Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • Beijing Is Winning the Energy Race
    Researchers set an alloy material sample used in building the Thorium Molten Salt Reactor in Shanghai on October 23, 2025. (Photo by Jin Liwang/Xinhua via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    On February 14, 2025, President Donald Trump established the National Energy Dominance Council, a cornerstone of his “all of the above” energy strategy. What followed instead was a large-scale shift away from renewables: Trump killed Inflation Reduction Act subsidies, canceled green energy projects, and rescinded remaining clean energy Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act funds. The president has allowed climate politics to obscure the goal of true energy dominance. Now, in the midst of the Iran war—an energy shock of its own making—America is feeling the consequences.

    China, on the other hand, is building the energy infrastructure of the future. In 2025 alone, Beijing built nearly nine times more energy capacity than the United States; this includes: ~10x more solar power, ~15x more wind power, ~21x more coal/natural gas, and infinitely more nuclear since the United States built none. If the race for chips is a national security issue, so is the race for energy, and the United States lacks a strategy.

    While Beijing is still heavily reliant on oil, it is pursuing the “all of the above” policy that America has failed to realize. In doing so, it is building an energy fortress and reducing its reliance on maritime oil and gas imports. Xi intends to eliminate strategic vulnerabilities and ensure that the CCP will never be vulnerable through its global supply chains.

    One of the centerpieces of this drive for energy security is a revolutionary nuclear technology pioneered by the United States at Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs). MSRs are a type of nuclear power plant that uses liquid, heated salt instead of water to cool the system. In most designs, the radioactive fuel is dissolved directly into this liquid salt, meaning the coolant and the fuel flow together as one mixture. This approach allows the reactor to operate at much lower, safer pressures than traditional water-cooled reactors while generating electricity more efficiently. America abandoned the program; China has since revived it. China is currently the only nation with an operational thorium-fueled MSR, the TMSR-LF1 project in Gansu province.

    While these reactors are not yet ready for full commercialization, the national security implications of thorium MSRs are massive. Thorium is an abundant byproduct of Chinese mining operations; Beijing is largely able to bypass the global uranium market and onshore its supply chain for nuclear power. China has enough thorium to power itself for potentially thousands of years without relying on large inputs of unstable uranium.

    MSRs have other benefits; they can be built anywhere. They do not require massive amounts of water for cooling or pressurized water systems. They can be deployed in the Gobi Desert, where TMSR-LF1 sits, or they can be deployed in mountain caves, safe from kinetic strikes in a conflict.

    Finally, these reactors are orders of magnitude safer than uranium nuclear reactors. MSRs cannot “melt down” in the traditional sense; in a breach, the salt simply drains into a separate tank and solidifies. This passive safety system prevents MSRs from becoming liabilities in the event of a natural disaster.

    China’s massive energy infrastructure build serves many purposes, but Beijing is explicit about its intentions with respect to AI. Beijing has codified a state-level effort called “Eastern Data, Western Computing.” The effort moves the energy and data centers to the western portion of the country, i.e. the deserts, caves, and mountains, while providing services to the eastern coastal cities. In China, the state coordinates the utility and the tech firm as a single national unit.

    If China is able to scale modular reactors and data center builds to power AI while America allows partisan politics, permitting issues, and regulatory instability to stymie its energy goals, the U.S. lead in advanced chips may become irrelevant.

    Don’t forget, you can also sign up to receive content from Persuasion and Yascha Mounk! Just click below and toggle the buttons for the content you want!

    Email preferences

    China currently dominates the entire supply chain of solar energy equipment exports and wind energy components. It is now racing to become the primary exporter of nuclear technology. If Beijing is able to commercialize MSRs and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) first, they may be able to set the standards for the technology and corner the global market for critical energy infrastructure.

    The military applications of China’s energy infrastructure are similarly seismic. Miniaturized MSRs can be used to power ships and submarines. These smaller MSRs could quadruple the endurance of nuclear powered vessels while increasing their safety and lowering their maintenance. Additionally, the Chinese are reportedly planning to deploy SMRs in the South China Sea to power the militarized islands they’ve been building there. This would protect them from supply chain disruptions caused by blockades and other sea lane closures in event of a conflict.

    Beijing’s energy advantage is structural; centralized leadership allows the CCP to coordinate utilities, technology firms, and capital allocation to achieve its goals. The United States has no equivalent mechanism. America’s energy infrastructure relies on private investment, where capital flows towards stability and financial incentives. The United States is providing neither for green energy.

    The United States has made acquiring and learning to produce high end chips a critical national security goal. Yet it is still blind to the next bottleneck: producing enough energy to power them. Securing high-end semiconductors and keeping them out of Beijing’s hands is a critical theater of competition, but it isn’t the only one. A million Blackwell chips are strategically irrelevant if you lack the domestic power capacity to run them.

    The United States has for years struggled to build enough energy capacity. Energy companies and AI firms have been mired in regulatory gridlock and multi-year lead times for grid connections. American grids are managed by a patchwork of state-level authorities, often with different rules and regulations. The lack of cohesion makes cross-country transmission lines a minefield where cost-allocation disputes frequently derail energy projects essential to national security.

    At the national level, Democrats and Republicans can’t agree on what the country should build. The result is chronic whiplash in incentives and regulatory structures, creating a hostile environment for long-term investment. America must find the political will to build domestic clean energy to reduce its reliance on global oil markets. The Iran war oil and gas shocks should be a wakeup call that this is unsustainable.

    To his credit, President Trump signed four executive orders aimed at quadrupling U.S. nuclear capacity to 400 GW by 2050. The Department of Energy (DOE) established a program to have at least three advanced reactors operational by July 4, 2026—an ambitious goal it is unlikely to meet.

    The administration has heavily prioritized portable nuclear solutions. In February 2026, the military conducted its first airlift of a 5-megawatt microreactor to Utah as part of a push to deploy localized power for data centers and military bases independent of the civilian grid. Despite these efforts, the current administration does not provide stability, which is a precondition for investments that will take years to pay off.

    Energy is the ultimate precursor to all other forms of national strength: energy to power factories, energy to power military equipment, energy to power digital infrastructure, and now energy to power artificial intelligence in all its forms. China has recognized this reality and is meeting the moment; the United States must do the same before the gap becomes unbridgeable.

    Shahn Louis is the founder of Anansi Strategic Intelligence LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk firm. A former senior intelligence analyst with experience across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, he specializes in China analysis and East Asian regional dynamics.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The World Simply Does Not Trust America
    Britain hosts a virtual summit with 40 countries, not including the United States, to discuss the Strait of Hormuz on April 2. (Photo by Leon Neal / Pool / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Back in 1995, I published my second book, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. In it I argued that trust is among the most precious of social qualities, because it is the basis for human cooperation. In the economy, trust is like a lubricant that facilitates the workings of firms, transactions, and markets. In politics it is the basis for what is called “social capital”—the ability of citizens to cohere in groups and organizations to seek common ends and participate actively in democratic politics.

    Societies differ greatly in overall levels of trust. In the 1990s, Harvard’s Robert Putnam wrote a classic study of Italy which contrasted the country’s high-trust north with its distrustful south. Northern Italy was full of civic associations, sports clubs, newspapers, and other organizations that gave texture to public life. The south, by contrast, was characterized by what an earlier social scientist, Edward Banfield, labeled “amoral familism”: a society in which you trust primarily members of your immediate family and have a wary attitude towards outsiders who are, for the most part, out to get you. The only large organizations in the south were the Catholic Church and, of course, the Mafia. The latter was a direct product of distrust: if you were a businessman, you couldn’t count on the state to protect your property rights because of a weak rule of law; if someone cheated you, you hired a mafioso to break their legs.

    Subscribe now

    In Trust, I characterized the United States as a “high-trust” society. This view has a long history. When the French observer Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s and traveled across much of the settled part of the country, he noted that America had a high density of civic associations, from bible studies to clubs to mutual aid societies, and that Americans found it relatively easy to work together with strangers in the face of challenges. This, he felt, stood in sharp contrast to his native France, where, he said, you couldn’t find ten Frenchmen who were ready to work together in a common endeavor. In France, there was little of the spontaneous sociability or social capital that he found in the United States. This view of high-trust America was supported, in the mid-20th century, by survey data that showed Americans trusting other Americans to a higher degree than people in France and many other countries.

    If I were to re-write Trust today, I would not characterize the United States as a high-trust society. Even as that book was being published in the 1990s, political polarization had started to spread, and Americans began to sort themselves according to their political preferences. That polarization has only increased in the interval between then and now. It has turned into what political scientists label “affective polarization,” in which partisans don’t just disagree on issues, but also come to believe that their opponents are deeply malevolent and dishonest. Social capital still exists between members of the different political tribes, but distrust is rampant across the society as a whole. We don’t accept a common set of facts on issues like vaccine safety or election integrity, and we live by a series of conspiracy theories that inform us that things are not what they seem.

    Trust and social capital are built on a foundation of moral virtue. We come to trust people who are honest and reliable, who keep commitments and are willing to offer support even when it isn’t of immediate benefit to themselves. Trust takes time to build through a process of repeated interaction: if we see another person fulfilling their promises and reciprocating favors, we tend to do the same for them, creating a virtuous circle. But a trust relationship that has built up over time can be broken in an instant, if one of the parties betrays that trust and takes advantage of the other player. Just as trust builds on itself, distrust can become self-reinforcing: if we are betrayed, we are tempted to seek revenge against the betrayer.

    Trust is also critical in international relations. We come to trust other countries based on their observed behavior, just as we do with individuals. There is no global enforcer of rules or a sovereign to make countries behave. The use of force is constrained only by the expectation that it will be met with a counter-force, in an environment where credibility is the coin of the realm.

    That is what makes me extremely worried about the present global situation, and fearful of where our world order is heading.

    It is hard to imagine that the current war with Iran and the crisis over the Strait of Hormuz does not represent a fundamental rupture in the North Atlantic security structure. NATO is an alliance built on trust: its deterrent value rests on the belief that NATO members will come to one another’s aid if a member is attacked. This is what happened after 9/11, when a number of alliance members did come to America’s defense in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO is not an all-purpose commitment to support a treaty partner who has undertaken an offensive war against a third party. Trump is accusing alliance members of betraying the United States by not collaborating with it to re-open the Strait—but no one ever signed up to wage offensive war.

    Subscribe now

    The truth of the matter is that the United States has never been as isolated as it is today. Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, has made some supportive noises in the current crisis, but that was done out of cynical calculation. No sane European leader can think that support for the United States today will be reciprocated by a Trumpist United States down the road. And while American actions have greatly benefited rivals like Russia and China, they can hardly delude themselves that the United States will reliably serve their interests in the future.

    Donald Trump has claimed that the United States has never been as respected as it has been under his presidency. Of the very many untrue things he has said in his career, this is among the most absurd. There has never been a time when the United States was more distrusted, by both traditional friends and by rivals, as at the present. A successful dealmaker needs to generate a minimal amount of trust that he will uphold his end of the bargain. But reciprocity is a virtue that Trump has never understood or practiced.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Kathleen Stock on the Case Against Assisted Death

    Kathleen Stock is a contributing writer at UnHerd, a frequent columnist at The Sunday Times and The Times, and a co-director of The Lesbian Project, which she runs with journalist and activist Julie Bindel.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Kathleen Stock discuss why liberal arguments for assisted dying are less coherent than they appear, whether palliative care offers a more merciful alternative to medically assisted death, and how different legal regimes around the world reveal the practical challenges of institutionalizing end-of-life choices.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I’ve really looked forward to this conversation, though the topic is obviously somewhat somber. You’ve written a book about medically assisted suicide. You end up arguing against it, but I wonder whether, before we can get into those arguments, you can lay out the basic liberal argument for the practice. Because I think from a philosophical liberal perspective, there are some obvious arguments for empowering people to make their own decisions about the body, their own decisions about how to live and possibly how to die, that are quite powerful. What would you put sort of on that end of the ledger?

    Kathleen Stock: Well, it’s part of the argument of my book that what look like powerful arguments from a liberal perspective actually are pretty incoherent. So it’s going to be difficult for me to convincingly lay out the case, since I spend so much of the book attacking these so-called liberal arguments.

    Basically, there are two different argumentative strains, which are not often distinguished and are often sort of ventriloquized together, so people get confused. One of them is freedom and one of them is mercy. The freedom one, I guess, is the one that you would associate with liberalism—in my view, pretty illegitimately. That would just say something like, look, it’s my right as an autonomous human being to do what I want with my body. So it tries to tap into a long tradition within liberalism of having rights over one’s body and doing what one wants with it, and tries to justify an argument for state-assisted suicide or state-assisted euthanasia from that basic liberal right. For reasons we can go into, I don’t think that works at all as a justification for state-assisted suicide. It’s really about non-interference, and that’s not what most people who want assisted dying are asking for. Actually, I call it “assisted death” to make it clearer what we’re talking about.

    The other argument is mercy. I don’t know if you’d call that a particularly liberal argument. I think it comes from a Christian tradition of relieving heavy burdens from people—of pain and suffering in this case. Everyone can understand that motivation. I do too. Those on my side of the fence have no desire to see people in pain or suffering. We just disagree about the best means of organising the relief of suffering in that way.

    Mounk: So let’s go into each of those a little bit to steelman those cases. I really look forward to hearing and engaging with the arguments for why those are less coherent than might meet the eye.

    On the first one, at the moment, in most jurisdictions, there are two kinds of obstacles. The first obstacle is that we can go to often state-provided, or at least partially publicly funded, medical services in various countries in order to get all kinds of health services, but we can’t get those services for assisted death. The second one is that in most jurisdictions, a doctor, or even a friend or family member who helps carry out your clearly documented desire to die at the end of a long disease, is going to be put in jail, is going to be prosecuted by the state. That’s where the kind of core liberal argument lies.

    Now, you might say that liberal argument shouldn’t go so far as to say that taxpayer money should be used in order to facilitate this. I think that is an interesting argument to make, and we can get into what the particular moral considerations should be to use collectively funded pools of money in order to do something that some people have very strong moral objections to. I’m quite receptive to that, though it has interesting knock-on effects on other debates, like abortion potentially.

    But at the very least, there seems to be a strong liberal case, prima facie, to say, well, we should stop criminalizing this. When somebody has a clearly documented desire to stop their suffering, the state shouldn’t be allowed to interfere and say, no, you’re not allowed to render them that act of mercy.

    Stock: So that’s the best version of the liberal argument, which basically treats a contract with one other person as if it’s an extension of the individual’s right to do what he wants with his body. It says, look, this person has agreed and they know what they’re doing and I know what I’m doing. So the right of non-interference should come around us both and see off the state from our joint enterprise. So that’s an argument for lack of criminalization. It’s not an argument for state-organized, state-supplied medically or doctor-supplied death through the health system, and particularly the public health system. That’s a massive structure for what is being presented as a much smaller problem.

    Now in the UK, and as I conceded at the end of my book, in 2008, the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer, who is now our prime minister, basically decriminalized assisted dying, assisted death. It’s now very, very difficult to prosecute it, and I think there have been five prosecutions since 2008. So effectively, that’s where we are in the UK. I actually say that’s probably okay. I still think that there should be a criminal deterrent. I think that the state should be able to investigate, because obviously, if it’s completely decriminalized, then that opens up opportunities for coercion, particularly of elderly and vulnerably ill people.

    Mounk: At the very least you would want an investigation to make sure that it in fact does assist the death and is not just murder, right?

    Stock: I have a whole chapter on those sorts of cases, or at least a part of a chapter on the cases where it looks like it’s supposed to be benevolent, but actually the husband cut his wife’s throat or something. There’s something savage going on. But I would not have written an entire book against the decriminalization of private acts of assistance.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    What is happening is bureaucratized, organized, institutionalized assisted suicide and euthanasia, often within the context of public health, free at the point of use, and then filtered into the medical system, the legal system, changing social norms across the country, being advertised as a good thing, feeding into equality law. If this group has it, why can’t this group have it? There are all sorts of ramifications there ethically that just do not get covered when you treat it as a private individual act.

    Mounk: So let’s dwell for a moment on the second argument for the practice—the argument for mercy. It doesn’t come in any particular way from the liberal tradition, but it is certainly something that the liberal tradition can also speak to. It is simply the recognition that a lot of people have horrible diseases. In many cases, it is extremely likely that the disease will lead to death within a clear time frame, and a lot of the time, some of the worst hours on earth that we spend are in those last days and weeks and months. So it does seem merciful in some cases to allow people to pass away two weeks, perhaps two months, before they otherwise would, having been spared some of the worst hours, having been spared some of the most extreme suffering and pain that they’re likely to undergo during that time period. What do you make of that argument? Do you see the force of it, or do you think that it’s confused in some way?

    Stock: Well, what I’ve tried to do, and what I think we all should do, is talk about the systems we have rather than the ones in our heads. There’s no system I know of that says two months. They all say something like six months at a minimum, if not twelve months. Quite often they say, reasonably, “death is reasonably foreseeable,” which could mean anything up to three years. That’s one of the major problems with that formulation.

    So we’re not necessarily talking about people in pain. They need not be in any pain at all. Nearly all the systems I can think of—in fact, all of them—talk about psychological suffering, or allow that psychological suffering, effectively allowing that no pain, just a kind of torment about the prospect of mortality or incapacity or whatever it is, may also be a reason. When you say death is definitely going to happen, well, if you’re trying to give a prognosis of six months, that’s actually really quite difficult to do. There’s not necessarily a definite in these systems. There’s a prediction which may or may not be correct.

    But having made those qualifiers, yes—once you pursue this kind of argumentative line, you are saying that assisted suicide is a means to the end of relieving pain and suffering, and also some other stuff that we can get into about so-called “dignity.” But let’s just take pain and suffering as the general descriptor. My point is that we should not be zooming in and trying to think about the individual person who’s in pain and asking, well, is it right that this person here who is suffering has a quick death? We need to zoom out and constantly remember that we’re talking about a massive system. The question is not whether this person should have it. The question is whether the government, the state, should try and provide this en masse for people.

    At that point, I say, well, there’s an alternative and it’s called palliative care. It’s a technology that few people really know about, and it’s certainly very imperfectly delivered, because it’s more expensive than providing death. But technologies in pain control and the secondary effects of pain control like nausea have really come on. Britain started the hospice movement and it should be a jewel in our crown—the idea that you provide places where the goal is not to get better, but to have a good death.

    If your aim is to relieve pain and suffering, you’ve got two choices: palliative care or killing people, basically. I think the merciful system is the one that pursues the former, not the latter, for reasons that I go into—the effects on the whole. So it’s not that I’m unmerciful. I think I’m particularly merciful. I’m just trying to take a wider view on the effects of bureaucratizing death rather than the one that’s traditionally taken by my opponents.

    Mounk: I have one more thing I’d love for you to do to situate us in this debate before we really get into the meat of our thoughts on this. What is actually the legal regime around the world?

    Obviously you’re writing this because there’s a change of legal regime that is underway at the moment in the United Kingdom, but a lot of our listeners are outside the UK. What is the law of the land in most places in the United States, in Canada, in Britain, in continental Europe? What kind of range are we talking about? How is it that some of the actual developments in countries like Canada and the Netherlands motivate a lot of the concern around this topic?

    Stock: Well, my initial impetus for writing was Britain, because it looked like, very suddenly, over the last year and a half, we were about to get assisted suicide delivered through our National Health Service. It now actually looks like that threat has been seen off for the moment, because the legislation is basically being held up in the House of Lords and the Scottish legislation has just failed. I’m relieved, because precisely the things that I’m worried about were the things that objectors talked about. Across the world, the picture is very diverse, and I really do try to summarize all the different trends. Jurisdictions are coming up pretty much with their own versions. Broadly speaking, you get three kinds of eligibility conditions.

    The first is that you just need a terminal prognosis of some length—in some places it’s six months, in some it’s twelve, and in some it’s “reasonably foreseeable.” In those sorts of regimes, there’s no further qualification. This applies to Oregon, and I think most of the United States states where they have it—there’s no further requirement of pain or suffering. You just need the terminal prognosis. You need to establish that you’re not being coerced in some totally perfunctory way, and then you can get it. That of course means that you could be chronically depressed, you could have tried to kill yourself several times throughout your life, you could be homeless—you can be doing it for any reason whatsoever. The prognosis is what gets you through the door. After that, no one really cares about why you’re doing it or whether it’s actually related to your illness at all. The background rationale there is autonomy, and I have some doubts about that. In other regimes you need both. In Australia, in some states, you need both a prognosis of the right length and a diagnosis of intolerable suffering that cannot be remedied otherwise, or something like that.

    Subscribe now

    In Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands—this wasn’t always the case in Canada, but gradually, as is well known there, the law has extended and become wider in its remit through various legal challenges—all you need to access assisted suicide or euthanasia is a diagnosis of irremediable suffering. You do not need a terminal illness. That’s where you see, particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands at the moment—and actually indeed in Spain today, there’s been a case that’s just hit my newsfeed—young people with no underlying physical illness that would make them die anytime soon, or at all, but with chronic depression, personality disorder, and so on, being euthanized by the state. There are obviously a lot of differences in all of this, but I try to pick out some common themes.

    It has basically become the case that assisted death is being used for any disease that might have a natural death as its outcome, because it will include cases, for instance, where the person is not taking their medication. So a person can get diagnosed with something like diabetes, or chemical sensitivity to cigarette smoke, or in one case I can think of, deafness—in these Canadian cases. Maybe they’ll have had a stroke at some point, so they have partial mobility. There’s this massive gray area where people are not fully well, but not dying by any means, and yet the state has and still will consider that their death is reasonably predictable, or that they are suffering enough to pass the test.

    There are also people with learning disorders in Belgium and the Netherlands being euthanized. There’s a whole spate of anorexics who basically become so ill through self-starvation that they then get the requisite terminal prognosis, or someone says, well, your suffering is clearly intolerable—and either way, they then get euthanized.

    These cases strike most people as horrific, and not what you imagine in the paradigm of the person in terrible pain in the last few days of a fatal illness. That’s not what’s happening.

    Mounk: Just to cite one example that crossed my radar over the last few years—a woman called Zoraya ter Beek, who was 29 years old in the Netherlands. She’d been diagnosed with chronic depression, borderline personality disorder, and autism, had tried numerous treatments which clearly weren’t effective, and she was euthanized at her home in May 2024. This is somebody who clearly was in severe psychological distress, but it was a case in which death was not reasonably foreseeable any more than it is for you and me and for every human. Clearly, what was a much more restrictive regime earlier on got expanded and expanded in a way that then made assisted dying available to somebody who clearly wasn’t in physical pain in the last stretches of a fatal illness.

    Stock: That’s an interesting case—I talk about it in the book. There’s also a case that came up today, as I say, in Spain: a young woman who seems to have been gang raped, who then became depressed—I’m not sure at what point, whether she was depressed before that, but she certainly was depressed afterwards. She tried to kill herself, then became paraplegic, and she’s being euthanized today.

    I did actually, unexpectedly, have a related experience. I was giving a talk in Berlin last year, talking about the Zoraya ter Beek case, and as it happened a Belgian minister was in the audience—it was a gender conference and he was there to see what Belgium could do about youth gender medicine. He said, “I’m a doctor, I have euthanized people and I am partly responsible for the Belgian law.” I said something about 30-year-olds being euthanized for mental illness, and he said, “Listen, we don’t want our young people jumping in front of trains.” The implication being that the state will do it more cleanly. The trains will run on time, as far as I can see. You can get into that mentality quite quickly once you’ve got this mechanism in your system to deal with suicidal ideation, basically.

    Mounk: So we have the arguments for some of these practices on the table. You don’t find them fully convincing. I have to say that they have a certain amount of moral pull on me. You’ve started to make some of the case against it. How do we balance between those different considerations? Why is it that rather than trying to restrict the practice, or trying to come up with more restrictive terms for it, you by and large conclude that the arguments are just muddled—that they ultimately don’t carry the weight of a burden of proof here?

    Stock: Well, let me focus on the freedom arguments, because they are probably the ones that for some reason seem most attractive to people. I think they are fundamentally confused, because we’re not talking about a liberal right of non-interference—we’re talking about assistance, and we’re talking about assistance from the state, not just from your friend who’s agreed. The demand from the pro-assisted death lobby is that the state, in the form of doctors, should help. That’s not non-interference, and that’s not I want to be left to get on with my own suicide in my own way. Unfortunately, most of us still have that opportunity—not everybody, but most. It’s a grim fact, and one that I do not celebrate.

    Generally, we don’t act as though there’s a right of non-interference in suicide. Generally, we have suicide prevention, we have suicide watches. But we’re not talking about someone’s individual right to do what they want with their body—and particularly not before we’ve brought the legislation in. So in Britain, we don’t have it. Now we’re in a public conversation about whether to get it, and before we bring it in, it’s somewhat incoherent to say, just leave me alone to have what I want. That’s not freedom—that’s just a demand that the state do something that I want. It gives us an extra choice, but so does extra breakfast cereals. It just sounds to me, from the perspective of a country which has yet to get it, that people going on about their freedom and their demands that their autonomy be respected are just not making sense.

    Subscribe now

    Now, if they were genuinely interested in freedom to die for everyone, why are they focusing only on the ill? In a way, the Belgian government might have the best idea if it’s really about freedom—anyone who wants to kill themselves should be facilitated by the state. But that’s never the argument. The argument is always about suffering, the ill. That suggests to me it’s not really about freedom for that cohort at all. It is about compassion—or at least that’s certainly a useful defense that opens the door to this sort of legislation. The freedom argument on its own really doesn’t get anyone anywhere. Because of course, once the institutions are in place, someone might be stopped from using them—maybe that’s going to be an inhibition on their freedom. But before the institutions are in place, their freedom has not been curtailed by the lack of them.

    Mounk: Those are really interesting arguments, and I want to deal with the connection between the freedom and the compassion argument in a moment. But to stick with the freedom argument—within the very specific context of the United Kingdom and the law that was being discussed there, I think you have a point. But there is a way for liberals to restate the argument in slightly broader terms, which is to say that at the moment there’s, for good reason, a prohibition on murder. We often use the prohibition on murder in order to restrict every form of assisted dying as well. Obviously this is a very complicated issue, because in many cases there are going to be gray zones where we don’t know whether somebody really was in a state where they could request to die, or whether somebody is using this as a cover to commit murder. We obviously want to be very careful so that this doesn’t just become an end-run around the most vile crime there is, which is murder.

    But as long as we fulfill those conditions, there could be lots of circumstances where we do want various forms of assisted dying to be permissible on freedom grounds. This could just be being allowed to access the kind of medication that you can take yourself. In general, the state needs a reason to prohibit me from buying all kinds of things, and the state’s reason to prohibit me from buying some kind of cyanide capsule—or whatever it might be that will have the intended effect of killing me if I take it—shouldn’t necessarily be there. One may also say, why shouldn’t I be able to entrust my friend or my relative with helping me die, if that’s what I wish? They need to be free from criminal prosecution if it’s obvious that there really was an agreement between us to do that. And in places where medical services aren’t necessarily state-funded, private insurance should be free to offer plans which include, as part of their provisions, financing for those forms of assisted death.

    None of that would fall under your concerns about why it should be a responsibility of the state to provide this—which I take seriously. They would all do an end-run around that and fall more cleanly into the zone of non-interference.

    Stock: I don’t think we need to get into the arguments about whether it’s freedom or not freedom. It’s not freedom to die anyway—you already had it. It’s freedom to make contracts with people who are going to help you to die, and it’s freedom to help others without going to jail. If you’re successful, you’re not going to jail. So let’s just say we’re now talking about a different kind of freedom to the one commonly used by the pro-assisted death lobby, which is freedom from pain, or freedom from the burden of your life, or freedom to choose. I think that’s just misleading rhetoric.

    Mounk: I’m not part of the pro-assisted death lobby. I’m just a political theorist rooted in liberal values who’s trying to puzzle this through. The way that I would puzzle it through is from this perspective of non-interference.

    Stock: I understand, but ultimately, in my experience, people really, really want this and they’ll find any argument that works for them to get it. Maybe we need to, instead of thinking about the arguments, also be thinking about the deep fears and unconscious motivations that are making this seem such an attractive option. That’s part of the book too.

    But generally speaking, as I say, I wouldn’t have written a book against mere decriminalization. Some of the arrangements that you’ve just described would still need to be extremely carefully handled, and they start to shade into some of the worrying areas that I go through—for instance, coercion. There is a huge worry about coercion as soon as you have suicide pills floating around elderly, vulnerable, disempowered, ill people, with carers who have financial interests in freeing up their own time or getting their hands on a house or whatever. The courts are extremely familiar with the kinds of motives that lead to murder or manslaughter in this area. Whatever arrangements were put in place, it would have to involve the right kind of investigation, which would be expensive.

    In Switzerland, I believe every death through assisted suicide has to have an associated investigation, and that’s enormously expensive for the Swiss state—in fact, it’s becoming so expensive that they can’t really deal with it anymore. Whatever arrangements were put in place, they never just affect the person who wants it and the person who’s helping them. This is the big message: they have knock-on effects for other people who want to carry on living.

    Mounk: But something similar is true in lots of cases of non-interference where we still think that there is a compelling case for erring on the side of liberty. Alcohol consumption has all kinds of downstream costs for society. But I think we rightly reject the prohibitionist argument that because somebody who’s drunk is then more likely to lead to other kinds of social costs—from diseases they might suffer, to behaviors that might impose other kinds of costs on society—we should just ban alcohol altogether. So if you allow any kind of claim to non-interference, any claim to “this is something that I’m choosing for myself, for my own life, for my own body,” the fact that it might have certain kinds of downstream harmful social consequences shouldn’t be allowed to trump that liberty interest. Otherwise, we should be able to coerce people to go to university, and we should be able to coerce people to not get a divorce, and all kinds of other things.

    Stock: My argument doesn’t depend on the general shape of some things that we allow people to do that have some bad consequences. My argument completely depends on the specific bad consequences of this thing. They are far greater, I can tell you, than allowing people to drink alcohol. We also do not let under-18-year-olds drink alcohol in most countries. I’d rather we just honed in on the actual implications for society rather than say, well, in these other cases we let you do things that are bad for you.

    Now, we’re not just letting people die—we’re helping them. We’re deliberately bringing death into a health system. We’re making the very same doctor who in the morning gives you pain control, in the afternoon gives you poison. We are potentially changing the attitude of a population to their healthcare providers, particularly people who are already frightened of going to the doctor. Some of them will be terrified—no matter how often you tell them it’s all fine, they are still going to be frightened. We are placing a burden on every single person with a terminal diagnosis, because now they have to make a choice that was socially unacceptable to think about before, but now it’s there—it’s in the waiting rooms, it’s on the posters, it’s in the news—and they have to explain to themselves or others why they’re not taking that choice. None of this applies to alcohol. Let’s just focus on the problems that this would bring, and is bringing, in countries where they have it.

    Mounk: The shape of the argument I’m making is not that these specific bad consequences are there, but that there are lots of other circumstances where individuals making choices—some of which might be bad choices—have harmful downstream social consequences. I’m just nervous about saying that in any case in which there are harmful downstream social consequences, that justifies us interfering with the liberty of the individual.

    Stock: I’m not saying that though. So we agree.

    Mounk: Well, I’m not sure we do, because there’s a question about... I just worry that when we’re talking about a case in which an individual makes a decision that’s primarily about their own life, but there are secondary and tertiary consequences for society that are complicated—you’re saying that, because of those secondary and tertiary consequences, that liberty interest should be superseded. I’m saying that if we acknowledge that principle in general, I worry that we’re going to be able to limit all kinds of other freedoms that we take for granted in a liberal society.

    Stock: My principle is not the general one—it’s the specific one in this case. It’s perfectly acceptable for some attempts to instigate legislation to say, no, we’re not going to bring this in, not necessarily just because of the bad effects on the people it would directly affect, but also because of secondary effects. It’s perfectly fine to take those decisions on a case by case basis, and we do already.

    I guess I’m just not getting it, because my argument is entirely directed to this particular case. I think assisted death is a Rubicon. It introduces state-sanctioned killing into societies which don’t even have the death penalty, and that in itself should give us pause. We need to look properly at all the implications—not just at what happens at the deathbed, but what happens across the system. The book is an attempt to get people to think about those things and to ask, is it worth it? Is it going to be worth it, particularly when you have palliative care that could be funded, that would achieve many of the same ends, perhaps even better?

    There’s a range of problems—from the potential for coercion, to changing attitudes towards medicine, to slippery slope problems, to what we do with people who will probably be judged to have mental capacity but where we might not feel comfortable about that, like learning disabled people. Are they going to get it? Pregnant women—are they going to get it? There are just so many issues here to be thought through carefully, and they’re not going to be solved by a quick people should be free to do what they want.

    Mounk: I feel very torn about this issue and I don’t know what I actually think about it. There’s a reason why a lot of people feel so torn. On the one hand, it does feel like if you suffer from a terrible disease, being able to decide what happens to you—being able to decide whether you want to go through that suffering or be able to cut it short—is an important form of choice we should have available to us. At the moment, in many jurisdictions, there are all kinds of things that are actively keeping us from being able to make that choice, such as being able to contact somebody to buy a pill that I myself can take that would put me out of my misery.

    On the other hand, there are all of those very real concerns that I take seriously when I read about some of those cases of assisted death for people who don’t have a mortal disease, or older people who might feel pressured by their families. I read an interesting account recently by a priest who said he was in favor of assisted dying until, in his service, he spoke to a family that said, “Can’t we try and do this by Sunday, because we’re flying off on a skiing holiday on Monday?” That changed his mind. A lot of people have the interests of their loved ones at heart, and some people don’t—and that’s obviously a problem here.

    I feel very torn about this, but I guess the way to get to the bottom of it is to try and size up those competing circumstances. One way that I think about this—and I wonder how you respond to it—is that the main way in which I’ve changed my mind about the world over the last ten years is that I’m much less confident about institutions. Ten or so years ago, I had a relatively high level of confidence that in countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany, where I grew up, our social institutions are relatively functional, work relatively well, have the interests of people at heart, don’t get captured by extreme ideologies, and don’t have deep forms of internal dysfunction. In that kind of world, I think I would have been much more open to legislation introducing something like assisted death, because I would have assumed that the doctors and others who make those decisions would act in a reasonable way.

    One of the reasons why I’m much more sympathetic to your argument than I would have been ten years ago is that both from seeing some of those actual examples in the Netherlands, Canada, and elsewhere, and in my general assessment of these institutions, I’m now much more worried that there might be extreme ideologues in charge of some of those decisions who don’t take seriously the case for the other side, or that straightforward financial incentives may drive some of those decisions—with doctors realizing they could be helpful by freeing up a hospital bed. So perhaps we have a conversation with the patient again, and so on and so forth.

    For you, is part of what’s driving this a fundamental distrust of our institutions? Do you think that in a place that had much more functional institutions, you would be more open to this case? Or is that not a big part of what’s driving you?

    Stock: It’s definitely a big part of what’s driving me. In fact, it’s part of the point I keep making in this book—let’s stop thinking of utopias and let’s look at the systems we actually have, because that’s where we’re going to get assisted death.

    In the UK, for numerous reasons, I’ve become more distrustful of institutions. In my previous book I talked about a total, catastrophic failure of the medical and psychiatric professions towards the bodies of teenagers and young people. I’m very aware of how institutions can be captured by glamorous moral precepts that are totally shallow, and as soon as they become bureaucratized, they just become not fit for purpose.

    I’m also highly aware of the collapsing health system we have in the UK. People on trolleys in corridors for hours and hours, unable to get an appointment with their GP, care homes not being inspected for years, hospices closing because they haven’t got enough funding. Hospices are only 30% publicly funded—the rest is charity donations. The birth rate is declining, people are living longer, and that pension system is going to collapse soon. Put deliberate assisted death into a system like this and you will effectively have a cheap, quick outlet for many social problems—and the people involved will not be complaining about it afterwards, because they won’t be here. You will inadvertently funnel people towards taking this option, because as soon as assisted death is in a system, there is less momentum towards palliative care. That will actually speed things up.

    Can I just go back for a second to the first part of your question, about fear? I think it’s really important and we haven’t covered it yet. The fear that able-bodied people have about terminal illness is often about pain, incapacity, loss of bodily function, inability to move around—things that disabled people live with now, and which are not necessarily terminal. As soon as you say those things are fundamentally undignified—so undignified that if the person wants it, we’ll kill them to get them out of that position—it is impossible to take that attitude and inject it into society in a way that’s sequestered from the rest of it, without having knock-on effects for disabled people. Effectively you are saying, you are in a fundamentally undignified position, and great that you want to carry on, but lots of people don’t, so we’re going to kill them or help kill them. That’s just a terrible message to send to disabled people.

    I understand the fear, I’m human, and I also have experiences that are relevant to this. But I just don’t think personally the cost is going to be worth it. We’ll end up with a society that many of us will simply not recognize in about 50 years’ time. That’s my biggest fear.

    Mounk: Speaking of some of these institutional failures, to what extent are there safeguards in place to make sure that when patients say they agree to die in this manner, that is actually the case? That doctors don’t try to pressure them because they could really use that hospital bed, that families don’t pressure the medical staff because perhaps they would like to go on that holiday—and one horrible case I read about where the inheritance tax was going to go up on January 1st, and therefore it would be useful if a relative died by December 31st. Those are the things that activate the fear on the other side—that these systems can get so out of control that you get these horrible cases.

    There’s an argument I’ve heard from people who defend assisted death, that as long as the laws are drafted in a smart way and as long as they’re sufficiently robust to introduce genuine safeguards, those kinds of cases can be avoided. How would you respond to somebody making that case?

    Stock: I’d like to see what they think these laws would look like, because as far as I can see, having looked extensively, they’re not like that at all. There’s very little attention paid to the background circumstances of the applicant. Ideally, in order to eliminate the possibility of coercion, you would want to know the financial status of this person, the family situation, whether there’s been any domestic abuse in their background, any convictions—and you’d want to know their history of chronic depression. None of that you’re allowed to know.

    This is the influence of the specter of freedom and autonomy coming in to hollow out the safeguarding process. Every time someone tries to make an appropriate safeguard—saying, for instance, we should have a reasonable time of reflection before we administer the poison, or maybe we should look into whether there’s any domestic abuse charges against her husband—someone will come in and say, no, it’s none of our business, it would be an infringement of their autonomy. What you get is reflection times reduced systematically through various challenges. It starts off being administered by doctors, ends up being by nurses or pharmacists. Access gets wider, safeguards get smaller, because they are presented as obstacles to freedom. That’s the case in all the systems I’ve looked at.

    Add into that the basic lack of money floating around most systems, and the fact that doctors really don’t know whether to say yes or no. Somebody comes in and says they’re homeless, or they’re alcoholic, but they’ve got cancer. They’re also dyslexic and can’t fill out the forms to get social housing. They say, I want to die. The doctor is not going to try and argue them out of it. They’ve got several months of life ahead, but the doctor is just not going to look for a reason to say no.

    What you do get in Canada, perversely, is doctors feeling pressure to say yes—because if they don’t immediately get the MAID team in when somebody starts saying, I can’t live like this anymore, relatives may start accusing them of holding the process up. In Britain at the moment, I think doctors sign off something like ten million sick notes a year. Doctors don’t seem to be able to say no to people who want things, and I suspect there’ll be no incentive for doctors to say no to people who say they want death. They will just think, well, I’m just part of a bigger system, I’ll just sign it off.

    We will not know whether that person was being coerced financially, physically, or whether they just want to get out of a horrible life—and I don’t mean horrible because of illness, I mean horrible because someone’s beating them up at home or whatever. None of that is going to come to light. I just don’t think there are systems that are financially well-resourced enough to establish it.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Kathleen discuss the decline of gatekeeping, why there are parallels between the arguments for assisted death and youth gender medicine, and the gender wars in the United States and UK. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    55 min
  • What Hegel Knew About Trump
    (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images.)

    This article was originally published in Notus Perspectives.

    It’s tough to pinpoint when exactly it happened, but gradually, as President Donald Trump has entered the second year of his second term, a sense of optimism has returned to the Democratic side. Maybe it was the big gubernatorial wins in New Jersey and Virginia last November. (“Democrats came out in record numbers,” gloated one strategist who worked in Virginia, “and this is a foreshadow of what we’re going to see next year.”) Or perhaps it was the numerous recent elections where Democrats have proven competitive in conservative areas. (“There’s something happening,” one Democrat said after the party had a surprisingly strong showing in a deep-red Tennessee district in December. “And I think that next November is going to be a big year for us.”) Or maybe it’s simply Trump’s dismal poll numbers. Whatever the cause, Democrats are increasingly looking to the future not with fear but with hope.

    “House Democrats are on the verge of a takeover,” Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries predicted last month. And while he is obligated to sound optimistic, he is not wrong. The war in Iran is highly unpopular. Gas prices are about to go through the roof. Democrats might well take back the House in November. They might even be in a strong position to take back the White House in 2028. On our current trajectory, it seems quite possible, even likely, that Trump will end his second presidency unpopular, ineffective, and roundly repudiated by voters.

    But too many Democrats are missing the forest for the trees. Yes, Trump himself may soon be disgraced, but he and his administration have set in motion long-term changes that are going to be with us for the foreseeable future. Trump, it is increasingly clear, is a figure of enormous historical significance who is reshaping America and the globe in ways that will not easily be undone by Democratic wins in future elections.

    Subscribe now

    Liberals, naturally, would like to believe the opposite: that once they triumph at the ballot box, all can go back to normal. “Time will show the Trump era to be less turning point, more freakish aberration,” Simon Tisdall, a foreign affairs columnist for The Guardian, wrote in December. “In history’s bigger picture, Trump is a blotch, an unsightly smear on the canvas.”

    This could not be more wrong. And the ill-conceived but also era-defining war in Iran—the seventh country that Trump has attacked in his second term—is just the latest manifestation of how Trump is irrevocably changing our world.

    My confidence in this prediction derives from an unlikely source. To try to make sense of Trump’s presidency, I recently returned to G.W.F. Hegel’s “Lectures on the Philosophy of History,” which I had read many years ago when I was trying to understand his influence on Marxism. This may seem to be an unnecessary diversion—like studying quantum mechanics in order to repair a car—but Hegel’s theory of history maps remarkably well onto our current situation.

    Hegel viewed history as consisting of stages punctuated by times of upheaval. He assigned to what he called “world-historical individuals” a special role in spurring the transition from one era to another. These individuals didn’t necessarily grasp the full import of what they were doing, and their actions, while transformative, didn’t necessarily result in the outcomes they intended. Trump, I have come to believe, is exactly such an individual: He is speeding the transition from one historical era to another. The ultimate results are very unlikely to line up with his exact ideological aims, but they will be profound. And the world is never going back to what it was.

    Hegel, writing in the early 1800s, divided history into three major stages. The first was the Asiatic-Oriental (ancient) stage, in which only the ruler possessed freedom; next was a Greek and Roman stage, in which some people were free but slaves were not; and finally, there was a Germanic-Christian stage, in which all citizens of a nation achieved freedom. Hegel further divided the Germanic-Christian stage into the barbarian centuries, the Catholic years of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Protestant years—his era—of sovereign states.

    The world, Hegel believed, goes from one stage to another because of continuing conflicts. During these clashes, individuals, peoples, and nations are motivated by different passions and interests, but the outcomes, driven by what Hegel called “the cunning of reason”—that is, the sum of historical forces beyond the control of any individual—almost invariably defy their expectations. To cite a contemporary example: A decision to invade a country may not result in the promised liberation of its people, but in decades of strife and hardship. These clashes eventually reach a point where they can only be transcended through a major change that results in a new stage of history. That’s when the world, in Hegel’s phrase, is “ripe for development.”

    At these moments, Hegel believed, a “world-historical individual” could play a decisive role. Alexander the Great spread Greek culture throughout Asia and North Africa. Julius Caesar transformed Rome from a republic to an empire. Napoleon Bonaparte—Hegel’s contemporary and the model for his theory—ended feudalism, instituted civil law (the Napoleonic Code), and put an end to the Holy Roman Empire, creating a continent of rival states.

    These world-historical individuals were “practical, political men” of action, not philosophers. Caesar, Hegel writes, was driven by “an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe.” Their ability to enact change depended on their willingness to defy current custom and mores. “It is even possible,” Hegel writes, “that such men may treat other great, even sacred interests, inconsiderately; conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension.”

    These leaders often leave death and destruction in their wake. To achieve their results, Hegel writes, “They must trample down many an innocent flower, crush to pieces many an object in its path.” To many of their contemporaries, they may seem to be monsters. They “appear to have done everything under the impulse of some passion, more grand—some morbid craving—and on account of these passions and cravings to have not been moral men.”

    Hegel saw the stages of history as naturally progressing in a positive direction. But shorn of that Enlightenment optimism, the parallels to today are considerable. When Trump burst onto the political scene in 2015, he entered a world where a consensus that had prevailed for decades was rapidly breaking down. The consensus had several names and overlapping premises. The economic component went by “neoliberalism” or “market liberalism” and consisted of a belief that the United States and the rest of the world could achieve peace and prosperity through the free flow of goods, capital, currency, and labor. Its crowning achievement was the World Trade Organization, which began in 1995.

    Subscribe now

    The geopolitical component was liberal internationalism, a concept that dated from Woodrow Wilson but that the United States began to put into effect after World War II. Its premise was that the United States could keep the peace by aggressively encouraging capitalism and democracy—through the spread of neoliberal institutions but, if necessary, through military intervention—and that it could prevent or resolve conflict through agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union. After the Berlin Wall fell, liberal internationalists assumed that both Russia and China could be brought into the American-led order of peaceful, free-market, free-trading nations.

    In the early 2000s, this consensus fell victim to a series of historical fiascoes. American invasions failed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Great Recession cast doubt on the reliability of free markets. Porous borders led to soaring illegal immigration in the United States and Europe. The fear of migrants became fused with the fear of Islamist terrorist attacks. NATO expansion plans provoked Russia into war in Georgia and Ukraine. China’s entrance into the WTO caused a massive loss of factory jobs in the United States and Western Europe. And far from becoming a liberal democracy, Beijing remained a dictatorship, one that threatened its neighbors.

    When established political leaders failed to recognize that the old order was disintegrating, politicians and populist movements sprung up on the left and right that did. And the most important of these was Trump and his MAGA movement.

    In a 2018 interview with the Financial Times, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who certainly knew his Hegel, said, “I think Trump may be one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretenses. It doesn’t necessarily mean that he knows this, or that he is considering any great alternative. It could just be an accident.”

    Trump may or may not have fully understood what he was doing, but he did, clearly and correctly, sense that the world was at a turning point, which he encapsulated in his promise to “make America great again.” In his first term, he took direct aim at the pretenses of neoliberalism and liberal internationalism. He rejected the ideal of free trade and boycotted the WTO. He instituted tariffs and negotiated bilateral and trilateral agreements. Defying his own party’s free-market precepts, he subsidized and protected industries that he thought were vital. He began building a border wall. He gave short shrift to the post-World War II system of alliances and institutions, including the UN and NATO. He denounced the “forever wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan that were intended to spread democracy. He negotiated an end to the war in Afghanistan.

    In his second term, he has gone much farther. He imposed global tariffs and slapped additional punitive tariffs on countries that were running large trade deficits with the United States or had simply incurred his displeasure. He empowered Immigration and Customs Enforcement to deport illegal immigrants through paramilitary incursions into Democratic cities. He cut funding to the UN and its agencies and sought to replace the Security Council with his Board of Peace. He backed away from Ukraine and courted Russia. He declared a new “Donroe Doctrine” that justified kidnapping Venezuela’s head of state. In Venezuela and Iran, he initiated military action not to spread democracy but to exercise power over two oil-rich nations by replacing their unfriendly leaders with those who would do his bidding.

    Trump’s break with neoliberalism and liberal internationalism perfectly fits Hegel’s profile of the world-historical individual standing at the center of a transition from one era to another. So do his character and leadership. He didn’t merely appear to act out of a “morbid craving” for power and glory; that is at the center of his being. When Napoleon became first consul of the French Republic in 1799, he had one of his successful battles turned into a national commemoration. Trump has put his name on buildings and institutions and lusted after the Nobel Peace Prize. When Napoleon became emperor in 1804, he bestowed titles and riches on his family and supporters. Trump has enriched himself and his family.

    Trump, like Hegel’s world-historical individuals, has ignored or repudiated “sacred interests” including the Constitution and its checks and balances. He tried to overturn the 2020 election. He shut down or fired leaders of independent agencies that Congress created. He fabricated pretexts for patently illegal actions by invoking laws that were intended for entirely different purposes—for instance, citing the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, intended to root out French insurrectionists, to justify deporting Venezuelans to a foreign prison without a hearing. His actions—which have included calling Somali immigrants “garbage” and belittling a female reporter as “piggy”—have been, in Hegel’s parlance, “obnoxious” and deserving of “moral reprehension.”

    Subscribe now

    When Caesar vanquished his enemies, Hegel wrote, they “had the form of the constitution, and the power conferred by an appearance of justice, on their side.” Like Caesar, Trump sees himself as above ordinary morality or law. In the wake of his invasion of Venezuela, The New York Times asked Trump if he saw any limits on his global use of power. “Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me,” he responded. “I don’t need international law.” This willingness to defy law and morality, and to pursue power and glory relentlessly, has been integral to world-historical individuals—and to their ability to detonate outworn ideas and institutions.

    Even if Democrats win in 2026 or 2028, it is increasingly difficult to imagine important parts of Trump’s legacy being reversed. Given recurring imbalances in the international economy, could any future president really resurrect the old dream of free trade? Remember that Joe Biden retained Trump’s tariffs from his first term. Going forward, countries are likely to emphasize bilateral and regional trade agreements, as well as government policy aimed at protecting key industries. Trade may begin to look more like it did 100 years ago, between the world wars.

    Trump has also likely dealt a death blow to numerous international institutions. His Board of Peace, dominated by illiberal democracies and autocracies, is unlikely to last, but it has still exposed the impotency of the UN and its Security Council. He has undermined, perhaps fatally, the trust that held together America’s post-World War II alliances. NATO temporarily lost its rationale after the Cold War ended, but it appeared to revive in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. After a lame attempt to reach an agreement between the warring parties, Trump has largely withdrawn from the conflict. By the time Trump leaves office, the defense of Ukraine may have become a lost cause—and with it, the bond between the United States and its erstwhile NATO allies. To make matters worse, Trump has sent mixed signals about his commitment to Article 5, which requires NATO countries to come to the aid of any members who are attacked. America’s Asian allies, which depend on our nuclear umbrella, have taken note.

    Trump may have also, without specifically intending to do so, prompted a struggle to divide up the world among the great powers that recalls pre-World War I imperial rivalries. In Latin America, he has attempted to coerce countries into accepting American leadership and business investment. He has softened his objection to Chinese economic and foreign policy, and, by undercutting international law, he may have helped lay the groundwork for Beijing to take Taiwan.

    What Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has called the “middle powers” have already begun to fend for themselves. Japan’s new prime minister has pledged to rewrite its country’s post-World War II constitution, which committed Japan to pacifism. France, Germany, and Canada have attempted to improve relations with China. International diplomacy and military rivalry, like international trade, are becoming more anarchic and less predictable. It is difficult to see how these changes, once underway, could be reversed by Trump’s successors.

    Outcomes that would have been unimaginable 10 or 15 years ago are now conceivable. Here at home, the foundations of our democracy—the rule of law, respect for election results, a free press—now appear shaky. On the economic front, we could experience another Great Recession because of constricted trade, the removal of regulations on banking and cryptocurrencies, and artificial intelligence’s reduction of job opportunities. We could even see the dollar lose its status as the main global reserve currency. Trump’s use of punitive tariffs and sanctions has already inspired key nations to discuss an alternative. If this were to happen, the United States could no longer run large budget deficits with impunity.

    In response to Trump’s weakening of the ties between the United States and its principal allies in Europe and Asia, we could see countries withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to build their own nuclear weapons. The spread of nuclear weapons might reduce the chances of regional wars breaking out, but it would also increase the possibility of a global catastrophe. Here again, there is probably no going back from the changes that Trump has set in motion.

    Trump won in 2016 and 2024 for many reasons, but one factor was that voters understood, as Kissinger had argued, that the old order was broken. Free trade was a chimera. The free movement of capital had contributed to the hollowing out of industry in the West. Illegal immigration had become unmanageable and a threat to public order. NATO had lost its rationale after the Cold War’s end. The UN had long ceased to play a constructive role in major conflicts. And American attempts to introduce democracy to rogue states had proven disastrous. It was no mean feat for Trump to have exposed these pretenses.

    But Trump—driven by hubris, seething with a desire for vengeance against his political enemies, and buoyed by “New Right” intellectuals, conservative media and billionaires with their own agendas—has also overreached. And voters have noticed. The pledge to deport illegal immigrants who had committed crimes morphed into sweeps by ICE of random illegal (and sometimes legal) immigrants. His demand that other NATO countries pay for their own defense somehow morphed into an attempt to poach Greenland from Denmark, a fellow NATO country.

    His promise to end “forever wars” and eschew “regime change” has yielded to a newfound enthusiasm for intervention aimed at securing power for the United States over oil-rich states. His tariffs aimed at protecting strategic industries became selectively punitive tariffs aimed at eliminating trade deficits entirely (which would also imperil the dollar as a reserve currency) and at providing revenue to make up for his huge tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy. His first-term forays into industrial policy—culminating in the highly successful Operation Warp Speed, which allowed for the impressive development of COVID-19 vaccines—have devolved into a defunding of medical and scientific research and the abandonment of renewable energy, including vital battery technology. Trump may not merely fail to make America great again; instead, he may have assisted in making China the center of the world again.

    Subscribe now

    Yet these failures do not disqualify him as one of Hegel’s world-historical individuals. On the contrary, those leaders—often propelled by megalomania—also overreached, then found themselves bedeviled by forces beyond their control. What Hegel described as “the cunning of reason” invariably caught up with them, making a mess of their ultimate ambitions. Alexander the Great swept through Egypt and the Middle East, but when he tried to conquer India, his troops revolted. Napoleon suffered a major defeat when he tried to expand his empire into Russia. He spent his final years in exile. And instead of solidifying the dominance of France, he bolstered Britain’s power and put Prussia on a path to becoming the continent’s preeminent military force.

    Does the pattern sound familiar? Trump has pushed us into a new stage of history. But it is a stage in which, because of his overreach, America may find itself diminished and disempowered. Whoever wins the White House in 2028 will inherit a fragmented international economy, ruptured alliances, and emboldened adversaries, not to mention a divided and angry electorate. That president, and presidents for many years to come, will be operating in a difficult and perilous world—a world Trump remade.

    John B. Judis is the author of The Politics of Our Time: Populism, Nationalism, Socialism and, with Ruy Teixeira, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Episode 184: Frank Dikötter on How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    This week, Richard talks to Frank Dikötter, author of Red Dawn Over China: How Communism Conquered a Quarter of Humanity (Bloomsbury).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, Instagram, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below. Bookstack listeners can take advantage of a 20% offer for paid Persuasion membership, with access to special columns and bonus Good Fight with Yascha Mounk podcast content.

    20% off for Bookstack listeners!

    0 min
  • Sebastian Mallaby on AI Safety and the Race for Superintelligence

    Sebastian Mallaby is the author of several books including The Infinity Machine: Demis Hassabis, DeepMind, and the Quest for Superintelligence. A former Financial Times contributing editor and two-time Pulitzer Prize finalist, Mallaby is the Paul A. Volcker Senior Fellow for International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Sebastian Mallaby discuss why AI developers simultaneously fear and advance potentially dangerous technology, whether open-source AI models pose unacceptable security risks, and how China and the United States differ in their approaches to AI safety.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: There’s something that struck me about Silicon Valley in general, and that in your book you really get to the heart of through the lens of one specific character, which is that so many people in Silicon Valley both seem to believe that artificial intelligence is a miraculous technology with lots of good things, but also a really dangerous technology—technology that could potentially kill all of humanity. Some of the major efforts at advancing artificial intelligence were actually motivated by trying to understand this technology and make it develop in such a way that it would be safe. Yet those same people seem to be at the forefront of developing the very technology that they warn could destroy the world.

    How should we think about that? If it was just one person, you might think it’s slightly schizophrenic, but you see it emerging again and again as a theme in different contexts—through the founding story of OpenAI and Sam Altman, but obviously also in the story of DeepMind, which you tell in your new book

    Sebastian Mallaby: Yeah, you’re quite right. It was stunning to me that if you think about any of the early labs—like DeepMind, founded in 2010—the two scientific founders, Shane Legg and Demis Hassabis, meet each other at a safety lecture. Then you look at 2015: the early discussions between Elon Musk and Sam Altman about founding OpenAI were all about safety, about being responsible, being more safe than DeepMind. It was like a competitive safety thing.

    Then you go forward and the next lab that gets started is Anthropic, which is started as a splinter group that thinks that OpenAI is not safe enough. So they kind of repeat the story that had happened earlier in the rivalry between OpenAI and DeepMind. Each of these labs began with the idea that they were going to be safer. Even Elon Musk, when he does Grok or XAI, he comes in with a record of having proclaimed his terror of existential risk from AI, going back to 2012 when he first met Demis Hassabis.

    So you’re right, they’re all schizophrenic and it’s a pattern. How do we think about that? Well, in the end, my feeling is that it’s an enlarged version of all of us. You and I are excited by technology and also scared by it. Yet we take the trade, we move ahead. Why do we do this? Because we’re human. If we didn’t do it, humans would still be living in caves. We do accept technological risk, and that’s what these guys are doing.

    Mounk: One of the leitmotifs of your book is this line that Geoffrey Hinton—a past guest of this podcast—says, alluding to Oppenheimer, that the thrill of discovery is so big that even if you’re very worried about its implications, it’s impossible to resist. I wonder, from your conversations with Demis and with others in the space, whether there is an ability to govern this technology.

    I was really interested when I had Nate Soares on the podcast—co-author with Eliezer Yudkowsky of the book If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies. He seemed to me to be too pessimistic about the prospects of technological annihilation; he basically thought AI is definitely going to try and kill us. Then I thought he was really optimistic about our ability to stand up to that through public policy—that we’ll get just the right incentives in place so that nobody builds the machine that definitely would kill us if we did build it. I was struck by how pessimistic he was on the first point and how optimistic he was on the second point.

    OpenAI gets founded to be really safe, Anthropic is a spin-off of OpenAI in a sense, a hostile spin-off of people who get worried about OpenAI, and now Anthropic is in some ways the leader of the pack. Does it just mean that our fate depends on what the natural tendency of this technology is going to be?

    Mallaby: No, I think that’s too fatalistic. I agree with you that there is, in the Yudkowsky view, an extreme caricaturing of both the level of the risk—a 100% probability of doom, which to my mind is just ridiculously high—and at the same time, too much optimism about the ability of our policies to do something about it. It reminds me of Jeffrey Sachs arguing about development aid 20 years ago, where he would always stress how deeply poor and dysfunctional developing countries were, and then he would say, but if you give them a lot of aid, we can fix all of it. Both sides were wrong. I think that’s a classic posture of somebody who’s arguing for radical government action: to exaggerate the problem and then underplay the policy challenges of getting it right.

    But I don’t think it’s correct to say we are hostage to some technology over which we have zero control, because there are ways of controlling it—you can control both the coding of it, the algorithmic design of it. There’s a whole field of alignment research to make large language models align with human priorities, and if more investment was going into that, we would have a better shot at aligning them better. That is something that can be done and worked on.

    We hope you’re enjoying the podcast! If you’re a paying subscriber, you can set up the premium feed on your favorite podcast app at writing.yaschamounk.com/listen. This will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    If you have any questions or issues setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email [email protected]

    An example of this would be the UK AI Security Institute, which does some of this alignment research. They once discovered a way that you could hack any of the leading large language models with a specific phrase that would unlock it to do things that were supposed to be off limits. Once you discover that, you tell the labs and they fixed the loophole, they fixed the security vulnerability. The point is you can do something on that algorithmic front. You can also do things in policy terms.

    Open source and open weight AI models are ridiculously dangerous. Why would you ever allow this kind of technology to circulate without any ability to call it back if somebody starts to use it for a massive cyber attack on infrastructure? It’s crazy.

    Mounk: Can you explain to people a little bit about open source? I think people may not be so aware both about what it is in general and what it is in relation to AI.

    In general, open source has always been the idealistic, do-gooder approach to software—you can customize it yourself, you’re not in the hands of some corporate conglomerate. We’ve seen a tendency towards the AI labs that are perhaps not at the very cutting edge—that can create very powerful models, but models that are just a little bit less powerful than the most cutting edge ones—going open source, because it is a way to attract people to those models and make them use them.

    As you’re saying, it means that basically you can download a model to your own machine and run it off your own machine in a way that is no longer subject to control by its original creator. In lots of contexts, that’s going to have positive elements—it makes it cheaper to use the technology. It means that, for example, if I wanted to handle some really sensitive information, if I wanted to create an index for a publisher and they don’t want to have any risk of somebody being able to train their AI models on that information, I can do that with an open source model because it would be closed loop. I know that the information is not being communicated back to anybody because I’m not running it on the internet.

    So there are lots of positive things. But you are saying, interestingly, that in terms of risk mitigation, it’s really bad—because those same exact features also mean that if somebody starts using this to develop a really potent bioweapon, there’s no way that anybody can track that that’s what they’re using it for, or stop them from doing it.

    Mallaby: There was a cyber attack in Mexico recently on a mass scale—pretty much everybody’s electoral records were hacked. This was done with the help of Anthropic. I’ve heard accounts that it was more than just help; basically a group used Claude to carry out this attack and Claude did most of the hacking for them. There was a bit of OpenAI being used as well, the ChatGPT model. Once the labs discovered that this attack was going on, they shut it down, because they had the ability to do that—it was not open weight. It was not on the machine of the bad guys; it was being used through a server controlled by the labs. That’s a real-life case of how you could shut down an attack.

    I’ve been to war-gaming exercises organized by the RAND Institute, and the classic nightmare scenario is that you have rolling waves of attacks on Western infrastructure by some unidentified attacker—it could be the Chinese government, it could be a terrorist group, you just don’t know. All you know is that all your infrastructure is not working: nobody has clean water, nobody has electricity, everybody’s panicking, and you don’t know how to stop it because you don’t know who the assailant is.

    Why would we risk this? We have war games telling us how this would work. We’re staring this in the face and we should be doing something about open weight models. It’s not easy because they circulate already, but at least stop the more powerful ones which are going to be created starting now.

    Mounk: Llama, the models by Meta, have been open source. The Chinese have released a lot of open source models as well. Companies like DeepSeek, as well as the many other companies in China that now have pretty powerful AI models, have created models that are very capable and very powerful, but they’re not as capable as the latest versions of ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini. There is a kind of competitive reason to release open source models if you’re a little bit behind, because nobody is going to pay a premium dollar to have access to your model—they’re going to use the most high-performing one. But these models are powerful enough that if you can make them available to people much cheaper, they’re going to get a lot of use, and that’s good for visibility and all kinds of other things.

    It is striking that the Chinese government, which in general is obviously quite conscious about its ability to control what’s going on in its country and in some ways around the world, has allowed that to go forward. That speaks to a broader conventional wisdom: that one of the dynamics here is a competitive race between the United States and China, and that supposedly China is less interested in AI safety than the United States is. I think you’re not so certain about that conventional wisdom.

    Mallaby: A standard view in U.S. government circles is: the Soviet Union and the United States lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis, they understood the existential risk of nuclear technology, they get that some weapons can be existential. The Chinese, on the other hand—their idea of catastrophic 20th century risk is the Great Famine, the Cultural Revolution, a politically-originated disaster. It’s not technological near-misses. To the contrary, in China, technology is associated with miraculous growth over the last 25 years. They want technology, they love technology. That’s the classic story, and if you try to talk to them about limiting technology, forget it.

    I just spent eight days there and was really struck by how both top research academics and leaders of the industrial AI companies were talking about safety. When I was there, there was this furore over Open Claw—an agent you can download onto your computer and let it do agentic things: manage your email, do your shopping, whatever. It’s pretty good technically, but it’s also dangerous because you have to make your computer naked to this agent and you don’t know what it’s going to do with all your data. It’s some sort of open source code, so who knows what it’s going to do.

    Subscribe now

    All of the Tsinghua professors and other AI researchers I was talking to were saying people shouldn’t be downloading this—and yet there were lines of ordinary Chinese people outside the Tencent headquarters, waiting for engineers to help install it on their laptops. In the end, the government weighed in and said people should not be installing this. I think the debate is tipping in China. The Chinese state is not averse to regulating things—it has regulated the internet a great deal. Why wouldn’t they want to control open source models, which could become dangerous? It seems to me too defeatist to just assume they won’t.

    Mounk: Part of the point here may simply be that the word “safety” is a very broad and capacious term, and the argument has been made that people just mean very different things by it. Part of it is that the United States is very influenced by science fiction, and so the kind of safety we imagine is the rise of the robots—will the robots try to kill us? Even at a slightly lower level, things like the risk of engineered bioweapons and so on.

    In China, when people talk about AI safety, part of what they mean is political safety—that these machines need to be aligned with a particular set of views, not give too much information about particular historical events, and portray a positive image of the Chinese Communist Party. Of course, a lot of what happens in post-training in the United States is to make sure that Gemini, ChatGPT, Claude, and so on don’t step on various social and political taboos as well. A lot of the work in post-training goes into making sure that chatbots know not to use certain kinds of slurs and not to wade into territory that might be politically sensitive.

    But have you found in your conversations in China that when you say the words “AI safety,” people just mean something different by it? Or do you think that difference has been overstated?

    Mallaby: There are lots of definitions of safety, but I was talking specifically about alignment risk—the idea that the robots will not be aligned with what humans want and will actually act against humans. That’s what people were talking to me about. That was the point about the Open Claw thing: people were installing an agent which might just take it upon itself to do something which is not good for the user.

    It’s not about political debates on what the large language model should or shouldn’t say. It’s actually about this more existential thing. Closely related to that is the point that it’s not just the machine that can be a bad actor—a human bad actor can get hold of it and use it to make a bioweapon or something of that kind.

    Mounk: Those two risks are obviously interlinked but important to distinguish. What kind of levers does public policy have to govern the existential risks of AI safety, or the more day-to-day, bread-and-butter risks?

    One problem is simply one of competition. I’ve had conversations with people in the European Union who I found to be slightly naive about this—who believe that the Brussels effect, which allows them to set a standard for how a car works and thereby creates a big incentive for car manufacturers to apply the same standards across different manufacturing contexts, means that the EU as a significant market can force a regulation that will by and large be listened to in the United States and other places as well. In the context of AI, where there simply aren’t very significant European AI companies so far—certainly not on a global scale—that logic breaks down. DeepMind is an interesting case because it started in the UK, but it’s now owned by a US conglomerate. Certainly when we talk about members of the European Union, there aren’t many significant AI players. There’s Mistral, and there’s the new venture that Yann LeCun is founding, but relative to US and Chinese entities, these are very small players. If somebody designs a bioweapon on one of those open source machines, that’s not going to stop at the frontier of the European Union.

    There’s also a broader problem of how do you actually make the technical rules. What kind of rules would allow us to achieve alignment? Do you have a view on how to even begin thinking about this policy space?

    Mallaby: These are two very different points. Let me just focus on the open source question.

    The first thing to say about the Europeans is that they’re happy to tolerate open source because Mistral is producing open source—Mistral is in precisely the position mentioned earlier: if you’re not at the frontier and you can’t compete on quality, you compete on availability and you make it open source. That is the French strategy. They haven’t even got to the threshold of being serious about open source before they start proclaiming the extraterritoriality of their regulation.

    Trying to stop open source is non-trivial. There’s a huge lobby of companies like Facebook Meta that create it, and in Europe, the French government wants Mistral to succeed and so wants to support its open source tactics. But if there was a policy shift and governments decided they wanted to control it, you would simply say to labs that were in your jurisdiction, or that wanted to do business in your jurisdiction, that they can’t be open source—at least if it’s a frontier model. There are going to be academic models that are experimental and much smaller, and those will be open source, and that’s probably fine. But the big frontier models are a different matter.

    If you’re Mistral and you want to sell to U.S. consumers, you probably want to raise capital in the United States—you have lots of touch points with the United States, so you’re going to comply with an American regulatory decision. The big problem is you have to get China on board, because they are an ecosystem unto themselves. The assumption in the United States is there’s no point even trying that conversation. Based on just having been there, I’m saying: no, there is a point. I don’t think Trump is going to pursue that, because he’s not interested in anything other than AI acceleration.

    Mounk: He also fundamentally believes in a zero-sum world, right? He thinks that most deals have a very clear winner and a clear loser, which doesn’t make it very appealing to try and strike a deal the point of which would be that both sides can win from it.

    Mallaby: There’s an opportunity here for a Mark Carney-style middle powers initiative. He made a famous speech at Davos where he said that Canada and the Europeans can’t rely on the United States—they need to get together and act collectively rather than wait for America, because that’s just not going to be useful for the next three years. On AI, that is something where Europe, and maybe Britain in particular, could start a discussion with the Chinese about how to think about open source. The UK has some credibility on this, both because DeepMind is based there and because their AI Security Institute is extremely good. You begin the discussion—you can’t consummate it until there is a new American president, but that will come at some point. It’s worth getting that conversation started.

    Mounk: Open source is one element of this. What about more broadly? If you imagined a real deal between a new U.S. president and perhaps a new leader in China—both serious about these things and recognizing that this is a genuine risk to humanity across borders—what could actually govern these technologies? We probably don’t want to shut AI down: it’s not feasible, and there are also tremendous benefits that can come from it, in medicine and science more broadly, that we don’t want to foreclose. At the same time, the people who have created these technologies are themselves extremely worried about how harmful the technology could be to humanity.

    Subscribe now

    Put aside for the moment all political constraints and imagine that we can write the deal and it will be approved. Do we actually know what that framework would entail? Because it feels like there are very, very knotty intellectual questions even about what kind of rules and regulation would, A) effectively control those existential risks, and B) do that without forestalling all of the potential benefits from the technology.

    Mallaby: Demis Hassabis, the central character in my book about AI, has for quite a long time advocated what he calls a CERN—as in the Centre for European Nuclear Research—a kind of governing body which would oversee AI on a multilateral basis, propose policies and enforce them, or at least set the policies while national governments do the enforcing.

    The elements of that policy would be: no open source, at least not for big models; and more investment in alignment, a branch of science and engineering that needs resources. You might also need tax incentives to require that private labs, whenever they spend a billion dollars on a training run to make a model more powerful, set aside, let’s say, 20% of that specifically for safety research.

    The point is that safety is both a private good and a public one. If you’re Google, you don’t want your customers to feel the technology is unsafe, so you have some private incentives to invest in safety. But there are also spillovers into broader societal risk—infrastructure collapsing, terrorist groups being empowered—which are public goods, not private ones. Therefore the public authority needs to ensure that the level of investment in safety rises to the socially optimal amount. That implies either government spending on research and engineering into alignment, or taxing the labs and nudging them to do it.

    So there are two important things: don’t do open source for frontier models, and do more research on alignment. The third thing is that, just as the Food and Drug Administration looks at drugs and determines if they’re safe to be released to market, there should be an equivalent body for AI models—they should be assessed, red-teamed, and only then released to consumers. That doesn’t exist anywhere in the world at the moment, which is crazy. But I think we’re going to get there in the end, because either governments will change their minds and do it, or there will be a Three Mile Island-type disaster and the public will demand it. It’s really a question of whether we do it before or after we suffer some AI catastrophe.

    Mounk: You mentioned P(doom) earlier—the probability that this incredibly capable new technology will lead, however you want to define doom, at the most extreme level to the death of humanity, or at the somewhat less extreme level to the enslavement of humans by our new AI overlords, which ironically we ourselves as a species have created. Where do you put P(doom) after thinking about these topics for the last few years?

    Mallaby: I’ll tell you a little bit about the journey. I began researching my book on DeepMind right around the time ChatGPT came out in late 2022. I already thought that machines were obviously going to be more intelligent than humans, and that normally more intelligent beings or agents will dominate the less intelligent ones. I could see that there was a theoretical risk, but I consoled myself with the idea that although the machines are more intelligent than us, or will be soon, they don’t have an incentive to dominate us. We have evolved over centuries and centuries to want to survive, pass on our DNA, and to fight viciously to be able to do that. Machines don’t reproduce in that way, they’re not evolved in that way, they don’t have a survival instinct—therefore, even if they’re cleverer, they won’t dominate us.

    The moment I lost my faith in that argument was when I went to see Geoffrey Hinton, who was on your podcast, and sat in his kitchen in Toronto for two hours. What he pointed out to me is: you’re going to have a powerful AI in the future, and you’re going to be worried that your enemy is going to mount a cyber attack on it. As a human, you’re way too slow to respond to a cyber attack, so you’re going to empower your own AI to defend itself. Once you’ve done that, you’ve necessarily given it a sense of self-preservation, a sense of pain, a sense of fear, a sense of proactive defense. You’ve erased the distinction on which I had based my confidence. Now it does have a survival instinct—and it’s cleverer than us.

    The bottom line on the P(doom) question is really a Rorschach test. People give a high P(doom) if they are temperamentally pessimistic about life and the world. Hinton—one of his former PhD students told me—was always worried about bioweapons finishing off humanity before he thought AI would do it. He always had doom about something. In my case, analytically I see the case for being very worried; temperamentally and emotionally, I just can’t get there.

    This came up when I was writing my book. I wanted to explore what it feels like to be creating an existential technology—what is the sensation that you might be destroying humanity with what you’re doing? What was at first crazy, but on reflection not surprising, is that people would give safety lectures describing the possibility of human annihilation while smiling, even laughing at points. Contemplating the annihilation of humans feels absurd, and the absurd is a close cousin of humor. There is a sort of fascination—people are drawn like moths to the fire by catastrophe scenarios. It’s something deep in the human tradition: all the second coming predictions, the apocalypse, the religious iconography.

    The first revelation of my book research was that not only Demis Hassabis and DeepMind, but all the other labs began—as we said earlier—with a strong perception that this could be disastrous. At the same time, they processed this feeling of disaster sometimes with laughter, and at other times, even when they were being serious and trying to think about how to fix it, they would go through experiment after experiment, hypothesis after hypothesis about how to safeguard it—and none actually worked.

    With Demis, he wanted to negotiate with Google when Google bought DeepMind in 2014. He wanted to oblige them to have an independent safety oversight board that would have the final say on the rollout of AI, so that it wouldn’t be in the hands of a corporate board driven by profit. Initially Google agreed and held a first meeting, but that was a disaster because it was chaired by Elon Musk, who had set up OpenAI to compete with DeepMind. What followed was a secret negotiation—something called Project Mario—which I discovered and was given leaked documents about from inside the company. What you see there is three years of negotiations between Mountain View and DeepMind in London on how to put AI governance in place within a for-profit company. In the end it didn’t work, because the for-profit company couldn’t accept the idea of empowering outside independent figures who would have a say over their proprietary technology. There are other iterations of these experiments throughout the story of DeepMind—how do you make AI good, how do you make it beneficial for the world? It’s extraordinarily difficult. That’s why, in the end, we correctly talk about governments intervening. It needs to be policy, and it needs to be policy on an international level, with the U.S. and China talking to each other.

    Mounk: One of the things that strikes me as interesting is that humanity has always thought that doom is upon us. From the story of the flood in the Bible to basically every junction in history, there has been some kind of millenarian cult saying the destruction of humanity is upon us—and often probably with a smile on their face. There is probably something in the human psyche which makes that thought both scary and exhilarating. Part of what’s exhilarating, of course, is that you stand at the cusp of history, that it’s your generation that is going to be involved in the final battle, and therefore your life matters. There’s a strange set of assumptions there.

    It would be easy to use the historical context to ridicule any of these concerns. Humanity has been around for however many million years—human history is at least 10,000 years old—why should it so happen that you and I are alive at the very moment when the technology that is literally going to bring about doom is being created? Isn’t that just our ridiculous need for significance in the world seducing us into making those assumptions?

    At the same time, you look at how quickly this technology is evolving, how powerful it is, the fact that it is the first time there is—or is going to be, depending on your exact interpretation—a technology that is objectively more capable than humans. The thought that that could all go horribly wrong is not exactly far-fetched. It’s hard to reconcile this fear of chronocentricity—the tendency to center our own time as the most important in the world—with the very cold, rational recognition that humanity now, from nuclear weapons to biotechnological capabilities to AI, has created tools and machines so vastly more powerful than anything that existed for 99.9999% of human history that there is real reason to think that this time it may actually be different.

    Mallaby: Chronocentricity—we exaggerate the importance and uniqueness of our own time. It’s a kind of “this time is different”-ism.

    The reason why this time could be different is precisely because this technology is different. It’s a new form of cognition—we haven’t had that before. A machine that can invent more machines is something we haven’t had before. Even if we downgrade our estimate, in my book I suggest this could be the biggest thing since the arrival of the human ability to do abstract thought, which is thought to have emerged around 70,000 years ago. Now we have a second form of cognition that can do abstract thought.

    But even if you think that’s exaggerated and say it’s more like the Industrial Revolution—that’s still pretty big. The Industrial Revolution brought about social and political convulsions that led to Marxism, The Communist Manifesto in 1848, and a slew of revolutions across Europe. I’m willing to be Marxian in the sense that technological change drives social and political change, and it can be fairly revolutionary and bloody. We shouldn’t be sitting here in the 21st century forgetting the lesson of the 19th: that the Industrial Revolution was highly disruptive.

    Mounk: Speaking of the Industrial Revolution, I want to ask you not about P(doom), but about the probability that our society gets really screwed up—which is the other obvious analogy to the Industrial Revolution and previous technological transformations.

    The first thing to say about many of these previous technological transformations is that they were in fact terrible for many people at the time. In retrospect, the Industrial Revolution is a very positive thing—humanity is thriving across a huge number of dimensions to a vastly larger extent than before it. But for about 50 years, the living standards of average people did not go up, there were huge economic disruptions, and many people whose skills were displaced suffered greatly. Certain kinds of craft skills were automated away, and people who had invested real energy into learning those skills—often to a very impressive standard—no longer had a use for them.

    But there was always a reservoir of demand for the kinds of things that humans could do. If you lost your job as a peasant or a hand weaver, you or your children could attain a higher level of schooling, and move into the rapidly growing number of jobs in offices or, more broadly, involving cognitive skills. Now we’re at a point where that escape route may no longer be available. There is obviously a huge debate—from some people in Silicon Valley who think every job is going to be gone in three years, which I find very naive, to certain economists who think it’s not going to have any impact on the job market at all.

    What do you think the economic impact of all of this is going to be, including on the job market? How has talking to Demis and other people in the space shaped and perhaps changed your view on this?

    Mallaby: One thing to start with is that this debate has been going on inside AI circles for a long time. When DeepMind was acquired by Google, they did have one safety oversight meeting, which took place in 2015. At that meeting, Mustafa Suleyman, the co-founder of DeepMind, made the argument that the pitchforks were going to come—that people were going to be displaced from their jobs and would come after the makers of AI. Eric Schmidt, who was the CEO of Google at the time, said: no, you don’t understand economic history—when you displace some jobs, new ones get created. That familiar argument. This is not a new debate, and it’s worth recording that, because we’re still having it and we need to move to actually do something about it.

    My view is that humans can retain a role in some areas of the economy and also in some areas of living. Human-to-human interactions are probably something we’re going to be better at. AI can be actors and therapists, but I think humans probably provide better quality companionship. That bleeds into things like enterprise sales—I suspect humans will retain an edge in areas where emotional intelligence and being a biological intelligence who sits down next to somebody and looks them in the eye remains powerful. Then there’s goal setting: we don’t want machines setting goals for us. Whether that’s a political leader or a volunteer organizer at a local level, goal-setting up and down society will remain a human thing. Entrepreneurship is clearly another good example.

    Then there’s going to be a whole range of changes in how we spend our time, which have the character of chess. A computer defeated Garry Kasparov in 1997, so we’ve run the experiment over almost three decades of computers being better than humans at chess. The number of chess players has gone up. The number of people who watch human chess players has gone up. No human fans watch machines play against machines. Instead, human champions train with the help of machine champions, get better that way, and discover new strategies thanks to AI. People’s passion for chess and the time they spend on it has gone up, not down. I think we’re going to be quite good at discovering new hobbies, activities, ways of competing with each other, ways of getting fulfillment and finding meaning in life that are not in the traditional category of paid activity—not a job, but a passion that can keep us going.

    Mounk: We do need jobs, at least in our current economic system, in order to have a livelihood. I really don’t believe the line that all jobs are going to go away—I think that’s terribly naive about both what actual jobs consist of and about all the regulatory and other obstacles to many of those substitutions. But it would be enough for two things to happen: A) that a lot of people who are now in very well-remunerated employment lose their jobs and are upset about that; and B) as a result, there is now an oversupply of highly skilled human cognitive labor, which depresses the wages even of those who do retain a job, because the number of people who could plausibly substitute for them has gone up significantly.

    If you imagine that playing out for even 50 years—which would roughly equal the duration of the disruptive phase of the Industrial Revolution, let alone forever—that would have profoundly troubling consequences for our political system, for our ability to sustain social peace, and for people’s sense that institutions are working. How should we think about that?

    Mallaby: A key point that more people need to understand is that you don’t need to posit that all people in some category lose their jobs. If only 20% lose their jobs, they will compete down the wages of the others, and that will create mass unhappiness. Think about COVID—unemployment spiked to something like 10 or 12 percent at some point, and that triggered an enormous fiscal response from the government. Stimulus checks were mailed out to every single American. We’re saying that even if just 12% of the workforce lost their jobs, that is politically and socially unacceptable, judging by what the government’s response was during COVID. So yes, I think it’s very troubling.

    In a funny way, this is actually the reason I got to write my book. I went to Demis Hassabis at the beginning of my project and said: you may not particularly want to spend 30 hours speaking to an author so they can get deep access and write a book about you, but you don’t have a choice. First, if you’re right—as you say in all your speeches—that AI is going to be the most important technological invention in human history, it follows that you, as its creator, are one of the most important people in human history. If that’s the case, there will be a book about you. Furthermore, you should welcome a book because if you’re going to disrupt people’s lives with your technology—change the way they bring up their children, change the way they conceive of themselves as human, because there are now machines that can think—you had better explain your motives for doing this to the world, because otherwise it won’t be accepted.

    If I go down the list of the leading AI lab leaders: Sam Altman at OpenAI, especially following the debacle with the Pentagon, is viewed by many as a slippery opportunist—perfectly willing to undercut safety principles in order to snag another government contract. Elon Musk has his own vainglory, and I don’t think most people would trust him. Dario Amodei does stand out for principle, but is very focused through a scientific lens. He’s a very deep scientist, very smart—but I think he sometimes underweights the difficulty of turning what he calls “a database full of geniuses” (his expression for AI) into actually using that intelligence for positive effects on economic productivity or whatever else you want to do with it. There are so many social and institutional frictions, and perhaps that is not what he thinks about because he’s such a pure scientist.

    Demis Hassabis, who I wrote about, is by far the most relatable, normal, and reassuring figure in the field. It’s good that people should get a chance to understand what it’s like—it perhaps makes it easier to accept what’s going to happen.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Sebastian discuss the broader economic changes triggered by AI, what would happen if OpenAI went bust, and why there isn’t an AI bubble. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    54 min
  • This Week At Persuasion
    What the crew of Artemis II saw yesterday. (Photo by Reid Wiseman/NASA via Getty Images.)

    On behalf of the entire Persuasion team, we’d like to say THANK YOU to our new donors and new paid subscribers for responding to our call to action this past week. With your support, our capacity to deliver great content grows—Persuasion’s future looks bright!

    And i…

    Read more

    0 min
  • Chile’s Hard Right Isn’t as Trumpy as It Wants to Seem

    Yesterday, Quico went live on Substack debating our associate editor Sam Kahn on the question: Should you boycott AI? If you missed the debate, you can now watch it here!

    Also: On behalf of the entire Persuasion team, we’d like to say THANK YOU to our new donors and new paid subscribers for responding to our call to action this past week. With your support, our capacity to deliver content like today’s piece grows—Persuasion’s future looks bright! If you’d like to join them, please upgrade your subscription today:

    Subscribe now

    And if you’d like to add your name to our list of supporters and donors, follow this link.

    Chilean President Jose Antonio Kast on March 18, 2026. (Photo by Rodrigo ARANGUA / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Last month, Chile inaugurated its most right-wing president since Pinochet. On the surface, there are reasons for alarm: President José Antonio Kast openly admires the 70s and 80s-era dictator. His father was a Nazi Party member. The international press is calling it Chile’s lurch to the far right—proof that even South America’s success story can fall to Trumpian populism.

    How did Chile come to this? Walk around Santiago—Chile’s clean, safe, functional capital city—and you’ll hear Chileans describe their country as bitterly divided, split between leftists who scornfully call the Pinochet years “the dictatorship,” and patriotic right-wingers who refer to it admiringly as “the military government.”

    To hear anguished Chileans tell the story, polarization threatens to pull South America’s development superstar apart at the seams. What you won’t hear, from Kast’s supporters or anyone else, is anyone proposing to change the basic policy settlement—the master lines that could actually change how Chile works.

    Because here’s Chile’s dirty secret: the polarization is performative. The consensus is real.

    It’s literally the first thing you notice. Leave the airport in Santiago and you’re suddenly riding down this smooth, wide, first-world highway that feels… German? Swedish? I don’t know, I just know I’ve traveled quite a bit in Latin America and I’ve never seen a highway like this.

    “Wow,” I tell the taxi driver, “that’s some road!”

    “You should see what we have to pay for it,” he says, pointing up at the illuminated signs every few hundred meters announcing the toll for that specific stretch. “They’re all private. The tolls are harsh.”

    Subscribe now

    Good old neoliberal Chile, I think to myself. Because we all know the story: General Pinochet’s brutal dictatorship privatized everything, murdered hundreds of dissidents, and set Chile on the path to anarchocapitalist development between 1973 and 1990.

    Or that’s the story I thought I knew until I asked my friend Juan Nagel, who teaches at ESE, Santiago’s fancy private business school.

    “Pinochet? Nope. It was Lagos who privatized the highways.”

    I do a double take. Ricardo Lagos is one of the heroes of Latin America’s democratization wave in the 1990s. More to the point, the guy’s a socialist. That doesn’t sound right.

    “Lagos was public works minister in the 90s before he got elected president,” Juan tells me. “Trying to show ideological moderation, I guess. Technocratic chops. But yeah, the highways are incredible. Just, y’know, expensive.”

    Foreigners make a lot of lazy assumptions about Chile, but the stereotype of a country set on a hard right-wing path by a brutal dictator who brought prosperity along with repression is a partial truth at best. The truth is much more interesting. Per capita GDP grew only about 40 percent during Pinochet’s entire 17-year rule, and that includes two devastating recessions in 1975 and 1982. Chile’s real push into middle-income status came with democracy: GDP per capita (in constant 2010 dollars) more than doubled from around $6,400 in 1990 to over $14,000 by 2018, and poverty plummeted from 45 percent in 1987 to just 20 percent by 2000.

    Chile’s development success story is the story of deepening consensus around institutions built on fundamentally sound liberal principles.

    It’s not just highways. It’s Chile’s mandatory private retirement savings-based pension system, and the sophisticated capital markets they give rise to. It’s the private-but-they-work utilities that keep the taps running in this mostly arid country. It’s the mixed health system that combines universally accessible public hospitals with pricey private care.

    Kast calls his incoming administration an “emergency government”—a framing that tells you everything about how he sees Chile’s problems and nothing about how radical his proposed solutions actually are. “Chile needs order,” he proclaimed in his victory speech in December, standing in front of an enormous Chilean flag. “Order in the streets, in the state, in the priorities that have been lost.” To restore that order, he promised $6 billion in spending cuts within his first 100 days, a crackdown on undocumented immigration (he gave migrants until his inauguration to leave “voluntarily”), and deploying police and even the military to high-crime areas.

    In his first week in office, he began digging trenches and building barriers on Chile’s desolate desert border with Perú to keep migrants out, and overturned an existing promise to regularize almost 200,000 undocumented migrants. He talks about streamlining the government, cutting the number of ministries from 25 to 15, slashing taxes on business and capital gains to boost investment. The rhetoric is all urgency and radical change.

    Subscribe now

    But look at the cabinet he’s assembled and you see something else entirely: a board of directors more than a revolutionary vanguard. Just eight of his 24 ministers belong to political parties. The rest are corporate executives, business lobby veterans, and lawyers who’ve spent their careers in Chile’s economic establishment. Key ministries—economy, mining, foreign affairs—have gone to figures deeply embedded in the country’s major conglomerates.

    It’s “chainsaw politics” Milei-style in the speeches, but in practice it looks a lot more like doubling down on the same institutional settlement that’s governed Chile for 35 years, with some clowning around in front of bulldozers at the border for the cameras. The reality is that Kast’s agenda—less taxes, less government, more private investment—scans like the 1988-era GOP as much or more than MAGA disruption.

    Chile has had many left-wing governments since democracy returned in 1990, including the latest one headed by Gabriel Boric, not so long ago a radical leftist student leader. None of them changed the basic contours of this settlement. Left-wing governments rebalance it some, shifting the fiscal burden a little higher up the social ladder. Right-wing governments strike a more pro-business, low-tax stance. But nobody talks about radically reinventing the Chilean system, because everybody can see it just sort of works.

    Many Chileans would roll their eyes at this characterization. They experience their country as profoundly polarized, riven into ideological tribes divided by the past and contemptuous of each other. “People will just ask you, straight up, ‘so are you a fascist or a communist?’” a friend tells me. “It’s bizarre.”

    The scars are fresh from everything that happened back in the day. But as you move around Santiago, it’s hard to reconcile the stories of deep division with the very obvious prosperity all around.

    One unmistakable sign of Chile’s success: all the Venezuelans. When Venezuela collapsed and eight million of my countrymen had to leave, almost as many chose Chile as chose the United States. Chile became the South American country most attractive to Venezuelans because it’s plainly the most prosperous in the region.

    The United States has 20 times Chile’s population, so the 670,000 Venezuelans here are far more visible than the 900,000 in the United States. Again and again, talking to service workers, I went through that slightly awkward moment of both pegging each other as Venezuelan and not being quite sure whether to acknowledge it.

    Not everyone is thrilled about the sudden arrival of 670,000 Venezuelans: Kast voters tended to be apoplectic about it. Perhaps calculating that radical stances are the flavor of the day, perhaps genuinely as disdainful of Venezuelans as he says, Kast is betting that Trumpy positioning is what’s going to catch the Zeitgeist. But this itself is just another unmistakable sign that Chile is graduating to first-world status: anti-immigration sentiment is now powerful enough to get a right-wing populist elected, and in 2026 there’s no more convincing token than that.

    Which means Chile isn’t about to lurch anywhere. The country’s institutions have survived seventeen years of dictatorship and thirty-five years of democracy—left-wing governments, right-wing governments, radical student leaders. They’ll survive Kast too, because the middle-class country they’ve created has made the institutions too valuable to tear down.

    That’s the real Chilean miracle.

    Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, the founder of Caracas Chronicles, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter. He lives in Tokyo.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Trump Betrayed His Own National Security Strategy

    We recently published a piece by our associate editor Sam Kahn on why he’s continuing to boycott AI. In true Persuasion spirit, we decided to make him debate it. So at lunchtime TODAY, at 12:30pm Eastern, Sam will debate our contributing editor Quico Toro on all things AI—Sam from the perspective of an avid AI boycotter, Quico as an avid AI user.

    The debate will happen on Substack Live. Click here to tune in!

    Donald Trump on March 31, 2026. (Photo by Brendan Smialowski / AFP via Getty Images.)

    I haven’t written for a while because I’ve been in Deep Springs. I returned after a week of being in a remote place far from the news… to see that we are now entering the second month of war with Iran.

    It’s a conceit of foreign policy intellectuals to try to infer from statements and events a consistent doctrine underlying an administration’s activities. It should be clear by now that there is no such thing as a Trump doctrine. The administration itself tried to articulate such a doctrine last November when it went through the ritual of producing a National Security Strategy for the second Trump term.

    It’s clear today that that strategy document bears no relationship to actual administration foreign policy. The NSS was notable for focusing U.S. strategy on the Western Hemisphere, and downgrading the importance of Europe. It mentions the Middle East only to say that former administrations’ focus on that region was no longer necessary because America had become a net energy exporter. It only mentions Iran twice—the first celebrating the fact that President Trump had negotiated “peace” between Tehran and Israel, and the second noting that Iran’s nuclear capabilities had been “greatly weakened” by the U.S. strike last summer. It nowhere discusses Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to the United States. The NSS does mention the Strait of Hormuz in the following terms:

    America will always have core interests in ensuring that Gulf energy supplies do not fall into the hands of an outright enemy, that the Strait of Hormuz remain open, that the Red Sea remain navigable, that the region not be an incubator or exporter of terror against American interests or the American homeland, and that Israel remain secure.

    The National Security Strategy document of course doesn’t suggest that the United States could itself trigger closure of the Strait by launching an attack, together with Israel, on Iran.

    To the contrary, the opening pages of the NSS spend time talking about how the United States needs to narrow its definition of core interests. It argues, “A strategy must evaluate, sort, and prioritize. Not every country, region, issue, or cause—however worthy—can be the focus of American strategy.” It goes on to criticize earlier administrations whose strategies have been “laundry lists of wishes or desired end states,” lists that “have not clearly defined what we want but instead stated vague platitudes.” It states further that predecessors “have often misjudged what we should want.”

    All of this makes sense in the abstract, but has nothing to do with what the Trump administration subsequently did. Iran does not now, and is not likely in the future, to present a direct threat to the United States. It does arguably threaten Israel, but regarding Israel’s security as vital to that of the United States is to engage in the same kind of mission inflation that the NSS criticizes.

    The truth of the matter is that the United States’ behavior can best be explained not in terms of a set of principles or hierarchy of priorities, but by the personal interests and preoccupations of the man who happens to be president today. Trump’s head is full of resentments, anger, anecdotes, made-up facts, things he heard on Fox News, and outright lies that he has convinced himself are true.

    It would appear that he began his second term favoring the kind of foreign policy restraint that the NSS advocates: he initially cautioned Bibi Netanyahu against striking Iran last summer. But the Israeli prime minister went ahead and attacked Iran regardless, opening up an opportunity for a one-and-done operation that Trump couldn’t resist. This was followed in early January by the snatching of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, in which Trump got very lucky. The difficult operation was successful, and Venezuela’s new leader proved compliant. This seems to have convinced Trump that he had an incredible military instrument at hand, and that he could not only use it at low cost, but would be applauded for doing so.

    Subscribe now

    After Venezuela he was asked by an interviewer whether there were any limits to his actions internationally, and he replied that the only thing that could stop him was “my morality.” Netanyahu appears to have convinced him that Iran would be another Venezuela, and that the regime would collapse quickly after the first few blows. Trump had by that time developed great confidence in his own foreign policy instincts; when asked recently when the war would end, he said he would “feel it in my bones.”

    Foreign policy doctrines are not simply of academic interest; they are meant to give guidance to and coordinate the activities of the institutions running the country: the State Department, uniformed military, and intelligence community. The National Security Council is meant to vet different views and present options, as well as warnings about future pitfalls, to the chief decision-maker.

    At the present moment, none of these institutions are functioning properly. They are headed by sycophants like Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, whose main motive is to stay on Trump’s good side. Trump relies on emissaries like Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner, neither of whom have the standing or knowledge to advise wisely, or clownish bullies like Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who has psychological problems of his own.

    The members of Congress, journalists, and foreign leaders asking the administration what its goals are will never get an answer. Those goals are basically whatever Trump believes will best advance his political standing at home, as well as actions that will enrich himself and his family. At one moment, he is demanding regime change and “unconditional surrender”; the next moment, he explains that the Iranian regime has already been changed; indeed, that the Iranians have asked him to run their country for them.

    It’s not a good thing when the world’s most powerful country is guided not by clear ideas, but by the personal needs of a single leader. There is no such thing as a Trump Doctrine, and consequently, no current basis for any kind of world order.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Resisting the Third Wave of Democratic Backsliding
    (Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    In my last piece, I set out the current challenges to democracy across the globe. It will be difficult to mount a credible response to this united front of despotisms without meaningful help from the U.S. government, but it’s by no means impossible. Despite the Trump administration’s closure of USAID and the dismantling and drastic down-sizing of the democracy-support infrastructure that was created over the last four decades, the principal institutions that comprise this field still exist, along with a far-reaching community, both here and abroad, of pro-democracy practitioners, activists, and advocates working in civil society NGOs, independent media platforms, universities, foundations, and other institutions. This community also has allies in many government ministries, development agencies, and multilateral organizations. It is a resource that can be tapped into and mobilized.

    The Prague-based Forum 2000, which was created by Vaclav Havel and Eli Wiesel in 1996, is exploring the possibility of building a new global movement to fill the vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal from efforts to advance democracy internationally. The organization issued the Prague Appeal for Democratic Renewal in 2017, a statement signed by almost 500 intellectuals and activists declaring that “liberal democracy is under threat, and all who cherish it must come to its defense.” The Appeal was followed by the creation of a worldwide International Coalition for Democratic Renewal (ICDR), which is the nucleus of a potentially much larger coalition of democracy organizations and activists. The non-governmental ICDR is also looking into the possibility of establishing a formal partnership with the inter-governmental Community of Democracies (CoD), a global coalition of states headquartered in Warsaw that is dedicated to promoting and defending democracy worldwide.

    The CoD was an initiative of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek, who took the lead in organizing the CoD’s founding assembly in Warsaw in 2000. Though the CoD was able to create a Democracy Caucus in the UN, and a UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) that continues to operate, it was never able to fulfill the hope that Albright had placed in it. President Biden bypassed the CoD entirely when he organized his Summit for Democracy, which itself had little impact; and when Senator John McCain ran for president in 2008, he proposed creating a League of Democracies without ever acknowledging that such a league already existed.

    The key question today is whether an effort should be made to revive and reform the Community of Democracies in an entirely new political context, in which democratic governments would take their own initiative and not follow the United States, and adding the weight of governmental commitment to a global nongovernmental support coalition for democracy. A regenerated CoD could be one of the possible new coalitions that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke about in his Davos speech earlier this year when he talked of “middle-power” governments forming “different coalitions for different issues” that would have “the capacity to build a new order that embodies our values, like respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states.”

    A first step would be for Forum 2000 and the CoD, working in cooperation with Canada and possibly other governments committed to developing a new democracy agenda, to establish an international commission of leading democracy specialists, activists, and practitioners to examine the lessons learned over four decades of aiding democracy, the last 25 years of which coincided with a period of continuous democratic decline. The commission should also fashion a credible and realistic strategy for a new global coalition for democracy.

    One critical issue that will need to be addressed is how to engage countries and organizations from the Global South in the leadership of a new coalition. A recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace cautions that some of the larger Global South countries like India and South Africa have long considered democracy assistance from Western countries and middle powers a form of “imperialistic” intervention, and that some of the smaller democracies from the Global South, many of which have benefited from democracy assistance over the years, would be more likely to play a positive role in a new coalition. Another source of engagement from the Global South would be the very substantial community of activists who have been at the forefront of struggles for democracy and would have a great stake in the success of a new global coalition.

    Another important issue would be how to involve the United States in the new coalition at a time when official U.S. policy and some of the ideologues driving it would not favor such an initiative. It’s very significant that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has been able to survive the attempt by the Trump administration and Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to destroy it. It was the NED’s founding in 1983 that launched U.S. democracy assistance, and though it received only a relatively small part of total U.S. democracy funding after the government entered the field in the 1990s through USAID and the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), it was always the flagship U.S. democracy institution and the center of a vast network of democracy activists and intellectuals in the United States and around the world.

    Remarkably, its budget has not been cut, and though the administration impounded much of its funding for months during 2025, it was still able to make over 1500 grants totaling $271 million to support groups advancing a comprehensive democracy agenda of countering the ideological influence of authoritarian regimes, supporting freedom of expression and digital activism, combating corruption, fostering democratic governance, and advancing democratic rights and freedoms. The World Movement for Democracy, the NED’s global coalition of democracy activists, was placed on hold during this period of crisis when the focus has been entirely on strengthening the grants program, but the activist networks NED has built over decades are still there and can become part of a new international democracy coalition.

    A new coalition could also engage NED’s party, business, and labor institutes that had to close many offices last year after losing USAID and DRL funding, but which still remain vital and globally networked institutions. The International Republican institute (IRI), for example, sent missions to observe the recent elections in Moldova, Cote D’Ivoire, Bangladesh, Ecuador, the Philippines, and Iraq—programs described in NED’s current Annual Report. One of the programs of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has mobilized a coalition of youth groups in Nigeria to shape constitutional and electoral reforms in the wake of the flawed elections in 2023. The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) worked with local economists and civil-society groups in Bolivia to block two nontransparent deals that would have given state-owned companies from China and Russia disproportionate control over the country’s strategic lithium industry. And the Solidarity Center helped agricultural, garment, and palm sector unions in Guatemala and Honduras protect their ability to organize and fight for decent wages and working conditions, thereby reducing the economic pressures that fuel outward migration.

    Subscribe now

    NED’s large bipartisan support base in the Congress is potentially an important political ally in the United States for a new international democracy coalition and offers a useful bridge to the current administration. The IRI board is chaired by Alaska Senator Dan Sullivan, who was preceded in that role by his friend John McCain, one of America’s leading democracy advocates. Lindsey Graham, Joni Ernst, and Tom Cotton are other Republican senators who sit on the IRI board, and Marco Rubio had been a board member before becoming the Trump administration’s Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. He had also been one of NED’s core supporters in the Congress and would likely welcome a new pro-democracy coalition. Not least, Robert C. O’Brien, the last and longest-serving National Security Adviser in the first Trump administration, is also a member of the IRI board. Aiding democracy abroad, of course, also enjoys great support among Democrats, who voted unanimously in favor of NED’s budget.

    There are other private U.S. democracy institutions and research centers that could play a leading role in a new international coalition. These groups include Freedom House, which since 1973 has produced the world’s leading survey of political and civil rights; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which under the leadership of Thomas Carothers has produced influential analytic studies of democracy promotion; and the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University, which is home to leading democracy scholars like Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, and Michael McFaul, and also manages the Leadership Network for Change, which brings together almost 2,000 scholars and activists from around the world who are alumni of several practitioner programs based at Stanford. The Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush presidential centers in Atlanta and Dallas, respectively, also have very substantial democracy programs and could be valuable partners of a new coalition.

    In addition to mapping out a strategy for building a coalition of democratic states and nongovernmental institutions from both the Global South and the world’s established democracies, a planning commission would also need to identify the principal democracy challenges that would need to be addressed. The first is how to support the struggle for freedom against the world’s dictatorships. These regimes not only repress their own populations, but seek to aid illiberal leaders and parties elsewhere and also to divide and weaken established democracies and fragile developing countries through disinformation campaigns and other tactics. Supporting dissident and opposition forces in repressive dictatorships, and countering the autocracies’ malign interventions in other countries around the world, will need to be a priority for a new pro-democracy coalition.

    A second priority will be aiding democratic groups in a wide range of hybrid or semi-authoritarian countries and backsliding democracies where a protracted battle is underway between liberal and illiberal forces. The former use whatever tools they have to defend rights and keep the political space as open as possible, from protest and even flawed electoral processes to international pressure and support. The latter systematically constrict freedom of expression, human rights, the rule of law, and fair electoral competition behind a front of captured or compromised democratic institutions. Effective political, technical, financial, and moral support to democrats will have to be adapted to the specific circumstances of each battle and responsive to the needs of the local actors. What is essential is that the activists should know that they are not alone.

    The world has changed drastically in the nearly fifty years since President Reagan delivered his Westminster Address, above all in the third area of priority, which is what Reagan called “the competition of ideas and values.” The ideological battle is much different today than it was during the Cold War, when the U.S.-Soviet rivalry dominated global political debate, but it does exist, and fighting it effectively is of critical importance.

    The speech delivered last December by Jørgen Watne Frydnes at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony honoring María Corina Machado was a model of how to fight this battle today. “Democracy is more than a system of government,” he said. “It is also the basis for lasting peace [and] the most effective system we have to prevent violence and conflict.” When the history of our time is written, Frydnes said, it won’t be the names of the autocrats that will stand out, but those of fighters like Andrei Sakharov, Nelson Mandela, and Maria Corina Machando “who stood tall in the face of danger” and whose resistance “can change the world.”

    As powerful as the speech was in defending democracy against its authoritarian opponents and their apologists, it actually presented only part of the argument that needs to be made in favor of democracy. As Maya Tudor notes in the Journal of Democracy, scholarship shows that in addition to promoting peace, democracy also delivers better health and education and greater prosperity. It’s associated with longer life expectancy and lower rates of infant and child death. It provides more years of schooling across regions and time periods and more rapid and less variable levels of economic growth. Tudor didn’t mention the economic comparison between the two Koreas, one democratic and the other totalitarian, but it’s telling that the per-capita GDP in South Korea, which was smaller than the GDP in North Korea until the mid-1970s, now exceeds it by more than 55 times.

    These are among the functional advantages of democracy, and there are others. There’s also the principle of freedom, which Reagan called “the inalienable and universal rights of all human beings.” Speaking at Independence Hall in 1861, Abraham Lincoln said that he “never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence [...] which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country but, I hope, to the world, for all future time.” It is the principle of freedom and democracy that is being challenged today and needs to be defended.

    Following President Trump’s first phone call in his second term with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a glowing report appeared in Russia Today describing the new U.S. policy toward Russia as being “more pragmatic, stripped of the pretense of universal values.” But for Americans, supporting freedom and democracy is not a pretense. It is part of our identity as a country. An opinion survey conducted last year by the Ronald Reagan Institute found that continued funding of programs that aid democracy abroad is a policy that “resonates” with over 70% of the American public, not only because such programs are seen to combat extremism and mitigate threats to the United States, but because they also strengthen freedom, protect religious liberty, and aid dissidents in authoritarian countries.

    A turnaround of the current U.S. policy is inevitable. In the meantime, building an international freedom coalition will keep the groups active in this work connected and moving forward, and it will make it possible for the United States to hit the ground running when the time comes to reengage. Whether it will be possible during this interim period to reverse the democracy recession is less clear. But establishing that as a goal will kindle a new spirit of hope—and that’s no small thing.

    Carl Gershman retired in 2021 after 37 years as the founding president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), where he oversaw the NED’s grants programs in Russia, China and some 100 other countries.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.