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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
It is too easy to succumb to despair about Europe’s future, as the Ukraine war continues and the continent faces two unfriendly global superpowers, China and the United States. The EU, built in more idealistic times, is adapting at a glacial pace to the new reality. Besides the bloc’s notorious incrementalism, European governments face a myriad of internal challenges, including slow economic growth, poor demographics, and increasingly unhinged domestic politics.
Yet there are green shoots of optimism—particularly in the EU’s continued commitment to Ukraine. At its recent meeting, the European Council adopted its 19th package of sanctions against Russia, targeting Russia’s shadow fleet, several Chinese companies involved in oil trade with Russia, as well as companies helping Russia circumvent the sanctions. Just the night before, the U.S. Treasury surprised some with its own sanctions imposed on Rosneft and Lukoil—the first update to U.S. sanctions policy against Russia since Donald Trump’s arrival in the Oval Office.
This is not the first seemingly big swing in U.S.-Ukraine policy. In late September, Trump claimed Ukraine could retake its full territory and hinted at transferring Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. The White House meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in mid-October, which Ukrainians hoped would finalize the deal, saw the plan scrapped. Of course, the encounter came just a day after a lengthy call between Trump and Vladimir Putin, following which preparations began for the now-aborted summit between Trump and Putin in Budapest, Hungary.
Throughout this wild cycle, Europeans stayed the course. The coalescing of European leaders behind Ukraine after the meeting in the Oval Office was instantaneous, accompanied by a 12-point peace plan endorsed by Zelenskyy. With an administration that seems internally divided on how to deal with the war, a united European front remains the best strategy to demand some putative bargain with the Kremlin that would then be imposed by Trump on Ukrainians and Europeans.
The EU can do more. In particular, it has come very close to leading the way in its push to use frozen Russian sovereign assets, as well as some privately held ones, to fund a major package of aid to Ukraine, worth up to €140 billion. The move should have come earlier and there are still major wrinkles to be ironed out—especially for Belgium, where most of the Russian assets are kept, and thus may be liable to a Russian legal challenge. Yet, the fact that the EU contemplates leveraging these assets directly is a far cry from the earlier tinkering around by taxing their windfall profits.
The progress, however slow, would not only be impressive in its own right. It would also be an act of defiance against the ongoing U.S. obstruction within G7 of multilateral plans to seize the assets—a solution that would present fewer risks to the EU’s financial stability than acting alone.
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But Europe’s gradual awakening from its stupor must extend beyond the effort to ensure Ukraine prevails in its fight for survival and a European future. One area that offers promise is attracting global talent and turning the EU into a real hub for research and innovation—just as the United States seems to take an increasingly hostile approach toward both migrants and academic freedom. The EU’s “Choose Europe for Science” program, backed by over €500 million, could make a significant difference in recruiting scientists from U.S. universities and research institutions rattled by the administration’s overweening higher education policies and cuts to research funding. This is complemented by smaller schemes deployed by countries such as Austria or even by individual universities.
One challenge, of course, is that the gap between U.S. and European universities is sizeable, both in terms of resources and in terms of culture. Relocation grants must go hand in hand with policies that will offer U.S. academics competitive salaries and an environment that rewards excellent work rather than favoring insiders.
It is also incumbent on the EU to keep the cause of free trade alive in the absence of U.S. leadership—a task at which the bloc could do much, much better. The WTO system might well be dead, but that should not stop Europeans from concluding their trade agreements with South American “Mercosur” bloc countries and India, nor from finishing accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, and Albania. The larger the EU’s single market and the better integrated it is with other major economies of the world, the more likely it will eventually serve as an anchor to rebuild the international trading system.
While the EU struggles to become a beacon of economic openness due to special interests, from Polish farmers to French unions, it also continues to labor under illusions in making fundamental choices about its own security. Although the ongoing increases in defense spending are welcome, it would be a grave mistake for European governments to treat additional spending on defense as a program for U.S. jobs or trade deficit reduction by buying exclusively U.S.-manufactured weapons systems. In many cases, there may not be good alternatives to U.S.-made equipment, but no one should be operating under the assumption, as many seem to today, that buying American weapons will make President Trump look more sympathetically at the alliance.
What the example of Ukraine demonstrates is that for European countries to bear the brunt of conventional deterrence in Eastern Europe and to project power elsewhere, they need to focus on building a vibrant and scalable industrial base at home, rather than buying expensive U.S.-made systems.
The Czech Republic, Romania, Greece, and Germany, among others, have placed orders for U.S.-made F-35 jets, at a total cost of tens of millions. Not only have such governments eschewed more economical European alternatives but they will also see their planes delivered only in the early-to-mid 2030s—hardly a smart move in the current volatile environment.
Moreover, to imagine that such purchases—coming inevitably at the cost of more immediate investments in defense capabilities—will somehow make President Trump more committed to NATO is delusional. The European Commission made a version of that mistake this year by accepting a humiliating, one-sided trade “deal” that imposed tariffs on European exports to America in exchange for tariff-free access of U.S. goods to the EU market—in addition to pledges of additional European investment in the United States and purchases of American commodities. The Commission’s rationale, hardly corroborated by current experience, was that playing softball on trade would ensure that the U.S. administration would remain attuned to Europe’s interests.
Counterintuitively, what the Trump administration has responded well to is not necessarily flattery or bribes, but rather credible displays of force. Just as President Trump seems to respect Xi’s defiance of the administration’s trade policies, he may be coming to begrudgingly recognize European leaders as more than just a collection of hapless weaklings whom he can bully. Europeans would do well to show consistency, including in defense of their economic interests.
Recognizing the new realities in Washington is different from setting in motion a transatlantic divorce. Quite the contrary, Europeans making their own choices, irrespective of what President Trump might want, is the first step toward putting the relationship on a more stable footing—and eventually will provide a basis for its reconstruction under more thoughtful political leadership in Washington.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.
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Writing about the coronation of Napoleon Bonaparte’s nephew, Louis, as the emperor of the French, Karl Marx coined one of his most famous phrases: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”
I have been thinking about this phrase a lot in recent weeks, as it has become increasingly clear what shape the Democrats’ response to Trump 47 is going to take.
The first time Trump won office, the response to his presidency turned out to be a tragedy. There were mass marches. There was the repeated invocation not to “normalize” him. There was a general expectation that his administration would eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. When all of that turned out to be false, many progressives responded by embracing a new and more radical political ideology.
With every passing year of the first Trump administration, the “resistance” to him grew more woke. To many on the left, his ability to win power seemed to vindicate the worst possible interpretation of their own country. Who could possibly argue with the idea that America is a deeply racist country, one whose nature is rotten to the core, when such a boorish demagogue resides in the White House?
Trump’s malign influence over the country also made it hard for moderates on the left to keep in check the extremists in their own ranks. There might, as many of them privately admitted, be much to criticize about the most radical theories and practices that were rapidly spreading in progressive circles, including a taste for cancellation that was ruining the lives of many innocent people and making key institutions deeply dysfunctional. But wasn’t it the duty of every right-thinking person to focus primarily on the threat posed by Trump—and wouldn’t they, if they disobeyed that apparent strategic command, be accused of doing his bidding?
A series of coincidences helped to ensure that the tragedy of the left’s response to Trump’s first presidency did not allow him to win a second consecutive term. Joe Biden, too old to understand where the mood of the party was supposedly going, and therefore less tarnished by the embrace of identitarian ideas than virtually all of his competitors, unexpectedly won the nomination. COVID led to widespread discontent with governments across the democratic world and showcased Trump’s managerial failings. More by luck than by strategic foresight, Democrats eked out a victory in the 2020 presidential elections.
But while the tragic consequences of the Democratic embrace of wokeness were put off, they were not averted. It is one of the reasons they proved incapable of building a sufficiently broad anti-Trump majority to force the Republican Party to moderate if it wanted to be competitive in future elections. It is a big reason for the Biden administration’s missteps on issues like the southern border, as well as for a broader loss of trust in key social institutions—such as universities and the mainstream press—with which the Democratic Party is now deeply associated in the minds of voters. And it helps to explain why so many working-class voters, especially from the minority groups that were supposedly in the bag for Democrats, fled the coalition, helping Trump to win a second presidential term in 2024.
When Trump won reelection, the obvious question was how Democrats would respond to his second administration. Would they learn from the mistakes they made the first time around or fall right back into the same trap?
Optimists argued that Democrats were sure to course-correct. There was a “vibe shift” underway, after all. Exit polls made it unmistakably clear how toxic the party’s stances on cultural issues had become. And some elected officials were even cautiously starting to break rank on a few divisive topics.
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Pessimists, including me, cautioned that the ideological obsession with a particular conception of identity had by now become so deeply entrenched in progressive circles that it would continue to shape the movement’s language and instincts. Even if a few elected officials might course-correct on a few salient issues, the party’s basic framework for how to talk and what to do was unlikely to change. And as Trump committed one outrage after another, any attempt at moderation would once again go out of the window: All of the dynamics that pushed the resistance toward wokeness the first time around would repeat the same feat a second time over.
It is still early days. We are, after all, a mere 10 months into a four-year term. With the Trump administration growing more radical by the day, both the government and the opposition are likely to be fundamentally transformed over the next three years. But so far, I would say that the pessimists have more or less been proven correct—albeit with an ironic twist.
The initial instinct to moderate on key cultural issues has mostly petered out. There is precious little indication of the party learning to speak a different language. Even though faith in the most extreme shibboleths of the woke movement, such as the idea that fusion cuisine is a harmful form of cultural appropriation, seems to have evaporated, Democrats keep semi-apologetically semi-embracing the same practices and talking points. (One of many examples: The Democratic National Committee still performs land acknowledgments at its meetings.)
What is left is a bizarro version of the initial tragedy: a tendency toward radicalization and an inability to keep bad actors in check, shorn of all conviction. In fact, the best description of the emerging Democratic strategy may simply be that the party has decided to emulate Trump, in style if not in substance.
Gavin Newsom, the governor of California who is currently favored by betting markets to become the Democratic Party’s 2028 nominee, is Exhibit A.
After last year’s election, Newsom’s first instinct seemed to consist of a ham-fisted attempt at “moderating” his political position, something he did by cozying up to key proponents and allies of the Trump movement. When he launched a new podcast, his first guests included the right-wing talk radio host Michael Savage, former Trump aide Steve Bannon, and a certain conservative very popular among young voters by the name of… Charlie Kirk.
But while this strategy succeeded in gaining public attention, it also led to massive blowback from the progressive base. Never slow to follow the shifting winds, Newsom quickly corrected course.
Instead of moderating his ideological position, Newsom decided to emulate Trump’s style. He started to echo the president’s unpresidential manner of tweeting, posting all-caps messages that imitated Trump’s distinctive diction. He started to dunk on opponents on social media in the no-holds-bar manner that fueled Trump’s rise. And despite having championed a California law that would impose prison sentences on anybody who spreads AI-created videos portraying real people just a year ago, he himself now posts deep fakes of J.D. Vance and other political opponents.
The recent selection of guests on Newsom’s podcast is a telling sign of his shift: They include resistance-y writers like the historian Heather Cox Richardson; liberal media figures like Jordan Klepper, the co-host of The Daily Show; Democratic Party stalwarts like Connecticut Sen. Chris Murphy; and foul-mouthed firebrands like Texas Rep. Jasmine Crockett. There’s no more trace of anyone who might upset the base.
Newsom is ideologically ambiguous: As a California Democrat, he has taken some very progressive positions. But he is also very much a member of the party’s establishment. Indeed, what’s striking about this moment is that the decision to imitate Trump’s style isn’t contained to one side of the ideological spectrum: Other elected officials who have done so include both avowed progressives like Crockett and relative moderates like J.B. Pritzker, the governor of Illinois.
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Take Abigail Spanberger, a former U.S. representative and the Democratic gubernatorial nominee in Virginia. A CIA veteran firmly rooted in the moderate wing of the Democratic Party, she has voted against strict COVID restrictions and loudly opposed defunding the police. She made headlines in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, which left Democrats with a diminished majority in the House of Representatives, when she let loose on the radicals who had tarnished the party’s brand in an internal caucus call: “We need to not ever use the word ‘socialist’ or ‘socialism’ ever again. … If we are classifying Tuesday as a success … we will get f—ing torn apart in 2022.” But Spanberger, often named as one of a handful of moderates who could one day run for national office, is no longer nearly as willing to distance herself from radicals in 2025.
In October, National Review published shocking text messages by Jay Jones, the Democratic nominee for attorney general of Virginia, in which he openly wished for a Republican colleague in the Virginia House of Representatives to be shot dead: “Three people, two bullets. Gilbert, hitler, and pol pot [sic]. Gilbert gets two bullets to the head,” he wrote. Jones even wished harm upon Gilbert’s children, texting that he is “breeding little fascists.”
Repeatedly pressed on whether Jones still enjoys her support at a Virginia governor’s debate last month, Spanberger proved incapable of either defending or ditching him, reduced to sputtering the same empty consultant-written phraseology over and over. Pressed on whether she still supported Jones, she kept inartfully side-stepping the question: “Importantly, at this point, as we move forward, the voters have this information … and it is up to voters to make an individual choice based on this information.”
Nor does Spanberger seem to have learned from the issue that swing voters found most off-putting in the 2024 presidential election. Asked her stance regarding the participation of biological men in women’s sport in the same debate, Spanberger kept resorting to the same tactic of evasion: “In cases across Virginia, I think it is incumbent upon parents and educators and communicators, in each local community, to make decisions locally … My priority would be to ensure that local communities, importantly parents, and teachers, and educators, are able to work together to meet the unique needs of each school and each community, and that is important, and I say that as the mother of three daughters in Virginia public schools.”
The most striking refusal to engage in basic political hygiene has come in the debate over Graham Platner. Platner is a bundle of contradictions. He is running to be the Democratic nominee for the Senate in Maine, one of the most competitive races expected in 2026, as an unabashed economic populist. Cultivating a compelling image as an everyman straight-talker on social media, he quickly drew endorsements from Sen. Bernie Sanders and other progressive stalwarts. And yet Platner was born to an affluent family, attended a $75,000-a-year boarding school, and did a tour of duty in Afghanistan as a security contractor with the private firm Constellis (better known by its previous name: Blackwater). And he has turned out to have a rather checkered political past, with new revelations about the racist and homophobic comments he has made on Reddit seemingly trickling out every day.
The climax of these revelations came late last month, when old photos emerged showing that he had a large tattoo of a skull-and-bones in the style widely used by the SS on his chest. Platner claims that he did not know what the tattoo symbolized when he got it on a drunken night out in Croatia two decades ago, but a former acquaintance of his reportedly told Jewish Insider that he jokingly referred to it as his “Totenkopf,” the symbol used by the SS units that ran the concentration camps. (Only after news of the tattoo broke did Platner have it covered up.)
Distancing yourself from a political candidate who had a literal Nazi symbol engraved on his body until news of it broke would seem like a pretty minimal test of political decency for Democrats. This is especially the case—these things shouldn’t matter, but of course they do—when he hasn’t even secured the party’s nomination yet, and would likely make it much harder for Democrats to flip a much-needed Senate seat in a winnable race. But motivated by the frustration that Republicans are failing to discipline extremists and cranks in their own ranks, a surprising number of power players in the Democratic Party are failing this test.
Platner’s ideological allies have been especially quick to make excuses for him: “He went through a dark period. He’s not the only one in America who has gone through a dark period,” Sanders said after news of the tattoo broke. But a surprising number of establishment figures have ridden to Platner’s rescue, too. Jon Lovett, a prominent speechwriter for Barack Obama who is now a co-host of Pod Save America, for example, tweeted in an apparent reference to the Platner scandal: “Only perfect candidates off the harvard law conveyor belt pls, highly disciplined, all boxes checked, well liked and humble, absolutely no spiritual connection to having a physical body except for severe IBS, volunteered at a soup kitchen in high school, signs email ‘cheers,’ etc.” (Apparently, there are only two types of Americans: those who have graduated from Harvard Law and those who have Nazi symbols tattooed on their chest.) Meanwhile, the party base seems to be rallying to Platner’s side: In a recent poll, he leads his principal rival for the nomination by 34 points.
Michelle Obama famously summarized the motto that (for the most part) defined the political style of her husband, the Democratic Party’s most successful politician of the 21st century, by saying that: “When they go low, we go high.”
It is of course understandable that many Democrats are growing impatient with that principle at a time when Trump and his allies are breaking every basic rule of personal and political decency. I can even see the basic logic for why Barack Obama himself has recently recorded videos urging California voters to embrace a blatantly antidemocratic redistricting reform to counteract the effects of an equally antidemocratic effort at gerrymandering that has already taken place in Texas. When your political opponent is proudly embracing every dirty trick in the book—up to and including open calls to prosecute perceived enemies—staying true to your principles can feel like a sucker’s game.
But, in another ironic echo of the first failed wave of resistance to Trump, the problem with this strategy is not only that it is immoral; it is also that it is likely to backfire. Voters who want a shameless bully in the White House already have an impressive specimen available to them; in this respect, at least, it is hard to improve on the original. And as the leaders of Occupy Wall Street used to say in more idealistic times, successful revolutionaries tend to govern in the way they win power: If Democrats should, against the odds, succeed in replacing Trump by copying him, it is far from certain that they would prove any more loyal to the basic principles of the American Republic once they are back in the White House.
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Watching the rise of woke during the first Trump presidency, I felt powerless to stop what looked to me very much like a giant train crash in the making. Watching the rise of Newsom and Platner and Jones—and the excuses made for them by everyone from Sanders to Spanberger—I now feel a similar sense of dread and inevitability.
Once upon a time, the #resistance was woke. Over the next years, it looks set to become soft-woke in content and soft-Trumpy in style. I never thought that I would one day feel nostalgia for the tragic mistakes that helped to cement Trump’s central role in American politics, but this new round of farcical missteps is likely to prove equally self-destructive.
This article originally appeared in The Dispatch.
In the first half of the conversation, Frank Fukuyama interviews Dan Wang on his book Breakneck, and how the engineering state led to the disaster of the “one child” policy; in the second part, Dan queries Frank on his view of the Chinese Communist Party, his meeting with anti-corruption chief Wang Qishan, and other topics.
All episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast are available here.
Podcast production by Ringo Harrison.
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Joseph Heath is a professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and the Trudeau Foundation, Heath is the author of several books, including Enlightenment 2.0 and The Machinery of Government.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Joseph Heath discuss the death of Western Marxism, approaches to equality, and how to create an equal society.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: One of the things I love about Substack is that sometimes the posts that do the best and go the most viral are the ones that may sound a little obscure to the uninitiated. Your most viral Substack piece is called John Rawls and the Death of Western Marxism, and it tells a broader story that you have been occupied with in your academic work and public writing for a long time. Why is it that the smartest academics who set out to vindicate Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s all ended up as boring old squishy liberal egalitarians? Why is it that this attempt to resuscitate Marxism didn’t work, and what does that tell us about people—from the likely next mayor of New York to many young writers and intellectuals around the world—who are trying to reclaim socialism today?
Joseph Heath: Yeah, actually, that Substack post was—I feel bad about this—a recycled undergraduate lecture. Whenever I was assigning Rawls to students, I found him a very unexciting writer. I was looking for a way to motivate them to get interested in it, so I came up with this line: this is the book that killed Western Marxism. On the one hand, it was a way of motivating students, but on the other, there is an element of truth to it.
The broader picture it came out of was that I’m now in my thirtieth year teaching philosophy as a university professor. When I started out, the twentieth century and Rawls were considered contemporary philosophy, and the history of philosophy ended in the nineteenth century. I remember at the end of the twentieth century, all the textbook publishers had to start revising their history textbooks to make the twentieth century part of history.
I was asked to referee or advise a number of these projects and say, okay, what do we say about the twentieth century? I also started revising my courses and teaching the twentieth century as history. Then I realized there is an incredible dilemma about teaching it—you have to explain what happened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Europeans went crazy and liberalism practically died out. Then there is this tale of its triumphant return in the 1970s with Rawls and American liberalism.
Once you start treating this historically, you realize you need about a twenty-minute explanation of what happened in the twentieth century for students who have no living memory of it. It’s a real challenge. So part of it was a story about how liberalism also adapted in the twentieth century. It’s not just that Marxism died out and was absorbed by liberalism; it’s that late twentieth-century liberalism became a far more robust doctrine, particularly because it had something to say about economic questions in a way that nineteenth-century liberalism really didn’t.
Mounk: Well, look, I love the article, and now I feel like I would love to take your undergraduate lecture. So walk us through this. Marxism emerges in the nineteenth century in response to the many depredations of capitalism that existed at the time—widespread immiseration of workers, deep economic crises, frequent bank runs. Marx concludes not only that this system exploits workers but also, perhaps more importantly, that it is destined to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.
Why is it that this set of ideas, as well as ideas on the far right—fascism and so on—put such pressure on liberalism in the first half of the twentieth century? Why is it that it then runs out of steam?
Heath: I used to think the nineteenth century was boring, and as I’ve gotten older, I’ve come to appreciate how much more interesting it was. There is a very clear sense in which our contemporary political thought is much closer to the eighteenth century. When students are assigned eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought—Rousseau, Kant, and so forth—it just seems a natural way to think about the world, whereas a lot of nineteenth-century theory feels quite foreign.
Mounk: That’s just because nineteenth-century thinkers were dominated by Germans, and Hegel and others were not particularly readable writers.
Heath: I mean, Kant was important in the eighteenth century, but there’s something natural about the way Kant approaches questions, I think, in a way that is not true of Hegel. The important thing to realize is that in the nineteenth century, liberalism was very much associated with doctrines of the social contract, and the social contract was really just a theory about the state. In particular, the egalitarianism and conception of rights that were so important to liberalism were really about political rights and about one’s status as a citizen in the state.
There was also the famous distinction between public and private, where in the domain of the private, one could do whatever one wanted. It is important to recognize, though, that the entire economy was classified as private. As a result, liberalism not only had nothing to say about the private, it actually insulated the private from any kind of political interference.
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That was fine in the eighteenth century, where basically everyone was a peasant or an aristocrat. There simply wasn’t an enormous private economy. But liberalism in part liberated the economic forces that generated the Industrial Revolution. Suddenly, the economy started to become a really big deal. When dispossessed peasants began living in shanty towns next to factories, and the factory owner said, oh, you’re all laid off, there were suddenly hundreds of working-class people with no work and no way to get food. That turned into a riot. That was clearly a social problem, and there needed to be some way of addressing it. Liberalism, in its eighteenth-century form, didn’t have anything useful to say about it other than protecting property rights.
So people started shopping around for a theory that would tell them what to do about the radical economic transformations taking place. In the English tradition, the most powerful response was utilitarianism, which was a kind of comprehensive moral theory—but it wasn’t a liberal theory. It said that we should try to produce the most good we can. A lot of nineteenth-century socialism was actually a kind of applied utilitarianism, but that wasn’t part of the liberal tradition.
Again and again, liberals went from being the revolutionary class, to put it in Marxian terms, in the eighteenth century, to being a profoundly reactionary class in the nineteenth century. They kept insisting that collective power couldn’t be used to address the issues generated by capitalism. So you wound up with a reformist version of socialism, increasingly radical versions with Marxism, and a kind of proto-fascist reaction trying to defend the local community against capitalism.
All of those were completely outside the space of liberalism. To jump to the end of the story, the thing I say about Rawls—the big innovation in late twentieth-century liberalism—is that he articulates the social contract idea in a way that is much more abstract, allowing it to be applied to economic questions as well as political ones.
Mounk: Let’s backtrack here for a moment, because liberalism as it’s formulated in the nineteenth century starts to have these real problems where it’s basically saying, all right, all of these workers are immiserated. We keep having these bank runs. There are all of these problems. But those are all parts of a private sphere. There are these very extensive liberties that people should have in that private sphere. There’s really nothing we can do about that. We just have to grit our teeth from there.
So you have a rise of these alternative theories which try to conceptualize this in another way, the most famous and most influential of which turns out to be Marxism. That motivates, in some ways, the Bolshevik Revolution. It becomes a huge political force in the first half of the twentieth century. That itself starts to have some serious problems. One of the concrete problems is that it keeps saying that capitalism will collapse, but capitalism does not look like it is collapsing. The kind of historical predictions which Marx makes turn out not to be true.
There are all kinds of writers within Marxism that try to explain that away, like Antonio Gramsci, who says it is because the bourgeoisie somehow manages to maintain cultural hegemony and that is why workers do not acquire the kind of class consciousness they need in order to carry out all of these revolutions and so on. There is an immanent attempt within Marxism to try and explain this. There is also this group of people who show up in the 1960s, particularly within the field of philosophy, people like G. A. Cohen, Philippe Van Parijs, and others, who are saying, let’s rescue this tradition. Let’s look at how we can empty Marxism of the things where it has gone wrong, the things where it made the wrong predictions, and make it a really philosophically coherent idea that can then ground our politics.
Tell us a little bit about that attempt, whose intellectual spirit, I think, is quite nicely encapsulated by its name of “no-bullshit Marxism.”
Heath: Well, it is sometimes said that if Marx were to come back from the dead today, he would not be a Marxist. The reason is that when he was working at the time, he was drawing upon the most sophisticated economic theories that were out there and then giving his own particular sort of take on them. Paul Samuelson once described Marx as a “minor Ricardian.”
The crucial thing was that he was a Ricardian because Ricardo’s work at the time was the most sophisticated economics. So a lot of the impetus for the movement of analytical Marxism that you were describing in the late 60s and 70s was just to update Marx’s ideas. Imagine that Marx comes back to life and wants to pick up where he left off. The first thing that he would do is read the last hundred years of economic science and theory in order to see what the most up-to-date views were.
At the time he was writing, for example, the labor theory of value was the standard view among economists. Since that time, that view has become universally rejected among economists. So if one gives Marx credit for his intelligence, if he were to come back to life today, he would also abandon the labor theory of value.
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So then the question is, Marx had certain key concepts like exploitation, which, the way he defined it, was deeply wedded to the labor theory of value. The question is whether, if you get rid of the labor theory of value, you could cleverly reconstruct the concept of exploitation using modern economic theory. Intuitively, it is not crazy to think you might be able to do that.
Mounk: The labor theory of value sounds like a very complicated thing. The underlying intuition is a relatively straightforward one, which is that I work really hard at my minimum-wage job. I make a real economic contribution by doing that. I can barely pay my rent, and yet here is the owner of the McDonald’s franchise or the owner of Walmart making huge amounts of money.
What seems to be going on here is that some of the value of the work that I’m doing is being taken away from me. I’m being exploited in order to generate these huge profits. That is fundamentally what is unfair about the capitalist system. That is an idea that continues to have a lot of straightforward intuitiveness. When I tell that story, it does not sound crazy. It sounds kind of reasonable.
So why is it that these people who believe in that idea, who want to rescue Marxism, who see themselves as part of this political tradition, end up concluding that this theory does not really make sense, that you cannot really make that hold up logically?
Heath: The way you told the story just now is the standard way it gets told, but it is important to recognize that it blends together two somewhat different moral concerns. It is important to the way you described it, for example, that the owner is making huge profits, not eking out a tiny little profit based on having a huge amount at risk or something like that. In the background, clearly, there is a concern about economic inequality.
Marx, in the nineteenth century, was writing in a period of growing skepticism about morality. It is also important to recognize that the nineteenth century was the first period in which one could be openly and avowedly an atheist and not immediately lose one’s livelihood or job. Marx was writing in a period of growing atheism. A lot of people thought of religion and morality as so deeply intertwined that both were going to fade away.
Marx was extremely reluctant to rest his critique on moral objections to capitalism. That was his famous complaint about the utilitarians and the utopian socialists—that they were naive moralists. Instead of complaining about inequality, he registered a much more technical objection to capitalism, and that was his concept of exploitation. That concept was that you have a kind of natural entitlement to the fruits of your labor, and if someone is taking it away from you, then you are exploited.
If you look at the world around you, typically people who are exploited are also poor, so the inequality objection lines up with the exploitation objection. You did not really have to be super clear about which one was the basis of your concern. Over the course of the twentieth century, one of the contributions of the analytical Marxists was to be more careful about these things, but also to produce models showing how you could pull the two apart. You could have a situation in which people were being exploited but there was no inequality, or situations where there was inequality but no exploitation. That really pressed the issue.
Mounk: One of the things that is intuitive about what you’re saying right now is that when you look at where labor unions have recently been thriving, they are often in upper-middle-class professions. The places where labor unions are now quite strong are often universities in the United States, journalism, even magazines, and so on. Writers, actors, and Hollywood directors in Hollywood have really strong unions.
Those might be places where there may still be inequality. All of these people may still have less money than the president of the university or the owner of a Hollywood studio, but they are certainly upper-middle-class. Most of them are making well more than the average citizen. So we start to see how these things come apart a little bit, and how perhaps what motivates people is this sense of exploitation, not the sense that they are somehow very poor or immiserated—though some of them shamefully claim that they are deeply immiserated when they really are not.
But give us some examples of how these two things can come apart analytically, in a way that helps motivate this concern.
Heath: The most famous example in philosophy is a sort of made-up story, which is Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” argument. This was part of a spectacular debate in the 1970s between Rawls and Nozick. Nozick’s example is that you imagine Wilt Chamberlain, the great basketball star, and the scandal was that Will Chamberlain wakes up one morning and decides that he is only interested in playing basketball if there is a surcharge added to the ticket price of everyone who comes to a game, a twenty-five-cent surcharge.
Nozick imagines that as a consequence of this twenty-five-cent surcharge, Wilt Chamberlain earns this eye-popping salary of, I think, $200,000 a year or something like that, which was considered at the time to be an extraordinary affront to economic equality. The point of the example was to show that you could have individuals who have these extraordinary natural talents, and if they go out and say, okay, well, this is how much I want to be paid for my talent, and other people are willing to pay it, what is the objection to it?
Nozick was making a kind of libertarian point. What he was trying to show was that this is going to generate a lot of inequality. But it concerned the Marxists because all that Wilt Chamberlain was doing here was getting paid for the exercise of his talents. If you were to start taking away the surcharge or taxing it or doing something like that, that looks like exploitation because you are not giving him the full fruits of his basketball-playing abilities.
That was the example that troubled a lot of philosophers—a case where giving people the full fruits of their labor produces massive amounts of inequality. It generated a lot of concern about what to say then about naturally-talented people and so forth.
Mounk: Nozick, when he is writing this argument, is not really talking about Marx, if I recall rightly. He may mention Marx somewhere in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, but he is arguing against a broader egalitarian tradition. Particularly, he is arguing against what he calls “patterned conceptions of justice” or “a certain kind of pattern of equality.”
Perhaps the pattern is one-to-one, we should all have exactly the same, or perhaps it is to say, well, it is fine for a CEO to earn twice as much money or three times as much money as a normal worker, but not more than that. Whatever the nature of a pattern is, Nozick says, the free function of a market is going to upset that pattern the moment you have achieved it, then let free exchange run again.
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So even if, at the starting point, Wilt Chamberlain and the stadium attendant and the people in the stadium who are watching him all have the same amount of money, if you allow him to say, give me the twenty-five-cent surcharge, and there are thirty thousand people in the stadium and he plays once a week, within a few months he is going to be vastly richer than anybody else in the society. Where is the injustice? This is all the downstream result of free exchange. What can our objection be?
What you are saying is that even though he is not directly criticizing or addressing the Marxists here, it ends up being a problem for Marxists as well because they actually are invested not just in the idea of a pattern of equality. They are not just saying, we want a society where everybody earns the same, or earns at most one and a half times what the worker earns. The way that what has been at the core of the theory has always been something else, namely, you should keep the just fruits of your labor.
The problem of capitalism is that somebody is taking what justly should be the fruits of your labor and taking it away. So you can slightly repurpose this example, you do not have to change the example, you sort of change the rhetorical import of it and say, hang on a second. Another way of thinking about this is not just that Wilt Chamberlain is upsetting this preference for patterned distribution, he is upsetting all he wants, which is to keep the fruits of his labor, to not be exploited. To get equality, to preserve equality, we have to exploit him.
Heath: Marxism was a sort of collateral damage of the Wilt Chamberlain argument. That is, it is exactly as you say, the target was a Rawlsian pattern conception of justice, and the slogan was “liberty upsets patterns.” The collateral damage was due to the fact that libertarianism of the Nozickian variety starts with a self-ownership postulate that says, first of all, you have a natural right to your own body, and then, by extension, you have a natural right to the fruits of your labor.
The “Wilt Chamberlain” argument showed that if that is your conception of justice, you cannot really be concerned about economic inequality. So you can imagine the Marxists on the side saying, oh, wait a minute. That is the same postulate that we are starting with. Because there is a sense in which Marx was really very much like Locke. That is, he had a very similar view about self-ownership and about property, and exploitation was a kind of offense to self-ownership, which is that I worked hard, I produced all this stuff, and who is the capitalist coming and taking it away from me?
The Marxists then began to think, if we actually are heavily committed to this view about labor and self-ownership, then it seems like we cannot care about economic inequality. But we do care about economic inequality. So how do we reconcile those two positions?
Mounk: You say that one great analytical philosopher of the twentieth century, Jerry Cohen, who also was a wonderful man and a great wit—I had the luck as a graduate student to see his one-hour philosophical stand-up special performed for a group of us geeky philosophy and political theory graduate students—spends ten years trying to deal with this. He realizes that his tradition of “no-bullshit Marxism” is about to be collateral damage of Nozick’s example.
He is trying to figure out a response to Nozick from within the Marxist tradition, some way of rescuing this idea of exploitation as the key problem with capitalism that withstands the example of Nozick and other kinds of more systemic examples like those produced by John Roemer that go in the same direction. How is he trying to respond to this, and why does he ultimately decide, this is the wrong way to respond; I can respond much better by jumping ship, as it were, to the liberal tradition?
Heath: By the way, I do not want to hang too much on this one “Wilt Chamberlain” argument because, while it was important and exciting and it is the more accessible one, someone like John Roemer produced a set of more formal models that illustrate some of the same tensions in a much more rigorous way. So, on the one hand, there is this Wilt Chamberlain thing, but it is not like the fate of Western Marxism hinged on it. There was actually a lot of different work being done by people showing the same thing.
Mounk: I hope, by the way, that Wilt Chamberlain was a socialist. That would be a great irony of this whole story, but I assume it is not true.
Heath: I should say that a prominent Canadian philosopher, David Gauthier, also offered a version of it called the Wayne Gretzky argument. So, in Canada, we have debates about Wayne Gretzky. There is a whole tradition there. Wayne Gretzky is most definitely not a socialist.
This gets a little bit into academic esoterica, but among the people who felt that they could respond to the “Wilt Chamberlain” argument and rescue egalitarianism, it generated a submovement called left libertarianism. Some of Cohen’s most talented students became left libertarians. They were, in a sense, like the rump of Western Marxism, because these were the people who wanted to accept the premises of self-ownership and exploitation but then try to show that it does not necessarily produce the inequality that Nozick showed.
Cohen, at one point, decided it would be easier to cut the Gordian knot on that and just say, once you narrow it down and say, look, your whole argument about capitalism is hinging upon this intuition about self-ownership and owning the fruits of your labor, that is not a rock-solid intuition. As people have pointed out for about 150 years, once you start putting together a team of ten people working together in a typical corporate setting where they have computers, an office, and all kinds of support, the concept of my labor is producing this thing that belongs to me becomes very difficult to specify. It is a solid intuition when we are talking about Lockean states of nature, where people are picking apples from a tree and so on, but it is not a rock-solid intuition in a contemporary complex economy.
Mounk: Right. That is the response that, to me—perhaps because I am a product of that tradition to some extent—is much more intuitive. One thing that you can say about the Nozick example is, all right, where does the stadium come from? What kind of background legal structures allow there to be such a thing as an NBA team? What social protections are in place to make sure that people are able to travel to this stadium by car or by public transport? How are they safe enough to be in that stadium and know they are not going to be mugged on the way to the game?
In particular, when you think more systematically about the vast profits of corporations, that requires the legal fiction of a corporation. That requires society to absorb some of the risks of business enterprises so that you can start a company, rack up debts, be unable to pay them back, and not go to debtors’ prison, but be forgiven those debts since they are corporate debts, not personal debts, and go on to found another corporation that then perhaps goes on to be super successful and produce value for society.
Since all of this is reliant on laws and other things that we collectively agree to, we might have very good reason to create incentives. We might want people to be entrepreneurs who can create great value and then also become personally wealthy, since that might be what keeps this wonderfully dynamic enterprise going. But we also are perfectly justified in saying that, as one of the prices of all of these benefits you derive from things like having this corporate structure that insulates you personally from the debt you might incur, you have to pay taxes which then allow us to uphold a welfare state, etc.
Nothing I have just said—unless I have made a mistake—requires arguments about what the proper valuation of labor is or how it is that we restore the rightful fruits of labor to the workers and avoid this kind of exploitation.
Heath: Yeah, those reflections are exactly what are the seductions of the Rawlsian framework in a sense. What Rawls said was that, first of all, you are not going to be able to do a kind of bottom-up theory of justice. You cannot imagine individual entitlements like little Lego bricks that you can then piece together and build up from, because it is way too complicated.
The way to think about justice is to start by talking about the basic structure of society, which is that we have a whole bunch of big institutions. We have the state, the economy, the contract law system, the universities, and so on—a bunch of big institutions. The job of those institutions is to secure what he called “conditions of background justice,” which is to create a by-and-large just background structure that then allows individuals to transact in various ways—to create corporations, to hire labor, to borrow money, etc.
We cannot be popping the lid on every single one of those. Courts do that, of course, but abstractly, when we do political economy, we are not going to be popping the lid on all of those things because they are just far too complicated. So what we need to be in the business of, from the standpoint of political philosophy, is evaluating the basic structure and whether the basic structure does a good enough job at securing conditions of background justice.
What we need is a really abstract theory of justice to tell us what the basic structure should look like. That is the Rawlsian picture. A lot of different ways of looking at things lead you to that picture. I take it that the point you are making about the complexity of all of this is one of the reasons for the attraction of the Rawlsian way of looking at it.
Mounk: That is not a coincidence. I was trying to lead into that. What is it that allows these people who are really invested in being Marxists and making Marxism work to say, you know what, actually the most important things that we wanted from that tradition, we can get out of a liberal egalitarianism? How is it that talking about questions of justice in that broadly Rawlsian framework allows somebody like Jerry Cohen and other people in that tradition to say, you know what, the more philosophically rigorous and the more realistic way to pursue a reasonably egalitarian society is to take on board those liberal assumptions?
In the last instance, that move allows them to become a little more comfortable with the idea of a market economy and some form of capitalism.
Heath: Once you turn to egalitarianism, you wind up being seduced by liberalism, in part because the liberal tradition is the one that historically has offered actual arguments for equality. If you look at the rhetoric of people who call themselves Marxists, most of the time what they seem to be complaining about is inequality and economic inequality. People are offended by inequality.
The first move out of Marxism is to say, okay, I am going to take that to be my central normative concern. I am not so much worried about exploitation; I am going to worry about equality. Jerry Cohen stopped at that point. He decided to be an intuitionist about it, which meant he said, I am not going to try to derive equality. Looking out at the world, you just kind of know that people should be equal or whatever, and I am not going to get into an argument for it. That is where he stopped.
A lot of people feel that you should be able to do a little bit better than that—that if you have somebody who does not care about equality, you should be able to come up with some kind of argument for it. The thing about the liberal tradition is that historically it has an argument. That is what the social contract argument is. The social contract argument says that in the past we used to think that social institutions were divinely ordained or imposed by tradition or whatever. We realized that all of that is indefensible and that there is no single correct way to organize things.
So what is the right way to organize things? It is what we can all agree to. You imagine a situation where we all have to get together and decide what the rules are going to be. The first thing that comes out of that is the requirement that we treat each other equally. If you and I are negotiating over something, I obviously cannot expect you to accept some compromise that I would not be willing to accept myself. There is a kind of symmetry and reciprocity built into coming to an agreement, and that generates a principle of equality.
Lots of people are egalitarian, but it is surprisingly difficult to come up with an argument for equality. When I challenge my students to say why, they get kind of angry, in part because a lot of people who are strongly egalitarian know they do not have a knockdown philosophical argument for equality. It is just something people care about deeply. If you challenge that, it is not as though there are dozens of different arguments for equality that you can pick from. There is actually a paucity of good arguments for equality, and the social contract argument is one of the few powerful ones.
Rawls then also wants to resuscitate that idea. When we think about justice, we have to imagine whether these institutions are ones that all of us could accept without gerrymandering them to benefit ourselves. If we were in this sort of abstract condition, would we agree to it?
That is where the last piece of the puzzle comes in. You start with equality, and you often get drawn toward liberalism because liberalism has a compelling argument for equality.
Mounk: To simplify vastly, one of the conditions here is that since this is a social structure that constrains all of us, it should in some meaningful way be to the benefit of all of us. Rawls then has a particular way of spelling out what that means for a distributive principle, which we do not need to get into deeply here. One interesting thing that comes out of this, and that you have touched on in a different post in your Substack, is that it leads to a very deep and broad discussion about what it is that we want to equalize.
To explain this, in part in response to a meme that many listeners to this podcast may know—it has gone very viral—which shows three people wanting to watch a baseball game. We seem to be keeping with the theme of American sports, though we have now changed from basketball to baseball. They do not have a ticket, and you can ask questions about whether that is an injustice, whether they are unable to buy a ticket, or whether they should be able to watch the game. The meme assumes that it is a moral good for them to be able to watch the game even if they did not have a ticket. They are trying to watch by looking over a fence.
One of them is tall enough that he can watch the game without any help. The second one is stepping on a medium-sized box in order to watch, and the third one, a very short child, is stepping on a tall box so that all three of their heads are roughly at the same level. They are all able to watch over the fence, and that is labeled “equity.” By contrast, “equality” is shown as each of them having a box of the same size, which means the tall person is unnecessarily tall and the other two cannot see. The meme suggests that what justice requires in this kind of situation is to equalize the outcome, and that the right term for that is equity.
One objection you have to this is that “equity” is a confusing term to use here, given what it has historically meant. When the meme was originally produced, it was labeled “equality of opportunity” versus “equality of outcome,” and it was really arguing for equality of outcome. That verbal point aside, what are the problems with that notion of equity, which has become very politically influential in recent years? Why is it that some of these people, including those in the tradition of “no-bullshit Marxism,” look at that and say, no, you are ignoring everything that we have been thinking and arguing about for the last fifty years?
Heath: The business about equity was frustrating to a lot of philosophers, simply because philosophy—political philosophy in particular—had been really dominated by what was called the “equality of what” debate. It ended about eight or nine years ago, but for most of my career, that was the dominant discussion in political philosophy. There was an incredibly intense debate about the correct way of understanding the principle of equality.
In a sense, the philosophers were talking to each other about this, and it was an incredibly intense debate, none of which seemed to have any impact on the broader public discussion. Part of the frustration with the equity idea is that it was disconnected from that long-standing academic debate that had already been going on.
Mounk: Perhaps we need to motivate the “equality of what” debate. When I talk to students, a lot of their instincts, understandably, are that they just want a society that is more equal, where people are treated fairly and equally, and where there are not vast disparities of wealth or treatment. All of that sounds like a good set of goals. But once you start to dig down a little bit, you start to realize that they are often in conflict.
The simplest way they are in conflict is that you might want to think people should be paid roughly the same per hour of work and also that they should be paid the same given the effort they put in. But those two things can come apart. If one person is running back and forth to do something and another person is taking some leisure or simply working less hard, you are going to have some kind of inequality of treatment either way. Either there will be inequality in the wage they receive in the end or inequality in wage rates where one person is effectively paid twice as much as another for each unit of work produced.
The question then immediately becomes, we are egalitarians, we want equality—what do we want equality of? Do we want strict equality of wages no matter the circumstances? Do we want equality of hourly wages, so that if someone chooses to work twenty percent more, they earn twenty percent more? Should we want equality of productivity, so that if one person works much harder than another, they should get more? What exactly is the right thing that we want to equalize?
You can then generalize this question beyond money to other things that might be desirable. Is that right? Why is it that this question becomes fifty years of philosophical enterprise?
Heath: It is actually even broader than that. Amartya Sen is often credited with having started the “equality of what” debate because he made the extraordinarily provocative observation that not only formally egalitarian views, but also basically all positions in political philosophy, are actually egalitarian. He argued that utilitarianism is a type of egalitarianism, libertarianism is also a type of egalitarianism—everyone is an egalitarian; they just disagree about what they are trying to equalize.
That was a really provocative idea. Traditionally, people had thought of egalitarianism as one school of thought in opposition to all these other schools of thought. Sen said, no, everyone is an egalitarian—they just disagree about the what. Part of the reason people liked that was because, as I said earlier, we do not have many high-powered arguments for equality. What Sen suggested is that we do not need a high-powered argument for equality, because actually everyone is an egalitarian. All we need is a really great argument for why our preferred objective of equalization is the correct one.
Mounk: Utilitarians say, roughly, that we should act in such a way—or have social policies designed in such a way—as to maximize the balance of happiness over pain in the world. There are different formulations of this tradition, but that is the most straightforward version. Libertarians, on the other hand, say that there are certain kinds of natural liberties that we have as individuals, and the most important thing about a political system is that it does not interfere with the exercise of those liberties. One of those liberties is economic. So, if Wilt Chamberlain wants to charge twenty-five cents extra on his ticket, who are we to tell him that he cannot do that because we have a strange, irrational preference for a particular patterned distribution of resources?
How is it that these two views, according to Sen, and perhaps according to you, are actually egalitarian?
Heath: Utilitarianism was the case he used. In the eighteenth century, utilitarianism was shockingly egalitarian. Bentham had this famous line that “pushpin is as good as poetry.” The purpose of it was to show that this traditionally more sort of aristocratic sense that there were higher and lower pleasures was incorrect, and that all there is, is pleasure.
Part of that important idea in the utilitarian calculus was that all pleasures are equal and everyone’s pleasures count for the same amount. That was thought to require the famous utilitarian aggregation that maximizing the sum of pleasures is grounded in this Sen-claimed egalitarian intuition that no one’s pleasures are better than anyone else’s. Many people found that eye-opening.
Utilitarianism is not egalitarian in the specific way that it doesn’t care about the distribution of happiness. It only wants to maximize the sum. But it is insistent on the egalitarian premise that everyone’s pleasure counts equally. Similarly, with libertarianism, one can argue that what it’s trying to do is ensure that everybody winds up with exactly the same system of rights.
It simply wants to insist that the basic equality of rights and their exercise not be compromised. That was what started the debate—the provocative claim. It made everybody think that we might be able to treat this as a technical problem: what to equalize. That led people to want to reframe all these traditional debates. For example, there’s this intuitive distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.
That was seen as a question about when you want to be equalizing—at the beginning or at the end. With this new Sen lens, people said it’s not about the time. Time is a consideration outside of egalitarianism. The Sen position says it’s not about time; it’s about what you want to be equalizing. Anything that can be articulated as an outcome can also be articulated as an object of equalization.
For example, a lot of economists are habituated to think about welfare and efficiency and optimization in terms of welfare. Sen said you could also think about equality in terms of welfare. An obvious and attractive—though problematic—position is to say we should try to equalize welfare. That’s going to look a lot like equality of outcome, but don’t talk about outcome; talk about welfare. That was the suggestion.
Mounk: So, helping to tie this back, how is it that all of this debate is important to understand if you want to think intelligently about equality, and why does it seem to undermine the implicit premise of that meme, which argues for equality of outcome or equity, whatever you want to label it?
Heath: The people who were inclined to equalize welfare would be the closest to being a kind of equality of outcome view. They realized almost immediately that to the extent individuals are making choices that give them differential outcomes, you can’t seriously be expecting to equalize that.
An example that came up in the literature would be a monk who swears a vow of asceticism and therefore eats only 1,500 calories a day or something like that—clearly is nutritionally deprived compared to the average American. But we’re not offended at that outcome because that’s an obvious product of a choice that this person has made.
One strategy is to hang on to the welfare idea but modify it and say, well, we’re trying to equalize welfare, but if the welfare you wind up with is a consequence of choices you’ve made, then we’re not trying to equalize. It’s only if it’s a consequence of things outside your control that we’re going to try to equalize it.
That led to the position called responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. It was the idea that we’re going to try to equalize stuff if you can’t be held responsible for the differences, but we’re not going to equalize if you can be held responsible. That position was called luck egalitarianism. People with that position were proud of it because they thought they had disarmed the most obviously correct conservative objection to crude egalitarianism, which is that if you give somebody some food and they throw it in the garbage, it’s not an offense to equality that the person then has no dinner.
The problem with the kids on the boxes is that that kind of crude equality of outcome is committing the mistake conservatives have complained about forever, which is trying to equalize an outcome without paying attention to what kinds of choices people have made and how much responsibility they bear for it.
Mounk: One of the things you say about this is, what are the circumstances here? Is this a tailgate in which everybody was told to bring their own box? Is it that one of these kids just doesn’t have the resources to bring a box because there’s deep historical injustice that makes them incapable of procuring one? Or is this particular kid just irresponsible and didn’t choose to bring a box even though they have lots of boxes at home that they could have carried ten yards to the field?
Obviously, in real-life situations, our moral intuitions differ depending on what the background story is. Is this the kid who grows up in a deprived neighborhood where the school was really bad and they didn’t have much of an opportunity to develop their talent, and so now they’re working in minimum wage jobs? Or is it somebody who had all the same opportunities and never applied themselves, or quit a job in a huff and now they’re in a worse job? Those make a moral difference in how we assess real-life situations, and it’s all flattened away in this kind of example.
Heath: Egalitarian philosophers, perhaps hubristically, felt that they had learned to draw the sting from that criticism. While it is the case that people make poor choices in life, there are also all kinds of things that are obviously beyond people’s control—structural factors that contribute to injustice. Economic factors, race, and gender are all unchosen and have clear and demonstrable effects on the kinds of outcomes people get.
The slightly hubristic egalitarian position was that we can have an egalitarian doctrine that picks out specifically the factors affecting people outside of their control. Then we can develop an institutional response that tries to equalize on those dimensions but does not try to achieve a comprehensive equality based on the improvident choices people have made. They thought they had the ultimate response to the classic conservative objections to crude egalitarianism.
Mounk: One of the attractions of the tradition, as you alluded to, is this line that it had somehow incorporated within the arsenal of the egalitarian left the most historically powerful arguments of the right: those of choice and responsibility. Now, we are going into philosophical depths here, but let’s do it. Bear with us.
I thought about luck egalitarianism somewhat incidentally as part of my PhD dissertation. I am also aware of some of the reasons we might want to criticize it. The starting assumption is powerful—that we don’t just want an equal outcome or equal patterns in society. What activates our intuitions about inequality is when somebody is poor for reasons beyond their control. Somebody who grew up in a neighborhood where the schools were terrible, who suffered malnutrition as a child, and then as an adult lacks marketable skills and remains in poverty seems to face something clearly unfair. There was no choice that put them into that subordinated position; something is wrong there.
The powerful insight of the luck egalitarian tradition is to express that without committing itself to full outcome equality. You take two kids from good families, growing up in affluent suburbs, going to prep schools, and one ends up getting a great job while the other never did a day of work in their life and now lives in poverty. That doesn’t seem like a stark moral injustice. Fair enough.
There are two problems with this, as I understand it. One is an argument made by Elizabeth Anderson, who has been on this podcast a couple of times. She argues about the way the state would need to treat the people at the bottom of this kind of society if it were being honest. Instead of saying, we don’t really know why you’re in this position—perhaps you had a tough break, perhaps you haven’t fully applied yourself—but you’re starving and we’re going to help you because we don’t want people to starve, it would have to say something like, we have carefully assessed your particular case and recognize that you’re not poor because of any choices you made. You’re not poor because you failed to apply your talents. You’re poor because you simply have no way of making money. No matter how hard you would have tried, you’re so untalented that we are willing to give you this help.
Even as victims of that kind of bad luck might be helped in a luck-egalitarian state, they would also be in a deeply subordinate position because that help is premised on the recognition that they cannot make a productive contribution to society. They are in this terrible position for reasons fully outside their control, and there seems to be something demeaning about it. That is one line of objection.
The other line of objection, which I find powerful, is that it entangles us in deeply metaphysical debates about what a choice actually is. It sounds simple to say, if you’re poor because of your own choice, then we won’t help you. If you’re poor because there’s nothing you could have done, then we will help you. That sounds plausible, but you might ask whether actual states and welfare bureaucracies are the right kinds of entities to determine that. Is it ever possible for a caseworker to know why you are in your position? Would this require agents of the state to make decisions well beyond their competence?
Even if you set aside this real-world concern and stay within the realm of ideal theory, asking only what the abstract principles of justice should be, what people deserve still depends on your answer to the debate about free will. If you believe in free will, then some people may have made bad choices, and it is fine that they have less than others. If you believe there is no such thing as free will, then this tradition of luck egalitarianism actually commits you back to strict equality. After all, if nobody truly makes a choice and we are committed to compensating for all effects of bad luck—everything beyond your control—then any inequality is beyond your control because nothing is under your control.
Suddenly, whether we have a society more egalitarian than any in history or one that is vastly unequal depends on your view of whether there is free will, which seems quite implausible.
Heath: Yes, to clarify, I’m not a luck egalitarian. Some of my friends are, but I was never committed to this. I’ve been explaining it to you, but I don’t endorse it. That’s to say, luck egalitarianism wasn’t the only game in town. Luck egalitarianism was, in a sense, the most left-wing position because it started with the most expansive commitment to equality, which was equalizing people’s welfare, making everyone equally happy. That was subject to obvious objections. So they worked back from that by saying, okay, except when it’s a consequence of choices, or except when this, or whatever. They took this comprehensive equality and introduced a bunch of exceptions.
Specifying when those exceptions occur becomes problematic for exactly the reasons you described. Another approach would be to start with a more modest conception of where you’re going in an egalitarian direction. You can find that in Rawls, which is that equality arises from systems of cooperation. Rawls famously characterized the basic structure as a system of cooperation. If you and I don’t need to cooperate, we can do whatever. There’s no reason for us to treat each other as equals. But if we need to cooperate, that means we need to agree on a set of ground rules, and that’s where equality springs up.
Equality pertains not to the universal human condition but specifically to the benefits of cooperation. That position started out on its back heel because it seemed miserly and less virtuous, so it was easily dismissed in the very left-wing academy as a right-wing position. But one can take that view and build it up to get a more robust conception of equality.
In a sense, the luck egalitarians start with rhetorically strong egalitarianism but then take away from it, whereas the more contractualist or Rawlsian approach starts with a modest conception but tries to build up. I think many of the problems with luck egalitarianism can be sorted out by starting from the more miserly “benefits of cooperation” perspective.
Mounk: Let me quickly speak to that. I think that’s really interesting. One of the things I find strange about the luck egalitarian tradition, and a lot of philosophical thought in ethics more generally, is that it assumes a strange structure to our ethical obligations. It assumes that nature has done a terrible job and that our role as humans is to remedy every inequality and every injustice that nature has created.
One way you can see that is that this luck egalitarian tradition ends up taking positions, at a time in the 1990s before there was such a thing as a manosphere or a social discourse of incels, that sound weirdly incel-like. For example, if you’re saying we have a responsibility as humans to remedy any inequality that isn’t the result of your choices, one thing you might say is that some people are more attractive and more charming than others. That leads to big inequalities. The ability to find a loving life partner who is deeply invested in your well-being and wants to start a family with you is a really important thing. Some people have a much easier time doing this than others because of unfair, unjust factors—being born attractive or not, or having charm or not. Shouldn’t we remedy that in some way?
Philippe Van Parijs, one of the main thinkers in this tradition, ends up saying yes. We shouldn’t have a right to particular partners—that would go against freedom rights—but we should have what he calls “an equitable, tradable share in partnerships.” If you have the same right to a partner and can’t procure one because of bad luck, you should be compensated in other ways. I think this whole way of thinking about the subject is really strange, and the weirdness of it stems from this idea that we, as individuals, have the task of making the world just—as though God did a bad job and our responsibility on earth is to play a pseudo-divine figure who rights the ills of the world.
By contrast, as you point out, something like the Rawlsian perspective starts from a simpler and more intuitive view. We are humans in the world, each with strengths, weaknesses, advantages, and disadvantages, and that’s fine. But we are engaged in social cooperation, and social cooperation involves coercion. If I disobey the laws of a country in which I’m born, I might end up in jail or face serious consequences.
An old question of political philosophy is what justifies that. When the tax collector says, you owe some money from your lemonade stand, give me a third of that or I’ll put you in jail, by what justification are they doing that? When they say, here’s a law about how loudly you can play music after a certain hour, and if you violate it we’ll fine you or jail you, what justifies that? The answer is that what legitimizes this whole scheme is that the terms of cooperation are fair so that everybody meaningfully benefits from it.
What we need to reflect on is the conditions under which it is fair in that way. That seems to me a much more sensible way not only of answering questions about equality but of thinking about what gives rise to those moral questions in the first place.
Heath: Yeah, I agree entirely. Those points about marriage and sexual relations go back to an old provocation from Nozick, who argued that there’s an analogy between the marriage market and the capitalist market. He said that in both cases, it’s just people getting together. In the case of romantic partnerships, you meet somebody, you get together. Similarly, with capitalism, you have something you want to sell, somebody else wants to buy it, you get together, you exchange goods.
In the case of the marriage market, this had some fairly toxic implications. He said that in the marriage market, nobody cares about equality or inequality of results. Beautiful people marry beautiful people, and we don’t have a government program to fix that. But it’s also one of the last domains of permissible racial discrimination, since people often express racial preferences over their partners, and that is still more or less permissible.
In the capitalist market, Nozick therefore says, how is it any different? If I don’t want to serve you at my lunch counter, why should I have to? At the time, it was such an obnoxious argument that it wasn’t taken seriously enough, until later on people like Van Parijs and others accepted it and said, yes, he’s right—there’s a strong analogy, and therefore maybe we should have corrective justice in the marriage market.
The correct way to respond to that is to observe a huge difference between the two. The marriage market—or whatever we call the sexual relations market—is not cooperative in the way the capitalist market is, because two people can get together and develop a relationship without requiring anything from anyone else in society. It’s an independent, dyadic interaction. In contrast, in the market, my ability to specialize in producing philosophy requires complementary specializations from millions of other people to provide my clothing, food, and so on.
The market is a vast system of cooperation, which raises the issue of justice. This point goes in the Rawlsian and against the luck egalitarian direction. You can’t just look at it and say, that’s bad. What’s problematic about the inequality generated by a market economy is that the market institutionalizes a system of cooperation. Whenever we are cooperating with others, it’s reasonable to ask how we should divide up the fruits of that cooperation.
The cooperative standpoint is the more compelling position, and it allows us to respond easily to Nozick’s provocation about the marriage market. A lot of what’s going on in luck egalitarianism is, I think, a misguided attempt to understand insurance. This has been the focus of some of my work. One of the things about luck egalitarianism is that it doesn’t really have a view on insurance.
Insurance is a terribly neglected feature of modern societies and specifically of the welfare state. Paul Krugman famously described the U.S. federal government as “a large insurance company with an army.” It’s a great line that captures how we should think about the welfare state: first and foremost as a set of insurance programs. These are some of the major systems of cooperation in our society, where we pool risks. As systems of cooperation, we can ask how the benefits and burdens of that system are divided. There are many interesting issues of justice that arise around these insurance systems.
Mounk: Help motivate that view. The obvious example is unemployment insurance. In many countries, the state requires you to pay a contribution to a fund as part of your salary. As a result, when you lose your job, you can claim unemployment benefits. The structure of that is straightforwardly like insurance.
You don’t want to be unemployed or hope to lose your job, but there’s a compulsory scheme where you pay a small share of your salary each month. As a benefit, when this terrible thing happens—when you suddenly don’t have a job and can’t pay your mortgage—you aren’t starving on the street. Hopefully, you can still pay your mortgage for a while because the unemployment benefit arrives.
It’s similar to car insurance. I don’t hope to have a car accident, but every month I pay a small premium, and when I do have an accident, I get a payout. I can cover the damages I caused to another car and hopefully repair my own.
What about retirement benefits or child benefits? There are many elements of the welfare state that don’t seem as obviously structured like insurance as unemployment benefits.
Heath: There’s a great book by David Moss called When All Else Fails, which tries to work through the logic of all these systems, showing how there’s a kind of implicit insurance logic to a lot of them. So there’s a whole way of reading the development of capitalism in the 19th century and the rise of the welfare state as a set of dramatic changes around the way in which we pool risks as a society.
Many of us are habituated to the broadly Marxian way of reading the conditions of the 19th century. If you think of the condition of the working class in the 19th century, the specific lens that Marx and the socialists brought to it was to say that it was a product of inequality and exploitation. That’s why their living conditions were so poor. There’s a great book that I’m a big fan of by François Ewald called L’État Providence, which has been partially translated into English.
He argues that that’s the wrong way of seeing it. The way to see it is that the institutions of feudal society in Europe had a variety of different risk-pooling mechanisms. That allowed people protection and gave people protection against the major risks of life, which included being widowed, being disabled, but also outliving one’s savings. Not being able to work in old age is actually one of the major risks.
Traditional medieval society had all kinds of institutions that essentially offered people low-level but adequate protection against those risks. What happened with the Industrial Revolution and capitalism was that capitalism destroyed most of those institutions. So what you see in the condition of the working class of the nineteenth century is actually not a distributive inequality but rather the consequences of exposing large segments of the population to risks that people historically were not exposed to.
The reason you wind up with so many beggars and orphans and widows and so on is that all of the community support mechanisms have been disabled. The drama that Ewald tells of the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century is about the rise of insurance, both the private insurance industry and the welfare state. The example of pensions is a really good one. A pension is a type of life annuity.
A life annuity is a slightly esoteric financial product whereby you pay a certain amount of money upfront, and in return, what you get is a fixed periodic payment from retirement until death. An annuity is an insurance product because what it offers people is protection against the risk of outliving their savings. Most people don’t know about them because there’s very significant market failure in private markets for annuities.
If you’re under the age of 50, for the most part, if you go to a bank and say, I’d like to buy an annuity, they simply won’t sell it to you because they don’t sell annuities to people under a certain age. So there’s a market failure. One of the things that the welfare state does is it provides collective public pensions so that when you’re 30 and working, you have a mandatory contribution to a state pension scheme that is essentially an annuity.
Mounk: Right, so in a way, there’s something counterintuitive here that I want to explain. You drive a car, you take out car insurance, and you don’t want to have a car accident. Your preference—unless there’s something wrong with your insurance and it gives you far too generous benefits—is to never have a car accident. That’s not a good thing to have. But when this bad event happens, your car insurance compensates you in a way that hopefully makes you more or less financially whole.
There’s something counterintuitive here. You probably want to live a long time. Your preference is to live a long time rather than die early. But in financial terms, if you retire at 65 and have savings that will last you 15 years, and you die after five years, that’s good luck since you died while your savings were still intact. Whereas if you live another 25 or 30 years and your savings run out, that’s bad luck from a financial perspective.
The pension scheme protects you against this financial bad luck by making sure that even if you live longer than statistically expected, you’re still able to have a decent income and live in dignity in old age.
Heath: Yeah, all of this can be hugely confusing. The first confusion arises with pensions, when people take a snapshot of them and say, what’s going on here? There’s this redistributive lens that imagines the welfare state is always promoting equality by redistributing. It looks at pensions and says, look, this is young people transferring money to old people. Then you could have a debate about why we should be giving them money. It used to be that old people were poor, so it’s thought to be a program designed to promote equality.
That’s the wrong way of thinking about it. If you take a yearly snapshot, it looks like redistribution from young to old, but over the course of people’s entire lives, it’s not redistribution between young and old. It’s my younger self distributing to my older self. The actual redistribution happens between people who die young and people who die old. People who die young save money into Social Security or the Canada Pension Plan, and that money tacitly gets transferred to those who live a long time.
People might ask why we should have that transfer. I like to use the example of car insurance. If you look at car insurance, it seems like a redistribution scheme where good drivers are redistributing wealth to bad drivers. People think, why does justice require that? The answer is that justice doesn’t require it—it’s the logic of an insurance system.
Certain kinds of events are, for the most part, bad luck, though people can contribute to them. If each of us had to face that bad luck alone, it would be highly inefficient because you’d have to save enough money to buy yourself a new car in a pinch. Instead, you pool those savings with others because, on a population level, it’s quite predictable how many people will have accidents. You’re pooling your savings against certain kinds of risk.
Pensions have exactly the same structure as car insurance. There’s a bad thing that can happen—outliving your savings. You pool your savings with other people to make sure none of us outlive our savings. None of it is redistributive. It’s all just a system of cooperation.
Mounk: Well, I think the trouble of understanding insurance for some people, though I trust not for listeners of this podcast, is even more basic. A surprising amount of the time, you see on social media—and I believe there was somebody on The View, perhaps Whoopi Goldberg—who recently voiced a similar thing on air, saying, if I have health insurance and I don’t go see a doctor or go to the hospital all year long, why doesn’t it pay me back my premiums? That is an even more fundamental misunderstanding.
To return to the broader strand of the conversation: If we are thinking of the welfare state as inherently an insurance scheme, what does that tell us about the nature of a welfare state? More broadly, with all of these interesting, subtle philosophical distinctions we have been making for the better part of an hour, how should we argue for some form of equality today?
For members of my audience who believe that they are rightly worried about inequality in our capitalist system, who think it is a problem that many people are quite poor while some people have vast riches, and who want some forms of social policy that might insure people against bad outcomes or perhaps redistribute—what ultimately do you take to be the argument that is convincing for that? Why is it that the resurgence of socialism, the resurgence to some extent of communism, and the resurgence of people saying we should reject the capitalist system altogether are unlikely to lead to their desired outcomes?
Heath: This insurance thing came out of nowhere, but the reason I brought it up was because when I look at the problems of American society, I see America as being, first and foremost, a kind of underinsured society—largely because of fear of state power. Once you understand that most of what the welfare state is doing is not running around taking money away from Peter in order to give it to Paul, it becomes clear that it does a little redistribution, but most of what looks like redistribution is actually insurance. These are mechanisms offering people protection against certain kinds of risks.
The weakness of the welfare state in the classic sense in America has left Americans more exposed to all kinds of risks that they reasonably would like protection against, but that constantly gets seen through the lens of redistribution. This is a bit dated, but I remember Barbara Ehrenreich’s book Nickel and Dimed. She worked as a waitress and low-wage employee in America to do an ethnography and report on what it was like. The media coverage in the United States focused on poverty and low wages, but when I read the book, I thought the whole thing was about health insurance. All of the drama was about health and sickness—falling ill, not being able to miss work, not being able to pay for procedures, and so on.
Americans sometimes fail to see how much the absence of comprehensive health insurance, and of welfare systems more broadly, affects all aspects of society. Looking at inequality in America, I feel that the focus on the top 1% and people like Jeff Bezos is a kind of shiny object. The real economic inequality and its problems lie in the fact that the people in the lower 30% form such a sticky category. It is extraordinarily difficult to move out of the lower 30% of the population economically in America compared to an average European country or even Canada.
A lot of that has to do with insurance, the lack of a safety net, and the absence of programs that adequately give people a start in life. That does not need to be articulated in zero-sum, redistributionist language. Much of it can be articulated in terms of the positive-sum logic of insurance—offering people protection against negative effects. A lot of luck egalitarianism was a poor way of articulating that. Luck egalitarianism identified the issue around risk but immediately turned it into a debate about equality rather than a debate about risk.
Mounk: That’s a really interesting observation, because what luck egalitarianism is saying is that we have some abstract obligation to right the injustices that naturally occur. The way it proposes to do that is by figuring out, for each person, whether they are poor because of their choices or because of something beyond their control. For all of the people who are victims of bad luck, it seeks to completely equalize outcomes. All of this is radically foreign to the intuitions and ways of thinking of most people.
Whereas if what you are saying is, look, most Americans work hard and play by the rules, as Barack Obama used to say, and they deserve to have a life of material dignity and opportunity. Sadly, sometimes horrible things happen in life—you have a work accident, you become disabled, or you develop a sickness that makes you incapable of work. In our society, we don’t sufficiently protect against these risks, most of which are outside people’s control. It’s not your fault you got sick. It’s not your fault you had a work accident. Wouldn’t it be better to have a society that protects people against those risks?
That framing highlights that such protections could also make people more able to take risks. It might make them more able to quit a job and start a business that could do wonderful things for the country without having to worry about health insurance. This would actually have positive effects for everyone. That is a much more palatable set of arguments with which to win electoral majorities in the United States.
Heath: Yeah, one of the many mysteries of American society is this tendency toward normative maximalism—taking on these hugely demanding normative commitments in a social context in which not only does nobody support that stuff, in terms of the democratic polity of America, but also there are not even the institutions to get you anywhere near achieving these outlandishly utopian commitments and ideals.
I think some of it has to do with the disenfranchisement, or the kind of isolation and alienation, of academics and intellectuals in America. The thing about Europe is that if you are a university professor and you do some work on economics and politics, it is quite likely that someday someone in government will call you and say, look, I want to put you on a committee, and I want you to advise on policy, or something like that. That kind of thing acts as a real corrective to this normative overkill—wanting to create total equality among everybody.
When somebody sits down and says, OK, but what should we do with the tax code right now? then suddenly the value of having a more achievable and modest normative commitment becomes apparent. I think, in part, it is certainly something I saw while studying in American universities: university professors in America—nobody cares about their opinion. In a sense, that allows them to develop these very outlandish positions.
My thought on luck egalitarianism is that you do not need that heavy-duty and controversial normative commitment to get the kinds of outcomes that would generate obvious and significant improvements in people’s lives. I started in all of this with a kind of commitment to normative minimalism, which is to think about what policy you want and then pick a norm that is just strong enough to give you that policy, but not any more controversial than is absolutely necessary to justify the policy you are currently trying to achieve.
Some of my intuitions about this came in Canada, in debates over healthcare in the late 20th century. In the late 20th century, when healthcare was starting to get expensive, people were seriously talking about privatizing the public healthcare system in Canada. The Conservative Party at the time actually was, broadly speaking, committed to privatization. Nowadays, nobody wants to privatize, for obvious reasons, but there was a live debate about it.
The thing that I noticed about that debate was that everyone who was defending the healthcare system was defending it entirely on egalitarian grounds. They were saying the reason why it has to be public is so that everybody can have absolutely equal healthcare. Other people were saying it would be much more efficient to have a private system. Nobody was defending the middle ground of saying, look, there are enormous benefits to having an insurance system for health insurance in the public sector. So there was this insurance argument for a single-payer healthcare system that was, at the time, a political orphan.
This is how I got involved in all of this, in terms of arguing about the welfare state. I wrote a book defending the Canadian healthcare system on efficiency grounds because nobody had been making that argument. The basic principle generalizes: do not pick a norm that is more controversial than the one you need to achieve the outcomes you are trying to achieve.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Joseph discuss the difference between the United States and Canada, from the impact of gun violence on society to how a lack of mobility entrenches poverty. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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It says a lot about how far we have fallen down the mud-slope to autocracy that many of Donald Trump’s serious offenses against democracy are no longer front-page news—or cannot remain so for long because they are so quickly displaced by others.
The most visceral expression of Trump’s contempt for democratic institutions, norms, and procedures—his recent sudden breakneck demolition of the White House East Wing—only captured headlines because of the shock and awe of the destruction. But the teardown, Bloomberg wrote, also “followed none of the precedents or procedures set forth by Congress, oversight agencies and even past White House occupants to safeguard the history of the People’s House.” It was not strictly illegal since the letter of the law requires approval for construction, not destruction. So, Trump “exploited an excavator-sized loophole,” thinking it would leave fussy preservationists no choice but to approve his plan for a gargantuan ballroom to fill the hole he created. (Two months earlier, in a similarly vulgar but less-noticed move, Trump paved over the lawn of the White House Rose Garden to create a white stone-cold space whose patio tables and yellow-and-white umbrellas replicate the arid opulence of his Mar-a-Lago resort.)
As Adam Gopnik trenchantly observed in The New Yorker, “The act of destruction is precisely the point: a kind of performance piece meant to display Trump’s arbitrary power over the Presidency, including its physical seat. He asks permission of no one, destroys what he wants, when he wants.” That thirst for arbitrary power, unmoored from longstanding norms and unchecked by any countervailing institution or force, is steadily implementing the authoritarian playbook that has eviscerated democracy in countries as diverse as Venezuela, Turkey, Hungary and India. And it is moving with such speed, multiplicity, and vengeance that it is encountering distressingly modest resistance.
Take the recent lightly-reported dismissal of the Inspector General of the Export-Import Bank, Parisa Salehi, a highly respected career official who was fired from her watchdog role after her office submitted two reports to Congress “that did not look good for the agency.” The inspectors general are the front-line officers in the public’s war on government waste, fraud, and abuse. Their offices were established by law in 1978, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, to prevent corruption and fraud in federal government agencies and departments, to audit their operations, to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, and to inform Congress and executive branch actors about the need for corrective actions. “In fiscal year 2024 alone,” the Partnership for Public Service reports, the “inspectors general saved the government over $70 billion.” You can’t be serious about rooting out “waste, fraud, and abuse” while indiscriminately firing these protectors of the public interest.
But since returning to the White House in January, Trump has fired 17 of them—two-thirds of all the presidentially appointed IG’s. With Salehi’s abrupt termination, three-quarters of those positions are now vacant. Trump has also moved to weaken the entire system of federal government oversight by defunding the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, forcing the shutdown of dozens of websites where Inspectors General report their findings to the public. A few Republican members of Congress have recently expressed concern, but none are standing up to what former Interior Department Inspector General Mark Greenblatt, a victim of Trump’s purge, terms the “complete decapitation of the I.G. community.”
Trump’s assaults on democratic norms and restraints are coming so fast and furiously that they are impossible to catalog fully in one article. The most ominous and outrageous depredations include his deployment of the military to establish order in American cities that do not want or need federal forces; his purging of the senior ranks of military officers (particularly women and minorities) who were suspected of not showing sufficiently unconditional loyalty to him; his politically motivated purges of career officials in the Justice Department and other government departments and agencies; his unrelenting pressure on the Justice Department to prosecute his declared enemies, such as former FBI Director James Comey and New York State Attorney General Letitia James, even when his own appointed federal prosecutors advised that there was insufficient evidence to do so; his politically punitive suspensions of funding to universities and his recent demand for some of them to sign a “compact” that would deeply compromise their academic freedom and autonomy; his violation of the law and the Constitution by impounding funds appropriated by Congress and terminating agencies established by Congress; and his eclipse of Congressional authority to set tariffs by claiming that the entire process represents a national emergency that he alone can address.
And these are just the transgressions we know about. Reuters recently revealed the alarming scope of an “Interagency Weaponization Working Group” that, in response to a Trump executive order on inauguration day, has been seeking to identify and retaliate against federal officials in the Justice Department, the intelligence community, the military, and other agencies who had allegedly targeted or resisted Trump for political reasons. The breadth of the Working Group—which includes officials from the White House, the Justice, Defense and Homeland Security Departments, the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, and other federal agencies—and the nature and scope of its intended targets, which reportedly include Trump’s former Covid response chief, Anthony Fauci, and former top military commanders who implemented mandatory Covid vaccinations, suggest that “the administration’s push to deploy government power against Trump’s perceived foes is broader and more systematic than previously reported.”
It is now clear that Trump’s earlier persistent vows of revenge against his political enemies were not just campaign bluster but indications of genuine, obsessive intent. On October 21 (the day after the Reuters story broke), a group representing more than 300 former diplomats and intelligence and law enforcement officials called for Congress to investigate the Working Group and assess its possible violations of laws and rules.
But Congress so far has been missing in action. There has been no presidential transgression on which House or Senate Republicans have been willing to draw the line. House Speaker Mike Johnson has for weeks refused to even call the House back into session in order to avoid swearing in a newly-elected Democratic representative who would add the last signature needed on a discharge petition to force a vote on a bill compelling the release of all government files on the Jeffrey Epstein case. And on the question of whether the president should be compelled to seek Congressional authorization for the use of force against the Maduro regime in Venezuela, as the War Powers Act would seem to require, Senator Rand Paul has been nearly a lone voice of Republican conscience. It seems that Republican senators will say no to Trump only if a Trump nominee admits to having a “Nazi streak” or is credibly accused of having sex with minors.
One way to assess how far we have fallen is to compare Trump’s actions so far to the means that autocrats abroad use to consolidate power. In my 2019 book, Ill Winds, I delineated a “12-step program” that aspiring autocrats pursue in order to dismantle democracy and entrench themselves and their parties in power. Recently, The New York Times has similarly delineated 12 “markers” of descent from democracy into authoritarianism. By either list, Trump’s conduct as president checks every box. Following the recent Times’ list, Trump has taken numerous steps to:
Stifle and intimidate dissent, even when it comes from late-night comedians;
Prosecute his political opponents on flimsy grounds;
Bypass Congress to impose his will;
Deploy the military to achieve domestic political control;
Defy or circumvent the courts;
Invent national emergencies to justify his exercise of expanded powers;
Vilify immigrants and minorities to rally nationalist fervor behind him;
Intimidate and control the news media;
Constrain and dominate universities;
Create a visible and imposing cult of personality; and
Corruptly enrich himself, his family, and his cronies.
In both The Times’ 12-point program and mine, the final step on the pathway to autocracy is to manipulate the electoral rules, districts, and institutions to assure victory indefinitely. This is the most dangerous element of the autocrats’ playbook, because it removes the most effective means of halting a slide into autocracy—the people’s democratic vote. In recent years, countries as diverse as Poland, Brazil, Senegal, and Sri Lanka have stopped or reversed the march to autocracy with opposition victories at the ballot box. With Trump’s poll numbers tanking over his management of the economy, his policy on tariffs, and his use of executive powers, substantial majorities of the public (nearing or exceeding 60 percent) disapprove of the job he is doing as president and believe the country is heading in the wrong direction.
Such numbers, which are steadily worsening for Trump, have historically predicted setbacks for the president’s party in mid-term elections and defeat in the next presidential election. In normal circumstances, the Republicans’ razor-thin majority of just three seats in the House would very likely evaporate in the coming midterms. But this is premised on the coming elections being free and fair. If they are not, Democrats could fail to win control of the House in 2026 even if they win convincing majorities of the popular vote both nationally and in swing states that Republican legislatures have brutally gerrymandered. Such an outcome occurred in North Carolina in 2024, where Democrats “won a majority of the votes for both the state House and Senate,” but “Republicans took roughly 60 percent of the seats in both chambers.”
This is why Trump demanded that Texas Republicans give him five more House seats, which they promptly did through the rare mechanism of a shameless mid-decade redistricting plan; it’s why he is now bullying several more Republican governors and legislatures to deliver further seat bonuses for him through gerrymandering; and it’s why, even as principled Republicans like former Indiana governor Mitch Daniels oppose this plot, others are following through. In Ohio, a Republican-controlled redistricting commission just adopted a redistricting plan for 2026 that would increase the Republicans’ 10-5 seat advantage to a more lopsided 12-3—in a state where the popular vote proportionally would give Democrats six (or in better years, seven) of the 15 seats. In late September, the Missouri governor signed a rushed gerrymandering law likely to increase Republicans’ advantage in Congressional seats from 7-2 to 8-1 (by fragmenting black communities in Kansas City). In late October, North Carolina Republicans carved up the seat of a black Democrat to tilt that state’s Congressional delegation from a 10-4 Republican advantage to 11-3—this in a state where the typical popular vote split would give the Democrats proportionally six seats.
Trump’s brazen campaign to retain control of the House by gerrymandering has unleashed a sickening national race to the bottom. In response to the Texas move, California placed an initiative on the November 4 ballot to temporarily suspend the state’s independent redistricting and impose a plan that would likely give the state’s Democrats five more seats, neutralizing the Texas power play. The move has been opposed by some good governance advocates. But when Trump’s Republican Party is trying to follow Hungary’s Viktor Orbán in rigging the national contest so as to make it virtually impossible for the opposition to win, and when (as the Princeton Gerrymandering Project shows) most of the country’s egregious gerrymandering is in Republican states, Democrats have no choice but to take steps where they can to try to level the national playing field.
And so, the race to the bottom accelerates. Under escalating pressure from Trump, Florida, Louisiana, Indiana, and Kansas are pursuing efforts to squeeze out more Republican Congressional seats. And other Blue states (Virginia, Maryland, Illinois, Colorado, and New York) are considering or imagining counter-efforts that would add another Democratic seat in each state. The Democrats’ plight will worsen considerably if, as expected, the Supreme Court overturns Section 2 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as it is expected to do in Louisiana v. Callais by the end of its term in June. Such a decision would open the door to a frenzy of racial gerrymandering in Southern states that could net the Republicans as much as 19 additional House seats by eliminating majority-minority (principally black) districts. This would include the seat of James Clyburn in South Carolina, which would give the state’s Republicans all seven House seats even though Democrats won 40 percent of the Congressional vote in the last election.
Rigging the districts is only one of several tools in the authoritarian arsenal to undermine free and fair elections. Trump is vigorously deploying others as well. On March 25, he issued an executive order requiring proof of citizenship to vote (even for voters already registered) and forbidding states from counting mail-in ballots received after election day. The provisions, while reasonable in the abstract, are cynically partisan in their intent and likely effect, since the voters affected would be disproportionately Democrats, particularly the estimated 21 million eligible voters who do not have “readily available” proof of citizenship. (However, a federal judge last Friday blocked Trump from enforcing his executive order to require proof of citizenship to vote, ruling it unconstitutional.)
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In recent months, Trump has also been placing notorious 2020 election deniers in sensitive federal government jobs. These include appointing Heather Honey, a leader in the national movement to overturn that election, as deputy assistant secretary for election integrity in the Department Homeland Security, and Marci McCarthy, a Georgia election denial activist, to a high-level position in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which is vital to repelling foreign and domestic attempts to hack our election infrastructure.
Given Trump’s obsession with controlling (and if necessary overturning) state election processes, and his accelerating penchant for deploying military force to Democratic cities and states to suppress imagined emergencies, a growing number of sober observers—former election officials, academic experts, retired generals and national security officials—are increasingly worried about a nightmare scenario (recently detailed by The Atlantic’s David Graham): With control of Congress hanging on the vote count in a handful of closely contested House races, Trump could declare a national emergency to prevent vote fraud, deploy federal military force to seize control of ballot boxes, and declare Republican victories. When protests break out, Trump could invoke the Insurrection Act to declare martial law and suppress demonstrations. The results might later be contested, but a recount would be pointless, Graham warns, if the chain of custody of the ballots and voting machines is broken.
The above is only one pathway (aside from gerrymandering) by which Trump could undermine the integrity of the 2026 midterms. He has directed his attorney general to investigate the Democrats’ premier online fundraising platform, ActBlue. He is preparing to use the IRS to investigate prominent donors to Democratic campaigns and liberal causes, hoping to diminish opposition funding. His Justice Department has demanded that states turn over their detailed voter registration records (including sensitive personal information of voters), and is now suing eight Democratic states that have failed to comply. Ms. Honey suggested in a call with right-wing activists in March that Trump could declare a national emergency in advance of the election to impose new voting rules on states and localities.
In sum, a warning: The threat to free and fair elections—the last line of defense against creeping autocracy—is proceeding more aggressively, and with greater potential of decisive success, than Trump’s campaigns against the freedom and autonomy of the media, universities, associations, and societal expression. Democracy defenders must focus intensely on this most critical of all threats. Resisting the eclipse of democracy will require investment, preparation, and coordination on a level rarely seen in American history, transcending factional divisions. It calls for visionary and courageous preemptive action.
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A basic rule is: When you have a power-hungry bully storming around the premises, don’t leave a loaded gun lying around. As the legal experts Bob Bauer and Jack Goldsmith (who served presidents of different parties) recently wrote, the Insurrection Act is one such loaded gun, with its “extremely broad and vaguely worded” authorizations for the president to use the armed forces domestically. Having failed to persuade Congress to reform it in the Biden years, Bauer and Goldsmith are quite unlikely to get this Republican Congress to do so now (and Trump would veto it anyway).
But there are steps the states can take to diminish risk. One would be for Democratic states with mail-in voting, most of all California, to require that mailed ballots be received by election day, and to invest in technology and personnel to speed up vote counts so that Trump has less opportunity to intervene in close and prolonged election counts. States should also encourage voters to vote in-person, and early. The more quickly votes are counted, the less scope for authoritarian intervention.
It may inconvenience voters to have to vote in person in greater numbers, or to send in their ballots five or more days before the election. But most voters have made up their minds well in advance of election day, and California’s ongoing off-year Proposition 50 redistricting initiative shows that voters can be mobilized in large numbers to adjust their voting practices if they think democracy is on the line.
Just nine months into Trump’s presidency, American democracy is at grave risk. Not just its liberal rule-of-law elements, but its very electoral essence, is hanging in the balance. Only massive, disciplined, and forthright efforts will save it.
Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, both at Stanford University.
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It’s no doubt a revealing confession about the failure of my empathetic imagination, but I can’t for the life of me understand what motivates Tucker Carlson to do what he’s done over the past decade.
But that’s not actually true. Allow me to rephrase it.
I can understand what he’s doing. What I can’t understand is why anyone would make such a choice.
But even that isn’t quite right. Let me try one more time.
I can understand why Carlson would make such a choice. I just can’t imagine making that choice myself.
What has he done that I find it impossible to imagine for myself? Made a decision to turn himself into the most dangerous man to Americans Jews by becoming a one-man conduit for pumping far-right anti-Semitism into the political mainstream of the United States.
Carlson and Fuentes, Nazis and NihilistsFor those blissfully unaware of the events of last week: Despite a history of mutual animosity between them, Carlson invited Nick Fuentes, the leader of the online far-right Groyper movement, onto his Twitter/X-based talk show and conducted a lengthy interview with him.
How to summarize who Fuentes is and what he stands for? It’s too simplistic to call him a neo-Nazi, though he’s frequently praised Adolf Hitler. He also praises and professes to admire Joseph Stalin. He’s also a racist who loves to make fun of black (and, really, all non-white) people. He’s also a misogynist who sometimes says things that make it sound like he’s gay. But then, he also says that having sex with women is “gay.”
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And, yes, he also despises Jews, and Israel.
What does it all add up to? The answer, I believe, is nothing. Like Steve Bannon but in a way seemingly tailor-made to appeal to a Gen Z audience, Fuentes practices the politics of bullshit. Which means he’s a nihilist. Which means he’s not even a Nazi. As Walter Sobchak aptly puts it in The Big Lebowski, “say what you will about the tenets of National Socialism, at least it’s an ethos.” Nihilism isn’t even an ethos. It’s a pose struck on a foundation of nothingness. Which means the pose doesn’t refer to anything deeper. It’s pure pose, all the way down.
In more concrete terms, this means that Fuentes will say anything, and will choose what to say in any given moment, on the basis of no other criterion than what he suspects will cause the greatest offense, the greatest outrage, the greatest stir, the greatest scandal. The thrill of transgression is what he and his listeners live for. Can you believe he said that? I didn’t know you could say that! That’s it. That’s all. It takes the moral aspiration of woke politics—to police the boundaries of acceptable speech for conformity to rigid progressive moralism—and inverts it. Anything that will provoke the most intense reaction by defenders of The System is worth saying, and saying again, and saying yet again, until The System is overrun by the transgressors relishing their liberation from the constraints of society and civilization.
And what causes a more intense reaction than right-wing Jew hatred?
Tucker Carlson Against the SystemBut why focus on Carlson rather than Fuentes himself, or perhaps Candace Owens, the conspiracy-peddling Jew-hating podcaster who is another major contributor to spreading anti-Semitism among the right-wing young? Because Carlson came from the journalistic mainstream and has used that status to grant legitimacy to people and views that would be marginalized in a healthy political culture. It’s not good that Owens and Fuentes have legions of followers. But the vast majority of Americans have never heard of them. Ideally, it would remain that way.
But Carlson’s two-hour interview with Fuentes, as of Sunday, has been viewed over 17 million times. Have I mentioned that it’s also a softball interview that makes Fuentes sound far more level-headed and reasonable than he nearly ever does? What’s all this fuss about?, many of Carlson’s regular viewers will no doubt wonder as they begin to stream the conversation.
And by the time they get to the point in the interview where Carlson asks Fuentes what he really believes, and Fuentes answers, for once, by skipping the bullshit and carefully talking about how diaspora Jews are unassimilable and almost invariably have dual loyalties that pit them against the countries in which they live, while Carlson frowns his trademark frown and nods gravely while mostly agreeing with everything Fuentes says, often punctuating it with “well, that’s just true”—by that point it’s likely that a good number of those 17 million people are thinking, You know, this just sounds like common sense. Why have I never thought about it this way? Why are conversations like this so rare? Maybe that has something to do with the Jews, too….
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Carlson, back in January 2016, was one of the very first mainstream conservatives to pronounce, in the headline of an essay in Politico magazine, that “Donald Trump is Shocking, Vulgar, and Right.” The ease and speed with which Carlson was willing to separate himself from the positions to which he’d committed himself for decades told us something about him: Since the gamble could easily have blown up in his face, it showed that he was willing to take big risks with his career. It also showed a certain ideological flexibility. As someone who’s moved around a bit ideologically in my career, I understand how that can happen.
But here’s the thing: Carlson moved right, joining Trump on immigration, crime, and wokeness, but he also embraced Elizabeth Warren’s pre-Senate left-populist positions on economics, as if he wanted to be a one-man exemplification of the horseshoe political spectrum. And then he became the loudest voice on Fox News to oppose aiding Ukraine to help with its defense against Russia’s war of aggression, just as he personally talked Trump out of bombing Iran during his first presidency. Then, after he’d been fired from Fox and launched his Twitter/X-based talk show, he turned sharply against Israel and began interviewing and promoting any anti-Semitic crackpot he could find who was articulate enough to defend his views in an extended interview. Oh, and he also talked about being mauled by a demon in his bedroom.
And now the Fuentes invite.
The trajectory goes, in just under a single decade, from mainstream conservative journalist to active crackpottery. Which tells me that Carlson has decided to distrust every single official source of information and knowledge in favor of… whatever sounds or feels right to him at any given moment. No authority can be trusted. No institution deserves respect and deference. Social life itself—civilized life itself—is governed by a conspiracy of lies. The only way out of the conspiracy of lies is to doubt whatever “they” tell you is true and to affirm whatever you personally believe to be true in its place. Even if it’s a different conspiracy. Even if it’s demonology. Even if it’s anti-Semitism.
A Jew Stares Down the American FutureIn a recent Substack post, my old friend Rod Dreher writes the following:
I was talking today with a Christian I know who is a big player in conservative politics … He tells me that what normie outsiders like me don’t know is that something like 30 to 40 percent of the Republican staff in Washington under the age of 30 are Groypers—that is, followers of Nick Fuentes.
Could Fuentes (or someone like him) be our political future? It’s pretty far-fetched to suggest that he could run and win a contest for that top spot. But JD Vance is right there in office, the vice president of the United States, the presumptive frontrunner to be the next Republican nominee. What probably matters more is whether Vance (or some other Trumpy Republican politician) makes a run for the presidency by opposing or welcoming the Groypers with open arms.
With that in mind, Dreher also tells us about a recent conversation with (Jewish) right-wing-media superstar Ben Shapiro in which they both agreed that “our friend J.D. Vance, who we both want to be POTUS one day, at some rapidly approaching point, has to take a firm, clear public stand against the Groypers…. This evil is not going to burn out on its own; it must be stopped … if it can be, at this point.”
Is this likely? From a man who jettisoned his political commitments and turned on a dime to become one of the country’s most fervent and obsequious supporters of a man he once described as an aspiring dictator who had no business getting close to the Oval Office again? That man is going to say to those throngs of young voters on his political right, this far and no further?
Excuse me for finding that a pretty thin reed on which to hang my secular Jewish hopes.
But hey, as Walter Cronkite used to say, that’s the way it is. In the fall of 2025, it might be that we have little choice but to pin our hopes for the future of democracy in America, along with the fate of its Jewish population, on the fortitude and moral integrity of JD Vance.
Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.
A version of this piece originally appeared in Notes from the Middleground.
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This week, Richard talks to Phillips O’Brien, author of the new book, War and Power: Who Wins Wars—And Why (Public Affairs).
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In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk, Richard Aldous, Sabina Ćudić, and Damon Linker explore the future of the Democratic Party from midterm predictions to the unstoppable rise of Zohran Mamdani, the impact of the ongoing government shutdown, and the recent meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping.
Richard Aldous is Eugene Meyer Distinguished Professor of History at Bard. His latest books are The Dillon Era and Schlesinger. He hosts Persuasion’s books and ideas podcast, Bookstack.
Sabina Ćudić is elected member of the National Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, vice president of the Foreign Relations Committee, vice president of the European liberals in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and the president of Naša stranka, a progressive, social-liberal political party.
Damon Linker is a senior lecturer in political science at the University of Pennsylvania and writes the subscription newsletter “Notes from the Middleground” at Substack.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Welcome to the tenth installment of The Good Fight Club. I am joined today by our semi-regular co-host and panelist Sabina Ćudić, who is a member of parliament in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, since a week or two ago, the leader of her party. I am joined by Damon Linker, who is familiar to readers of Persuasion because he often publishes excellent articles and is the author and publisher of the Notes from the Middle Ground Substack. I am also joined for the first time by the host of a rival podcast on the Persuasion network called Bookstack. It’s an excellent podcast. He is also a professor of history at Bard, Richard Aldous.
I thought that we would start with the looming midterm elections. The midterm elections are next year. This is halfway to the midterm elections, the first electoral test for Donald Trump since he was elected about a year ago. We have landmark races in Virginia for governor, where it looks like relative-moderate Abigail Spanberger is probably going to eke out a rather interesting competition from a candidate with roots in Jamaica who is an immigrant to the United States on the Republican side. We have a gubernatorial race in New Jersey, and we have, of course, the mayoral race in New York City.
Damon, what do you think these elections are telling us about the state of the Democratic Party and whether it is able to fight back against Trump at the ballot box? How do they all go for the more important midterm elections next year and, of course, for the all-important presidential elections in 2028?
Damon Linker: Well, I guess I’ll be a bit of a muddying-the-waters kind of guy and say that I actually don’t think the outcome of the upcoming elections is going to tell us all that much because we’re dealing with a situation where the Democrats tend to do better the fewer people vote. That’s the way things work these days in the United States because the Democrats have become a party of the highly educated and highly engaged.
When off-year, somewhat unusual elections take place, Democrats show up while not as many Republicans do. This dynamic works not quite as much but is still somewhat in play during midterm elections. It’s least salient in presidential elections. That’s why Trump manages to do as well as he does in the presidential elections, but then, in special small elections in off years, Democrats overperform. I would expect the Democrats to do well in these races, but what it tells us about the future, I’m actually not sure very much.
Mounk: Yeah, this is downstream from some really interesting socioeconomic transformations. It used to be that Republicans had the more educated and more affluent coalition, and more educated and affluent voters tend to show up even for less important elections. So Republicans used to overperform in midterms. It’s a really interesting testament to what Piketty calls the “Brahminization of the left” that this has reversed, and now it is the Democrats who do better than expected in midterms and then underperform in presidential elections.
In 2022, the midterms lulled Democrats into a false sense of security. Democrats did much better than expected in the midterms, and they thought, perhaps we’re on a good course. In 2024, Trump won nevertheless.
Richard, what about some of these murky figures in this upcoming election? You have somebody like Abigail Spanberger, a former CIA operative who runs, at least in certain ways, as a moderate. Then, of course, you have someone like Zohran Mamdani, who’s likely to be elected as mayor of New York City on a much more progressive lane. Is this the first step in an internal primary campaign, an internal civil war within the Democratic Party for its future direction? Will those figures prove to have lasting importance? How are we thinking about these candidates?
Richard Aldous: I think this is one of the things that is so interesting because this election does show the crunch that the Democratic Party is in. Historically, it is true that when the Democrats move to the center, that’s when they tend to get elected. But when you look at that race in New York, it shows how two things can be true at the same time. A lot of the things that Mamdani is saying about New York—about it being so expensive, that real wages are down by around 10%, and so on—are true.
At the same time, it’s also true that the way in which New York historically has had such a generous welfare system is because it has allowed finance to thrive and has enjoyed the profits that come from that. So when you see big figures and big firms like JP Morgan, for example, moving the majority of their employees from New York to somewhere like Texas, that undermines the very premise of the thing that Mamdani is going to try to do.
I think there’s a real dilemma here for the Democrats about appealing to their own voters while also being able to expand beyond them and pay for the things that their own voters want.
Mounk: Sabina, I believe you mentioned once to me that Zohran Mamdani is a friend of yours, perhaps an acquaintance of yours. To what extent do you think he can represent something like the future of the Democratic Party? On the one hand, it’s very clear that he has huge political talent, that he’s very charismatic on social media, and that he’s dealing—as my colleague Sam Kahn wrote in an excellent article that came out in Persuasion a few days ago—with the gerontocracy problem that Democrats have.
On the other hand, he may be undermining some of the economic bases of the success of New York. He has taken stances on cultural issues, such as embracing the idea of “defunding the police,” which may play well with a younger electorate in Brooklyn and more affluent parts of New York, but which are probably unpopular nationwide. He himself is actually quite significantly underwater in terms of nationwide favorability ratings. How are you seeing the evolution of the Democratic Party through his figure and others who are rising at the moment?
Sabina Ćudić: Let me start by saying that I come from a majority-Muslim country, so there is a layer of interest in these elections also through that lens of the future of the Democratic Party and the possibility of it providing an all-encompassing and authentic response to what is perceived as this enormous wave, a tsunami of racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia that has been shown throughout the race. In a sense, it’s a lens through which we look at how we perceive the future of the Democratic Party.
It’s not just about his success but about where Democratic voters will shift—not just in the midterms in 2026, but where they will stand in terms of candidates for the presidential elections in three years. For example, what is largely seen not just as progressives versus moderates but also the willingness, desperation, and cynicism of his counter-candidates—obviously Adams dropped, but now with Cuomo, who participated in some talks and debates with extreme right-wing hosts—to really galvanize parts of Democratic fringe voters versus the progressives.
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It seems like, as you said, a civil war within the party whose outcome will in good ways but also probably in misleading ways shape the debate in the upcoming years. Why do I say misleading? Because I think we will jump to conclusions that are not necessarily true. Some of these conclusions might be that we need to go fully progressive or that we need to fully abandon the moderate candidates who will, even if they win in Virginia and New Jersey—at least that is my understanding of the polling—win by a significantly more modest margin compared to Mamdani. So it is seen as a referendum on where the party should go.
But again, I think that referendum might provide some misleading directions. As you said, what stands in New York does not necessarily stand in North Carolina or Arizona.
Aldous: It is interesting though, isn’t it, Sabina, because that last point that you made about New York, that this is a kind of curiously New York time in terms of politics, that we have a president of the United States who was from New York, we have the democratic leaders in the Senate and the House of Representatives both from New York, and then these kind of two stars on the kind of progressive side of the party, Mamdani and then AOC, who are also from New York. So there’s a kind of a curious way in which New York is more relevant in American politics than it’s been actually for decades as well. You almost go back to the 1950s when you had Nelson Rockefeller against Averell Harriman and this kind of thing. But it is very striking how New York is representing so many different strands in politics at the moment.
Mounk: I love New York, but perhaps a bad state of American politics is the thought of New York.
Linker: I agree with a lot of what everyone has been saying. I do worry, at the level of theory, that while it’s great for the Democrats to be a diverse party, this comes with real challenges. When you have progressive areas of the country—whether large cities or college towns—they can pick a Democratic Socialist to be the nominee and actually win their elections, while in more conservative parts of the country, such as union-voting Midwestern towns and regions, they have more conservative Democrats.
The path to victory, or at least one path to victory for the Democrats over the near-term future, is to cultivate this diversity within the party—to say it’s okay if you are, if not pro-life, then at least open to restrictions on abortion if you come from a more conservative part of the country, and still call yourself a Democrat and a good member of the party.
The problem is that we live at a time in which all politics gets nationalized very quickly, and the Republicans are really good at this. There is no way that, assuming Mamdani wins—especially if he wins big—every stumble, everything he says that’s controversial, every problem that arises from his agenda as it gets enacted in New York, won’t be hung around the neck of every Democrat in the country when they run.
Ćudić: Is that also true with Trump and the Republicans? Can we just, for a second, wonder what it is that makes people in New York—admittedly including people that Ezra Klein talked to—vote against their own economic interest in voting for Mamdani? 47% of surveyed Jews in New York voted for Mamdani. It is beyond just policy.
It is, and as you correctly pointed out, speaking on the question of New York, what people—at least in Europe—see equally in Trump and Mamdani is the sense of authenticity that is being brought to the table, which inspires even those people who stand to lose from their policies, for both of them.
Linker: That’s true, although it’s a complicated story about New York politics. Over the last three decades or so, we have had sixteen years of mayors who were either Republicans or very conservative independents in the form of Rudy Giuliani and then Michael Bloomberg. So the recent history of New York City shows that it’s not like San Francisco or Provincetown. It’s not a place that’s 90% left progressive.
It’s quite open to voting for a kind of law-and-order candidate who will actually push the boundaries of, say, using the police to try to keep crime under control and pass business-friendly, finance-friendly tax rates and regulations. What we’re seeing here is the shift in the Democratic Party, especially among younger Democratic voters. The party has moved further left in the last ten or so years, partly in reaction to Trump but also because of demographic changes and the character of Millennial and Gen Z voters.
Mounk: I think one of the interesting points about this question of electoral coalition that Damon and Sabina are discussing is where the support for Mamdani comes from. It’s surprising in a number of ways. Sabina pointed out that about 47% of Jews intend to vote for Mamdani. It’s also surprising that only about 50% of Muslims intend to vote for him. So there’s not much of a religious split in who’s going to vote for this candidate, which should be surprising if you just follow social media.
I worry that Mamdani has general charisma and is able to communicate with authenticity in a way that a lot of Democrats cannot, but on the most important dimension—which people aren’t discussing very much—he’s making the problems of the party worse. He’s doing best not among Muslims, not worse among many Jews, and it’s not about any of those dimensions. He’s doing the best in the parts of the city that have a lot of highly educated young people, and he’s doing the worst in the outer boroughs where there are more working-class voters.
The Jewish vote goes right through that separation. A lot of young Jewish graduates from good colleges in South Brooklyn are going to vote for Mamdani. A lot of poorer Jews, perhaps immigrant Jews from the Soviet Union and Brighton Beach, are not going to vote for him. Similarly, I haven’t seen the exact geographic breakdown of which Muslims are going to vote for Mamdani and which are not, but I’m pretty sure that a huge majority of college-educated Muslims in Cobble Hill and Manhattan are going to vote for him, while some of the less well-educated, less affluent Muslims in the city may not.
My concern is that this is the wrong direction for the party to go in because it needs to expand its socioeconomic coalition rather than double down, as Kamala Harris did in her 2024 presidential campaign, on that coalition. I’ve mentioned this on the podcast before. The most striking thing to me about the 2024 election is that, according to an analysis by The Economist, in terms of socioeconomic coalition, Kamala Harris most resembled, of the last twenty Democratic and Republican presidential candidates, Bob Dole, the Republican candidate in 1996. That is the fundamental problem of the Democratic Party right now.
Ćudić: The only way to solve that problem is to see whether he delivers, and there is enough time between when he wins and the midterm or presidential elections. There is enough time for him, if his policies deliver—which I am somewhat skeptical of. I come from a social-liberal background. I’m the president of a social-liberal political party, fiscally more conservative, and I’m skeptical of the capacity for delivering on his promises. But let’s imagine that he does. Would that change the profile of his voters?
Aldous: We think about this election in national terms, but we have to remember that all politics, famously, are local. This is not a national election. This is an election taking place in New York.
Those young voters you mentioned—The Economist had some good statistics last week showing that real wages are down 9% since the pandemic and that 54% of the median wage goes to rent in New York. There are issues around childcare, transport, and other local concerns. He has managed to utilize and weaponize these very local issues to speak to people who might not necessarily vote for him or agree with him on global issues, like what’s going on in Israel, and say, you know what, I can’t find somewhere to live, childcare is terrible, my life is really not great living in New York, I don’t want to have to move to New Jersey or somewhere. So I’m just going to give this guy a chance, because why not?
Linker: I don’t disagree with that, but Yascha’s point is worth emphasizing again about the demographic breakdown of these Mamdani voters. We’ll get more confirmation after Election Day, but it appears that he is continuing the trend we’ve seen behind the weakness in center-left parties across Europe and in this country, which is that the sorting of the parties is resulting in the Democrats becoming a party of wealthy people or those just below wealthy.
A lot of the people Richard is talking about who really love Mamdani are young people in the city who aren’t making enough to afford rent and food because it’s an expensive city, and they’re angry about that. But these are upwardly mobile, future professionals.
The Democrats need to keep in mind two dimensions of the challenges confronting the party. Does the party move to the center or to the left? That’s the debate that takes up most of the oxygen. But it’s a different axis to ask whether the party will be more or less in favor of the establishment and the system—that’s the populist axis. It’s perfectly possible to be a more centrist Democrat who is also a populist and runs against the failures of the Democratic establishment.
Mamdani is the perfect exemplar of a left populist, and that mix, though it might be extremely successful in New York City in 2025, will be a major loser if generalized beyond that context to the broader country. I really hope for a different mix with some other candidates coming down the pike.
Aldous: The other thing I would add to that is that, of course, you’re quite right that the Democratic Party is no longer the party of the working class broadly, but it is still the party of those who are highly educated but not upwardly mobile—those who have gone through a college education and now perceive themselves as being low status, not the status they thought they were going to have. That has been a key demographic for Mamdani in the campaign.
Mounk: The Democratic Party is a party of high status and low income. One of the problems is that this tends to be a temporary position. A lot of college graduates are high status and low income for five or ten or fifteen years, then suddenly they are high status and high income. Whether they still vote the same way at that point is open to question.
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There’s another dimension here that I want to touch on. We’ve been talking to some extent, and in a really good way, about left versus moderates. However, there’s also a big debate in the Democratic Party under the surface at the moment about whether to emulate Trump’s style or to continue listening to Michelle Obama’s famous invocation that “when they go low, we go high.”
You have relative moderates in the party, like Gavin Newsom, who certainly has taken some very left-wing positions, being the governor of California and rising in that state’s politics, but who is also an establishment Democrat who is relatively moderate for California. He is mocking political opponents with fake AI videos and social media posts that, according to legislation he introduced last year, would actually be criminal. He is emulating Trump with these trolling, all-caps tweets in Trump’s style, and it has really worked. Since he started doing that, his odds of becoming the 2028 Democratic nominee have shot up on prediction markets.
You have someone like Abigail Spanberger, who is ideologically quite moderate, not distancing herself from Jay Jones, the candidate in Virginia running to be attorney general, who texted a political opponent that he hoped a Republican candidate would be killed and even said he wished ill upon his children because he was supposedly raising little fascists.
The party is also standing by someone like Graham Platner or other key figures in the party—from Bernie Sanders to some of the Pod Save America crowd—who not only have made quite extreme remarks on Reddit and social media, but who until recently had a Totenkopf skull-and-bones tattoo inspired by the SS on his chest.
Is the Democratic Party, whatever it ends up doing ideologically, starting to emulate Trump? Is that a way to get to the kind of authenticity you’re talking about, Damon, or is that very much the wrong way of trying to reach more Americans?
Linker: My view is that we need more of this. I’m not sure of the exact right mix. Trump is a very sui generis figure. He hit on a distinct combination of Archie Bunker policy positions and attitude with a lot of humor. He was already very famous as a reality TV star, known as a socialite with beautiful women, wealth, and gold-plated apartments. That mix is something you’re never going to be able to reproduce in either party going forward.
The general sense of being populist and scrappy, being willing to insult certain pieties within the culture—much as I don’t like this politics and think it can be dangerous in some circumstances—has real appeal. At the far extreme, you end up with people like Nick Fuentes and others on the far right whose entire public persona is about puncturing pieties and saying the most outrageous thing they can think of at any moment, with no substance to it at all. The danger is that we end up with candidates who have Totenkopf tattoos on their chests and post really nasty tweets. I’m not endorsing any of that, but I do think the path toward something successful politically for the Democrats lies more in that direction than in producing more Chuck Schumers.
He’s the head of the Senate, one of the main party figures, but Hakeem Jeffries isn’t much better. Even though he’s younger, he’s still a very staid party player. Everything he says sounds like it’s been consultant-driven, poll-tested, and ultra-cautious—very risk-averse in both what he says and how he plans. The party needs to be shaken up. That runs risks, but it’s also a path forward for where American culture is now.
I don’t personally like this. I’m in my mid-fifties, highly educated, and I like a good civil debate and thoughtful expressions of rhetoric and allusions to history. But honestly, there isn’t an audience for that kind of politics anymore, and it makes me sad, though I think it’s a reality.
Mounk: I think you’re in danger of making me forcibly defend Zohran Mamdani here, which is to say that I was joking earlier, but I don’t think the choice is between Graham Platner and Hakeem Jeffries or Chuck Schumer. On that dimension, I would place Mamdani somewhere quite different.
In terms of his personal style, Mamdani is a kind of happy warrior who has some plans for New York City that I think are going to go badly wrong. The idea of state-run grocery stores is, in my view, a really bad idea. Perhaps that will end up being important, or perhaps it will be a distraction that doesn’t matter much. But in terms of his personal style, he comes across as clear and authentic—a communicator who is able to go on all kinds of different platforms, from very brief videos on TikTok to long podcasts. I don’t think he’s emulating Trump in that way.
By contrast, what Newsom is doing doesn’t feel authentic. It feels like some clever consultant had the idea of, why don’t you pretend to be Trump? It doesn’t feel authentic to me.
Linker: Mamdani’s style is one of the options for a more populist approach, and it’s certainly one I prefer stylistically, even if substantively I don’t agree with him on much. I also agree with you about Newsom. The I’m going to tweet just like Trump tweets approach isn’t, I think, the best way forward. However, as you noted before, it seems to be working for him so far among Democratic voters.
Ćudić: I’ll be blunt and say that America brought and championed an extreme sterility and Puritan spirit in politics, which lasted for many decades. We Europeans are much more used to seeing the dead French president’s mistress sitting next to his wife at the funeral, or a president marrying his high school teacher, or all kinds of variations like that throughout Europe. The remedies that the United States brought to the table are not just in politics. Even your most advanced fashion magazines cannot show nipples compared to ours, and so on. I think that has reached its peak, and the pendulum has swung.
I was probably mentioning this to you, Yascha, at some point when I took some students to meet a famous Washington lawyer who was Hillary Clinton’s sparring partner in preparation for her Senate debates. They used a fake audience and turned buttons from “extremely agree” to “extremely disagree,” creating an EKG of the entire debate and honing the message to the point where everybody sounded like Miss Universe. Authenticity in that process was utterly lost.
Voters instinctively, consciously or subconsciously, associate that with inauthenticity—and rightly so. Compared to these people, Hillary Clinton included, Trump really sounds authentic, even though we may be appalled by what he’s saying. It sounds unrehearsed.
The pendulum needs to swing in a different direction, where the Democratic Party must exercise authenticity. As you said, Newsom feels really inauthentic. Even publishing the name of the person actually writing his tweets—who turns out to be a “super cool” staff member—proves that it’s not him. I’m not saying Mamdani is doing it all by himself; there is clearly an incredible amount of production involved in the videos that seem authentic and simple. Those of us in politics know that.
Still, there is a level of spirit he brings to the table that people respond to. They are willing, in the same way they forgive Trump—even those offended by what he says—to forgive him on account of authenticity. In the same way, Mamdani once talked about “defunding the police” and now backtracks, saying that as a student or young politician he was very open to those progressive ideas but is willing to listen and learn. Increasingly, people want to hear that kind of humbleness and see politicians not as deities, but as people who make mistakes and take responsibility for them.
Aldous: I think that point about authenticity does key into the point about language in politics. This is where the whole cancel culture, woke agenda, has ended up being a poison chalice for the Democrats. You saw it in the last presidential campaign, where you had one candidate, Donald Trump, who could go on any old podcast, talk for three and a half hours, shoot the breeze on virtually any subject.
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Then a candidate in Kamala Harris for the Democrats, who took several weeks before she would do a major interview. When she did do an interview, you could literally see her turning mental somersaults, trying not to say something that was going to give offense. That whole sense where within even that particular alliance, somebody would be scolded for saying the wrong thing, for not being woke enough, not being progressive enough, not being aware enough, actually created a political party that was unable to say anything because they were always trying to second-guess themselves.
Sabina, your point is right, and Yascha, you were making the same point, that maybe there is a new generation of politicians. Mamdani is one;AOC would be one. Pete Buttigieg, coming from a slightly different kind of tradition within the party, is probably another—people who can go on and can talk about things and have that sense of being able to discuss things in an intelligent, open, winning kind of way.
Mounk: Perhaps Barack Obama was an example of that too. He doesn’t quite seem like he fits into that list, but his instinct when the remarks by Reverend Wright came out during the 2008 primary campaign—highly negative about America, highly unpatriotic—was telling. He could have said, I distance myself from Reverend Wright, he’s a terrible person, and I never really listened, I was never there on those days, I had no idea. Instead, he said, no, I’m going to hold a major speech about race in America.
The tonality of it was different. It was still a time when the instinct was to hold a major speech rather than compose a tweet. He walked toward the fire rather than away from it. He said, let me actually share the deepest account—though I’m sure with some political massaging—of what I actually think about this topic so you can come to understand me, rather than running away from it in a superficial way.
Aldous: That’s another example of language in politics. Barack Obama followed a president who famously was not nimble in the use of language, George W. Bush. That’s a good example of how language was deployed against what, at that time, was the status quo in politics.
Mounk: There’s one elephant in the room here, which is the shutdown, and it’s kind of amazing. In previous times when there was a government shutdown, it was the major piece of news every day. At the moment, it’s receding into the background a little, except for those affected by it, which so far have included government employees, TSA workers, and others. At least as of the time of this recording, it may soon grow to include everyone who receives food stamps in the United States.
Are we ever going to get out of the shutdown? Is this the kind of thing that will lastingly harm Trump’s image? I could imagine a lot of voters who perhaps vote for Trump because they think he gets things done and prefer him to the alternative, even if they don’t agree with him on everything. But if they remember, hang on a second, it was under Trump that for a month or two I didn’t get those benefits I rely on to feed my kids, that could change things.
A lot of moments that people said would turn voters on Trump, I was skeptical about, but this feels like the sort of thing that, at the margins, could really erode his support. What do you all think?
Linker: I don’t know, because people’s memories in politics these days are so incredibly short. It’s hard to imagine that, assuming they reopen the government within the next month, people will still be thinking, yeah, I remember 11 months ago when this happened, by the time of the midterm elections. I’m skeptical about that.
It’s almost as if those narratives about things that will hurt Trump are overdetermined at the moment. The New York Times ran a piece this week with extensive reporting from Iowa about how many Trump voters there have been slammed by what he’s doing. Soybean sales for farmers have collapsed to zero. The Trump-Xi meeting today seems to have reversed that for now, but the tariffs in all directions—both the retaliatory tariffs hurting sales of Iowa-made products and the tariffs raising costs for manufacturing jobs that rely on imported inputs—have increased costs enormously. This is rippling throughout the Iowa economy.
Looking at that article, you would think, how could Trump or a Republican win in Iowa anytime soon, given that he’s hurting his own voters so much? Yet many people interviewed in that story said, yeah, it’s really bad right now, but I assume he knows what he’s doing, and it’ll get better. He’s making America great again. It’s just a rough patch on the way to things improving.
It’s all so muddled right now, and the messaging is relentlessly negative. You might not be happy about what’s happening, but the argument is that the other party is so much worse that you still have to vote for us because they would destroy your lives ten times worse than we already have. It’s a horrible dynamic for politics, but negative partisanship can work bizarre miracles, it appears.
Aldous: I think there’s always a mutually assured destruction element in these situations, where neither party really ends up coming out well. My guess is that they might be able to move toward opening the government fairly soon, because once the elections are out of the way and people have seen that their health contributions are going to go up, the Democrats will be able to say, there we are, we made our point, now let’s get the government open before things like food stamps and military pay are affected.
There’s always politics involved in these situations, but usually both sides end up taking a hit. Pragmatism will probably work its way through the system fairly quickly. But, of course, those will probably end up being famous last words.
Mounk: Sabina, you’ve said in the past that you get some satisfaction from watching the country that has so often lectured Bosnia and other nations around the world now being in complete political dysfunction. Is that satisfaction starting to run out now that this shutdown has lasted for weeks?
Ćudić: Let me start by saying that I don’t have science behind what I’m about to say, but I’m going into my fifteenth year of practicing politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I can easily beat any Jehovah’s Witness in the number of doors I’ve knocked on doing door-to-door campaigning. We are a party that relies on heavy street campaigning, and considering our budgets, we do it quite successfully.
I’ve noticed one thing in talking to people who voted for nationalists or right-wing parties or who are perhaps swaying in the direction of my party: people don’t like being wrong or admitting that they were wrong. You will rarely hear, I was so wrong. I was such an idiot. I voted for that party. I can’t believe what I did. Now I’m going to move in this direction.
We rely too much, in the context of the shutdown, on the idea that people will despise Trump for an outcome and, as a result, move in the opposite direction. People are more intuitively keen to vote for something than against something.
That’s part of Mamdani’s appeal. It’s not about anti-fascism or rallying against something; it’s about an optimistic, visionary alternative. People would rather support that. Even if they’re not going to go out and vote, even if they despise the person they voted for, it’s not enough for them to get out of bed and vote for the others.
We are overestimating the capacity of this mutual destruction approach—who people will hate more and reward the others for it. I don’t think it’s a good approach.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Richard, Sabina, and Damon discuss the recent meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, what this means for the U.S. economy, and whether reports of America’s decline as a global superpower are premature. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
There is perhaps no country in the world more liberal than the Netherlands. A commercial republic since the sixteenth century, it became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage and euthanasia in the early 2000s. Abortion and psychedelics are available, and of the major countries in Europe, the Netherlands is the least religious.
On the surface, the country’s election on Wednesday was a reaffirmation of its liberal character: after the collapse of a right-wing cabinet, the progressive D66 party—led by 38-year-old Rob Jetten—tied for first place and now seems poised to take the country back toward its liberal tradition.
Under the surface, though, the election reveals the staying power of a more defensive and conservative set of ideas in Europe. The next Dutch government, while it will be made up of ostensibly liberal and centrist parties, will almost certainly pursue large increases in military spending and restrictions on immigration and asylum. The Netherlands is poised to typify a phenomenon present all over the continent: governments justifying conservative means to pursue liberal ends.
Europe’s liberals are mandating assimilation programs for immigrants in the name of secularism. They are bolstering the military in service of European cooperation. They are restricting migration in order to protect tolerance. And they are defying European legal precedents in the name of preserving the larger European project.
The Netherlands has voted to make itself Europe’s clearest example of Fortress Liberalism.
For decades, Dutch liberalism meant openness to immigration and laxity on defense. In 1995, the Netherlands welcomed about 96,000 immigrants. In 2022, the country took in over 400,000. Now, approximately one-sixth of Dutch residents were born abroad and 14% of Dutch youth are Muslim.
During that period, support for immigration restrictions grew. This caused friction between progressives and centrists in the coalition of Prime Minister Mark Rutte, disagreements that became irreconcilable in early 2023. Rutte’s centrist government collapsed. With immigration central in the subsequent election, the hard-right Geert Wilders won a dramatic victory: his Party for Freedom (PVV) won more seats than any other party. The mainstream parties decided to work with him.
The result of Wilders’ success was the Schoof Cabinet, which united Wilders with right-of-center liberals on the promise to curb immigration. They had some success—the rate of immigration into the Netherlands fell 20% between 2022 and 2024. But Wilders’ demands proved too much. In May this year, Wilders called for the Dutch government to invoke Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides that member countries can abrogate EU asylum laws when they interfere with “the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.” Wilders claimed the influx of asylum seekers constituted a war-like threat to Dutch sovereignty.
The traditional center right, following European legal precedent, rejected the proposal. In June, the Schoof Cabinet became the second Dutch government in a row to collapse over immigration. The split reflected a dynamic at work throughout Europe: even where parties agree on the need to limit migration, they remain divided over the breadth of the restrictions and whether to defy European courts and precedents.
The Netherlands long had a similarly firm consensus on military spending. The country spent no more than 2% of its GDP on its military for decades. Like the rest of Europe, the Dutch trusted the American security umbrella provided by NATO and the solidarity and deterrent force of the European continent.
But under pressure from the Trump administration and the war in Ukraine, the Netherlands has dramatically boosted its military budget. In 2024, it spent more per capita on defense than France, Italy, or Germany. It increased its budget faster and farther than other European countries. Rutte, who signed budget after budget with minimal defense spending, is now Secretary General of NATO, pressuring other European leaders to commit to spending 5% of GDP on defense.
In Wednesday’s election, all the participants in the fallen right-wing Schoof Cabinet performed worse than they did in the previous election in 2023. Both Wilders’ PVV and the parties of the traditional center right lost seats. Yet there is no reason to believe the Netherlands will reverse course on immigration or defense. While the messaging may change, Dutch liberals will likely accelerate the Netherlands’ becoming a more defensive and militarized country.
The new Dutch consensus extends across the spectrum. Even the Party for the Animals—a leftwing group devoted primarily to animal rights—endorsed increased defense spending in June. The progressive D66 party supported budget cuts to defense for decades. This year, their platform proclaimed: “Our military is our greatest strength,” and called for an EU-wide army to defend against Russian aggression.
D66 has similarly changed its line on immigration. Party leader Rob Jetten (likely the country’s next prime minister), while criticizing right-wing rhetoric, has taken an approach that echoes Bill Clinton’s catchphrase on abortion—“safe, legal, and rare.” He has promised to make the Netherlands’ asylum system “fast, strict, and fair.” Jetten wants all asylum claims to be processed in migrants’ country of origin rather than on Dutch soil. He proposes mandating Dutch language learning for all refugees from “day one.” A September policy paper from D66 put it bluntly: “The Netherlands is a country with liberal values. Those who do not respect those values lose their rights.” It reflects a broader tonal shift: Jetten has broken with his party’s tradition of individualism, embracing the Dutch flag and speaking often about national pride and community.
Jetten’s party is not an outlier: the main left-wing party, until recently the first-choice party of Dutch Muslims, pledged to “get a grip” on migration, while a conservative party which may join Jetten’s coalition wants to revise articles of the European Convention on Human Rights which prohibit inhumane treatment of migrants and protect the rights of migrants to establish families.
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The Dutch Bar Association claimed earlier this month that 12 of the 15 main Dutch political parties were making promises that violated the rule of law. For example, D66’s promises to separate troublesome asylum seekers in shelters and to swiftly punish threats against police officers—measures which enjoy broad support in Dutch society—were deemed possible violations of due process and related rights.
The political parties poised to play a role in the Netherlands’ new government have all tried to reconcile promises of toughness on immigration and defense with more abstract commitments to liberal values and the European project. Military buildup is presented as a project of European solidarity in the face of Putin, who would undermine liberal democracy. Even those promising to revise human rights conventions frame revision as necessary for “restoring interstate trust” between EU members. Assimilating Muslim immigrants is described as essential to upholding modern attitudes on gender and sexuality.
A speech last year by Dilan Yesilgöz, Mark Rutte’s successor as the leader of the Dutch center right, captured this spirit succinctly. Yesilgöz pointed to her own story as a Turkish refugee, and invoked Spinoza and the Enlightenment to paint a hard line on immigration as necessary to preserve Dutch liberalism. She declared:
Where the world’s first same-sex marriage once took place here in Amsterdam, two men now walking hand in hand down the street are being verbally abused. Where we fought for equal rights for women half a century ago, in some families here in this city, girls are now denied swimming lessons or school camps. Or they even become victims of honor-related violence. [...] Unfree ideas are being spread in the Netherlands from Islamic countries, but also from the Kremlin [...] This isn’t how we envision the Netherlands. This isn’t my Netherlands.
Yesilgöz’s speech appropriates an idea once advocated only by the hard right but which now resonates all over Europe: for liberalism to be saved, some illiberal policies are needed. It was once only leaders like Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen who explicitly tied gay rights and secularism to limiting migration and preserving Europe. Not anymore. In Poland, a populist government was recently ousted and the liberals who replaced them enacted tougher asylum policies in the name of serving as Europe’s “Eastern Shield.” Nine European leaders, ranging from the Danish center left to the Italian right, co-authored a letter calling for human rights courts to be more permissive on immigration restrictions in the name of safeguarding democracy.
Today, only one government in Europe—Viktor Orbán’s Hungary—outright rejects liberalism. But the other side of the spectrum has now also become fringe. The message that Western democracy is best preserved by pacifism and openness to foreigners is no longer viable in much of the continent. The liberal and centrist parties are deciding that Europe must become defensive if it is to remain free: they have become Fortress Liberals.
Is Fortress Liberalism a new modus vivendi? If Europe’s mainstream simply gets tough on defense and migration, might that staunch the populist tide? Here, the Netherlands offers only clues.
The National Voter Survey, conducted before every Dutch election, found a national consensus that migration should be limited and that immigrants make it harder to find homes: more than 70% of Dutch voters agree on this point. Yet the discontent went deeper: the survey also found the highest level of discontent with democracy in any year since the survey was established, and that more than one-third of Dutch voters wanted a “strong leader,” even if it was someone who “bent the rules.”
These results show that even when populist political parties falter in office, the voter sentiments driving their success have tremendous staying power. The desire for order, expressed most clearly in the discontent with mass migration and the desire to have strong defense, extends far beyond those issues.
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Fortress Liberals are betting that openness can be practiced in some fields of policy and not others. Liberal democracy, they argue, must become less welcoming in order to become more stable. One reason the word “liberal” exists at all is because Enlightenment theorists—like the Netherlands’ own Spinoza—identified an intrinsic connection between freedom of thought and lifestyle and the open and cosmopolitan nature of countries like the Netherlands. The new Jetten-led Dutch government, if formed, will continue to test whether that connection is a necessary one—or whether what liberalism really needs today is higher walls and bigger guns.
Leo Greenberg is a student at Yale University, where he studies History and Philosophy.
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Over the past month, my mind has kept going back to one of the most trivial, and perhaps also one of the most profound, internet scandals of recent times.
You remember the scene: A camera at a Coldplay concert is showing audience members enjoying the show, with lead singer Chris Martin making a few friendly comments about each fan. The camera cuts to an attractive middle-aged couple in the midst of a cute embrace, with the man holding the woman from behind as they sway to the music. Then the couple spots the Jumbotron, and a perfectly choreographed series of panicked actions unfolds. The woman, shocked, covers her face, and turns away from the camera. The man dives to his left, out of the camera’s view. A younger woman, sitting behind them, and evidently in the know about what is happening, comes into view, the look on her face a poetic mix of horror and glee. “Oh, what?” Martin comments. “Either they’re having an affair or they’re just very shy.”
It didn’t take long for the internet to confirm Martin’s first hypothesis. The man was the CEO of a tech company, someone known in his milieu but far from famous. The woman was the company’s head of HR (or, to cite the correct corporate appellation, its Chief People Officer). Both were promptly tarred-and-feathered in the public sphere, and nearly as promptly resigned from their jobs. The clip of their embrace and its dissolution has been viewed by tens, perhaps by hundreds, of millions of people around the world.
A lot has been written about this incident. But the aspect of it which I found most striking has barely been mentioned: The culture of the second half of the twentieth century was in many ways defined by the worldwide growth of huge cities, and the relative anonymity they afforded—with all its opportunities to escape the constraining norms of smaller towns and villages, but also to engage in actions many would consider immoral. But this culture ended sometime in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. For even if you think that you are hiding in plain sight, with over 60,000 people surrounding you in a massive stadium, the power of social media can now expose you to a massive worldwide audience in a matter of minutes.
In a literal sense, cities are still growing and the world is still urbanizing. In a cultural—or, if you will, spiritual—sense, the urban interlude of human history has come to an end. We all live in a village again.
The Postwar AberrationI’ve been thinking a lot of late about the ways in which the postwar world, which we took to be the baseline for what developed democracies would look like for the foreseeable future, has turned out to be a brief historic aberration.
Take the economy. North America and Western Europe experienced an extraordinary growth spurt in the decades after 1945. A huge portion of the population gained access to basic medical care like antibiotics, acquired household goods like fridges and washing machines, and got to own a car for the very first time. Even life expectancy rose markedly over the course of a few short decades. Despite the considerable political turbulence of the postwar era, which we have a tendency to underestimate with the benefit of hindsight, this gave the institutions of liberal democracy an extent of “output legitimacy“ that they are unlikely to enjoy again anytime soon.
Similar points could be made about the way in which other factors which helped to create a comparatively stable world in the postwar years have turned out to be artifacts of a very unusual era. The widespread commitment to the basic rules and norms of the democratic game, for example, was usually thought to be a hallmark of mature democracies, and widely expected to last indefinitely. But as the memory of the horrors of Nazism, and the contemporaneous evidence of the dysfunction of communism, faded from view, more and more citizens lost their attachment to liberal democracy; as I chronicled in some of my earliest academic work, a significant share of citizens now has deep skepticism about our political system.
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The postwar years also saw the rise of a relatively orderly public sphere, with people often agreeing about the facts even when they disagreed about their opinions, and gatekeepers working at mainstream media outlets able to define the realm of the reasonable. This too was thought to come downstream from big structural transformations, such as the rise of literacy, the near-universal attainment of a high school degree, and the increase in the college-educated population. And yet that dynamic has turned out to be an artifact of the unusual conditions of the postwar era, with media companies located in a geographic center able to broadcast out to the periphery, but with the technological preconditions for any one individual to share their opinion with millions of others over social media not yet in place.
For the last few days, I’ve been reflecting on yet another way in which a postwar development which we took to presage what the world would look like for the foreseeable future has turned out to be a short aberration: a certain culture of personal freedom facilitated by urban life. For it turns out that the life of the city, with its attendant freedoms from neighborly supervision and collective constraint, was really just a short interlude in the history of humanity. Facilitated by social media, the village has returned with a vengeance—stripped of its warmth, and supercharged by the cruelty of the crowd.
The Cage of NormsFor most of human history, most of the human race lived in roaming bands of hunter-gatherers, or in small sedentary settlements engaged in agriculture. These two forms of early human organization have important differences, which anthropologists have explored at length. But they also have one crucial commonality: Both create small communities of people in which most people know each other, and the actions of each individual are subject to constant social surveillance.
This social surveillance has historically served an important function. Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, famously argued that we need a coercive political order to keep the worst angels of human nature in check. When the state isn’t able to monopolize violence, simple conflicts between different individuals will quickly escalate, producing a “war of all against all” that renders life “nasty, brutish, and short.” But as Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have pointed out in The Narrow Corridor, the best ethnographic evidence suggests that such mayhem is much rarer than Hobbes imagined; in truth, most rural societies in which state authority is absent or very limited are governed by a strict “cage of norms.”
Traditional societies tend to evolve elaborate, and often highly repressive, codes of conduct. Even in the absence of a formal police force or court system, they turn out to be extremely effective at enforcing these moral strictures. Since everybody knows each other, and village life makes it very difficult to conceal anything you do, violations of that moral code are easily discovered. And since people in rural areas traditionally rely on a significant amount of mutual aid, and social death is a fear that millennia of evolution have baked deeply into our DNA, the mechanisms of ostracism are nearly as effective a deterrent to deviance as a modern-day penal code.
Another way of saying this is that for most of human history, most of the human race has lived in fear of cancellation. Rural life had many advantages. At its best, it provided a genuine sense of community; a thick social network of deeply familiar people; and collective help in everything from child-rearing to building a new barn. But the cage of norms that facilitated that cooperation came at a steep price for personal liberty—a fact to which just about any member of an ethnic, religious, or sexual minority group, or indeed any individual with idiosyncratic tastes or opinions, could vividly attest.
The Urban InterludeIt wasn’t primarily a change in moral convictions or a decline in religiosity or even the resistance of those it oppressed which eventually set us free from the cage of norms; it was urbanization.
Urbanization roughly proceeded in four phases. The first and slowest of these phases involved the emergence of a small number of moderately sized towns, which housed a vanishingly small percentage of the overall human population, but played an outsized role in creating the modern world.1 The second phase, which roughly started with the Industrial Revolution, saw the rapid emergence of bigger urban conglomerations, which in virtually every country remained home to a minority of the overall population, but started to erode the hold that the cage of norms enjoyed over national life.2 The third phase, which shaped the first half of the 20th century, saw a rapid growth of cities, with countries like France, Germany and the United States all seeing a majority of their populations living in urban areas for the first time in history, raising the expectation that the relative anonymity of the city would remain the default mode for the indefinite future. The fourth phase, which started around 1950, saw this process of urbanization expand to much poorer parts of the world, with the United Nations estimating that a majority of the total human population has lived in urban centers since sometime in the first decade of the 21st century; the urban future had seemingly gone global.
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Many key elements of postwar culture are downstream from that structural transformation. The sexual liberation movement, for example, had nearly as much to do with the ability not to be branded with a Scarlet Letter as it did with the invention of the pill. (Tellingly, mid-17th century Boston, the setting for Nathaniel Hawthorne’s famous novel, had fewer than 2,500 inhabitants at the time.) Contraceptive methods, though far less reliable, were in widespread use even before the revolutionary invention of the pill; but the ability to engage in sex before marriage also required freedom from the reputational consequences for engaging in such “immoral” acts, which could previously include professional ruin for the man and an inability to find suitable marriage partners for the woman.
Other cultural transformations tell a similar story. Homosexuality, for example, has been prohibited and punished in the vast majority of rural settings. This is a reason why those gays and lesbians lucky enough to enjoy some agency over their lives have long been drawn to the relative anonymity of larger towns and cities. It is why gay life began to thrive over the course of the second half of the twentieth century in cities like San Francisco and London and Cologne and Chengdu. And it is why the gay rights movement developed at this particular juncture in history, with the attitudes of most citizens in developed democracies swinging from unabashed hostility towards homosexuality to widespread acceptance over the course of the late 20th century.
These changes long seemed unstoppable, even inevitable. In the year 2000, most social scientists would likely have argued that the decline of the extent to which communities policed the moral deviance of their members was rooted in attitudinal shifts produced by the process of modernization. According to the eminent sociologist Ronald Inglehart, for example, the second half of the twentieth century was characterized by the rise of “postmaterialist” values. As people became better able to procure the bases of a materially prosperous life, they set their sights on higher ambitions like self-actualization. This was reflected in a liberalization of their attitudes about the world, one that would slowly spread from the most affluent to the great majority.
If all of this was true, then it was also natural to assume that the relative freedom of city life in the second half of the twentieth century would prove resilient to technological change. Perhaps it was just about possible to imagine a regression to “materialist” values if the share of the urban population rapidly declined, if serious material hardship made a comeback, or if a major war focused minds on survival and tribal loyalty. But technological changes that give people a greater ability to express themselves, and to connect with each other, it was widely assumed, would only accelerate the spread of postmaterialist values. The future, Inglehart and most of his contemporaries believed, would be more and more tolerant.
As we now know, that assumption was hopelessly naive.
The Structural Transformation of the Social Media SphereThe process of urbanization is continuing apace at the beginning of the 21st century. Every year, a greater share of the world’s population lives in cities. Countries like China, which were overwhelmingly rural in living memory, are now predominantly urban.
But there has also been another massive change, which has transformed the culture of our age even more profoundly. In a strange historical irony, the very decade which saw a majority of the world population living in urban areas for the first time in history also saw the invention of a technology which ensures that all of us have now effectively returned to the moral structure of village life: social media.
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Social media has a lot of benefits.3 It also has two major effects which undo the anonymity of city life, and thereby reintroduce the cage of norms under modern conditions. First, it creates the danger that anybody who violates a social norm may suffer social shame on a massive scale. (Interestingly, this is even true when the social norm in question is widely violated and comparatively minor.) And second, it transforms each community with thick social connections into a digital village, allowing for the supervision and enforcement of norms even in the absence of national publicity.
The “Coldplay Couple” is a perfect example of the first dynamic. Marital fidelity is of course an important virtue; but it is one that millions of people across the world breach every day. And at a concert with tens of thousands of attendees, a secret couple must of course expect that many people will “see” them; but, as per the realities of urban life, they may reasonably hope that none of the people who see them will know or care who they are. You can see why the Coldplay couple expected to remain anonymous during their outing, and thereby to avoid the adverse social consequences for their infidelity.
But social media has fundamentally changed the structure of the public sphere, making it dangerous to keep relying on the presumption of anonymity we have inherited from the urban interlude. If some video clip is sufficiently compelling, it can pull two concert attendees out of their relative obscurity, beaming their image across millions of smartphones in a matter of hours. And when their illicit behavior is thus presented to a vast global audience, the relatively common nature of their misdeed does not protect them from being fired, ridiculed, and socially ostracized. In this way, social media facilitates the stochastic enforcement of the cage of norms: While most people can get away with breaching social norms most of the time, everyone must live in fear that their particular transgression—whether serious or trivial—will randomly be brought to the world’s attention.
When we think of the ways in which social media robs us of the anonymity of big city life, our minds turn to famous incidents like the Coldplay couple. But important as those are, this is an optical illusion. Most social media drama plays out on a much more local scale. Every day, thousands of people around the world suffer severe social punishment in their high school, on their university campus, or in some local community, because of social media posts that are seen not by millions but by thousands or hundreds or dozens of people.
For the most part, discipline is now exacted and punishment imposed in the semi-obscurity of our highly diffuse social networks. Just as social media facilitates near-total communication, so too does it facilitate near-total surveillance, a panopticon much more omniscient than those dreamt up by Jeremy Bentham and dreaded by Michel Foucault.
One Cage, Many RulesVillages have varied widely in the content of the norms that they have enforced on their inhabitants. Most villages are patriarchal, some matriarchal. Most villages strongly impose monogamy and punish premarital sex, some favor different sexual and marital arrangements. Most villages discourage homosexuality and persecute those who engage in it, a few are tolerant of certain forms of same-sex attraction.
When I say that the brief urban interlude is ending, and that we are returning to the moral constraints of village life, I am therefore not predicting that all of the cultural changes of the last two centuries will somehow vanish. The content of the cage of norms can vary widely even as its form stays constant. And while in many parts of the world, from rural India to urban China, social media is often being used to impose a conservative notion of sexual morality, I have always thought invocations of The Handmaid’s Tale to be a deeply misguided metaphor for the United States: the prospect of an America whose most dominant cultural figures are Donald Trump, Taylor Swift, Beyoncé, and LeBron James turning into a theocracy are slim indeed.
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Nor are all of us residents of the global village in which we now find ourselves likely to be subjected to the exact same norms. In the past, customs could vary significantly from one village to the next. Today, the norms whose breach may lead to social death can vary widely from one online community to another.
But what the online cage of norms shares with the one that is offline is the basic mechanism that is used to discipline and punish. The content of the norms to which you are subject are ultimately arbitrary; what remains unchanging is that these norms are deeply coercive, and that any breach of them, real or imagined, has such steep social costs that most people choose to stay in line.
A Bizzarro Global Village Without the Joys of Rural LifeVillages have benefits that can, to some extent, compensate for their vices.
I am writing these lines in the Italian village in which my family has owned a modest home for two decades. When there is a problem with the house in our absence, we have local friends who never hesitate to help. I do not worry about burglars because our neighbors are likely to spot and remember any stranger walking up or down the street. And when I try to buy coffee at the bar that is a hundred yards away, it sometimes takes me half an hour to get there, because I end up chatting with so many people along the way.
One year, a cat somehow snuck into our house as we were departing from the country, and got locked in while we were away. When a passerby heard her pitiful meowing a few days later, a complex rescue operation began. A neighbor had the key to an absent neighbor’s house who had the key to an absent neighbor’s house who had the key to our house. Within half an hour, the poor kitty was freed and fed.
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The revillageification of the world thus poses a double problem: it deprives us of the most important benefits of big city life without affording us the compensating benefits that have traditionally accompanied village life. If a pipe has burst in your home, the people surveilling your behavior online aren’t going to stop the flood. If someone is about to break into your house, the people calling for you to be canceled because you broke the unwritten norms of the chess world or the knitting community aren’t going to call the police. And when you are feeling down, your Facebook friends and TikTok followers sure aren’t going to bump into you on your way to the bar, holding you up with the kind of chitchat that makes it so hard to feel true loneliness in a bustling village.
As for so much of human history, we all live in a village now. But it is a digital village, a bizarro version of the original, hypercharged with the easy judgments and harsh punishments of rural life, and painfully devoid of its joys.
1Most estimates suggest that as late as 1800, less than 10 percent of the global population lived in cities.
2The notable exception is the United Kingdom, which likely crossed the threshold to being majority urban in the second half of the 19th century.
3For example, it connects members of minority groups which might previously have been isolated. If you have a rare disability or an obscure intellectual interest or a niche sexual fetish, social media makes it much easier to find people who are similar to you. This can allow people who would previously have suffered judgment or discrimination at the hands of the majority to build community and grow in confidence. But while this was initially expected to create a challenge to the cage of norms, which had already been pried wide open by two centuries of urbanization, the opposite has turned out to be the case—for other ways in which social media transforms the structure of our culture have turned out to predominate.
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