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Martin Wolf is Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator at the Financial Times, London.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Martin Wolf discuss why stock markets remain near record highs despite Trump’s tariffs, whether “TACO” (Trump Always Chickens Out) is a sustainable pattern, and how Trump’s economic ambitions compare to those of truly revolutionary leaders.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: We had a wonderful conversation yesterday about the current state of the economy. Of course, we talked about the Federal Reserve and Trump’s attacks on it. We were planning to release the episode on Saturday. In between, Donald Trump announced his pick for the new chair of the Federal Reserve when Jerome Powell retires in a few months. It’s Kevin Warsh. Given that you know just about everybody in that world, Martin, I imagine you might have met Kevin at some point. Tell us about him and what you make of him.
Martin Wolf: Well, I have met him. I’ve heard him. He’s very articulate and confident in the way he expresses himself. The honest truth is that there are some real puzzles about him. There are things I don’t understand about him, and friends of mine don’t really understand them either.
Clearly, by comparison with a number of the other candidates, he’s a relatively credible figure. He’s a significant academic economist, although there have been some very good chairs who weren’t. Alan Greenspan, for example, was pretty good until the end, when he let things rip. Warsh has lots of experience in markets. He’s politically astute. He has been a governor of the Fed, and quite an influential one during the financial crisis, when Ben Bernanke relied significantly on his judgment about markets.
So he is, I think, a reasonably qualified figure. I don’t think there’s much doubt about that. Then there’s the question of his judgment. He is famously, historically, an inflation hawk. In 2010 he delivered a speech that is very well known in New York, in which he stressed that the job of Fed independence is to manage monetary policy, and that it is our duty to ensure inflation does not rise too fast. He argued that it should be absolutely clear that the Fed should not be funding the government with low interest rates or expanding the balance sheet beyond a limited degree. I won’t go into that in detail.
Already in 2010 he was worried about surging inflation. People like me at the time, and many others, Paul Krugman being the most famous, thought that was mad. There was no sign of inflation in 2010. The worry was that the economy was in a slump. It seemed extraordinary that he should worry about inflation then. It looked very purist, almost ultra right wing, a let-the-markets-go-where-they-might view. If there was a deep recession, well, it would sort itself out. The only real worry, in that view, was inflation.
In fact, inflation did not rise for another ten years, and for reasons very different from what he was focusing on. So it seemed like a bad judgment, but it also suggested that he really was an inflation hawk. That appeared to be what he genuinely believed.
More recently, of course, in the run-up to this decision, he has been indicating that monetary policy should loosen and that interest rates should come down. If you’re an economist looking at where the US is now, that does not look plausible at all. Inflation is fairly resilient. The economy is very hot. The labor force has shrunk because people have been driven out of the country. Should interest rates really be cut?
That leads to the conclusion that what really drives him, and this is the point Paul Krugman has been making, is politics. He is politically loyal. In that case, he is not really an inflation hawk at all. That stance was just convenient in 2010, when Republicans were attacking Democrats for pursuing inflationary policies, even though they really weren’t. What he would really be saying now is that he is a political figure who is going to support Donald Trump.
The truth is that, going through those possibilities, I don’t know which he really is. If he truly is an inflation hawk, there will be real ructions between him and Mr. Trump. If he is not an inflation hawk, then I’m worried.
Mounk: Do you expect that Warsh would go along with Trump’s attempts to undermine the independence of the Fed? Do you expect that he would be soft on inflation? How do you think this might play out over the next few years?
Wolf: Well, the way he has described his view on independence is as follows. It is very interesting, actually. There is monetary policy. There, we should be independent. As I said, he was very clear about that consistently through the crisis. One would have to assume, if he is serious about that at all, which is a very big question since he has not had this job before and has not borne this responsibility, that if inflation were to pick up a great deal, and it is obvious that it could pick up a great deal, though he might be too slow about it, he would tighten monetary policy severely, even if the president hated it.
We do not know if he will do that. We never know that until we see it. The most famous case when the Fed did do what the president wanted, when it was precisely the wrong thing to do, was under Arthur Burns in the early 1970s. That basically led, or at least played a big role, in the great inflation upsurge of the 1970s, which was a monetary policy disaster. That is how we learned how important independent central banks and control of inflation are. We would not want to see that happen again.
Will that happen? It depends on whether there will be an upsurge in inflation if he cuts interest rates, as he has indicated he would like to do, and how he would then respond. We honestly do not know. If that were to happen, it would be very worrying. We would be back in quite a big mess.
He has said, and this is very important, that in other areas, notably regulation, consumer protection, and things like climate, those are areas in which the Fed should not be independent and should bow to other institutions. Most of those I do not worry about very much. The regulation issue, however, is important. One of the big lessons of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 was that if banks are not carefully regulated, and we saw this again with Silicon Valley Bank, and they allow their balance sheets to become too leveraged, particularly with a large amount of long-term debt, they become very vulnerable to runs, and then you get crises.
If he really decides to take a back seat on regulation, and the administration continues with what look like some very risky regulatory positions on quite a number of things, that could also turn out to be a problem. So I would say there are two areas of risk: monetary policy in relation to Trump, and financial regulation. We will have to see which is the real Mr. Warsh.
Mounk: Assuming that Kevin Warsh gets confirmed and takes office, what standards should we judge him by in the first years of his job? Where do you think the areas are in which he might end up in conflict with Donald Trump? We are going to want to see whether he is able to stand up for expert economic decision-making, or whether he allows himself to be steamrolled by the president.
Wolf: Well, we have to judge him like any other chair. He is supposed to be guided by the evidence, by the data. He has been clear about this. The data are sometimes ambiguous, in which case you give the chair the benefit of the doubt to some extent. He has argued that we are going to see a huge productivity upsurge because of AI, and therefore we should not worry too much about inflation. This is rather similar to the argument Greenspan made in the mid-1990s, when he said that a productivity upsurge justified allowing the economy to run hotter and that it would not be inflationary. That turned out to be right.
So if the Fed argues that we have a productivity upsurge that will keep inflation low and therefore we should not raise rates, and it turns out to be right, that is a perfectly reasonable judgment and one has to give him the benefit of the doubt.
If, however, it becomes obvious that inflation is really surging and the president wants him not to do anything about it, even though his job clearly is to do something about it, then his response becomes the decisive test. Monetary policy is always conducted in relation to an uncertain future and with long lags, so there is often room for reasonable disagreement. Sometimes, though, it becomes clear that the Fed is too late. Many people would argue that this was already the case in 2021 and 2022. At that point, action is required, and what matters is whether he takes it.
That is the biggest test of all. Similarly, though this is a lesser test, if he goes along with large declines in bank capitalization and the rise of leverage in hidden or opaque forms that are potentially dangerous, and he does not push back against that, that would also be a bad sign.
Mounk: We’ve now had Donald Trump in office for a year. What has changed in the world economy since then? Are we still living in the same world or are we, in economic terms, living in a completely different one?
Wolf: There are two answers to that. I think in terms of expectations, some policy parameters, and the perceived future, increasingly we’re living in a different world. That creates a disjunction because, of course, the actual economy doesn’t change very quickly unless you have an event like a world war, which, thank God, we haven’t had for a very long time, which does change things incredibly quickly.
Essentially, economies go on doing what they’re doing. Most of the transactions are a continuation of previous transactions. Businesses are essentially the same. Trade flows continue. Financial capital flows continue. You look at growth rates, they’re all something incremental on what was there before.
I think it’s very important for people to remember that actually economies, people’s livelihoods, what they go out to do every day, don’t change that quickly unless you’ve got a stupendous shock like a pandemic, which changed things, or a war, a major war. But the framework, and I’ve written several columns on this, within which all this activity is going on has become wildly uncertain and unpredictable and, in some obvious and important ways, has actually changed.
So we’re living in one of those, to use a cliché, Wile E. Coyote moments when you think you’re going to go over a cliff, but actually you’re not going over a cliff because you can’t go over it that quickly.
Mounk: Or you haven’t felt the impact of going over the cliff until you look down and then suddenly, you plummet to the ground.
Wolf: I think it’s very important. Partly it’s because it wasn’t as revolutionary as all that, and partly because of what my friend Robert Armstrong, a colleague, has called the TACO: Trump Always Chickens Out. His bite isn’t nothing, but his bite is much less bad than his bark, which means that he hasn’t changed everything. It’s just that everything has become uncertain.
Mounk: So the stock market should be at an interesting intersection of those two things because valuations of stocks are partially based on last quarter’s earnings and the business that is ongoing, but it’s also a bet on the future. It’s the expectation that markets have about how well a company is going to do over the next many years. So why is it that the stock market is not quite at record highs as we’re reporting, as we’re speaking, because it’s gone down a little bit over the last couple of days, but very close to record highs, higher than it was a year ago, at a time when tariffs are much higher than they were a year ago, and it was widely predicted that that would harm the economy in a very serious way?
We see the investigation and then potential prosecution of Jay Powell as the head of the Federal Reserve. We see extreme political pressure on the Fed to lower interest rates and the likelihood that a new appointee, which Trump is going to be able to name relatively soon, is going to be a partisan appointee who just does the bidding of the White House. All of that should at the very least make investors less certain about whether Amazon and Apple and Nvidia and all of those companies are going to continue to bring in the returns that have earned them those outsized valuations in the stock market. Yet the market is up. So what’s going on with that? How can we make sense of this?
Wolf: There are several answers. One answer is that I’ve never regarded the market as a very good predictor of what is actually going to happen, and that’s consistent with the evidence in the medium to long run. But it’s important to disentangle what we’re talking about. You’re talking about the market, and it’s very interesting that you are. You’re talking about the U.S. market.
The U.S. market is very important. Of course, it’s the most important stock market in the world and has been for a very long time. But actually, strangely, in the last year it’s non-U.S. markets that have been doing particularly well. European markets have done much better than had been expected. In a way, that seems more surprising, because you’d think that Trump’s tariffs, whatever they do to the United States, should have hit the rest of the world even harder. But that doesn’t seem to be how it has played out. There are a number of answers. It’s not just about the United States. It’s a much more complicated story.
The first is something I pointed out in a column a week or two ago. I can’t remember exactly when. The world economy since the pandemic has been doing really well overall. Not just the American economy, which is obvious, but more generally we’ve had a very strong recovery from the pandemic. Profits have been doing very well. On top of that, we have a very big technological revolution going on, centered on the United States and now increasingly on China, whose benefits ought to be available to everyone in the world. So it’s not just about the profits of those companies, but the opportunities that will be created by using these new technologies, particularly artificial intelligence.
It’s also important to remember that betting that the world economy will grow and that profits will be made by new businesses has been a pretty consistently good bet, at least since the 1970s, which is a very long time and well outside the time horizon of most investors.
The last point is that this is an era of easy money. You might be a bit worried about inflation, and that’s reasonable. But in an inflationary age, it’s quite sensible to hold real assets. Gold is a real asset, so it’s doing very well. Silver is a real asset. But so are stocks. Yes, there could be disruption, but a reasonable assumption is that in the medium to long run, equities are a good hedge against inflation. They’re not perfect. You can get profit squeezes of various kinds. But if you’re worried about inflation, selling bonds is the most obvious thing to do. That might be a real problem for some governments, but equities are not an unreasonable place to be.
For all these reasons, I don’t find what we’re seeing in markets worldwide, and the optimism about growth, unreasonable. It’s also worth stressing that the tariffs, as they’ve ended up, are clearly a disruption, but they are tariffs of the United States against the world. The United States is a very big market, but as I pointed out at TICON today, it accounts for only 17 percent of the world’s imports of goods and services. That’s important, but there’s another 83 percent.
That 83 percent is continuing to trade. Not only continuing to trade as before, but also finishing big trade deals. Look at the EU–India deal. It’s a very big trade deal. Trade hasn’t been abandoned globally. The United States has pulled back, but others have not. I think people are basically saying to themselves that Trump isn’t as bad as they feared, the United States isn’t going to blow up, the rest of the world is fine and coping quite well, and the best thing to do is bet that capitalism will continue to perform. This might be wrong, but I think that’s what people are saying.
Mounk: That’s a very strong reconstruction of why that optimism isn’t obviously silly. I think there’s a tendency among opinion journalists, whether op-ed writers or podcasters, to assume that everybody is stupid and nobody understands things. When markets are so high, they may very well be betting on the wrong horse, and they may very well be underestimating some of those tail-end risks. But you first need to understand the logic of a lot of very sophisticated people, with a lot of money riding on making the correct calls, before you can then go on to criticize them.
Wolf: Remember, markets are expensive. That is a reason for believing in correction. But it’s not obvious to me that what markets are betting on is insane.
Mounk: Now, one of the foundations of this is the idea of TACO, that Trump always chickens out. There are two concerns I have about that. One is a straightforward one, which is that he has chickened out particularly on economic policy repeatedly over the course of the last year. He seems to be chickening out on Iran in certain ways. So this is something that might apply beyond economic policy as well.
But of course, he is quite unpredictable, and he has done some things that are more extreme than people would have predicted over the course of the last year. So the fact that he has chickened out on a number of things during the first year of his administration does not predict with certainty that he is going to continue doing so in year two and year three and year four. And of course, I am sure that Trump is well aware of the term TACO at this point. Given that he is, if nothing else, proud and a man of vanity, he probably wants to disprove that it applies to him. The second point, which is slightly more subtle and which I have seen somebody make on social media, is that the dynamics of TACO are going to get more and more gnarly. At the beginning, Trump makes an announcement, for example, that he is going to raise all these tariffs. There is immediate panic in the financial markets. Stocks go down a lot. That is a very strong signal. That is what makes all of Trump’s allies say, you can’t do this, and he backs down.
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The next time Trump makes an extreme announcement, the market reaction is more muted because people start to think that he chickened out last time and perhaps he will chicken out again this time. But that means that the mechanism that made him back down last time has become a little bit weaker, though it is still enough, and he chickens out again. The third time he makes an extreme announcement, the markets say TACO. People have read the column. They know the term. They ignore it. There is barely any reaction in the markets. Then perhaps Trump thinks it is safe to go ahead with it. So is TACO a kind of resource that gets whittled down and consumed over time, because the game of chicken involved keeps getting closer to the knife’s edge? The driver has to jump out at a later and later stage for the mechanism to work.
Wolf: I think that’s not implausible. I’ve never been fully confident that one should rely on it. Foreseeing what Trump will do is certainly way beyond my pay grade. But it does seem to me that there’s an argument to be made that the areas where he’s really passionate about breaking the mold are relatively few.
If I compare him with other autocratic leaders with big ambitions, and I’m not making any other comparison, just think of Mr. Hitler, it was pretty obvious and exposed that he actually wanted to change the entire world and, among other things, conquer the whole of the East and repopulate it. That was a spectacularly big, indeed insane and criminal ambition.
But what does Trump want to do? He wants to change trade policy. Lots of tariffs. He doesn’t want to break the world, but he wants to change trade policy, and he’s done that. He wants to eliminate the U.S. deficit, but he hasn’t actually taken any of the main measures that would be needed to do that. I’m sure he’s surrounded by people who must be telling him that he wants to be a big presence in the world.
Mounk: In fact, there was just a news story, as we’re recording, in The New York Times today, and I’m sure in the Financial Times as well, that the U.S. trade deficit is now at record highs, and that as a result of economic policies over the last year, the trade deficit has increased, which is the opposite of what he wanted.
Wolf: No, the tariff policies don’t work because he’s not coherent and not logical. He replaced Mr. Maduro in Venezuela. This is about as small a thing as you can do. He wants to give Putin a big chunk of Ukraine. What he wants to do in Iran. All I’m saying is this is not a man who wants to revolutionize the world. He does want to withdraw the United States from its post-war hegemonic role. That’s very important, but it’s one of those slow-motion changes.
I think one area where he does want to change things is the way the United States works. That’s why I think ICE and how it operates may be the most important thing he’s doing. But when I look at him in the world, he’s conservative and revolutionary in some sense, but his ambitions are quite small. So TACO is not required to change anything very radical. It’s not clear to me that he actually wants to shape the world as a whole from top to bottom. He wants to withdraw from it, which has very big implications, but very different implications from a revolutionary.
If I were an American looking at this, I would say, as I wrote in my book on this, the real issue is whether our democracy will survive. That’s very important. Does Trump really want to shape the world in a meaningful sense as other great revolutions have? My instinct is no.
Mounk: That’s a really interesting point. A childish way of saying this is that he doesn’t want to revolutionize the world; he just wants to put his name on it.
Wolf: He wants to put his name on it, and he wants to take America home, which is a very big change. You can see it’s changing Europe now, and this is all very important. But it doesn’t mean that it shakes the world in the sense that we suddenly realize the whole monetary system of the world, the whole economic system of the world, is going to be utterly different tomorrow. It doesn’t feel like that.
Mounk: I sort of understand Trump’s obsession with tariffs. I think it’s a misperception of the world, but you can see how somebody with a certain set of economic instincts thinks, why am I walking down Fifth Avenue and there are all these Japanese and German cars? He’s on the record in the 1980s saying that he wanted them to be American cars. How do we make sure to do that? We put up tariffs so that these German and Japanese cars can’t come in. I can see why he’s so obsessed with that. It’s easy to understand where that comes from.
I’m a little more surprised by the fact that he is clearly very deeply committed to having low interest rates. Is that because, if you’re a real estate guy, low interest rates are helpful because you can take out mortgages more cheaply, and so he’s always wanted low interest rates throughout his career for that reason? Or is it that there is a theory, coherent so far as it goes, that low interest rates stimulate the economy, and if the economy is going well, then he’s going to be more popular and people are going to think it’s a Trump boom?
That economic theory is right so far as it goes. But if you go too far, inflation shoots up and you have all the problems that probably elected Trump the second time, among a host of other reasons. Why is it that he’s so obsessed with putting pressure on the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates faster than its governors think is sensible?
Wolf: It would be absolutely insane for me to say that I understand the intellectual processes of Donald Trump, because I really don’t. I think there can be few men more different than him and me. But I have come to the view, so this is a hypothesis, that he really does view the world through the lens of a real estate developer.
He thinks it makes a lot of sense for America, like a good real estate developer, to borrow money. Of course, it’s much better to borrow money if it’s cheap. Unlike Trump the real estate developer, Trump the president owns the U.S. government, which in his view includes the Federal Reserve. The job of the Federal Reserve, from his point of view, because he now owns the bank, which he didn’t when he was a businessman, is to do what he wants. In the past, that created lots of problems for him because his projects went bankrupt many times.
I think he believes the job of the Federal Reserve, which is my bank, just as the government is my government, is to make sure borrowing, which is part of what he has done with his fiscal policies, remains cheap. He has pursued a massively expansionary fiscal policy. I control the bank. I can force people to lend to me cheaply. So why am I not doing it? Why is this person stopping me from doing this?
They say it’s because of inflation. Donald Trump has never thought about inflation as a systemic problem. He has no idea, in his mind, of what the whole economy is or how things add up across the whole economy. That’s not how he thinks. Similarly, as a businessman, it’s obvious to him that if he spends more than his income on the products of some other company and runs a deficit, he is going to go bankrupt. So if the Germans, the Japanese, and the Chinese insist on selling more to him than they buy from him, they’re going to drive him into bankruptcy. He doesn’t like that either.
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One way he thinks he can get around this, as Mr. Bessent has told him, is to drive down interest rates at the Fed. It’s not as good as forcing them to rebalance, but he’s not going to go any further. He thinks these people are behaving badly and defrauding the United States.
The final thing I think he believes is this. When he looks at his wonderful fortress country, when was it really proud and great and powerful? The answer, from his point of view, is the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the United States was booming, when it had huge tariff walls and stopped other countries from sending goods to it. In his view, that is when America built its industry, and that is what it should return to.
These are very primitive, very basic, perfectly natural ideas for a not particularly intellectual businessperson to hold. They’re not consistent or coherent, but I’ve come to the view that this is actually how he thinks.
Mounk: Explain one thing to me that is taken for granted in discussions of the very contentious relationship between Donald Trump and the Federal Reserve and this extraordinary announcement of an investigation into Jerome Powell. Part of this, as you’re saying, is that I have argued for a long time that a hallmark of authoritarian populism is the unwillingness to accept checks and balances, the unwillingness to accept limitations on power. I’m the elected president. I should be able to decide what I want. How come there’s this weird independent institution that gets to define my will? That is illegitimate. That’s a fairly straightforward piece.
But why is it that the independence of a central bank is so important? The case that, ten or fifteen years ago, a lot of my friends on the left were making, and that now some people in the Trump universe are making, is superficially compelling. Where interest rates lie has big downstream consequences for economic life. When you have higher interest rates, you often have lower inflation, but you also have higher unemployment. When you lower interest rates, you often raise inflation, but you also stimulate the economy and can lead to lower unemployment and more people finding jobs. That’s not always true, it’s within limits, and you can complicate the picture in a million ways to make it more sophisticated than I, as a humble political scientist, have made it. But there are some trade-offs there.
Isn’t that a political trade-off? Isn’t that something elected politicians should decide? Isn’t that something we, as a people, should have a say over, because it’s a normative trade-off between two different goods? There is at least a very reasonable prima facie case that this should be subject to democratic control, and that perhaps the fact that so many things have not been subject to democratic control, including interest rates, is one of the reasons why people got angry and voted for populists in the first place.
Having laid out that case, what is the reason why the independence of central banks is so important? Why is it that if there is an investigation into, and perhaps prosecution of, Jerome Powell, that is not just potentially an injustice where an upstanding public servant is being scapegoated because he happens to be in the wrong position at the wrong time and is unwilling to bow to Trump’s pressure? Why is it actually a problem for the long-term well-being of the U.S. economy and perhaps the world economy?
Wolf: The broad point is that a democracy in which the government can do whatever it wants at any moment and for any reason will pretty soon cease to look like a democracy. There have to be constraining institutions. At the very least, there have to be institutions that ensure fair elections. You have to have institutions that ensure political rights and protect them against the government. That pretty quickly gets you to the position that you have to have some sort of independent rule of law that protects these things. You can discuss how far it goes, but a democracy ceases to be a democracy if an elected government can do whatever it wants. Absolute democracy is its own antithesis.
Then the question becomes, what about money? Where does it fit? Should it be part of the political domain, outside the political domain, or somewhere in between, which is where we are now? Politicians decide who the Fed chair is. Politicians set the law within which it operates. That is absolutely clear. The Fed has a mandate to pursue low unemployment and price stability. It has a dual mandate, which is more progressive than in places like Germany or the eurozone, where the focus is primarily on price stability. So it clearly operates within a political context, like other institutions, but it is given substantial operational independence.
Why is that? There’s a general answer and a very specific historical one. The general answer is that power over money is immense. It is an immense power, but wielded irresponsibly it is immensely destructive. The danger is that a government decides it can print money without limit, finance any size of fiscal deficit with the printing press, and ignore normal budgetary procedures. That gives the government enormous power, but over time it destroys money itself. We have many historical examples of this. Look at Argentina. This is not a theoretical concern.
Economists almost universally agree that there has to be some institutional constraint. Historically, there have been two approaches. One was tying money to a commodity, the gold standard. That collapsed in the 1930s, and no serious economy has returned to it. The alternative is to delegate monetary authority to an independent institution.
In the postwar period, only a few countries, most notably the United States and Germany, had genuinely independent central banks. Many others, including Britain and France, had highly politicized central banks after World War II. By around 1980, there was a broad consensus among economists that countries where politicians controlled central banks performed worse, with higher inflation, greater instability, and worse long-run outcomes, than countries with independent monetary institutions.
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The experience of the 1970s was crucial. President Nixon pressured the Fed, and the result was the Great Inflation. That confirmed for many that central bank independence worked better. Milton Friedman articulated this most clearly. In the short run, inflation can feel good. It can boost employment and growth for a few years. But eventually inflation expectations explode, interest rates spike, bankruptcies rise, and unemployment soars. It is a terrible trade-off.
Countries with independent central banks, particularly Germany, did much better. That experience shaped later decisions, including the creation of the European monetary system and the euro. This didn’t come out of nowhere. The theory was tested in practice and broadly validated. We tend to forget this history because it happened decades ago, but that doesn’t make it irrelevant. Most economists still believe central bank independence is essential. This old man believes it too.
Mounk: I’m struck by two things. We were recently at a small gathering together, alongside some other wonderful former podcast guests like Audrey Tang, the Taiwanese digital minister, and Rachel Kleinfeld, the great researcher on violence as well as American democracy. You said a really striking thing in that context, which is, I think you quoted somebody saying this to you, that people always worry that we’re going to forget history. That’s not what happens. We learn the lessons of history, and then we forget them.
That is really striking and may apply to a broader conversation about populism as much as to this. One of the pieces of data that you presented is that you can look at the impact of populism on the economy. When left-wing populists get elected, like in Venezuela, the economy immediately goes into negative territory and then becomes worse after that. When right-wing populists get elected, the economy tends to be boosted by that for a few years. They come in promising cuts to taxation, cuts to regulation, and a business-friendly environment. For the first few years, the markets buy that, investors buy it, and things go relatively well. Then those places tend to nosedive, and they end up in comparably bad territory as the left-wing populists, not quite as bad, but almost as bad.
Wolf: Yeah, not quite as bad. 15 years later, you’re significantly poorer, about 10% poorer than you would otherwise have been, is the estimate.
Mounk: Presumably, one of the mechanisms for this is that they tend to take control of the central bank.
Wolf: This is one of the mechanisms. They tend to mess up public finances and that’s why they have to take control of the central bank. They cut taxes too much. You can see this in the United States now.
Mounk: My last question about Donald Trump, and then I want to move on to some other topics: does this fit the pattern? The economy is doing reasonably well in the first years of him being in office, but soon he’s going to be able to name the chair of the Federal Reserve. He hasn’t completely transformed the economic system or the tariff system, but you’re certainly starting to see things that create drag for the U.S. economy. The trade deficit is up rather than down. Where does the United States fit into that slide that you presented?
Wolf: My view is that it fits very well. I’ll come to this in a second. The second point I would make, which is really, really important, is of course that the United States is different from everywhere else. It’s not a normal economy going into right-wing populism. It’s the United States. It’s the biggest economy in the world. It’s arguably the most technologically dynamic. I’m not going to engage in the debate between the United States and China now, it’s complicated, but it’s got a fantastic reservoir of innovative strength, the world’s most significant companies, and tremendous momentum. Messing up America is difficult. This is something I always say. Messing up America is completely different from messing up Argentina.
But it does seem to me that trade policy has created wild unpredictability, and so has investment policy, and this will affect investment. It’s bound to affect investment. They have damaged some of the obvious wellsprings of American growth. Immigration, and the willingness of talented foreigners, given what’s going on there, to come and live with their families, must be diminished. Lots of Chinese people are certainly saying, well, my future in China will be better than my future in America. I think they’ve damaged universities and research institutions. They’re damaging the rule of law and confidence in the rule of law. You can see that quite generally.
The soundness of the public finances depends on getting interest rates down. Why does he want rates down? Because interest on current levels of debt, which are now back to where they were in 1945 after a world war, is enormous. The debt ratios are so high. If he could halve interest rates, his public finance problems would largely go away. Of course he wants to lower interest rates, because debt interest is a huge part of his budget. But once he says that, he’s saying to people who hold Treasuries and other U.S. assets that this is a very unsafe place to put your money. Sell Treasuries and sell dollars. You can see signs of that too. The dollar is rather weak.
So we are seeing an immense machine, which I never underestimate, but they are making policy mistakes of exactly the kind I would expect to show up in negative form over the next ten to fifteen years if they are not reversed, slowing growth, slowing dynamism, and more immediately creating a real risk of crisis in the bond markets, the currency markets, and therefore in public finances. That could generate a profound shift in wealth-holders’ confidence in US liabilities, of which there are an incredible number. That could generate a crisis, which could probably include a stock market crisis. That’s the risk.
Mounk: You just returned from Davos, and you wrote a column about it in the Financial Times. You said that two topics dominated. The first is Donald Trump, and we’ve devoted a good half hour to that topic. The second is artificial intelligence. I want to make sure to pick your brains on that as well, because I’ve been thinking about it a lot lately.
To me, the fundamental economic question about artificial intelligence is whether it is a normal technology, as two writers recently claimed, or a profoundly abnormal one. There is a view of the way it is going to automate away some jobs which says that we’ve been through this many times in history. A new technology comes in. It can fulfill a bunch of tasks that humans previously did at lower cost. Those humans lose their jobs. That can be very traumatic for people who have invested heavily in developing highly sophisticated skills, whether that’s medieval monks copying books word by word, or telephone operators who with great speed and dexterity patched your incoming call through to the right recipient.
New technology makes that obsolete. That is bad for those people. Their life trajectories may be negatively affected. Their earnings may be negatively affected. If they’re too old, they may not be able to retrain at a similar level of skill in some other profession. But it is good for the world as a whole, because the talents of future generations are freed up toward more productive uses. There is a reinstatement effect where new kinds of jobs suddenly show up. Human talent is redirected into better fields, and that’s how we all got richer. That’s why the world is much richer today than it was 200 or 500 years ago.
There is also the case on the other side, which is that virtually all forms of automation in the past affected manual rather than mental work. They tended to affect a particular profession, a particular activity, or a particular task. Now we have general-purpose technologies that can be dropped into virtually any mental task. An AI system doesn’t just patch calls through more effectively. It can potentially substitute for a lawyer, an accountant, a social media manager, an HR manager, or fifty other kinds of white-collar jobs. That raises the possibility that there will not be a reservoir of demand for human labor in the same way that there was in the past.
Where do you fall? Do you think that this is fairly framed? Do you think AI is going to be a big disruption that ultimately leads to a larger and more thriving middle class, or do you think it is going to decimate middle-class jobs in a way that is fundamentally different from previous technological transformations?
Wolf: This is a very complicated question. My answer to this is, first, genuinely I don’t know. Partly because I probably lack the expertise, but more importantly because I don’t think we know. The discussions I’ve had with people in this area indicate to me pretty strongly that we don’t know, and I suspect it will take a while.
Let me separate this out into three areas. First, the economic impact. It seems to me that the core argument you’re making, which is that this is a substitute for, if you like, skilled, trained thinking activities, is different. In the past, computers augmented that, and now it appears they’re going to substitute for it. This is obviously very important because the people who do that are, in some sense, the core of our society and our economy. Something that displaces what they do, and most obviously starts by displacing the young in these activities, whose entry jobs are disappearing first, is going to have an extraordinary economic impact and, because of that, an extraordinary social impact.
I’ll come to that further, but if you imagine that the displacement is huge and the new jobs you talk about emerge, as they usually do, rather slowly, we could have a social and political crisis that makes deindustrialization look trivial. Deindustrialization, though one of the biggest forces shaping our world, shook the working class, particularly the male working class, from top to bottom. Shaking the prospects of the educated middle class is socially far more dangerous and explosive because it affects them and their parents, who are the people who run our societies in almost every possible way. It does seem to me that the nature of the displacement you describe is going to create challenges even if we eventually arrive at a whole new set of activities.
The obvious question is what those new activities will be and how much they will involve an augmented form of intelligence or skill that we can’t easily imagine now, and how much they will be something completely different. What will those be? Will they involve relations among people in some way? I did discuss this at some stage with somebody young, obviously very brilliant, and the owner and creator of one of the leading firms. I won’t mention who, because that wouldn’t be fair. I asked him this very question, and all I can say is that he didn’t have an answer. If he doesn’t have an answer, nobody does.
All I can say is that, yes, logically, we should be able to find something else. The question is whether we will find something else that somebody is prepared to pay for. If not, how do we support all these people? That gets back to the structure of ownership and capital ownership. Can we really have a technological revolution that essentially benefits the shareholders and owners of fifteen or twenty companies? That would be revolutionary.
The final point I would make goes beyond the differential economics and the impact question of what will replace what. I think there’s a deeper question, and I’m interested in your reaction. I tend to think, perhaps because of what I do, that thinking and creating through thinking is at the core of what it means to be a human being. That’s what makes humans different from all other animals. If it’s true, and there’s a huge debate about this, that we’re moving into a world where machines can do that as well as we do or better, then we’ve deprived ourselves of any value in our own eyes as humans.
If that’s true, we would be living in a world with superior machines, and we would know they are superior. If we live in that world, what are we going to think we, as humans, are for, if anything? That strikes me as a profound existential question.
My instinct, for all these reasons, is to feel that it would have been a very good idea to bury this technology as soon as somebody invented it. That was never going to happen. Competition ensures that it won’t be regulated successfully, so we’re going to go on this journey. Perhaps this reflects my age or a certain conservatism, and the fact that I have a lot of grandchildren. I’m very concerned. I think the thinking that is emerging at a social level about what this means, and how we control it if we can, is de jure and beyond de jure. The idea that it’s all under the control of ten or so billionaires who, in my view, to a significant extent are psychopaths, terrifies me.
Mounk: I’ve written an article called The Third Humbling of Humanity. This draws on a concept by Sigmund Freud, who identified the first humbling of humanity as the realization that the universe doesn’t revolve around the Earth, and the second humbling of humanity as the recognition that we’re not God’s special creation but rather descended from apes.
Of course, the third great humbling of humanity was Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, which I think involves a little too much self-regard, so I discount that. That’s why I think artificial intelligence is going to be the third big humbling of humanity. What is it that defined humanity if you look at a lot of writing about this 200 years ago or 20 years ago? It’s the fact that we are capable of acts of intelligence and artistic creation that set us apart from other primates, that set us apart from cats and dogs and cows and whales and other intelligent animals. It’s the fact that we can compose poems and write short stories and make movies and sing songs.
If AI will soon be able to do all of that about as well as we can, and according to some studies humans already prefer poems written by AI to those of some of the greatest poets in history, and translations of the Odyssey composed by AI to translations by various well-known translators, that poses a really deep existential challenge to us at the level of a species.
I’m a creative artist. I’m a writer. That’s a form of creative art. I sadly do not have talents for music or painting. You really wouldn’t want to hear me sing a song or look at a picture I painted. But I also think about this from the perspective of creative artists and how our role changes through that.
I think I will always want to write my own prose because I learned laboriously how to write clearly. I grew up in Germany, where clear writing was not prized, and I owe it in many ways to your country, Martin, where I went to university, to having had a couple of teachers who said, spare me this convoluted stuff, write as clearly as possible. That is the way I make sense of the world and my own ideas. I’m also somewhat optimistic that my audience will still want to hear me talk and not some AI, and see me write and not some AI.
But if we get to a place where it will be easier for me to put two lines of an idea and my past writings into an AI and it can write my article better than I can, I’m still going to write my own articles, but it will change my relation to the work. The way I think about this is the Etsy store problem.
If you are in the eighteenth century and you are making socks for your children, the reason for that is that you want them to stay warm through the winter. It’s an essential activity. It makes you feel needed. It has very direct utility, which makes the activity satisfying. If today you have an Etsy store in which you sell handmade socks, that’s a nice novelty item. It’s a nice luxury to have. I respect people who have Etsy stores, and I respect the people who buy handmade socks. But everybody knows that factory-made socks would probably be more durable and warmer. So it’s essentially a kind of indulgence.
I worry that acts of artistic creation are going to go from something that is essential to making sense of the world, something that in an abstract sense has real value to add and feels like a necessary activity, to a glorified Etsy store, a kind of novelty. Look, this is a human-written text. That is a crisis of meaning, perhaps less important than the broader one at the level of the human species that I evoked earlier, but for people who take part in creative processes, I think it will be traumatic in its own way and require a great deal of adjustment.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Martin discuss what artificial intelligence means for human creativity, and its potential impact beyond the United States and Europe. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Last week, Die Zeit, the German magazine on whose board of publishers I serve, asked some of the world’s leading thinkers to answer a deceptively simple question: Should Europe break with the United States? Here is my answer.
A few weeks ago, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and a host of other European nations sent troops to Greenland to protect the Danish territory against… the United States. Even a year ago, as Donald Trump took office for the second time, it would have been hard to imagine such a turn of events. But the realization that an old political order is breaking apart, and that we are unlikely to return to the relative calm of the postwar years anytime soon, has slowly been dawning on political leaders desperate to keep living in the past.
That practically forces the question of whether Europe should break up with the United States. But natural though it may be to ask that question at this moment, it betrays naivety about the sorry state of the continent—and risks pushing it in the wrong direction.
It is clear that Germany, in particular, can no longer rely on the United States the way it once did. The extent to which European countries outsourced their military security to America in the postwar era relied on the knowledge that, despite all of their differences, both Democratic and Republican presidents would value NATO and tolerate the EU. Given the hostility that Trump—and, crucially, other parts of the rising right—harbor towards NATO and the EU that reliance has become a liability.
But by the same token it is clear that Europe can’t fully break up with the United States. For all of the understandable rage that Europeans have towards the Trump administration over his flirtations with the Kremlin, for example, it is still American arms and intelligence reports that are making it possible for Ukraine to keep defending itself against the Russian invasion. And which paragons of European values should substitute for the United States if Europe decided to make a clean break with Uncle Sam: Narendra Modi in Delhi? Xi Jinping in Beijing? Vladimir Putin in Russia? MBS in Saudi Arabia? The mullahs in Iran?
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The answer to Europe’s weakness is therefore twofold. First, the continent must work with the countries that actually exert power and influence in the world in a less sentimental way. This of course includes being willing to deal with uncomfortable partners even if they don’t fully share Europe’s values. But it also includes trying to sustain the increasingly rocky alliance with the United States, Europe’s most longstanding partner. NATO may well break apart over the next three years; but Europe should do what it can to forestall, not to provoke, that outcome.
Second, Europe must at the same time do everything it can to get back on its own two feet. The last months have made it painfully obvious that a strong yet declining economy combined with an extensive and ever-increasing bureaucracy are not enough to have a real voice in the world. If Europe wants more autonomy, the key is not breaking with Washington; it is being able to provide military security on its own continent, to generate genuine economic growth, and most of all to play a real role in the technologies of the future, from electric cars to artificial intelligence.
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The real obstacles to Europe’s ability to shape its own fate have nothing to do with the people in charge in some faraway capital. They are rooted in the lack of ambition and imagination that has slowly come to characterize contemporary Europe. After a disastrous first half of the 20th century, the model onto which the western part of the continent stumbled in the wake of the Second World War has worked incomparably better. This makes it tempting to stick with it even as it has come to be increasingly ill-adapted to the changing times. But if Europe wants to play a leading role in the world—or simply to stand up for its own values on its own continent—it must recognize that this model has now run out of road. For Europe to thrive in a new historical era, the continent must adopt a new vision for its own future.
Promises of breaking with the United States are as tempting as they are easy. But if Europe doesn’t get its act together first, reducing its reliance on the White House only means increasing its reliance on the Kremlin or the CCP. The only way for Europe to take its fate into its own hands is to awaken from its slumbers and resolve that it no longer wants to be a museal continent.
The hot new theory online is that reading is kaput, and therefore civilization is too. The rise of hyper-addictive digital technologies has shattered our attention spans and extinguished our taste for text. Books are disappearing from our culture, and so are our capacities for complex and rational thought. We are careening toward a post-literate society, where myth, intuition, and emotion replace logic, evidence, and science. Nobody needs to bomb us back to the Stone Age; we have decided to walk there ourselves.
I am skeptical of this thesis. As a psychologist, I used to study claims like these for a living, so I know that the mind is primed to believe narratives of decline. We have a much lower standard of evidence for “bad thing go up” than we do for “bad thing go down.”
Unsurprisingly, then, stories about the end of reading tend to leave out some inconvenient data points. For example, book sales were higher in 2025 than they were in 2019, and only a bit below their high point in the pandemic.
Independent bookstores are booming, not busting; at least 422 new indie shops opened in the United States last year alone. Even Barnes & Noble is cool again.
The actual data on reading, meanwhile, isn’t as apocalyptic as the headlines imply. Gallup surveys suggest that some mega-readers (11+ books per year) have become moderate readers (1-5 books per year), but they don’t find any other major trends over the past three decades. Other surveys document similarly moderate declines. For instance, data from the National Endowment for the Arts finds a slight decrease in the percentage of U.S. adults who read any book in 2022 (49%) compared to 2012 (55%). And the American Time Use Survey shows a dip in reading time from 2003 to 2023:
Ultimately, the plausibility of the “death of reading” thesis depends on two judgment calls.
First, do these effects strike you as big or small? Apparently, lots of people see these numbers and perceive an emergency. But we should submit every aspiring crisis to this hypothetical: How would we describe the size of the effect if we were measuring a heartening trend instead of a concerning one?
Imagine that Time Use graph measured cigarette smoking instead of book reading. Would you say that smoking “collapsed” between 2003 and 2023? If we had been spending a billion dollars a year on a big anti-smoking campaign that whole time, would we say it worked? Kind of, I’d say, but most of the time the line doesn’t budge. I wouldn’t be unfurling any “Mission Accomplished” banners, which is why I am not currently unfurling any “Mission Failed” banners, either.
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The second judgment call: Do you expect these trends to continue, plateau, or even reverse? The obvious expectation is that technology will get more distracting every year. And the decline in reading seems to be greater among college students, so we should expect the numbers to continue ticking downward as older bookworms are replaced by younger phoneworms. Those are both reasonable predictions, but two facts make me a little more doubtful.
Fact #1: There are signs that the digital invasion of our attention is beginning to stall. We seem to have passed peak social media—time spent on the apps has started to slide. App developers are finding it harder and harder to squeeze more attention out of our eyeballs, and it turns out that having your eyeballs squeezed hurts, so people aren’t sticking around for it. It’s no wonder that, after paying $1,000 for a new phone, people will then pay an additional $50 for a device that makes their phone less functional.
Fact #2: Reading has already survived several major incursions, which suggests it’s more appealing than we thought. Radio, TV, dial-up, Wi-Fi, TikTok—none of it has been enough to snuff out the human desire to point our pupils at words on paper. Apparently, books are what some hyper-online people call “Lindy”: they’ve lasted a long time, so we should expect them to last even longer.
It is remarkable, even miraculous, that people who possess the most addictive devices ever invented will occasionally choose to turn those devices off and pick up a book instead. If I was a mad scientist hellbent on stopping people from reading, I’d probably invent something like the iPhone. And after I released my dastardly creation into the world, I’d end up like the Grinch on Christmas morning, dumbfounded that my plan didn’t work: I gave them all the YouTube Shorts they could ever desire and they’re still... reading!?
Perhaps there are frontiers of digital addiction we have yet to reach. Maybe one day we’ll all have Neuralinks that beam Instagram Reels directly into our primary visual cortexes, and then reading will really be toast.
Maybe. But it has proven very difficult to artificially satisfy even the most basic human pleasures. Who wants a birthday cake made with aspartame? Who would rather have a tanning bed than a sunny day? Who prefers to watch bots play chess? You can view high-res images of the Mona Lisa anytime you want, and yet people will still pay to fly to Paris and shove through crowds just to get a glimpse of the real thing.
I think there is a deep truth here: Human desires are complex and multidimensional, and this makes them both hard to quench and hard to hack. That tinge of discontent that haunts even the happiest people, that bottomless hunger for more even among plenty—those are evolutionary defense mechanisms. If we were easier to please, we wouldn’t have made it this far. We would have gorged ourselves to death as soon as we figured out how to cultivate sugarcane.
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That’s why I doubt the core assumption of the “death of reading” hypothesis. The theory heavily implies that people who would once have been avid readers are now glassy-eyed doomscrollers because that is, in fact, what they always wanted to be. They never appreciated the life of the mind. They were just filling time with great works of literature until TikTok came along.
I don’t buy this. Everyone, even people without liberal arts degrees, knows the difference between the cheap pleasures and the deep pleasures. No one pats themselves on the back for spending an hour watching mukbang videos, no one touts their screentime like they’re setting a high score, and no one feels proud that their hand instinctively starts groping for their phone whenever there’s a lull in conversation.
Finishing a great nonfiction book feels like heaving a barbell off your chest. Finishing a great novel feels like leaving an entire nation behind. There are no replacements for these feelings. Videos can titillate, podcasts can inform, but there’s only one way to get that feeling of your brain folds stretching and your soul expanding, and it is to drag your eyes across text.
That’s actually where I agree with the worrywarts of the written word: All serious intellectual work happens on the page, and we shouldn’t pretend otherwise. If you want to contribute to the world of ideas, if you want to entertain and manipulate complex thoughts, you have to read and write.
According to one theory, that’s why writing originated: to pin facts in place. At first, those facts were things like “Hirin owes Mushin four bushels of wheat,” but once you realize that knowledge can be hardened and preserved by encoding it in little squiggles, you unlock a whole new realm of logic and reasoning.
That doesn’t mean every piece of prose is wonderful, just that it can be. And when it reaches those heights, it commands a power that nothing else can possess.
I didn’t always believe this. I was persuaded on this point recently when I met an audio editor named Julia Barton, who was writing a book about the history of radio. I thought that was funny—shouldn’t the history of radio be told as a podcast?
No, she said, because in the long run, books are all that matter. Podcasts, films, and TikToks are good at attracting ears and eyes, but in the realm of ideas, they punch below their weight. Thoughts only stick around when you print them out and bind them in cardboard.
I think Barton’s thesis is right. At the center of every long-lived movement, you will always find a book. Every major religion has its holy text, of course, but there is also no communism without the Communist Manifesto, no environmentalism without Silent Spring, no American Revolution without Common Sense. This remains true even in our supposed post-literate meltdown—just look at Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s book Abundance, which inspired the creation of a Congressional caucus. That happened not because of Abundance the Podcast or Abundance the 7-Part YouTube Series, but because of Abundance the book.
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I know that what we used to call “social media” is now just television you watch on your phone. I know that people want to spend their leisure time watching strangers apply makeup, assemble salads, and repair dishwashers. I know they want to see this guy dancing in his dirty bathroom and they want to watch Mr. Beast bury himself alive. These are their preferences, and woe betide anyone who tries to show them anything else, especially—God forbid—the written word.
But I also know that humans have a hunger that no video can satisfy. Even in the midst of infinite addictive entertainment, some people still want to read. A lot of people, in fact. 5,000 years after Sumerians started scratching cuneiform into clay and 600 years after Gutenberg started pressing inky blocks onto paper, text is still king. Long may it reign.
Adam Mastroianni writes the Substack Experimental History.
A version of this article was originally published at Experimental History.
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Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, February 27, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
On October 17, 1961, tens of thousands of Algerians marched through the streets of Paris in peaceful defiance of a discriminatory curfew imposed by the French state. Police opened fire, beat protesters, arrested them en masse—and, in some cases, threw people into the Seine, where they drowned. Historians later called it “the bloodiest act of state repression of street protest in Western Europe in modern history.” At least 48—but possibly hundreds—were killed.
Yet for decades, the official story minimized the violence. The death toll, it was claimed, was three. Police had acted to defend themselves. The protesters were terrorists.
The French state actively buried the truth. Records were falsified. Evidence suppressed. Investigations blocked. Publications seized. The paper trail was shaped to match the story.
In 1999 the French Public Prosecutor’s Office concluded that a massacre had taken place, but only in 2012 did President Hollande acknowledge it on behalf of the French Republic. This is the danger of a public sphere without a distributed capacity to challenge official accounts in real time: It is difficult to imagine that the events of October 17 could have been hidden for so long if thousands of protesters and bystanders had carried smartphones, livestreamed the crackdown, and uploaded footage as the bodies hit the water.
Paris 1961 is a historical warning. Minneapolis 2026 is its modern counterpoint.
Within hours of the killing of Alex Pretti by federal immigration agents on January 24, top officials attempted to shape the narrative. They placed the blame squarely on the victim, with Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem claiming that Pretti “approached” ICE officers with a gun and was killed after he “violently resisted” attempts to disarm him. White House Senior Advisor Stephen Miller called Pretti “an assassin” who “tried to murder federal agents.” FBI Director Kash Patel said, “You don’t have a right to break the law and incite violence.”
In other words, Pretti supposedly posed a threat and paid the price.
But something happened that couldn’t have happened in France in 1961. As bystander footage spread across social media, the official narrative began to collapse. Videos appeared to show a cellphone in one of Pretti’s hands and no gun in the other. Officers also appeared to remove his holstered gun—legally carried—before he was shot several times. It then emerged that Pretti was an ICU nurse with no criminal record—hardly the prototype of a terrorist.
The official account was clearly at odds with the best available evidence. Four days after the shooting, the Trump administration is already scrambling to save face, cast blame, and “de-escalate” the ICE presence in Minnesota.
The current obsession with misinformation tends to focus on the public: online mobs, foreign influencers, flaming trolls. But history suggests a more inconvenient truth: in times of crisis, disinformation often comes from above. Governments, including democratic ones, have powerful incentives to shape information. When a state agent shoots a citizen, the response is rarely “Let’s expose ourselves to transparency.” It is often the opposite: to control the narrative, limit scrutiny, discourage dissent, and frame the event in morally legitimizing terms.
What should our response look like? The Pretti case offered an answer—not only through the videos, but through something else that happened almost simultaneously: the public correction of powerful figures, at scale. Within hours the statements by Miller, Noem, and Patel—and even the official @DHSgov account—had all received Community Notes on X, a platform that, ironically, has become increasingly central to the populist right and is owned by Trump ally Elon Musk.
This is where social media performs a civic function.
When platforms label content as “false” in a top-down fashion, many users interpret it as bias—“truth policing” by corporate gatekeepers in cahoots with governments. But the Community Notes system is different. It is crowdsourced, asking volunteers to add context and sources to misleading posts. An open-source algorithm decides which notes become visible, and, crucially, prioritizes notes that gain support from users with different political perspectives. The point is not unanimity—it’s cross-ideological agreement sufficient to clear a threshold of credibility.
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This is what makes bottom-up correction hard to dismiss as partisan censorship. It involves a distributed group of users reaching a form of consensus, often by pointing to credible reporting. It can create a positive feedback loop: journalism supplies verifiable facts; the crowd amplifies and contextualizes them; the overall information environment becomes more resilient.
Early research into the impact of crowdsourcing is promising. Studies have found high accuracy rates for Community Notes in specific domains like COVID-19 content, and a significant share of notes cite high-quality sources.
More broadly, crowdsourced fact checking reflects an important principle: when trust in elite institutions collapses, a purely expert-driven model may fail or even backfire. Politically diverse crowds can sometimes do what “authoritative” gatekeepers cannot: persuade skeptics that a correction is legitimate.
Crowdsourcing is not a silver bullet. The search for a single, decisive fix for disinformation is a “modern mirage” that often serves as a pretext for giving authorities new powers they will inevitably abuse. But the promise of crowdsourcing suggests we should bet on pluralism: multiple, overlapping checks that strengthen the public’s ability to verify claims without empowering any single institution—especially the state—to control the boundaries of permissible speech. The mainstreaming of crowdsourced fact-checking across social media platforms should function as a disincentive to brazen lying by politicians and political influencers.
In Paris in 1961, the state could suppress evidence, control archives, intimidate media, and deflect until public attention faded. In Minneapolis in 2026, video evidence traveled faster than the official storyline—and distributed networks of verification made it harder for powerful figures to rewrite reality without pushback.
This is what a free society should aim for: not a perfect public sphere without falsehoods (which has never existed), but a public sphere with enough openness, transparency, and decentralized checking power to ensure that lies—especially from the top—cannot become the permanent record.
Jacob Mchangama is the Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech and a research professor at Vanderbilt University. He is also a Senior Fellow at FIRE and the author with Jeff Kosseff of The Future of Free Speech: Reversing the Global Decline of Democracy’s Most Essential Freedom (forthcoming 2026).
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For decades, American policy toward Taiwan has been a highly successful tightrope balancing act. The doctrine of “strategic ambiguity,” a deliberate refusal to say whether the United States would defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, was designed to keep all parties guessing. It deterred Beijing from attacking and, simultaneously, restrained Taipei from declaring formal independence. For a generation, this delicate act preserved a fragile peace.
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That era is over. What was once a strategic advantage has become a dangerous albatross, increasing the likelihood of the very miscalculation it was designed to prevent. In a world of broken communication channels, incoherent political signaling, and isolated leadership, ambiguity is no longer a tool of stability. It is a catalyst for catastrophic conflict. The time has come for the United States to make a choice, and to proclaim it loudly.
The old strategy worked for the world in which it was born. Crafted in the wake of President Nixon’s opening to China, the policy was codified in the Taiwan Relations Act and a series of communiqués with Beijing. It allowed Washington to formally recognize the People’s Republic of China while maintaining robust unofficial ties with the self-governing island of Taiwan. This dual deterrence worked because it relied on a shared, unspoken agreement between Washington and Beijing. Even amidst global instability, the red lines on Taiwan were broadly understood and the diplomatic channels for managing the issue remained open.
Today, the foundation of that system has crumbled, and three dangerous cracks have appeared.
First, the American signal is lost in the noise. Strategic ambiguity requires careful, unified messaging to be effective. Instead, America’s foreign policy now broadcasts a cacophony of contradiction. Presidents have repeatedly appeared to abandon the policy in impromptu statements, only to have their staff walk them back hours later. Congress, meanwhile, sends a steady stream of high-profile delegations to Taipei, signaling ironclad support. The president proudly proclaims himself the “Peace President,” unwilling to involve America in foreign wars, yet greenlights strikes in Iran and Nigeria, as well as the overthrow of Nicolás Maduro. The publicly-released 2025 National Security Strategy signals that Russia and China are no longer our problem as we focus on the Western Hemisphere. What, then, should our adversaries make of the arms shipments to Taiwan and Ukraine? What should have been calculated ambiguity has quickly devolved into dangerous incoherence, leaving both allies and adversaries unclear on our true intentions.
Second, the lines of communication are dead. When signals become muddled, reliable channels are needed to clarify intent and de-escalate crises. These channels have atrophied. Military-to-military hotlines between the Pentagon and the People’s Liberation Army are routinely ignored by Beijing. High-level American diplomatic engagement has become sporadic and fraught with tension. Even more dangerously, the primary channel for de-escalation is silent. The direct lines of communication between Taipei and Beijing, once a critical safety valve, have been functionally severed for nearly a decade. In a crisis, there is no reliable way for leaders in Washington, Beijing, or Taipei to ask the most important question of all: “What do you mean by that?”
Finally, the structure of power in both nations creates a profound danger of leadership echo chambers. In Beijing, political purges and a demand for absolute loyalty have cultivated an environment where dissent is impossible and unwelcome information is suppressed. In Washington, a new and similar propensity to favor personal loyalty over institutional expertise can leave a leader surrounded by yes-men, cut off from the grounding assessments of career diplomats and intelligence officials. In both capitals, leaders are at risk of becoming overconfident, fed by sycophants who reinforce their preconceptions. Beijing may convince itself that America has neither the capability nor the will to intervene. Washington may fatally underestimate the scale of China’s military modernization, falsely believing that they are still working with cheap imitations of American tech. When both sides believe they understand the other, but are operating on flawed assumptions, the risk of a disastrous misstep becomes grave.
To continue this policy is to wager that all sides will guess correctly. This is no longer responsible. The alternative, what some have called “strategic clarity,” is fraught with its own perils, but is now less risky than the status quo. It presents two stark, difficult paths.
The first path is a clear commitment to defend Taiwan. A formal security guarantee would end all speculation and present Beijing with an unambiguous deterrent. The primary risk, cited for decades, is that such a move would embolden pro-independence factions in Taiwan and trap the United States in a conflict not of its choosing. This is a serious concern, but one that can be managed with precision. A defense commitment could be explicitly conditional, applying only to the defense of Taiwan as it currently exists. Such a clause would make clear that the American security guarantee does not extend to a future, formally independent state, reassuring Beijing that our goal is preservation, not provocation.
The second path is a clear statement that America will not defend Taiwan militarily. This would force Taiwan to confront a reality our current policy allows it to avoid: that its long-term survival rests entirely in its own hands. Forced to abandon any hope of American rescue, Taipei would face a stark choice. It could accelerate its transformation into a defensive “porcupine,” bristling with enough weaponry to make an invasion prohibitively costly for Beijing. Or it could choose to negotiate a political settlement, perhaps a version of the “one country, two systems” framework now dismantled in Hong Kong. While deeply unpalatable, either choice would be of Taiwan’s own choosing—a better fate than being marched into a devastating war based on a miscalculated guess about American intentions. For the United States, it would avert a superpower conflict, but the cost would be a catastrophic retreat from leadership, shattering our credibility with key allies like Japan and South Korea.
Neither path is easy, and both carry undeniable risks. But the greatest danger now lies not in the choice itself, but in the failure to make one. The conditions that made strategic ambiguity a success have vanished. The United States owes it to the world to replace this dangerous gamble with the difficult responsibility of clarity. We must ensure that Taipei, Washington, and, most importantly, Beijing, understand the precise consequences of their actions before a decision is made that will change the world. By making our position clear, we place the final, heavy choice on Beijing: Will you shatter the peace of this century just to settle a grievance from the last?
Shahn Louis is the founder of Anansi Strategic Intelligence LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk firm. A former senior intelligence analyst with experience across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, he specializes in China analysis and East Asian regional dynamics.
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Recently, we read a novel that should be catnip for the literati. One girl, a helpless witness to her mother’s abuse, grows up and leaves home for good. Will she escape the cycle of domestic violence… or repeat it? In scenes of abuse, it’s unflinching; in moments of agonizing complication, such as when the protagonist feels pity for her abuser, it’s daringly true to life. Characters say what they feel, and it’s often uncomfortable. No softening the dialogue to fit the currently “correct” sensibilities.
Of course, we’re talking about Colleen Hoover’s 2016 novel It Ends With Us. Have you read it?
The chattering class overlooks Hoover—and popular writers like her—to its own detriment. Not only has she been a quiet champion for free expression in literature, she’s a self-made, genre-defying, working-class maverick whose open, non-judgmental attitude gives her credibility and relevance across every division you could list: religious, cultural, political, national, and class. The disdain Hoover routinely receives (one representative guide to Hoover’s oeuvre is titled “the bad, the terrible, and everything in between”) says far more about the literati’s contradictory, perhaps even suicidal impulses, than the quality of her writing. And that says a great deal about how the divides in American life play out, and how Americans—even avid readers—are, so to speak, on an entirely different page from one another.
In a more capacious, and generous, state of mind, the literati would look past their hang-ups with Hoover and treat a writer like her as a golden opportunity to really understand the zeitgeist and to bridge cultural divides. Or, at a minimum, would be excited that somebody is reading something and would give “popular literature” the courtesy of trying to figure out what all the fuss is about.
In case you’ve been living in a cave the last decade, Colleen Hoover rose from self-published obscurity to become a record-breaking, word-of-mouth sales sensation. She released her first novel in 2012. Although she’s often described as a TikTok phenomenon, anointed to fame by luck and the algorithm, the truth is that she’s a hustler who built her audience of “CoHorts” from the ground up. According to The New York Times, when she self-published her first novel she was making $9 an hour and living in a trailer; she used her $30 royalty check to pay the water bill. Her years of effort have paid off, big-time. By 2022, she’d written six of the ten books on The New York Times Best Seller list. To date, Hoover’s books have sold over 50 million copies worldwide. Hoover inspires plenty of talk (CNN described her as America’s “most controversial” author), but as the literary agent and romance novel guru Alyssa Morris told us, “There’s not a real engagement with her actual books. It’s an engagement with her persona or the perception of her persona.”
In the chomping maw of internet discourse, Hoover is an avatar for a multitude of hot-button talking points: algorithmic slop, political correctness (in that she’s very much not), good reading vs. bad reading, and the gender wars. Outlets like The Atlantic and The New York Times tend to focus on Hoover’s rags-to-riches success and the adjacent, admittedly juicy personal dramas—particularly the legal battle between Justin Baldoni and Blake Lively, which overshadowed the 2024 movie adaptation of It Ends With Us. Meanwhile, regular readers respond in a very different way. They share how her stories make them feel: emotionally devastated, gobsmacked by twists, connected to the characters, and excited to read more, and more, and more. (Hoover is, at press time, up to 26 books, and counting.)
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“But the sentences!” we hear you crying out. “They’re so bad!” Well, sure, yes. Some of them really are bad—and internet trolls have produced whole online exhibits dedicated to the very worst of her writing. Here, for instance, is one snippet of dialogue from 2014’s Ugly Love: “‘Miles,’ I say with a smile, ‘you’re looking at me like you fell in love with me.’ / He shakes his head. ‘I didn’t fall in love, Tate. I flew.’” Let that stand in for some sentences that are even less tasteful. But, as damning an indictment of Hoover’s writing as her own prose might be, clunky sentences abound in award-winning books as well. (Looking at you, Ocean Vuong, Rita Bullwinkel, and Colson Whitehead!) Hoover’s awkward phrases aren’t a sufficient explanation for why she’s become the approved target of so much reflexive disdain. Maybe it’s because she has no gatekeeper pedigree, only gumption, and her self-publishing origin story has left a permanent stain for reading audiences that insist on the imprimatur of high-end publishing companies. (The fact that she’s a fixture with the Big Five now doesn’t seem to matter.)
Part of it, we feel bound to say, may be simple sexism. Hoover’s been siloed as a “women’s issues” writer, and dismissed accordingly—there is so often a sneering belittlement towards her work. At the same time, there is an incessant suspicion of Hoover as being somehow toxic to her fragile female readers. The word “problematic” is so frequently appended to her that it might as well be an epithet. A common bugbear of anti-CoHos (yes, there is such a thing) is her refusal to spoil her twisty plots with trigger warnings—which the P.C. crowd likes to demand. And the myth that “BookTok” alone created her success makes her a stand-in for wider grievances with social media and the internet age. Hoover’s critics have won the vibe war. For many, Hoover’s been branded a uniquely bad writer, a novelist for the slop age.
What’s more, Hoover’s writing is often coded for—and we wish there was another way to say this—white trash. Instead of wealthy people behaving badly or saintly victims, we have baby daddies, incarceration, and student-teacher relationships. Her characters’ names (Ryle, Ledger), backgrounds (nursing student, ex-military, modest upbringings), and plot mishaps (accidental pregnancies, secret affairs) cue contempt among certain kinds of readers. Lily, the main character in Hoover’s most famous book, It Ends With Us, holds the common, often maddeningly forgiving attitude that her abusive husband Ryle is not a bad person, and that, as Ryle himself puts it at one point, “we’re all just people who sometimes do bad things”—a perspective that Lily herself seems to sympathize with and that is never entirely repudiated within the narrative. As writers ourselves, we admire Hoover for staying loyal to her protagonist’s mixed-up human feelings. The many readers (and media outlets) who took the novel to task for “glamorizing” domestic violence seem to have missed Hoover’s point entirely: domestic violence can happen to any of us.
In high-brow novels, being a victim of abuse will ruin your life and then kill you or those you love (Hanya Yanagihara’s A Little Life, Douglas Stuart’s Shuggie Bain, Anna Burns’s Milkman all serve as examples). They are novels without a lot of hope. In contrast, This Ends With Us dares to be unliterary. The heroine not only lives in the end, but finds a new, happy relationship with someone else and a co-parenting equilibrium with Ryle. Like it or not, this situation is one that many, many readers recognize, and arguably aspire to—down to the quotidian details of shuffling a child between two households. (Hoover describes the novel as being heavily drawn from her own parents’ relationship.) It’s worth pondering: Who’s out of touch here, the high-brow cynics or the humbler dreamers? Not to mention that high-brow novels almost never deliver the kinds of shocking, satisfying twists that Hoover has built her career on.
Reaching readers is harder than ever. More than half of Americans read no books at all. Maybe you pride yourself on reading daring, bold books, or perhaps you’re in the middle of a reading slump and desperate for a compulsive page-turner. Maybe you’re just an ornery contrarian (we can sympathize) who prefers to make up your own mind rather than leaning on received opinion. Regardless, we invite all readers to reject the culture of scorn and add a Colleen Hoover novel to their list.
Book culture is at its best when it’s also popular culture, but reading is rapidly becoming a niche hobby—and the entrenched snobbery of literary types isn’t helping. If we want to think clearly about the role of books in America, then we need to think clearly about Colleen Hoover and popular writers like her—and the way that Hoover, in particular, has put a voice to so many women’s experiences. Where many other writers, whatever their literary merits, fail to attract audiences, she wins readers over and pulls lapsed readers back into the fold. We dismiss her at our own loss.
Melanie Jennings is a MacDowell fellow whose short stories, essays, and poems have appeared in Ploughshares, Hotel Amerika, and Crab Orchard Review. She lives in Oregon where she is working on a novel. Here is her Substack.
Elizabeth Kaye Cook is a writer in New York City. Her fiction and nonfiction have been published in Carve, The Gettysburg Review, Three Crows Magazine, and others. Her newsletter is Notes from Elizabeth Kaye Cook.
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Atul Gawande is an American surgeon, writer, and public health researcher.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Atul Gawande discuss how simple checklists can boost survival rates in the operating theater, what it means to have quality of life, and our complicated relationship with mortality.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I am delighted that you are on. I have been reading you for a long time in your books and in The New Yorker and elsewhere. One of the things you have done for the American public is to take people inside what can seem like a black box: the medical profession, the way hospitals work, to show what determines when something goes well, when something goes badly, and how some of these things function. Before we get into the details of this, what motivated you to do that?
Atul Gawande: Well, it is hard for me to put my finger on it. I had come to medical school after having served on the Hill doing health policy. I had a stint doing that. I grew up in rural Ohio, the son of two immigrant Indian doctors for a rural community. My sister and I were the children of two doctors who were very active in being part of the community. I always grew up seeing medicine not just through the lens of the clinician but also through the lens of my parents knowing everybody they took care of in a local community. You see medicine through the community. I came to practicing medicine out of trying to see it as a citizen. When you are working on the Hill, you are thinking about it from the perspective of taxpayers and everybody else.
One more thing made a difference, which is that on the fifth day of July of my residency, my son was born and had a cardiac issue that kept him in the hospital for a month. I was physically going back and forth between being a brand new intern trying to convince people to let me join their operation to learn on them, to being on the other side as a dad with a child with a serious congenital heart defect that would require surgery and needing to navigate it from that point of view. By the time I got the opportunity to be writing about these things, I had already absorbed the idea of needing to see it from many perspectives and not accepting that it would be okay to pretend we are infallible, that everything is, leave it to us, the experts. That was changing in the modern world anyway.
Mounk: One of the things that I appreciate about those early books is that there are two rather different views of medicine, both of which are one dimensional. One is of medicine as a perfect exact science. We have the rules to apply, doctors are omniscient, and they have understood capital S science. Any questioning of them, any uncertainty, any room for ambiguity does not exist. There is also a view on the other side, which is that this is a complete art, and we should trust doctors as the most skilled craftsmen who have engaged in this profession for a long time. Their judgment is superior not because there is one clear way of doing it but because they have superior experience, knowledge, and virtue, and therefore we should defer to them.
It seems to me that you are articulating something subtle in the middle between those extremes, because you emphasize how much uncertainty and ambiguity there is. In something like The Checklist Manifesto, you also say this view where doctors are consummate professionals and it is their judgment and the practice of this craft that is superior is also wrong. In some circumstances, we should be given strict guidelines and told that even if you have done this operation a hundred times, you have to tick each checkbox off. Tell us a little about where this in-between space lies.
Gawande: You hit the nail on the head. I would characterize it as the view of doctors as heroes, which has the two extremes you describe, as craftsmen and as scientists knowing everything. There is also the view of doctors as villains, or the whole business of medicine as corrupt. There was then my experience of being a young surgery resident trying to navigate how I learn to do this thing, its complexities, and the way things go wrong. One of my first articles for The New Yorker was about making a terrible mistake that nearly killed a patient.
We had a study that I got to be part of that encapsulated this for me. We looked at 15,000 patients admitted to hospitals in two states, Utah and Colorado, and asked the question: when people have a bad outcome, when they die or leave the hospital with a serious disability, is that because the knowledge exists and we failed to apply it correctly, or is it because we are ignorant of the knowledge? What was striking was that two-thirds of the time the knowledge existed and we failed to apply it correctly.
That struck me as an incredible generational transformation. For millennia, human beings did not understand what was happening in our bodies, what the diseases and conditions were, let alone what to do about them. As early as the 1950s, we mostly did not have solutions for most problems. By the time I was in training, we had solutions but were not executing on them correctly. That can inspire outrage, malpractice lawsuits, regulations. Much of the way medicine dealt with it was by training you more and more, as if you could jam all of this into your head and know everything and be omniscient.
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What was clear is that other industries dealing with high risk were adopting systems that made it easier for people to do the right thing and harder to do the wrong thing. We had not embraced that. My book The Checklist Manifesto was about navigating coming out of residency and starting to create basic systems that became a checklist in the operating room. It was not a checklist of nineteen steps for every operation. It was nineteen things in every operation the team needs to communicate about to make sure you are prepared for whatever comes, to recognize the special issues of this patient, the goals we have that day, and work together as a better team. That is recognizing that the system is all of us coming together.
It cut the death rate 47% in eight cities in our original study and ultimately scaled around the world.
Mounk: Tell us about the actual differences in that approach. You are right that being trained more and more to do the same thing is not going to accomplish perfect results. I spent much of my life writing for many years, and every now and again I still stupidly misspell a word. We are all going to screw up even at things at which we are very skilled.
At the same time, a lot of the abilities of a skilled surgeon come from facing a patient with a condition that is slightly different from anything they have done before. They may discover a complication in the process of surgery that they did not expect. If you had what the title implies, a rigid checklist where it is step one, step two, step three, that is the fast path to failure. That sounds a little like the technology we had before Google Maps, which was MapQuest. It was great if you followed all nineteen instructions, but if you missed one turn, you were suddenly without a plan.
What does it look like to have a system that avoids these avoidable errors without giving you the kind of rigidity where one complication that was not anticipated leaves you lost?
Gawande: Well, on this nineteen-item checklist, there are three pause points. You pause right before the patient is put to sleep, right before the incision, and then right before you leave the room. At each step there are what I have sometimes called dumb checks. Do you have the correct patient? Are you operating on the right side of the body? Did you give an antibiotic, if you are giving an antibiotic, in the sixty-minute window when it works maximally? If you have fluid that is needed or blood, is it available in the room? Those are the very rote, just-do-it items.
Most of the power of it comes from the additional steps that the people in the room take to communicate, which you would think happen every time but do not. Most teams come together at the beginning of the day and they are entirely new. There is someone new on the team, it is an assembled team. You start by asking people to say their names and their roles. You go around and do that. It does a couple of things. The most important thing is that it activates you to have heard your name in the room. Like in a meeting, it gives you permission to speak again so that when you have a concern later, you feel you have the voice to raise it.
Another part is that you discuss the plan and the person on the table. What are the key issues for this person? What equipment is required, and is it ready? Does anybody have any concerns, including the patient? Then again, before you leave the room, what is the plan for the next twenty-four hours? Do we agree on it? Do we have our next action steps?
Mounk: Just to understand before that, it may have been the case that the surgeon themselves had an idea of this. They know what operation they are doing, et cetera, but perhaps other members of the team did not, and therefore they were not paying attention to warning signs of something going wrong. Tell us about how it has changed from what was the case before and what this kind of meeting accomplishes.
Gawande: When we designed it with the World Health Organization, we were tackling how to reduce complications in surgical care. We brought a Boeing safety engineer in. In cockpits, in airline crashes, failures of communication often occur because someone does not speak up who has information that should be known, or doubts or concerns, or is seeing things that are not seen. The surgeon may have a plan in their head, but the anesthesiologist may know more about the medical issues of the patient that you should be aware of. They were on a blood thinner that was stopped a day ago. They have a history of XYZ conditions that you need to be reminded of, which might not be foremost in the surgeon’s head or the nurse’s head or others. The nursing team may know about issues the patient may be having. They have a bad back today. They told me about XYZ. Everybody has a piece of a puzzle for making it come out with a better outcome, and they are not voicing it, they are not bringing it forward.
Mounk: I am going to ask a question that seems out of left field, but that you are practically forcing, at least for anybody who has watched the latest season of The Rehearsal with Nathan Fielder, in which he goes to elaborate lengths to suggest that what is at issue in many plane crashes is that the co-pilot is too intimidated to raise concerns about the pilot’s course of action. The way you are talking makes it sound as if that is a plausible theory, at least as it applies to medicine, that often there is somebody in the room who knows something that would be able to avoid those complications. Perhaps part of what is going on is a power dynamic in which, if you do not feel empowered to speak up, you keep that concern to yourself in a way that has adverse consequences.
Gawande: This is probably the hardest part about implementing the checklist. It was a change in the culture of the operating room because the highest value of the operating room used to be the autonomy of the surgeon. The surgeon was the fighter pilot who decided everything that happened. You call it an operating theater in many countries. It is the stage onto which the surgeon steps and everybody is expected to be working for the surgeon. When in fact, what we needed to do was move away from the fighter pilot and more toward the pit crew. We are all here in service of a goal together. All of our voices matter. We all have something to contribute and to say.
One of the key measures of whether the checklist is being used well is whether you hear everybody’s voice speak up to convey at critical moments, in those pause points, what the concerns and needs are and what you understand the situation to be. We have shown, as we deployed it in South Carolina for example, that every percentage increase, every one-point increase on a five-point scale in the level of teamwork, respect, and willingness to speak up translates to another reduction in mortality.
Moun: So in other words, Dr. House is a terrible guide to how to practice good medicine. What are the cultural reservations you encountered here? One of them presumably is some of your esteemed colleagues saying, no, I am the fighter pilot. I am the most important person in the room, and I do not want to hear the nurse speaking up. Another one that I have in my mind is perhaps about the status of a doctor as the kind of craftsman who really knows best and should not be constrained by artificial scaffolding like the checklist. I know this because I have a friend who is a French doctor who wanted to get The Checklist Manifesto translated into French, and he has very good English. He wanted to do this.
I don’t know if the book now has a French edition or not; this was perhaps ten years ago. However, he had great difficulty getting it published because the response from many French doctors was, we know what we are doing. Why on earth do we have to follow a checklist? This seems like a terrible American mechanistic view of the world. It does not comport with how we think about practicing medicine.
Gawande: It is an interesting cultural phenomenon, not between France and the United States but among surgeons themselves. We surveyed surgeons, and the broad response was that 70 to 80 percent would accept the checklist, but 20 to 30 percent thought it was a waste of time. They believed they did not need it, that it did not matter, and that it was merely another layer of bureaucracy.
However, when asked, if you were having an operation, would you want the surgeon to use the checklist? 94 percent said yes. Surgeons, like everyone else, have a Lake Wobegon effect: we all believe we are above average. You would not become a surgeon if you did not have confidence in yourself.
The difference between a 1 percent mortality rate—typical for inpatient surgery—and reducing that rate by half, as the studies show, is a reduction of half a percentage point. In other words, you go from 1 percent to 0.5 percent. You cannot feel that difference day to day. You cannot feel the difference between performing with a 1 percent error rate and a 0.5 percent error rate. Over time, however, virtually everyone ends up having a serious error that is caught by the checklist, and that experience is what makes surgeons believers.
The challenge is in getting people to try it, believe in it, and avoid turning it into a mere paper-documentation exercise. It is also crucial because checklists can easily become captured by bureaucracy. I have seen places where a 19-item checklist becomes an 80-item checklist, imposed from above with steps that make it harder to think, harder to engage your brain, and harder to operate effectively. This is why the people in the operating room must be part of designing the checklist.
Mounk: I think this is a really interesting point: we are, in general, very good and highly professionalized at these operations. It is incredible that we are at a time when ninety-nine out of one hundred times we undertake these complicated medical procedures, the patient ends up being safe. However, as a result, the difference between a lousy surgeon and a great surgeon is not the ninety-nine out of one hundred cases; it is the one edge case.
How do you perform when you are objectively very good at this? Ninety-nine out of one hundred times you fix some medical problem and the patient walks out of the operating room—perhaps not that very moment—alive and hopefully well. But you could actually do better. How do you get yourself to that higher level of performance beyond simply avoiding errors through something like a checklist?
I know you have written, for example, about yourself—when you were a very distinguished surgeon with a very good record—using a coach in order to get better at what you were doing. What is the lesson from that for people within and outside the medical field?
Gawande: First of all, the error rate—or rather the complication rate, not even the error rate—will be higher than one percent. We were talking about the death rate. Some of our operations might have twenty or thirty percent complication rates, and you also have, around that, a wide distribution: some people will have two- or three-times-lower rates of complications than others.
The checklist helps lift the bottom end of performance, but I became very interested in coaching after trying to understand how we train in some professions and not in others. I remember going—since I am a tennis player—and paying a former college player a hundred dollars for an hour to go over my serve.
I realized that in the culture of sports, the number one player in the world—Carlos Alcaraz or Jannik Sinner—has coaches at every step along the way. By contrast, most professions do not.
Mounk: A tennis player at the top of the game is not going to say, I’m a consummate professional, I’m at the top of my game, why on earth do I need somebody to give me advice? By contrast, that is an instinct many people in other professions are likely to have.
Gawande: Most professions—surgeons, lawyers, musicians—do not have coaches. They gain their years of practice and experience, their 10,000 hours, and then they are launched into the world with the expectation that they are the masters of their own improvement. They are assumed to be the best judges of how to make that happen. I remember that when I was writing for The New Yorker, I became interested in the subject.
I had an excuse to call people up, so I called Itzhak Perlman, the greatest violinist of his generation, and asked why violinists do not have coaches. He said he did not know, but that he always had one. He married a fellow concert-level violinist from Juilliard, his wife Toby, and she would follow him, observe his performances, and give him feedback: what he was doing well, what he was not doing well, where he sounded a little wooden, and so on.
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That led me to say, you know what, I am going to try this. I was at mid-career. My complication rates had plateaued. I had been steadily improving, and then I had hit a wall. I had done more than a thousand of the operations I performed, and it did not feel as though there was any more room to go.
So I brought in one of my former professors to observe me. He stood and watched, and I thought the operation had gone great. We went back to the surgeon’s lounge, and he had twenty minutes of notes. He said, did you notice the light swung out of the wound, and for thirty minutes you did not have adequate lighting? Did you notice the anesthesiologist was struggling with the blood pressure at one point but never told you what was going on?
We worked together, and he would periodically observe and coach. The difference between teaching and coaching is that a coach has an external view of your reality. They observe you, or they have data about your performance, and they make you confront your external reality, rather than rely on your internal perception. We all have blind spots.
We have now introduced this at Harvard hospitals. Our malpractice insurer offers a ten percent discount to surgeons who take on a coach or train to coach others. Many departments have started training everyone in how to coach, because it represents another cultural shift—a mindset of growth and humility that you bring to your work.
Mounk: There is a collective action problem. You were a very good doctor with significant prominence, and you were writing about this in The New Yorker. For you to say, I am taking on a coach, was not embarrassing. For someone who feels insecure—someone in the middle of the pack, or even a little below it—taking on a coach might feel like a signal that they do not trust themselves or that they believe they are doing something wrong. That becomes a major disincentive to adopting the practice.
If, however, it is normalized—if it becomes part of what consummate professionals in the field do—or even if there is an external incentive, such as getting ten percent off malpractice insurance, it becomes much easier for people to take that step.
Gawande: Really crucial. Many of the chairs of surgery that I’ve spoken to who’ve instituted it report that their quickest to jump in and do it are their best performers. That they are the most interested in hearing and have the most confidence about taking on a coach. Many people react by saying, that’s just for beginners. That’s for the new surgeons. That’s not for me.
But they’re able to win people over by creating it as a norm, except for their bottom performers who often feel the most exposed because they have issues that are exposed by entering their operating room. In many ways, it makes it easier for the surgeons, the chiefs, to deal with the low performers because now you have a pathway into those operating rooms where you don’t really have the line of sight into what’s happening, even though as a surgical chief you’re responsible for the quality of your teams.
Mounk: That’s fascinating. I think it transposes to other fields as well. People at the top of their field often are very good because they have that self-critical mindset and they always want to improve. They also just have the self-confidence to say, sure, I’m happy for somebody to observe me work. If they point out some way that I can improve, all the better. Whereas it’s people who already are insecure, who perhaps are lying to themselves, are telling themselves, I’m great, but they somehow have doubt and they realize perhaps it’s not the case, who really worry about what if somebody observes me and I do something embarrassing or they catch me doing something that exposes the fact that I’m actually not that good. So that makes a lot of sense to me psychologically.
We are at a moment in which medicine is more politicized than it has ever been in our living memory probably. Part of that is the pandemic and the way that played out, part of it is of R.F.K. Jr. being the secretary of health and human services. How do you message the realities of medicine where in the descriptions, including in your audiobooks, there is often ambiguity, often uncertainty about what to do. Better outcomes depend on these systems, but those aren’t fail proof either. Humility is the right thing for the medical field. At the same time, it’s absolutely clear that at scale, medicine delivers incredible outcomes for people, that we have extended the human lifespan in an astonishing way over the course of the 20th century, that the ability to get good medical care is very predictive of a longer life and a better life. Is there a way for us culturally to hold those two truths in our heads at the same time, especially in a moment that’s increasingly polarized?
Gawande: You’ve asked a lot in that question. Let me start by saying doubt and concern about medicine is not new. If anything, people have more confidence in medicine than they did in the 19th century, when you would go to doctors and you would be bled or you would be subject to treatments that often left people worse off rather than better off. Today we are in a space where between public health and what medicine has been able to do, we have essentially doubled the human lifespan. People spend about half their life dealing with a chronic illness now.
After age 40 or 50, most people have one or more chronic illnesses to navigate, and you have specialists to navigate that with. The further difficulty is that the most challenging debates are around the parts of medicine where what we are doing is invisible. It might be a vaccination. It might be a medication. It does not have an immediate effect. Maybe I am helping prevent an infectious disease or address high blood pressure, which is not going to kill you for 20 years, and then persuading people that a sacrifice now for an invisible problem is going to produce a better outcome later.
There are often people who will mount attacks saying that the solutions coming forward are harmful. When they are invisible, it can be difficult to try to get people to come on board. When Joseph Lister came up with a system of antisepsis that cut surgery’s death rate by 80%—washing hands, using antiseptic solutions—surgeons did not believe it, believed he was trying to ruin the profession, and did not adopt for a couple of generations the basics of antiseptic treatment and behavior.
It was because you were asking them to use an antiseptic, which in his case was dilute carbolic acid. It was literally pain now for someone else’s gain later. When you turn to vaccines today, we have eliminated the diseases that killed huge numbers of children. We have cut child mortality by 75%. Since the 1960s, 40% of that gain has come from childhood vaccines. Maintaining that protection when the diseases do not frighten people anymore but you can cast the vaccines as a villain is always going to be a challenge.
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The difference in this moment is that the people who have been given power, people like R.F.K. Jr., but also President Trump himself, have defended and been the conveyors of the conspiracy theories. Where you normally have the leaders of our major medical institutions—the National Institutes of Health, the CDC, responses to pandemics and so on—who normally will be honestly trying to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence as it is, what is known and what is not known, and do it in a systematic way with scientists who have had a track record in the field really trying to weigh it out, that is very different at this moment.
The CDC process, for example, involves doing a full review of the literature around any given topic that they weigh. There is a vote upcoming on whether they will remove hepatitis B vaccination for babies out of concern that there is no proof there is no harm. However, the second part of the process is that any change that is made is weighed against the evidence that it might cause harm. That second part has been removed as part of the CDC process. So now when they are weighing whether they should remove the hepatitis B vaccine, you will only hear questions about whether the evidence is incomplete.
We know we have reduced hepatitis, a killer of children in particular, by enormous amounts since we have instituted childhood vaccines for hepatitis. The constant refrain of “there is no proof of no harm” is not being weighed against the consequence of removing such vaccines. I think the way we navigate science is understanding that no one scientist has a monopoly on knowledge and evidence. Science is a series of approximations. The power that science has given us in the last century for public health and health care delivery has been a doubling of the human lifespan. That has occurred not because any one solution is perfect, but because we are continually evaluating, studying, driving evidence, testing our hypotheses, and approximating our way to better and better answers.
The counter is always these lines of argument that cherry-pick evidence, come up with people who may be scientists but often have not had a track record really doing the work in the field and weighing the evidence carefully, and go in the face of the larger community’s assessment of where the evidence has led us.
Mounk: I am sort of torn on the subject. I think it is absolutely clear that vaccines have saved myriad lives, vaccines in general, like that for measles and the COVID vaccine in particular. At the same time, I can understand people who looked at some of the actions of public health authorities during the pandemic, including some of the statements they made to the public, and concluded, actually, this all seems rather less professional and rather more politicized than I imagined. So I just do not know whether to trust all of you. I think about this in different discussions today as well.
I am a professor at a university. I think that universities in the United States do incredible amounts of good, and I think that they provide a very good education to students. I also think that there are some genuine problems in universities.
It was striking to see recently one of your colleagues, I believe both at Harvard and The New Yorker, Jill Lepore, say that she considered quitting academia and quitting her job at Harvard because she felt constrained by some of the strictures of wokeness at the height of 2020. It seems to me that we need to do a better job of acknowledging where things go wrong and where we have screwed up, and defending the institution.
A lot of the time we are put in this position where it feels like it is either one or the other. There are people who want to point out all of the mistakes and all of the problems with institutions like Harvard or Johns Hopkins, where I teach, in order to dismantle those institutions. There are people who want to defend those institutions, and the way they do that is to deny that there are any real problems. Is there a way of communicating that middle path about public health and about medicine more broadly?
Gawande: I feel in many ways that our earlier discussion about surgery is exactly that. Pretending surgeons are infallible, that we do not have complications, that we do not have serious error rates, and that it does not have damage that does exist is insane. It does not serve us any good, and it does not build trust. We are never going to be 100 percent trusted. That said, every time I am amazed when people see me and they have barely got to know me and will, in the course of a half-hour discussion, trust me to put them to sleep and open up their body and remove an organ or a cancer that they have. That is because we have been able to demonstrate results in general.
We have continually demonstrated improved results over time, even as we acknowledge we have high rates of error, we have areas where we do not have adequate knowledge, and that we are sometimes mistaken in serious ways, that we can be prone to orthodoxy and hold on too tight to some ideas and not tight enough to others.
The answer comes from being a profession that is constantly analyzing the mistakes, constantly striving for perfection, but understanding you never achieve it. In the pandemic, there were teams needing to make, whether at the state level, public health officials, federal officials, and so on, judgment calls that they were going to get wrong in the face of rapidly evolving information. Early on we did not move to masks fast enough. I disagreed with CDC recommendations and wrote an article reviewing the evidence indicating that we should be instituting universal mask requirements in hospitals if that would stop COVID spreading in the hospital. We adopted that and moved quickly, even against CDC and WHO recommendations. It then became the CDC and WHO recommendation to move in that direction.
It was clear we did not get adequate effect from school closures. We caused enormous damage that was not acknowledged or weighed, whether to the mental health of children or their educational outcomes. We are paying a price for that even now that people are justifiably angry about.
That said, a world without the CDC, a world where I came back from working at USAID, where I led global health and saw the dismantling of an institution that saved 90 million lives over the last 20 years, is resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths already from dismantling by accusing it of being a criminal enterprise, a money laundering operation, having never accomplished anything of significance, even as it was playing a pivotal role in controlling HIV and TB and reducing child mortality. That is a recipe for our own self-destruction.
Mounk: Obviously, this is a moment in which public health and science are under attack in the United States. I think for people who are outside of the field, it is hard to evaluate how big and how serious the damage is. If we step back for a moment and look at how much funding has been cut, what the changes have been that have been made over the last 10 months, the question becomes: do you think these are things that are very concerning because they are going in the wrong direction, but there is still world-class research and medicine and other fields going on in the United States today, and that by and large newborns are still continuing to get the same vaccines that they were a year ago?
Or are we already at a place in which there have been such big changes that they have a very measurable impact on people? Let us start by saying within the United States, and then I want to get into the cuts to USAID that I know you have been working on a lot in a moment.
Gawande: We will start in the United States, but I do think it was significant that the pattern was set outside the country in populations that we did not see as Americans here at home, but it had devastating effects. When you extended many of those policies, for example cutting back on and cutting confidence in vaccines, you have seen the dismantling of HIV prevention programs at the CDC. You have stopped all federal research funding to Harvard and a bunch of other universities. We slashed and stopped HIV vaccine research and development funded by the federal government.
I can go down the list, but it has been devastating. It is devastating in a very particular way. As a case in point, our research training budgets have been slashed, and that has meant that we have dramatically reduced the number of PhD students and doctoral students being trained in science, and post-doctoral graduates who are then getting their early experiences in science. I have said before that this has suddenly become the worst time to be a young person who dreams of a career in science. Neuroscientists are driving Ubers, and the result of that is a sacrifice of our seed corn for what has made the United States one of the most important leading countries in advancing human lifespan and capability.
This last century, we have been the country that has invested the most in research and developed the leading population of science and clinical researchers. That capacity is now seriously damaged. That is the first level of harm. The second is that we have suddenly determined that major areas of really important work are verboten. If they are not blocked entirely, they are severely damaged. HIV research work and prevention efforts have been slashed severely. Work on the development of new vaccines, an entire platform of mRNA vaccine development that would be critical to our readiness for any future pandemic, has been abandoned.
You can go down the list. Anything around dealing with racial disparities and trying to understand what we can do to reduce a higher rate of death in black women who are pregnant has been slashed. That is insanity in many respects and deeply harmful to our future. The translation into lives lost immediately is unclear. We are seeing now, for example, in Maine, an outbreak of 30 cases of HIV in a homeless population, and not having the CDC released to allow emergency support during the government shutdown. Those are ways in which this translates into genuine harm, and we are not prepared and do not have the systems in place if we do face major outbreak spreading.
Mounk: Let’s go to the international side of this. You were assistant administrator of USAID. I feel like that is one of those agencies that people knew existed, knew it was doing something, and probably suspected it was doing something important, but probably could not have described very well what it actually does. When you were assistant administrator of the agency, what did it do?
Gawande: USAID is in the name: You aid other countries to develop. It is our country’s investment in a certain model of thinking. It was founded by JFK, taking the lessons of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was where we did this very unusual thing in history of coming out of a war and, instead of plundering the people for their riches, we invested in the countries we had defeated. We brought a Marshall Plan to help them redevelop their economies, whether it was Germany, Japan, Italy, and so on. It paid off spectacularly. We ended up fostering peace and stability. We also grew important trade partners for us in the world. It helped lift our own prosperity.
So John F. Kennedy founded USAID on the principle that we would do the same in other parts of the world. It was the agency that drove the eradication of smallpox around the world and ended a killer that had cost half a billion lives in the previous century. It was the agency that took countries like India, brought them food aid to get through famine and terrible humanitarian crises, but then also invested in building their expertise and agricultural strength so they would become a food exporter and free of aid in the world.
The translation of a largely low-income Latin America into becoming a middle- and high-income Latin America for 80 percent of the countries was because of 20 to 30 years of US leadership and investment in supporting development instead of destroying development. So what USAID did when I came in was that I found a place where it was the best job in medicine that you have never heard of. I had 2,500 people in 65 countries. Our job was to deploy resources to reduce mortality and improve lifespan as optimally as we could.
The budget, out of a fifteen-thousand-dollar American taxpayer payment in taxes per year—so for every American, we pay about fifteen thousand dollars each in taxes on average—twenty-four dollars was what we received as a budget. It amounted to less than half of my hospital’s budget. We deployed it in ways that reached hundreds of millions of people and saved lives by the millions. So that was HIV control, TB, malaria. It was maternal and child health improvement and systems for getting better vaccination, addressing diarrheal illness, addressing deaths in childbirth. It was family planning. It was a variety of things around the biggest killers for human beings, saving lives now and improving systems later. That translated into the 90 million lives saved in the last 20 years.
There is legitimate criticism that USAID could be more efficient, that it focused too much on international nonprofit organizations and not enough on building local organizations, that there was a dark history at times where its aid was used to pursue political and military aims in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
None of what happened was addressing any of those issues. USAID had the highest impact in lives saved of any agency per dollar in the US government. Its dismantling was initially a pause that the president put in place on his first day in office, a pause on foreign assistance. Within weeks, it was apparent that hundreds of thousands of lives would be lost by the end of the year. Instead, they doubled down. There was no curiosity. It was the gleeful swinging of the chainsaw by Elon Musk. They purged the staff, terminated 86 percent of the programs, impounded the funds, and then shut the agency down. The result is 600,000 lives lost so far, estimated as of the beginning of November.
Mounk: 600,000 lives lost is a huge tragedy. It is also such a big number that it seems very abstract. Tell us about some of the direct impacts that had on people and how we can be sure. I am sure that some estimates say 500,000, some estimates say 700,000, but how can we be so sure that there really are a large number of lives that have been lost as a result?
Gawande: Yeah, it can be hard to see. After the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s in China, it was 23 years before people actually got the mortality statistics released in China that showed 50 million people died. We currently are not getting measurement because the aid cutoff has cut off measurement of many of these programs. They fired the inspectors general who would be auditing and showing where the damage was done. The UN mortality estimates will not be available for two years to tell us what happened in 2025.
But there are several ways we know. One way is that researchers are tracking based on what we know has happened when individual countries were cut off from aid. We have seen the pattern of the mortality reductions. So they have made estimates. A Boston University mathematical modeler named Brooke Nichols has made estimates based on those kinds of studies and made very conservative assumptions, for example that only 25 percent of the HIV funds that have been cut will be sustained as cuts through the end of the year, and that 75 percent would be restored. That has not happened. The impounded funds that remained would be released and sent around. The number of 600,000 is based on a conservative estimate.
Ninety million lives saved is a well-documented description, and we know that that translates over 20 years to many millions of lives from these programs. So it is not inconceivable that this could be happening.
The other way that I pursued trying to find out what is really happening was by actually visiting the places where the aid cuts had happened and seeing it for myself. A film crew followed me as I traveled. We made a short film, a 22-minute film that has been released by The New Yorker and is also on YouTube called Rovina’s Choice.
One of the things I particularly wanted to see was primary health centers. I visited an AIDS referral center, and there was a refugee hospital in a refugee settlement along the border of Kenya, surrounded by unstable countries like South Sudan and Somalia. One of the things we had been able to implement at USAID was findings that came out of US research and research abroad showing that you could cut the mortality rate of children with severe acute malnutrition from 20 percent when they arrived in hospital facilities to under 1 percent. Mortality did not need to happen by giving a therapeutic food, an especially formulated peanut-based paste that could rescue the children. You could do it at home, and community health workers, simply having a measuring tape and a scale, could identify children before they got to the worst stages and do interventions cost effectively, train people in these systems, and make sure these basic approaches were deployed. We brought significant parts of the world to get their mortality rates down below 1 percent for severe acute malnutrition.
I wanted to see what was happening to those systems. I did a lot of work in Kenya as part of my work. What I saw was the total breakdown in those systems. The movie is simply following the experience of the people in the clinic where this was happening and the experience of a mother with a child who is sick and starving and trying to navigate a broken system to get the care that that child needs. She is forced to make a terrible choice that no one should have to face. I am not going to give it away. I implore people to go on YouTube or The New Yorker website and see it.
Now it is not hard to envision how there are tens of thousands of people, just from the malnutrition cutoff of training and support systems alone, who are in harm’s way, let alone from the cutoff of vaccines and the cutoff of training and systems in other domains of global health.
Mounk: I have not yet seen the movie, and I look forward to doing so. I am not sure that is the right term. It sounds harrowing but important.
Do you think that if there is a Democratic administration in 2028, they are going to rebuild USAID? If they do, should they rebuild it as it was, or are there changes that they should make? Is there a way to use this horrible suffering that resulted from the dismantling of USAID to build an institution that might transform even more lives positively when and if it is rebuilt?
Gawande: I think there is action that is possible even sooner than that. If the Congress can pass a budget, the House and Senate Republicans have backed higher levels of foreign assistance and global health work in particular than has been provided by the administration. It is an open question whether they can pass a budget. There is a lot of pessimism that they will not be able to, and then it leaves it for Trump to do whatever he wants. I have no great hope that there is going to be a change there.
Even in the midterm, if there is any shift of power, the ability to move budgets forward that would refund not just USAID but CDC and NIH could return. These are popular programs. They are not under attack except by this administration. So that can change even sooner.
Building a development agency and development capacity is a crucial part of what I think any administration will need to do coming in after Trump. Foreign policy rests on a three-legged stool, as people often say, of defense, diplomacy, and development. It is less costly and more effective in winning hearts and minds and building influence, as well as bettering humanity, to include development expertise and capacity. USAID was our largest civilian operational capacity around the world. We have lost a footprint that had more than 10,000 people around the world, with networks that reached hundreds of thousands, likely millions, of people whom we were able to deploy.
One of the things I did, for example, when Ukraine was invaded by Russia again was respond when Russia cut off the supply of medicines to the country and bombed the oxygen factories. With a team of about 40 people, we were able to work with the Ukraine government, without military involvement, and restore a system that could supply medicines from their western border. That system ensured that 250,000 people with HIV and almost a million people with heart disease could get their medications that month. The casualties otherwise would have dwarfed anything that the bombs would have done.
We got oxygen support back to the hospitals and things like that. That capacity is already missed now. It is going to be missed and needs to be rebuilt. It will not come back quickly. You cannot dismantle that entire network and build it back in the space of months. This will take years, but we will absolutely be rebuilding it. It is in our interest as a country, and it is too stupid not to address the issue.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Atul reflect on our relationship with mortality, both as individuals and as a society. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Donald J. Trump has returned to the presidency with a simple, radical ambition: to turn the American state into a family business. And business is booming: since Trump took office, he and his family have made an estimated $3.4 billion. Meanwhile, the scale of transformation of the American body politic has been jaw-dropping. Loyalty now counts for more than competence in government service, public office is openly monetized, and personal favor has replaced impersonal rule as the basis of authority.
More than a century ago, Max Weber identified this form of government and gave it a name—patrimonialism. In patrimonial systems, the state is not an institution standing above its ruler, but instead the ruler’s personal property. What once seemed incompatible with American constitutionalism is now taking shape in plain sight.
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Vital government agencies have been shuttered or hollowed out; universities are being browbeaten into ideological conformity; and executive power is exercised not as a bounded branch of government, but instead as a personal prerogative. Trump and his inner circle have pursued self-enrichment on a staggering scale, blurring any remaining distinction between public authority and private interest through ties to foreign autocrats, compliant corporate leaders, and speculative financial schemes. Trump’s revived appetite for imperial assertion abroad—threatening NATO allies, flirting with territorial revisionism, and meting out extraterritorial justice—only deepens this transformation. Patrimonial rule can also degenerate into overt coercion and episodic brutality at home. In Minnesota, Trump has provided immunity for federal officers caught killing U.S. citizens. While enforcing Trump’s policies, ICE agents know they are shielded from independent oversight of their actions.
The question, then, is no longer whether Trumpism represents regime change. It does. The real question is whether anything can still be done to reverse the tide.
The answer is a qualified yes—but only if Americans learn to read patrimonial politics accurately. Too often, the ordinary workings of patrimonialism are mistaken for signs of imminent collapse, while the Trump regime’s real points of fragility go unnoticed. Distinguishing between these is essential for effective resistance.
Will Trumpism be undone by the leader’s creeping cognitive decline? Trump’s outlandish statements and actions are often treated as evidence of incipient dementia or loss of control. In fact, they are central instruments of patrimonial rule. Conduct that seems “outrageous” and “unpresidential” demonstrates powerfully that the ruler is above the constraints that apply to ordinary people. Public threats against political enemies, casual talk of seizing allied territory, renaming national institutions after himself—such as affixing his name to the Kennedy Center—along with demands for personal loyalty oaths, public humiliation of subordinates, and the routine conflation of the presidency with his private brand, all serve a common purpose. They dramatize personal dominance and signal that no realm of public life lies beyond the ruler’s reach.
The recent revelations surrounding Jeffrey Epstein function in much the same way. Rather than triggering elite defection or popular disillusionment, Trump’s repeated proximity to the affair—and his evident insulation from legal or political consequences—reinforces the central lesson of patrimonial rule: the ruler has immunity. What would be a career-ending scandal in an impersonal legal order instead becomes another demonstration of selective impunity.
Even seemingly trivial projects, like Trump’s obsession with constructing a grand White House ballroom bearing his personal imprint, or the installation of self-congratulatory plaques under presidential portraits that pointedly demean his two immediate predecessors, fit squarely within this logic. Such gestures are not about utility or historical commemoration but about symbolic possession—marking the seat of government as an arena of personal triumph and grievance. In patrimonial systems, architecture and inscription alike become claims: the state is not merely governed by the ruler; it is reshaped in his image and memory.
Factional infighting also poses little threat to Trump. Patrimonial rulers benefit from rivalry among subordinates, so long as it does not turn into opposition to the ruler himself. In Trump’s orbit, public disputes rarely translate into open challenges to his authority. Those unwilling to accept subordinate status typically exit rather than rebel; those who remain compete to demonstrate their unflinching loyalty. The recent marginalization and eventual resignation from Congress of Marjorie Taylor Greene illustrates this dynamic: even highly visible allies who fall out of favor are more likely to depart the royal court than to organize opposition within it. In short, there is no “MAGA civil war”—only court politics in its classic form.
Another common misunderstanding is that the judiciary will eventually step in to save us when Trump’s violations of constitutionalism get too brazen or his “conflicts of interest” go too far. This sadly romantic notion of the power of the third branch of government ignores the lessons of history. Whether in Putin’s Russia, Orbán’s Hungary, or Netanyahu’s Israel, courts do not simply disappear under patrimonialism. They continue to function, applying the law in routine cases. What changes is the boundary of judicial autonomy. When the ruler’s core interests are threatened, informal pressure and selective enforcement quietly override formal legality. Legal institutions survive, but their independence becomes conditional. It’s not surprising that appellate judges appointed by Trump have sided with him in 92% of the cases involving his administration.
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Finally, imperial overreach abroad is unlikely to bring Trumpism crashing down. The more libertarian elements of Trump’s coalition may worry about his military interventions in Venezuela, Syria, and Iran, combined with his threats to do the same in Colombia, Mexico, Canada, and Greenland. But for Trump’s loyalists and core supporters, these “muscular” assertions of U.S. power are thrilling. In fact, foreign military interventions often strengthen personalist regimes by mobilizing nationalist sentiment and normalizing emergency rule. Even costly or inconclusive ventures rarely undermine leaders who control the narrative. One has only to look at Putin’s Russia, now approaching its fourth year in a botched, incompetent, and unrelentingly brutal invasion of Ukraine, to see that military failure by itself is not necessarily fatal to patrimonial rulers. Imperialism with fuzzy borders is not an aberration of contemporary politics; it is increasingly its organizing principle.
Patrimonial regimes are not invulnerable. But their weaknesses are structural, gradual, and often unspectacular. These can be exploited.
Time limits matter. Research on personalist systems shows that instability begins when elites perceive an approaching endpoint to the current regime. Trump’s outrageous rhetoric and rambling speeches may not threaten his power, but his advancing age combined with the Constitution’s two-term limit do introduce a potentially corrosive uncertainty about the staying power of Trumpism. Political succession is the Achilles’ heel of patrimonial rule, and the mere anticipation of a post-Trump future encourages hedging, quiet disloyalty, and a search for alternatives long before any transition formally begins.
This is why Trump’s frequent discussion of a possible third term, including the promotion of “Trump 2028” merchandise and encouraging hangers-on to explore the legal options for circumventing the 22nd Amendment, is not mere bluster or distraction. It is an implicit acknowledgment of this vulnerability and an attempt to neutralize it. By signaling that even formal term limits may be negotiable, Trump is trying to freeze elite calculations, suppress succession planning, and extend the time horizon of personal rule. In patrimonial systems, uncertainty about the ruler’s exit destabilizes loyalty; promises of indefinite tenure are meant to restore it. This is precisely why proposals for an extended presidency should be vocally opposed and ridiculed, not indulged as speculative theater.
Declining popularity also matters. MAGA may remain disciplined, but the rest of us are deeply unhappy. Elections, protests, and open dissent function as signals to the uncommitted, communicating that power is contested and that not only disobedience but also loyalty to the regime carries risk. Civic courage is not just symbolic—it is strategic. Every refusal to normalize Trumpism weakens its aura of inevitability; every accommodation strengthens it. This is why sustained efforts to chip away at Trump’s popularity and to increase the margins of electoral defeat for MAGA-backed candidates are not ancillary but central to democratic resistance.
Another real vulnerability of patrimonial regimes like Trump’s is that they are lousy at providing public goods. Systems that purge expertise and reward loyalty over competence eventually fail at basic governance. These failures may arrive suddenly and catastrophically—as in botched disaster response, financial panic, or an unchecked global pandemic—or accumulate more quietly through slow decay, chronic underperformance, and the normalization of dysfunction. The cumulative effect is the same: public institutions cease to be experienced as sources of protection and predictability. As institutions hollow out, citizens encounter the regime less as a source of order than as a source of danger.
Finally, while Trump’s foreign policy adventurism is unlikely to threaten him domestically, it will certainly face growing opposition abroad. For decades, Europeans, Canadians, and other partners “bandwagoned” with U.S. power not merely out of fear or dependence, but rather because American leadership was embedded in a shared international order that delivered mutual benefits. Trump’s increasingly transactional, coercive, and revisionist posture is quickly unraveling that bargain. As trust erodes, allies will stop accommodating U.S. demands and instead begin quietly balancing against American power through independent defense initiatives, alternative trade arrangements, and diplomatic hedging.
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Already, key allies have distanced themselves, or even openly criticized, Trump’s intervention to seize Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Venezuela. Any use of U.S. military might to pry Greenland away from Denmark, our allies warn, will mean the end of the NATO alliance. The resulting disruption in global security arrangements may prompt U.S. adversaries to try to carry out long-held military plans of their own. MAGA acolytes may hanker for a return to 19th century “spheres of influence,” but plenty of national security hawks in Congress, executives of military industries accustomed to selling weaponry to NATO countries, and even members of the U.S. military itself, have reasons to fear it.
Max Weber warned that patrimonialism is inherently hostile to modern statehood. It personalizes authority, corrodes institutions, and undermines the very capacity to govern. Trumpism’s greatest strength—its concentration of power in one man—is also its deepest weakness. Whether the American constitutional republic survives will depend not on waiting for scandal or spectacle to do the work for us, but on resisting patrimonial rule before the state itself is reduced to the personal property of Trump and his cronies.
Stephen E. Hanson is Lettie Pate Evans Professor of Government at William & Mary.
Jeffrey S. Kopstein is Dean’s Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine.
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