Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • AI Companies Aren’t Evil. But They Are Reckless.

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    Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei. (Photo by Fabrice Coffrini / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Earlier this year, a prominent company with millions of customers announced a major product upgrade—albeit with one little catch.

    If this new product was released to the public, the company said, it could be used to disrupt—and perhaps destroy—civilizational infrastructure, from financial markets to transportation systems to power and water utilities.

    But fear not! The company hastened to reassure the public that it had the situation under control. The company would decide, on its own terms, what the world needed to know, who should be called in to contain the problem, and how much gratitude the rest of us should feel for being spared a catastrophe we never knew was coming. No public accountability or government intervention required.

    This, of course, is the story of Anthropic and its latest AI model.

    Anthropic discovered that the model, known as Mythos, could autonomously identify zero-day vulnerabilities—that is, security flaws that software makers don’t know exist—across every major operating system and web browser. Some of the flaws Mythos found were decades old, overlooked and unnoticed by literally millions of human eyes. This was not an intended feature, but one that the AI seems to have picked up along the way, as Anthropic’s developers rushed to create a more powerful model with better reasoning and coding abilities.

    Intentional or not, it introduced a substantial new danger to the world. In the wrong hands, Mythos could be a weapon fit for a supervillain—a cheat code for attacking the world’s most critical infrastructure.

    And yet, the decision to build such an advanced model was not made by any external agency. No independent body evaluated it. No regulator was notified in advance.

    And once the threat was identified, Anthropic decided—alone—what to do about it. After judging Mythos too dangerous for public release, Anthropic created a private consortium made up of handpicked partners like Amazon, Apple, Cisco, JPMorgan Chase, and Nvidia to fix the bugs and ensure Mythos’ safety.

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    With that all worked out, they gave policymakers and the public a heads-up on their dangerous new product and the plan to contain it.

    This is what passes for AI governance in 2026: a single company accidentally builds an entity powerful enough to pose an existential threat to the digital systems that power modern life, unilaterally decides how to deal with it, and then loops in everyone else.

    Except of course, it’s not at all clear that they’re dealing with it: A few weeks after all this transpired, we learn that Mythos was, in fact, accessed by unauthorized users. Was catastrophe avoided, or merely delayed? We may yet find out.

    Mythos is the clearest evidence yet that our system for developing, assessing, and disseminating powerful AI systems is dangerously dysfunctional.

    As tempting as it is to blame this dysfunction on bad actors or rogue tech CEOs, I think it’s something deeper than that: a broken incentive structure. As careless as their actions may sometimes seem, AI developers aren’t being intentionally malevolent—they’re rationally operating within a system that rewards chasing progress now and worrying about consequences later.

    The leading AI companies, armed with billions in capital, are all sprinting toward the same horizon with an imperative to cross the finish line first. They all have the same motivation: “If I don’t build it, someone else will.”

    That logic co-exists with a genuine belief that AI may prove to be a transformative force for good, generating productivity in unimagined new ways and pointing the way forward for progress. AI’s potential benefits have been exhaustively documented—whether to address climate change or to enhance medicine or simply to widen our horizons—but at this stage in the AI era, we all have to acknowledge that AI is accompanied by myriad harms, from job loss to manipulative engagement to cognitive offloading to AI psychosis to AI-assisted suicide and murder.

    The scale of these numerous challenges demands a response as wide and deep as our society. One self-interested company or a hand-picked corporate consortium can’t be trusted to get it right—the issue is far larger than that. The solution, should we get there, will require public understanding and engagement, and government oversight.

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    To those that claim AI is too complex, too consequential, or too powerful to govern: you’re wrong. In reality, this argument is—at best—a shoddy defense of the broken incentive structure producing it.

    Because AI is complex, we have a responsibility to comprehend it. And because AI is so consequential, we have a responsibility to govern it. Institutions, policymakers, and regulators have been understandably disoriented by the AI frenzy of the last few years, but now must rise above the noise and rewrite misaligned incentives. That means—yes—establishing a role for government in the AI sphere. Concerns about governmental efficacy are understandable, but government must be meaningfully engaged. There simply is no other manifestation of the will of the public.

    We have governed consequential technologies before: automobiles, aviation, pharmaceuticals, nuclear energy, and more. Every one of these industries today operates inside a hard-won system of accountability—a system that took time to build but, crucially, did not kill innovation. It’s time to apply the same rules and accountability structures to AI, and with even more urgency, considering how quickly it is integrating into virtually every aspect of our society.

    And the fact is, no meaningful federal regulation of AI currently exists. States have stepped up to fill the void, with 73 AI laws—ranging from protecting kids online to ensuring a human is in the loop when it comes to critical decisions like healthcare—enacted across 27 states in 2025. But states’ reach is increasingly limited, with Trump issuing an executive order in December directed against “excessive state regulation.” The tech industry, meanwhile, has worked to paralyze regulation at every turn, with AI companies pouring money into Super PACs to support tech-friendly candidates and block state regulatory laws.

    So what could a meaningful regulatory structure actually look like, assuming the political will for it materialized? Let’s take Mythos as a test case.

    Under a more rational governance framework, a tool with society-altering capabilities like that of AI would face mandatory pre-deployment testing by independent evaluators—not the company selling the product.

    There would be standardized public reporting of risks, so that regulators, businesses, and users could make informed decisions rather than relying on what the developer chooses to disclose. There would be real whistleblower protections for employees inside AI labs who see something wrong and want to say so.

    And if an AI product caused foreseeable harm after its release, the company that built and deployed it would bear legal responsibility. Liability is what aligns private incentives with public safety. It’s why cars have seatbelts and airbags—not because manufacturers wanted them, but because they knew they would pay the price for cutting corners and because insurers and legislators aggressively pushed safety measures. The same logic applies here.

    These two principles—safety and transparency before deployment; and a genuine duty of care to the public—are key to establishing a framework for orienting policymakers, companies, and citizens towards what responsible AI actually requires.

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    None of this is radical. It’s all standard with existing products. And all of it is overdue.

    Mythos is just the latest and most egregious evidence that we cannot keep relying on the judgment of individual companies to stand in for the public accountability structures we’ve so far refused to build around AI. The next threat may not be discovered in time. Or it might come from a company more desperate to succeed in an incentive structure that rewards reckless behavior.

    We’ve done this before. We have the tools. It’s time we reclaim our future with principles that will protect us, individually and collectively.

    Julie Guirado is the Executive Director of the Center for Humane Technology and oversees its AI Roadmap.

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    0 min
  • Episode 186: Odd Arne Westad on the Coming Storm

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    This week, Richard talks to Odd Arne Westad, author of The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict, and Warnings from History (Henry Holt).

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Bhaasita Athani

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    29 min
  • Lant Pritchett on Why Foreign Aid Misses the Point

    Lant Pritchett is a development economist from Idaho. Having now thrice retired, he is currently a Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics in the School of Public Policy and the co-founder and Research Director of Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP).

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Lant Pritchett discuss why the traditional foreign aid approach to development is fundamentally misguided, how countries actually achieve prosperity through organic national transformation, and whether the classic path to development remains viable in the 21st century.

    Will you be in London on Sunday, September 6? I’ll be interviewing Francis Fukuyama about his life and thought to mark the publication of his memoir In the Realm of the Last Man at the Sekforde at 5pm. Find out more and book tickets here. Paying subscribers can access a code for free tickets here. —Yascha

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: When I talk to people who care a lot about economic development, they love to talk about inclusive development, about sustainable development. They tend to focus on how much more affluent countries should donate to less affluent countries, perhaps figuring out what the best intervention is—whether foreign aid should be spent on this kind of thing or on that kind of thing. Not to simplify, but you think that whole approach is basically wrong. Why is that?

    Lant Pritchett: What I think of when I think of development is what we call “getting to Denmark.” There was a historical process whereby many countries—not just Western countries, but other countries—had a fourfold transformation. They had a transformation from a low productivity to a high productivity economy, and it was mostly broad-based. That is economic growth, and inclusive economic growth, if you want to add the adjective. They also went through a transformation of acquiring state capability—the ability of the public sector to do things that needed to be done, like regulation and providing certain services. They also went through a transformation from subject to citizen, to a polity that was based on responsiveness to the needs and wishes of the citizen rather than vice versa. They also went through this harder-to-describe transition of equality under the rule of law, whereby kith and kin and other identities became reduced in importance and everybody was treated equally.

    That is what development meant in the post-decolonization era, after World War II, as countries became independent from their colonial overlords. It meant this big fourfold transformation. Foreign aid can be modestly helpful with that, but it is not very central to it. The more you think about donors and what donations should be and what the right interventions are, the more you lose the plot.

    In my papers, I show that if you get to what I call national development—this fourfold process—that is a machinery for producing good things. We are worried about whether people have clean water, decent housing, and all of these material things that are really good for people to have. But if you get to national development, you get to that, and vice versa.

    There is a big question of whether what we talk about as foreign aid is aid to the process of national development, or whether it is aid to mitigating the worst consequences for human well-being of that lack of national development. The latter is not a strategy for the former. By and large, a lot of the development agencies lost the plot completely and became essentially charity organizations focused on mitigating the worst consequences of the fact that many countries had not acquired national development.

    There is nothing wrong with that. Mitigating terrible things that happen to human beings because they live in a country that is underdeveloped is a good thing. But it is not development. Too much attention to the latter detracts attention from the core issue.

    Mounk: Is the concern here simply that this money is being spent on things that don’t actually help to solve a problem in the long term—that the most effective use of that money would be to invest in things that actually help solve these underlying problems, and therefore make the country more affluent so there is not as much poverty or human desperation that you need to buffer with these donations? Or is it more profound than that—that those donor dollars in some ways make it harder for that process to take place, that they might in some complicated way backfire? Is the concern mostly about efforts wasted, or efforts that might in some complicated way impede the country that is supposedly being helped from solving its long-term problems?

    Pritchett: The big problem is more about ideas than it is about the concrete use of money. I have what I call the “bird on the elephant” theory of development. Development agencies are spending all this money, financing projects—some of them economic projects like roads and bridges and power plants, and some of them charity-like projects funding health interventions and the like. But that is in some sense secondary to the fact that this creates a global discourse about development and about how countries can do development.

    I am much more worried about the waste of effort on ideas. We have geniuses—truly stunning geniuses—devoting themselves to charity work as opposed to thinking about development strategy. Ideas are supremely important to the fate of nations, and the ideas that get transmitted via a global discourse of research and practice, to government officials, to people in power, to people who have influence—that is a huge deal. Obviously the most consequential thing that has happened in the last 50 years is the leadership of China changing its mind about what to do in China and how to make China a better place to live. That was, fundamentally, a change of ideas. By losing the plot on national development in favor of mitigation, we also draw the discourse, the research, and the ideas away from big questions: How do we get states to be more capable? What is the right sequencing of state capability and democracy? How does democracy interact with the creation of economic growth—does it impede it or not? The number of people in the world who can produce new, original, and correct ideas is very few, and drawing those people onto small issues is a huge loss.

    I don’t think aid is often counterproductive. Some of my friends—Bill Easterly, and Angus Deaton—think that aid can sometimes foster mentalities and practices that impede development. I think the elephant is mostly neutral. But if the bird, who sits on top of the elephant and sees what is going on, warns the herd of impending dangers, and can provide a vision—if that gets messed up, then the whole elephant is diminished.

    Mounk: Let’s take a step back. One of the intuitive things about what you’re saying is that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France didn’t become rich because some much richer countries said, we’re going to give you a bunch of development aid. These were mostly internal processes, obviously with an international component—trade with each other and so on. So it stands to reason that if we want to think about how countries like India or Kenya might become rich in the future, it would probably be by following some of the same kind of processes.

    Now, a certain kind of progressive critic would respond by saying that there is an economic structure in the world and that these countries are in some ways interdependent. If you’re one of the most developed countries in the world, you can specialize in high-return services, for example. If you are much poorer than those countries, then you can’t follow the same development path as those that developed historically, because you occupy a different niche in the economy. The other difference, of course, is just the stage of development. A lot of the countries that grew rich in the 19th and early 20th century did so through industry and manufacturing. But nowadays most wealth is not created in factories—it’s created in the knowledge sector, in the service industries. Perhaps the same kind of path to development just isn’t open anymore. When I was in India, a lot of people were worried about whether the traditional path to development is still available in the 21st century.

    What do you think about that? Can you broadly follow the same playbook that made the rich countries of the world rich in the past? Or do we actually need to look for a different path, either because of a change in the nature of the world economy or because of the different relative standing of the poorest countries in the world within it?

    Pritchett: Your question brought up two very different strands that we shouldn’t conflate. One is the path being organic and being driven by a country’s own dynamic. If you take, say, Dieter Mikloski’s work, the key to all of this was creating an environment in which you can give it a go. That is distinct from the question of specifically what, economically, a country is going to do. The question of whether the path that Denmark took is open to Kenya has two very different components.

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    One is the deeper question: can Kenya develop an organic dynamic within its polity, society, and economy such that the actors find a path for Kenya to become prosperous? That is the true endogenous process. The second question is, when Kenya organizes itself to find that path, will it look like the specific economic path that Denmark followed? The answer to the latter is certainly no—and no in both a good way and a more challenging way.

    The first way the answer is no: what happened—and I wrote a paper a long time ago called “Divergence Big Time” that emphasized this—is that the rich countries in 1870 were not that advanced relative to the most lagging countries, because there is a floor. There is only so poor you can be. What has happened in the world is that the rich countries have done this through exponential growth. They have created the basic hockey stick graph.

    The rich countries collectively grew at 2% a year for 120 years, and the power of compound exponential growth means they are manifold richer than they were in 1870. But in the process, they invented and discovered a great many things—in science, in practice, and in all kinds of domains—that weren’t available in the world in 1870 but are available in 1970 or 2026. This means the countries that enter this process later have the potential to grow incredibly faster than any rich country grew.

    None of the countries that were rich in 1970 or 1980 were rich because they grew fast. They were rich because they grew steadily. But that created the possibility that later countries could accelerate their growth enormously. The fast-growing countries in the world are growing incredibly faster than they did historically. China, Korea, Vietnam—growing at 6% per capita wasn’t an option for Denmark, which just had to stay on 2%. That is the good news. Countries that, in whatever way, manage this endogenous process that creates an organic drive for prosperity can discover ways to grow incredibly faster than was available to the old countries that had to make their own way.

    We have seen incredibly good news, and we don’t want to lose the plot on that. The years since World War II have been the best years for improvement of the material condition of humankind by a multiple of any prior period. I work some on education. The average person in the developing world had roughly two years of education in 1950 and has eight now. From whoever your mythic forebears were—Adam and Eve, let’s say—to 1950, humanity had accumulated two years of education. In just 60 years, it added six. Three times more education was added in 60 years than in all of human history combined. That is true of health. That is true of a whole range of things. Just fantastic progress.

    Take child mortality. There were all kinds of countries in the world 50 years ago where basically one in five children was dying before the age of five—a rate of around 200 per thousand. Worldwide, that is now down to around 30. Many people in the world in 1950 were living in material conditions not that much different from ancient Greece or ancient Egypt. Even today, if you compare Egypt in AD 1—when Joseph and Mary went to visit—to some of the poorest African countries today, they are at roughly the same level of GDP. For a very long period of human history there was very little progress, and then it accelerated dramatically. From all of human history, we got to still one in five children dying around 1960, and now that figure has fallen enormously. If you look at the people with access to electric power, people with access to water and sanitation—it has just been an amazingly good run.

    These questions always start from the assumption that the global order is preventing progress, and that is just surreal when you look at the world over the last 60 years. There has been amazing progress in many places on many things, and this isn’t just a matter of measuring GDP.

    Mounk: One illustration of that from my own life: when I was an undergraduate in England in the early 2000s, there were big debates about the World Trade Organization. The shape of the debate, and I remember this vividly, was always whether this was going to screw over China and India—whether the World Trade Organization was just a smart way for the rich countries of the world to keep the poor countries from developing. Today, when you look at the critiques of letting China into the WTO, it is exactly the opposite. The question is whether America screwed itself over, or screwed its working class over, by letting China in—which led to a huge increase in wealth in China and rapid deindustrialization in parts of the US.

    You can take seriously the idea that there were some mistakes made in how that was done and what impact it had on the working class in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and other places. But if you have to choose, from the standpoint of humanity, between those two scenarios, we have ended up with the much better one. We have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty to genuine middle-class status in China. Perhaps we could have done that a little bit better, with less disruptive consequences for the already pretty affluent people in the United States. Perhaps that’s a red herring. But it is striking to what extent the progressive case against things like the WTO in 2000 has completely flipped on its head in terms of how we talk about it today.

    Pritchett: One of my favorite colleagues and friends at the Kennedy School was Dani Rodrik. If you look at Dani Rodrik’s intellectual trajectory, his most recent book is about shared prosperity, which is hugely concerned about the prosperity of the middle class in America and how the global system hasn’t been good for it—versus his earlier concerns about the WTO and whether its trade structure was truly open to facilitating the growth of poor countries. It turns out we had the opposite problem from the one we thought we were going to have.

    Absolute poverty in the world has just amazingly declined. Every discussion of the world and how it’s going needs to start from that factual basis. Hans Rosling wrote a book called Factfulness—the fact is, on nearly every measure of material well-being, things are just fantastically better. In many dimensions, by the way, better than we would have expected even from the economic growth that we got. Sometimes people say, you economists focus just on economics, and we really should have focused on these other things. But if you look at the expansion of schooling, for instance, schooling expanded not by less than we would have expected from the economic growth we got, but way more. Just getting kids into school was one of the most phenomenally transformative things in history, and it happened more than we would have expected given the growth, not less. All of development was focused on expanding schooling. So you cannot say that economists focused on growth at the expense of these other things. That is just not true.

    Mounk: Let me push you on that—it’s a question I was going to pose in any case. There are a lot of people who are very skeptical of GDP as a metric. They think we can be incredibly rich and yet people are miserable. Society can be very rich in the aggregate, but only because a few people are incredibly rich and everybody else is incredibly poor. There are these standard examples that come up in conversation all the time. If I’m stuck in a traffic jam burning gas and not getting anywhere, that’s increasing GDP—so GDP is a really bad metric.

    You believe that GDP is in fact a very good metric of human well-being and that it correlates very strongly with things that we care about more directly. When listeners next encounter somebody who says GDP is a terrible metric we shouldn’t care about, what should they respond?

    Pritchett: I want to be clear: I don’t think GDP is a good metric of human well-being. GDP is a very good metric of the net production of a society, and that production creates the material basis for human well-being. GDP per capita is just factually very highly correlated with nearly everything we care about in terms of material well-being.

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    But here is the response you should make. The relationship between GDP and most things we care about in terms of material well-being is concave—meaning those things get better as GDP gets better, starting from poor levels to middle levels. By the time you reach a GDP per capita of roughly $40,000, you have met most of the basics of material well-being, and hence the relationship flattens out. It doesn’t go away necessarily, but it does flatten out.

    The real danger in the world discourse is that people unhappy sitting in traffic in Luxembourg—which I use as an example because the only time I went to Luxembourg I got caught in traffic—are right that their overall well-being is not that highly correlated with GDP, because their GDP is so high in the first place. But we shouldn’t extrapolate that back.

    Mounk: To put this point a little more polemically: it is very easy—and I grew up in that kind of milieu, not particularly affluent, but among artists and musicians in Germany living in pleasant towns—for people to say that the important thing in life isn’t to drive a big car and go on a fancy holiday, that there are things much more important than material well-being. Of course, if the floor of your society is that you have a decent apartment with heating and running water and you eat three meals a day, then that is probably true. But if you are sitting in a mud hut in a developing country, that is most assuredly untrue.

    Pritchett: One of the fundamental insights of economics is declining marginal utility—the more you have of something, the less important it is to you. If you say the West is suffering a paucity of purpose and people are unhappy because they don’t have some driving purpose, well, that is because they have already satisfied the purpose of having material things like a hot shower, a heated home, and the ability to go 300 miles in a few hours. Whereas most of humankind, for most of history and even today, is nowhere near that.

    I am happy for German artists to have angst about what their purpose in life is and whether they are really happy and whether more material goods would make them happy—and it probably won’t matter that much to them. But don’t project that back onto Africa, or conclude that India doesn’t need growth, or Bangladesh doesn’t need growth, or that we don’t really need to worry about whether those countries grow.

    The right response to the claim that GDP is a bad metric for improving the human condition is to ask: where are you on this spectrum of existing progress? Since you are likely having this conversation with people who are materially fantastically well off relative to any period in human history and relative to most of humanity, they should be sensitive to the fact that yes, that may be true for them, but it is not true for six billion other people on the planet. Don’t project your life and concerns onto theirs, because you have diminishing marginal utility precisely because you have so much.

    Mounk: Let’s go to those poorer people in the world. You are pointing out that GDP per capita is very strongly correlated with the other things we care about—child mortality, life expectancy, education, and so on. What does that tell us about what we should aim for? Does it suggest that we should just aim to increase GDP per capita and assume the other things are likely to follow? Or could the association go the other way around—that what we need to do is have all of those specialized interventions to improve the local hospital and the local school, and that is what will then correlate with increases in GDP? Which way around do we read the correlation?

    Pritchett: This depends on where you are in the spectrum. I have done a paper where I try to disentangle this question. One of the things that GDP does, by the way, is create a broader tax base. People often get engaged in a very strange discussion as if focusing on GDP growth means ignoring the need for government services. But you cannot have government services unless governments have revenue, and government revenues are mostly tax buoyant—meaning they grow more than proportionately with growth.

    Mounk: So GDP growth actually is what enables you to have all those government services?

    Pritchett: At one point I did the calculation: Ethiopia’s government spending per head is around $300 per person per year. What can you do with $300 per person per year? Ethiopia’s GDP per capita is so small that if the government started taking bigger proportions of it, they would be eating into expenditures on food. Sixty percent of a poor household’s budget is on food. You cannot just say Ethiopia’s government should fund all these specific interventions—how are they supposed to do it?

    When I argue in favor of GDP per capita, it is not because GDP per capita exclusively funds private goods. It is also the basis for funding public goods and public service provision. Getting that mix right is complicated, but economists are not out there saying there should be no government and everything will take care of itself if we just have high GDP per capita. The argument is that high GDP per capita reflects a high productivity economy, and a high productivity economy creates the material basis for both private and public expenditures.

    National development is about the process of creating both the material possibilities and the mechanisms for doing that—hence my fourfold definition of development. You could call me a growth fanatic, but I am not a growth-only person. You also need a decent government. In all of the empirical work, you can look at Equatorial Guinea—a few kleptocrats dominating a bunch of oil, with the rest of the economy completely disarticulated from that. Can you get to high GDP per capita and still have low levels of living? Yes, if all of that is being captured by relatively few people.

    Mounk: You probably need a natural resource for that as well. It would be very hard to imagine a case where 0.1% of people have an incredibly productive company that doesn’t rely on natural resources and doesn’t rely on broader education and so on. It probably takes a somewhat special case—like kleptocratic control over natural resources.

    Pritchett: The way I like to describe the goal—the way we should think about how countries can make progress—is what I call “inclusion into productivity.” The reason human beings are this amazing species is that we have learned how to cooperate to create value. A large part of the development process is getting more and more sophisticated ways in which people can cooperate over time and space to create value. When I look at a great big corporation with tens of thousands of employees, this is a mechanism of cooperation to create value—a cooperation across people with all kinds of different skills and contributions.

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    The process of development is getting more and more people out of being engaged in activities where they work a plot of land and attempt to eke out a living in low cooperation, and into more and more sophisticated value chains. That is inclusion into productivity. What I am actually concerned about is the productivity of individuals—but they are going to be more productive not by being more separated from a sophisticated modern economy, but by being more embedded into it. That dynamic, which leads to indicators of inclusive growth, is how I think about the fundamental dynamic on the growth side. Growth should be a process of more and more of the population engaged in higher and higher productivity, with more and more people included into these mechanisms.

    Mounk: To go back to those two different challenges I posed earlier: one is whether poor countries can still grow at the same speed that others did, and your answer is yes—in fact, a lot of them are growing more quickly. There is a strange thing in the premise of that argument, which somehow implies that we haven’t seen examples of poor countries developing very quickly. That is partially because people who think about this tend to drop successful countries out of their sample. They don’t remember that China in 1980 was an incredibly poor country. Today we no longer think about China as being part of that sample because it has grown out of it. That in itself is evidence that rapid development is possible. If China was able to do that, there shouldn’t be an in-principle reason why Kenya or India couldn’t achieve the same feat.

    The other question is what that looks like in the 21st century, when some of the historical development path is no longer available. My understanding is that your answer is going to center on those four development factors. Why are those so hard to implement in places where they are not in place? Ideas are really important, as you said earlier. If only the right people adopted the right ideas, they should be able to put those four things into place. But clearly it is more complicated than that. It is not just that the rulers of these countries have never had the right ideas. There must be obstacles beyond that.

    Pritchett: One of the obstacles is that the process of growth of inclusive productivity is a transformational process. A transformational process requires winners and relative losers. In many places, economic, political, and bureaucratic structures congeal. They congeal because there is a certain way in which a country produces value, and that way of producing value often produces certain ways in which the government extracts value. That can lock into an equilibrium that resists change rather than encourages it.

    There are low-level equilibrium traps—ways in which countries get stuck. We already alluded to one of those. In resource economies, if you are relatively well endowed with certain point-source resources—and by point-source I mean not land, which is diffuse and requires a geographically distributed population, but oil or diamonds—you can see how the people who mine the diamonds and the people who control the country get embedded in a relationship where, as long as that elite bargain can survive off the extraction of value from diamonds, it is not looking for anything else. It is not looking to solve the problem we are talking about, which is how a country comes to be embedded in more and more sophisticated value chains. If an elite can generate a bargain that sustains itself politically over time with just diamonds, it is not looking to do anything else, and that becomes an obstacle.

    Economies and countries get stuck in an elite bargain that is more worried about the threats from new industries creating new power structures than about stagnation around the parts of the productive structure they are already in. You can easily get stuck in the dynamic between economy, polity, and bureaucracy in which an elite bargain undermines the rule of law and undermines the expansion of new opportunities, in the interest of playing defense around where they are. Finding countries that can handle this dynamic of change is very hard. That is why we see so few transformational successes, even though the global order makes them possible.

    Mounk: Is there some way to change that, to contribute to that? If economists at the moment are focused far too much on whether giving people in this village one kind of intervention or people in that village another kind of intervention will lead to a little bit more growth—and you think that is fundamentally the wrong question to ask—do we have better answers to how we can help a country like Nigeria, with a very fractious political system and an elite bargain that is very bad for the country, get out of that trap?

    Pritchett: Many of your questions have two sophisticated halves to them. Let me dwell on the first half—the premise that people are wasting their time. I want to emphasize that they are not just focused on the wrong question. They are focused on ontologically the wrong question.

    The word ontology is not one I like to use, but what it means here, at its fundamental roots, is this: the problem with the world is not poor people. The problem is that people are in poor places. If you are studying the dynamics of how to make people less poor, you have to be ontologically studying the characteristics of the system, not the people. The methods being deployed by economists to study how to make people better off are focused as if the person were the unit at which we should be studying this. That is ontologically wrong.

    Mounk: Let’s stay with this half of the question before moving on to the other half. Take a step back and explain to us what the dominant paradigm in development economics has been for the last 20 years and how that dominant paradigm is particularly vulnerable to the critique you’re making. I take it you’re mostly talking about what are called RCTs. What is an RCT? How did it become so dominant? Why do you think that’s the wrong way to ask this question?

    Pritchett: If you characterize what development actors are doing as carrying out interventions, then you can get obsessed with understanding whether the particular intervention you’re undertaking has a truly causal effect. We can’t just evaluate a project on a before-and-after basis—we need to really separate out the causal impact. For separating out the causal impact, doing a randomized controlled trial is the best way to do that.

    The problem is, if I’m trying to do a randomized controlled trial, I need some group of individuals to receive the treatment and some individuals to be the control group. That means I have already ontologically assumed that the important causal effects are individuated, as opposed to being country-wide or market-wide phenomena. This is as plain as I can make it.

    Mounk: Let me try to put this in plain terms to see whether I understand correctly. The idea is: I study Village A and Village B, I give Village A deworming medicine and Village B nothing, or perhaps some other kind of treatment. If what I’m trying to figure out is how to spend a hundred million dollars for a charity, that is a very reasonable question to ask. The problem you are pointing to is that what actually explains why both Village A and Village B are very poor—versus Village A and Village B in England being relatively affluent—is these country-level characteristics: in particular, whether they have managed to figure out the rule of law and all the other things we have been talking about. You are defining the interesting stuff out of the question if you are just comparing two villages within the same country that are meant to be as similar as possible, and then seeing whether this or that kind of treatment is going to marginally improve the lives of people in each of them.

    Pritchett: Let me take what I consider a paradigm example—one that, when you encounter it, should make you realize something has gone badly wrong. There was a paper in Nature—the most highly reputable scientific journal in the world—about carrying out an experiment in Niger where a cash transfer was given to some people and not to others. Bundled with that cash transfer was a psychosocial intervention, and the study then looked at whether this psychosocial intervention independently and causally caused individuals in Niger to see their incomes rise.

    This was Nature magazine’s characterization of what development economics was doing, with 11 prominent development economists as co-authors. When you see that, you should immediately think: this is madness. People in Niger are poor because they are in Niger. Niger, on every indicator of national development, is a basket case. If you are not fixing Niger, thinking that you are doing good in the world by making tiny tweaks to psychosocial interventions at the individual level, you are assuming that a large part of the low standard of living there must be a characteristic of the people in Niger. That is just wrong—wrong by orders of magnitude. People in Niger are poor because they are in Niger. If you allow a person in Niger to move to France, their income will converge to that of people in France almost instantaneously, because France is a high productivity place and Niger is a low productivity place.

    If Niger as a country had national development at the level of France, all of these problems would be addressed, because national development is a machinery for endogenously identifying and solving problems. If you don’t have that, attempting to solve these problems at the individuated level is wildly, ontologically wrong. You are not taking into account that the outcomes individuals have are determined not by their own characteristics, but by the characteristics of the political, organizational, economic, and social system they live in.

    Mounk: The other thing that strikes me about this study is the theory of action lurking in the background. I have no doubt that people who encounter psychosocial problems are less productive, and I am moderately optimistic that the right kind of psychosocial intervention might reduce those problems and therefore make people more productive. But how on earth are you going to deliver psychosocial intervention at scale in one of the poorest countries in the world? It is not going to happen because an army of therapists is flown in from Brooklyn, New York to treat everyone.

    How do you actually reduce the amount of psychosocial problems that people have? How do you increase access to therapy and other support for people who do have serious psychosocial problems? By making the country a lot more affluent. If the country is a lot more affluent, perhaps your child doesn’t die at age three and you have fewer psychosocial problems to begin with. You are less depressed about the fact that your child just died. You will have the money to afford a therapist, or perhaps the government will have the money to fund a mental health service. You are asking the question from the wrong end.

    Pritchett: Then you get obsessed with cost effectiveness, which means reducing both the numerator and the denominator. In this study, per capita income went from $1.80 a day to $1.85 a day. If you look at Vietnam, in 1990 it had a per capita income of about $1.80 a day—similar to where Niger is now—and it has since gone up to around $7.50 a day. That is development. None of that in Vietnam came from people becoming psychosocially more capable first, with everything else following from that.

    Mounk: It’s not that USAID or the Ford Foundation sent an army of psychologists to Vietnam.

    Pritchett: It was because the development actor and discourse helped Vietnam change its mind about its development strategy. Vietnam said: we can embody Vietnamese labor into global value chains in a way that is going to radically change the productive possibilities and the inclusion into productivity of Vietnamese people. They did it successfully, and extreme poverty disappeared in Vietnam right before our eyes through a process that involved almost no direct anti-poverty interventions.

    So that is the first point: this isn’t just wrong, it is ontologically wrong. Ontologically wrong means you cannot fix it by doing slightly better experiments on this or that. It is looking at the wrong set of ways in which prosperity actually happens. Prosperity happens through the inclusion of individuals into productivity—a cooperative endeavor involving artifacts and institutions whereby large numbers of people can cooperate to create value: markets, governments, bureaucracies, and large organizations. Not whether I am a more go-get-em person. That was the first part.

    Mounk: The second part then is: if RCTs are the wrong thing to look at, if that is not how we are going to make change, if we shouldn’t be obsessed with whether it is this intervention or that intervention at the level of the village or the town—but rather should be asking how we help countries choose successful development paths like Vietnam, paths that put in place the institutions needed to actually develop—how can development economists or other social scientists help with that?

    Is the problem fundamentally that the people in Nigeria just don’t get it? Or is it, as you were saying earlier, that the people in charge have their own interests and want to preserve the privileges they have? They are worried that in the process of development they might be displaced from power, and so they would rather continue to be the kleptocratic elite in a relatively poor country than be displaced in a much more affluent one. Is development economics, or more broadly the field of social science, actually going to be able to help in that process? Or is that a hopeless endeavor?

    Pritchett: It is not a hopeless endeavor, because after all, it has happened. The strange thing about saying it is a hopeless endeavor is that it has to ignore that Korea happened, and Taiwan happened, and Vietnam happened, and China happened, and Indonesia happened, and India happened.

    Mounk: But did it happen because those places, for whatever reasons, had more favorable circumstances where they were more able to challenge their elites—or did we just get lucky that they put a few of the right reforms in place? Or did it happen in some way because social scientists helped guide them?

    Pritchett: Yes, social scientists helped guide them, because social scientists created the data—like GDP per capita—to show that some countries have had really rapid growth by doing certain things and other countries have not. Deng Xiaoping didn’t just decide on moving towards a path of unleashing incentives for people to engage in private enterprise—perhaps too strong a word for what happened in China in 1978—in an intellectual vacuum. He looked around the world, brought in experts who had studied economics and the relative performance of economies, and was convinced that there was an alternative path from where China was to where China wanted to be.

    The idea that ideas are irrelevant and that social science hasn’t had an impact is surreal. In the case of India, which I know relatively well—I have been going back and forth to India since 1992 and have spent time living in different cities there—there was a debate in India in 1991 about how to respond to an incipient macroeconomic crisis. That debate drew on decades of social science about the relative importance of market versus government-led development, and of import substitution versus export orientation. It drew on a body of empirical science that had been generated over time, and it led the country to do different things. You cannot act as if India decided what it did in the reform period in an intellectual vacuum. It is surreal to say that social science cannot in principle affect the way governments act, because it has demonstrably done so in specific instances. Maybe it has not always been as successful as one would hope, and let’s admit that oftentimes social science is pushing against direct material and political interests.

    But let me answer your question. The answer is what I call full Trinity growth diagnostics. If development economics were focusing its time, effort, and capabilities on the development of full Trinity growth diagnostics, I think we would be in a radically better place to help countries with their organic, country-level development strategies.

    What do I mean by full Trinity? For something to be successful, it has to be technically correct—it has to have a correct causal model of how, if actors undertake this action, working perhaps through a complex adaptive system, a particular outcome will result. It is not direct cause and effect, because markets are complicated and complex adaptive systems. But the technical question is: if I do this, will this be the result?

    The second element of the Trinity is organizational. If I am asking a government to undertake actions to promote a given outcome, does the government have organizations capable of doing that? If I say I am going to do industrial policy to promote high-tech industry, do I have government organizations capable of identifying and promoting high-tech industry?

    The third element is that it has to be politically supportable. I have to be able to assemble and sustain a political coalition to support the implementation of these actions.

    The first step of this is a growth diagnostic—a process that I and colleagues at the Kennedy School developed over time—of asking, in a given place, what are the binding constraints to having more rapid growth than we are currently experiencing. The binding constraints matter because when we ask what is good for growth, we tend to produce a very long list. If you say “get to Denmark,” you can say Denmark has this and Denmark has that. But you cannot do everything that Denmark now does. You have to do the right thing. Identifying the right thing involves an analytical process of prioritizing among the many things you could do—asking which would have the biggest impact on the prospects for a rapid, sustained, and inclusive episode of growth. We have mechanisms for trying to adjudicate among contesting claims about what the binding constraint is.

    But then we have to supplement that by asking: of the things that should be priorities and would have a big impact on economic growth, which can we actually do? Saying that if you had Korea’s current capabilities you could do a certain thing is not very helpful if you have Niger’s capabilities. We have to ask which of the binding constraints can realistically be addressed. Then you have to have a realistic, positive model of the politics—which of these can the existing elite be persuaded to engage in? None of those questions poses an intellectual challenge anything like reconciling general relativity with quantum mechanics.

    Mounk: But it’s an art rather than a science, I imagine. What might that look like concretely? Let’s say there is a new government in some country—genuinely reforming in certain ways, perhaps a little corrupt in others. They have just come to power, perhaps through election, perhaps in some other way. They can make some changes, but they cannot make a million changes at the same time. It is hard to drive change across sectors simultaneously, and there is a limited amount of money to invest because it is a very poor country. Should they invest in education or in the judiciary? Should the first big push be to reform the judiciary—so that who wins a dispute is driven more by the facts and creates stable expectations, rather than by bribes or family relations? Or should they start with a big push on schools, making sure teachers are competent and actually show up? I imagine that is the kind of choice a government might realistically face. How should you go about making that decision?

    Pritchett: There are analytical tools for addressing this, and this is where we get into the mechanics of what a growth diagnostic would do. Partly what a growth diagnostic does is ask: if it were the case that a proposed action were the binding constraint to growth, what should we observe about the economy?

    There are four or five things we look for. First, if we think X is a binding constraint—say, corruption—then when we see relaxations or improvements in corruption, we should see more growth. If I have my arm in a sling and the movement of my arm is constrained by that sling, then if I remove the sling, I should be able to move it a lot more. If I can’t, maybe it was the shoulder injury all along and there is a different cause. Changes in the constraint should cause changes in outcomes.

    The second is what we call bypassing. If finance is a constraint and I could otherwise be productive and profitable, we should see firms actively engaged in creative ways of raising finance. We should see enterprises actively adapting around the constraint.

    The third involves what we have given the quirky name of camels and hippos. Different industries in an economy are more or less intensive in a particular proposed constraint. If we say water is a constraint, then we should observe camels—animals well adapted to a lack of water—and we should not observe hippos. If we look at the economy and the industries that are thriving are ones that economize on the proposed binding constraint, that is evidence in favor of its being the binding constraint.

    These are plausible, sophisticated ways of analyzing the current situation of a country. They can produce answers like: putting more kids through school really isn’t a binding constraint here, because we don’t see changes in that producing changes in growth, we don’t see firms desperately engaged in training because they are short on skills, and we don’t see labor-intensive, non-skill-intensive industries thriving because they are economizing on the lack of skill. That means we need other explanations.

    This technique has been deployed and it produces interesting results—not clean RCT-looking results, nor should one expect that. To me, the key test of a growth diagnostic is whether it comes to different answers for different countries. If you come to the same answer for every country, you have an ideology. If every country you go to produces the answer that reforming the trade system would accelerate growth, you are an ideologist. Maybe you are right sometimes, but you are not always going to be right, because there are going to be societies in which that is not the most important binding constraint. When we do these growth diagnostics in different countries, we come to demonstrably different answers. The data and the evidence line up around different things.

    This is a promising technique, but it has been radically under-invested in—because the resources in the world have been devoted to deworming studies rather than to creating a global community of practice that does technical growth diagnostics. More support to a global community of practice focused on honing the art and science of growth diagnostics would be a tremendous way the world could support the organic process of countries finding their own development paths. It would allow you to engage with countries and actors within countries in a radically different way than coming to them and saying: you lack these 50 things, all of which would be good if you did them—when you know they are going to be able to do two, maybe three.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Lant discuss migration, how to build a fair asylum system, and what the destruction of USAID means for the future of development. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 8 min
  • Ukraine Is Now An Arms Superpower
    Fiber optic drones being tested in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine. (Photo by Jose Colon/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    When the first few months of the full-scale war in Ukraine passed and it became clear the conflict would last years rather than months, a popular subject in political commentary in Ukraine was the need to adopt the Israeli model of steel porcupine—a small state that defends itself by building vast defensive and offensive military capability, making any attack too expensive in money and human lives—maybe with a nuclear bomb or two down the line.

    At the time, it seemed impossible—it takes too long and costs too much. But Kyiv has created its own steel porcupine.

    A Strategic Decision

    Four years down the line, instead of being a security recipient, Ukraine acts as a security donor, acquiring allies in unexpected corners of the world. Instead of closing down and becoming entirely self-reliant, Ukraine chose to open up and make other countries reliant on what it can offer—drone know-how in the Middle East and the U.S. bases there, a defensive wall between Europe and the threat from Russia, and any future benefits Europe will enjoy once the Ukrainian ballistic programme comes of age.

    Instead of the traditional steel porcupine, Ukraine has developed an inverted form—it shoots quills not at its enemies but at its allies, injecting them with a protective layer of technology. Not many have noticed, however, that this ensures Ukraine receives not just protection from the allies to whom it now becomes more valuable, but also offers Ukraine a level of control unlike that of many other countries. Due to the nature of the arms business, Ukraine will have a say on who will or will not be allowed to use its technology, even when produced in joint ventures. Ukraine is advancing its defence deals very strategically, at exactly the right time and place for maximum effect. Considering how strategic its actions on the foreign affairs front have been, this seems to be a deliberate plan a long time in the making. If you already have a lot of responsibility, you might as well go and get yourself great power.

    How Did We Get Here?

    Without the war in Ukraine, drone warfare would still be in its infancy, military procurement would still consider tanks and infantry fighting vehicles a better investment than a drone wall, warships would still sail the Black Sea without a care in the world, and there would still be no defence against the full complement of U.S. and European missiles (Russians have since learned to counter HIMARS and developed responses to ATACMS as well). Estonia’s decision this month to suspend a €500 million infantry vehicle order and redirect the funds entirely to drones and air defence, citing lessons from Ukraine, shows how fast procurement thinking has shifted.

    The powers that be decided not to right the wrong when Russia invaded Ukraine, and now large sections of their military technology are slowly turning obsolete. These same powers now have to adjust to the new world of warfare, and the only country that knows how it works is Ukraine.

    Why Ukraine is Unique

    Ukraine is uniquely positioned to throw a wide defensive tech net over its allies, and not just because it is the only active battlefield capable of testing and fine-tuning any weapon under the sun. Take Russia—it has similar access to battlefield conditions, and yet not many countries are queuing up to buy Russian-made modern drones. In fact, their most successful models are Iranian Shahed drones. Russia needed Iran to set up the production lines and train the operators—and this is the extent of their international drone programme.

    Ukraine, in addition to being highly innovative and resourceful, also designed a procurement system almost entirely devoid of bureaucracy—arms developers work directly with military units, which means there is no lag between development and the front line. War is about the survival of the fittest—only the best military tech companies remain on the market. The decentralized drone development model bypasses the layer where traditional corruption lives—when a military unit orders directly from a developer, the middleman is removed entirely.

    We also often forget that the Ukrainian military sector did not just appear out of nowhere—it was well established and indeed formed the basis for the Soviet arms industry.

    Ukraine’s Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnipro designed and built the SS-18 Satan—the most fearsome nuclear ICBM in the Soviet arsenal, capable of carrying ten independently targeted warheads across 10,000 kilometres while releasing decoys to defeat radar. After 1991, Ukrainian engineers continued maintaining the remaining Satans in Russian silos until 2014, when Kyiv stopped all cooperation. The stockpile is ageing without the maintenance that kept them viable, and nobody knows if they would fly or explode if launched. Russia has been attempting to replace the Satan with its own design, the RS-28 Sarmat, for the past 20 years—and despite having a working Ukrainian-designed model at their disposal, has achieved exactly one successful test launch out of six attempts, one of which destroyed the test silo entirely. Ukraine built it. Russia cannot even replicate it.

    How the Arms Trade Actually Works

    International arms deals are controlled first by national interests and only after that by financial considerations.

    Since defence is a matter of national security, defence companies cannot just sign agreements with other companies or states—they need permission from their government. The same applies to the purchasing side: the country that owns the underlying technology, not the company producing military goods, decides which other country can purchase the specific equipment, even if it is manufactured elsewhere and another party foots the bill.

    The U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) ensures only specific defence articles reach very specific markets. Those markets require authorization from the State Department, not merely a commercial agreement, to sell or even gift them to a third party. This is a foreign policy instrument as much as a trade one.

    Almost the entire European defence industry is criss-crossed with U.S. technology and requires re-export licences as a result. In practice, the United States decides who can and who cannot buy weapons that contain its technology, regardless of where those weapons are manufactured or who paid for them. There are countries with their fingers in several defence pies, but none more so than the United States.

    When former Warsaw Pact members began transferring their Soviet-era weapons to Ukraine at the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia objected on the grounds that the original re-export licences had belonged to the Soviet Union. The problem was resolved on the basis that Ukraine, as a Soviet successor state, held the same standing as Russia over equipment that had once been part of the shared arsenal.

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    The system in place is essential to Ukraine’s ability to sell weapons. Every country that signs a weapons manufacturing or sales contract with Ukraine must guarantee that the technology will not end up in Russian hands, or the hands of any Russian-affiliated state, under any circumstances. That means there is a long list of countries banned from acquiring Ukrainian weapons.

    Ukraine is, in effect, building its own version of ITAR. The same architecture that keeps its technology out of Russian hands also gives Kyiv a say in who gets to defend themselves with it. Every cooperation agreement embeds Ukrainian technology into another country’s defence architecture, and every embedded system requires a Ukrainian licence to transfer further. The United States spent decades getting to that position. Ukraine is acquiring significant leverage over international arms markets in a few short years. Kyiv is too smart not to realize what they are building.

    Re-export Licence as Diplomacy

    Ukrainian weapons systems are not just a financial mechanism and an alliance-building exercise. They offer Kyiv foreign policy instruments very few countries have. By being an undisputed leader in the battlefield drone ecosystem, Ukraine as a monopolist of sorts can send geopolitical signals through its defence cooperation agreements.

    The ten-year defence cooperation agreements signed in the Middle East send a pointed message to Washington from both sides: Ukraine indicating it has serious leverage, and Middle Eastern countries demonstrating that the United States is not the only player in the area. Ukraine also now has leverage in other areas—it can make sure its new partners do not accept Russian ships laden with stolen Ukrainian grain, unlike Israel, which has accepted several shipments.

    Zelenskyy’s meeting with President Ilham Aliyev in Gabala on April 25, his first visit to Azerbaijan since the full-scale invasion began, was held just 100 kilometres from Russia’s border. The six defence cooperation agreements signed there send an unmistakable message to Putin: Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus is finally over, while Kyiv’s has just begun.

    A good example of what successful arms deals look like for Ukraine is its cooperation with Turkey. Ukraine supplies the engines that power Turkey’s most advanced combat drones—Baykar’s Akıncı and Kızılelma were developed with Ukrainian-made Ivchenko-Progress engines, earning the Kızılelma the nickname “a Turkish bird with a Ukrainian heart.” Turkey, in turn, supplies Ukraine with Bayraktar drones and Ada-class corvettes currently under construction for the Ukrainian navy, and is building a Baykar manufacturing plant outside Kyiv. It is therefore not surprising that Turkey used its considerable influence over the UN-recognized Libyan government to allow Ukraine to establish a military presence on the Libyan coast, from which Ukrainian naval drones have since hunted Russian shadow fleet vessels in the Mediterranean.

    A different kind of example is Switzerland, which in 2022 refused re-export permissions for Swiss-made Gepard ammunition Germany was trying to send to Ukraine, blocked Denmark from transferring Swiss-made Piranha III armored vehicles, and blocked Spain from re-exporting two Swiss-made anti-aircraft guns. The Netherlands responded by stopping all Swiss arms purchases. The policy cost Switzerland its reputation as a reliable defence partner across Europe at precisely the moment Europe began the largest rearmament programme in its history.

    Not Bad For a Country With No Cards

    While an obvious take-away from the arms deals Kyiv is currently signing is that it has emerged as a global security provider, the real outcome is the permission architecture Ukraine is embedding into the global arms industry as we speak, and the power that architecture affords on the global scene. Ukraine is increasingly holding the strings to a global defence network that will operate without Washington’s permission.

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    This also acts as the other side of security guarantees for Ukraine. The lamentable demise of the rules-based order and the loss of the United States as the global sheriff means no written guarantees will work. There is almost no scenario in which Ukraine would trust them. Ukraine can rely on its own military, and now it will also be able to rely on its defence industry being too valuable for allies to walk away from. By becoming indispensable to the global security landscape, Ukraine can spread its influence far wider than anything Russia can achieve.

    While Israel turned itself inwards and made itself hard to kill, Ukraine turned outward and made itself too important to abandon. In the process, it is acquiring a lot of control over global security. It did not ask for this task, and it still has hard times ahead. But it found a way to protect itself by protecting others.

    Ines Burrell is a geopolitical analyst and political risk consultant based in the UK. Born in the Baltics, with a degree in International Relations from the University of Exeter, she writes and gives live commentary on European security and Russia.

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  • This Week at Persuasion
    The London marathon! I watched from a pub, safely indoors and sitting down. (Photo by Alex Broadway/Getty Images.)
    • The inaugural meeting of the Intellectual Bootcamp, which will discuss Jonathan Haidt’s “Why the Past 10 Years of American Life Have Been Uniquely Stupid,” will take place TODAY Friday, May 1 at 12pm EST at this link.

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  • British Jews Are Tired
    The crime scene in Golders Green on April 29, 2026. (Photo by Justin Tallis / AFP via Getty Images.)

    On Wednesday afternoon, a man with a knife ran down a street in north London trying to stab Jews. Two were wounded. I want to tell you why this did not surprise me. But first, a story.

    In my early twenties I spent a summer traveling: two months in Ghana on an internship with a small NGO, several weeks in Jerusalem at a religious seminary at the foot of the Western Wall, then home to London for the last year of my studies.

    Before I left for Ghana, my family were appalled. Wasn’t it dangerous? What about the state of the hospitals? I went, and even though I eventually did spend a few days hospitalized, I never once felt unsafe.

    When I told my Ghanaian colleagues I was going on to Israel, their faces paled. Suicide bombs. Rockets. Stay with us, they said, where it’s safe. But rarely have I felt more at home than when wandering through the cobbled streets of the Old City.

    And when I told my teachers that I was flying back to London, they shook their heads. What about the antisemitism? The radicalization? But I came home to my mum’s cooking, to unarmed police, to quiet streets and football on the TV.

    I tell the story as a subtle rebuke: nowhere is as bad as the news might suggest. It’s like the opening image of Carol Rumens’s “The Émigrée”:

    The worst news I receive of it cannot break / my original view, the bright, filled paperweight.

    Solid. Durable. Belonging to a person who knows the truth about their home and is holding on to it.

    This week’s attack in Golders Green has shaken a community that was already shaking. The paperweight is cracking.

    Golders Green is the closest thing London has to a Jewish neighborhood: kosher bakeries, multiple synagogues within ten minutes’ walk, the kind of place where you hear Talmud discussed on the bus. Two men, one in his seventies, one in his thirties, were stabbed by a man who ran down the road targeting Jews. Both survived. They were the latest casualties on a list that includes the two killed in Manchester last Yom Kippur, when an Islamic State-inspired attacker drove into worshippers outside a synagogue and stabbed his way towards the entrance.

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    Between those two attacks, the months were not quiet. Arson at a synagogue in Harrow. An attempt in Finchley. An attack on a building formerly used by a Jewish charity in Hendon. Hatzola ambulances, the Jewish volunteer medical service, set on fire. In fact, the Community Security Trust recorded 3,700 antisemitic incidents in Britain in 2025, the second-highest figure on record.

    Counter-terror officers are investigating links to Iranian proxies. A group calling itself HAYI has claimed responsibility for several of the arson attacks, and three Iranian nationals were charged last year under the National Security Act for surveillance of UK targets.

    People are afraid. They are asking the questions quietly, and then aloud, in living rooms and synagogues: Are we doing now what German Jews did years ago? Are we ignoring the same warning signs?

    Britain in 2026 is not Weimar Germany. The government has not been captured. Jews are not being stripped of citizenship by statute.

    But we might be France. In 2012, a gunman murdered three children and a teacher at a Jewish school in Toulouse. In 2015, four shoppers were killed at a kosher supermarket in Paris. In 2017, Sarah Halimi, a Jewish retiree, was beaten and thrown from her apartment window by a neighbor shouting “Allahu akbar.” In 2018, an eighty-five-year-old Holocaust survivor was stabbed eleven times and set on fire in her Paris flat.

    The French Jewish community has lost tens of thousands to emigration since the early 2000s, well over ten percent of its number—not under fascism but under a functioning republic, with courts and civil rights law and presidents who gave speeches denouncing the attacks. What is happening in Britain today looks less like Germany in 1933 and more like France 15 years ago: pressure, applied from multiple directions, inside a democracy that keeps expressing its concern.

    The attack was shocking. But it was not a surprise.

    What we have lived with for the past few years is the slow normalization of a particular kind of language. Zionism is not a political ideology with internal debates, it is a cancer. Its adherents are not citizens, they are a parasitic body to be excised.

    But once a person is a parasite, the moral grammar of what one does to him changes. You do not negotiate with cancer. You eliminate it. In central London, marchers have carried placards describing Zionism as Nazism, in public, in daylight.

    The “eternal Jew” of the propaganda, redrafted as the “eternal Zionist.”

    Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, the former Chief Rabbi of the Commonwealth, described antisemitism’s survival strategy as mutation: “In the Middle Ages, Jews were hated because of their religion. In the 19th and 20th centuries they were hated because of their race. Today they are hated because of their nation state.” The new antisemite, he observed, declares: “I’m not a racist. I have no problem with Jews or Judaism. I only have a problem with the State of Israel.”

    But a Jew does not need to be a state actor to be a target. Mere affiliation is enough: a flag in a window, a cousin in Tel Aviv, a kippah worn without a keffiyeh. It marks you as unaligned, which is to say suspect.

    Meanwhile, the chorus is the one we have heard for decades. Politicians find the attack “deeply concerning.” Cross-party statements arrive within the hour, sincere but impotent. A site visit, a photo opportunity, a BBC interview. We are asked, again, to mobilize around the fact of being hated.

    But that is the trap any besieged minority faces.

    Most of us are scared. Some are angry. Many are tired. Tired of being asked to rally around a Jewish identity that, for many, has thinned to a surname and a grandparent. We have spent a lifetime being told that being Jewish is incidental, a private flavoring in an otherwise universal British self. Now we are asked to be Jews in public at the moment many of us have the least Jewish vocabulary to draw on.

    The temptation, in that vacuum, is to let the fight become the identity. To be a Jew because you stand against antisemitism. To be proud because you are not afraid. But what would any of us be if there were no antisemitism to fight? Would we still stand and declare ourselves proud? And if so, proud of what?

    It is a negative theology. Judaism defined by what is done to it, by what it endures, by what it is not. It hollows from the inside.

    In his book A Letter in the Scroll, Sacks warned that a community whose shared content is the experience of attack will, when the attack eases, find it has nothing left to share. This was not an argument against the fight. It was an argument about what must exist alongside it: a Judaism defined by more than external opposition, by what it affirms rather than simply what it endures.

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    That, I think, is the real precipice in front of any minority under siege. Not the one usually offered, between flight and resistance. The deeper choice is whether we let ourselves be defined by our opposition to antisemitism.

    In what may be the most quoted passage of that book, Sacks wrote: “I am a Jew because, knowing the story of my people, I hear their call to write the next chapter. I did not come from nowhere; I have a past, and if any past commands anyone this past commands me.”

    Any community whose only language is its own defense will, in the end, have nothing left worth defending. Instead, the call to action is not a fight for our “right” to be Jews. It is to engage in our responsibility to “be them.” Light the candles on Friday night. Make our sabbaths feel different. Learn the Hebrew you always awkwardly stumbled through. Open the books our grandparents kept and rarely read aloud. Argue about the weekly Torah reading. Sing Jewish songs badly. Make blessings on the good that we have with our children.

    To live in our own language with fluency and conviction, with pride and with joy, is more than half the battle.

    A community that can do that has nothing to prove and everything to keep.

    Matt Marks runs Tribe, the United Synagogue’s youth arm, advises the BNJC on Jewish life, and is a south-coast rabbinic chaplain with University Jewish Chaplaincy. He is a Sacks Scholar writing a PhD on Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks’ intellectual legacy.

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  • Reminder: Intellectual Bootcamp At Noon Eastern!

    Persuasion’s first “Intellectual Bootcamp” will meet in a few hours, at 12pm EST. Here is the link to join by Zoom:

    https://us06web.zoom.us/j/82853159147?pwd=Xi8TS3nHyZMSxAGPBrF1LViI2onrK3.1

    Passcode: 129264

    If you have trouble joining, please email [email protected]

    We will have introductions and then discuss Jonathan Haidt’s “Why the Past Ten Ye…

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  • If “86” Is Illegal Speech, Nobody is Free
    Ellis Boyle, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, during a press conference about the Comey indictment on April 28, 2026. (Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images.)

    During a rally in 1966, a recently drafted man, Robert Watts, reportedly told friends, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”

    For this, a federal court convicted Watts of “knowingly and willfully threatening the President.” The Supreme Court would later overturn that ruling in Watts v. United States, noting that Watts’ comment simply constituted “political hyperbole” and was therefore protected by the First Amendment.

    Now imagine if Watts had written his message out in seashells.

    This is the absurd situation we find ourselves in this week, following the Trump administration’s second indictment of former FBI Director James Comey, this time for a social media post depicting shells on a beach spelling out “86 47.”

    The photo posted by Comey.

    The administration alleges that, in posting the photograph, Comey “knowingly and willfully” made a threat to kill President Trump under the same statute used against Watts in 1966, along with another statute that prohibits transmitting threats through interstate communication. They also allege in their indictment that “a reasonable recipient” would interpret the post “as a serious expression of an intent to do harm” to the president.

    But there’s nothing reasonable or serious about this prosecution.

    For one thing, the term “86” has been around since the 1930s, commonly used in restaurants and other contexts to mean “get rid of,” “throw out,” or “refuse service to.” When combined with the number 47, referring to our current 47th president, the message becomes clear: Get rid of Trump.

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    To assume that “86” means “kill” or “assassinate” is, at best, uncharitable. There are obvious ways to “get rid of” a president without ending his life, like impeachment and removal from office. When the Chicago Sun-Times reported that NBA coach Jim Boylen was “eighty-sixed by the Bulls,” nobody thought it meant the Bulls’ front office had murdered him.

    Even if they can somehow establish that “86” unambiguously means what they say it means, the prosecution still has their work cut out for them. Unless it can be proven that Comey himself seriously expressed an intent to kill the president, the phrase “86 47” would still be protected speech. The law is clear that merely wishing for someone’s death is and should be protected speech, as distasteful as it may be, absent more evidence proving intent to cause harm.

    Comey isn’t even the first to use “86” in reference to presidents. In 2022, right-wing activist Jack Posobiec posted the same message (minus the seashells) referring to then-President Joe Biden. It’s a ubiquitous enough sentiment that Amazon has both “86 47” and “86 46” merchandise for sale. It’s absurd to argue that anyone who purchases or displays those products necessarily intends to threaten the president in question, as opposed to simply voicing opposition to him.

    Even the timing of this indictment is comical. Comey’s “86 47” photograph was posted in May of 2025. It strains credulity to think Trump and his administration considered four digits written in seashells a threat against the president’s life, but failed to act on it for 11 months.

    Simply put, this indictment lacks merit. Merely labeling disfavored speech a “threat” doesn’t magically make it so. To lose First Amendment protection, that expression must clear a very high bar—and for very good reason. 2003’s Virginia v. Black established that “true threats” are “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”

    Twenty years later, Counterman v. Colorado made clear that the government must prove the speaker either intended the statement as a threat or “consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.” That’s the constitutional floor. In Comey’s case, however, the government must meet the higher standard—proving he subjectively intended to make a threat—because that is what the statutes he’s being charged under require.

    Some have also suggested that Comey’s post incited violence. But the indictment doesn’t charge him with that, likely because even the Department of Justice recognizes how untenable such a claim would be. Incitement is another narrow First Amendment exception, limited to speech intended and likely to provoke imminent unlawful action. Not only is there no evidence Comey was urging anyone to assassinate Trump, but it’s impossible to argue with a straight face that a viewer of his seashell photo would have immediately set out to locate the president and attempt to kill him as a result.

    The law is structured the way it is to address specific, concrete harms while giving the most possible breathing room for free expression—particularly when it comes to criticizing the government. As the Supreme Court noted in Watts’ case, “the language of the political arena … is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” Any attempts to punish such expression, the ruling continued, must be interpreted “against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”

    When considered in that context, a photograph of seashells on the beach becomes about as threatening to the president’s life as a salad.

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    Lowering the bar for what counts as true threats and incitement would hand the government a dangerous tool to crack down on dissent under the pretext of preventing violence. It’s not hard to characterize a wide range of political rhetoric as menacing or a potential contributor to future violence: calling Trump administration officials fascist, labeling abortion murder, declaring that “All Cops Are Bastards,” or claiming an election is rigged, for instance. Without the First Amendment’s narrow and exacting standards, it would be all too easy for administrations of either party to criminalize a vast swath of political expression.

    The reality is that this indictment is a flimsy excuse to use government authority to punish the president’s political enemies—something this administration is quite fond of and has been thoroughly documented doing. This is all the more reason to vehemently oppose this indictment and the retaliatory actions of the administration.

    If political retribution for speaking out becomes the norm in American politics, then everyone’s right to free speech could be eighty-sixed.

    Angel Eduardo is senior writer and editor at The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression.

    Aaron Terr is Director of Public Advocacy at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression.

    Follow Persuasion on X, Instagram, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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  • Trump Is Finally Fading
    (Photo by Tasos Katopodis/Getty Images.)

    Predicting Donald Trump’s political demise has typically been a fool’s errand. Some of my smartest friends have declared his definitive fall from grace again and again, only to be proven wrong each and every time.

    If you watch MSNBC or listen to NPR, you may over the past decade have believed that Trump’s presidential campaign is a hopeless publicity stunt; that the Republican Party is about to turn on him because of the Access Hollywood tape; that he has no chance of winning against Hillary Clinton; that his presidency will be so chaotic that he’ll be forced to resign within his first year in office; that Robert Mueller’s investigation into his relationship with the Kremlin will result in his impeachment; that his mishandling of the COVID pandemic will make him toxic to voters; that his loss against Joe Biden has ended his career for good; that he is about to be impeached over the January 6 riot at the Capitol; that he is sure to lose the race for the Republican nomination against Ron DeSantis; that he is sure to lose his bid for reelection against Joe Biden; that he is sure to lose it against Kamala Harris; and so on.

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    Ten years into Trump’s political career, the most avoidable mistake pundits can make is to underestimate his powers of survival and resurrection.

    And yet, I have come to the tentative conclusion that this time may, finally, be different. For the past decade, Trump has dominated American politics like no other president in living memory; now, signs of that era coming to a close are suddenly multiplying. It is, as Saturday’s appalling assassination attempt on the president reminds us, impossible to see around the next historical corner. But it sure seems as though Trump’s hold over the country is finally slipping. This, to misquote Winston Churchill, no longer feels like the end of the beginning; it may be the beginning of the end.

    A minority of Americans has always been drawn to Trump because of his most extreme actions and statements. They loved his coarseness, reveled in his taunts, and unhesitatingly embraced his radicalism. This group made up a significant share of his most devoted base—but it was never big enough to explain how he could have won two presidential elections.

    Many of the voters who twice put Trump over the top have, all along, had a more conflicted view of him. Trump swore that he would make Americans far richer. He would cut taxes and curb inflation. The costs of health insurance would fall. There would be peace in the Middle East. The country would return to its former grandeur. It is not hard to see why those who were inclined to believe that he might actually turn these promises into reality, at least to some extent, found them to be very enticing.

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    During his first term, Trump did celebrate some genuine successes, from Operation Warp Speed to the Abraham Accords. But when he predictably failed to bring about most of his outsized promises, he proved shrewd at making up excuses. He had only just taken power. The deep state was standing in his way. The “Russia hoax” had made it impossible for him to govern. The global pandemic had messed everything up. The share of Americans who were genuinely excited about Trump shrank rapidly towards the end of his first term; and yet, the thought that it might be worth giving him a second chance in 2024—even if he just delivered on some tiny fraction of his promises—lingered in the minds of a surprising number of voters.

    But the fulfillment of promises can’t be deferred forever without voters starting to lose patience. As Viktor Orbán learned to his chagrin in Hungary, there comes a time when leaders are measured by their results rather than their rhetoric. And that time has now come for Donald Trump.

    The immediate reasons for Trump’s travails lie in his ill-fated war with Iran. The contention that foolish “foreign entanglements” had repeatedly led America astray was central to his political persona from day one. In his second inaugural address, he announced that “we will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” This makes it especially damaging that he pursued a war of choice in Iran without bothering to make a coherent case for it to the American public or ensuring that there would be a real exit strategy. The one major promise that Trump actually honored in his first term was that he would start no new major wars; that too now looks like empty self-promotion.

    The knock-on effects for Trump’s other areas of traditional strength have been brutal. Americans voted out Joe Biden’s Democrats in good part because of the persistently high level of inflation after the pandemic, which had been fueled by the administration’s generous stimulus programs. Now, Trump’s failure to anticipate that Iran would choose to block oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has led to a renewed spike in inflation, putting the president’s approval ratings on inflation and the cost of living underwater by a remarkable 40 points.

    Trump is also in trouble in some historic areas of strength that are less directly connected to the war in the Middle East. Most Americans grew furious with Biden’s inability to control immigration at the southern border. But in his second term, Trump has embraced a deportation policy that is so pointlessly cruel that, in many polls, a clear majority of Americans now disapproves of his handling of the issue.

    The result is becoming increasingly clear in the data: Overall support for Trump is at or near record lows.

    Trump has often been far more popular with the American public than his detractors cared to acknowledge; today, his approval ratings are genuinely dismal. Nearly 58 percent of Americans disapprove of Trump’s job performance (most of them strongly) while only 39 percent approve (most of them weakly), according to statistician Nate Silver’s polling tracker. His net approval is as low today as it was in the immediate aftermath of the January 6 assault.

    In the past, Trump has been hated by liberals, seen as divisive among independents, and (the complaints of a small band of principled columnists notwithstanding) enjoyed popular support among conservatives. Declines in Trump’s poll numbers were usually precipitated by independents abandoning him. Today, Trump remains toxic among liberals, has come to be viewed negatively by most independents, and is newly divisive among conservatives.

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    Trump’s ironclad grip over the Republican base is starting to loosen. In the past, conservative critics of Trump have usually complained that he has sold out the views and values associated with figures such as Ronald Reagan. Now, criticism of Trump within the conservative camp is for the first time being framed as a betrayal of the supposed values on which the MAGA movement was founded. Some of the biggest influencers on the American right, such as Candace Owens and Tucker Carlson, have recently expressed regret for supporting Trump. For the first time since 2016, his hold over the MAGA movement may actually be weakening.

    The political costs from these developments are likely to compound over the course of the coming months. Betting markets give Democrats about a 6-to-1 edge to win the House of Representatives in the midterm elections this November; despite a daunting electoral map, they also have slightly more than even odds to take control of the Senate. If Trump’s party really does suffer a serious shellacking in the midterms, his inability to push major legislation through Congress and the impending end of his term will further weaken his control over his own party. With attention turning toward the 2028 primaries, the White House may suddenly see its power slipping away, as happened after the 2006 midterm elections, in which Democrats took control of both houses of Congress, rendering George W. Bush largely powerless during the last years of his term. Sooner than we can now imagine, Trump may come to be seen as a lame duck.

    When Trump was reelected with a bigger, younger, and more diverse electorate in 2024, it seemed as though he might actually manage to impose his vision and his values on the country. In the first months of his second term, the administration was moving with impressive speed. Resistance to its ascendancy was conspicuous by its absence. It felt as though America might stand at a genuine tipping point.

    The window of opportunity for Trump to reshape the country in a significant way was, I think, real. But he responded to the cultural excesses of the Democratic Party—and the broader progressive establishment with which it is increasingly associated in the public mind—with even more extreme cultural excesses of his own, provoking a broad counter-reaction which extended well beyond those who partook in resistance marches during his first term. Therefore, it now seems increasingly safe to say that he has squandered it. Trump’s second term will leave behind an America that is weakened, cheapened, and fractious; but it seems increasingly unlikely that he will leave behind an America shaped in his own image.

    This is cause for optimism, an indication that America has proven to be more resistant to the appeal of authoritarian populism than many feared. It would take someone who is much more popular and disciplined than Trump to change the country in a fundamental way.

    And yet it is far too early to celebrate. Trump will, after all, remain in office for another 32 months. That is enough time to do a lot of damage to democratic institutions, to engage in a great deal of corruption, and perhaps to start more reckless wars. In all likelihood, a President Trump who is starting to sense that the tide is turning against him will turn out to be more, not less, dangerous to the American republic—and the world.

    Some danger will persist even after he leaves office. When demagogues leave office—even when they are booted from office in disgrace—it rarely spells the end of their movement. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro lost his bid for reelection and was imprisoned for trying to impede the peaceful transfer of power, and yet his son Flávio has close to even odds of becoming the next president of Brazil, according to prediction markets. Alberto Fujimori was hounded out of Peruvian politics due to massive corruption and human rights abuses nearly three decades ago, and yet his daughter may be about to lead the country.

    In Brazil, Peru, and many other democracies around the world, voters may decide to give populist movements a second (or third or fourth) chance because they were so disillusioned with the hapless alternatives. Given that the popularity of the Democratic Party remains at record lows, it would be deeply naive to rule out a similar future for the United States.

    Trump looks likely to start fading from American politics over the coming years. But the broader threat of Trumpism may well outlast its creator.

    This piece was originally published by the Dispatch.

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  • Link for Intellectual Bootcamp this Friday!

    Persuasion’s first “Intellectual Bootcamp” will meet this Friday, May 1 at 12pm EST. Here is the link to join by Zoom:

    https://us06web.zoom.us/j/82853159147?pwd=Xi8TS3nHyZMSxAGPBrF1LViI2onrK3.1

    Passcode: 129264

    If you have trouble joining, please email [email protected]

    For the first session, we will have introductions and then discuss Jonathan Ha…

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