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Persuasion

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Persuasion episodes

  • The Good Fight Club: Why Japan’s “Weirdo” Victory Matters, the Rise of Chinese Soft Power, and the End of Asian Stability

    In this week’s episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk, Bethany Allen, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Chang Che examine the stunning electoral victory of Japan’s new prime minister Sanae Takaichi, China’s coercion tactics and how they’re backfiring across Asia, and what the rise of “authentic outsiders” tells us about the current moment in global democrac…

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  • Gavin Newsom, You’re No Bill Clinton
    Gavin Newsom at the Munich Security Conference, February 13, 2026. (Photo by Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance.)

    Gavin Newsom has had quite a year. While other Democratic politicians have struggled to adapt their pitches to the chaos of the second Trump term, Newsom has responded with a blizzard of activity that has dramatically raised his national profile. He has also benefited from copious, if not fawning, media coverage including a splashy recent profile in Vogue Magazine. At first mired in single digits with a scrum of other potential candidates, all trailing Kamala Harris by wide margins, he is now within striking distance of her in three commonly-cited poll averages of primary voter support for the 2028 Democratic presidential nomination.

    His rising strength is reflected in the betting markets. On Predictit, he is far and away the betting favorite for the Democratic nomination, way ahead of AOC (second) and Harris (third). And in the market on the 2028 general election, he is way ahead of other Democrats and very close to the leading Republican candidate, JD Vance.

    What accounts for this remarkable pro-Newsom surge? How did this liberal California Democrat win over so many in the wake of Democrats’ comprehensive defeat running… a liberal California Democrat?

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    The answer lies in Newsom’s ability to be everything to, well not everybody, but to every Democrat. Think of Gavin Newsom not as an ordinary politician but as a message delivery system—and a very effective one. Of course, all politicians to varying degrees are that. But Newsom stands out as letting absolutely nothing stand in the way—principles, beliefs, prior positions—of delivering the message he deems most politically effective at any given time to any given audience.

    That has enabled him to appeal to diverse Democratic audiences. Think of Resistance liberals, whose white-hot anger at Trump is sure to galvanize a large share of Democratic primary voters. Right after Trump was elected, Newsom declared a special session of the California legislature. His office said:

    The special session responds to the public statements and proposals put forward by President-elect Trump and his advisors, and actions taken during his first term in office—an agenda that could erode essential freedoms and individual rights, including women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights … A special session allows for expedited action that will best protect California and its values from attacks.

    A steady stream of denunciations of Trump administration actions from Newsom and the governor’s office has followed, especially during last June’s protests against ICE actions in Los Angeles which resulted in the deployment of the National Guard to quell riots. Newsom did not hold back his rhetoric or legal actions against this development. He said:

    Democracy is under assault right before our eyes—the moment we’ve feared has arrived.

    He’s taking a wrecking ball to our Founding Fathers’ historic project.

    And so on. Indeed, Newsom has not missed a chance to aggressively oppose everything the Trump administration has done, whether it directly involves California or not. He has traveled to Brazil to oppose Trump’s climate policies at COP30 and, most recently, showed up at the World Economic Forum in Davos to denounce the administration. And, in reply to Republican attempts to gerrymander congressional seats in Texas and elsewhere, he has happily torn up nonpartisan districting in California to heavily gerrymander the state for the Democrats.

    In essence, he has appointed himself Chairman of the anti-Trump Resistance and has the receipts to back it up. In Resistance liberal land, they love this just as Newsom intends.

    But for those who are concerned that the party must moderate some, not just resist Trump, Newsom also has something to offer. He started a podcast, This is Gavin Newsom, where his guests have included the late Charlie Kirk, Steve Bannon, Ben Shapiro, and other conservative luminaries. This has provided him with the opportunity to venture some cautious signals that he is more moderate than the average Democrat. In his podcast with Kirk he agreed that the presence of trans-identified biological boys in girls’ sports seemed “unfair” to him. And in his recent podcast with Shapiro, he allowed as how calling ICE activities “state-sponsored terrorism” was not justified and that it was probably not a good idea to call for abolishing ICE. Related, in a conversation with Ezra Klein, he admitted that “we [the Democrats] failed on the border, we have to own that.” He has also, in his actions as California governor, responded to moderates’ concerns about homeless encampments by supporting moves to dismantle them and to concerns about crime with tougher rhetoric and additional tools to prosecute felonies and drug dealers.

    On the other hand, he has not been shy about reassuring progressives and “woke” Democrats that he is still one of them. For example, after his podcast statement on trans-identifying boys in girls’ sports, he almost immediately walked back any implication that he would support a policy to change that situation in California or any other place. In his interview with Klein, he was quick to point out and defend the provision of health insurance to illegal immigrants as part of his overall commitment to universal health care. He refused to support a crime ballot measure, the prosecutor-backed Proposition 36, which reversed many provisions of the earlier Proposition 47 by classifying more crimes as felonies and increasing penalties (it passed overwhelmingly anyway). And of course, there’s his overall record as governor of California where he has supported one progressive priority after another from expanding Medicaid to undocumented immigrants to restricting police’s ability to enforce prostitution laws.

    For economic populists, besides the usual railing against economic inequality, Newsom has been staunch in his support of higher minimum wages and more generous social welfare programs. He also succeeded in getting the earned income tax credit doubled. He is tight with California labor unions, including the umbrella California Federation of Labor Unions, the Service Employees International Union, and the California Teachers Association, all of whom enthusiastically support Newsom.

    Even the emerging “abundance” faction of the Democrats gets the love from Newsom. He has supported key YIMBY initiatives, especially SB 79, which has eliminated long-standing regulatory obstacles to rapid development of dense housing near transit stations. More generally, he has ostentatiously declared himself to be in favor of an “abundance agenda” and has said that the seminal text of the abundance movement, Ezra Klein’s and Derek Thompson’s Abundance, “is one of the most important books Democrats can read.”

    But in parallel with all these other commitments, Newsom is—and always has been—close to Big Tech. He has opposed, as his friends in that world demanded, the proposed wealth tax on California billionaires and has generally favored a light touch on regulating the industry, most recently on AI.

    Finally for realpolitik Democrats, who don’t align with—or even care about—any of these factions but just want to beat Trump by any means necessary, Newsom also wants to be their guy. He is more than willing to fight dirty; no tactic can be ruled out if it is potentially effective. His social media team out of the governor’s office is now notorious for aping Trump’s unhinged, all-caps style and dishing out scatological insults. To paraphrase Michelle Obama, “when they go low, we go lower.” That warms the heart of super-partisan Democrats and consultants who just want to win.

    Gavin Newsom: friend of the Resistance, friend of moderates, friend of progressives, friend of populists, friend of labor, friend of abundance-istas, special chum of Big Tech, and hard man for the Democratic Party. He’s got it all, twinned with a preternatural ability to deliver a perfectly calibrated message to each of these audiences when called upon to do so.

    The Gavin Newsom message delivery system brings to mind another famed Democratic message delivery system, Bill Clinton, who was similarly adept at reaching a wide range of audiences and similarly willing to bend his principles to do so. Indeed, Newsom, in a fascinating profile of him written by Helen Lewis for The Atlantic, professes his admiration for Clinton and is clearly seeking to model much of his political strategy on The Man from Hope.

    So is Newsom the next Bill Clinton? I don’t think so. Despite the similarities there is one huge and hugely important difference: Clinton’s message delivery magic was in the service ultimately of reaching a general election audience, not just a Democratic audience. But the latter is what Newsom is optimized for—he’s never had to run in competitive elections and beat Republicans. Indeed, he has actually underperformed relative to the Democratic lean of his own state, according to the rigorous “Deciding to Win” report. Not only that, his 10-point underperformance relative to expectations in his most recent election is the worst of 21 potential candidates tested by the report.

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    But he does know how to appeal to Democratic audiences—which is increasingly what more and more Democrats seem optimized for. This is great for individual candidates in blue states, cities, and districts but terrible for the Democratic Party as a whole. It encourages the party—and candidates like Newsom—to think their basic positions don’t have to change much and that their past record, commitments, and statements don’t matter.

    This is wrong and egregiously so, as the “Deciding to Win” report definitively shows (and common sense would suggest). Your record and past positions matter a lot once you have to speak to a general electorate that doesn’t share the baseline assumptions of partisan Democrats. Just ask Kamala Harris.

    Will Republicans want to dredge anything up from the pandemic response? How about $11.4 billion disbursed to illegal claimants, per a Los Angeles Times report, with another $19 billion claims under investigation for fraud? Maybe they’d like to choose housing as a line of attack? Under Newsom, California has spent $24 billion on homeless housing under a landmark initiative, with some housing units costing over $1 million, and all for homelessness to increase by about 30,000 during that time. Or perhaps the soup du jour will be the “rail fail”—the strange compromise in California where Newsom postponed a massive high-speed rail project while leaving a Central Valley spur that Newsom has admitted is a “train to nowhere.” Or perhaps the focus can be on his early support for marijuana decriminalization—an issue that is starting to result in a backlash. And, failing all that, how exactly are heartland voters going to respond to Newsom’s concerted attempt to phase out gas-powered cars, with the result that California has the highest gas prices in the country?

    Never mind that Newsom, in his current abundance-embracing persona, has been a thoughtful analyst of why massive state spending programs so often tend to fail. That sort of nuance will tend to be lost on general election voters. A great deal of California’s very visible dysfunction occurred on his watch—or, more broadly, during the period when progressive policies he favored were ascendant—with the state widely associated with out-of-control homelessness and a breakdown in crime enforcement in major metropolitan areas as well as with famously high taxes that have not yielded commensurate gains in quality of life. By openly discussing—in the friendly confines of his podcast—some of the problems of exactly the progressive policies that he is mostly closely associated with, Newsom makes the lane of attack against himself only that much more obvious.

    When he ran, Bill Clinton could avoid many of these sorts of issues because he had been governor of a conservative state and had inevitably tacked closer to the national median. Newsom, in 2028, won’t have that luxury. He’ll find himself in a pretzel trying to distance himself from policies that he either vigorously promoted or that occurred under his watch—exactly the same problem that we saw play out with Kamala Harris in 2024.

    Could the Democrats be about to make the same mistake with Gavin Newsom? Absolutely, because he knows just how to talk to them. That’s too bad because what they really need is a Bill Clinton and Gavin Newsom, well, he’s no Bill Clinton.

    Ruy Teixeira is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and co-founder and politics editor of the Substack newsletter, The Liberal Patriot.

    A version of this article was originally published in The Liberal Patriot.

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  • This Week At Persuasion
    Men perform molten iron fireworks in a park in Beijing on February 15, 2026 ahead of the Lunar New Year of the Horse. (Photo by Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images.)
    • We’re delighted to announce the launch of Ask the Author—regular Zoom hangouts with our authors, during which they will discuss their writing and answer your questions! The first will take plac…

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  • Orbán is Trump’s Immigration Idol
    Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump on January 22, 2026. (Photo by Fabrice Coffrini / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Röszke, Hungary. Covered in deep snow, the remote stretch of land along Hungary’s border with Serbia takes on a truly desolate aspect. Yet even in this monochrome expanse the dividing line between Hungarian territory and the rest of the world stands out starkly: it’s a 14-foot-tall chain link fence topped with coils of razor wire and stretching for miles into the distance. Signs warn—in Hungarian, English, and Arabic—that anyone attempting to breach it is in for an electric shock.

    Many still try. During my visit in early January, the border guards showed me and a group of other journalists surveillance video of migrants trying to cut through the fence in the predawn darkness. Some did penetrate it but were quickly rounded up, Levente Baukó, a police colonel, told us. It was evidence, he said, that Hungary’s efforts to fight international migration are working.

    Hungary’s traditional national motto is, “With God for Homeland and Freedom.” But under Viktor Orbán, who has served as prime minister for the last 16 years, its unofficial credo is “Keep Out.” No other government in the West has taken a harder line against immigration, and none seems prouder of having done so.

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    The fence at Röszke symbolizes the transformation of Hungary from instigator of the liberal revolutions that swept Europe in 1989 to champion of illiberal counterrevolution in 2026. One of the catalyzing events in communism’s fall was Hungary’s decision in 1989 to let East Germans pass through en route to the West. A reform communist government in Budapest tore down the barbed wire along its border with democratic Austria. At the time, Hungary’s attitude seemed to portend that liberal democracy, open borders, and political integration were the continent’s natural destiny.

    A generation later, in 2015, a mass migration of non-Europeans destabilized the continent, fueling political fragmentation, social distrust, and the rise of right-wing populist parties. Hungary’s role in the event was once again catalytic—but this time in the opposite direction. As hundreds of thousands poured across the Serbia-Hungary border, clashing with Hungarian security personnel and camping out en masse in Budapest’s main train station, Orbán dispatched security forces and erected new border barriers. An erstwhile liberal dissident in 1989, he recast his government as “Christian and national,” and himself as a “patriotic” dissident against the European Union’s asylum doctrines.

    Orbán, in fact, had already announced his embrace of “illiberal democracy” in a speech to ethnic Hungarians in Romania almost exactly a year earlier. The hallmarks of this new order were co-optation of universities, courts, and major media; one-party dominance by Orbán’s own Fidesz party; and greater government involvement in key economic sectors, which has bred corruption and cronyism. Much of this, especially the corruption, is unpopular, which is why Orbán—in elections taking place this April—finds himself facing the strongest political challenge since he regained power in 2010.

    But the crackdown on immigration is decidedly not among the things Hungarians hold against Orbán. One reason that the party of opposition leader Péter Magyar is currently leading Orbán in the polls is that it does not challenge the government’s hard line on migration.

    In fact, Magyar has promised to eliminate one of the last major immigration pathways for non-EU citizens: some 35,000 two-year guest worker visas Hungary issues annually to Armenians, Georgians and Filipinos. (Two men who cleaned the rooms in my Budapest hotel were from Bangladesh, serving out contracts signed before a recent law excluded their nation.)

    As for asylum, it’s been eliminated, except for occasional applications that must be filed at Hungary’s embassies abroad. Two recent grants went to former members of a Polish government that was sympathetic to Orbán. They were wanted for corruption in that sister EU country.

    Hungary is the closest thing modern Europe has to an ethnostate, and the origins of its self-conception lie deep within its idiosyncratic history. Orbán might be exploiting this—but he did not manufacture it.

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    The Magyars arrived in the Carpathian Basin from Asia a millennium ago—a small, nomadic people that to this day still speaks a language unrelated to almost any other in the world. Hundreds of years ago, they fought the Tatars and Ottomans in battles that ultimately left them defeated and occupied but proud of having resisted: “We think of ourselves as guardians of Christendom and the West. It is a crucial element in our identity,” says Balázs Hidvéghi, a senior aide to the prime minister.

    Later would come other national traumas: territorial dismemberment after World War I; a disastrous dalliance with Nazi Germany in World War II; Soviet domination; and the crushing of Hungary’s 1956 revolt by Russian troops.

    In all the world, there are just 14.5 million ethnic Hungarians; 9.6 million in Hungary proper and most of the rest in neighboring Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Croatia. The country’s population is shrinking, despite Orbán’s efforts to jump-start the birth rate with subsidies for child-bearing.

    To a people with this history, and this demography, mass migration from culturally different countries is not readily understood as an opportunity—and very readily comprehended as a threat. In terms of maximizing the growth potential of an already under-performing economy, Hungary’s migration policy makes little sense. But in terms of maximizing a small country’s social stability and cultural continuity, Orbán’s current policy, and Magyar’s promise to toughen it, do make sense—at least to Hungarian voters.

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    The EU disapproves (it’s trying to fine Hungary a million euros a day for refusing to cooperate with Europe’s asylum policy). Yet Hungarians respond that Budapest is safer and more orderly than London or Rotterdam. It is fair to argue, as they do, that European governments have actually moved toward more restrictive policies because of problems integrating the millions who have come over the last decade.

    Small, demographically fragile, historically traumatized, and built around a thick conception of national identity that predates and, in some ways, rejects, modern liberalism, Hungary built its fence at Röszke not in defiance of its deepest traditions, but as an expression of them.

    Full disclosure: my visit to the country was organized by the Hungarian embassy in London and funded by pro-government foundations. The other journalists involved were generally from British media and no doubt the sponsors’ goal was to foster a sympathetic portrayal of Orbán’s government. I generally avoid such press junkets, but I decided this one was worth doing because of the opportunity to see the border installations and discuss immigration policy with top officials.

    I also wanted to go because of the fact that Orbánism (or something very like it) is being copied in America right now. President Trump openly and extravagantly admires Orbán, in no small part due to his migration policy; the fence on Hungary’s southern border serves as a model for the even less penetrable “big, beautiful wall” Trump seeks for America’s. Orbán’s spirit is akin to the spirit that animated the ICE crackdown on illegal immigrants in Minneapolis and elsewhere.

    But to see what Hungary is doing first-hand is to appreciate that, to the extent Orbán’s hardline approach to immigration works, politically and administratively, it does so because of factors that are absent in the American context.

    The United States is a nation of immigrants whose founding ideologue, Thomas Paine, envisioned it as “an asylum for all mankind.” Some 77 percent of the American public favors maintaining legal immigration at current levels or increasing it, according to a new poll for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Pragmatic economic arguments, such as bolstering the labor force, get much more traction in a multi-ethnic continental country such as ours than they do in Hungary.

    To be sure, illegal migration is deservedly controversial, and the chaotic mass border crossing President Biden allowed is especially unpopular. Democratic-led sanctuary cities effectively shield many illegal immigrants who have committed offenses and should be deported, which is hard to defend as policy and a likely loser in national politics. Yet the Trump administration’s sometimes violent crackdown on more benign illegal immigrants—day laborers and the like—is creating a chaotic spectacle of its own, and has cost the lives of two U.S. citizens in Minneapolis. It is causing a backlash almost as intense as the one Biden’s permissive policy triggered.

    There might not ever be consensus on more sustainable immigration policy in this country. But if there is, it would not, and could not, resemble Hungary’s. Politicians and intellectuals promoting “Heritage America”—the reconceptualization of U.S. identity as a function of the English language and Christian religion—are not only misguided substantively but doomed to fail politically.

    Unlike Hungary, the United States, as historian Gordon S. Wood eloquently explained in the American Enterprise Institute’s 2025 Irving Kristol Award lecture, is a “credo nation.” The essential condition of citizenship is subscribing to the political ideals embodied in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Europe’s experience is indeed a warning of the destabilization that uncontrolled and unvetted mass migration can bring. The Orbán government has a point about that. But a rational American answer would be legislation that steers between open borders on the one hand and zero tolerance of immigration, legal or illegal, on the other.

    History matters in Hungary; it matters here, too. And a clear lesson of U.S. history is that, despite repeated bouts of nativism and restrictionism—some worse even than the present one—this country has found ways to maximize the benefits of immigration and minimize the costs. The United States is not now, nor has it ever been, an ethnostate. It never will be.

    Charles Lane is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for The Free Press.

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  • Why American Governments Can’t Get Things Done

    We’re delighted to announce the launch of Ask the Author—regular Zoom hangouts with our authors, during which they will discuss their writing and answer your questions! The first will take place on Monday with Francis Fukuyama discussing this article. Click here to find out more and sign up!

    The American state. (Picture via Getty Images.)

    We’ve done some rearranging here at Persuasion. From now on, you will all receive Francis Fukuyama’s articles directly into your inbox, by default. Exciting! But if for some reason you would prefer not to receive these emails, simply opt out by clicking here and sliding off the toggle labeled “Francis Fukuyama.” This will not affect the other Persuasion content you receive.

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    This post is part of the ongoing series “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents,” published by American Purpose and Persuasion. The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it. We hope you enjoy!

    My topic today is the crisis in American state capacity. By “state capacity” I mean the ability of the American government to accomplish the tasks set for it by the American people. In my last article, I talked about declining capacity at NASA, as illustrated by their inability to return human beings to the Moon over the course of 20 years. This crisis in capacity exists in many other realms, for example in the government’s difficulty building public infrastructure or, in many American cities, adequate affordable housing.

    Before I begin talking about the crisis in state capacity, however, I need to put the problem in a broader historical context. My first observation has to do with the cultural attitude of Americans towards their own government. Seymour Martin Lipset, my former colleague and mentor, argued over the course of his career that one of the deepest characteristics of American political culture is distrust of government, which makes the United States different from virtually every other advanced democracy in Europe and Asia. In other liberal democracies, people have a more favorable view of their government, which they typically see as protecting them from external and internal threats and providing valuable public services. In the United States, by contrast, people on both the left and the right tend to see government as a threat to their liberties.

    On the right, there has been a longstanding narrative that “unelected bureaucrats” are running wild, implementing a left-wing agenda outside the control of elected representatives. It is this view that underlies the Trump administration’s attack on what it calls the “deep state,” using language that comes from authoritarian countries like Turkey and Egypt that have in fact been run from behind the scenes by their security establishments. It was this “deep state” narrative that gave rise to Elon Musk’s (now defunct) Department of Government Efficiency, which in the early days of the second Trump administration led to the arbitrary firing of thousands of civil servants and the closing of entire agencies. Musk in particular seems to believe that federal bureaucrats don’t do anything of value, and therefore should be randomly fired in the interests of saving money.

    There is, however, a similar anti-government narrative on the left. The 1960s saw the rise of “public interest” law and figures like Ralph Nader, who argued that the government had been captured by corporate interests and needed to be brought to heel. Idealistic young people wanting to advance social justice goals no longer went into government service, as they did during the Progressive Era and New Deal era between the 1890s and 1940s, but rather into public interest law firms that litigated against the government to stop it from doing what they considered to be harmful things. The rise of the environmental movement, in particular, fueled an anti-establishment mentality and new constraints on state power.

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    Thus, by the time of Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, there was a meeting of minds on both the right and left that government power was not a force for good, and that it needed to be constrained, de-funded, or abolished altogether. Public service lost its luster, and ambitious young people either went into the private sector or to nonprofits and public interest law.

    This, I think, is the background for the current crisis of American state capacity. The way that the American government has evolved since the 1960s has involved the piling on of successive layers of constraints on state power. Many groups in American society, from corporations to labor unions to homeowners to nonprofit organizations, were given veto power to stop initiatives they didn’t like, leading to a situation I have elsewhere labeled “vetocracy”—rule by veto.

    The actual problem with government is in fact the opposite of the conservative narrative of an out-of-control bureaucracy riding roughshod over American democracy. While there are specific cases of this happening, the broader picture is of a government—at municipal, state, and federal levels—that is over-constrained by layers of rules and procedures that make decision-making and policy implementation extremely difficult.

    Let me give you some examples of this. Government procurement of anything from office furniture to F-35 fighter jets falls under something called the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), which comprise hundreds of pages of detailed rules with which federal procurement officers must comply. Some of these rules were put there in the wake of long-ago corruption scandals; others were aimed at social justice goals like increasing the number of minority-owned, women-owned, and small businesses. Meanwhile, those who unsuccessfully bid for government contracts have rights to appeal decisions, throwing many simple purchasing decisions to the courts. FAR is one of the reasons why government procurement of everything from hammers to toilet seats is slower and far more costly than in the private sector.

    Another example is “notice-and-comment.” The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, which was intended precisely to limit the ability of bureaucrats to make up new rules on their own, mandates that any proposed rule change by a federal agency must be published in the Federal Register. The rule is subject to a 90-day period during which ordinary citizens can make comments, and the agency must show that it has taken these comments into account. Notice-and-comment was one of the first formal mechanisms mandated by Congress to ensure broad public participation in government decision-making.

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    The problem is that notice-and-comment has expanded way beyond the intentions of its framers. A major rule change can engender hundreds of thousands of comments, and the agency proposing it can be sued if citizens think their comments did not receive an adequate response. While this limits the government’s discretionary authority, it also greatly slows down the entire rule-making process.

    A final example of procedural complexity in American government has to do with something called “private right of action.” In contrast to most other modern democracies, the United States does not enforce many of its own rules. This is often left up to “private attorneys general,” that is, private citizens who have standing to sue other parties or the government itself for violating the law. This makes sense in an area like employment, where violations of labor laws are hard to detect except by those victimized by them. But private right of action is also used extensively in environmental law at both federal and state levels. In this domain, legal discovery—the process by which the parties in a legal dispute obtain information and evidence—is far less important, since there are many other mechanisms, like environmental impact assessments, that can be used to uncover environmental abuses. Private right of action throws law enforcement into a costly and time-consuming common law process, where the goalposts for what constitutes violations of law are constantly moving.

    Thus, at least one cause of declining state capacity in the United States has to do with the increasing levels of procedural complexity imposed on government action. This complexity seems to be an inevitable feature of modern liberalism. Conservatives, of course, want to put obstacles in the way of state action. But as the legal scholar Nicholas Bagley pointed out in a seminal 2019 article in Michigan Law Review, many progressives who want the government to do more in pursuit of social justice also believe that legitimacy comes from procedural correctness. Over time, they have encumbered the state with complex rules that end up preventing the state from taking the actions they desire. With regard to the environment, for example, progressives want to abate carbon emissions, but have added procedural barriers to the building of infrastructure like alternative energy and transmission lines that would help solve the problem.

    Enjoying this article? Check out the Frankly Fukuyama podcast for interviews from leading political thinkers on the issues of the day!

    The private sector has complained for many years of over-regulation by the government. But the government itself faces decades of accumulated regulations that limit its ability to act effectively. There are many powerful interest groups who want to limit regulation of the private sector, but relatively few voices advocating de-regulation of the government itself. Indeed, many on the right and left believe that the government has too much discretionary power and needs to be further constrained.

    Restoration of state capacity will thus depend on a culling of the veto points that have been delegated over the years to different stakeholders in and out of government, and delegation of actual authority to the appropriate parts of the government to carry out the people’s wishes. We need new mechanisms to hold that form of delegated power accountable to the people. It has been done before in American history—remember the Apollo program?—and can in theory be done again.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Due to an editorial error, this piece originally cited the wrong article by Nicholas Bagley. We regret the error.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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  • The Fallacy Fallacy
    Detail from The Triumph of Truth, Luigi Massini, 1880. (Photo by Molteni&Motta/Universal Images Group.)

    Have you ever wondered why people believe the moon landing was faked, vaccines secretly poison us, and Mercury in retrograde can ruin your love life? Why does irrationality seem so pervasive? A popular answer, beloved by academics and educators alike, points to fallacies—certain types of arguments that are deeply flawed yet oddly seductive. Because people keep falling for these reasoning traps, they end up believing all sorts of crazy stuff. Still, the theory offers hope: if you memorize the classic fallacies—ad hominem, post hoc, straw man—you will inoculate yourself against them.

    It’s a neat little story, and I used to believe it too. Not anymore. I’ve become a fallacy apostate.

    Growing doubts

    My doubts began when I was still in academia, teaching critical thinking to philosophy students and science majors alike. Fallacies are a favorite chapter in such courses. In some ways, they are ideal teaching material: they come in tidy lists and seem easy to apply. Many trace back to Aristotle and still parade under their Latin names—ad hominem, ad populum, ad ignorantiam, ad verecundiam (better known as the argument from authority), the slippery slope, affirming the consequent, and so on.

    So I dutifully taught my students the standard laundry list and then challenged them to put theory into practice. Read a newspaper article or watch a political debate—and spot the fallacies!

    After a few years, I abandoned the assignment. The problem? My students turned paranoid. They began to see fallacies everywhere. Instead of engaging with the substance of an argument, they hurled labels and considered the job done. Worse, most of the “fallacies” they identified did not survive closer scrutiny.

    It would be too easy to blame my students. When I tried the exercise myself, I had to admit that I mostly came away empty-handed. Clear-cut fallacies are surprisingly hard to find in real life. So what do you do if your professor tells you to hunt for fallacies and you can’t find any? You lower the bar. To satisfy the assignment, you expand your definition.

    The Fallacy Fork

    In 2015, I published a paper in the journal Argumentation with two colleagues arguing that fallacy theory should be abandoned. Here is its crux: every so-called fallacy closely resembles forms of reasoning that are perfectly legitimate, depending on the context. In formal terms, good and bad arguments are often indistinguishable. Worse, there is almost always a continuum between strong and weak arguments. You cannot capture that gradient in a rigid formal scheme. As my friends Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber succinctly put it in The Enigma of Reason: “most if not all fallacies on the list are fallacious except when they are not.”

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    We show this by using a dilemma we call the Fallacy Fork, which forces you to choose between two unpalatable options:

    (A) You define your fallacy using a neat scheme of deduction. In a deductive argument, the conclusion must follow inexorably from the premises. If the premises are true yet the conclusion could still be false, the argument is invalid—case closed. The trouble is that, in real life, you almost never encounter such clean blunders. You can invent textbook examples, sure, but flesh-and-blood cases are surprisingly rare.

    (B) So you loosen things up and abandon the strict realm of deductive logic. You add some context and nuance. Now you can capture plenty of real-life arguments. Great. Except there’s a catch: your “fallacy” stops being fallacious. It turns into a perfectly ordinary move in everyday reasoning—sometimes weak, sometimes strong, but not obviously irrational.

    Let’s see how some of the most famous fallacies fare when confronted with the Fallacy Fork.

    Post hoc fallacy

    As the saying goes: correlation does not imply causation. If you think otherwise, logic textbooks will tell you that you’re guilty of the fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc. You can formalize it like this:

    If B follows A, then A is the cause of B.

    Clearly, this is false. Any event B is preceded by countless other events. If I suddenly get a headache, which of the myriad preceding events should I blame? That I had cornflakes for breakfast? That I wore blue socks? That my neighbor wore blue socks?

    It’s easy to mock this fallacy—websites like Spurious Correlations offer graphs showing correlations between margarine consumption and divorce rates, or between the number of people who drowned by falling into a pool and the number of Nicholas Cage films released per year.

    The problem is that not even the most superstitious person really believes that just because A happened before B, A must have caused B. Sure, in strict deductive terms, post hoc ergo propter hoc is a fallacy—but real-life examples are almost nonexistent. That’s the first prong of the Fallacy Fork.

    So what do real-life post hoc arguments actually look like? More like this: “If B follows shortly after A, and there’s some plausible causal mechanism linking A and B, then A is probably the cause of B.” Many such arguments are entirely plausible—or at least not obviously wrong. Context is everything.

    Imagine you eat some mushrooms you picked in the forest. Half an hour later, you feel nauseated, so you put two and two together: “Ugh. That must have been the mushrooms.” Are you committing a fallacy? Yes, says your logic textbook. No, says common sense—at least if your inference is meant to be probabilistic.

    Here, the inference is actually reasonable, assuming a few tacit things:

    1. Some mushrooms are toxic.

    2. It’s easy for a layperson to mistake a poisonous mushroom for a harmless one.

    3. Nausea is a common symptom of food poisoning.

    4. You don’t normally feel nauseated.

    If you want, you can even spell this out in probabilistic terms. Consider the last premise—the base rate. If you usually have a healthy stomach, the mushroom is the most likely culprit. If, on the other hand, you frequently suffer from gastrointestinal problems, the post hoc inference becomes much weaker.

    Almost all of our everyday knowledge about cause and effect comes from this kind of intuitive post hoc reasoning. My phone starts acting up after I drop it; someone unfriends me after I post an offensive joke; the fire alarm goes off right after I light a cigarette. As Randall Munroe, creator of the webcomic xkcd, once put it: “Correlation doesn’t imply causation, but it does waggle its eyebrows suggestively and gesture furtively while mouthing ‘look over there.’” The problem with astrology, homeopathy, and other forms of quack medicine lies in their background causal assumptions, not in the post hoc inferences themselves.

    Ad hominem

    Perhaps the most famous fallacy of all is the ad hominem. The principle seems simple: when assessing an argument, you should attack the argument, not the person. Play the man instead of the ball, and you’re guilty of ad hominem reasoning. But is it really that simple?

    If your ad hominem argument is meant deductively, then yes—it’s invalid. For example: “This researcher is in the pocket of the pharmaceutical industry, therefore his study is flawed.” If “therefore” is intended in a strict deductive sense, the argument is clearly invalid: the conclusion doesn’t logically follow. But how often do we actually encounter such rigid ad hominems in real life?

    Here’s a more reasonable, plausible version: “This researcher studying a new antidepressant was funded by the company that makes the drug. Therefore, we should take his results with a large grain of salt.” This is far more defensible, especially for ordinary people under real-life constraints. It’s what philosophers call a defeasible argument—one that’s provisional, open to revision, and inconclusive. Most real-world arguments work this way. Yes, it has an ad hominem structure, but does that mean we should dismiss it outright?

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    Courts routinely rely on ad hominem reasoning. Judges can discount witnesses or experts because of bias, conflicts of interest, or hidden agendas. Sure, a biased witness might still tell the truth—but courts aren’t schools of formal logic. Politicians attack the character of their opponents too—and often for very good reason.

    Even in science, despite its lofty rhetoric, personal reputation and status matter enormously. Peer review is anonymous in theory, but once you publish a paper, you’re staking your name and reputation on it. You also have to declare your affiliation, funding sources, and any conflicts of interest. Everyone understands why. A study claiming a link between vaccination and autism by someone who’s funded by anti-vaccination groups isn’t automatically invalid—but you’d be well-advised to take it with a truckload of salt.

    The truth is, we can’t do without ad hominem reasoning, for the simple reason that human knowledge is deeply social. Almost everything we know comes from testimony; only an infinitesimal fraction do we verify ourselves. The rest is, literally, hearsay. No wonder we are so sensitive to the reputation and trustworthiness of our sources.

    Fallacies galore

    I could continue to dissect every other “fallacy” on the list, but you’d probably get bored. I’ll quickly run through a few more examples—then you can try it yourself.

    • The argument from ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantiam) is usually called a fallacy because of the classic dictum: “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” But in real life, it often is evidence, and people seem intuitively aware of this. For example: “Recovered memories about satanic cults sacrificing babies are probably the product of confabulation and suggestion, because we have never found any material traces of these atrocities.” That’s perfectly reasonable. The probabilistic premise is sound: if such cults had existed, we would have found baby corpses—or at least hundreds of missing infants.

    • The argument from authority (ad verecundiam) claims something is true because an expert said so. But as we’ve seen, almost all our knowledge is testimonial—based on authority. Rejecting arguments from authority entirely would lead to radical skepticism. Once again, context matters. Is the expert truly knowledgeable in this field? What’s their track record on similar claims? Do they have incentives to lie? Do others trust them? In the real world, these questions matter far more than any blanket rule about “ad verecundiam.”

    • The gambler’s fallacy occurs when you assume that if an event has happened less often than expected, it is somehow “due” next time around. At the roulette table, this belief will reliably lead you astray. But casinos are highly artificial environments designed to produce independent events. Out in the wild, things are different. Events cluster, streak, and correlate, and humans are remarkably good at detecting patterns. In natural settings, what looks like the gambler’s fallacy is often not fallacious at all.

    • The fallacy of affirming the consequent is a staple of formal logic. From “If A, then B,” you cannot infer “B, therefore A.” The hackneyed textbook example goes like this: “If it rains, the street will be wet. The street is wet. Therefore, it rained.” Well, who knows? Perhaps a firetruck just hosed down your street? The problem is that one person’s “affirming the consequent” is another person’s inference to the best explanation. Anyone stepping outside onto a wet street will almost automatically conclude that it probably rained. That’s not a logical blunder; it’s ordinary causal reasoning. Without this kind of abductive inference, we would have no causal knowledge at all.

    A rare breed

    Pure fallacies are a rare breed. You mostly spot them in logic textbooks or books about irrationality—not in real life. If you think you’ve caught one, chances are you missed something and the case isn’t so clear-cut. Maybe you exaggerated the force of an argument, turning a defeasible argument into a deductive one, glossing over probabilistic assumptions, or stripping away context and knocking it down in the abstract. In other words, you may have built a straw man—another supposed “fallacy” that can’t be formally defined.

    Humans love to pigeonhole things into neat little boxes, and the traditional taxonomy of fallacies—especially the ones with pretentious Latin names—is irresistible in that regard. Encounter an argument you don’t like? Just squeeze it into a pre-established category and blow the whistle: fallacy! Making causal inferences from a sequence of events? Post hoc ergo propter hoc! Relying on an expert for a point? Ad verecundiam! Challenging someone’s credibility? Ad hominem!

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    In my experience, fallacy theory is not just useless—it can be actively harmful. It encourages intellectual laziness, offering high-minded excuses to dismiss any argument you don’t like. It impoverishes debate by pretending that messy, real-world disagreements can be resolved with the blunt tools of formal logic. You end up like my students: slightly paranoid, dismissive, and, ironically, less critical than when they started.

    Most of all, fallacy theory misleads us about the real sources of human irrationality. Most people intuitively grasp the basic rules of logic and probability—we wouldn’t have survived otherwise. Human reason is a bag of tricks and heuristics, mostly accurate in the environments in which we evolved, but easily led astray in modern life. And it is strategic and self-serving, motivated to reach conclusions that serve our own interests.

    Despite its flaws and foibles, though, human reasoning is far more sophisticated and subtle than the theory of “fallacies” suggests.

    Maarten Boudry is a philosopher and independent scholar writing on human progress and human (ir)rationality. He is the author of The Betrayal of Enlightenment, forthcoming from Pitchstone Publishing.

    A version of this article was originally published at Maarten Boudry’s Substack.

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    0 min
  • Jacob Savage on the Costs of the Great Awokening

    Jacob Savage is a writer and ticket scalper.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Jacob Savage discuss whether the “Great Awokening” had lasting material effects beyond culture, how diversity initiatives changed hiring patterns in academia and Hollywood, and why these changes primarily affected one generation of white men rather than older cohorts already established in their careers.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I think it’s really hard to know what to make of what Matthew Yglesias a number of years ago called the Great Awokening. While we were living through it, it felt at times as though the foundations of American culture were changing in a pretty fundamental way. In a very rapid manner, we were embracing institutional practices, language, and norms that were very different from what the country had looked like 15 or 20 years earlier. A lot of mainstream institutions just got on board with a whole set of ideas without examining them very deeply. It felt as though there was a permanent change.

    There’s something weird that’s happened, I think, where there was a vibe shift, and Donald Trump was elected. Not only are progressives much less ascendant in American politics than they seemed to be a few years ago, but a lot of the people who had paid lip service to these ideas have now disowned them or even claimed that they never believed any of those things. When there’s a political scandal where Zohran Mamdani appoints somebody who had said these crazy things on Twitter a few years ago, it just feels like that language is out of a different world because it has disappeared a little bit from the public, or at least from the more mainstream parts of it.

    So it would be tempting to say this is all a kind of slightly surreal dream. We’ve woken up, it’s over, and there’s no lingering effect. But I take it that you would disagree with that. You would say that at least there is a particular generation of young white men who have been deeply impacted, whose careers have been deeply impacted by some of those institutional practices, particularly in the more artistic professions and so on. Tell us why you think this was a profound moment that had a transformative impact.

    Jacob Savage: I don’t think it was limited to the Great Awokening, and I think you can see the roots of the Great Awokening going back to 2013, 2014. I think there’s a tendency for people to think that this was cultural overreach that had no material effects on anyone in any way.

    What drove me in part to write the article was to say this wasn’t just a vibe shift one way and a vibe shift the other way, and people being annoyed over pronouns or the way that people talked about America. There were actual material effects in the real world on actual people that these policies had, and I think that has largely gone ignored by the institutions.

    There was a real change in the ability of younger white men to ascend in various fields. I don’t think those fields are necessarily limited to what I wrote about specifically, academia, media, and Hollywood. Those were some of the worst of it and some of the fields that documented most in depth what they were doing. But it wasn’t exclusive to those fields. I think that beyond the vibe shift of it all, there really are material effects that need to be grappled with in some way. Diversity was billed as a win-win, and there is a loser in it. It was younger white men. There’s no way around it.

    Mounk: The way it’s sold, as you were saying, is as a win-win. There’s this cartoon, which a number of people have written about very well, advocating equity. What you see in the cartoon is a baseball game going on in the background. There’s a very short child, a child of medium height, and an adult trying to watch the baseball game over a fence.

    There’s equality and there’s equity. There are two panels. In the equality panel, there are boxes of the same height for everybody. The adult, who could already see over the fence, can now see over the fence even more, while the two children can’t see over the fence at all. In the other panel, the world of equity, there’s the biggest box for the shortest child, and he’s just able to see the game, and a medium box for the medium-height child, who’s also able to see the game. There’s no box for the adult, because the adult is already seeing the game, so there’s no need.

    Leave aside the fact that you could make arguments, as an economist, that perhaps the baseball team needs ticket revenue in order to sustain itself, and that even this picture of equity is not as costless as it appears. Leave that to one side. You might say that this indicates a world in which we can just expand the pie, in which now everybody is able to see the baseball game where previously they were not able to.

    But a lot of things are rival in the world. In order to get into college, because colleges really haven’t expanded their enrollment very much for a very long time, it’s either this kid or that kid. It’s rival in a very different kind of way. Of course, the rhetoric of universities and a lot of these other institutions has always been that we’re leaving talent out there because we don’t have the right recruitment pipelines, because there’s been prejudice against them historically. All that these diversity initiatives are doing, they say, is finding highly qualified candidates that we previously overlooked, to make sure that the most meritorious are now able to access these institutions.

    What is wrong with that famous cartoon of equity as a picture of what happened, or with those claims that colleges and others made that all they were doing was going out and finding real talent that had previously been overlooked?

    Savage: I would say, for one, that the cartoon of equity, if you are using it as a full analogy, is incredibly racist. It suggests that the non-white man is incapable of seeing the field without an incredible amount of help. I think that is infantilizing and wrong. We do not live in the segregated South anymore. That is not the situation we are in as a country.

    So I think, fundamentally, that cartoon assumes that anyone who is not a white man is so beleaguered and belabored that they cannot possibly see the field without all of these extra steps. I do not think that reflects the actually existing world that we grew up in.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about the actual stats here. If a lot of these institutions were saying, look, historically we have discriminated, which is certainly true of many of these institutions, they were saying that now perhaps, if you are a business, there are recruitment pipelines. The easiest way to find new employees is to ask existing employees for recommendations. That is going to run within certain kinds of communities that have been privileged for a longer time. All that we are doing is expanding opportunity.

    Savage: I think that, for instance, in the Hollywood context, there was obviously an old boys’ network going as late as the 2000s. There were fellowship programs designed to get around that, to give people who did not have access to someone’s uncle or brother-in-law a way in. I do not think anyone really objected to those programs at the time.

    What ended up happening, though, is that those programs stuck around after hiring became exclusively non-white men at the lower levels. So instead of being a way to get people in from the side, people were being let in through the front door, and there was still a side entrance. Then there was just no room for anyone else.

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    I do not think anyone really had a problem at first. Some people obviously did, but my sense is that our generation did not object to these minor rectification ideas: there was a pipeline problem, and we should try to expand the pipeline. The issue was that once those actions had been going on for a while, before 2015, they not only continued, but the pipeline for everyone else was shut down.

    Mounk: One way these debates tend to go is that people say this never happened, and also that it was good that it happened. When you were saying that a lot of these younger white men just were not being hired at all, in your Compact article you go through these numbers in pretty impressive detail. This is from an earlier article, I think, but one really striking fact is that I believe there is not a single white man who has published fiction in The New Yorker who was born after 1984.

    Savage: There has recently been one, after the article was published. But basically, things became next to impossible in a lot of fields for the old objective metrics of success to carry weight. I think this was, interestingly, both a top-down and bottom-up cultural phenomenon.

    From the top, you had vague mandates. From the bottom, you had people reading the stories, or people in HR, who wanted to do the right thing, so to speak. There was never a quota, but from both ends you were seeing these preferences.

    A career is made up of many yes-or-no decisions. Do you get that job? Does that job lead to the next job? Does that job lead to the next job? If the dice are weighted against you pretty severely at each of those decision points, eventually the outcomes are going to start looking the way that they do. You can really only see that after time. In the moment, any individual decision seems ambiguous. Maybe it was me, maybe it was not the system. But when you look at it over the space of ten years, you can see that this culture change had very material effects.

    Mounk: For those who might be skeptical about what you are saying and who have not had a chance to read the article, go read the article. It is really interesting. But tell us about some of those numbers. That stat about The New Yorker is striking, but that is one magazine, or one section of the magazine. What are some of the numbers that are going to move at least some of the way toward convincing a skeptical person that this effect was as large as you are saying, and that this is a real thing?

    Savage: When I moved to Los Angeles to try to be a screenwriter in 2011, the number of lower-level writers on TV who were white men was, I think, around 48 or 49 percent. Last year, the number of lower-level white male writers was 11 percent. I spoke to an anonymous showrunner who contacted me, and he told me that the 11 percent number is not even real. That number consists of pure nepo hires who get sent down by the network, or someone’s star child.

    So basically that 11 percent is, sure, still white men, but they are the ultra-connected ones who never quite deserved the job to begin with. You go from 48 percent to 11 percent without the pipeline changing that much, and without the population changing that much. It seems fairly obvious what the cause of all that was.

    Mounk: Part of the background here is that 48 percent may be slightly overrepresented as a share of the overall population. Obviously, there are other background factors about who gets the kind of education that probably makes you better at screenwriting, et cetera. But when you look at things in purely demographic terms, 48 percent of men is overrepresentative, while 11 percent is definitely underrepresentative relative to the share that white men make up of those age cohorts in the United States.

    Savage: Right, the age cohort is probably around 30 percent. So you are going from basically a slight overrepresentation, which I would partially argue is a question of what the pipeline was at the time, to being a third underrepresented. Women of color are now 36 percent of lower-level staff writers. The preferences are very clear in that context. I think in academia, too, you can see some of those numbers.

    Mounk: I know that we are only establishing the basics right now, but I think that is an important part of the conversation. Tell me about some of those numbers in academia and in other fields beyond Hollywood as well.

    Savage: Academia varies college by college, and it is difficult to get a complete sense of how bad things were overall. But even ten years ago, if you looked at cohorts graduating from graduate school with PhDs versus the cohorts receiving tenure-track offers, the outcomes already did not favor white men.

    Something like 50 percent of PhD holders were white men, while they accounted for only around thirty-something percent of tenure-track offers. If you go further and look, especially at elite colleges, you see between 2015 and 2024 a drop-off that is striking. Humanities departments might hire sixty assistant professors and only three of them are white men, even though the graduate school cohort is around 30 to 40 percent. You see this pretty much across the board.

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    There is an interesting corollary that I found, which is that this seemed not to apply as much to non-American white men, for several reasons. One is that they exist somewhat outside American culture-war dynamics and seem less threatening to tenure committees, according to a couple of academics I spoke to. Another is that the federal government does not classify foreign academics on work visas as having a race. So for schools eager to trumpet the diversity of their new hires, these hires did not count against them. As a result, many of the white men who did get jobs ended up being European, Canadian, or Australian.

    Mounk: There is an interesting corollary to that, which is that non-white people who were not born and raised U.S. citizens often did not count for purposes of diversity either. I know a number of stories where highly qualified non-white candidates were passed over, and they were often told, very openly, if not officially, that the dean would not let them be hired because they would not count toward the diversity quota. There is something strange about the way non-Americans existed outside of this system.

    One of the arguments you make is that some of the effects of this were hidden because of a generational effect. One obvious counterargument to what you are saying is to point to university presidents, heads of studios, showrunners, and many people at the top of these fields, a lot of whom continue to be white men. Explain your argument for why this affected one generation so strongly, but did not affect people in the same way if they already had their foot in the door by 2013 or 2014 and were already part of the system.

    Savage: I think it seems fairly obvious, but this was my central insight that had not really been talked about before. This diversity stuff was not entirely costless, but it was mostly costless to older white men who had already existed within these institutions. Most institutions are not trying to hire full professors or deans without experience. You are not suddenly going to get a pipeline that looks much different for people who are 55, 60, or 65 years old. That is the pipeline that exists, and you are going to hire out of it.

    What is actually happening is a lot of hiring at the lower levels, and that is where the bulk of the preferences end up going. The fact that Martin Scorsese is still working does not get me a job in Hollywood. It does not even make me feel seen. He is almost 90 years old. No one is going to tell him to stop making movies because he is a white man. That spot is simply used as a way of saying, look at all the white men who are still at the top, and they are still at the top.

    This was not something that evenly affected cohorts. You can only really see who it affected when you dig into the younger, more hirable people.

    Mounk: That is what is fascinating about some of the numbers you present. One of the weird upshots of that is that each group can find reasons to feel aggrieved. I am not saying that means each group has equally good reason to feel aggrieved. But young white men can say, look, I am being systematically disfavored in a lot of these job applications. You can think, if it were just me, then I would have doubts about how good I am at this. But if I see that none of my white cohort members in this fellowship program, or this PhD program, or this kind of incubator for an arts job are getting jobs, while all of the other ones are getting jobs, then perhaps there is a very strong set of preferences operating here.

    Of course, the people who want to say that there continues to be extreme discrimination against minority groups will say, look at the people who are at the top, this is all made up. One of the strange things, which I think helps explain some of the racial polarization over the last ten years and some of the deep rancor in our society, is that everybody can retreat to a narrative in which they are the aggrieved party.

    The downstream effect of these schemes is that everything shifts from individual, merit-based decisions into group-based claims of having been disfavored, and into the sense that the only way to get a fair shake is to organize at the level of the group in order to fight for better treatment for members of that group.

    Savage: I think that is definitely fair. I think the thing is that people do look at these institutions and still see a lot of white male faces. I do not know a way around that short of a guillotine and a revolution. So you are left with a situation where you can say, okay, we are going to stop discriminating now. We are going to do our best to be fair, knowing full well that this can only ever be imperfect at best, but we should try. Or you are left saying that we should just continue this cycle ad infinitum forever.

    I obviously come down on the side of trying. I think millennials, at least for the most part, really believed in racial and gender-based equality. We believed we were all going to be given equal chances. We understood that some people had a leg up and some people did not. But overall, I think we believed it in a way that I am not sure previous generations did. I think what the DEI stuff did was disabuse us of that belief in a way that has ultimately been pretty poisonous for our politics.

    Mounk: What do you think has happened to the people who were impacted by that? I assume there is a huge range of responses, depending on personality, political predilection, and other factors in people’s lives. But you could imagine this going all the way from denial and the sense that you have to keep being a good ally, up to the idea that if you need to be sacrificed for the sake of a broader good, then so be it.

    Then there are people who have presumably turned pretty strongly to the right because they feel that they were up for creating equal opportunities and up for giving up any other advantages. But if this has turned into outright discrimination against them, and they no longer stand a fair chance, they are going to grab onto anybody who promises to give them a fair shake. How do you think this has influenced the politics of the younger generation?

    Savage: I think it has certainly affected the politics of younger white men. You can see that in the polling. You can see it if you look at who many of the alt-right anons were. They were often disaffected academics who could not get jobs. If you had given Bronze Age Pervert a chair at the University of Chicago, I do not think he would be writing what he is writing. That is an extreme example, but it makes the point.

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    In terms of my friends, most of whom are still reluctant Democrats, no one really believes in it anymore. I do not know any white men my age who are into politics in the way we were ten or twenty years ago. There is no idealism left. It is more a matter of reluctantly voting for the party that promises to disadvantage you, or reluctantly voting for the other guy who will not. I see a complete vibe shift in the way formerly liberal white men interact with the political world.

    Mounk: What is interesting, by the way, is that the vibe shift has broadened in the younger generation. It is obviously particularly strong for specific reasons among white men. Many of the white men you are talking about are probably in their thirties or early forties, people who were hopeful about breaking into those professions and have now perhaps recognized that they are unlikely to do so, and are figuring out how to deal with the disappointment and resentment that can come with that.

    I teach a lot of younger students, a very diverse group, and I am finding in the classroom that a term we used to use has fallen out of favor. Part of that is because it started to sound like an angry uncle shouting at the Thanksgiving table. But part of it is that I think the underlying phenomenon has actually gone away. That term is social justice warrior. There was a moment when a cohort of young people thought of themselves as warriors in the cause of social justice. This was their cause. They saw themselves as revolutionaries. They wanted to impose this on society.

    When you were teaching, you always felt that there were at least a couple of students, though many were lovely, who were there as social justice warriors. They were going to say something that broke the ethos of the class, or try to make life difficult for you. I am struck by the extent to which that has evaporated over the last few years. For many students now, these ideas feel like what their elementary school teachers taught them, what their middle school teachers taught them, and what their high school teachers taught them. They know they are supposed to parrot them a little bit on college applications.

    But it is not something they really own. They have a kind of cynicism about it, the way students tend to have cynicism about what they are taught. That does not mean they have a fully developed systemic critique of it. Some do, but many do not. It feels more like, yes, these are the talking points, this is what we are supposed to say. That fervor has gone away more broadly. Do you think this reflects a larger cultural shift, the downstream effect of the much-cited vibe shift? Or does it have a different timbre for the white men in their thirties and forties you are mostly writing about, compared with this broader generation of young people who no longer share the fervor of a great awakening?

    Savage: I cannot really speak to what Gen Z or younger people think, because I do not interact with them that much. But I think there are still plenty of true believers among millennials. There are still people for whom it is always white men who are bad. I remember being at a party in Los Angeles shortly after the fires, talking with a couple of gay men about how terrible Karen Bass had been, when a white woman our age started shouting at us, asking how dare we attack a Black woman.

    It felt like she was fighting an insane rear-guard action from 2020, but it is still there. It is still ambient in the atmosphere. I do not think it is over, especially among millennials. I think millennials are bifurcating in how they think about these things.

    Mounk: So you are saying it is still there. What about the actual institutions? Some woman shouting at a party can still be a true believer. Institutions are slow to change. Once something has become an ingrained set of practices, with particular vehicles for it, particular fellowship programs that are implicitly or quite explicitly reserved for particular groups, those things tend to persist.

    But as we have seen over the last ten years, when the wind shifts, American elites can also be pretty fast in changing their sails. I was struck by the fact that I happened to glance at The New York Times list of best books of 2025. Eyeballing it, four or five of the ten books were written by white men. I am pretty sure, though I have not done the exercise and perhaps you have, that if you go through the last ten years of The New York Times lists, you would not see that high a share of white men.

    I do not think it is a coincidence that this came after the victory of Donald Trump, even though The New York Times does not like Donald Trump. I doubt that anyone involved in this decision has any particular liking for him. And yet his election plausibly changed things. It made it possible to put people on that list whom previously someone might have said, well, we can have one or two, but four seems a little much. Why do we not drop a couple? Is that an indication of real change, or do you think that change is not actually happening?

    Savage: I think there is some vibe-shifty change. For instance, the showrunner I spoke to basically said Hollywood is more or less pretending the last ten years did not happen. The policy now is sort of back to 2012 rules, which is hire who you want, do not make it an all-white mailroom and embarrass us, but other than that, fine, do whatever you want.

    I think in the media, a friend who has a friend at The New York Times told me that the sense is they went too hard on the wokeness stuff and are dialing it back, and are ready to hire white men again. They are not obsessed with their diversity statistics. I think they will soon return to some form of more meritocratic hiring.

    I think the media has also been self-correcting in a way, because a lot of people who did not get jobs have started their own things and have been able to move on and create new things. The one holdout that I think will be very difficult to dislodge is academia. I am getting sent job ads all the time, and I think academia might be completely lost.

    There are still job ads in 2026. Someone sent me an ad from Mount Holyoke that was basically three paragraphs saying white men need not apply, using all of the traditional language about wanting diverse candidates who have experience teaching diversity. Ideally, if you are teaching literature, you will have experience with Latinx literature or women’s literature. They are hiring an adjunct professor to teach creative writing, but they clearly do not want it to be a white man, and they are advertising it as such.

    I think academia is full, at this point, given the people who got tenure over the last ten years, of true believers. I think it will be very difficult to reinstall anything like a normal pipeline there. The other industries, I think, are slowly going to try to pretend nothing happened while inching back toward normalcy.

    Mounk: A couple of thoughts on academia, which is obviously the field I know best in this conversation. The first is that there undoubtedly were illegal hiring processes over the last ten or fifteen years. I have never been involved in one, thankfully, and I have never been involved in a hiring process where I had to fight against doing illegal things. But I have heard things mentioned casually by friends and colleagues at other institutions that make that very clear. These were not just illegal under the standards that apply after the recent Supreme Court ruling about affirmative action. They would have been illegal at any point in American history in the last fifty years, just straight out saying we are not going to consider white candidates, and so on, as well as gender or other preferences in some fields.

    I would argue that in academia it really depends on what institutions you are looking at and what fields you are looking at. In humanities departments at liberal arts colleges, which is implicitly what you were talking about with writing and Mount Holyoke, I am very willing to believe that you are right, both that this is continuing to happen and that the people in those positions are such true believers that it will be very hard to course-correct. My hunch would be that in a lot of the hard sciences, people went along to get along, and there were probably illegal hiring processes there as well. But the moment the imperative went away, a lot of people thought, thank God, now we can go back to hiring the most competent engineer.

    In the social sciences, which I know best, there are a few true believers, but I think the disciplinary standards, especially at research universities, have held. I could imagine there being some real improvement there as well. The other thing I will say, which is a broader point I have been thinking about, is that it is really good to have a market. This is obvious, but one of the problems with an academic journal, when there is really strong ideological pressure, is that there is no end customer that can force a course correction. It is all one community. Your tenure depends on being able to publish in these journals. It is a small community of people who do peer review and a small number of editors. They all select each other through complicated mechanisms. Once it goes off the rails, there is really no way to force it back.

    With The New York Times, I was very critical of it for a number of years, and I still have my regular complaints. But I think there has been a real course correction. I am much more comfortable trusting The New York Times to convey, on most things, a basically factually correct view of the world and a greater variety of opinion about how to think about it today than I was three or four years ago. Not that everything is perfect now, but it is a difference of night and day. I think a lot of that is because The New York Times has readers. Every time they open an article for comments, the predominant view of the commenters, who are center-left liberals, is that they hate Trump but also hate the woke stuff. You see that repeatedly.

    I think they realized that when they went too far on the woke stuff, they were losing customers and subscribers. People tuned out. There is a course-correction mechanism in an industry like media that is absent in some other fields, which I think are going to be impacted by this for longer.

    Savage: I think that is fair. I think academia has also become a monoculture in other ways in a lot of fields. Until that breaks, I am not sure that any of the rest of it can. Academia has a lot of very tough problems ahead.

    One thing I have been thinking about is immigration and migration, which are obviously big issues. Until there is an academic class taught at Harvard, Yale, or Princeton about the pros and cons of immigration that treats Christopher Caldwell with respect, as something to be grappled with, I do not think academia, or the soft sciences, will be past where they are right now.

    Mounk: I guess so. I have not taught that class, but I have taught a class on populism in which I certainly assign readings that argue against current immigration regimes and forms of immigration, and that, for example, make the argument that the gap in cultural representation between popular views and what political elites want is one of the big reasons for why there is backlash. I have been struck by two things. First, none of my colleagues have made trouble for me over that. Second, some students agree, many students disagree, but it did not feel like I was going out on a limb by teaching this. They engaged with it respectfully.

    I teach a variety of texts and a variety of opinions in the classroom. I always hope that some people will agree with a text and some people will disagree with it. That is true of this text as much as of any other text.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Jacob discuss how to tackle discrimination without the toxicity of DEI, why the Democrats should promote national unity, and how it feels to have been held back professionally due to identity. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    43 min
  • The Humanities Are About to Be Automated
    (Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill conversing with Claude.)

    There has long been a divide between those who believe that artificial intelligence is an enormously transformative technology and those who believe that it is hopelessly overhyped. Never has that divide been more enormous than in the last weeks.

    Most people who have regularly used the technology in the recent past believe that the rate at which the state-of-the-art models progress is extremely rapid. They are now capable of engaging in long chains of reasoning that dramatically increase their problem-solving abilities in areas from financial analysis to molecular biology. Their ability to one-shot practical tools, from data visualizations to websites, is astonishing. They have become so good at coding that some of the most accomplished computer programmers in the world now say they barely write any of their own lines anymore. And just the other day, leading scientists presented a genuinely new finding in astrophysics, one that corrected long-held assumptions in the field, that was produced by a large language model.

    And yet, many people I know, especially in the humanities, continue to be in deep denial about the state of this technology. Perhaps the most common way in which they dismiss the importance of this technology is to claim that AI models are not intelligent or creative. Sure, they say, these stochastic parrots can do some impressive things like summarize an email or write boilerplate corporate language; but they are congenitally incapable of making a genuine intellectual or artistic contribution.

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    A lot of the time, the people who make this argument are not very clear on what they mean by intelligence or creativity, and keep shifting ground when you push them on their definition. If you manage to pin them down, it usually becomes evident that their argument is circular: they believe that AI systems cannot be intelligent or creative because only texts or works of art produced by humans are instances of intelligence or creativity.

    I don’t want to get consumed by a futile semantic debate about how to use those words. What I do know is that I consider the ability to make a novel, interesting, and plausible argument about politics to be one important indicator of intelligence and creativity, and that I devoted a long stretch of my early adult life to developing the ability to do so at a high level. So when, still jet-lagged from a recent trip to Europe, I woke up well before the crack of dawn a few days ago, I decided to see whether the newest AI models would be capable of writing a competent academic paper in my field of study, political theory. The result both elated and depressed me.

    I spent the better part of a decade primarily devoting my intellectual energy to the study of political theory. That required me to master some of the most influential texts in the history of political thought; to make careful distinctions between different ideas and follow the premises of an argument through to their logical conclusion; and (the part I always struggled with the most because I found it so boring) to learn the conventions of academic publishing, developing a sense of the implicit norms which govern what you do and don’t do in a “publishable” academic paper.

    Though little of either my academic or my public work now falls squarely into the category of political theory, narrowly understood, this training has deeply shaped how I write, and I am immensely grateful for it. Years of thinking about the nature of political arguments taught me how to understand the structure of all kinds of questions about the social world, to spot the logical inconsistencies in both scholarly articles and social media posts, and to turn a nascent idea into a cohesive argument at rapid speed. The core skills imparted by a rigorous study of political theory provided the intellectual foundation for much of my work, whether I was engaged in trying to understand the conditions under which democracies might come to be more vulnerable to demagogues than was widely believed at the time in The People versus Democracy, or to explain and critique the rise of a new ideology on the American left in The Identity Trap.

    In fact, it is, I think, hardly a coincidence that political theorists tend to punch above their weight in public debate in the United States. The list of prominent thinkers and commentators who are at least partially trained in political theory is surprisingly long, especially given the field’s tiny size: to name but a few, it includes George Will, Andrew Sullivan, Michael Sandel, Bill Galston, Danielle Allen, and Patrick Deneen.1

    In some ways, it should be easier for artificial intelligence to crack political theory than some other fields. After all, political theory doesn’t require collecting or analyzing new datasets, and many of the field’s canonical texts are likely to be strongly represented in the training data for AI. But in other ways, it is a high bar: Making an original argument in the field requires both a demanding mix of interpretative and argumentative skills, and a new idea on a topic people have argued about for thousands of years. The ability of large language models to create a convincing work of political theory thus seems to me a good test case for the debate about whether artificial intelligence is or is not intelligent.

    (Claude’s opinion of the field, I must admit, is a little less flattering. Referencing my desire to disprove that AI is “merely a stochastic parrot,” Claude told me that “political theory may be the one field where ‘stochastic parrot’ is actually a compliment, since the whole discipline consists of creatively recombining things Tocqueville and Mill already said.” Ouch.)

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    I started by asking Claude Opus 4.6, with extended thinking enabled, to help me write a political theory paper that could be published in a top journal in the field. After consulting recent publications in top journals, it came up with five different ideas, some better than others. One, for which I later asked Claude to write a summary for general readers,2 reproduced here, felt to me like it held promise:

    Political theorists have spent the last decade asking whether big corporations are like mini-governments—whether your boss is a kind of dictator, whether tech companies should be democratized. That’s the right instinct, but it’s looking in the wrong place. The real power that Google, Meta, and OpenAI exercise isn’t over your choices—it’s over the conditions under which you think. They don’t tell you what to believe; they shape what you encounter, what feels plausible, what questions seem worth asking, and increasingly, through generative AI, they produce the very material out of which your beliefs are formed. Tocqueville had a phrase for this: the “formidable circle drawn around thought.” Mill feared the same thing—that when a society loses the friction of genuinely competing ideas, even its true beliefs decay into “dead dogma,” held by rote and understood by no one. Both were responding to the communications revolutions of their own eras. Ours is more radical than anything they imagined, because for the first time in history, a handful of private companies control not just which ideas circulate, but the infrastructure of cognition itself—and they do so with no democratic mandate, minimal transparency, and almost no accountability. I call this epistemic domination, and I argue it’s the single greatest untheorized threat to self-governance in the twenty-first century.

    In the next step, I uploaded two recent papers in Political Theory, a top journal, and asked Claude to give me an outline of the paper which follows the field’s conventions. After that, we went section by section, with me giving one round of high-level feedback on each. To give an example, I worried that the section it had written on John Stuart Mill spent too much time rehashing the arguments in favor of free speech from Chapter 2 of On Liberty, which would be very familiar to political theorists, tasking Claude with incorporating quotations from more obscure texts such as published letters.

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    The human feedback involved in this process certainly drew on my training in the field, but it was very minimal. Including the time it took Claude to generate the text, and the rather longer time it took me to read what Claude had written, it took less than two hours from when I had the idea to run this experiment to when the draft was finished.

    The draft could certainly be improved in a few respects. There are certainly a few places in the argument where reviewers could come up with clever objections. Claude explicitly urged me to check the page numbers in some of the references for the quotations it used against canonical editions of the works by Tocqueville and Mill. It also asked me to double-check the wording of some of the quotes from less canonical texts, such as the correspondence between Mill and Tocqueville. (Since I wanted to present Claude’s output to you in its original form, I did not do this. The few references I looked up seemed to be correct, but I expect that there are some mistakes that would need to be corrected before the paper could be submitted to an academic journal.) But on the whole, the outcome was depressingly good: I am confident that it could, with minor revisions, be published by a serious journal.

    The power of motivated reasoning is immense. If this little experiment should happen to draw a bit of wider attention, a lot of people will quickly claim that this paper is deeply flawed or outright stupid, and that it could never have been published in a serious journal. The way to definitively disprove this would have been to do a version of the Sokal Hoax, getting this paper accepted at a good journal under false pretenses before sharing it publicly.

    I briefly thought about doing this. But since the ethics of submitting work to journals under false pretenses is contested, and institutional review boards of universities tend to frown upon the practice, I decided not to do so. Suffice it to say that I am convinced that someone with basic knowledge in political theory could pull such a feat off with ease. If you are a political theorist who is deeply convinced of the contrary, why don’t you give it a good-faith try?

    But the comparison to the famous hoax by Alan Sokal, as well as the follow-up by Helen Pluckrose, James Lindsay and Peter Boghossian, is in any case misleading. Both of these efforts targeted journals in academic subfields that had gone deeply awry; they were a deliberate reductio ad absurdum. The paper produced by Claude, by contrast, is hardly absurd. While it has its shortcomings, and is not exactly earth-shatteringly original, nobody can seriously call it a reductio. Had a fellow student submitted it to my department’s graduate student workshop when I was doing my PhD, my respect for them would have gone up rather than down.

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    This is not meant to be a gotcha about political theory, a field I continue to admire greatly. It is a wake-up call about the future of the humanities. Even if you put aside the extent to which some fields in the humanities have been captured by ideology in recent years, the whole enterprise has started to look a little askew. Professors at top universities are—in good part because of what it now takes to get a good job in the field—more focused on publishing erudite contributions to niche debates in scholarly journals which only a handful of their colleagues will ever read than on teaching and mentoring the ever-dwindling ranks of their students.

    This was always absurd. But once artificial intelligence is able to write these contributions in the stead of humans—not just in political theory but also in theology and art history and comparative literature—it is totally indefensible.

    In some ways, the Age of AI will make the humanities more important than ever. Disciplines from literature to philosophy are needed to help us answer questions about how we can find a place in the world when we are much less needed than before, and what it is to be human when we are no longer the only ones capable of doing some of the things of which our species was once uniquely capable. But at a time when artificial intelligence can jump through the hoops that have over the past decades come to define an academic career in the humanities with growing ease, a radical reimagination of how we pursue and impart meaningful knowledge in these fields is desperately in order.

    Don’t believe me that the AI-induced crisis of the humanities is upon us? Take a look at the political theory paper Claude wrote up in a couple of hours for yourself:

    The Oligarchy of Scale: Epistemic Domination and the Conditions of Self-Governance

    Abstract

    Political theorists have increasingly turned their attention to corporate power, asking whether firms exercise authority, coercion, or governance in ways analogous to states. I argue that this framing, while productive, generates a characteristic blind spot. The most consequential form of private power in contemporary societies operates not through the direct exercise of authority over identifiable subjects but on the epistemic conditions under which citizens form their beliefs, preferences, and political judgments. Recovering two underappreciated strands of the liberal tradition — Tocqueville’s analysis of the democratic mind in Democracy in America and Mill’s theory of epistemic infrastructure in On Liberty — I show that both thinkers theorized precisely this form of power, though neither possessed the conceptual vocabulary to name it. Drawing on their insights and on recent work in postcolonial and feminist epistemology, I develop the concept of epistemic domination: the arbitrary capacity of an actor to shape the epistemic conditions under which a political community reasons and judges. I distinguish this concept from republican domination, epistemic injustice, and ideological hegemony, and argue that the rise of artificial intelligence corporations represents its most complete contemporary realization. Democratic theory, I conclude, has been operating with an incomplete account of what self-governance requires.

    Keywords: epistemic domination, Tocqueville, Mill, corporate power, artificial intelligence, democratic theory

    Political theorists have recently rediscovered the corporation. After decades in which concentrated private power received relatively little attention from the discipline, a growing literature now insists that the authority exercised by firms over workers, consumers, and communities demands the same scrutiny that political theorists have long directed at the state.[^1] Elizabeth Anderson’s account of the workplace as a site of “private government” has been particularly influential, revealing the extent to which employers exercise arbitrary, unaccountable authority over the daily lives of those they employ.[^2] Isabelle Ferreras and Hélène Landemore have extended this line of argument to ask whether democratic principles require the democratization of the firm itself.[^3] David Ciepley has urged political theorists to recognize the corporation as a distinctive political entity — chartered by the state, endowed with legal personhood, yet governed by neither democratic nor market principles alone.[^4]

    These contributions share an important structural feature. Each models corporate power on categories drawn from the analysis of political authority: governance, coercion, domination, legitimacy. The question they pose is, in essence, whether firms exercise something sufficiently like political power that the normative frameworks we apply to states should be extended to them. This is a productive line of inquiry, and the answer is plainly yes. But it also generates a characteristic blind spot. By asking whether corporations govern, coerce, or dominate in ways analogous to states, this literature tends to look for corporate power where we have already learned to look for state power — in the direct exercise of authority over identifiable subjects.

    I want to suggest that the most consequential form of private power in contemporary societies operates differently. It does not principally work through the direct exercise of authority over employees or the coercive imposition of terms on consumers, though it does these things too. It works, rather, on the conditions under which citizens form their beliefs, interpretations, and political judgments — on the epistemic environment that democratic self-governance presupposes but that democratic theory has largely taken for granted. When a handful of corporations control the infrastructure through which information is produced, curated, and encountered — when they shape not merely what people know but the frameworks within which they interpret what they know — they exercise a form of power for which our existing theoretical vocabulary is not well equipped.

    This is not an entirely new anxiety. The concern that concentrated control over the conditions of thought might prove more dangerous to self-governance than the direct exercise of coercive power has deep roots in the liberal tradition, though those roots have not been adequately traced. In what follows, I recover two largely underappreciated strands of this concern. The first runs through Tocqueville’s analysis of intellectual life under democracy in Democracy in America, where his account of the “tyranny of the majority” extends well beyond social conformism to theorize how democratic conditions can narrow the very range of what he calls “thinkable thought.” The second appears in Mill’s On Liberty, where the celebrated defense of free expression rests on a less frequently examined argument about the structural conditions that a society requires in order to maintain its collective capacity for sound judgment.

    Reading Tocqueville and Mill together in this way reveals that both were theorizing a form of power that contemporary political theory still lacks adequate resources to name. Both recognized that self-governance can be undermined not only by coercion, censorship, or the direct suppression of dissent, but by subtler transformations in the epistemic environment — transformations that operate below the threshold of any individual’s freedom being visibly curtailed. Both were responding, crucially, to communications revolutions in their own eras that threatened to concentrate influence over public opinion in new and unprecedented ways. Drawing on these historical resources, I develop a concept I call epistemic domination: the arbitrary capacity of an actor to shape the epistemic conditions under which a political community forms its beliefs, preferences, and judgments. This concept is related to, but distinct from, several neighboring ideas in contemporary theory — Philip Pettit’s republican domination, Miranda Fricker’s epistemic injustice, and the Marxist tradition of ideological domination — and I take care below to specify the differences.

    The contemporary form of private power that most fully realizes the anxieties Tocqueville and Mill articulated is the large artificial intelligence corporation. Companies such as Google, Meta, and OpenAI do not merely distribute information, as newspapers and broadcasters have long done. They increasingly shape the conditions of cognition itself: the questions users encounter, the answers that appear plausible, the framings that feel natural, the alternatives that remain thinkable. Through the design of recommender systems, the training of large language models, and the curation of search results, these firms exercise an ongoing, infrastructural influence over the epistemic lives of billions of citizens — an influence that is largely unaccountable, frequently opaque, and concentrated in remarkably few hands. If epistemic domination names a real and distinctive form of power, then the rise of AI corporations represents not merely a new chapter in the familiar story of corporate concentration, but a qualitative transformation in the relationship between private power and democratic self-governance.

    My primary purpose in what follows, however, is not to offer a policy agenda or a regulatory framework for addressing this transformation. It is to argue that democratic theory has been operating with an incomplete account of what self-governance requires — and that Tocqueville and Mill understood this more clearly than we have generally recognized.

    Tocqueville and the Democratic Mind

    The most familiar element of Tocqueville’s analysis of democratic culture is his account of the “tyranny of the majority.” In its popular reception, the phrase names a straightforward political danger: that a democratic majority can vote to oppress minorities, concentrating power as effectively as any despot.[^5] In more careful scholarly treatments, the concept is understood to describe something subtler — a form of social conformism in which democratic citizens, eager for the approval of their equals, suppress dissenting views out of a desire to belong.[^6] Neither reading is wrong. But both, I want to suggest, capture only the outer layers of Tocqueville’s concern. Beneath the political danger and the sociology of conformism lies a more unsettling argument about the epistemic consequences of democratic life — an argument about how equality of conditions reshapes not merely what citizens are willing to say, but what they are equipped to think.

    The key texts are not the celebrated chapters on majority tyranny in the first volume of Democracy in America, but the less frequently examined opening sections of the second volume, where Tocqueville turns from democratic institutions to democratic habits of mind.[^7] He begins with a paradox. Democratic peoples, precisely because they recognize no natural intellectual authority among their equals, are driven to seek authority in the only source that remains available to them — the aggregate opinion of the many. In aristocratic societies, Tocqueville argues, individuals defer to the intellectual authority of particular persons or classes whose superior judgment they acknowledge. Democracy dissolves this deference. No citizen in a democracy regards any other citizen as inherently more competent to judge: “as citizens become more equal and more similar, the tendency of each blindly to believe a certain man or a certain class decreases.”[^8] The result, however, is not intellectual independence. It is a transfer of cognitive authority from identifiable individuals to an anonymous and overwhelming collective. “Not only is common opinion the sole guide that remains for individual reason among democratic peoples,” Tocqueville writes, “but also it has among these peoples an infinitely greater power than among any other.”[^9]

    The mechanism of this transfer is worth attending to closely, because it is here that Tocqueville moves beyond anything that can be captured by the language of conformism or political oppression. The authority of the majority over the democratic mind does not operate through persuasion, nor through force. It operates through a kind of cognitive saturation:

    The public among democratic peoples has a singular power the idea of which aristocratic nations would not even be able to imagine. It does not persuade, it imposes its beliefs and makes them penetrate souls by a kind of immense pressure of the mind of all on the intelligence of each.[^10]

    The phrase is remarkable. An “immense pressure of the mind of all on the intelligence of each” is not a description of social disapproval or political coercion. It is a description of an epistemic condition — a condition in which the sheer weight of shared opinion reshapes the individual’s capacity for independent judgment, not by punishing dissent but by making it cognitively unavailable. The majority, Tocqueville continues, “takes charge of providing individuals with a host of ready-made opinions, and thus relieves them of the obligation to form for themselves opinions that are their own.”[^11] The language of “relief” is pointed: citizens do not experience this as constraint. They experience it as convenience — the comfortable delegation of cognitive labor to a source that feels, by its very ubiquity, authoritative.

    This transformation matters because it changes the character of intellectual constraint. Under aristocratic conditions, the obstacles to free thought are visible and personal: a censor, a patron, a church. One can identify the source of constraint and, at least in principle, resist it. The cognitive authority of the democratic majority operates differently. It does not suppress particular opinions by force. It renders them implausible — not by refuting them but by depriving them of the social conditions under which they could be taken seriously. In the first volume, Tocqueville captures this in a passage that deserves more attention than it has received:

    In America, the majority draws a formidable circle around thought. Inside those limits, the writer is free; but woe to him if he dares to leave them. It is not that he has to fear an auto-da-fé, but he is the butt of mortifications of all kinds and of persecutions every day.[^12]

    The passage is typically read as a description of social penalties for dissent — ostracism, career closure, reputational damage. But the metaphor of the “formidable circle” suggests something more fundamental. A circle drawn around thought is not a punishment imposed after the fact of dissent; it is a prior constraint on the space within which thought operates. What falls outside the circle is not merely dangerous to express. It ceases, over time, to be genuinely available as a live intellectual option.

    Sheldon Wolin’s magisterial study of Tocqueville captures part of this dynamic. Wolin reads Tocqueville as a theorist of the “total culture” of democracy — a thinker who understood that democratic power operates not primarily through institutions but through the pervasive shaping of mores, habits, and dispositions.[^13] This is right as far as it goes. But Wolin’s emphasis on democratic culture can obscure the specifically epistemic dimension of Tocqueville’s concern. The problem is not merely that democracy produces a distinctive culture of conformity. It is that democratic conditions tend to produce a distinctive epistemology — a set of default assumptions about where authoritative knowledge resides, what counts as a credible claim, and which questions are worth asking — that systematically narrows the range of perspectives available to the democratic community.

    It is in the closing passages of the chapter on democratic belief that Tocqueville states this concern in its most radical form. Having traced the transfer of cognitive authority from individuals and classes to the majority, he pauses to take stock of what has been gained and lost:

    I see very clearly in equality two tendencies: one that leads the mind of each man toward new thoughts and the other that readily reduces him to thinking no more. And I notice how, under the dominion of certain laws, democracy would extinguish the intellectual liberty that the democratic social state favors, so that after breaking all the obstacles that were formerly imposed on it by classes or men, the human mind would bind itself narrowly to the general wills of the greatest number.[^14]

    The passage is devastating in its precision. Democracy simultaneously liberates and extinguishes — it breaks the old constraints of class and caste, but replaces them with a new and in some ways more thorough form of intellectual closure. The human mind, having freed itself from the particular wills of aristocratic masters, “binds itself narrowly” to the general will of the majority. Tocqueville is fully aware of the echo of Rousseau, and fully aware of the irony: the general will, that great emancipatory concept, here becomes the instrument of epistemic confinement. His final verdict is unsparing: “Men would not have found the means to live independently; they would only have discovered, a difficult thing, a new face of servitude.”[^15]

    It is in the famous final chapters of the second volume that Tocqueville draws these threads together in his portrait of “soft despotism.” The passage is routinely cited in discussions of paternalistic government, but its epistemic dimension is rarely foregrounded. Tocqueville describes a form of power that “does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes.”[^16] The verbs are revealing. This power does not “destroy” or “tyrannize” — it “prevents things from being born,” it “extinguishes” and “dazes.” These are verbs of epistemic foreclosure, not coercion. What soft despotism eliminates is not freedom of action in any conventional sense but the generative capacity of a society — its ability to produce new ideas, new interpretations, new ways of understanding its own condition.

    Two features of Tocqueville’s analysis deserve emphasis. The first is that the epistemic threat he describes is structural, not intentional. No individual or institution sets out to narrow the range of thinkable thought. The narrowing is an emergent consequence of democratic conditions themselves — of equality, of the cognitive authority of the majority, of the displacement of individual judgment by collective opinion.

    The second is that Tocqueville was writing in response to a specific transformation in the infrastructure of public communication. The 1830s and 1840s saw the rapid expansion of the mass-circulation press in both France and the United States — the “penny press” that for the first time made newspapers available to a broad democratic public.[^17] Tocqueville does not discuss the press extensively in these chapters, but his analysis is intelligible only against this backdrop. The “immense pressure of the mind of all on the intelligence of each” is not an abstraction; it is mediated and amplified by new communications technologies that, for the first time, made it possible for a single set of framings to reach a genuinely mass audience.

    Tocqueville, then, offers something more than a sociology of conformism and something deeper than a warning about majoritarian despotism. He provides the elements — though not the finished form — of a theory of epistemic compression: the process by which the conditions of democratic life, mediated by the infrastructure of mass communication, progressively narrow the range of interpretations, framings, and questions available to citizens. The threat to self-governance he identifies operates not at the level of what citizens are permitted to think, but at the level of what they are equipped to think. This distinction will prove essential in what follows.

    Mill and the Ecology of Opinion

    If Tocqueville theorizes the demand side of epistemic compression — how democratic citizens come to delegate their cognitive authority to the majority — Mill theorizes the supply side: what happens to a society’s collective capacity for judgment when the conditions under which opinions are formed, tested, and revised become impoverished. The standard reading of Chapter 2 of On Liberty treats it as a defense of individual expression — the ur-text of the liberal free speech tradition, grounding the right to speak in the autonomy and dignity of the speaker.[^18] This reading is not wrong, but it understates the radicalism of what Mill is doing. His argument is not primarily about the rights of individuals. It is about the epistemic needs of the community. The question that organizes the chapter is not “What does the individual have a right to say?” but “What conditions must obtain if a society is to maintain its collective capacity for sound judgment over time?”

    Mill had been developing this question long before On Liberty. In his 1836 essay “Civilization,” he offered a remarkably direct analysis of the relationship between the expansion of mass communication and the degradation of public intellect. The essay observes that as the instruments for forming and circulating opinion grow more powerful, they do not — as optimists expected — elevate the quality of public discourse. They tend instead to flatten it. The growth of the reading public and the proliferation of cheap print do not produce a more discerning citizenry; they produce a citizenry more thoroughly saturated by a narrower range of ideas. “The individual becomes so lost in the crowd,” Mill writes, “that though he depends more and more upon opinion, he is apt to be attached less and less by any well-grounded opinion — less and less to have, properly speaking, any opinions of his own.”[^19] The problem is not ignorance. It is a specific form of epistemic dependence in which citizens are surrounded by more information than ever before, yet possess less genuine understanding — because the conditions for forming independent judgment have been eroded by the very institutions that supply them with ready-made conclusions.

    Mill was also in direct correspondence with Tocqueville during this period, and their exchange reveals how closely the two thinkers were tracking the same anxiety from different national vantage points. In an 1840 letter responding to the second volume of Democracy in America, Mill wrote to Tocqueville that the great danger of the modern age was not political tyranny but the erosion of independent thought under conditions where the instruments of opinion-formation had grown overwhelmingly powerful.[^20] The letter confirms what the published works suggest: Mill understood himself to be engaged in a shared intellectual project with Tocqueville — the project of theorizing a form of power that operated not through coercion but through the structural transformation of the conditions under which citizens think.

    On Liberty, published two decades after “Civilization,” represents the mature and systematic statement of this concern. Chapter 2 advances a series of arguments for the liberty of thought and discussion that are typically summarized as variations on a single theme: truth is best served by open debate.[^21] But this summary flattens what is in fact a carefully sequenced argument about the conditions under which a community maintains its epistemic health. Mill’s central insight is that even true beliefs degrade when they are not regularly tested against serious challenge. A belief held without understanding of the grounds on which it rests becomes what Mill calls “dead dogma” — mechanically repeated, poorly understood, and incapable of guiding action in new circumstances.[^22] “Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post,” he warns, “as soon as there is no enemy in the field.”[^23] The concern here is not with the silenced individual but with the community’s relationship to its own convictions. A society in which true beliefs circulate as dead dogma has lost the capacity to understand why it believes what it believes.

    Mill extends this argument in a direction that has not been sufficiently appreciated. Dissenting opinions, even mistaken ones, serve what we might call an ecological function: they preserve perspectives, framings, and partial insights that the dominant view has absorbed incompletely or not at all. When they are eliminated, the community does not simply lose a wrong opinion. It loses the corrective pressure that the wrong opinion exerted on the right one — the friction that kept the prevailing view honest, precise, and responsive to its own limitations. What Mill describes functions less like a marketplace and more like an ecosystem: a complex environment in which the health of the whole depends on a diversity of elements, including elements that are individually deficient. When the ecosystem is degraded — when dissenting views are eliminated or starved of the conditions in which they can survive — the result is not simply the loss of particular opinions but the slow atrophy of the society’s collective cognitive capacity. The meaning of received doctrine “is in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct.”[^24]

    What emerges from these arguments is not primarily a theory of individual rights but a theory of epistemic infrastructure — an account of the structural conditions that a society must maintain if it is to preserve its collective capacity for sound judgment. Those conditions include, at minimum: the active circulation of competing interpretations; the regular testing of prevailing convictions against the strongest available objections; the preservation of dissenting perspectives even when they are unpopular; and the maintenance of institutional spaces in which intellectual friction is not merely tolerated but actively sustained.

    Mill, like Tocqueville, locates the primary danger not in state action but in structural conditions that operate below the threshold of any identifiable act of repression. The “tyranny of prevailing opinion” does not require a censor. It requires only the absence of countervailing pressure — an absence that can be produced as effectively by the sheer homogeneity of available opinion as by the deliberate suppression of dissent. What Mill fears is not persecution in its crude forms but the quiet disappearance of intellectual alternatives: not the burning of books but the failure to write them; not the imprisonment of dissenters but the slow erosion of the social conditions under which dissent remains a live possibility.

    This concern was inseparable from the material transformation of the press that Mill witnessed over his lifetime. The mid-Victorian period saw a dramatic consolidation of British journalism. The repeal of the so-called “taxes on knowledge” — the advertisement duty in 1853, the stamp duty in 1855, and the paper duty in 1861 — had been championed by liberals as a blow for intellectual freedom, opening the press to new voices and broader participation.[^25] The actual result was more ambiguous. Cheaper production costs enabled the rise of mass-circulation newspapers, but the capital requirements for launching and sustaining a publication at national scale simultaneously concentrated ownership in fewer hands. The Daily Telegraph, founded in 1855, became the first British penny daily and reached a circulation that dwarfed its predecessors; by the 1860s, a small number of large-circulation papers exercised an influence over public opinion that would have been unrecognizable a generation earlier.[^26] Mill does not name these developments in On Liberty, but the essay “Civilization” had already identified the mechanism with uncomfortable clarity: the same technologies that distribute opinion more widely also tend to homogenize it, because the economics of mass communication reward breadth of reach over depth or diversity of perspective. The paradox — more readers, fewer genuinely independent sources of judgment — is precisely the structural condition that On Liberty‘s arguments are designed to address.

    Read together, Tocqueville and Mill are theorizing the same phenomenon from complementary directions. Tocqueville traces how democratic equality generates an irresistible gravitational pull toward cognitive uniformity — the “immense pressure of the mind of all on the intelligence of each.” Mill traces what is lost when that uniformity goes unchecked: not merely the rights of individual dissenters, but the epistemic infrastructure on which the community’s collective intelligence depends. Tocqueville describes the force; Mill describes the damage. Both understood — with a clarity that has not been adequately recognized — that self-governance requires not merely the formal liberty to speak and vote, but the maintenance of background epistemic conditions that no account of rights, however generous, is sufficient to guarantee. Neither, however, possessed the conceptual vocabulary to name this form of power precisely. It is to the construction of that vocabulary that I now turn.

    Epistemic Domination

    Tocqueville and Mill were reaching for a concept that neither quite possessed. Both identified a form of power that operates on the conditions of thought rather than on thought itself — that shapes not what citizens conclude but the epistemic environment within which they reason. Both recognized that this power is more dangerous to self-governance than overt coercion precisely because it is harder to perceive: it does not suppress particular opinions but narrows the range of opinions that a community is equipped to form. Both observed that it is amplified by, and in important respects inseparable from, the material infrastructure through which opinion is produced and circulated. Yet neither developed a precise conceptual vocabulary for naming it. Tocqueville gestured toward it through metaphor — the “formidable circle around thought,” the “immense pressure of the mind of all on the intelligence of each.” Mill theorized its consequences — dead dogma, intellectual atrophy, the slumber of decided opinion — without isolating it as a distinct category of power. The concept I propose here is an attempt to complete what they began.

    I call it epistemic domination — a term I adapt from recent work in postcolonial and feminist epistemology, where it has been used to describe the imposition of dominant knowledge systems on marginalized communities.[^27] In that literature, epistemic domination names the process by which colonial or hegemonic epistemic frameworks displace alternative ways of knowing — what Bethwell Ogot has described as the denial of intellectual agency to colonized peoples, and what Kristie Dotson and others have theorized as a structural form of epistemic oppression that goes beyond the interpersonal wrongs identified by Fricker.[^28] I retain the term because it captures something that these scholars have recognized more clearly than the mainstream of political theory: that control over the conditions of knowledge is a distinctive and irreducible form of power. But I redeploy it in a different register. Where the postcolonial usage centers on the displacement of one epistemic tradition by another — Western over indigenous, dominant over subaltern — I use the term to name a structural condition in which a single actor controls the infrastructure through which an entire political community encounters, evaluates, and interprets information, regardless of which epistemic tradition is at stake. The domination I describe is not the triumph of one way of knowing over another. It is the concentration of control over the conditions under which all knowing takes place.

    More precisely: epistemic domination, as I use the term here, denotes the capacity of an actor to arbitrarily shape the epistemic conditions — the available information, the operative framings, the range of interpretations that appear plausible, the questions that are treated as worth asking — under which a political community forms its beliefs, preferences, and judgments. The emphasis on capacity is deliberate. Like Pettit’s republican domination, epistemic domination is a structural condition, not an event. It obtains whenever an actor possesses the ability to reshape the epistemic environment at will, whether or not that ability is exercised on any given occasion. A community subject to epistemic domination may, at any particular moment, enjoy a rich and diverse informational environment. The domination consists in the fact that this condition is contingent on the will of another — that the actor who controls the epistemic infrastructure could, if it chose, narrow, distort, or redirect the flow of information, interpretation, and framing on which the community’s judgment depends.

    The emphasis on arbitrarily is equally important. Not all shaping of epistemic conditions constitutes domination. Editors exercise judgment about what to publish; teachers select curricula; governments fund some research programs and not others. These activities shape the epistemic environment, but they do so under constraints — professional norms, institutional accountability, democratic authorization, competitive pressures — that limit the arbitrariness of the shaping. Epistemic domination obtains when the shaping is not subject to adequate constraints of this kind: when the actor who controls the epistemic infrastructure is not meaningfully accountable to the community whose epistemic conditions it shapes, and when no institutional mechanism exists through which that community can contest, check, or redirect the shaping.

    Four existing bodies of work approach the phenomenon I am describing. Each illuminates an aspect of it, but none captures the whole.

    The postcolonial and feminist epistemology literature from which I draw the term comes closest to recognizing epistemic domination as a structural condition rather than an interpersonal wrong.[^29] Irfan Ahmad has usefully emphasized the temporal dimension of epistemic domination — the way in which dominant knowledge systems naturalize particular conceptions of historical time and progress, rendering alternative temporalities unintelligible.[^30] This structural orientation is essential to the concept as I develop it here. But the postcolonial usage is primarily concerned with asymmetries between epistemic communities — with the domination of one tradition of knowledge by another. The form of epistemic domination I identify operates within a single political community and affects all its members, including those whose epistemic traditions are dominant. When a handful of corporations control the infrastructure through which information is encountered and interpreted, the resulting domination is not a matter of which cultural tradition prevails. It is a matter of who controls the background conditions against which all traditions — dominant and marginalized alike — must operate.

    The second neighboring concept is Philip Pettit’s republican conception of domination as arbitrary interference.[^31] Pettit’s account has the right structural form: domination is a condition of vulnerability to arbitrary power, not a discrete act of oppression, and it can obtain even when the dominating party is benevolent. But Pettit’s framework is oriented toward interference — toward acts that constrain the choices available to the dominated agent. Epistemic domination does not primarily constrain choices. It shapes the conditions under which choices are conceived. A citizen subject to epistemic domination may face no interference whatsoever in the Pettitian sense: no one restricts her options, penalizes her decisions, or coerces her behavior. What is shaped, rather, is the informational and interpretive environment within which she identifies her options, understands their significance, and forms her preferences among them. This is a form of power that operates upstream of the domain in which Pettit’s domination does its work — not at the point of decision but at the point where the materials for decision are assembled.[^32]

    The third neighboring concept is Miranda Fricker’s epistemic injustice, which identifies two forms of wrong done to individuals in their capacity as knowers: testimonial injustice, in which a speaker’s credibility is unfairly deflated due to prejudice, and hermeneutical injustice, in which a gap in collective interpretive resources prevents someone from making sense of their own experience.[^33] Fricker’s framework is illuminating, particularly her recognition that epistemic wrongs can be structural rather than merely interpersonal. But her account is oriented toward injustices suffered by particular knowers — individuals or groups who are disadvantaged in specific epistemic transactions. Epistemic domination, by contrast, is a condition that affects the entire community, including those who benefit from it in the short run. The domination is not a matter of who is believed or whose experience can be articulated. It is a matter of who controls the background conditions against which all believing and articulating takes place.

    The fourth neighboring concept is the Marxist and Gramscian tradition of ideological domination — the claim that ruling classes maintain their power in part by shaping the beliefs, values, and interpretive frameworks of subordinate classes.[^34] This tradition captures something essential: that power can operate through the constitution of the taken-for-granted, not merely through force or institutional authority. But ideological domination, in both its classical and Gramscian forms, presupposes a relatively coherent ideological content — a set of beliefs or values that serves the interests of the dominant class and is propagated, deliberately or through structural mechanisms, to the dominated. Epistemic domination need not operate through the imposition of any particular ideology. It can operate through fragmentation as readily as through false consciousness — through the production of confusion, the erosion of shared epistemic standards, the flooding of the informational environment with noise, or the algorithmic amplification of engagement over accuracy. An actor who dominates a community’s epistemic conditions need not persuade that community of anything in particular. It is sufficient to control the infrastructure through which persuasion, inquiry, and interpretation take place.

    The concept of epistemic domination thus occupies a distinctive position in the theoretical landscape. What Tocqueville described as the narrowing of “thinkable thought” and Mill theorized as the atrophy of society’s capacity for independent judgment is, I am suggesting, best understood as a problem of domination — of arbitrary, unaccountable control over the epistemic conditions on which self-governance depends.

    One feature of this concept deserves special emphasis. Epistemic domination represents a threat to democratic self-governance that is in a critical sense prior to the concerns that occupy most democratic theory. Theories of deliberative democracy presuppose citizens who arrive at deliberation with beliefs, preferences, and interpretive frameworks that are, in some meaningful sense, their own.[^35] Theories of aggregative democracy presuppose that the preferences expressed through voting reflect the authentic judgments of voters.[^36] Theories of representation presuppose that constituents are capable of evaluating the performance of their representatives against some standard of their own devising.[^37] Epistemic domination threatens each of these presuppositions at its root. If the conditions under which citizens form their beliefs, preferences, and interpretive frameworks are themselves subject to arbitrary control by an unaccountable actor, then the outputs of deliberation, aggregation, and representation are compromised at their source — not because any particular stage of the democratic process has been corrupted, but because the epistemic inputs on which every stage depends have been shaped by a power that is neither democratically authorized nor democratically accountable. This is the sense in which democratic theory has been operating with an incomplete account of what self-governance requires: it has attended carefully to the procedures through which collective decisions are made, while largely taking for granted the epistemic conditions that make those procedures meaningful.

    The Contemporary Realization

    Every communications revolution generates new possibilities for epistemic domination — and new theoretical vocabularies for understanding them. Tocqueville wrote in the shadow of the mass-circulation press; Mill watched the consolidation of Victorian journalism concentrate opinion-formation in fewer hands. Each identified a structural threat to the epistemic conditions of self-governance that the previous generation’s theoretical vocabulary was inadequate to name. We are living through an analogous moment, though the transformation underway differs from its predecessors not merely in scale but in kind.

    The difference can be stated precisely. The mass-circulation press that Tocqueville and Mill confronted was a technology of distribution. It determined which opinions, interpretations, and framings reached a broad public, and it concentrated that determination in a relatively small number of editors and proprietors. But it operated on finished epistemic products — articles, editorials, arguments — that were composed by identifiable authors, subject to professional norms, and available for public scrutiny. The epistemic environment was shaped, but the mechanisms of shaping were legible.

    The infrastructure controlled by contemporary technology corporations operates at a different level. Companies such as Google and Meta do not merely distribute finished epistemic products to a mass audience. Through the design of search algorithms, recommender systems, and content curation mechanisms, they shape the conditions of epistemic encounter itself: the process by which individuals come to be presented with information, the criteria by which some claims are rendered salient and others invisible, and the framings within which new events are interpreted. The distinction matters because it marks the difference between controlling a channel and controlling an environment. A newspaper editor decides what to print. A search algorithm determines what it is possible to find. A recommender system shapes not merely which opinions a citizen encounters but the sequence, context, and affective framing in which she encounters them — conditions that cognitive science has shown to be at least as consequential for judgment as the propositional content of the opinions themselves.[^38] Shoshana Zuboff’s influential account of “surveillance capitalism” captures important dimensions of this transformation, particularly the extraction of behavioral data and its deployment for purposes of prediction and modification.[^39] But Zuboff’s framework is oriented toward the economic logic of data extraction and the threats it poses to individual autonomy. It does not theorize the specifically political dimension of the problem — the way in which corporate control over epistemic infrastructure undermines the conditions of democratic self-governance as such. The concept of epistemic domination names a political condition, not merely an economic practice.

    Three features of this infrastructure make it a qualitatively new site of epistemic domination, rather than simply the latest chapter in the familiar story of media concentration.

    The first is opacity. The editorial judgments of a newspaper proprietor are, at least in principle, recoverable. One can read the paper, compare it with rivals, and form a reasonably accurate picture of how the proprietor shapes the epistemic environment. The algorithmic systems that curate search results and populate news feeds are not recoverable in this way. They are proprietary, complex beyond the interpretive capacity of individual users, and frequently beyond the full understanding of the engineers who designed them.[^40] Citizens subject to this form of epistemic shaping cannot, even in principle, identify the mechanisms by which their informational environment has been constituted. The circle drawn around thought is invisible to those inside it. This opacity does not merely make epistemic domination harder to resist; it makes it harder to perceive. Under the conditions Tocqueville described, citizens could at least recognize the social pressure to conform, even if they lacked the resources to withstand it. Under conditions of algorithmic opacity, the shaping of the epistemic environment presents itself not as pressure but as the natural order of available information — as simply what there is to know.

    The second is personalization. Mass media, for all its concentrating effects, at least imposed a common epistemic environment. Citizens reading the same newspaper inhabited a shared informational world, even if that world was partial and curated. This commonality had a paradoxical benefit: precisely because the distortion was shared, it was in principle detectable. Algorithmic systems eliminate this possibility by producing individuated epistemic environments — news feeds, search results, and recommendation streams tailored to each user’s inferred preferences and behavioral profile. The result is not a single “formidable circle around thought” but millions of individually drawn circles, each shaped by the same infrastructure yet enclosing different informational worlds.[^41] Mill’s fear that the disappearance of intellectual friction would reduce living truth to dead dogma finds its most efficient realization in recommender systems that maximize engagement by presenting users with increasingly refined variations of what they already believe — precision instruments for producing the “deep slumber of a decided opinion.”

    The third is generativity, and it marks the sharpest discontinuity — not only with the press that Tocqueville and Mill confronted, but with the social media platforms and search engines that have dominated discussion of technology and democracy over the past decade. Previous concentrations of communicative power, including the platform-based concentrations that currently preoccupy scholars and regulators, operate on human-produced content. They curate, amplify, or suppress, but the underlying epistemic material is composed by identifiable human agents with their own intentions and commitments. Large language models and generative AI systems introduce a genuinely novel element: the capacity to produce plausible text, argument, and interpretation at scale, without an identifiable author and without the constraints — accountability, reputation, professional norms — that have historically operated as checks on the production of public speech.[^42]

    This last feature deserves particular emphasis because it distinguishes the emerging form of epistemic domination from the one that has occupied most critical attention thus far. The epistemic domination exercised through search engines and social media platforms is primarily a domination of selection: it determines which human-produced claims, arguments, and framings are made visible or invisible to which audiences. This is a serious form of power, and the analysis of opacity and personalization applies to it fully. But it remains parasitic on a substrate of human epistemic production. The form of epistemic domination that generative AI makes possible is qualitatively different. It is a domination not merely of selection but of production — the capacity to generate plausible epistemic material at a scale and speed that can flood public discourse, simulate the texture of genuine argument, and erode the distinction between inquiry and fabrication. A corporation that controls both the generation and the curation of the epistemic material on which a political community relies does not merely shape which existing opinions citizens encounter. It shapes what there is to encounter.

    Existing regulatory and theoretical frameworks are inadequate to this phenomenon. Antitrust doctrine addresses market concentration, and recent proposals to apply it to technology companies have gained significant traction.[^43] But antitrust has no vocabulary for epistemic concentration. Its remedies — breaking up dominant firms, preventing anticompetitive mergers, imposing interoperability requirements — operate on market structure. A technology conglomerate can be divided into smaller units that collectively exercise the same epistemic domination, because the domination derives not from market share as such but from control over the epistemic infrastructure through which citizens form their judgments.

    Rights-based approaches fare no better. The liberal rights tradition offers powerful protections against identifiable acts of interference with individual expression — censorship, prior restraint, penalties for speech. But epistemic domination does not interfere with anyone’s expression. It shapes the background conditions against which expression takes place. A citizen whose epistemic environment has been constituted by algorithmic curation and generative AI has suffered no violation of her rights in any standard sense. She has not been silenced, censored, or coerced. She has been subjected to conditions that compromise her capacity for independent judgment without any of her formally recognized rights being engaged.[^44]

    Platform regulation — the most rapidly developing area of policy response — treats technology corporations as media companies: publishers or distributors of content subject to obligations of accuracy, fairness, or transparency.[^45] This framing captures something real. But assimilating the power of AI corporations to the familiar category of media power misses the deeper structural transformation. A media company operates within an epistemic environment that it did not create and does not fully control. A corporation that designs the search algorithms, curates the information feeds, and deploys the generative models through which citizens encounter the world does not operate within the epistemic environment. It constitutes that environment.

    What Tocqueville described as the emergent consequence of democratic equality and Mill theorized as the structural decay of intellectual life under conditions of homogeneity has, in the space of two decades, become the designed product of privately controlled infrastructure. The epistemic conditions of self-governance — the diversity of available interpretations, the friction between competing perspectives, the capacity of citizens to form judgments on the basis of an informational environment they can scrutinize and contest — are now contingent on the decisions of a remarkably small number of corporate actors who are neither democratically authorized nor democratically accountable. This is epistemic domination in its most complete contemporary form. The question it poses for democratic theory is not how to regulate a new kind of media company, but how to ensure that the epistemic conditions on which self-governance depends are not subject to the arbitrary will of any actor — public or private.

    Conclusion

    I have argued that democratic theory has been operating with an incomplete account of what self-governance requires. The tradition has attended carefully to the procedures through which collective decisions are made — to the design of deliberative institutions, the aggregation of preferences, the authorization of representatives — while largely taking for granted the epistemic conditions that make those procedures meaningful. Tocqueville and Mill understood, more clearly than we have generally recognized, that these conditions are neither natural nor self-sustaining. Both theorized a form of power that operates not on what citizens are permitted to think but on what they are equipped to think — a power that narrows the range of available interpretations, erodes the friction on which sound collective judgment depends, and does so without engaging the categories of coercion, censorship, or rights-violation through which political theory has traditionally identified threats to freedom.

    The concept of epistemic domination is an attempt to give this form of power a precise name and a precise location in our theoretical vocabulary. It is not reducible to republican domination, epistemic injustice, ideological hegemony, or the postcolonial critique of dominant knowledge systems, though it draws on and learns from each. It identifies a structural condition — the arbitrary, unaccountable control of the epistemic infrastructure on which a political community depends — that is prior to and more fundamental than the procedural questions that have occupied most democratic theory. If the epistemic inputs of democratic life are themselves subject to domination, then no procedural reform, however well designed, can be sufficient to secure self-governance.

    This paper has been primarily diagnostic rather than prescriptive, and deliberately so. The construction of institutional responses to epistemic domination — responses that might secure what we could call epistemic non-domination as a condition of democratic life — is a task that exceeds the scope of a single article.[^46] But the shape of such responses can at least be gestured toward. They would need to address not merely the content that circulates within the epistemic environment but the control of the infrastructure itself. They would need to ensure that no single actor — public or private — possesses the arbitrary capacity to reshape the conditions under which citizens form their judgments. They would need, in short, to extend the democratic demand for non-domination from the domain of political decision-making, where it has long been recognized, to the domain of epistemic conditions, where it has not. What Tocqueville and Mill understood, and what we have been slow to remember, is that the greatest threats to self-governance are often invisible precisely because they operate on the conditions of thought itself.

    [^1]: For an overview of this turn, see [PT corporations piece, Vol. 53, Issue 4 — citation to be completed].

    [^2]: Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

    [^3]: Isabelle Ferreras, Firms as Political Entities: Saving Democracy through Economic Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

    [^4]: David Ciepley, “Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 139–58.

    [^5]: This reading is prominent in constitutional theory and Federalist political thought. See, e.g., the invocations of Tocqueville in discussions of countermajoritarian institutions in Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

    [^6]: For representative versions of this reading, see Jon Elster, Alexis de Tocqueville: The First Social Scientist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 149–55; Larry Siedentop, Tocqueville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 67–73.

    [^7]: Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Volume II, Part 1. All subsequent citations refer to this edition.

    [^8]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.1.2, 409.

    [^9]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.1.2, 409.

    [^10]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.1.2, 409.

    [^11]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.1.2, 410.

    [^12]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I.2.7, 244.

    [^13]: Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), especially chapters 9–12.

    [^14]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.1.2, 410.

    [^15]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.1.2, 411.

    [^16]: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II.4.6, 663.

    [^17]: On the transformation of the American press in this period, see Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 125–52.

    [^18]: For a representative treatment, see Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 15–34.

    [^19]: John Stuart Mill, “Civilization,” in Essays on Politics and Culture, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), 51. The essay was first published in the London and Westminster Review in April 1836.

    [^20]: Mill to Tocqueville, 1840. The Mill-Tocqueville correspondence is usefully discussed in H. O. Pappé, “Mill and Tocqueville,” Journal of the History of Ideas 25, no. 2 (1964): 217–34. The specific phrasing should be verified against The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XIII, ed. Francis E. Mineka and Dwight N. Lindley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963).

    [^21]: This is the standard pedagogical summary. See, e.g., Jonathan Riley, Mill on Liberty (London: Routledge, 1998), chapter 3.

    [^22]: John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 34. All subsequent citations refer to this edition.

    [^23]: Mill, On Liberty, 38.

    [^24]: Mill, On Liberty, 39.

    [^25]: On the “taxes on knowledge” and their repeal, see Martin Hewitt, The Dawn of the Cheap Press in Victorian Britain: The End of the ‘Taxes on Knowledge,’ 1849–1869 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

    [^26]: Aled Jones, Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power and the Public in Nineteenth-Century England (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996), chapters 4–5; see also Stefan Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850–1930 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), chapters 1–2.

    [^27]: The term appears with increasing frequency in postcolonial and feminist epistemology. See especially Kristie Dotson, “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression,” Social Epistemology 28, no. 2 (2014): 115–38; Bethwell A. Ogot, “Rereading the History and Historiography of Epistemic Domination and Resistance in Africa,” African Studies Review 52, no. 1 (2009): 1–22; and Vrinda Vaditya, “Social Domination and Epistemic Marginalisation: Towards Methodology of the Oppressed,” Social Epistemology 32, no. 4 (2018): 272–85.

    [^28]: Dotson, “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression,” 115–20; see also Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., “Epistemic Oppression,” in The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Philosophy, ed. Kim Q. Hall and Ásta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), who recommends “epistemic domination” as the more encompassing term.

    [^29]: Kiefer Roberts Harris, “Epistemic Domination,” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2022): 42–52, develops the concept in a broadly feminist epistemological framework, with attention to the structural conditions under which epistemic agency is compromised.

    [^30]: Irfan Ahmad, “The Time of Epistemic Domination,” ReOrient 6, no. 2 (2021): 171–97.

    [^31]: Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), especially chapters 2–3; see also Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

    [^32]: The language of “upstream” and “downstream” in relation to preference formation draws on, though is not identical to, Cass Sunstein’s discussion of adaptive preferences in Free Markets and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13–31.

    [^33]: Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

    [^34]: Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), especially 12–13, 52–55, 195–96. For a useful overview of the development of the concept of hegemony, see Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” New Left Review 100 (1976): 5–78.

    [^35]: See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 304–8.

    [^36]: See, e.g., William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982).

    [^37]: See, e.g., Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), especially chapters 7–8.

    [^38]: On the effects of framing, sequence, and context on judgment, the foundational work remains Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453–58. For a recent treatment of algorithmic framing effects specifically, see Cass R. Sunstein, “Algorithms, Correcting Biases,” Social Research 86, no. 2 (2019): 499–511.

    [^39]: Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019). Zuboff’s analysis is invaluable for understanding the economic logic of data extraction, but her central categories — “behavioral surplus,” “prediction products,” “instrumentarian power” — are oriented toward the commodification of experience rather than the political conditions of self-governance. The concept of epistemic domination differs in locating the threat not in what corporations extract from citizens but in what they impose upon the epistemic conditions within which citizens reason and judge.

    [^40]: On the opacity of algorithmic systems as a distinctive political problem, see Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); and Jenna Burrell, “How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms,” Big Data & Society 3, no. 1 (2016): 1–12.

    [^41]: The fragmentation of shared epistemic environments is discussed in Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (New York: Penguin, 2011); for a more rigorous empirical treatment, see Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing, and Lila A. Adamic, “Exposure to Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on Facebook,” Science 348, no. 6239 (2015): 1130–32.

    [^42]: On the epistemic implications of generative AI, see Regina Rini, “Deepfakes and the Epistemic Backstop,” Philosopher’s Imprint 20, no. 24 (2020): 1–16, on the erosion of testimonial norms by synthetic media.

    [^43]: See Lina Khan, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” Yale Law Journal 126, no. 3 (2017): 710–805; and Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018).

    [^44]: For a discussion of the limits of rights-based frameworks in addressing structural epistemic conditions, see K. Sabeel Rahman, “The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept,” Cardozo Law Review 39, no. 5 (2018): 1621–89.

    [^45]: On platform regulation as media regulation, see Philip Napoli, “Social Media and the Public Interest: Governance of News Platforms in the Realm of Market Failures,” Telecommunications Policy 39, no. 9 (2015): 751–60. The European Union’s Digital Services Act (2022) represents the most ambitious effort in this direction; see Regulation (EU) 2022/2065.

    [^46]: I develop the concept of epistemic non-domination and its institutional implications in a companion piece currently in preparation.

    1

    The dissertation by my Persuasion colleague Francis Fukuyama was on international relations; but he studied political theory deeply, his dissertation was co-chaired by a political theorist, and his most influential works were nearly as much works of political theory as of comparative politics.

    2

    The substance of the original idea was very similar: “Political theorists have recently begun taking corporations seriously as political-theoretic objects (there’s a piece on this in Political Theory 53:4). But the AI companies represent something unprecedented: entities whose products directly shape the epistemic environment, whose internal governance structures determine the boundaries of public discourse, and whose scale gives them quasi-sovereign power—yet which are theorized, when they’re theorized at all, through frameworks (antitrust, regulation, rights) that were designed for a fundamentally different kind of corporate actor. The paper would reconstruct what Tocqueville, Mill, and the anti-monopoly tradition actually feared about concentrated power, and argue that those fears are more precisely realized by AI corporations than by the trusts and monopolies those thinkers actually confronted. The key move: what’s distinctive isn’t market concentration per se, but the epistemic dimension of the concentration—these companies shape not just what people can buy but what people can know and think.”

    0 min
  • How To Build An Abundance Movement in Europe
    (Photo by Jens Büttner/picture alliance via Getty Images.)

    This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “Abundance in America.” This series aims to analyze the challenges hindering growth and development, as well as how to build a coalition around abundance.

    To receive future installments into your inbox—plus more great pieces by American Purpose and Francis Fukuyama’s blog—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the buttons for “American Purpose” and “Frankly Fukuyama.”

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    In the United States, the “abundance agenda” has emerged as a rallying cry for revitalizing economic dynamism: streamlining regulations, accelerating infrastructure, and unleashing innovation to deliver widespread prosperity. This approach recognizes that liberal democracy falters when it fails to provide tangible progress, breeding resentment and populist backlash.

    Europe, meanwhile, faces a parallel crisis. Persistent shortages in housing and infrastructure are eroding public trust, fueling the rise of far-right parties. As of early 2026, with economic growth sluggish at around 1% EU-wide and populist momentum showing no signs of abating, an abundance-oriented strategy—one that is centered on pro-growth policies and targeted deregulation—offers a path to reclaiming liberalism’s promise of opportunity for all.

    Europe’s shortages are structural failures that exacerbate inequality and alienate voters. Housing affordability has deteriorated sharply over the past decade, with average house prices rising by more than 60% EU-wide since 2010 and rents surging by 30%. In high-demand cities like Berlin, Paris, and Amsterdam, young professionals and lower-income families spend upwards of 40% of their disposable income on housing, far exceeding the EU average of 9% for energy poverty alone.

    Building permits—a key indicator of future supply—have plummeted since 2021, declining by around 20% across the EU by 2024, with steeper drops in Germany (43% between 2021 and 2024) and Austria (over 40%). The COVID-19 aftershocks, high financing costs, and regulatory bottlenecks have compounded this, leaving an estimated housing demand gap of 925,000 units in 2025.

    This stagnation is also reflected in infrastructure. Europe’s energy transition, while ambitious, has exposed vulnerabilities: grid congestion, delayed transport projects, and underinvestment in utilities have driven up costs and slowed deployment. For instance, per-kilometer rail construction in Germany and Portugal is cheaper than in the United States, but cross-border delays and regulatory complexity persist.

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    The European Commission estimates that 82 million households—about a third of the EU’s total—are overburdened by accommodation costs, while competitiveness is further hindered by broader infrastructure gaps in clean energy and transport. These shortages are not evenly distributed; urban “magnet cities,” where demand outpaces supply, bear the brunt, leading to overcrowding and social strain.

    This scarcity mindset has become fertile ground for populism. Across Europe, housing and infrastructure frustrations are increasingly linked to right-wing and even far-right gains. Research from the Progressive Politics Research Network shows that dramatic rent increases and affordability crises erode support for center-left parties, pushing voters toward anti-establishment alternatives. In regions where house prices stagnate or fall relative to national averages, lower-income voters turn to populist right-wing parties, which exploit these issues by blaming immigrants for resource competition.

    For example, in Germany and the Netherlands, centrist governments faced backlash in the 2025 elections over unmet housing promises, while far-right groups like Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) gained traction by tying shortages to migration. Studies confirm this pattern: soaring rents correlate with up to 6 percentage point increases in far-right support in affected areas, from Greek islands during the 2015 refugee crisis to urban France today.

    The parallels with the United States are striking. There, housing shortages in coastal cities and infrastructure delays have fueled discontent, contributing to populist surges like Trumpism. In both contexts, perceived scarcity breeds zero-sum thinking: “There’s not enough to go around, so outsiders must be the problem.” Europe’s version is more insidious, interwoven with the continent’s migration debates and post-pandemic recovery.

    As UN experts warned in 2024, failing to address housing risks amplifying far-right narratives, turning a social crisis into a political one. In Ireland, far-right actors have explicitly linked housing shortages to immigration, creating resonant narratives amid persistent structural issues. This dynamic threatens liberal democracy’s core: when institutions fail to deliver basics like shelter and reliable infrastructure, citizens lose faith, opening doors to authoritarian appeals.

    An abundance agenda for Europe must confront these failures head-on, prioritizing pro-growth strategies that reduce barriers to building and innovation. The EU’s first-ever Affordable Housing Plan, unveiled in December 2025, marks a promising start. Structured around four pillars—boosting supply, mobilizing investment, enabling reforms, and supporting the vulnerable—it aims to slash red tape, unlock public funding, and address short-term rental companies like Airbnb, which exacerbate scarcity in tourist hotspots.

    The plan accelerates from 2026, proposing revisions to state aid rules for broader housing support and a Pan-European Investment Platform, potentially saving billions in speculative pressures. By earmarking €19.6 billion from the Recovery and Resilience Facility for affordable housing, it signals a shift toward results-oriented governance.

    Deregulation, thoughtfully applied, is key. Europe’s “vetocracy”—layers of permitting, environmental reviews, and local vetoes—has stifled progress. Streamlining these without sacrificing standards could accelerate deployment: for housing, it would mean faster approvals for modular construction and repurposing vacant spaces; for infrastructure, simplified EU-wide tenders for green energy grids and transport. Some national examples show promise in this area: Germany’s proposed €500 billion fund for grids, transport, and defense aims to boost state capacity, while Denmark’s model of centralized planning has mitigated some shortages. Pro-growth reforms should balance environmental goals with speed—e.g. earmarking more carbon market revenues for the Social Climate Fund, expected at €65 billion from 2026-2032, to support vulnerable households in transition.

    Critics warn of a race to the bottom, but abundance liberalism isn’t neoliberal deregulation; it’s about enabling building while upholding rights. As EU Commissioner Teresa Ribera emphasized in 2026, high standards in green and digital sectors drive competitiveness, not hinder it. By fostering innovation ecosystems—e.g. through the New European Bauhaus for sustainable design—the EU can create jobs in construction and low-carbon tech, countering populist zero-sum frames. This requires €363 million in annual savings from regulatory simplification, as per the 2025 chemicals omnibus, extended to housing and infrastructure.

    Comparatively, Europe’s mixed systems—which enable, for example, stronger national planning in Nordic countries than would be possible under U.S.-style localism—offer advantages. Yet without action, stagnation persists: ING forecasts only 1.5% construction growth in 2026, after flatlining in 2025. An abundance approach could flip this and deliver optimism.

    Europe’s shortages are not inevitable; they stem from regulatory inertia and underinvestment. By embracing pro-growth deregulation—streamlining permits, mobilizing funds, and prioritizing abundance—liberal democracies can reclaim the narrative from populists. This isn’t just economic policy; it’s a defense of liberalism itself, ensuring it delivers not just rights, but results. As 2026 unfolds, the time for bold reforms is now. Failure risks more than economic lag—it endangers the open society Europe has built.

    Jesper Steenstrup Vogelius is a Danish political consultant based in Copenhagen.

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    0 min
  • Episode 181: Hélène Landemore on Politics Without Politicians

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    This week, Richard Aldous talks to Hélène Landemore, author of Politics Without Politicians: The Case for Citizen Rule (Thesis).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

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    29 min

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