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By Yascha Mounk
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  • The Meaning of Anthropic vs the Pentagon
    Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth inspecting Multi-Domain Autonomous systems July, 2025. (Photo by Win McNamee.)I.

    A little more than a decade ago, I sat with my father and watched him die. Six months prior, he had been a vigorous man, stronger than I am today, faster and more resilient on a bike than most 20-somethings. Then one day he got heart surgery and he was never the same. His soul had been sucked out of him, the life gone from his eyes. There were moments of vivacity, when my father came back into his aging body, but these became rarer with time. His coherence faded, his voice grew quieter.

    He spent those six months in and out of the hospital. And then on his last day he went into hospice. That day he barely uttered any words at all. In the final hours of his life, my father was practically already dead. He lay on the hospital bed. His breathing gradually slowed and became less audible. Eventually you could barely hear him at all, save for the eerie death rattle, a product of a body no longer able even to swallow. A body that cannot swallow also cannot eat or drink, and in that sense it has already thrown in the towel.

    I spoke with him, more than once, in private. I held his hand and tried to say goodbye. My mother came into the room, and all three of us held hands. Eventually a machine declared with a long beep that he had crossed some line, though it was an invisible one for the humans in the room. My father died in the late afternoon of December 26, 2014.

    A few days and eleven years later, on December 30, 2025, my son was born. I have watched death as it happens, and I have watched birth. What I learned is that neither are discrete events. They are both processes, things that unfold. Birth is a series of awakenings, and death is a series of sleepenings. My son will take years to be born, and my father took six months to die. Some people spend decades dying.

    II.

    At some point during my lifetime—I am not sure when—the American republic as we know it began to die. Like most natural deaths, the causes are numerous and interwoven. No one incident, emergency, attack, president, political party, law, idea, person, corporation, technology, mistake, betrayal, failure, misconception, or foreign adversary “caused” death to begin, though all those things and more contributed. I don’t know where we are in the death process, but I know we are in the hospice room. I’ve known it for a while, though I have sometimes been in denial, as all mourners are wont to do. I don’t like to talk about it; I am at the stage where talking about it usually only inflicts pain.

    Unfortunately, however, I cannot carry out my job as a writer today without acknowledging that we are sitting in hospice. It is increasingly difficult to honestly discuss the developments of frontier AI, and what kind of future we should aim to build, without acknowledging our place at the deathbed of the republic as we know it. Except there is no convenient machine to decide for us that the patient has died. We just have to sit and watch.

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    Our republic has died and been reborn again more than once in America’s history. America has had multiple “foundings.” Perhaps we are on the verge of another rebirth of the American republic, another chapter in America’s continual reinvention of itself. I hope so. But it may be that we have no more virtue or wisdom to fuel such a founding, and that it is better to think of ourselves as transitioning gradually into an era of post-republic American statecraft and policymaking. I do not pretend to know.

    This brings me to a skirmish between an AI company and the U.S. government. I don’t want to sound hyperbolic about it. The death I am describing has been going on for most of my life. This particular incident took place last week, and it may even be halfway satisfyingly resolved within a day.

    I am not saying this incident “caused” any sort of republican death, nor am I saying it “ushered in a new era.” If this event contributed anything, it simply made the ongoing death more obvious and less deniable for me personally. I consider the events of the last week a kind of death rattle of the old republic, the outward expression of a body that has thrown in the towel.

    III.

    Here are the facts as I understand them: during the Biden administration, the AI company Anthropic negotiated a deal with the Department of Defense (now known as the Department of War, hereafter referred to as DoW) for the use of the AI system Claude in classified contexts. That deal was expanded by the Trump administration in July 2025 (full disclosure: I worked in the Trump administration at that time, though did not work on this deal). Other language models are available in unclassified settings, but until very recently, only Claude could be used for classified work, which is where the actions that involve intelligence gathering, active combat operations, and the like occur.

    The deal, first negotiated between the Biden team and Anthropic, included two usage restrictions. First, Claude could not be used for mass surveillance of Americans. Second, Claude could not be used to control lethal autonomous weapons, which are weapons that can identify, track, and kill targets with no human in the loop at any point in the process. When it negotiated the expanded deal, the Trump administration had the opportunity to review these terms. It did, and it accepted them.

    Trump officials claim to have changed their mind not so much because they want to do mass surveillance on Americans or use autonomous lethal weapons imminently, but because they object altogether to the notion of privately imposed limitations on the military’s use of technology. The administration’s change of heart on the terms of this deal has caused them to commit to a policy decision intended to harm or even destroy Anthropic, one of the fastest-growing firms in the history of capitalism, and arguably the current world leader in AI, an industry the administration claims to believe is crucial to our country’s future. But we’ll get to that.

    IV.

    The Trump administration has a point: it does not sound right that private corporations can impose limitations on the military’s use of technology. Yet of course, thousands of private corporations do just that. Every transaction of technology between a private firm and the military involves a contract (indeed, the companies that do this are called defense contractors for a reason), and these contracts routinely contain operational use restrictions, technological limitations, and intellectual-property restrictions.

    In some ways, Anthropic’s terms resemble these traditional examples of privately imposed contractual limits on the military’s use of technology. The company’s position on autonomous lethal weapons, for example, is not one of outright opposition to the use of such weapons but instead a judgment that today’s frontier AI systems are not capable enough to autonomously make decisions about human life or death. This seems similar to existing cases where contractors negotiate stipulations on the use of their technology. The big difference, however, is that Anthropic is essentially using the contractual vehicle to impose what feel less like technical constraints and more like policy constraints on the military. (Think of the difference between “this fighter jet is not certified for flight above such-and-such an altitude, and if you fly above that altitude, you’ve breached your warranty,” and “you may not fly this jet above such-and-such an altitude”). It is probably the case that the military should not agree to terms like this, and private firms should not try to set them.

    But the Biden administration did agree to those terms, and so did the Trump administration, until it changed its mind. That alone should make one thing clear: terms like this are not some ridiculous violation of the norms of defense contracting. Anyone attempting to convince you otherwise is misinformed or lying.

    There is no law that says “contractual terms between the military and the private sector can have technical limitations, but not policy limitations,” in part because the line between those things is awfully hard to draw in timeless and universally applicable words (i.e. in a statute). The contract was not illegal, just perhaps unwise, and even that probably only in retrospect. Note that this is true even if you agree with the underlying substance of the limitations. You can support restrictions on mass domestic surveillance and lethal autonomous weapons, but disagree that a defense contract is the optimal vehicle to achieve that policy outcome. The way you achieve new policy outcomes, under the usual rules of our republic, is to pass a law.

    Except the notion of “passing a law” is increasingly a joke in contemporary America. If you are serious about the outcome in question, “passing a law” is no longer Plan A; the dynamic is more like “well of course, one day, we’ll get a law passed, but since we actually care about doing this sometime soon, as opposed to in 15 years, we’ll accomplish our objective through [some other procedure or legal vehicle].” With this, governance has become more and more informal and ad hoc, power more dependent on the executive (whose incentive is to jam through every goal he has in as little time as possible, since he only has the length of his term guaranteed to him), and the policy vehicles in question more and more unsuited to the circumstances of their deployment, or the objectives they are being deployed to accomplish.

    There are two concerns that the Trump administration says caused it to change its mind: number one, that Anthropic may impose these policy restrictions on them, by, say, pulling Claude from military use during active military operations. Number two, that these policy restrictions would be imposed by Anthropic in its capacity as a subcontractor for other DoW contractors. In other words, the DoW could come to rely upon some other company’s technology, which is in turn enabled by Claude and governed by the same terms of use that restrict domestic mass surveillance and autonomous lethal weapons (or, in the DoW’s mind, arbitrary new restrictions Anthropic could add at any time). Add to this the reality that the Trump administration perceives Anthropic to be its political enemy (they are probably right about this), and you have a situation in which the military suddenly realizes it is building reliance upon a firm it does not trust.

    The Department of War’s rational response here would have been to cancel Anthropic’s contract and make clear, in public, that such policy limitations are unacceptable. They could also have dealt with the above-mentioned subcontractor problem using a variety of tools, such as issuing guidance to contractors to avoid agreeing to terms with subcontractors that constitute policy/operational constraints. If Anthropic refused to compromise on its red lines for the military’s use of AI, the execution of such a policy would mean that Anthropic would be restricted from business with the DoW or any of its contractors in those contractors’ fulfillment of their classified DoW work.

    But this is not what the DoW did. Instead, the DoW insisted that the only reasonable path forward is for contracts to permit “all lawful use” (a simplistic notion not consistent with the common contractual restrictions discussed above), and has further threatened to designate Anthropic a supply chain risk. This is a power reserved exclusively for firms controlled by foreign adversary interests, such as Huawei, and usually means that the designated firm cannot be used by any military contractor in their fulfillment of any military contract.

    War Secretary Pete Hegseth has gone even further, saying he would prevent all military contractors from having “any commercial relations” with Anthropic. He almost surely lacks this power, but a plain reading of this would suggest that Anthropic would not be able to use any cloud computing nor purchase chips of its own (since all relevant companies do business with the military), and that several of Anthropic’s largest investors (Nvidia, Google, and Amazon) would be forced to divest. Essentially, the United States Secretary of War announced his intention to commit corporate murder. The fact that his shot is unlikely to be lethal (only very bloody) does not change the message sent to every investor and corporation in America: do business on our terms, or we will end your business.

    This development strikes at a core principle of the American republic, one that has traditionally been especially dear to conservatives: private property. Suppose, for example, that the military approached Google and said “we would like to purchase individualized worldwide Google search data to do with whatever we want, and if you object, we will designate you a supply chain risk.” I don’t think they are going to do that, but there is no difference in principle between this and the message the DoW is sending. There is no such thing as private property. If we need to use it for national security, we simply will. The government won’t quite “steal” it from you—they’ll compensate you—but you cannot set the terms, and you cannot simply exit from the transaction, lest you be deemed a “supply chain risk,” not to mention have the other litany of policy obstacles the government can throw at you.

    This threat will now hover over anyone who does business with the government, not just in the sense that you may be deemed a supply chain risk but also in the sense that any piece of technology you use could be as well. Though Chinese AI providers like DeepSeek have not explicitly been labeled supply chain risks (yes, really; this government has decided that Anthropic, an American company whose services it used in military strikes as recently as this past weekend, is more of a threat than a Chinese firm linked to the Chinese military), that implicit threat was always there.

    No entity with meaningful ties to government business would use DeepSeek, simply because the regulatory risk is too high. Now that the government has applied this regulation to an American company, the regulatory risk simply exists for all software. This action, combined with the broader political risk the government has created, will increase the cost of capital for the AI industry. Put more simply, this will mean less AI infrastructure and associated energy generation capacity.

    Stepping back even further, what the DoW has done could end up making AI less viable as a profitable industry. If corporations and foreign governments just cannot trust what the U.S. government might do next with the frontier AI companies, it means they cannot rely on that U.S. AI at all. Abroad, this will only increase the mostly pointless drive to develop home-grown models within Middle Powers, and we can probably declare the American AI Exports Program (which I worked on while in the Trump administration) dead on arrival.

    In short, I can see only downsides to the Trump administration’s decision to designate Anthropic a supply chain risk, particularly considering the far less costly policy alternatives it could have employed. One gets the sense that the people making these decisions at the DoW are not acting with strategic clarity nor any respect for the basic principles of the American republic—not to mention in stark contrast to President Trump’s own stated vision of letting AI thrive in America.

    V.

    With each passing presidential administration, American policymaking becomes yet more unpredictable, thuggish, arbitrary, and capricious—a gradual descent into madness. It is hard to know at what point ordered liberty itself simply evaporates and we fall into a purely tribal world.

    Even if Secretary Hegseth backs down and narrows his extremely broad threat against Anthropic, great damage has been done. Even in the narrowest supply chain risk designation, the government has still said that they will treat you like a foreign adversary—indeed, they will treat you in some ways worse than a foreign adversary—for refusing to capitulate to their terms of business. Simply for having different ideas, expressing those ideas in speech, and actualizing that speech in decisions about how to deploy and not deploy one’s property. Each of these is fundamental to our republic, and each was assaulted—not anything like for the first time but nonetheless in novel ways—by the Department of War last week. Most corporations, political actors, and others will have to operate under the assumption that the logic of the tribe will now reign.

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    There is something deeper about the damage done by the government, too. The Anthropic-DoW skirmish is the first major public debate that is truly about where the proper locus of control over frontier AI should be. Our public institutions behaved erratically, maliciously, and without strategic clarity. Our political leaders conveyed little understanding of their own actions, to say nothing of the technology and its stakes. They got off on an extraordinarily bad footing with leading AI companies, and it is hard to imagine their ever recovering, because they do not seem to care about improvement. The machinery of our current republic seems to be in such disrepair that it is hard to see how it lasts. No one knows what comes next, but I strongly suspect that whatever it is will be deeply intertwined with, and enabled by, advanced AI. It is with this that we will rebuild our world, as Tyler Cowen advised in a recent post. As we do, and as we have future debates about the proper nexus of control over frontier AI, I encourage you to avoid the assumption that “democratic” control—control “of the people, by the people, and for the people”—is synonymous with governmental control. The gap between these loci of control has always existed, but it is ever wider now.

    No matter what world we build, the limitations imposed in the law on what we know today as “the government’s” use of AI will be of paramount importance. We really do want to ensure that mass surveillance and autonomous weapons/systems of control cannot be used to curtail our liberties—at least we want to try. So I applaud the AI labs for caring about these red lines. Over the coming years and decades, I expect that our liberty will be in greater peril than many of us comprehend.

    Each of us gets to choose which futures we wish to fight against, which we can live with, and which we will fight for. As you make your choices, I suggest ignoring the din of the death rattle and trying to think with independence. Do not process this with the partisan blinders of 20th century mass politics; one way or another, you are entering a new era of institution-building in living color.

    Before you get to all that, though, take a moment to mourn the republic that was.

    Dean W. Ball served as Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, where he was the primary staff drafter of America’s AI Action Plan. He writes the AI-focused newsletter Hyperdimensional.

    A version of this article was originally published in Hyperdimensional.

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  • Two Ways To Understand the Peril Facing American Democracy
    Donald Trump delivers the State of the Union address on February 24, 2026. (Photo by Kenny Holston-Pool/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Among his critics, reactions to Donald Trump’s second presidency seem to fall into two broad categories. The first contextualizes the current moment within America’s political history by studying previous episodes of political turmoil and conflict. The second tries to understand it through the experiences of other countries that have seen their leaders entrench themselves and embrace an expansive understanding of their power.

    Anecdotally, the former mindset seems more common among Americans, including many leading intellectuals. The United States, after all, is a big country, and takes considerable and justified pride in its exceptionalism. For people born and brought up firmly within American political culture, it is only natural to try to answer questions about America’s present primarily by using its past as a framework.

    Conversely, one can expect transplants to the United States and outside observers—even sympathetic ones—to be less inclined to see America as an island unto itself, whose success and endurance are a natural default. Rather, it might come to them naturally to juxtapose the American experience against that of other countries.

    A representative of the first camp, Yuval Levin, my colleague at the American Enterprise Institute, has argued that by the standards of modern presidencies, Trump’s has been less transformational than the bombastic headlines and delirious media cycles suggest. Yes, the southern border has been closed, and immigration enforcement has escalated dramatically. Extraordinary foreign policy moves have been made in global theaters from Gaza through Iran to Venezuela. Yet, Levin argues, “Trump has signed fewer pieces of legislation than any president in the modern era.” His executive orders are almost as ephemeral as his Truth Social posts, waiting to be rolled back by the next Democratic administration.

    Furthermore, U.S. history itself is complicated, “a union of liberal and illiberal forces,” as the George Mason University economist and polymath Tyler Cowen puts it. Trump can be seen as a continuation of this mixed, complicated set of political traditions. Even the undisputed heroes of the American story—think Lincoln or FDR—were abusers of civil rights and put the U.S. constitutional system under stress. “Certainly, we are returning to some bad and illiberal behaviors of the past,” Cowen argues, “and it is right to be concerned. Yet this seems to be more a feature of the ebb and flow of American politics than a decisive turn away from liberalism.”

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    A focus on American history alone, clear-eyed as it may be, risks breeding a certain complacency. America may seem to contain multitudes, but its political history is only a narrow subsection of the human experience. The United States has seen a lot throughout its existence and its political institutions have survived and adapted. Today, despite ill-advised and irresponsible policies, the nation remains a powerhouse of economic vibrancy and innovation unparalleled in human history. It faces few immediate external threats. Thanks to its massive internal market, it can expect to thrive even if the rest of the world struggles economically.

    Despite these undeniable strengths, however, the United States is just a nation composed of fallible, flawed human beings. It may be a big, successful, and powerful one, but it is not immune to challenges commonly observed in other democracies—especially those that share some of the specific characteristics of the American system of government.

    That is precisely where a comparative perspective can be helpful, even if it leads to a set of conclusions that are considerably more “hair on fire” than what one may be able to conclude by judging America’s turbulent present solely by the standards of its (frequently turbulent) past.

    One simple observation, visible on indices of democratic quality and the rule of law, is that parliamentary democracies, monarchies, and republics tend to perform better than presidential and semi-presidential systems. In fact, parliamentary systems tend to be more stable and are, on average, associated with better economic outcomes.

    While the United States may have dodged the pattern for a long time, it is not unthinkable that it will eventually run out of luck. Just a few months before Trump’s descent down the golden escalator, Matt Yglesias suggested that the U.S. system might fail just like its various clones, most prominently in Latin America.

    He pointed to the gridlock that emerges when the executive and legislative branches are controlled by different factions. Because of the separation of powers, there is no formal way of negotiating conflicts between them. In a situation of extreme polarization, what ensues are irresolvable stand-offs and constitutional crises. This scenario, frequent during the Obama years, may materialize again following a possible Democratic takeover of Congress this fall. What is even worse, however, is that the United States has also witnessed a gradual erosion of the legislative branch, opening the door to executive aggrandizement—a path that canonically leads to democratic decline.

    The fact that Trump’s rule by executive decree might be reversed by his successor is no consolation. There is a term for a form of government in which incumbents serially abuse executive power yet can be occasionally voted out and replaced by another faction: competitive authoritarianism. While different from outright dictatorship, it still tends to yield poor outcomes—and it represents very much a departure from the constitutional architecture envisaged by the Founding Fathers.

    Likewise, even if Trump has neither a long-term agenda nor a path toward an effective consolidation of power, he and his ilk are inflicting enormous damage on the United States. Judging by the experience of other countries, including those that have fought off authoritarianism, the path to recovery will likely be long and difficult.

    If Viktor Orbán is voted out of power this spring—a big if—it would be foolish to expect Hungary to immediately switch to being a well-functioning liberal democracy. It is more likely that his successor will discover a plethora of ticking policy bombs, cadres of Fidesz loyalists across the public administration, and oligarchs banking on Orbán’s return. Even if the next government does address such challenges effectively, the tools it has will likely be illiberal (purging public administration of Fidesz loyalists, cracking down on Orbán-friendly business interests, etc.). As a result, the now-broken norms of political behavior are more likely to perpetuate in their brokenness instead of being glued together in a moment of national kumbaya.

    It is hard to see how it can be otherwise in the case of the United States. Many norms have been broken of late—norms surrounding corruption and conflicts of interest, integrity of federal criminal law, and the peaceful transfer of power. Consider, for example, Trump’s immediate reaction to the Supreme Court’s recent tariffs ruling, calling the majority justices “unpatriotic and disloyal to our Constitution.”

    Inflammatory rhetoric aside, for ten months the federal government was collecting revenue—amounting to $200 billion—from tariffs that were illegal. While the Court is to be applauded for pushing back against the administration, Trump has now simply invoked a different statute—using a similarly novel and expansive interpretation—in order to continue with his favorite tariff policy, still without authorization from Congress.

    Perhaps his effort to collect tariff revenue without Congress will eventually be thwarted by litigation. Yet even then, the United States will have reached a point where it appears perfectly acceptable for an administration to do illegal things, knowingly, without much in terms of political or other repercussions. Barring a fundamental shift in public opinion and political culture, how does one come back?

    Well, perhaps a major cultural shift is the only thing that can help. After all, comparative work suggests that incumbent entrenchment works best when backed by public opinion—which is why “populist discourse increases support for executive aggrandizement by framing the president as the genuine representative of the people and by portraying institutional opposition as corrupt.”

    While the base of Trump’s support appears fanatically solid, it is limited and declining. Nor has his effort gone far enough to derail and divide the opposition or render their work inherently fruitless. There is still a possibility of flushing the Trump phenomenon out of the system and restoring a commitment to broad political liberalism, as envisaged by those who founded the nation 250 years ago. However, the fact that the United States has muddled through with some success in the past is not a guarantee that it will do so again. And, if anything, the awareness of the possibility of failure, informed by the experience of less fortunate nations around the world, might help generate the sense of urgency that the current moment demands.

    Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist at American Purpose.

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  • What “Western Civilization” Really Means
    Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivers a keynote speech at the 62nd Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2026 in Munich, Germany. (Photo by Johannes Simon/Getty Images.)

    We are part of one civilization—Western civilization. We are bound to one another by the deepest bonds that nations could share, forged by centuries of shared history, Christian faith, culture, heritage, language, ancestry, and the sacrifices our forefathers made together for the common civilization to which we have fallen heir.

    —Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference, February 14, 2026.

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio got a standing ovation at the end of his talk at the Munich Security Conference in February, largely for his assertion, quoted above, that the United States and Europe are all part of a single “Western Civilization.” His listeners were doubtless gratified that he backed away from the aggressive nastiness towards Europe displayed by Vice President JD Vance the year before, and that he seemed to be anchoring the trans-Atlantic relationship in values, as countless American leaders had done in the years before the rise of Donald Trump.

    But what is the “Western Civilization” to which Rubio was referring? His version of it is likely to be quite different from the understanding of most contemporary Europeans, and from mine as well. (Rubio did manage to get in a dig at me and the “end of history.”)

    For an important group of American conservatives, “Western Civilization” denotes a specifically Christian civilization, and a culture built around active Christian belief. Rubio alludes to this by speaking not of “Christian heritage” but of “Christian faith” in his remarks. His list of shared aspects of common civilization also includes the words “heritage” and “ancestry,” which echo Vance’s use of the term “heritage Americans” to imply, it would seem, that our culture is based on a common ethnicity as well as shared religion.

    There is no question that Western civilization is rooted in “Christian heritage.” One of the deepest Christian values is belief in the universal equality of all human beings in the eyes of God. National conservatives mock the liberal belief in universal human equality, and Rubio himself argues that no one fights for an abstraction, but for a particular way of life. But there’s one important abstract idea that lies at the core of Christianity and of Western culture. It was expressed by the Apostle Paul in Galatians 3:28: “There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”

    Many important thinkers, from Alexis de Tocqueville to G.W.F. Hegel to Friedrich Nietzsche, have understood that Christianity spawned modern liberal democracy. Most people who defend human rights today do not do so in religious terms, but there is no question that modern understandings of rights descend from Christian religious beliefs.

    But in making this transition, Western civilization detached itself from any overt identification with religion. The reasons for this were historical: following the Protestant Reformation, Europeans spent the next 150 years killing each other over differing interpretations of Christian doctrine, over ideas like transubstantiation or childhood baptism. Since Medieval times, there has been no monolithic Christian doctrine; Protestantism spawned a “way of life” quite different from Catholicism.

    As a result of this disagreement over final ends, the Enlightenment founders of modern liberalism agreed to push religion into the realm of private belief, and to focus politics on life itself rather than the good life as defined by a particularly religious doctrine. In addition, early natural scientists were engaged in a prolonged struggle with the Catholic Church; it was only with the separation of empirical inquiry from religious dogma that modern natural science, and the economic world it made possible, emerged.

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    So there is in fact a very different understanding of Western civilization from the one that Rubio advances, one that is built around liberalism itself, encompassing Enlightenment values like openness, tolerance, and skepticism about received ideas. This version of Western civilization downgraded the role of religion in politics. We can fully acknowledge the Christian origins of many of our ideas about democratic rights without defining our shared civilization in religious terms. Indeed, societies were very diverse with regard to religious belief not just in the current era of mass migration, but all the way back to the sixteenth century.

    Even worse than shared religion is an effort to define our civilization in terms of “heritage” or “ancestry.” I hate to remind Marco Rubio, but his particular heritage and ancestry lead back to an authoritarian and Catholic Habsburg Empire, while that of James Monroe and Thomas Jefferson lead to a very different and more liberal Protestant part of Europe.

    Last month saw the passing of the civil rights leader Jesse Jackson. Jackson played a critical role in keeping alive the struggle for racial equality begun by his mentor Martin Luther King. But Jesse Jackson was decidedly unhelpful in one respect. Back in 1987 he came to Stanford University and participated in a march where students chanted “Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western Civ has got to go.” As a result of these sorts of pressures, Stanford and other elite universities got rid of their Western culture core courses, and replaced them with an incoherent mishmash of multicultural offerings. This was a big mistake.

    Jackson apparently disavowed this rejection of Western culture, as well he might. His own life was completely framed by Western civilization, under either of its definitions. He was a Christian minister in a civil rights movement that was led by other Christian ministers like Martin Luther King, who preached succor for, as Jesus put it in Matthew, “the least of these.” And he was also an advocate for universal human rights, someone whose advocacy was protected by a rule of law established by his nation’s Declaration of Independence and Constitution.

    This protection will not survive unless students in the West learn the history of their own culture. The only way to counter reactionary ideas like those of Rubio or Vance is to have a proper understanding of how Western civilization evolved and is today defined by liberal Enlightenment values that were originally rooted in Christian belief. It is these “abstract ideas” that define our way of life, and for which we should be willing to struggle and die today.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    This article has been updated to reflect the fact that Jesse Jackson disavowed the chant at Stanford.

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  • After Khamenei
    Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on February 24, 2026. (Photo by Iranian Presidency/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iranian regime’s longstanding supreme leader, marks the most consequential rupture in the Islamic Republic since 1989. For nearly four decades, Khamenei stood at the center of Iran’s political order. His power was not only constitutional but also ideological and, most importantly, coercive. He presided over the gradual transformation of the Islamic Republic from a revolutionary theocracy into what can be described as a theocratic security state, in which clerical legitimacy and security power became deeply intertwined. With his death, the system has lost its anchor. With the massive missile attacks against the regime, the question now is not only who will eventually replace him, but who will govern right now in this moment of uncertainty.

    Formally, the answer appears straightforward. Under Article 111 of the Iranian constitution, a three-member interim council assumes the duties of the Supreme Leader until the Assembly of Experts selects a successor. That council now consists of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi. Technically, this body exercises the Supreme Leader’s powers, supervising the armed forces, overseeing key appointments, and maintaining continuity in state authority.

    On paper, the composition of this council reflects institutional balance. Pezeshkian represents the executive branch, Ejei embodies the judiciary and the security-oriented legal apparatus, and Arafi provides clerical legitimacy and ensures that the transition remains anchored in the religious establishment. The arrangement projects constitutional order and political stability; it signals that the Islamic Republic remains in power despite the tumult, and that it has the necessary mechanisms to manage succession and avoid chaos.

    In reality, however, constitutional formality and political power rarely coincide in the Islamic Republic. Over the past three decades, real authority has increasingly shifted toward a security-elite coalition that operates beyond the state’s visible architecture. The institutions that matter most are not only those named in the constitution, but those that control coercion, intelligence, and elite coordination—meaning that the formally-named trio is not the ultimate authority.

    Behind the constitutional council stands a more consequential alignment centered around three power-brokers: Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei (the only one of the three to also serve on the official interim council), Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Ali Larijani. This is not a legally defined body, but an elite security and political nexus that reflects where decision-making power has accumulated over time.

    Ejei is more than the head of the judiciary. He has long been a central figure within Iran’s intelligence and prosecutorial networks, with a career rooted in repression, surveillance, and the management of dissent. His presence guarantees that the security institutions remain unified and that any sign of fragmentation is quickly contained.

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    Ghalibaf, as Speaker of Parliament and a former commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), bridges the military and political classes. He represents the bureaucratic and managerial face of the security state. Ghalibaf understands the Revolutionary Guard’s internal logic and maintains relationships across the more conservative factions. In a succession crisis, such networks are more important than formal titles. He is well-positioned to coordinate among parliament, the Guard, and other power centers, preventing institutional paralysis.

    Larijani occupies a different but equally significant role. As the former IRGC commander and speaker of parliament, with deep roots in the clerical establishment and extensive experience in national security, he functions as a power broker among elite factions. As the secretary of the most important security body, the Supreme National Security Council, Larijani is adept at navigating the complex terrain between ideology and “pragmatism.” In a system where consensus among elites is essential for survival, his ability to mediate and align interests has become central. With influence lying in networks rather than constitutional power, he does not need a formal seat in the interim council to shape his preferred outcomes.

    The distinction between the technical council of Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Arafi and the more substantive alignment of Ghalibaf, Larijani, and Ejei reveals an important feature of the Islamic Republic’s evolution: Over time, the regime has become less dependent on charismatic clerical authority and more reliant on institutionalized coercion and elite coordination. Khamenei’s personal dominance masked this shift, but his death exposes it.

    If the regime survives this transition, it is unlikely to move toward liberalization. On the contrary, the logic of succession under pressure tends to favor securitization. In the absence of a leader of Khamenei’s stature, the system will rely more heavily on collective elite management and on the security apparatus to deter both internal dissent and external pressure. The IRGC and its allied institutions will not allow instability to open space for popular mobilization. Repression, surveillance, and centralized coordination are likely to intensify rather than diminish.

    The Assembly of Experts will eventually select a new Supreme Leader—yet the identity of that individual may matter less than the structure that surrounds him. The future leader will inherit a state in which real power has already shifted toward a consolidated security elite. He may hold the title of Supreme Leader, but he will operate within a framework shaped by the very figures who managed the transition.

    Khamenei’s death so far signals a moment of reconfiguration. But the formal institutions continue to function and the security elite remains cohesive. The key question is whether this coalition can maintain unity under mounting U.S. and Israeli attacks and domestic and international pressure. If it does, Iran will likely emerge from this crisis, not weaker in coercive capacity, but more openly defined by it.

    Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.

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    0 min
  • Donald Trump, Interventionist
    Donald Trump monitors military operations against Iran on March 2, 2026. (Photo by The White House via X Account/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    Read our ongoing coverage of the conflict in the Middle East—including a podcast with Francis Fukuyama and the hopes (and fears) of an Iranian exile for her country’s future after Khamenei’s demise. If you value the work we do, please consider supporting our mission and upgrading to a paid subscription. Now more than ever, we need your support to allow us to pay our team and react to a world that gets crazier by the day.

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    My break from the right had many causes, but it began over the Iraq War of 2003. I have never wavered in thinking the decision to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein was a terrible mistake—basically, the geopolitical equivalent of committing negligent homicide in an act of drunk driving. I came to that view very early, before the war had begun, at a time when I assumed Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. I thought he could be deterred—and doubted the post-invasion attempt to foster a stable democracy would be successful. My views obviously didn’t soften or reverse once we discovered there were no hidden stockpiles of weapons. Hussein had been bluffing—to deter Iran and other regional powers—and the bluff turned out to be far too convincing for the dictator’s own good.

    Over the remainder of the Bush administration and then the entirety of the Obama administration, I listened to leading members of the Republican Party and its media cheerleaders stake out a position on foreign policy that was a grotesque caricature of Ronald Reagan’s stance toward the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Rather than blending principled strength with hard-nosed pragmatism, as Reagan did, we got poses of swaggering toughness, Manichean moralism, and the know-nothing presumption that anyone anywhere living under a tyrannical government was a little Thomas Jefferson in waiting, eager and able to found a stable democratic government and liberal society the moment the American cavalry rode to the rescue. It was childish and reckless—deployed more for domestic political consumption than emerging from an informed and thoughtful geopolitical strategy.

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    This is why, though never tempted to vote for Donald Trump, I nonetheless appreciated his willingness in 2016 to say that the Iraq War had been an unmitigated disaster. At the time, it felt like a dam breaking, and I cheered it on from the sidelines.

    In retrospect, though, it’s kind of incredible that so many people thought that Trump was some kind of “isolationist.” What they failed to notice was the precise character of Trump’s criticism of Bush and the Iraq War. He never said we shouldn’t have invaded Iraq or toppled its government. He said, rather, that the war (by which he meant the years-long occupation, effort at nation- and democracy-building, and participation in the country’s bloody insurgency and civil war) had been a disaster, and that we had failed to “take the oil.”

    Meaning: We should have withdrawn quickly and made a deal to pocket a pile of oil revenue as a fee for having rid Iraq of its Hussein problem.

    Trump didn’t care if the country became a basket case. The fact that it did become one from roughly 2004 to 2009 only mattered because our troops were there. In place of Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn rule—“If you break it, you own it”—Trump would substitute an altogether different approach to the world: “If you break it, who gives a shit?”

    What this war with Iran has revealed, in addition to confirming once again that the intelligence and military capabilities of the United States and Israel are quite impressive, is that a lot of right-leaning writers, analysts, and former public officials have learned exactly nothing over the past 23 years. Mike Pence, Jeb Bush, Mike Pompeo, Nikki Haley, John Bolton—all of them, and many more, have despised the Iranian government for the past 47 years, and are now celebrating the president’s decapitation strike against the regime.

    What should have been the chastening experience of Iraq doesn’t matter. What should have been the chastening experience of Afghanistan doesn’t matter. What should have been the chastening experience of Libya doesn’t matter. Every act of regime change is like the very first time, with the world created anew, from scratch, presenting a blank canvas on which American military power can and should paint a miracle. There is evil in the world, and it is America’s role to strike it down with righteous wrath. Even if Trump could not possibly care less what ultimately happens to the 93 million people who live in Iran. Even if he doesn’t so much as attempt to make the case for war to the American people. Even if he ignores Congress entirely. Even if he doesn’t pay the slightest lip service to the United Nations or international law. Even if he has no plans whatsoever for what should follow the American-led revolution.

    Iran’s theocratic tyranny is bad. Therefore, overthrowing it is good. Full stop.

    That really is the level of thinking we’re dealing with here. These people are prepared to defend any force willing to wipe it out—even if it’s the second Trump administration.

    Intellectuals are people of ideas and reasoning. Their instinct is to tidy up an irritatingly messy world. But Trump’s actions cannot be coherently ordered and contained. When he humiliates Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, it looks like a victory for Vice President JD Vance’s preferred isolationism. When he captures Nicolás Maduro, it looks like a triumph for Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s efforts to settle unfinished business from the aftermath of the Cold War. When he works with Israel to kill Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it looks like the Bush-era neoconservatives are back, baby.

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    But none of that is true—or no more than momentarily so. What Trump wants above all is freedom of movement, the absence of constraints. He can be convinced to do almost anything, so long as it can be accomplished quickly and without him getting ensnared in a political trap. It’s not that Trump used to be an isolationist and now he’s been revealed to be a neocon. He’s just some guy doing stuff, making it up as he goes along.

    A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted after the commencement of the attack on Iran finds just 27 percent support for it. And that was before the deaths of four American soldiers were announced. No one should be surprised. Since 2008, with the partial exception of 2020, American voters have consistently favored presidential candidates who sold themselves as less inclined to opt for the use of military force than their opponents. And each time, the person who won the White House went on to govern in a more hawkish way than their campaigns suggested.

    No wonder the electorate is in such an enduringly surly mood.

    Trump 2.0 has been appalling on nearly every front. The attack on Iran isn’t an exception to the unfolding disaster. It’s just its latest chapter.

    Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

    A version of this article was originally published at Notes from the Middleground.

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    0 min
  • Hope and Fear in Tehran
    Plumes of smoke rise over Tehran on March 1, 2026. (Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    Two days ago, I had a very short conversation with my sister in Iran. The internet kept dropping because of government interference. I asked how they were doing. She replied, “We’re waiting to be attacked.”

    Yesterday, we woke up to the news that the United States and Israel have launched an attack on Iran—a war that has felt inevitable for so long that its arrival is both shocking and unsurprising.

    American and allied forces targeted missile sites and air defenses. The attacks extended to port areas and energy hubs. There was a devastating strike on a girls’ elementary school in Minab, reportedly resulting in over 100 civilian casualties.

    Even in wars described as strategic, children die first.

    In many cities, including Tehran, explosions were heard near major government and military sites, including parts of the Supreme Leader’s compound. News followed that Ayatollah Khamenei himself was dead. I can’t lie—when I saw satellite images of his compound in ruins and heard the reports of his assassination, it felt surreal. When I lived in Iran, I passed that heavily guarded building many times on the way to my grandmother’s house. I would not dare look up at the armed guards, irrationally afraid they might recognize my hatred.

    For many Iranians inside the country—and for those condemned to exile—this is a cathartic moment decades in the making.

    Videos are pouring out of Iran—people celebrating, dancing in the streets. “This is the dance of justice,” my cousin wrote to me.

    Some of the footage is reminiscent of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the moment Saddam Hussein was found hiding in a hole. For those living under authoritarian rule, that image of Saddam—messy and disoriented, far removed from the carefully groomed image he had projected for decades as Iraq’s strongman—suggested something radical: dictators can fall. I remember people handing out candy on the way to school, celebrating the end of Saddam’s brutal regime. We know how that story ended.

    This is where Iranians find themselves: relieved that the Islamic Republic’s machinery of repression is being struck; mourning the thousands killed by the regime in its crackdown in January; mourning, too, the civilians (including children) killed in the U.S.-Israeli bombardment. Relief and grief coexist. Celebration and terror sit side by side.

    The celebrations are not about loving bombs—they are about the collapse of a man and a system that made everyday life feel like a war long before this one began.

    For more than 20 years, many Iranians have lived in a state of suspended expectation: “It’s coming. Help is coming. War is coming.” That anticipation becomes part of your identity. It shapes how people emigrate, protest, save money, raise children. We learned to live under the shadow of an anticipated explosion—where fear and hope converge.

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    Whether the average American is aware of it or not, the United States and the Islamic Republic have been locked in a soft war since the 1979 hostage crisis. But for Iranians inside the country, the war has never been abstract or diplomatic. It has been intimate and daily—one side armed with guns, prisons, and militias; the other side resisting with bare hands, sticks, and stones.

    In the last few decades, the people of Iran have taken to the streets over and over again and shown—to themselves and to the world—that they are willing to fight for their freedom. What they have asked for are conditions that make survival and agency possible: the ability to organize without arrest, to protest without disappearance, to speak without being executed. And they have repeatedly asked the international community, particularly the United States, for support.

    In the summer of 2009, millions of Iranians poured into the streets after a stolen election. I remember the sound of people calling “Allahu Akbar” from rooftops at night—not as a religious act, but as a defiant signal, a way of saying, We are still here, and we need help. I watched the government hunt those people down. Neda Agha-Soltan, a student in Tehran, was shot dead on a street I knew. I remember the specific quality of the silence that settled afterward—the silence of people who had called for help and been left alone.

    The Obama administration chose restraint, guided by an understandable fear of interference. But what was framed as moral caution felt, to many of us, like moral abandonment.

    For many, “help” is defined through respect for sovereignty and moral restraint—shaped by the desire not to repeat historical mistakes. These fears are not imaginary. They are grounded in real harms. Foreign interventions have left devastating scars, and skepticism toward them is justified. History shows that intervention rarely builds democracies.

    But it has, at times, stopped slaughter.

    Now President Trump has acted. Whether this action will be deemed a success is a question history will answer. War rearranges political timelines. It can weaken regimes, but it can also prolong leaders’ survival.

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    “War is a blessing,” Khamenei’s predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, declared in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War—a war that might have ended sooner but instead stretched on, costing hundreds of thousands of lives and consolidating the Islamic Republic’s grip on power. My father’s generation fought in that war. Some never came home. Others came home changed in ways they couldn’t name. I grew up around the wreckage of it—the missing uncles, the men who flinched at loud sounds. War unifies a country. It strengthens ideology. It exposes internal enemies. It deepens loyalty through fear. The Islamic Republic survived that war. It emerged from it with its grip tightened around the throats of the Iranian people.

    Authoritarian systems have survived—and even solidified—under external attack.

    Most Iranians, inside Iran and in the diaspora, are celebrating this historic moment. For the post-Revolution generation, which has been raised on the expectation of foreign rescue, the death of Ali Khamenei feels like light breaking through darkness.

    But this rescue, arriving in the form of missiles, does not seem to have come with a plan for the day after. There are many reasons to hope, but we must also ask the most uncomfortable questions: What if freedom is not the immediate outcome? What if the regime survives? What if repression deepens? What if the space for change narrows instead of expanding?

    These are the questions swirling in my mind as I hold my newborn child in my arms. I think of the mothers who will never hold theirs again.

    History will debate strategy. The mothers will count graves.

    Mitra Vand is an Iranian-American writer from Tehran. Her work examines authoritarianism, exile, and the emotional consequences of political violence. She writes under a pseudonym.

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  • Francis Fukuyama on Trump’s War With Iran

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama discuss whether the unprecedented strikes on Iran will lead to the downfall of the mullahs, whether America can avoid getting drawn into a Middle Eastern quagmire, and whether the midterms will turn Donald Trump into a lame duck.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: There is something remarkable about the fact that the president in recent memory who has been most adamant that he wanted to be, not his terms but basically an isolationist, that he thought that the American empire was overextended, that George W. Bush, his own predecessor as a Republican president, had chosen these disastrous wars of choice.

    Now it’s Donald Trump who is engaged in a war of choice in Iran. At least according to Donald Trump and some Israeli sources, as we’re recording, it appears to be the case that they’ve managed to kill, in the first hours of this attack, the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei. What do you make of this situation?

    Francis Fukuyama: Well, I guess an initial thing to say is that I don’t believe almost any of the information I’m seeing, especially on social media, because I’ve seen a lot of assertions. Now, I assume that if Trump himself announces that Khamenei has been killed, that’s probably true. There are also a lot of videos of missiles hitting American air bases, of ordinary Iranians rioting and calling for the end of the regime. I don’t know how many of those are true. So it’s very hard to sort out what’s empirical at this point and what isn’t.

    Mounk: I think we need to be careful in exactly how we frame things. It is clearly a massive attack on Iran. I developed a mini theory of how Trump wants to operate in foreign policy. It’s less of a doctrine and more of a playbook. It seemed to fit the initial attacks on Iran last June. It seemed to fit the attack on Venezuela in which he favored massive attacks that would move very quickly.

    Basically, by the time that people woke up, they would already be over. This seems to be quite different from that. This does not appear as we’re recording this to be a conflict that’s going to be over in 24 or 48 hours.

    Fukuyama: I think this is the case with all of these decapitation attacks. I actually had a former colleague at RAND, Steve Hosmer, who was a very wise political analyst who actually did a study of decapitation attacks going all the way back to World War II.

    His conclusion from looking at these other cases is that they’re very unpredictable and they almost always don’t achieve the political end that has been sought. Now, I think that the problem here is that unlike the snatching of Maduro or the attack on the Ferdo enrichment facility, this is going to lead to a lot of internal instability. I think this is generally true if you take out the senior leadership.

    You still have a very well-organized and very well-armed IRGC that has a real interest in the outcome of this because their lives are on the line. I think that what you’re going to get is a lot of internal conflict. You could get into conflict within the regime. Different parts of the regime seek to assert dominance over the whole thing and then between the population and the regime.

    That is going to be extremely difficult to control. I think that this is not something that can be done on a single strike. They’re going to have to continue to try to influence things from the air. We have a lot of experience with strategic bombing and the political effects of strategic bombing. There have been many, many books looking at the effectiveness of this.

    Just as in this study that I was mentioning of decapitation attacks, you essentially set up this extremely chaotic aftermath where if you’re not willing to put forces on the ground, you really cannot control things. That means that you’re right that this is not going to be a one and done situation. There’s going to have to be follow-up attacks. This is a conflict that is likely to continue for some time.

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    Mounk: You are very knowledgeable about a great number of countries under different circumstances. What do we know about the circumstances under which regimes fall and the circumstances under which they persist? It is quite clear that the Islamic Republic has some loyalists and some hardliners, but it also appears to be clear that there is very deep discontent in the Iranian population. We saw that with the courageous protests at the end of December and at the beginning of January. It took extraordinary force and extraordinary brutality to end those protests. There is a Revolutionary Guard that wants to preserve its own political power and its own economic might because they are very involved in every aspect of the economy.

    I think it is hard to know to what extent they are at this point committed to the theocratic nature of the regime, as opposed to just wanting to preserve some form of quasi-military rule. What would it take to destabilize this regime? How big of a difference does it make whether the reports that we are hearing—claims by the president of the United States himself—that Ayatollah Khamenei is dead? Is that going to make a huge difference to the likely future of this regime in the next week? Is it unclear that it would actually make a giant difference?

    Fukuyama: I think it’s already been destabilized. Unlike the case of Venezuela, where capturing one individual, Nicolas Maduro, left intact a power structure that then faced very different incentives on how it was going to act, I think in this case, it’s a much more complicated system. You have extremely well-entrenched groups. It’s not just the IRGC, it’s also the Basij, this other big militia that spread all over the country. They don’t represent anything like the greater part of the population, but they’ve also been pretty self-disciplined in suppressing any threats to the population. Now that the senior leadership is out of the way, you have multiple questions. Will they continue to suppress dissent? I’ve seen videos just in the last couple of hours of people protesting in the streets in different Iranian cities. Will they continue to want to shoot people in that situation? Will they turn their guns on one another? I think the only thing you can really predict at this point is that it’s going to be very chaotic and there’s going to be a lot of follow-up violence.

    Mounk: What is the broader regional situation? It’s interesting that during the strikes in June, it took Iran a relatively long time to retaliate and the retaliation seemed surprisingly circumspect. They hit one military base the United States has in the region; they had some minor strikes on Israel and it was clearly calculated to deescalate to some extent. This time around the response from Iran came much faster, within about two hours. It hit a number of countries in the region that had actually apparently been trying to stay out of this conflict, including Saudi Arabia, giving them a strong reason to jump into the conflict.

    It doesn’t so far look as though they’ve been able to do tremendous damage. There was relatively limited damage. What is that telling us about the future trajectory of this war, about Iran’s ability to retaliate and about whether this becomes a full-scale regional war involving Saudi Arabia and a bunch of other countries in the region?

    Fukuyama: Iran is actually pretty weak at this point. I think they’re trying to throw everything they’ve got at the United States and its regional allies. I don’t think it’s actually going to do very much except for occasional damage to a hotel or an air base or something like that. I think that the issue really is not a wider regional war. In any event, the major allies of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, have both been severely weakened. It’s not as if they could start up other conflicts in other parts of the Middle East. I think the main action is going to be inside Iran. It’s going to be who survives, what kind of a leadership does the regime manage to retain? How do they deal with the population? I think it’s possible that the scales have been shifted so much that the overthrow of the regime is entirely possible. If that happens, then you have a whole different set of big questions that arises. How do you actually create an alternative to this regime that’s been around ever since 1979? I think that the fear of a wider war and more countries getting sucked in is not what I would focus on at the moment.

    Mounk: Does this mean that the United States can choose when to escalate and when to de-escalate? Do you think the moment the United States feels that they’ve achieved their objectives, they can get out of this? Or is Donald Trump now on the road to a quagmire that he may not be able to get out of in the way that George W. Bush got sucked into a quagmire in Iraq and in Afghanistan?

    Fukuyama: First of all, it’s not clear what Donald Trump’s objectives are. What a lot of people have been saying is that he never explained either to the American people and may not have clearly in his own mind what he hopes to accomplish by this. If his goal somehow is actually regime change that leads to a stable and reasonably democratic outcome, then that’s not going to happen for a long time and the United States is likely to get sucked into this much further. If it’s possible that Trump, if he actually has managed to kill off Ayatollah Khamenei and the senior leadership, he may say, okay, mission accomplished. That’s what we wanted to do. Now it’s up to the Iranian people to take over and then just stop fighting at that point.

    At which point, the poor Iranians were then left to slug it out in what could be a pretty messy and bloody civil war. Given Trump’s earlier proclivities, it seems to me very unlikely that he has the intention of following through and actually producing a stable successor regime to the Islamic Republic.

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    Even if he did have that intention, he probably doesn’t have the capacity to do that. What you’re looking at is the prospect of just presiding over a lot of instability that the United States and Israel caused, but not a terribly satisfying outcome, except in these very reduced expectations, as I suggested.

    Mounk: What are the offerings for him for claiming victory? Last June, he claimed that the Iranian nuclear program had been completely decapitated. That one’s slightly counter to the justification for this particular conflict and was contradicted by various intelligence assessments at the time, but it gave him a clean out: overnight attack, a bunch of very impressive bombs. We’ve achieved our objective, moving on. With Nicolás Maduro, there’s obviously the spectacular capture of the dictator of Venezuela, bringing him to Brooklyn where he’s sitting in jail, bringing him to a court in Manhattan. It was very easy for him to say the operation was a success. We’re cutting deals with the successor even though that certainly doesn’t fulfill the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people, moving on. What’s the success that he would claim in this case? Is it just that he’s going to say tomorrow, well, we’ve killed Khamenei and the rest is up to the Iranian people? Is it that he would wait for some kind of regime change? What’s the moment where he claims victory and turns his attention to whatever is next on the Trump administration’s agenda?

    Fukuyama: Unfortunately, I think that his view of what success would be is a completely political decision that has to do much more with American public opinion than any reality on the ground in Iran or in any other part of the Middle East. I think that in the first place, one of the big motives for this attack was to take the attention away from the fact that his administration was failing in many respects in terms of its domestic policy. It’s funny, they were playing a clip when Obama was still president, Trump saying, well, this is what happens when our administration starts failing. They launch a war to distract people’s attention. I’m afraid that this is part of what’s going on here, that there’s a lot of negative things in terms of the way Americans think about his administration. That may have been part of the motive. If that’s the case, he’s really looking at the polls in this country to see what mission accomplished means. I think if there’s a point at which he gets widespread support for having launched the attack, for having killed a few leaders, he may well wash his hands of it, even though he has actually not accomplished the goal of a real regime change.

    Regime change is really, really hard. I think there’s one thing that Afghanistan and Iraq taught us: Producing a stable political outcome that is consistent with American long-term security interests in that part of the world is really, really difficult. I just don’t think that he’s going to be able to get there, but he may not need to if the American people decide he did what he said he was going to do in terms of the decapitation and that’s that.

    Mounk: I think let’s dream for a moment and go through some of the different scenarios from what might happen if the current regime is in some meaningful way replaced. Obviously, the best case scenario would be that we get a genuinely democratic Iran and that the aspirations of what does look like a very substantial portion of the Iranian people to have a reasonably secular democracy are fulfilled.

    That would obviously have a potential to change the Middle East in a very significant, very positive way. I assume that the likelihood of that is small, in part because there are so many people in the military apparatus with a very strong vested interest in keeping control of power to some extent. It’s certainly something to hope for.

    Fukuyama: I think that was true in Venezuela also. They had a very powerful military and the colectivos, local militias. The situation is very different in Iran. The main problem for any kind of democratic opposition in Iran is that it does not exist. It is not an organized force. The regime has been very good at jailing or killing anybody who seemed to arise. There is no María Corina Machado who had demonstrated her popularity and legitimacy in an election just a year ago. In Venezuela, there is actually a big organized emigre community that has been supporting her and could plausibly take over Venezuela at the right moment sometime in the next few years.

    That kind of opposition really does not exist. Now, people have been fantasizing about Reza Pahlavi’s son coming back as a successor. The opposition is so fragmented that they basically have to unify around somebody; they need some figure who can provide them a little bit of coherence and stability. If it is the Shah’s son, maybe that will happen. I think that compared to Venezuela, they have a much tougher road to hoe. The other thing is that the Chavez-Maduro regimes got started in the late 1990s. They have had about 20 years to mess things up in terms of taking over the structure of the Venezuelan state. The Islamic Republic has been around since 1979. The ability of any kind of opposition group to simply take over the governing of that place is going to be a much harder task than I think it potentially would be if you actually had a democratic restoration. I know that is just one scenario that you are trying to think through, but I agree with you. It is not very likely to happen, certainly not in any short-term period.

    Mounk: Yes, so perhaps what is more imaginable is that you get some of the most powerful military leaders within the country saying, we’re going to liberalize the regime in certain respects. We’re going to move it towards a form that either is no longer theocratic or only ostensibly theocratic, and basically join a long list of military regimes in the region. I think that’s a good test case on how much the ideology of a regime matters. If you have effectively some of the same generals in charge, but without the religious overtones or at least religious overtones significantly reduced, some of Iran’s national security interests are going to remain the same as they were. Some of its historical amenities to countries like Saudi Arabia would remain the same. The Iranian regime has also particular zeal in arming proxies around the region and sponsoring terrorist attacks. I’m sure that there’s some realist IR scholar among the close to thousand people who are listening to us live and among the many more who will listen to this as a podcast, who will try and explain why actually this is just a rational response for the Iranian regime. You just look at borders and arms and other objective factors and that’s what it should do.

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    It does seem like non-realist scholars of international relations would be right to press on that and to say, no, it does seem like a lot of those choices are driven by ideology and in this case, by religious beliefs and convictions more than just by the kind of objective self-interest of the regime. How do we disentangle those things? Imagine you get a pretty hard-nosed military general who wants to keep his hands on power, wants to make sure that all of his other generals and colonels and so on still get to run a lot of the Iranian economy, but does not want to give up their privileges. They think perhaps it’s in our interest to ratchet down conflict in the region a little bit. Is that realistic? How much would change under such a scenario?

    Fukuyama: I have heard Iranian friends in the democratic opposition assert that if this regime falls, Iran is going to become one of the most secular countries in the whole world because they have had such a long experience living under this Islamic dictatorship that virtually everybody hates it.

    Therefore, they are going to go to the other extreme of demonstrating anti-religious or anti-clerical faiths. There obviously are still true believers in this, but I think it is interesting. There has been a general pattern where you have ideological regimes that start out ideological that gradually convert themselves into not just authoritarian regimes, but highly corrupt authoritarian regimes. People may not have been following this that closely, but I think that basically happened in Cuba. Fidel Castro created a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship that was built around an egalitarian Marxist ideology. I think at this point, what holds them together is not ideology at all. It is really self-interest; it is all of the drug smuggling and extortion and other things that they can do. The Maduro regime in Venezuela had already gone a long way down that path. I am positive that something very similar to that has happened in Iran, where the main motive for a lot of the people in the IRGC and the Basij is not ideological at all. It really has to do with their economic interests. The idealism that may have existed at one point may well not exist anymore. We will have to see the extent to which that is really true.

    The other thing is that the desire for revenge on the part of the population, I suspect, is going to be much more intense than it was in Venezuela. This is a subject for different podcasts. It is interesting the way that Delcy Rodríguez is actually kind of stabilizing things and actually doing things to stabilize the economy and to raise people’s living standards sufficiently that I think she has actually been able to mute a lot of the anger and the desire for immediate democratization that might otherwise exist. I think that these guys in Iran are going to have a much harder time dealing with that even if you had a pragmatic military guy who wanted to liberalize and restore relations with the United States. I think it is just going to be harder for them to do that.

    Mounk: The Venezuelan regime has been extremely brutal and extremely corrupt, but the absolute brutality visited upon the protesters in Iran in January was rare even by the standards of these kinds of autocratic regimes. We do not have exact numbers because of how repressive the regime is, but the number of protesters who appear to have been killed there over the last two months is extraordinary.

    Fukuyama: They are talking about tens of thousands of people killed just in a single month. As bad as Maduro was, it did not get to that point. The other thing is that the Iranian economy has been in collapse for some time. Inflation has been out of control. Nobody has any savings. There is really not a middle class anymore that has any kind of property they need. I think they are much, much more desperate than even people in Venezuela who are pretty desperate themselves.

    Mounk: I think we both hope that even if it does not seem likely at this point, events do take a turn for the positive in Iran and that the aspirations of people in Iran are realized. Let’s talk about some of the other actors in the region and then return to the United States and Trump himself. How is Israel’s position? Israel suffered the horrible attacks and massacres of October 7th, sponsored in large part by Iran. They have been phenomenally successful in military terms over the last couple of years, really weakening their adversaries in the region to an astonishing extent, including Iran itself, but at a high humanitarian cost and a high cost in the country’s public standing.

    Israel is in some ways more isolated now than it has been in most stretches of its history. There is a very interesting poll in the United States that was conducted in the last weeks, which suggests that for the first time since the start of this poll, more Americans now sympathize with the Palestinian cause than with the Israeli cause. Benjamin Netanyahu has been able to sustain himself in power despite his occasional deep unpopularity within his own country. Are these substantive victories for Israel that are going to make the country safer, or are these Pyrrhic victories that over the medium or long term are going to make Israel a lot more vulnerable?

    Fukuyama: I think that the political damage that the Netanyahu government’s actions have created since October 7th are the single most damaging thing that Israel has suffered. The poll numbers that you just cited are true, but particularly among young Americans, support for Israel, which had been pretty much instinctive in my generation, is just completely gone right now. I think that this kind of use, just overt use of military force to get your way, which has been characteristic of both Netanyahu and of Trump, is not going to endear either of them to especially these younger constituencies, even if the outcomes are good in terms of raw power geopolitical terms. I think that that is what I would worry about because you cannot kill all your enemies and you cannot kill all your critics. You really need to retain some sense of legitimacy. I think this is not going to help things.

    Mounk: That is very much the concern I have: that if you are in a moment of strength, it is easy to fall foul of hubris. But at some point as well, we will be in a moment of weakness. Of course, now it is easy to imagine either a Democratic president in the United States who does not want to help Israel or, for that matter, a Republican president of the United States who is quite hostile to Israel, given some of the voices and figures that are rising on the American right. Whether Israel can maintain its strength if it undergoes a period of economic crisis, it undergoes some kind of internal crisis, and if it can no longer count on the support of the United States is a very important question. The poll that I cited—there is some expected partisan split where Republicans are more friendly to Israel and Democrats are more friendly to Palestine. As you are saying, the most striking split is that Americans over 65 remain more inclined to support the Israeli cause. The younger the age group, the stronger they lean towards the Palestinian cause.

    Fukuyama: The split within the American right is actually quite disturbing from the standpoint of Israel’s interest. There is a recent interview between Tucker Carlson and Mike Huckabee, who in essence represent these two completely radicalized poles, one being very anti-Israeli and I would say also pretty anti-Semitic and the other one being over the top pro-Israeli. That is something that is really new in the Republican Party. I do not think you have ever seen the kinds of expressions of hostility that Israel is leading America down the wrong path and manipulating American policy and so forth. People on the right have not said this kind of thing before. In the Democratic Party, you have a similar kind of split. It has recently not been publicly expressed in quite the same form, but you have Mamdani elected in New York City, who really is the first publicly elected official that has broken with the tradition of American support, the strong economic and military support, for Israel. On both the extreme right and extreme left, you are seeing this horseshoe effect where you have the two extremes on both sides of the political division coming together in opposition to Israel.

    Mounk: One of the strange ironies in the region, before we return to the United States, is that Israel is losing a lot of support among the countries that have traditionally been allies to it. It also has lost whatever remnants of support it may have had in other countries of the region. However, the fact that Iran retaliated against American allies in the region, against Saudi Arabia and Jordan and other countries, means that they may now join a regional war on the side of Israel against Iran. The politics of the Middle East never fail to confuse and to be complicated. There is a strange irony in that.

    Fukuyama: That is true. This trend started with the Abraham Accords in the first Trump administration where it turned out that these conservative monarchies in the Gulf were actually much more willing to make peace with Israel than their more left-wing counterparts. Now that there have been overt attacks on these countries, I think that is a trend that will strengthen. This is one of the geopolitical payoffs for Netanyahu; he has actually probably bolstered his support.

    In thinking about international politics, sometimes actual outcomes really trump any ideological priors that people have. This is what you were suggesting earlier: although you may start out having a certain ideological point of view, at some point your material interests become overwhelming and you make excuses and you can come around to supporting things that you did not support earlier. I think that has already happened in a lot of the conservative Gulf countries. Down the road, whether that will remain the case, or whether these monarchies are actually laying the grounds for a populist revolt against their rule, is something that may happen in the future. We have not seen it yet, but it is something to keep an eye on.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Frank discuss whether the MAGA movement will turn on Trump, the psychology behind his foreign policy, and the future of the Republican Party. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    39 min
  • Francis Fukuyama on Trump’s War With Iran

    We’re trying something new! Frank featured on today’s episode of The Good Fight, so we’re sharing it with subscribers to the Frankly Fukuyama podcast! If you’d like to sign up to The Good Fight or Frankly Fukuyama, please click here and toggle the correct buttons! We hope you enjoy the conversation.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama discuss whether the unprecedented strikes on Iran will lead to the downfall of the mullahs, whether America can avoid getting drawn into a Middle Eastern quagmire, and whether the midterms will turn Donald Trump into a lame duck.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: There is something remarkable about the fact that the president in recent memory who has been most adamant that he wanted to be, not his terms but basically an isolationist, that he thought that the American empire was overextended, that George W. Bush, his own predecessor as a Republican president, had chosen these disastrous wars of choice.

    Now it’s Donald Trump who is engaged in a war of choice in Iran. At least according to Donald Trump and some Israeli sources, as we’re recording, it appears to be the case that they’ve managed to kill, in the first hours of this attack, the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei. What do you make of this situation?

    Francis Fukuyama: Well, I guess an initial thing to say is that I don’t believe almost any of the information I’m seeing, especially on social media, because I’ve seen a lot of assertions. Now, I assume that if Trump himself announces that Khamenei has been killed, that’s probably true. There are also a lot of videos of missiles hitting American air bases, of ordinary Iranians rioting and calling for the end of the regime. I don’t know how many of those are true. So it’s very hard to sort out what’s empirical at this point and what isn’t.

    Mounk: I think we need to be careful in exactly how we frame things. It is clearly a massive attack on Iran. I developed a mini theory of how Trump wants to operate in foreign policy. It’s less of a doctrine and more of a playbook. It seemed to fit the initial attacks on Iran last June. It seemed to fit the attack on Venezuela in which he favored massive attacks that would move very quickly.

    Basically, by the time that people woke up, they would already be over. This seems to be quite different from that. This does not appear as we’re recording this to be a conflict that’s going to be over in 24 or 48 hours.

    Fukuyama: I think this is the case with all of these decapitation attacks. I actually had a former colleague at RAND, Steve Hosmer, who was a very wise political analyst who actually did a study of decapitation attacks going all the way back to World War II.

    His conclusion from looking at these other cases is that they’re very unpredictable and they almost always don’t achieve the political end that has been sought. Now, I think that the problem here is that unlike the snatching of Maduro or the attack on the Ferdo enrichment facility, this is going to lead to a lot of internal instability. I think this is generally true if you take out the senior leadership.

    You still have a very well-organized and very well-armed IRGC that has a real interest in the outcome of this because their lives are on the line. I think that what you’re going to get is a lot of internal conflict. You could get into conflict within the regime. Different parts of the regime seek to assert dominance over the whole thing and then between the population and the regime.

    That is going to be extremely difficult to control. I think that this is not something that can be done on a single strike. They’re going to have to continue to try to influence things from the air. We have a lot of experience with strategic bombing and the political effects of strategic bombing. There have been many, many books looking at the effectiveness of this.

    Just as in this study that I was mentioning of decapitation attacks, you essentially set up this extremely chaotic aftermath where if you’re not willing to put forces on the ground, you really cannot control things. That means that you’re right that this is not going to be a one and done situation. There’s going to have to be follow-up attacks. This is a conflict that is likely to continue for some time.

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    Mounk: You are very knowledgeable about a great number of countries under different circumstances. What do we know about the circumstances under which regimes fall and the circumstances under which they persist? It is quite clear that the Islamic Republic has some loyalists and some hardliners, but it also appears to be clear that there is very deep discontent in the Iranian population. We saw that with the courageous protests at the end of December and at the beginning of January. It took extraordinary force and extraordinary brutality to end those protests. There is a Revolutionary Guard that wants to preserve its own political power and its own economic might because they are very involved in every aspect of the economy.

    I think it is hard to know to what extent they are at this point committed to the theocratic nature of the regime, as opposed to just wanting to preserve some form of quasi-military rule. What would it take to destabilize this regime? How big of a difference does it make whether the reports that we are hearing—claims by the president of the United States himself—that Ayatollah Khamenei is dead? Is that going to make a huge difference to the likely future of this regime in the next week? Is it unclear that it would actually make a giant difference?

    Fukuyama: I think it’s already been destabilized. Unlike the case of Venezuela, where capturing one individual, Nicolas Maduro, left intact a power structure that then faced very different incentives on how it was going to act, I think in this case, it’s a much more complicated system. You have extremely well-entrenched groups. It’s not just the IRGC, it’s also the Basij, this other big militia that spread all over the country. They don’t represent anything like the greater part of the population, but they’ve also been pretty self-disciplined in suppressing any threats to the population. Now that the senior leadership is out of the way, you have multiple questions. Will they continue to suppress dissent? I’ve seen videos just in the last couple of hours of people protesting in the streets in different Iranian cities. Will they continue to want to shoot people in that situation? Will they turn their guns on one another? I think the only thing you can really predict at this point is that it’s going to be very chaotic and there’s going to be a lot of follow-up violence.

    Mounk: What is the broader regional situation? It’s interesting that during the strikes in June, it took Iran a relatively long time to retaliate and the retaliation seemed surprisingly circumspect. They hit one military base the United States has in the region; they had some minor strikes on Israel and it was clearly calculated to deescalate to some extent. This time around the response from Iran came much faster, within about two hours. It hit a number of countries in the region that had actually apparently been trying to stay out of this conflict, including Saudi Arabia, giving them a strong reason to jump into the conflict.

    It doesn’t so far look as though they’ve been able to do tremendous damage. There was relatively limited damage. What is that telling us about the future trajectory of this war, about Iran’s ability to retaliate and about whether this becomes a full-scale regional war involving Saudi Arabia and a bunch of other countries in the region?

    Fukuyama: Iran is actually pretty weak at this point. I think they’re trying to throw everything they’ve got at the United States and its regional allies. I don’t think it’s actually going to do very much except for occasional damage to a hotel or an air base or something like that. I think that the issue really is not a wider regional war. In any event, the major allies of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, have both been severely weakened. It’s not as if they could start up other conflicts in other parts of the Middle East. I think the main action is going to be inside Iran. It’s going to be who survives, what kind of a leadership does the regime manage to retain? How do they deal with the population? I think it’s possible that the scales have been shifted so much that the overthrow of the regime is entirely possible. If that happens, then you have a whole different set of big questions that arises. How do you actually create an alternative to this regime that’s been around ever since 1979? I think that the fear of a wider war and more countries getting sucked in is not what I would focus on at the moment.

    Mounk: Does this mean that the United States can choose when to escalate and when to de-escalate? Do you think the moment the United States feels that they’ve achieved their objectives, they can get out of this? Or is Donald Trump now on the road to a quagmire that he may not be able to get out of in the way that George W. Bush got sucked into a quagmire in Iraq and in Afghanistan?

    Fukuyama: First of all, it’s not clear what Donald Trump’s objectives are. What a lot of people have been saying is that he never explained either to the American people and may not have clearly in his own mind what he hopes to accomplish by this. If his goal somehow is actually regime change that leads to a stable and reasonably democratic outcome, then that’s not going to happen for a long time and the United States is likely to get sucked into this much further. If it’s possible that Trump, if he actually has managed to kill off Ayatollah Khamenei and the senior leadership, he may say, okay, mission accomplished. That’s what we wanted to do. Now it’s up to the Iranian people to take over and then just stop fighting at that point.

    At which point, the poor Iranians were then left to slug it out in what could be a pretty messy and bloody civil war. Given Trump’s earlier proclivities, it seems to me very unlikely that he has the intention of following through and actually producing a stable successor regime to the Islamic Republic.

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    Even if he did have that intention, he probably doesn’t have the capacity to do that. What you’re looking at is the prospect of just presiding over a lot of instability that the United States and Israel caused, but not a terribly satisfying outcome, except in these very reduced expectations, as I suggested.

    Mounk: What are the offerings for him for claiming victory? Last June, he claimed that the Iranian nuclear program had been completely decapitated. That one’s slightly counter to the justification for this particular conflict and was contradicted by various intelligence assessments at the time, but it gave him a clean out: overnight attack, a bunch of very impressive bombs. We’ve achieved our objective, moving on. With Nicolás Maduro, there’s obviously the spectacular capture of the dictator of Venezuela, bringing him to Brooklyn where he’s sitting in jail, bringing him to a court in Manhattan. It was very easy for him to say the operation was a success. We’re cutting deals with the successor even though that certainly doesn’t fulfill the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people, moving on. What’s the success that he would claim in this case? Is it just that he’s going to say tomorrow, well, we’ve killed Khamenei and the rest is up to the Iranian people? Is it that he would wait for some kind of regime change? What’s the moment where he claims victory and turns his attention to whatever is next on the Trump administration’s agenda?

    Fukuyama: Unfortunately, I think that his view of what success would be is a completely political decision that has to do much more with American public opinion than any reality on the ground in Iran or in any other part of the Middle East. I think that in the first place, one of the big motives for this attack was to take the attention away from the fact that his administration was failing in many respects in terms of its domestic policy. It’s funny, they were playing a clip when Obama was still president, Trump saying, well, this is what happens when our administration starts failing. They launch a war to distract people’s attention. I’m afraid that this is part of what’s going on here, that there’s a lot of negative things in terms of the way Americans think about his administration. That may have been part of the motive. If that’s the case, he’s really looking at the polls in this country to see what mission accomplished means. I think if there’s a point at which he gets widespread support for having launched the attack, for having killed a few leaders, he may well wash his hands of it, even though he has actually not accomplished the goal of a real regime change.

    Regime change is really, really hard. I think there’s one thing that Afghanistan and Iraq taught us: Producing a stable political outcome that is consistent with American long-term security interests in that part of the world is really, really difficult. I just don’t think that he’s going to be able to get there, but he may not need to if the American people decide he did what he said he was going to do in terms of the decapitation and that’s that.

    Mounk: I think let’s dream for a moment and go through some of the different scenarios from what might happen if the current regime is in some meaningful way replaced. Obviously, the best case scenario would be that we get a genuinely democratic Iran and that the aspirations of what does look like a very substantial portion of the Iranian people to have a reasonably secular democracy are fulfilled.

    That would obviously have a potential to change the Middle East in a very significant, very positive way. I assume that the likelihood of that is small, in part because there are so many people in the military apparatus with a very strong vested interest in keeping control of power to some extent. It’s certainly something to hope for.

    Fukuyama: I think that was true in Venezuela also. They had a very powerful military and the colectivos, local militias. The situation is very different in Iran. The main problem for any kind of democratic opposition in Iran is that it does not exist. It is not an organized force. The regime has been very good at jailing or killing anybody who seemed to arise. There is no María Corina Machado who had demonstrated her popularity and legitimacy in an election just a year ago. In Venezuela, there is actually a big organized emigre community that has been supporting her and could plausibly take over Venezuela at the right moment sometime in the next few years.

    That kind of opposition really does not exist. Now, people have been fantasizing about Reza Pahlavi’s son coming back as a successor. The opposition is so fragmented that they basically have to unify around somebody; they need some figure who can provide them a little bit of coherence and stability. If it is the Shah’s son, maybe that will happen. I think that compared to Venezuela, they have a much tougher road to hoe. The other thing is that the Chavez-Maduro regimes got started in the late 1990s. They have had about 20 years to mess things up in terms of taking over the structure of the Venezuelan state. The Islamic Republic has been around since 1979. The ability of any kind of opposition group to simply take over the governing of that place is going to be a much harder task than I think it potentially would be if you actually had a democratic restoration. I know that is just one scenario that you are trying to think through, but I agree with you. It is not very likely to happen, certainly not in any short-term period.

    Mounk: Yes, so perhaps what is more imaginable is that you get some of the most powerful military leaders within the country saying, we’re going to liberalize the regime in certain respects. We’re going to move it towards a form that either is no longer theocratic or only ostensibly theocratic, and basically join a long list of military regimes in the region. I think that’s a good test case on how much the ideology of a regime matters. If you have effectively some of the same generals in charge, but without the religious overtones or at least religious overtones significantly reduced, some of Iran’s national security interests are going to remain the same as they were. Some of its historical amenities to countries like Saudi Arabia would remain the same. The Iranian regime has also particular zeal in arming proxies around the region and sponsoring terrorist attacks. I’m sure that there’s some realist IR scholar among the close to thousand people who are listening to us live and among the many more who will listen to this as a podcast, who will try and explain why actually this is just a rational response for the Iranian regime. You just look at borders and arms and other objective factors and that’s what it should do.

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    It does seem like non-realist scholars of international relations would be right to press on that and to say, no, it does seem like a lot of those choices are driven by ideology and in this case, by religious beliefs and convictions more than just by the kind of objective self-interest of the regime. How do we disentangle those things? Imagine you get a pretty hard-nosed military general who wants to keep his hands on power, wants to make sure that all of his other generals and colonels and so on still get to run a lot of the Iranian economy, but does not want to give up their privileges. They think perhaps it’s in our interest to ratchet down conflict in the region a little bit. Is that realistic? How much would change under such a scenario?

    Fukuyama: I have heard Iranian friends in the democratic opposition assert that if this regime falls, Iran is going to become one of the most secular countries in the whole world because they have had such a long experience living under this Islamic dictatorship that virtually everybody hates it.

    Therefore, they are going to go to the other extreme of demonstrating anti-religious or anti-clerical faiths. There obviously are still true believers in this, but I think it is interesting. There has been a general pattern where you have ideological regimes that start out ideological that gradually convert themselves into not just authoritarian regimes, but highly corrupt authoritarian regimes. People may not have been following this that closely, but I think that basically happened in Cuba. Fidel Castro created a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship that was built around an egalitarian Marxist ideology. I think at this point, what holds them together is not ideology at all. It is really self-interest; it is all of the drug smuggling and extortion and other things that they can do. The Maduro regime in Venezuela had already gone a long way down that path. I am positive that something very similar to that has happened in Iran, where the main motive for a lot of the people in the IRGC and the Basij is not ideological at all. It really has to do with their economic interests. The idealism that may have existed at one point may well not exist anymore. We will have to see the extent to which that is really true.

    The other thing is that the desire for revenge on the part of the population, I suspect, is going to be much more intense than it was in Venezuela. This is a subject for different podcasts. It is interesting the way that Delcy Rodríguez is actually kind of stabilizing things and actually doing things to stabilize the economy and to raise people’s living standards sufficiently that I think she has actually been able to mute a lot of the anger and the desire for immediate democratization that might otherwise exist. I think that these guys in Iran are going to have a much harder time dealing with that even if you had a pragmatic military guy who wanted to liberalize and restore relations with the United States. I think it is just going to be harder for them to do that.

    Mounk: The Venezuelan regime has been extremely brutal and extremely corrupt, but the absolute brutality visited upon the protesters in Iran in January was rare even by the standards of these kinds of autocratic regimes. We do not have exact numbers because of how repressive the regime is, but the number of protesters who appear to have been killed there over the last two months is extraordinary.

    Fukuyama: They are talking about tens of thousands of people killed just in a single month. As bad as Maduro was, it did not get to that point. The other thing is that the Iranian economy has been in collapse for some time. Inflation has been out of control. Nobody has any savings. There is really not a middle class anymore that has any kind of property they need. I think they are much, much more desperate than even people in Venezuela who are pretty desperate themselves.

    Mounk: I think we both hope that even if it does not seem likely at this point, events do take a turn for the positive in Iran and that the aspirations of people in Iran are realized. Let’s talk about some of the other actors in the region and then return to the United States and Trump himself. How is Israel’s position? Israel suffered the horrible attacks and massacres of October 7th, sponsored in large part by Iran. They have been phenomenally successful in military terms over the last couple of years, really weakening their adversaries in the region to an astonishing extent, including Iran itself, but at a high humanitarian cost and a high cost in the country’s public standing.

    Israel is in some ways more isolated now than it has been in most stretches of its history. There is a very interesting poll in the United States that was conducted in the last weeks, which suggests that for the first time since the start of this poll, more Americans now sympathize with the Palestinian cause than with the Israeli cause. Benjamin Netanyahu has been able to sustain himself in power despite his occasional deep unpopularity within his own country. Are these substantive victories for Israel that are going to make the country safer, or are these Pyrrhic victories that over the medium or long term are going to make Israel a lot more vulnerable?

    Fukuyama: I think that the political damage that the Netanyahu government’s actions have created since October 7th are the single most damaging thing that Israel has suffered. The poll numbers that you just cited are true, but particularly among young Americans, support for Israel, which had been pretty much instinctive in my generation, is just completely gone right now. I think that this kind of use, just overt use of military force to get your way, which has been characteristic of both Netanyahu and of Trump, is not going to endear either of them to especially these younger constituencies, even if the outcomes are good in terms of raw power geopolitical terms. I think that that is what I would worry about because you cannot kill all your enemies and you cannot kill all your critics. You really need to retain some sense of legitimacy. I think this is not going to help things.

    Mounk: That is very much the concern I have: that if you are in a moment of strength, it is easy to fall foul of hubris. But at some point as well, we will be in a moment of weakness. Of course, now it is easy to imagine either a Democratic president in the United States who does not want to help Israel or, for that matter, a Republican president of the United States who is quite hostile to Israel, given some of the voices and figures that are rising on the American right. Whether Israel can maintain its strength if it undergoes a period of economic crisis, it undergoes some kind of internal crisis, and if it can no longer count on the support of the United States is a very important question. The poll that I cited—there is some expected partisan split where Republicans are more friendly to Israel and Democrats are more friendly to Palestine. As you are saying, the most striking split is that Americans over 65 remain more inclined to support the Israeli cause. The younger the age group, the stronger they lean towards the Palestinian cause.

    Fukuyama: The split within the American right is actually quite disturbing from the standpoint of Israel’s interest. There is a recent interview between Tucker Carlson and Mike Huckabee, who in essence represent these two completely radicalized poles, one being very anti-Israeli and I would say also pretty anti-Semitic and the other one being over the top pro-Israeli. That is something that is really new in the Republican Party. I do not think you have ever seen the kinds of expressions of hostility that Israel is leading America down the wrong path and manipulating American policy and so forth. People on the right have not said this kind of thing before. In the Democratic Party, you have a similar kind of split. It has recently not been publicly expressed in quite the same form, but you have Mamdani elected in New York City, who really is the first publicly elected official that has broken with the tradition of American support, the strong economic and military support, for Israel. On both the extreme right and extreme left, you are seeing this horseshoe effect where you have the two extremes on both sides of the political division coming together in opposition to Israel.

    Mounk: One of the strange ironies in the region, before we return to the United States, is that Israel is losing a lot of support among the countries that have traditionally been allies to it. It also has lost whatever remnants of support it may have had in other countries of the region. However, the fact that Iran retaliated against American allies in the region, against Saudi Arabia and Jordan and other countries, means that they may now join a regional war on the side of Israel against Iran. The politics of the Middle East never fail to confuse and to be complicated. There is a strange irony in that.

    Fukuyama: That is true. This trend started with the Abraham Accords in the first Trump administration where it turned out that these conservative monarchies in the Gulf were actually much more willing to make peace with Israel than their more left-wing counterparts. Now that there have been overt attacks on these countries, I think that is a trend that will strengthen. This is one of the geopolitical payoffs for Netanyahu; he has actually probably bolstered his support.

    In thinking about international politics, sometimes actual outcomes really trump any ideological priors that people have. This is what you were suggesting earlier: although you may start out having a certain ideological point of view, at some point your material interests become overwhelming and you make excuses and you can come around to supporting things that you did not support earlier. I think that has already happened in a lot of the conservative Gulf countries. Down the road, whether that will remain the case, or whether these monarchies are actually laying the grounds for a populist revolt against their rule, is something that may happen in the future. We have not seen it yet, but it is something to keep an eye on.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Frank discuss whether the MAGA movement will turn on Trump, the psychology behind his foreign policy, and the future of the Republican Party. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    39 min
  • My Day of Jury Duty
    (Photo by Franklin McMahon/Chicago History Museum/Getty Images.)

    A couple of months ago, I received an official letter from the District of Columbia with the words JURY SUMMONS printed atop the envelope in big, intimidating letters.

    I have been an American citizen since 2017. But so far I have never been called upon to perform this particular duty bestowed by American citizenship. The historical purpose of the right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers was to ensure that an out-of-control executive could never turn the criminal justice system into a tool to augment its own power; at a time when the Department of Justice, adorned with a giant banner of Donald Trump’s face, is attempting to prosecute a number of his critics on spurious grounds, the relevance of this tradition feels far from abstract.

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    So, one Wednesday morning in February, I dutifully trudged to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia at nine in the morning. It was the first mild day after a few brutal winter weeks. As the sun was rising high into the sky, the snowbanks that still marked the city’s streets were starting to melt. In the distance, I could make out the cupola of Congress.

    It was hard to know what to expect. As a political scientist, I know all kinds of facts about the jury system but have never seen a jury in action. Would I serve as a juror on some minor civil case or some spectacular murder trial? And would they even want me to serve? Both prosecutors and defendants can strike a number of potential jurors from the pool simply because they have a hunch that they may not be favorable to their case—and professors, suspected by the prosecution of being overly progressive and by the defense of being overly smartalecky, are often among the first to be voted off the island.

    At the entrance to the courthouse, I joined the first of many lines I would be standing in that day. As I made my way through an airport-style security check, I spotted one well-worn sign noting that the wearing of masks was no longer mandatory and another which exhorted visitors to the court not to wear gang insignia or expose their underwear.

    Once inside, I made my way up to the fourth floor and caught the first glimpse of my peers: a long line of people waiting to prove their identity and receive their juror cards. There is something strange about seeing a statistical average manifest in the flesh. I realized that I had, in my life, looked at countless polls and sat through numerous focus groups. But never before had I actually been part of that statistical abstraction: a group of average Americans.

    It turned out we all had something in common: young and old, dressed in the grey suits favored by the city’s well-heeled lobbyists or the sneakers and sweatshirts worn by its poorer residents, most (but not all) of us were staring at our phones. A long-faced Asian woman wearing a bright pink shirt was one of the few to raw-dog reality, staring into space without any form of entertainment. A single prospective juror, a white lady in her late 50s, was reading, her paper copy of The New Yorker turned to a short story called “The Heat of the Moment.”

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    A short video, based on the findings of the “implicit bias test” (which has, I couldn’t help grumble to myself, been widely debunked) was playing on loop. “It’s pretty well settled that most biases happen at an unconscious level,” the chief justice, Milton C. Lee Jr., an elderly black man with a fastidiously trimmed grey beard and a benevolent tone of voice, explained.

    “At the beginning of this video we all saw the chief justice,” a chipper young woman seconded in the cadence of the devout. “The truth is that we all immediately judged him.” What judgment, I wondered, had I unwittingly passed on the chief justice? That he takes pride in his appearance and, after a long day at the courthouse, likes to sit back in a large armchair with a small tumbler of fine whiskey?

    When it was finally my turn to enter the office, a court clerk checked my ID, then handed me a lanyard with a sign that read Petit Juror and bore the number by which I’d be known for the remainder of the day. The next stop was the “juror’s lounge,” which turned out to be a giant waiting room, with about ten rows of forty chairs, all facing towards the front.

    After an hour, a court official announced over a tinny intercom that a jury was about to be convened. She would call some of us by our names and the last three digits of our juror numbers. After a couple dozen other people, I finally heard something resembling my name: “Moo… Mou… Muuunk? 063.” I looked at my card to verify that she meant me, picked up a new piece of paper which had the number 23 written on it, then lined up along the back wall, wedged between jurors 22 and 24.

    When our little troupe of fifty or so would-be jurors was complete, we were marched, single-file, into a windowless courtroom. The AV system was playing a loud background hum of static. The defendant, a young black man accused of driving without a license and fleeing the police, and his wizened defense lawyers, sat to the right. The prosecutors, a man and a woman, both fresh-faced and surprisingly young, sat to the left. Jurors one through 14 took a seat in the jury box; the rest of us, still arranged by number, sat in the public gallery.

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    For ten long minutes, the whole courtroom was silent. Then the static suddenly cut out; the judge composed his face into a benevolent smile and turned towards us. Judge Jason Park, an Asian-American man in his mid-forties who had (I later learned) been nominated for his position by Donald Trump, explained that the American justice system is founded on the “belief that regular folks in the community have the experience and intelligence to make these judgments and make them well. This truly is government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Whether you are selected or not, I hope you leave today with a sense of having served your civic duty.”

    Judge Park administered an oath to us, then started to read a long list of numbered questions. Had we heard anything about this case? Had we ever been arrested for a felony? Did we have any relatives who had been to jail? If the answer was yes, we were supposed to write its number on our juror card. Like me, Juror 24, an elementary school teacher in her twenties who was sitting to my right, handed in a blank sheet. Juror 22, a black woman in her forties with a friendly demeanor and a tired face who was sitting to my left, had, I saw out of the corner of my eye, written down three or four numbers.

    Judge Park asked Juror 1 to step forward to a microphone positioned in front of his dais. The lawyers put on headphones, and the static noise returned. We all watched as one juror after another was called up to give answers we couldn’t make out to questions we couldn’t hear. I glanced at my phone and realized it was well past noon.

    Some jurors spent ages answering questions about themselves before returning to their seats. Others were up there for a grand total of sixty seconds. Juror 22, the woman who had written various numbers on her card, answered questions for at least five minutes. Finally, it was my turn. By this stage, I had endured so many earnest lectures about the importance of jury service that my ambivalence had disappeared: I really wanted to be picked.

    Was there, Judge Park asked in his benevolent demeanor, any reason why I wouldn’t feel able to consider this case without prejudice? “No, your honor,” I said, the customary honorific feeling strange in my mouth, as though I were reciting lines in a movie.

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    “What do you do for a living?” the judge asked. How, I wondered, could I answer this question in an honest way without inspiring either the defense or the prosecution to blackball me? “I’m a professor of political science,” I said.

    “What is your work about?” the judge asked.

    “Um, I have written a lot about democracy in the past,” I said, groping for words that would be accurate yet sound innocuous. It occurred to me that it would be rather ironic if being a scholar of democracy should get me excluded from this most democratic of traditions. “My current project is about artificial intelligence,” I added, tentatively.

    “Thank you very much,” the judge said. “You may take a seat.” I had barely been up there for thirty seconds.

    A few more people were called up to answer questions about themselves. Then the static cut out again, and the judge told us that we would need to come back after lunch.

    The elementary school teacher and I got lunch together at a nearby deli. “I really hope I don’t have to serve,” she told me over pastrami sandwiches. “The kids would be really upset if I’m not in school for Valentine’s Day.” But, she said, she wouldn’t be picked anyway: “My colleagues told me that they never select teachers.”

    When we returned to the courtroom, all trial’s protagonists were already inside, standing in a show of respect for us as we returned to our earlier seats. The static cut out again. Everybody who was still in the room, Judge Park explained, had been found constitutionally eligible to serve. Now, both the prosecution and the defense would be allowed to strike ten potential jurors from the pool for any reason other than protected characteristics such as their race or religion. “Please don’t take it personally if you are struck. I myself have never been selected to serve on a jury.”

    There was much passing of papers between the defense and the judge, and between the judge and the prosecution. Finally, Judge Park’s voice cut back through the static: “Juror number 4. Please vacate your seat and stand at the back of the room.” One by one, the judge asked five of the people seated in the jury box to get up from their seats. Evidently, they had been blackballed.

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    Then he started to go through the first people seated in the gallery. “Juror number 16, please take the fourth seat in the jury box.” I did some quick math in my head and realized that my juror number would likely be low enough to be promoted to the jury if neither the defense nor the prosecution had nixed me. To my surprise, I felt my heart starting to pound. “Juror 22, please take seat 11.” The lady sitting to my left stood up and took a seat in the jury box. She had no visible reaction to being selected, but her face looked to me a little more tired than it had before.

    If I were to be chosen, they’d have to call me next. “Juror 26, please take seat 12.” I had not been chosen. Nor had the elementary school teacher. We looked at each other, and I tried to match her smile of relief. But all I felt was a pang of disappointment.

    Then I remembered what Judge Park had said earlier: Even though I wouldn’t actually help to decide the fate of the defendant, I had still served my civic duty. Earlier, that had sounded a bit hokey; now, it rang true.

    The whole day had, in a sense, been a waste of my time. I had stood in a never-ending succession of lines, and spent hours playing on my phone, only to be dismissed for reasons that would never be explained to me.

    But that is not the main lesson I took away from the experience. When I first arrived in America, I was in awe of the country’s institutions, from its courts to its universities. Today, it can feel as though many of these institutions are in a state of terminal decline—failing to do their jobs, run by incompetent loyalists, increasingly distrusted by the general public.

    A deeply ordinary day in a deeply ordinary court reminded me that this collapse is not yet total: There are still judges who perform their duties with great professionalism; lawyers and clerks and security guards who take genuine pride in their jobs; and ordinary Americans willing to take upon themselves the awesome responsibility to sit in judgment of their peers. While the civic fabric is rotting rapidly, it is made of ample and sturdy cloth. As I emerged back into the sunshine and took a walk down the National Mall, trying to dodge the puddles of melted snow, I looked upon the glistening cupola of Congress with a little more optimism about my adoptive country than I had been able to muster that morning.

    0 min
  • Danielle Allen on Why Technocratic Liberalism Failed

    Danielle Allen is the James Bryant Conant University Professor at Harvard University. She is also Director of the Allen Lab for Democracy Renovation at the Harvard Kennedy School and Director of the Democratic Knowledge Project, a research lab focused on civic education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Danielle Allen discuss why the liberal worldview of the 1990s and 2000s has collapsed, how “power-sharing liberalism” can address the failures of technocratic governance, and whether participatory democracy risks empowering the professional managerial class at the expense of ordinary citizens.

    Polarization is at an all-time high. It can feel daunting—perhaps even misguided—to engage in meaningful dialogue with those holding starkly different views. What does it mean to champion pluralism in such a moment? Persuasion’s series on the future of pluralism, generously supported by the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations, features essays and podcast interviews that make the case for civic dialogue and highlight inspiring examples of it in practice. You can find past installments here.

    This transcript has been edited and lightly condensed for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: We speak regularly, and it seems to me striking that we have now been in this crisis of democracy, or whatever we want to call it, for at least ten years, at least since Donald Trump was elected in 2016. For me, it feels like with each passing year we have fewer answers about what to do and how to get out of this moment. At the beginning there were confident prognostications that this was just a temporary thing, that changes were going to make sure that something like Trump could never get elected again, or confident policy prescriptions about the three clever tricks we had to adopt in order to get through this moment. It seems to me that as Trump got reelected, and as similar political movements are now leading in the polls in Britain and France and in some polls in Germany, that no longer seems realistic. Where is your head in terms of understanding this moment and thinking about how to respond to it?

    Danielle Allen: Sure, thanks. I appreciate that framing, Yascha. You and I have been in conversation about these themes for nearly a decade at this point.

    I think we live in a new world. In that regard, the most important thing is to understand the world we live in and then to figure out how we are going to navigate it. There are a lot of features of that new world. One is what I talk about as the end of neoliberalism, and I mean that in a purely descriptive fashion. One might also mean it from an evaluative point of view, but what I mean is literally that a set of status quo policy frameworks involving trade liberalization, globalization, relatively open borders, and market-based solutions for nearly all social problems is no longer with us. That status quo policy package is gone. In the United States, both the Biden administration and the Trump administration have moved into completely different policy territory. We are also seeing dramatic policy shifts in other countries.

    In that context, the third thing we are seeing is a real struggle on the part of legacy democracies to govern effectively in turbulent and rapidly changing circumstances. That is the situation. I believe in freedom. I believe in self-government for free and equal citizens. For me, the question is not how we preserve some old thing, but rather how, in these conditions, we win the institutions of free self-government. I take it that we have the job of winning them from a set of circumstances that are fundamentally eroding the opportunity for free self-government.

    Mounk: One thing that I have been thinking about a lot is that the worldview that I, to some extent, had when I was 18 years old, and to some extent was raised into as I went through my university education, has fallen apart in quite a remarkable way. You and I have some ideological differences and some differences of approach. You are also a trained classicist, which sadly I am not. We were raised in a somewhat similar academic environment as political theorists.

    It seems to me that the world, even as it looked when I entered graduate school in 2007, and certainly when I entered college in 2000, has fallen apart. Some of the most fundamental assumptions, not about the normative debates we used to have in the government department at Harvard, but some of the underlying assumptions about what the trends of the world were, have not stood the test of time.

    The idea that nationalism would be the ideology of the twentieth century and would not really shape the twenty-first century in the same way. The idea that international trade would bring democracy to the world and liberalize China. The idea that meritocracy would give everybody opportunity and that as the share of people going to college increased, people would be optimistic about the future. I could go on.

    To me, the task of this moment is trying to think about how we preserve some of the values that I am still committed to. I continue to be a philosophical liberal, while freeing ourselves from the constraints of a worldview that clearly does not speak to this moment, that makes us incapable of political battle and taking on these illiberal forces that, for all their flaws, sound more like they are talking about the year 2025 than my friends sometimes do.

    Allen: I often make a point like one that you’ve just made with reference to the work of your collaborator, Frank Fukuyama, and his important book, The End of History. I sort of joke that when he published that book, The End of History, in the early 90s, there was this idea that liberalism, Western liberalism, was triumphant and that the big conflicts of politics had ceased and now we knew what world we were going to live in. My joke is that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union was the beginning of history, not the end. It was like the restarting of history.

    The Cold War had frozen things in place, had frozen geopolitical realities in place, and with its end suddenly jockeying for power and position could begin again, and really that is history. When I was a kid, I used to read history books and wonder what it was like to live in big history, and I feel like now we all know. This is what it’s like to live in big history. Rather than being the end of history, it was the beginning of big history again.

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    So the question is how you handle that condition, how you navigate it. You are an advocate of liberalism. I’m an advocate for a very specific variant of it, which I call “power-sharing liberalism.” This is the theme of my book, Justice by Means of Democracy. That variant developed based on a critique of where I think the liberalism of the 70s, 80s, and 90s went wrong.

    Mounk: Where did the liberalism of the 70s, 80s and 90s go wrong and how is power-sharing liberalism a response to that?

    Allen: It went wrong in the sense of taking liberalism as resting on a package of two sets of rights or freedoms. Philosophers talk about negative liberties, freedoms from governmental interference, freedom of expression and conscience and religion and so forth. There are also positive liberties, the freedoms to participate, to be a voter, to run for office, to help steer and shape your own community.

    Liberalism for the last few decades has really prioritized the former and established an approach to policy where, as long as technocrats deliver sufficiently high material well-being and protect those negative liberties, participation rights do not really matter that much. We have technocrats, we have it under control. I think that was a fundamental mistake and produced real blind spots about the operation of the economy.

    For example, blind spots to the impacts of globalization and to the erosion of dignity and empowerment that people have been experiencing, which have become wells of resentment and toxicity. Power-sharing liberalism is an approach to liberalism that takes both bundles of rights completely seriously and considers participatory rights non-sacrificeable.

    I spend my time looking around our structures, institutions, and organizations, trying to revive their capacity to empower people to govern themselves. It means different ways of organizing civil society organizations. It means rethinking the institutions of representative government. It means looking at policy domains and making sure that they are not only connected to appropriately participatory governance processes, but also that their outcomes support people’s empowerment.

    For me, that puts housing at the top of the list of economic policy questions, because if people do not have stable housing, they are not empowered in essentially every other dimension of their life. That changes the balance after decades where growth and taxation were the key economic concepts. Housing may be the single most important economic theme. If we cannot get that right in a liberal democracy, the growth question does not matter.

    Mounk: You square this emphasis on participation with another concern that a lot of people have had in the last years, and to which I think you’re generally sympathetic, which is the dominance of a professional managerial class in a lot of our supposedly neutral institutions and in our culture more broadly. When you create more opportunities for participation, a lot of the time the people most likely to take those opportunities are those who have the most financial means, the most education, and the time, and they are likely to be comparatively privileged people rather than comparatively unprivileged people.

    I always think of a lovely text by another former political theorist at Harvard, Michael Walzer, a lovely text that he published in Dissent in the 1960s called “A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen.” It starts with a famous quotation from Marx where you fish in the morning, hunt in the afternoon, and criticize critics in the evening. He says that if we believe in basic democracy, if we believe in participatory democracy, what is actually going to happen is that we are going to be giving out fishing licenses in the morning, sitting on the hunting commission deciding when we are allowed to hunt in the afternoon, and instead of writing beautiful poems in the evening we are going to be sitting on a horrible literary prize committee fighting with each other about which poem should win.

    That is a bit of a parody, but I wonder to what extent these two things can come at cross purposes. Take the case of housing. I agree with you that housing is incredibly important, that one of the reasons why people are very pessimistic, including relatively affluent young people with relatively good jobs, is that they feel they are never going to be able to afford a nice apartment in New York, Boston, or Los Angeles, the centers of economic opportunity in the United States.

    Of course, a lot of the reason why we are unable to build housing is forms of participation that get every building process bogged down in environmental review, and where neighbors can always complain about changes in the character of a neighborhood that are going to come from any housing project. Do you fear that in some ways participatory democracy of a kind, which for good reason you are emphasizing, may actually strengthen rather than weaken the overrepresentation of one stratum of society in decision-making that has already been able to concentrate quite a lot of benefits in its own hands?

    Allen: First of all, there is a question of the science of democratic design. I think our intellectual resources for doing that work are not at their strongest point. We have neglected this science. If one digs into the history of it, a key feature of the science of democratic design is that you are always trying to optimize for multiple values. Participation or inclusion is one value, but so too is energy.

    You have to find designs that are able to align these two values. In the nineties and two thousands, there was a lot of embedding of participatory processes into decision-making mechanisms without concern for this question of energy. It is important to find alternative designs that can bring those two values together. People are experimenting with more efficient ways of doing sense-making and ensuring that the impacted community and the participatory community actually align with each other.

    Right now, we have a lot of misalignments where, for example, a suburb makes decisions about housing, but those decisions impact a much broader area. The decision-making location has been placed at the wrong jurisdictional level. You can make jurisdictional adjustments as well as process adjustments to align incentives better and increase the efficiency of those participatory elements. My labs spend a lot of time looking at that and trying to figure out an array of possible participatory mechanisms and which ones are more efficient and give more energy to the decision-making process. That is one thing.

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    Another thing is that the idea that we need to take positive liberties seriously is a strong alternative model for how we think about society and the economy. At the moment, we are watching an ever-increasing extraction and monetization of people’s time. I feel like I have much less control over my time than I did even ten years ago. I also have a strong awareness that technology is a big part of that because with calendaring systems and digital systems we can control time down to the last millisecond.

    The concept of the protected workweek, the protections gained in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, is eroding. I am not sure how many people can keep bounds around a 35-hour workweek any longer. Against that background, we have to revisit the question of the workweek, how we bound it, and how we control it.

    Employers have become used to the idea that supporting work-life balance is part of being a decent employer. We have to turn the crank on that. The framework should be to support work-life civic balance. That can mean giving people the day off on election day. It can mean that if employees decide to run for municipal office and need to work three-quarters time for three years instead of full-time, they should not lose their jobs.

    Employers should accommodate people taking on local responsibilities. At the moment, even at the municipal level, there are insufficient people able to stand for office. The fact that badly designed approaches to participation exist does not delegitimize participation as a value. It signals that we have to rebuild the science of democratic design. That is one thing. The second thing is that there is a broader economic framework that we have to intervene in to give people control over their time again.

    Mounk: One area in which this trade-off becomes very obvious is in electoral mechanisms. You recently published an article on your Substack and on Persuasion, arguing that primaries, as they are designed, are a really bad idea. That seems to me to be exactly a case of this.

    If you have five to eight percent of people participating in a congressional primary, that feels like a democratic advance relative to what the situation was in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when it was the famous smoke-filled back rooms where deals were being hashed out. But those five to eight percent of the population are quite likely to be unrepresentative of the population as a whole. We know from many studies that they tend to be much more ideologically extreme, less compromising, and more angry than the average voter.

    By the time the average American shows up to the polls in November, they have two choices, both of which can, in some circumstances, be quite extreme and both of which they feel do not represent them. One of the results of that is that the number of Americans who affiliate with either the Democratic or Republican Party is at record lows.

    How do you think about squaring that circle? How do we increase participation in a real way while changing the system that gives us this fake simulacrum of participation in a way that actually allows political parties to exert tremendous ideological discipline over their members?

    Allen: I think one of the things that is really important in thinking about the future of democracy, or the future of liberalism, is to recognize that there is no static end state. Even past reforms that were democratizing and liberalizing were not static end states. The reason for this is that I agree with the iron law of oligarchy, the argument that every form of human social organization tends over time toward oligarchic capture.

    If that is correct, and I think it is correct, then the project of democracy is always and perpetually to undo the challenge of oligarchic capture. Oligarchic capture can take different forms. In our current moment, we have capture by small voting blocs within the formal parties, blocs with more extreme views, which have captured our political institutions. There is also the issue of corporate capture, which is another part of the story. Both of those things are relevant.

    When political party primaries were introduced, they were a positive democratic reform. They expanded the conversation beyond smoke-filled back rooms and exposed things to public accountability and transparency. Over time, however, the process was captured again through gerrymandering. That then combined with reduced participation in a more captured and less legitimate process to give us the problem that we now have to undo again.

    I think that being committed to the project of freedom is about being committed to renovating political institutions every couple of generations. That is one of the messages I am trying to communicate. When people feel despairing about our current moment, my response is that this is the price of freedom. Over time, institutions cease to deliver for the project of freedom, and they have to be renovated again. It happens to be our job in this particular moment.

    Mounk: I agree with that. I wonder whether the kinds of institutional changes we have been talking about are going to be enough. That is a hard challenge because I do not think anybody really has the answer to that. One concern I have is that some of these reforms are responding to specifically American ailments. We see democracy under significant threat in many countries with very different political systems.

    Arguably, Switzerland, which is the most participatory democracy in the world, has done relatively better than some other countries. I can see how you could make a comparative case that participation strengthens democracies. One pitfall of this conversation is to look at specific American ailments and suggest fixes. I often agree that those are ailments and that the fixes make sense. But when I look at the fact that moderate political forces are on the decline everywhere, I worry that this may not be enough.

    The other point I want to make is that liberalism has been in deep and serious intellectual crisis a number of times in history. You can place those crises at different moments. The two most obvious ones are the rise of industrial capitalism and a large, relatively immiserated working class in the factories of Manchester and the Midwest in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, and then the period of ideological competition from fascism and communism in the middle of the twentieth century.

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    Each time, liberalism responded in part by reinventing the tradition, by figuring out how to take certain forms of social rights and integrate them within a basic liberal framework. Liberals came to favor rather than oppose universal schooling, limits on working hours, restrictions on child labor, and many other things. The response to communism and fascism was more complicated, involving thinkers like Karl Popper, Hannah Arendt, and others who were trying to think through how to persevere under the threat of totalitarianism.

    What strikes me is that I do not see a similar attempt to reimagine the tradition today. There are many people doing good work, and perhaps these things only become evident in hindsight, but it is not clear to me where the fundamental rethinking of liberalism is at the moment that could rejuvenate it.

    Allen: Well, it’s tough, Yascha, because I’ll be honest, that’s what I think of myself as doing. My question would be back to you. Take my book, Justice by Means of Democracy. Why does it not count as an example of that?

    Mounk: Well, I think it does count as an example of that. I just wonder whether we are still too stuck in a paradigm to have gone far enough in reinventing the tradition. Then there is the more straightforward problem of, in a moment when we do not have much political power, how we actually make some of those changes.

    It feels to me like the anger that people have at the political system at the moment, the sense that the political system is not responding, may not be carried by the responses so far. Perhaps I am being too pessimistic.

    Allen: I want to go back to your first question, which was about the U.S. context versus the comparative context, and how minute institutional solutions in one place can be pertinent to the larger global systemic change we are seeing, and how to put these pieces together. I am pushing you on my book partly because it is only one book, and obviously, to your point, there needs to be a field of intellectuals working in this space. I do think I have made a proffer in that space, and I would love people to take it seriously as a proffer.

    I have also felt frustrated at times about why that proffer is not being taken up and why there is not already a bigger, richer conversation. I do think there is some real work emerging. I think Anton Barba Kay is doing fantastic work from another point on this spectrum. I think there is real work emerging, and it would be good if we could collectively figure out how to accelerate that or make that conversation more visible.

    To return to the prior question, from my point of view, a lot of the work of reanimating and transforming liberalism is about teaching people to live in self-governing ways again. That can only be done in place. Any citizen who carries the spirit of citizenship and cares about these traditions needs to figure out how to bring self-government into existence in the place where they live. If they can achieve that, there will be lessons for others to do the same.

    Over time, the particular approach to resuscitating self-government in the US may produce institutional solutions that others pick up and use. That is how liberalism grows and spreads. It is not that someone has a blueprint for the whole world. A particular political community finds a solution. Take the abolition of slavery or universal suffrage. Neither spread as a global blueprint. Particular political communities figured them out.

    Take legislative supremacy, making sure that the executive acts within bounds and that the will of the people is channeled through a legislature to steer society. In the American case, that took a revolution, a constitution, and a presidential system. In the British case, it took decades of fighting corruption in the monarchy, Burke’s economic reforms, and then suffrage and electoral reform. Completely different institutional solutions aimed at the same goal.

    The United States does not have legislative supremacy. The UK does. That contrast produces different lessons. I spend a great deal of my time working in Massachusetts. My theoretical work is in a book, but my practical work is on the ground, in the place where I live.

    Mounk: And you ran for governor of Massachusetts.

    Allen: I did, but that was a long time ago at this point. What I am talking about now is that, for me, this work of democratic renovation is always cultural as well as institutional. That means civic education as well as institutional change. The civic education work that I do is, at this point, serving 100,000 kids in the state of Massachusetts, for example.

    There is also a set of ballot initiatives. Democracy is on the ballot in Massachusetts in November 2026 in ways that would really change how our electoral system operates and how it contributes to shaping the electoral system of our national government. I am quite confident that here in Massachusetts we are going to find a path to a resuscitated version of energetic participatory self-governance.

    The question then will be whether that can be a model for other states and whether we can help the whole U.S. federal structure reorient and reorganize itself. My hope would be that if we can figure that out, other countries can also learn from it. I would never pretend to have answers for any other country. In that regard, I am absolutely a place-based worker. I am completely bounded by place.

    Mounk: Let’s talk about civic education a little bit. It’s obviously very important. You’ve done a lot of work on uncovering what the state of civic education is in the United States. My understanding is that, to a striking degree, how much civic education we give middle school and high school students has declined. Of course, that calls for an easy solution, which is to engage in more civic education. The moment you do, there are deep ideological battles about how we should teach and what we should teach.

    There are people on the political right who want to present the United States as the best country that has ever existed on earth with no blemishes. There are people on the left who want to portray the United States as the worst country that has ever existed on earth with no redeeming features. How do you, in a deeply polarized political environment, think about designing a curriculum for civic education that people on different ends of the ideological spectrum can accept and that hopefully builds commonality?

    Allen: Well, the answer is in your question. Polarization is the single biggest obstacle to rebuilding the infrastructure of civic learning. Therefore, if you want to rebuild the infrastructure of civic learning, the first thing you have to do is solve for polarization.

    I was part of a huge collaborative effort of 300 people from across the country. It was a cross-ideological network of scholars and practitioners that created something called Educating for American Democracy: A Roadmap. We agreed from the outset that we were coming from different parts of the political spectrum, but we shared a sense of urgency about the need for kids to have access to rich civic learning opportunities. We knew we would encounter things we disagreed on, and we agreed that when we did, we would stop and work through them until we came up with solutions.

    Over about eighteen months of work, we did exactly that, and we produced a consensus framework for excellence in history and civic learning. The short answer is that you solve polarization by getting people from different parts of the ideological spectrum into the same conversation, committing to staying in the conversation, and learning how to compromise with each other. We did it, and we are growing, and we are implementing curricula aligned with that roadmap all over the country.

    Mounk: What are the main obstacles to this? Is it people who say it is more important to teach reading and writing and other basic skills, or to give people business classes or shop classes or something like that? Or is it people who are opposed to this on ideological grounds? What do you think makes it so hard to spread civic education further than what you are doing with the next initiative?

    Allen: Well, you’re right that polarization is a challenge. For decades, people have not been able to rebuild civic learning infrastructure because of polarization. We did this work from 2018 or 2019 through 2021, when we released the roadmap, and have been building implementations ever since. We got through one obstacle, namely polarization, and then you get through that one and hit the next.

    The next obstacle is the level of resources available for civic education. You’re exactly right. Educational policy for seven decades has prioritized STEM education. That shows up in dollars, but it also shows up in requirements and in where testing is required versus not required. Civic learning continues to operate largely outside the funded and tested parts of the educational system. As a result, it is short on time and short on access to resources. That is the problem we have to solve next.

    Mounk: What do you find in terms of the substance of the content? I am relatively heartened by some studies, like the one that Warren commented on a number of years ago, which show that the number of people who hold relatively polarized views about American history, like the ones I sketched a moment ago, is actually quite small. Most Republicans do want the history of slavery to be taught in schools and do recognize that Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King are great American heroes. Most Democrats recognize that, despite their moral flaws and the fact that they enslaved people, the founders of the United States are great Americans who contributed a great deal to the development of the country.

    So a majority of the population can probably agree on the broad outlines of what we should be teaching about our history. But does that hold for the Republican state legislator in Alabama? Does that hold for the elementary school teacher or the secondary school teacher who actually has to deliver the content?

    Allen: You’re right about where the supermajority of opinion is. A large swath of practitioners, whether in classrooms or in state legislatures, hold those views.

    That does not mean there are no conflicts or contestations. There very much are, everywhere we look. You see a landscape where you can get strong cross-partisan collaboration. Take Arizona, for example, where a Republican state legislature set up a new School for Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership attached to ASU. It was set up by a Republican legislature, and when the politics in the state changed and a Democratic governor came in with Democratic control, there was a decision to keep the school. They did not shut it down, and it became a bipartisan project. The same is true at the University of Tennessee. You also see other states, for example Oklahoma, where you had a head of education who developed a policy to put Bibles in every classroom and was overruled by the Republican governor. Things are definitely contested.

    What I think we can say is that there is a critical mass of people who take a broad view, who recognize that we can teach both the good and the bad of American history, and that engaging people in inquiry about the past, equipping them to ask questions and come to their own judgments and understanding, is the important path forward. There is a critical mass of people from both sides of the political spectrum. As with any project, the task is to grow the coalition and increase the number of allies who support that work.

    Mounk: I think I am asking you, and myself, something that is probably unfair, because neither you nor I are campaign strategists. We are not in the business of trying to help political candidates win. But there is an obvious question in the background of my mind as we have this conversation, which is that to make any of these changes, you need political majorities. At the moment, it does not feel like those political majorities are anywhere in the offing.

    Should political theorists play a role in trying to formulate the language, the rhetoric, the strategies, and the ideas that can allow politicians who are committed to basic democratic institutions, whether on the left, the right, or the center, to win political power so they can put some of these programs into practice? Or should we content ourselves with coming up with reforms that would be great for somebody to implement? I know you are doing a lot of concrete work in states to get these ideas off the ground as well.

    How should we think about our role? I am generally split on this. Sometimes I think my comparative advantage is to think about big ideas and to envision what a better set of institutions and norms might look like, and then hope that somehow that influences the world and somebody takes it up. Other times I think that we may be in our own bubble if we sit there thinking about what a great system would look like at a moment when the ability to implement any of this depends on rejuvenating the political language of parties that are clearly exhausted. They are exhausted because they do not have the right words and ideas, and those are things that we, as political theorists, should be able to help with.

    Allen: I appreciate you asking that question in the vocabulary of what is the right role, what should we do in our role as political theorists. I really depend on Cicero for thinking about roles and his concept of the persona. There is a persona of the philosopher, a persona of the politician, a persona of the father or the mother, and every role has its rights and responsibilities.

    In my own case, I understand myself to have a political theorist role, a citizen role, and a mother role, for example. There are things I do as a political theorist that I do not do as a mother. There are things I do as a citizen that I do not do as a political theorist. For me, that separation of role and responsibility is really important.

    I think the job of a political theorist is to ask questions about what is the general welfare. The Constitution puts a stake in the ground for the idea that we are trying to pursue the general welfare, or what is safety and happiness for a people, and then makes those answers available to everybody. To all politicians, it does not matter what your party is. I am trying to help figure out what the right answer is, and I hope I have something to offer that will be of value. That is what I see as the role of a political theorist.

    As a citizen, it is a different question. As a citizen, my role is to help us self-govern, and that means stepping up and trying to take steps that I think are important for that. As a citizen, I consider it part of my job to help cultivate what I call a supermajority for constitutional democracy. I do that in small ways in my local community. I do that by being willing to share ideas with candidates. I am willing to share ideas with candidates from all parties.

    I think we see candidates from all parties who are doing good things. I think both Spencer Cox in Utah and Wes Moore in Maryland have powerful policy ideas and powerful narrative frames that we would be well benefited to elevate. At any rate, the short of it is that I hear your expression of the need for two kinds of work in my own life. I do that by self-consciously having different roles that I inhabit, different email addresses, different telephone numbers for my different roles.

    Mounk: That’s great, that’s really helpful. You’ve written movingly and very interestingly about the Constitution and about the Declaration of Independence. It’s interesting to me that we seem to be in a political moment where there is a fashion for criticizing and perhaps rejecting some of those founding documents. I don’t know whether that is a new departure in American history, or whether, obviously during the Civil War, that was the case, but how many moments in our past there have been in which there was so much intellectual ferment around the idea that perhaps the Constitution itself is flawed, or whether that is something that keeps coming up and there are always some smart radicals in the academy making the devil’s advocate case against the Constitution.

    It is striking to me, from your colleague Jill Lepore at Harvard, who does appreciate the Constitution very much but wants it to become much easier to amend, to people who really blame the Constitution for the fundamental problems of the United States in a way that goes far beyond what Jill would say. How do you think about the strengths and weaknesses that the Constitution gives the American political system, and how we should approach it with appreciation but without blind reverence?

    Allen: It’s perfectly expressed, appreciation without blind reverence. That is exactly one of the design challenges of good civic education, being able to do both of those things at the same time. In the roadmap that we produced and disseminated, we named those design challenges, and that is exactly one of them. In our education, we try to appreciate without reverence, or criticize without falling into cynicism, and appreciate without flying into adulation.

    I think we have turned a corner on that question in the last couple of years. It matters that 2026 is the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence and the American Revolution. There is a great deal of activity all over the country digging back into founding documents in a way that we have not seen since 1976 and the bicentennial.

    Three or four years ago, I would have agreed with you about the problem of cynicism. I give talks about the Declaration and the Constitution all over the place, and inevitably I would get a question about scrapping it all, written by slaveholders, and so on. I am not getting those questions now. I did not get them last year, and I am not getting them this year. People seem willing to take these documents seriously again while recognizing their flaws and limitations.

    I think constitutionalism is hugely important because, at the end of the day, this is Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws. A free society depends on prioritizing law, the stability of legal structures, and the attachment of the people’s voice, through a legislature, to that legal structure. While we do need amendability, and I agree with Jill Lepore about the need for revisability, we need that revisability against a backdrop of clarity that the anchor for the ongoing protection of freedom is lawfulness.

    Mounk: Yeah, that’s very interesting. It just came to my mind, which might sound a little strange, that the desire to abolish the Constitution is a little bit like the desire for Britain to exit the European Union in 2016. The structural similarity is that you are comparing a status quo, which has strengths and very genuine weaknesses, against an imagined alternative outcome.

    One of the strange things about the vote to leave the European Union in Britain was that everybody could imagine what they wanted afterwards. There were people on the left who thought this would allow Britain to become a socialist country that finally nationalizes the railways again and perhaps other industries as well. There were people on the right who thought this would allow Britain to become Singapore on the Thames, and they could vote together to exit the European Union.

    The moment they did vote to exit the European Union, they could not agree among themselves and everything turned into a significant mess. This is not to say that the European Union is without flaws. There is something similar around the Constitution. The Constitution has some things that I would ideally want to change. I can see the attraction of imagining my favorite Constitution, but the idea that any process where we have, especially in the politics of today and the media landscape of today and the polarization of today, a constitutional convention to come up with something significantly better than what we have is, I think, quite unrealistic.

    I happened to be in Chile briefly before the constitutional assembly there met for the first time. I believe it was in early 2020. There were great hopes that people put into saying the real problem, the real root of our political problems, is this Constitution, which has a very complicated history in Chile. It was decreed by the outgoing Pinochet government. There are good reasons to be skeptical of it. People thought that refounding the Constitution would make all of the problems go away.

    What happened was that a very left-wing constitutional assembly passed a rather absurd constitution that was soundly rejected by the population. Then there were elections for a new constitutional assembly, which produced a very right-wing assembly. They produced a constitution that was absurd in different ways and was again roundly rejected by the majority of the population. Five years later, they are back to square one and still stuck with the same Constitution.

    Allen: One of the remarkable parts of the American story is that the Declaration was unanimously signed by the people who participated in developing it, that the Constitution was unanimously voted on by the people who participated in the convention, and that they then gave themselves a supermajority requirement for ratification and met that supermajority requirement.

    When you think about wanting a new constitution, you have to ask yourself whether you can deliver that unanimity and whether you can deliver a supermajority. You have to ask whether the conditions exist where that is even a feasible possibility. If it is not, then probably what we need is revisability within the existing framework.

    It is important to say out loud that there is a great deal we can revise through federal law or state law that has constitutional implications, and people often forget that. I am very focused on things in state law that control the federal superstructure, particularly laws about election systems and laws about campaign finance.

    State by state, in legislatures that are functional and able to make decisions together, we can move through sets of laws that could give us an operating system quite different from the one we currently know.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Danielle discuss how to build a better politics and the impact of getting involved in local communities. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    49 min

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