Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • The Case Against the Unitary Executive

    Under the doctrine of the “unitary executive,” Donald Trump has fired numerous federal officials that had statutory job protections. Congress has seen fit to limit the president’s removal power for the past 150 years in order to protect expertise and de-politicize parts of the federal government, like the Federal Reserve Board. For government to operate effectively, there needs to be a separation of powers not just between the branches of government, but within the executive branch itself, and the Supreme Court should not hand Trump this power.

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    13 min
  • The Good Fight Club: Gaza Ceasefire, U.S. Government Shutdown, and America’s Slouch Towards Autocracy

    In this week’s episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk, Garry Kasparov, Russ Muirhead, and Quico Toro discuss the ceasefire in Gaza, the impact of the U.S. government shutdown, and the extent to which America under Trump mirrors Russia and Venezuela.

    Garry Kasparov is the chairman and founder of the Renew Democracy Initiative (RDI), which publishes …

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    1 hr 5 min
  • Israel Must Not Turn Into Sparta
    Benjamin Netanyahu listens while U.S. President Donald Trump addresses the Knesset on October 13, 2025. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images.)

    For anybody who’s visited Israel, submerged themselves in the thousands of years of history there, of every form of triumph and transcendence and brutality that you can imagine, there’s one site that stands out from all the others. It’s a flat promontory on the top of an astonishingly steep precipice located at the eastern edge of the Dead Sea. It’s called Masada and it is as close as anything that nature could design to an impregnable fortress.

    In a vivid passage, here is how the Roman-Jewish historian Josephus described it:

    There was a rock, not small in circumference, and very high. It was encompassed with valleys of such vast depth downward, that the eye could not reach their bottoms. They were abrupt; and such as no animal could walk upon… There is also nothing but destruction in case your feet slip. For on each side there is a vastly deep chasm, and precipice; sufficient to quell the courage of every body, by the terror it infuses into the mind.

    At the very end of the Jewish Revolt, four years after the Roman conquest of Jerusalem, a group of hardcore fanatics—the Sicarii—retreated to Masada and for the better part of a year heroically resisted a siege by the Roman Legion X before, in Josephus’ account, committing mass suicide. Of all the poignant symbols of Jewish statehood, there is probably none more powerful than Masada, of the absolute determination of Jews to live and die in freedom and in the practice of the Jewish religion. “Let us preserve our selves in freedom, as an excellent funeral monument to us,” Eleazar, the military commander of the Sicarii, said in Josephus’ account of the mass suicide.

    It’s a story that’s very difficult to not be impressed by, and it has been at the very center of modern Israel’s conception of itself. “A generation of youth was raised by Masada,” Louis Rabinowitz wrote in a book for young adults in 1970. “This is the generation that created the state, the generation of defense in its various manifestations.” Yael Zerubavel, in a scholarly account of the phenomenon of the “Masada myth,” contends that the episode “was seen as the essence of the national spirit that made the Jews stand up and fight for their freedom.”

    There are only a few problems with the story. One is that the Sicarii were utter fanatics, whose attacks—if Josephus is to be believed—were mostly confined to massacring other Jews viewed as collaborating with the Roman occupation. Then, the story of the heroic speeches and mass suicide seems almost certainly to have been a bit of poetic license. Sober archeological findings seem to indicate that the siege ended with a more run-of-the-mill battle. “There is no archeological evidence that Masada’s defenders committed mass suicide,” writes biblical archeologist Kenneth Atkinson. And then the isolated revolt was almost perfectly pointless and self-defeating. A scholarly article in the Sociological Quarterly calls it “one of the least significant and least successful events in ancient Jewish history.”

    Given all that, a chill went down my spine when I read the text of Benjamin Netanyahu’s “super-Sparta” speech in mid-September where he claimed that Israel had been driven into a state of isolation on the world stage and would need to adapt by embracing that isolation, by “adapting to an economy with autarkic characteristics” and by becoming a “super-Sparta,” producing its own weapons and economic necessities and generally ignoring the outside world. In particular, Netanyahu singled out Europe, arguing that Muslim migration had led to European countries developing an “Islamist agenda” that was intrinsically anti-Zionist.

    Another way to put it was that Netanyahu was adopting a “Masada Mindset.” The overwhelming sense of the speech was a belief that Israel, and Jews, have an utterly singular fate. The international community is, at core, so opposed even to the existence of Israel that Israel need not pay attention to the international community. That general indifference extended certainly to defense questions—Israel, as Netanyahu has made abundantly clear, would be the sole arbiter of its own security without interest in the niceties of international law. And that sense of proud isolation could extend even to trade—with Netanyahu, rhetorically at least, moving Israel closer to Russia, if not North Korea, in his articulation of exiting the global marketplace.

    A month is, of course, a long time in politics, and suddenly everybody is singing a different tune. Netanyahu has to some extent repudiated his “super-Sparta” speech, claiming that his remarks had been misunderstood. And suddenly, against all apparent odds, a negotiating deadlock has been broken, with Jared Kushner brokering the sort of deal between Israel and Hamas that has eluded decades of negotiators, and with this year’s Nobel Peace Prize winner touting Trump as a worthy successor. The remaining hostages have returned amidst great joy, Hamas has agreed to the ceasefire, an International Stabilization Force is slowly replacing IDF positions in Gaza.

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    But in this mood of unexpected jubilation, we have to ask ourselves what the dynamics have been up to this point—and the critical point, as it has been really for the entirety of the conflict, is Israel’s conception of its own nationhood and statecraft. Yes, Netanyahu accepted the terms of the ceasefire, but his speech doing so was a study in ambivalence. “Hamas will be disarmed and Gaza will be demilitarized,” he said. “If this is achieved the easy way, great. If not, it will be achieved the hard way.” This is of course the same government that, only weeks ago, initiated its military occupation of Gaza and struck at Hamas’ chief negotiators in Qatar. And the very clear implication of Netanyahu’s speech was that he simply didn’t believe that any such ceasefire could hold—that in his view the international community continued to underestimate the depths of Palestinians’ hatred towards Israel and that force was the only truly effective instrument in securing Israel’s stability.

    In the subtext of Netanyahu’s speech was the Masada Mindset—the vision of heroic self-sufficiency that leaves little room for liberal internationalism. In the delicate period to come, as a ceasefire takes effect—and as inevitable breaches in the ceasefire occur and both sides struggle to respond to them—the paramount issue will be whether the Netanyahu government can ward off the temptations of the Masada Mindset.

    To this point, his government has not been close to doing so. In the aftermath of the October 7 sneak attack, a rational course presented itself to Israel’s government. There would, certainly, be military action in Gaza. That action would wipe out Hamas’ military leadership and reduce Hamas’ ability to stage anything like the October 7 attack for the foreseeable future and would, as Times of Israel columnist Yossi Klein Halevi wrote on the day of the attack, “restore Israel’s deterrence.” Meanwhile, Israel would benefit diplomatically from the widespread sympathy of the Western world, and the war in Gaza would end very much as in the Trump/Kushner plan, with an exchange of hostages for prisoners, with the international community active both in peacekeeping and the dissemination of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip.

    A wide array of sophisticated observers have held that the conditions for this deal have been in place for at least a year, following the death of the October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar. Former prime minister Ehud Olmert held that Israel had already achieved its military objectives by May 2024. Former prime minister Ehud Barak stated last September that the war continued only for political reasons having to do with Netanyahu’s governing coalition. IDF captain Yotam Vilk, who fought in Gaza for a year, wrote recently in a New York Times op-ed, “If we went to war on Oct. 7 to save what was dearest to us, it soon became clear to me that we were fighting because our leaders were never planning to stop.” Former Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said this week, “Israel long ago achieved its war aims of destroying Hamas’s capacity to repeat Oct. 7 and killing the leaders responsible.” A New York Times account of a high-stakes cabinet meeting in April 2024 gives a vivid sense of the kinds of political pressures Netanyahu was under and how they impacted the conduct of the war. In the Times’ reporting, Netanyahu was all set to present his plan for a six-week ceasefire when Bezalel Smotrich, the far-right finance minister, threatened to walk out of the government, at which point Netanyahu hurriedly denied the existence of his own plan. “No, no, there’s no such thing,” he told his cabinet.

    Under pressure from hard-liners like Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, the national security minister, Netanyahu continually stalled the Biden administration in its pursuit of a break in the fighting. A fragile ceasefire in early 2025, marred by violations on both sides, ended after two months with Netanyahu launching a surprise attack and declaring, “Israel will, from now on, act against Hamas with increasing military strength.”

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    Beneath everything in Netanyahu’s conduct of the war—beneath the coalition politics, beneath the details of ceasefires agreed to and then broken—is one fundamental view of statecraft: that it is force alone, steadfastly applied, that can guarantee security. But a policy like this has real repercussions. Two years after the effusion of sympathy from the rest of the world, Israel has found itself more alone than it has been in memory—with the International Criminal Court issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former minister of defense; with a wave of countries such as France, the UK, Canada, and Australia recognizing Palestine as a state; with the European Union moving towards trade restrictions against Israel; with support for Israel plummeting even in the United States, with, at the time of writing, a majority of Americans opposing continued military aid to Israel. Netanyahu’s “super-Sparta” speech was a symptom of a much larger issue—a confirmation of Israel’s isolation on the world stage—and, for many Israelis and friends of Israel, none of that was necessary. As Yair Lapid, the leader of Israel’s opposition, put it: “Isolation is not fate. It’s the product of a wrongheaded and failed policy by Netanyahu and his government, who have turned Israel into a third-world country.”

    The sudden about-face by the Trump administration in pushing for a ceasefire—a response, apparently, to the extremity of Israel’s actions in bombing Qatar—is a gift to Israel that restrains the Netanyahu government from its own worst impulses. But those impulses are still there. If, on the one hand, there is a view of Israeli nationhood that holds that Israel is one nation amongst a community of nations and that its success will tend to rise or fall by the esteem with which it is held by the rest of the world, there is another view that Israel has a fate entirely of its own, that the rest of the world can’t possibly understand the Jewish spirit of ceaseless vigilance and self-defense, and that Israel’s ultimate survival is contingent only and entirely on heroic self-sufficiency. That is the Masada Mindset. It has a very deep resonance in Israel. It has been uppermost for two years and, if it has contributed to military successes on a wide front from Lebanon to Iran, it has also had its dire consequences in the court of international opinion. Just as has been the case since October 7, Israel’s long-term survival hinges on the ability of society and the government not to give in to this mindset.

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    It may be facile to make too much of the Masada metaphor, but I can’t help but be haunted by Josephus’ depiction of the morning after the suicide when the Romans continued with their planned assault only to discover “nobody as an enemy, but a terrible solitude on every side, with a fire within the place as well as a perfect solitude.”

    As an American Jew with deep emotional ties to, and family in, Israel, the particular terror I have is of Israel giving in to the Masada Mindset that is so central to Israeli nationalism but also so self-destructive. Over the past two years, it has alienated Europe, perhaps irrevocably. Israel is fortunate to still have a friend in the United States—and a friend that is willing to push through a ceasefire deal and to put U.S. troops in harm’s way to help maintain it—but the preservation of the ceasefire will hinge, likely more than anything else, on Israel’s ability to show restraint when and if breaches occur. It will be not only a lost opportunity, but an immense tragedy, if Israel once again gives in to its nationalistic impulses and to the belief that it’s possible to go it alone.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

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    0 min
  • Iran’s Crackdown on Free Thought
    Two women sitting outside the main entrance of the University of Tehran. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    When Islamic Azad University summoned veteran professor Mehdi Zakarian for “supporting Western-oriented thinking,” it reflected the Islamic Republic’s ongoing war against intellectual freedom. In Iran, universities are not sanctuaries of inquiry but battlegrounds where dissent is equated with subversion.

    Since the Islamic Republic was founded in 1979, the university has been a battleground between the regime, which seeks to control and use it for its own ideological purposes, and academics who fight for scholarly independence and autonomy. That is why, under the banner of “Cultural Revolution,” the regime shuttered universities for three years in the 1980s to purge dissenting students and professors and to Islamize higher education.

    To achieve this, disciplinary boards became instruments of political control. Universities dismissed thousands of professors deemed liberal or Marxist, and thus disloyal to the revolutionary order. The 1984 Disciplinary Rules for Faculty Members gave regime-controlled committees, including clerics teaching obligatory Islamic studies courses, sweeping powers to investigate not only administrative or professional issues but also ideological and “Shari’a-related” offenses. The range of so-called violations was staggering: unauthorized meetings, strikes, blasphemy, “atheistic ideas,” or “support for misguided sects.”

    The punishments are equally harsh. Faculty can be summoned, reprimanded, expelled, or permanently banned from public service. Under the 1986 Disciplinary Act for the Country’s Faculties, accused professors are denied the right to a personal defense. Vague definitions of “ethical” or “political” crimes allow these committees to weaponize accusations at will, leaving dissenting professors vulnerable to arbitrary expulsion.

    Disciplinary boards do not operate in isolation. They are part of a larger repressive apparatus that includes the campus intelligence offices (herasat), law enforcement (entezamat), the Basij militia, the “Supreme Leader Representation in Universities,” and other coercive institutions. Together, they form a web of surveillance and intimidation designed to ensure that universities remain sites of indoctrination rather than inquiry.

    The system extends to admissions. Universities allocate seats through a quota system favoring regime loyalists, sometimes up to 70 percent in certain disciplines, as a form of patronage to consolidate support. Universities simultaneously “purified” curricula of secular perspectives and infused them with Quranic studies across multiple fields, embedding ideological vetting into every stage of higher education.

    The purge of the 1980s continued into the 1990s, albeit gradually. Even under relatively moderate presidents such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), universities expelled such well-known professors as Jalil Roshandel and Seyed Javad Tabatabai.

    Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013), Iran launched a second cultural revolution aimed at tightening ideological control over universities. This resulted in the expulsion of many Iranian students and professors, including the renowned political scientist Hossein Bashiriyeh, who now teaches at Syracuse University. I was fired in this wave, after four years of teaching at Islamic Azad University. The wave intensified after the 2009 Green Movement, which erupted after a disputed presidential election, when universities forced dozens of professors sympathetic to protesters into early retirement or exile.

    A “third cultural revolution” began after Ebrahim Raisi’s rise to the presidency in 2021. Notable dismissals included Arash Abazari, now at Emory University. Following the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, repression intensified: Professors faced interrogation and marginalization, while universities suspended or expelled hundreds of students. Reports by Scholars at Risk documented a consistent pattern of intimidation, denial of promotion, and dismissal for those deviating from the official line.

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    Although political repression slowed under President Masoud Pezeshkian, who assumed office after Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash in May 2024, pressure on universities returned. Zakarian’s summons at Islamic Azad University, along with that of Hatem Qaderi, a political science professor at Tarbiat Modares University, marked a renewed campaign of policing thought.

    The timing is telling. These incidents followed the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel, which dealt a blow to the Islamic Republic. Rather than ease domestic pressures to allow critical voices to help the country recover, a hope that Zakarian expressed, the opposite occurred: Insecurity at the top translated into repression below. According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, security forces arrested more than 20,000 people, including dissidents and activists, under the guise of national security, with ethnic and religious minorities accused of being spies for Israel.

    This pattern is not new. In the wake of military or political humiliations, authoritarian regimes often crack down internally to project strength, scapegoating intellectuals to divert attention from failures. Iranian universities, long a barometer of the country’s political climate, once again stand at the forefront of repression.

    Summonses such as those of Zakarian and Qaderi are less about individual behavior than enforcing ideological conformity. By criminalizing engagement with global ideas and labeling them “Western influence,” the Islamic Republic reveals its fear that free inquiry could challenge its legitimacy.

    The regime frames such purges as defending revolutionary ideals from “foreign infiltration,” what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls “cultural invasion.” In reality, they betray the regime’s lack of confidence that its ideals can withstand debate. For the Islamic Republic, universities are not centers of knowledge but ideological battlefields where enemies allegedly conspire to corrupt Iran’s youth.

    The costs are profound. By silencing academics rather than engaging them, the regime undermines its own resilience and innovation. Decades of cultural revolutions have already eroded Iran’s standing in higher education. A state that stifles academic freedom loses the capacity for reflection, correction, and the intellectual capital needed to recover after crises. Scholars call this the “dumbification of the state”—the erosion of meritocracy and critical thought through repression and patronage.

    Zakarian’s ordeal is a warning: When a state fears the classroom, it is already at war with its future. The fate of Zakarian and Qaderi underscores a larger truth: Authoritarian regimes view universities not as incubators of innovation but as battlegrounds of control, which they can weaponize to police thought and manufacture loyalty.

    A version of this piece was originally published on the Middle East Forum.

    Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Oren Harman on the Magic of Metamorphosis

    Oren Harman is a Senior Fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and teaches at the Graduate Program in Science Technology and Society at Bar Ilan University. His latest book is Metamorphosis: A Natural and Human History.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Oren Harman explore the evolutionary benefits of altruism, metamorphosis in the world around us, and how it impacts our perception of human growth.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You’re writing about subjects that don’t immediately touch on politics but are actually interesting to think about from a political perspective. In a way, you’re trying to answer some puzzles about evolution. Why is it that a caterpillar turns into a butterfly when that seems an unnecessarily complicated process from an evolutionary perspective? Why is it, as you explored in a previous book, that many of us are capable of altruism, and many animals are capable of altruism, even though you would think that in an evolutionary process favoring the survival of the fittest, you would end up selecting against that kind of altruism? Why don’t we start there? Explain the puzzle to us first. What’s so puzzling about altruism?

    Oren Harman: Darwin himself recognized the puzzle when looking at social insects, where you have entire classes of bees, termites, and ants that appear to forgo reproduction altogether in order to sacrifice their lives for their queen. From a biological point of view, their fitness is zero. They don’t reproduce and are negligible from an evolutionary point of view. That seems to make no sense if evolution is a game of survival of the fittest. Why would a characteristic that reduces fitness evolve over time? Darwin wrote, “If I cannot find a good solution to this problem, my entire theory is worthless.”

    Mounk: He really was bothered by this. It wasn’t just an interesting little puzzle. He felt that it was a challenge to the core of his scientific worldview.

    Harman: For sure, and his answer was that it’s for the good of the community—what we would today call group selection. For many years in the twentieth century, group selection was considered very fuzzy thinking and bad science. When you think of two groups competing with one another, what would be your guess as to which group would be stronger in this competition: a group full of altruists or a group full of egoists?

    Mounk: I would guess that it’s a group full of egoists.

    Harman: Well, you would guess that it’s actually the group full of altruists because they’re all cooperating with one another. The egoist would be every man for himself. The altruists come together.

    Mounk: Oh right, yeah. But within the group, it’s the egoists that would win.

    Harman: Exactly. Within the group, if you’re a selfish person, then when everyone runs ahead to fight the enemy, you take a step back and live to tell the story the next day. If this characteristic is inherent in you, if it’s a trait that can be passed on biologically, then over time there’s a problem of stability for the altruistic group.

    Mounk: The standard example of this that I remember, I think from Jonathan Haidt’s book The Righteous Mind, in which he has a chapter on group-level selection, is that we might say, look at that fast herd of gazelles over there. The objection of those who are skeptical about group-level selection is to say, it’s not a fast herd of gazelles; it’s a herd of fast gazelles.

    What happens is not that an entire group of gazelles is wiped out by a lion and some other entire group of gazelles survives. Each time, the slowest gazelle gets eaten. Over time, the gazelles become faster because those are the ones that survive and pass on their genetics. What looks like group-level selection—that the fast herd survives while the slow herd doesn’t—is actually individual-level selection.

    Each time, what happens is not that a lion eats all of the gazelles, but that it eats the slowest gazelle. So what is the response to that?

    Harman: For Darwin, marshaling a sort of Victorian morality, it was uncomplicated. This was for the good of the community, as he called it. Later on, we became aware of the logical problem in this explanation. Ever since Darwin, and until this very day, scientists of different stripes—mathematical population geneticists, evolutionary psychologists, economists, and other thinkers—have tried to approach this problem with different tools.

    The book I wrote, The Price of Altruism, is about a man named George Price, who wrote a mathematical equation in the early 1970s that offered a deep treatment of the dynamics of natural selection. It helped explain the evolution of traits where there is a conflict between different levels of the biological hierarchy—between the individual and the group, or between the individual and the genes within the individual.

    He wrote that equation and then became an evangelical Christian because of his philosophical interpretation of its meaning. To him, the equation showed that true altruism—true selflessness—doesn’t really exist in the world. There is always, as he puts it, “scratch an altruist and watch an egoist bleed.” Once a Christian, this was a terrible realization for him because Christianity was all about sacrifice.

    He ended up killing himself in a squat in London in 1975. He was a forgotten figure but also a great genius, and that book was about him, using his story to tell the larger story of where kindness comes from.

    Mounk: What is the response to straightforward arguments that smart undergrads can make in a philosophy class about why there isn’t such a thing as altruism? One argument is that we’re driven by our utility function. Perhaps that function isn’t narrow—it’s not only about how many dollars are in your bank account. When I do a favor for my friend, it is either because I hope they’ll reciprocate in some way, or because it gives me pleasure to see my friend helped. Even then, what drives me is my own pleasure. It gives me pleasure to look after my dog and see my dog run around happily.

    Harman: An argument against these ideas is that we are deeply social creatures. It was crucial for our survival to cooperate with one another, to tolerate one another, and to live together without killing each other. Gradually, we developed the biological substrates at the genetic, neurological, and anatomical levels that allowed us not only to live with one another and cooperate beneficially, but also to genuinely empathize with one another. That is built into our biology. What is interesting about us is that both traits exist at the same time.

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    It is often up to external conditions which trait manifests more strongly, as well as to education and culture. The blessing of being human is that we have this double nature—the blessing and the curse. It is up to us to create the conditions that allow the more empathetic, sympathetic, cooperative, and sacrificial traits to manifest, rather than the egotistical and self-serving ones. We must create those conditions and teach ourselves to be better. It will not happen on its own.

    Mounk: I’m trying to think about how that operates in different kinds of animals. Presumably, the bee that sacrifices itself for the queen is not acting rationally. It is not making conscious choices about whether to sacrifice itself. It follows an instinctual biological program.

    Would you say there is something similar in human beings? When we see someone being attacked in public, some people are cowardly and do nothing, but some will stand up and protect that person. Is that an instinctual response that overrides rational self-interest in a way that parallels the bee sacrificing itself in that situation?

    Harman: There are studies showing that a certain percentage of humans act instinctually in ways that are not rational. For example, you see someone fall onto train tracks and you jump after them. That percentage seems to be quite robust—about 10% of people will do that.

    It has been very interesting for scientists to study these people more closely. What makes them such remarkable altruists? The jury is still out. There are many attempts to reduce complex behaviors to simple biological explanations—to find the cause in their genes or their brains.

    At Stanford, for instance, there is a center for the study of human well-being and kindness that was initially funded by the Dalai Lama. Researchers there literally place Buddhist monks in fMRIs to see whether their brains function differently. These scientific attempts exist, but I feel they will always come up short. The biological leash is not short enough to explain all of our behavior instinctually. Clearly, we have that instinct within us, and some exercise it in ways that continue to amaze us.

    Mounk: I was happy to see in one recent study that when dogs see their owners, the region that corresponds to feelings of happiness or endorphins lights up very strongly. That seems to be independent of whether or not they are given a treat. Even if loving their owners may be an evolutionary strategy at some level, at the level of experience it doesn’t seem to be instrumental in that way.

    Harman: I think there is what we call in human terms kindness or empathy—an ability to love one another—that is genuinely in us. George Price killed himself after writing this remarkable equation, which advanced our understanding of the evolution of a trait like altruism. He was wrong in philosophically interpreting his equation to mean that there is no true selflessness in humans. He was wrong. So there is hope.

    Mounk: It seems there are two different levels of thinking about this. One is what motivates us and what our experience of the world is. The other is why evolution created us to be motivated in this way. Whether we are talking about a dog that genuinely loves its owner or about humans who have genuine love and empathy for family, friends, partners, or even for a stranger being assaulted on the street, most have this kind of genuine empathy.

    There may be someone who hopes to gain a reward, a sociopath trying to move through social life, but that is not true of most human beings who act altruistically in this way. The second question is why evolution led to human beings who are capable of that kind of empathy and altruism. That question is at a rather different level.

    Harman: We suffer from a bias of originalism. We think that if we can understand the origin of a certain trait, then we have understood that trait entirely, which is not the case. There is a difference between why a trait evolved, why it was selected in the first place, and what happens once it becomes an ingrained capability.

    Mounk: That’s a mistake we often make in politics nowadays. It’s been labeled for a long time the genetic fallacy, the idea that if you can show that something has problematic origins, then it must be bad today. That often doesn’t follow. Perhaps the old age pension scheme in Germany has problematic origins as an attempt by Bismarck to keep down the demands of the working class and to stave off socialist revolution.

    To conclude from that that you should be normatively opposed to the old age pension scheme in Germany today would be a categorical mistake. Let’s get back to that second level of the question. If it’s obvious that we can have genuine altruism, genuine empathy, genuine fellow feelings, the question still is, why is it that evolution selected for that? If the fast herd of gazelles is actually just a herd of fast gazelles, and that seems to show that cases of what look like group level selection turn out to be individual level selection, then how do you get the bee that is not individual-level selected, that has zero chance of passing on its own genes?

    Why is it that people sometimes sacrifice themselves for strangers with whom they don’t necessarily share a lot of genetic material? Wouldn’t the people who do that end up being selected out? If 10% of people are the kinds that are going to jump on the train tracks and rescue somebody when the train is oncoming, aren’t they going to keep reducing as a share of the human population because they have a higher likelihood of being hit by a train before they have kids? If that’s the case, aren’t they eventually going to die out?

    Harman: That’s probably why their level is down to where it is, about 10%. But that is a kind of equilibrium because they end up being crucial for the cohesion of the group. It is crucial to have such people who are able to exercise, almost instinctually, a care for others that transcends politics and culture. The answer is no, these are the dynamics of group selection in our case.

    Mounk: Tell me what that means. Let’s say there are sociopaths who are not altruistic in any way, and then there are garden-variety altruists who have all kinds of altruistic behaviors but are not exceptional altruists. Then there’s this group of super altruists. Is your contention that when the level of super altruists falls below 10%, this has such adverse effects on the group that a group containing so few of them will be outcompeted by other groups that have more of them? So, even at the individual level you’re selecting against the altruists, but at the group level, you’re selecting for having at least that one-in-ten share of altruists, and that’s why that’s the equilibrium.

    Harman: There are studies that point in that direction. One of the traits of a sociopath is that he or she doesn’t blush. What does that tell you? Blushing was a signal that, evolving as a social species, you have internalized the norms of the group. You blush because you understand that you’re doing something wrong. The sociopath doesn’t blush. We have all of these ingrained biological mechanisms whose evolutionary rationale is to signal to the other, you can deal with me, or I am friendly. All of us have that. Some of us can be thought of as a kernel surrounded by ripples that spread outward. These ripples represent how far our concern or altruism extends. For whatever reason—and although there is biological variation in the population when it comes to these traits—it isn’t just biology, as we discussed with the myth of originalism. Some of us stay close to the core, meaning we tend to look out for ourselves more. Some of us have been able to have this ripple go out and extend from us outward in ways that reach something which has been called pathological altruism, where you give like crazy.

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    What happened with George Price is, when he perceived this equation to be a terrible realization, he said, I will show with my own actions in my own life that I can transcend this miraculous mathematics. He went out to the streets of London and became a radical altruist, which is what he did. He gave away everything. He started by giving a pound or two, then buying sandwiches, then helping these people on the streets with their woes with the law and the police, representing them in courts of law, and inviting them into his one-bedroom apartment until he had nothing. He literally gave away everything and became a homeless man on the streets of London himself, which is where he killed himself in a squat in 1975. So you have the whole gamut, as with most complex behavioral traits. There is variation across the gamut, and it is good that we have that variation. Variation is the lifeblood of evolution.

    Mounk: Tell us more about this pathological level of altruism. Presumably we have a garden-variety altruism, which seems well adapted. Then we have the 10% of people that we would probably call heroes and admire. The willingness to risk your life to save a stranger from an oncoming subway car is something that, under many circumstances, we think is a positive trait.

    If it is obvious you are not going to save the stranger and that you are going to die in the process, then perhaps it would be smarter to stand out on the platform. In many of those circumstances, the chance of saving the stranger is much higher than the chance of coming to harm yourself. It takes courage and altruism. When people do that, it is something admirable and, in some ways, rational. It is not rational in the narrowest definition of the word; it is not maximizing your self-interest in some kind of very narrow economic sense.

    It is something that does not seem like a kind of crazy Don Quixote-style caper, where you are doing something that seems obviously ill-advised, even though it might, at some level, be admirable. When do we cross the boundary?

    Harman: Well, I think that is a normative question. It is down to what we define as pathological. For instance, in my culture, there are groups within the culture that, for cultural and religious reasons, have become radical donors of kidneys and lungs. It is a sort of trend that spreads like wildfire in the population. This is a population of settlers, interestingly enough. When that was satiated to some degree, women began giving their wombs to other women who could not have babies.

    Who is to say whether this is pathological or not? It is clearly a trend. It is clearly driven by cultural considerations. It has to do with identity and with the way a particular group defines itself as opposed to other groups. The question of pathology is one that we determine in our cultural wars, and it will be something that changes over time.

    Mounk: It is interesting, but I think this is where the distinction between an in-group and an out-group comes in. At least my mental model of the world has come to be, which was not always like this, that we are hardwired to have some amount of altruism and courage in dealings with the in-group. When we have a strongly defined in-group, that is often when we become capable of sacrificing ourselves, as humans have done for many centuries and millennia in war under certain circumstances, but also for performing genuinely altruistic acts, like giving up a kidney for somebody in our community who may not even be a sibling or a cousin, but someone we relate to as part of our in-group. Interestingly, that can go hand in hand with very cruel treatment of the out-group.

    Harman: It is not only that it can go hand in hand, but that necessarily, in evolutionary time, these were requisites of one another. In other words, the reason group selection works is that it leads to the cohesion of a group so that the group can smite the external group. That was its initial cause and rationale in selective terms.

    This does not mean that we need to strap ourselves to this rationale and have it be true until the end of time. This is where it began. In fact, without the enemy, the external enemy, the out-group, you could not develop these internal mechanisms for group cohesion, which were so strong that they became genuinely ingrained in our biology.

    What is beautiful about the evolution of culture over history is that we have been able to use these characteristics that are embedded within us. They were embedded for reasons that today we might see as quite vicious and violent, and we have used them to extend our degrees of empathy to the out-group and beyond. To some degree, the types of challenges we face as a species on planet Earth will require us to extend these degrees of empathy so that we can come together and solve challenges, such as when a pandemic comes our way. We need to be able not to see the political borders that divide us, but rather to see our common humanity in order to fell such a scourge.

    Mounk: I think that is what is interesting about this charge, that in a particular case, altruism has become exaggerated or misguided. It can apply to the individual case, like Price, where you are no longer keeping even the basic possessions you need in order to have a decent life yourself. That may ultimately result in you being so destitute and so desperate that you commit suicide and are no longer able to help others.

    That seems self-undermining, and even from a kind of Kantian universal imperative perspective, it seems like an irrational thing to do because you cannot sustain the level of prosperity you need in order to keep helping others. More often, I think what is meant by that charge is the claim—whether true or false, rational or irrational—that you are not helping your in-group in the right ways. When people say there is something pathological about your altruism, what they often mean is that, rather than helping your in-group, you are naive about the intentions of the out-group and are helping them.

    Harman: I think that is true. I see it in my own culture today, where we are fighting a terrible and violent war in Gaza. Israelis who say, wait a second, there are many innocents being killed in Gaza. What the hell is happening here? What are we doing? are often branded as traitors from within by nationalists who say, we have a real, true and vicious enemy in Hamas, but if you show empathy, this type of empathy is self-sacrificing. If you hold these views, we will not survive.

    Of course, as ever, every form of human behavior can be shown in such a way that it looks as if it is an abuse when it really is not.

    Mounk: What do you think is the right balance between the positive role that a strong in-group can play—the ways in which it can give us belonging, identity, and solidarity, and ensure that our group survives group-level selection, which is one of the evolutionary mechanisms at play, as you are saying—but at the same time, that it does not lead us to lose our humanity in such a way that we start to justify anything that might be done to the out-group, with the excuse that to care about that would be a form of pathological altruism?

    Harman: I think this is a question that humans have asked themselves. I think of the pacifists in World War I. There were international pacifists in Germany, France, and England, who, the moment the shooting began in 1914, faced a great dilemma. Some of them remained idealistic, while others said, wait a second, there is a real and immediate danger now, and we have to come to the front.

    I think this question boils down to being able to discern when a danger is truly a danger and when a danger is really a bias. When a danger is a cultural bias, when it comes down to views that we should unpack, contextualize, and try to improve upon—to be better people. That will always be a very fine line. There will always be arguments about it. There will always be certain people calling others traitors for being more capacious and for having a lower threshold of angst before danger.

    When Angela Merkel said, Germany is a strong nation, we can absorb all of these refugees from Syria, there were Germans who said, what are you talking about? This is going to be detrimental. Others said, way to go, Angela, that is the better side of humanity that we all want to move toward.

    Mounk: We have been talking a lot about altruism, which is one kind of evolutionary puzzle. You have just published a book that investigates another evolutionary puzzle—that of metamorphosis. Why is that an evolutionary puzzle? It is surprising that if you want to build a butterfly, you do not start by building a butterfly. You start by building a caterpillar.

    Harman: Most of us think of tadpoles and frogs, and caterpillars and butterflies, when we think of metamorphosis. It seems quaint and almost childlike. It is related to our childhood, and we think of it as idiosyncratic and not very representative.

    Today, biologists estimate that three quarters of all animal species undergo some form of metamorphosis, which is an extraordinary figure because it means that they need to go through what is defined as radical or dramatic post-embryonic development. It means that you need to go through that in order to become who you are.

    Mounk: Is that because biologists have hugely expanded the definition of what they mean by metamorphosis? Is that because there are far more species of butterflies than we thought? Give us some examples of where there is metamorphosis that we might not typically think about.

    Harman: It is because there are different forms of metamorphosis. Take a starfish. A lot of marine invertebrates metamorphose. A starfish starts out life as an egg, as all living things do. Then there is a developmental program that begins to turn that egg into a juvenile, what we call a larva. In the case of the starfish, the larva is bilateral. In other words, it has the symmetry of you and me. It has a top, a bottom, a back, and a front. It exists as a pelagic creature in the water. It kind of has wings. It looks like a little angel—a translucent angel.

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    At a certain point in time, a second developmental program begins within its stomach and starts to create the adult, which has a completely different symmetry. It is radial. It does not have a back and a front, a top and a bottom, in the same way. Gradually, it grows to a certain size and migrates to the tips of its own juvenile. Then, in a kind of immaculate consumption, it falls to the bottom and becomes sessile. The adult and the juvenile exist simultaneously. In some sense, the juvenile has birthed the adult.

    Each one of these creatures has the exact same genome in each of its cells, but you would have no idea, if you saw these two creatures together, that they have anything to do with one another. In human terms, this is very strange. We almost do not have the language to describe this relationship because one is not the father of the other. They are not cousins or brothers. They are, in fact, an identity but different manifestations of the same identity.

    Mounk: It is amazing. Darwin is incredible. I never really read The Origin of Species. A few years ago, I downloaded it on Audible. It happened to be offered for free, or perhaps I used a credit to buy it, I forget. It is so contemporary, so easy to follow, and so vivid. It is an incredible piece of literature.

    Harman: He was a great writer, for sure. There are many manifestations of metamorphosis in nature, and different gradations of it. In insects, you have the creation of the chrysalis, or a cocoon in the case of moths, where what emerges looks nothing like what went in. This is called true metamorphosis, or complete metamorphosis. There are gradations—semi-metabolous creatures and so forth—but three quarters is a crazy number.

    Mounk: The obvious question is why, right? I can see how there is an ecological niche for butterflies. If you want to create a butterfly, why go through the work of creating a completely different kind of creature and then have a butterfly evolve and grow out of that completely different kind of creature?

    If you want to have a very simple kind of animal that lives in the sea and can barely do anything, why create a complicated animal first that then turns into this super simple animal? That seems like an incredible amount of wasted effort. Is this a weird accident of evolution and how the biological program came about, or is there some genuine evolutionary fit that comes from these different kinds of phases? I presume that is the obvious question to ask about this.

    Harman: Before we get to the solutions, there is a really fascinating history when it comes to this conundrum. It goes all the way back to the ancients, and people like Hippocrates and Aristotle and Pliny the Elder. They all weighed in. They lived in an ancient world that was suffused with miraculous transformations.

    Gradually, the thinking about them morphed itself into a science. So people like Virgil, the Roman poet Virgil, counseled honey-makers to bury a bull with its horns above ground, just this amount, and then wait for nine to thirty-two days and then cut the horns. That was the way to get bees because bees would come flying out. Pliny the Elder said that silk moths come from vapor on rainfall and oak blossoms. Other people counseled that women’s hair, if it got hot enough, could turn into snakes and so forth.

    This was a preoccupation of the ancient world. Probably the most important influence was Aristotle, as with many things, who spoke of a causal universe in which things happen to creatures because it is in the nature of those creatures to become who they are. In the case of metamorphosis, what he wrote was that only the act of sex between a male and a female could provide nature to a creature—only a father who gives a creature its essence, its eidos, and a mother who gives its form. The father was much more important because the essence is more important. The female was only the form.

    Insects, whom Aristotle thought were generated spontaneously, had to transform again in order to become who they are because, unlike us humans, they were born imperfect. What is really interesting when you look at these ancient attempts to understand metamorphosis is that Aristotle saw butterflies and ants and all kinds of other insects having sex. But the theory was so much stronger than what he observed that it trumped what his eyes saw, and he stuck to his guns.

    Mounk: This reminds me of a favorite piece of writing of mine by Tony Judt in The Memory Chalet, where he describes the graduate of École Polytechnique in France who was sent to observe the first train between Manchester and Leeds in the 1830s and to report back about this worrying technological advance of the rival nation of the United Kingdom. He goes and observes everything perfectly, does some very detailed calculations as an engineer, and reports back to the École Polytechnique that trains are scientifically impossible.

    Harman: Exactly. Aristotle insisted that women have fewer teeth in their mouths than men do because of the way he thought of the difference between, and his culture thought of the difference between, the essence of a woman and the essence of a man. You want, from 2,500 years into the future, to sort of scream at him, “Aristotle, why don’t you open your wife’s mouth and just count the teeth,” and so forth.

    It does not work that way because our ideas are always deeply enmeshed in the cultures that produce them. To return to metamorphosis, these ideas of the ancients were then Christianized in the Middle Ages by people like Aquinas and Albert, and by Jews and Muslims like Ibn Khaldun and Maimonides, who adopted these views of transformation to their own communities. Yet, even by the seventeenth century, we did not know how a man and a woman make a child, much less how a butterfly emerges from its chrysalis.

    Mounk: What do you mean we didn’t know how a man and a woman make a child? Surely by the 17th century, humans knew that.

    Harman: We hadn’t found an egg. This is an incredible history, which I write about in the book. We did not know what the female egg was.

    Mounk: So we knew about the act of sex and we knew about the relation between the act of sex and getting pregnant, but we didn’t know about the anatomy or biology.

    Harman: We knew that men had sperm. We were looking for what it was that the female brought. Aristotle, Galen and others thought it was the menstrual blood. There were many attempts to find what was called a female testicle and to find the egg. Until the seventeenth century, we really did not know how that worked. We did not know whether it was the sperm or the egg which gives the creature its essence or maybe just its form.

    We also did not know whether all creatures existed like babushka dolls in miniature within their parents, going back to the Garden of Eden and to the origin of the world, as the Bible told. It was a gradual development of many discoveries made by a cast of quirky and egotistical gentlemen, and also a very extraordinary woman named Maria Sibylla Merian, often called the mother of ecology, who traveled to Suriname when she was fifty-two years old to look at the life cycle of exotic tropical butterflies. She began to figure out just how living things are conceived, how they develop, and how they reproduce—three terms that had all been bunched up together for millennia under what people called generation.

    What is really fascinating about this story is that it turns out that cracking how metamorphosis worked was crucial for understanding these very fundamental questions about all life.

    Mounk: How so? What’s the connection?

    Harman: It is a long and involved story, but I would say the crux of it is that you had to understand that in metamorphosis, unlike what the ancients believed, this was not a phenomenon of spontaneous generation, that there was always an egg involved, and that all of life came from an egg. This was crucial for other scientists, not working on metamorphosis but in some cases working on both, to go out and search for an egg in the uterus of females.

    It is a really interesting connection between metamorphosis and understanding how creatures are made. Also, remember there was no concept of a species, a stable species, in the same way that there was beginning with Darwin. People really did believe, and this was the best science of their age, that anything could turn into anything. A human being could turn into a rabbit. These were beliefs that were, in some cases, published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of London.

    Mounk: That helps to explain the long-standing obsession that people, up to and including Isaac Newton, had with alchemy. If humans can turn into rabbits, then surely something must be able to turn into gold.

    Harman: Exactly. These things are all related, and you have these wonderful characters who, from our point of view, seem extremely colorful, moving between these worlds of inanimate objects and living creatures and applying the same notions of transformation to both. In the nineteenth century, the question of metamorphosis suddenly becomes a question about evolution, and why, to return to your question, nature would go to such lengths to turn creatures into what they eventually become.

    There is a wonderful piece of writing by Orwell in which he observes a spadefoot toad from the Sonora Desert emerging from the ground after ten months of sitting completely still without eating or moving. He says this toad looks like a strict Anglo-Catholic towards the end of Lent. Its shrunken body allows one to see what you would not see otherwise—that it really has the most beautiful eyes of any living creature on the planet. He calls it a gold color, and I think it is called chrysoberyl, he writes, or something like that. But what Orwell neglected to tell his readers is that all of the drama had already happened before this frog emerged from its pond.

    To transform from a tadpole into a frog that can live on land, it has to switch from breathing underwater to breathing on land. It has to exchange aquatic for terrestrial locomotion. It has to change its diet of plants and tiny water bugs to flies, crickets, and earthworms. Its skin has to adapt to life above water—to the sun, winds, and rain. Gills have to become lungs. It has to grow a new cardiovascular system to carry hemoglobin and a new immune system because the dangers that lurk underwater are very different from those that prowl on land.

    New color patterns have to invade its skin to make terrestrial camouflage possible. It has to recut its throat in sync with chest muscles to allow females and males to breathe above water but also to call each other to mate. Front and back legs grow internally and then pop out spontaneously. The tail is absorbed, the gut is shortened, the heart arteries are newly retooled, the eyes are reformed into those gems that enchanted Orwell, and, most amazingly, the brain is completely rewired and encased in a bony cranium. There is an enormous amount of massive destruction of tissues and organs, cell death and regeneration, genetic reprogramming, and anatomical remodeling, and all of this happens in a matter of weeks. It is a great question, and scientists today—modern science—return to this challenge, the double challenge: how does all of this happen, and why does it happen?

    In a general sense, if you think of metamorphosis as a mechanism to restrict intergenerational competition, then if you look like one thing when you are young, eat a particular food, and live in a particular area, and then grow into something completely other, eating a different food and living in a different area, you will restrict the competition between young and older, between juvenile and adult. That is one general explanation for why metamorphosis evolved. But it is not good enough.

    Mounk: I see. The idea is that if a puppy dog and a grown dog nourish themselves from the same kind of thing, then in an ecosystem where they do not have humans to hunt bulls for them and give them bully sticks, they are going to be in competition with each other. In competition with each other, the small dogs are going to lose out because they are less strong and possibly less agile. That creates a problem.

    One way around that problem is to have the young animal, before the metamorphosis, search for very different kinds of nourishment. Presumably, that assumes that the relevant level of analysis is within the same species or within a set of species that go through a similar kind of metamorphosis. If there is competition for that resource from other species that do not go through that kind of metamorphosis, those very simple creatures still have to search for the same kind of nourishment in competition with those other creatures.

    For whatever reason, avoiding the competition within the same species is sufficiently important that this still retains a big evolutionary advantage. Is this not a further set of questions we have to answer there?

    Harman: Yes, those are important questions. What is amazing when you look at nature is its specificity. A particular species will only eat a particular plant and nothing else. It has evolved to specialize on this plant. Within species, the ability to reduce competition within the species is crucial for that reason.

    Nature is full of surprises and full of deceit. There is a particular type of blue butterfly, which is now under threat in many places in Europe.The egg turns into a little larva, which is a tiny auburn-colored thing, and it drops from the tree onto the ground. It emits a chemical signal that attracts a very particular species of ant, a myrmica. Only that species of ant will react to this chemical signal, and it will come, thinking that it has discovered its own. It will carry the larva into its den and feed it at its own expense because it was deceived. Some months later, once it has grown, the chrysalis will open up, and a beautiful blue butterfly will emerge.

    There is interspecies competition all the time and a great amount of deceit. Anything that gives a species a certain edge will have a chance of being selected. In a general sense, reducing that intergenerational competition is important. But in insects, there seems to be a trade-off between growth and differentiation. You need to grow as much as you can before you differentiate into the form that will allow you to be a sexually reproducing creature.

    There are many studies on this. I spent the last year in a lab at the Freie Universität in Berlin with a team performing studies to understand the exact dynamics of this trade-off between growth and differentiation. That is another explanation.

    Another explanation that is used is that you get rid of all your gut biota when you destroy your gut and create a new one. It is an immunological explanation for metamorphosis. You change your gut residents, which makes you stronger because you start anew.

    These are some of the explanations that have been given. It is interesting when you look at how we have imagined metamorphosis through three different orders: philosophy, God, and science. The ancient Greeks looked at a butterfly emerging from its chrysalis as a kind of proof of a causal universe leading to us. Lowly insects and slimy frogs had to transform because they were imperfect, unlike humans.

    Medieval Christians looked at the same phenomenon and imagined it as a reflection of divine will. The transformation of a wriggly worm into a flying jewel was an earthly reminder of the transfiguration of Jesus to Christ, saying that redemption is possible.

    Today, we think of metamorphosis as a scientific problem in genetics and physiology and as a road taken for reasons that we are still trying to discern on a blind evolutionary path. We speak of genes, hormones, and molecular clocks, and we use amazing technology. You can use a 3D microcomputed tomography camera to see exactly what is happening at every stage of metamorphosis within a chrysalis and track each and every nerve cell that migrates and rewires to turn the brain of a caterpillar into the brain of a butterfly. It is amazing. These are things that were unthinkable just a generation ago.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Oren discuss how humans experience metamorphosis and how this affects the law and society. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 9 min
  • What Japan Taught Me About American Trains
    (Photo by Joseph Weiser/Icon Sportswire via Getty Images.)

    I rode the train from New York to D.C. this week, and I have thoughts. I took the Acela, the flagship offering from Amtrak, America’s semi-nationalized, permanently beleaguered rail operator. The service spans the 225 miles that separate the sole superpower’s biggest city from its capital in a stately, none-too-rushed three hours. Plenty of time to mull the gap between this service and the trains back home.

    Okay, yes, I’ve only lived in Japan for one year, but that’s more than enough for Japanese rail to etch itself into my soul. As an urbanist, there’s a special joy in living in a place built for and around trains.

    The Tokyo metro area has more than 280 subway stations and around a thousand train stations. In the vast span of Central Tokyo, you are nearly always a short walk from several different metro and train lines. At peak times, trains show up every 150 seconds.

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    Not surprisingly, rail is the presumed mode for trips across metro Tokyo, which is home to more people than California. But rail is also the dominant form of long-distance transport, thanks to the famous Shinkansen bullet train network.

    The Shinkansen is a marvel of human-centered design: the spinal column that holds Japan together. Riding the Acela made me realize it’s also something else: a train system designed to be used as a train system.

    Take boarding. Trains are long, and they stop along a platform. The trick to getting people boarded quickly is to take advantage of these features. In Japan, that means checking tickets at the station gate, then letting passengers make their own way to the specific car they’ll need to board along a clearly marked platform.

    To ensure everyone remains safe even when the platform is busy, barriers prevent anyone or anything falling on the tracks. This reduces delays. By the time the train pulls up to the platform, everybody is where they need to be. The whole procedure is designed to allow many people to board and unboard quickly, which is important considering trains are running at hundreds of miles per hour just 4 minutes apart.

    But the point of the Shinkansen isn’t just speed: it’s flexibility. Along the Tōkaidō Shinkansen line between Japan’s two main cities, there are up to 16 trains per hour: one leaves every four or five minutes. So you can just show up at the station without even checking the timetable—on average, you’ll wait less than 3 minutes for the next train. You can reserve a seat, but you don’t have to.

    At worst, you might end up in a standing-room-only car—but it’s not an airplane, so standing is inconvenient but not unsafe. In any case, if the train you get on is too full another one will soon follow. You can hop off anywhere along the line and hop onto the next one to get a seat.

    Amtrak takes a different approach. Somebody must have decided that since airlines are the Acela’s main competitor, the trick is to make the Acela experience as airline-like as possible. You see nods to this throughout the passenger journey.

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    Begin with the station layout. In New York, you wait for your train not on the platform, but in a ticketed waiting room, where you watch for gate announcements that explicitly mimic what you get at an airport.

    Passengers then schlep to line up at the one escalator leading down to the tracks. This chokepoint is entirely of Amtrak’s choosing; nothing about the technology itself necessitates it. Airplanes have a single point of entry; lining up to board is inevitable. Trains obviate the need for this, but on the Acela you have to line up anyway. Before you’ve even boarded the train, Amtrak has already nullified one of its best advantages.

    Another way trains are different from airplanes is that they run on tracks, so they don’t experience air turbulence. Without turbulence, luggage bins can be uncovered (as they are on the Shinkansen), which makes them much more visible and much more useful.

    The resulting cabin design isn’t fancy, but it’s functional. You can store your skis up there, if you want, and everyone can see at a glance where there’s space. You couldn’t do it on a plane, of course, because things would sporadically fall off and bonk the passengers on the head. On a train, there’s no reason not to.

    But the Acela thinks it’s an airplane. So on board what you get are rows of closed, airline-style overhead bins that you can’t see through.

    The Acela’s mindless mimicking of air travel goes right down to the details. You can check in your luggage on the Acela if you want. Even the announcement that comes over the speaker explicitly mimics what you’d hear on a plane.

    What Amtrak has given us is a train masquerading as an airplane. This would make sense if people loved air travel, but everybody hates it. The only reason we put up with all the hassle inherent in an airplane is that the darn things fly, which is the one thing the Acela certainly can’t do.

    Really the Acela is a train with low self-esteem. Or maybe a personality crisis.

    But then: the Acela should have self-esteem issues. It’s never been given tracks engineered for high-speed travel, so it bumbles along at an average of 82 miles per hour while the Shinkansen Tokyo to Osaka travels at twice that speed.

    What’s more, the service runs just once per hour per direction, at most. The airline-style ticketing system means you can’t just buy an open ticket, turn up at Penn Station and hop on the next Acela, even if you were willing to wait the 60 minutes or so that separate departures.

    Once you do get that Acela ticket, a persistent upsell begins, with text, email and billboard messages from Amtrak entreating you to upgrade from their self-styled “business class” to first class (via their app, of course.) What ought to be a no-frills service turns into an exercise in premium mediocre marketing.

    It’s maddening. Because New York-Washington ought to be the perfect route for high-speed rail. At Japanese speeds, you could hop on in New York and hop off in D.C. about an hour and 40 minutes later. The Shinkansen, at peak cadence, moves around 20,000 people per hour in each direction. The Acela, less than 400.

    In a world where 16 Acelas per hour were leaving New York and reaching Washington in 100 minutes, how many airlines could compete? Not many. And that, one suspects, is why no such service will ever be allowed to exist.

    Once you have a high-performance, high-cadence, human-centered rail network at your disposal, life without it becomes inexplicable. In Japan, airlines are forced to compete with trains purely on price: the only way they can make up for air’s inherent inferiority in convenience, comfort and flexibility. Between Tokyo and Osaka, only time-rich/money-poor people choose to fly.

    Alas, without proper high-speed rail, the biggest city in the United States is joined to its capital largely by a highly polluting, horribly inconvenient air service. And to add insult to injury, the rail competitor that ought to dominate the route goes and humiliates itself—it apes the manners of its winged cousin.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.

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  • This Week At Persuasion
    Revellers having fun without me at Oktoberfest in Munich, Germany. (Photo by Alexandra Beier/AFP via Getty Images.)Upcoming Live Events
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, October 24, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

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    0 min
  • On Authoritarian Theater
    (Photo by Mathieu Lewis-Rolland / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Today’s piece was written by Isaac Saul. You can check out his newsletter Tangle here.

    In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has deployed Illinois National Guard troops to Chicago and attempted to mobilize the National Guard to Portland, Oregon, leading to arrests and clashes with protesters in those cities.

    On Saturday, a federal judge (who was appointed by Trump in his first term) temporarily blocked the administration from deploying the Oregon National Guard to Portland. Judge Immergut found that the size and nature of immigration protests in the city did not justify mobilizing the Guard, writing that President Trump’s statements to the contrary were “simply untethered to the facts.” The order will remain in effect for 14 days, unless extended. In response, the Trump administration filed a notice of appeal to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

    The same day, tensions between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers and protesters escalated in Chicago when federal agents were allegedly rammed and boxed in by 10 cars near an ICE facility. Officers fired shots at a woman in one of the cars, saying that she was armed with a semi-automatic weapon. No one was seriously hurt, but Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem announced that additional personnel would be deployed to the area in response to the incident.

    Then, on Sunday, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called up 400 members of the Texas National Guard for deployments to Portland, Chicago, and other cities to support federal agents and protect property.

    On Tuesday, hundreds of federal officers carried out a large-scale raid at an apartment building in Chicago, leading to a reported 37 arrests of alleged unauthorized immigrants. The raid—a joint operation involving multiple federal agencies and utilizing Black Hawk helicopters—targeted a residential building allegedly frequented by members of the Tren de Aragua gang. However, witnesses and residents said that nearly every building resident was detained, including children and U.S. citizens, in some cases without clear explanations for their arrests.

    White House officials say the law enforcement activity in Illinois is necessary to maintain public safety in and around Chicago while also protecting immigration authorities from heightened threats.

    Also on Tuesday, President Trump suggested in a meeting with military leaders and Secretary Hegseth that cities like Chicago should be “training grounds for our military,” describing the unrest over immigration enforcement and federal troop deployments as “a war from within.” The comments drew strong rebukes from Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson and Illinois Governor JB Pritzker. “Sending troops into cities, thinking that that’s some sort of proving ground for war, or that indeed there’s some sort of internal war going on in the United States, is, just frankly, inane,” Pritzker said.

    Trump shot back in a post on Truth Social, saying that Johnson and Pritzker “should be in jail.”

    When President Trump deployed troops into the nation’s capital to police crime this summer, I said it was clearly a “trial run for other cities.” Trump made no secret of it, and now that prediction has come true. He is checking off three of the five boxes I said I’d be watching to determine whether he was pursuing an authoritarian style of governance, a development that is deeply alarming.

    But fully describing why these deployments are concerning requires acknowledging the problems that have compelled so many people to support them. So here’s the best argument I’ve heard for Trump’s actions, starting with Chicago:

    There were over 10 million encounters with unauthorized migrants under Joe Biden while Democratic leaders told us the border was secure, and tens of thousands of those migrants ended up in Chicago, straining the city’s resources. Trump is making good on his deportation pledges that won him the election by sending ICE to the city, which under decades of Democratic leadership has been home to some of the country’s most dangerous neighborhoods. It makes sense to want federal troops there to protect those ICE agents, because Chicago’s leadership won’t support the immigration enforcement effort, its police don’t have a handle on the city’s most dangerous neighborhoods, and we’ve seen what appear to be organized attacks on ICE agents.

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    The argument is similar in Portland: The city’s federal facilities, including ICE detention centers, have been the targets of protests and demonstrations. In some cases, those demonstrations have been violent or dangerous. While the protests often occupy just a small part of the city, Portland police’s inability to get a handle on the situation has forced Trump to deploy federal troops to protect law enforcement and federal buildings.

    Basically: He wouldn’t be doing this if leaders in Chicago and Portland had control of these issues.

    An easy and immediate counterargument is that these deployments are illegal and will be halted by the courts. In fact, that is a likely outcome—though the courts move slowly and Trump moves fast—and it’s impossible to know how many appeals and refilings the cases will require before they’re settled (Trump deployed troops to Portland for 60 days; the deployment could easily end before a binding court order permanently halts it).

    Obviously, the president violating the law (or a state’s sovereignty) should be enough to compel people against this move. But it clearly isn’t; very few Republican leaders are objecting to Trump’s deployment, his voters seem invigorated by it, and pro-Trump pundits seem outright supportive of it.

    I can understand this posture. An immigration crackdown is politically popular, and fears about crime are high, so a lot of people welcome a president “doing something”—legal arguments aside. But while I believe that the legal limitations on Trump’s power are sufficient reason to oppose them, I’m more compelled by a different argument: These actions cost us too much.

    Some costs I accept. For example, I’d be happy to see my tax dollars go toward securing the border and paying for more immigration judges to process asylum claims and bring order to our system. Trump has approved those actions, and I support them. Increasing border security with technology and troops is a worthwhile cost for more order in our immigration system. I own property near the border in West Texas, and I accept that increased security in this area means I have to go through checkpoints and submit to questioning by border patrol agents.

    I also accept the cost of changing our asylum system. This one is tougher for me because it means we, as a nation, are going to be much stricter toward the downtrodden and desperate who come here seeking a better life. But our asylum system is broken, and it is being abused, and it needs to be reformed for the greater cause of improving our entire immigration system.

    These costs are all worth it.

    But other costs give me pause. Is it worth normalizing masked agents in America roaming the streets in unmarked cars, snatching up people who look or sound like immigrants? Is it worth abandoning due process and deporting people without hearings? Is it worth treating apartment buildings in Chicago like terrorist hubs in Afghanistan? Is it worth having soldiers rappel from helicopters into their homes? Is it worth detaining American children, dragging them out of their homes naked and afraid?

    Perhaps, to some, all of this is worth it if the upside is rounding up illegal-immigrant gang members who are terrorizing communities. But what if these raids are consistently pulling in American citizens, or people here legally, or nonviolent criminals? What if, on top of this, the government cuts highlight reels of said raids to share on social media, treating our Constitutional rights like a video game?

    Do I want there to be order in Portland? Of course I do. Like many Americans, I watched Portland’s 2020 protests devolve into property damage, looting, and arson, and I wondered where the real leaders on the left were who could control their own cities. But that was five years ago, and those days of disorder are unlike what we have now. Portland gets to decide how to govern itself; it has elections where its citizens get to choose their own future and determine how their city is run and what environment they want to live in.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    Even if you believe Portland is in some kind of disarray, is the cost of “fixing Portland” worth accepting a president flouting a court order from a judge he appointed, who explained in great detail why the justification for his troop deployment was unwarranted? Is it worth having a president describe U.S. cities as “training grounds” for our military, and quite obviously reveling in the thought of a military crackdown on citizens he sees as his political enemies?

    Whenever somebody points out the above, they are inevitably accused of having “Trump derangement syndrome,” or of being so biased that they can’t see the genuine threat the left poses. This is not a new phenomenon, or unique to the right.

    What worries me now is that the underlying response to fears about the left seems to be a genuine desire for Trump to amass more power. Top aides to the president are openly calling for a crackdown on prosecutors and judges and describing legitimate rulings from Trump-appointed judges as a “legal insurrection.”

    The American citizenry has been backed into a corner that feels hard to navigate out of. It’s really not difficult to imagine where all this is going and to see a very, very dark future. Right now we need leaders willing to pump the brakes and step back from the brink—but there don’t seem to be many in sight.

    If you enjoyed today’s piece, be sure to check out Isaac Saul’s newsletter Tangle, where he summarizes arguments from the left and right on the big news of the day, then gives his own take. It’s free.

    A version of this article was originally published by Tangle.

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    0 min
  • The End of Macronisme
    France’s outgoing prime minister Sebastien Lecornu with an image of France’s President Emmanuel Macron in the background during a live broadcast interview. (Photo by Ludovic Marin/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Another month, another French government falls. Sébastien Lecornu’s resignation as prime minister on Monday came less than four weeks after his predecessor, François Bayrou, lost a confidence vote. The one before that lasted just three months. Since snap elections in mid-2024 produced parliamentary deadlock, France has appeared increasingly ungovernable. It is even more so now.

    Such instability is unprecedented under the country’s 1958 constitution, which was designed to secure executive authority. The next victim of this systemic failure is likely to be the isolated figure at the top, Emmanuel Macron. The president has three options: name his fourth prime minister in 15 months, call another snap election, or stand down himself. Any of them could spell the end not just of Macron’s power but of his brand of centrism.

    Any new prime minister needs support from an assembly that is hopelessly split into three blocks—left, center right, and far right. Macron’s last three appointees relied on an alliance with moderate conservatives. Lecornu fell when they withheld their backing. Socialists are urging him to pick one of their own. France has seen “cohabitation” between a president and a prime minister from opposing sides before, but always with a majority in parliament. There is none now. Unlike previous “cohabiting” presidents, Macron cannot even choose a viable opponent to work with.

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    Sooner or later, Macron may well be forced to call another snap election. The hard-right National Rally (RN) is particularly keen on this: credited with about 32% support by pollsters, it is by far the most popular party in France. No one knows whether this could translate into a parliamentary majority in the country’s two-round voting system. What is clear, however, is that the left would also do well, and the president’s centrist rump would shrink further. Whatever the timing or outcome of any new election, the president’s legitimacy will be under renewed attack.

    Macron insists he will serve his full term until 2027. But most French voters see him as the problem and a vast majority want him gone. Moreover, political uncertainty carries a financial cost: economists reckon that growth this year will be 0.3 percentage points of GDP lower than it would have been without the turmoil. Meanwhile France’s borrowing costs continue to surge amid an unresolved budget crisis. Until recently, calls for Macron’s resignation came mainly from the extremes, notably far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Senior conservatives now back the idea as the only way out. Most strikingly, longtime Macronista Édouard Philippe, a former prime minister, has joined the chorus.

    If that scenario unfolds, Macron faces humiliation. He would be the only French president of the Fifth Republic to be forced out (when Charles de Gaulle resigned in 1969, he did so out of wounded pride after losing a referendum, not from necessity). Furthermore, if a new presidential election were held now, power would almost certainly fall to Mélenchon’s hard left or to the nationalist RN.

    Macron first won the presidency in 2017 promising a “revolution.” Traditional divides, he said, were woefully outdated. The vast majority of French people yearned both for the social safety net pioneered by the left and individual opportunity championed by the right. But each side had become corrupted by partisan spirit and collectivist shibboleths, whether misguided egalitarianism or narrow nationalism. He would retain the best traditions from the two camps at the same time (“en même temps” was his early catchphrase) and bring that legacy into the 21st century. Prickly, state-heavy France would turn into a pro-Western, market-friendly power that took inspiration from its European partners the better to lead them. The future belonged to the open-minded, pragmatic center as the old left and right faded into ideological irrelevance.

    Eight years on, this vision lies in ruins. Macron is hemorrhaging support to the very extremes he had staked his reputation on fighting. The main political battle in France will now pit tax-and-spend leftists against right-wing xenophobes, with both sides bent on looser ties with the EU and NATO. Whichever side prevails, it will mark defeat not just for a man, but for everything he embodies.

    How did we get here? Many blame Macron himself. In 2022, he made history by winning re-election. Yet he squandered the opportunity. Neglecting the parliamentary campaign, he lost his majority but still commanded a sizable bloc that could have anchored a coalition on favorable terms. Instead, his prime ministers stoked anger by using a constitutional device to ram legislation through parliament without votes. Then came last year’s dissolution—a rush of blood after a minor EU election setback. That spectacular own goal shrank his representation further and produced the present stalemate.

    Since then, Macron has been widely accused of ignoring the voters’ message and ruling as if nothing had changed. He appointed loyalists as prime ministers—Lecornu, who had served in all his previous governments, being both the most loyal and least successful of them. The president courted conservatives, who had far fewer MPs than the left-wing bloc. Another complaint, often heard during his first term, is that Macron irresponsibly set out to destroy traditional parties. By aggressively poaching moderates from both sides, he abandoned the right and the left to demagogues.

    Some of those accusations are justified. Macron certainly lost his touch after the 2022 re-election, which was really a vote against his second-round opponent, Marine Le Pen. His subsequent miscalculations stem from the illusion of a warm endorsement by voters. And his initial project of gathering center-right and center-left figures under one big tent was flawed: a functioning democracy requires a contest between alternative governments-in-waiting, not a single party of reason opposed only by radicals on the margins.

    Still, most of the charges against the president are unfair. You can accuse Emmanuel Macron of recklessly calling a snap election or of disregarding voters, but you can’t accuse him of both. His turn to conservatives made sense after Mélenchon, speaking for the united left, insisted on a big-spending programme without compromise.

    More fundamentally, the rise of populism was not Macron’s doing. Mainstream parties of right and left have been in retreat across the West for a decade—often with justification. In France, the center right and center left crumbled because of their own mistakes, not Machiavellian planning. The socialists failed to articulate a clear, modern vision. Their president, François Hollande, ended his term in 2017 with even lower approval ratings than Macron has now. That year the conservative Republicans fielded a terrible candidate and have continued their slide ever since. Their rival chieftains now fight over the remnants of a once-dominant party that attracted barely 10% of the vote last year.

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    Uniquely in France, the anti-establishment spirit of the late 2010s benefited a charismatic centrist. In many ways that was lucky. Despite many hiccups and headwinds—the “Gilets jaunes” tax revolt, urban riots and a pandemic, among others—Macron has a solid record. His labor reforms and tax cuts, notably for businesses, have sparked an investment boom and ended mass unemployment. Much remains to be done: France’s GDP per capita still lags far behind Germany and the Netherlands, and even trails Britain’s. But unlike his immediate predecessors, Macron has reversed the country’s slide at a time when others have struggled.

    Now enemies emboldened by widespread anger propose to unpick those achievements. Whether they will actually risk a full-blown financial crisis with repercussions across Europe remains to be seen. But there is no question that, deserted by all, Macron has failed to secure his legacy. This is not surprising. All his predecessors have ended up trapped in what one of them, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, called “the lonely exercise of power.”

    French presidents wield outsize powers that leave them exposed as lightning rods for all discontent. Every incumbent has ended deeply unpopular. For a maverick without a strong party behind him, that failure can be fateful for the project he represents. If Macron had instituted a more collegial rule, he might not have taken his ideas of centrism down with him. Instead, he followed the heady logic of an absolutist system. The collapse of Macronisme reveals the tragedy of France’s imperial presidency.

    Henri Astier is a London-based journalist who writes for French- and English-language publications. He writes the Substack Out of France.

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    0 min
  • David French on The Mess We’re In

    David French is a columnist for The New York Times. His most recent book is Divided We Fall: America’s Secession Threat and How to Restore Our Nation.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and David French discuss how politics has changed since 2017, where the Democrats have gone wrong, and how Donald Trump’s second term is different to his first.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I was trying to think about what I want to talk to you about. I read you assiduously and listen to you. You have a lot of interesting things to say, but more than anything else, it felt like a therapy session. We’ve known each other for about eight years now.

    David French: It’s amazing, Yascha. The thing that has struck me so much is if you go back and put yourself in a time machine to 2017 or 2018, there were terms we used a lot then that you just don’t use anymore, like “dog whistle.” People were constantly trying to determine whether there was some sort of emerging racist element on the right. They were trying to determine that through things like dog whistles, subtle signals, and subtle messaging—was the “okay” sign an okay sign, or was it a white nationalist sign? Doesn’t that seem quaint? It’s not dog whistles anymore; it’s nothing but bullhorns. It’s remarkable how overt the racial, ethnic, and religious aggression has become.

    Mounk: Another term we’ve given up on is “normalization.” Back then, we had this idea that there was normal politics, and Donald Trump was outside of that normal politics. If only we resisted his normalization, then this moment would pass. More broadly, it’s interesting to think back to some of the assumptions we had wrong. I remember being in many debates at the time about who would win the civil war within the Republican Party, and how quickly Trump would win it. I was a relative pessimist because I thought that Trump would eventually win that civil war. But, of course, there was no civil war. The old-style Republican Party simply flipped over and played dead.

    The other striking thing is that back then, I was somewhat skeptical of that narrative, but not as much as would be warranted now. The assumption was that this was the last stand of the old rural white men who voted for Donald Trump, and that he was the nostalgic force in politics—the force of yesterday. It’s completely unclear that that’s true now, either in the United States or anywhere else, when you look at the fact that Reform is leading in the polls in Britain, the Rassemblement National in France, and the AfD in some polls in Germany.

    French: If I look back at the 2016–2017 period, one of the things I did not anticipate was how much parts of the left would view Trump not as a threat but as an opportunity. In other words, he was going to so completely discredit the Republican Party and be such a destructive force for Republicans that Americans would turn on him quickly, creating an opportunity to enact a lot of left-wing goals and visions for the country.

    If you look back at the original #Resistance, the Women’s March, and some of the figures around it, you could see the emerging trends that culminated in the wave of cancel culture we saw in 2019 and 2020. I’ll never forget your piece in The Atlantic, “Stop Firing the Innocent,” about how leftist overreach was going to empower Donald Trump. That was not something I saw, because in the circles we were in, many people did not see Trump as an opportunity at all. They saw him as a genuine threat that caused people with traditional differences to put them aside.

    But large parts of the American left were not willing to do that and instead doubled, tripled, and quadrupled down on really extreme, unpopular, and often intolerant ways of moving, acting, and thinking in the world. At this point, it’s inarguable that this helped Donald Trump a lot.

    Mounk: That, I think, is one of the fundamental truths about this moment that is not sufficiently remarked upon, which is that Donald Trump, with all the power he currently holds, is a bigger danger to American democracy and to basic American values than the progressive left. But the degree to which both parties have distanced themselves from where most Americans stand is the condition of possibility for each of them continuing to be so extreme.

    If Republicans were able to go into the cultural center of the country, they would blow the Democrats out of the water. But since they don’t, Democrats can continue to be dysfunctional in all kinds of ways, and Donald Trump can get reelected. Conversely, if Democrats were only able to actually stand for decent, progressive, inclusive values, but in a way that actually speaks to most Americans, then Donald Trump would not have won in 2024.

    French: I agree with that completely. What you’re watching is MAGA essentially recreating many of the excesses of the radical left, except with much greater force and energy because it’s being directed and driven from the White House in a very decisive way, with all the instruments and levers of power that the federal government possesses. As strong as the Twitter mob could have been in 2018 or 2019, it’s still nothing compared to the full weight and power of the federal government.

    By doing this in such a heavy-handed way, what you’re already beginning to see is that even the things Trump promised to do that were popular have become unpopular because of how he’s doing them. There’s that Newton’s law of motion—for every action, there’s an equal and opposite reaction. What we’ve seen is that for every extreme, there’s an equal and opposing extreme.

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

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    This large group of Americans—it’s even wrong to say “in the middle,” it’s better to say non-extreme Americans—are being left out of this. I’m firmly convinced that, at this moment, MAGA is engaged in serious overreach and will learn the same lesson the far left learned when it engaged in overreach. But because MAGA’s overreach is so connected to the power of the federal government, the damage they can do before the backlash is very considerable and dangerous.

    Mounk: It’s amazing how violent and protracted the birth pangs of a political realignment turn out to be. I do think that the natural realignment of American politics is that the Republicans become a kind of multiracial working-class party, and the Democrats become the party of the relatively educated and prosperous in the more thriving parts of the country.

    But neither party has quite realized that this is what is going on or has been able to consistently pursue that new electorate. That very much includes the Trump administration. It’s remarkable how successful Trump was at winning. We now know from the Catalyst study, which is the most reliable analysis of voter trends, that he doubled the African American vote—albeit, from a low base—and that he very significantly increased the Asian American vote.

    Among Latinos, he did just as well as exit polls suggested back in November 2016. But I also bet that many of those new voters who could have become lifelong Republican voters if Trump had played his cards right are now quite alienated and horrified by what he is doing. Some of the most robust anti-immigrant speeches I have heard in my time in the United States were often from Latinos—Uber or Lyft drivers, cab drivers, and others I have spoken to in my life. Trump could very easily have gained a huge foothold with Latinos through very robust border enforcement policies and deportations of undocumented migrants who have committed crimes, but the kind of brutality with which he is pursuing deportations and the evident lack of regard for the fears that even documented migrants may have about the way in which ICE is entering neighborhoods, etc.—that is going to alienate a huge chunk of that electorate.

    French: Especially since many of the Hispanic Americans who are actual citizens are being brutalized right now—actual citizens, green card holders, or people with legal authorization to be in the country.

    Mounk: It doesn’t take many examples of ICE agents getting the wrong person and doing something wrong for a lot of people to start feeling legitimately afraid.

    French: Absolutely. There was an incident where the reporting is that a Black Hawk helicopter descended on a Chicago apartment building. They separated the Black residents of the apartment building into one area and the Hispanic residents into another, mocking and laughing at children who were crying. That kind of behavior, which is much more reminiscent of Russia than the United States, is circulating through the country.

    Most people don’t follow the ins and outs of Twitter. They’re not aware of every outrage on any given day. But when you brutalize people at scale, even if they’re not paying attention to the news, word of it leaks out very broadly. The Republicans are, on the one hand, extremely proud that they’ve started to build this multiracial working-class coalition and then act as if they don’t have a multiracial working-class coalition. It’s the strangest thing.

    It’s a reverse image of the way the Democrats took the highly educated far left—Black and Hispanic scholars and theorists from the academy—and decided that’s what Black and Hispanic voters are like. They’re not.

    Mounk: We need to get better at reaching Latino voters. What are we going to do? We’re going to get the president of the Latinx Victory Fund, who has an MA in migration studies from Brown University, and have them tell us how ordinary Latinos feel? It’s absurd.

    French: Everybody knew this in real time because, if you go back to 2019, there was a tremendous Nate Cohn analysis of the Democratic primary electorate. It found that one-third of the Democratic primary electorate was online and two-thirds was offline. The one-third online was disproportionately white, prosperous, and progressive, and the two-thirds offline were far more diverse, working class, and culturally conservative.

    In the 2020 primary election, all but one of them ran for the one-third. Only one of them, Joe Biden, ran for the two-thirds.

    Mounk: The tragedy is that the only candidate who was too old and not attentive to the advice of strategists was Joe Biden. We ended up with a president who had some genuine strengths in communication, both because he was a genuine moderate and because he was able to connect with ordinary people. I’m thinking back to when he went to the offices of your now employer to ask for the endorsement of the editorial board. The editorial board didn’t even take Joe Biden seriously and ended up, I believe, recommending a split endorsement—which had never been done before—Elizabeth Warren and the Senator from Minnesota,Amy Klobuchar. But Joe Biden won over someone who worked at The New York Times in a custodial capacity, in the elevator, and there was a viral clip. But that also set up the tragedy that Joe Biden was way too old to run for president. Then you had all of the other self-sabotage of the Democratic Party that came out of it.

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    I want to go back to immigration for a moment. There is a genuine problem with immigration where you have cycling preferences of voters. What voters want, by and large, is very firm control of the border without state cruelty. The reason voter sentiment keeps switching on immigration is that for a while you have no state cruelty and very porous borders, and people get angry about those porous borders and demand a crackdown. Then politicians try to crack down on the border, but that necessarily entails some state-sanctioned cruelty. Then people say they don’t want the state to sanction cruelty, and that’s why you have these cycling preferences.

    Having said that, it’s hard—both normatively and in terms of pleasing voters—to know how to trade those things off, because the preferences of voters are incoherent. But what the Trump administration is doing is not even trying. They’re saying not just maximize border control, but maximize border control and state-sponsored violence to show how tough they are, with no attempt to minimize the cruelty.

    French: I don’t think the immigration issue is rocket science in the slightest. The immigration issue is the simplest imaginable. The parties are in the grip of extremists on both sides. Here’s the position that has been polling well for generations: control who comes into the country and show compassion for the people who are already here. If you are a peaceful person contributing to society—especially if you’re a Dreamer, especially if you’re a kid—many people either want you to stay or want you to be the lowest priority on the deportation scale. But if you’re a criminal, out immediately, instantly.

    You can expel illegal criminal aliens very quickly without brutality. The brutality comes when you do giant sweeps of people, trying to gather up large numbers at once. On the extremes, the Republicans don’t just want a border wall—we’ve hardly heard about a border wall this term—they want absolute, total, punitive repression. The Trump administration is enacting that.

    It will always be a mystery to me how the Biden administration thought it could permit that level of immigration on the southern border. It’s one of the biggest own-goals in history. We’ve talked about the far cultural left, but I think Biden could have still won if the border had been under control. It would have been tight, close, an absolute nail-biter, but Biden or his successor could have won if the border had been under control.

    The combination of inflation—where, truth be told, America did better than most countries—a border out of control, and this sense that so many Americans have that the far left isn’t just alien to them but actually hates them, despises them, looks down on them, thinks they’re horrible people. It’s like three strikes and you’re out at that point.

    Mounk: Yeah, in a strange way, I think from a political science perspective, there’s one tiny good news story buried in that, which is that it’s tempting to say, and some political scientists and some economists have argued over the last decades, that voters are not very rational and that they don’t reward or punish politicians for what they do. Of course, I think that on the whole Donald Trump is worse for America. But actually, I think a lot of voting behavior in 2024 was a retrospective evaluation of what Democrats did, and it was responsive to some of their mistakes.

    The United States did a little better than other countries on inflation, but there were also economic policies that accelerated inflation. On the border, the Biden administration took proactive policies and executive orders that hugely aggravated that problem.

    From a political science perspective, it’s reassuring that we don’t live in a world of lol, nothing matters. When things go off the rails, voters punish incumbents. More likely than not—and we’ll get to what our outlook is for 2026 and 2028—I think for similar reasons Trump is significantly underwater in approval ratings now and may sink further if some of the bad policies the administration is enacting, from tariffs to all the things we’ve been talking about, start to harm ordinary Americans.

    French: That’s exactly correct. There’s also another rational response we haven’t mentioned—the absolutely disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. Biden had a positive approval rating until then, and it went down and never came back up.

    This is what I want people who are sitting there screaming at their iPhones right now—Trump is worse! Got it, I agree. I did not like the Biden administration on a number of levels. I really think this is substantially worse than where we were under Biden. I agree one million percent on that. However, if your party is failing in some significant areas, and it’s a two-party system, at some point the argument that the other side is worse isn’t going to keep working. You just have to deliver at some point.

    It’s pedantic to say it because it’s been said so much, but if you really want a country to prosper in a two-party system, you need two healthy parties. Somebody might say, no, if you have one healthy party, then it can just keep winning. No, parties are made of human beings. Your “healthy” party might fail in some material ways, and you better pray to God at that moment that the other party is ready, willing, and able to step up in a constructive way that’s oriented toward the common good and the prosperity of the republic.

    Instead, what has happened is that the Democrats often refuse to listen to criticism because they always say, Trump is worse. Fine, but at some point, don’t we have to acknowledge that you’ve got to sell yourselves to the public in a positive way? It cannot simply be that the other side is so bad. Otherwise, we’re never getting out of this cycle.

    Mounk: I wrote a lot of articles in the first Trump term about how horrible Trump is and how the things he was doing were dangerous. I still sometimes write those articles and still sometimes talk about that on the podcast. There’s a reason why, in certain ways, I’ve shifted my focus. It’s not that I’m less convinced that Trump is dangerous. In fact, Trump is more dangerous now than he was in his first term in a number of ways.

    That assumption we had in the first Trump term—that somehow this was a four-year problem and it was going to go away—was fundamentally wrong. Unless we look in the mirror and figure out how more moderate political parties in the United States and other countries can meet this moment and give voters an offer that allows them to win consistently, and hopefully win big at the ballot box and force the right back to a negotiating table on democratic grounds, they are going to win.

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    When I think about where my comparative advantage is, in terms of who’s listening to me—because I don’t think I have many far-right MAGA listeners on this podcast—and where there’s a lack of serious reflection in our intellectual culture, it’s in trying to build this project of how to defend the basic principles of liberal democracy in a way that can win the assent, and the enthusiastic assent, of a large, majoritarian share of the population.

    If we’re not asking ourselves that question—if we think it’s enough to just preach to the choir of people who are already convinced about why the thing Trump did yesterday is terrible—we’re missing the point. The thing Trump did yesterday is terrible. We’re recording this a few days before the podcast is out, and I’m sure as you listen to it, three or four days from when we’re recording this, he did something terrible. I’m sure that’s true. Absolutely. That’s not going to help rebuild the Democratic Party.

    French: Anybody can look at my work and know that I have gone with both barrels at every outrage in this Trump administration. I’ve taken an immense amount of incoming from the MAGA right. But I will tell you, my friends on the left, the idea that people got volcanically angry at Ezra Klein for writing a book about abundance, about how to make America able to build big things, to build houses, and to make housing affordable—and they get volcanically angry at him because of their niche, hyper-specific, left-wing ideology—is absurd.

    I try so hard to be charitable, Yascha, I really do. But at some point, you just have to say when things are idiotic. Ezra made this tremendous point—I believe it may have been to Ta-Nehisi Coates—when he said, “You can imagine the end of the Republic more than you can imagine a Democrat winning Arkansas.” But Democrats used to win Arkansas all the time. A president was from Arkansas. I remember when Democrats would win the state of Tennessee.

    One thing you might want to do is make yourself open to a pro-life candidate in the Democratic Party—a socially conservative candidate who shares your values on economic policy, foreign policy, and immigration—but who is socially conservative. You would have thought I had sacrificed a goat on live television. It was unbelievable. What it made me realize is that for an awful lot of people, Yascha, politics is much more like religion than anything else.

    In a religious context, if you’re talking to a Christian about doctrine, they’re not going to negotiate on the divinity of Jesus or on the doctrines of baptism because those are ultimate things. But in politics, which should be far downstream from religion, the question of incremental change versus total change is a common choice you have to make. Is incremental change better than regression? These kinds of decisions are made all the time.

    If politics becomes religion—let’s suppose you’re a strong supporter of trans rights—the idea that having a Democrat who doesn’t want biological males participating in women’s sports or who has hesitancy about medical interventions for youth is somehow indistinguishable from someone who wants to reform the law so that a trans person can’t even own a gun or is deemed a domestic terrorist, or almost the equivalent of one, is beyond irrational. It’s only explainable in the context of an almost fundamentalist religious worldview.

    Mounk: I thought there were two interesting things about that conversation. Broadly speaking, I agree more with Ezra Klein than with Ta-Nehisi Coates. But there was an interesting weakness in the hemming and hawing way the moderate left often talks that came out of that exchange.

    First, on substantive grounds, I agree exactly with the point you just made. I was preparing to make it myself—that even if you think biological men should absolutely be allowed to play in female competitive sports, and even if you think there should be no concerns at all about giving cross-gender hormones to twelve- or thirteen-year-olds, you could still recognize that compromising on those issues may be worth it if it means that serving trans service members aren’t being booted out of the military with dishonorable discharges, as is happening because of Trump. Trans Americans would be spared the really nasty rhetoric from the White House that we’re getting under Trump. Even if you just care about the full package of what the more radical trans organizations want, you could say that perhaps we should compromise on those one or two things if what it spares is many other things.

    But I also find it interesting that there’s a cowardice in that framing—of talking about it merely as a compromise. Too many people on the reasonable left are saying, well, the problem is that the average American is a bigot. Or in the case of Kamala Harris, the average American is a bigot, so I can’t choose Pete Buttigieg as my running mate because they’re not ready for a gay vice president, which is essentially what she says in her book, astonishingly. They just want to compromise. When I hear that stuff, a little part of me wants to say, well, then I’ll go with AOC. I see why someone who says “no compromises” and proudly holds their moral position ends up looking like the more attractive option when the alternative is, I agree with everything the progressives believe—number one. Number two, unfortunately, we live in a country of bigots. Number three, I’m the person saying we should just cut deals with the bigots. That’s not a very attractive vision.

    We need the courage to say we stand with trans Americans. We stand against people being booted out of the military. We stand against the horrible rhetoric about trans people from the White House. There are also principled reasons to worry about the fairness of competitive female sports if people who’ve gone through male puberty are allowed to partake in them. If there’s good evidence that twelve- or thirteen-year-olds, after one appointment with a doctor, are being given puberty blockers and then relatively quickly rushed into cross-gender hormones and other things that make them sterile and cause serious health problems for the rest of their lives, perhaps that’s something we should worry about—not because we’re selling out trans people, but because we care about the interests of those twelve- and thirteen-year-old kids.

    French: I think treating all of these issues—sports, youth gender transition, intimate spaces like locker rooms—as if the only positions are bigotry or full participation, with nothing in between, is wrong. As you were saying, compromise is often framed as a compromise with bigotry because there are other things that need to be accomplished. You’re 100% right. But here’s the thing, Yascha—you and I have spent enough time in center-left spaces to know that, by and large, many people in the center-left do have concerns about youth gender transition.

    Mounk: I’m sure your dear colleague might secretly feel that way as well, even though that’s not what he was saying on the podcast.

    French: I cannot speak to that at all, but I know for a fact that I have many friends on the center left who genuinely have these concerns. I will tell you why they don’t voice them. The left side of America has a very similar problem to the right side of America: if you deviate from the MAGA line, it’s not just that people disagree with you—they will brutalize you. They will treat you as if you are Satan himself.

    In extreme cases, they will threaten you, they will try to cancel your job, and they will attack you. There’s an ideological discipline that exists in both parties that is brutal.

    Mounk: A disciplined agent is always on your own side. If you’re a liberal or progressive professor at a university and the MAGA people are going after you, that’s unpleasant, but you’re not worried you’re going to lose your job or that your colleagues are going to look at you strangely. When you’re being attacked from your own side, that’s when it becomes scary. The same is true on the right—if you criticize Trump, God help you.

    French: Yes, exactly. I say this from the standpoint that I have gotten enormous heat from the right for defending the basic civil liberties and human rights of LGBT Americans. I have been brutalized on the right for defending basic free speech rights. At the same time, if you take my exact set of beliefs and move them into the Democratic Party, I don’t know if they would permit me to stay.

    This is a remarkable dynamic. You nailed it—there are many people in the center left who are not standing up to this at all. They frame it purely as pragmatic compromise instead of acknowledging that there may be legitimate concerns here. There are rational concerns, as you were saying, about starting youth gender transition so rapidly and dramatically with untested, unproven medical treatments.

    The idea that expressing those concerns in good faith could lead to total social death is alarming. I do think it’s less severe than it used to be. In 2019, 2020, and 2021, that was what was happening—you were talking total social death. It’s changing, and changing in a positive direction, but given the urgency of the moment, not quickly enough.

    Mounk: Let’s go back to our therapy session and to the year 2017. I think it was in early 2017 that my esteemed colleague, Francis Fukuyama at Persuasion, argued that we’re living through a kind of natural experiment in the United States. He said that the idea of institutions is that they were supposed to be able to withstand people who don’t have much respect for democratic institutions. That is why we have checks and balances. That is why we have a division of power between the presidency, Congress, and other branches of government.

    So the question was whether or not those institutions would prove capable of withstanding even a president who, I think, evidently lacks respect for those democratic values. Eight years in, how do you think we’re doing on that natural experiment?

    French: Terribly. I would say my alarm about the state of our institutions has only accelerated in the last eight months because we have witnessed some of the most powerful institutions in the most powerful country in the world capitulate. In spite of possessing strong political and legal positions, they have capitulated utterly to pressure from Trump’s authoritarianism. He’s vicious. He’s also incompetent. So we’re not even talking about the most lethal, effective, vindictive form of authoritarianism. This is a form that’s often bubbling, incoherent, and incompetent.

    I’ve said this many times, but it’s true. Many people imagine themselves to be brave. Many of those same people look at mistakes of the past and can’t comprehend: how did our country allow that to happen? You’re seeing it now. An awful lot of people, when push comes to shove, aren’t willing to bear risk. It’s turning out they’re not even willing to bear much risk at all.

    They may be unhappy. They may be angry. They may still oppose Trump, but they’re going to give him what he wants because it’s actually hard to be brave. Courage is not easy. Even a little bit of courage is not easy.

    Now, when you’re living through something less extreme than years past and you’re capitulating just as fast, there needs to be a wave of humility across this country followed by a wave of resolve that says, okay, I thought we were stronger. We’re not. Now we have to gear up, get ourselves some backbone, and confront this administration lawfully, peacefully, and maybe with real civil disobedience.

    If I had said to you before this second term of Trump that major networks, some of the most powerful law firms in the world, some of the wealthiest academic institutions in the world, in spite of grotesque violations of their rights, would go ahead and preemptively capitulate to the president, I think we both wouldn’t have predicted that.

    Mounk: I agree with you. During the first Trump term, I was very worried about the way in which these institutions would cave because I had seen it in many other countries. American institutions actually fared reasonably well under the first Trump term—not thanks to him. In part, it was because he was less competent than he is now, had less of a team of lawless individuals than he does now, and had less of a clear program in his mind about what he wanted to accomplish. The institutions held up relatively well.

    I was wary of being overly alarmist a second time, but as a result, I probably did not predict that things would move as quickly as they have over the last eight months. I am very worried, for example, about the fact that Trump is now clearly in a position to bring politically motivated prosecutions against his opponents. We’re not talking about tweet storms or people getting fired. We’re talking about people getting indicted by the full force of the federal government and its investigative powers. I am very concerned about those things.

    At the same time, I feel like we’re in a fog of war, and it’s hard to tell whether we’re in steps one, two, and three of the ten steps toward a situation in which Freedom House would rightly—or at least should—call the United States partly free, and we’re in a form of competitive authoritarianism, or whatever the political science terms are. Or whether, in fact, the institutions are holding up somewhat well.

    Trump is able to go after James Comey, to bring a prosecution that clearly would not have happened if Trump wasn’t directing it, firing prosecutors, and putting others in place who will bring the charge. At the same time, it looks relatively unlikely that Comey will actually go to jail or be found guilty by a jury of his peers.

    We see compromises, for example, by law firms targeted by Trump in ways that are brazen violations of democratic norms. I think those law firms have acted shamefully. But there are still lawyers in the country willing to represent opponents of Donald Trump. In fact, the federal government has lost an astonishing share of court cases.

    French: Note the common thread there, where Trump abuts against the judiciary. The judiciary, to take the wonderful title of my podcast co-host and dear friend Sarah Isgur’s new book is The Last Branch Standing. I’m not going to say I agree with everything the court and the judiciary have done, but by and large, it’s functioning.

    Mounk: Let’s stay with this argument for a moment because I find, especially in Europe, people think the court now has a super conservative majority and will do whatever Trump wants. Even in the United States, I hear people on the left and in the center talking as though the Supreme Court is clearly captured by Trump. I share your skepticism about that, but lay out the case. Tell listeners some of the things the Supreme Court has done that demonstrate this is too simplistic a view of where it stands.

    French: Let’s go back to Trump’s first term. He had the worst record at the Supreme Court of any modern president. That was all four years, and it was a majority Republican-nominated court his entire first term. In the interim period between the two terms, during the Biden administration, MAGA lost time and again at the court.

    MAGA reached goals regarding things like the independent state legislature doctrine—an extremely aggressive legal initiative—and had a miserable record at the court. Trump did win the immunity case and the 14th Amendment disqualification case, but I will circle back to that. In this new administration, especially early on, he took some significant losses, such as the ruling that required notice and an opportunity to be heard if someone is going to be deported, even under the Alien Enemies Act. That was a big deal. By saying it had to be a habeas petition—something more intricate and complicated than a typical deportation proceeding—it actually put a bigger brake on deportations than people realize.

    Here’s the key to understanding the Supreme Court and its jurisprudence regarding Trump: these justices are old-school classical liberal originalists, by and large. I would say there are 5.3 originalist justices on the court. I give Roberts a 0.3 in originalism. These are classical liberal originalist justices who, to varying degrees, adhere to some version of the unitary executive theory.

    What that means is, if a case challenges Trump’s control over the executive branch—as many emergency docket cases have—then, according to traditional Federalist Society originalism, the president’s control over the executive branch is deemed very broad. However, when Trump moves into areas involving substantive constitutional rights or the roles of Congress, they give him a much shorter rope.

    You saw this just this week with Lisa Cook. The court refused to let her be immediately fired. The Fed is not neatly within the executive branch, which makes it different from other firings. They’ve scheduled oral arguments months from now, while she’s still in office.

    That shows a distinction. I would fall out of my chair in shock if Trump wins the birthright citizenship case. I think he loses that 8–1 or 7–2, best case for him.

    Mounk: By the way, an interesting case of complete misreporting. Even if you read many of the most esteemed news sources in the United States—and particularly when I looked at the media in Europe—when the court decided that we shouldn’t have one federal judge out of hundreds be able to suspend executive action or legislation until it’s been fully negotiated in the courts, the occasion for that was Trump’s attempt to undermine birthright citizenship.

    Any educated German, French, Italian, or British reader would have thought the Supreme Court allowed Trump to get rid of birthright citizenship. I think even many readers of The Washington Post and The New York Times may have gotten that impression. Weeks later, the Supreme Court then certified a collective class action lawsuit, which said, no, you cannot strip people of birthright citizenship for now. Once it’s negotiated, we’ll see—the judgment is yet to come out. But like you, I very much expect that Trump will not win once it winds its way, most probably, up to the Supreme Court.

    French: I would also be surprised—not “fall out of my chair in shock” surprised—if he wins his tariff case. So if, at the end of this Supreme Court term, you have a situation where Trump can fire members of the executive branch, but he can’t change birthright citizenship, can’t unilaterally implement tariffs, can’t deprive people of due process, can’t deprive people of free speech, then what you have is classic conservative jurisprudence.

    I disagree with many elements of unitary executive theory. I think much of it is inconsistent with originalism. But that theory is not unique to Trump. This is part of the Venn diagram where Trumpism overlaps with traditional Republicanism. Some of it is not traditional, but this area is.

    What I would say is, knowing the judiciary—and knowing judges as well as I do—it’s the last branch standing for a reason. I think it will continue to be the last branch standing. However, if Congress doesn’t resist the president, then the one thing I’d love to communicate clearly is this: you could have a perfect Supreme Court. The Supreme Court could rule for Trump in every way he wants, and he could still do enormous damage to American culture, society, and law just by Congress being prostrate before him.

    For example, the Venezuelan boat strikes. The court does not enjoin military action. That’s not what it does. It’s up to Congress to check a president going rogue with the U.S. military, and they are absolutely unwilling to do it.

    So the last branch standing is like a rear guard for a retreating army. It can slow the defeat and maybe allow the retreating army enough time to gather its forces and counterattack. But if the retreating army continues to retreat, all the rear guard does is slow down the loss.

    Mounk: I think we have a similar mental model of how to think about the Supreme Court. The way I sometimes describe it to European audiences when I give media interviews is that the majority of the Supreme Court is broadly in the tradition of the Federalist Society. If you read the consensus-ish opinions of where the Federalist Society stood on a range of issues in 2014, before Trump entered politics, you would do pretty well at predicting the decisions of the Supreme Court today.

    That overlaps with what Trump wants to do on some things, but it’s also important to note that it doesn’t overlap on others. Let me play devil’s advocate for a moment about why the last branch standing may not be as reassuring as you’ve been saying. One is a question, and the other is a thought experiment.

    The question is: what about the immunity case? How does that fit into what you’ve been talking about, and how concerned should we be about it? Isn’t that what has allowed the Trump administration to go very far in what it does, with many members of the administration not afraid of legal liability for actions taken once Trump is no longer in the White House?

    The related question is: if the court allows Trump very broad control over the executive, is that going to be control enough? If, for example, it means that Trump can fire every career prosecutor at the FBI and put in place loyalists who start methodically going after Americans who displease the president, and the price of criticizing the president becomes a high likelihood of being indicted by a grand jury—and, famously, in the words of the New York judge from the 1980s, you could indict a ham sandwich?

    Perhaps eventually you get off, after spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on lawyers and defending yourself with the risk of ending up in jail for a long time. Perhaps, in most cases, juries of your peers will let you off in the end. That is still a tremendously dangerous tool of power that the White House now has under its control. How much will—and can—this last branch save us?

    French: Let me talk about the immunity case, which I completely, 100% disagreed with on originalist grounds. But let me put it in perspective. The immunity case was meaningless to Trump getting off. The reason Trump was not prosecuted and convicted had nothing to do with the immunity case. It had everything to do with how long it took to bring the case and him winning the election in 2024.

    As Amy Coney Barrett deftly pointed out during oral argument, it became clear that many of the charges against Trump were related to his private conduct, and the immunity decision was going to do nothing for him. In fact, the strongest charges against him were related to his private conduct. So, the immunity case is a problem.

    Mounk: The Stormy Daniels case would have been private conduct. What about the Georgia case?

    French: That was Amy Coney Barrett who clarified that when Trump was, for example, pressing the Secretary of State of Georgia, that was as a candidate, not as a president. Much of what happened in the January 6 cases was clarified during oral argument to have been private conduct. So he was still absolutely on the hook for the most serious charges. The reason he was never prosecuted is because he won—not because of the immunity case.

    Mounk: So you think the same is going to be true of members of this administration going forward? That a lot of the damaging things they do, even if done with power, won’t be covered?

    French: They’re not covered by that case, the lower link. But the immunity case is not the dagger at the heart of the American Constitution. The dagger at the heart of the American Constitution is the pardon power. The president has total authority. On the very last day of his term, he could engage in political prosecutions, graft, corruption, and take bribes. His entire administration could be on the take from Qatar, for example. His entire administration could be making Bitcoin millions by colluding with crypto allies. He could just pardon everybody.

    There is zero recourse. He could pardon them from all federal charges. He could issue preemptive pardons in every federal employment. This is something the Anti-Federalists were screaming about in 1787 and 1788. Madison, in one of the few areas where he got it wrong, said, don’t worry about it. Impeachment will take care of it. We know impeachment is a dead letter.

    So when people talk about the immunity case—again, I thought it was completely wrong—it is a non-factor to the health of American democracy compared to abuse of the pardon power. If you combine the ability to fire, even if you fire everybody and bring in apparatchiks, in theory they’re all bound by the Constitution. But you can just pardon them.

    The pardon power, in my view, is the dagger in the heart of American democracy. Smart people have seen this for more than 200 years: that a particularly unscrupulous man could get into office and wreck the country this way.

    Yes, I’m very worried about Supreme Court decisions that extend the unitary executive, where you can scorch through the civil service and replace it with a pure spoils system. I don’t think Americans fully understand what that could mean for their daily lives. If every four years you sweep out a million people and sweep in a different million, it’s just nuts.

    Mounk: There’s a very deep problem that incoming parties face, which we can see now in Poland. I’m calling it a post-populist dilemma. If a government replaces civil servants with loyalists, and that populist government then loses power, the new government—broadly committed to democratic norms—faces a terrible choice. Either leave those loyalists, who are actively undermining democratic norms, in office to continue doing damage, or fire them all in a similarly irregular way, thereby creating a new norm that each incoming administration will do a clean sweep.

    That dilemma helps explain why the Polish government is floundering in deep ways. Democrats are going to face that absolutely in 2028, and it’s going to be a big problem.

    I want you to keep helping me think through this moment more broadly and see through the fog of war. Let’s take an area like free speech. I’m deeply concerned about what the administration has done in terms of punishing students for unpopular political speech by canceling their F1 student visas and making them immediately deportable, by trying to punish universities for engaging in unpopular speech or practices by threatening federal funding and imposing very hard conditions. We’re now apparently giving them a kind of poisoned carrot—this carrot or else.

    I was very worried about the commissioner of the FCC going on a podcast and saying about Jimmy Kimmel—who, by the way, said something factually wrong and disgusting about the assassin of Charlie Kirk, implying he was somehow part of a MAGA crowd—but for the commissioner of the FCC to go on a podcast and say, they gotta fire him. We can do this the easy way or the hard way, like some kind of mob boss, as even Ted Cruz recognized, is clearly worrying.

    I’m very worried about all of these attacks on free speech. At the same time, you look at the headlines of mainstream news outlets and don’t get the sense they’re pulling punches. I myself am often asked, particularly outside the United States, are you worried, as a professor at an American university, about criticizing Donald Trump? I have to say, in this conversation, there’s no part of me that thinks, oh my God, if I say this about Donald Trump, is he going to come after me? Perhaps that’s naive. Perhaps three years from now he will. But I don’t think we live in that culture or climate of fear yet.

    This is another area where I’m deep in the fog of war and torn about how to think about it. Are we really on steps three and four toward people being incredibly afraid to criticize Donald Trump? Or do you think by 2028 it’s going to be obvious that we can still say what we want about the president, and unless you get really unlucky, it won’t have consequences? Where on that spectrum do you think we’re going to end up?

    French: Let me just say the reason I think it’s a little naive not to be concerned is this: if something you said went viral—if you had a moment that really ticked off some people in MAGA—watch out. What that means is, often, it’s a matter of who they choose to fixate on at a given moment. Whoever they fixate on, regardless of status—whether an American citizen, a green card holder, or someone like Jimmy Kimmel—they will suffer. MAGA will use whatever avenue of control or authority they have to make that person suffer.

    With Kimmel, it’s a historical accident that he’s on broadcast television, and the government owns the airwaves, so there’s some degree of FCC control—not as much as the administration thinks it has. So they use that lever. With you, your academic institution could be a lever. Obviously, the publication you started is not going to punish you. But what lever might they have over you? Immigration status.

    So the way I look at it is this: if you’re a public critic of Donald Trump and haven’t experienced some sort of reprisal from the MAGA movement or the administration itself, a lot of that is just a matter of luck, to be honest.

    Mounk: I agree with that, but I don’t think it has created a culture of fear. Perhaps I’m wrong about that. I know what it’s like to look at Hungarian newspapers and see every outlet print the same picture of Viktor Orbán with the same positive write-up of his latest speech. For now, that is just not what MSNBC, The Nation, and NPR feel like. It’s not even what The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and other organizations—some right of center, like The Wall Street Journal, and others left of center, though not far-left progressive—feel like.

    They are daily criticizing Donald Trump in a pretty robust way. The question I have is: how likely is it that this will still be the case two or three years from now? That’s where I think the real danger lies. I don’t know. This is a genuine question. I find it really hard to think through.

    French: I agree with that, but it’s worth noting that, at The New York Times, for example, we don’t have a culture of fear—but we’ve been sued for $15 billion. The Wall Street Journal doesn’t seem to have a culture of fear either. It’s continuing to report on Epstein and has similarly been sued for $10 or $15 billion.

    The difference is that the lever Trump has against The New York Times is not as strong as the one he has over an immigrant. It’s a totally different strength of leverage. He’s trying to do what he can to The New York Times, but under current conditions and legal structures, his ability to impact us is less than it is for someone like Jimmy Kimmel.

    Mounk: But that’s the question I’m asking. I have no doubt whatsoever that Trump is willing to use any lever he has, and the federal government is very powerful in all kinds of ways—direct and indirect. That’s a very bad state of affairs.

    I’m trying to ask this question from the perspective of the natural experiment that Francis Fukuyama talked about in 2017. Right now, I think it’s fair to say the administration is attacking free speech in deeply concerning ways. It’s also fair to say that we clearly have a free press in the United States that is unafraid to report on and criticize the president. How do you think this is going to look in two or three years?

    French: If present trends continue, you’re going to see a substantially different media environment. Twitter is already under the direct control of one of Trump’s closest allies. TikTok is heading in the same direction; that deal is in the works. Meta has been thoroughly cowed and intimidated. Right now, the Zuckerberg position seems to be: “How high?” when the administration says jump.

    So, in the world of social media, there’s already a significant amount of existing and emerging control. Then there’s broadcast. We can’t forget the $25 million that YouTube just agreed to pay to the president. ABC paid a very large settlement without fighting a case that was stronger than their case against CBS. CBS filed a large settlement in response to a specious, frivolous case. They settled. We’re not settling. The Wall Street Journal isn’t settling. I feel like The New York Times would fight this to the ends of the earth, and that’s one reason I’m grateful to be where I am.

    When you talk about a culture of fear, at this point, the administration’s actions have been so aggressive on so many fronts that if you don’t feel afraid as a critic of the administration, that’s more a matter of disposition than anything else. One of the firms that settled had very strong positions, but dispositionally, they weren’t up for the fight.

    You’ve been in the middle of the free speech maelstrom for a long time. You’ve had people come after you in very aggressive ways—cancel culture, etc.—and you’ve developed a thick skin. You’ve spoken in the face of criticism that would make the average person wilt. So it’s harder for you to look at a situation and say, this makes me afraid. That’s your disposition.

    I bet a lot of people who haven’t been in the fray, who aren’t all about the fray, or who are used to a way of existing where you could directly challenge an administration without getting hit with a billion-dollar lawsuit—over time, they will feel differently. I don’t think we’re going to lose robust dissent in this country, even if people are being sent to jail. You would still have robust dissent, even if it got to the point where he’s rounding people up—which I don’t think will happen. I hope not. But you’d still have it. What you’re seeing is a slow and steady increase in the zone of fear.

    Mounk: I think you’re being far too kind about me and hugely overstating my personal level of courage. Even in Russia, you have people who speak out—some who are courageous, wonderful, and heroic, and who will speak out no matter what. But you’re right to point out that can’t be the criterion.

    French: A lot of people would ask me, why did you defend this person who said this horrific thing? When I was president of FIRE, we defended a professor named Ward Churchill, who compared the World Trade Center victims on 9/11 to little Adolf Eichmanns. Horrific speech.

    One of the things I’ve said is: imagine the zone of free speech like a big circle. Your average person does not want to come close to the outer edge of the circle. So the bigger you can draw the circle, the more permission you give the average American to express what’s on their mind and heart. The more the circle constricts, the more the actual zone of conversation in America constricts. Wherever the line is, most normal people are going to be well short of it.

    The more the circle constricts, the more the zone of conversation constricts. People who have been in the free speech trenches for a long time are sometimes the worst gauges of the actual free speech climate. We’re used to representing, defending, and talking about deeply unpopular speech. You get into a mode of “bring it on” when defending free speech, if that’s been a big part of your life’s work.

    When it’s not a big part of your life’s work—when it’s ancillary to your experience—people tend to be shocked and extremely nervous at the very idea that their words can hurt them.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and David discuss how serious the situation in the United States is—and how to fight back. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 9 min

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