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By Yascha Mounk
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  • Superintelligence Isn’t Enough
    CEO of OpenAI Sam Altman. (Photo: Kevin Dietsch via Getty Images.)

    Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!

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    I have a longtime friend whom I’ve known since my college days, who made his money as an investor and entrepreneur at the edge of the tech world. One constant about him over the years has been his endless admiration for people he regards as “very smart.” He means this in a very specific way: they are very good at math, and have done well for themselves making money using their brainpower.

    He’s not alone in this preoccupation. Silicon Valley is a virtual cathedral for the worship of geniuses—initially people like Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk—who have built world-beating companies around applications of technology. That technology has now moved onto AI, where Sam Altman, Demis Hassabis, and Yann LeCun have become the new icons of brilliance.

    And what this generation is building is, indeed, intelligence. There is a race currently on for artificial general intelligence (AGI), a machine that will have the cognitive capabilities of a human being. Indeed, more than that: cutting-edge machines are “growing” rather than being programmed, and are reportedly capable of modifying themselves to extend their own capabilities. They will not stop at human intelligence, but will become smarter than human beings. This type of “superintelligence” will then lead to huge advances in science, technology, and the economy. There are already achievements along these lines, like Hassabis’ Alphafold project that has solved protein-folding problems that seemed beyond the capabilities of earlier technologies. There are serious discussions taking place now about a future, not that far away, where advanced economies using superintelligent AI will be able to achieve substantially higher growth rates of 10, 15, 20 percent per year, compared to the 2-3 percent that’s considered substantial today. Material deprivation will disappear and be replaced by schemes to subsidize those whose livelihoods have been displaced by AGI, like universal basic income.

    There are several problems with these speculations. The first is one I’m not in a position to evaluate: whether AGI or superintelligence are even possible. Writers like Eric Larsen have suggested that while LLMs are good at culling enormous stores of existing knowledge, they lack the kind of speculative insight that the cognitive scientist C. S. Peirce labeled “abduction” that is required for true innovative discovery.

    But let us assume for the moment that AGI will come about, and that machines will become more intelligent in certain respects than human beings. There are powerful reasons to believe that this capability will be transformative in many ways, but may not produce explosive economic growth as the AI cheerleaders expect.

    The reason for this skepticism is that the binding constraint on economic growth today is simply not insufficient intelligence or cognitive ability. Even absent smart machines, human beings today collectively have more cognitive ability than at any prior point in human history. The binding constraint has to do with how that intelligence interacts with the material world in a myriad of ways. Economic growth depends ultimately on the ability to build real objects in the real world. A smart machine may be able to come up with a plan for a better mousetrap, but to actually fabricate that mousetrap requires capabilities beyond any machine’s control.

    At a macro level, we are already running into the constraint of too many dollars chasing too little stuff. As environmental doomsayers have been arguing for years, there are ultimately material limits to growth. The one most obviously in front of us is global warming, but there are many others. The planet does not have the resources to sustain 8 billion people with an American standard of living; indeed, at 10 percent annual growth, China, America, and Europe would soon run out of everything, including agricultural land, water, energy, and almost everything else.

    At a micro level, there is a problem translating the work of smart machines into material goods. Product innovation has always depended on a prolonged iterative process whereby a designer tries out ideas, fails, and modifies the design in response. No amount of superintelligence will ever be sufficient to simulate the behavior of material objects under the conditions of the existing material world, as generations of builders and tinkerers know.

    Finally, there is the political and social level. I attended a presentation by an engineer at a leading AI firm who suggested that in the near future, AGI would be able to, for example, provide clean drinking water to struggling cities in the developing world.

    The problem is that the failure to provide such basic services in poor countries is not lack of knowledge of what a good municipal water system looks like. The problem is political and social. People do not want to pay the higher costs engendered by a new water system; unionized workers in the municipal water authority do not want to lose their jobs to automation; business owners do not want the disruption that will occur as the streets are torn up for new pipes; the finance minister believes there are other priorities and can’t raise taxes to pay for a new system. In many poor countries, there are water mafias that buy water where it is cheap, and resell it at extortionate prices. They are armed and ready to use violence if you get in their way.

    A superintelligent machine may be able to understand these problems, but it will have no way of overcoming them. We already know what a good municipal water system looks like; what we don’t have is an implementation plan to put it in place in city X.

    Our understanding of the role of intelligence has been distorted by the kind of technological change that has occurred over the past couple of decades. The internet, social media, and related technologies are all based on software. Apart from data servers and cloud storage, they don’t require fabricating new devices that have never been tested. As a result, software scales very easily. This is how Google, Meta, and other companies have been able to turn into giants so quickly.

    Companies that make money by building material objects in the material world have much more difficulty scaling up. They too benefit from economies of scale, but reach a point of diminishing returns much faster than a software company. (This is, by the way, one reason why Elon Musk’s Tesla has been such a remarkable success story, because it has scaled successfully making material products.) We have somehow come to see the software paradigm as the dominant one that will characterize the AI age, but the economic benefits AI promises will not scale so easily.

    This is not to say that AI will not lead to huge productivity gains: take a look at Jerry Kaplan’s predictions about the future of robotaxis. But intelligent people, like those in Silicon Valley, tend to overestimate the importance of intelligence in life more generally. There are many other abilities beyond intelligence that make for a good and successful human being, and many other inputs other than what AI can provide that are required to produce economic growth.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • The Good Fight Club: Who’s a Hypocrite About Free Speech?

    In this episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk, Renée DiResta, Jacob Mchangama, and Jonathan Rauch discuss threats to free speech under Joe Biden vs Donald Trump, how to protect free speech, and the administration’s new compact for universities.

    Renée DiResta is an Associate Research Professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown and author of Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies Into Reality.

    Jacob Mchangama is the Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech and a research professor at Vanderbilt University. He is also a Senior Fellow at The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) and the author of Free Speech: A History From Socrates to Social Media.

    Jonathan Rauch is a senior fellow in the Governance Studies program at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Persuasion Board of Advisors.

    Yascha Mounk: Welcome to this live recording of The Good Fight Club coming to you directly from the Global Free Speech Summit 2025 at Vanderbilt University. We have with us—please give them a big round of applause—Jacob Mchangama, who is the executive director of The Future of Free Speech and the organizer of this conference. We have Renée DiResta, a professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown and author most recently of Invisible Rulers. We have Jonathan Rauch, a senior fellow at Brookings and a contributing writer at The Atlantic.

    This summit is about free speech, and we’ve had really great speeches and conversations about free speech over the last 24 hours. There is, I think, a question about free speech which is hard to escape at the moment, which is that virtually everybody who claims to care about free speech seems to be a bit of a hypocrite. When you look at some of the loudest defenders of free speech on the right of American politics, whether that’s somebody like Elon Musk or somebody like Donald Trump, suddenly they are demanding the firing of people who offend them. They talk about the importance of what they call “consequence culture.” They say of course people should be free to say whatever they want, but then there should be all these terrible consequences for when they express themselves in unpopular ways.

    The left is just as hypocritical. The left has spent, or these parts of the left have spent, years arguing for consequence culture and talking about why actually free speech is a reactionary conservative value. Now suddenly when Jimmy Kimmel is fired, they are holding rousing defenses of free speech. So the slightly provocative question I’m going to ask each of you is, should we give up on free speech if everybody who talks about free speech is actually a hypocrite? If not, then why should we care about this value?

    Jacob Mchangama: We are all hypocrites about free speech. It is human nature. Free speech is a deeply difficult concept and in some ways counterintuitive to human nature, I think. The good thing is that we have made progress. The circle of accepted speech, at least in mature democracies, has grown a lot. I do not think we will ever escape hypocrisy. It is what, in my book on the history of free speech, I call “Milton’s Curse” after John Milton, the famous English poet who wrote the Areopagitica in 1644, a very famous defense of free speech. But when you read it more carefully, it becomes clear that Milton is not in favor of free speech for Catholics. He is not in favor of blasphemy. In fact, he is mostly in favor of free speech for mainline Protestant sects. So it is definitely not a new concept, but it is something to be on guard against.

    I think this is where, in the United States, the value of the First Amendment becomes really clear because it provides a very strong, robust protection against government overreach. It is a necessary but not a sufficient protection for free speech because unfortunately, as we see, cultural institutions, law firms, and media outlets voluntarily cave to the pressure of the Trump administration, even though they could rely on the strongest free speech protection in the world, which I think is an affront to dissidents in Iran and Russia who cannot rely on that protection. But I think it is a big difference, particularly compared to the European model, where a lot of the things that the Trump administration is threatening to do, but which would violate the First Amendment, are perfectly feasible and actually being carried out in Europe right now.

    Ultimately, we need that civil libertarian impulse to win the day. That is extremely difficult at a time of intensive polarization because that just overrides the civil libertarian impulse.

    Mounk: Jonathan, if we’re all hypocrites, why insist on the value?

    Jonathan Rauch: We are all hypocrites some of the time on some issues, and that is okay with me. It is just human nature to be more reluctant to defend the speech of people we loathe than the speech from people we love. That is quite natural. It is, however, why we develop institutions and rely on them to give us guardrails, and those are what are being crashed through right now.

    Renée DiResta: When I saw the prompt, one of the things that occurred to me was the extent to which hypocrisy is maybe not necessarily the best frame, in part because I think a lot of people do not actually know the specifics. They do not understand the nuance. They do not really know the details. One of the things that I think a lot about in the context of the work that I do, the sort of intersection of speech and the internet or content moderation or the areas that I work in, is actually just the lack of understanding of the facts of the matter and the extent to which that allows polemicists to spin things in particular ways, and the extent to which that spin, when coming to you from a very trusted voice in a media ecosystem, particularly a niche media ecosystem, means you are not necessarily going to see the alternate perspectives.

    The way that social media curates and presents information to you means that if you trust Jim Jordan, you are going to see this particular drum that he has been beating for three years, and you are going to think that the Biden censorship regime is real, and that it manifested in very particular ways. You are not going to see the facts presented that came out of particular court cases and other things that undermine those claims. It takes an extensive amount of work to try to break through with—actually, here are the facts, here is the information, here is what actually happened, now maybe form an opinion on it. I think that it is not even so much a hypocrisy issue. It is that many people are not actually seeing the facts of the matter. That creates an additional layer of complexity on top of that.

    Mounk: I think this is one thing that I really want to get into today, which is how we should think about some of those attempts to moderate social media. Is that a threat to free speech, or is that in fact an important way of facilitating free speech? Perhaps that is going to be one of the areas in which we have some disagreements on this panel. To stick with this idea of hypocrisy for a moment, there is one defense that I could make of the importance of free speech despite the hypocrisy, which is that, in lots of other areas, we also recognize the importance of the value even if everybody flips on it.

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    It is always the case that when Democrats are in the White House, they suddenly discover the importance of having extensive presidential powers. The moment they get into the opposition, they say we need really strict limits on it. Republicans talk about the importance of having very strict limits on presidential power when they are in the opposition. Once they are in the White House, they do not think about those for a moment. There are all kinds of areas where we see this kind of switching, for example about whether you should be able to suspend the majority requirement to have 60 senators vote through a certain kind of appointment for you to the judiciary, but it again flicks back and forth depending on political parties. None of us would say, therefore, that the idea of limited government or the idea of checks and balances is unimportant. We recognize that precisely the temptation people have to use all the power they have when they are in government is one of the reasons why we need that value all the more importantly.

    I do think that it also poses a kind of deeper cultural challenge, which is that if we are in a moment where our politics is so polarized that there are fewer and fewer principled defenders of free speech. If, as a matter of practice, the majority of people who make these free speech arguments are just making them in instrumental ways to serve their own cause, how helpful is that free speech talk in our politics, even if we continue to be committed to the First Amendment and to the underlying importance of those values?

    Rauch: Can I break the order and challenge the premise? I think I heard you say something that requires pushback, which is that there is some sense of equivalence between Biden-era free speech hypocrisy and Trump-era free speech hypocrisy. Whatever the Biden administration did by way of jawboning Twitter and other social media is ant-size, microscopic compared with what the Trump administration is doing—seizing people off the street because they wrote op-ed pieces, weaponizing the FCC, threatening to pull licenses if Disney does not take Kimmel off the air. I could go on. This is a different kind of thing. This is not just turnabout hypocrisy.

    Mchangama: Yeah, I agree that the Trump administration has definitely taken assaults on the First Amendment to the next level. On his very first day in office, he signed this executive order on restoring free speech, which has not been honored. I would say that in the Biden years, the vibes coming out of the Biden administration, also on the cultural aspects of free speech, were very much in tune with the 2020 vibe, when people could get canceled for speech. When I heard Democrats talking about regulating the internet, it seemed like they were very envious of developments in Europe and saw the First Amendment as an impediment.

    To a certain extent, they respected it. Whatever they did, they did behind the scenes, not in the obvious ways that the Trump administration has done. I think, though, it is important to note that not that long ago, Attorney General Pam Bondi went out and said, hate speech is no longer free speech, which is not in line with First Amendment practice and is something that people on the left in the United States have long said—the First Amendment should not protect hate speech.

    There was actually quite a bit of pushback from conservatives, even MAGA conservatives, who said, we do not want to go down this road. So it was not like the entire conservative movement was on board with suddenly introducing hate speech restrictions, and she had to walk it back. She did not do it very elegantly. That seemed to me like there were parts of even hardcore MAGA conservatives who said this is a red line that we do not want to cross, and I think that is important.

    Mounk: I love it when we have an actual disagreement on The Good Fight Club, and I sense that there is a genuine disagreement here. So, Renée, if the argument is that yes, what the Trump administration is doing on free speech now is terrible, and I agree with you, Jonathan, that it is worse than what the Biden administration did, but if people then say, look, under Biden, the government did exert considerable pressure, as we now know from admissions from executives at Google and other social media platforms, to take off certain content about COVID from the internet, for example, we know that for a while the entire account of the New York Post was blocked on Twitter because of stories about Hunter Biden’s laptop, which turned out, according to The New York Times and other outlets, to be truthful.

    There was certainly a very broad cultural defense of the idea that people should be canceled for various things they say and that we should have this kind of consequence culture. There were progressives who were on record as saying that the idea of free speech is a conservative ideal and not one that progressives should embrace. Is that part of the prehistory that explains this moment, and should we be concerned about some of the things that happened during the Biden administration, or do you agree with Jonathan on this?

    DiResta: I’m very glad you brought that up. Who was president when the New York Post’s account was locked?

    Mounk: Sure, that was still under Donald Trump during the 2020 campaign.

    DiResta: This is one of the amnesia moments that I think it is actually important to call out. The president of the United States in 2020 was Donald Trump. Many of the content moderation policies that people object to today—and that, ironically, Ted Cruz wrote an entire report about two days ago calling the Biden censorship regime—he alleged that the Biden censorship regime began in 2018. Who ran the government in 2018? Can anybody answer that question? We all know.

    Yet here we are, re-litigating how long the New York Post‘s account was blocked on Twitter. I said to Bari Weiss on that day in a public exchange—since we’re friendly—that it was a very bad call. How long was that account blocked? Approximately 48 hours. What happened when it was blocked on Twitter, when that URL was banned on Twitter? It was shareable on Facebook. It was shared 500,000 times on Facebook.

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    Two of the most notorious stories that the right harps on—and I say this as an independent—that the right harps on as the pinnacles of egregious content moderation tyranny, one happened during the Trump administration. It was blocked for 24 to 48 hours, and it was a bad call, but it was not what people have turned it into.

    Now let us talk about COVID. The COVID lab leak theory, which is the other example that everybody points to, was blocked by one platform for three months, not at the behest of Biden; it was at the behest of the World Health Organization. Meta lays this out in its policies—that from February 2021 to May 2021, it blocked it for three months at the behest of the World Health Organization. By the way, I said that too was a bad call. I thought that was a bad call because I did not think it was in line with any of the other COVID policies that ostensibly were trying to protect people’s health or protect community health. Whatever you think about them, that was the dominant motivation behind the content moderation policies that the platforms put in place.

    In the letter that Google sent to Jim Jordan this week—for those who do not know, Jim Jordan received a letter under subpoena; this is a letter from a company under subpoena that has been investigated for the last two years. I know this because I was investigated for the last two years. Under subpoena, he secured this letter from Google that says, the Biden administration requested us to moderate. We stuck with our policies. We did not change them. We refused the pressure. One of the things that Jim Jordan says is, but I secured a commitment from them that they are not going to fact-check. The irony of that letter was several layers deep.

    The other thing that Jim Jordan had was two years of interview transcripts from about 20 interviews that he conducted with YouTube executives, which he dropped in a 12,000-page document dump about a week before Christmas in December 2024. If you go through those, every single executive says, we did not feel pressure, we did not feel coerced.

    What Jon is saying is 100% correct. Every administration—and I went and I sat in oral arguments at the Supreme Court hearing for Murthy v. Missouri—and Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Kagan are sitting up there on the dais saying, when we worked in the White House, we applied pressure to the media too. There is a difference between pressure and coercion. What you are seeing here is something that is very different. People really need to understand that the facts of the case and what happened in this so-called Biden censorship regime are absolutely not on par in any way with what has happened since.

    Mounk: Jacob, what do you think? Renée’s argument is that a lot of the “censorship regime” actually started while Trump was in office and therefore was not directed by the federal government, and that some of the most famous instances of censorship were short-lived or were partial—only on some social media platforms. Do you think, therefore, that more moderate political parties, whether that is the Democrats in the United States or some of the governments and government entities in Europe, do not have a problematic relationship to free speech—that the threat only comes from the populist right—or do you think that there is a genuine problem with the attitude toward free speech in the political mainstream?

    Mchangama: No, even if it was short-lived, it is still an egregious example. That is one example, and those are the most prominent examples that are being brought to light. But what are the others that have not been brought to light? So I would not downplay it. Again, I think it is quite clear that the current administration is on a multi-pronged attack on free speech.

    It is not related solely to social media. I would say that what the Trump administration is doing quite cleverly is going after elite institutions—traditional media, universities, law firms—all of those that were seen as being complicit in the cultural repression of free speech that went along with the 2020 vibe. That resonates with people who felt that their voice was limited, not necessarily by the government, but by elite institutions.

    That is why, when Jane Fonda launches a First Amendment initiative to defend it, and you have a lot of Hollywood stars signing on to it, I think that feeds into the culture war narratives where people will say, yes, now you are interested because Hollywood stars and prominent journalists are on the receiving end, but you did not care when it was the ordinary social media user. That is the problem of polarization because you want both elite institutions and the ordinary user to be able to exercise free speech.

    When you have that dichotomy—where it is the masses versus the elite narrative surrounding it—you pit two constituencies against each other, and that just feeds the underlying culture war.

    Rauch: Jacob, could I see if I can locate whether or not you are disagreeing with Renée and me? I have been in the free speech business since Kindly Inquisitors in 1993. That book was about non-governmental repression of speech and thought at universities, but also elsewhere. I think that you and I, and probably all of us, agree that free speech is not just about law and government; it is also about culture. You need to have cultural institutions that follow principles of free speech, especially universities for whom the pursuit of inquiry and knowledge is fundamental.

    So I think we all agree that culture matters, but I am going to guess that we may also agree—but I will try you on this—that government repression of speech is more concerning than cultural repression of speech. I would argue it is an order of magnitude more concerning because the government can yank your license, investigate you, try you, or put you in jail.

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    That is where I bridle at an equivalence between what students are doing on campus by way of canceling other students who are right-wing versus what the FCC just did or what ICE did. I am going to insist that these are different kinds of things and that one is much more serious than the other.

    Mchangama: I just said that I thought the Trump administration is worse on free speech than the Biden administration. But when you are talking about culture, go back to John Stuart Mill. He talks about the tyranny of the majority. So I would say it depends on the context of a specific country whether cultural intolerance is worse than the government doing it.

    Rauch: We do disagree. I think the problem with Europe, which you have rightly identified with what is going on in Britain, is that it is government-mandated. They are arresting people, and I am always going to worry about that much more.

    Mchangama: If the government puts you in jail, that is definitely worse than being thrown off Facebook for a comment. I would agree with you on that. But again, I think that you have been a very prominent voice on cancel culture, and I think there is a danger if you say, well, we should not worry about that anymore because the Trump administration is doing that, so now we have to downplay what went before it. I think we need to be able to hold both things in our head and recognize that even if there is a hierarchy, this is worse. Getting thrown off Facebook is not the same as being jailed, but both matter.

    Rauch: We do have to walk and chew gum. But cancel culture is cancer and what the Trump administration is doing is a heart attack.

    Mounk: I want to go to the normative question. I think this is a really interesting attempt to understand what did and did not happen over the last five years, but I think there is also a question about what the ultimate settlement should be on things like social media. Obviously, there are many kinds of content on social media that are bad in all kinds of ways, whether they are straightforwardly hateful or spreading information that is false—lies about particular people that, in principle, might be libelous but are probably difficult to prosecute for all kinds of reasons.

    How should we think about the moderation of social media? How much power should social media companies have to censor political viewpoints they dislike on their platforms? For example, do we say these are private companies so they can do whatever they want, or do we think that some of the liberties and privileges they have—for example, by not being legally responsible for their content—should be subject to some form of viewpoint neutrality that is maintained on those platforms?

    What should the government be allowed to do? To what extent should the government be allowed to go to Twitter and Facebook and other social media platforms and say, we are really worried about misinformation about COVID or the election or whatever else, and therefore we want you to play ball in this or that way? At what point do we think that becomes a form of government interference in free speech?

    Let us take it out of the debate about what did or did not happen during the Biden administration. What actually is the principled position, from a set of people who are not hypocrites about free speech and who very much care about this value, for how we should regulate this space?

    DiResta: I have looked at the regulatory conversation for a little over a decade now and watched many arguments come up about CDA 230. Many of them came from the right, arguing that CDA 230 should be contingent upon must-carry, that platforms must not be able to take down certain types of content.

    These laws have largely been found to be unconstitutional because the fact is, this is a platform with editorial and curatorial rights, and under the First Amendment law in the United States, the platform has the right to decide, as a private company and as a private entity, what it will or will not carry. That is simply the law.

    Mounk: Can I ask you a question about that? My understanding is that The New York Times, The Boston Globe, and The Washington Post have a right to publish whatever they want, but they also have forms of liability and responsibility for what they publish. What normally comes hand in hand with having some form of editorial oversight over your product is the fact that you are then responsible for what it is you publish.

    You know much more about this than I do, so I may be getting details wrong—but my understanding is that Section 230 says you are now free from those obligations. If somebody on your platform says something libelous, you, as the provider of this platform, are not legally responsible for it.

    So I think, from my understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence, it would be perfectly acceptable for the federal government to say that if you want to keep Section 230 protection against being liable for the contents that you publish on your platform, then you have to be a platform rather than a publisher. The moment you start censoring some things but not other things, you are more similar to The Boston Globe, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. Like those publications, you should then be liable for what people say on your platform. You get into the business of being a publisher, we treat you like a publisher.

    It is not obvious to me that that goes against either the letter or the spirit of the First Amendment, because it would be a way to make sure that those platforms—which have tremendous public reach, where much of our political conversation now happens, aren’t politically tendentious in different ways, first in favor of progressives and now in favor of the MAGA crowd.

    DiResta: I think that what you are saying is a couple of things. First, platforms are intermediaries, which means they are carrying the speech of other people; they are not writing it themselves. There are some very interesting court cases that are starting to emerge about generative AI and the speech that comes out of AI, because that is much more clearly the speech of the company that has produced the AI. That is where some interesting First Amendment jurisprudence is being formed right now—whether those things are going to have First Amendment protection or whether they will be treated as products under product liability terms. There are a lot of interesting things happening there.

    But social media platforms are curating and amplifying content created by users. One thing that is very difficult is the question of how you ascertain whether they have censored or taken a non-neutral stance toward a particular viewpoint. This is one of the reasons I was a big supporter of the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, which was a piece of legislation that had fairly bipartisan support. It argued that there should be disclosure mandates made to platforms, requiring them to release certain types of transparency information, and that there should be data access provisions whereby researchers and others could request certain types of data. That would allow investigations into whether there were certain kinds of curation, moderation, or recommendation decisions that privileged one point of view over another.

    I remember making this appeal to people like Senator Blackburn, saying that rather than going on the vibes of conservative censorship, if you would actually like to know, you should create a regulatory requirement for platform transparency. Ironically, this is what the Digital Services Act does. Many of the things that people in the United States want the government to regulate into existence—regulating the speech of centralized social media platforms—are what the DSA does. Ironically, you have Jim Jordan taking forays over to Europe to complain about the DSA as a censorship law. So nobody is actually content with any of the things that come out of the regulatory regime because, as I mentioned in the talk I gave here yesterday about reframing, everybody sees an opportunity to create an advantage for their side.

    That is where I see the greatest hypocrisy—the flipping back and forth between the right and the left on what a centralized platform should do. My personal hope is that you actually have a proliferation of social platforms such that concentration is solved to some extent by market forces, which would dissolve the power of the concentrated platform by creating an environment where there are many more speech platforms. That is why I support interoperability laws and things that allow users to take their data and move to other places. I recognize that, too, is something that people do not find popular because they consider it to be an interference in the market, but this is where we are.

    Mounk: So the Digital Services Act is the major attempt by the European Union to impose regulation on this space. I am sure you have certain things you like and certain things you do not like. I am sure you would write it slightly differently, but on the whole, do you think it is a good thing—yes or no?

    DiResta: I never want to be in the position of defending European regulation. I will say I think it is unfairly maligned in American media because of the lack of nuance. The transparency provisions that it grants are highly useful. It also gives users a right to appeal when they are taken down, which is something they do not have under U.S. law. It gives them a right to demand an explanation for why they are taken down. There are a lot of user protections built into the DSA that are fantastic.

    The parts that many people do not like about it are that it uses vague terminology around things like systemic risk, and it has requirements stating that speech that is illegal in the European Union can be subject to government takedown demands. There is a mechanism called “notice and takedown,” where the government issues a notice and the platform then carries out the takedown. These things, again, per my interest in transparency, should be made public. I actually support FIRE and others who have proposed legislation saying that should be done in the United States too, and I agree with that. The combination of transparency and access is critically important.

    Mounk: Jacob, I’m guessing you disagree.

    Mchangama: I think overall the DSA is actually a problem. Especially if you look at the current context of Europe, the typical defense of the DSA is that it does not regulate any content, it does not provide specific categories of content that should be removed. It is just that what is illegal offline should be illegal online. But the underlying reality of Europe, including the European Commission, is that it is regulating more and more speech.

    With a notice-and-takedown system for illegal content, you provide this provision that when you get notified, you have to remove illegal content, and then you consistently expand the categories of illegal content. That becomes, to be a bit polemical, a censorship machine. Take, for instance, right now, the European Union—both the European Commission and the European Parliament—are pushing through a proposal to create a harmonized hate speech law, to make hate speech an EU crime. The idea is that hate speech should not be limited to any specific protected category; every viable identity should be protected, and it should be understood through an intersectional lens.

    You can imagine how that might be interpreted. The DSA would mean that anything interpreted as illegal should be removed. Or take an example from Denmark, which has a recent law about desecrating sacred texts. That is now punishable. The Turkish ambassador just went out and thanked Denmark for its very wise law. That is illegal content that could be demanded to be removed under the Digital Services Act.

    When you look at the speeches of European commissioners, they talk about free speech, but it is always followed by “but.” The consistent narrative is that disinformation and foreign information manipulation—a very Orwellian term—is undermining democracy. It is a constant move toward framing free speech as dangerous and emphasizing the need for top-down control. You cannot view the DSA in isolation from those dynamics. I think the net effect of the DSA is that it limits free speech much more than it supports it.

    Rauch: Are you saying that the real problem, or the big problem, in Europe is not the Digital Services Act but the hate speech codes?

    Mchangama: No, if you create a notice-and-takedown system where you say, we want to ensure that there is no illegal content online, and then you keep ramping up the underlying categories of illegal speech, you are basically outsourcing online censorship to private companies in ways that create huge incentives for over-removal. We have done reports at the Future of Free Speech where we looked at the legally deleted comments on Facebook and YouTube in Sweden, Germany, and France. What we found was that between 88% and 97% of the comments that were deleted were perfectly lawful. Half of those lawfully deleted comments were not even particularly controversial.

    There is a tendency, especially among policymakers, to look at particular content and then say that social media is drowning in illegal content or drowning in misinformation. But the data does not support that. A good example was prior to the European parliamentary elections, when Věra Jourová, a European commissioner, said that disinformation and AI-generated content were like an atomic bomb. What happened? There was no significant impact on the parliamentary elections. It had been the same narrative in 2019, when the European commissioner also said that the European elections risked being drowned in disinformation. The autopsy afterward showed there was no problem.

    When you have that narrative and a political reality in which European politicians are moving to ban more and more speech, the DSA must be seen in that context. It becomes a tool to limit more and more speech. I just cannot see how it can function in any other way.

    Mounk: Jonathan, take us back to the broader principles here. You have written about the dangers of a kindly inquisitor. You have talked about what it takes to have a constitution of knowledge—a set of social institutions and norms that actually allow us to pursue truth in meaningful ways. What does that mean in the age of social media? How do we balance, on the one hand, the fact that social media can be a fire hose of falsehoods—it is one of the forces that clearly is deeply polarizing our society—and, on the other hand, the fact that precisely for the reasons beautifully expressed in your work, we should be very worried about governments having influence and say over what can be said on social media? Because sometimes we may have enlightened governments that are on the side of the good and the true, but often, as in the United States at the moment, we do not.

    How are you thinking, on the whole, about the principles that should guide us as we try to figure out these difficult questions of social media regulation?

    Rauch: The core idea of The Constitution of Knowledge is that free speech is necessary but not sufficient if you want to live in a world that is knowledgeable, peaceful, and free. You also need a fairly elaborate structure of institutions, rules, and norms that shape how we talk to each other in the search for truth and that allow us to build a global network of researchers, journalists, lawyers, government officials, and others who are looking for each other’s mistakes. This is a species-transforming technology. It is why humanity now produces more new knowledge every morning, literally, than it did in its first 200,000 years. Free speech is part of that.

    But you need two other elements. You need the discipline of fact—you cannot just make things up or talk your way through nonsense—and you need viewpoint diversity. You need enough different ideas in the room to create generative conflict and expose mistakes. Everyone says “social media,” but social media itself is not necessarily part of the constitution of knowledge. It is an entertainment product, an advertising vehicle. It is not Facebook’s job to advance the goals of research.

    Nonetheless, I would like to hope that digital platforms try to be good citizens of the constitution of knowledge and that they understand that when people look up important information—like whether the measles vaccine is safe—the answer they get back should be more likely to be true than false. I think that is good for society, and I also think it is good for the platforms. I do not think they are required to do that, but as a moral matter, I wish they would.

    Four years ago, when I wrote The Constitution of Knowledge, I thought content moderation was necessary. You cannot do without it. These are communities, and they have to set community standards. Since then, I have come to think that the public is just not going to accept anything that appears heavy-handed. Now I think we should be looking at the kinds of things Renée DiResta is talking about—middleware, which gives individuals more control over their algorithms, and transparency, which lets us see and evaluate what is going on.

    The government should be able to talk to these platforms—it talks to The New York Times all the time—but this should be formalized and logged. It should not be people at the White House calling up someone and yelling at them. So now I am focused on subsidiary elements that are not as heavy-handed as content moderation. Did I answer the question?

    Mounk: You did, I think, better than I expected anybody could.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Renee, Jacob, and Jonathan discuss how the Trump administration is attacking academic freedom, how universities should respond, and to what extent the political climate in the United States resembles Hungary. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    43 min
  • When the Russians Cut Off Mom's Water Supply
    A woman carries her dog following a drone strike on Mikolayiv, November 17, 2024. (Photo by Serhii Ovcharyshyn/NikVesti.com/Global Images Ukraine.)

    As a Ukrainian refugee based in the UK, I know one thing: people notice the absence of my British accent as soon as I greet them. A question inevitably follows. I both fear and expect it: “Where is home for you?” I answer shortly: “Ukraine.” I already know the questions that will follow after a bit of uncomfortable silence, signaling my conversation partner doesn’t know which route to take next.

    The most obvious is: “So, how are things there now?” It is also one of my least preferred ones; almost four years later, I’m still unsure of how to answer. My first instinct is to appease, smooth things over—as if to reassure the other, comfort them like I would a small child. “It’s alright,” I want to say, “it’s better now.” There are no monsters hiding under the bed.

    But this is not the truth. I cannot mold the uncomfortable reality of war into nonchalant small talk. The truth is—it’s not good. Hundreds of missiles and drones terrorize Ukraine daily, and their numbers are growing. My hometown Mykolaiv has been severely damaged. My family survived three close missile attacks. I’m fearing for the lives of my loved ones every day. They are not safe. No one in Ukraine truly is. But that’s a lot to say to a stranger, isn’t it?

    Russians occupied the neighboring city of Kherson in a matter of days in 2022. This meant two things: first, my hometown was in their missile range, so they could attack, cheaply and conveniently, every day. Second: Mykolaiv was next. Nobody knew what would happen—but the city prepared, gathering used tires and Molotov cocktails. Our two main bridges were wired to explode. When they landed by air, just ten minutes away from my family apartment, they received a quick pushback. A tank battle happened right in front of my brother’s apartment, on Mykolaiv’s central avenue. When I drove there a year later, the road was smooth and freshly-cemented, burnt tanks were cleared out, removed, along with the bodies of those who’ve given their lives to protect my city.

    But then, the war was right on my doorstep, breaking into my childhood haven, blowing up the safety locks. They were coming for my family, and they would come for me; that is, if I was there. But I was in Europe, having arrived four days prior to the full-scale invasion. Paralyzed by fear and guilt for not being there, I was watching the war ravaging my city, unfolding from my screen—from local news reports, messages from friends, and calls with my mother, who was right in the middle of it.

    My mother, one could say, was the unfortunate case. She lived in downtown Mykolaiv and was looking after her two immobile parents, living along the same street. In ordinary times, these two facts were unremarkable, but in March 2022, they made her the perfect target. Russians bombed the central area relentlessly, setting off explosions every few hours. She started sleeping in our small closet, as per official recommendations—between the two walls, leaving her shelter only to attend to her parents, moving in short runs from one to another. The woman who looked after them had escaped the city on the first day, meaning someone had to feed them, buy medications, administer treatments.

    Every day that I called her, I could hear the life withering from her voice, slowly slipping away. “I’m fine,” she repeated in a quiet, robotic voice, “I’m fine.” And I was there, on the other end of the line, utterly helpless, lost, mute. It’s a special kind of torture—being unable to help those you love.

    One March afternoon, I heard from my childhood friend: “Your mom can stay with us, if she needs to.” No one sends those kinds of messages out of the blue. Something had happened. In the next minute, I find the photo of my apartment block on the news. I’d get used to it over the next few years, but the first time hit the hardest. Hysterical, I called her; she did not pick up. She called back a minute later, the longest minute in my life. When the missile hit, she was in a supermarket. The damage was manageable—a few windows and a total mess inside, caused by the blast wave. Our apartment remained whole.

    Even after the missile attack, she refused to evacuate. But water—water was the final straw. Two weeks later, the Russians hit the pipeline bringing water to Mykolaiv from the Dnipro river—hardly an accident. Nothing was running from the taps. Panic ensued: people looking for long-abandoned wells, emptying supermarket shelves, queuing for the emergency water stations. Volunteers from other cities rushed into Mykolaiv with trucks, giving packs of bottles away to hundreds of stretched-out hands. My mother was one of them.

    “You don’t even feel like you’re human,” she’d tell me on the phone. “So humiliating.” Every other day, she’d stand in a line to the water station with three five-litre bottles, the most she could carry, to fill them up and drag them back to each of the three apartments she was responsible for. Admiring her resilience, I wondered: how long could she last? That’s not exactly how I imagined my middle-aged mom spending her retirement. I had to ask her the hard question: “How much worse should it get for you to get out of there?” The next week, she and my grandparents evacuated to a village in the Ukrainian west.

    For the next eight months, daily attacks on Mykolaiv continued. Every morning, I was waking up to yet new pictures of the fresh destruction in the city, trying to recognize places I used to see every day. And every day, I saw just the debris, the distorted fragments of my past, unable to collect them into a single image. A missile hit the school I attended for 11 years. My parents’ university, the place where they first met. The city administration building and the luscious green square surrounding it, my to-go summer spot.

    I envisioned a middle-aged Russian general with a pen in hand and a printed list, sipping on a cup of coffee, crossing out the names of the places I loved. Erasing them from the map of Mykolaiv, making it impossible to live in. Spaces to study and fall in love in, grow and dream—smashed to pieces, sentenced to no future.

    Until one day, the attacks subsided. It was November 11, 2022, Kherson Liberation Day. The Ukrainian army had pushed the Russians back, and their missile range could no longer reach my hometown. By then, they had destroyed a total of 10,000 civilian facilities in the Mykolaiv region.

    Since then, slowly, Mykolaiv has recovered. My family has returned. The city filled with people moving from Kharkiv and Kherson, away from the frontlines. The city administration replaced our windows, repaired our roof, cleared out the debris. Renovation plans were made for hospitals and universities. My school was rebuilt and opened its doors for new students this September, for the first time since 2021. And finally, after three years, a new water station has been built in Mykolaiv, delivering fresh water to the pipes.

    Mykolaiv hasn’t fallen because its people persist. These are not soldiers prevailing on battlefields, not wartime heroes awarded with medals “For Courage.” But day by day, they are doing what they’re supposed to. Dentists and teachers, doctors and policemen. They wake up in the morning, and they get to work. And that is how they are doing justice to their city. By not giving up on it. By keeping on.

    But it is not a story with a magical resolution. The monsters are still under the bed, lurking. There’s an ever-present danger of Russian troops advancing again. Mykolaiv remains vulnerable, drones crossing our skies every night. People who were killed won’t come back. Buildings won’t recover with a wave of a wand.

    With war, there’s no happily ever after—only blood, toil, tears, and sweat. But, most importantly, there is hope.

    Anastasia Lebedenko is a Ukrainian non-fiction writer. Her political and cultural writing in the form of first-person POV and personal essays explores her experience of living through a 21st-century war. She looks to bring Ukrainian voices to Western publishing and journalism.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Why Argentina’s Economy is Floundering
    (Photo by Luis Robayo/AFP via Getty Images.)

    When Javier Milei took over as president of Argentina in 2023, there was no shortage of pundits speculating about which of his many flaws would doom his presidency. My guess was that his general pugnaciousness would leave him squabbling with opponents in congress permanently and unable to govern. Many others thought his rigid, doctrinaire libertarianism would push him to adopt unworkable policies, or that protests from trade unions would leave Argentina ungovernable.

    Everyone got it wrong. Milei’s first year in office confounded critics: the guy proved more competent and politically astute than the doubters guessed, achieving more in the way of structural reform than most had thought possible. Sclerotic markets were liberalized across the board and fiscal discipline maintained, leading to an immediate fall in inflation. Even as spending cuts took a toll on Argentinians’ household finances, the eccentric new president remained remarkably popular. He fought with congress plenty, but he also managed to cobble together deals to get legislative approval for key reforms, privatizing state-owned enterprises, eliminating red tape, and overturning rent controls. Argentina, so long a byword for economic chaos, seemed to be on the mend.

    It couldn’t last. Last month saw the country return to form, with a stock market freakout coming on the heels of an exchange rate crisis, and the president out pleading for support abroad. In some ways, it was the same old, same old Argentina. What’s bizarre, though, is that Milei seems to have gotten himself into this bind not via an excess of libertarianism, but by a dearth of it.

    Milei had been elected on a wild, utopian promise to abolish the Argentine peso altogether. The chronically disaster-prone currency had proven Argentina’s undoing time and time again, and adopting the U.S. dollar seemed like a radical solution to the chronic devaluation problem. But once in power, Milei quickly realized that ditching the peso would not be so simple: finding enough dollars to swap out everyone’s peso holdings was beyond the government’s capabilities, so Milei started talking about dollarization the way old Soviet apparatchiks would talk about the withering away of the state and the arrival of communism: as a notional but far-off goal that might perhaps be enjoyed by some distant future generation.

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    For the here and now, Milei’s priority became just to ensure the peso would not blow up again, sending his whole agenda off track. But bucking up confidence in the peso has been a losing game for the last eight decades: investors have had ample opportunity to learn that, in Argentina, even sincere vows to reform the economy typically end up in tears.

    Back when he was a TV pundit in the 2010s, Milei made a habit of explaining why messing with capital markets was generally a losing game. But a funny thing happened once he reached the Casa Rosada, where Argentinian presidents live. Unable to ditch the peso, Javier Milei found himself forced to defend it: pledging scarce dollar reserves to ensure it didn’t lose too much value too quickly.

    The “exchange rate band” Milei adopted amounted to a government promise to prop up the peso’s value should it ever wobble beyond pre-established parameters. It’s a hazardous promise to make. If something happens to give investors pause—if it looks like the government might run out of the dollars it uses to prop up the currency, for example—they’ll head for the exits, selling their pesos en masse and sending the value of the currency plunging.

    The dynamics here are unfamiliar to Americans, who’ve been spoiled by the unique privilege of issuing the world’s reserve currency, which exempts them from this kind of problem. Argentinians, though, have been trained by many turns on this merry-go-round to know exactly what to do when the peso starts to wobble: rush to dump it.

    Javier Milei, of all people, ought to have known better than to gamble his government’s credibility on a currency promise he may not be able to keep. When his party lost provincial elections in Buenos Aires on September 7, investors got jittery and started dumping local stocks, then selling their pesos for dollars. The stock market plunged 13% in a couple of days, and the peso reached the limits of the exchange rate band Milei had vowed to defend.

    Argentinians, who’d seen it all before, braced for impact.

    Impact didn’t quite come, because in the Nth impossible twist in an impossible saga, Milei ended up requesting emergency support from his biggest ally: Donald Trump. This Thursday, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent promised to backstop the peso with U.S. taxpayer dollars. In the end, the Argentinian president who’d vowed never to seek a bailout ended up getting bailed out by the American president who’d vowed to stop bailing out his deadbeat allies.

    Where does this leave Javier Milei’s reform program? Badly battered. Increasingly perceived as a Libertarian in Name Only, Milei’s put himself in precisely the kind of position he’d spent his career denouncing previous presidents for getting into. Dependent on foreign largesse to defend an artificially inflated value for the peso, Milei’s reputation for economic competence is seriously bruised. And while Washington has been happy to break character and support a foreign ally in this one case, Milei now depends on the continued goodwill of a notoriously fickle ally for economic stability.

    It’s easy to imagine how pundit Milei would have reacted a few years back if faced with President Milei’s bumbling. Market forces, he would have said, are far too powerful to be stymied by administrative fiat. Dependence on unpredictable allies, he would have railed, makes a mockery of Argentinian sovereignty. Half measures, he’d have concluded, only invite further speculative attacks.

    In all this, pundit Milei would’ve been right. President Milei, alas, stopped listening.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Episode 172: Phillip and William Taubman on McNamara at War

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    This week, Richard Aldous talks to Phillip Taubman and William Taubman, authors of the new book, McNamara at War: A New History (Norton).

    Bookstack is a production of American Purpose at Persuasion.

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

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    28 min
  • Quentin Skinner on Liberty

    Quentin Skinner is the Emeritus Professor of the Humanities and Co-director of The Centre for the Study of the History of Political Thought at Queen Mary University of London. His latest book is Liberty as Independence: The Making and Unmaking of a Political Ideal.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Quentin Skinner discuss the “republican” conception of liberty, whether it can found a real political alternative to the status quo, and what that tells us about the liberal tradition.

    This transcript has been edited and lightly condensed for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Thank you very much. It’s a particular honor to me, both because I admire your work and because, when I was an undergraduate studying history in Cambridge, you were the Regius Professor of History at Cambridge. I’ve been familiar with your work for a very long time and attended your lectures and so on. So it’s very interesting to be able to have this conversation.

    You have a new book which picks up on one of the central themes in your work, and really is, I think, the magisterial statement of it—which is that there is a neglected tradition of how to think about liberty that you think could really help us make sense of a political world, but that has gotten somewhat lost over the course not just of the last years or decades, but of the last centuries.

    Perhaps we can start with: what is the dominant conception of liberty which takes over, particularly over the course of the 18th century?

    Quentin Skinner: Yes. Well, that does seem to me an excellent place to start. I think that, from the period that you’re talking about—and I would even date it rather specifically from the end of the 18th century—there is a kind of change around from what had been a hegemonic ideology in thinking about liberty to a different one. Now, the different one, which I think is still dominant, did not emerge at that time, but it emerged as dominant at that time. That is the view that, when we talk about personal freedom, or indeed civil or political liberty, what we are talking about is absence of constraint.

    That’s why, in the traditions that we’ve inherited, people are always very anxious to talk about negative liberty. The presence of liberty is marked by an absence. You are free if you are not restrained or not prevented from acting according to your will.

    Now, it’s not quite as simple as that, because that tradition has always been divided into two. Most have thought that this restraint can either be physical—that’s to say, someone stops you from doing something, prevents you from acting according to your will—or it can take the form of coercion of the will, when you threaten someone with bad consequences.

    Mounk: So perhaps because I think the physical element of this now seems very radical to us and quite unaccustomed—it’s the position held, for example, by Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan, who says: if there are laws against being able to criticize the king, you are free to criticize him until the moment somebody comes and physically restrains you.

    Explain a little bit what that view is and how it contrasts with a view that then becomes more influential—where threats also count as a threat to liberty.

    Skinner: That is the other strand of this first view. The classic statement of it, as you rightly say, is Thomas Hobbes. Of course, he’s writing Leviathan in 1651, which is why I was careful to say that this doesn’t emerge in the late 18th century. It’s always been there. Hobbes takes the view—an ingenious one—that the effect of coercion is not to frustrate your will, but rather to change it. That is to say, coercive threats have the effect of motivating you to act in a different way. Hobbes says that’s an expression of your will—it’s not a denial of your will. That does not take away your freedom. He says, in a typical moment of humor, that when a man throws his goods into the sea for fear that his ship should sink, he not only does it willingly—he does it very willingly. So that is the action of a man who was free. There’s no coercion. The only thing that takes away freedom of action, as you say in your very interesting point there, is someone actually coming along and shutting your mouth or stopping you from doing something.

    But that, of course, is not the usual view. The usual view is the one that I think we associate in the Anglophone tradition with the rise of utilitarianism—Bentham, John Stuart Mill—and which was continued in the high liberal tradition in the United States as well as in this country right up to the present generation. In this country, the famous work of Isaiah Berlin on theories of freedom, and of course John Rawls’s great masterpiece of 1971 on the idea of justice and the place of liberty in that theory of justice, is that liberty is absence of constraint.

    Mounk: There’s something intuitive about this—at least to us—perhaps in part because we’re the inheritors of this tradition, right? The idea here is sometimes called, in a more analytical philosophical context, freedom as non-interference. The notion is: I am free to the extent that nobody is interfering with my actions. In this strand of the tradition, that doesn’t mean someone is already physically restraining me. It can mean a law that is restraining me. It can be the threat of punishment that is restraining me. But what it really signifies is: I am free insofar as I can do what I’m able to do without some human agent coming along and saying, no, I’m going to bar your entry into this building, or, I’m going to throw you in jail if you do this.

    There is something straightforward and intuitive about it. Tell us about how that conception came to be, why at one point there was another way of thinking about liberty, and why you worry about its dominance in our political discourse today.

    Skinner: Well, thank you, yes. That would lead me to begin to talk about the rival tradition, which has come to be called—unfortunately, I think, and we could talk about that if you like—the republican view of liberty. It comes from a classical era in which it was a republican view, but it was embraced by many people who would have been horrified to be called republicans.

    Mounk: Just to be clear here about why you’re concerned about this: obviously, in the American context, “republican” might mean the Republican political party. But you also mean that there could be people who believe it is appropriate to have a constitutional monarch—like in the United Kingdom—and nevertheless embrace this view. So “republican” isn’t just a troubling term to you because of its contemporary political resonance in the United States, but also because it gets bound up with this rather different debate about whether you can have a constitutional monarch and still be free.

    Skinner: That’s why I want to avoid it altogether. I don’t want to talk about republican liberty. Some distinguished work has been done under that heading, especially by Philip Pettit and his many followers. But for reasons that you’ve just articulated, we want to keep away from that, I think.

    So let me just say about this other tradition that most interests me: they do not wish to deny that if someone restrains or prevents you from acting at will, then for that moment or that time, you lose your liberty of action. If you are put in jail, you have for the time being lost your liberty of action. However, here’s the crucial point. The writers I’m interested in do not think that that is what you need to focus on if you wish to understand the concept of civil or political liberty. Because they think there is a logically prior question to ask, and that is not, is anyone restraining you from acting, but could anyone restrain or prevent you from acting according to your autonomous will if they chose? That is to say, are you at the moment living in subjection to or dependence upon the will and the power of anyone else? Now, why is that instead held to be the question to ask about freedom and unfreedom? Here’s the point. If there’s any such arbitrary power over your life, then you never act freely. There’s no such thing as freedom of action.

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

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    We shouldn’t have started with that, because this takes over the whole field. It says: even if there’s no interference, nevertheless, if you’re subject to somebody else’s will, your actions never express your autonomous will. They express your will, but they also reflect the permission of those who have the power to intervene—and could intervene with impunity at any point if they should choose.

    So what it means to possess your liberty is to be a free person—as in the Roman tradition, in the Roman law, a liber homo, a free man or woman—and thus not to be subject to, and hence dependent on, the arbitrary will and power of anyone else. Then you can act according to your autonomous will, and that is what it means to be a free person.

    One thing to be added here is: these writers are not saying that if you are dependent on someone else, that inevitably means that you have forfeited your liberty. All of us, for example, are dependent on the goodwill of our friends. That doesn’t make us unfree. The unfreedom comes only if you are subject to an arbitrary power—the will of someone else which has power to control you. If you ask, well, what do they mean by arbitrary? This is just echoing arbitrium in the Roman law tradition and thus in Latin. It just means they can act according to their will. It’s uncontrolled. It’s unregulated. It’s outside the law. It’s just their will. The main point they want to make—and now they’ve articulated a fundamental distinction crucial to the ancient world—is: we’ve now shown you what it is to be a slave. Because a free person acts autonomously. To be a slave is to be someone who has a master.

    Mounk: There’s a lot of very interesting things in this, including this crucial distinction between being in some ways subject to the will of other people, but not being subject to the arbitrary will of other people. I want to return to that later.

    But first, perhaps you can just elucidate this a little bit by giving some concrete examples. This view acknowledges that interference generally will count as a diminishment of your liberty—that if somebody is interfering with what you want to do, then that is reducing your liberty. But it is saying, well, we also need to be worried about these forms of domination. We also need to be worried about these forms of arbitrary interference.

    Why do these two things come apart? Why is it that if nobody’s interfering with me, I may nevertheless be subject to this arbitrary will? What are some concrete examples of where that might be the case?

    Skinner: Their point is: it may never happen—the bad thing that takes away all of it. It could happen at any moment. The model for the Republicans in the English Republican tradition—which, of course, flourished in the brief period when Great Britain was a republic, that is to say, in the mid-17th century—they’re very keen on the point that you’ve just made. The answer that they would give to you, which I shall now give to you, is that the great example—James Harrington in The Oceana, or John Milton—is the Sultan.

    There is no law. The Sultan is the law. His will is the law. That may be fine, but as Harrington says, in a republic, your rights are clear because they’re enshrined in the law. Under the Sultan, you have no rights. Anything could happen to you, and that would still be within the bounds of what is allowed the Sultan, because he is the master. As Harrington memorably puts it, you are only the tenant—not just of your lands, which can be taken from you with impunity at any point—but of your head, which can also be taken from you with impunity at any point.

    That is called despotism. Despotism is very common. They see it all over Europe. They dread it under the Stuart regime. That is what you really have to fear: what could happen to you. It may not, but it could at any time.

    Mounk: I think two other ways of trying to make sense of this in my mind—you can tell me if I’m somehow mischaracterizing this in concrete terms today or within the relatively recent past—are:

    One, to cite somebody who you might put down as a liberal you’re concerned about. I think John Stuart Mill’s writing in The Subjection of Women really speaks to this. This was a time when he married his longtime friend and collaborator, Harriet Taylor. He acquired, by the act of marriage, a lot of rights over her and her property. In a very moving statement, he disavowed those rights because he believed that the only truly meaningful relationship is one of equals, in which he doesn’t have those kinds of rights over his wife. Of course, he also acknowledges that this is ultimately an empty legal act. He wishes it would have legal efficacy, but because of the background conditions, he still holds certain rights over his wife. Even if he never intends to exercise those rights, and even if he publicly pronounces that he will never exercise those rights, the legal framework of that time still makes it impossible for man and wife to be truly equal. The man holds in reserve these legal rights over his wife that, even by an act of will, he cannot abnegate.

    To give a very different kind of example: it always struck me that a lot of the power of the television show The Office, particularly in the rather less sweet—and therefore, I think, ultimately more compelling—British version, comes from an illustration of arbitrary power.

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    David Brent, the boss in that show, played by Ricky Gervais, is in some ways a well-meaning man. He’s somebody who at least claims to care a lot about his employees, who sometimes bends over backwards to do whatever they want rather than following company policy. He’s also somebody who holds arbitrary power over them and acts in unpredictable and inconsistent ways, which make him quite tyrannical to them—even when he isn’t aware of that himself, even when he doesn’t mean to act badly necessarily, even when he doesn’t always exercise that power. That, to me, always seemed like one kind of illustration of what it means to suffer the arbitrary will of another—even when they might not exercise it.

    Skinner: Absolutely. Let me take up both of those cases. Let’s take the second first, because the workplace is an important instance of how important it is that we should be thinking of liberty in relation to dependence and subjection rather than restraint. You don’t get restrained in the office, but there is someone who has power over you—and that includes, in the worst case, power to dismiss you simply at will. Marx correctly described this as wage slavery, and it’s a very important feature of Marx’s theory that he’s not a Marxist about liberty. He is a Republican about liberty. That is to say, he believes that the kind of dependency that you suffer if you are in a de-unionized or non-unionized workforce is slavery. He calls it wage slavery, and he’s taking us right back to the classical tradition there.

    On your first point, this is very important. John Stuart Mill changes his mind. In the Essay on Liberty of 1859, Mill articulates an absolutely classic statement of what we talked about much earlier when I was laying out the distinction between these two traditions. He wants to say that liberty is an absence of either physical or coercive restraint. That’s the definition of liberty that underlies the discussion. Now, in The Subjection of Women, he has, quite frankly, changed his mind. It’s very interesting that he does so exactly at the time when the question of the exclusion of women from certain very important legal rights held by men is actually under debate. Until the legislation of 1871, women were not able to make a will.

    There was one extraordinarily important point where they had no autonomous will—which was that they couldn’t make a will, they couldn’t dispose of their own property if they were married women. Of course, that is, as Mill says in his title, a case of subjection. These are not equal rights under the law. There is some power which does not apply to men, which does apply to women. The law should apply equally to everyone. So yes, Harriet Taylor, I think, is visibly present in that great text. The chapter picks up a long-standing 18th-century argument in early feminism, which comes out very early on in Mary Astell, in Reflections on Marriage of 1705, when she says that the difficulty about men seeing themselves under the law and women under the law is that women are not just under the law—they’re under the men. She says, we are slaves. That is her reflection on marriage. Women are enslaved to their husbands because they do not have anything except the goodwill to rely upon.

    Mounk: Another context in which that distinction then becomes relevant is in the importance that different traditions ascribe to political institutions—because that relates to whether or not the will to which one is subject is arbitrary. At least to the purest defenders of the earlier view, who makes the laws isn’t that important. What’s important is the nature of the laws. If restriction of your liberty is simply that you’re being interfered with, then who made the law that interferes with you is, to some extent, much less important than the extent to which it interferes with you.

    Perhaps the starkest and most interesting formulation of this comes from Thomas Hobbes, who says that the word libertas—liberty—is written in large letters on the turrets of the city of Lucca to this day. But this doesn’t imply that individual men there have more liberty, or more immunity from service to the Commonwealth, than men do in Constantinople—one of the images of unfreedom at the time. Whether a Commonwealth is monarchic or democratic, the freedom is still the same. Hobbes’s idea was: there are laws that you have to follow in many republics. Benjamin Constant made this point very powerfully in a speech in the 19th century: that actually, back in ancient Athens, where people were very involved in making laws in a way that we’re not today in modern democracies, nevertheless, the extent of the laws was very, very far-reaching. You couldn’t change or add a string to your lyre without offending the ethos, the census, in a way that would really radically restrict. So we should really focus on what the laws are.

    Whereas the Republican tradition would say: no, it matters whether we co-authored those laws collectively as citizens of a self-governing entity, or whether those laws were imposed on us without any input.

    Tell us a little bit about, when we scale up from private relations—as we’re talking about in the case of Mill—to the workplace, as in the slightly surprising analogy to The Office—to a political level, what would the difference between these traditions be in thinking about the importance of liberty?

    Skinner: That quotation from Hobbes is, in fact, exactly the passage to which Harrington so devastatingly replies when he says it’s completely ridiculous to say that the citizens of Lucca are not more free than the citizens of Constantinople. Because in Constantinople, the will of the Sultan is the law. There is no other law. It’s simply his arbitrary will. So you are subjected to his arbitrary will. That is the definition of a slave. Slavery is the antonym of liberty. So what the hell is Hobbes talking about?

    Hobbes is trying to get away from the fact that he perfectly well understands that, in a republican tradition, what is crucial is not how many laws are made—which is Hobbes’ point—but who makes the law. Because if the law is made in such a way that you have not consented to it, then it confronts you as an arbitrary power.

    We’re now talking about the entire ideological framework of the American Revolution, because this was exactly the analysis that the American colonists produced in the face of the British. It will be a very good illustration of the distinction that you want me to draw if I take that example.

    In 1763, when the British finally managed to end the Seven Years’ War, they had run the national debt up to some absolutely hair-raising level. The country was effectively bankrupt and had to raise a lot of new taxes. The decision that was made in 1764 was that they would directly tax the American colonies—which they had never done before. There had been tariffs, of course, between both countries, but there had never been direct taxation simply for the purpose of raising money from the mother country, as they liked to call themselves in Britain. The immediate response—I’m talking of 1764—from John Otis in the Massachusetts General Assembly is to cite this and say: we are being taxed without having any representation in the decision. There is nobody who is representing us in Parliament. So the law confronts us as a purely arbitrary power. The British are reducing the colonies to slavery.

    That is the language they begin to use. If you look at the very earliest of the major pamphleteers of the American Revolution, they all invoke it. Stephen Hopkins, governor of Rhode Island, in The Rights of Colonies, makes the point. But most of all, John Dickinson in his Letters from a Farmer—one of the great texts of the Revolution—says: taxation without representation is a wholly arbitrary power. Then in letter seven he says, I say it with indignation, and I say it with grief: you have made us slaves, because you have taxed us without our consent. You have taken away our property arbitrarily. That is how you behave towards slaves. You simply dominate them. You make them subject to your arbitrary power. You give them no right of appeal.

    When Adams and Jefferson really begin to heat up the rhetoric in the early 1770s, that’s the point they make. Jefferson says, again, these are mere acts of power. They reduce us systematically to the condition of slaves. That is the answer that animates the Revolution. What’s very important about this alternative way of thinking about rights is the claim that there can be no lawful form of government in which the law is passed other than by the consent of the people. That, I have to say, is a problem for this view of freedom, and it’s one that hasn’t, I think, perhaps been properly faced. Just to make sure I’m not just an advocate but someone who’s trying to think about this theory, I’d like to add that point.

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    First, we have to say: there must be a represented will. Nobody thinks that the entire population of the colonies can be shipped over to England in order to say whether they agree to taxation. So they will have to be represented by someone whom they trust. But that’s already not their will. That’s a represented will, and it embodies an element of trust.

    The further problem is—as we all know—democracies operate, even at their best, by majoritarianism. You are always, that is, liable to be in a minority. So there’s always going to be someone whose will has not been represented in the law, because they would have voted against that law if they had been properly represented. That would be their view. That is the dilemma this view is left with.

    Rousseau’s great aspiration was to solve the dilemma by distinguishing the will of all from the general will. Much hangs on whether you think we can make good sense of that distinction. I can’t myself make very good sense out of that alleged distinction or see what the volonté générale is. If there were such a thing and we could make sense of it, then that would solve the problem. Otherwise, the problem remains.

    But the claim of the American colonists remains: you have enslaved us. That is contrary to the law of nature. Slavery is contrary to the law of nature on all these accounts, because we are all born free. They love to cite Locke in this connection. All men are born free. They must voluntarily enter into a state. The state must be a reflection of their consent. Ultimately, they are judges of the state, and they can depose at will if there is tyranny or if there is despotism. So what happens if you think, well, there is tyranny and despotism? You declare your freedom. What would the act of declaration of freedom be? It would be a declaration of independence. That is the theory of freedom we are and must be talking about. It is the founding ideal of the American Republic—liberty as independence. And it is they who say so.

    Mounk: Right. You see that from the fact that the first famous document is the Declaration of Independence, with the famous slogan: no taxation without representation, and so on. I find the importance of that—historically, at that moment—as you describe it, very compelling in your new book.

    Skinner: Well, it’s important to me because it is a declaration of independence, and I’m trying to talk about the apogee, as it were, of that view of freedom—which very quickly then comes under tremendous fire.

    Mounk: I want to stay for a moment on this interesting side point about the problem being normative. I think that is a persistent problem just in our conception of democracy—not just in a particular conception of liberty, but in the way that we tend to think about democracy in general, right? If the justification for the laws to which I’m subject is in part that we don’t believe Hobbes, that we think it does make a difference whether I am part of a people that has signed off on the laws that constrain me through some form of legitimate democratic process, then there is a fundamental puzzle about why that should still bind me if I’m in the minority. If I didn’t vote for this law, why is it that nevertheless I should be bound by it?

    One response to that is the one that you ascribe to Rousseau, who certainly has formulated it in the most stark way, but that is actually still very present in the Federalist Papers and other founding documents of the United States, and in our conception of democracy more broadly. When you look at Federalist 10, for example, there’s a lot of talk about the idea that representatives aren’t just meant to carry the individual views of different citizens or different districts to Congress, but that they will refine and enlarge the public view by deliberating about what is truly in the public interest. That conception of a public interest is some perhaps softer version of something like the Volonté Générale.

    There is a real challenge in our democratic theory to this idea, particularly at a time when it doesn’t always feel like parliaments are particularly deliberative. It doesn’t always feel as though what truly goes on in the United States Congress today is hundreds of people earnestly deliberating about what is in the public good. That feels like a rather naive description of what actual day-to-day politics looks like. If we give up on that idea, then this dilemma returns with quite a lot of force. What do we make of that?

    Skinner: Well, I think it is a dilemma for democracies. I don’t think that, as I’ve been saying, there’s an easily attained solution to it. The alternative—the Hobbesian alternative—is one that I would want to rule out immediately, because it has to depend on an analysis of the nature of man. It’s very ingeniously presented by Hobbes, and the view is that we have to consider what life would be like without law. Of course, everyone in the contractarian tradition liked that thought experiment: what would it be like to live without law? Locke is famous for saying, well, we’re endowed by reason, and reason is the law of nature. We’d be able to intuit some fundamental laws of nature, which need to be laws of our state. There’s the optimistic picture of how we can at least get this going. Hobbes, of course, says no—the state of nature would be a state of war because of the nature of man being so competitive. What we have to do is to alienate our natural rights. That form of absolutism combats various forms of something near to republicanism or even democracy throughout the recent centuries of the Western tradition. Hobbes is the absolutist who says: there may be rights of nature, but in setting up a civil association, in setting up a state, those have to be given up into the hands of a sovereign power. That sovereign power must then operate them for the common good. The more you move in that direction, the more the form that will be taken by that state cannot be a democratic form. Hobbes, of course, eagerly embraces that. He’s not a royalist—he doesn’t defend the Stuarts—but he is a monarchist. He does think that the government must be unitary.

    All of that is a protest against the tradition that you and I have been talking about. I’m not pretending that it would be easy to implement a perfect form of the idea of 1776, but that is the project. It’s perfectly true that when it came to the ratification of the Constitution of the United States fifteen years later—when finally all the states did agree to ratify—the Constitution is a much less radical document than the Declaration. They had seen that there were going to be big difficulties about getting people in an enormous landmass, with different interests in different states, to come to some kind of agreement about what the laws shall be. It turns out to be a presidential system. That’s what you’ve left yourselves with. It’s more what the exponents of the view that we’ve been talking about would call presidential rather than republican. Republics don’t have presidents, except as ornaments. They don’t start a constitution—as the United States does—by asking, well, what are the executive powers? Executive powers in the radical version of this view are in the hands of the people.

    That brings up a further very big issue. We’re not solving these problems, but I’m just giving you a way of thinking about them. The people who are sent to represent me—are they there in order to give the more tutored views that I would not myself give, which is one vision in England and one vision in the United States as well? Or are they delegates? If you send someone to a conference in your name, then notice that they’ve got to act in your name. That is to say, they say what you would have said. That’s a very different way of thinking about representation. That would have to carry us into that very large debate: are these representatives delegates, or do they have their own autonomy?

    Mounk: Two thoughts here. One is that I think the problem you outline exists on either of the views about the nature of representation, I think. If what you’re really concerned about is not being dominated by an outside force, and if you recognize that any laws potentially are arbitrary if they don’t take your views and interests into account in the appropriate ways, then you sort of have a dilemma.

    If on one end you say you have delegates that are bound to carry your view to Westminster in London or to Washington, D.C.—in that case, if you’re in the numerical minority, it would feel like the law is coercing you. You don’t have any meaningful influence over it, since you’re in the minority. There’s something very problematic about this.

    Part of the solution to this is to say, well, instead of having a delegate, you have a representative, and they actually deliberate. What’s meaningful about the deliberation is that it’s not just the sum of the majority view that is then imposed on you. It’s that they actually do track something like the true public interest or the public good.

    But if we then don’t feel that either such a public good exists, or that empirically it’s very unrealistic to think that the House of Parliament today or the House of Congress today actually are doing anything like tracking that kind of public good, then again, from the perspective of this conception of liberty, you should be very troubled about where we are—shouldn’t you? Am I getting something wrong?

    Skinner: They never, in the tradition I’m talking about, take the view that delegacy can possibly be the answer. They don’t fully face the difficulty which that leaves them with, which is that if it’s not delegacy, then it’s majoritarianism, and then the minority will feel that the law is not a reflection of their will. The answer that would have to be given to that is that although it may only be a majority, a majority is as good as we can do, and the question is whether that majority has acted arbitrarily—whether it is now acting in such a way that some fundamental rights are being overturned.

    Of course, the war was fought from 1775 in the colonies—on the grounds that what had happened in Great Britain was not an expression of the Constitution. It was an expression of arbitrary power. Everybody in the tradition I’m talking about agrees that if a power can be shown to be arbitrary—that is to say, that the people who are subject to that power have been enslaved—then there is a natural right to resist slavery. That’s what they see themselves as doing. That gives you the best that you can do. It’s very hard to see how there can be a better best than that when we’re talking about very large communities.

    As John Locke says at the end—and they love to quote this—you ask me, in the case of an arbitrarily imposed power, who shall be judge? He says, well, in that case, the people shall be judge. The people must rise up and remove that power.

    Ultimately, the doctrine solves its problems, to answer your question, by being potentially revolutionary. The people shall be judge. It goes back to the people, and they get rid of this and start again. Or they get rid of it entirely, as happened in 1776 or the 1780s after they defeat the British, and you say, okay, we’re out of here. We’re starting all over again with a completely different story, and we’re calling it the United States.

    Mounk: I want to suggest to you another possible solution to the underlying moral dilemma that we’re facing here, I think. That is what I would call the philosophically liberal answer to this, which I think would go something like this.

    The right concern is twofold. It is, first of all, that you want to be able to live your life freely and in a self-determined manner—live your life in such a way that people aren’t telling you what to do, aren’t impeding in particular with the things that are most central to a human life, like your own choice about what to say and not say, how to worship and whether to worship at all, and so on and so forth.

    Secondly, we then obviously need some political guarantees to make sure that we maintain that freedom over time. The problem with having a dictator who promises us those things is that even though we might have that for a minute or two, it might be gone next week or next month, and that’s not good enough. We recognize that some of the laws by which we will be bound are going to be made by shifting political majorities, and that it may sometimes be rather uncomfortable to be in one of those minorities. We can lessen the feeling of that—we can ensure that that doesn’t fundamentally impede our freedom—by writing a bill of rights, by saying there are a certain set of basic liberal freedoms that we are always guaranteed, irrespective of who is in the majority.

    Even if the majority wants to make laws prohibiting us from worshipping in a particular way, prohibiting us from criticizing the powerful in particular ways, prohibiting us from engaging in forms of artistic expression that may be offensive to the great majority of our neighbors, we will always retain those rights because they are enshrined in our fundamental political documents. We have enough democratic self-governance to assure its persistence. If that, to me, is a formulation of our mainstream political tradition—right? That seems to me like one way of talking about how people today would describe the American political system, and how they would describe our way of thinking about freedom. What is it that’s missing? Why is it that we need to recover the conception of freedom that you talk about with such clarity and eloquence in your book and in your work in order to make those points? Why is it that that’s not enough?

    Skinner: The liberal view of liberty is ultimately uninterested in forms of government. As you say, it asks that there should be an individuation, and that people should be able to pursue their goals as they wish. It can move to a minimalist and anarchistic form, as it does in mid-19th-century America: he governs best who governs least. That says, look, we’re not so interested in who is making the laws—we just don’t want there to be very many laws. We want to be absolutely left alone. It moves in a kind of anarchistic direction, which was revived by people like Robert Nozick in response to Rawls’s form of liberalism. One danger with it is that it is actually dangerous to public order and is potentially anti-democratic.

    The response that is given ex ante by the tradition that I’m interested in is—well, there are two responses, and they are interestingly different—but they come down to the idea that at the absolute basis of your society, there must be some rights that are absolute and are not subject to majoritarian discussion at all, and they’ve been put beyond the reach of any legislation to change them. That is crucial in the British case with the Bill of Rights. The British like to think they don’t have a constitution, but there is a Bill of Rights in 1689, which reiterates a view of what I was interested in your calling fundamental rights. The modern terminology would be to talk about human rights or natural rights. It’s a very interesting—and, I think, important—question to ask: what view of rights do we want to go with our view about liberty?

    The view of rights that is enshrined in the declaration in the British Constitution—and they are still beyond the power of statute to change them—are what are held to be rights so fundamental, as the 1689 constitution says, that they cannot by any means be changed. They include habeas corpus—that is to say, the right not to be imprisoned without cause and trial—the right of self-defense, which even Hobbes allows, of course, and the right to hold property. These rights are held to be fundamental. They’re not natural rights. They are rights that are inherited liberties. They’ve stood the test of time. They’ve been shown to be essential to being a free state. This is as near to guaranteeing that you are a free state as can be given, in addition to the view that the freedom of people must be freedom from dependence.

    Against that, there stands a very different tradition, which we also know from the radical English story—of Milton, Sidney, Locke, Wollstonecraft—all through the 17th and 18th century. This is the idea of a human right: that there are God-given rights, which are universal moral demands that everyone can make upon everyone else. We make a lot of that nowadays. It’s a metaphysical idea. The alternative idea of fundamental rights has something to be said for it, although we don’t use that vocabulary anymore in trying to think about these intricacies about liberty in the state. I think that it would be well worth going back to this tradition to think about rights as well as to think about liberty. There’s something strange about having a metaphysics of rights in which, as in the United Nations Declaration, there are 29 human rights which are held to be self-evident. What’s happening here is that the idea of a right is ballooning into what it would be nice to have or what would make a nice society. To say that these are human rights doesn’t seem to me to say anything.

    The idea of a fundamental right is one where you can say, well, look, this has always worked in our society. It continues to work. People want it. We should therefore continue it. If we think of better ones, we’ll add them. But they are fundamental in the sense that they’ve stood the test of time. This sounds rather like Edmund Burke’s view of rights, but it is the traditional common law view in the English tradition. I think it deals with some of these questions that you’re asking about.

    Mounk: That’s a very interesting distinction, and I sort of stumbled upon the term fundamental rights without thinking about it in the moment. I think you’re right to point to the fact that there are important verbal distinctions between whether we talk about human rights, natural rights, and, of course, fundamental rights.

    Skinner: Yes. What I’m saying is that the distinction is between thinking of rights historically—fundamental rights, which are intrinsic to the history of the polity—so Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights in this country—by contrast with the metaphysical view of rights, which is that they’re universal moral demands that somehow everyone has an obligation to acknowledge.

    Now, amazingly, the claim is—in the United Nations Declaration—we can actually list them. Some of them would look very strange in other societies, which nevertheless feel that they are considering the rights of their people.

    Mounk: That speaks to a deeper concern that you have, and a lot of intellectual historians have, about trying to justify things that are quite historically contingent by claiming that they’re somehow derived from a very abstract reflection. Often, what happens is that you start with your society and try to defend some of the things that you believe—often rightly—to be valuable about it. You sort of pretend that they’re derived in some very complicated way from first principles, in order to then loop back to saying, and therefore things should be as they are right now. There’s something quite strange and concerning about that.

    I want to go back, just so that listeners keep track of what the political import of this is—of this ongoing conversation, of the competition between these two different views. As I take it to be—please correct me if I’m misrepresenting in some way—one of the concerns you have about the hegemonic view, the liberal view, the view of freedom as interference, is that it is insufficiently concerned with things like political liberty. It is insufficiently concerned with the different kinds of ways in which our ability to act freely in the world can be constrained by things like social arrangements within the family, by things like work relations within your company or place of work, and by things like the fact that you might live in a place—let us say, like Singapore—where you don’t have true political rights of participation, even though day to day you might be given quite a lot of liberty as non-interference.

    I want to push you on this one more time—less with some of the debate that has existed about how conceptually distinct they are, and there’s an interesting philosophical debate about that—than about whether the actual political traditions in which we live really are that different. Which is to say: is it actually true that most people who think about freedom today are completely unconcerned about the political arrangements under which we live? Is it true that they would say, if a president came in and wanted to concentrate power in his or her own hands, but would lead people to continue to worship as they want and do all kinds of things—would people not be concerned about that? Are people who are very much part of a liberal tradition—whether that is John Stuart Mill or John Rawls or Benjamin Constant—really as unconcerned about those kinds of ideas as is implied?

    If that’s not the case, then hasn’t the importance of ensuring the longevity of your enjoyment of freedom as non-interference—and the fact that, in order to have any security about your long-term enjoyment of these values, you obviously also have to make sure that somebody can’t just change their mind tomorrow—aren’t those ultimately different ways of speaking about the same thing, which would explain why these ideas are ultimately widely held today, even though people might formulate, philosophically, freedom as being focused on non-interference?

    To go one more point: one way that you distinguish those things is to say that if you believe in the importance of freedom as non-interference, you might end up with a very minimalist, libertarian view of government. You might simply see government as a threat to your freedom, because all that government might do is interfere. If you’re worried about interference, then that is necessarily bad. I would put to you that you could have a libertarian tradition that takes up your concept of freedom just as easily. In fact, many libertarians complain about the government precisely for reasons that come directly out of the political tradition you prefer—what we would call that freedom is non-domination, or, in some formulations, Republican liberty.

    What do libertarians say? They say, I want to be able to do with my property and my life as I want. I want to be able to decide whether to mow my lawn or not. What happens? There’s a housing association that makes incredibly minute rules about how I have to upkeep my home. The moment I break them in some really small way, they impose these arbitrary fines on me. What happens? I want to attach a new part to my home so that a family member can move in. But there are regulations that the local town council has passed, which make it impossible for me to do that. What happens? I want to open a restaurant that serves alcohol, but because there are ridiculous liquor licensing laws, I’m not able to go about that business and do those things. All of those are quite centrally concerned with the arbitrary decision-making powers of members of my housing association, of members of the city council, of all kinds of things. What they’re concerned about is precisely the exercise of arbitrary power in ways that make us unfree.

    It’s not clear to me that this distinction between the different political traditions is either as stark as you make it out to be, or that it allows us to distinguish as clearly as you want to between political traditions for which you have more sympathy, and ones like libertarianism, for which you have less sympathy.

    Skinner: Well, I don’t agree with much of that. There are two things I would want to say about that. One is that the superiority of the image of liberty as independence is extremely important in two ways that the current hegemonic way of thinking about freedom as absence of restraint just doesn’t get to. In the case you’ve taken, someone who agreed with me would want to say to your rather anarchistic-sounding imagined figure: what makes you say that these claims are arbitrary? The town council has been voted upon. Everyone there is a representative. We’ve agreed that they should make the rules that run our local society. We’re all in these local democracies. I vote for people in my own part of London who constitute a local town council, and they organise a very great deal of my life. They’re not an arbitrary power. They’re a power which has been voted in by a very large majority of people, and they’re constantly under pressure from a minority, and they are under some obligation both to consider that and to put it to us for things that are like referendums. It is absolutely not the picture that your anarchistic person wants. It is a picture in which there are no arbitrary powers, and he will just have to recognise that that is what it is to live in a democracy.

    One of the problems with the current view is that it is not very interested in forms of government. He governs best who governs least—and your man sounds like an anarchist. He sounds awfully like someone like Sumner, who wants to say that there’s something we have to call democratic despotism. Leave us alone. Let’s not have these laws. That was the extreme to which the opposing view that I’m wanting to defend was put in the United States—as it was in England by Herbert Spencer in attacking John Stuart Mill—saying, this is all arbitrary. We want all of these laws to be abandoned. We want he governs best who governs least. That is not, in what I find a large city like London, at all a good recipe. What you have to have is democratic consent for everything. You can’t have it all together. You must do your best. The point that I want to make in response to you is: the liberalism you described is indifferent to forms of government. The view of liberty that I described requires democracy. So I’m a democrat. I’m not an anarchist.

    I want to make a second point, which is that the view of liberty which I’m espousing here contrasts very strongly with the prevailing one in the fact that the prevailing one is just very bad at identifying silent power. Silent power is an extremely important feature of modern lives, which the view of liberty that I’m interested in is very keen on. The reformed figure of John Stuart Mill was keen on it in one respect, which is that he points out in The Subjection of Women that you can be unfree even if you’re not coerced, because you can live in subjection owing to the bounds of the law. That’s to say, there’s an economic dependence of women. There are other forms of dependence as well. I’ve mentioned this in talking about workforces which have been de-unionised. They confront the silent power of the owner, or of the capitalist, or of whoever else is running the operation. This silent power may not be exercised, but it’s there, and it may not be coercive, but it has an effect on you.

    I also think that it’s very important to think about the relationship between states. Liberalism is uninterested in that question quite generally, but the view of freedom that I’m interested in is equally worried about states being subject to the power of other states which dominate them, and which domination they cannot escape. A really poor state, which has got something to offer a rich state—like, for example, what happens in relations between China and Africa at the moment—cannot afford to say no. It is subject, therefore, to the whims of the dominating power, which can ask for all sorts of regulations to be set aside, or requirements of how to preserve the environment or the local climate and everything can all be set aside in the name of what they wish to do. The state that is so needing all of this to be done has no means of doing anything except accepting the silent power as part of the contract.

    A further point which ought to affect all of us—but strangely doesn’t—is how bad liberalism, in its current guise, in its way of thinking about freedom, is at thinking about surveillance societies. This is the subject now of a really important literature. We have no control over a great deal of data that is now taken from us and held about us, with surveillance from the state and from corporations. We don’t know what they’re going to do with it. We are subject entirely to their will in what they do to it. We are therefore, in a surveillance society, increasingly living the life of slaves. This is seen in liberalism as a threat to privacy. I am saying it is a threat to liberty. You are subject to the arbitrary power of another force in your society, over which you have no control, and to which you have not given your consent. All of the examples I’ve given are examples that separate the believer in liberty as independence from the believer that liberty is just being left to do what you want to do.

    I think that there is no liberty without democracy, and that it’s no good being your anarchist who says, well, this is just the town council issuing arbitrary dictates. None of these are arbitrary. They do not reflect the uncontrollable will of anyone. The will is eminently controllable. We can vote them out any time we want. The will is a reflection of what they hope the people in general want. That’s the picture that goes with my view about liberty.

    Mounk: That’s very interesting. Just to clarify the contrast here, firstly, I agree with you that there can be no true liberty without some form of democratic mechanism which justifies the laws by which we’re bound. It just strikes me as rather strange to say that that is absent from the contemporary liberal tradition. I think that’s absolutely the mainstream liberal view in 2025. But also, the absolutely mainstream liberal view when you read John Stuart Mill or Benjamin Constant or many other thinkers is that you need democratic control both for laws to be legitimate because they reflect the democratic will in some significant way, and to preserve that liberty over time to make sure that we don’t end up with dictators who might allow you to have your liberty for a year or two—but the moment the rule is going to be threatened, will obviously revoke those liberties very strongly. So I guess I’m just a little bit puzzled why it should be the case that liberals aren’t able to formulate this point.

    The other thing is—I get to push a little bit of the libertarian point because that’s really interesting. A libertarian is a very key figure who demonstrates that this pure view of liberty as non-interference is going to lead you to the political conclusion about which you’re concerned, whereas it seems to me that actually many libertarian concerns come just as strongly out of worries about domination as they do out of worries about non-interference. So, we can have an empirical debate about the nature of housing associations in the United States or co-ops in cities like New York. I think there are very minute details in the regulations they have about what color you can paint your house or how often you have to mow your lawn and whether you’re allowed to have people visit your apartment in New York city and so on. You may not be as familiar with the nature of co-ops in New York or of housing associations in the United States.

    But let’s take an example from recent politics that I think is quite instructive about this. Many people had the feeling that the state overreached in some of its regulations about COVID, both in the extent of the lockdowns and in telling citizens that they needed to get vaccinated. Now, you might think that those are the right decisions. I was one of the people writing early on that we needed some social distancing measures. But just sort of phenomenologically, as it were, trying to understand where that concern lies—I think part of it is that people said, but I want to be able to go outside. Part of it is that some people said, but I don’t want to get vaccinated. But a lot of it is that they felt—this very libertarian streak that was unhappy with the response to the pandemic felt—that there was an arbitrary power being exercised over them. That the state, albeit in some complicated way democratically legitimized through elections in which not that many people don’t participate, in which the people who have a majority of the seats in parliament don’t necessarily reflect the majority of people in the country actually having voted for them, and so on. But there’s just in the end a couple of cabinet ministers, a couple of mayors in certain places, whatever, who make those decisions on their own, and they can, from one day to the next, tell you: You can’t leave your house, have to get this vaccine, or you’re going to lose your job. And I think, actually, when you listen—whether you agree with them or not, I disagree with significant parts of what these voices are saying—to what the concern is, the concern often, I think, absolutely about arbitrary power.

    So I guess, again, just to restate it: my concern is both that the liberal tradition, I think, is much more concerned about political liberty than you acknowledge, and that the traditions which you think would be kept at bay by adopting a different conception of liberty which emphasizes non-domination more, actually already formulate many of their grievances and their concerns in language that stems partially from their tradition.

    Skinner: Well, I’ve stated the contrary view. You’re simply talking about a liberal view of liberty. It’s an interesting case to take a great crisis because that calls on questions which have nothing to do with liberty but have very much to do with having some sense of what will forward the common good under a crisis. But that would be another discussion.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Quentin discuss why intellectual history is so important, and the best way of studying great books. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 9 min
  • Moldova Chooses Europe Over Russia
    Moldovan president Maia Sandu preparing to cast her vote on September 28, 2025. (Photo by Andrei Pungovschi/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is part of the Persuasion family.

    “How do we bankrupt Russia?” one character asks in an internet meme circulated about Moldova’s parliamentary election this past Sunday. The answer? To hold more elections in Moldova. Moldovan authorities estimated that the Kremlin spent hundreds of millions of euros to run influence campaigns on Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok, to organize the transport of voters in the diaspora—especially within Russia—to polling stations, and to buy votes directly. Mind you, Moldova’s economy has an annual GDP of some $18 billion, making it akin to a political campaign in the United States spending hundreds of billions, and still failing to win.

    The brute force of Russian money was also combined with a new degree of sophistication. Unlike in the old days, when Russian operatives or people working for the disgraced oligarch Ilan Shor would smuggle bags of cash into the country, the more recent methods involved opening personal bank accounts in Russia for thousands of Moldovans ahead of the 2024 EU referendum and presidential election, as well as the use of crypto this year.

    Yet it was all for naught. While opinion polls suggested much tighter margins, President Maia Sandu’s Party of Action of Solidarity (PAS) received over 50 percent of the votes—more than twice that of the Russian-backed Patriotic Bloc (24 percent). For all the talk of Moldovans’ disappointment with PAS, the party is keeping its absolute parliamentary majority, a necessary precondition for the wholesale reforms that are needed for Moldova to eventually join the EU.

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    Moldova might not be the champion of the European idea that the world wanted—but it turns out to be very much the champion that we all needed. Now, it is up to Brussels to help ratify the years of progress, culminating in PAS’s victory in the recent parliamentary election. This is a moment to celebrate—but also a moment for PAS and its counterparts in the EU to consolidate the victory and pry Moldova out of Russia’s hands once and for all.

    No one can do it for the Europeans. Following Sandu’s victory, they must seize the opportunity and bring Moldova into the EU by the end of the current parliamentary term, alongside Albania and Montenegro, which seek to conclude the technical part of accession talks by 2027. Moldova is hoping to follow the same schedule, though its understandable domestic challenges in areas such as the rule of law, the judiciary, and corruption are further compounded by the unclear status of the breakaway region of Transnistria and the presence of a Russian “peacekeeping” force.

    There are grounds for optimism beyond just the auspicious politics of the moment. Moldova is tiny. It is a country of 2.4 million people—less than the Austrian capital of Vienna and its suburbs—around one million of whom are already EU citizens by virtue of their Romanian nationality. Yes, it is poor, but EU money goes a long way. If the Kremlin thought it a wise investment to spend hundreds of millions trying unsuccessfully to sway Moldovan elections, surely the EU with its sheer economic size could afford to spend 5 percent or more of Moldova’s GDP indefinitely on public investment that will, under the right conditions, accelerate economic growth and bring Moldova closer to the EU’s average.

    Previous waves of EU enlargement provide a warning against simply injecting EU funds into corrupt and politically fraught environments. Yet this is not a time to be pennywise but poundfoolish. The experience of EU funds spent well, from places such as Poland or the Baltic States, should guide the rollout of EU programs in Moldova.

    The question of the legal status of Transnistria, and potentially of Gagauzia, may complicate the picture. Yet neither case should be seen by the EU as an insurmountable problem, in part due to their miniscule scale. In the latter case, the issue is not separatism as such but rather the ties that Russia developed with representatives of the local Gagauz minority, a Turkic ethnic group, which is majority Orthodox. Briefly independent in the 1990s, Gagauzia has little in terms of urban centers or even its own economy. Gagauzia’s main export commodity, wine, has benefited from the extraordinary transformation of the Moldovan wine industry writ large, especially the growth in quality standards and the reorientation toward EU markets.

    Much of the same argument, with the caveat of a larger scale, applies to Transnistria. The economic viability of steel and cement plants in Rîbnița, the largest businesses in the region, long relied on the supply of cheap energy from Russia. Once severed, thanks to the war in Ukraine, it is hard to see how the self-proclaimed separatist “republic” can be sustained economically without the help of Chișinău—and the EU.

    Ukraine’s sealing of its border with Transnistria during the war has effectively choked off smuggling and other criminal activity that helped prop up the regime. Russian “peacemakers,” meanwhile, are largely an imaginary construct. Although there are dozens of Russian officers, not rotated in years, the bulk of the military force consists of local holders of Russian passports who signed up in the hope of receiving Russian military salaries. Again, unless the war turns into a catastrophe for Ukraine, it is hard to see how Transnistria can be sustained in its current form as a Russia-backed separatist mafia state. Transnistrian elites, by most accounts, see the writing on the wall as they have been maintaining lively communications channels with Chișinău. Following the most recent parliamentary election, and assuming that the Ukrainian state will continue to serve as a bulwark against Russian imperialism, it would be only sensible for the Transnistrians—and the Gagauzians—to start planning a post-Russian future in a European Moldova.

    How exactly the settlement will look on the eve of Moldova’s EU accession and in its aftermath is not clear. But in the grand scheme of things, these are trivial complications—especially when compared against the magnitude of the already fought and won political battles in which Moldova’s David successfully confronted Russia’s Goliath.

    Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.

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  • It’s the Internet, Stupid
    (Photo by Alberto Gardin/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images.)

    We are delighted to feature Francis Fukuyama in the pages of Persuasion once again. Some of you may not know that he writes a regular column, “Frankly Fukuyama,” which is proudly part of the Persuasion family, and which you need to manually opt in to receive.

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    Ever since the year 2016, when Britain voted for Brexit and Trump was elected president, social scientists, journalists, pundits, and almost everyone else have been trying to explain the rise of global populism. There has been a standard list of causes:

    1. Economic inequality brought on by globalization and neoliberal policies.

    2. Racism, nativism, and religious bigotry on the part of populations that have been losing status.

    3. Broad sociological changes that have sorted people by education and residence, and resentment at the dominance of elites and experts.

    4. The special talents of individual demagogues like Donald Trump.

    5. The failures of mainstream political parties to deliver growth, jobs, security, and infrastructure.

    6. Dislike or hatred of the progressive Left’s cultural agenda.

    7. Failures of leadership of the progressive Left.

    8. Human nature and our proclivities towards violence, hatred, and exclusion.

    9. Social media and the internet.

    I myself have contributed to this literature, and like everyone else ticked off cause #9, social media and the internet, as one of the contributing factors. However, after pondering these questions for nearly a decade, I have come to conclude that technology broadly and the internet in particular stand out as the most salient explanations for why global populism has arisen in this particular historical period, and why it has taken the particular form that it has.

    I’ve come to this conclusion by process of elimination. It is clear that all nine of the factors above have played some role in the rise of global populism. Populism, however, is a multifaceted phenomenon where certain causal factors are more powerful in explaining particular aspects of the phenomenon, or in explaining why populism manifests itself more powerfully in certain countries than others. For example, while racial resentments obviously play an important role in America, they do not in Poland, which is one of the most ethnically homogeneous societies in the world. And yet the populist Law and Justice Party came to power there for eight years.

    Let’s go through the weaknesses of explanations 1 through 8.

    Cause #1, growing economic disparities, was certainly a powerful driver of working-class voters toward populist parties and figures like Trump. However, around half of all Americans voted for Trump at a time when employment and overall growth were relatively high. We were not in the midst of a depression, as was the case in 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt was elected and the unemployment rate stood at nearly 25%. While economic stresses from inflation certainly drove many Americans to vote for Trump in 2024, inflation was far higher and more persistent in the 1970s.

    Cause #2, the idea that populism is driven by a nativist white backlash, is a plausible one. While countries like Poland and Hungary don’t share America’s troubled racial history, one could argue that fear of immigration and the dilution of the power of those countries’ dominant ethnic groups was a powerful motivator of populist support. But even in America, racial fears are only part of the story. While Trump gets support from overtly racist groups and figures like the Proud Boys or Nick Fuentes, many non-whites, including African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians, decided to vote for him in 2020 and 2024. Indeed, Trump has succeeded in doing what the Democrats once did: assembling a multi-racial working-class coalition.

    Cause #3, the broad sorting that has occurred where Democrats have become the party of educated professionals living in big cities, while Republican voters are less educated and more rural, is replicated in many countries around the world. But sorting is more likely an effect of a deeper sociological change rather than a factor driving that change. Americans were not deciding to move to the countryside because they were conservative; rather, there was something about the conditions of life in rural versus urban areas that engendered different political perspectives.

    Cause #4, the special talents of Donald Trump, is undeniable; he has many imitators but few have demonstrated the demagogic abilities that he has. But the MAGA movement that he has spawned has succeeded in taking over almost completely one of America’s two major parties, something that doesn’t happen purely by one man’s force of will. Becoming a Trump loyalist required many Republicans to abandon long-held beliefs about things like free trade and internationalism that once defined them. The fact that they were susceptible to this conversion is the phenomenon that needs to be explained.

    Cause #5, the failure of Democratic politicians to solve or even address problems of public order, homelessness, drug use, infrastructure, and housing was obviously important to many centrist and independent voters. This was a big factor as well in many down-ballot races, where blue states and cities compiled poor governance records. But honestly, poor governance under left-leaning politicians has been with us for quite a while (recall New York City under Abe Beame and David Dinkins). One could argue that the social consequences of the pandemic triggered special awareness of these weaknesses, but Trumpism existed well before 2020.

    Causes #6 and #7—intense dislike of left-coded cultural issues like DEI, affirmative action, political correctness, LGBTQ policies, immigration, and poor leadership by Democrats—are obviously related. It was poor judgment by Democratic politicians that allowed the party to be defined by these cultural factors, rather than staking out clear positions on economic issues of more general appeal. The problem with seeing cultural issues as central to the rise of populism, however, is that they have been around for quite a while. Feminism and social dysfunctions like drug addiction and family breakdown date back to the late 1960s, while identity politics made its debut in the ‘70s and ‘80s. These social movements engendered backlash and contributed to the elections of conservative presidents like Nixon and Reagan. Yet they did not set off the kind of furious reactions seen in the 2020s.

    Cause #8, human nature, has been raised recently by Bill Galston in his new book Anger, Fear, Domination: Dark Passions and the Power of Political Speech, and celebrated in a recent review by Jonathan Rauch. Galston argues that ugly polarization and partisanship have always been part of human politics; the liberal civility that contemporary democracies have enjoyed in recent decades is an anomaly that needs to be explained, and not the norm of human existence.

    The problem with any explanation of a social phenomenon that takes human nature as its starting point is the question of “why now?” Human nature has presumably been constant throughout human history; it does not explain why people’s behavior turned suddenly ugly midway through the second decade of the 21st century. A permanent human nature must be interacting with some other phenomenon that is more transitory and time-bound. In any event, Steven Pinker among others has argued that human behavior has been getting less violent over time, and there is a substantial body of empirical evidence to back him up. It is hard to argue that the sort of political extremism we’ve seen in recent years in the United States is worse than other instances of societal breakdown. Remember the Nazis?

    Any satisfactory explanation for the rise of populism has to deal with the timing question; that is, why populism has arisen so broadly and in so many different countries in the second decade of the 21st century. My particular perplexity centers around the fact that, by any objective standard, social and economic conditions in the United States and Europe have been pretty good over the past decade. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that they have been this good at many other points in human history. Yes, we had big financial crises and unresolved wars, yes we had inflation and growing economic inequality, yes we had outsourcing and job loss, and yes we had poor leadership and rapid social change. Yet in the 20th century, advanced societies experienced all of these conditions in much worse forms than in recent years—hyperinflation, sky-high levels of unemployment, mass migration, civil unrest, domestic and international violence. And yet, according to contemporary populists, things have never been worse: crime, migration, and inflation are completely out of control, and they are transforming society beyond recognition, to the point where, in Trump’s words, “you’re not going to have a country any more.” How do you explain a political movement based on assertions so far removed from reality?

    As I wrote in a recent article, the current populist movement differs from previous manifestations of right-wing politics because it is defined not by a clear economic or political ideology, but rather by conspiratorial thinking. The essence of contemporary populism is the belief that the evidence of reality around us is fake, and is being manipulated by shadowy elites pulling strings behind the scenes.

    Conspiracy theories have always been part of right-wing politics in the United States. But today’s conspiracies are incredibly outlandish, like the QAnon belief that the Democrats are operating secret tunnels under Washington, D.C. and drinking the blood of young children. Educated people would rather criticize Trump’s trade policies than his connections with Jeffrey Epstein, and yet the latter has dogged him relentlessly for several months now (although here we have the case of an actual conspiracy to cover up this connection).

    This is what leads me to think that Cause #9, the rise of the internet and social media, is the one factor that stands above the others as the chief explanation of our current problems. Broadly speaking, the internet removed intermediaries, traditional media, publishers, TV and radio networks, newspapers, magazines, and other channels by which people received information in earlier periods. Back in the 1990s, when the internet was first privatized, this was celebrated: anybody could become their own publisher, and say whatever they wanted online. And that is just what they did, as all the filters that previously existed to control the quality of information disappeared. This both precipitated and was an effect of the broad loss of trust in all sorts of institutions that occurred in this period.

    Moving online created a parallel universe that bore some relationship to the physically experienced world, but in other cases could exist completely orthogonally to it. While previously “truth” was imperfectly certified by institutions like scientific journals, traditional media with standards of journalist accountability, courts and legal discovery, educational institutions and research organizations, the standard for truth began to gravitate instead to the number of likes and shares a particular post got. The large tech platforms pursuing their own commercial self-interest created an ecosystem that rewarded sensationalism and disruptive content, and their recommendation algorithms, again acting in the interest of profit-maximization, guided people to sources that never would have been taken seriously in earlier times. Moreover, the speed with which memes and low-quality content could travel increased dramatically, as well as the reach of any particular piece of information. Previously, a major newspaper or magazine could reach perhaps a million readers, usually in a single geographic area; today, an individual influencer can reach hundreds of millions of followers without regard to geography.

    Finally, as Renee DiResta has explained in her book Invisible Rulers, there is an internal dynamic to online posting that explains the rise of extremist views and materials. Influencers are driven by their audiences to go for sensational content. The currency of the internet is attention, and you don’t get attention by being sober, reflective, informative, or judicious.

    Nothing illustrates the central role of the internet more than the spread of the anti-vax movement, and the installation of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. as Trump’s Secretary of Health and Human Services. Kennedy’s various assertions about the dangers of vaccinations are not only untrue; they are actively dangerous, because they convince parents not to give their children life-saving vaccines. It is hard to connect opposition to vaccines to any kind of coherent conservative ideology—indeed, in earlier periods conservatives would have welcomed the innovation and benefits that vaccines conferred. It is the internet that facilitated what grew into a vast network of vaccine skeptics. No number of empirical scientific studies could overcome the desire of many people who wanted to believe that there were evil forces in American society pushing things that were harmful to them, and they saw plentiful confirmation of their views on the internet.

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    DiResta gives an example of how the internet contributed to this spread directly. There should be no reason why yoga moms should be drawn to QAnon and conspiratorial thinking. There was, however, one prominent yoga guru who urged his followers to look to QAnon for the truth. An algorithm on an internet platform picked up this connection, and in effect decided that if this yoga influencer was into QAnon, other yoga aficionados should also be into conspiracy theories as well, and started recommending conspiratorial content to them. That is what algorithms do: they don’t understand meaning or context, but simply seek to maximize attention by directing people to popular content.

    There is another type of internet content that explains the particular character of our politics today, which is video gaming. This connection was brought home by the case of the young man, Tyler Robinson, who allegedly shot Charlie Kirk. Robinson was evidently radicalized on the internet. He was an active gamer who inscribed memes from that world on the shell casings of the bullets he used. This was also true of many of the January 6 participants, who had taken the “red pill” and could see the conspiracy of mainstream forces to steal the election from Donald Trump. And the video gaming world is huge, with worldwide revenues estimates in the range of $280-300 billion.

    So the advent of the internet can explain both the timing of the rise of populism, as well as the curious conspiratorial character that it has taken. In today’s politics, the red and blue sides of America’s polarization contest not just values and policies, but factual information like who won the 2020 election or whether vaccines are safe. The two sides inhabit completely different information spaces; both can believe that they are involved in an existential struggle for American democracy because they begin with different factual premises as to the nature of the threats to that order.

    None of this means that causes 1 through 8 are not important or helpful in leading us to an understanding of our present situation. But in my view, it is only the rise of the internet that can explain how we can be in an existential struggle for liberal democracy, at a time in history when liberal democracy has never been as successful.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • Trump’s War on Universities
    Texas Governor Greg Abbott. (Photo by Brandon Bell/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is now proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    We can’t say they didn’t warn us. Back in 2021, JD Vance boldly asserted that “universities are the enemy” and promised to “honestly and aggressively attack the universities in this country.” Now that a multipronged assault on higher education has unfolded during the first few months of the second Trump administration, it is worth stepping back and taking stock of how the campaign is going.

    The attack has proceeded using three sets of tools: the formidable powers of the federal government, state legislative power, and perhaps most disturbingly, the mobilization of society itself to undermine the classroom.

    Start with the federal government. The biggest structural blow to research universities has been the major cutbacks in funding for scientific research and for government-funded medical care provided by many university hospitals. Funding and staff cuts have crippled the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, as well as other sources of federal research. The mechanism has been a combination of sequestering appropriated funds and reduced budgets in the One Big Beautiful Bill. It is not clear that these funds will ever return.

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    This marks the broader unraveling of the postwar bargain between government and universities, in which government would outline broad priorities for research conducted by university faculty on a competitive basis. The model produced the greatest university system in the world, and countless scientific discoveries. But it always carried the risk of government strings. (This was foreseen by early observers, such as University of Chicago President Robert Maynard Hutchins, who criticized the G.I. Bill after World War II on the grounds that government funds would diminish the autonomy of universities.)

    Another set of tools being wielded by the Trump administration are the investigative powers granted under federal anti-discrimination law. Before Trump, prior administrations had deployed veiled threats to cajole universities into adopting favored policies. The Obama administration, for example, used a technically non-binding “Dear Colleague” letter to push universities into setting up large and sometimes overzealous bureaucracies to combat sex discrimination and sexual harassment. (The use of “Dear Colleague” letters by Obama and Biden, and their reprise in the Trump administration, was discussed by Shep Melnick in a recent article in these pages.) The Trump administration has now gone further and faster, most notably in the headline-making attacks on Ivy League universities. Weaponizing anti-discrimination law under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the administration withheld money from universities that was due under existing grants and contracts. While Title VI does allow withholding of funds, this requires an extensive set of procedures that the government did not follow. Threatened with existential funding cuts, several universities agreed to settlements on issues ranging from DEI policies, admissions, eliminating trans women’s participation in sports, and fighting antisemitism. (The Trump administration also issued a “Dear Colleague” letter of its own, prohibiting the use of federal work-study funds to support voter registration and other activities.)

    The most intrusive settlement to date was that of July this year with Columbia University, which had been particularly hard hit by its bungled response to Palestine-related demonstrations. It was the two-faced testimony of President Minouche Shafik before Congress in April 2024 that had escalated those protests and triggered a round of encampments at American universities. This summer’s settlement included changes to admissions policies, increasing supervision over the Middle Eastern studies department, reducing the role of foreign students in Columbia’s “business model,” and a $200 million fine to the federal government. The university also has to pay for a third-party monitor to verify its compliance with the agreement. The settlement marked a major win for the Trump administration.

    Perhaps in reaction to the bad press Columbia received, other universities in the crosshairs took different tacks. Instead of paying a fine to the federal government, Brown university paid $50 million into a community development fund, something that looked positively benevolent in comparison. But in addition to dismantling DEI initiatives, Brown was forced to reach out specially to recruit Jewish students. The University of Pennsylvania settlement focused primarily on the issue of transgender individuals participating in women’s sports, and required the school to strip school records from trans swimmer Lia Thomas. Penn was required to issue apologies to other swimmers that had lost to Thomas, and to take away her medals, but it did not materially suffer in the same way as the other schools. UCLA, Northwestern and other schools continue to be under investigation for antisemitism, with prospective fines and withheld funds reaching into the billions. Meanwhile, the presidents of Northwestern and the University of Virginia resigned under pressure.

    Harvard, of course, is the biggest prize. When the administration demanded that the university appoint conservatives in the name of “viewpoint diversity,” Harvard pushed back, and was buoyed by a victory in September in which a federal judge ordered the restoration of research funds that had been withheld improperly. Winning the battle, however, might not mean winning the war. The federal government retains enormous power to conduct investigations and can decline to award future funds, and a settlement appears imminent. Harvard is also one of a small number of schools subject to a new endowment tax under the Big Beautiful Bill.

    While the Ivy League always attracts oversized attention, it educates a tiny minority of the country’s students. The far more consequential challenges to higher education are occurring in red states. Republican legislatures in Texas, Indiana and Florida seem to be competing with each other to cripple state universities with new requirements coupled with severe funding cuts. Politicization of oversight by governing boards puts academic freedom at risk. In Indiana all state universities now have post-tenure review processes that include evaluation of faculty on their ability to foster free speech and viewpoint diversity in the classroom. The process includes a complaint mechanism whereby students can report on their professors, and at least one professor has already been sanctioned for political speech.

    This leveraging of students to monitor their professors is a particularly insidious technique in the campaign, because it undermines the trust necessary for pedagogy. A chilling incident happened in September at Texas A&M university, hardly a hotbed of progressive thought. A student invoked President Trump’s executive order to interrupt a lecture, claiming that the discussion was illegal because Trump had declared that there are only two genders. Governor Greg Abbott weighed in, and soon the lecturer was fired, while two deans lost their administrative positions. This was not enough for the local GOP, and soon the university president had to resign on account of a conversation secretly recorded by the student in which he was insufficiently outraged at the professor. The broader story is that GOP politicians are incentivizing students to monitor their own professors and engage in “gotcha” games that go viral, deeply undermining the trust needed for effective pedagogy.

    Then Charlie Kirk was assassinated. His killing on a university campus was a grave desecration—but the aftermath has been truly head-spinning. Conservatives who decried left-wing cancel culture a few years ago are calling for the firings of anyone who was insufficiently reverential in their reaction to the murder. Many lecturers and administrators have been fired, along with some tenured professors, often for very bland expressions of disagreement with Kirk’s controversial views. While these efforts to squelch speech might seem like the opposite of what Kirk would have wanted, one of the hallmarks of Turning Point USA was the mobilization of students to identify professors for supposed pedagogical or ideological violations. The “professor watchlist” program regularly highlights so-called woke professors and encourages students to shame them, often on the basis of a single tweet. Students can feel like they are empowered in the Republican ecosystem, even as they undermine the institution they are enrolled in. In this sense, Kirk embodied another trend of our times, namely the exploitation of university environments by outside actors who are not directly engaged in academic debate. The social media era has crumbled the already-low walls of the ivory tower, and Turning Point USA is an active agent in this process.

    To be sure, professors should not be above accountability. Exercising First Amendment rights outside the classroom in the form of extramural speech properly opens one up to criticism, and professors should not get a free pass in the public sphere. But once “monitoring” enters the classroom, there is a massive risk that faculty (and other students) will be intimidated and chilled by fear of recorded or leaked conversations. Every student becomes a potential enemy. It is this attack on university life from below that has faculty terrified.

    American higher education will survive all this, of course. Reduced federal funding will force tough choices, and no amount of private philanthropy will be able to make up for cuts in expensive areas like cancer research. Reducing the number of foreign students able to enter the country impoverishes our discourse, and red-state politicized attacks on tenure will force excellent faculty to move elsewhere, maybe even outside of the country. Red state students will suffer. All this will make us stupider, less healthy and probably poorer. Americans are free to choose this route, but in mobilizing students against faculty using social media, we risk losing something much deeper: learning itself.

    Tom Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Faculty Director of the Forum on Free Inquiry and Expression at the University of Chicago.

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  • Justin Marozzi on Slavery in the Islamic World

    Justin Marozzi is a historian and journalist who has spent most of his professional life living and working in the Muslim world. His latest book is Captives and Companions: A History of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Islamic World.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Justin Marozzi discuss different conceptions of slavery and manumission globally, what we can learn from enslaved people’s stories, and modern slavery.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: When we think about slavery, we normally think about the North Atlantic slave trade, particularly as manifested in the United States, but also other parts of the Americas. You’ve written a book about the history of the slave trade in the Islamic world, which itself has roots in other forms of slavery that pre-exist the Islamic world.

    Tell us a little bit about slavery as a human institution, as something we see across many different cultures, religions, and geographic parts of the world.

    Justin Marozzi: When Islam first originated in the seventh century on the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab Muslims of the time were essentially inheriting the systems of slavery that their pagan ancestors had used since time immemorial. Those pagan Arabs on the Arabian Peninsula were also surrounded by Christian Byzantines and Jews. It was, to that extent, a universal institution.

    What became Islamic about it was the arrival of the Quran, the arrival of the Prophet Muhammad, and over the succeeding centuries, that accretion of Islamic holy law, Sharia law, and the sunnah, the traditions of the Prophet. But there is nothing instantly or peculiarly Muslim about slavery as it arrives on the cusp of Islam in the seventh century.

    What has always interested me about it is that this is the very beginning of what proves to be a long, extraordinarily rich, and ultimately pretty controversial history, because it doesn’t just wither out and die. It continues through the next 14 centuries, and sadly, even into the 21st century.

    Mounk: It has its roots in all of these pre-Islamic practices. We go back to the ancient world, and there are all kinds of different forms of slavery that existed in different parts of the world. It then gets shaped in many ways, both by precepts of religion that try to regulate slavery and by the ways in which empires, countries, and caliphates whose religion is Islam shape this practice.

    Tell us a little bit about this extraordinarily long history of slavery in that part of the world.

    Marozzi: Yeah, it’s interesting because there is such a wide variety, both thematically and across that long chronology, that it can often seem almost overwhelming or bewildering to know where to start. I suppose one helpful way to think about it is in terms of the different categories of enslavement. A number of those are very consistent throughout the 14 centuries.

    I think the one that would be top of my list would be concubines. Concubines have existed from the very birth of Islam with the Prophet Muhammad. He was gifted concubines. Concubines were taken by his fellow Arab Muslim warriors during the great ages of the Arab conquests, which continued after the Prophet Muhammad, in the early Umayyad dynasty.

    To zoom right through into our era, or very close to it, King Hassan II of Morocco in the 20th century had concubines. He had a number of slaves in his palaces, and it was considered perfectly normal and reasonable. So you have that incredibly long period, virtually coterminous with the history of Islam, in which concubines are part of the backdrop of cultural life and a key category among the enslaved.

    Mounk: The word concubine is a little bit confusing here because it can mean such a variety of things in different contexts. At the lowest end, it can simply mean someone with whom you’re having an extramarital affair, perhaps someone whom you’re in some way financially supporting. What we’re talking about here is women who are forcibly enslaved and then sold into concubinage. Is that right? Where did these women come from, and what was the nature of the slave trade in concubines?

    Marozzi: You’re completely right. It takes different forms as well. A concubine from the seventh or eighth century was quite likely to have been captured and become the property of the conquerors. When you see some of the earliest exhortations to jihad and holy war, even from some of the earliest caliphs, they rally the Muslim troops with the incentives of taking booty, taking human chattel, taking women and children. That is one of the most obvious ways a female concubine would be taken in the earliest days of Islam.

    Scroll forward to the Ottoman Empire, which lasted four or five centuries until 1922. During that period, concubines were sourced from various geographies, in particular the Caucasus. The Ottoman sultans, the royal courts, had a strong predilection for Caucasian women, and they were sourced in very large numbers, along with male children who were trained, converted to Islam, indoctrinated, given military training, and the best of the best became the Janissaries, the crack fighting force of the Ottoman Empire. They won their spurs in many key battles of the time, not least in 1453, when Sultan Mehmed II took Constantinople, and it became Muslim Istanbul.

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    Concubines could be sourced from all over the world. The Ottomans had them. In our time, from 2014 to 2017 or 2019, depending on where you were—Iraq or Syria—the Islamic State was very explicit about enslaving and raping women they considered either infidels or apostates. They had this interminable internal debate about whether Yazidi women of Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq were apostates or infidels. That would dictate how they were treated: whether they were to be slaughtered or raped and enslaved. In the end, it was a bit of both, but largely they were enslaved as modern concubines. I suspect they were treated much worse than a concubine in a royal palace in the harem in Istanbul, where life was maybe more like a gilded cage. They weren’t free to leave, but they led lives of secluded refinement.

    Mounk: In the geographical region that became the Islamic world before Muhammad, he, as with many other social customs and norms of his time, then tries to regulate them in accordance with his theology. What are the basic theological categories here? What is the basic set of rules he puts in place for how to govern slavery, how to make it, in certain ways, supposedly more humane, but also how to facilitate its ongoing practice for the following centuries?

    Marozzi: I think Muslims to this day take set great store by the life of the Prophet Muhammad. We often hear about the sunnah, the traditions of the Prophet, and the hadith, the sayings of the Prophet, some of which are more or less authentic, and they are treated accordingly. We also have the Quran, the revealed word of Allah, as received by the Prophet Muhammad in the years after 610.

    The first thing I would begin with is the acceptance within the Quran. There are all sorts of expressions for slaves and slavery in the Quran, one of the most common of which is, those whom your right hands possess. To summarize, the strong sense from the Quran is that slavery is an institution. It’s real. It’s human. It’s legitimate. There is no sense that the Quran is proposing to abolish the institution of slavery.

    After that initial legitimation, the most important thing I would highlight is the Quran in particular, supported by holy law later, and the traditions of the Prophet, enjoining compassionate treatment towards one’s slaves. Within that, there are also specific categories. Is it permissible to have sexual intercourse with one’s female slave? The answer is a very strong yes. Is it permissible to have sexual intercourse with a woman you’ve just enslaved in a conquest? The answer again is yes.

    There are also incentives. The Prophet Muhammad sets an example of freeing slaves. It is clearly an unqualified good to liberate one’s slave. So there’s this emerging rubric or framework governing the moral treatment of one’s slave. A lot of the time, which we haven’t discussed so much, there is manumission. In some categories, seven years might have been a ballpark figure for one’s enslavement, after which one becomes a free man or woman. There is no necessary impediment to pursuing all sorts of different careers, and, as we’ve discussed, in some instances, rising to the very top of Arab or Ottoman Muslim societies.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about manumission, both in the theological sense and in the way it ends up being applied in practice. Theologically, I understand that one of the key distinctions in who you can take as a slave originally is whether or not they are of the Muslim faith.

    What difference does it make whether a slave then converts to Islam—whether out of genuine conviction or under considerable duress—or whether they don’t? What does it mean when a slave converts to Islam? Does that, in some way, make the slavery less theologically justifiable?

    How does that then work out in practice? Obviously, there are cases of manumission. There are also many cases, as you were saying earlier, where slavery becomes effectively a hereditary status. So how should we think about which slaves get freed and under what kind of circumstances over this time period?

    Marozzi: First of all, Islam is extremely clear that co-religionists—fellow Muslims—cannot be enslaved. We see in Africa that this was frequently ignored. I’m thinking of the state of Kano in today’s Nigeria: Muslims enslaving fellow Muslims, both locally and exporting them north toward the Mediterranean coast and also west. It’s an interesting area where the Atlantic slave trade blurs with the slave trade in the Islamic world.

    Some Muslim slaves are also exported west across the Atlantic to take their place on American plantations. A slave who is not a Muslim but is taken by a Muslim owner and then converts to Islam remains a slave. Islam is quite pragmatic about that. In no way is your conversion to Islam any guarantee of your liberation or your freedom. In practice, maybe that makes you much more amenable to your master. I think that’s quite likely. But it alone is no guarantee. You can be a Muslim convert and still a slave.

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    Manumission—there are examples of it from the very earliest moments in Islam. Bilal himself—who’s being tortured in the seventh century for adhering to what, to most Arabs around him in Mecca, would have appeared as a cult (the Prophet Muhammad wandering around Mecca inventing a new religion; most of his fellow Meccans would have considered this complete heretic behavior)—Bilal was being tortured. He gets redeemed while he’s being tortured under a rock and left out in the open sun for not renouncing Islam. He’s on the cusp of becoming Islam’s first martyr. Instead, he’s redeemed. It’s a very early instance of a slave being redeemed in the sources. It is considered enlightened, good.

    Bilal becomes a free man, but he’s forever attached to Muhammad in what we might call a retainer role, as opposed to a formal slave. He never leaves Muhammad’s side until his death, aged about sixty. It establishes the precept, the principle of manumission being an inherent good. That’s a constant throughout the history of Islam and the history of slavery in the Islamic world—rulers clicking their fingers and saying, you, you’re freed. You’re a free man. You’re a free woman, etc.

    We touched a little earlier on concubinage in the Ottomans. That is interesting because, as you said earlier, if the father doesn’t recognize the child, that child is going to be a slave. However, if the father recognizes the child, they become free. For centuries, the Ottomans largely preferred concubines to procreate with rather than wives. This is a lineage based on formal slavery—a concubine is formally a slave. That’s what fascinated me, because you have a ruling class with slavery in the DNA. There’s no direct equivalent of that in the American case. That explains the cross purposes at which, in the nineteenth century, a British official calling for abolition speaks to an Ottoman sultan and his cabinet of ministers—they don’t understand each other at all.

    Mounk: That’s fascinating. What is the importance of a religious distinction here? I’m guessing—correct me if I’m wrong—that if you’re an infidel, that means you don’t have the moral rights of somebody who’s Muslim. You don’t have to be treated with the same kind of respect. You’re less culpable than somebody who is an apostate, who is more guilty, and therefore the “right course of action” would be to slaughter them.

    Marozzi: Yes, that’s right. Apostasy is really the ultimate crime against Islam. Someone who has had the effrontery to leave the last revealed religion merits that fate—to be slaughtered on the spot.

    Mounk: Of course, that has a certain internal logic to many religions. I may be misremembering the details here, but I believe that in John Locke’s Letter on Toleration, he says that we should tolerate Jews and Muslims because they have a wrong faith—but you can kind of tolerate that. Apostates to Christianity, however, can’t be tolerated because that would really undermine the unity of the Christian faith in a way that’s too concerning and unacceptable.

    Tell us a little bit about the extent to which this is an industry and how that evolves. My understanding is that in the ancient world—in ancient Greece and Rome—you often have slaves that are taken as a side-effect of battle, in a certain kind of way. You had war with certain people, and then the people you vanquish became slaves. The logic is that of a military inferior, and they can often be people who share the same religion and, in our sense at least, the same ethnicity. They can be residents of a city with which you were allied until twenty years ago, or until two years ago, and then you go to war with each other, and if you vanquish them, they become slaves. In the North Atlantic slave trade, the key distinction was racial. The idea was that if you’re black, you don’t have the same kinds of rights or the same kind of status as if you’re white, and that marks out that status.

    My understanding here is that the key distinction was religious. One of the reasons, for example, why concubines were “recruited”—were captured—in the Caucasus is that those were lands close to countries ruled by Islamic rulers, but that were not Muslim. Therefore, it was permissible in a different kind of way to capture those women. Tell us a little bit about the logic of where these slaves were recruited and what the moral justification for that was within the system.

    Marozzi: Yes, there are a number of similarities between the Atlantic slave trade and the slave trade in the Islamic world. One of the key ones, which I felt was borne out by the research I did, was that Africa bore the brunt of the Islamic world’s enduring—or sustained, perhaps even insatiable—appetite for enslaved humans: men, women, and children. To be more specific, sub-Saharan Africa, which was much less Muslim—could be Christian, might be pagan or animist. What was not allowed, under Islamic law, was the enslavement of fellow Muslims. But again, this is the classic distinction between what was formally not allowed and what actually happened in practice.

    From time to time, we come across these pathetic, beseeching letters from small Muslim principalities in sub-Saharan Africa, writing to various overlords in distant capitals saying, we are fellow Muslims, and yet we’ve been overrun by marauding warriors who are enslaving our women, men, and children and committing various atrocities. This is not allowed. This happened frequently in Sudan. As late as the nineteenth century, warriors came from Egypt down south into Sudan and enslaved fellow Muslims—among Christians as well. This was frequently a great source of division. Not rivalry exactly, because these were people on the wrong end of enslavement.

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    The Caucasus were, as you say, again, non-Muslim countries. You could generalize by saying that, according to classical Islamic doctrine, they were ripe for enslavement. We can come there and enslave your people. Equally, because this is not always black and white, there were plenty of impoverished families in the Caucasus who would routinely offer their young boys to go and be enslaved in the Ottoman court in the hope and expectation that those boys’ lives might be materially better off if they joined the great imperial headquarters in Istanbul, where, as we said a moment ago, the best of the best could rise to the very top of the Janissaries—and in some cases, even higher than that.

    In Istanbul, I was speaking to a very distinguished historian, Edhem Eldem, whose great-great-grandfather was enslaved as a toddler on the Greek island of Chios when the Ottomans took that island in 1822. That same relative rose through the ranks. He was educated, sent to France, learned the French language, became an engineer, returned to Istanbul, worked his way up the imperial bureaucracy, and in the late 1880s, he became the Grand Vizier—the equivalent of a prime ministerial position—the number two position in the Ottoman Empire after the Sultan. This always fascinated me in the models of enslavement in the Islamic world: that, in theory—and occasionally in practice, though we shouldn’t overstate it—you could literally rise to the top of society, from enslavement to the very top.

    An example from the earliest time is Bilal. He was an Ethiopian slave. He became one of Muhammad’s devoted companions and followers, a fellow jihadist, and was given the great honor of becoming the first caller to prayer, a muezzin. Every time you hear the call to prayer, which is the same throughout the Muslim world, the first man who ever did that was Bilal, a former slave, who is remembered as a very illustrious figure in early Islam to this day.

    Mounk: What about the element of race in all of this? I said earlier that one of the distinguishing features between the North Atlantic slave trade and the slave trade in the Islamic world was that the former was explicitly along racial lines and the latter was not. I understand, for example, that sometimes the children of concubines and Muslim men could be acknowledged as free if the father acknowledged them as his children. So the hereditary status was perhaps also somewhat less pronounced than in the United States.

    At the same time, my understanding is that there was a clear racial element here as well. For example, the term abd literally means slave, and then came to be used as a kind of racial epithet for people of African origin. In what ways was the slave trade racial and racialized? And in what ways was it non-racial, non-racialized, when you’re thinking, for example, about the fact that it involved a lot of concubines from places like modern-day Georgia and other parts of the Caucasus, which, at least in the strange American imagination of race, would today count as white?

    Marozzi: Yes, that’s right. There is a clear distinction between formal principle and pragmatic real-world practice. Islam would say formally it is completely colorblind or that humans are equal. The Quran contains the line, Allah has favored some of you over others in provision. This is one of the key verses that suggests some level of acceptance of inequality between humans. There is no sense at all in the Quran of anything pro-abolition.

    On the one hand, Islam is meant to be colorblind. In practice, Africa was the great pool of slave labor for successive Muslim dynasties from the Middle East, from the earliest times through the Ottomans and into much later periods, into the nineteenth century and beyond. There are writings from key Arab figures over many centuries. Think of Ibn Sina—better known in the West as Avicenna—Jahiz, Ibn Khaldun, Masudi, and other historians. These are not fringe figures in the Arab intellectual firmament. Their writings on Africans contain very strong stereotypes: male and female physical characteristics, intellectual aptitude, interest in music and dance. These passages are extraordinary. It is irrefutable that there are racialized tendencies in the classical Arab view toward Africa.

    If you look into the actual slave trade, especially in Ottoman times and earlier, the data is limited. Market rates and figures are scarce. Typically, an Arab slave woman would be worth less than a woman from the Caucasus. A black African woman was more likely to be employed as a domestic slave in various households. A Caucasian woman was more likely destined for concubinage in an imperial or noble harem, a much more rarified world involving staggering sums.

    There are examples from the Ottomans and earlier Abbasids, headquartered in Baghdad, where concubines were traded like modern-day footballers, sold and traded for astronomical sums. There was conspicuous consumption among caliphs and courtiers bidding for famously beautiful and accomplished women in slave markets. These women were more likely to be Arab, with distinctions even between Yemenis and Saudis. There are also slave manuals. A famous example from the tenth century is by an Arab Christian who describes the various attributes—physical and otherwise—of women. It is essentially a guide on how to buy your best slave. This was written over a thousand years ago.

    Mounk: We talked a little about the recruitment of concubines in places like the Caucasus. What was the capture of these slaves—many of whom were more likely destined for domestic labor and other forms of forced labor in sub-Saharan Africa—like?

    Tell us how that worked and the gruesome journeys they had to take to go from non-Muslim sub-Saharan African countries and regions to their destinations in the Islamic world.

    Marozzi: The Arabs had a word for it, razzia, which translates roughly as raid. There are accounts of these raids on unsuspecting small African communities by well-armed and well-prepared Arab slave raiding parties. The scenes were apocalyptic. I have a line in the book about how the hunter takes a different view of the hunt than the quarry.

    There was a man called Tippu Tip who was direct in his conversations with British colonial powers. He said white Europeans had ridiculous ideas about their traditions of slavery. He claimed he treated his slaves well, that they didn’t want to leave, and that abolition efforts were a waste of time. He painted a benevolent picture of the enslavement of Africans, in which he was closely involved as an ivory trader.

    Accounts by African writers describe it as a scorched earth policy of killing and maiming, amputating, and terrible scenes of rape and brutalization—especially on the East African coast.

    There are harrowing descriptions. Some involve young boys who were captured and emasculated, meaning castrated. The rationale was that a eunuch who survived the operation became a very valuable slave. Eunuchs were elite slaves. Mortality rates were high.

    That affected what they cost and how they were traded. The practice happened in sub-Saharan Africa. According to holy law, it is against Islamic law to castrate someone. The pragmatic workaround was to have Christian monks, especially in certain places, perform the operation. Then, a surviving eunuch could be imported into North Africa and onward to the Ottoman world.

    Mounk: Let’s talk about eunuchs. Then we’ll go back to the nature of the slave trade. Eunuchs were prized in part because they could fulfill certain functions that other enslaved people couldn’t. One obvious example is serving as guards and servants in harems or other contexts where you want to be sure they can’t have sexual contact with the women they encounter. I believe you said up to two thirds or even three quarters of young boys who were castrated in that way died from the effects of the operation.

    How did the slave traders decide which boys were destined to become eunuchs? What were the ways in which they were castrated? How were they trained, if they survived, to fulfill these responsibilities—some of which involved real influence and authority?

    Marozzi: I think that varies in different periods, Yascha. To talk about eunuchs in the Islamic world is one of those categories that goes from the seventh century, the Prophet Muhammad. He was gifted a eunuch or two. Certainly hehad eunuchs around him. It was normal for Arabs at the time to have that. They were in the Persian courts. They were among the Byzantines, the Chinese before that, and the Egyptians. It is part of the universal aspect of slavery. We know more about them generally from the Ottomans onwards, with flashes of biographical detail coming out of historical accounts at different periods. I’m thinking of the tenth century in Egypt, where a eunuch almost founded a dynasty or became a de facto ruler, against all odds. This occasionally happens. It is counterintuitive, highly unusual, and in no way representative of the experience of enslavement. There are stories where eunuchs rise to the top of society.

    One of the best examples would be a man called Beshir Agha, an eighteenth-century Ethiopian slave, bought in a slave market for something like thirty piastas. An extremely intelligent man, industrious, conscientious, worked his way up to become the chief black eunuch at the Ottoman court. In charge of Islamic foundations, a very influential man, extremely powerful. At the time of his death in the later eighteenth century, he left a fortune of thirty million piastas. He was one of the richest men in the Ottoman Empire, which is an extraordinary story. Was he representative? No. He was very well-schooled, incredibly well-educated. There is a survey of the books in his house at the time of his death—learned treatises on Islamic jurisprudence, histories, biographies, etc. He was highly educated. The danger with those stories is that we romanticize the rags-to-riches element.

    As Turkish historian Edhem Eldem reminded me, for every one person like that, there are unknown numbers—thousands, maybe tens of thousands—of unheralded concubines, eunuchs, domestic slaves who are never recorded. We know nothing about them. There are no voices. There are no traces left.

    Mounk: It is tempting in history to focus on the remarkable individuals about whom we know a lot. The very rare slave who is a eunuch and somehow amasses huge influence, or is a concubine and amasses huge influence.

    You talk about some of those fascinating characters in the book as well. It makes for a more interesting and “inspiring” story. It is easier to say something about, because by virtue of their influence, by virtue of how unusual their story is, there are historical sources to draw from.

    There are untold numbers, untold millions of individuals who are exploited in horrific ways and about whom it is very difficult to write, because they are one of many anonymous victims of history about whom we don’t know much.

    Marozzi: I think that’s exactly right. There have been a number of historians who, in recent years, have focused specifically on exhuming or excavating—digging out—these very elusive voices. There is an Israeli historian called Ehud Toledano, whose work I used to tell one particular story in the nineteenth century of an incredibly badly used and abused Circassian concubine called Shemsigul.

    We only know about her, apart from Ehud Toledano’s extremely meticulous research, because she decided to stand up for herself and take legal action against an unscrupulous, amoral slave dealer-owner who had raped her, made her pregnant, then denied all knowledge of it. His wife beat her to try to induce a miscarriage. This story comes out in the legal case.

    While it is full of deeply disturbing and unsettling material, that story also serves as a reminder that we know so little about those untold individuals. For historians who have looked at this immense subject, one of the greatest challenges is trying to get to the voices.

    Even when you do, they are frequently—or almost always—mediated by other parties. In this case, they might be mediated by Egyptian policemen or a lawyer—someone who has taken this woman’s account. As mediated as it is, it is as close as we can get to that very human original source. It is a constant challenge.

    Mounk: One way of getting closer to this subject is to look at the individual and try to reconstruct not just the extraordinary stories of people who somehow amassed influence and relatively affluent lives despite that status, but to try to get to a more typical experience of those who suffered tremendously under it.

    Another is through the numbers. Over the course of these many centuries of slavery, roughly how many human beings are we talking about? How does that compare to other forms of slavery, like the North Atlantic slave trade?

    More broadly—this is a question that perhaps historians haven’t been able to answer, perhaps you don’t have it at the tip of your tongue—when we think about the phenomenon of slavery in the world in general, what kind of share would the North Atlantic slave trade take up? What kind of share would the slave trade in the Islamic world take up? What kind of share would other forms of slavery take up?

    Slavery seems to have been virtually a human universal, something that existed in many different times and places. A lot of those societies where it existed were on a much smaller scale. Per capita, the ancient Athenians or the ancient Romans may have had as many slaves or more slaves, but they were much smaller settlements. I’m guessing they made up a much smaller share of the overall number of people on whom these kinds of injustices were imposed.

    Marozzi: I’m going to try to concentrate in my answer on the two main ones we have brought into play. So, the Atlantic slave trade—five centuries between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries—and the numbers are something in the window of about eleven to fourteen million people enslaved. Those are 99.9% Africans. I’ve concentrated on what we would call in today’s language North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa as the pool of labor, the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, maybe as far east as Afghanistan, but not really India.

    In that period—let’s say seventh to the twentieth century—the figures for slavery in the Islamic world are around twelve to fifteen million enslaved, possibly as many as seventeen. So very comparable figures to the Atlantic slave trade over a much longer period. One obvious caveat to that is that in my book I haven’t added or studied the slave trade to the Indian subcontinent, nor have I looked at Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Far East. You can, in other words, add many more to that figure.

    For me, one of the obvious comparisons was in the historical treatment of these different models of enslavement. There are a number of comments from scholars over the years. Bernard Lewis, several decades ago, said it was professionally hazardous for a young scholar to embark on this sort of work. I don’t think that’s the case all these decades later. He probably wrote that in the late eighties or thereabouts. I wouldn’t say it’s professionally hazardous to study this now, but the fact remains that, while the last fifty years have resulted in huge strides in understanding more about the Atlantic slave trade, the slave trade in the Islamic world has been massively neglected by comparison.

    The fact is we know so much less. It’s exciting, in the sense of historical research, that more scholars are looking into this, but they have a lot of ground to catch up on in terms of the work from largely North American, European, and Western scholars who have been focused overwhelmingly on the Atlantic slave trade.

    Mounk: Why do you think that is? What are the roots of the fact that this huge phenomenon, which shaped the history of these countries in important ways and is an important part of the human story, has been neglected in these ways?

    Marozzi: I think there are a number of reasons for that. The first thing I’m going to say is possibly a little bit of Western parochialism.

    When I studied history at university in the early nineties, you had to study British, American and European history. If you wanted to look beyond that, there was one paper at the time. It was called The West and the Rest. That was it.

    Mounk: I did history at Cambridge as an undergraduate, so I know about The West and the Rest. I don’t think that was the official title of the paper, but it was what everybody referred to it as.

    Marozzi: That was fairly extraordinary, considering there are some of the world’s great historians looking at, you’d hope, all parts of the world. That wasn’t long after Hugh Trevor-Roper dismissed the history of Africa as endlessly gyrating barbarous tribes.

    So in the West, there has been less interest in looking beyond the West. There are other reasons, more recent perhaps. As Bernard Lewis said, professionally hazardous. A sense that this is an uncomfortable topic. Over the last five years of research, people would say, that’s brave, or that’s a bit reckless. Are you sure? Is that a good idea—to look into, to write a book about slavery and the slave trade in the Islamic world?

    I thought that was complete nonsense. It’s an important historical subject. For a historian, it’s a compelling story—not least because, as I said earlier, the history of slavery in the Islamic world is coterminous with the history of Islam. It lasts as long as Islam has lasted. It is a perennial backdrop to societies in North Africa and the Middle East today. That is fascinating. It is a historically legitimate source of inquiry—of course I’d say that.

    Another thing is, in much of the Arab world, there hasn’t been a great reckoning with slavery and its legacy. We are at the very earliest stages of this. There is a museum in Doha called the Bin Jelmood House. The gloss it provides on slavery in the Islamic world is PR. A sort of PR guff, pointing to the benevolent role that Islam played in the abolition of slavery, rather than acknowledging the trauma, cruelty, and realities of what that slavery looked like. I remember a young Turkish woman—historian—embarking on a career in Ottoman slavery. She was trying to find a PhD supervisor. She said she had approached a fairly distinguished older historian, and he said, my dear, you don’t need to be looking at this. Our ancestors treated their slaves very well. Find yourself another subject. That was from a professional historian, saying the equivalent of, there’s nothing to see here.

    I was in Oman a couple of weeks ago and brought the subject up to an educated man in his seventies. He said, I don’t know what all the fuss is about. We took slaves in Africa because that was the business. We were all doing it. What else could we do? If we didn’t do it, we would starve. It was direct, complacent, entitled. No one has done surveys on this, but that is probably a fairly representative view about slaving Africans in much of the Arab world.

    It takes me back to Libya, during the Libyan revolution. I was with a group of young revolutionaries, one of whom was ethnically from further south—a darker-skinned Libyan Arab. He was routinely called abed by his Libyan friends, which means slave. At first, I thought I hadn’t heard it properly. I said, what are you talking about? Why are you calling him that? Is that his name? What do you mean? They said, oh, it’s just a joke. It’s just a name. We don’t mean anything by it. They all laughed about it. Everyone apart from the man in question thought it was funny calling him a slave. It was a nickname—as it is in Libya today—for black people. You call them slaves. Abed singular, abeed plural.

    There are these legacies of racism toward black Africans in the Arab world. In Tunisia, there is one community I wrote about where a village is completely divided—those who are the descendants of enslaved Africans and those who were the masters. One side of the village is very rich, or relatively prosperous. The other is impoverished.

    Without wanting to generalize too much, my experience is that there has been less reckoning intellectually with this subject in much of the Arab world.

    One final thought—something in Iran. I was looking some time ago at an academic article on a nineteenth-century female slave in Iran. It begins with the words: the history of slavery in Iran has yet to be written.

    That is a very long answer to your question, but those are a number of reasons why I think we don’t know as much about it as we should.

    Mounk: To put on the philosopher’s hat rather than the historian’s hat, one of the reasons why this matters is that if we want to understand how horrible practices like slavery can perpetuate themselves, it’s important to have an accurate read of what the causes are. As somebody who is trained to some extent in history as an undergrad, and then in political theory, but also in comparative politics, my instinct is always to say: what is specific about this society, and how does it compare to other societies?

    If you look at something like the horrible, brutal, terrible history of the slave trade in the United States and the Atlantic world, and you think of it in isolation from other forms of slavery, you think this is somehow a unique phenomenon in human history—even if perhaps you know in an abstract way that it existed in other places. That is effectively how you treat it. You’re going to misunderstand what the historical roots of it are, and the circumstances under which slavery might recur in the human species. To understand that this is something that took a distinctive form in different times and places—but has unfortunately been nearly a “normal” aspect of how humans wage war, how humans perpetuate material inequality, how they demarcate some as equals and others as inferior—significantly changes your understanding of it in ways that are important and urgent.

    The other thing I would say is that I’m a German Jew. I believe it’s important to reckon with history and to look at the negative elements of your own history. I do worry about a tendency to measure with two different kinds of measures—to define countries by the bad without looking at other elements of their history. Humans are capable of imposing terrible cruelty. You can’t think of the history of Germany without the Holocaust. I don’t think you can think of the history of the United States without slavery. But it is strange when some people have a self-flagellating attitude toward their own countries and insist on pretending that other countries are supposedly virtuous—ignoring the terrible things in their histories. In fact, most cultures have good moments, great contributions to humanity, great forms of culture, and also terrible things. That doesn’t mean each historical evil weighs equally. That doesn’t mean we can’t make distinctions between different forms of injustice. We need to be able to look into the face of both the injustices and the good things that cultures have produced. It doesn’t serve either to just look at the bad in one place or to just look at the good in another.

    Marozzi: I couldn’t agree with you more, Yascha. As you say, in some aspects, there is a self-flagellating tendency, which is strange. For me, it’s a form of decadence in late Western democracies to see the West as the unique source of evil. I also think it’s profoundly ahistorical, inaccurate, and wrong. It feels to me that there is a blind spot on this subject within much of the Muslim world. I also think it’s changing.

    What is interesting, when you look at some of those new scholars—I’m thinking in particular about scholars in Tunisia, Turkey, and Morocco—their experiences involve words like taboo. When they want to research this area, they’re told this is not something worthy of study, or not appropriate to study, or shameful to study. You’re bringing disrepute onto our town, community, nation, religion, Islam—whatever it may be. Those desires to cover up or not engage with this strong historical fact are regrettable. I do think it’s changing, but there’s a long way to go. To say something like “the history of slavery in Iran has yet to be written” is an extraordinary comment.

    It’s unfathomable to imagine someone saying that in a North American context—“the history of slavery in America has yet to be written.” Great strides have been made in that area. We’re not seeing the same within the Islamic world, so I completely agree with you on that point.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Justin discuss abolition of slavery, and how it persists today. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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