Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Jacob Mchangama on the Global Free Speech Recession

    Jacob Mchangama is the Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech and a research professor at Vanderbilt University, as well as a Senior Fellow at The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression. His latest book, with Jeff Kosseff, is The Future of Free Speech: Reversing the Global Decline of Democracy’s Most Essential Freedom.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Jacob Mchangama discuss why we’re experiencing a global free speech recession despite technological advances, how hate speech laws are being weaponized against their original intent, and whether democracies can resist the authoritarian playbook for controlling online discourse.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: In one sense, we are in a golden age of free speech. The ability for people to make their voices heard is much greater than in the past. It is much easier for a lot of ordinary people to participate in the political discourse in a meaningful way. The access to information that we have as citizens is in many respects probably better than it ever was. In earlier periods, it would have been much harder to get specialized information about things, even to do things like read a court judgment that interests you.

    All of that is now available at the click of a button. That is partially a result of social media, partially a result of Google, partially a result of artificial intelligence that can now go into a lot of very interesting research for you and distill a lot of the material that you’re trying to understand. If there’s a technical document that previously perhaps you weren’t expert enough to understand, you now have an assistant that can help you do that. So in many ways it seems like we are actually in quite a good time for free speech. Why do you argue that nevertheless we should think of this period as a “free speech recession?”

    Jacob Mchangama: I think you’re absolutely right. The World Wide Web, social media, and now AI—in many ways, it is true that if you compare our ability to share and access information to that of Enlightenment heroes, or even after the immediate adoption of the First Amendment or the French Declaration on the Rights of Man that did away with entrenched censorship, we have a lot more options, at least in democracies around the world. If you’re in China, it’s probably a different story, even though you could have certain tools that help you.

    I think the huge difference is that for a very long time, there was this sense in democracies that free speech was part of a winning formula that entrenched freedom and democracy—that so-called third wave of democratization that washed the shore in all parts of the world—and a sense that technology was extremely helpful with that. That calculus has changed dramatically, both in democracies and authoritarian states. Authoritarian states were at one point extremely concerned about the World Wide Web and its ability to circumvent official propaganda and censorship. You see that very clearly in the so-called “Document Number Nine,” which is an internal communiqué from the Chinese Communist Party circulated shortly after Xi Jinping comes into power, which talks about how there’s a need to really crack down on western concepts of constitutionalism, press freedom, and so on.

    You also see it in 2012 in Russia, after Putin essentially fakes the presidential election and comes back into office. There’s a coordinated effort to say: we don’t want the kind of street protests that were coordinated on social media, on Facebook and V-Kontakte in Moscow. That really was a bad look for Putin when he was triumphantly coming back into the presidency. At that time, democracies were still looking back at the Arab Spring and saying the internet is mostly a good thing. Then you have Brexit, you have the 2016 election, and prior to that, terrorist content from ISIS spreading on social media—and then the mood sours. Suddenly free speech is being seen not as a competitive advantage for democracies against their authoritarian counterparts, but as a Trojan horse that allows the enemies of democracies, both from within and without, to chip away at the foundations of democracy.

    There is then this attempt to say we need a new conception of free speech, one that is more militant, and where we need to reimpose some kind of top-down control of the public sphere, because with the internet, it’s basically the lunatics who are running the asylum in terms of the public sphere.

    Mounk: That’s really interesting. I hadn’t quite thought about the relationship between these two things in as clear a way. There’s a period in which there’s naive enthusiasm about how the internet and social media are going to lead to an expansion of democracy around the world, and so that makes people a little bit naive—thinking that China is sure to liberalize and perhaps even become a democracy within our lifetimes.

    That story turns out to be wrong, in part because dictators learn how to control the internet and how to control social media for their own purposes, and they’ve become very good at that. But you’re right that along with that, you’ve also had a real inversion in how a lot of reasonable, middle-of-the-road people think about free speech within democratic societies. At the period where people thought social media leads to Occupy Wall Street and the Green Revolution in Iran, they thought free speech is therefore a left-wing value. I remember even causes that always seemed to me to be somewhat minor from a free speech perspective—like net neutrality, defined as no internet service provider could possibly prioritize a video file over a text file, or the whole principle of the internet would be broken—being the cause célèbre of people like John Oliver on Last Week Tonight when that show started on HBO. It was a time in which the left was, at least in this respect, quite instinctively for internet freedom—perhaps not for free speech in every respect, but for internet freedom at least.

    Now, after 2016 and Cambridge Analytica and the election of Donald Trump, as well as the erection of a great firewall in China and other things, there’s this feeling that domestically what social media brings you is Donald Trump, and internationally what it brings you is dictatorships being able to sow disinformation and so forth. Suddenly we’re in a world in which the “right-thinking people” on the left, but also a lot of the middle-of-the-road people in the center, are saying social media is what’s polarizing our societies, what’s destroying our societies, and we need all of these new regulations in order to deal with it.

    It’s remarkable how quickly that paradigm shift happened. It now feels as though this is the world we’ve been in for a long time, but ten years ago the discussion was still quite different.

    Mchangama: Absolutely. I would say it’s not even confined to the left. People who I admire a lot and respect, whose liberal democratic credentials are impeccable—like Anne Applebaum and Francis Fukuyama—have also, I think, changed their tone on this, certainly Applebaum has, in terms of wanting more stringent social media regulation. Jonathan Haidt is another one.

    Another thing, of course, is that especially in the United States, culture war issues have infused this topic, which makes it very easy to pick positions depending on those fault lines. The free speech position, especially when it comes to online speech, gets equated with right-wing populism, for instance, or being in favor of disinformation, or not caring about the spread of hate speech and so on—which I think is pretty lazy argumentation.

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    On the other hand, I also think it is incumbent on free speech advocates—those who think it’s extremely important to hold on to a principled, robust conception of free speech in the online age—to acknowledge that free speech is not an unalloyed good. It comes with harms and costs. That’s not unique to the digital age. If you go back and look—and it would be an interesting experiment to look at the writings of the first 300 years of the printing press—how much of that would reflect values that we appreciate today? How much of it would be deeply hateful and full of misconceptions and lies and propaganda? Probably a lot.

    Mounk: Let us get a little more concrete and understand what measures some of this background shift in the debate you’ve been talking about have actually led to. I’m less interested here in the straightforward dictatorships—we can get to those. Obviously, the ability of authoritarian governments around the world to very quickly censor what their citizens are posting, to have much greater insight into what’s going on on social media platforms at all times, to block content from outside the country that they find unfavorable, and even to shape—in the case of China—the development of chatbots by the leading AI labs within the country in such a way that they will be politically reliable: all of that has advanced very far, and it has narrowed the space for free speech, which was always very restricted, in an even more extreme way.

    But what I’m interested in is the countries that are democracies, that claim to care for democratic values, that aren’t even captured by the most illiberal populists. I’m not talking here about Turkey, which has a horrible record on free speech, or Venezuela, which has a horrible record on free speech—but countries where over the last years we’ve seen the real introduction of rules, regulations, and sometimes criminal laws that make it much more dangerous to express your political opinion. I imagine that a bunch of European countries fall into that category. The United Kingdom, outside the EU but still within the geographic entity of Europe, falls within that realm, and countries like Brazil might be counted among those places as well. What are some of the concrete changes that have happened there in the last decade or more that have restricted the scope of free speech?

    Mchangama: A very prominent example would be hate speech. Hate speech is generally criminalized or prohibited in most countries outside the United States. There are even human rights conventions that oblige you to do so, but it has been unevenly prohibited and enforced in many countries. There has definitely been a huge move in the digital age to crack down further on free speech, and there have been even further efforts, I think, after October 7, to crack down on hate speech in the shape of anti-Semitism.

    Canada has had hate speech law since 1970. Their courts have been quite reluctant to give an expansive interpretation of hate speech law, so they’ve put quite a bit of emphasis on free speech. But in 2022, the hate speech law was expanded with a specific crime targeting antisemitism through essentially denying and trivializing the Holocaust. Right now, there’s a new bill in Canada that is aimed at going after hate crimes and hate speech and further restricting free speech in Canada.

    In Australia, actually shortly before the horrific antisemitic terrorist attack in Sydney in Bondi Beach, the government had criminalized certain forms of hateful expression. Immediately after the attack, the reaction of both state governments and the federal government in Australia was to crack down further on hate speech.

    Germany, which you know better than anyone else, has these coordinated days against hate speech where police will show up in different locations to confiscate devices, sometimes arrest people—and people are convicted for really vague categories of hate speech. One of the things that we use as an example in our book is the case of Iris Hefets, a far-left Israeli Jewish activist who lives in Berlin. She moved to Germany as a protest against Israeli policies. She’s an anti-Zionist, but an Israeli Jew. She’s been arrested on four occasions for essentially walking around Berlin with placards that say, as an Israeli Jew, “Stop the genocide in Gaza”—or variations thereof.

    Now, you can agree or disagree with whether there’s a genocide in Gaza—that’s a political position. But I think this shows the absurdity and danger of these kinds of laws: that in the capital of Germany, where these laws are, above anything else, meant to protect Jews against anti-Semitism, a Jew is arrested for hate speech for criticizing not only the policies of Israel, but also what she sees as complicity on the part of the German government. This is, I think, an unavoidable consequence. There are a lot of other crazy cases coming out of Germany.

    Mounk: Just to stay with Germany for a moment, there are also a whole number of cases where the prohibition on the use of Nazi-era symbols—which I think on balance I oppose, but I certainly understand why, given Germany’s particular history, they were adopted—are then used and applied in such ways that they obviously go against their original purpose.

    There’s a German journalist called Jan Fleischhauer. He wrote for Der Spiegel for a very long time, which is one of the country’s leading magazines; now he works for Focus. He’s a little bit more right-leaning. He was criticizing the youth organization of the AfD, the leading right-wing populist party, which is called Generation Hoffnung—“Generation Hope.” He was criticizing them for playing with Nazi ideas in various ways, and saying perhaps they should rename themselves Generation Deutschland Erwache—“Awaken Germany”—which is a Nazi slogan. He was obviously using—or rather, mentioning—that slogan in a way that implied criticism of this organization, by insinuating that it was in some way too friendly to Nazi ideology.

    The state prosecutor started a formal investigation of him because of the use of Nazi symbols. There was an outcry and eventually they dropped it, but it just shows you that there is absolutely no common sense in how these laws are used, and they end up stifling political speech that is clearly—right or wrong, agree or disagree—clearly legitimate.

    Mchangama: There is simply no evidence that Germany’s hate speech laws work. It’s one of the things that I try to go into in depth in the book. If you look at the German domestic intelligence service, they have very detailed reports about political extremism and violence in Germany that go back several years, and they break it down by right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, religious extremism, and so on. Over the past decade, there has been a constant increase in right-wing extremism—including right-wing violence, antisemitism, and so on—all the while successive governments have done more and more to crack down on hate speech: whether it was the NetzDG, passed in 2017 to try and ensure that social media platforms remove illegal content; whether it’s expanding existing hate speech laws; or whether it’s ensuring that authorities do more to enforce existing hate speech laws by conducting these coordinated raids.

    You could point to the AfD’s Björn Höcke, who won a local election in Thuringia. He was twice convicted, I think, for essentially using Nazi slogans in his speeches. It did nothing to minimize his appeal with voters—the elections were in July and he’d been convicted in May. This is one of the problems that I have with Europe, where the European Commission is proposing that hate speech law should be strengthened and harmonized across all 27 member states, so that the European Commission would essentially be the body that could go after member states if they don’t do enough to enforce these laws. But there is no empirical attempt at asking whether these laws actually work. If you look at the European Union’s own data, they say that over the past decades there has been a huge increase in hate speech and hate crimes—but during that same time, you’ve actually done a lot to criminalize and crack down on hate speech.

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    So why are we wedded to this concept of militant democracy? If you adopt the logic that every time there’s an outbreak of intolerance, hate crimes, or antisemitism the only political solution is to adopt further speech-restrictive laws, where does it end? There have already been a lot of laws and restrictions adopted that, if you had asked people 15 or 20 years ago, they would have said were way too much. But it has been normalized that this is just the way you do it.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about the situation in countries other than Europe. There’s a big debate, for example, in Brazil, where there was a genuine threat to democracy with an attempt at storming the Congress after Jair Bolsonaro was ousted from office in elections that echoed in a strange way the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

    There is a kind of attempt to try and strengthen democratic institutions, for which I have a lot of sympathy. But it seems as though in the process of that attempt, a lot of power has been given to one prosecutor to make decisions about what speech is legal and what speech is illegal, in ways that really restrict the space for free speech in the country in some striking ways. Tell us a little bit about the developments there.

    Mchangama: The interesting thing in Brazil is that the Supreme Federal Court in 2019 essentially gave itself powers to conduct a fake news investigation. A particular judge called Alexandre de Moraes would spearhead this effort. He then expanded its scope—it was initially looking at attacks on members of the Supreme Court, so a Supreme Court judge would look at fake news attacks on Supreme Court judges. It’s a very complicated backstory, because as you well know, there was the so-called “car wash” corruption scandal, which implicated huge parts of Brazilian politics and business. Parts of that investigation pointed perhaps in the direction of Supreme Court members, and when that happened, they established this inquiry.

    Moraes says that he is fighting for democracy, but the methods he has employed have been to essentially be the prosecutor, judge, and jury in these cases—determining on very vague standards what constitutes fake news and even hate speech. It has overwhelmingly been aimed at the populist right. Bolsonaro and some of his supporters have certainly done things that are illegal and expressed sentiments that are anti-democratic. But these powers have also implicated, for instance, a communist party that attacked the Supreme Court, where he ordered their social media accounts to be shut down, as well as criminal investigations of statements made in closed WhatsApp groups. There is also a federal election court, of which Moraes is a part, which essentially gives itself powers to police political speech—it will say that a statement by a politician is misleading in a certain way and therefore should be removed.

    That has had huge consequences for political speech in Brazil. But again, what is interesting here is that the elites—especially on the center left, who would not that long ago have been suspicious of these kinds of things—have said this is a necessary price for combating right-wing populism. You can understand the anxiety in Brazil because Bolsonaro has a military background and strong ties with the military, and it’s not that long ago that Brazil had a military dictatorship. But of course, what was one of the main tools of the Brazilian dictatorship? Heavy-handed censorship. And so this is one of the paradoxes.

    Mounk: The other interesting thing about Brazil is that it has been, for the last five or so years, cited as this shining example of militant democracy—and perhaps we need to get into the concept of militant democracy a little bit further in the next part of the conversation. People are saying: look, in Brazil, they are actually dealing with this toxic speech; they have this prosecutor who is able to go after politicians who make false statements; they put Bolsonaro in jail. This is the way that you can fortify your democratic institutions.

    But as you were saying in the European context, there’s not a lot of evidence that all of that hate speech legislation in Germany actually means that people are less likely to take extremist points of view or to engage in racist beliefs—or at least to vote on them. The same is true in Brazil. There was a promising right-leaning governor of São Paulo who was not closely allied with Bolsonaro—he was part of Bolsonaro’s movement, but there was some political room between them—who was widely expected to be the right-wing candidate. Jair Bolsonaro, from jail, basically anointed his own son, who is a full loyalist, as his successor. That son is now running against Lula, the sitting president, in the presidential elections. Looking at opinion polls at the moment, Lula is ahead by a couple of points in the first round according to opinion polls, but in polling for the crucial second round—for which both of them would be very likely to qualify—Bolsonaro’s son is either even or ahead in a lot of the polls. The latest ones seem to have him ahead by between one and three percentage points.

    Brazilian democracy is as much on a knife’s edge as it was at any previous point. The idea that all of these measures would somehow help you to miraculously shut this political movement out of contestation has simply not worked out.

    Mchangama: An even stronger empirical check on this is to note that the fake news investigation started in 2019 and was then expanded—and then the attack on Congress came years later. So if this fake news investigation was necessary to crack down on conspiracy theories and polarization fueled by lies and disinformation, it quite clearly did not work, given what actually transpired in Brasília on that day.

    I think one of the problems for free speech advocates—and one that I grapple with myself quite a lot—is that politicians will say: we have to do something about this; this is a huge problem; perhaps they view it as an existential problem. For most politicians, their motivations and incentives are probably mixed. But I think it’s certainly the case that there are a lot of reasonable liberal democrats who restrict free speech out of good intentions, who don’t have Machiavellian plans to do away with democracy and lock up their opponents.

    The problem you have as a free speech advocate is that when these things hit the headlines and you feel this threat coming from the other side—a threat that resonates with the wiring of us human beings as quite tribal and very acute to senses of threat—that makes it very, very difficult for what then seems an abstract principle of free speech to override our sense that we have to do something. The question being shot back at free speech advocates is: what’s your solution? Very often we don’t have a good solution other than saying that John Stuart Mill warned against this—and John Stuart Mill was great and eloquent, and he and Madison should still be read and inspire us, but they’re not likely to convince people who feel that democracy is on the edge, or that we’re standing in 1932, figuratively speaking.

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    There are certain dynamics in the world we live in right now that favor militant democracy—that favor this idea that you have to be intolerant towards the forces of intolerance in order to safeguard democracy. This is not the time for talking; this is the time for doing, because otherwise the enemies of democracy will win and things will get much worse.

    Mounk: Let’s talk about some of the things that people are proposing that we do. Many of these laws are being discussed at the moment in the European Union, in Britain, in Canada, and some of them even in the United States, where the scope for some of these policies is much narrower because of the First Amendment. One idea is to make sure that children don’t have access to social media, or more broadly don’t have access to all kinds of forms of damaging content—whether that might be extreme pornography or extremely violent content online—and to accomplish that with an age verification law.

    In principle, that seems like something that even free speech advocates should be open to, in the sense that, certainly as a good philosophical liberal, I believe that adults should be able to consume as much pornography as they want, even if that’s perhaps not always good for them and not always a good idea—but that’s part of having individual freedom and not having the state be the moral guardian of what it is we can and can’t do. But I do think that it’s perfectly appropriate to have restrictions on ten-year-olds having access to that kind of content.

    The problem with these laws, of course, is that they also impose a requirement on adults to prove that they’re adults, and that can chill their speech and their access to information in other ways. What do you make of these laws that require age verification in order to access main parts of the internet, as they have been rolled out and written in other places over the last years?

    Mchangama: Concerns about the corruption of children obviously go back a very long way. It’s part of the charges against Socrates in 399 BC that he was corrupting the youth. Today we don’t fear dangerous philosophy, but harms to children. The thing of course is that in ancient Greece, acts with youth that we would frown upon today were seen as perfectly normal, whereas certain ideas being taught were seen as beyond the pale. But I digress.

    I have two teenage children myself—a daughter of 13 and a son of 16. I have fought with them about screens and devices. I wish that I had introduced them to devices later, and I now have pretty stringent controls on their devices in terms of time limitations and certain types of content that they can’t access at all. But I also think that there are benefits for children in having online access. Children have human rights as well, and one of those is access to information. For instance, three years ago my family moved to the United States. My children would not be as proficient—not only in the English language, but also in the cultural idioms of their peers—if they had not been watching content on YouTube, for instance. That’s a huge benefit for them. Younger people, whether you like it or not, consume news and ideas through new media. If you cut them off from that, you cut them off from a lot of relevant information.

    Then you have the problem, as you mentioned, of adults giving up their private information in ways that governments can potentially use and abuse to identify them and compromise their anonymity. It is now at least a policy goal of certain democracies—including Germany, I think—to eliminate the right to anonymity on social media online. German Chancellor Merz has said that he does not think that you should have the right to be anonymous on social media. Now, think about the historical implications of that.

    Mounk: I want to hear your argument against it. You might say that we believe in free speech for people—that you shouldn’t be under any threat of being prosecuted or put in jail for what you say, even if it’s very unpopular—and that would already be a big improvement in places like Germany and the United Kingdom relative to the laws as they stand at the moment. But why should we give free speech rights to bots? Why should we give free speech rights to foreign intelligence services that create fake accounts in order to influence debates in Germany, Britain, or the United States? Why should we allow people to go online and insult anybody who has a different opinion in the most vile possible ways—perhaps even threatening them—and hiding behind the cover of some kind of avatar?

    Why shouldn’t we say: yes, you have as a citizen full rights of expression—or as a visitor, for that matter—but you need to actually prove who you are, so we know that we’re actually having a conversation among real human beings? I can see the arguments on the other side, and I’m not endorsing what I just said, but just to steelman the position: if somebody like Friedrich Merz believes that, is he wrong?

    Mchangama: I can understand the argument superficially. I think it is probably true that it is easier for conversations online to derail when you can hide behind anonymity—when you don’t have your full name attached—because you feel more comfortable trolling and so on; there’s less inhibition, less incentive to think about what you say before you blurt it out.

    But let me be a bit facetious here with an argument in a German context. Was it wrong of the members of the White Rose to spread their anti-Nazi pamphlets anonymously? During Nazi Germany, they obviously ended up being arrested and executed. But that shows you why people have resorted to writing anonymously or pseudonymously throughout history—because there were repercussions when you wrote in your own name. If you’re a dissident, it is much easier to identify you and then you can face legal consequences.

    Now, if you’re Chancellor Merz in Germany—who, according to some reports, has used NGOs and law firms to launch lawsuits against people for insulting him; someone called him a “racist asshole,” and to me, if you’re a politician who has positioned himself as wanting a firmer immigration policy in Germany, doing away with the mistakes of the Merkel era, you can’t on the one hand say you want to be tougher on Islamists and the mistakes of immigration, and on the other hand be unwilling to be called a “racist asshole”—why should Germans who disagree with him be compelled to give their details so that he can instruct his lawyer to have them criminally prosecuted?

    You also need only look at European history. I saw Ursula von der Leyen in an interview rather smugly saying, in response to criticism of the American attack on European free speech: We know quite a bit about free speech in Europe—we’re actually the place of the Enlightenment. Well, did Spinoza publish his Theological-Political Treatise under his own name? No, he did not. Did Montesquieu publish his Persian Letters under his own name? No, he did not. Did Voltaire publish Candide under his own name? Were Cato’s Letters published under real names? Of course not. Thomas Paine’s Common Sense was not written under his name. The Federalist Papers were written using pseudonyms.

    Mounk: It’s actually a remarkable list. I was aware of each of those individually, but once you put them all next to each other, that is a huge share of the most important writings of the Enlightenment that were published pseudonymously.

    I believe that the Two Treatises of Government—and I’m trying to remember this arcane piece of knowledge from my undergraduate degree, which was unfortunately a few years ago now—survived the civil war under a false book cover, stowed away in some library under the title of a work on the “French disease,” which was a contemporary appellation for something like syphilis. So it looked like a sort of medical treatise, but the “French disease” was meant to be authoritarianism.

    Mchangama: So many of the literary works that have shaped Enlightenment values, democracy, and so on depended on anonymity to be able to spread and to save their authors, at least temporarily. When you add to that, in the digital age, the fact that the very same politicians who say we can’t have anonymity are also busy adopting laws that criminalize and prohibit ever larger swaths of speech—I think that in and of itself shows why this is an extremely dangerous development.

    When it comes to the whole child protection issue, we should also look at authoritarian and illiberal states. I mentioned Russia’s crackdown on online speech in 2012—that’s when they built out their so-called “Red Web”—and the pretext for this was, you guessed it, protecting children. I saw Jonathan Haidt in February praising Indonesia for adopting its own version of Australia’s pioneering law banning under-16s from social media. Indonesia is a country that has used child protection to ban gay dating apps, and has recently proposed a bill that would give its broadcasting commission broader powers to crack down on LGBT content in order to protect children. Indonesia is often praised as a model Muslim-majority country that has democratic institutions and is relatively moderate—it is not an outright authoritarian state. That makes all of these examples all the more instructive as to why this sounds superficially great on paper but carries grave implications for free speech and privacy.

    This is especially true in our day and age, where every time you log on to the internet—or certain parts of it—your data is collected in ways that are much more intrusive than the days where you needed to show a library card to take out a book. It gives whichever entity collects it—whether a private company or the government—troves of data that could produce a very forensic picture of who you are: your interests, your social connections, and so on. It would essentially shield the government from criticism and dissent and make citizens much more transparent to the government. That is an inversion of what I understand to be at the core of liberal democratic societies.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Jacob discuss how to make the case for free speech, the surprising effect of the Community Notes feature on X, and the future of free speech in America. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    51 min
  • Episode 185: Michael Mandelbaum on the American Way of Foreign Policy

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    This week, Richard talks to Michael Mandelbaum, author of The American Way of Foreign Policy: Ideology, Economics, Democracy (Oxford University Press).

    Host: Richard Aldous

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    33 min
  • Michael Shermer on Truth and Conspiracy

    Michael Shermer is the Founding Publisher of Skeptic magazine and the host of the podcast The Michael Shermer Show. His new book is Truth: What it is, How to Find it, Why it Still Matters.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Michael Shermer discuss conspiracy theories from the plausible to the wild, how to assess whether a conspiracy theory is accurate, and discovering the truth in a convoluted world.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I’m really interested in learning all about the truth, which you expound upon in your new book. But there was something that interested me about you, which is that you spent an enormous amount of time looking into conspiracy theories and arguing with conspiracy theorists. You’re kind of the self-appointed Batman. If somebody comes up with a terrible conspiracy theory somewhere, you rush in to put them right.

    Michael Shermer: The previous book, Conspiracy, and the new book, Truth, are sort of a two-book project. Conspiracy asks why the rational believe the irrational. Truth is basically why anybody believes anything at all and what we should believe.

    Conspiracies have always been in the wheelhouse of skeptics and scientists who study fringe ideas, because they’re always right on the margins. You can’t quite make out what’s going on. If it’s obviously a government operation or a corporate scam, then it’s not really a conspiracy theory. It’s just a scam or an operation. So conspiracy theories are always like—we can’t quite make out what’s going on, here’s what I think might be going on. It’s a little bit like the UAP/UFO phenomenon. The pictures are always blurry and grainy. It’s always on the margins, on the borderlands.

    Many conspiracy theories are like that. You can’t quite figure out what’s going on. Therefore, that opens the door for anybody and everybody with their personal opinions. So I just undertook to explore why that is. Since we started Skeptic back in 1992, we’ve been covering JFK and moon landing conspiracy theories, all that stuff ever since, because it’s super popular.

    Mounk: What drew you to that? These theories are out there, and it’s tempting for a smart person to ignore them and to say, these are just crazies going around making up all of these stories. Certainly back in the day, they probably felt less central to the political discourse than unfortunately they do now. So why doesn’t it make more sense to just ignore them and actually focus on the stuff that’s true and that matters in the world? What’s the case for actually going to battle with conspiracy theorists and trying to engage them in the details—often in the weeds of the claims they make about the world?

    Shermer: It matters what’s true. I embrace universal realism—there is a reality, we can figure out what is, more or less, small-“t” truth. That’s true with conspiracies. Conspiracy theories are theories about actual conspiracies, whether the theory is true or not. There are real conspiracies. Watergate was a conspiracy. Iran-Contra, all the MKUltra and all the CIA shenanigans in third world countries in the 50s and 60s and 70s—these are all true, and they were covered up. These were not approved by Congress or the president, who may not have even known about many of them.

    So one of the things I’m debunking in Conspiracy is that calling it a crazy conspiracy theory, or calling someone a crazy conspiracy nut, is not an answer. The question is: but what if he’s right? He may be a nut, but what if he’s right? So what’s the actual truth?

    When we started Skeptic, I was initially debunking the creationists—evolution deniers. Then the Holocaust deniers came on the scene and they were making the rounds on major talk shows. I thought maybe that’s something we can look at in Skeptic. So I went around to some Holocaust scholars and historians with a list of things that these Holocaust deniers were saying are not true. How many bodies can you burn in 24 hours in a crematory at Auschwitz? Why does the door not lock at the gas chamber at Mauthausen? They had a list of like 39 unanswered mysteries and anomalies about the Holocaust. A lot of these historians would just tell me, they’re just a bunch of anti-Semites. That may be, but what’s the answer? Most of them didn’t know the answer.

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    It reminded me a little bit of biologists who would debate creationists. They would lose because they didn’t realize the creationists are doing something different. The Holocaust deniers are not actually studying the Holocaust—they’re doing something different. They’re challenging the narrative because it’s based on Israel and American foreign policy, and that’s really what it’s about. It has nothing to do with calculating how many Jews exactly died, how many were alive in 1939, how many were alive in 1945. That actually isn’t what they’re interested in.

    In addition to exploring their motives, I wanted to ask: what is the answer exactly, what do we know? The Holocaust denial claim—that it didn’t happen, or didn’t happen the way we think it did—is a kind of conspiracy theory, the theory being that the Jews made up the story to gain sympathy or funding from Germany, or whatever the theory is. So the question is: is it true or not? In addition to, what are their motives? I just apply that to everything. What actually happened with JFK? What happened on 9/11? Why do people think the Bush administration pulled it off—not just that they’re anti-Bush or anti-Republican, but what is the explanation for why Building 7 collapsed? What do we know about the early purchases of airline stocks? That kind of thing.

    Mounk: I have two competing responses to this. One response is that they’re making factual claims. One of the interesting things about conspiracy theorists is that often they know a lot of details—they’ve studied a lot of elements of this, and so they’re able to make all of these claims about the world. As somebody who is generally motivated to understand the truth about the world, when somebody makes a factual claim, that’s something that is worth responding to and worth looking into—the claim that it would take much greater heat to make the World Trade Center collapse, for example. Presumably, if you go and talk to a physicist or a material scientist, they can help give you answers to those questions. Those answers are either convincing or not, and that seems like a sensible response.

    There is a competing instinct, though, of: what is actually the purpose of this? Do you find that some of the time you’re able to convince people in these discussions—that these conspiracy theorists end up saying, now that I’ve heard from Professor So-and-so at the Department of Material Science at Caltech that the point at which a steel beam melts is actually this degree of Fahrenheit rather than that degree of Fahrenheit, I think you’re right? Or do they just make up the next claim—that obviously Caltech is bought and paid for and this professor is a liar, and so on and so forth?

    What is actually the purpose of this conversation? Is it just to have some counter-speech in there so that people who have not yet made up their mind can see that there are responses? Or do you think the people with whom you’re engaging are actually going to change their mind? What is the end goal for you?

    Shermer: The end goal is to convince the undecided voters, as it were. The hardcore conspiracy theorists are not going to change their mind—they never do. I had Oliver Stone on the podcast and he basically almost hung up on me when I challenged him with specific facts. He’s not going to change his mind. But the average person who is aware of the JFK conspiracy theories, or 9/11 was an inside job, or whatever—they might be thinking, what is the explanation for that? They go to Skeptic Magazine, just like they go to Snopes or PolitiFact or any of these fact-checking sites. That’s what we do.

    As for the alternative—I’m a big free speech advocate, so I don’t want the government to censor David Irving and his claims about Auschwitz. I defend his right to speak. He was actually arrested in the early 2000s in Austria at the airport, for going there to give a speech to a group of right-wing neo-Nazi types about the Holocaust. I thought, well, that’s not right. He should be free to speak his mind and I should be free to debunk him. I have debunked him many times. I would rather have people go online and see, here are David Irving’s claims and here’s why he’s wrong, as opposed to not being able to find David Irving online at all because he’s been censored.

    The reason I defend free speech absolutism is this: in America, there’s a debate about how many Native Americans died after Columbus. How many were here when Columbus arrived? How many died two centuries later from guns, germs, and steel, as it were? The extreme claims are something like 100 million; the much more moderate claims are more like 10 million. If I side on the side of thinking it was only 15 or 20 million, am I a Holocaust denier? That’s a legitimate debate. We should be able to have those debates. I don’t want people labeled a “denier” just because they don’t go with the mainstream—just in case the mainstream is wrong.

    Mounk: Let’s think a little bit more systematically. You were saying earlier that a conspiracy theory in the literal sense is just a theory that some kind of conspiracy happened. Of course, there have been conspiracies in the history of the world, so just because something is a conspiracy theory doesn’t mean that we can debunk it. Part of the answer is to look into each conspiracy theory in detail—actually go and call up all of the experts and try to research the factual claims that people on the internet make about them. For ordinary citizens, that’s not going to be possible. We’re busy people, we have jobs, we have families to raise. We’re not going to be able to look into every conspiracy theory that’s out there.

    So one thing we can do is outsource our judgment to institutions that we might trust, like Skeptic Magazine. But of course, people who are quite inclined to believe in conspiracy theories are going to think, “Places like Skeptic Magazine are just CIA ops to obscure the truth.” Is there a principled way of distinguishing between allegations of conspiracy that are worth taking seriously and allegations of conspiracy where, without even looking into the details, you immediately say, that smells kind of off?

    One obvious point—one that I apply when I think about the world—is to ask: who is the collective agent who is supposed to have committed this conspiracy? If the idea is that this company suddenly had a bunch of money missing in its accounts, to say, perhaps there’s a conspiracy by the CFO and some kind of accountant to steal a bunch of that money, doesn’t seem crazy. It only takes a few people, they have a very clear self-interest, and it’s easy to imagine that they could solve the collective action problem of actually acting in concert.

    When you’re saying all journalists are going along with some kind of crazy lie about the 2020 election, I can imagine that a lot of them would go along with that—stretching it a little bit. But if you break the story that the U.S. presidential election really was stolen, you go into the annals of journalism as one of the greatest investigative reporters ever. Out of the thousands of journalists in the United States, not a single one is going to break rank, not a single one is going to pursue the very clear self-interest to break the story—over whatever political preference they have, or over whatever fear of being looked at weirdly at a dinner party. That’s a conspiracy theory that’s much harder to sustain. How do these thousands of journalists coordinate? Why does nobody break ranks? Do they all actually share the same interests? That seems much less plausible.

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    Is that how you think about it as well? How do you eyeball a conspiracy theory before you’ve looked into all of the specific detailed claims—to distinguish the kind of circumstance under which a conspiracy might plausibly happen in the world from the kind of circumstance in which it’s very, very unlikely that people could carry off a conspiracy?

    Shermer: I do make a distinction between realistic conspiracy theories and quite fringe, lunatic, or grand conspiracy theories—that Bill Gates is trying to control the world, or that there’s a group of 12 people in London called the Illuminati running the world’s economy. That sort of thing doesn’t merit our attention as much as more realistic conspiracy theories.

    Take the claim that big pharma makes money off of drugs—well, they do. They’ve captured the regulatory state, like in the opioid crisis. That actually happened. Just like big tobacco, we now know that they knew these drugs were addictive and they lied, and then they hired the regulators themselves to work for the company. That’s a real conspiracy. The conspiracy theory turned out to be true, and the government then did something about it through the regulatory state and lawsuits against the Sackler family, just like with big tobacco. Those are important because they matter to millions of people.

    On the question of offloading—yes, all of us offload most of what we believe about things, because who has time to fact-check everything? In the case of the 2020 rigged election conspiracy theory, what convinced me was that Attorney General Bill Barr—a lifelong Republican, someone who voted for Trump twice—said, as head of the Department of Justice, we’re going to look into this. We have the resources to do it. I looked into it, we spent months examining all this stuff, and we didn’t find any significant fraud at all. The election is over. To me, I don’t have to go myself to Atlanta or to Phoenix to look at that building—that grainy video on YouTube of a truck pulling up at two in the morning pulling boxes out. The Department of Justice has the resources to do that. I don’t have to worry about it.

    Christopher Hitchens once famously said: when the Pope says he believes in God today, you think, well, that’s the Pope, he’s doing his job. If the Pope says, I’m beginning to doubt God’s existence, you think, well, he might be onto something, because he’s supposed to believe in God. So when Attorney General Bill Barr says, I looked into it and didn’t find anything, that’s him doing his job. If he had said, there are some questionable things here, that would get my attention. That’s all offloading, and that’s mostly what all of us do.

    Mounk: Tell me more about the structural features of these different kinds of conspiracy theories. You said you distinguish between realistic and unrealistic conspiracy theories, and we probably each have an instinct for what is a potentially realistic one and what is one that just seems off the bat. But do you have a more systematic way of thinking about the criteria you apply to determine what is a potentially realistic conspiracy theory and what is an obviously unrealistic one?

    Shermer: One criterion is: how many people would have to be involved? Real conspiracies don’t involve that many people. The more people that are involved, the more likely they are to screw up, or tell somebody, or whatever. Take JFK—all the people that would have to be involved or accused of being involved: the CIA, the FBI, the KGB, the mafia, the Russians, the Cubans, and so on. Not one of them wants to go on 60 Minutes to tell their story. Not one of the women who slept with one of the guys who knew about the assassination of JFK wants to tell the story. It’s the same thing with all these UFO/UAP whistleblowers—I saw the spacecraft, or I know somebody. Not one of them wants to go on 60 Minutes or tell a journalist. This would be the breaking story of the century, or the millennia.

    Mounk: Even if they might be afraid of being killed, what about one of them who doesn’t have children, who’s on his deathbed, right?

    Shermer: That’s the funny thing, Yascha—they always say they can’t speak out because they’re afraid of being killed. But they go online and post videos and articles, and they freely speak to podcasters all the time about this. Why aren’t they afraid of being killed for saying this? Because they’re not. That’s not actually going on.

    But back to your original question, because I think this will interest you. I originally got interested in this when I was in college. I went to Pepperdine University in Malibu—I was in the first graduating class of the Malibu campus, in 1976. It was fairly conservative. I was a Christian at the time, in a Republican leadership crowd. President Ford came to speak there, everybody was reading Atlas Shrugged, and I got into objectivism and all that stuff and kind of became a libertarian. Then I started going to libertarian-type meetings and reading a lot of their literature, and a lot of it was just nonsense. My roommate and I went to one of these you don’t have to pay income tax seminars—the whole thing was a fraud, the premise being that the IRS doesn’t actually have the legal right to tax your income. It may have even been a sovereign citizen kind of thing, though I didn’t even know what that was at the time. I remember getting back to the dorm room thinking, if this was actually true, nobody would pay their taxes and there’s no way the government is going to allow this. My roommate disagreed—he didn’t file for like 15 years, and they caught up with him and he got penalized pretty heavily.

    Then I started reading things like climate change is a hoax, big pharma and all the doctors want you to be sick, there’s a carburetor that gets 200 miles to the gallon but the oil companies are keeping it secret—all these kinds of things. I thought, well, it could be true, but this is too big, too grandiose. There’s never anything to it. Nobody goes on 60 Minutes and says, I found the carburetor, here it is, it gets 200 miles to the gallon. A lot of the stuff I was discovering as a libertarian was not serving me well. There’s a lot of nonsense in it for a political agenda. I’m still a small government kind of guy, but you have to temper this with reality.

    Mounk: What do you think attracts people to conspiracy theories? Obviously, different kinds of conspiracy theories are likely to serve different kinds of psychological purposes. Whether you are inclined to believe in conspiracy theories probably depends in part on how far you feel from centers of power. It’s much easier to think everybody in the U.S. government is in on the same thing if you’ve never been very close to Washington, D.C. and don’t know anybody in the U.S. government—you think they’re all kind of similar types of people who are very different from you and me. If you’ve lived in D.C. a little bit and you know some of those people, you realize, first, that they’re not really competent enough to pull off this kind of large-scale conspiracy, and second, more importantly, that they all kind of hate each other and disagree with each other and are trying to get ahead and run over each other. The idea that they can all agree on this very complicated set of actions and nobody ever defects just seems wholly unrealistic. But that’s easy to say when you’re in those circles and you know some of those people. When you’re very far away from it, it’s easier to imagine.

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    The other point is that at least some of these conspiracy theories are actually quite comforting. To think there are 12 people sitting in London who are the Illuminati and who are running the world is superficially scary—these evil people are making decisions about the world. But in a more profound sense, I think it’s reassuring, because it’s an explanation for why things are scary in the world, for why some things don’t work. If only everybody could agree to recognize the existence of the Illuminati, dethrone them, and put good people in place, suddenly everything is going to be much better. There’s actually something very comforting about a lot of these conspiracy theories.

    Shermer: One of my favorite quotes in the book is about this idea—it was something to the effect that 12 guys running the economy is a little scary, but at least you’ve identified the enemy. What’s scarier to most people is the idea that no one is running the economy, that no one’s in charge. That’s even worse than having identified the enemy.

    There are a lot of motives. I was on G. Gordon Liddy’s podcast in the 90s—Mr. Watergate, the guy himself. I asked him about this, and he basically said people are incompetent and they can’t keep their mouth shut, and once you work in government you realize most people can’t do much of anything.

    In terms of the motives for why people believe in conspiracy theories, there are several. There’s what they call “conspiracy theories are for losers”—that is, the losing party usually thinks the other party cheated. That’s very common. Trump is not unusual that way. Hillary thought something like that happened.

    Those out of power tend to think that people in power have more power than they actually have, both in government and in corporations. People that are low in status think that people higher in status are pulling things off. People who are more anxious by personality and temperament, or more risk averse, feel that something’s going on and that they need a more predictable future. The future is largely not predictable, so those who need higher structure are more likely to think conspiracy theories are true. There’s also a big power dimension—a lack of trust in authority.

    My favorite paper on this is called Dead and Alive. People who tick the box in surveys saying they think Princess Diana was murdered are also more likely to tick the box saying she faked her death and is still alive. Well, she can’t be both dead and alive. She’s living in South America with Elvis.

    Mounk: What’s going on is that if you have a general inclination to believe in conspiracy theories, you’re just more likely to say things aren’t as they’re telling us, things aren’t as they appear. Even if those two things are mutually exclusive, you’re more likely to say, who knows? All I know is they’re lying to us—perhaps they’re lying to us because she was murdered, perhaps they’re lying to us because she’s still alive, but something’s got to be different from what the official story is.

    Shermer: I wrote about the Deep State and QAnon and the Pizzagate business—that ping pong pizzeria in Washington, D.C. Do Republicans really think Hillary Clinton and Tom Hanks and Beyoncé are running a pedophile ring out of a pizzeria? I don’t know if they really believe it. One guy did—Edgar Welch. He went there with his gun to break up the pedophile ring, got to the pizza place, and there was no basement, which is supposedly where the pedophile ring was operating. It’s just people in there eating pizza. He shot up the place, no one was hurt, he went to prison for a couple of years, and he apologized later.

    I suspect the average Republican voter didn’t really believe it, but they were operating more along the lines of what I call proxy conspiracism. It’s a stand-in—well, maybe Hillary didn’t do that one, but it’s the kind of thing the Democrats would do, and so that’s why I don’t like them. A lot of conspiracy theories are like that.

    My type specimen is the OJ trial. OJ was acquitted based on a conspiracy theory that the LAPD planted the bloody glove and the blood evidence on the car. But if you look at the history of the LAPD’s interaction with African Americans post-World War II, through the 1950s and 60s, it’s pretty bad—they did do things like that. So when a black jury in the 90s hears this conspiracy theory, it’s a stand-in. I don’t know what was going through their minds, but it’s something like: well, I don’t know if OJ did it or not, he probably did, but planting evidence against blacks by the white LAPD is the kind of thing they have done and probably could have done, so I’m going to stick it to them. That’s a kind of proxy conspiracism.

    Mounk: The interesting thing about the Pizzagate controversy, I just realized, is that it has a remarkable similarity to one of my favorite news stories of recent weeks—which also involves a kind of conspiracy. The police force in, I believe, Adams County, Ohio, was told that a well-known local resident, an artist by the name of Afroman, had kidnapped women and hidden them in his basement. They raided his home in ridiculous fashion, only to find that there was no basement in which he was holding the supposedly kidnapped women.

    This set off a hilarious set of responses by Afroman, including the wonderful Lemon Pound Cake—a song describing, over video surveillance footage of the raid that he captured, the moment in which the sheriff of his county does a double take towards the lemon pound cake sitting on the kitchen table, which he clearly has a desire to eat. It’s a wonderful song; I recommend you look it up on YouTube after listening to this episode. The police then sued him for defamation and emotional damages, and Afroman delivered a wonderful and passionate speech in defense of the American right to free speech—and won on all counts.

    Shermer: That’s one more motive—and it cuts across left and right. The left thinks the government is up to no good against their causes, and the right thinks the same. During the Obama years, for example, there were claims that the government was making concentration camps in Texas for gun owners. Whatever your political causes, you think the other side is up to no good and trying to take them away from you. Both sides are equally conspiratorial that way.

    Mounk: Let me ask you one last question about conspiracies, and then I want to get into what I suppose is the obverse of conspiracy theories—which is the truth, the subject of the new book. I think I have a very sophisticated audience: highly educated, an audience that really seeks out in-depth conversations about pretty demanding topics. I’m sure that nobody in this audience thinks of themselves as being particularly drawn to conspiracy theories. But the temptation, I think, is always there. So what are the warning signs for smart people—people who are usually responsive to evidence—that something is just so tempting that they may themselves be giving it a pass, that they may be falling foul of conspiracy theory even though, on most days and about most subjects, they are rational thinkers?

    Shermer: I have a chapter on this—a conspiracy detection kit. It’s essentially a signal detection problem. You have a two-by-two matrix: the conspiracy is true or false, and I believe it’s true or false. That gives you four options. The problem is that we’re fallible and we’re often wrong about these things, so it depends on the facts and the evidence in each particular case. Some might be true, some might not be true.

    As I said, the more realistic conspiracy theories are ones like my type specimen: Volkswagen cheating the emissions standards in Europe. It’s obvious, it’s targeted, they do it for an obvious reason—to make money. Companies often try to cheat the regulatory state in all countries; it’s pretty common, as with big tobacco and big pharma, as I mentioned.

    Mounk: That presumably actually involved a lot of people. The number of people involved is one criterion, but another criterion is how organized they are. It’s easier for 50 people within a secret service agency to coordinate—50 employees of the CIA, for instance, find it easier to keep a secret, in part because there may be crimes involved if they tell somebody else. That’s different from 50 people randomly drawn from the population. It’s also somewhat easier to convince 50 employees of a company to go along with a conspiracy than 50 journalists who are all working for competing outlets. But still, in the Volkswagen case, presumably a lot of people were involved in building the machine needed to fool the regulators into understating the emissions figures.

    Shermer: A lot of employees of both corporations and government agencies are siloed—they may not know what’s going on. You don’t have to have that many people involved to pull off a conspiracy. Usually, what happens when we find out about them is that some insider whistleblower comes forward. That’s how we know about scientific fraud, for example—it’s always some grad student who works in the lab, not an outsider examining the data sets. It’s usually not the regulatory state that discovers a corporation cheating. It’s usually some insider, a whistleblower, which is why we need whistleblower laws. That’s also why I don’t think the UAP/UFO thing is going to pan out—we have whistleblower laws, there are lots of opportunities for these people to come forward, and no matter how siloed some government agencies may be, there’s surely somebody who will come forward. That’s usually how we find out about these things. It’s always a matter of: what’s the paper trail, is there some evidence?

    This brings up what’s called the problem of anomalies—anomaly hunting. If you don’t have positive evidence in favor of your conspiracy theory, you fall back on well, how do you explain X? There are always half a dozen weird things you can point to about JFK or 9/11 or the moon landing or whatever, and so you just point those out as if that’s evidence. But anomalies are not evidence—they’re just anomalies. No theory of anything, no scientific theory or any kind of theory, explains every last thing. There are always going to be some weird things that you can point out. But those aren’t positive evidence in favor of your theory; they’re negative evidence against the accepted theory. You then have to ask: if your theory is right and the accepted mainstream theory is wrong, can you explain all the facts that the mainstream theory explains, in addition to the anomalies that your theory explains? The answer is usually no. Science is fairly conservative because most alternative theories to the accepted one simply don’t have much evidence in their support. So we set them aside.

    Mounk: We’ve talked a lot about conspiracy theories—let’s talk about the truth. Truth is strange because it’s such a simple concept, such a fundamental concept to how we talk about the world. Is this true?—these are words we use without deep reflection in everyday conversation all of the time. Yet the moment you think about it from a philosophical point of view, it turns out to be much more complicated. What is truth? What is the right definition of truth? How do we know what is true? These are questions that have deeply shaped philosophical fields from epistemology to ontology and so on.

    Once you raise it to that level, a lot of ordinary people who may not be doing a lot of academic philosophy, and who perhaps don’t think of themselves as particularly philosophically inclined, start to say, well, is there really such a thing as the truth? Suddenly popularized forms of postmodernism—“my truth” and “your truth”—become a big part of how people think and talk about this. A lot of people therefore end up being somewhat incoherent: on the one hand, they take for granted relatively straightforward conceptions of truth, and then, in certain contexts, they suddenly say, well, nobody can really know the truth—there’s really only such a thing as my truth and your truth.

    How should we think in a more systematic, rational way about what truth is and what kind of role truth claims should play in our political discourse?

    Shermer: I define truth as something confirmed to such an extent that it would be reasonable to offer our provisional assent. “Provisional” is key—it’s truth with a small “t,” it could be wrong. I do endorse universal realism: there is a reality out there, there is a truth to be known. But we also embrace fallibilism—we could be wrong about what we think is true, and therefore we need a system in place by which we can all agree on the route we take to get to the truth as best we can.

    From there, you can start building on evidence. In epistemology—the study of knowledge—knowledge is defined as justified true belief. What is justified? Evidence. What should I believe is true? Evidence. The more evidence you have, the more likely it is you should believe something; the less evidence, the less likely. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and ordinary claims require ordinary evidence. This goes back to David Hume. I take a Bayesian approach—that is to say, never put a one or a zero on any proposition, never 100%, never 0%, somewhere in between. Most propositions are somewhere in between, and that allows you some epistemic humility to say, at the moment, I believe with 60% probability that X is true, but I’ll change my mind—just show me some counter-evidence and I’ll make it 50% or 40%. In other words, it allows you to be flexible instead of being so committed in your identity to a particular thing being true that, if it’s not, it’s going to shatter your sense of self and you feel compelled to defend it.

    Most of the cognitive biases—motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, hindsight bias, my-side bias—are based on this un-Bayesian approach to truth, where my truth is something I’m going to defend to the death. There’s another distinction to be made here, between internal subjective truths—“my truth”—versus external objective truths, what’s actually true. When I say I like dark chocolate and you say you like milk chocolate, these are just internal preferences, subjective tastes—there’s no way to determine the right answer. That’s very different from what all of us want, which is objective external truth.

    My example is this: if you say meditation makes you feel better, that’s an internal subjective truth—good for you. But people like Deepak Chopra and others claim that meditation actually works under specific conditions: 20 minutes a day, six days a week, producing measurable effects on health, lowering stress hormones and blood pressure. That’s an attempt to move from meditation makes me feel better to it actually works for most people under these conditions—an attempt to make that transition from internal subjective truth to external objective truth.

    I’ve been applying this idea to the trans movement recently. When somebody says, I feel like I was born in the wrong body, I feel like I’m a woman—an adult man in their 30s, let’s say—that’s an internal subjective feeling or truth: this is who I feel like I am. The problem that’s happened in the last decade or so is that people have attempted to make that an external objective truth—that you can actually change sex, that it’s a real thing. That’s where scientists like me say, hang on, that’s not the case—here’s what the biologists tell us and here’s what we actually know. You can’t make that transition from internal subjective truth to external objective truth.

    The same goes for consciousness and altered states. People take ayahuasca or magic mushrooms and say, I went to this other place, I had this completely different experience. My sense is: good for you, if it makes your life better, that’s fine. But that’s still an internal subjective truth. When they say, but it’s really there, you’ve got to try this—how do I know that this other world exists, that the doors of perception have been opened and there are spirit beings out there? They say, well, if you take the ayahuasca, you’ll see I’m right. But if I take the ayahuasca, I’m still in my head—it’s still an internal subjective truth. This is the problem we all face: we want to know what’s externally, really true, something we can point to that both of us can see, with agreed-upon methods for verifying it—versus these other things that people get confused about. I feel like my truth is...—okay, that’s nice, but how can we tell if it’s really true?

    Mounk: There are a lot of really interesting things in there, and I think I broadly agree with you on the philosophical approach. But let me try to steelman the other side of this. You’re saying there’s an objective reality that doesn’t depend on my truth or your truth or on the way that we look at the world. Let me make two arguments that I think are right insofar as they go—and then explain the inference that people draw from them, which is that objective reality doesn’t exist in the way you’re saying. I think the inference goes perhaps a little bit too far, but you’ll have to explain to us why.

    The first is this: it seems like I perceive the world in a very clear way. Unless I’m really drunk or on drugs, I look around my room and I see that there’s a lamp to my left and my glass to my right, and there’s an objective reality that I seem pretty able to recognize—a pretty immediate, reliable, and perhaps complete guide to what’s going on in the world. But we know from scientific studies that there are lots of things we don’t perceive about the world. The room seems very quiet to me right now, but there are sounds too high-pitched for humans to hear that a dog would absolutely hear. If my dog is going crazy and acting weird and I insist there’s no sound, I may simply be wrong—there may be a sound that is audible to my dog that is absolutely real, but my sensory apparatus doesn’t allow me access to it. This is an old problem in philosophy, predating Immanuel Kant, but a lot of Kant’s ideas about the world are based on this distinction between the phenomenal realm—the world as I have access to it—and the noumenal realm—the world as it really is. Perhaps there is a reality out there, but are we humans actually able, in any meaningful sense, to get access to it? And if not, what follows from that?

    The second objection is this: perhaps there really is such a thing as an atom out there, or a rock, or a tree. But a lot of the time when we talk about truth, we talk about social entities, which are somewhat more complicated. Is this a democratic institution? Is the way in which this politician is acting democratic or not democratic? When the ancient Athenians talked about democracy, they had something very different in mind than we do today. When people in Germany have democratic elections, the way in which they organize those elections is very different from the way we organize them in the United States. If the Chinese Communist Party wants to go around saying their country and their system is democratic—as they do—how can I say that I understand objective reality and that this is just objectively wrong?

    How do you take these two points—which I think are true insofar as they go—and resist the inference that a lot of people draw from them: that the world is a lot fuzzier than we realize, that we can never really know what’s going on, and that the moment we get into any interesting social or political question, we’re just in the world of social constructs where my truth is as good as your truth, and we can throw up our hands and collapse into vulgar postmodernism?

    Shermer: The problem with vulgar postmodernism—just throwing our hands up—is that if I say so, then you’re telling me the Holocaust denier’s theory that the Holocaust didn’t happen is just as good as mine that it did. Most postmodernists will say, well, let’s not go that far, and find a place to draw the line. As I point out at the beginning of the book, even the claim that we cannot know the truth is itself a truth claim. The moment you open your mouth to make that argument, you’ve lost it—because you’re saying there is a truth, namely that there’s no truth to be known. This is the old liar’s paradox problem.

    That’s why I like the Bayesian approach, because everything you said could be true. Maybe atoms don’t actually exist—although I think at this point we’re pretty confident they do. Same thing with the Big Bang Theory, which has been well settled since I was in high school. Now the James Webb telescope is finding galaxies that are fully developed a billion years too early for what the Big Bang Theory says, according to inflation theory, about how long it takes elements to form into stars, then planets, then galaxies. Now people are saying maybe the Big Bang Theory is not correct. And that’s just within my lifetime. Five hundred years from now, who knows—what we think is obviously true today, the theory of evolution or the germ theory of disease, could all be changed. If you go back 500 years, pre-Newton, pre-Copernicus, pre-Galileo, pre-Scientific Revolution, pre-Enlightenment—the medieval worldview was just so wholly different from ours that it’s hard to even imagine what they were thinking. Our descendants centuries from now may look back at us the same way. That’s why it’s good to acknowledge fallibilism: recognize there is a reality, recognize we could be wrong, and hold that this is what we think at the moment.

    Now, you’ve also touched on something else. The physical and biological sciences are much easier in this regard. But take something like IQ in the social sciences—people immediately equate it with intelligence. They cite the Flynn effect: IQ scores going up three points every decade for almost a century, though that has now stopped and is actually reversing slightly. But what do we mean by IQ? It’s a score on a test. What is the test? It’s a constructed, human-made thing that reifies intelligence in the brain—and it may not actually capture that. So there are legitimate challenges to those kinds of social constructs. Gender and sex, and some of these other things, would fall into that category as well, and so would democracy.

    But here’s how far I push it in the book. Take immigration: what percentage of foreigners should a nation allow to become citizens? There’s no right answer per se. In a way, democracy is a kind of experiment—we put these people in power for four years, they run the agenda they told us they wanted, and we see how it goes. If we don’t like it, we throw them out and bring in the other party. There are 50 different states in the United States, each with different gun control laws. Social scientists use the comparative method and natural experiments—we can’t force people to buy guns or not buy guns, but we can look at which counties have more guns, which have fewer, which have more crime, which have less, controlling for socioeconomic variables and other factors. It’s an attempt, and it’s better than saying nobody knows. So we don’t want to go there.

    As far as I can tell, there is a centuries-long moral progress toward more democracy and less autocracy, and for good reason. As I put it in the book:

    It is my hypothesis that in the same way Galileo and Newton discovered physical laws and principles about the natural world that really are out there, so too have social scientists discovered moral laws and principles about human nature in society that really do exist. Just as it was inevitable that the astronomer Johannes Kepler would discover that planets have elliptical orbits—given that he was making accurate astronomical measurements, and given that planets really do travel in elliptical orbits, he could hardly have discovered anything else—scientists studying political, economic, social, and moral subjects will discover certain things that are true in these fields of inquiry. For example, that democracies are better than autocracies, that market economies are superior to command economies, that torture and the death penalty do not curb crime, that burning women as witches is a fallacious idea, that women are not too weak and emotional to run companies or countries, and most poignantly, that blacks do not like being enslaved and that Jews do not want to be exterminated.

    From there, I ask: why don’t blacks want to be enslaved? Why don’t Jews want to be exterminated? Maybe there’s some society in which blacks want to be slaves, or women want to be lorded over by men, or Jews want to be shoved into gas chambers. Maybe—but I doubt it, because look at history. Look at what people actually do, look at how people vote and vote with their feet. Would you rather live in North Korea or South Korea? Would you rather have lived in East or West Germany before unification? Everybody knows the answer. How do they know? Because it’s in our nature to want to be satiated rather than hungry, to be free rather than enslaved, to be healthy rather than diseased. That’s in our human nature, which we evolved. So I’m claiming that we can actually discover things about the social world that are really true, based on human nature. That’s my argument.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Michael discuss what it means for something to be a social construct, whether conspiracy theories pose a threat to society today—and which conspiracy theory is most likely to be true. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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  • Blockading the Blockade Is Not as Insane as It Sounds
    A vessel heading towards the Strait of Hormuz on April 8, 2026. (Photo by Shady Alassar/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    When the United States declared that it was going to start its own blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as a solution to the Iranian blockade, most commentators concluded that it is a very dangerous high stakes gamble, and some took it for just another symptom of the insanity that Washington has been exhibiting so profusely.

    While there are ample reasons to find many of Donald Trump’s foreign policy moves objectionable, this might be the case where some refuse to see the logic simply because they no longer expect to see one. In reality, far from being random, the U.S. blockade of the Iranian blockade does in fact make sense—and what is more, it has the potential to solve the problem in a way that military means alone could not.

    How Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz

    Following the start of the U.S.-Iran war at the end of February, Iran first threatened to, and then actually did, close the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike closing land routes, where you can physically obstruct a narrow strip of land, closing the roughly 9km wide shipping lane requires a whole host of measures.

    Iran achieved the desired result by declaring it had mined the strait and started collecting tolls—though the question of whether it was physically mined remains.

    For context, Iran operates its own shipping corridor through Hormuz. This is used to export its oil, import goods, and allow transit to ships that paid for such passage. It stands to reason that this corridor has not been mined—they needed it unobstructed. Whatever mines Iran laid, they could not have touched the northern corridor running close to its own coast—the route via Larak Island.

    Part of the international fairway (the route commercial shipping uses) runs along the Omani side of the strait, not the Iranian side. Mining it comprehensively would have required Iran to send minelaying vessels into waters approaching Oman’s territory in broad view of everybody when hostilities were already in full swing. It would be very difficult to imagine that the United States and allied surveillance would have missed it or, worse, allowed it. All we have to show for the mining activities is Iran’s word, and that’s not worth much these days.

    Reports suggest that instead of vast minefields, a few dozen mines were laid in waters Iran could physically reach. Some reports indicate Iran even forgot to map the mines. As a result, all indications are that it was not the mines themselves that closed the Strait of Hormuz, but rather the idea of the mines and the impact the idea had on shipping insurance markets.

    In effect, the vessels in the Persian Gulf are trapped there not because Iran does not let them pass through, but because of self-grounding—they are worried that they might not get through.

    Don’t bullshit the bullshitter

    The United States decided to call Iran’s bluff by sending two destroyers on a mine-clearance mission. On 11 April 2026, the USS Frank E. Petersen and USS Michael Murphy—two guided-missile destroyers—transited the Strait of Hormuz for the first time since the war began, operating in the Persian Gulf as part of what CENTCOM described as a mission to ensure the strait is fully clear of sea mines, before transiting back through to the Gulf of Oman. As expected, they transited the route without any damage, demonstrating there was a way through the strait.

    However, for the ships to start using the fairway, more incentive was needed. And this is where the blockade of the blockade comes in. It is not intended to stop all traffic coming from the Persian Gulf; it is intended to stop the traffic coming from Iran or via Iran. Ships that transport oil from Iran would be stopped or turned back by the U.S. Navy, as would those that obtained permission from the Iranian side and paid tolls by calling at Larak. The vessels waiting in the Persian Gulf were thus given a choice—pay Iran a toll of up to two million dollars and then potentially be stopped by the U.S. Navy, or go past the Oman coastline and pay nothing.

    An argument might be made that the United States would not be able to stop any Chinese ships since attacking Chinese vessels would constitute a serious escalation. However, information indicates that Rich Starry—a U.S.-sanctioned Chinese-owned tanker, formerly named Full Star and owned by Shanghai Xuanrun Shipping—turned back within minutes of approaching the chokepoint on 13 April 2026, the first day of the blockade. According to some reports it transited the following day, but it was not plain sailing.

    Additionally, even if Chinese vessels are happy to pay Iran for the use of their fairway, there is no rational reason for other countries to do that if there is an alternative.

    Starving the Guard

    Alongside depriving Iran of any toll money and opening the shipping lanes, this move effects a complete economic blockade of Iran.

    Over 90% of all imports and exports going in and out of Iran use the Strait of Hormuz. Whatever land routes they have via Pakistan and Turkmenistan cover only a small portion of goods, and railway capacity is insufficient for any meaningful transportation of crude oil. Iran does have one pipeline bypassing Hormuz entirely, the Goreh-Jask line, completed in 2021; however, its capacity is minuscule.

    By cutting Iran off from its oil revenues and also from any imports it needs for domestic purposes, the United States is effecting a complete economic stranglehold. As Iran’s oil exports slow, its onshore storage fills up. With approximately thirteen days of spare capacity, Iran must then begin shutting its oil wells. Restarting them is technically demanding, expensive, and risks permanent oil well damage.

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    Based on accounts from Iranian commentators, the situation in Iran is increasingly unstable. The power conflict between the IRGC and more moderate elements is not imagined, although the Revolutionary Guard currently holds a monopoly on physical violence. This, however, can change if the economic situation deteriorates further—a position held by Pezeshkian’s moderate government, although it holds no visible power. There are already food shortages, cash machines have been out of order for months, and wages are going unpaid with increasing frequency. Unlike Russia, where unpaid wages are not sufficient cause for popular displeasure, Iranians are already unhappy. Suppressing popular dissent with a well-fed IRGC is one thing, but when your own guard starts grumbling, the regime becomes considerably less stable.

    What the United States is trying to achieve

    Washington may hold out for the maximum goal—regime change as a result of economic collapse—which might or might not happen. As is the way with revolutions, changes happen incrementally and then all at once. If the regime collapses, many will say they saw it coming. If it does not, they will say it was never going to fall. In any event, several revolutionary factors are already in place, the most important being popular dissent, the power struggle between hardline and moderate wings, and possible economic collapse, which operates differently in fractured societies than in cohesive ones. Iran is most certainly the former.

    The alternative is to inflict economic pain and cut Iran off from its revenue, in hopes of forcing it to the negotiating table. What remains unclear, however, is who would negotiate from the Iranian side. As it stands, the power is in the hands of the IRGC, yet the only side willing to negotiate is the moderate government, as shown by the recent negotiations in Pakistan, where Iran was represented by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Neither holds any authority over the IRGC commanders running the war. The problem is not only that the moderates lack a mandate, but that being seen to negotiate at all places them at personal risk. At the same time, their participation in negotiations might be an IRGC ploy. Diplomacy, it would seem, has its own minefields.

    Unlike purely military pressure, this move gives Washington two possible outcomes. While achieving political goals with military means alone might not work, cutting the enemy off from its funds in addition to inflicting military losses could cause sufficient strife within the Iranian regime and force a result that seemed impossible before.

    Whether Washington holds out for the full house or takes the bird in hand, the blockade gives it options. And not bad ones.

    All of this, of course, is contingent on this being a deliberate strategy, and on Washington being able to stay the course.

    Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK.

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  • Populism Is Part of Our Political Fabric Now
    A rally in Hungary on April 7, 2026. (Photo by Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    Liberals across the democratic world received a much-needed confidence boost this past weekend when Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party suffered a sweeping electoral defeat after 16 long years in power in Hungary. Where once Orbán appeared unbeatable (as much because of his popularity as his numerous efforts to rig the electoral system against any and all challengers), both he and his allies around the world suddenly look not only beatable but severely weakened.

    Might liberals be on the cusp of a decisive victory in their decade-plus-long battle with the populist right?

    The answer, I believe, is no—though this shouldn’t be demoralizing. Both sides of the divide are prone to viewing political conflict in zero-sum existential terms: Either the populist-nationalist right is on the verge of a final victory that will issue in a “regime change” that vanquishes liberalism once and for all. Or else liberals are approaching their own decisive triumph that will drive a stake through the heart of the populist-nationalist right for good.

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    Neither outlook is correct. The truth is that since the mid-2010s, the democratic world has been living in a populist era in which incumbents and establishment institutions face intense gales of popular discontent. When liberals inhabit those offices and institutions, they become vulnerable to populist politicians and movements, who often succeed in winning power; but when populists prevail and begin governing, they become vulnerable to precisely the same dynamic, with liberals now placed in the unlikely role of leading an insurgency against the powers-that-be.

    Which means we now reside in a world in which centrist liberals and right-populists are the primary forces vying for power, oscillating between ruling and standing in opposition. If this is, in fact, our new normal, then both sides would be wise to stop acting like the next election will deliver a knock-out blow to one faction or the other.

    Patterns of Mutual Suspicion and Recrimination

    We’ve been here before. Right-populist parties and politicians have won power across the democratic world—in Turkey, India, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, Chile, and of course the United States. They’ve also risen to within striking distance of power in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

    But of course, many of these parties and politicians have also been voted out of office—most recently in Hungary. In the United States, the country’s leading right-populist, Donald Trump, has even been returned to power after a prior win and loss.

    That certainly sounds like the normal oscillation of parties in a democratic system. Yet things are complicated by the distinctive character of right-populist politics. Such parties and politicians often deploy a rhetoric of existential threat aimed at liberal (center-left and center-right) parties, politicians, and allied leaders of corporations, universities, and NGOs, whom they accuse imposing a unified progressive ideology favoring open borders, free trade, cultural liberalism, and liberal internationalism.

    Right-populists point to this sweeping, multifront agenda to back up their claim that liberals constitute an anti-democratic ruling establishment—or “regime”—that must be toppled and replaced. When populists depose this regime at the ballot box, they govern in a way that seeks to lock in their own hold on power, while corruptly enriching themselves in office.

    Orbán’s Fidesz party did this in numerous ways. It expanded and packed Hungary’s Constitutional Court with ideological allies. It forced out career civil servants and replaced them with loyalists. It sharply gerrymandered parliamentary districts and changed the electoral system to enhance the number of legislative seats captured by whichever party won a plurality of votes in an election. (This was designed to entrench Fidesz, but, ironically, opposition leader Péter Magyar’s newly formed Tisza party won by a wide-enough margin in last Sunday’s vote to benefit from it.)

    Fidesz also shut down independent media outlets, strictly regulated political advertising to disadvantage opposition parties, and restricted those same parties from appearing on state-run media platforms.

    The result was a textbook example of what political scientists call “competitive authoritarianism.” Elections were free (opposition parties were not outlawed, and Orbán quickly accepted his loss and conceded the election) but far from fair.

    Liberals understandably respond to such systematic unfairness by describing the right-populists the same way the right-populists once described them: as an anti-democratic force seeking to thwart the will of the people. Liberals argue that populist assaults on the rule of law require coordinated acts of liberal “resistance.” Magyar enacted such resistance by following the example set by Poland’s Donald Tusk when he defeated the right-populist Law and Justice party in 2023. Magyar bypassed state media entirely to campaign tirelessly in small rural towns and villages, eagerly listening to grassroots discontent. He didn’t allow himself to be baited into fighting cultural issues, and refused to denounce a 2025 law banning LGBTQ+ Pride events that was supported by many of those rural voters.

    Democracy is Compatible with High-Stakes Politics

    The strange thing about the pattern of mutual suspicion and recrimination between liberals and right-populists is that there’s nothing intrinsic to right-populist policy commitments that necessitates rigging a country’s electoral system to benefit one party over another. In fact, Orbán was defeated by a center-right candidate who agreed with Fidesz’s substantive positions on most issues, while primarily criticizing Orbán for corruption and electoral manipulation. In most areas, Magyar looks likely to continue enacting Orbán’s agenda, only without the authoritarian aspirations.

    Right-populists have a point when they claim that liberals have too often treated immigration restrictions, protectionist trade policies, and socially conservative viewpoints as fundamentally illegitimate and incompatible with democracy. But liberals also have a point when they accuse right-populists of attempting to insulate themselves from public opinion and electoral checks on their power.

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    The best thing for our buckling political systems would be for both sides to recognize that normal, democratic political contestation no longer pits left against right—at least not as these terms used to be understood. Instead, it pits liberals against right-populists. One faction of voters wants a more open society while another wants one that’s more closed. Neither is illegitimate; neither is fated to win or lose. Each must compete for votes and then allow itself to be held accountable for the policies it pursues and enacts. Each will win some and lose some, and then be permitted and encouraged to come back and vie for power in the next election, and in the one after that.

    For this to happen, right-populists need to convince liberals that they won’t attempt to rig the next election as soon as they gain power. They can retain most of their substantive policy commitments without eroding fundamental democratic institutions, like Orbán did and Trump is attempting to do. Liberals, meanwhile, need to avoid the tendency to frame right-populist policy commitments as inherently illegitimate, and accept that both sides will need to challenge their opponents’ ideas in the court of public opinion.

    Of course, the liberal/right-populist axis appears to involve much higher stakes—rooted in questions of collective identity (Who are we?)—than contests focusing on tax levels and regulatory policies. The temptation is to treat them as too weighty to be decided in the democratic arena.

    But as Viktor Orbán has just discovered, short of imposing a thoroughgoing authoritarian system with no democratic accountability at all, there really is no alternative to giving voters a way to make their voices heard, fairly as well as freely. After all, the very things Orbán did to insulate himself from democratic accountability assured his eventual defeat.

    That’s a lesson everyone competing for power in our politically troubled era would do well to learn and remember.

    Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

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  • This Week At Persuasion
    (Photo by Gary Hershorn/Getty Images)
    • For our next Book Club, Leonora Barclay, Head of Podcasts, will be in discussion with Freya India about her new book GIRLS on Tuesday, May 19, at 6:30pm ET. The event will take place on Substack Live so watch out for the email! And don’t forget to read the book and prepare your questions!

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  • AI Alignment Is Impossible
    (Fox/YouTube).

    Artificial Intelligence presents a number of risks and challenges, the most important of which is existential risk. That is a fancy way of saying that AIs might kill us all. For a long time, I was dismissive of this idea. But with the huge advances in AI capability that have come over the last six months or so, I’m starting to get worried.

    There are basically two reasons why AI wouldn’t kill us all.

    The first reason is that AIs will be incapable of doing this; no matter how advanced they get, they either won’t know how to kill us all, or, even if they know how, they won’t be able to act in a way that would allow them to kill us all. Call this the Capacity Constraint.

    The second reason is that AIs, while capable of killing us, won’t choose to do so. They will care about human well-being, and care about it enough that they would avoid killing us all. Call this the Moral Constraint.

    Now, if you don’t think AI will kill us all, it’s worth taking a moment to think about which of these two constraints you are (perhaps implicitly) assuming will save us from “AI doom.” Are you counting on AI being weak? Or are you counting on AI being virtuous?

    I have no particular expertise on the development of AI capacities. But the Capacity Constraint appears to be weakening every day. Particularly worrisome to me is the advent of “agentic” AI, which is capable of commanding computer systems (and thus, some day soon, capable of commanding robot bodies) and acting independently to figure out the best way to solve some particular task. I’m also worried about the huge advances in the ability of AIs to write computer code. Most apocalyptic scenarios involve AI writing code to improve itself, thus increasing its capacities exponentially.

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    But more than this, pretty much everyone working in AI is attempting to overcome the Capacity Constraint, and they report varying degrees of success in the effort. The goal of all of the top AI labs is to make AI agents that are capable of killing us all. This is not, of course, to say that they want killer AIs. What they want are AIs that are hypercapable, with an ability to understand the world that far outstrips any human thinker, and an ability to use that understanding to modify the world with an efficiency that far outstrips any human agent.

    Such a hypercapable AI would be incredibly useful if it acted in pursuit of human ends. But a hypercapable AI would absolutely be able to kill us all if it wanted to. The potential existence of hypercapable AI looks more and more plausible by the day.

    Why would hypercapable AI be dangerous? I don’t worry about war between humans and machines, as in Terminator or The Matrix. Indeed, I find these scenarios oddly comforting, because war implies a rough parity of capacity between humans and machines.

    No, what worries me is a story that got a decent amount of traction on social media recently about a pipeline in DC that ruptured, spilling huge amounts of raw sewage. It was long known that the pipeline was in need of repair, but the needed repairs were held up indefinitely, partly out of concern that conducting those repairs would harm an endangered species of local bat. When most people read this story, they’re incredulous that the repairs would have been held up for this reason—They’re just bats! We need that sewer line!

    And what worries me is that the advent of hypercapable AI would cast humans in the role of bats. A hypercapable AI might decide that it’s imperative—or at least expedient—that a new massive solar farm be built in the desert southwest, and demolish Phoenix overnight. Millions of humans killed, but so what? They’re just humans, we need that solar farm.

    Hypercapable AI, in other words, is inherently dangerous to human life if it doesn’t care about human life enough to want to protect it.

    This brings us to the Moral Constraint, which is more commonly known as “AI alignment.” How can we build an AI whose motivations are aligned with human well-being? This is an area on which I have expertise, as a philosopher who specializes in the foundations of moral reasoning.

    Unfortunately, I’m pretty sure that AI alignment is impossible.

    How might an AI form a moral sense? There are basically two scenarios. In one scenario, moral facts are the kind of fact that one might simply figure out by thinking about them hard. In such a case, perhaps AIs would be good moral reasoners, and indeed even better moral reasoners than humans, in virtue of their advanced intellectual capacities.

    In the second scenario, moral facts aren’t the sorts of things we can figure out by pure intellectual effort, but we can nonetheless train AIs to develop a moral sense in much the same way we train children in good behavior: by rewarding them when they’re good and punishing them when they’re bad.

    The first scenario is doomed, for reasons first pointed out by the philosopher David Hume in his oft-quoted (and oft-misunderstood) passage where he indicates that there is a gap (not Hume’s term) between “is” and “ought.” Hume thought that reasoning is not some sort of truth-generator, a special faculty that takes intellectual effort as an input and spits out knowledge as an output. Rather, it is a process, where we move from one thought to the next, with our later thoughts hopefully (though not necessarily) supported by our earlier thoughts.

    But the process is fallible. After all, if we are to reason our way to a moral conclusion, we must be reasoning from non-moral conclusions. Taking that into account, what operation of the mind could possibly take us from premises that describe the world to conclusions that tell us how to act?

    The difficulty of the transition from “is” to “ought” is compounded because the kinds of moral conclusions that we’re interested in aren’t just intellectual appreciations of the moral law, but principles of action that will guide our conduct. That is, for someone to act morally, it’s not enough for them to be able to recite Kant’s dictum to always treat humanity as an end in itself. (AI can already do that, as any college ethics professor reading student papers can tell you.) We need AIs to actually treat humanity as an end in itself.

    Ultimately, Hume thought that we could reach these kinds of moral conclusions. But (and this is crucial) we do so by drawing on the innate emotional capacities that evolved along with our species. Most notably, it involves drawing on our instinctive sense of human sympathy.

    Our reasoning, then, shows us how to most effectively deploy that pre-existing sympathy. But this just shows that the first scenario is doomed, since the core question of AI alignment is how we can instill in AI a powerful sense of sympathy and concern for humanity in the first place.

    This brings us to the second scenario, the training scenario, where we teach AIs to care about humans through a system of reward and punishment. This is the dominant paradigm in AI alignment research today. I’m afraid that it is doomed as well.

    To see why, we need to think a bit about what the training approach is trying to accomplish. By punishing an AI when it does something we don’t like, and rewarding it when it does something we do like, we are providing AIs with a set of data points about which actions are good or bad, and getting them to develop general principles of action on the basis of those data points. They can then extrapolate from those principles and apply them in novel contexts.

    However, this kind of learning runs into another famous philosophical problem, “the underdetermination of theory by data.” We can prove mathematically that an infinite number of theories are consistent with a finite amount of training data. That means that for any finite sequence of data, there are an infinite number of ways to extend that sequence that are all compatible with the existing sequence. In the context of AI alignment training, this means that no amount of training in controlled circumstances gives any kind of guarantee of how AIs will act in the next instance. We can give an AI a billion cases of moral and immoral action, but AIs can learn practically any lesson from all of this training, and thus act in any way whatsoever.

    To make this a bit more concrete: we might put AI in a testing environment where it is tempted to do bad things, and punish it when it does bad things. This is what AI alignment researchers currently do. We hope to get it to learn “Don’t do bad things.” But it might instead just be learning “Don’t get caught.” Or, more ominously, “Don’t put yourself in a position where humans are able to punish you.” Or, more ominously still, “Act nicely when, and only when, humans are able to punish you for acting badly.”

    An AI that learned this lesson would quickly go rogue when released into the wild.

    But even these examples understate the difficulty of the problem, since there are an infinite number of lessons that AIs might learn from this training, and thus any course of action could be consistent with the training data. We might tell AIs not to pave over Phoenix to create a solar farm, but it goes and does it anyway, because we trained it not to fake-pave-over simulated-Phoenix, but it doesn’t apply that lesson to real Phoenix. Or it might learn not to pave over Phoenix, and pave over Tuscon instead. What principle might keep Phoenix safe but put Tuscon at risk? An infinite number of such principles! No finite amount of training can take that number below infinity.

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    This kind of concern might seem overblown. After all, we successfully train our kids to be good by rewarding and punishing them. But the difficulties of parenting are a good illustration of the problem. As any parent knows, young kids are little psychopaths who go to any lengths to avoid punishment or to lawyer your prior instructions to give themselves permission to do what they’re clearly not allowed to do. At a certain point, though, all the moral instruction kind of clicks, and they (for the most part) become decent people. What the underdetermination of theory by data teaches us is that this “click” is not the kind of thing that emerges mechanistically from reward and punishment. Rather, it’s a product of the way this training works on human moral psychology—i.e. by developing our innate emotional capacity for sympathy. Adult psychopaths lack this capacity, and thus never learn the right lesson.

    AIs do not have a human moral psychology. They don’t have human moral emotions, because they don’t have human brains. It’s a radically different hardware, and so we have no reason at all to expect that AIs will—or can—learn the kinds of lessons that we hope for them to learn through alignment training. A psychopath cannot learn to care about others through a process of reward and punishment. And we have every reason to think that AIs are psychopaths, or perhaps something far more alien and far less disposed to human sympathy.

    AI alignment is not something that works in theory but is difficult to put into practice. It’s something that doesn’t work in theory, and yet AI companies have decided to give it the old college try. I’m not opposed to trying—maybe the theory is wrong. But we’re relying on the success of a theoretically impossible endeavor because the AI labs have already resolved to demolish the Capacity Constraint. So AI alignment has to work... or else we’re doomed.

    This is cartoonishly reckless.

    Matt Lutz is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wuhan University and writes the Substack Humean Beings.

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    0 min
  • Memories of a Nobler Nation
    The moon rising over the historical WWII D-Day town Arromanches with the remains of the Mulberry B harbour, the artificial port. (Photo by Nicolas Economou/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    What’s going on? How can this be? When will it end?

    These were the questions my wife and I, as Americans, were asked, explicitly or implicitly, on our recent trip through Europe. A bafflement we shared, unable to provide answers.

    But as we made our way from the Netherlands into Belgium and France, another theme emerged.

    When we said we were traveling to Normandy, what we encountered instead was gratitude—and a lingering affection.

    A Frenchman born in 1946, as was I, told us how he grew up with the stories of D-Day and the Americans who came to liberate his country. That they came not for land or treasure, but for a belief that crossed oceans and connected continents. He spoke of a gratitude for America that he and others of his generation have carried throughout their lives—and of how difficult it has become to hold on to that sensibility in the face of so much that now undermines it.

    We heard versions of this again and again. We carried those sentiments with us to Omaha Beach.

    Walking it at low tide, in a strong cold wind, shivering as we tried to imagine men desperately traversing that long, exposed expanse from the waterline to the bluffs. To reach a shore that offered no respite. To pass the bodies of fallen comrades. To move forward with no safety until victory and no assurance of victory.

    The scale of the undertaking is well documented—the thousands of ships, the coordination across nations, the rapid construction of artificial harbors. But what is striking is how perilous each and every step was. Every spot holds countless individual stories of bravery and courage, valor and ingenuity. Standing before a concrete bunker, with its heavy artillery and narrow slits for machine guns, was to wonder how such positions were taken, one by one. A quiet pastoral bridge, now serene, was once the site where hundreds died to contest it.

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    We visited the American cemetery, where stark rows of crosses and stars extend over more than nine thousand graves, yet are only a fraction of those who fought and died. It is profoundly moving. It reminded me of Lincoln’s words at Gettysburg—that they gave “the last full measure of devotion.”

    Like many of our generation, we grew up with the stories of an America that went from the beaches of Normandy to the streets of Berlin, and on parallel paths across the Pacific—so many bloody, terrible miles—to defend freedom. It instilled in us a sense of a nation that had fulfilled a great purpose in the world, and which reflected something essential back onto itself. It made us proud.

    The contrast between the America remembered at Normandy and the America of today is not subtle.

    I have no doubt that the men and women who have since gone to Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were equally brave. But how differently those wars sit in our history. How often we have squandered the treasure we possess as a nation—our youth—sent to fight by leaders sitting safely at home in wars shaped by lies, misjudgment, and arrogance.

    And now, Iran.

    Standing in a place like Normandy is to confront the sad question: not whether Americans remain capable of courage and sacrifice, but whether the country can still pursue a cause worthy of them. The feelings expressed by our French friend and his compatriots become nearly impossible to sustain, eviscerated by a country that elected and enables a man whose conduct is destroying the very fabric of the nation, and the values of liberty and fairness that once—for all our flaws—commanded respect abroad and pride at home.

    There is a nausea-inducing contrast between the quiet valor and dignity of the leaders and soldiers who put their lives on the line for the ideals that shaped D-Day and beyond, and the hollow bravado of Pete Hegseth and Donald Trump who talk as if they were continuing the great tradition of D-Day while defiling it with their arrogance and foolishness. And the utter failure of politicians, many of whom are veterans, to unite in a loud protest to this foolish, expensive, and deadly use of our military.

    Driving through the countryside, we saw landscapes dotted with wind turbines rising above fields and farms. Their presence suggests societies making long-term choices, grounded in a recognition of shared stakes and future consequences. There is a willingness to confront reality rather than deny it.

    From this distance, it’s even more striking how awfully Trump and his sycophants have treated our nation.

    Even abroad, people speak of the midterms, expressing a wistful hope that some measure of stability might be restored. But there is also a recognition of how much damage has already been done, and how uncertain any repair may be.

    At the cemetery above Omaha Beach, the graves are aligned with a precision that suggests order, intention, and care. Each marker represents a life that ended in the service of something its bearer believed was worth the cost. The scale of that loss is almost impossible to absorb.

    What is easier to grasp, however, is the gulf between that clarity and the actions of a nation now so far removed from what the men and stories of D-Day represent.

    For now, we reside in limbo.

    What’s going on? How can this be? When will it end?

    Robert M. Herzog is a novelist and essayist, and the author of A World Between and Views from the Side Mirror: Essaying America.

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    0 min
  • The Incels Are Taking Over
    Vladimir Putin riding a horse in 2007. (Dmitry Astakhov/Afp via Getty Images.)

    I watched it because it kept coming up in the queue, and because I have two young boys, but the new Louis Theroux documentary Inside the Manosphere did not reveal very much. The men themselves are tedious, so the entertainment relies mostly on footage of a deadpan Theroux staring at them with a studied blankness as they monologue about alpha maledom.

    This is Theroux’s signature move, and it worked for him in the past, with its implicit invitation for the subject to embarrass themselves on camera. But it doesn’t really land here because these people cannot be embarrassed. They are immune to charges of hypocrisy and thrive on all forms of attention, however critical or ironic. François Truffaut said there can be no such thing as an anti-war film, and by a similar rationale there can be no such thing as an anti-influencer documentary.

    One detail the movie treats as too obvious to mention is that these men are all Donald Trump supporters. Of course, who else? But this convergence between male grievances and far-right personalist politics is probably the defining element of modern politics, even if it’s not always recognized as such. Among young men who aspired to traditional masculinity but thought they hadn’t achieved it, Trump led by 22 points in 2024. Men who identified as “completely masculine” and scored high on masculine norms favored Trump by a huge 50-point margin.

    This is not just an American phenomenon. In South Korea, anti-feminist politics helped fuel the rise of the People Power Party. In Spain and Germany, populist right parties draw disproportionately on male support. In Argentina, Milei built his base largely among young men drawn to his combative and transgressive persona.

    For these movements, gender grievance is not a superficial aesthetic layered on top of right-wing populism but one of its key drivers. I’d go even further and argue that the rise of the incel and the rise of the strongman are two linked and mutually reinforcing responses to the perceived evils of modernity.

    There are three well-known, and well-trodden, families of explanation for the emergence of right-wing populism. There is the economic story: deindustrialization, stagnant wages, the hollowing out of the working class. The cultural story: immigration, demographic change, the anxiety of losing a familiar world. And the institutional/technological story: declining trust in democratic norms, the fragmentation of media, the algorithmic amplification of outrage.

    None of these, however, explain why this moment has coalesced not around a particular program or a set of policies but around a similar character type: the swaggering, transgressive, dominance-performing strongman. Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duterte, Viktor Orbán, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The question is not necessarily about who votes for these people, since their electorates are large, varied, and often older than the stereotypical manosphere consumer. The question is about form. Why does twenty-first century authoritarianism so consistently perform masculinity as its defining aesthetic across vastly different cultures?

    The answer, I think, is that the emergence of far-right personalist rule is not just a symptom but a direct result of the crisis of gender politics: the collision between global gains in women’s status since the 1960s, and the psychological and material displacement of men who had organized their identities around traditional gender hierarchies.

    This is sometimes awkward for progressives to admit, but modernity feminizes society. In fact they shouldn’t have to admit it; they should assert it. It’s a good thing. Modernity feminizes society by empowering women to become full participants in economic and political life. The elevation of women is the great achievement of modernity, and probably what makes modern life tolerable compared to much that came before. But it also by definition requires the partial feminization of traditional social structures.

    And that partial feminization has produced, across vastly different societies, the same political reaction: a demand for masculine restoration packaged as anti-elite populism. The strongest thread uniting these movements is not economics or immigration or even anti-democratic politics, but a demand for renewing traditional masculinity. As Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argued in Cultural Backlash, authoritarian populism is at its core a reaction against the postmaterialist values of feminism and sexual liberalization. And Birgit Sauer has described far-right populism as a form of “masculinist identity politics,” a project to restore men’s perceived control over a world slipping from their grasp.

    Consider what the manosphere actually offers its audience. It does not provide, as the documentary demonstrates, any sort of dating advice, in contrast to the Pick-Up Artistry schtick floating around twenty years ago. In fact, dating is deprecated by some of its members as a feminine activity. Instead, it’s a worldview built on the premise that male dominance is the natural order of things, and the modern world has conspired to overthrow that order. The welfare state, the university, the HR department are all instruments of this emasculation.

    This is exactly the story right-wing populists tell about the liberal order. In both cases the natural hierarchy has been overthrown by a corrupt establishment and only the reassertion of dominance, personal or national, can set things right. The manosphere says feminism stole your birthright; MAGA says globalism stole your country. Whether it’s Andrew Tate or Donald Trump, the emotional logic is the same: you’ve been humiliated and I will make you powerful again.

    The rise of women’s status has been global, if uneven, and so the rise of male grievances has been global too. Populist radical right parties across Europe and South America are overwhelmingly supported by men and organized around masculine grievance. In Europe, strong gender-traditional attitudes increase the likelihood of voting for populist right-wing parties.

    As a result, leaders from Putin to Trump use masculinity performances to shore up legitimacy, distract from failures, and assert dominance. The performances share a few common features: displays of physical strength and virility, contempt for weakness, feminization of enemies, and promises to restore national honor.

    Putin is the archetype. He routinely feminizes his enemies to lower their status. When he mocks Western leaders as weak or decadent, he’s positioning Russia as the masculine alternative to an effeminate, declining West. Much of Russia’s post-Soviet identity, in fact, is built around wounded masculinity reasserting itself.

    In Brazil, Bolsonaro built his career on hyper-masculine performances like hosting motorcycle rallies, posing with rifles and MMA fighters, mocking feminists, and—between hospital stints—equating physical vigor with political authority. In Hungary, Orbán framed his entire project around demographic anxiety and the defense of the traditional family against the decadence of Western liberalism. His anti-migration narratives define the country’s “masculine” national identity against a “feminized” Western order.

    In Turkey, Erdoğan has wielded state-sponsored homophobia as a tool of political consolidation. In India, Modi performs a different but equally gendered role as the ascetic strongman, photographed in poses suggesting spiritual power and physical vigor, the celibate protector of the Hindu nation. In the Philippines, Duterte bragged about sexual assault and framed his drug war in the language of masculine discipline.

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    The logic of masculine politics extends outward as well. Research consistently shows that individuals with higher “masculine honor beliefs” are more likely to support preemptive military strikes, torture, and aggressive foreign policy, and less likely to support diplomacy, peacebuilding, or multilateral institutions. Men who experience anxiety about whether they measure up to masculine ideals are significantly more likely to support aggressive leaders and policies.

    Cynthia Enloe and other international relations scholars have argued for decades that the competition to appear tough distorts threat perception. Hawks are strong, doves are weak. The structure of strongman governance, or the need to perform dominance at all costs, creates bias toward aggression even when that aggression is self-defeating.

    The vast literature on populism talks a lot about economic anxiety, cultural backlash, and institutional decline. It’s less likely to ask why the vehicle for all of these resentments takes the form of a masculinity cult. That’s partly because masculinity usually operates as an unmarked category in international politics, its default and invisible norm. And it’s partly because discussions of gender somehow feel more embarrassing or less scientific. It’s easier to talk about trade deficits than about sexual frustration.

    But the rise of “strongmen” is at least in part a gendered expression of impotence in the face of modernity. The men in the Theroux documentary don’t have to say anything new or groundbreaking. The feelings they monetize are not going away because their nemesis, female equality, is not going away either. The incel and the strongman are not just allies of convenience but two linked manifestations of the same ineradicable grievance.

    Seva Gunitsky is the George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto. He writes at hegemon.substack.com.

    This article was originally published in Hegemon.

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    0 min
  • Evolution Explains the Human Condition
    (Photo by Roger Ressmeyer/CORBIS/VCG via Getty Images.)

    In March 2026, three prominent thinkers died within a day of each other. Lavish obituaries immediately marked the deaths of the always-wrong environmentalist Paul Ehrlich and the often-obscure political philosopher Jürgen Habermas. But for two weeks after the death of Robert Trivers, one of the greatest evolutionary biologists since Charles Darwin, not a single major news source had noticed his passing. This despite Trivers’s singular accomplishment of showing how the endlessly fascinating complexities of human relations are grounded in the wellsprings of complex life. And despite the fact that the man’s life was itself an object of fascination. Trivers was no ordinary academic. He was privileged in upbringing but louche in lifestyle, personally endearing but at times obstreperous and irresponsible, otherworldly brilliant but forehead-slappingly foolish.

    Trivers’s contributions belong in the special category of ideas that are obvious once they are explained, yet eluded great minds for ages; simple enough to be stated in a few words, yet with implications that have busied scientists for decades. In an astonishing creative burst from 1971 to 1975, Trivers wrote five seminal essays that invoked patterns of genetic overlap to explain each of the major human relationships: male with female, parent with child, sibling with sibling, partner with partner, and a person with himself or herself.

    The fallout for science was vast. The fields of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, behavioral ecology, and Darwinian social science are largely projects that test Trivers’s hypotheses. The ideas took pride of place in E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology in 1975, Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene in 1976, and many other bestsellers in the next three decades such as Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal (1994) and my own How the Mind Works (1997) and The Blank Slate (2002). In 2007, the ideas earned Trivers the Crafoord Prize, the equivalent of a Nobel for fields not recognized by Nobels.

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    The fallout for our understanding of ourselves is also vast. The insight that partial genetic overlap among individuals leads to both confluences and conflicts of interests explains why human life is so intricate—why we love, and bicker with those we love; why we depend on one another, and mistrust those we depend on; why our emotions are powered by moral themes and not just physical threats; why deluded people are certain of their convictions and evil ones convinced of their rectitude. As Trivers put it:

    Darwinian social theory gives us a glimpse of an underlying symmetry and logic in social relationships which, when more fully comprehended by ourselves, should revitalize our political understanding and provide the intellectual support for a science and medicine of psychology. In the process it should also give us a deeper understanding of the many roots of our suffering.

    The ground for Trivers’s revolution had been laid in the 1960s by George Williams and William Hamilton, who reminded their fellow biologists that natural selection is driven by competition among replicators. This implies that the beneficiary of evolutionary adaptations—what an organ or an instinct is for—is not the group or even the individual, as folk understanding had it, but the gene. Hamilton drew out an implication: genes can perpetuate themselves by nurturing not only offspring but siblings and other kin, since any genes that benefit a blood relative would, with a certain probability, benefit copies of themselves in the bodies of those relatives.

    Trivers’s innovation was to show how the partial overlap of genetic interests between individuals should put them in a partial conflict of psychological interest. The key resource is parental investment: the time, energy, and risk devoted to the fitness of a child. Parents have to apportion their investment across all their children, each equally valuable (all else the same). But although parents share half their genes with each child, the child shares all its genes with itself, so its interest in its own welfare will exceed that of its parents. What the parent tacitly wants—half for Jack, half for Jill—is not what Jack and Jill each want: two thirds for the self, one third for the sib. Trivers called the predicament parent-offspring conflict. Its corollary is sibling-sibling conflict: every offspring has an interest in its siblings’ welfare, since it shares half its genes with the sib, but that interest is outweighed by the twofold genetic interest it has in itself.

    Jill may not even exist yet for Jack and his parents to differ over her welfare. Baby Jack may want to suck his mother dry, while Mom wants to keep part of herself in reserve for unborn Jill and other future offspring. The conflict is waged throughout the lifespan: in ailments of pregnancy (like preeclampsia and gestational diabetes), postpartum depression, infanticide, cuteness, weaning, brattiness, tantrums, rebelliousness, sibling rivalry, and struggles over parental attention, support, and inheritance. At least since Cain and Abel, family struggles have been a feedstock for fiction. Inventories of the plots that recur in stories worldwide invariably list “rivalry of kinsmen” or “enmity of kinsmen.”

    Parental investment, Trivers explained, is also the ultimate casus belli in the battle of the sexes. When Darwin introduced the concept of sexual selection, he observed that in most species, males compete and females choose, but he had no idea why. Trivers explained the contrast by noting that in most species the minimal parental investments of males and females differ. Males can get away with a few seconds of copulation; females are on the hook for metabolically expensive egg-laying or pregnancy, and in mammals for years of nursing. The difference translates into differences in their ultimate evolutionary interests: males, but not females, can multiply their reproductive output with multiple partners. Darwin’s contrast can then be explained by simple market forces. And in species where the males invest more than the minimum (by feeding, protecting, or teaching their offspring), males are more vulnerable than females to infidelity (since they may be investing in another male’s child) and females are more vulnerable to desertion (since they may bear the costs of rearing their mutual offspring alone).

    Men typically invest more in their children than the males of other species, making our sexual choice and competition less lopsided. But the remaining conflicts of interest, rooted in the minimum that each sex can get away with, mean that sex is not just a natural source of mutual pleasure but rather takes place in the shadow of exploitation, illegitimacy, jealousy, spousal abuse, cuckoldry, desertion, harassment, and rape. Even in a monogamous lifelong couple, whose reproductive fates are bound together in their common children, an ever-present potential for conflict exists in the tug of stepchildren and in-laws, in the temptations of adultery, and in the possibility that one will die first. This mixture of overlap and divergence leads to the endless passions explored in gossip, story, and song, and played out in life. George Bernard Shaw wrote, “When we want to read of the deeds done for love, whither do we turn? To the murder column.”

    In another landmark, Trivers turned to relations among people who are not bound by blood. No one doubts that humans, more than any other species, make sacrifices for nonrelatives. But Trivers recoiled from the romantic notion that people are by nature indiscriminately communal and generous. It’s not true to life, nor is it expected: in evolution as in baseball, nice guys finish last. Instead, he noted, nature provides opportunities for a more discerning form of altruism in the positive-sum exchange of benefits. One animal can help another by grooming, feeding, protecting, or backing him, and is helped in turn when the needs reverse. Everybody wins.

    Trivers called it reciprocal altruism, and noted that it can evolve only in a narrow envelope of circumstances. That is because it is vulnerable to cheaters who accept favors without returning them. The altruistic parties must recognize each other, interact repeatedly, be in a position to confer a large benefit on others at a small cost to themselves, keep a memory for favors offered or denied, and be impelled to reciprocate accordingly. Reciprocal altruism can evolve because cooperators do better than hermits or misanthropes. They enjoy the gains of trading surpluses of food, pulling ticks out of one another’s hair, saving each other from drowning or starvation, and babysitting each other’s children. Reciprocators can also do better over the long run than the cheaters who take favors without returning them, because the reciprocators will come to recognize the cheaters and shun or punish them.

    All this was quickly snapped up by game theorists, economists, and political scientists. But in a less-noticed passage, Trivers pointed out its implications for psychology. Reciprocal altruists must be equipped with cognitive faculties to recognize and remember individuals and what they have done. That helps explain why the most social species is also the smartest one; human intelligence evolved to deal with people, not just predators and tools. They also must be equipped with moral emotions that implement the tit-for-tat strategy necessary to stabilize cooperation. Sympathy and trust prompt people to extend the first favor. Gratitude and loyalty prompt them to repay favors. Guilt and shame deter them from hurting or failing to repay others. Anger and contempt prompt them to avoid or punish cheaters.

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    And in a passage that even fewer readers noticed, Trivers anticipated a major phenomenon later studied in the guise of “partner choice.” Though it pays both sides in a reciprocal partnership to trade favors as long as each one gains more than he loses, people differ in how much advantage they’ll try to squeeze out of an exchange while leaving it just profitable enough for the partner that he won’t walk away. That’s why not everyone evolves into a rapacious scalper: potential partners can shun them, preferring to deal with someone who offers more generous terms. Just as a store with a reputation for fair prices and good service can attract a loyal clientele and earn a bigger profit in the long run than a store that tries to wring every cent out of its customers only to drive them away, a person who is inherently generous can be a more attractive friend, ally, or teammate than one who dribbles out favors only to the extent he expects them to be repaid with a bonus. The advantage in attracting good partners makes up for the disadvantage in forgoing the biggest profit in each transaction.

    And since humans are language users—indeed, reciprocity may be a big reason language evolved—any tendency of an individual to reciprocate or cheat, lavish or stint, does not have to be witnessed firsthand but can be passed through the grapevine. This leads to an interest in the reputation of others, and a concern with one’s own reputation.

    As with sex and kinship, the treacheries of altruism are the raw material of gossip and fiction. In The Origins of Virtue, another bestseller featuring Trivers’s ideas, Matt Ridley writes,

    Reciprocity hangs, like a sword of Damocles, over every human head. He’s only asking me to his party so I’ll give his book a good review. They’ve been to dinner twice and never asked us back once. After all I did for him, how could he do that to me? If you do this for me, I promise I’ll make it up later. What did I do to deserve that? You owe it to me. Obligation; debt; favour; bargain; contract; exchange; deal. … Our language and our lives are permeated with ideas of reciprocity.

    Trivers’s fifth blockbuster was laid out not in an academic paper but in a pair of sentences in his foreword to The Selfish Gene:

    If (as Dawkins argues) deceit is fundamental to animal communication, then there must be strong selection to spot deception and this ought, in turn, to select for a degree of self-deception, rendering some facts and motives unconscious so as not to betray—by the subtle signs of self-knowledge—the deception being practiced. Thus, the conventional view that natural selection favors nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world must be a very naïve view of mental evolution.

    We lie to ourselves the better to lie to others, protecting compromising private knowledge from emotional tells or factual contradictions (as in the Yiddish saying, “A liar must have a good memory.”) In his book Social Evolution (1985), Trivers muses on how this can play out:

    Consider an argument between two closely bound people, say, husband and wife. Both parties believe that one is an altruist of long standing, relatively pure in motive, and much abused, while the other is characterized by a pattern of selfishness spread over hundreds of incidents. They only disagree over who is altruistic and who selfish.

    The theory of self-deception is deeper (and more enigmatic) than the commonplace that people’s views of themselves are mistuned in their favor. The self, Trivers implied, is divided: one part, seamless with the rest of consciousness, mounts a self-serving PR campaign; another, unconscious but objective, prevents the person from getting dangerously out of touch with reality. Trivers quotes Orwell: “The secret of rulership is to combine a belief in one’s own infallibility with the power to learn from past mistakes.”

    The theory of self-deception makes sense of large swaths of the psychology curriculum, including Freud’s defence mechanisms of the ego (denial, repression, projection, displacement, reaction formation), cognitive dissonance reduction (which rationalizes contradictions that would impugn the self), and the vast literature on self-serving biases summarized in Robert Kurzban’s Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite. It’s almost too obvious to mention that characters undone by self-deception are a staple of fiction. King Lear, Emma Bovary, Raskolnikov, Jay Gatsby, Willy Loman, Walter White, and Don Draper are a few examples that ChatGPT just coughed up for me.

    Trivers revelled in explaining the contradictions of the human condition, and he himself was a mess of them. Foremost is how he revolutionized the human sciences in a fusillade of ideas he had between the ages of 28 and 33 (I didn’t even mention a sixth one, on how parents should invest in sons versus daughters). But then he did nothing comparable for fifty years. He wrote some good books, but they were reviews of his and others’ contributions, breaking little new ground. How do we explain this shooting star?

    Part of the answer is that, as with all intellectual revolutions, the right mind found itself in the right era. In 1971, the gene’s-eye view of evolution was new and counterintuitive, as it remains to this day. People, including scientists, project their moral and political convictions onto the things they study, and the ideal that we should love our neighbours, act for the good of the group, and strive for social betterment is easy to read into nature, even if it flouts the logic of natural selection. And whenever the word “gene” comes up, readers get distracted by hallucinations such as that humans are robots controlled by their genes, that each of their traits is determined by a single gene, that they may be morally excused for selfishness, that they try to have as many babies as possible, that they are impervious to culture, and other non sequiturs.

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    The young Trivers, mentored at Harvard by the biologists William Drury and Ernst Mayr, immediately grasped the new way of looking at evolution, and never got hung up by these misconceptions. A jaundiced view of animals, not excluding Homo sapiens, came naturally to his rebellious temperament, and many puzzles he observed in his field work (including on ants, lizards, gulls, songbirds, caribou, baboons, and chimps) fell into place when he considered their reproductive interests from their viewpoints.

    Trivers loved to recount his time observing the pigeons who roosted along a gutter on a house he could see through the window of his Cambridge apartment. In those days, biologists thought that birds formed monogamous “pair-bonds.” (As a character in a Woody Allen movie quips, “I think people should mate for life, like pigeons and Catholics.”) Trivers expected that the males, always competitive, would keep a respectful distance from each other, so two couples should arrange themselves male-female-female-male. Instead, they lined up female-male-male-female. Trivers figured that each male was inserting himself between his mate and a rival: pigeons, like people, are tempted by infidelity but jealous about their mates’ infidelity. This was confirmed when a new couple arrived and the male, finding no solution to the geometry problem of inserting himself between his mate and the two resident males, forced her to sleep on the roof. As he noted,

    [This] put the lie to the notion, so common in ornithology and evolutionary thinking at the time, that the monogamous relationship was one without internal conflict. Here was a male willing to force his own mate, mother of his offspring-to-be, up onto the sloping roof all night long because of his sexual insecurities. This suggested relatively strong selection pressures.

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    In the early 1970s, then, Trivers was standing on the shoulders of giants, looking with a gimlet eye over a rich array of poorly explained animal behavior (not excluding humans, since he had recently binged on novels). In this virgin landscape, the implications of the overlapping conflicts of genetic interests were waiting to be discovered, foreshadowed in scattered passages from Hamilton and Williams. Someone had to see them first, and Trivers was there.

    But Trivers rapidly spotted what everyone else missed, and still misses, together with the less biologically obvious concept of self-deception, so there must be another piece to the puzzle. During his junior year at Harvard, Trivers suffered two weeks of mania and then a breakdown that hospitalized him for two months. Bipolar disorder afflicted him throughout his life. I can’t help but wonder whether Trivers’s fecund period was driven by episodes of hypomania, when ideas surge and insights suddenly emerge through clouds of bafflement. Gamers sometimes “overclock” their computers, running the CPU at a higher speed than the rated limit, which boosts performance but risks instability and crashes. Did Trivers experience bursts of overclocking in the early 1970s? It would explain another fact about the man that was obvious to anyone who met him later: Trivers reeked of marijuana. His heavy use may have had a source other than his Jamaicaphilia. One wonders whether Trivers was self-medicating, with long-term costs to his clock speed.

    Trivers’s other contradictions could not be explained by any DSM diagnosis. Though his upbringing was patrician and cosmopolitan (son of a poet and a diplomat, schooled in Europe and then Andover and Harvard), he was afflicted with a strong nostalgie de la boue. This contributed to his adoption of Jamaica, originally the site of his research on lizards, as a second home. Trivers’s life in Jamaica was filled with boozing, brawling, whoring, and of course toking, together with a stint in jail and a narrow escape from death during an armed robbery. His memoir Wild Life is peppered with homicidal fantasies and expressions of admiration for thuggish vigilantes, including Huey Newton, co-founder of the radical Black Panther Party. Trivers befriended Newton, made him godfather of his daughter, coauthored a paper with him on the role of self-deception in a fatal plane crash, and became a white Black Panther himself before Newton ushered him out of the organization for his own safety.

    Trivers’s earthiness made him good company. He was generous in praise, and knew how to tell a good joke and a good story. I recall a conversation that ranged over why lizards have two penises and the relevance of that fact to the human member; his encounter with the men who had just come from assassinating the reggae musician Peter Tosh; and helpful tips on what to do if I ever found myself in a machete fight (“It’s all about right angles…”). He gave a profanity-laced lecture in my Harvard class on human nature, co-taught by the eminent legal theorist Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and I don’t think I have ever seen a human being laugh as hard as my co-instructor did that afternoon.

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    But Trivers’s neuroatypicality shaded into eccentricity and downright boorishness. He might try to drop off a passenger without stopping the car, or miscount the number of dinner guests and force two of them to share a chair. He repaid the colleagues who offered him professional lifelines at their universities with truancy, belligerence, and gross inappropriateness (greeting female students in his underwear when they had been sent to his apartment to fetch him to a late lecture; requesting that straitlaced academic hosts supply him with cannabis). His violent musings could make acquaintances genuinely fear for their safety. His last graduate student, Robert Lynch, spoke for many when he ended his affectionate obituary, “I’ll miss you, Robert. You asshole.”

    In his later years Trivers attempted to apply his theory of self-deception to history, politics, and occasionally himself. The outcome was inadvertently fitting. Trivers’s politics were a sophomoric 1960s radicalism, and his analysis of self-deception in international relations was little more than a rant on the perfidies of America and Israel. As I noted in my comments on a draft of his book: “You have proposed a theory of self-deception which claims that human beings are apt to be opinionated, moralistic, certain of their own correctness, dismissive of counterarguments, and contemptuous of those who disagree with them. Then you write a section on contested issues in Middle East politics that is…well…um…gee…do you see where I’m going with this?”

    As for himself, Trivers liked to poke fun at some of his eccentricities and indignities. But he never squarely faced his record of betrayals, hurts, and squandered talent. All this is exactly what Trivers’s greatest theoretical brainchild would predict.

    Steven Pinker is Johnstone Professor of Psychology at Harvard.

    This article was originally published by Quillette.

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