to be concerned that feminization is driving men away from traditionally male institutions. But once again she misidentifies the cause. Research has shown that professions dominated by women are considered less valuable, while those seen as more masculine enjoy a status (and corresponding financial) bump. This suggests that it’s not toxic female behaviors driving men away, but a lack of respect for women.

    Anyone who has spent time in groups dominated by each sex knows that the social lives of men and women are very different. Until recently, I worked in predominantly female workplaces in which updates about our complex love lives were practically a standing agenda item in team meetings, and the solution to any issue was invariably “let’s all join hands.” (I loved it.) All-female groups also tend to handle conflict differently to men, for example by canvassing other members to see if there’s general agreement before making a decision on how to act.

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    But it’s wrong to extrapolate that feminization somehow poses a threat to civilization. Indeed, there are plenty of areas in which more feminization would improve things for men as well. Letting men take paternity leave of longer than two weeks tends to lead to more hands-on childcare, which in turn is associated with better outcomes for children. Indeed, research shows that fathers today want to spend more time with their children than those of previous generations, suggesting that both men and women would benefit from increased focus on areas of life that are traditionally considered women’s domain, such as childrearing.

    Today, we are lucky that we don’t have to choose between the old, stagnant patriarchal system in which women were confined to the domestic sphere, and the cruel matriarchal system people like Andrews think we already live in. Instead, we can embrace the positive aspects of masculinity and femininity, whilst finding effective strategies to mitigate the harms of both. This means championing values and policies that lead to a free and fair society for all—even men.

    Leonora Barclay is Head of Podcasts at Persuasion.

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    1

    We shouldn’t read too much into these figures, given how hard it is to control all the variables. But at the very least they suggest that women don’t actively hinder peacemaking.

    0 min
  • Self-Mastery Is Good, Actually
    (Photo via Getty.)

    Making intelligent and illuminating observations about cultural trends is tricky. It involves connecting seemingly disparate dots and transforming them into a coherent picture that isn’t initially apparent. But before that work of synthesis can happen, it’s first necessary to notice the dots in the first place. That’s hard for the same reason it would be hard for a fish to say something intelligent and illuminating about water: It’s everywhere; the fish is suspended within it, and it forms not just the background to its world but also permeates it from top to bottom.

    I stumbled on one such cultural dot when I saw a post in The Argument by Jerusalem Demsas titled “I Could Watch TikTok for 10 Hours a Day.” Demsas didn’t make an entirely novel observation, but she expressed it well: Social media platforms are addictive. Those who spend hours a day interacting with them are addicts. Maybe when a friend reaches out to say he or she just spent five hours scrolling through Instagram, we should respond as if he or she just confessed to drinking an entire bottle of vodka alone on a Tuesday night—that is, with an expression of disapproval and an offer of help and support.

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    Demsas is open to entertaining the passage of new government regulations to address this problem, but as a young American living in the 2020s, she’s more comfortable thinking about how to “max out our nongovernmental powers.” By which she primarily means a technical fix analogous to the way GLP-1s successfully rewire brains to help people reduce their appetites and lose weight. As examples, she tells us she uses a “dumb phone” much of the time and leaves her iPhone at the office on weekends. She also suggests workplaces banning social media. And so forth.

    Something about the way Demsas talks about this problem, which is very real, and the way she thinks to address it point to something else—something deeper and more troubling—that’s going on in our culture.

    If It Feels Good, Do It

    The political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed that modern commercial societies have a way of conjuring desires for things that no one longed for in the first place. Supply isn’t always generated by pre-existing demand. Supply itself can generate demand. Ooh, just look at that shiny new thing! I’ve never seen anything like it before. It’s beautiful. It’s cool. It tastes great. It’s fun. It’s entertaining. It feels good. I want it. I need it.

    Rousseau made his observation in the latter half of the 18th century. He saw the phenomenon quite early. It’s accelerated over the intervening two-and-a-half centuries, as a multitude of wondrous products have proliferated. Many of them have greatly improved our quality of life, making it easier, safer, and more enjoyable. They’ve “relieved man’s estate,” as Francis Bacon, an early modern theorist of technological modernity, memorably described one of its aspirations.

    But somewhere along the way, mostly over the past couple of decades, capitalism has begun to do more than produce products. It’s begun to produce products that, in turn, produce experiences.

    The experience of watching algorithmically curated, highly stimulating little video morsels, one after another, on a supercomputer we carry around with us in our pockets everywhere we go.

    The experience, on those same devices, of easy gambling on sports and other competitive events.

    The experience, on those same devices, of watching all-but-infinite amounts of every conceivable form of pornography.

    The experience, soon to come on those same devices, of interacting with artificial intelligence capable of producing an incredibly realistic simulacrum of a romantic and erotic partner.

    The experience of joining together with ideologically likeminded compatriots anywhere in the country and the world to do battle against political opponents and enemies. (Yes, it’s likely that a number of our political problems can be traced back to the transformation of political activity into one more mode of digitally mediated experience.)

    These kinds of experiences, which create an incredibly intense link between a person’s mind and an online interactive social world of human and artificial forms of intelligence, can be incredibly addictive, precisely because they feel so real and, lacking the friction and complications of real-world physical interactions, are so psychically intense. Cognitive scientists and social psychologists are inclined to describe these experiences in terms of chemicals released in the body: we’re getting addicted to dopamine and serotonin and adrenaline.

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    However true that might be at the level of physiology, I prefer to think about it in the less reductive, old-fashioned moral categories that come down to us from the tradition of political philosophy: Digital technology is giving us incredibly intense experiences of pleasure; pleasure is a powerful temptation that is extremely difficult to resist; what we often call “addiction” is more accurately described as an incapacity to achieve self-mastery sufficient to resist the siren song of pleasure.

    Resisting Temptation in a World Lacking Support for Virtue

    It is darkly ironic (or perhaps extremely significant at a deep cultural level) that human beings began producing technologies capable of generating such intensely pleasurable experiences less than half a century following a decade (the 1960s) when countries around the world underwent a cultural revolution that began disassembling the complex social and ideational mechanisms that humanity long used to fortify the capacity of individuals to resist powerful temptations. Tired of feeling judged—by God, by parents, by neighbors, by our own consciences—we rebelled, proclaiming before all the world that what we choose to do with our lives is a matter of moral indifference and no one’s concern, maybe not even our own. (French novelist Michel Houellebecq is our greatest imaginative explorer of this post-’60s terrain and its myriad discontents.)

    This shift has left each of us to our own devices—quite literally, it would seem. Like Demsas, most of us would rather avoid asking the government to step into the role of an objectified Superego telling us what to do. But neither do we feel capable of straightforwardly resisting temptation on our own. We can’t stop ourselves from eating a pint of ice cream or a bag of Doritos in front of the computer, but we can ask our doctor for an Ozempic prescription and then take the proper dosage. We can’t resist spending hours on TikTok or Pornhub every evening, but we can choose to leave our phones or laptops at the office so we won’t. We have will power, but we also lack sufficient will power. We can ask for help, but we can’t fully help ourselves.

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    Maybe there’s nothing wrong with this. Gluttony—for food, for drink, for sex, for pleasures of every variety—has long been considered a vice and a sin. In attempting to resist or moderate it, we used to rely on belief systems and a thick set of institutions and social relationships that, for many of us, no longer exists. Because of their disappearance, we instead reach for pharmacological helpmeets or little cognitive-behavioral tricks to keep us from giving into our intensely pleasurable addictions. Whatever gets you through the night.

    The End of Self-Mastery

    Yet I can’t help but wonder if there’s a loss involved in relying on these helpmeets and tricks instead of the old beliefs, institutions, and social relationships that existed to encourage and support individuals attempting to do the hard part for themselves.

    It’s the difference between leaving your iPhone at work and bringing it home but mastering your desire to use it more than you think you should. Or between taking a GLP-1 and choosing not to but saying no to the dessert anyway, even though you want it, because you know saying yes will be bad for you and that knowledge is good enough to get you to act according to a higher notion of your own self-interest.

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    When we rely on a machine to do an arduous physical task for us, we avoid injury and get to enjoy greater leisure. But what if it’s physically and spiritually healthier to complete the task for ourselves, with our own hands and arms and legs? Our own muscle and bone?

    Human beings are weak, needy creatures. We require encouragement and support in doing what we know is good. And yet we’ve created a world of unprecedented temptations at a moment in history when our old support systems have been dismantled. That might make helpmeets and tricks the best most of us can do.

    I hope it’s enough—but I worry it won’t be. Self-mastery is good and important. And I’m not sure we’ve thought long or deeply enough about what it would be like to live in a world without it.

    Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

    A version of this piece originally appeared in Notes from the Middleground.

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    0 min
  • Lulu Meservey on How Media Has Changed

    Lulu Cheng Meservey is the founder of Rostra, an advocate of “going direct,” and the writer of Flack.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Lulu Meservey explore why the traditional communications playbook is no longer effective, why so many politicians come across badly on TV, and how to be a great leader.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I’ve been following you for a long time online, and you’re really interesting in having understood earlier than most that the old-fashioned communications playbook doesn’t work anymore because the old-fashioned structure of media doesn’t exist anymore. Perhaps let’s take a step back. What would somebody who was at the top of the comms game have suggested 25 or 20 years ago to a company when they were launching a big new product or when they were dealing with a critical media story? What would the advice have been about what they should do under those circumstances?

    Lulu Meservey: Back then, communications were very centralized. You hear people reminiscing that there were three TV channels, and that was more than 25 years ago, but still, there were many fewer TV channels and many fewer online channels. YouTube was not what it is. Twitter is not what it is. So you had to go to the gatekeepers. The game was that if you could win over the gatekeepers who had the audience, then you could essentially borrow their audience for a moment while they told their audience something good about you. They had the people, the following, and the trust. The game was to find the ten people there, win them over, and then they would vouch for you to the audience.

    Mounk: So you lunch and dine with the beat reporter, the New York Times columnist, all of those traditional journalists, and you hope that they’re going to tell your story for you.

    Meservey: Yes, and today, even when you talk to people who are sort of éminence grise—I say this in a respectful way—in the PR world who know everybody and have been doing this for a long time, their go-to move is still to go wine and dine the editors or to put you in front of an editorial board. I learned about this thing called “desk sides,” which I guess originates from you just popping up on the side of someone’s desk and trying to become friends with them. But apparently, you have your handler take you around and essentially meet with all of these people and try to earn their favor.

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    Mounk: Huh, interesting. Though it was effective in a different kind of media landscape, why do you think that isn’t effective anymore? If you’re trying to launch a product, get your startup better known, or get the word out there, it still feels like it would be pretty useful to have a favorable mention of your product or your company in the New York Times. Surely that still makes a difference. Why is that no longer, by and large, the kind of game you should play?

    Meservey: Yeah, well, first of all, doing that is a “nice-to-have.” Having people on your side is always better than not, and having friends is always better than not. I am not one of those people who says that the New York Times is completely irrelevant. There is some relevance, especially with specific audiences. If you’re selling to the government or if you’re about to IPO, there certainly is relevance. You don’t have to burn those boats in order to go do something else.

    However, the something else that we’re about to talk about is a lot more effective. That something else is now decentralized, going from you to many. There are still people in your audience who are more influential than others—people who are literal influencers or creators or whose voices just carry a lot of weight. But there are still very many of them compared to 25 years ago or even a decade ago. So it’s more decentralized. You’re going one-to-many.

    It’s much more dependent on trust and credibility than it was before because it’s not just that you win over one person, they trust you, and then they vouch for you. You have to be earning that trust over and over with so many people in so many quarters constantly. Lastly, what’s emerging is this lot of AI slop, and it’s coming from people and from companies. You see companies put things out there that are indistinguishable from ChatGPT when it was GPT-3.5, and that just doesn’t cut it anymore. So the bar for cutting through, and the bar for quality, is a lot higher.

    On the topic of many-to-many, by the way, here’s an important caveat: it’s no longer just one person speaking on behalf of the entire enterprise. It’s not just the CEO speaking on behalf of the company or the candidate speaking on behalf of the campaign. Now you have employees weighing in—employees of the campaign or people who belong to that political movement weighing in. Truly is many, many, many-to-many, where sometimes the voices of employees are actually more important than what the CEO is saying.

    For example, you have employees speaking out about workplace conditions or doubts about the company or disgruntled employees who leave. What they’re saying can actually make much more of an impact than a press release or an announcement from the company. So if you’re the CEO, you need to know that you have tens or hundreds of alternate spokespeople working in your company, and they all need to be aligned. It’s not something where you just speak for everybody and they all stay silent.

    Mounk: Yeah, I’m thinking of this book that Clay Shirky wrote a long time ago, where he distinguished between a world of one-to-many communication and the world we’re now in of many-to-many communication. In the old world, there just weren’t a lot of people around who could reach a large audience. So if you wanted to reach a large audience, you were basically dependent on those desk sides, those lunches, those dinners, because the number of people who could say, hey, this is an amazing new tech product, were the tech editor of the New York Times and of Wired and perhaps of 60 Minutes or something like that. Unless you were able to get one of them to tell your story, you would have had to rely on word of mouth.

    Now, for some kinds of products, word of mouth might work—they’re so addictive or so convincing that if you just give them to a hundred people, they spread like a virus to lots and lots of others. But that’s going to be a relatively limited number of products that have those properties.

    Now we’re in a world of many-to-many communication, where the set of people who can reach a wide audience has hugely expanded—both because a lot of people have significant social media followings and because, if you can create content on social media that is sufficiently viral, it takes off. All of that word of mouth can happen on social media platforms. It doesn’t have to be in-person word of mouth, and that creates these new avenues of communication.

    Meservey: I think the lazy way to approach this is to say, it doesn’t matter too much how interesting we are; if we can just get in front of people, we will force them to see us. They read the Wall Street Journal, and we will get in the Wall Street Journal somehow through these relationships. Then we will non-consensually force our news into their eyeballs, and they’re going to like it. This is a caricature, but it’s the extreme version of laziness, where you’re not trying to be particularly interesting. You’re just saying, we’ve got news, we’re going to force it into your feed or into your paper.

    The other way to do this–which I think is much better–is harder. You have to challenge yourself to be so fascinating and for your news to be so arresting that you could whisper it to ten people, and they couldn’t help but each tell ten other people, and those people couldn’t help but tell ten other people. If you put in the extra work upfront, you’re basically putting a multiplier or leverage behind the message. Mathematically, if each person wants to tell a bunch of other people, you’re much better off for obvious reasons than if you tell five people and have them each want to tell a bunch of people. That is much better than you telling a thousand people upfront and calling it a day because it’s so boring that they’re not going to talk about it anymore.

    Mounk: I think that people always underestimate the importance of having the right viral message and overestimate the importance of doing it in the right way and perhaps even having the right advice. I’m thinking about times when I’ve published books, and I’ve heard that from friends as well, where if you’re publishing a book that, for whatever reason, speaks to that moment—that has a message that people want to be hearing—then most of the time when your book is really successful, it’s because it has a message that people already want to be hearing, which is a little depressing.

    You’re going to end up thinking that your PR person, or usually the marketing professional at your publisher, is really amazing because they’re booking you on all these great shows and making all of these things happen for you. If you have a book that might be a good book, might even be a more interesting book, but that doesn’t have that product-market fit—that doesn’t really fit into that moment or what people want to be hearing or what producers want to be hearing from—you’re going to start getting frustrated with your PR or marketing person, saying the last one was much better. They could get you on whatever show, and this person isn’t getting you on that show, so they must have worse contacts or must not be putting in as much work.

    Most likely, there are differences between very good people and less good people, but it’s not actually a difference in that person. Sometimes it’s the same dumb person doing the same damn thing. The difference is in what you’re selling and whether your message happens to have demand at that time.

    Meservey: I would say the person reaching out, or the medium—the shows that you choose or the tweets that you write—these things matter. They’re not nothing. But their importance really pales in comparison to how interesting the message actually is. People do not think enough about making themselves interesting and relevant to other people. The challenge would be: can you describe this in a way that someone who hears it is going to tell their family about it over dinner? They’re going to know how to describe it, and they’re going to want to bring it up. If not, you’ve failed the test. If nobody wants to pass it on, if they don’t know how to talk about it, you’ve failed the test. You reach however many people you reach with the first volley. You force yourself into their feed, they have to listen to it. Maybe you tricked them into listening to it because they’re scrolling past it, and then there are just no legs after that.

    That’s true laziness if you’re focusing on the medium—like, do I get on the show? Then you’re on the show, and you say something so bland and insignificant that nobody ever wants to revisit it again. The same goes for books, ideas, companies, product launches—you name it.

    Mounk: Because you’re talking about the message once you’re on the show, I find that the few times I’ve had media training, it’s not clear to me that it gave the right advice. Basically, what it said was: you go into the show with the three points you want to make, and whatever happens, you bring those points in. You’re extremely disciplined about bringing in those points. You have this battle plan for the conversation, the purpose of which is to get those talking points out.

    I think it depends a little on what you’re trying to do. If you’re launching a product, I can understand how you’ve got to save the day on which it goes on sale, whatever happens. Or there’s one particular selling point of this product that you need to make sure somehow comes up. For my purposes, where I want to sell a book or I want people to become paying subscribers of my Substack—sure, I can see that.

    But I find that if I’m too focused on getting across the points I want to make, I become inauthentic. I become kind of weird. It can be jarring because, even if you’re doing it relatively elegantly and subtly, people can smell that you’re trying to bring the conversation back to what you want to say. The person I’m having a conversation with is probably thinking, this guest isn’t great because they’re not actually answering my questions; they’re just going back to their talking point.

    Do you think that is one of the pieces of conventional wisdom people should question? Should people stick to their talking points, or should they be more authentic?

    Meservey: Most people are excessively media trained. What’s happening is not that you’re training sophistication into the person, but that you’re training personality out of them and training the edge out of them. I’m a big believer in not excessively media training somebody because the vibes of the person are much more important than the specific words they say. People are left with an impression of you as a person.

    According to some studies, over 90% of that impression is based on your vibes, aura, body language, tone of voice, and appearance rather than the actual words you say. So if you have to make the trade-off of sacrificing some of your vibes, personality, and sparkle in order to say the right words, that’s a horrible trade-off. There are probably 50 people alive who don’t have to make that trade-off. Maybe there are 50 people in America who don’t have to make it. If you’re Bill Clinton or Barack Obama, maybe if you’re Donald Trump or Pete Buttigieg—people who have extreme talent for weaving talking points in while making it seem natural—then great. It’s not a trade-off; you can do both.

    For the vast majority of people, there is some trade-off. You have to be very careful how much of that you trade. The other thing to remember is that, in most cases, the product is the person. If you’re trying to promote your book or your Substack, the product is actually you. It’s not the one specific book or piece of writing; it’s your thoughts and you as a person.

    For example, Bari Weiss and The Free Press—now going to CBS—the predominant source of trust or credibility around The Free Press was whether you liked or trusted Bari. She as a person represented the product. There are a lot of people who hate Bari Weiss, but I don’t know anybody who hates her but loves The Free Press.

    You represent the product; you represent the company. If you show up as a clunky, inauthentic poser, that casts a pall over the whole company. One of my favorite people in tech, Scott Wu, is the leader of a company called Cognition, which creates a coding agent. He’s someone who is most comfortable in front of a computer and not trying to hold forth, but he has gone on podcasts because he wants to tell people about their product, Devin. The feedback I’ve gotten is that the best podcast he ever did was one where he was severely sleep-deprived and undisciplined, a little impatient and very raw. People loved it because it was the closest they got to the real Scott. When you hang out with him, he’s a great hang, but when he’s in front of a camera, he’s usually a little uncomfortable.

    Mounk: This is the advice I got before I did my first ever television interview, which was a CNN interview about doping, of all things. Someone told me that if you want to be good on TV, you just have to be yourself, which sounds similar to what you’re saying. The ironic thing is that it’s the one thing that’s impossible to do when you’re starting out on TV.

    I think by now I can more or less do it. I’ve done enough broadcasting, podcasting, and media appearances that I’m not fully myself, but I’m close. That takes a lot of practice and a lot of hours because it’s a very unnatural situation—to be in a room with someone, or nowadays as likely as not on Zoom, and pretend that you’re just having a conversation while knowing that tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of people are listening to you.

    Do you think that’s the right advice—that to be good on TV, you just have to be yourself? Does that hold for everybody, or are there some people who really shouldn’t be themselves on television? How do you accomplish being yourself?

    Meservey: One of the best pieces of advice I’ve gotten is that nobody gives a shit about you. People don’t care about you that much. If you go out there and flop and it doesn’t go well, people will just move on. Nobody is thinking about you that much.

    For some people, if you’re Sam Altman and you go on an interview and flop, it might get replayed a lot, and it’s more consequential because your company is more consequential. For the vast majority of people, it is just not that big of a deal.

    Mounk: That depends on whether you flop or you flop. Even if you’re a no-name person and you have a meltdown on air—thirty seconds of complete blankness where you suddenly can’t speak—that’s going to go viral even if you’re nobody. I think that’s the fear that people have.

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    Meservey: That’s an edge case. I think you can control whether you’re going to have a screaming meltdown. Not everyone can, but there are the Katie Porter examples we’ve been seeing recently.

    For most people, the range of outcomes is pretty tame. You might have a mediocre interview where you wanted to say some things and forgot. Just don’t stress so much about it. People are a little like electrons in that way—once you observe them, they change in the process of being observed. Once the cameras are on, it’s nearly impossible to be your normal, natural self.

    I pregame for this. I get nervous about these things, even though I know we’re friendly and you’re not trying to secretly destroy me with a gotcha question. I’m still a little nervous. I just walk around and remind myself that if it doesn’t go well, it’s not a big deal. For most people, it takes a lot of practice. People say the presence of so many fashion models gives us unrealistic expectations about bodies.

    So many influencers, so many extremely gorgeous and charismatic people on TikTok and with podcasts give us unrealistic expectations for how we’re going to be in front of the camera. If we try to emulate that, most of us fall into this uncanny valley where we’re not ourselves anymore, but we’re also not Jake Paul or whatever. What are we then? It’s this strange in-between space that doesn’t appeal to people as much as if you had just stayed put and stayed yourself.

    Mounk: That’s very interesting. To go back to the point about excessive media training, I was thinking about that not with Katie Porter—who perhaps could use a little more media training or just more hiding of her true personality—but with Abigail Spanberger. I saw clips of her debate with Winsome Earle-Sears the other day. She was in a situation where she knew she was going to be asked about something that put her in a bind.

    The person running as lieutenant governor, who in a sense was running for the position independently but was obviously on her slate, was discovered to have sent text messages meant for a friend but sent to a Republican instead. The messages said that this moderate Republican, who had said something positive about a moderate Democrat, deserved to be killed, and his kids deserved to be killed—“those little fascists,” he said. The kids were two and four years old.

    How should someone like Spanberger play this? She might think that, for whatever reason, she can’t distance herself too clearly from that lieutenant governor candidate—either because other Democrats would be mad if she did, or because she thinks it would be hard to govern if she won the governor’s race and had a Republican lieutenant governor. That means she knows this debate is coming up and that she’s going to be asked about it.

    She came up with a slightly wooden set of talking points that she kept sticking to: “I don’t approve of those messages. Everybody’s running as an individual. I think I’m going to be a great governor of Virginia,” or something along those lines. What would you have advised her? Is the key point that you just have to be on the right side of this—that you have to go into the debate having taken your distance from that candidate?

    I’m not talking morally here but strategically. Is the only way to win this comms battle to have a leg to stand on, and the only way to have a leg to stand on is to disavow it—to say, I don’t want to be governing with him; this is terrible? If not, is there some way to get around this? Because what she ended up doing just looked so unnatural, so rehearsed, and so media trained that it was deeply, deeply off-putting.

    Meservey: First of all, I think that guy sucks. This isn’t sincere advice meant to help them, but it’s useful as a case study. One important thing to remember is that if you’re trying to do both things at once, it’s not that you’re pleasing both sides—it’s that you’re pissing off both sides. That’s always how it goes. If you’re trying to make nobody mad, you end up making everybody mad. You’re better off picking who’s going to be mad at you and for what than trying to make nobody mad, because again, everybody will be mad at you.

    People are so fed up with wishy-washy, cowardly, half-measure responses that they see right through them and actually look for them. You saw this with the initial Cracker Barrel rebrand response. Anytime there’s a statement from a person or a company, people are looking for them to take a stance. You can take a stance and have some people be mad; that’s better than everybody being mad.

    In this situation, it’s not an option to give a non-answer. You have to have a view on it. The clearly correct view is that it’s unacceptable. There’s no world in which you can defend it. However, there are two levels of “unacceptable.” One is that the action was unacceptable, but it doesn’t represent the entire person, and the other merits of that person outweigh this. The other is that the action represents the entire person and reveals something within them that is unsalvageable. Opponents would argue the latter—that this action represents the person and shows something deep inside his soul that is spoiled. If she wants to defend him without defending the action, she should clearly condemn the action and say, I don’t stand by this. No one reasonable would stand by this. But I also think he doesn’t stand by this, because what I know of him as a person is… and then continue with the positive framing. What I believe he’s going to do in office is… and so on.

    Therefore, while this act is completely reprehensible and unacceptable, she could argue that he has now tasted what it is like to lash out in a moment of anger and perhaps has become more empathetic because of it. You have to score it somehow.

    Mounk: Yeah, why is that? I agree with you, though I’m not sure the candidate is salvageable. Morally and politically, the smartest route would probably be to distance herself completely. But why is it that in three minutes you’ve come up with something that seems both better politically and less reprehensible morally than this addiction to not saying anything?

    If a constraint exists for whatever political reason—let’s take it as a hard constraint—you can’t completely distance yourself from this candidate. Why can’t a politician be trained to go out there and say, these text messages are disgusting and reprehensible, but I know this person, and this is not what they represent? They might even say, all of us have said something off-color at some point, and it doesn’t always represent who we are. This was completely unacceptable, but I know him. I know this doesn’t represent who he is, and I think on the policies that matter, he’s going to do a better job for Virginia.

    That line might not be perfect, but it’s something you can work with. Why, instead, are they advised to go out there and use wooden, legalistic language that avoids saying anything at all? This isn’t an isolated case. In the same debate, there was a question about trans girls having access to female changing rooms in Virginia schools and other related issues. The response was the same kind of non-response. Abigail Spanberger said, this is a decision for local districts and local parents and teachers to make, which doesn’t take any real stance.

    As you said earlier, that approach ends up pissing off both sides. People who believe we should be fighting for those rights will say she’s not standing up for them, and others will sense she’s just trying to not own an unpopular position while still defending it. You may as well take a position outright, or go where the majority of people are, but instead you end up stuck in this middle ground.

    I’m reminded of the congressional hearing with university presidents—Claudine Gay of Harvard and the presidents of Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania—who all failed to defend their institutions’ missions in a substantial way. They’re all now out of office. Why is it that the advice so often seems to be: don’t really say anything at all, even though it’s clearly ineffective?

    Meservey: There are two types of public figures. One type is their own person, and everyone else has to deal with that and work with that. John Fetterman is an example. Palmer Luckey is an example. They are who they are. If you want to work with them, you need to figure out how to work with them because they are not going to change. You are going to change.

    Then there are people who are machines that turn consultant advice into public statements. A lot of politicians are in this category, where they just aggregate consultant advice and then echo it. That doesn’t speak well of them as people because if you don’t have your own views, personality, and principles when it comes to these statements, how are we going to trust you to have your own backbone when it comes to anything else?

    A lot of people are like this, and it comes from a place of fear. Each consultant knows that if they advise something safe, they will never be penalized for missed opportunities. They will only be penalized asymmetrically for mistakes. They are penalized for mistakes of commission, not omission. Therefore, the best way for them to continue collecting fees is to avoid mistakes of commission. If they can make sure you don’t say something stupid, it doesn’t matter if you miss an opportunity, as long as there is no specific error that can be pinned on them.

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    What ends up happening is a principal-agent problem where they act in their own self-interest. They are not trying to find the best possible outcome for you; they are trying to find the outcome that keeps them from being fired. You go along because you don’t have the clarity of moral vision or the strength of principle to override them. That is how you end up with weak public figures.

    Mounk: This is something striking to me, particularly in the political ecosystem where, if you run a consultancy—especially on the Democratic side, where the thought constraints are stronger, but also on the Republican side in different ways—and you lose an election, plenty of people lose plenty of elections. The fact that you advised the losing campaign doesn’t stop you from being hired again.

    If your candidate said something that upset the base and went viral on social media in a negative way, even if it actually increased that candidate’s chances of being elected, the next candidate might say, I don’t know if we can work with you. You are the people who put out that message a lot of allies hated. Some of my staff might get upset if I hire you. The incentive is not to make your candidate win; it’s to avoid bad publicity that might hurt your brand as a consultant.

    The same is true in other cases. There was reporting that those university presidents had taken extensive advice from law firms, and I think they all took the advice of the same law firm before the congressional hearing. Those lawyers are risk-averse. They are not thinking about how to maximize the chance of a good outcome; they are thinking about how to minimize the chance that you say something that might have legal relevance. The result is that you end up being overtrained into not saying anything at all.

    I want to go to another case I’m thinking of. I informally advised a minor Democratic presidential candidate in the 2020 primaries. He was very charismatic in person, a big, booming personality. You thought, my God, once this person gets on the big stage and people see what he’s like, he’s going to do great. Then every time the camera turned on, he was terrible. His personality just disappeared.

    Is that because some people are simply charismatic in person but not on TV? Is that something most people can overcome? Is there one kind of charisma that works in a room and another that works on a national debate stage? What do you think explains that?

    Meservey: I think there’s something innate, which doesn’t mean that you can’t improve it or work on it, but I do think that people inherently have the mediums that best suit them. Some people are better in a small group. Some people are more charismatic in front of a large crowd. You ever see somebody who’s hugely charismatic talking to a massive rally, but then one-on-one they don’t seem that engaged?

    Moun: I did a year in theater after college, and there was an actress at the theater I worked at who, if you talked to her in the canteen, was pretty and smart, but she seemed forgettable. You would never walk into the canteen and have your eyes drawn to her. Then she’d step on stage, and she was just magnetic. In front of a thousand people, she had something that attracted your attention and fascination in a remarkable way. When you saw her in private, she was perfectly pleasant and cute, but there was nothing charismatic about her in that context.

    Meservey: I think Bill Clinton was more charismatic in front of a large crowd. I actually think Hillary Clinton is more charismatic in small groups. When you talk to people who have worked directly with her or interacted with her in an intimate setting, she can be very charismatic. In front of a stadium full of people, she’s not as charismatic as her husband, who obviously is a once-in-a-generation political talent.

    Before we stray too far from this topic of how to give a straight answer and a strong answer without seeming to hedge, I want to raise the example of Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential debate. Do you remember this? He was asked on stage about the death penalty, and the question was intense: if your wife, Kitty, were to be raped and murdered, would you support the death penalty for the person who did that? This has always bothered me so much because I feel like the correct answer, politically and strategically, would have been a layup.

    His actual answer was this hemming and hawing and very academic response that made him seem not even human. Someone just talked about your wife being raped and murdered, and you’re going to sit back and go through your talking points? It’s insane. A very good answer, assuming this is what he believes, would have been: If someone in my family were subjected to that, and if this crime were committed against someone in my family, I would want to tear the perpetrator limb from limb. I would want to behead them with my bare hands. I would torture them in a chamber for a year. That is why you shouldn’t leave it up to me to decide in that moment out of emotion. That is why we need, as a society, to decide in advance the line between punishment and barbarism so that in the moment we’re not making decisions like that. Because if someone ever did that and I met them in person, I would commit horrendous crimes against them.

    Mounk: There’s always the obvious emotion you feel that somehow, in those situations, you think you’re not allowed to share. If you want to defend this political position, obviously you can’t flip-flop. You’re campaigning on not having the death penalty. You can’t suddenly say, when someone brings up this hypothetical, let’s have the death penalty. That makes no sense.

    Being against the death penalty is a defensible position. I think it is, and it’s not so clear that 1988 public opinion was such that you couldn’t win an election while opposing the death penalty. You still have to allow yourself to express human emotion—to say, of course I would want this person to suffer in the worst possible way. But that’s precisely why we need to make rules when we’re not the person who’s affected.

    I think that’s right. You’re right that there’s this instinct because Abigail Spanberger feels she can’t completely distance herself from this other candidate. She feels she can’t express the anger and disgust over those messages. The only way you can avoid completely distancing yourself from that person is to express the anger and the disgust and then say, having expressed all of this, here’s why I still think they’re going to be better for the state of Virginia than the alternative.

    I want to go to a broader question of what this means for communication today. If we are no longer in a world of one-to-many communication, if we’re in a world of many-to-many communication, and we’ve taken this detour of thinking about how to do well in media, what is the right strategy for a company launching a new product or for someone with an important message to communicate? You’ve talked a lot about the importance of directly communicating with your audience. What does that entail, and why do you think that’s a big part of the answer?

    Meservey: Direct can mean a few things, and I mean all of them. One meaning of direct is to build your own audience and share directly with them, not just through middlemen or gatekeepers. Another meaning of direct is like you and I having a direct conversation—a frank and candid conversation. That is what people want as well. That is the advice Dukakis should have taken before going into that debate: speak directly, without mincing your words, and just say what you mean. People do not have the patience to sit through PR slop and corporate pablum to figure out what you are actually saying.

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    Another way of being direct is for the person or people directly responsible to have the message come from themselves, instead of filtering it through multiple layers. I mean all of these things. If you are a founder or a CEO starting something new today, or a political candidate—the founder of a movement to get yourself elected, the chief executive of the vision you are selling to voters—you need to have the message come directly from you. That does not mean you have to personally star in every video or show your face in every clip, but it must be your words and your ideas, not the average idea of seventeen lawyers and fourteen PR people. People can tell the difference.

    It also has to be presented directly and forcefully, without dancing around. Get to the point. Even on short videos, for example, people post clips on X where the drop-off after thirty seconds is probably around ninety percent. I do not remember the exact numbers, but it falls off a cliff. People’s attention does not sustain, especially if you have not earned it in the first few moments. You need to say it upfront instead of dancing around and building up to it.

    History is long. It is never about just one moment. Politicians would do well to remember this. It is not just about one election or one statement. There are many things ahead. C. S. Lewis, in a different context, said that every small win is a strategic point from which a thousand more victories can be gained. That is true. It is not just about winning one specific thing; it is about building for the long term—whether that is building trust or relationships with voters, or, if you are a company, building an audience so that you can continue to grow in the future.

    What I hate to see is when people create something great and genuinely interesting and then give it away to someone else—donating engagement to them. If you are starting a company and have created something genuinely viral and engaging, but you were too scared and did not believe in yourself enough to put it out under your own name, you may have donated that success to someone else. If you hand it to an influencer and it blows up when they post it, you have just donated a bunch of engagement and audience to them for no reason other than fear. I hate to see companies do this.

    Mounk: What are some examples of people pulling communications off brilliantly? We have talked about several examples in politics and a few outside of politics where people did communications badly. What are the kinds of things we should emulate?

    Meservey: Given the news of last week, and since I already mentioned Bari in this podcast, I’ll use her as an example. There are many things Bari Weiss has done that are brilliant communications, even though a lot of people are mad at her or don’t like her. In fact, that is part of the package.

    A lot of people think that to have good communications and win people over, they need to be as bland as possible so that nobody gets mad. What they are doing is protecting the downside but capping the upside. It is a higher floor and a tremendously low ceiling. What she has done, which I think is the right way to do it, is elicit strong feelings within your tribe and get your people to be diehards. If others are mad about it, it either does not matter or it actually helps you.

    A lot of the vitriol directed at Bari—and there is a lot, some of it antisemitic and some of it simply cruel—is not pleasant. If I were her, reading through the mentions, I think I would probably have a mental breakdown. She is much stronger in that sense than most people. I am sure it is not fun, but strategically, for what she is trying to build, it is not the worst thing. It shows what she stands for and what she is not willing to back down from, even in the face of anger.

    That is one example: taking a stand and being willing to say, you are going to be part of this movement, and you are not. We do not see eye to eye, and that is okay.

    Mounk: That’s a hard trade-off because it depends on how much you care about the success of your enterprise versus having a pleasant life. Bari is fantastically successful, but having the knowledge that in any room you walk into there will be people who genuinely like and admire you, and also people who are snarkily texting their friends saying, can you imagine who I’m in a room with right now?—that has a high cost.

    You’re right that it is the right strategy, and it is one of the reasons The Free Press has been successful. There is a basic rule of politics that whatever you are for, some people will be against it. Whenever you embrace a cause, you are building a coalition, but you are also building your anti-coalition. Trying to avoid that leads to a kind of indeterminateness where perhaps nobody dislikes you, but nobody likes you either. Nobody has a reason to trust or follow you.

    The personal costs involved in this are not trivial, and it makes people who are willing to bear those costs—whether you agree with them or not—quite admirable. There is this persistent charge that gets thrown around about anyone people disagree with, calling them a grifter. Nearly always, that is wrong. The easy thing, the convenient thing, is not to break with your political tribe, not to say things that are controversial, and to minimize the hate you get online. That is almost always the easier choice.

    Not doing that is rarely, if ever, driven by cynicism. It is nearly always driven by genuine belief because the cost is significant. Most people would rather get along with their friends, go to dinner parties without being asked critical questions, have a standard media job, and make some amount of money than be Bari.

    Meservey: That’s why most people won’t be great. That is leadership, and it’s not for everybody.

    Leadership is being willing to suffer costs that fall disproportionately on you personally for the good of the enterprise, so you can build something enduring that outlasts yourself. I’m biased here because Bari is a friend, but even if you are ideologically on the total opposite side of what she is doing, the principle still stands. You have to be willing to say, these are not my people, in order to say through contrast, these people are. That is the movement you are going to build.

    It requires stepping up and having that courage because leaders do things all the time that are terrible for themselves personally. They see their children less than their employees do. They get less sleep than their employees do. They get more death threats than their employees do. All of these things are part of being the tip of the spear for the movement you are trying to build.

    It absolutely sucks to be the person facing that, but somebody has to do it, and there is no movement without a leader willing to bear it.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Lulu discuss why moderates are struggling to communicate well, how Substack became a competitor for the New York Times, and how to make a boring idea sound radical. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    51 min
  • Transgender Identity Really Has Fallen Among Young People
    (Photo via Getty Images.)

    A firestorm erupted last week when the British professor and commentator Eric Kaufmann made a bold claim: Identifying as transgender is “in free fall among the young.”

    But as journalist Benjamin Ryan rightly pointed out, the surveys Kaufmann referenced didn’t measure identifying as transgender. Instead, they measured identifying as nonbinary (note the chart says “not identifying as male or female,” which is not the same as identifying as transgender). Another journalist, Erin Reed, criticized Kaufmann’s analysis for not using survey weights. Kaufmann has since responded to both critiques.

    Wondering which side was right, last week I analyzed data from the nationally representative Household Pulse survey, which asked directly about transgender identity. It is also a better population-wide indicator than the elite schools used in Kaufmann’s graph. The Household Pulse data showed a decline in trans identification among 18- to 22-year-olds in 2024, but I was cautious about drawing conclusions from it as the decline appeared only in a limited time period (July to September) and two of the three survey administrations added an option for nonbinary identification that wasn’t there before. Maybe that was why identifying as transgender declined.

    Then, over the weekend, I found it—a nationally representative survey that asked the same question about transgender identification from 2021 to 2024. It also asked separately about identifying as nonbinary.

    The data are from the Cooperative Election Study (CES), fielded each year by YouGov and administered by Tufts University. They show that identifying as transgender really is in free fall among the young in the United States. So is identifying as nonbinary. In other words, Kaufmann was right (with what some consider the wrong data, but still right).

    Among 18- to 22-year-olds, trans identification fell by nearly half from 2022 to 2024. Nonbinary identification dropped by more than half between 2023 and 2024:

    Year of birth plays a key role here. Americans born in the early 2000s were more likely to identify as transgender than those born before or after them. That was also true for identifying as nonbinary, though with a less pronounced up and down pattern:

    One caveat: We don’t have 2025 data from the CES yet, so we can’t tell if this trend will continue. CES is partially funded by the National Science Foundation, so it’s possible the survey will not ask about or report data on transgender or nonbinary identification this year due to the Trump administration’s mandate on not acknowledging gender identity.

    I hope they do, though, as that will be the only way to know that the 2024 data aren’t a blip.

    Jean M. Twenge is Professor of Psychology at San Diego State University and the author of Generations: The Real Differences between Gen Z, Millennials, Gen X, Boomers and Silents—and What They Mean for America’s Future and 10 Rules for Raising Kids in a High-Tech World.

    A version of this article originally appeared on Jean Twenge’s Generation Tech Substack.

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    0 min
  • In a World Obsessed With Innovation, What If Most of It Isn’t Real?
    Mastercard office building, 2018. (Photo by Smith Collection/Gado.)

    In the beginning was the work. The work was done. The work was real. Then, somewhere along the way, work became just motion.

    It was like virtue signaling—only worse. At work, I practiced another kind of signaling: innovation signaling. Everyone knows innovation is the ultimate corporate virtue. For years, it wasn’t innovation itself but the signaling of it that I performed. Innovation signaling was my job.

    And not just mine.

    At Mastercard, I made around $250,000 a year. Over six years, my title changed—Enterprise Architect, Director of Strategy, Principal of Technology. When you’re an engineer, “Principal” is the ceiling if you’re not interested in managing people, and I hit it early. With nowhere to go upward, I moved sideways instead—new bosses, flights to Manila, Dubai, London, and headquarters in New York.

    There was movement—through airports, through inboxes. Emails received, emails sent. We gathered in front of whiteboards, drawing the shapes we learned in kindergarten: squares, circles, triangles, arrows connecting them. Each stood for something—systems, messages, networks, the physical, logical, or business layers of whatever new innovation we were trying to invent. When it became too obvious that it wasn’t new, we said we were reinventing. When even that felt untrue, we called it reframing, repurposing, reusing.

    What we produced was usually an abstraction of what already existed, wrapped in something new—sometimes just new buzzwords. Because you have to move—even when you’re not inventing anything. You have to check the box, upload the file to an internal shared-drive graveyard—a proof of motion, a justification to others and to ourselves that work had been done. That the high salary reflected merit. That it was earned. That it didn’t come at the cost of something else.

    I don’t know when I started noticing that all the movement was the same kind of nothing. Maybe it had started disappearing even earlier, and I just hadn’t seen it—because I was anchored to a different time, blinded by my own expectations of what work was supposed to be. Maybe I was still learning, and I mistook learning for doing. There was a lag in perception. I’m just not sure what caused it.

    It’s not a great revelation—David Graeber wrote Bullshit Jobs back in 2018. But we were technologists. Bullshit jobs were for administrators and bureaucrats, for consultants and life coaches, for people selling insurance or purpose. Not for us.

    At first I thought it was just a short-term lull. Maybe my team was signaling innovation this year, but other teams might do something real. Or if not them, then surely the company. But there was nothing.

    I moved everywhere, touched projects, asked people: “So what are you working on?” Every conversation followed the same arc: “What? Then what? So what?”

    Sometimes work looped back on itself like a recursive function. Sometimes it was a dead-end street. Worst of all—a highway that ends midair.

    It never added up to anything.

    I started checking the company’s press releases. Everything sounded groundbreaking. Blockchain! Cutting-edge innovation!

    But it wasn’t. I knew what those projects actually delivered because I was leading some of them. When I came across a press release I wasn’t sure about, I started feeding them through AI.

    Copy.

    “Is this true innovation or innovation signaling?”

    Paste.

    One by one, every single one of them came back as innovation signaling. Every. Single. One.

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    The job of almost everyone I worked with at Mastercard for six years was the same as that of the marketing team writing press releases. We were all spinning, packaging, messaging. The only difference was our audience. I took the spin upward—to my boss and senior leadership. That I was worth keeping. That I was worth $250,000, plus benefits, equity, and remote work. The marketing team took it outward—to the public, to shareholders. To you.

    It’s not so obvious. You see logo changes, a new chime when you check out, a slick Super Bowl ad, your card made to look like titanium. But what’s behind all that is old. Mastercard’s “switch”—the company’s bread and butter, the monolithic system that authorizes, clears, and settles transactions—was built during the Nixon era. It’s still the same.

    But there is always something that can be pushed out as transformative, digital-first, next-generation, seamless, future-ready, AI-powered, priceless. But it was the same thing as before—just repackaged, rebranded, abstracted. You thought it was new. We pretended it was new.

    Later, I moved on from Mastercard and joined consulting companies. More travel. I touched more companies. Banking, financial services, fintech, consulting—saturated with people signaling innovation.

    Financial gatekeepers: Experian, TransUnion, Equifax, FIS, Fiserv, PayPal, Stripe. They don’t innovate; they extract.

    Internet and cloud infrastructure: Equinix, Digital Realty, Cloudflare, Akamai. They own the digital roads and charge tolls.

    Logistics monopolies: UPS, FedEx, Union Pacific, BNSF. Generating private profits on public dependence.

    Healthcare and identity gatekeeping: Epic Systems, Cerner, UnitedHealth, ID.me, LexisNexis. They control access to health and identity, but not for the public good.

    Capitalism shouldn’t tolerate this kind of work across so many corporations for long. There’s competition, there’s supposed to be rational choice. Customers vote with their feet. Stop innovating, and they should go elsewhere.

    But these companies do not just last. They thrive even though they don’t innovate. Because of the digital machinery they inherited. Because of network effects, barriers to entry, locked-in customers, hostile acquisitions.

    The companies I worked for made plenty of money. No matter what happened—COVID, mass layoffs, war in Ukraine, any global crisis—someone would always say: “Well, our cash coffers look good.”

    We could weather any storm—stagnation, stagflation, shrinkflation, inflation, hyperinflation, recession. You name it.

    Bonuses. Promotions. Record profits. The company’s coffers stay full.

    These companies don’t just survive. They thrive.

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    Economist Tyler Cowen has asked: What happens when two-thirds of the economy is stagnant?

    I think what he identified on the macro scale, I experienced on the micro level. How much of the white collar economy is actually fake?

    I think I was trapped in the stagnant two-thirds. Then again, maybe “trap” isn’t the right word. I was making $250,000 a year. Some might call that floating.

    For some reason, I keep thinking of that drifting, aimless plastic bag in American Beauty. So free—yet still just a plastic bag. Floating. Polluting. Empty.

    Sarah Majdov is a computer engineer and technologist who spent years in what she calls the “Goldilocks position” of corporate life—right in the middle, high enough to glimpse strategy, low enough to understand execution. She is the author of Fatamorgana.

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    0 min
  • Randall Kennedy on Racism in America

    Randall Kennedy is the Michael R. Klein Professor at Harvard Law School where he teaches courses on contracts, criminal law, and the regulation of race relations.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Randall Kennedy discuss the history of racism in the United States, the shortcomings of critical race theory, and whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the trajectory of racism in America.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I’m really excited for this conversation. I’ve been reading you for a long time. One of my frustrations in the intellectual debate over the last five or so years has been the rise to prominence of critical race theory and the attacks on it, which I think were often simplistic and caricatured.

    Then there was the response on the left, which was that there’s really nothing to see here because all critical race theory means is thinking critically about the issue of race—and who wouldn’t want to do that?

    The way I read your work—and tell me if I’m putting words in your mouth or mischaracterizing it—is as someone who certainly thinks critically about race in America and about the role it plays in the American legal system. It’s not the only thing you work on, but it has been one central theme of your scholarship. Yet, you have at times criticized critical race theory and would not consider yourself a critical race theorist. I think it would be very interesting for listeners to learn what that in-between space is.

    Randall Kennedy: First of all, I do not want to join in any demonization of critical race theory. I know people who call themselves critical race theorists. I know them as colleagues, friends, and fellow scholars. I’ve learned from them, and I respect them. I do, however, have differences. I’d say the main difference is that I’m a liberal.

    For instance, I embrace the anti-discrimination standard and believe in the establishment of that standard. What do I mean by “anti-discrimination standard?” I mean the presumption that taking race into account is a bad thing. Is it always bad? No. I distinguish between racial discrimination, which in some instances may be justifiable. I was, and remain, a defender of affirmative action—within limits. But generally speaking, I believe that taking race into account is a bad thing, has been a bad thing in American history, and remains a bad thing.

    I believe that, as a presumptive matter, we ought not take race into account. We should take people as people, and that’s it. That’s one distinction, because critical race theorists, I think, view the anti-discrimination standard as insufficient. In my view, it’s not going to bring about radical change in American society or the fulfillment of all hopes for social justice. But it is an incursion on a particular aspect of American life—the racist use of the race line against racial minorities.

    The anti-discrimination standard, which was at the heart of what occurred between 1950 and 1970 in the United States—the invalidation of de jure segregation, the attack on private racial discrimination best featured in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the attack on racial disfranchisement best featured in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Open Housing Act of 1968—in my view, those were great achievements that changed American life for the better.

    Mounk: An implicit new emphasis in that is that, for many of the founders of critical race theory, those weren’t viewed as huge achievements. That’s not to say they were against them or thought the civil rights movement was bad, but they were certainly very critical of it. They didn’t believe that the basic liberal, philosophically liberal framework of the civil rights movement could make a very significant contribution to improving the condition of historically discriminated racial groups in the United States.

    Kennedy: I think what you just said is correct. One difference between me and them is that they’re happy about those changes, but they basically view them as cosmetic. Some would say they’re rather minimal. You have this phrase that’s very widespread, “the new Jim Crow.” In my view, the great champions of the civil rights movement succeeded to a great extent in overcoming Jim Crow. But some critical race theorists would say that no, Jim Crow just changed his clothes. Jim Crow was not killed; we have Jim Crow in new guise.

    I think that’s a mistake. You should recognize a victory, and a tremendous victory was won between 1950 and 1970. That doesn’t mean that all social injustice was overcome in America. It doesn’t even mean that racism was overcome in America—it was not. But in those years, a particular type of institutionalized racism was overcome.

    The law played an essential part in that. The people who engineered that change in law—some of them were lawyers, like the great Thurgood Marshall, the preeminent example—and some of them were not lawyers. Some were protesters, the great racial dissidents of the period who petitioned, demonstrated, lobbied, and, in some cases, went to jail to trigger lawsuits. These people accomplished something in American life, and that should be recognized.

    Mounk: It seems to me that this question about optimism versus pessimism—seeing the progress or focusing on the remaining injustices—is really key to people’s attitudes toward liberalism. That’s true for those who focus mostly on race, but it’s also true for whether people end up being liberal or non-liberal feminists, or whether they become liberal critics of colonialism or post-colonial scholars who reject liberalism.

    There are really two elements to this. One is whether you can acknowledge that every society is going to have imperfections—that racism, sexism, and other genuine ills are always going to continue to exist in certain ways in human societies, given our fundamentally tribal and self-interested nature—and nevertheless recognize that our societies suffer from those ills significantly less than those in the past did.

    The second is whether you think that the aspiration to live up to universal principles was a key force in bringing about some of those improvements, or whether, as many of the more critical perspectives would claim, it can’t be—that it’s merely the wool pulled over people’s eyes to blind them to the real interests of the powerful and privileged, which justify domination through empty references to universal principles.

    Kennedy: I think the tragedy of our particular moment is that politics today—and here I’m mainly thinking of the second Trump administration—has given the pessimistic view a real boost.

    Again, I want to emphasize that I’m not one to demonize the critical race theorists. My father, whom I venerate, was an early figure in critical race theory. He was completely pessimistic about American democracy. His view was, “This is a white man’s country. It was created as a white man’s country. It’s going to stay a white man’s country.” He was as critical and as pessimistic as Derrick Bell could have ever been—Derrick Bell being viewed as one of the progenitors of critical race theory and a friend and colleague of mine.

    The camp of pessimism does have a very distinguished intellectual lineage. Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, in his chapter “The Three Races of America,” was thoroughly pessimistic. Thomas Jefferson—thoroughly pessimistic. Abraham Lincoln—thoroughly pessimistic. In the Black nationalist tradition—Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammad—thoroughly pessimistic.

    Unfortunately, both historically and today, there are reasons they can point to that justify their pessimism. There is reason to think that we shall not overcome. You can’t say that’s a silly idea; it’s not. It has grounding. But on the other hand, there is also reason to think that we shall, that we can, overcome.

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    In the nineteenth century, the great spokesperson for that view was a man born into slavery—Frederick Douglass. Before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Douglass was asked whether he foresaw a time when Black and white Americans could live together as equals and as neighbors, and he said, “yes, I can foresee that.”

    In the twentieth century, the great spokesperson for this view was the wonderful Martin Luther King Jr. In the twenty-first century, the person most well known for expressing it is Barack Obama.

    Again, I don’t want to make light of the depth and intensity of racism in American life—we are seeing it—but we also ought not underestimate the countercurrents. We have to take into account the abolitionist crusade, the Second Reconstruction. We have to ask ourselves: have things changed in America? Well, have they? Yes, things have changed in America. In my life, every day, I see change in America.

    Mounk: I don’t know how deeply you got into this with your dad, but what would that argument look like? What is the argument you would make to him, given that he was born and raised in the segregated South?

    Kennedy: My father was born in Louisiana. He had a very tough upbringing and saw racism at its ugliest, at its most violent. He never forgave the United States of America for its mistreatment of Black people. For him, the most gripping thing was the way the United States treated Black people who served in the armed forces.

    They were sent straight back to segregation after they stopped serving. Not only were they sent back to segregation after they stopped serving, but while they were serving, they would see German and Italian prisoners of war go into restaurants that they themselves could not enter. This really scarred my father. It was a big thing with him.

    We talked about this a good bit. I would say to him, “Dad, I understand, that was absolutely horrible. But let me ask you a couple of things. You’ve got three kids, right?” He would say, “Yeah, of course I’ve got three kids.” I would say, “How are they doing? All three of your children went to Princeton University.” “That’s right, three children.”

    “I understand that what you saw in Louisiana was terrible. You married my mother, a wonderful woman. You met at Fort Jackson outside of Columbia, South Carolina. I understand that terrible things happened to you. But it’s also true that somehow you both got it together. You were refugees from the Jim Crow South. You went to Washington, D.C., built a household, raised three children who went to Princeton University. You have three children, all of whom became lawyers.”

    “Doesn’t that suggest something about the society we live in that’s a problem for your theory? You are doing better than most of the people who tried to oppress you and keep you down.”

    Mounk: There are a lot of people living in the most affluent suburbs of New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles whose life’s dream would be to send three of their kids to Princeton University.

    Kennedy: He did not live to see the inauguration of Barack Obama, but my father did live to see the inauguration of the first Black governor—probably the only one at that time—Douglas Wilder, when Wilder was elected in Virginia. I must say that even he was taken aback by it.

    I am so sorry I never had the chance to talk with him about Obama. It is true that if my father were alive today, I think he would point to Trump and say, this is what I’ve been telling you.

    He would say to me, Randy, you’re being sentimental by being so upset. This is America being America. That would be his view.

    Mounk: When I think about this question, I feel very differently hearing about your father and hearing similar arguments from some of my more privileged friends, acquaintances, and colleagues. For someone with your father’s life story, I understand where that pessimism comes from. I disagree with it intellectually in various ways, but I certainly don’t feel that I have any right to sit in judgment of it.

    When I hear faculty members at elite universities—people who grew up in those nice suburbs and who also went to Princeton or other prestigious institutions—say, America is just the same as it was fifty or a hundred years ago, I find that offensive to the life story of your father. It is offensive to the reality of how deep the injustices were that your father and many others in American history endured to say that today is just the same.

    Kennedy: I would agree with all of that. I think ignorance has a lot to do with it. I talk with people all the time about these sorts of things. If somebody says to me, for instance, that there haven’t been many changes, I ask, what about the 1964 Civil Rights Act? They say, that didn’t matter much.” I say, listen, you’re talking to me. I was born in 1954. I clearly remember drives from Washington, D.C., to my birthplace, Columbia, South Carolina, before the 1964 Civil Rights Act. I remember them clearly. There was a noticeable difference between that drive in 1963 and that drive in, let’s say, 1966—not to mention today.

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    Unfortunately, people just don’t know. The irony is—and here I’ll go back to some of my critical race theory colleagues—I say, in a certain way, you are not taking into account enough how bad things were. If you don’t think that much has changed, then I think you don’t have a sufficient understanding of what Jim Crow was.

    I’m not saying this to give any oxygen to complacency. I do want to state, however, that heroic, intelligent, persistent, collective action did make a difference. It has certainly made a difference in my life. It has certainly made a difference in the life that I can hand off to my children. Let’s be realistic.

    I want to be a realist about everything. Let’s not just be realistic about the downsides—let’s be realistic about the upsides too. It’s a complicated story.

    Mounk: You told me before we started the conversation that you’ve just submitted a manuscript on the civil rights era. Congratulations on that. I look forward to reading it when it comes out, I guess next year.

    To what extent do you think that the frame of the civil rights era continues to be the thing that can allow us to make progress? Because this is, I think, ultimately what this debate is about. Philosophical liberals want to say, we have not yet fully lived up to some of those standards in various aspects of our society, but those are the right standards. We can use those standards as the lodestar to continue making progress. We’ve made significant progress so far, and there’s more to make, but we have the roadmap for how to do that.

    The people who are much more pessimistic emphasize that we haven’t made any progress, but the reason they do that is to reach the conclusion that none of this is going to work. It’s a chimera. It’s an illusion to think that this framework can help point us toward further progress. That’s why, they argue, we have to rip it up and put something completely different in its place.

    Kennedy: I would say that dissidents in American life have made a difference. One of the things we should be attentive to is that vehicles can only carry so much of a load. I am not saying that the ideas and doctrines so prominent between 1950 and 1970 were insufficient. They covered a lot of ground, but we face new ground today. With new ground come new ideas.

    Some of the vehicles that were used then were wonderful, but we now have a very different America. Demographically, when I was coming up—I was born in 1954—it was, to a very large degree, a society of Black and white.

    Mounk: You could put everything through that, and even when we measure segregation in American schools, we still, to a large extent, use metrics that made sense when there were two ethnic groups. Now that many schools have five, six, or even ten ethnic groups, those measures no longer make sense in capturing those changes—at least not at a purely empirical level anymore.

    Kennedy: Absolutely. Things have changed to a very large extent, and along with change, we need to be experimental. For instance, is a race-based approach the best way to address a problem that may have a disproportionate adverse effect on Black people?

    Let’s talk about schools. Some people say that schools today are as segregated as they were in 1954. No, they are not. In 1954, the year I was born, the state of South Carolina had, as part of its constitution, a requirement that Black children be separated from white children in schools. It was in the constitution, in the statute books, and enforced by a whole phalanx of people who put it into operation. They were not apologetic about it; that was the way it was. They believed they were defending the right moral order.

    Because of the struggles of the civil rights era, that system was invalidated and put on the defensive. In the United States today, we have many problems. I am not saying we don’t. We have unfairness that is, frankly, scandalous. However, you will not have a public official stand up and publicly say, I’m in favor of separating people on a racial basis in public schools. You will not have it. That does not mean there is nothing to attend to, but we should be careful with our language. It is not true that there has been no change in segregation in public schooling.

    As for affirmative action, I have defended it, and I still do. I am proud of having defended it. I think affirmative action did many good things. It had its weaknesses and its detriments. Now the courts have struck down affirmative action in higher education. Are there other ways to try to address ongoing difficulties and unfairness? Yes.

    Even setting aside the Supreme Court for a moment, there were people suggesting experiments of other kinds. I think we should be open to those—for instance, people who talk about class rather than race.

    Mounk: One of the strangenesses of the way affirmative action was practiced about ten years ago, connected to the demographic changes we were discussing earlier, is that it often was not benefiting the group for which it was originally designed. When affirmative action was first put in place, there were very few recent immigrants from African countries in the United States.

    By the time the Supreme Court struck affirmative action down, according to various estimates, a third to a half of the Black students at Ivy League institutions such as Harvard were children of immigrants from Nigeria, Kenya, and other countries whose parents had come on H-1B visas. These were often tremendously deserving students who made significant contributions to their universities. However, they were often not poor students and did not tend to come from the most underserved neighborhoods, such as the South Side of Chicago or the poorer parts of Baltimore, which we might have hoped affirmative action would help lift up.

    Kennedy: Yes, the affirmative action dispute was a complicated one. The fact of the matter is that the rationale the courts allowed for affirmative action was diversity. That was a pedagogical theory. The idea did not really have to do with repairing injustices of the past.

    Mounk: It was a pretty patronizing idea because, to some extent, it implied that those Black students were there to enrich the educational experience of the majority of students, who would somehow learn better through diversity in the classroom. I have very mixed feelings about affirmative action. On the whole, I am in favor of burning the entire admissions system down in American universities. It is unjust and absurd across many dimensions, including the much-underdiscussed fact that virtually every elite school is now engaging in massive affirmative action in favor of boys, because otherwise they would have such an uneven gender ratio, which is also absurd.

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    By far the strongest normative defense of affirmative action is simply that African Americans have been excluded and maltreated in the most extreme ways for a very long time in American history. Therefore, at least on a temporary basis, creating opportunities for African Americans to be integrated into the elite institutions of this country and to gain those opportunities is an incredibly important way to address that history.

    The problem from the beginning was that the Supreme Court did not allow for that rationale. Everyone was forced to pretend that they cared deeply about the, in this context, rather strange value of diversity, rather than the issue that this debate has always, at some level, truly been about.

    Kennedy: That is a function of race talk in American life. In the United States, we have legal fictions, we have talk, and we have double talk. Societies are like that sometimes. Sometimes you have to approach things indirectly. Sometimes you use euphemisms. Sometimes you cannot say what ought to be said directly. That was true at the time of Brown v. Board of Education, and it is true in our time.

    We had affirmative action, and everyone knew that the real impulse behind it was to try to repair deep-seated racial wrongs. The Supreme Court, however, would not allow that, so we came up with this cover story. Over time, my view of that story changed. I used to scoff at it entirely, but I stopped doing so. There was something to it. Still, I agree that the strongest impulse behind racial affirmative action in America was to repair past wrongs.

    Are there other ways to accomplish the advancement of racial justice in American life? I think there are. In fact, I think there is a strong argument that people like me may have invested too much in affirmative action in higher education. Affirmative action is only an issue at the most elite schools. If you are a plausible candidate at those schools, it means you are already doing well. If you do not go to one, you will go to another good school.

    What about the kids who graduate from high school—or the kids who do not graduate at all? What about the ones who graduate but are functionally illiterate? Why aren’t we focusing more on them? Why aren’t we focusing more on K–12 education, preparing people so that, frankly, they do not need any hand? It was a great thing to extend a hand to those who had been badly mistreated, but what about preparing people over time so they do not need it?

    We need a more experimental approach. We should ask how to frame progressive, reformist action that creates a big tent—one that brings together coalitions rather than dividing people into small, competing groups. We should think in a broader, more inclusive way.

    The great champions of the civil rights era—A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, Martin Luther King Jr., John Lewis—were great figures. Their greatness does not depend on whether we embrace the particulars of what they advanced. Their ideas and conduct were exemplary. The closing note in my book is that I do not know what will happen to the monuments they left behind. That was only seventy, eighty, ninety years ago. I cannot foresee the future. Maybe there will be a rollback, which would be terrible, but it could happen. What they created, though, was admirable and changed many lives for the better.

    Even if their monuments are eroded, nothing can take away the way they acted—their generosity, their dignity. One of the great things about the period I wrote about, and one of the most inspiring things to study, is how these people, crushed into the dirt by the Jim Crow South, conducted themselves with such grandeur, generosity, and inspiration. They inspired people all around the world. We Shall Overcome is known everywhere. The women’s movement, the gay rights movement—every movement for social justice—has been inspired by what these people did. So I would say to everyone: read about them, listen to them carefully, and take the best of what they did. Embrace it, and put it to work in our time.

    Mounk: I wholeheartedly agree with you on that. One of the things that sometimes depresses me about this political moment is that, faced with so much horribleness and indignity from this administration, not enough people are looking to the attitude embodied by the civil rights movement for guidance. What is encouraged and celebrated instead is someone like Gavin Newsom saying, I’m going to sink to the level of Donald Trump and mock him on social media with the same kinds of memes he uses to mock us, rather than emulating that incredible ability—when faced with physical intimidation, assault, and every dirty trick used by the political powers of the Southern states, and to some extent the federal government as well—to speak to the highest parts of our nature and conscience.

    I came to the United States and started my PhD at Harvard in 2007. That was what was so inspiring about Barack Obama. That is one of the continuities between Obama and the civil rights movement. Even though the circumstances were far less difficult in his time, he tried to call upon the most magnanimous and noble parts of our nature, rather than saying, I’m going to fight dirt with dirt.

    It would have been easy to understand in the 1950s and ‘60s why people might have said, we are faced with such violence and injustice; let’s fight back with violence of our own. It would have been perfectly understandable for people at that moment to resort to that strategy. The enduring importance of that political moment lies not only in the moral example of refusing to do that, but also in the fact that it showed such an approach can, under the right circumstances, be far more effective.

    Kennedy: Tremendously effective. We paid lip service. I think that people know just enough to think that they know what happened during the civil rights era. I think people should take a second and a third look at what the people of Montgomery, Alabama, did in that glorious year when they basically created a government for themselves. Rosa Parks, E. D. Nixon, Martin Luther King Jr., Ralph Abernathy—absolutely extraordinary. Their lawyer, Fred Gray, too.

    They had been marginalized and minimized. People did not think anything of them, and yet look at what they did. They surprised the world. Their example should be embraced, and I think it can lead to what we are going to need because, frankly, at the present moment, our country is in peril. Our democracy is absolutely in peril. To get out of this hole that we are in—this hole of polarization that is paralyzing our efforts to do almost anything—we are going to need inspiration from aspects of our traditions. The tradition that I have just finished writing about is one of the most important, one of the most revealing, and one of the most inspiring.

    Mounk: I want to come back for a moment to how to make further progress and how to think about the role of race in the law in particular. There are two sets of views that seem relatively straightforward but are flawed for different reasons. One of them is the one that at least some materials of critical race theory embrace, which is to say that we should give up on the presumption that it is wrong for the law to discriminate on the basis of race and create a system in which how people are treated is often dependent, quite explicitly, on racial category.

    The hope is that, unlike in the past, such a system would work to the benefit of those who have been most discriminated against and disadvantaged. One concern about this is normative. The other is empirical. If you have such a pessimistic interpretation of American history, why would you think that a system that explicitly discriminates on the basis of race is somehow going to favor the most disadvantaged rather than revert to what those kinds of systems looked like in the past?

    On the other side, you have the stance of more conservative, philosophically-liberal jurists, including some Supreme Court justices, who say, the way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. In their view, race should not play a significant role in the law under any circumstances. Of course, we should have certain forms of anti-discrimination laws. We should stop businesses from excluding people on the basis of race. We should have legislation ensuring that if an employer suddenly fires ten Black employees and no white employees, there can be an anti-discrimination lawsuit that provides a remedy if it is obvious they were fired on racial grounds.

    But, for example, we would not have affirmative action. We would not have set-asides in federal contracting. We would not have districts drawn to ensure majority-Black representation. Those two positions each seem straightforward and coherent in their own ways. Yet it seems that you, on a number of these issues, are arguing for something not exactly in the middle but suggesting that, on the whole, we do not want race to be at the center of the law. We should have a presumption against it. But there are more areas than conservative, philosophically-liberal jurists would acknowledge in which race does need to play a role. What does that look like, and what is the logic for that middle position?

    Kennedy: A couple of things. You mentioned two, and I want to add a third, but let me walk through your first two.

    First, I share your resistance to a legal regime that would normalize and reinforce racial distinctions throughout social life. For one thing, things change. One of the main requirements for that kind of regime is clear distinctions. Who is white? That question, and others like it, are becoming more and more complicated.

    Mounk: Incidentally, I am a political scientist by training. When you look at people who defended forms of consociational democracy in countries like Lebanon—where, very explicitly, which office you can be elected to, what kinds of laws about education, marriage, and divorce you are subject to, and so on, depend on your status as a Sunni, Shia, or Maronite Christian—the people who came up with those schemes, like Arend Lijphart, explicitly said that we have to make sure there is not too much contact and mixing between those different population groups, because otherwise the scheme will fall apart.

    The very logic of that system, from the beginning, recognized that for its maintenance you need relatively ironclad categories. One of the wonderful things about American life is that some of those categories have started to blend and mix in all kinds of ways over the course of the last fifty years.

    Kennedy: I don’t want a system in which I have to fill out a form asking, who was your great-grandmother? Where did she come from? Was she born in the United States, or was she born in Jamaica, or in Africa? I prefer the fluid, the integrationist, the amalgamationist mix. So that’s number one.

    Number two, you mentioned Chief Justice Roberts and his view that the way to get rid of discrimination is to stop discriminating. I have considerable sympathy for that position. The problem I have with Chief Justice Roberts, or at least one problem—probably my main one—is this: I hear that claim, but why is it that he and others get so passionate in the face of affirmative action or electoral arrangements that advantage people of color, yet I don’t see the same passion about the age-old policies and habits that disadvantage people of color?

    Take other forms of gerrymandering, for instance. Listening to our present administration on anti-discrimination law, if you just arrived here and didn’t know any better, you would think it was mainly white people, white men, who were being discriminated against in the United States. It is still the case today that there is a tremendous amount of racial discrimination, but I don’t hear that from the people who embrace Chief Justice Roberts’s position.

    To tell you the truth, if I thought that the people who say “race is out” were applying that belief comprehensively, passionately, and consistently, I might take a different view. I might not ultimately agree with them, but I could say, let’s have ten years of that and see what happens.

    There is a third thing, a looming ghost in the room, that you did not mention but that is on my mind. That third thing is the old-time religion of racism in America. It is still the case that there are people who believe in racial hierarchy. The way they cover it is by saying, race blind—we don’t want to take race into account, while in fact they are taking race into account.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Randall discuss anti-discrimination laws and mistrust in the U.S. political system. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    55 min
  • The Paradox of No Kings Day
    Photo: Barrett Fife.

    As a lifelong D.C.-area resident, I’ve witnessed my fair share of protests: The Women’s March, the March for Our Lives, multiple Black Lives Matter protests, D.C. Pride, pro-Palestinian rallies, the list goes on. (In fact, I think the only major D.C.-based demonstration I’ve missed in the past decade is January 6.)

    If you’ve ever asked yourself, what would it be like to attend all those events at once? then I have some unfortunate news—you just missed your chance.

    This past Saturday, D.C. saw one of its largest demonstrations in recent memory: the No Kings rally to protest Donald Trump’s second administration. Organizers say that over 2,600 No Kings rallies were held across all 50 states, and there were likely millions of attendees nationwide.

    My first reflection was that the title “No Kings”—though sharp and memorable—is not politically useful. To state the obvious, on a very literal level, the United States does not have a king, and suggesting otherwise could be perceived as insulting to the 77 million Americans who voted for Donald Trump. The name also appears to be causing confusion worldwide. Democrats Abroad, for instance, rebranded their iterations of the protest No Tyrants, “so as not to mix messages in a country with a monarchy.”

    This is not to say that Trump doesn’t have some monarchical qualities; he certainly does. However—and this is my second concern with the name—if a MAGA Republican were to look at your anti-Trump slogan and say, sure, I agree with that, then perhaps it’s time to return to the drawing board.

    Still, the name motivated a lot of compelling signage and patriotic rhetoric of the sort that has been sorely lacking from the left in recent years. Organizer-sponsored posters proclaimed “No Kings Since 1776,” people waved and distributed American flags, and plenty of homemade signs made reference to the Founding Fathers. Many attendees I spoke to cited the Constitution as their primary motivation for being there.

    As will always be the case with large-scale demonstrations, not everyone stayed on theme. In fact, many attendees sported outdated and, dare I say, nostalgic branding from the 2010s. No Kings attracted pink pussy hats, Human Rights Campaign paraphernalia, and Black Lives Matter signage. I even spotted a bona fide vintage poster from the 2017 Women’s March. (There were fewer Palestinian flags than I expected, but that’s likely due to the recent ceasefire deal spearheaded by none other than the president himself.) And in case you were worried, Baby Trump was back and better than ever.

    There were countless references to the Epstein files. Other protestors advocated for a “Free D.C.,” trans rights, science, abortion rights, Supreme Court reform, and the Equal Rights Amendment. There were climate groups, reproductive choice advocates, voting rights groups, labor unions, and immigration groups. The Democratic Socialists of America were represented, as was the Center for New Liberalism.

    Ideologically overwhelmed yet?

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    One could find this inspiring, so many disparate causes united under one banner. But for those of us who want to see tangible reform in the United States, the lack of clear messaging or policy recommendations—especially during a protest intended to inspire action—was disorienting.

    The two most high-profile political speakers were Senators Chris Murphy and Bernie Sanders. Murphy confidently stated that “we are not on the verge of an authoritarian takeover; we are in the midst of an authoritarian takeover,” and went on to list some of the Trump administration’s most egregious actions: the FCC’s targeting of Jimmy Kimmel, plain-clothes ICE agents snatching people off the street, repeated attacks on the free press. But he avoided any reference to specific actions or policy proposals that might push back against Trump’s overreach.

    This contrasted with Sanders, who received, unsurprisingly, the biggest applause of the day, despite having the fewest Trump-specific remarks out of the many speakers. In fact, Sanders’s appearance was nearly indistinguishable from one of his 2020 campaign-trail stump speeches, rife with anti-billionaire rhetoric, attacks on Citizens United, and support for an expanded social safety net.

    Is it any wonder that the speech that actually advocated for something, rather than simply being against Trump, was the most energizing?

    There were countless notes of frivolity it would be tempting to complain about. The inflatable animal costumes. The inescapable phallic jabs at Trump. Even potty-mouthed Jesus and a left-wing January 6 Shaman.

    But perhaps that would be overly cynical. Maybe this day—one filled with jubilation and camaraderie in addition to frustration—was exactly what America needed: chaotic, incoherent, unfiltered catharsis. Millions took to the streets and spent a day in unified pandemonium. Now they can put away their costumes and figure out how to move forward.

    Last week, Speaker Mike Johnson said: “I bet you see pro-Hamas supporters, I bet you’ll see Antifa types, I bet you’ll see the Marxists in full display—the people who don’t want to stand and defend the foundational truths of this republic.” He was almost entirely incorrect.

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    Yes, there were a few idolizing references to Luigi Mangione. Some people carried Palestine flags (which does not mean they were “pro-Hamas” or supported globalizing the intifada). Plenty of harsh words were directed at Trump, JD Vance, Stephen Miller, Mike Johnson, Jeff Bezos, and other perceived enemies.

    Photo: Barrett Fife.

    But the crowd—most of them—clearly loved this country. We can argue about the efficacy of their tactics, but their patriotism and loyalty were obvious.

    I came to No Kings day with both an open mind and deep skepticism about the protest’s utility. I left with my skepticism unabated but my spirits lifted. Participation in the democratic process—which includes peaceful protest and civil disobedience—is the lifeblood of this country. I am heartened to know that such a spirit remains alive in the United States today.

    Still, I can’t help but ask: What next?

    Barrett Fife is on Persuasion’s Operations team.

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