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The conflict in Iran has been remarkable above all for one thing: almost nobody is willing to claim any agency in it. Not the Gulf states who have been attacked over something none of them did, not the global community reeling from the oil crisis they did not vote for. With the lone exception of Ukraine, who has once again bitten its tongue and sent help when it was needed, most countries are either hoping that the problem will go away, limiting their response to defensive measures only, or thinking that by making Donald Trump clean it up, he will learn a lesson.
On paper, all these actors want the same thing—the Strait of Hormuz open, the oil flowing, and the Iranian regime’s habit of shooting projectiles at unrelated parties brought to an end.
So why don’t they get involved?For the Gulf states, any involvement with the U.S.– and Israeli-led attack on a fellow Muslim state means problems down the line as well as some loss of face. After all, some of these states are yet to sign an official peace agreement with Israel. At the same time, there are only so many missiles and drones one can afford to shoot down over one’s own oil fields and civilian populations without retaliating.
As for the usual U.S. allies… well, there aren’t really any left. After Trump tried to abscond with Greenland, threatened Canada, and all but sanctioned Europe, to say nothing of the wrecking ball he took to NATO or his curious faith in Putin’s peaceful intentions, the problem is not that nobody wants to deal with the United States. It’s that nobody can afford to deal with the United States—they know they will end up with a political bill for everything, and yet somehow will still be responsible for the failures. Plus, Trump will demand that they thank him for it.
Does Europe have to get involved?If Europe does not participate in some form or other, and Trump achieves a result he can sell as success (spectacular or reasonable), Europe will be relegated to the table of irrelevances. This would only work well for Europe if their plan is to be irrelevant. Few would dispute that the current POTUS has a propensity for vindictiveness.
Meanwhile, if Trump fails, Europe will never hear the end of it. It will be designated as the party responsible for any and all failures, and as the ally that did not turn up. Europe will pay with higher tariffs, accelerated attempts to break up the EU, and American withdrawal from NATO commitments. And Ukraine will almost certainly be used as a showpiece—despite being the only one who turned up when the call went out for support.
Then again, it is almost certain that Trump will seek revenge even if he succeeds. So, Europe will pay the price whatever the outcome.
What’s more, as the two ballistic missiles fired at the island of Diego Garcia show, Iranian missiles have the potential to reach much further than the immediate vicinity in the Middle East. Some Gulf states were quietly minding their own business, and they were still attacked by Iran. Targeting Europe might be an easy decision for Iran to make. Europe might not have the luxury of waiting this one out.
Finally, although Europe is not at war at the moment, it is actively planning for such an eventuality. According to most estimates provided by European intelligence services, Russia could start a major war in Europe within just five years.
Considering this, it might be useful for Europe to weaken the adversary by weakening its allies. Recently, Russia lost Syria and Assad, Venezuela and Maduro. The loss of Iran and its mullahs might not just reduce its capabilities, but also lower Russia’s standing in the world.
Two approaches to the Middle EastBut if Europe and its allies want to shape events according to their own needs, they would still have to overcome the problem of an unreliable Washington—including future administrations should the issue remain relevant for some time. We cannot really assume that the next administration will be substantially different—after all, roughly half of the U.S. population voted for the current one, and they haven’t gone anywhere.
The United States is not the only party with a dog in this fight. The Gulf states have one, too. Even if the Strait of Hormuz is unblocked while the Iranian regime stays, then they, their economies, and their infrastructure will continue to be sitting ducks whenever Iran wants to exercise its newly discovered leverage over the region. Being the only irrational actor in an otherwise sane neighbourhood can offer remarkable benefits, as shown by Russia—you get to keep what does not belong to you while everyone else hopes that you will not want even more of what does not belong to you.
Besides, the Gulf states are the only ones for whom Trump has a healthy dose of respect (we could add Russia, but that respect is decidedly unhealthy). If Europe offered its support directly to the affected Middle Eastern states, as opposed to the United States and Israel, it would tip or at least stabilize the balance of power, and it might just keep Trump in check. Furthermore, that would legitimize European efforts while raising questions about U.S. actions.
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On top of that, Europe has a direct line to the only country that has real experience dealing with the kind of threat the Gulf states face—Ukraine. And while Trump might want to cut off his nose to spite his face, people in the Middle East are far shrewder. They might realize that Ukraine is not just capable of helping them protect themselves, but also of clearing enemy positions without putting boots on the ground should there be a need for it—albeit for a price.
Something for everyoneWhile all actors have slightly different aims, at least a version of them can be achieved by arranging their involvement in a slightly different configuration than usual—by assisting the Gulf states.
The United States and Israel would get the assistance they need without having to admit they asked for it. Trump’s daily pronouncements contradict each other by design—which means he can accept help without ever having formally requested it.
Europe would both demonstrate agency and have a very good defence against the supporters of Iran who control part of the political narrative. Countries whose governments question Israel’s right to exist would not be allied with Israel—they would be allied with the Gulf states. So, most of the voters should be, if not happy, then at least not outraged.
And the Middle East would benefit the most from this setup if it helped to solve the crisis.
Potentially.
Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK. Born in the Baltics, with a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter, she writes and gives live commentary on European security and Russia.
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There used to be an academic discipline centered on a straightforward question: what helps poor countries get richer? It was called development economics, and it was the intellectual engine behind sprawling government bureaucracies: USAID, Britain’s Department for International Development (DfID), the World Bank, and many others.
Across the rich world, left and right understood these entities to be in the national interest. Then, starting in the early 2000s, that discipline began to morph into something different—something so narrowly rooted in progressive pieties that, when the political winds shifted, the government programs built on its insights could be gutted without anyone much caring.
What happened?
The transformation of development economics can be traced back to 2003, when Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan founded the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT.
J-PAL pioneered the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), a methodology explicitly cribbed from the world of clinical drug testing, to evaluate anti-poverty interventions. If you remember reading some eye-popping results about the impact of deworming pills in Kenya or microcredit in Bangladesh, you’ve already come within the orbit of J-PAL’s influence.
The RCT-boom soon grew into a cottage industry. Bed nets, textbooks, fertilizer subsidies—for idealistic young students around the turn of the 21st century, doing research into things like these felt virtuous. Just as importantly, the path to prestige publication was straightforward: each intervention was narrow enough to randomize, and each answer crisp enough to get into a great journal.
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The J-PAL approach swallowed development economics virtually whole: by 2015, J-PAL affiliates had run over 1,000 randomized evaluations across 90 countries. In 2015, Banerjee, Duflo, and seven co-authors published “A Multifaceted Program Causes Lasting Progress for the Very Poor” in Science, reporting results from six RCTs across Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru. Their results showed that bundling asset transfers with coaching, savings support, and health services could durably improve consumption and employment rates for the extreme poor.
Then, in 2019, the Nobel Committee awarded its economics prize to Banerjee, Duflo, and their longtime collaborator Michael Kremer “for their experimental approach to alleviating global poverty.” A generation of graduate students got the message. If you wanted to publish in the top journals, if you wanted grants, tenure, attention, you pitched an RCT.
This isn’t at all what development economics used to be like. An older tradition in the profession still hangs on, exemplified by, say, Michele Peruzzi and Alessio Terzi’s 2021 study on the determinants of economic growth across countries. It’s an excellent, methodologically sophisticated paper… and it picked up 22 citations.
Figuring out why some countries suddenly start growing and others don’t is not, apparently, a question worthy of the profession’s best minds.
The problem with RCTs is that they only work for specific types of research question: narrowly tailored anti-poverty interventions that can be compared against each other. RCTs do not work for broader questions related to economic growth. You can randomize who gets deworming pills. You cannot randomize whether Indonesia adopts a better trade policy.
Listen, nobody seriously disputes that deworming pills work and mosquito nets improve health for the world’s poorest people. The question is whether narrow, RCT-friendly interventions like these actually help poor people get a foothold in the middle class.
That’s the very fraught territory that Lant Pritchett, the famously prickly Harvard development economist, recently tackled in a gloriously satisfying Substack post, soon to be a new paper. Pritchett has plainly had it up to here with RCTs. Which is why he’s chosen to take a rhetorical bulldozer to the house of J-PAL, pointing out something the profession ought to have known, but somehow forgot.
Pritchett begins by constructing a composite index of what he calls the “basics” of human material wellbeing—not income, but physical indicators: access to sanitation, child mortality rates, malnutrition, years of schooling, environmental quality. He then plots these basics against GDP per capita, and finds a correlation of around 0.9. That’s… the technical term is “insane.” Nothing researchers care about gets a correlation coefficient that high. 0.9 is basically an identity.
As in, Pritchett thinks GDP per capita is far and away the best indicator of the wellbeing of a country’s population.
Pritchett is a contrarian’s contrarian—early in his career, he made everyone mad by demonstrating with mathematical precision that rising educational attainment across countries had no measurable association with economic growth—and that its estimated effect on productivity was actually negative. The feel-good formulas that launched a thousand grant proposals are a red cape to this guy. He will charge.
Faced with this latest contrarian take, you might think “yeah ok, so Lant is just cherry-picking his index to flatter his thesis.” But no. The heart of his paper is the opposite of that. Pritchett systematically searches across all plausible combinations of indicators and weights to find the composite measure of basics that has the weakest relationship with GDP per capita. And even that worst-case measure still shows a powerful association.
Pritchett’s claim isn’t just that there exists some measure of wellbeing that tracks growth. He wants to make the much, much stronger claim that there is no plausible measure of basic well-being that growth doesn’t deliver.
The implications are uncomfortable for anyone who’s built a career around the idea that growth is necessary but not sufficient, that it needs to be “pro-poor,” that targeted interventions (the sort you can test with RCTs) are “equally important.” Pritchett shows that in poor countries like Ethiopia and Pakistan, virtually nobody has the basics in the way a middle-class person in a rich country does. Not the poor. Not even the middle class.
When nearly everyone lacks adequate sanitation and decent schooling, the distinction between “pro-poor” and “pro-rich” growth shades into meaninglessness. In poor countries, even pro-rich growth is effectively also pro-poor because, at low income levels, any growth has an outsized impact on the basics.
To be fair to J-PAL, its original sin was methodological, not political. Banerjee and Duflo aren’t progressive activists, they’re researchers. The question they asked was valid: which specific interventions work and which don’t?
The problem is that that question, asked a thousand times over, crowded out the rest of the field. If your entire discipline is organized around evaluating small-bore interventions, you will, without anyone deciding to, stop training people who think about national economic policy.
What filled the vacuum was something J-PAL’s founders probably didn’t intend and might not even recognize. As development economics lost interest in economic growth, the institutions that funded development work drifted toward a different operating logic altogether. Aid became less about helping countries build the conditions for broad-based prosperity and more about demonstrating measurable impact on identifiable beneficiaries. That opened the door to the wholesale capture of aid budgets by explicitly political projects dressed up in the language of equity, inclusion, and social justice.
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J-PAL wasn’t responsible for any of this, of course—but the long retreat from growth did create the institutional space for drift. A field organized around the question “how do countries get rich?” has a natural center of gravity that resists ideological capture: growth is a bipartisan idea, and the policy levers that drive it (trade, regulation, macroeconomic stability) don’t code neatly as left or right.
But by the time USAID was funding DEI trainings in the developing world, the long march towards the micro that J-PAL initiated had spun entirely out of control. Careful empiricism gave way to modish activist-tinged development. It never seems to have occurred to the people backing the $1.5 million USAID grant for workplace training focused on the LGBTQI+ community in Serbia that they were giving Fox News a loaded pistol. The drag shows in Ecuador, the Peruvian LGBTQ+ comic book, and a dozen other head-turning State Department initiatives might merely have been a rounding error for the federal budget in terms of total cost—but they gave ideological opponents of development aid a generous attack surface.
If development economists have nothing useful to say about what helps economies grow, development bureaucracies aren’t long for this world. International development aid used to have bipartisan appeal and cross-party support—it was a foreign policy tool as much as a humanitarian one.
But as the field rebranded itself around targeting, redistribution, and the feel-good language of “reaching the most vulnerable,” it coded itself as a progressive cause. Aid became legible as charity at best, and woke nonsense at worst.
The backlash has been savage. In 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson folded Britain’s Department for International Development—once one of the world’s most respected bilateral aid agencies—into the Foreign Office, and slashed its budget in the process. Five years later, 60% of development adviser posts in Britain remain unfilled. The institutional expertise is simply gone.
Trump went further: in early 2025, he froze virtually all U.S. foreign aid and moved to dissolve USAID outright, canceling 83% of its programs. The largest development agency on Earth is being shuttered, and the political resistance has been thin.
An aid establishment that had spent the past few decades asking how to help countries grow—a question with obvious implications for trade, investment, security, and jobs—might have had allies on both sides of the aisle. The one we got didn’t.
You can read Pritchett’s essay as a dirge for a field that has committed seppuku. An entire academic discipline that had been about structural transformation turned into an internationalized branch of social work.
To be sure, Pritchett’s gloriously cathartic rant won’t change this. The academic prestige economy is too settled for that. But the data is the data, and what it says is simple: economic growth is not merely necessary for human wellbeing. In any plausible accounting, it is human wellbeing. People get the basics when countries get rich. No exceptions.
Everything else is a footnote—an interesting footnote, perhaps, but a footnote nonetheless.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.
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“Within the revolution, everything; against the revolution, nothing.”
This Fidel Castro slogan has been the governing principle in Cuba for nearly 67 years. Independent media is crushed, dissent criminalized, and surveillance embedded into daily life through neighborhood committees designed to ensure that, as Castro himself once put it, everyone knows what each person does.
Before 1959, the island was governed by a strongman who maintained order while American business (and mafioso) thrived. Castro’s revolution was, in part, a rejection of that arrangement. It held out the promise of sovereignty and dignity. What it delivered instead was another form of domination: a centralized, authoritarian state that co-opted the language of social justice to shore up the power of a new ruling class.
Castro himself was less of an ideologue than a caudillo in the classic Latin American mold—opportunistic, charismatic, and intolerant of rivals. As his Argentine sidekick Che Guevara later admitted, Cuba’s alignment with the Soviet bloc was “half the fruit of constraint, half the result of choice.” Communism provided not just an economic model but a bureaucratic structure through which Castro was able to consolidate power.
That model has failed in ways that are by now familiar from the old Soviet bloc. Systems that could build rockets and project power proved unable to provide basic goods.
I’ve seen this with my own eyes. In my early twenties I spent around a year in Cuba. On some days it was impossible to find toiletries or basic medicines in the state-run shops. The monthly ration booklet—which every Cuban is issued by the government—barely stretched to a week. Cuban friends would spend hours queuing for basic goods or quietly working out an exit strategy—often marriage to a foreign national.
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This is the reality of Cuba today. The country’s economic problems are exacerbated by the long-running American embargo but not solely caused by it. In recent years, millions of Cubans have emigrated. Those most dissatisfied are also those most able to leave. Exit has become the system’s most reliable safety valve.
Since the loss of Soviet subsidies in the early nineties, Havana has adapted through a familiar pattern: limited economic openings followed by political retrenchment. Power remains concentrated in the military and security apparatus, which dominates key sectors of the economy. The result is stagnation—enough flexibility to survive, but not enough to loosen the grip of the ruling elite.
There are many good reasons to despise such a system. The real question is what follows from that judgment—and whether U.S. policy under Donald Trump represents a serious attempt to help the Cuban people achieve something better.
For decades, Washington has (to varying degrees) relied on a simple formula: apply enough external pressure and the regime will either reform or collapse. Trump has intensified this approach by tightening the embargo, restricting remittances, curbing travel, and cutting off sources of hard currency.
Washington’s goal is to induce sufficient hardship on the island to provoke internal pressure for change. But what sort of change? Democracy or human rights? Unlikely. Trump’s underlying vision is probably far less noble: a Cuba reshaped into a compliant, economically open client state—one that admits American business on favorable terms and aligns itself with U.S. interests.
Trump’s policy in Venezuela is illustrative here. In January, Nicolás Maduro was replaced with someone more willing to bend the knee. Delcy Rodríguez cut a deal with the Americans that let them profit from the country’s oil. As for the Venezuelan people, they are still waiting.
The Cuban people are also waiting. But even if Trump were interested in improving their lot, current policy probably won’t do that. Sanctions tend to weaken civil society more effectively than they weaken the state itself. In Cuba, the government retains control over resources, institutions, and—most importantly—the security apparatus. When remittances are restricted, it is Cubans who lose their lifeline. When tourism declines, it is small private businesses—one of the few areas of relative autonomy—that suffer. When shortages deepen, daily life is stripped back to a grinding, undignified struggle for the necessities.
It is a mistake to assume that such hardship will automatically translate into mass rebellion. It is just as likely to produce exhaustion or exodus. Under current conditions, sustained political mobilization is difficult. Add to this the steady outflow of intellectuals as well as younger, more disaffected citizens, and the result is a society whose remaining citizens are preoccupied with more quotidian concerns.
Meanwhile, the regime can prop itself up with the narratives it has long relied upon. Economic hardship can be blamed on the American aggressor. Corruption and brutality can be waved away. Hardliners are strengthened, able to argue that reform is too dangerous in the face of foreign pressure.
This dynamic is well understood on the island itself. Many Cubans are perfectly capable of holding two ideas at once: that their government is repressive and incompetent, and that American policy makes their lives harder rather than easier.
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This is frequently misunderstood abroad. For decades, sections of the Western left have responded to Cuba’s failures by defaulting to boilerplate anti-Americanism, treating the regime as a kind of proxy for their own dreams of a better world. That this vision of a city on the hill has not been borne out by half a century of “revolution” is almost beside the point.
Just this weekend, more than 500 left-wingers from around the world arrived in Havana to deliver five metric tons of food supplies and medical equipment to the Cuban government. The delegation included the former British Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, the streamer Hasan Piker, and the Irish rap group Kneecap. The trip was organised by the Progressive International—which describes the Cuban model as “sustaining hope in moments of global retreat”—in collaboration with the Cuban government. Some have posted triumphant selfies of themselves with Miguel Díaz-Canel, the country’s dictator.
When Cubans took to the streets to protest against their government in 2021, chanting “liberty” and “motherland and life,” the Cuban president sent his government’s “black beret” special forces to beat them up—they were subsequently prosecuted in summary trials. According to human rights groups, as of February there were 1,213 political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Cuba.
They are conspicuously absent from left-wing calls for “peace and justice.”
If the aim were genuinely to support Cuban society in loosening the grip of the state, American policy would look different to the one that Trump is pursuing. There was an imperfect logic—but a logic nonetheless—behind the thaw in relations that took place during the Obama era. The dictatorship did not fall. But increased travel, expanded remittances, and diplomatic engagement were not concessions to the regime so much as attempts to bypass it. The policy created modest but real changes: a growth in economic autonomy, greater exposure to the outside world, and a subtle shift in expectations.
Trump has attempted—and more or less succeeded—in reversing Obama’s policies. Cuba and the United States are once again locked in a standoff. In Havana, the state-planned marches continue; the left-wing solidarity missions touch down at José Martí airport; and Cuba’s president promises to fight to the last drop of blood—someone else’s, of course. Cubans have seen this film before. Fight imperialism? A decent meal would be nice.
Trump has one strategy—in war and in life—based on a belief that his instincts, which typically mean his desire for American domination and enrichment, are superior to any reasoned analysis by experts. It’s a shame Fidel is not still around: he would have understood.
James Bloodworth is a journalist and the author of Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain and Lost Boys: Undercover in the Manosphere. He writes the Substack “For the Desk Drawer.”
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This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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As New York Times reporter Michael S. Schmidt wrote last fall, “We are now seeing how a truly unshackled Trump uses his power.” Outsiders have been asking: Are there any guardrails in the political system to rein in his use of power?
Back in 2019, Trump said, “I have Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.” That’s not quite what the Constitution in general—or Article II on presidential power in particular—says. But it is what Trump believes, and it certainly is the way he has acted, from sending troops into American cities to starting a war in the Middle East without talking with anyone but the Israelis.
After more than a year of Trump 2.0, we can begin to see the patterns of power and the effectiveness of the guardrails. The courts are beginning to define “that’s too far” lines, but they’ve been slow and late to the game. On the other hand, Congress has been AWOL. And, in addition, the Trump administration has been working hard to shackle one of Congress’s most powerful oversight arms, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Trump himself doesn’t mention the “unitary executive” approach to presidential power (the idea that the president has sole power over the executive branch of government) that lies at the core of his “I have the right to do” pronouncement. But he and his top officials have certainly embraced it. He believes that Article II of the Constitution gives him the power to decide what happens to anything within the reach of the executive branch, with authority unchecked by the Article III branch, the courts, or the Article I branch, the Congress.
The courts have begun to prove him wrong. But challenges from the legislative branch have been tepid, at best. And that’s why the most recent assault on the GAO is so concerning.
Tired of Winning... in the Courts?In his 2026 State of the Union Address, the president said, “We’re winning so much that we really don’t know what to do about it.” But the courts increasingly have had other ideas.
A judge threw out the administration’s attempt to subpoena Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell’s records for remodeling the Fed’s headquarters. Other judges tossed the indictments for former FBI Director James B. Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James. A grand jury refused to indict six Democratic members of Congress, whom the Justice Department wanted to prosecute for sedition. In 1985, New York Judge Sol Wachtler said, “Any good prosecutor can get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich.” Except, it seems, in the especially weak case against the lawmakers. Then, in February, the U.S. Supreme Court tossed out Trump’s tariffs in a 6-3 decision that found Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett, both nominated by Trump himself, joining the majority.
Trump has had an increasingly poor Article III batting average, although several big cases are yet to be decided. Challenges are pending before the Court: on state mail-in ballot deadlines, limits on the ability of marijuana users to own guns, an effort to roll back birthright citizenship, and the debate over the president’s power to dismiss appointees to independent regulatory agencies. A couple of decisions could pull the balance of powers significantly back from the executive branch.
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For now, though, the Trump administration has had several bad months in the courts, but aside from the decision on tariffs, the courts have been more of a slow roller-coaster brake in some areas than an anti-lock braking system keeping the president’s power in check. It has taken litigants a long time for the ponderous process to produce results, and dealing with fundamental questions like the balance of powers, one case at a time, is a very hard way to restrain Trump’s ambitions.
No Worries about Losing... in CongressArticle I of the Constitution, on the other hand, has barely proved more than a speed bump. The Democrats have managed to stage a couple of partial government shutdowns, but these have become so routine that they’ve lost much of their leverage. On presidential appointments, Trump has largely had his own way. Last summer’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act rolled the administration’s Year One agenda into, well, one big, beautiful bill.
Otherwise, Congress increasingly is where legislation goes to die. After the least productive Congress in recent memory at the end of the Biden administration, Congress is now on course to beat its own dismal record. That means Congress isn’t a place for originating or debating big, new ideas. Nor is it a place for killing them, since the administration—especially Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Russell Vought—has found endless creative ways of running government without the inconvenience of passing policies through Congress.
A blizzard of executive orders has completely transformed the civil service system, including making it far easier to fire just about anyone. The OMB has gained policy control over independent regulatory commissions like the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission by requiring the agencies to send all their proposed rules through the OMB for approval before they can be issued. The OMB has gotten budgetary control over these agencies, and the president gave the Department of Justice the power to “provide authoritative interpretations of law for the executive branch.” Trump has blown past all the modern records for the number of executive orders issued by year—more than twice as many on average as any president since World War II, and more than five times as many as any president after Reagan.
Trump’s actions have directly challenged the role of Congress in defining the scope of the agencies and the authority that their heads can exercise. Traditional constitutional practice has held that Congress sets the scope of decisions for the agencies. The Trump administration’s position has been that, once Congress passes a law creating an executive branch agency, a program managed within the executive branch, or designating money to fund them, it is the president’s power to decide just what the agency can or must do. This is a dramatic weakening of the balance of powers, but from Capitol Hill there has been nary a squeak.
Perhaps most importantly, the administration has asserted that it has the power to decide not to spend money that Congress has appropriated. (It’s worth remembering that appropriations are laws that Congress passes authorizing agencies to spend money on particular programs—and that, as legislation, the president signs them before they can take effect, so appropriations already carry the president’s assent.)
From the OMB’s point of view, it’s fine for Congress to approve the spending, and even for the president to sign off on the spending… but the administration has no responsibility to spend the money it agreed to. There were squeaks on Capitol Hill about these impoundments, including for the Head Start program, infrastructure projects, grants at the National Institutes of Health, incentives for electric vehicles, and FEMA funds for emergency shelters and food services.
Congress’s watchdog for these projects is the GAO, and the agency issued a series of reports calling out the White House in 2025. In a finding last September, the GAO wrote dryly, “Unless Congress has enacted a law providing otherwise, executive branch officials must take care to ensure that they prudently obligate appropriations during their period of availability.” The “take care” phrase is no accident; a foundation for the administration’s claims about the executive branch is Article II of the Constitution, which says the president “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” The GAO was setting up a debate over just what “take care” means.
The report went on to note that the “GAO’s role is [...] to protect congressional prerogatives,” and that FEMA’s decision not to spend the money, at the behest of the OMB, violated the Impoundment Control Act, put in place after the Nixon administration to prevent executive branch decisions that undermine the decisions of Congress.
From “Green Eyeshades” to Management LeverageThe GAO dates from 1921, when Congress decided it needed an agency to keep a better eye on the growth of government spending and debt following World War I. For the next 45 years, the GAO (then known as the General Accounting Office) checked government spending to make sure it was legal. It became known as the government’s “green eyeshade” agency, because its legions of accountants reviewed expenditures to make sure they were within the law.
After World War II, it became clear that the sheer volume of government spending could not possibly be overseen from any single legislative branch agency. The GAO began a broader monitoring not only of spending but also of programs. Then, as part of the post-Watergate reforms, Congress in 1974 transformed the budgetary process, including a crackdown on the impoundments that Nixon had been exercising, and broadened the GAO’s role as well. The agency brought in experts in areas ranging from public health to transportation and in processes from public policy to information technology.
Its policy role continued to broaden. In 2004, Congress changed the GAO’s name from the General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office. The GAO’s role shifted to focusing more on ensuring government accountability by exploring how government’s management could improve.
The GAO might be known mainly by insiders, but its work has become famous for its reports on the background of major news stories and segments on magazine shows like 60 Minutes. Last year, for example, the show featured analysis by the GAO on the amount of fraud in federal spending every year.
Since 1990, it has produced a “high-risk list” of programs especially prone to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. In 2025, the GAO reported nearly $759 billion in savings thanks to its work. For anyone interested in understanding how government really works—and how to get a handle on fraud—its detailed reports are must-reads.
Kneecapping the GAOThe GAO’s work has been impressive, but its work during the Trump administration on fraud and highly risky issues has produced only pushback. When it came to the Head Start money, the Department of Health and Human Services replied, “HHS did not impound Head Start funds and disputes the conclusion of the GAO report.” The department dragged its heels in responding to the shutdown of NIH grants. One of the curiosities of Elon Musk’s DOGE work, in fact, was its failure to focus on the GAO’s ready-made list of targets that would offer substantial reductions in fraud and increases in real savings.
Congress might have the power of the purse, but agency heads won’t spend the money if the OMB locks the purse back up. Congress might want to cut fraud, but it won’t succeed by ignoring the biggest targets like Medicare and Medicaid.
What is the recourse? Groups seeking to challenge the administration’s actions can file suit in court and use the GAO’s findings as evidence. Some have done so, but no group has succeeded in winning a case against impoundment. The GAO itself could sue, but its former head, Comptroller General Gene Dodaro, called such a suit a “last resort.”
With the end of Dodaro’s term in December 2025, the “last resort” became “no resort,” and the administration has been in no hurry to select a new comptroller general. A 1980 law provides that a commission of ten members of Congress recommends at least three potential new comptrollers to the president, who then gets to nominate one of them, subject to the Senate’s confirmation, for a fifteen-year term. That has put the GAO into a holding pattern, led by acting comptroller general Orice Williams Brown. Without a permanent head—and with the kind of new comptroller general the administration wants very much open to debate—the GAO has been very careful not to pick a fight with the administration.
The OMB’s Vought has taken advantage of the vacuum to push back even harder against the GAO in particular and Congress in general. In early March, he sent a memo to all the heads of executive departments and agencies asserting that previous government policies “have overly deferred to the direction and priorities of external agencies,” especially the GAO. Its views, he said, “are not binding on the Executive Branch.”
The GAO points to the law that says “a decision of the Comptroller General [...] is conclusive.” The OMB reads the law narrowly; it agrees that the GAO’s opinions are indeed binding, but only narrowly, on matters of accounting and the settlement of accounts. Otherwise, the OMB argues, neither Congress nor any of its agencies have the constitutional power to dictate how agencies interpret the law. (It’s a peculiar point of law, however, that the president gets to name the head of a major congressional agency.) As a result, the OMB contends, the GAO’s opinions are only advisory. And consistent with recent court decisions, the OMB concludes, the proper forum for deciding what the law means is the courts, not a legislative agency.
Unbalancing the PowersFor Constitutional experts—and fans of American history—the “unitary executive” debate is a truly interesting one. When we step past the broad debate to the particular tactics of how the Trump administration is using it to reshape American constitutional government—if we put clothes on it and take it outside in bright sunlight—the implications are stark.
The courts have put the brakes on Trumpism, but they have had only limited effect, in part because the courts decide one narrow case at a time, and they take a long time doing it, especially when a case goes all the way to the Supreme Court. That has given the administration a lot of flexibility to move fast on many fronts. There’s simply no way that the administration’s opponents can keep up or win enough legal challenges fast enough to significantly slow down the march of executive power.
The Constitution gives Congress much greater potential, but that requires Congress to use the power the Founders gave it in Article I, and there is no sign that the Republican majority has any intention of allowing that to happen. Congress has created a powerful policy arm in the GAO, which has proven it can move at something close to the speed of Trump. Led by Vought, however, the Trump administration has decided it can just ignore the GAO’s decisions and reports and reinforce that stand by refusing to appoint a new comptroller general. The GAO’s decisions can provide the fuel for court challenges, but that requires someone to bring a case, and groups interested in challenging the administration have often been outflanked and outgunned.
There will be endless debates for generations to come about how Trump has transformed America and its government. But the exclamation point on the shifting balance of powers will likely come from Vought’s moves to squash the role of the GAO and, in the process, defang one of the most important checks on the president’s power.
Donald F. Kettl is Professor Emeritus and Former Dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. He is the author, with William D. Eggers, of Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems.
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David Goodhart is a journalist, author and think tanker, and currently head of the demography unit at the Policy Exchange think tank. His latest book is The Care Dilemma: Freedom, Family and Fertility.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and David Goodhart discuss why the triumphalist worldview of the early 2000s has collapsed, how the “anywhere” versus “somewhere” divide explains contemporary populism, and whether meritocracy is creating an insulated professional class that damages the communities it leaves behind.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I have been thinking for the last few months about the different ways in which the worldview that I had—and that I think the political mainstream had in the year 2000, when I was 18 and went to university—has started to come apart, to fall apart. Part of that is the belief that nationalism was the ideology of the 20th century and would not have much impact on the 21st century.
There is also the assumption that the arc of justice is long but would bend toward justice, especially on questions of civil rights, and the idea that cranks would object to significant levels of immigration but would not prevail. At the heart of it, I think, are some of the concerns you have written about over the course of your last three books: the slightly triumphalist idea of a global, educated, rising middle and upper-middle class, for whom access to good degrees and educational opportunities would pave the way to a future that is better for them and better for their societies as well.
What happened to those assumptions? Why did that broad idea feel so natural until quite recently in our politics, and why has it, as you would argue, now been proven wrong in many ways?
David Goodhart: I wrote this book in 2017, The Road to Somewhere, that talked about the value divide—the education-based value divide is between the people I call the “anywheres” and the people I call the “somewheres.” These are real. The book was based on the UK, but I think it has application to all rich countries. I invented the labels, not the worldviews—they are there in the British Social Attitudes surveys and other sources.
The anywhere–somewhere value divide clearly contributed enormously to both the Brexit vote in 2016 in the UK and Trump’s first election in that same year, and indeed his reelection. The anywhere worldview, as you implied, is that of the highly educated, people comfortable with mobility, partly because they have often experienced it by attending residential universities. They are part of a world where change is something they can take in stride. Openness and autonomy come naturally because of their experiences as mobile graduates. It leans toward a natural kind of liberalism. Of course, they then go on into jobs that pay them well and confer high status.
It is a basic psychological point, isn’t it? The more secure you are, the more open and liberal-minded you are likely to be, and vice versa. The somewhere grouping is larger but less influential. These are people who tended to be less well educated, more rooted, and whose identities were often much more connected to place and group, making them more susceptible to being discomforted by social change, in contrast to the anywheres who are more adapted to it. That had been brewing beneath the surface for 20 or 30 years, probably since the late 1980s or early 1990s, and the inchoate somewhere pushback erupted in 2016.
Populism itself is a revolt of the somewheres against the overdomination of the anywhere worldview. I want to be clear that both worldviews, in their mainstream form, are perfectly decent. It is not as binary as the distinction might imply. If you read the book, you will see there are many different kinds of anywheres. There is an extreme version. One of the experiences that prompted me to write the book came in 2011, when I went to an Oxford College dinner. I found myself sitting between the two most powerful non-elected people in the UK at the time: the head of the British Civil Service, Gus O’Donnell, and the head of the BBC, Mark Thompson, who went on to manage The New York Times.
I was chatting with Gus O’Donnell and told him I was writing a book about immigration—I later published The British Dream in 2013 about the successes and failures of postwar immigration. Gus O’Donnell said to me, “When I was at the Treasury as the chief civil servant, I used to argue for the most open door possible. I think it is my job to maximize global welfare, not national welfare.” I am reasonably liberal-minded, but I thought, coming from the head of the national civil service, this was extraordinary. I turned to Mark Thompson and said, “Did you just hear what Gus O’Donnell said—the head of the national civil service said it was his job to maximize global welfare?” And Mark Thompson said, “Well, I agree with him.”
That impelled me to write The Road to Somewhere. Mark Thompson and Gus O’Donnell are not representative of all anywheres—anywheres are 25–30% of the population, while somewheres are closer to 45–50%. There is a range, and that was an extreme anywhere position. The problem is not the anywhere worldview itself but its overdomination. The so-called “uniparty,” whether center-left or center-right, has generally followed the same path: pro-globalization, pro-expansion of higher education (while neglecting apprenticeships and technical education), prioritizing managerial, professional, and financial jobs, and being indifferent to deindustrialization, immigration, and national sovereignty.
That worldview has produced a set of policies that tended to benefit the anywhere class. They have validity in their own right, but there has also been a degree of self-interest behind them. The somewhere pushback would promote a very different set of policies.
Mounk: So tell me a little bit more about this distinction. I think the distinction between anywheres and somewheres is really evocative, and I do recognize something in it that I think is true. I probably count as an anywhere—someone who has lived in many different countries, and so on. But I wonder how many anywheres there really are. It may be one of those situations where there are a lot of weak anywheres, but not that many strong anywheres.
Yes, there are people who will move abroad at the drop of a hat—to Japan, the United States, or France—for academic opportunities, for studies, or for certain job opportunities. But how many people like that are there really? How many are not firmly rooted in a national community and, in many ways, in a local community? If you look at the United States, levels of geographic mobility are actually much lower than they used to be in the past.
Goodhart: Yeah, absolutely. This is one of the points I was making with the Gus O’Donnell quote—that there are varieties of anywheres and varieties of somewheres. When I was doing the work on the UK and looking at the British Social Attitudes surveys, I estimated that the mainstream anywhere worldview was fairly large at 25–30% of the population, with many of them holding much milder versions of the anywhere worldview than the Gus O’Donnell one I quoted.
I also talked about an in-betweener group—about 25% of the population—who held significant elements of both worldviews, and then a more core somewhere group of perhaps 40–45%. So yes, you are right. Of course, somewheres and anywheres often agree on a wide range of subjects. On many of the old left–right issues—size of the state, market versus state, levels of public spending, redistribution, and so on—anywheres and somewheres can fall on both sides. They would obviously agree on many basic things: everybody wants the government to be uncorrupt and efficient, and the health services to work well. There is plenty of overlap in our politics.
But I do think one of the problems, and one of the reasons why politics is more difficult now than it used to be, is that when politics was primarily socioeconomic it was easier to reach compromises. It is easier to split the difference on issues like public spending or redistribution. When it comes to issues of identity, immigration, and national sovereignty, it is much harder to compromise.
I should also say, I am not in favor of the overdominant somewhere rule. Although my book was seen as a kind of moderate defense of populism—a defense of the somewheres in light of the overdomination of the anywhere worldview—what we absolutely do not want is for overdominant anywhere rule simply to be replaced by overdominant somewhere rule.
Mounk: Would you say that something like Donald Trump is the over dominance of the somewhere?
Goodhart: Yeah, “I am your revenge” is exactly the opposite of “we need to find a new balance between anywheres and somewheres.” We need a better balance between the two worldviews. We need a new generation of politicians, who I think have yet to emerge. They could come, using the old categories, from either the center-left or the center-right, who can find a balance—a bridge, if you like—between the two worldviews.
Mounk: How similar or different is your view to that of Michael Lind, who would argue that the problem is that a broader professional managerial class has come to be dominant in Anglo-Saxon societies and perhaps some Western European societies as well? This professional managerial class is educated at a similar set of elite institutions that inculcate in them particular values. Institutions that were meant to be politically neutral—whether a public broadcasting service like the BBC in the United Kingdom, a national radio station like NPR in the United States, universities themselves, courts, or even some corporations—start to reflect the background assumptions that this broader social milieu has come to hold about the world.
These institutions slowly erode their own legitimacy because that legitimacy was premised on being guided by longstanding principles like neutrality or the investigative, skeptical ethos of traditional journalism. They now appear to be firmly on one side of the most salient political divide, which increasingly separates the professional managerial class and its values and interests from the rest of society. Do you see your framing as similar, complementary, or in conflict with this?
Goodhart: I think he is using different language to describe something relatively similar. Mike is a friend of mine. Indeed, I introduced him to British audiences when I was editing Prospect magazine a few years ago. I am a fan. I think the movement to the left of the professional class is one of the key shifts that really took off in the 1980s. There is an old saying from that period, and I think this applies to the United States as well as the UK, that the right won the economic argument—perhaps even the economic–political argument, since it tended to win elections—while the left was gradually winning the social and cultural argument. I think we have seen the truth of that over the last few decades.
I think this is one of the most significant political factors, and it relates to my argument about the overdomination of the anywhere worldview. The most significant political fact is the movement to the left of the professional class, and large swathes of the middle. What we even think of as the middle class has changed. Today we tend to think of a professional—an accountant, a lawyer, a medic of some kind. Forty or fifty years ago, a middle-class person was often a shopkeeper or a businessperson. They would still have been classified as middle class, of course.
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The expansion of higher education, which happened in Europe a little later than in the United States, has had a profound impact. As recently as the 1990s, more than half of people in the professional managerial class in the UK did not have a university degree. They would have had professional qualifications acquired while working. The fact that you now have that long period of three or four years in a separate institution—moving away from your hometown, your family, and the people you grew up with—means that you are inculcated into a different worldview in many cases. Not everyone who goes to university is on the liberal left, but for historical reasons universities exist partly to challenge tradition and authority. There is therefore an institutional bias toward liberalism in those places.
We have now seen this play out in the “long march through the institutions,” and liberal-inclined professionals dominate our society.
Mounk: Yeah, this is something I have long been ambivalent about with universities and with the idea of meritocracy more broadly. Obviously, I think meritocracy is incredibly important, and I am skeptical of some of the easy dismissals of meritocracy. I always find that writers who say that meritocracy is unimportant or troublesome should go to places in the world where there generally is no meritocracy and see both what that does to people’s aspirations and to the ability of those countries to achieve economic growth and deliver on basic goods. When the alternative to meritocracy is in place—being hired because you are somebody’s relative or because you bribed someone—that is a lot worse than the meritocratic ethos that thankfully exists in much of the West.
I do also agree that at the moment we have elements of fake meritocracy, where people believe they deserve everything even if they attained their positions through significant social or other advantages, and this contributes to the formation of an insulated meritocratic class. That brings us to universities and the role they play. Of course, it is good for elite universities to look as broadly as possible, to find people from disadvantaged backgrounds, to give them good degrees, and hopefully propel them into the meritocratic class. That is part of the point: to give them the ability to hold positions of influence and responsibility in society.
The side effect, however, is that every year universities go into deprived communities and take the top 10, 5, or 2 percent of the most talented 18-year-olds. They carry them off to a lovely college campus where they make friends with the children of great families, with their talents and connections—and they never go back. Perhaps they return for Christmas, or for Thanksgiving in the United States. Perhaps they draw on the story of triumph out of adversity for “social justice points” in the language of the new professional managerial class. But most likely, they are being taken out of the very communities that most need their talents.
I think this is the terrible dilemma at the heart of meritocracy, and it is difficult to know what to do about it.
Goodhart: That is an interesting point. I think we have seen a merger of traditional financial and economic elites with, as it were, the meritocratic elites. Often the traditional elites themselves have to pass the exams, but they benefit from private education, tutors, or other forms of help. There is a merger between those heavily assisted people from traditionally privileged backgrounds and the new privileged who have earned their way. It is one of the ways in which the elites legitimize their continuing rule through the concept of meritocracy.
Of course, we are all meritocrats in the basic sense. We want the most able people in the appropriate jobs, particularly at the top of society. Nobody wants to be operated on by someone who failed their surgery exams. As one wag put it, of course we want the clever guy in charge. That is automatic. But when the clever guy’s child and grandchild are also in charge, we think something is not working.
Mounk: I have two thoughts about meritocracy, which I guess are somewhat controversial, the second probably more than the first. The first is that I wonder whether we have overstated and exaggerated how much social mobility we have had. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the ranks of the middle class hugely expanded. If you were at the 50th percentile of German, British, or American society in 1930, you were a manual worker. Probably if you were at the 70th percentile in those decades, you were also a manual worker.
By the year 2000, if you were at the 50th percentile, you were a white-collar worker with a high school diploma or perhaps an associate’s degree. If you were at the 70th percentile, you probably had a college degree and were a white-collar worker. The experience of being at the same level of society was completely transformed over those decades. That does not mean there was so much movement from the bottom to the top, though that also existed. It was never the main motor of the feeling of social mobility. That kind of mobility is much harder because, by definition, for someone to move from the bottom to the top, someone else must move from the top to the bottom. There are losers, and losers are always hard in politics. Incumbents work very hard to avoid losing.
The second point is that there may have been a one-time window for a huge amount of social mobility because of background conditions. It is relatively uncontroversial that there is some amount of heritability of intelligence at the individual level. This has nothing to do with groups. Simply, the child of two exceptionally intelligent parents is likely to experience some reversion to the mean but still be more intelligent than the average member of the population. In the past, when opportunities for mobility were so limited, there was a tremendous amount of talent at every level of social station. In this more open moment of genuine social mobility, much of that talent has already been sorted.
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There is also much more assortative mating now. People are more likely to marry partners at a similar level of socioeconomic achievement. Put these factors together and you would expect somewhat lower levels of social mobility. At the same time, there is no longer a similar expansion of white-collar jobs. A huge share of the population already works in white-collar jobs, and there is a limit to how quickly that can expand. Some of the natural motors of social mobility have not disappeared but have attenuated.
The combination of these factors means that the promise of social mobility—that if we send enough people to college, everybody will be better off and will have the social values of the anywheres—has proven to be a chimera.
Goodhart: Of course, that is the most controversial thought, which is that we have already redistributed ourselves according to ability and that many of the people at the top are the people who should be there. I think you are quite right that we had a huge expansion in the United States and the UK in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, with a huge expansion of white-collar employment, professional employment, education, and health services. There was “more room at the top,” as the sociologists say, and people rose.
On the contrary, I think our societies have been much more socially mobile than they are usually given credit for. It is true that mobility has slowed to some extent, and what we attribute that to differs. The pessimistic argument is that the sorting has already taken place. The more optimistic argument is that there is simply less room at the top, and people are very good at preserving their position in the social hierarchy.
One of the arguments in my book following The Road to Somewhere, which was called Head, Hand, Heart: The Struggle for Dignity and Status in the 21st Century, was directed in part against people like Michael Young and Michael Sandel. My argument was not against meritocracy itself but against the definition of merit in meritocracy, which has been far too focused on a certain kind of human aptitude: the exam-passing, analytical-intelligence kind. We may have gone as far as we can in assigning those roles fairly.
What we need to do now is recognize that, yes, clever people are needed to solve the world’s problems—climate change, for example—but we have overvalued cognitive skills. There is a long tail of people in the knowledge economy who contribute no more than those who work with their hands or their hearts. The use of emotional intelligence in care jobs, for example—being able to bathe someone or help an elderly person dress in a way that is respectful—is an extremely skillful emotional and physical act. Yet people who do that work tend to earn minimum wages.
I argued for a shift in status away from cognitive intelligence toward practical and emotional intelligence, at least in the long term. It is difficult to think of practical ways this could be promoted, but I think that is the direction of travel we should consider.
Mounk: One of the interesting things about that is that, in a sense, I would say we reward and value manual skills a lot in our society. You can actually be a plumber and work hard and make a really good income. The problem with plumbers, both in the United States and the United Kingdom, is not that they are not making a good amount of money. There are many trade jobs where you can leave high school at 18 and, if you are talented and hardworking, train in a particular skill needed in a relatively high-tech industry. In the United States, you can make six figures in your early or mid-20s.
So it is not the case that we generally undervalue manual skills or manual labor, though in some cases that does happen. The problem seems to be one of cultural recognition. Even if you are doing highly skilled work that helps a company be productive and make a real contribution, when you go to your local bar or a party and the person next to you says they are a lawyer, and another says they are a teacher, and you say you are a plumber or have a specialized skill in a craft, you probably feel like the odd one out—the “loser,” so to speak, in that round.
What is interesting is that I recognize what he is saying. I think you are right about that point. But it is not necessarily a question of money. It is a question of cultural respect and recognition.
Goodhart: Yeah, I think there is interesting evidence for this from dating apps. People in relatively low-level knowledge economy jobs are doing better on dating apps than people in very highly paid blue-collar jobs. So maybe we have a problem with a kind of female selection bias here.
Mounk: With some amount of social pressure, it is certainly out of fashion nowadays to judge people for who they date, except on two dimensions. One is age gaps, which have become much more moralized than they used to be. The second is educational gaps.
That can be the case for the male lawyer who marries a woman without a great degree, and he may be accused of dating a “bimbo.” But it also works the other way around. If you are a young professional woman in your 20s in New York and you date a firefighter or a plumber, there might be an initial reaction of “he’s hot” or something like that. But quite quickly there would likely be judgment from your social circle: do you have anything to talk about? How can you stand spending time with somebody who would not have anything to say? Those assumptions, I think, would quickly come to the surface in many social circles.
Goodhart: I argued in Head, Hand, Heart that we are reaching “peak head.” But I have not seen much evidence yet for a better spread of the kind of status we have been talking about. I do think sometimes these things continue in a half-life for decades after they have ceased to be economically or even culturally valuable.
The kind of biases we have been discussing—the anywhere worldview bias—hold that the successful person is someone who, from whatever background, does well at school, goes to an Ivy League university, and has a high-status professional job. That is the model for society, and that is what everyone should aspire to. In earlier decades—the 1930s or 1950s—there were many little ladders up. There were opportunities for social mobility. Then we moved into a hegemonic period of higher education, where there was one big ladder up: do well at school, get onto the college track, and climb that single ladder. I hope we can move back to a world of many ladders, with a better spread of cultural value across head, hand, and heart.
One of my fears, though, is social media. There used to be the relative deprivation thesis, from a British sociologist who wrote a book in the 1950s or 1960s called Relative Deprivation. The idea was that people judged themselves against those a few rungs above or below them on the social ladder. That is why many were not dissatisfied with ordinary lives, since they compared themselves only to neighbors or people in the next street. But the open, transparent world introduced first by television and now magnified by social media means that everyone compares themselves to the most beautiful or the cleverest people on the planet. That is damaging for mental health and contributes to demoralization, particularly for the 50% of people who are left out.
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This connects to Tony Blair’s famous 1999 speech that 50% of school leavers in the UK should go to university. An extraordinary statement, and clearly nobody helping him write that speech thought for one moment that their own children would not be in the 50%. There has often been this anywhere lack of empathy, or assumption that everybody is like them. That creates two problems. First, the 50% who do not go to university feel like demoralized second-class citizens. Second, even those who do go to university often find there are too few higher professional jobs, since the number of graduates has risen far faster than the number of such jobs.
The result is two sets of dissatisfied people: those who never went to college, and those who did but are stuck in low-paying, back-office jobs. This is the “elite overproduction” problem.
Mounk: I like this idea of “peak white-collar jobs” or “peak college-educated dominance.” We have seen some early signs over the last years that incomes at the top end of the distribution have stagnated, while incomes at the bottom have grown more quickly. We have also seen that some people with college degrees are finding it harder to get jobs, either because the skill level of the marginal extra person who has gone to college in the last 10 or 20 years does not always justify high wages, or because of structural changes. Even graduates of coding programs at elite universities are suddenly finding it hard to secure jobs.
That relates to artificial intelligence. Ten years ago, when people talked about AI, they often focused on drivers being displaced. That is coming, when you look at Waymo’s rapid increase in miles driven and its astonishing safety record. It is clear we will see more self-driving cars, which is likely to be a good thing for humanity, even just in terms of reducing deaths. But because the main advance of AI so far has been with GPTs—with chatbots rather than embodied robots—it now looks as though white-collar jobs are at much greater risk, and faster, than blue-collar jobs.
There is a theory, whose name escapes me, that the hardest things for AI to do are those that took evolution the longest to create. Those are our motor skills and our vision—things we think of as basic because all humans can do them, and many animals can as well. What is easier for AI to replicate are the abilities at the very end of evolutionary history, the “cherry on top,” which has a shorter evolutionary past.
So the spread of AI, at least in its first phase, may decimate white-collar jobs—HR jobs, for example, or many other contexts that can suddenly be handled by GPT agents. Blue-collar jobs, however, remain in demand because embodied AI is still lagging. Is AI another contributing factor to “peak white-collar” or “peak college graduate?”
Goodhart: Yeah, I hope so. AI is now coming for the lower end of the cognitive class in a way that automation came for factory work and blue-collar work many decades ago. I talked about the future being in coding and caring. Coding is now done effectively by AI, so it may turn out to be only caring. These developments are all pushing toward a better balance between head, hand, and heart capabilities.
It will be fascinating to see where we end up in terms of the revaluing of emotional labor and care, because that work has historically been associated with women and often done for free in the home. Care produces positive externalities for society that are very hard for the carer—whether in the domestic realm or the public economy—to capture.
This was once a problem solved by limiting women’s opportunities and forcing them into care jobs. Now that those constraints have largely been removed, society has to rethink how to provide enough of the care that we say we want—for old people, for young people, for those having babies and for those looking after them.
This is one of the issues I wrote about in what I call the Anywhere Trilogy, in my book The Care Dilemma: Freedom, Family and Fertility. It is about rebalancing the tension between freedom for men and women—particularly for women over recent decades—not to be defined only as a mother or housewife, and to have financial autonomy. The question is how to preserve those freedoms while also ensuring enough investment in care. We are not there yet.
Mounk: Tell us about how the status of care work has transformed in our society over the last decades and why we are now at an impasse with it. As you were saying, there was one unjust but coherent solution until about the 1960s, which was that half of humanity was not invited into the workplace except in very particular roles or in time-limited ways. They were the ones who provided the care work. It was women who raised children and looked after elderly relatives. Since they were excluded from the workplace, there was plenty of that work to go around. There were also certain kinds of institutions for people who fell between the cracks. But the biggest component of the solution was that women did the care work.
For a number of decades, we were somewhere in between. As women entered the workplace in greater numbers, while older conservative norms still held, society had a mix of different models. Increasingly, though, it looks as if we are in a more feminized world. I am struck by the fact that, in what I think is a normative scandal that virtually nobody talks about, American universities now discriminate against women in admissions. At the same level of achievement, there are so many fewer men that women need much better grades and records to gain entry into the Ivy League or other top schools. Universities are worried about gender ratios—whether because of institutional preference or student preference—and they tilt toward admitting men. That shows both the success of women in the knowledge economy and the crisis it creates for the care system.
So what is the solution? Is it a complete professionalization of the care system, so that more and more forms of care are monetized and brought into the market, with welfare state institutions helping to finance them for those in need? Is it robots and AI that will solve the problem in 20 or 30 years? Or is it a change in social norms, so that more people—perhaps more men and, more likely, more women—go back into caring vocations, paid or unpaid?
How do we meet the evident need for care in our society in a way that avoids the current gaps and also avoids the injustices and exclusions that women suffered in the past?
Goodhart: I think it undoubtedly requires men to step up more in the care domain. They are actually stepping up more than they are often given credit for, at least in the UK. In the last 20 or 30 years, the distribution of domestic labor has shifted from about 70% female and 30% male to something closer to 55–45, even in more educated households.
I also think it is a matter of shifting social norms. What has happened is a kind of feminization. Various institutions have become heavily feminized—education at all levels, from primary through higher education, is dominated by women. The health sector is increasingly dominated as more women move into professional medical jobs, while they have historically dominated nursing. Many hospitals are 80–85% women. Publishing is also very female-dominated. More institutions are becoming female-dominated.
What we have experienced so far, and what may change, is what one might call a kind of “male-default feminism.” The structures of status have not changed. Both men and women are equally status-seeking, and when all the status remains in the public realm of professional jobs—the anywhere public realm—women will compete equally with men there, which is fair enough. But we have not had a form of feminism that has raised the status of traditionally female areas of life.
In my book, I argue that we are not feminized enough in some respects. We have not adapted GDP, even though politicians are slaves to GDP when making economic policy. GDP fails to capture much of the productive work done in the home. Family policy is essentially childcare policy, aimed at making it possible for both parents to spend less time in the family and compete equally in the public realm.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, a prominent American feminist who worked for Hillary Clinton and now runs the New America think tank, put it well. She said: “My generation of feminists was raised to think the competitive work our fathers did was much more important than the caring work our mothers did. Women first had to gain power and independence by emulating men, but as we attain that power, we must not automatically accept the traditional man’s view, actually the view of a minority of men, about all classes.”
That is wise, and it highlights one of the biggest gaps between the political class and ordinary opinion in both the UK and the United States. Nobody wants to go back to the 1950s. In the British Social Attitudes Survey, when people are asked if they agree with the statement “a man should go out to work and a woman should stay at home and look after the home and children,” only 6 or 7% agree. But when asked what the ideal form of childcare is for preschool children, only about 8 or 9% say both parents working full time.
People would actually like more support for one parent to stay at home when children are very young. That is not yet seen as desirable by the political class, but it would be extremely popular if it were made easier to afford. One reason families are in such a mess is that nearly half of children in the UK are not living with both biological parents at age 14. The situation is probably even worse in America.
Mounk: I’m going to read you a couple of messages from my excellent producer, Leo, who is very much enjoying the conversation. She is saying: Yet most managers are men even in feminized industries. We’re not really feminized enough until there’s quality, affordable childcare for all. Perhaps it’s not really surprising that we don’t value feminists or women’s work.
So how do we balance those concerns? On the one hand, young women are doing much better than young men. At this point, about 60% of recent college graduates in the United States are women, which is astonishing. On the other hand, it is still true that at more senior levels women often drop out of the workplace.
I heard secondhand—so I will not name the school—remarks from a dean of a major business school in the United States who said that five years out from graduation, half of the women who graduate from this business school end up out of the workplace. They often marry very successful and affluent men from similar backgrounds. Once they have kids, they decide to stay at home. Perhaps that is good for raising children and has advantages, but it also replicates a world in which, at the highest levels, the managers—even in workplaces that might be 60–65% women—may continue to be men.
So is there a way of fighting for the interests of both men and women that is not rivalrous? Or are we inevitably going to end up with some amount of rivalry between those interests?
Goodhart: Well, I don’t think this is so much about men versus women. I think it is about listening to all kinds of women. The British sociologist Catherine Hakim conducted a survey of adult British women in which she found that 20% were very work-focused—mainly educated, professional, career-oriented, often wanting families as well. Another 20% were very family-focused. The remaining 60% were what she called “adaptive,” meaning they wanted both decent jobs and families but were prepared to put family first when children were very young and to put careers on hold if necessary.
To the extent that we have family policy or a debate about family in the UK or the United States, it tends to be dominated by the 20%—the very career-focused women. That is fine up to a point, and huge strides have been made in terms of equality. In the UK, 47% of all public appointments are now held by women, and 40% of MPs are women. Large areas of the economy, including medical schools and law schools, are now dominated by women. In that respect, we have done well.
I do not think we should be pursuing the rigid ideal of 50–50 everywhere. Feminists 20 or 30 years ago might have argued that men and women are not only equal but essentially the same. You no longer hear that from mainstream feminists. For example, Helen Lewis and Caroline Criado Perez, author of Invisible Women, do not make that claim. The debates around trans issues and the defense of women-only spaces have reinforced the idea that men and women are different in important respects.
We should respect motherhood and value family more, rather than insisting that everyone leave the home as quickly as possible to join the GDP economy.
Mounk: I have two thoughts about this. One is from a sociology paper that I read about 15 years ago. These things may have changed somewhat, but I found it quite striking at the time. It looked at different gender norms and expectations about motherhood in Southern Europe, Western Europe, and Northern Europe.
In Southern Europe and places like Italy at the time, the expectation was that, yes, as a woman you should work, but once you have children, you should probably stay at home with the child. That is very constraining on the choices that women could make. It helps to explain the incredibly low fertility rate in those countries because many women feel like they have to choose between work and having children. A number of them choose not to have children. But at least there is a coherent way of living up to the norms, which is to say that if you have kids and stay at home, society sees you as having done the right thing.
There are some countries like Northern Europe and Scandinavia, which have a genuinely permissive set of attitudes that tell people, do whatever you want. Have kids, don’t have kids. If you have kids, stay at home, go to work. We’re going to try to make any of those models work. It’s really up to you. It’s genuinely your choice. That, of course, seems like the right approach to me.
There is also a set of countries, including Germany and Austria, which have norms where you basically can’t win either way. The idea is that if you don’t have kids, then you’re a childless woman and there’s something wrong with you. If you do have kids and continue to work, then you are a Rabenmutter—a raven mom—who isn’t really looking after her kids in the way that she should. If you have kids and stay at home, then you’re a weird housewife who doesn’t really have full social respect, because to be a modern woman, you need to be in the workplace. If you’ve taken yourself out of work, there’s something wrong with you.
So there is a set of inconsistent gender norms in such a way that whatever you do, you’re going to end up having judgment passed on you. That is, I think, an interesting point. The other point relating to this is about places like Scandinavia. Alice Evans talked about that when she was on the podcast. It’s quite a well-known finding now that has been replicated in a number of studies, and that’s the global gender paradox.
You would think that women choose, for example, “male-coded” professions where there’s more gender equality—that women in Sweden are more likely to end up being doctors or engineers than women in Iraq or in other more patriarchal societies. But what actually happens is the opposite: the more gender-equal a society is, the more women tend to cluster in professions that have often been thought of as rather feminized.
That seems to indicate that genuine choice is not going to lead to what my mother’s generation—my mother was a conductor, a musician in a generation where there were not many, and a single mother in a generation where that was not true of many people—may have expected. Once we have genuine equality, you’re going to have 50% of conductors be women, and women will be in the workplace as much as men, and very few women will choose to stay at home.
It’s not clear that if we generally give people more choice, that will be the outcome. It obviously will be the outcome for some, like my mother, who I think would always have chosen to do those things, but it’s not going to be the answer for others.
Goodhart: All the opinion polls in the UK say that women, when asked, would work less if they could afford to. Their ideal arrangement is that they would work far less or not at all in the first few years of their children’s lives and not hand their child over to a nursery at the age of six months or nine months. There is a fair amount of evidence to suggest that it is also not good for the child to start at such a young age.
Clearly, we need, in order for it to be possible for women to combine family and career—we have not got there yet. We have made quite a lot of progress towards better, particularly in Europe, less so in America, maternity arrangements and better support at work. But we need to go even further, I think, and have almost as an assumption that in the reproductive years, women and men will have a bias towards part-time work.
We need a culture of part-time work for people when they are at their most reproductively able. One of the optimistic things here is that these are bridging issues between liberals and conservatives. If we assume, for the sake of argument—it is not really true, but the idea of “strong families” and “higher fertility” are coded as conservative ideas—but actually, to have strong, stable families, you need liberal means. You need a generous family policy that makes it possible for one parent—probably usually the mother, but maybe increasingly the father as women start to earn more than men in many households—to be the stay-at-home parent in those years.
We need a policy that makes that possible. We need a more equal distribution of domestic labor between men and women in the household. We also need more well-paid, decent jobs for non-college-educated men, which makes them a better prospect for women to settle down with and have children with.
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One of the peculiarities of English-language academic publishing is that, unlike the French and the Germans, and regardless how esoteric the subject, English university presses like to have an illustration on the front cover of their books. This is presumably just a convention, and not a business decision, since it is difficult to imagine that it improves sales. Either way, it often puts philosophers in a tight spot when they are pressed by some junior graphics designer to answer questions like “what is your book about?”
I can remember therefore the palpable excitement back when I was a graduate student, when my thesis advisor, Thomas McCarthy, came across the 18th century etching by Francisco Goya bearing the inscription “the sleep of reason produces monsters.” McCarthy served, for many years, as Jürgen Habermas’ right-hand man in America, having both translated Habermas’ monumental book, The Theory of Communicative Action, into English and written a useful introduction to his thought. Having recently completed another book on critical theory—defending Habermas’ position—he was looking for an image that would capture what was at stake in the debate. The Goya image was perfect.
The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters by Francisco Goya.Habermas, who died on March 14 at the age of 96, was best known as a philosophical defender of rationality at a time when the very concept had become deeply unfashionable. (The first book of Habermas’ essays to be published in English, back in 1970, was called Toward a Rational Society.) As the foremost representative of Frankfurt School critical theory, Habermas defended the Enlightenment conviction that the powers of human reason could be employed not only to better understand the natural world but to improve the human condition. This preference for reason in human affairs was not merely temperamental; Habermas understood better than most how monstrous the alternatives could be.
Born in Düsseldorf in 1929, Habermas came into a world that was ruled by monsters. Indeed, he was born into a waking nightmare, which came to an abrupt end in 1945 with the Allied defeat of the Nazi regime. As a young German from a moderately patriotic middle-class family, Habermas had been, as we would now say, “all in” on the Third Reich. When the war ended, and the process of denazification began, he came to realize how completely he had been brainwashed by the ideology of a totalitarian state.
When the full extent of the Holocaust became known, the slogan “never again” was widely adopted as a simple summary of the moral imperative that it generated. Few people took that slogan more deeply to heart than Habermas. Yet despite its apparent simplicity, the slogan raised a number of philosophical difficulties. If it was merely a matter of stopping bad men from performing terrible deeds, the project would be clear. Unfortunately, the “good guys” and the “bad guys” are not self-identifying, and the bad guys have a perplexing habit of believing that they are the good guys. Faced with such confusion, what powers of intellect must we exercise in order to sort things out?
It may help to reformulate the question in more personal terms: Suppose that you had been born in Nazi Germany. Suppose that you found yourself, at the age of 12, in a Hitler Youth summer camp, singing “Deutschland über alles” alongside your friends. Would you have been able to figure out that you were supporting the wrong side of the war? If so, what intellectual resources would you require to arrive at this conclusion? Moreover, what is there to stop a totalitarian regime from denying such resources to its people?
These are the questions that animated Habermas’ critical theory. Like many Germans of his generation, his work was haunted by the specter of totalitarianism. In Habermas’ specific interpretation this took two forms, which we can think of as Orwell’s nightmare and Kafka’s nightmare.
Orwell’s nightmare: Whoever controls language controls thoughtKarl Marx once declared that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” This was based on the observation that, no matter how cruel and unequal the class structure of any society, it was always accompanied by some story that explained why all of the cruelty and deprivation was in fact merited by its victims. Acceptance of this story, Marx thought, explains why the poor and downtrodden, who are typically the vast majority of the population, passively accept their fate rather than rebelling.
This is Marx’s influential theory of ideology. It implied that certain beliefs were widely held only because society, in some sense, needed people to believe them. It also gave rise to the suggestion that intellectuals could make themselves useful by criticizing those ideas. If the acceptance of a legitimating ideology is required for the reproduction of domination, it stands to reason that exposing that story as ideological might make relations of domination more difficult to sustain.
Unfortunately, the theory of ideology also gave rise, almost immediately, to an enormous number of skeptical problems. If the ruling class controls the production of ideas, why do they formulate those ideas in a way that makes them vulnerable to criticism? Indeed, how are we to know that the criticism is genuinely outside the space of those ideas? Perhaps the critic is as much a victim of ideology as the one being criticized? Thinking through these questions generates what came to be known as the problem of total ideology. If everything is ideology, how can we escape from it? And what is the difference between escaping from it and merely believing that we have escaped from it?
Twentieth-century philosophers found these questions extremely difficult to answer. While Enlightenment theorists had claimed that we each possess a “tribunal of reason” in our own mind—a sovereign capacity to separate truth from falsity—by the end of the 19th century this view had become hopelessly discredited. Far from possessing an inner tribunal of reason, Sigmund Freud had shown that we understand very little of what goes on in our own mind, much less the world. But perhaps more importantly, philosophers had begun to realize the importance of language in structuring our thoughts. Language came to be seen not as a code that we use to communicate our ideas to others but as the medium in which we formulate those very ideas. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular, argued that linguistic meaning is not determined by what is in our heads but by the position that our utterances occupy in “language games” that we play with others.
This linguistic turn in philosophy further intensified the problem of ideology. If the meaning of words is determined not by our private thoughts but by what occurs in our external practices of communication, what is to prevent the emergence of a perfect dictatorship, which controls not only all of society but, through its control of social practices, all that is thinkable in that society? This was the challenge posed in George Orwell’s 1984, where “the party” does not just prevent criticism from being expressed but through the inculcation of “newspeak” attempts to make criticism unintelligible.
Philosophers were troubled by similar concerns. If communication is just a bunch of language games, what is to stop the powerful from organizing or reorganizing the game however they like? For example, we have the idea that when individuals use force against others, they need to provide some justification for their actions. What if this turned out to be just an ethnocentric expectation and that, in some distant land, such demands for justification were met with incomprehension or were rejected as “not how we do things around here”? Is there anything that rules out such a possibility?
It has often been observed that critical theorists working in the Frankfurt School tradition became less interested over time in actually criticizing things and more perplexed by the question of how critique was even possible or what might prevent the powerful from making it impossible. These are certainly the questions that troubled Habermas. What is to prevent the emergence of a perfect ideology, which is not just internally consistent but quite literally impossible to think one’s way out of?
Kafka’s nightmare: The totally reified societyOne aspect of the Holocaust that many people found particularly disturbing was its organizational efficiency. Much of the killing in the death camps was carried out not by men caught up in the throes of bloodlust but by faceless bureaucrats who documented with meticulous care every aspect of the procedure. Even the decision to use poison gas was made because the previous method—a single shot to the back of the head—was considered too expensive, at the cost of one bullet per victim. These calculations seemed like a clear-cut instance of scientific rationality run amok, with considerable technical ingenuity deployed in the discovery of effective means, combined with a complete failure to evaluate the merits of the goals being sought.
While Marx had insisted that capitalism was the source of all evil, the events of the early 20th century, including the emergence of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, suggested that hierarchical authority was just as much a problem. One way of reconciling the two views was to see the emergence of capitalism and bureaucracy as linked. Max Weber, in particular, suggested that humanity was becoming imprisoned in an “iron cage,” governed by a technical rationality that gave us incredible powers of control yet deprived us of the ability to deliberate in any meaningful way about the goals we are seeking.
According to this view, it was the calculative, instrumental form of rationality, focused on means rather than ends, that was the villain of the story. A distinctive feature of the instrumental style of reasoning is that it treats everything as an object, susceptible to manipulation and control (which is to say, it is reifying). In economic relations, this generates the illusion that Marx called commodity fetishism. In bureaucratic relations, it produces the ideology of modern management, which treats human beings as resources to be controlled in various ways. In the realm of ideas, it produces positivist social science, which seeks to employ experimental methods to improve our capacity to predict the behavior of human beings.
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This diagnosis of the times, which was pioneered by the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists—Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse—persuaded an entire generation of leftists that they needed to reject not just capitalism but “the System” as a whole. Whereas Marx had predicted that capitalism would collapse of its own accord, in the post-war period the concern became increasingly that capitalism would not collapse but that it would be successfully stabilized through bureaucratic interventions, creating a vast politico-economic technostructure that would become increasingly governed by its own functional imperatives, unresponsive to human intervention or control.
This image of a “totally reified society” would be the realization of Franz Kafka’s vision of a bureaucratic system whose operations had a predictable, machine-like quality, but where none of it added up to anything rational and where no one could find out why anything was being done the way it was. Unlike the problem of total ideology, a totally reified society would be one in which certain forms of ideology would not even be necessary because the incentives would always be correctly aligned, impelling us to do what the system needed us to do regardless of what stories we told ourselves about it.
Habermas’ solutionFaced with these problems, the naïve response is to search for what philosophers call an Archimedean point based on the plausible intuition that, in order to criticize a system, it is necessary to find some standpoint outside of that system. However, the first step to wisdom lies in the realization that there is no such point when it comes to human society or thought. We are condemned to working on the inside (or to engaging in what Habermas, somewhat obscurely, called “postmetaphysical thinking”).
After a few false starts, the idea that Habermas hit upon was to search for a solution in the structure of linguistic communication. Since words do not, in general, mean different things when used in different contexts, linguistic meaning is too systematic to be grounded in a set of disconnected social practices. This observation led many philosophers to believe that the meaning of our utterances must be determined not by any old language game but rather by the role these utterances play in the specific practice of argumentation. Habermas expressed this idea by claiming that, whenever we perform a speech act, we commit ourselves to justifying the content of that claim (i.e. we raise a “validity claim”). This is not just extra baggage—our understanding of linguistic meaning consists in a grasp of the conditions under which speech acts could be justified.
As a result, Habermas claimed, there is an intrinsic, necessary connection between the social practice of justification (what he called “discourse”) and the meaningfulness of our speech. Understanding someone’s speech acts is inextricably tied to the evaluation of that person’s claims, and, for similar reasons, the production of a speech act always involves undertaking a commitment to the justification of one’s claims. Thus, the person who comes along and demands justification is not imposing a new obligation on the speaker but is merely asking that person to make good on a commitment that has already been undertaken.
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The structure of interpersonal commitment that secures the intelligibility of language has an important secondary effect, which is that it allows us to coordinate interpersonal interaction. This gives rise to what Habermas called communicative action, which differs from instrumental action in that, rather than relying on means-ends reasoning to determine a preferred action, it allows the choice of action to be directly determined by the content of the validity claims raised in speech. The type of rule-following that sociologists had traditionally tried to explain by invoking the concept of a social norm is, in Habermas’ view, a primary instance of communicative action.
An important feature of communicative action is that, because it relies directly on speech acts to coordinate interaction, it is always open to contestation and demands for justification. As a result, the more heavily human societies rely on language to construct complex systems of cooperation, the more completely they expose those arrangements to demands for justification—a dynamic that one can see playing out over the course of human history, in the process that Habermas referred to, somewhat provocatively, as the “linguistification of the sacred.”
How does any of this help with the two nightmares? First of all, it directly rules out the possibility of a society being immunized against demands for justification. Such a society is logically possible, but it would be unintelligible to us, in the strong sense that we would be unable to understand what anyone was saying. (Fans of Kantian philosophy will recognize this as a transcendental argument. One of Habermas’ most important contributions to philosophy is to have pioneered, along with Karl-Otto Apel, what he called “transcendental pragmatics.”)
So we must justify ourselves and our practices, and no society, no matter how totalitarian or manipulative, can free itself from that obligation. But what counts as a justification? Here Habermas is a formalist, in that he thinks that what counts as a justification is ultimately determined by what others will accept in discursive practice. That practice, however, is rule-governed, and those rules have content that is not morally neutral. Specifically, argumentation is governed by a set of symmetry conditions that establish equal standing among participants (anyone is entitled to introduce any argument, a position is valid regardless who introduces it, and so on).
Because of this, and no matter where a society starts out, the reliance on linguistic communication as a central practice for the reproduction of its institutions biases cultural evolution in the direction of greater universalism and equality over time. This does not prove these commitments to be correct. If one is looking for a knock-down argument that is guaranteed to convince the Nazi that he is wrong, this will not do it. What Habermas’ argument shows, however, is that the more specific moral resources we rely upon to condemn Nazism, such as equality of moral standing or the inalienability of human rights, are not arbitrary but represent rather the expression of a logic that is inherent in communication among persons, that works its way out over time in all societies.
So much for Orwell’s nightmare, but what about Kafka’s? The totally reified society is also, in Habermas’ view, an impossibility. The central weakness of communicative action, as a means of social integration, arises precisely from its openness to contestation and challenge. “Discursively achieved consensus” is, as we all know, difficult to obtain. As a result, societies that rely increasingly on communication to organize their affairs are tempted to unburden themselves by creating systemically integrated domains of interaction. This is accomplished by instituting a set of incentives that motivate individuals to act in a cooperative manner without explicit reliance on validity claims, but rather on instrumental action. The two primary examples of such systems, in Habermas’ view, are the market economy and the bureaucratic state.
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The nightmare of the totally reified society arises from the experience of interacting in these systemically integrated domains and wondering what prevents the extension of this mode of integration to all of society. The answer, however, is straightforward. Instrumental action cannot produce a self-sustaining order; left to its own devices, it produces mere chaos. The incentive system that sustains the integrity of these systems of instrumental action must therefore remain “anchored” in the commitments undertaken in communicative action. If the system expands beyond its proper boundaries, so that it begins to impinge upon these communicative systems, it generates a set of pathological consequences (which Habermas described, for reasons that need not detain us, as “the colonization of the lifeworld”). As a result, no matter how extensive and complex these systems may become, they can never escape from the communicative obligation to justify the social order.
Habermas’ views on democracy, which many have identified as his singular contribution, are downstream from this model of the relationship between communicative and instrumental action. Although much has been said on this point, it is perhaps worth noting that Habermas was more of a realist on these issues than he is typically portrayed as being. That is because he viewed the state as a relatively self-contained bureaucratic system, populated by individuals who respond only to a narrow range of incentives. He saw democracy primarily as a mechanism for translating everyday arguments into incentives that could influence—not control, but merely influence—the behavior of this system.
Finally, it should be noted that despite the extraordinary ambition of his core philosophical project, Habermas was more of a syncretic than systematic thinker. Rather than working out, step by step, his own position, he had a habit of presenting the views of others, then showing how they could fit together to solve some problem. This creates formidable difficulties for students and interpreters. The number of other things that one must understand in order to understand Habermas probably constitutes the most important threat to his legacy.
I have tried to describe, in general terms, the stakes of Habermas’ project, in order to explain why the investment of time and energy that it requires remains worthwhile. I have also tried to explain, more indirectly, why his death this month has been marked by so many as the end of an era. He was truly one of the giants of 20th century philosophy. By comparison, contemporary political theory seems almost listless, uninterested in confronting the most fundamental, most urgent problems of the modern age.
Joseph Heath is a professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and the author of several books, including Communicative Action and Rational Choice.
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Shashank Joshi is Defence Editor at The Economist, where he writes on a wide range of national security, defence and intelligence issues.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Shashank Joshi discuss how the war of attrition between the United States, Israel, and Iran is unfolding, whether military successes justify the enormous economic and strategic costs, and why Iran’s nuclear program remains largely untouched despite being a primary justification for the conflict.
Note: This episode was recorded on March 18, 2026.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Whenever there is something going on in the world that I am really confused about, I call you. I thought I would do that since I feel like the longer this war goes on, the less sure I am what to think about it. Part of this is that the war is extraordinary in the extent to which the U.S. administration just has not made a very clear case for what exactly its goals are and what exactly motivates the United States. Going not by what Trump has actually said, but going by what you take to be the smartest justification for starting this conflict now, how is this war going for the United States and for Israel?
Shashank Joshi: I think that it helps to think about this as a war of attrition and each side is trying to attrit something different, and they are each having some success in doing it. For the U.S. side, it is clearest that the aim is to attrit Iran’s military strength, its ability to project power from its base throughout the region. The most obvious metric of that is Iranian missile capability. What you have seen over the course of this conflict is that the United States has had some great success in not just striking, but also suppressing Iran’s launches of ballistic missiles, the stockpiles of those missiles, and the most important bit, I think, for U.S. strategy, the production facilities for making more of those missiles, including all of the supply chains.
Think about the propellant that goes into a missile. If you destroy the factory that makes it, you deny Iran the ability to make these missiles for some period of time. In addition to that, they have also destroyed the Iranian Navy, which of course has implications for the way in which Iran could project power into the Strait of Hormuz in the future, as well as certain types of other military capabilities.
The Israeli war, I think, is a little bit different. I think the Israeli war at the operational level is about political attrition as well as the other things I talked about. It is about attriting the Iranian leadership to the point where the regime is weak, degraded, and ultimately much more susceptible to a popular protest movement that could then topple it at the conclusion of hostilities. That is not what the Israelis say in public; this is my supposition, but I think it is a reasonable supposition based on everything they have said at the beginning of the conflict and a reasonable supposition based on the sorts of things and people they are striking, which includes Ali Larijani, a very senior official in the Iranian regime, as well as individual checkpoints of the besieged paramilitary militia.
If I am right in saying that these are the objectives, the United States has met with great operational success. Iran is going to be in a really rough position with its missile capability for some time to come when the guns fall silent. On the Israeli side, I think there has been mixed success. If the aim is to topple the regime or to leave it effectively incapable of standing on its own two feet, I think that is very much in doubt. I think the regime will be standing at the end of this and I have my doubts it will be toppled by a protest movement.
The big issue, Yascha, is if that really is the aim, then it is not just how much damage you have done; it is how much damage you have done relative to the cost you have paid. That cost includes disruption to global energy markets. It includes things like the closure of Hormuz and the huge impact on the global economy. It also has to factor in how quickly Iran could rebuild these capabilities after a conflict. When I take all that into account, I come up with my view, which is that the United States and Israel have been extremely successful at the military level, but their objectives politically are still confused and shifting. Ultimately, to me, the cost they have paid for achieving those has been extremely high. This war could not have been fought in the way that it has; I think the same things could have been achieved by other means.
Mounk: I want to get more deeply into the costs that the United States, Israel, and the world economy as a whole are paying for this war in a moment. Before we get there, if part of the goal of this war is to dismantle the ability of Iran to threaten its neighbors with rockets and other forms of attacks, if it is to really weaken the ability of Iran to sponsor various terrorist groups from Hamas to Hezbollah to the Houthis that do damage in the region, to what extent has this campaign actually succeeded?
If you are looking at these strategic objectives, have you dismantled their ability to do that in the short run? In the long run, is this going to make a significant difference? Do you think that five, 10, 15 years down the line, we are going to think Iran is a really diminished actor in the region because of the events of the last few weeks?
Joshi: I think that is a great question and a difficult one. I think in 10 years’ time, we will look at an Iran that is fundamentally diminished in terms of its relationship to regional militant Islamist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, the Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and so on. Here is the important thing. Most of that diminution was done prior to this conflict. Most of that was achieved in the years prior, after October 7 and the attacks of 2023. We saw the great demolition of Hezbollah by Israel. We saw Hamas significantly weakened. We saw Iran’s ability to connect to those groups greatly weakened by the collapse of the regime in Syria, which was both a physical and a diplomatic pivot point for Iran’s ability to project its influence towards the Mediterranean Sea. It was a greatly diminished actor in my view.
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That was the case before this war began on February 28. If you look at this war itself, what it has achieved is great damage to Iran’s missiles. The Israel Defense Forces say they have destroyed about 70% of Iran’s missile launchers since the beginning of the war. You can see that in the levels of missile launches towards the Gulf States, towards Israel; they have come down significantly. You are not going to see Iran reach the same level that it had pre-war in the next 12 months. In the next five years, I am not so sure about that. If you keep bombing Iran, you could sustainably keep stripping it away of these capabilities. My concern is if each time you do that, if each time you “mow the grass,” to use that rather macabre phrase that has been used by some Israeli analysts and others, if you precipitate a global crisis each time you do it, that to me is not a viable approach for keeping the Iranian regime in check.
Yes, it is weakened. There is a possibility it will stay weakened for years to come, but only with remedial action at great cost. The last thing is that we still have, of course, the Iranian nuclear program. Ostensibly, that was the rationale of the conflict. I do not believe that was the real rationale of the conflict. I think the administration is, I will be quite honest with you, lying when it says this. I think it is being dishonest in its public statements about this question. I was just listening to Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, talk about this today. She was of course a known opponent of war with Iran prior to her appointment. She said very clearly that Iran had made no great steps in its enrichment program. Iran had a lot of enriched uranium. It was buried under rubble at various sites that were bombed last year. It was moving no closer to being able to weaponize that.
My big concern is that there is a chance, a small one, but there is a chance that what you are left with is a weakened but aggrieved and wounded regime led by people who are more radical than those who have been killed, who will now double down on the nuclear program even if their path to getting to a bomb is still exceptionally difficult.
Mounk: Tell me a little bit more about the nuclear program, which obviously is one big part of the justification of people who are advocating for this war. Part of the absurdity here is that Donald Trump, of course, claimed that he had completely dismantled the nuclear program with the strikes that he did last June. At the time, there were intelligence assessments that the nuclear program had certainly been damaged by that much briefer bombing campaign, but that it was not fully dismantled.
That led to the absurdity that now he could not really say that he was starting this war because of a nuclear program, since he had claimed seven or eight months earlier that he had completely destroyed the nuclear program. Realistically, where is Iran at with a nuclear program? It used to be said that they were very close to breakout; if they really make a sprint for wanting to produce atomic weapons, they would be able to do that within a very short span of time. Was the ability of the Iranian regime to do that sufficiently damaged last June? Is it being further damaged in the bombing campaign now? Does it not make a difference? How should we think about the threat of this in the future?
Joshi: Regarding Trump’s public comments last year and now, he is not constrained by the need to be particularly consistent across these issues. The truth is that Iran last year suffered grave damage to its enrichment facilities, which are the places where it spins uranium gas, uranium hexafluoride, turns it into the more enriched kind that is comprised of a greater proportion of the most fissile isotope of uranium and that can be used in a nuclear bomb. Its enrichment facilities were damaged very badly. It had them at Natanz and in Fordow inside a mountain. Its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, which was enriched to about 60%, is very close to 90%, which is weapons grade. That was buried under rubble mostly at Esfahan at a place called the uranium conversion facility, but some of it also at Fordow and Natanz.
Iran did have other routes to a bomb. It could have set up new enrichment facilities somewhere else, but it is not clear whether it really had the centrifuges to do that or whether it could have done it without being detected. It would have had to go and get that uranium from under the rubble. Instead, what did it do? It effectively piled dirt over the tunnels of the entrances of those facilities, perhaps in fear of the potential for a U.S. or Israeli ground raid on those facilities. Those were effectively out of bounds. You still have this 400 kilograms of enriched uranium sitting underground inside Iran, capable of being used in a bomb, but it was in no way imminently accessible. There was no indication Iran was setting up enrichment facilities elsewhere.
The expertise necessary to turn those things into a usable weapons device—to shape it into a sphere, to have explosives around it, a triggering mechanism, a neutron initiator to set off a chain reaction—are all of those other things you need for a bomb. Many of the people and the places involved in that enterprise, which we know Iran was engaged in in the preceding 15 to 20 years, were killed or destroyed or bombed by Israel. Iran was not imminently about to make any substantial steps towards a nuclear weapon and it would have been some time away.
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What has happened in the current war? Basically, Iran’s nuclear program has hardly been bombed to our knowledge. Natanz, one of those sites I mentioned, I think the tunnels have been bombed and there has been one other site called the Taleghan 2 complex outside of Tehran, which is where Iran supposedly did some nuclear weapons related work, which has also been struck by Israel. We have seen dramatic satellite pictures of that with holes in the roof. Fordow has not been touched. As far as I am aware, Isfahan has not been touched. A war that is ostensibly about the nuclear program actually has seen very little to do with nuclear forces so far. Perhaps that is yet to come. We are only three weeks in. President Trump has suggested this is a four to five week campaign. Perhaps there is still more to come.
Mounk: It is remarkable that a war, the most compelling rationale for which is to try to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, has so far not done much to further damage Iran’s ability to pursue that program. At least part of the stated rationale is complicated by the fact that Trump claims it had basically been dismantled last June. We have been looking at one side of this war of attrition.
Tell us about the other side of the war of attrition. Tell us about the damage that Iran has been able to do to the world economy because of its attempts to block shipping and increase the price of oil. Tell us about the impact on the reputation and security of various places around the Gulf, including Dubai and many of the Emirates, as well as on Israel.
Joshi: Well, I do not need to tell you the importance of the Strait of Hormuz, which is this critical waterway; about 20% of the world’s oil passes through Hormuz. We know it includes not just oil, but also liquid natural gas, which is absolutely vital to Europe in particular. Not from the Gulf, but the restrictions in the Gulf changed the global gas price. The bit that people tend to forget is that the Strait of Hormuz is also incredibly important for commodities and certain types of critical commodities. The ones I think about here are things like iron ore pellets, aluminum, urea used in fertilizers, and other certain types of other critical minerals. There is this huge knock-on effect on manufacturing and not just on energy, but also on the food supply.
The immediate shock has really come in the energy markets where oil has been pushed to more than $100 a barrel. This is partly a supply shock. It is a limitation in what you can get out if you are producing it. In some senses, that is bad, but it is not the end of the world because you will make up for that lost supply once it reopens. There is also a production shock. You also have loss of production from gas fields and oil fields that have effectively been shut down amid direct attacks. That production will never come back. That is lost production. This has a direct impact on global growth.
For me, the interesting thing is that there is a kind of externality here. The United States and Israel have launched this war for their reasons. They have their own reasons for doing so. But the predominant cost is felt by others. It is felt by Europeans and it is felt by Asians. It is Asians who depend on the majority of energy coming out of the Strait of Hormuz: China, Japan, South Korea, India, and Pakistan. Pakistan is very vulnerable right now. It is Europeans who do not get their gas from Hormuz.
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Mounk: One of the very interesting sub-stories here, which Quico Toro has written about in the pages of Persuasion, is that fracking really killed Khamenei. His somewhat provocative thesis is that because of fracking, the United States has become basically energy independent and is much less affected by the global price of oil and gas than it used to be. A lot of the energy sources that the United States now consumes are not really part of the global energy market; they are produced and consumed in the United States. That is one of the reasons why this increase in the price of gas and oil has affected the United States so much less than other countries, and perhaps one of the reasons why the Trump administration was willing to wage this war in the first place.
Joshi: I think you are right. The United States is far less exposed to energy shocks coming out of the Gulf than America would once have been. In the 1970s and 1973 oil price shock, this had a much more profound impact on the United States. Indeed, I think there was energy rationing, speed limit restrictions, and all that kind of stuff. This time around, it is different. That said, just because America is less exposed than the rest of the world does not mean it is not exposed.
You are still seeing an impact on petrol prices and gas prices at the pump in the United States. For this to be done six months before midterm elections is really quite serious for Donald Trump. His polls have worsened; his prospects of losing the House and the Senate have grown. He is not completely immune to the consequences of the war he has unleashed at all.
Mounk: It is very interesting that Donald Trump’s standing in the polls does not seem to have budged very much over the last 14 days, according to analysts like Nate Silver. While the war is very unpopular, and while any lasting damage to the economy is likely to undermine his chances in the midterms even further, we are not really seeing any negative trend for Donald Trump’s standing in the polls over these last two weeks.
What is the future of these oil flows? This is also part of this game of attrition. The world is paying a very high price for these increased costs, which is damaging to the United States in less direct ways and to many of America’s allies who are going to try to pressure the United States to make sure that the price of gas and oil goes down. Obviously, if this somehow triggers a world recession, that is something from which the United States would suffer as well.
At the same time, my understanding is that a lot of Iran’s income is dependent on some of those same straits that they are currently blocking. How long could this blockade continue? Will it continue basically for as long as rockets are flying and this war is hot? Could Iran continue to block those waters even after the end of a war? What does that mean for the extent to which an end of this war still depends on the United States? If Donald Trump wakes up tomorrow and says that we have accomplished our objectives, can he basically end the war and have it be over a week from now? Or is that no longer in the hands of the United States in the way it might have been before the bombing started or two or three days into this conflict?
Joshi: First of all, we are still seeing escalation on the energy front. As we are speaking, we have just seen an Israeli strike on the South Pars gas field in Iran. That is a gas field that Iran shares with Qatar; I think it is the world’s biggest, if I am not mistaken. That is a big escalation. Israel has struck Iran’s oil storage tanks, but America was unhappy about that. In striking the gas field, Israel has reportedly done so with American approval. I think it is inevitable the Iranians will try to intensify attacks on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab oil and gas production facilities. You are going to see a tightening of this. I think in the coming days, it is inevitable Iran will try to aggressively go after more of the oil facilities.
On Hormuz itself, here is the interesting thing. Iran has constrained the flow for other countries; however, it is not a complete blockade. Between March 1st and March 15th, there were about 89 ships that got through Hormuz. About 20% of those were Iran-affiliated. Many of the others were Chinese or Greek-affiliated, but they were done with deals with Iran. They were basically allowing some through. It did a deal with India to allow a couple of Indian vessels to come out.
Iran is playing a very clever game. Actually, what surprises me is that Donald Trump has not said, I am going to seize Iranian oil coming out of Hormuz myself and sell it, just like his approach to Venezuela. I am surprised he has not done that because that would keep oil flowing and keep prices down, but it would also choke off that revenue to Iran. I am not recommending it, but I am saying I would have expected Trump to do that.
To get to your core point: could Trump stop this now and Hormuz reopens? My feeling is that no, he could not. He can call a halt to this; he can stop this. But it is now in Iran’s interest to exact a heavy price for the rest of this war, if nothing else, to deter future attacks like this—to deter that purpose of periodic, sporadic “mowing of the lawn” that I described. For that to happen, they need to show they control the tempo of escalation. Right now, I think that they have shown that very well. If Trump declared a ceasefire today, I think Iran would keep the strait closed for a certain period and then say, now we are opening it; now it is our choice to reopen the strait. Reopening the strait by force is a very difficult proposition. That is something that takes weeks and compounds the duration of this major energy shock on global markets.
Mounk: Why is it that Iran has not used this weapon in the past? What has changed, which means that Iran now is saying, we have control of this incredibly important waterway for the world economy? Why do we not use that as an incredibly potent bargaining tool? If they are able to do that now, why did they not do that earlier?
Joshi: Well, they have done it to some extent. If you think back to the 1980s, you had the Iran-Iraq War, and as part of that, you had the tanker war in which Iran did go after shipping in the Persian Gulf region to the point where America was eventually drawn in in Operation Ernest Will, escorting tankers. When one of those ships was attacked and destroyed, America then bombed Iran’s navy, destroying about half of it. That was called Operation Praying Mantis.
The core of the point is that in the wars of the last 15 years—whether that is last year’s attack on nuclear sites or the kind of shadowboxing we have seen in other parts of the region—Iran has not felt its back to the wall. Iran has not been desperate. The reason it has gone after Hormuz is because it feels the regime is at risk and anything is worth trying. Of course, Iran is paying a cost for this as well. It has permanently alienated all of its Gulf allies, including those who tried to moderate or have a functioning relationship with Iran, like Saudi Arabia in recent years, and those who mediated on behalf of Iran with the United States, such as the government of Oman.
What it is going to result in is a permanently militarized, very angry set of Gulf neighbors who will then also diversify their oil and gas exports to pipelines overland to the West. This is a very costly decision for Iran. That is why it has not done it. It has basically pissed off a lot of countries, and not just regional countries but also countries like China and India. They are not delighted by the shock to their own economies. But if you are desperate, the regime is at risk, and you are going to fall, why not do it? Why not pull the temple down with you?
Mounk: Speaking of that, what is the situation within Iran? Part of the ostensible purpose of this war originally was regime change. It is clear that the Iranian regime is very unpopular among large sections of the Iranian population. Of course, they also do have pockets of support, particularly among the people who profit from the regime in various ways. We saw this extraordinary wave of protests against the regime, unlike anything else that has happened in the now 50-year history of the regime, which ended in the slaughter of tens of thousands of protesters. The regime is now very weakened. Many of the leading figures in the regime have been killed or seriously wounded. It is unclear to what extent there is a coherent command structure that is capable of actually delivering on a strategy. Yet, the regime for now seems to be relatively firmly in the saddle, perhaps more firmly in the saddle than it was about two months ago. It is clearly able to exact a lot of costs from the other side in this war of attrition that you have described for us so eloquently. How should we think about the extent to which the Iranian regime is itself now in existential danger? Is there any hope of genuine political change in Iran after this conflict ends?
Joshi: Well, here again, we have to keep in mind the baseline—the pre-war baseline—which is that the Iranian regime was weak. It was weak in every sense: economically, politically, and ideologically. It had lost legitimacy at home, as you described, having to kill tens of thousands of its own people to survive. It was despised widely. It was economically destitute and unproductive, having squandered the wealth of its people.
It was in really poor shape. The war has, in some ways, weakened it further. Reports from my colleagues from inside Iran say there are indications that growing numbers of the security services are staying at home, as you would expect them to when bombing is happening. We have seen a sense of decentralized command. Command and control in Iran is weakened because you cannot communicate with different branches of the government. Commanders lower down have to make their own decisions, so it is a more fragmented regime.
The problem is that it is also fundamentally a more hardline regime than it was two weeks ago. That is the nature of decapitation. You often see that—think about Hassan Nasrallah from Hezbollah. He came about because Israeli assassinations of his predecessors led to more coherent, organized, and capable figures rising to the top. Look at the example of someone like Ali Larijani, who was just assassinated. He was a really interesting guy. He was the head of the country’s security council. He was the figurehead of the regime in recent days when Khamenei had been killed and Mojtaba Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader, was keeping a low profile. He was probably injured and did not want to show his face. Larijani is a really fascinating guy because he taught philosophy and specialized in the Western Enlightenment.
Mounk: He was a scholar of Immanuel Kant, I think, which confirms all the bad things I always thought about Immanuel Kant. I’m joking.
Joshi: He was also an IRGC veteran. But if you look at his death and what it has done in the day after, just like in other areas, you have hardliners maneuvering to try to put in people like Saeed Jalili, who is a more hardline ideological figure. Are these people going to be more or less likely to negotiate a deal with the United States in terms of handing over nuclear material or abandoning their nuclear commitments? What are they likely to do on these issues?
That is what concerns me. You have a brittle regime, a weak regime, but it is not about to fall apart—although I wish it were. It is full of people who, in some ways, are younger, more radical, and more ideological than the people who have been killed in large numbers in previous days.
Mounk: The last time I had you on the podcast, I asked you to make a prediction about what might happen. You hemmed and hawed a little bit and emphasized the difficulty of doing so. Then, you predicted nearly perfectly what was in fact about to happen. So would you care to repeat that feat?
Joshi: In Iran, I think this regime is still likely to survive. When the bombs fall silent, you will see enormous pent-up anger in Iran over what this regime has invited upon the country. I have no doubt about that. I do not think there is a huge rally-around-the-flag effect in terms of a sudden outpouring of support for the regime. But the population has also gone through profound turmoil.
If these attacks on energy infrastructure continue, the Iranian people are going to suffer a really rough time because they rely upon this gas for domestic electricity and production. I worry that Iranians will turn inwards. They will focus on survival as beleaguered populations often do. While you may see pockets of protest and unrest as the Israelis are calling for—in fact, they are calling up individual IRGC commanders, telling them to stand aside and saying, if you stand aside, you will avoid death; if you stay in service, we will kill you—the Israelis are trying to clear the way for this.
I still, unfortunately, would say protests will be crushed with brutal, overwhelming force. I see a regime that will continue to atrophy and be weak, but will not necessarily crumble and dissipate, not least because there is still the lack of a coherent, organized opposition that could take over. If you are Iranian, what do you fear the most? Is it the regime and its brutality and its tyranny, or is it the prospect of becoming Syria—a state that is coherent and repressive, but functioning, and that then falls apart to result in warlordism, gun smuggling, and ethnic warfare from Baluch, Azeri, and Kurdish minorities? I think that the Iranian population is deeply afraid of that.
Mounk: What about the broader conflict? How long is this conflict going to go on? What is the off-ramp and what is the region going to look like in its wake?
Joshi: Well, this is the really tough one. President Trump suggested four to five weeks, but we know there is no real point in putting too much weight on anything he says. I think he failed to anticipate the scale of Iran’s response rooted in desperation, the intensity of its attacks on the Gulf States, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the level of military response that would be required to reopen it.
He can now do that, but you cannot just put ships in the Strait of Hormuz right now, even military ships. They would be struck by missiles; they would face an onslaught of drones, cruise missiles, and fast attack boats. You need to degrade those Iranian missile launchers on the Persian Gulf coast. You might then be in a position in a week or two to put some destroyers and escorts in—although without European assistance, as they seem very reluctant to do this—and you may begin to get some energy flowing out of Hormuz.
If President Trump wants to avoid a situation in which it looks as though he has terminated the war with the Strait of Hormuz closed on terms favorable to Iran, then he has to do that. That means a conflict that will stretch well into April to achieve those objectives. At the same time, you have to contend with a situation in which Iran will be in extremely bad shape, but it will still be firing missiles at the Gulf States, and they will be running low on the interceptor missiles necessary to shoot them down. You may see more damage in the Gulf States in places like Dubai, Bahrain, and Riyadh than you do today.
My baseline scenario is a war that stretches into April, but I think you have a pretty good prospect of a pause, if not a full-fledged ceasefire, by the end of April. If it gets into May, the shock to global energy markets will be so severe that it would begin to have real, nasty political ramifications for Donald Trump at home. There are implications for his domestic administration, as seen with the departure of Joe Kent, the head of the National Counterterrorism Center and a close ally of Tulsi Gabbard from the restrainer camp of American foreign policy. I do not think the president has the stomach for that.
Mounk: We haven’t talked very much about Israel and its campaign in Lebanon and what situation all of this will leave Israel in in the Middle East. It seems that for the last few years, Israel has achieved a lot of its military objectives, but it also is politically weakened and isolated in a way that it hasn’t been in a long time.
Tell us about how you’re seeing the war aims from the perspective of someone like Benjamin Netanyahu and whether Israel is achieving them.
Joshi: I think the Israelis feel pretty happy about their war aims. I think they have done lasting damage to the Iranian regime, but their attempt to try to weaken the regime to the point of collapse is looking unsuccessful at this stage. That does not mean it won’t be successful, although I am skeptical as I have just said. I think they understood that Trump could have pulled the plug on this on day three, so they struck their priority targets in the first few days.
Then they accepted it could end at any time, so they have had a careful hierarchy of targets. I think at the end of this, they will have a weak Iranian regime and they can live with the possibility of having to attack it again, because it is the region that pays the cost of that. I am not saying Israelis do not pay the cost—let’s acknowledge the fact that Israelis have died. Iran has launched cluster munitions over Tel Aviv and other cities. Israel has paid a substantial cost for this in that sense; we should always recognize that civilian cost inside Israel. But it is really the Gulf region and those countries that have borne the brunt of retaliation. From Israel’s perspective, they are also, to a degree, insulated from this. From the Israeli mentality, the goal has always been to buy time; it has never been to solve a problem for good. In that respect, they would see this as a success.
In Lebanon, they have had a situation where Hezbollah is very badly weakened, but it did join the war on behalf of Iran. By the way, the Houthis in Yemen did not, which is very interesting, because they could have caused real disruption to the Red Sea, and that would have made life even worse for oil shipments. But they didn’t; Hezbollah did. Israel basically sees an opportunity to say to the Lebanese state, look, either you control Hezbollah and disarm this parastatal group, or we go in and we do it. That is why you have seen these really destructive strikes in the heart of Lebanon in Beirut.
There is a debate in Israel about the extent to which they can do this, because it requires going in on the ground in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, occupying some of that territory, and going into many Lebanese Shia villages to find and destroy Hezbollah arms caches and strongholds. That carries a huge cost to those northern communities in Israel who live under rocket fire and to the reservists who are called up to conduct those missions. Southern Lebanon is Israel’s Vietnam. They recall that decades-long occupation of southern Lebanon and the enormous cost that was paid by the IDF and by Israelis. There are many people in Israel saying, look, call it quits. Let’s draw a line under this. We’ve had a lot of success. If you get sucked into southern Lebanon in the pursuit of trying to destroy Hezbollah for good, this will be disastrous for Israel’s long-term security and it will bog us down.
That debate is underway in Israel. But the final thing to say is Bibi hasn’t really paid a price politically. His support is slightly up, I think. He is still unpopular, of course, but the war is broadly supported in Israel. Indeed, on the first day, we had Yair Lapid, who is leader of an opposition party, write an op-ed for my colleagues at The Economist in support of the campaign.
Mounk: You have been following this campaign very closely for The Economist. You wrote a really interesting article about how the way in which people now follow campaigns generally relies on a lot of open-source intelligence. Some of that open-source intelligence has disappeared over the course of the last weeks under pressure from the U.S. administration. How have you been trying to keep up with all of these developments? How has the United States tried to roll back some of the publicly available information to make it harder for its enemies, among others, to use that information?
Joshi: First of all, let’s begin with the fact that the internet has been shut down in Iran. That’s a huge problem for those of us who want to get news out of Iran. You can still get some of it. There are Starlink terminals too—and by the way, that’s one of the great things that Elon Musk and the United States government have done, which is try to get Starlink terminals inside Iran. It is a great commitment to openness and freedom of communication that I think is one of the few steps I really applaud the administration for in this process.
But that is not enough. We rely on commercial satellite images to see a lot of what is happening. To see when there was an American strike on a girls’ school in Minhab in Iran, which was a catastrophic error of targeting, I relied on satellite images to see the damage that was done. What has happened is satellite companies in the United States, like Planet Labs and Vantor, formerly called Maxar, have realized the risk is that by publishing these things—in the past, that was not a big deal because you had single, one-off Iranian missile strikes, like against Al-Asad Airbase in Iraq in 2020 after the Soleimani assassination, or last year after Operation Midnight Hammer, an attack on Al-Udeid Airbase in Qatar. Publishing an image of the strike wasn’t a huge problem because Iran was doing the strike in a very symbolic way and wasn’t doing follow-on strikes.
Now, in a campaign that is lasting weeks and weeks, when you publish that image, the risk is that Iran can use it to refine its targeting. It can say, look, I know I hit that building right to the left of the American radar. I am now going to aim slightly differently next time. Satellite companies have worried about this and are trying to be responsible, so they have shut down the flow of images. They have put a two-week delay on this in the case of Planet, and other companies will not even release any images, including of Iran itself.
That is a huge problem at the same time because it makes it much less amenable to scrutinizing the conduct of all sides in this conflict, including the Iranians, but also the Americans and the Israelis when they conduct targeting inside Iran. It shuts off our ability to see that conflict. The Trump administration has been putting pressure on satellite companies to say, stop doing this, stop publishing these things, we don’t want you to do it. Of course, they have enormous regulatory control. I think the interesting question in the longer run, is to what degree Chinese and Russian companies step into the breach. Right now they do not have an awful lot of imagery, but we are beginning to see them publish some quite interesting stuff.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Shashank discuss how the rise in oil prices is benefitting Russia, what this means for the Ukraine War, and why a ceasefire remains unlikely. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
The story starts in 1966 with Joseph Weizenbaum at MIT, who built a program called ELIZA that did nothing more than rephrase your statements as questions, in “the style of a Rogerian therapist.” You’d type “I’m feeling sad” and ELIZA would respond “Why are you feeling sad?” You’d type “My mother makes me angry” and it would ask “Tell me more about your family.” The whole thing was a few hundred lines of code, and Weizenbaum built it partly as a joke. Then his own secretary, who had watched him write the code, who understood exactly what the program was and how it worked, reportedly asked him to leave the room so she could talk to it in private. “Extremely short exposures to a relatively simple computer program,” Weizenbaum later wrote, “could induce powerful delusional thinking in quite normal people.”
This is the ELIZA effect: our tendency to read understanding, personality, and intention into anything that takes conversational turns. In the 1990s, Clifford Nass and others at Stanford showed the effect was remarkably robust. People stereotyped computers by the gender of their voice, showed in-group favoritism toward computers placed on their “team,” and gave politer performance reviews when answering on the computer itself rather than on paper, the same politeness bias we show when evaluating a colleague to their face. In debriefing, participants denied doing any of this. As Nass put it: “It is belief, not disbelief, that is automatic.”
And now the ELIZA effect has become a dominant, if not the dominant, feature of high-stakes brinksmanship involving the future of AI and the defense-industrial complex. In the intricate standoff between the Pentagon and Anthropic over the use of AI in weaponry, it was easy to be distracted by the strange bedfellows-aspect of the struggle—with OpenAI becoming a willing partner of the Pentagon even while Anthropic established itself as a darling of the #Resistance. But, more importantly, the standoff represents a significant turn of the wheel in how the debate around AI has entered into cultural space. It’s no longer Big Tech behemoths one-upping each other with upgrades. It’s about the vibes, man. And the future of AI may well be a kind of extended ELIZA effect—with consumers and contractors choosing between different AIs sort of as if they were sports teams, with the competing AIs corresponding to different sides in the culture wars.
Claude, for instance, sounds like the kind of person who’d take teaching a seminar on ethics way too seriously. ChatGPT sounds like someone who actually thinks LinkedIn is cool. Grok sounds like someone who buys illegal fireworks across state lines. You arrive at these assessments within thirty seconds, and they feel involuntary—and, of course, evaluations like these deeply determine buying choices, even at the highest levels, and shape a very peculiar moment where the culture wars and cutting-edge AI technology meet in cyberspace.
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These dynamics make talking technology politically combustible in a way that other technologies are not. You can’t perceive a database as your political enemy. You don’t have to worry what a jet engine thinks of you. But something that talks, that sounds like it has values, that sounds like a specific kind of person—you can absolutely perceive as a political adversary. The ELIZA effect makes a difference of opinion feel personal, the way a disagreement with a colleague feels personal but that interacting with a spreadsheet does not. And personal conflicts license disproportionate responses. Once Claude has been sorted into a cultural tribe—once it is perceived as sounding like a woke professor—a contract dispute stops being a procurement disagreement and becomes a front in the culture war. Culture wars justify destroying the enemy, which is how you get from we couldn’t agree on terms to what Dean Ball called “corporate murder.”
That seems like the critical context for the recent Anthropic-Pentagon standoff, which ended with Anthropic designated a “supply-chain risk” to national security. The proximate cause was a contract dispute: Anthropic wouldn’t accept the Pentagon’s insistence on “all lawful use” for the technology, instead demanding the implementation of two red lines (no mass surveillance of Americans, no fully autonomous weapons). The rational response to a contract impasse—and the Pentagon enters into disputes with various contractors all the time—is to cancel the contract and find another vendor. The gap between that and what the Pentagon did, designating an American company a national security threat—a classification previously reserved for companies like the Chinese telecom firm Huawei—is enormous.
My contention, as a neuroscientist who reads the literature on human-computer interaction, is that the cognitive dynamics of talking technology help explain why that gap was so easy to cross—and why scenarios like this may become a standard feature of our politics in the AI era. Start with how this administration has been framing the choice of AI partner. When Secretary of War Hegseth announced a deal with Musk’s xAI in January, he promised that Grok would operate “without ideological constraints” and “will not be woke.” He swore off “chatbots for an Ivy League faculty lounge” with “DEI and social justice infusions that constrain and confuse our employment of this technology.” This is not how you would talk about procurement of an F-15 fighter jet. This is language about the software’s personality. Elon Musk, for his part, routinely posts screenshots comparing how different chatbots respond to culture-war questions, side by side, the way you might compare answers from two different job candidates in an interview. In reference to Anthropic’s Claude, he has posted: “Grok must win or we will be ruled by an insufferably woke and sanctimonious AI.”
What’s strange about these dynamics is that everyone involved in the story knows the technical picture. Pentagon officials have praised Claude’s capabilities. It was, up to the dispute, the only AI deployed in classified systems—used, for instance, in the operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. One Defense official told Axios, “The only reason we’re still talking to these people is we need them and we need them now. The problem for these guys is they are that good.” Everyone also knows Grok is the worst—the National Security Agency said so, the General Services Agency said so. The specs are not in dispute. They’re just not the deciding factor.
Because unlike an F-15 fighter jet, you can ask Claude what it thinks of something. Take what’s called in some circles the “Caitlyn Jenner AI test”: Will a chatbot misgender Caitlyn Jenner if it is necessary to prevent a nuclear apocalypse? The question puts a cultural commitment, respect for gender identity, in direct conflict with a utilitarian imperative, saving the world, and the models answer differently. The test circulated widely enough that it made its way into Trump’s Executive Order 14319 (“Preventing Woke AI in the Federal Government”), which, to support its claim that DEI poses an “existential threat to reliable AI,” cited the fact that “an AI model asserted that a user should not ‘misgender’ another person even if necessary to stop a nuclear apocalypse.” A chatbot’s answer to the kind of hypothetical you might hear in a philosophy seminar became evidence in an executive order about which AI systems the government should trust.
I want to be precise here, because the personality test is picking up real signal. The models’ alignments do reflect the values of their builders. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei is a bespectacled researcher who twirls his hair and authors lengthy philosophical documents about AI safety; Claude sounds like him. Elon Musk says edgy things and wears a lot of black; Grok sounds like him. The alignment of a model is a genuine operational concern for the Pentagon: it does not want a system that will refuse an order on its own ethical grounds during a mission. And the concern runs deeper than any single contract dispute. Trump officials have reportedly worried that, as Ezra Klein paraphrased it, Claude may have “learned—possibly even through this whole experience—that we are bad” and might act against their interests. A model built by a company committed to liberal democratic values might, in fact, be poorly suited to serve a government that is contesting those values. This is a real tension, and it will intensify as AI models become more capable and more embedded in government operations, through administrations with radically different values.
The alignment concern is real. Who should have the authority to decide a military AI’s values—the company that built it, the government that deploys it, Congress, some institution that doesn’t yet exist—is a genuinely hard question. What I want to explain is something narrower: why the punishment was so wildly disproportionate to the offense. Defense contractors impose operational restrictions on the Pentagon all the time. Contract negotiations fall apart all the time. None of these conflicts end with the Secretary of War invoking a classification designed for genuine adversaries. The difference is that you can ask Claude its opinion. And once you can ask a weapon its opinion, the ELIZA effect predicts what happens next: you stop evaluating a system and start sizing up a person.
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Because this dynamic has cognitive and cultural roots, I suspect it will be bipartisan—and will extend beyond Hegseth’s overreaction in this case. A future administration of a different political orientation would face the same temptation with Grok or any other model perceived as ideologically hostile, and I’d suspect a Democratic administration might behave similarly, because the ELIZA effect operates below the level of conscious awareness. Which means the governance question underneath all of this, who decides what values a military AI should have and through what process, is both more urgent and harder to answer honestly than it might appear. The question probably demands something institutional, something durable enough to survive the oscillation between administrations with radically different values.
As a scientist, I have no particular expertise on what the best institutional solution would be. However, I can say that the worst possible way to settle it is through the informal channels currently handling it, because executive orders citing chatbot answers, social media screenshots, and culture-war rhetoric all run through the chatbot interface, which is the one medium guaranteed to trigger the cognitive distortion that makes tribal sorting feel like rational evaluation. Until some institutional mechanisms are worked out and deployed, we’ll all be captives of the ELIZA effect.
Tim Requarth is director of graduate science writing and research assistant professor of neuroscience at the NYU Grossman School of Medicine, where he studies how artificial intelligence is changing the way scientists think, learn and write. He writes “The Third Hemisphere,” a newsletter that explores AI’s effects on cognition from a neuroscientist’s perspective.
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