
Sign up to save your podcasts
Or


This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
To receive future installments into your inbox—plus more great pieces by American Purpose and Francis Fukuyama’s blog—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the buttons for “American Purpose” and “Frankly Fukuyama.”
Subscribe now
Email preferences
One of the centerpieces of Trump’s second term has been his all-out war on the administrative state. This has taken a dizzying variety of forms, from mass firings of career civil servants, to reorienting agencies at express odds with their mandates, to the unilateral creation of new agencies devoted to reshaping the machinery of the government in his image. All of these actions are underwritten by the same idea: the administrative state constitutes a burden on the American public, and that burden should be reduced.
There is a modicum of logic underlying this idea. Government administration is not exactly famed for its efficiency. As anyone who has participated in regulation knows, the regulatory process rarely runs a straight line from aim to output. It is not a stretch to think that the administrative bureaucracy of our government could be made more efficient.
That is not what Trump has done.
What Trump has done is not reduce the burden of the administrative state—he’s just made someone else carry it. By converting the administrative state from a regulatory entity into a purely political mouthpiece for our commander-in-chief, Trump has shifted the burden of the state’s operation from the government to the people being operated on. Even more to the point: when Trump talks about reducing the burden of the administrative state, he’s not talking about reducing the burden on us—he’s talking about reducing the burden on himself.
A Legal BurdenThe notion of burden plays a large role in our legal system. Generally speaking, a legal burden is one of the main mechanisms for how the law determines what normal should be. For instance, we put the burden of proof on the person bringing a suit rather than the person who is being sued, by requiring them to prove their case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This in turn helps to set the norm as “not being sued” rather than “being sued,” because putting the burden on the person bringing the suit to affirmatively prove their case makes it less likely that the suing will happen at all.
In criminal cases, we take this standard even farther, raising the burden of proof to “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This helps to set the norm as “rarely being prosecuted” rather than “often being prosecuted”—because putting such a difficult-to-meet standard on the government to make out a criminal case makes it less likely that the government brings that case in the first place.
These are far from the only examples of how the law uses burdens. There are burdens of proof that determine who has the responsibility of persuading the decisionmaker at each stage of trial; there are burdens of production, which determine who has the responsibility to cough up the evidence; there are undue burdens, which determine to what extent certain constitutional rights have been unacceptably curtailed by government action; the list goes on. Saddling people with the burden of actually doing something is one of the main ways that our legal system sets the standard for behavior in our society.
And that includes the regulatory burden of the administrative state. This happens in a few different ways. By the very nature of regulation, the government is almost always the enforcing party, meaning that they are subject to the same burdens of litigation that any initiating party would be. But at an even more fundamental level, the administrative state is designed to keep as much of the burden of regulation on the government for as long as possible, primarily by setting evidence-based standards for more aggressive forms of regulatory enforcement.
For instance, financial regulation is managed by a complex series of overlapping processes, each of which carries an increasing burden—in terms of time, effort, and money—to the entity being regulated. The lowest level might include self-reporting by banks on their own behavior; at the next level, semi-regular examinations conducted by regulators, which take a closer look at a bank’s processes to ensure that they pass muster; at the next level, one-off requests for information regarding a suspected violation, which force the banks to go digging for much more comprehensive information that they might not have readily available; culminating in, ultimately, civil or legal suits launched by the government, which seeks to impose penalties for severe violations.
Each of these levels of enforcement—and the numerous other levels that fall in between—represents an increasing burden on the regulated party, and is accordingly utilized only if the regulator determines that the facts support taking that additional step. This scheme of escalating levels of regulation is echoed throughout the administrative state. The net effect is to consistently reserve the strongest remedies, and the burden that those remedies represent, for only the situations where those costs are justified by the facts.
But Trump’s never exactly been one for the facts.
A Regulator With One ToolThe administrative state under Trump shortcuts the entire process of escalating remedies, and jumps straight to the most aggressive regulatory tools available—which puts the burden of that regulation squarely on the regulated party instead of the regulator. In other words, his supposed assault on the administrative state is less an assault on the state itself than it is an assault on the notion that the state should have to do any homework before enforcing the executive’s agenda.
For instance, as part of the about-face by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on diversity issues—seeking to root out rather than encourage DEI initiatives—it issued public letters to 20 of the country’s most prominent law firms (including my former firm, WilmerHale) this past March. Those letters requested a wide variety of information from the firms, including detailed personal information about applicants and employees, and indicating concern that the firms’ DEI policies violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Even setting aside the legal tenuousness of these allegations, the letters jumped over numerous stages in the EEOC’s normal regulatory process. That process normally would have included not only a formal investigation, but non-public requests for information—requests that almost certainly did not happen, as the new EEOC had not yet had time to make such requests. To ignore these typical steps was unusual—so unusual, in fact, that it prompted seven former EEOC officials to send a letter to the new acting chief of the EEOC stating that “[t]hese letters appear to exceed your authority under Title VII,” before detailing the regulatory process that should have taken place.
You can also sign up to receive great content from Persuasion and Yascha Mounk! Simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons.
Email preferences
This is far from the only example. From the DOJ’s indictment of former FBI Director James Comey, to ICE’s aggressive and inhumane enforcement policies, agencies in the Trump administration have shown a reckless willingness to jump straight to the most aggressive form of regulatory enforcement, regardless of whether it is justified by the facts. Nor is this aggressiveness restricted merely to enforcement actions: to date, the Brennan Center has counted more than 80 regulatory changes in the first nine months of Trump’s second term, all of which constitute a moving target for regulated parties and a significant burden to meet. This litany of haphazard regulatory change blatantly contradicts Trump’s aggressive “deregulation” agenda.
What’s more, not only does this shift the burden of regulation to the people being regulated, all of whom must now affirmatively work to prove their own innocence, rather than waiting for the government to assemble enough information to conduct its own assessment. It actively adds to that burden. Under Trump, agencies have interpreted their legislative mandate so aggressively and nonsensically (e.g. having the EEOC attack DEI initiatives) that it stretches those mandates to the breaking point, effectively saddling regulated parties with the burden of meeting legal standards that have not even been passed yet. This shortcuts the entire legislative process—which saves Trump the burden of having to deal with it.
In brief, Trump has converted the administrative state into a machine for turning his opinions into law with almost no oversight whatsoever—and he’s put the burden on us.
Trump’s Burden On UsIn American law, procedure is where the rubber meets the road. It’s where the Constitution’s guarantee of life, liberty, and property is given force in the form of due process; it’s where the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected via Miranda warnings; and it’s where our collective decisions as to what should constitute “normal” are given expression in the form of legal burdens.
The administrative state has historically placed the burden of regulation predominantly on the government, in keeping with this country’s strong individualist ethos. By converting the administrative state into a political pulpit first and a regulator second, Trump has inverted that balance. Now, the burden is on the regulated party to prove their own innocence—not only in response to the laws that currently exist, but also to ones that Trump would merely like to exist.
This is in complete opposition to Trump’s extremely loud proclamations that he is lessening the burden of the administrative state. Yet he keeps on touting how much more efficient things are—likely because from his standpoint, as the head of the administrative state, the burden is going away. It’s just not his problem anymore.
Now it’s ours.
Matthew Wollin is a former lawyer turned legal journalist. He’s written for Mother Jones, Newsweek, Slate, and The New Republic. His Substack Should You Care? helps make sense of legal issues for non-lawyers and answers the never-ending news cycle’s eternal question: should you care?
Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
Subscribe now
Are you in DC? Francis Fukuyama will sit down with Jeremiah Johnson, co-founder of the Center for New Liberalism, for a live podcast recording at the New Liberal Action Summit 2025 Opening Reception at Solace Outpost in Navy Yard this Monday, October 20th at 8 PM. They’ll discuss how the internet is responsible for the global tide of populism, how America’s right wing is seizing more control over our media systems, and much more! RSVP for the opening reception here: https://partiful.com/e/kLWpVbsPvYDpKib5hgHx
RSVP for NLAS 2025 here: cnliberalism.org/nlas
A “No Kings” protest in New York on October 18, 2025. (Photo by Timothy A. Clary/AFP via Getty Images)I could feel the panic attack set in the second the suggestion was made. “Would you go cover the No Kings protests on the 18th?” my editor asked, reasonably enough. My heart started pounding, my palms sweating. “I’d rather slit my wrists,” I wrote back. Because in my head, 25 years had vanished. I was back in Caracas, in 2000, planning to go to the very first pro-democracy, anti-Chávez protests, and things were about to go very wrong indeed.
It wasn’t quite the first time. Reading American news these days, everything feels like a flashback. Or a callback. You see “Trump tells Attorney General Pam Bondi to prosecute enemies ‘now,’” I see Chávez in 2004, doing the exact same thing. You see FCC Chair Brendan Carr threatening ABC, I see Diosdado Cabello moving to shut down opposition broadcaster RCTV in 2010.
I’m always mentally slotting the latest outrage into its Venezuelan timeline. It’s all echo.
And of course that’s not a proper basis for analysis. America is its own country, its trauma is its own trauma. It doesn’t exist as an echo other than in my head. But in my head the echo is so loud it’s overwhelming, deafening, paralyzing. I’ve seen this movie before. I know how it ends. It’s awful. And then this sense that it’s going and you can witness it but you can’t stop it. It’s all flashback, but worse than that—it’s only flashback.
“I’ll write you a thing,” I said, “but only if you publish after my flight back home to Japan is in the air.”
Faced with the kinds of news America is cranking out, my amygdala has completely run away with my journalistic brain. I can’t find my analytical voice in all this. I can’t even breathe right.
Of course I know the details are different, but everything rhymes. The news has the feel of a recurring nightmare. Every day the newspaper brings new stories of outrages that all start to jumble together. Each was unthinkable until ten minutes ago but now, apparently, it’s just the way things are.
American news stories aren’t the same as ours were, but they feel the same. That staggered feeling as we see one guardrail after another give way, each with the realization that you and the autocrat are learning at the same time that maybe none of the taboos are really taboo, that none of the guardrails can really pen them in. That desperately exposed feeling, that terrifying sense of being entirely naked in the face of a power that could not give two shits about any of the principles you hold sacred. That nauseated sense of facing a power that takes pleasure in your humiliation.
Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!
The collapse of Venezuela’s democracy is something I don’t talk about very often anymore. Because I don’t know how to convey the depth of the loss. Because all the metaphors feel contrived, or self-pitying. It feels like the loss of a child. The pain fades as it recedes in time but it doesn’t end, not really. Or it’s like a phantom limb, an absence that hurts in a way you can do nothing about because what hurts is what’s missing.
Chávez took power in 1999 and gradually, very gradually, wore away the institutions of the Venezuelan state until no democratic safeguard was left standing. He aggressively politicized everything, denying in principle that those who opposed him were legitimately entitled to do so. He blurred the lines between the state, the government, the party, and himself, until all that was left was a personalist blur. By the time he died in 2013, the constitution was a dead letter. And under his successor, Nicolás Maduro, the wheels fell off altogether, both for our democracy and our society.
We lost everything. Millions of us. Our future, our home, our place in the world. We spent 20 years fighting as hard as we could to stop it, a whole generation of us did. And we failed, and that failure is what our lives will always be about.
When I look back at what I wrote at the time, what burns me is how naive I was. I had this feeling all through that exasperatingly slow drip-drip drip of democratic backsliding that what we had were Third World problems. That of course our institutions were going to shit because they were flimsy little things with a scant 40 years of history, that our democracy was frail because it was young, that shit like this could never happen in a proper democracy. That Britons and Americans and Germans couldn’t understand us because they were so far past this level of development. It was embarrassing to have to explain what was happening to Venezuela. I got so bashful about the shithole-countriness of the story. Throwing away a perfectly good democracy at the behest of some authoritarian narcissist seemed so throwbacky, so embarrassingly anachronistic. Proper countries don’t do that.
It never once occurred to me that Venezuela was a forerunner, that the authoritarian playbook Chávez and Maduro were enacting could play out one day in a place like the United States. Kristi Noem making a partisan rant in a video to be shown at all airports. A duly elected opposition congressional delegate refused her seat for no reason at all. Every day brings new outrages that either rhyme with what Venezuelans went through or just repeat it outright.
Now America seems ready to attack Venezuela, but the country getting poised to strike looks more and more like the country about to be struck.
Democratic backsliding ain’t theory to me. I saw my own democracy throw itself off a cliff. I protested, wrote, organized, got tear gassed, and lost. I saw, with horror, that being 100% right on the merits made zero difference of any kind. I don’t know what to say to Americans now, because my fear is too loud for my thinking to break through.
And I don’t want to write from the amygdala. Nobody wants to read that.
But right now, amygdala is all I’ve got.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.
Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
Subscribe now
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He is the author, with Moisés Naím, of Charlatans: How Grifters, Swindlers, and Hucksters Bamboozle the Media, the Markets, and the Masses.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Quico Toro explore whether fraudsters are motivated by self-deception or the desire to scam, how the internet and our society enable charlatans, and how to resist them.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
If you are having a problem setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email our podcast team at [email protected]
Yascha Mounk: You have written with our mutual friend Moisés Naím a new book about charlatans. Charlatans have always existed. If you go back to the first human settlements, presumably there were already charlatans around. What makes charlatans particularly interesting or important in this moment?
Quico Toro: Well, yes. I always think of the story of the golden calf in Exodus. Whoever made that was clearly making up stories about its magical power. So it is a timeless thing. That is right. They have clearly always been around.
The reason we wrote this book is that when you read about charlatans in earlier times, there were really only a couple of common types. There were get-rich-quick schemes and snake-oil health scams. You can see why, because those are very broad nets. Many people have health problems, and if you have one, you dream of being healthy again. Almost everybody would rather be rich than not rich. For thousands of years, if you were standing on a soapbox in the market trying to hoodwink people, you had a good chance of finding a market among a random crowd.
What has changed in the last few years is that technologies now allow charlatans to microtarget the people they want to reach. As a result, we have seen an explosion in the types of charlatanism today. It is not just “get rich quick” or “get well.” It is things like connecting with aliens, preying on people who are depressed or suicidal and dream of relief, promising true love, or pushing ideas like “making America great again” or racial reconciliation. There are many kinds of things that people are deeply committed to.
Charlatans now have the technology to find those audiences, build new communities of followers, and exploit them in new and creative ways. That makes the phenomenon especially interesting.
Mounk: Why do you think it has become that much broader? Presumably in the past there must have been things other than “get rich quick” or “get well” schemes. I imagine, for example, that people—whether we want to count that as charlatanism or not—wanted to sell spiritual salvation.
In a sense, you could say that the whole Catholic Church, for a few centuries when it was selling indulgences, turned itself into an institutionalized charlatan. It was saying, if only you pay a hundred golden ducats, then you are going to get 500 years less of being tortured in purgatory.
How do we define charlatanism, and how does that help answer the question of why you think there are more of them around today?
Toro: We define a charlatan as somebody who connects with a prior belief that you are deeply committed to and then interposes themselves between you and that belief. They usually start by creating this link, then make assertions of having access to special knowledge or particular powers that ordinary people do not have. They manipulate you into believing that the things you hold deeply can only come true in the world through them.
There are many charlatans in the book who take religious themes and exploit people on that basis. Sometimes people ask, are you saying that all religions are based on charlatans? That is not what we are saying, because there is also a harm standard. What defines the charlatan is the string of broken lives left in their wake.
Looking at mainstream religions today, there is a great deal of social science research showing that people who are religiously observant—Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims—are healthier than others, happier than others, and more embedded in their communities. They have stronger social connections than people who do not participate in those communities. So there is no sense that their lives have been destroyed.
Mounk: But how do we define harm then? I am imagining some extreme religious cult or spiritual cult—a yoga guru who takes all your money, alienates you from your family—but for some lost people, that may actually make them happier. Perhaps if they had not become bound up with that community, they would have ended up as drug addicts, alcoholics, or perhaps even killed themselves.
Even if the community is completely exploiting them, selling something that is complete nonsense, made up by some 32-year-old on Ayahuasca, if the standard is, would your life be worse if you had never encountered this? then perhaps for many people it would be worse, but for some people it might not. For some, life may turn out relatively better devoting themselves to this ridiculous spiritual quackery or cult than it would have otherwise.
Toro: You are getting at one of the hard realities that makes writing about this so difficult. Across the board, when you attack a charlatan, the first people to defend them are those inside the charlatan’s movement. In many cases, charlatanism includes an aspect of financial fraud.
That makes it extremely hard to prosecute people who are taking advantage of victims who not only refuse to press charges but even protest on behalf of the charlatan. You are asking a deep question—deeper than we usually conceive of it. What we see is that the people inside the lives of charlatans’ victims—their family members, those close to them, the people dearest to them—normally have no trouble identifying the harm charlatans cause.
Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.
If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!
Subscribe now
Set Up Podcast
And if you are having a problem setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email our podcast team at [email protected]
Oftentimes, after the spell is broken, victims come out and sheepishly begin to understand. It is almost like cult deconditioning. People need to rebuild their lives, because what a charlatan does is manipulate your identity against you. When you break free, you must rebuild your identity on a new basis, and that is very hard.
Mounk: That gets to the offering. At each stage, and with each individual, you are susceptible to a particular charlatan who promises to deliver on your most deeply cherished hopes and avert your most deeply held fears. When a Cypriot turned up in the Republic of Venice at a time when Venice was declining and in an economic downward spiral, when everybody felt that they were being shoved from the sunlight in political terms, he said, I am going to produce gold, and through this alchemy you will be rich and relive your golden age.
How do they produce this sort of product-market fit, to speak in contemporary marketing parlance? Charlatans are always brilliant at reading people exactly. Is it simply that they offer a pitch and see who shows up? How do they manage to exploit these deepest hopes and fears?
Toro: In a way, it is not actually that difficult. The story of Mamunya in Venice in the 1580s is a classic example. It was no secret that the nobility and the city fathers of Venice were deeply anxious because their city had been a superpower. Suddenly they were cut out of trade routes, as the Portuguese could sail directly to India and the Spanish had built a new empire in the Americas. Venice no longer had a central role, and it could not sustain its status as a superpower. The city was broke.
At a time when alchemy was widely believed in, someone like Mamunya could arrive in Venice and claim to have found the Philosopher’s Stone. He understood that once he said that, people would line up behind him. The interesting thing is that a charlatan does not have to change anybody’s mind. They rarely try to, because it is too hard and does not usually work. Instead, they figure out what people already believe and then champion it—champion it with charisma and with verve.
When there is something in the world you feel must happen—something without which the world does not make sense—and somebody makes the strongest, most appealing case for it, our cognitive defenses are weak. It is natural and normal to fall for people who reflect our deepest values back to us. The danger comes when those people are unscrupulous, feel no remorse, and only want to manipulate you. That puts you in a very bad position.
Mounk: So you were speaking about the victims of this manipulation, and you said that what they have in common—though they are very different from each other in all kinds of dimensions—is that they have some deep hope, and that is being manipulated. What about the charlatans themselves? Are they all sociopaths? Do they all know they are selling something that is not true? Are some of them delusional? Are there some who seem to have had fellow feeling but ended up as charlatans nonetheless?
What do we know about the commonalities and the differences among the charlatans themselves?
Toro: This is a question Moisés and I spent years going back and forth on and arguing about. When you think about it, it is very hard to tell, because you would have to be inside a charlatan’s head, and that is the one place you can never really be. They are very protective of that. Did I tell you to develop a new system for seeing inside the head of a charlatan? If you just give me all your life... No, we are not doing that.
It is very difficult to tell. But we did find a couple of cases where I thought we had a strong sense that the charlatan really believed it. I always think first of Dr. Joseph Mercola, the COVID disinformation superspreader who built a scammy online supplement empire. Court documents reveal his net worth is at least a hundred million dollars, and we do not know how much more he has made. He built a huge fortune selling quack medicine.
In a way, this is a throwback to the snake-oil salesmen of the old West. While researching the book, we had to sit and listen to Dr. Mercola’s podcast for hours. He is really good. Even listening with skepticism, at a certain point you found yourself thinking, maybe I should try some magnesium. Maybe that is the problem in my life.
The place where he really got us was his crank theory, which is not true. I spoke to many doctors who all said this was nonsense. His theory is that people accumulate too much iron in their blood, and the only safe way to get rid of it is by donating blood. Every time he had a guest on his podcast, he would ask, when was the last time you donated blood? You should go and donate blood.
We thought about this. It is strange because he does not make any money from it. Donating blood is one of the best things you can do in terms of prosocial behavior—you save lives and improve your own health, though not for the reasons he claimed. He was giving correct advice for the wrong reasons, in a way that did not benefit him personally. So we came away saddened. He is obviously a charlatan, but he believes it.
Mounk: I have two thoughts here. In philosophy, there is a distinction between truth and true belief. The idea is that some people believe things that are true, but they do not believe them for the right reasons. Therefore, they do not truly hold the truth. There seems to be something similar here. He may be advocating a course of action that is beneficial to the world, perhaps with side benefits for you, but for the wrong reasons. It is analogous.
If I were to be a cynic about his motivations, I might say that is a smart way of pulling the wool over people’s eyes. If I want to get as much money out of you as possible—if it is a romance scam or we are just friends—if I never pay for anything, you are going to think quickly that I am selfish. If I am generous to you in many ways, and then suddenly I come to you and say, Quico, I need $50,000 because this horrible thing is happening in my life, you are much more likely to give me money if I have always paid for lunch.
Subscribe now
So is there an element of that here? He may say, yes, I tell people to buy my supplements, but I also tell people to do all kinds of things from which I gain no benefit. Therefore you should trust my intentions, and therefore you should trust this other action I am taking.
Toro: That is possible. I cannot rule it out because I cannot climb into Joseph Mercola’s head—thank God. But if so, I have to say it sounds a little too clever by half. We read about a lot of charlatans and spent a long time looking at their different stories. That case seemed unique, because we did not see such a roundabout approach elsewhere.
If you listen to him, it is difficult not to get the sense that he is genuinely convinced that unless you give blood two to four times a year, you will be very sick. Please, listener, do give blood two to four times a year. It is very important for entirely different reasons. But that is one case where we felt we had some insight. He seems like a true believer. In many other cases, you just cannot tell.
Mounk: You just cannot know. Elizabeth Holmes—did she buy her own nonsense or not? Did she believe it at some point, then realize she was in over her head and shift? Did she half believe and half not believe? It is incredibly hard to know.
Toro: There are people—we write about Arif Naqvi, who ran a private capital fund in the Middle East investing in developing countries—who took all kinds of sophisticated investors for a ride.
Mounk: Tell us that story, because I had not heard about him before. It is fascinating not only because the scale of the grift was incredible, but also because he was able—as Elizabeth Holmes was as well—to pull the wool over the eyes of very sophisticated people.
Toro: He seems to have been initially just an investor and a capitalist who was very good at what he did. He was a Pakistani financier who set up a shop in Dubai. He started doing deals, buying and selling companies. Very soon he was going to Davos and other confabs of the rich, where people felt guilty about their extreme elite status. He realized their dream was not about having more money—they already had more money than they knew what to do with. Their dream was about feeling they were doing something virtuous for the world’s poor.
He began targeting them with this. “Doing well by doing good” grift is what we call it. That was a phrase he used to convince people that through Abraaj, his private equity fund, they could buy companies in developing countries, reorganize them, make a lot of money, and create more economic dynamism in poor countries, improving poor people’s lives.
He does appear to have started with the intention of doing that. But as business went less well than he expected, he seems to have morphed over time into a Ponzi schemer. People who end up acting in charlatan-like ways do not necessarily start out that way. Even Charles Ponzi himself is an example.
Mounk: That is true of many financial Ponzi schemes. Some are conceived as Ponzi schemes from the beginning, such as selling things in a neighborhood or other small operations. But in many cases, the person begins simply as an investor. At some point, they are unable to pay the returns they promised. At that stage, instead of going bankrupt, they start taking on new investments in order to pay out the old ones. They push themselves into being a Ponzi schemer rather than accepting failure.
It is the moment of desperation—when you should say, I am sorry, I made a mistake. You will get back cents on the dollar, and I will go live an unremarkable life—that you instead start falsifying the books. The only way to keep going is to make it bigger and bigger. I may be misremembering the details about Bernie Madoff, but I think that was true of him as well, was it not?
Toro: I am not sure about Madoff, but Charles Ponzi himself in the 1920s seems to have gone through something like this. Historians disagree about it, but Ponzi did have a good idea for a good scheme at the start. It was only later that things went off the rails. That seems to be a clear case.
Mounk: Of all the things to get named after you, it is amazing. Lou Gehrig had great athletic achievements and then suffered a terrible disease. What is he remembered for? The fact that he got that disease. There is something particularly strange or ironic about being Mr. Ponzi and having all of these schemes named after you.
I want to go back to the psychology piece of this. I know many people who have dreams they think they are about to realize, but they never do. They believe they will be great stage actors, novelists, or entrepreneurs. From the outside, it looks obvious that they do not have it. Most people around them seem to know it too, but they believe.
Subscribe now
Presumably that is the generous interpretation of some charlatans. They believe in themselves. Charlatans are people like that with a better sense of how to sell things. They convince themselves, I have figured out the recipe for doing this. I am on the way to figuring out the recipe. Or am I wrong to think that?
Toro: Maybe, but after looking at many of these cases, I really do not think so. The psychology of someone with great or outsized belief in themselves seems like a very normal psychology. This is what normal people do. They become attached to things, want to pursue them, and want the world to be different in some way.
What we see in many charlatan cases—it is tricky because I am not a psychologist, and neither is Moisés, so we cannot diagnose them—is that if you look at the definitions of antisocial personality disorder, what used to be called psychopathy, you find traits such as inability to feel remorse, inability to see other people as true subjects deserving of respect. Machiavellianism, narcissism—you see these abnormal traits again and again.
The conclusion we come to is that the victims are normal people. There is nothing wrong with the victims. There is something wrong with the charlatans. There is an abnormal psychology to realizing the power they can have by manipulating dreams, enjoying it, and building their entire lives around it. Cross-culturally, people with these “dark triad” traits tend to persist and appear in many societies.
Mounk: Let me think about the converse of this. Right now I was considering the case of somebody who is able to deceive themselves but does not have those dark triad personality traits. They do not have talent for something. For example, I have recently been playing more soccer, and I suddenly convince myself that at my age I am finally going to become a professional soccer player. Clearly that is not going to happen. But I am not selling stocks in my future earnings. I am not getting people to invest in my soccer career. I just become irrationally convinced that if I practice enough, I am going to play for Bayern Munich. Humans have an incredible ability to self-delude in that way, and perhaps some charlatans might be like that. You are a little skeptical.
What about the inverse? What about people who are relatively competent at something? What they are selling is not a complete lie, but they have strong dark triad traits that lead them to hugely oversell what they are doing. That seems to me to be the bigger phenomenon. When I look at many politicians, startup founders, or online influencers, the most disturbing thing about our culture is not the poor souls who deserve compassion but are not very dangerous, who completely delude themselves about one day achieving something impossible. It is not even the outright scammers, though they are the worst and can do real damage in certain domains.
Most people fall somewhere in between. What they are selling is not completely made up; it is vastly overhyped. They seem to share many of the traits that most charlatans do. They have dark personality traits. They know exactly how to manipulate. They know exactly how to sell. It is probably easier to do all of that if you have something that works to some extent. So is that half-charlatanism the true scourge of our age?
Toro: I fully agree with all of that. That is why we wanted to write the book—because there is something about today’s communications landscape that makes ours a charlatanogenic culture.
It puts you in a position where it is very easy to slide into charlatan-like behavior. What acts as a brake on that, ultimately, is whether you have enough of a conscience to feel bad if you are truly manipulating or destroying people’s lives. What shifts a person from the possibility of charlatan-like situations into outright charlatanry is the absence of that brake. Charlatans do not feel remorse when they take someone else’s savings, exploit them for sex, or use them to gain more political power.
We now have many more charlatans noticing niches of belief that can be targeted, and many more ways of reaching potential marks. That is what is different. In the past, if your dreams or core beliefs were very niche, they were probably too niche for anyone to bother exploiting. That is no longer true.
One of my favorite stories from the book is about Mehmet Aydın, who grew up in a farm town south of Istanbul. He lived in a farming community but later moved to the city, where he missed the rural lifestyle. He realized there were millions of people in Turkey like him. He built an entire scam around that feeling.
Do you remember Farmville, the Facebook game? He essentially ripped it off and layered on a story: if you played his game and invested in his company, there would be real cows corresponding to each screen cow. Those cows would produce cheese, milk, honey, and sausages, and you would make money. Even though you lived in the city, you could connect with Turkey’s true farming stock.
It had never occurred to me that people in Istanbul and Ankara might feel this way, but he knew, and he could target something that specific. In the book, we show how people find these niches because of their life experience and how they can now exploit them as charlatans. A hundred years ago, they could not.
Mounk: I think that is fascinating, and I enjoyed that story, which is one of many wild stories in the book. I am trying to get at where I encounter charlatans in my own life. I have emails in my spam folder trying to sell me all kinds of nonsense. Those are people who simply lie outright. For them, we have laws.
In those cases, if you claim there is a real cow and there is no cow, we know how to deal with that. The machinery does not always work, but it exists. Technological developments make it easier for scammers, and there are more scammers today than in the past, partly because there is more wealth to exploit.
What really bothers me about the world are areas where people are not doing anything illegal. They may be driven by the same character traits, and they may exploit what you call in the book the weaknesses of the human operating system. But they are “semi-charlatans” because they stay on legal ground. They overpromise rather than lie outright.
There is a lovely legal concept in England called “mere puff.” If you say, this product will make you 12% slimmer, and it does not, then you can be sued because you lied about the study. If you say, this is 100% good, you cannot be sued because that is puffery. That realm of puff seems to me to be where the charlatanogenic aspects of our society truly lie.
Let me give a few examples. I hope I am a good teacher. I tend to get good evaluations, and I enjoy teaching very much. It gives meaning to my life. But I think the most popular teachers often have something of a cult leader about them. They do not just say, we are going to talk about important subjects, I am knowledgeable, and I want to make sure all points of view are heard. They say, I have access to unique wisdom, I am the charismatic figure in this classroom, and I will give you access to this special knowledge.
Or take fundraising. Persuasion is a 501(c)(3), so I do some amount of fundraising. When I raise funds from people I genuinely like and respect, it is easy, because we are friends. It is harder to ask for money, but it happens. The people who are really good fundraisers do not just fundraise from their genuine friends. They cater, flatter, and sell. They may run organizations that do decent things, but they overstate: This will transform the world, this will make all the difference.
I think Persuasion does important work, contributes to public discourse, and helps orient people in a powerless political moment. It may even be one of the forces that help rebuild moderate politics and push back against populism. But I will not say it is only because of us. The people who are really good fundraisers will say that.
The same is true of pitches from other publications and platforms. Our pitch is: we are serious people reflecting seriously on the world, hopefully in a way that is engaging, entertaining, and politically meaningful. Please support us if you value that. Others say, everybody else is lying. We alone tell you the truth. You must come here. Some of what they publish is good. They should not be in jail. They are not breaking the law. How do we think about that space?
Toro: You are getting at a lot of important themes and many of the reasons we wrote the book. Not all charlatans are criminals. Many end up behaving in criminal ways, but one interesting thing about charlatans is that they operate out in public under their own names. That makes them different from fraudsters.
In that gray space, you have to be very careful. They work with the things you believe in—but it is good that you believe in things. If you do not care about public discourse, do not care about a free society, then Persuasion or anyone else cannot scam you. You cannot get a purchase on someone who does not believe in anything. What makes charlatans so interesting is that they exploit vulnerabilities that are also what make us human. They exploit the same qualities that make us interesting, creative, and hopeful: the desire to see change, to make a better world, to imagine how the world should be.
Charlatans are the parasitic element in society that looks at those qualities and says, I can exploit that. A world with no charlatans would be a world full of nihilists, people who do not believe in anything. If you do not believe in anything, you cannot be scammed. But if you do not believe in anything, you are a psychopath, and we would not want to live in that kind of world.
The way I think about it is that we will always have charlatans because we will always believe in people. Charlatans are a parasitic element in society that cannot be eradicated. They can only be managed, like diabetes. But we are living in a society with more sugary treats everywhere, which makes the condition harder to manage. I do not see many people realizing, or internalizing, that they are at greater risk now than before.
Mounk: So what makes people more at risk? The psychological preconditions are the same as before. Perhaps as we ascend Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, higher-order desires become a bigger part of what motivates us. That gives charlatans more areas to attach themselves.
If all you want is housing, security, and safety, those are primary concerns. Someone who promises those things can be dangerous to you, but you will know quickly whether you have food or shelter. Desires such as enlightenment, racial harmony, or everlasting beauty are different. They are complex, span long timeframes, and are easier to exploit.
If that is the case, what can we do? Is the line of defense to become aware of this concept and adjust our own psychology—so that we–Quico, Yascha, and our listeners on this podcast–can see the warning signs better, find healthier ways to fulfill our desires, and avoid the cheap sugar rush charlatans offer? Or is it better regulation and law, better ways to deal with the internet, social media, and AI? What should we do?
Toro: I think it is all of those things, but you are missing one important element: social isolation and screen-mediated societies.
Many of the charlatans we discuss target people who are not embedded in thriving human communities and lack others around them who can check their instincts. A major reason we are more exposed is not only that we are wealthier, but also that we have fewer breaks and checks on our enthusiasm. One thing everybody should do—for many reasons, and this is just one—is to turn off the screen, spend time outside, volunteer, join a community arts project, or help with a Little League team. Have humans around you so that when you hear an alluring pitch you can say, I heard this guy saying this and this, and then get a second opinion or outside perspective.
Another interesting thing about charlatans is that you can hear a hundred pitches and ninety-nine of them will be aimed at people different from you. They will try to connect with dreams and commitments that are not yours, and those pitches always sound ridiculous. You wonder, how could anyone fall for this obvious scam? That gives a false sense of security: I am protected, I will be fine. But when the hundredth pitch really connects with you—especially at a time when you are isolated—it becomes very hard, cognitively, to resist.
Mounk: That is interesting. I thought about this the other way around. There was a guy I went to college with who, every time somebody important was speaking on campus—and at a good university you have the privilege of many people coming through—he would go to every talk. If you spent your days attending those events, you could have brief conversations with important people every week or every day. He went to all of them and flattered the speakers at the end. He would say, I am a lifelong fan, you are an inspiration.
You would always see it. At any talk by anyone influential, he would be there and pull the same stunt. Nine out of ten of them would look embarrassed, recognize that he was a little strange, politely smile, say thank you, that is very nice, and forget about him twenty minutes later. But one in ten would fall for it. One in ten would respond, and then he would brag, I am emailing with so-and-so. It was a numbers game.
I had thought about it as a numbers game for the charlatan. He was a kind of charlatan. But it is also a numbers game for the targets. You may be very good at spotting ninety-nine out of a hundred charlatans. But one will have the charm, strike the right note, or catch you at a low moment, and they may be able to prey on you. That is a very good point.
Toro: One interesting thing is that different charlatans have different models. Some play a mass game, exploiting millions of people a little bit. Others are very niche, aiming to get only thirty or fifty people in the world to join them, but then going very deep and taking over their lives. At that point you move into cult territory.
The thing that bothers a charlatan least is if you laugh off their pitch, because they expect that. It is baked into the model. They know their pitch is not meant to win over people who were not already inclined. It is a discovery device.
Mounk: Since you mentioned laughing them off, I think some people might fancy—perhaps some cultures, like the British who like to make fun of things—that they are more immune to charlatanism because they have a sardonic sense of humor. The idea is that Americans can fall for charlatans because they are earnest and believe in big dreams, whereas a more cynical culture like the English may have weapons against that. Humor can take somebody down a peg and expose their grift, and often there is something ridiculous about charlatans.
Perhaps if you come from a culture where you do not allow yourself to dream big, you might be more protected. Is there evidence for that? Are some cultures more resistant to charlatans than others? Or is it the case that if you come from a cynical culture, the one person who lights up that fire of hope in you may actually leave you more defenseless against their schemes?
Toro: I have not found any evidence or research on this question. I wonder how you would even study it. I tend to be skeptical, because even cultures that superficially present as cynical or detached, once you scratch past that outer layer of cynicism, you find people are committed to certain things. That is just a normal part of human cognition. A person who truly cannot be reached by a charlatan’s pitch is, almost by definition, unusual—and not in a good way. You would not want to be friends with that person, because that is not normal psychology.
In a way, I take pride in being scammable. I do not think I have ever really been taken by a charlatan, but there have been a few times when I was curious or thought, this is a good idea. For example, I believe in capitalism and free markets, so if I had heard a pitch from someone appealing to those beliefs at the right time, I probably would have found it quite interesting.
Being scammable should be worn as a badge of pride. It means you are a normal person. I worry more about people who take pride in being unscammable.
Mounk: This is so cynical. There was a big story a little while ago about a finance writer for New York Magazine who ended up being scammed and wrote a viral piece about it. Many people online mocked her: you are supposed to be a personal finance writer, so how can you end up being scammed in this way?
There was a fascinating response piece that involved more reporting. One part of the story was that she went to her bank and asked for $50,000, or some very large sum. The response writer said this made them think she had fabricated the story. If you go to your bank and ask for $50,000, they are not going to hand it over immediately. All the alarms go off, and the bank says, why do you need it today? We can give it to you in a couple of days. Explain the situation to us.
In her article, she presented herself as a freelance writer or columnist in Brooklyn with limited means. So how did she get the money? The answer was a smaller scam she was pulling on her readers. There is indeed a branch matching her description. But it turns out she comes from a wealthy family and is a trustee of a major charity. The reason the bank did not blink at handing over $50,000 is that she has signing authority on accounts worth millions of dollars. For the bank, $50,000 was not that much.
Toro: That surprised me. I think we are too quick to judge people who get taken in by charlatans. A lot of what we are trying to do in the book is build people’s capacity to empathize, to see themselves in the position of the victim, and not to be so quick to judge. That quickness to judge, in a strange way, exposes you more, because it makes you feel invulnerable.
Mounk: But I guess, as a society, we might not want to live in a place where nobody ever falls foul to a scam, because that would mean we’re all so cynical, skeptical, and pessimistic that there would be many negative externalities. What about at the individual level? Should we cultivate the kind of skepticism that leads to that? I have a question here from my producer Leo, who asks, is there anything to learn from charlatans? Would I be more successful if I were a psychopath?
Toro: Of course, I do not think you would want to. You cannot fake psychopathy. If you are not a psychopath and you try to pretend that you are, you will only drive yourself insane. This is not a recipe that can be followed, because it is a personality trait. Thank God for that.
Mounk: You can’t learn to be a psychopath. Incredibly, psychopaths can learn to pass themselves off as not being psychopaths.
Toro: Very easily. That is not hard for them at all. There is a lot of evidence that psychopaths tend to excel in many fields, because if you do not worry about the consequences of your actions or other people’s feelings, life is essentially on easy mode. Many political leaders show signs of psychopathy.
Some evolutionary psychologists have proposed—controversially—that it may be good for a society in times of crisis to be led by someone willing to make inhuman choices for the collective good, and that someone with a more normal psychological makeup might not be the best leader in such moments. They suggest this is why there is a stable supply of psychopaths in all societies: there can be an evolutionary payoff to having that pool of talent available. Many other evolutionary psychologists, however, think that idea is nonsense.
Mounk: Presumably, the main evolutionary explanation must be at the individual rather than the group level. If you are a psychopath, you can manipulate people and situations, which makes you better at acquiring resources. You may even be more successful in finding romantic partners and passing on your genes.
Toro: Definitely. If you do not mind lying, it is easier to get laid, of course. That is obvious. But the broader point is that this is not the kind of success normal people would want. It is a definition of success that is deeply pathological.
At the individual level, what we can do is limited. You can try to keep enough real human relationships in your life so that you have that second thought. That is very important. The other part—what you can do internally, psychologically—is easy to say but almost impossible to do. You need to hold your deepest commitments at arm’s length every so often, not to reject them, but to understand them the way a psychopath or a charlatan would: as vulnerabilities that could be exploited.
It takes real self-awareness to think, I care deeply about this, and I will continue to care about it, but caring this much puts me at risk. That is a sophisticated kind of cognitive move, and not everyone can handle it. In fact, no one can do it consistently, which is why we are all at risk.
Mounk: Your argument against wanting to be a psychopath, as you point out, is a strange question because you can’t learn to be a psychopath. It reminds me of one of my favorite arguments in philosophy by Bernard Williams on a similar topic—why we shouldn’t be egotists, which is related to psychopathy. What he’s saying is that there’s this long philosophical debate about whether we can find transcendental reasons for why you shouldn’t be self-serving—why there are objective moral rules and laws that show you why you should be altruistic in certain ways or to some extent.
Bernard Williams says, look, we’re not going to find those, but that’s irrelevant. What I can tell you is what kind of life it leads to be an egotist. If you are a complete egotist, you’re incapable of enjoying friendship, love, and other social goods that are meaningful to most people. Some people may still have a psychological predilection to go there, and we’re never going to convince them with a moral argument. But for most of humanity, that is reason enough not to want to be an egotist. There are rewards in what it means to care for a friend, to care for a romantic partner, to care for a child, to care for a pet, to be part of a broader life project. The success of your life is in some ways entangled with something beyond yourself that gives meaning and structure to your life. Those are the reasons why you shouldn’t be an egotist.
If all of that doesn’t matter to you—if you say, I don’t care about any of that—we’re not going to find some objective argument that convinces you. But we don’t really need to.
Toro: Yeah, philosophers are strange. That seems to me a very odd way to discuss the argument, because these things are not normally the subject of rational consideration. I don’t think they are. For people who are basically psychologically normal, this is both inevitable and entirely a given, to the point where if you’re unable to act on those insights, that is prima facie evidence that you have a badly disordered personality and probably a personality disorder. So I think we’re saying the same thing.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Quico discuss charlatans in politics, why they thrive, and whether politics will overcome charlatanism. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
To receive future installments into your inbox—plus more great pieces by American Purpose and Francis Fukuyama’s blog—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the buttons for “American Purpose” and “Frankly Fukuyama.”
Subscribe now
Email preferences
Can the declaration of Armageddon, made in my most recent article, ever have a postscript? The one rule about the Trump assault on the bureaucracy is that no battle is ever final. And three big stories—make that four—underline the point.
The first was a ruling on Wednesday by Senior U.S. District Judge Susan Illston in San Francisco that blocked the layoffs launched by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The judge concluded that the administration has “taken advantage of the lapse in government spending, in government functioning, to assume that all bets are off, that the laws don’t apply to them anymore.” Moreover, “They’re overturning the agency mandates that Congress has put in place. They can’t do that.” Statements by President Trump, Vice President Vance, and OMB Director Russell Vought all pointed to a political motivation for the reductions in force (RIFs)—as the layoffs are known—instead of reasons rooted in law.
Judge Illston also pressed the government’s attorney for more details about the administration’s justification for the RIFs. The attorney said she wasn’t prepared to answer the question. This didn’t please the judge, who was searching for some kind of argument so she could understand the administration’s case.
So the judge put a halt to the firings, at least for employees represented by AFGE, the union that brought the case.
The second story was evidence that the administration did not seem deterred by the criticism it was getting. OMB Director Vought said earlier in the day that the initial firing of 4,000 employees was just a “snapshot” of what was to come. The RIFs would keep “rolling throughout the shutdown,” he said. “I think we’ll probably end up being north of 10,000.” When more cases bubble up, the clear political motivation of the decisions won’t make it any easier for the government’s attorneys.
The third story came when the White House issued a new executive order that expanded on a previous hiring plan for the federal government. It required every agency head to create a “Strategic Hiring Committee” to “approve the creation or filling, as applicable, of each vacancy within their agency.” The committee, moreover, was required to “ensure that agency hiring is consistent with the national interest, agency needs, and the priorities of my Administration.” The committee is required to include the deputy secretary or other number two individuals as well as the chief of staff to the agency head.
Subscribe now
That means the very top officials in every agency have to approve the hiring of every single new government employee. At the Department of Housing and Urban Development, for example, it means about a thousand new hires a year. In the Department of Defense, the number ranges between 30,000 and 40,000. That’s a lot of paperwork for already-busy top officials to review.
Fine print in the executive order, though, could make the job easier: focusing on individuals who demonstrate a commitment to “the priorities of my Administration.” That’s a license for patronage and an invitation for administration officials to tapdance around the merit-based requirements in the administration’s earlier guidance.
None of this, however, applies to officials hired for political roles, including Schedule C confidential assistant positions and employees in the new Schedule G, created without a limit to perform any political task required. So it’s even more tempting to move fast in hiring those officials to further increase political control over federal agencies.
The Trump administration is playing a fast-moving game that the courts are struggling to keep up with and that Congress is watching from miles away.
Make no mistake: Judge Illston is precisely right that the administration is determined to overturn the law wherever and whenever it chooses. It’s going to continue to work all the angles on this plan, especially while the shutdown continues. And it’s going to be tough for anyone to catch up and challenge it.
In fact, the biggest political mistake the administration made in this phase of its campaign is that top officials—Trump, Vance, and Vought—were too clumsy in their deeds by being too clumsy in declaring their purpose. By declaring the firings “should be Democrat-oriented,” they made it easy for federal judges to strike the actions down.
The administration might learn to play the game more cleverly and combine a higher level of skill with the fast pace of its action.
Subscribe now
And that’s just what happened in the fourth story, with a memo authorizing Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to transfer any available cash to pay members of the armed forces. This gave the Democrats a tough choice: balk at what clearly was an effort to grab Congress’s power of the purse and risk the ire of everyone who supports paying members of the military (which is almost everyone); or concede the point on political grounds and surrender one more mile in the balance-of-powers battle.
This was just one day in the life of the republic, but it’s a scary omen. This Armageddon can indeed have a postscript. In fact, not one but many. Watch this space.
Donald F. Kettl is Professor Emeritus and Former Dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. He is the author, with William D. Eggers, of Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems.
Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
Subscribe now
Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, October 24, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
The right seems to be on a mission to expose universities as centers of leftist indoctrination. Too often we professors waved away the charge. We called these assertions naive at best, Trumpy at worst. Students, we rightly noted, are not putty in our hands, to be molded as we see fit. They have their own minds. Plus, we all too often struggle to even get them to do the readings. How could we possibly be indoctrinating them?
This objection has been made plenty of times. But it’s time we saw it for what it is: A dodge that deflects attention away from what professors are actually doing in their classrooms. The truth is that far too many are teaching in ways that look a lot like they’re trying to indoctrinate students, even if that isn’t always their intention.
We just completed a study that draws on a database of millions of college syllabi to explore how professors teach three of the nation’s most contentious topics—racial bias in the criminal justice system, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the ethics of abortion. Since all these issues sharply divide scholars, we wanted to know whether students were expected to read a wide or narrow range of perspectives on them. We wondered how well professors are introducing students to the moral and political controversies that divide intellectuals and roil our democracy.
Not well, as it turns out. Across each issue we found that the academic norm is to shield students from some of our most important disagreements.
Consider, for example, Michelle Alexander’s important 2010 book, The New Jim Crow. Alexander argued that mass incarceration emerged after the collapse of the Jim Crow system in the South, largely as a way to reestablish the subjugation of black Americans. It would be hard to overstate its influence. Ibram X. Kendi called it “the spark that would eventually light the fire of Black Lives Matter.” And on college campuses, it became the assigned reading. On the topic of race and the criminal justice system, no other work is more popular in the syllabi database; it appears in more than four thousand syllabi in U.S. universities and colleges.
Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!
As soon as it was published, The New Jim Crow stirred contention within academia. The most prominent critic was James Forman, Jr., a professor at Yale Law School. In a seminal working paper, Forman challenged Alexander’s thesis. Among other shortcomings, Forman wrote that The New Jim Crow “fails to consider black attitudes toward crime and punishment, ignores violent crimes while focusing almost exclusively on drug crimes, obscures class distinctions within the African American community, and overlooks the effects of mass incarceration on other racial groups.” Forman’s work culminated in a book titled Locking Up Our Own, a well-regarded work that won the Pulitzer Prize.
How often is Forman’s book assigned along with Alexander’s? Less than four percent of the time. Other prominent critics—like Michael Fortner, John Pfaff, and Patrick Sharkey—are assigned even less often. Fortner’s important book The Black Silent Majority, for example, is assigned with The New Jim Crow less than two percent of the time.
So what is assigned with The New Jim Crow? Mostly books that are broadly aligned with it. The three most commonly co-assigned texts include Angela Davis’s Are Prisons Obsolete?, Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me, and Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. We estimate that less than 10 percent of professors assigning Alexander’s book actually teach the controversy surrounding it.
Teaching of Israel and Palestine fits the same pattern. Staunchly anti-Zionist texts—those that question the moral legitimacy of the Israeli state—are commonly assigned. Rashid Khalidi, the just-retired Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia, is the most popular author on this topic in the database. A Palestinian-American and member of the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation in the 1990s, Khalidi places the blame on Israel for failing to resolve the conflict and sees the country’s existence as a consequence of settler-colonialism.
Subscribe now
The problem is not the teaching of Khalidi itself, as some on the American right might insist. To the contrary, it is important for students to encounter voices like Khalidi’s. The problem is who he is usually taught with. Generally, Khalidi is taught with other critics of Israel, such as Charles D. Smith, Ilan Pappe, and James Gelvin.
Not only is Khalidi’s work rarely assigned alongside prominent critics; those critics seem to hardly get taught at all. They include Israel: A Concise History by Daniel Gordis, a professor at Shalem College in Israel. Despite winning the National Jewish Book Award, Gordis’s book appears only 22 times in the syllabus database. Another example is the work of Efraim Karsh, a prominent historian. His widely-cited classic, Fabricating Israeli History, appears just 24 times.
For most students, though, any exposure to the conflict begins and ends with Edward Said’s Orientalism, first published in 1978. Said is the intellectual godfather of so many of today’s scholars of the Middle East, thanks in no small part to this classic book. In Orientalism, Said claimed to be the first scholar to “culturally and politically” identify “wholeheartedly with the Arabs,” and he faulted the West for not recognizing the “Zionist invasion and colonization of Palestine.”
Orientalism is among the most popular books assigned in the United States, showing up in nearly four thousand courses in the syllabus database. But although it was a major source of controversy, both then and now, it is rarely assigned with any of the critics he sparred with, like Bernard Lewis, Ian Buruma, or Samuel Huntington. Instead, it’s most often taught with books by fellow luminaries of the postmodern left, such as Frantz Fanon, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault.
What about the ethics of abortion? This question is taught in a more even-handed way, at least compared to the other issues we studied. More than a third of syllabi that assign Judith Jarvis Thomson’s classic defense of abortion rights, for example, pair it with a pro-life voice. Yet even in this case, we observe the same pattern: Most professors shield their students from scholarly controversy.
These patterns are likely the result of several causes. Some professors may simply be unaware of the broader scholarly controversies surrounding these issues, especially if they are teaching material well outside of their field. Roughly a quarter of professors who teach The New Jim Crow, for example, are trained in the fields of English, social work, education, theology, and philosophy—and thus they presumably have no real expertise in law or political science. So, not surprisingly, we find that they are even less likely to assign Alexander’s critics than political scientists or historians. (By way of contrast, the ethics of abortion is almost entirely taught by philosophers—that is, by scholars with real expertise in the subject matter. It’s not surprising that their courses better reflect their field’s disagreements.)
We also suspect that too many professors, swept up in this or that moral cause, use the classroom as an opportunity to press that cause onto their students. The temptation to do so must be especially strong when they are convinced of their own particular analysis. The logic goes something like this: If, in our considered judgement, scholars like Alexander, Khaldi, and Thomson see further than others, then isn’t it our duty to privilege these thinkers? Do we really have any special obligation to teach their misguided critics?
The biggest problem with this line of reasoning was identified by John Stuart Mill long ago. Put bluntly, it’s arrogance and, worse, paternalism, based on an assumption of infallibility. There is no good reason to suppose that any of these thinkers have a monopoly on wisdom, or the right to decide these matters for students, when there is a real debate among the experts. And even if these thinkers did have such a monopoly, it would still be valuable to teach their critics, so students can become more fluent in the ideas that divide both intellectuals and the public, and sharpen the analytic skills that they will need to make the world better.
Having taught controversial topics ourselves, we also believe that syllabi always create an Overton window—a range of reasonable points of view. The problem with the way most syllabi narrow Overton windows is that they tend to keep discussion within ideologically “safe” boundaries. Inculcating such habits of thought can’t be good for students, even if we believe that this or that perspective is far nearer to the truth than those we are excluding. It also creates a false impression of intellectual consensus where there is none.
Perhaps the most troubling objection to our project, and the most emphatic complaint we’ve heard since posting our paper, is that now is not the time to be raising these concerns. In the face of Trump’s blunderbuss war on the universities, we shouldn’t air our profession’s dirty laundry. One colleague, whose work we deeply respect, told us that it could be used “as a pretext” to do even more damage to the institutions that we love.
But we are convinced that there are other dangers to ignoring a real problem—dangers that are every bit as existential as Trump’s war on the universities. If we professors suspend our critical inquiries in the face of this emergency, then Trump has truly destroyed higher education.
Subscribe now
So here is our suggestion: Professors should actually teach the scholarly controversies on the issues that most divide them, and they should advertise their success at opening their classrooms to dissenting perspectives. These changes could be incentivized through generous course development grants. Institutions could offer more teaching workshops to graduate students and new professors, many of whom have little guidance on how to teach.
This is not an attempt to de-politicize universities, nor an appeal to “neutrality.” The irony is that we can only temper the current political war over higher education by politicizing our courses; that is, by building more contention into them. It may take decades to fully right our ship. But if we succeed, future generations of professors will be able to do more than dodge the question, “Aren’t you professors just indoctrinating students?” Unlike us, they will be able to answer future critics of academia with an unequivocal “no”—and for proof, point to thousands of balanced syllabi on the issues that most divide us.
Jon A. Shields, Yuval Avnur, and Stephanie Muravchik are professors at the Claremont Colleges.
Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
Subscribe now
Bret Stephens is an opinion columnist for The New York Times and the founder and editor-in- chief of SAPIR, a quarterly devoted to issues of Jewish concern.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha and Bret discuss how Donald Trump has changed political culture, why moderates around the world are struggling, and what makes the United States uniquely innovative.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I had this thought the other day that Trump really is winning, and he is winning in part because he is much more effective and efficient in imposing his will on the American Republic than he was in the first term. But he may be winning more broadly because he seems to be teaching our entire political culture to operate by his rules.
One of the things I admired about Barack Obama was his insistence that when they go low, we go high. At this point, it feels as though Democrats—and really the entire political culture—have decided that we are in a mudslinging match, and the only way to win is to bring as much mud as possible. That does not mean that the two sides are the same or that they pose equivalent dangers, but it is still depressing.
I found the response to Charlie Kirk’s assassination attempt, and to the text messages by Jay Jones, the candidate for attorney general in Virginia wishing for his moderate Republican opponent and his children to be killed, deeply troubling—especially the excuses made for it. The fact that the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination now appears to be Gavin Newsom because he has decided to emulate Trump as much as possible on social media just reinforces that sense.
It feels like we are on an inexorable slide toward a generalized culture of Trumpism. Am I being overly pessimistic here?
Bret Stephens: I think, Yascha, that tracks some of my thinking from even his first term. I remember saying at some point in that era that the problem with Trump is not that he is catastrophic; it is that he is corrosive. Corrosion can lead, in time, to catastrophe, but what he was really doing was degrading the soft tissue of American democracy in a way that was ultimately going to harm—if I have to extend the metaphor—more essential organs.
American democracy held itself up, to a large extent, through the kind of manners and morals—in Burkean terms—that sustained our way of doing business. You can trace the corrosion back years, and people will argue about when it really began, but Trump gravely accelerated it. Now the Democrats believe they can find political advantage by adopting a symmetrical approach.
My intuition–although I worry it is more of a wish–is that this is profoundly wrong. If the average independent or undecided voter is left with a choice between Donald Trump and MAGA-ites behaving as they do, and the left behaving like MAGA-ites, the MAGA-ites will win almost every time. Not everywhere, but almost every time. For a variety of reasons, the best strategy for opponents of Trump—including conservative opponents like me—is exactly that Michelle Obama strategy: to go high.
There is a yearning in a healthy segment, or what remains of a healthy segment, of the American Republic for a totally different kind of discourse. Having the Adam Schiffs of the world drop F-bombs to show their coarseness, toughness, or everydayness does not serve the Democrats well. But maybe that is because I wish for a more genteel period in American politics that is not coming back. I don’t know.
Mounk: There are two questions here, I suppose. One is how we actually protect our democratic institutions and regain the kind of politics we want in the long run. The way I have put this since the beginning of this debate is that you are put into a terrible dilemma when you are trying to play soccer and your opponent shows up with baseball bats. If you keep playing soccer while they are threatening you with baseball bats, you are going to be beaten up.
I certainly think that the Trump administration is doing things at the moment that are deeply threatening to the rule of law and the separation of powers in the American Republic. Trump sending what, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal, appears to have been meant as a private message to Pam Bondi instructing her to go after his political opponents, and James Comey being indicted five days later on a slapdash, cobbled-together indictment made by a just-appointed prosecutor for that purpose, is a baseball bat. That is dangerous for the American Republic.
Of course, the problem is that if, in response, you get a bunch of baseball bats as well, perhaps you have a better chance of winning, but you are no longer playing soccer. If the purpose is not just to win the next election but to preserve the American Republic, then there is a very serious dilemma here.
The other point you are making is that perhaps, in terms of electoral politics, it is not actually that smart to go low. Gavin Newsom has, I think, boosted his chances of becoming the Democratic Party nominee by mocking Trump on social media and posting fake AI videos of J.D. Vance—which, by the way, legislation he supported in California would have made criminal—and engaging in these antics. But he may not be boosting his chances of actually winning the 2028 presidential election against someone like Vance if he is selected. So what is the way forward?
Stephens: I think Democrats are under a misapprehension—or many Democrats are—that they have a communications problem. They actually have a substance problem. I do not think Gavin Newsom is going to become president, not because he is not telegenic or good at debate, but because California is a visibly misgoverned state.
It is a state where more people leave than enter, a state where businesses struggle to survive. Talk to any entrepreneur in California who is not in high tech and they live under a vast weight. It is a state that has made every conceivable mistake, and it is wholly governed by Democrats, so there is no escaping political accountability.
I have said this for years: the secret of successful demagoguery is not to traffic in lies, but in half-truths. Hitler had a point about Versailles. Many Germans who objected to what John Maynard Keynes called the Carthaginian Peace of 1919 had a point. He made it in the most angry way, and of course, the program was evil and insane. But Trump has cannily picked up on a number of issues that were politically legitimate, genuine, and treated as unmentionable by most Democratic politicians.
Migration and the border crisis, which swept the United States under Biden because of his policies, was one of them. Trump alighted on that. The extent of urban disorder—whether recorded as crime, juvenile delinquency, or simply scary-looking streets—is another legitimate issue. The cover-up of Joe Biden’s mental health is a third. Trump picked up on these when the entire Democratic establishment said there was nothing to see.
The secret for Democratic revival, to my mind, comes from acknowledging those mistakes—some of which were very serious—and proposing real solutions. Trump is right that there is a real immigration issue, but Democrats can follow the model of Barack Obama, who was not afraid to deport illegal migrants and to call them illegal migrants rather than wander in the semantic waters of “undocumented workers.”
At the same time, Democrats can have an immigration policy that welcomes the Yascha Mounks of the world—and more than the Yascha Mounks—because the country does not just need intellectuals. It needs agricultural workers and people coming with dreams, big hearts, and ambition. That message would resonate with Americans. Simply sounding like Donald Trump, then proposing progressive solutions while refusing to acknowledge the failures of progressive governance, is a losing strategy. It hands the keys to Trump.
Mounk: Let’s disentangle two different positions here, Bret. I agree with you on the merits of Gavin Newsom’s presidential run. He owns the record of California far too much and does not seem to have a political core. He has gone along with and advocated very progressive and culturally far-out measures in California, then tried to pretend that he was a heterodox thinker with right-leaning influences on his podcast. Now he is swinging back to this social media stuntman phase. I do not think people will believe who he is.
I also think his good looks are as much a detriment as an advantage. Good looks, in general, are an advantage in politics, but he lacks authenticity. He would have been right for an era of soundbite politics in the late 1990s or early 2000s. His suaveness and his ability to produce the right phrase written by a team of PR advisors at the right moment would have created just the right seven-second clip for the evening news. In an age when people crave and prize authenticity, he does not seem appealing to a broader audience.
Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.
If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!
Subscribe now
Set Up Podcast
And if you are having a problem setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email our podcast team at [email protected]
I have argued many times that the problem is that Republicans are far outside the American mainstream in many of their positions and policies, but so are Democrats. That includes not only the far left but also the relative moderates, or whatever one might call Gavin Newsom.
There are two possible conclusions from that. The first is that Democrats need to go back to Barack Obama—to a party that talks unapologetically about securing the border, that values a social safety net but also takes pride in rapid economic growth and a functioning market economy. On cultural and economic issues, they need to go back to being normal and return to the center of American politics. There is a large grain of truth in that. If Barack Obama were eligible to run for president in 2028, he would have a very good chance of winning.
On the other hand, that does not explain why moderate political parties that have not gone to the extremes of the Democrats in the United States are struggling all over the world. Why are the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Germany both in decline? Why is Emmanuel Macron limping toward the end of his second term, hugely unpopular and without a majority in parliament? Why is Keir Starmer, who bent the Labour Party back toward the center-left, so unpopular?
If we had a Barack Obama–like politics without the personal charisma and exceptional political talent of Barack Obama himself, would we not just end up like the last German governments, like Macron, like Starmer? Is there not a deeper problem with the ability of that kind of politics to inspire enthusiasm in the electorate?
Stephens: I know I have just been saying nice things about Obama’s migration policy and his wife’s wise words about going high, but I actually think Obama’s presidency will not be well remembered by historians—not least because it paved the way for Donald Trump, but also because Obama introduced a kind of progressivism in American politics that ultimately served the Democrats poorly, even if, at the time, his political skill made it seem successful.
The figures we need to go back to are Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton profoundly understood, in a way that Obama never did, the concerns of middle and lower-middle America. He understood—even though his personal behavior belied it—that the country was socially fairly conservative. He understood that what people wanted above all was prosperity and order, beyond the progressive goals of social reform. He was broadly able to deliver on that. He left the country with a budgetary surplus, peace, and prosperity, while also helping bring crime down to record lows.
Tony Blair likewise, after years of failed progressive leadership in the Labour Party, especially under Neil Kinnock, captured the center. Both of them did so with genuine charisma. One of the challenges today is that moderate politics often require a kind of anti-charisma. A moderate political leader I admire is Michael Bennet, the senator from Colorado. When he ran for president in 2020, he said, if you vote for me, you won’t have to think about what’s going on in the White House for weeks on end, because we’ll just quietly go about the business of government. Lovely message in theory, but he went nowhere in that race–though I suspect he will be the next governor of Colorado, which will be good for that state.
Democrats need to do two things. First, not only shelve but disavow the more radical progressive positions of the past ten years—soft on crime, indifferent to mass migration, far left on cultural issues—and understand that those were not just political mistakes, but mistakes in principle. Second, they need to find someone with genuine political charisma who can communicate a position of muscular centrism. The only Democrat I see clearly running for president who has that is Rahm Emanuel. He is immensely energetic and well-spoken, but right now he is far outside the mainstream of the Democratic Party. The final point is that the qualities that would make for a successful Democratic nominee in a general election are precisely the qualities that will doom a nominee in the primary.
Mounk: A couple of thoughts on that. I agree with much of what you say, but precisely for that reason, I am trying to challenge myself—and I am challenging myself by challenging you. When you go back to Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, I wonder whether part of what made those electoral coalitions work is a world that no longer exists.
They were leaders of left-leaning political parties at a time when they could still take for granted at least part of the working-class vote. Of course, there were working-class Tories persuaded by Margaret Thatcher and many working Americans who voted for Ronald Reagan. But there were still states, constituencies, and voters throughout both countries who unthinkingly voted for the left because that was what their parents and grandparents had done. They were still grateful for the New Deal, or they had fathers and grandfathers who were members of trade unions in mining towns across the United Kingdom. It was part of a social culture—of a class identity—that assumed you would always vote for the left.
Clinton and Blair could therefore expand that coalition by appealing to middle-class, more urban swing voters who wanted a somewhat more cosmopolitan outlook on the world, a more inclusive outlook, one that would not remain silent about the AIDS crisis in the United States, and that recognized Britain had become more multiethnic. Their candidacies offered excitement, a sense that the modern age had arrived, that voters were moving beyond the staid world of John Major and George H. W. Bush. This created an amalgamation of quite different sets of voters.
Now, the right has become smarter. Despite its supposed nostalgia, the populist right today has found ways—especially through social media—to appeal to young people and to present itself as the future as much as the left ever did. More profoundly, that sociological rootedness of the working class in the left has vanished. There is no longer any presumption that if you are from a mining town in Britain, you must vote for Labour, or if your great-grandparents benefited from the New Deal, you must vote for the Democratic Party. That assumption is gone.
Douglas Alexander, the former Scottish Labour leader, once told me—either on this podcast or in private conversation—that when he went back to his old constituency, a mining town, to help campaign for one of his successors, Labour was offering voters a nostalgic trip back to the mining museum. But what those voters actually wanted was a weekend at Euro Disney. The cultural rootedness in left-wing politics that once secured those constituencies has disappeared. Those same areas now vote for the Tories under someone like Boris Johnson and likely for Reform in the next election. The same dynamic explains why so many Midwestern states went for Trump in 2016.
Stephens: All of your points are well taken, and I would add one more. Both Tony Blair and Bill Clinton benefited from leading parties that were desperate to win, even if that meant sacrificing ideological purity. Democrats under Reagan’s two terms and George H. W. Bush’s first had been drubbed in three consecutive elections. They were not going to nominate another anti–death penalty liberal like Mike Dukakis. They were lucky to find Bill Clinton. The same was true for Tony Blair after eighteen years of Conservative rule under Thatcher and Major.
At the same time, I think it is a mistake to assume that the party holding the working class automatically wins elections. Democrats held the working class for generations and still lost plenty of elections, both in Britain and in the United States. Every political era presents a unique set of challenges but also unique opportunities. The United States right now presents a major opportunity for Democrats—one they seem too divided, inept, or radical to seize.
Subscribe now
Many Americans support Trump through gritted teeth. They are embarrassed by the way he conducts himself, alarmed by his authoritarian instincts, and disgusted by his family’s self-enrichment. They do not want to turn the American Republic into a neo-monarchical order. Yet they look at the alternative and see weakness and radicalism—typified by figures like Zohran Mamdani, who, barring a political miracle, will soon be one of the most visible faces of the Democratic Party.
A few years ago, during the lockdowns, one of my kids showed me a TikTok video. A voice off-camera says, would you rather (A) go into lockdown with your mother-in-law or— and before the next option is spoken, the man immediately says, B. At this moment, for a critical mass of Americans, anything is better than governance by left-wing progressives who seem more alarmed about pronouns and misgendering than about twenty million illegal migrants crossing the border with no plan for integration.
Democrats have to understand that whatever legitimate faults they can point to in Donald Trump will not compensate for the distrust and disgust many Americans feel toward them. I voted for Kamala Harris because I believed January 6th was an unforgivable sin. But if she had run against almost any other Republican, I would not have voted for her. She represented a style of high-handed, dishonest, radical progressive politics that would have been destructive to America and its place in the world.
Many of my friends on the right who share my concerns about Trump said to themselves, forget about January 6th and his anti-democratic impulses; Kamala would be worse. They voted for Trump. The challenge for Democrats is how to win back those voters—people just a few degrees to the right of me—into a small-d democratic coalition.
We are not talking about a huge number of voters. We are talking about a few hundred thousand in six or seven key states, many of whom are not working-class but middle or upper-middle-class people. They are straining under the weight of Trump’s tariffs and other economic policies and are just looking for a Democrat who is above the line of what they can accept from a liberal politician.
Mounk: Yeah, I wonder about how we should define the goal here, actually. The minimal goal for people who are worried about what the Trump administration is doing and would undoubtedly continue to do under the administration of JD Vance or whoever the likely Republican candidate is in 2028. I’m excluding scenarios in which somebody like Spencer Cox becomes the nominee of the Republican Party, which would diffuse the situation very significantly, but that doesn’t seem likely at this juncture. Is it enough for Gavin Newsom, Josh Shapiro, or Gretchen Whitmer to win in 2028 because they flipped those five or six hundred thousand votes distributed across states in the right strategic way? Or do we need something more fundamental to get out of this political moment?
I think part of my relative pessimism about this moment, and part of the reason why I actually think that the Democratic Party may need to transform itself in an even more radical way than you’re saying, is that I don’t think that would be enough to protect American politics in the long run. It might give us an interval of two or four years of relative calm.
We’ve seen in many countries around the world that populists who lose power for a little while then quickly come back. A year ago, the great story of hope and success was Poland. Donald Trump himself in the United States, of course, but there are examples from other countries as well. In Poland, the success story was the Law and Justice government, which was destroying democratic institutions in Poland quite rapidly, being displaced after eight years in power at parliamentary elections. But they kept the presidency and then were able to install a handpicked successor to that right-wing populist president into office. The more moderate governing coalition is now embattled, and there’s a real question about whether it’s going to be able to retain its parliamentary majority when the next parliamentary elections take place.
You could very easily imagine that Gretchen Whitmer somehow squeezes out a victory in 2028 and does a decent job governing. We’re going to like some things she does and complain about other things she does, but she’s not going to frontally attack democratic institutions. Then in 2032, Donald Trump Jr. or whoever else comes back with a significant majority, retakes the White House, and has control of Congress. We’re right back in the middle of the kind of problems we now face.
I think our ambition needs to be for Democrats to win for 10 years with 55 to 60 percent of the vote in such a way that Republicans are forced to come back to the negotiating table, as Labour was forced to come back to the negotiating table in the 80s and 90s because the Conservatives were consistently winning significant majorities. The party realized it needed to transform itself significantly to be able to actually compete electorally.
Is that realistic at all? If that is not realistic, is all we can do to somehow squeeze out these singles and ground doubles and try to win the game this way? Or does that just speak to the thesis that we have to be very pessimistic about where American politics is going to lie in 15 or 20 years?
Stephens: Look, step one is to win an election. Step two is to govern well. The lesson of the Biden presidency is step one was accomplished in 2020 and step two was a dismal failure. Why? Because Biden campaigned as a moderate and governed as a leftist. Not uniformly, but basically he governed as one. I think his government was more left-wing than he himself realized because he was often, by many eyewitness accounts, without a clear sense of what his administration was actually doing and proposing.
The key is simply that you have to make yourself electorally palatable. I think electorally palatable to the center, not simply finding a way to eke out voters on the left. Then you have to govern in a way that gives middle-of-the-road Americans a sense of comfort that you are governing effectively in their interests, in their language, and in their moral comfort zone, which in too many cases Democrats stopped doing in recent years.
Subscribe now
Now there’s a third issue, which is a serious one. You mentioned Keir Starmer in passing earlier. I think Keir’s problem is that he says things which voters feel he doesn’t really believe. He says, we’ve got to get a handle on the migration crisis. But the spirit is that it’s a political problem, not that there is a really serious issue with the levels of migration that Britain has experienced over the past four or five years—under Tory governments for the most part, by the way.
There has always been a problem with the center left, which is that they are viewed with a lot of suspicion by many voters who think that they are wolves in sheep’s clothing, so to speak, that their heart is essentially beating far to the left. In their heart, they are Oskar Lafontaine, but they are presenting themselves as Gerhard Schröder, to speak in your language.
Mounk: This is a deep cut. Yes, this is the very poor man’s equivalent of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair: Gerhard Schröder, who was elected as the head of a red-green, Social Democrat–Green coalition in Germany in 1998. He pretended to be more of a third-way politician, which he was in economic policy, but not really on foreign policy.
Schröder went on to be on the board of Gazprom and was a close ally of Vladimir Putin. His internal party rival was Oscar Lafontaine, who came from a much more traditional left-wing social democratic tradition.
Stephens: Yeah, Lafontaine. He was the Bernie Sanders of his time, in effect. Democrats have to adopt the right tone and the right policies, but the third aspect is that they’ve got to believe it. They’ve got to believe in their hearts that this isn’t just a phase on the way to the next round of progressive social experiments. They’ve got to believe that they really want a thriving capitalist society in which profit-seeking is not viewed as a sin.
They’ve got to believe that law and order in American cities is not the antithesis of civil liberties; it is the handmaiden of civil liberties. They’ve got to believe that in order to have a sovereign country, you have to have control over your borders and know who’s coming in, in what numbers, where they’re from, and whether they have criminal records. You have to believe that American power rests in part on military efficacy and military might, and that it is a pillar of American democracy. In effect, the Democratic Party has to become the party of Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy and, in his way, of Bill Clinton once again.
There is that tradition in the Democratic Party. By the way, you have to believe in one more thing, and I should have mentioned this earlier. You have to believe that people should be judged by the content of their character, not the color of their skin. The identity politics trap that the Democrats got themselves into was not only philosophically at odds with the real Democratic tradition, but also politically toxic and dangerous. If you can play minority identity politics, you can play white identity politics. They have to move away from that.
I would conclude with this thought: Donald Trump is doing them a giant favor by doing the dirty work of getting rid of the DEI apparatus that had seized so many corners of American life. DEI was ultimately not only in its execution and practice antithetical to the American creed, but it was bad for the Democratic brand.
Mounk: It is striking that there was an expectation of broad outrage if the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade. Not in all of American society, since it is a very divided issue, but certainly among Americans who are left of center, among Americans who are pro-choice. I think there was a genuine reaction to it across the population, and it probably helps to explain why Biden did comparatively well, though unexpectedly, in the midterms in 2022.
There was also an expectation that a lot of Americans who are left of center would be angry and outraged when the Supreme Court overturned affirmative action. It is very interesting that never materialized. One part of that reason is that it seems many universities are basically continuing to engage in affirmative action and are effectively defying what the Supreme Court ruled. We will see how that plays out in terms of legal challenges to some of the practices that Ivy League and other schools continue to engage in.
I think it is also partially because there was never the level of broad-based commitment to affirmative action that Democrats perhaps thought there was. In electoral terms, there is now no real attempt to reinstate it. You did not see even Kamala Harris in 2024 campaigning on it. Perhaps somewhere in the platform of the DNC it may have been mentioned, but certainly on the campaign trail she was not saying, I am going to appoint judges that make sure that affirmative action will once again be legal in the United States. That was not a central plank of her campaign.
It may be that if the Trump administration succeeds in dismantling much of the DEI bureaucracy, Democrats will quietly drop the issue when they return to power, realizing they cannot reinstate it. I know we have returned to the Bill Clinton comparison a lot, and I was not planning to make so much of this conversation about him, but it does get to an interesting point about what a new paradigm for a non-Trumpist center or left in the United States would look like.
Clinton came at a time of optimism. The Soviet Union had just fallen apart. America was at the zenith of its power. It was a unilateral moment in international relations. Clinton was building in some ways on the optimism of Reagan, and toward the end of his presidency there was a major economic boom. It felt as though the future was going to get better. More Americans were going to go to college, get educated, and have more opportunity in the knowledge economy, which was expected to serve Americans well. The impact of automation, deindustrialization, and China’s entry into the WTO was not yet felt in a broad way. Under those circumstances, that form of politics could win.
I was just invited to speak at the launch of a project called France 2050, in which the Ministry of the Plan—founded by de Gaulle to make the five-year plans of the post-war period, now a government think tank and forecasting agency—tries to imagine what France might be like in 2050. They conducted an opinion poll, and it found that people in France consistently expect the country to be more or less the same in 30 years, except worse. They do not think there will be radical changes, but they expect France to be less powerful, less influential, with less money, pensions more at risk, and the state of democracy worse. Everything is expected to be a little bit worse.
There are reasons to be pessimistic about France’s future, and French citizens certainly are more pessimistic than there is reason to be about America’s future. Americans in general may be more optimistic and probably have reason to be more optimistic at the moment. Yet there is a parallel. Most Americans do not think the country will be stronger, safer, or better 25 years from now. That may make it much harder to rerun something like Bill Clinton’s politics in our time. So the broader question is: how can a political center succeed in a moment of broad-based pessimism?
Stephens: I’m not sure you’re right for a couple of reasons. Looking back in American history, you find repeated recurrences of broad national pessimism. The 1970s was a very pessimistic era, and there was a lot of evidence to justify it. People thought the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev was an unstoppable force.
There was a succession of political, economic, and geopolitical crises—Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation, the oil embargo—that entrenched this feeling of pessimism. Reagan won in 1980 on a message of deep optimism about the American experiment, that America could overcome its problems. Americans were hungry for an optimistic messenger. One of the things that made Jimmy Carter such a flaccid politician was that he seemed to adopt the spirit of pessimism, of limits, of an era of American life that was diminished. That reflected the zeitgeist of the 70s until Reaganite sunshine burned off those clouds. Reagan came with a program that produced a great deal of prosperity, at least for a number of years. The same was true in effect with Margaret Thatcher.
Optimistic politicians who claim the spirit of America as one of possibility, hope, and resilience are always going to have a successful run. Trump’s success came from his cunning formula, “Make America Great Again,” which combined nostalgia for the past, optimism for the future, and a critique of the present. The word “make”—as in create, build—packed into four words. It was a slogan of genius. So I do not think living in a pessimistic era makes it impossible for a Democrat to be a “sunny warrior,” as Reagan was, with a different set of policies.
There is also what I call the “pessimism paradox of democracy.” Democracies are always inclined to a certain degree of pessimism. Not just the 1970s, but other eras as well. Even the 1950s, which we now look back on as a halcyon period, were saturated with pessimism about nuclear war and other threats. Open societies focus on their defects more than their virtues. Closed societies constantly advertise their virtues and hide their weaknesses, even from themselves. That often becomes their undoing. For example, China is not publishing statistics on youth unemployment to maintain the image of an unstoppable juggernaut, when in fact it faces deep-seated economic issues.
At any moment in America–although it often escapes media attention–a lot of good things are happening. Many are invisible because they are happening in the proverbial garage of the next Steve Jobs. Imagine an economic historian in 2075 at Johns Hopkins or the University of Chicago, talking to her students about the inventions that set the economic tone for the 21st century in the way the steam engine did for the 19th, or penicillin, airplanes, and telecommunications did for the 20th.
What would those inventions be? Likely artificial intelligence, immunotherapy, gene therapy, perhaps fracking and hydrocarbon superabundance. Whatever the list, almost all were made in America. That should be a source of optimism, because the United States continues to innovate in ways that France, Britain, and even China do not. China still struggles to make a commercial jetliner. When it comes to innovation beyond intellectual property theft, China suffers because its economic system sets political limits on free thinking. Free thinking is the engine of invention and entrepreneurship. That is a philosophical problem they cannot solve within their system.
One of the underappreciated achievements of the last few years is that America has overcome “wokeness.” People dislike the term, but everyone knows what it means: a censorious social justice ideology that classifies people by identity, seeks structural solutions to every problem, and looks on American institutions with grave suspicion. This ideology felt unstoppable six or seven years ago, not just at the government level but at the institutional level. Today, American institutions are racing to get away from it, at least paying lip service to viewpoint diversity and shaking up left-liberal media establishments to bring in different voices.
This is healthy. It happened organically in American society. It shows strength, like the roots of a tree bending around rocks in the soil. That adaptability is a source of resilience. Authoritarian systems like China’s appear strong, but they are brittle, like panes of glass. When they fracture, they shatter.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Bret discuss the future of China, whether wokeness is really over, and the future of U.S. media. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Writing after the assassination of Charlie Kirk, the Hoover Institution’s Sir Niall Ferguson offers comforting reassurance. Warnings of America’s democratic collapse are overwrought. The United States, according to Ferguson, remains “a very long way from Italy in 1927 or Germany in 1938.”
What Ferguson is thinking of is not just the fulminations of Trump’s progressive critics. Even conservative Andrew Sullivan wrote this summer in The Weekly Dish: “I think this is how a republic dies.”
In response, Ferguson catalogs a seemingly impressive list of institutional safeguards still operating. Courts issuing injunctions. The Republicans’ wafer-thin majorities in Congress. Lawyers with “a vested interest in preserving the rule of law.” His message is clear: those sounding alarms about institutional collapse suffer from “Windrip Syndrome”—a term Ferguson adapts from Sinclair Lewis’s 1935 novel It Can’t Happen Here to describe mistaking contemporary political turbulence for fascist takeover.
Ferguson is right on one level. America has experienced nothing like the Night of the Long Knives. But that misses the real test: Are the checks and balances of constitutional democracy being so hollowed out that democracy is at real risk? The evidence suggests this to be the case. Trump’s systematic capture of law enforcement, regulatory agencies, and emergency powers achieves tyranny in all but duration—authoritarian control operating through constitutional forms.
Subscribe now
The president’s crowning achievement since taking office has been transforming the constitutionally outrageous into the contemporary routine. The relentless cascade of norm violations creates its own anesthesia. When everything is scandalous, nothing shocks. Across multiple domains—law enforcement, regulation, press freedom, and emergency powers—Trump has systematically converted democratic institutions into instruments of personal will. The result weaponizes federal powers to punish opponents and reward loyalty. The methods may be legal in form. But the function remains authoritarian.
Ferguson’s analysis overlooks this reality in three ways. He focuses on the relative absence of fascist imagery and misses the significance of Trump’s regulatory authoritarianism. He sees routine power-stretching where there is systemic presidential overreach. And he treats litigation volume as health rather than as a symptom of executive defiance.
The Fascism FallacyFerguson’s first misstep is foundational: measuring threats against 1930s fascist imagery rather than democratic norms. The fascist yardstick obscures how effectively American institutions have been captured. The question isn’t whether Trump resembles Mussolini’s blackshirts or Hitler’s brownshirts. It’s whether law enforcement and regulatory agencies now operate as instruments of presidential will rather than neutral arbiters of law.
Consider the capture of law enforcement. At the Justice Department, dozens of officials linked to January 6 prosecutions have been fired or reassigned, replaced by loyalists, including former Trump defence lawyers. The acting deputy attorney general ordered FBI personnel lists targeting those who worked Capitol riot cases. This move facilitated retaliation against law enforcement professionals who simply did their jobs. The administration stripped Secret Service protection from John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, Trump critics who served during his first term, despite active Iranian assassination threats. Personal vindictiveness now drives personnel decisions involving life and death.
Ferguson might note that presidents have legal authority to dismiss Justice Department officials who serve “at the pleasure of the president.” He would be correct about the legality. But his focus on legal procedures misses the constitutional point: when law enforcement becomes an extension of presidential will rather than an independent check on it, you no longer have the rule of law. You have law by rulers—a distinction Ferguson’s procedural focus obscures.
The pattern of capture operates in press intimidation. After Jimmy Kimmel’s comments about Charlie Kirk’s assassination in September, FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr warned Disney they could “do this the easy way or the hard way.” The threat worked immediately—affiliates dropped the show, Disney suspended it indefinitely. When ABC reinstated Kimmel days later, Trump threatened the network again: “I can’t believe ABC Fake News gave Jimmy Kimmel his job back… I think we’re going to test ABC out on this.” The Kimmel episode followed an all-too-familiar pattern, beginning with the Associated Press being barred from briefings for refusing to adopt White House terminology about the “Gulf of America.” Trump made his intent clear when he told reporters late last month that networks giving “only bad publicity” should “maybe” have their licenses revoked.
Step by step, regulatory intimidation moves towards what jackbooted censors accomplished in the 1930s—journalism operating at the government’s pleasure rather than by constitutional right. Major outlets still publish critical coverage daily, but their persistence obscures how the structural foundations are being undermined. Critical journalism now operates under the shadow of regulatory threats rather than being protected by institutional independence. The absence of 1930s theater doesn’t provide comfort; it provides camouflage for more sophisticated methods of control.
Ferguson’s historical lens thus becomes counterproductive. By conjuring up dramatic fascist imagery, he overlooks regulatory capture that systematically undermines press independence through different means.
The Normalization TrapFerguson’s second shortcoming lies in treating Trump’s systematic coercion as routine presidential power-stretching. He argues that the “imperial presidency” stretches back generations, citing Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal as “a power grab by the executive branch” and Barack Obama’s use of “legally dubious threats to yank federal funds from universities.” This historical framework suggests constitutional friction represents normal political weather, not democratic breakdown.
But Ferguson’s normalization obscures a crucial distinction. Testing constitutional boundaries differs from methodically demolishing them. Roosevelt’s New Deal faced Supreme Court resistance and adapted its approach accordingly. When the Court struck down key legislation, Roosevelt changed tactics rather than ignore the ruling. Obama’s university funding threats operated through existing legal frameworks with congressional oversight. When universities challenged the policy, his administration negotiated rather than escalated. Both presidents tested boundaries but accepted institutional pushback.
Trump, by contrast, has articulated a philosophy that dispenses with limits altogether. In February he pinned a message to Truth Social and X declaring: “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law.” This was no casual boast but a statement of principle, echoing the Napoleonic doctrine that sovereignty lies in deciding when law no longer binds. In Trump’s formulation, the test of presidential legitimacy becomes not fidelity to the Constitution, but the leader’s self-proclaimed mission to “save” America.
Subscribe now
Trump has put this philosophy into practice through an unprecedented blizzard of executive orders. In his first months, he attempted to strip birthright citizenship by decree, barred asylum rights under a declared “border invasion,” imposed “Liberation Day” tariffs without congressional authorization, and ordered nominally independent regulators like the Federal Election Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Federal Trade Commission to submit budgets and rules to the White House for clearance. Each measure has been challenged in the courts, but the pattern is unmistakable: executive orders are no longer used to implement law but to supersede it.
Previous presidents tested executive boundaries, but within constitutional frameworks and subject to institutional correction. Trump’s approach differs fundamentally: the sheer volume and constitutional audacity of his orders overwhelm the system’s capacity to respond. By the time courts rule on birthright citizenship or regulatory independence, executive action has already reshaped reality on the ground. Emergency deployments continue despite adverse rulings. Regulatory changes proceed whilst appeals drag on. The legal process becomes reactive theater rather than effective constraint: courts can vindicate rights in theory whilst failing to constrain power in practice.
Meanwhile, the president uses regulatory power as a shakedown mechanism. The White House cleared Nvidia’s and AMD’s China chip licenses on the understanding the government would take 15% of those sales—a license-for-revenue toll. An executive order stripped law firm Paul Weiss of clearances and federal work until they offered concessions and publicly disowned a former partner. And Paramount paid to settle a 60 Minutes suit while seeking administration sign-off on its Skydance sale. The message to boardrooms is plain: compliance buys protection; resistance invites pain.
The pattern extends beyond regulatory coercion. What began as a promise to strip politics out of universities receiving federal funding has mutated into something far more dangerous. It’s now a federal power grab that tells institutions whom they may admit, what they may teach, how they may govern, and even which student groups may exist. Harvard filed federal lawsuits challenging the administration’s constitutional authority, while others capitulated entirely. The pattern reveals organized coercion: resist and face annihilation; comply and surrender autonomy.
Subscribe now
Meanwhile, the transformation of the presidency into a personal profit center operates in plain sight. The Trump family launched cryptocurrency ventures, attracting $2 billion from an Abu Dhabi firm and $75 million from Chinese-connected investors. This happened just as crypto regulatory oversight was dismantled. Qatar “gifted” a $400 million jumbo jet destined for Trump’s presidential library. It’s Plunkitt’s “honest graft” for the influencer age—the fusion of public power and private brand until the distinction barely matters.
Scholars and pundits have an obligation to recognize the severity of what is occurring—and to see it as unprecedented in American history, at least outside of wartime. By treating systematic coercion as familiar power-stretching, analysis like Ferguson’s delays recognition of institutional capture even as it accelerates. When democratic erosion operates through legal processes rather than dramatic rupture, the window for effective resistance narrows rapidly—making scholarly reassurance counterproductive.
Institutional TheaterFerguson is also on shaky ground when he equates institutional survival with democratic health. He celebrates that courts are “grappling with close to 400 cases involving the Trump administration.” He notes that America retains “1.3 million practicing lawyers” with “a vested interest in preserving the rule of law.” These metrics suggest institutional resilience—democracy’s immune system responding to authoritarian infection.
But Ferguson is not sufficiently differentiating form from substance. The sheer volume of litigation against Trump’s policies doesn’t demonstrate judicial constraint; it reveals executive defiance requiring constant legal intervention.
Military deployments demonstrate this institutional theater perfectly. National Guard troops have remained on the streets of U.S. cities whilst courts issue injunctions that are promptly stayed on appeal. What once would have triggered a constitutional crisis now passes as routine public safety. Ferguson might note that federal courts ruled Guard operations unlawful under the Posse Comitatus Act—evidence of judicial independence checking executive overreach. But when injunctions are stayed on appeal and hundreds of troops remain deployed after their authorization dates have expired, the legal system becomes performative rather than protective.
The same pattern operates with universities. Ferguson could point to Harvard’s federal lawsuit challenging funding freezes. He might see this as proof that institutional independence survives. But institutions now align their policies in advance to avoid prolonged litigation. Legal remedies become irrelevant to practical outcomes. The threat of funding cuts achieves compliance without formal enforcement.
Subscribe now
Ferguson’s confidence in institutional forms reveals the limitations of historical analogy. Europe’s 20th-century fascists abolished democratic institutions outright. They dissolved parliaments, shuttered courts, and banned opposition parties. Contemporary authoritarians preserve institutional forms but drain their constraining power. Normalization through exhaustion makes oversight impossible.
The Perils of ReassuranceFerguson’s approach underestimates the dangers of the erosion we are experiencing. When a respected historian assures the public that institutional forms guarantee democratic substance, it can become harder to see the erosion for quite the menace that it is.
Public understanding shapes political response. If voters believe safeguards remain robust, they demand less protection. If journalists accept that press freedom persists because some criticism continues, they miss how methodically their independence is being gutted. If politicians hear that courts check executive power, they see less urgency in defending legislative prerogatives.
Ferguson is technically correct that America hasn’t become Mussolini’s Italy. But so what? Trump’s concentration of regulatory, judicial, and emergency powers achieves authoritarian control without the historical theater. The rule of law doesn’t require jackboots to die.
As James Madison warned in Federalist 47, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands… may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Trump’s systematic concentration of power through regulatory coercion and institutional capture realizes Madison’s warning—the accumulation of all powers accomplishing what the Founders defined as tyranny. Reassurances like Ferguson’s risk offering false comfort while this reality unfolds behind the preserved forms they celebrate.
Roger Partridge is a founder and senior fellow of The New Zealand Initiative and writes on public policy, constitutional law and liberalism. He publishes on Substack at Plain Thinking.
Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
Subscribe now
This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
To receive future installments into your inbox—plus more great pieces by American Purpose and Francis Fukuyama’s blog—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the buttons for “American Purpose” and “Frankly Fukuyama.”
Subscribe now
Email preferences
What would happen if Armageddon came and hardly anyone noticed? The 1998 Bruce Willis movie of that name was boffo at the box office, but the Trump firing of feds on October 10 slipped by with surprisingly little attention.
That day was an Armageddon in the relatively short life of the Trump administration. It was a fundamental challenge to the constitutional separation of powers, but it disappeared in the dust of a very big news weekend that featured the peace deal in the Middle East.
Taking advantage of the government shutdown, the administration fired more than 4,000 employees, a move that slipped by most of the media. The next morning, in fact, CNN’s roundtable debated President Trump’s snub by the Nobel Peace Prize committee. That was the easy headline, because the fed-firing Armageddon was much less salacious and much more difficult to unpack.
So why is this an Armageddon—and why has it been mostly invisible?
The second question is the easiest to answer. Since its very first hours, the administration has brushed back the boundaries on virtually every bit of presidential power. Firing a few thousand more federal employees seemed like just a blip on an already crowded radar screen.
It’s the first question that matters most. At the beginning of the weekend, Russell Vought, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), posted on X, “The RIFs have begun.” The start was another round of layoffs—“reductions in force,” or RIFs—but this time there were two new features. One was the administration’s explicit political targeting. Trump was asked whether the firings were politically motivated. Absolutely, he said. They would “be Democrat-oriented because we figure, you know, they started this thing” (“this thing,” of course, being the government shutdown.) “So [the firings] should be Democrat-oriented. It’ll be a lot.”
In fact, the president said he’d cut “the most egregious, socialist, semi-communist, probably not full communist” programs as part of his continuing campaign to slash programs by cutting their employees.
The administration viewed the first round as just a start. Four days later, the OMB said it was “making every preparation to batten down the hatches and ride out the Democrats’ intransigence.” It pledged to “continue the RIFs.” Trump said that he was going to continue to target programs that Democrats supported and that “they’re never going to come back, in many cases.” To underline the point, Trump posted an AI-generated video on Truth Social featuring Vought as the grim reaper (without apology to—or the permission of—the musical group Blue Öyster Cult, whose music provided the soundtrack for the video).
And in his most telling note, Trump said at a White House event, “We’re being able to do things that we were unable to do before.”
The Wrath of ArmageddonIn terms of style, there are lots of new things about this government shutdown, including the vitriol coming from top figures and a more experienced hand at strategy, thanks to lessons from previous long shutdowns. But even more fundamentally, what’s different is a conscious strategy of using the shutdown to work around the constraints on the president that come from the Constitution’s balance of powers. Congress can’t approve a new budget. No budget, no money. No money, no government functions—except for essential services, which the OMB, conveniently, can define on its own. No designation of “essential,” and the administration figures it can simply end programs, agencies, and employees who used to run them.
In what had passed for normal times, Congress created programs and funded the people to implement them. In this shutdown, the Trump administration has played the reverse game. No funds for the people—just write them and tell them that their services are no longer needed.
For the administration to kill a program, it used to need Congress’s say so. In this shutdown, without a budget, the Trump administration is killing programs and functions simply by draining them of the people needed to run them. Getting legislation to close down a program, as we learn over and over again, is messy because the affected constituencies circle to defend themselves. The shutdown version of killing programs is much cleaner. It cuts Congress and the public out of the decision, and then empowers the president and his budget chief to make the decisions.
You can also sign up to receive great content from Persuasion and Yascha Mounk! Simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons.
Email preferences
Why go through the tough debates about cutting programs (which rally supporters on Capitol Hill), closing down agencies (which is even tougher), or impoundments (which are illegal, the Government Accountability Office has ruled), when Trump claims the power to make a one-stop shop: simply gut a program by firing feds, without the inconvenience of the separation of powers?
It’s a handy formula. In one area that suffered big cuts, the former director of a CDC center said sadly, “CDC is over. It was killed.” He added, “This administration only knows how to break things. They have made America at risk for outbreaks and attacks by nefarious players. People should be scared.” But the administration wasn’t, and few people noticed. The administration’s sustained attacks on the CDC hit their mark. A September 2025 Gallup roll showed that the public’s rating of the CDC had fallen by one-fourth in the last year, to a level just barely higher than the IRS. What had once been hailed as the world’s best public health agency was in shambles.
Can He Do That?It’s possible to answer this question in two ways. One is to have an academic debate around the principles and history of administrative law. That’s mighty interesting, but it doesn’t put points on the board (or score cuts in the federal workforce).
The other is to reckon with an inescapable reality of the American constitutional system: each of the three branches has only the powers that the other branches are prepared to surrender to it.
And here’s where the problems march in. As I write this, the House has been AWOL—literally—for 26 days, since September 19. It’s impossible to have a check if no one is around to enforce a balance.
As for the judiciary, there are (at least) three problems. One is that the administration has moved so far, so fast, that it’s been hard for anyone to keep up. It’s a flood-the-zone strategy that the Green Bay Packers have used with great success: overload the field with receivers on one side of the field and bet that the defense won’t be able to keep up. (Full disclosure: I’m an owner of the Green Bay Packers, along with 538,966 others.) The more cases the administration stirs up, the harder it is for litigants to challenge its actions and for the courts to hear the cases.
The second is that the president enjoys an inherent amount of deference because of the “presumption of regularity”—that he has the power to do what he does unless someone can prove otherwise. Combating Trump on these grounds means digging into the details of the procedures used in making decisions, and that can be tough and time-consuming, by which point, the administration is already three more decisions down the road.
The third is the argument that the administration makes about inherent “unitary executive” powers. It’s the “’cause I say so” argument. Article II of the Constitution says, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” This “vesting clause,” a single sentence in the Constitution, is “causing America huge problems,” New York Times columnist David French contends.
So, just what is the “executive Power”? Well, it’s what the president says it is “’cause I say so”—until Congress or the courts say otherwise. And with Congress out of town and the justices of the Supreme Court trying to figure out how to deal with the hot potato that the president who appointed them is tossing their way, the “’cause I say so” argument is going to stick, at least for a while.
The Whisper in the WindSooner or later—probably later than sooner—Congress will find a way through the impasse it brought on itself. Sooner or later—certainly later than sooner—the Supreme Court will wrestle with the challenge of deciding where the fences around the president’s power ought to be.
It’s inconceivable, however, that these decisions will put the constitutional balance of powers back to where they were in mid-September of this year, let alone September 2024. We’ve entered a realm dominated by the presumption of irregularity, and by Trump’s skill (more precisely, the skill that Vought and the administration’s top attorneys bring to the issue) in stretching presidential power far beyond where it had been before.
Just since January, we’ve seen the federal workforce take a hit of 154,000 employees who took the “Fork in the Road” offer of a “deferred resignation,” agreeing to resign back in February in exchange for a promise to pay them through the end of September. At least another 51,000 employees had been laid off before October 10. Then there are the 4,000 fired in October. That totals about 210,000 employees—and the numbers are rough, because the administration has released very few solid statistics, keeping the full impact of its work a whisper in the wind.
This is a lot of people—a bit more than 9 percent of the federal workforce. And the administration isn’t done yet, Trump promises.
And all of this came through strategies and tactics either unknown or untested before January 20, 2025. The closest a previous administration had come was during the Nixon years. Nixon and his team dreamed of this kind of power, but they never dared try it and, even in their dreams, they never imagined pushing things this far.
The mass firings drain the federal government of the talent it needs to run the programs that Congress has created. It makes it increasingly impossible to recruit the workers the government will need in the future. Who, after all, would want to bet their careers on a job that could instantly vaporize on the whim of the boss?
Even worse, it encourages everyone in the political system to see every step in purely partisan terms. On one hand, of course, every policy decision has partisan overtones. It’s often said that “there’s no partisan way of filling a pothole,” but that’s not true. Which neighborhoods get attention first when it comes to filling potholes, paving sidewalks, and plowing snow is an inherently political decision. That’s one thing. But framing every decision through a deeply partisan lens is what fed the party machines of a century and a half ago, and that didn’t go well, either for problem solving or for the American people.
Trust in government is mighty hard to build, but a Gallup poll, released just before the 4,000-person cuts, shows how easy it is to destroy it. Trump’s attacks on the CDC, CIA, IRS, FDA, FEMA, and EPA have driven the public’s trust for all of these agencies into the ground.
In Federalist 70, Hamilton famously argued, “A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government.” Firing feds is a quick road to enfeeblement—and undermining trust in the government that’s left.
But how to control that power? The last thing the Founders wanted was to recreate George III on this side of the Atlantic. So Madison, in Federalist 58, wrote about Congress’s power of the purse, which “may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people.”
Congress has been firing blanks. The purse is empty. The Supreme Court has been unable to unzip it or determine how deeply the president’s hands can reach into it.
And Trump has maneuvered through all these institutions to create a constitutional Armageddon whose costs will last long past this shutdown—and, indeed, far into the nation’s future, past the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence next year, which we’ll celebrate with a mixed martial arts fight on the White House grounds.
Donald F. Kettl is Professor Emeritus and Former Dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. He is the author, with William D. Eggers, of Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems.
Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
Subscribe now
“Joey, we love you,” announced the congregation of ATLAH World Missionary Church as I concluded my address to the church’s members last month. I was floored that this declaration of love came from the same flock whose pastor—James David Manning—once posted on the bright red letter board outside his Harlem church, “Jesus would stone homos.” I was even more floored that it was Manning himself who prompted them to utter it.
For about six months, I had been attending New York City’s most notorious anti-gay ministry as an openly bisexual man to bridge the divide between the LGBT community and an isolated church defined by the theatrics of its eccentric pastor. For years, I have been inspired by the work of Daryl Davis, who does exactly this type of bridge-building. Davis, a black blues musician, has saved hundreds of Ku Klux Klan members from hate through the power of connection. Earlier this year, following in his footsteps, I found my nearest anti-gay church and reached out to the pastor to ask if I could visit in a spirit of kindness and respect. He graciously agreed.
The first time I entered ATLAH, the smell of incense hit my nose as the church’s security guard patted me down to ensure I had no weapons. I noticed discolored patches on the stained glass windows where rocks had been thrown. One of the congregants explained to me that they sometimes receive mail containing inappropriate objects like dildos, as well as hateful letters. Pastor Manning keeps a rock that was thrown through a window at the foot of his podium.
When I first sat down with Manning on a pew near the front of his church, I was surprised by his respectfulness, given his outlandish rhetoric and espousal of homophobic conspiracy theories. He openly admits that he holds many unconventional beliefs, including birtherism—the belief that President Obama was born in Kenya. He told me that if I wanted to join his church, I needed to renounce the “homosexual lifestyle” (but he also told me that I would never be turned away if I chose not to).
I was struck by the fact that none of the congregants directed hatred at me. One did recoil in fear when I introduced myself as a bisexual man. But that fear soon melted into hugs and warm greetings. Now, whenever we see each other, that congregant opens her arms and embraces me with an almost childlike warmth.
What I thought was a story about “hate” is actually a story about a kind congregation sincerely convinced of the sinfulness of homosexual behavior, hanging on to every word of Manning’s weekly performances. At his pulpit—his theater stage—he recounts the church’s long-standing legal troubles with New York City and pushes his far-fetched mayoral campaign. He decries the forces he believes persecute him: Trump, Obama, the “white homosexual gentrifier,” Al Sharpton, and others. His sermons, which sometimes resemble stand-up comedy, seem to function as a kind of release valve for the congregants’ frustrations about gentrification, the cost of living, and social changes that disquiet their socially conservative sensibilities.
Listening to sermons and chatting afterward helped me build a rapport with some of the congregants. So when Pastor Manning invited me to speak before the congregation, I knew I had an opportunity to test Davis’s philosophy of curiosity over confrontation. I opted for a conciliatory approach, in keeping with the teachings of Braver Angels, a depolarization nonprofit I have been involved with for several years that brings the left and right together to disagree better.
One of the conditions that allows people to connect across groups is participation in common goals. So I littered my speech with references to, and respect for, Constitutional rights and quintessentially American norms around dialogue—such as President Lincoln’s insistence that “I don’t like that man. I must get to know him better”—to present common ground and a unified national identity.
When the time came to give the speech, I was nervous. I wondered whether the several gaping mouths I saw in the pews were expressions of awe or horror. I reminded myself of another principle that is fundamental to successful bridge-building work: that we cannot control the reactions or opinions of the people we disagree with. I labored this point to my audience, emphasizing that “the greatness of America is the fact that I can come here and share [a] different perspective—not to shame or guilt you … but to listen.”
By standing up peacefully to deliver a speech before the congregation, I functioned as an embodiment of “intergroup contact theory.” The theory, originally developed by psychologist Gordon Allport in 1954, is less about changing minds than about showcasing human complexity in a way that erodes the fears another person or group has of you.
Allport posited that consistently encountering the uniqueness of an outgroup member gently challenges the stereotypes the ingroup holds about them. Anxiety surrounding interaction with outgroup members tends to decrease with sustained contact. The theory also highlights certain conditions that are optimal for contact. One condition is that in- and out-group members should be equals. By positioning myself as someone merely seeking dialogue and connection, I eliminated the possibility that I would be perceived as an invader or coercive force undermining the congregation’s autonomy.
Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!
Nearly every faith tradition teaches of the universality of suffering and hardship. Research shows that sharing our experiences, especially deeply vulnerable ones, is highly effective at reaching people. As I approached the end of my speech, I told the congregants the story of my gay uncle who provided support to my parents when my stepmother was slowly dying from Alzheimer’s disease.
I did not merely tell a story about a gay family member who was devoted to us in a dark time. I showed how my family would be less whole if our culture did not accept gay relationships. I ended by asking the congregation to find the complexity in the LGBT community I had come to find in them. In doing so, I offered the love Christ called “agape.”
As I exited the church, members of the congregation stood up to greet me. Many shook my hand and approached me to talk with great enthusiasm.
Four days after I delivered my speech, Charlie Kirk was assassinated on a college campus in Utah. The bullet that pierced his throat also tore a hole in our civic fabric. At times, the reaction in the press, politics, and on social media felt like a mix of celebrating violence and finger-pointing across the aisle.
Yet a flurry of media coverage and calming public voices, like Governor Spencer Cox of Utah, also called for more Americans to actively build bridges to heal toxic polarization and stop the cycle of political violence before it becomes more extreme. He was right. The cultural fissures on display after the tragedy will only lead to more violence unless they are healed through deliberate efforts to connect with our fellow Americans, and build what social scientist Robert Putnam calls “bridging social capital”—ties between groups that do not normally engage with each other.
This work will take years, if not decades. It will involve a deliberate effort on the part of individual Americans to embrace one another across ideological differences. The timeframe for addressing polarization may seem daunting. After all, movements for African American emancipation, such as the abolition of slavery, and the subsequent Civil Rights Movement, spanned centuries. Yet the early 17th century Quakers, who were among the first abolitionists, would be amazed by the 13th Amendment and modern civil rights laws.
These accomplishments were not the result of any one person, but rather the culmination of millions of people adopting beliefs about human freedom over generations. Population-level changes in mindset have happened in this country before. By deliberately resetting our view of ideological rivals to one of curiosity rather than condemnation, contemporary Americans can liberate each other from ignorance—and violence.
Joey T. McFadden is a writer & commentator with Young Voices, host of “In Response…,” and Blue Co-Chair of the Braver Angels NYC Alliance. See his paintings on Instagram.
Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.
And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:
Subscribe now
From the publisher's feed